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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..964ed31 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #54642 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54642) diff --git a/old/54642-0.txt b/old/54642-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index cc03be2..0000000 --- a/old/54642-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8933 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Theory & History of Historiography, by Benedetto Croce - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Theory & History of Historiography - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Translator: Douglas Ainslie - -Release Date: May 2, 2017 [EBook #54642] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORY & HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Internet Archive. - - - - - -THEORY & HISTORY - -OF HISTORIOGRAPHY - -by - -BENEDETTO CROCE - -authorized translation - -BY - -DOUGLAS AINSLIE - - -LONDON - -GEORGE G. HARRAP & COMPANY - -1921 - - - - -PREFACE - -TO THE FIRST ITALIAN EDITION - - -Almost all the writings which compose the present treatise were printed -in the proceedings of Italian academies and in Italian reviews between -1912 and 1913. Since they formed part of a general scheme, their -collection in book form presented no difficulties. This volume has -appeared in German under the title _Zur Theorie und Geschichte der -Historiographie_ (Tübingen, Mohr, 1915). - -On publishing in book form in Italian, I made a few slight alterations -here and there and added three brief essays, placed as an appendix to -the first part. - -The description of the volume as forming the fourth of my _Philosophy -of the Spirit_ requires some explanation; for it does not really form -a new systematic part of the philosophy, and is rather to be looked -upon as a deepening and amplification of the theory of historiography, -already outlined in certain chapters of the second part, namely the -_Logic_. But the problem of historical comprehension is that toward -which pointed all my investigations as to the modes of the spirit, -their distinction and unity, their truly concrete life, which is -development and history, and as to historical thought, which is the -self-consciousness of this life. In a certain sense, therefore, this -resumption of the treatment of historiography on the completion of the -wide circle, this drawing forth of it from the limits of the first -treatment of the subject, was the most natural conclusion that could -be given to the whole work. The character of 'conclusion' both explains -and justifies the literary form of this last volume, which is more -compressed and less didactic than that of the previous volumes. - -B. C. - -Naples: May 1916 - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - - -The author himself explains the precise connexion of the present work -with the other three volumes of the _Philosophy of the Spirit_, to -which it now forms the conclusion. - -I had not contemplated translating this treatise, when engaged upon -the others, for the reason that it was not in existence in its present -form, and an external parallel to its position as the last, the late -comer of the four masterpieces, is to be found in the fact of its -publication by another firm than that which produced the preceding -volumes. This diversity in unity will, I am convinced, by no means act -as a bar to the dissemination of the original thought contained in its -pages, none of which will, I trust, escape the diligent reader through -the close meshes of the translation. - -The volume is similar in format to the _Logic_, the _Philosophy of the -Practical_, and the _Æsthetic_. The last is now out of print, but will -reappear translated by me from the definitive fourth Italian edition, -greatly exceeding in bulk the previous editions. - -The present translation is from the second Italian edition, published -in 1919. In this the author made some slight verbal corrections and -a few small additions. I have, as always, followed the text with the -closest respect. - - -D. A. - -The Athenæum, London - -November 1920 - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PART I - - THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY - - I. History and Chronicle - II. Pseudo-Histories - III. History as History of the Universal. - Criticism of 'Universal History' - IV. Ideal Genesis and Dissolution of the 'Philosophy of History' - V. The Positivity of History - VI. The Humanity of History - VII. Choice and Periodization - VIII. Distinction (Special Histories) and Division - IX. The 'History of Nature' and History - - APPENDICES - I. Attested Evidence - II. Analogy and Anomaly of Special Histories - III. Philosophy and Methodology - - PART II - - CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY - - I. Preliminary Questions - II. Græco-Roman Historiography - III. Medieval Historiography - IV. The Historiography of the Renaissance - V. The Historiography of the Enlightenment - VI. The Historiography of Romanticism - VII. The Historiography of Positivism - VIII. The New Historiography. Conclusion - - Index of Names - - - - - -PART I - - -THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY - - -I - - -HISTORY AND CHRONICLE - - - -I - - -'Contemporary history' is wont to be called the history of a passage -of time, looked upon as a most recent past, whether it be that of the -last fifty years, a decade, a year, a month, a day, or indeed of the -last hour or of the last minute. But if we think and speak rigorously, -the term 'contemporaneous' can be applied only to that history which -comes into being immediately after the act which is being accomplished, -as consciousness of that act: it is, for instance, the history that -I make of myself while I am in the act of composing these pages; it -is the thought of my composition, linked of necessity to the work -of composition. 'Contemporary' would be well employed in this case, -just because this, like every act of the spirit, is outside time (of -the first and after) and is formed 'at the same time' as the act to -which it is linked, and from which it is distinguished by means of a -distinction not chronological but ideal. 'Non-contemporary history,' -'past history,' would, on the other hand, be that which finds itself -in the presence of a history already formed, and which thus comes into -being as a criticism of that history, whether it be thousands of years -or hardly an hour old. - -But if we look more closely, we perceive that this history -already formed, which is called or which we would like to call -'non-contemporary' or 'past' history, if it really is history, that -is to say, if it mean something and is not an empty echo, is also -_contemporary_, and does not in any way differ from the other. As in -the former case, the condition of its existence is that the deed of -which the history is told must vibrate in the soul of the historian, -or (to employ the expression of professed historians) that the -documents are before the historian and that they are intelligible. -That a narrative or a series of narratives of the fact is united -and mingled with it merely means that the fact has proved more -rich, not that it has lost its quality of being present: what were -narratives or judgments before are now themselves facts, 'documents' -to be interpreted and judged. History is never constructed from -narratives, but always from documents, or from narratives that have -been reduced to documents and treated as such. Thus if contemporary -history springs straight from life, so too does that history which -is called non-contemporary, for it is evident that only an interest -in the life of the present can move one to investigate past fact. -Therefore this past fact does not answer to a past interest, but to a -present interest, in so far as it is unified with an interest of the -present life. This has been said again and again in a hundred ways by -historians in their empirical formulas, and constitutes the reason, if -not the deeper content, of the success of the very trite saying that -history is _magister vitæ_. - -I have recalled these forms of historical technique in order to remove -the aspect of paradox from the proposition that 'every true history is -contemporary history.' But the justice of this proposition is easily -confirmed and copiously and perspicuously exemplified in the reality -of historiographical work, provided always that we do not fall into -the error of taking the works of the historians all together, or -certain groups of them confusedly, and of applying them to an abstract -man or to ourselves considered abstractly, and of then asking what -present interest leads to the writing or reading of such histories: for -instance, what is the present interest of the history which recounts -the Peloponnesian or the Mithradatic War, of the events connected with -Mexican art, or with Arabic philosophy. For me at the present moment -they are without interest, and therefore for me at this present moment -those histories are not histories, but at the most simply titles of -historical works. They have been or will be histories in those that -have thought or will think them, and in me too when I have thought -or shall think them, re-elaborating them according to my spiritual -needs. If, on the other hand, we limit ourselves to real history, to -the history that one really thinks in the act of thinking, it will be -easily seen that this is perfectly identical with the most personal and -contemporary of histories. When the development of the culture of my -historical moment presents to me (it would be superfluous and perhaps -also inexact to add to myself as an individual) the problem of Greek -civilization or of Platonic philosophy or of a particular mode of -Attic manners, that problem is related to my being in the same way as -the history of a bit of business in which I am engaged, or of a love -affair in which I am indulging, or of a danger that threatens me. I -examine it with the same anxiety and am troubled with the same sense of -unhappiness until I have succeeded in solving it. Hellenic life is on -that occasion present in me; it solicits, it attracts and torments me, -in the same way as the appearance of the adversary, of the loved one, -or of the beloved son for whom one trembles. Thus too it happens or has -happened or will happen in the case of the Mithradatic War, of Mexican -art, and of all the other things that I have mentioned above by way of -example. - -Having laid it down that contemporaneity is not the characteristic -of a class of histories (as is held with good reason in empirical -classifications), but an intrinsic characteristic of every history, -we must conceive the relation of history to life as that of _unity_; -certainly not in the sense of abstract identity, but of synthetic -unity, which implies both the distinction and the unity of the terms. -Thus to talk of a history of which the documents are lacking would -appear to be as extravagant as to talk of the existence of something as -to which it is also affirmed that it is without one of the essential -conditions of existence. A history without relation to the document -would be an unverifiable history; and since the reality of history lies -in this verifiability, and the narrative in which it is given concrete -form is historical narrative only in so far as it is a _critical -exposition_ of the document (intuition and reflection, consciousness -and auto-consciousness, etc.), a history of that sort, being without -meaning and without truth, would be inexistent as history. How could -a history of painting be composed by one who had not seen and enjoyed -the works of which he proposed to describe the genesis critically? And -how far could anyone understand the works in question who was without -the artistic experience assumed by the narrator? How could there be a -history of philosophy without the works or at least fragments of the -works of the philosophers? How could there be a history of a sentiment -or of a custom, for example that of Christian humility or of knightly -chivalry, without the capacity for living again, or rather without an -actual living again of these particular states of the individual soul? - -On the other hand, once the indissoluble link between life and thought -in history has been effected, the doubts that have been expressed as to -the _certainty_ and the _utility_ of history disappear altogether in -a moment. How could that which is a _present_ producing of our spirit -ever be _uncertain_? How could that knowledge be _useless_ which solves -a problem that has come forth from the bosom of _life_? - - - - -II - - -But can the link between document and narrative, between life and -history, ever be broken? An affirmative answer to this has been given -when referring to those histories of which the documents have been -lost, or, to put the case in a more general and fundamental manner, -those histories whose documents are no longer alive in the human -spirit. And this has also been implied when saying that we all of us in -turn find ourselves thus placed with respect to this or that part of -history. The history of Hellenic painting is in great part a history -without documents for us, as are all histories of peoples concerning -whom one does not know exactly where they lived, the thoughts and -feelings chat they experienced, or the individual appearance of the -works that they accomplished; those literatures and philosophies, too, -as to which we do not know their theses, or even when we possess these -and are able to read them through, yet fail to grasp their intimate -spirit, either owing to the lack of complementary knowledge or because -of our obstinate temperamental reluctance, or owing to our momentary -distraction. - -If, in these cases, when that connexion is broken, we can no longer -call what remains history (because history was nothing but that -connexion), and it can henceforth only be called history in the sense -that we call a man the corpse of a man, what remains is not for -that reason nothing (not even the corpse is really nothing). Were -it nothing, it would be the same as saying that the connexion is -indissoluble, because nothingness is never effectual. And if it be not -nothing, if it be something, what is narrative without the document? - -A history of Hellenic painting, according to the accounts that have -been handed down or have been constructed by the learned of our times, -when closely inspected, resolves itself into a series of names of -painters (Apollodorus, Polygnotus, Zeuxis, Apelles, etc.), surrounded -with biographical anecdotes, and into a series of subjects for -painting (the burning of Troy, the contest of the Amazons, the battle -of Marathon, Achilles, Calumny, etc.), of which certain particulars -are given in the descriptions that have reached us; or a graduated -series, going from praise to blame, of these painters and their works, -together with names, anecdotes, subjects, judgments, arranged more or -less chronologically. But the names of painters separated from the -direct knowledge of their works are empty names; the anecdotes are -empty, as are the descriptions of subjects, the judgment of approval -or of disapproval, and the chronological arrangement, because merely -arithmetical and lacking real development; and the reason why we do -not realize it in thought is that the elements which should constitute -it are wanting. If those verbal forms possess any significance, we owe -it to what little we know of antique paintings from fragments, from -secondary works that have come down to us in copies, or in analogous -works in the other arts, or in poetry. With the exception, however, of -that little, the history of Hellenic art is, as such, a tissue of empty -words. - -We can, if we like, say that it is 'empty of determinate content,' -because we do not deny that when we pronounce the name of a painter -we think of some painter, and indeed of a painter who is an Athenian, -and that when we utter the word 'battle,' or 'Helen,' we think of -a battle, indeed of a battle of hoplites, or of a beautiful woman, -similar to those familiar to us in Hellenic sculpture. But we can -think indifferently of any one of the numerous facts that those names -recall. For this reason their content is indeterminate, and this -indetermination of content is their emptiness. - - -All histories separated from their living documents resemble these -examples and are empty narratives, and since they are empty they are -without truth. Is it true or not that there existed a painter named -Polygnotus and that he painted a portrait of Miltiades in the Poecile? -We shall be told that it is true, because one person or several -people, who knew him and saw the work in question, bear witness to -its existence. But we must reply that it was true for this or that -witness, and that for us it is neither true nor false, or (which comes -to the same thing) that it is true only on the evidence of those -witnesses--that is to say, for an extrinsic reason, whereas truth -always requires intrinsic reasons. And since that proposition is not -true (neither true nor false), it is not useful either, because where -there is nothing the king loses his rights, and where the elements of a -problem are wanting the effective will and the effective need to solve -it are also wanting, along with the possibility of its solution. Thus -to quote those empty judgments is quite useless for our actual lives. -Life is a present, and that history which has become an empty narration -is a past: it is an irrevocable past, if not absolutely so, καθ' αὑτό, -then certainly for the present moment. - -The empty words remain, and the empty words are sounds, or the graphic -signs which represent them, and they hold together and maintain -themselves, not by an act of thought that thinks them (in which case -they would soon be filled), but by an act of will, which thinks it -useful for certain ends of its own to preserve those words, however -empty or half empty they may be. Mere narrative, then, is nothing but a -complex of empty words or formulas asserted by an act of the will. - -Now with this definition we have succeeded in giving neither more -nor less than the true distinction, hitherto sought in vain, between -_history_ and _chronicle_. It has been sought in vain, because it has -generally been sought in a difference in the _quality_ of the facts -which each difference took as its object. Thus, for instance, the -record of _individual_ facts has been attributed to chronicle, to -history that of _general_ facts; to chronicle the record of _private_, -to history that of _public_ facts: as though the general were not -always individual and the individual general, and the public were not -always also private and the private public! Or else the record of -_important_ facts (memorable things) has been attributed to history, to -chronicle that of the _unimportant_: as though the importance of facts -were not relative to the situation in which we find ourselves, and as -though for a man annoyed by a mosquito the evolutions of the minute -insect were not of greater importance than the expedition of Xerxes! -Certainly, we are sensible of a just sentiment in these fallacious -distinctions--namely, that of placing the difference between history -and chronicle in the conception of what _interests_ and of what does -not _interest_ (the general interests and not the particular, the -great interests and not the little, etc.). A just sentiment is also -to be noted in other considerations that are wont to be adduced, such -as the close bond between events that there is in history and the -_disconnectedness_ that appears on the other hand in chronicle, the -_logical_ order of the first, the purely _chronological_ order of the -second, the penetration of the first into the _core_ of events and -the limitation of the second to the superficial or _external_, and -the like. But the differential character is here rather metaphorized -than thought, and when metaphors are not employed as simple forms -expressive of thought we lose a moment after what has just been gained. -The truth is that chronicle and history are not distinguishable as -two forms of history, mutually complementary, or as one subordinate -to the other, but as two different spiritual _attitudes_. History is -living chronicle, chronicle is dead history; history is contemporary -history, chronicle is past history; history is principally an act of -thought, chronicle an act of will. Every history becomes chronicle -when it is no longer thought, but only recorded in abstract words, -which were once upon a time concrete and expressive. The history of -philosophy even is chronicle, when written or read by those who do not -understand philosophy: history would even be what we are now disposed -to read as chronicle, as when, for instance, the monk of Monte Cassino -notes: 1001. _Beatus Dominicus migravit ad Christum_. 1002. _Hoc anno -venerunt Saraceni super Capuam_. 1004. _Terremotus ingens hunc montem -exagitavit_, etc.; for those facts were present to him when he wept -over the death of the departed Dominic, or was terrified by the natural -human scourges that convulsed his native land, seeing the hand of God -in that succession of events. This does not prevent that history from -assuming the form of chronicle when that same monk of Monte Cassino -wrote down cold formulas, without representing to himself or thinking -their content, with the sole intention of not allowing those memories -to be lost and of handing them down to those who should inhabit Monte -Cassino after him. - -But the discovery of the real distinction between chronicle and -history, which is a formal distinction (that is to say, a truly real -distinction), not only frees us from the sterile and fatiguing search -after material distinctions (that is to say, imaginary distinctions), -but it also enables us to reject a very common presupposition--namely, -that of the _priority_ of chronicle in respect to history. _Primo -annales_ [chronicles] _fuere, post historiæ factæ sunt_, the saying of -the old grammarian, Mario Vittorino, has been repeated, generalized, -and universalized. But precisely the opposite of this is the outcome of -the inquiry into the character and therefore into the genesis of the -two operations or attitudes: _first comes history, then chronicle_. -First comes the living being, then the corpse; and to make history the -child of chronicle is the same thing as to make the living be born from -the corpse, which is the residue of life, as chronicle is the residue -of history. - - - - -III - - -History, separated from the living document and turned into chronicle, -is no longer a spiritual act, but a thing, a complex of sounds and -of other signs. But the document also, when separated from life, is -nothing but a thing like another, a complex of sounds or of other -signs--for example, the sounds and the letters in which a law was once -communicated; the lines cut into a block of marble, which manifested a -religious sentiment by means of the figure of a god; a heap of bones, -which were at one time the expression of a man or of an animal. - -Do such things as empty narratives and dead documents exist? In a -certain sense, no, because external things do not exist outside the -spirit; and we already know that chronicle, as empty narrative, exists -in so far as the spirit produces it and holds it firmly with an act of -will (and it may be opportune to observe once more that such an act -carries always with it a new act of consciousness and of thought): -with an act of will, which abstracts the sound from the thought, -in which dwelt the certainty and concreteness of the sound. In the -same way, these dead documents exist to the extent that they are the -manifestations of a new life, as the lifeless corpse is really itself -also a process of vital creation, although it appears to be one of -decomposition and something dead in respect of a particular form of -life. But in the same way as those empty sounds, which once contained -the thought of a history, are eventually called _narratives_, in memory -of the thought they contained, thus do those manifestations of a new -life continue to be looked upon as remnants of the life that preceded -them and is indeed extinguished. - -Now observe how, by means of this string of deductions, we have -put ourselves into the position of being able to account for the -partition of historical _sources_ into _narratives_ and _documents_, -as we find it among some of our modern methodologists, or, as it -is also formulated, into _traditions_ and _residues_ or _remains_ -(_Überbleibsel_, _Überreste_). This partition is irrational from -the empirical point of view, and may be of use as indicating the -inopportunity of the introduction of a speculative thought into -empiricism. It is so irrational that one immediately runs against -the difficulty of not being able to distinguish what one wished to -distinguish. An empty 'narrative' considered as a thing is tantamount -to any other thing whatever which is called a 'document.' And, on -the other hand, if we maintain the distinction we incur the further -difficulty of having to base our historical construction upon two -different orders of data (one foot on the bank and the other in -the river)--that is to say, we shall have to recur to two parallel -instances, one of which is perpetually referring us back to the other. -And when we seek to determine the relation of the two kinds of sources -with a view to avoiding the inconvenient parallelism, what happens is -this: either the relation is stated to depend upon the superiority -of the one over the other, and the distinction vanishes, because the -superior form absorbs into itself and annuls the inferior form; or -a third term is established, in which the two forms are supposed to -become united with a distinction: but this is another way of declaring -them to be inexistent in that abstractness. For this reason it does not -seem to me to be without significance that the partition of accounts -and documents should not have been adopted by the most empirical of the -methodologists. They do not involve themselves in these subtleties, -but content themselves with grouping the historical sources into those -that are _written_ and those that are _represented_, or in other -similar ways. In Germany, however, Droysen availed himself of these -distinctions between narratives and documents, traditions, etc., in -his valuable _Elements of Historicism_ (he had strong leanings toward -philosophy), and they have been employed also by other methodologists, -who are hybrid empiricists, 'systematists,' or 'pedants,' as they -are looked upon in our Latin countries. This is due to the copious -philosophical traditions of Germany. The pedantry certainly exists, -and it is to be found just in that inopportune philosophy. But what -an excellent thing is that pedantry and the contradictions which it -entails, how it arouses the mind from its empirical slumbers and makes -it see that in place of supposed things there are in reality spiritual -acts, where the terms of an irreconcilable dualism were supposed -to be in conflict, relation and unity, on the contrary, prevail! -The partition of the sources into narratives and documents, and the -superiority attributed to documents over narratives, and the alleged -necessity of narrative as a subordinate but ineradicable element, -almost form a mythology or allegory, which represents in an imaginative -manner the relation between life and thought, between document and -criticism in historical thought. - -And document and criticism, life and thought, are the true _sources_ -of history--that is to say, the two elements of historical synthesis; -and as such, they do not stand face to face with history, or face to -face with the synthesis, in the same way as fountains are represented -as being face to face with those who go to them with a pail, but they -form part of history itself, they are within the synthesis, they -form a constituent part of it and are constituted by it. Hence the -idea of a history with its sources outside itself is another fancy -to be dispelled, together with that of history being the opposite of -chronicle. The two erroneous fancies converge to form one. Sources, in -the extrinsic sense of the empiricists, like things, are equally with -chronicle, which is a class of those things, not anterior but posterior -to history. History would indeed be in a fix if it expected to be -born of what comes after it, to be born of external things! Thing, not -thought, is born of thing: a history derived from things would be a -thing--that is to say, just the inexistent of which we were talking a -moment ago. - -But there must be a reason why chronicle as well as documents seems -to precede history and to be its extrinsic source. The human spirit -preserves the mortal remains of history, empty narratives and -chronicles, and the same spirit collects the traces of past life, -remains and documents, striving as far as possible to preserve them -unchanged and to restore them as they deteriorate. What is the object -of these acts of will which go to the preservation of what is empty -and dead? Perhaps illusion or foolishness, which preserves a little -while the worn-out elements of mortality on the confines of Dis by -means of the erection of mausoleums and sepulchres? But sepulchres -are not foolishness and illusion; they are, on the contrary, an act -of morality, by which is affirmed the immortality of the work done by -individuals. Although dead, they live in our memory and will live in -the memory of times to come. And that collecting of dead documents and -writing down of empty histories is an act of life which serves life. -The moment will come when they will serve to reproduce past history, -enriched and made present to our spirit. - -For dead history revives, and past history again becomes present, as -the development of life demands them. The Romans and the Greeks lay -in their sepulchres, until awakened at the Renaissance by the new -maturity of the European spirit. The primitive forms of civilization, -so gross and so barbaric, lay forgotten, or but little regarded, or -misunderstood, until that new phase of the European spirit, which was -known as Romanticism or Restoration, 'sympathized' with them--that is -to say, recognized them as its own proper present interest. Thus great -tracts of history which are now chronicle for us, many documents now -mute, will in their turn be traversed with new flashes of life and will -speak again. - -These revivals have altogether interior motives, and no wealth of -documents or of narratives will bring them about; indeed, it is they -themselves that copiously collect and place before themselves the -documents and narratives, which without them would remain scattered -and inert. And it will be impossible ever to understand anything of -the effective process of historical thought unless we start from the -principle that the spirit itself is history, maker of history at every -moment of its existence, and also the result of all anterior history. -Thus the spirit bears with it all its history, which coincides with -itself. To forget one aspect of history and to remember another one -is nothing but the rhythm of the life of the spirit, which operates -by determining and individualizing itself, and by always rendering -indeterminate and disindividualizing previous determinations and -individualizations, in order to create others more copious. The spirit, -so to speak, lives again its own history without those external -things called narratives and documents; but those external things are -instruments that it makes for itself, acts preparatory to that internal -vital evocation in whose process they are resolved. The spirit asserts -and jealously preserves 'records of the past' for that purpose. - -What we all of us do at every moment when we note dates and other -matters concerning our private affairs (chronicles) in our -pocket-books, or when we place in their little caskets ribbons and -dried flowers (I beg to be allowed to select these pleasant images, -when giving instances of the collection of 'documents'), is done on a -large scale by a certain class of workers called _philologists_, as -though at the invitation of the whole of society. They are specially -known as the _erudite_ when they collect evidence and narrations, -as _archæologists_ and _archivists_ when they collect documents and -monuments, as the places where such objects are kept (the "silent white -abodes of the dead") are called libraries, archives, and museums. -Can there be any ill-feeling against these men of erudition, these -archivists and archæologists, who fulfil a necessary and therefore -a useful and important function? The fact remains that there is a -tendency to mock at them and to regard them with compassion. It is -true enough that they sometimes afford a hold for derision with their -ingenuous belief that they have history under lock and key and are -able to unlock the 'sources' at which thirsty humanity may quench its -desire for knowledge; but we know that history is in all of us and that -its sources are in our own breasts. For it is in our own breasts alone -that is to be found that crucible in which the _certain_ is converted -into the _true_, and _philology_, joining with _philosophy_, produces -_history_. - - - - -II - - -PSEUDO-HISTORIES - - -History, chronicle, and philology, of which we have seen the origin, -are series of mental forms, which, although distinct from one another, -must all of them be looked upon as physiological--that is to say, true -and rational. But logical sequence now leads me from physiology to -pathology--to those forms that are not forms but deformations, not true -but erroneous, not rational but irrational. - -The ingenuous belief cherished by the philologists that they have -history locked up in their libraries, museums, and archives (something -in the same manner as the genius of the _Arabian Nights_, who was -shut up in a small vase in the form of compressed smoke) does not -remain inactive, and gives rise to the idea of a history constructed -with things, traditions, and documents (empty traditions and dead -documents), and this affords an instance of what may be called -_philological_ history. I say the idea and not the reality, because -it is simply impossible to compose a history with external things, -whatever efforts may be made and whatever trouble be taken. Chronicles -that have been weeded, chopped up into fragments, recombined, -rearranged, always remain nevertheless chronicles--that is to say, -empty narratives; and documents that have been restored, reproduced, -described, brought into line, remain documents--that is to say, silent -things. Philological history consists of the pouring out of one or -more books into a new book. This operation bears an appropriate name -in current language and is known as 'compilation.' These compilations -are frequently convenient, because they save the trouble of having -recourse to several books at the same time; but they do not contain -any historical thought. Modern chronological philologists regard -medieval chroniclers and the old Italian historians (from Machiavelli -and Guicciardini down to Giannone) with a feeling of superiority. -These writers 'transcribed,' as they called it, their 'sources' in -the parts of their books that are devoted to narrative--that is -to say, chronicle. Yet they themselves do not and cannot behave -otherwise, because when history is being composed from 'sources' as -external things there is never anything else to do but to transcribe -the sources. Transcription is varied by sometimes summarizing and -sometimes altering the words, and this is sometimes a question of -good taste and sometimes a literary pretence; it is also a verifying -of quotations, which is sometimes a proof of loyalty and exactitude, -sometimes a make-believe and a making oneself believe that the feet -are planted firmly on the earth, on the soil of truth, believed to -be narrative and quotation from the document. How very many of such -philological historians there are in our time, especially since the -so-called 'philological method' has been exaggerated--that is to say, -a one-sided value has been attributed to it! These histories have -indeed a dignified and scientific appearance, but unfortunately _fehlt -leider! das geistige Band_, the spiritual tie is wanting. They really -consist at bottom of nothing but learned or very learned 'chronicles,' -sometimes of use for purposes of consultation, but lacking words that -nourish and keep warm the minds and souls of men. - -Nevertheless, since we have demonstrated that philological history -really presents chronicles and documents and not histories, it might -be asked upon what possible ground do we accuse it of irrationality -and error, seeing that we have regarded the formation of chronicles, -the collection of documents, and all the care that is expended Upon -them as most rational? But error never lies in the fact, but only in -the 'claim' or 'idea' that accompanies the fact. And in this case -the idea or claim is that which has been defined above as properly -belonging to philological history--namely, that of composing histories -with documents and narratives. This claim can be said to exercise a -rational function also, to the extent that it lays down the claim, -though without satisfying it, that history should go beyond the mere -chronicle or document. But in so far as it makes the claim, without -itself fulfilling it, this mode of history must be characterized as -contradictory and absurd. - -And since the claim is absurd, philological history remains without -truth as being that which, like chronicle, has not got truth within -it, but derives it from the authority to which it appeals. It will be -claimed for philology that it tests authorities and selects those most -worthy of faith. But without dwelling upon the fact that chronicle -also, and chronicle of the crudest, most ignorant and credulous sort, -proceeded in a like manner by testing and selecting those authorities -which seemed to it to be the most worthy of faith, it is always a -question of faith (that is to say, of the thought of others and of -thought belonging to the past) and not of criticism (that is to say, -of our own thought in the act), of verisimilitude and not of that -certainty which is truth. Hence philological history can certainly be -_correct_, but not _true_ (_richtig_ and not _wahr_). And as it is -without truth, so is it without true historical interest--that is to -say, it sheds no light upon an order of facts answering to a practical -and ethical want; it may embrace any matter indifferently, however -remote it be from the practical and ethical soul of the compiler. -Thus, as a pure philologist, I enjoy the free choice of indifference, -and the history of Italy for the last half-century has the same value -for me as that of the Chinese dynasty of the Tsin. I shall turn from -one to the other, moved, no doubt, by a certain interest, but by an -extra-historical interest, of the sort formed in the special circle of -philology. - -This procedure, which is without truth and without passion, and is -proper to philological history, explains the marked contrast so -constantly renewed between the philological historians and historians -properly so called. These latter, intent as they are upon the solution -of vital problems, grow impatient to find themselves offered in reply -the frigid products of philology, or become angry at the persistent -assertion that such is history, and that it must be treated in such -a spirit and with such methods. Perhaps the finest explosion of such -a feeling of anger and annoyance is to be found in the _Letters on -the Study of History_ (1751) of Bolingbroke, in which erudition is -treated as neither more nor less than sumptuous ignorance, and learned -disquisitions upon ancient or primitive history are admitted at the -most as resembling those 'eccentric preludes' which precede concerts -and aid in setting the instruments in tune and that can only be -mistaken for harmony by some one without ear, just in the same way as -only he who is without historic sense can confuse those exhibitions of -erudition with true history. As an antithesis to them he suggests as -an ideal a kind of 'political maps,' for the use of the intellect and -not of the memory, indicating the _Storie fiorentine_ of Machiavelli -and the _Trattato dei benefici_ of Fra Paolo as writings that approach -that ideal. Finally he maintains that for true and living history we -should not go beyond the beginning of the sixteenth century, beyond -Charles V and Henry VIII, when the political and social history of -Europe first appeared--a system which still persisted at the beginning -of the eighteenth century. He then proceeds to paint a picture of those -two centuries of history, for the use, not of the curious and the -erudite, but of politicians, too one, I think, would wish to deny the -just sentiment for history which animates these demands, set forth in -so vivacious a manner. Bolingbroke, however, did not rise, nor was it -possible for him to rise, to the conception of the death and rebirth of -every history (which is the rigorously speculative concept of 'actual' -and 'contemporary' history), owing to the conditions of culture of -his time, nor did he suspect that primitive barbaric history, which -he threw into a corner as useless dead leaves, would reappear quite -fresh half a century later, as the result of the reaction against -intellectualism and Jacobinism, and that this reaction would have as -one of its principal promoters a publicist of his own country, Burke, -nor indeed that it had already reappeared in his own time in a corner -of Italy, in the mind and soul of Giambattista Vico. I shall not adduce -further instances of the conflict between effective and philological -historians, after this conspicuous one of Bolingbroke, because it is -exceedingly well known, and the strife is resumed under our very eyes -at every moment. I shall only add that it is certainly deplorable -(though altogether natural, because blows are not measured in a -struggle) that the polemic against the 'philologists' should have been -transferred so as to include also the philologues pure and simple. For -these latter, the poor learned ones, archivists and archæologists, are -harmless, beneficent little souls. If they should be destroyed, as is -sometimes prophesied in the heat of controversy, the fertility of the -spiritual field would be not only diminished, but ruined altogether, -and we should be obliged to promote to the utmost of our power the -reintroduction of those coefficients of our culture, very much in the -same way as is said to have been the case with French agriculture after -the improvident harrying of the harmless and beneficent wasps which -went on for several years. - -Whatever of justified or justifiable is to be found in the statements -as to the _uncertainty_ and _uselessness_ of history is also due to -the revolt of the pure historic sense against philological history. -This is to be assumed from observing that even the most radical of -those opponents (Fontenelle, Volney, Delfico, etc.) end by admitting -or demanding some form of history as not useless or uncertain, or not -altogether useless and uncertain, and from the fact that all their -shafts are directed against philological history and that founded upon -authority, of which the only appropriate definition is that of Rousseau -(in the _Émile_), as _l'art de choisir entre plusieurs mensonges, celui -qui ressemble mieux à la vérité._ - -In all other respects--that is to say, as regards the part due to -sensational and naturalistic assumptions--historical scepticism -contradicts itself here, like every form of scepticism, for the natural -sciences themselves, thus raised to the rank of model, are founded upon -perceptions, observations, and experiments--that is to say, upon facts -historically ascertained--and the 'sensations,' upon which the whole -truth of knowledge is based, are not themselves knowledge, save to the -extent that they assume the form of affirmations--that is to say, in so -far as they are history. - -But the truth is that philological history, like every other sort of -error, does not fall before the enemy's attack, but rather solely -from internal causes, and it is its own professors that destroy it, -when they conceive of it as without connexion with life, as merely -a learned exercise (note the many histories that are treatments of -scholastic themes, undertaken with a view to training in the art of -research, interpretation, and exposition, and the many others that -are continuations of this direction outside the school and are due to -tendency there imparted), and when they themselves evince uncertainty, -surrounding every statement that they make with _doubts_. The -distinction between _criticism_ and _hypercriticism_ has been drawn -with a view to arresting this spontaneous dissolution of historical -philology; thus we find the former praised and allowed, while the -latter is blamed and forbidden. But the distinction is one of the -customary sort, by means of which lack of intelligence disguised as -love of moderation contrives to chip off the edges from the antitheses -that it fails to solve. Hypercriticism is the prosecution of criticism; -it is criticism itself, and to divide criticism into a more and a less, -and to admit the less and deny the more, is extravagant, to say the -least of it. No 'authorities' are certain while others are uncertain, -but all are uncertain, varying in uncertainty in an extrinsic and -conjectural manner. Who can guarantee himself against the false -statement made by the usually diligent and trustworthy witness in a -moment of distraction or of passion? A sixteenth-century inscription, -still to be read in one of the old byways of Naples, wisely prays -God (and historical philologists should pray to Him fervently every -morning) to deliver us now and for ever from _the lies of honest -men_. Thus historians who push criticism to the point of so-called -hypercriticism perform a most instructive philosophical duty when they -render the whole of such work vain, and therefore fit to be called -by the title of Sanchez's work _Quod nihil scitur_. I recollect the -remark made to me when I was occupied with research work in my young -days by a friend of but slight literary knowledge, to whom I had lent -a very critical, indeed hypercritical, history of ancient Rome. When -he had finished reading it he returned the book to me, remarking that -he had acquired the proud conviction of being "the most learned of -philologists," because the latter arrive at the conclusion that they -know nothing as the result of exhausting toil, while he knew nothing -without any effort at all, simply as a generous gift of nature.[1] - - - -II - - -The consequence of this spontaneous dissolution of philological history -should be the negation of history claimed to have been written with -the aid of narratives and documents conceived as external things, and -the consignment of these to their proper lower place as mere aids to -historical knowledge, as it determines and redetermines itself in the -development of the spirit. But if such consequences are distasteful -and the project is persevered in of thus writing history in spite of -repeated failures, the further problem then presents itself as to -how the cold indifference of philological history and its intrinsic -uncertainty can be healed without changing those presumptions. The -problem, itself fallacious, can receive but a fallacious solution, -expressed by the substitution of the interest of _sentiment_ for -the lack of interest of thought and of _æsthetic_ coherence of -representation for the logical coherence here unobtainable. The new -erroneous form of history thus obtained is _poetical history._ - -Numerous examples of this kind of history are afforded by the -affectionate biographies of persons much beloved and venerated and by -the satirical biographies of the detested; patriotic histories which -vaunt the glory and lament the misadventures of the people to which the -author belongs and with which he sympathizes, and those that shed a -sinister light upon the enemy people, adversary of his own; universal -history, illuminated with the ideals of liberalism or humanitarianism, -that composed by a socialist, depicting the acts, as Marx said, of the -"cavalier of the sorry countenance," in other words of the capitalist, -that of the anti-Semite, who shows the Jew to be everywhere the source -of human misfortune and of human turpitude and the persecution of the -Jew to be the acme of human splendour and happiness. Nor is poetical -history exhausted with this fundamental and general description of -love and hate (love that is hate and hate that is love), for it passes -through all the most intricate forms, the fine gradations of sentiment. -Thus we have poetical histories which are amorous, melancholy, -nostalgic, pessimistic, resigned, confident, cheerful, and as many -other sorts as one can imagine. Herodotus celebrates the romance of the -jealousies of the gods, Livy the epos of Roman virtue, Tacitus composes -horrible tragedies, Elizabethan dramas in sculptural Latin prose. If -we turn to the most modern among the moderns, we find Droysen giving -expression to his lyrical aspiration toward the strong centralized -state in his history of Macedonia, that Prussia of Hellas; Grote to his -aspirations toward democratic institutions, as symbolized in Athens; -Mommsen to those directed toward empire, as symbolized in Cæsar; -Balbo pouring forth all his ardours for Latin independence, employing -for that purpose all the records of Latin battles and beginning with -nothing less than those between the Itali and Etrusci against the -Pelasgi; Thierry celebrating the middle class in the history of the -Third Estate represented by Jacques Bonhomme; the Goncourts writing -voluptuous fiction round the figures of Mme de Pompadour, of Mme Du -Barry, of Marie Antoinette, more careful of the material and cut of -garments than of thoughts; and, finally, De Barante, in his history of -the Dukes of Burgundy, having his eye upon knights and ladies, arms and -love. - -It may seem that the indifference of philological history is thus -truly conquered and historical material dominated by a principle and -criterion of _values_. This is the demand persistently addressed to -history from all sides in our day by methodologists and philosophers. -But I have avoided the word 'value' hitherto, owing to its equivocal -meaning, apt to deceive many. For since history is history of the -spirit, and since spirit is value, and indeed the only value that is -possible to conceive, that history is clearly always history of values; -and since the spirit becomes transparent to itself as thought in the -consciousness of the historian, the value that rules the writing of -history is the value of thought. But precisely for this reason its -principle of determination cannot be the value known as the value of -'sentiment,' which is life and not thought, and when this life finds -expression and representation, before it has been dominated by thought, -we have poetry, not history. In order to turn poetical biography into -truly historical biography we must repress our loves, our tears, our -scorn, and seek what function the individual has fulfilled in social -activity or civilization; and we must do the same for national history -as for that of humanity, and for every group of facts, small or great, -as for every order of events. We must supersede--that is to say, -transform--values of _sentiment_ with values of _thought_. If we do not -find ourselves able to rise to this 'subjectivity' of thought, we shall -produce poetry and not history: the historical problem will remain -intact, or, rather, it will not yet have come into being, but will do -so when the requisite conditions are present. The interest that stirs -us in the former case is not that of life which becomes thought, but of -life which becomes intuition and imagination. - -And since we have entered the domain of poetry, while the historical -problem remains beyond, erudition Or philology, from which we seem -to have started, remains something on this side--that is to say, is -altogether surpassed. In philological history, notwithstanding the -claims made by it, chronicles and documents persist in their crude -natural and undigested state. But these are profoundly changed in -poetical history; or, to speak with greater accuracy, they are simply -dissolved. Let us ignore the case (common enough) of the historian -who, with a view to obtaining artistic effects, intentionally mingles -his inventions with the data provided by the chronicles and documents, -endeavouring to make them pass for history--that is to say, he renders -himself guilty of a lie and is the cause of confusion. But the -alteration that is continuous and inherent to historiography consists -of the choice and connexion of the details themselves, selected from -the 'sources,' rather owing to motives of sentiment than of thought. -This, closely considered, is really an invention or imagining of the -facts; the new connexion becomes concrete in a newly imagined fact. And -since the data that are taken from the 'sources' do not always lend -themselves with docility to the required connexion, it is considered -permissible to _solliciter doucement les textes_ (as, if I am not -mistaken, Renan, one of the historian-poets, remarked) and to add -imaginary particulars, though in a conjectural form, to the actual -data. Vossius blamed those Grecian historians, and historians of other -nations, who, when they invent fables, _ad effugiendam vanitatis notam -satis fore putant si addant solemne suum 'aiunt,' 'fertur,' vel aliquid -quod tantundem valeat_. But even in our own day it would be diverting -and instructive to catalogue the forms of insinuation employed by -historians who pass for being most weighty, with a view to introducing -their own personal imaginings: 'perhaps,' 'it would seem,' 'one would -say,' 'it is pleasant to think,' 'we may infer,' 'it is probable,' 'it -is evident,' and the like; and to note how they sometimes come to omit -these warnings and recount things that they have themselves imagined -as though they had seen them, in order to complete their picture, -regarding which they would be much embarrassed if some one, indiscreet -as an _enfant terrible_, should chance to ask them: "How do you know -it?" "Who told you this?" Recourse has been had to the methodological -theory of "imagination necessary for the historian who does not wish -to become a mere chronicler," to an imagination, that is to say, which -shall be reconstructive and integrating; or, as is also said, to -"the necessity of integrating the historical datum with our personal -psychology or psychological knowledge." This theory, similar to that -of value in history, also contains an equivocation. For doubtless -imagination is indispensable to the historian: empty criticism, empty -narrative, the concept without intuition or imagination, are altogether -sterile; and this has been said and said again in these pages, when -we have demanded the vivid experience of the events whose history we -have undertaken to relate, which also means their re-elaboration as -intuition and imagination. Without this imaginative reconstruction or -integration it is not possible to write history, or to read it, or to -understand it. But this sort of imagination, which is really quite -indispensable to the historian, is the imagination that is inseparable -from the historical synthesis, the imagination in and for thought, the -concreteness of thought, which is never an abstract concept, but always -a relation and a judgment, not indetermination but determination. It -is nevertheless to be radically distinguished from the free poetic -imagination, dear to those historians who see and hear the face and -the voice of Jesus on the Lake of Tiberias, or follow Heraclitus on -his daily walks among the hills of Ephesus, or repeat again the secret -colloquies between Francis of Assisi and the sweet Umbrian countryside. - -Here too we shall be asked of what error, then, we can accuse poetical -history, if it be poetry (a necessary form of the spirit and one of the -dearest to the heart of man) and not history. But here also we must -reply--in manner analogous to our reply in the case of philological -history--that the error does not lie in what is done, but in what is -claimed to be done: not in creating poetry, but in calling histories -that are poetry poetical histories, which is a contradiction in terms. -So far am I from entertaining the thought of objecting to poetry -woven out of historical data that I wish to affirm that a great part -of pure poetry, especially in modern times, is to be found in books -that are called histories. The epic, for instance, did not, as is -believed, die in the nineteenth century, but it is not to be found in -the 'epic poems' of Botta, of Bagnoli, of Bellini, or of Bandettini, -where it is sought by short-sighted classifiers of literature, but in -narratives of the history of the Risorgimento, where are poured forth -epic, drama, satire, idyll, elegy, and as many other 'kinds of poetry' -as may be desired. The historiography of the Risorgimento is in great -part a poetical historiography, rich in legends which still await -the historian, or have met with him only occasionally and by chance, -exactly like ancient or medieval epic, which, if it were really poetry, -was yet believed by its hearers, and often perhaps by its composers -themselves, to be history. And I claim for others and for myself -the right to imagine history as dictated by my personal feeling; to -imagine, for instance, an Italy as fair as a beloved woman, as dear as -the tenderest of mothers, as austere as a venerated ancestress, to seek -out her doings through the centuries and even to prophesy her future, -and to create for myself in history idols of hatred and of love, to -embellish yet more the charming, if I will, and to make the unpleasant -yet more unpleasant. I claim to seek out every memory and every -particular, the expressions of countenance, the gestures, the garments, -the dwellings, every kind of insignificant particular (insignificant -for others or in other respects, but not for me at that moment), almost -physically to approach my friends and my mistresses, of both of which -I possess a fine circle or harem in history. But it remains evident -that when I or others have the intention of writing history, true -history and not poetical history, we shall clear away myths and idols, -friends and mistresses, devoting our attention solely to the problem of -history, which is spirit or value (or if less philosophical and more -colloquial terms be preferred, culture, civilization, progress), and we -shall look upon them with the two eyes and the single sight of thought. -And when some one, in that sphere or at that altitude, begins to talk -to us of the sentiments that but a short while ago were tumultuous in -our breasts, we shall listen to him as to one who talks of things that -are henceforth distant and dead, in which we no longer participate, -because the only sentiment that now fills our soul is the sentiment of -truth, the search for historical truth. - - -[1] See Appendix I. - - - -III - - -With poetical history--that is to say, with the falling back of history -into a form ideally anterior, that of poetry--the cycle of erroneous -forms of history (or of erroneous theoretical forms) is complete. -But my discourse would not perhaps be complete were I to remain -silent as to a so-called form of history which had great importance -in antiquity when it developed its own theory. It continues to have -some importance in our own day, although now inclined to conceal its -face, to change its garments, and to disguise itself. This is the -history known in antiquity as _oratory_ or _rhetoric_. Its object was -to teach philosophy by example, to incite to virtuous conduct, to -impart instruction as to the best political and military institutions, -or simply to delight, according to the various intentions of the -rhetoricians. And even in our own day this type of history is demanded -and supplied not only in the elementary schools (where it seems to -be understood that the bitter of wisdom should be imbibed by youth -mingled with the sweet of fable), but among grown men. It is closely -linked up with politics, where it is a question of politics, or with -religion, philosophy, morality, and the like, where they are concerned, -or with diversions, as in the case of anecdotes, of strange events, -of scandalous and terrifying histories. But can this, I ask, be -considered, I do not say history, but an erroneous (theoretical) form -of history? The structure of rhetorical history presupposes a _history -that already exists_, or at least a poetical history, narrated with -a _practical end_. The end would be to induce an emotion leading to -virtue, to remorse, to shame, or to enthusiasm; or perhaps to provide -repose for the soul, such as is supplied by games; or to introduce into -the mind a historical, philosophical, or scientific truth (_movere, -delectare, docere,_ or in whatever way it may be decided to classify -these ends); but it will always be an end--that is to say, a practical -act, which avails itself of the telling of the history as a means -or as one of its means. Hence rhetorical history (which would be -more correctly termed _practicistical_ history) is composed of two -elements, history and the practical end, converging into one, which -is the practical act. For this reason one cannot attack it, but only -its theory, which is the already mentioned theory, so celebrated in -antiquity, of history as opus oratorium, as φιλοσοφία ἐκ παραδειγμάτων, -as ἀποδεικτική, as νίκης γύμνασμα (if warlike), or γνωμης παίδενμα (if -political), or as evocative of ἡδονή, and the like. This doctrine is -altogether analogous to the hedonistic and pedagogic doctrine relating -to poetry which at that time dominated. It was believed possible to -assign an end to poetry, whereas an _extrinsic end_ was assigned to it, -and poetry was thus passed over without being touched. Practicistical -history (which, however, is not history) is exempt from censure as -a practical act: each one of us is not content with inquiring into -history, but also acts, and in acting can quite well avail himself of -the re-evocation of this or that image, with a view to stimulating his -own work, or (which comes to the same thing) the work of others. He -can, indeed, read and re-read all the books that have from time to time -been of assistance to him, as Cato the younger had recourse to reading -the _Phædo_ in order to prepare himself for suicide, while others have -prepared themselves for it by reading _Werther, Ortis,_ or the poems of -Leopardi. From the time of the Renaissance to the eighteenth century, -many others prepared themselves for conspiracies and tyrannicides by -reading Plutarch, and so much was this the case that one of them, the -youthful Boscoli, when condemned to death for a conspiracy against the -Medici, remarked in his last hour to Della Robbia (who recounts the -incident), "Get Brutus out of my head!"--Brutus, not, that is to say, -the history of Brutus that he had read and thought about, but that by -which he had been fascinated and urged on to commit the crime. For the -rest, true and proper history is not that Brutus which procreated the -modern Bruti with their daggers, but Brutus as thought and situated in -the world of thought. - -One might be induced to assign a special place to the history now known -as biased, because, on the one hand, it seems that it is not a simple -history of sentiment and poetry, since it has an end to attain, and -on the other because such end is not imposed upon it from without, -but coincides with the conception of history itself. Hence it would -seem fitting to look upon it as a form of history standing half-way -between poetry and practicism, a mixture of the two. But mixed forms -and hybrid products exist only in the fictitious classifications -of empiricists, never in the reality of the spirit, and biased -history, when closely examined, is really either poetical history or -practicistical history. An exception must always be made of the books -in which the two moments are sometimes to be found side by side, as -indeed one usually finds true history and chronicle and the document -and philological and poetical history side by side. What gives the -illusion of a mingling or of a special form of history is the fact that -many take their point of departure from poetical inspiration (love of -country, faith in their country, enthusiasm for a great man, and so on) -and end with practical calculations: they begin with poetry and end -with the allegations of the special pleader, and sometimes, although -more rarely, they follow an opposite course. This duplication is to be -observed in the numerous histories of parties that have been composed -since the world was a world, and it is not difficult to discover in -what parts of them we have manifestations of poetry and in what parts -of calculation. Good taste and criticism are continually effecting this -separation for history, as for art and poetry in general. - -It is true that good taste loves and accepts poetry and discriminates -between the practical intentions of the poet and those of the -historian-poet; but those intentions are received and admitted by the -moral conscience, provided always that they are good intentions and -consequently good actions; and although people are disposed to speak -ill of advocates in general, it is certain that the honest advocate -and the prudent orator cannot be dispensed with in social life. Nor -has so-called practicistical history ever been dispensed with, either -according to the Græco-Roman practice, which was that of proposing -portraits of statesmen, of captains, and of heroic women as models for -the soul, or according to that of the Middle Ages, which was to repeat -the lives of saints and hermits of the desert, or of knights strong -of arm and of unshakable faith, or in our own modern world, which -recommends as edifying and stimulating reading the lives and 'legends' -of inventors, of business men, of explorers, and of millionaires. -Educative histories, composed with the view of promoting definite -practical or moral dispositions, really exist, and every Italian knows -how great were the effects of Colletta's and Balbo's histories and the -like during the period of the Risorgimento, and everyone knows books -that have 'inspired' him or inculcated in him the love of his own -country, of his town and steeple. - -This moral efficacy, which belongs to morality and not to history, has -had so strong a hold upon the mind that the prejudice still survives -of assigning a moral function to history (as also to poetry) in the -field of teaching. This prejudice is still to be found inspiring even -Labriola's pedagogic essay on _The Teaching of History_. But if we -mean by the word 'history' both history that is thought as well as -that which, on the contrary, is poetry, philology, or moral will, it -is clear that 'history' will enter the educational process not under -one form alone, but under all these forms. But as history proper it -will only enter it under one of them, which is not that of moral -education, exclusively or abstractly considered, but of the education -or development of thought. - - - -IV - - -Much is said, now even more than formerly, of the necessity of a -'reform of history,' but to me there does not seem to be anything -to reform. Nothing to reform in the sense attributed to such a -demand--namely, that of moulding a _new form of history_ or of creating -for the first time _true history_. History is, has been, and always -will be the same, what we have called living history, history that is -(ideally) contemporary; and chronicle, philological history, poetical -history, and (let us call it history nevertheless) practicistical -history are, have been, and always will be the same. Those who -undertake the task of creating a new history always succeed in setting -up philological history against poetical history, or poetical history -against philological history, or contemporary history against both -of them, and so on. Unless, indeed, as is the case with Buckle and -the many tiresome sociologists and positivists of the last ten years, -they lament with great pomposity and no less lack of intelligence as -to what history is that it lacks the capacity of observation and of -experiment (that is to say, the naturalistic abstraction of observation -and experiment), boasting that they 'reduce history to natural -science'--that is to say, by the employment of a circle, as vicious as -it is grotesque, to a mental form which is its pale derivative. - -In another sense, everything is certainly to be reformed in -history, and history is at every moment labouring to render herself -perfect--that is to say, is enriching herself and probing more deeply -into herself. There is no history that completely satisfies us, -because any construction of ours generates new facts and new problems -and solicits new solutions. Thus the history of Rome, of Greece, and -of Christianity, of the Reformation, of the French Revolution, of -philosophy, of literature, and of any other subject is always being -told afresh and always differently. But history reforms herself, -remaining herself always, and the strength of her development lies -precisely in thus enduring. - -The demand for radical or abstract reform also cannot be given that -other meaning of a reform of the 'idea of history,' of the discovery -that is to be made or is finally made of the _true concept_ of -history. At all periods the distinction has to some extent been -made between histories that are histories and those others that -are works of imagination or chronicles. This could be demonstrated -from the observations met with at all times among historians and -methodologists, and from the confessions that even the most confused of -them involuntarily let fall. It is also to be inferred with certainty -from the nature itself of the human spirit, although the words in -which those distinctions are expressed have not been written or are -not preserved. And such a concept and distinction are renewed at -every moment by history itself, which becomes ever more copious, more -profound. This is to be looked upon as certain, and is for that matter -made evident by the history of historiography, which has certainly -accomplished some progress since the days of Diogenes of Halicarnassus -and of Cicero to those of Hegel and of Humboldt. Other problems have -been formed in our own day, some of which I attempt to solve in this -book. I am well aware that it affords solutions only to some among the -many, and especially that it does not solve (simply because it cannot) -those that are not yet formed, but which will inevitably be formed in -the future. - -In any case it will be thought that the clearness acquired by the -historical consciousness as to the nature of its own work will at -least avail to destroy the erroneous forms of history, that since we -have shown that philological history or chronicle is not history, and -that poetical history is poetry and not history, the 'facts' that -correspond to those beliefs must disappear, or become ever more limited -in extension, to the point of disappearing altogether in a near or -distant future, as catapults have disappeared before guns and as we see -carriages disappearing before, automobiles. - -And this would be truly possible were these erroneous forms to become -concrete in 'facts,' were they not, as I have said above, mere -'claims.' If error and evil were a fact, humanity would have long ago -abolished it--that is to say, superseded it, in the same way as it has -superseded slavery and serfdom and the method of simple barter and so -many other things that were facts, that is to say, its own transitory -forms. But error (and evil, which is one with it) is not a fact; it -does not possess empirical existence; it is nothing but the negative or -dialectical moment of the spirit, necessary for the concreteness of the -positive moment, for the reality of the spirit. For this reason it is -eternal and indestructible, and to destroy it by abstraction (since it -cannot be done by thought) is equivalent to imagining the death of the -spirit, as confirmed in the saying that abstraction is death. - -And without occupying further space with the ex-position of a doctrine -that would entail too wide a digression,[1] I shall observe that a -glance at the history of history proves the salutary nature of error, -which is not a Caliban, but rather an Ariel, who breathes everywhere, -calling forth and exciting, but can never be grasped as a solid thing. -And with a view to seeking examples only in those general forms that -have been hitherto examined, polemical and tendencious historiography -is certainly to be termed error. This prevailed during the period of -the enlightenment, and reduced history to a pleading against priests -and tyrants. But who would have wished simply to return from this to -the learned and apathetic history of the Benedictines and of the other -authors of folios? The polemic and its direction expressed the need -for living history, though not in an altogether satisfactory form, -and this need was followed by the creation of a new historiography -during the period of romanticism. The type of merely philological -history, promulgated in Germany after 1820, and afterward disseminated -throughout Europe, was also certainly error; but it was likewise an -instrument of liberation from the more or less fantastic and arbitrary -histories improvised by the philosophers. But who would wish to turn -back from them to the 'philosophies of history'? The type of history, -sometimes tendencious, but more often poetical, which followed in the -wake of the national Italian movement, was also error--that is to say, -it led to the loss of historical calm. But that poetical consciousness -which surpassed itself when laying claim to historical truth was -bound sooner or later to generate (as had been the case on a larger -scale in the eighteenth century) a history linked with the interests -of life without becoming servile and allowing itself to be led away -by the phantoms of love and hate suggested by them. Further examples -could be adduced, but the example of examples is that which happens -within each of us when we are dealing with historical material. We -see our sympathies and antipathies arise in turn as we proceed (our -poetical history), our intentions as practical men (our rhetorical -history), our chroniclistical memories (our philological history); we -mentally supersede these forms in turn, and in doing so find ourselves -in possession of a new and more profound historical truth. Thus does -history affirm itself, distinguishing itself from non-histories and -conquering the dialectical moments which arise from these. It was -for this reason that I said that there is never anything of anything -to reform in the _abstract,_ but _everything of everything_ in the -_concrete_. - - -[1] See _Logic as Science of Pure Concept._--D. A. - - - - -III - - -HISTORY AS HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSAL CRITICISM OF 'UNIVERSAL HISTORY - - -I - - -Returning from this dialectical round to the concept of history as -'contemporary history,' a new doubt assails and torments us. For if -the proof given has freed that concept from one of the most insistent -forms of historical scepticism (the scepticism that arises from the -lack of reliability of 'testimony'), it does not seem that it has been -freed or ever can be freed from that other form of scepticism, more -properly termed 'agnosticism,' which does not absolutely deny the truth -of history, but denies to it _complete_ truth. But in ultimate analysis -this is to deny to it real knowledge, because unsound knowledge, half -knowledge, also reduces the vigour of the part that it asserts to be -known. It is, however, commonly asserted that only a part of history, a -very small part, is known to us: a faint glimmer which renders yet more -sensible the vast gloom that surrounds our knowledge on all sides. - -In truth, what do we know of the origins of Rome or of the Greek -states, and of the people who preceded the Greek and Roman -civilizations in those countries, notwithstanding all the researches -of the learned? And if a fragment of the life of these people does -remain to us, how uncertain is its interpretation! If some tradition -has been handed down to us, how poor, confused, and contradictory it -is! And we know still less of the people who preceded those people, of -the immigrations from Asia and Africa into Europe or inversely, and of -relations with other countries beyond the ocean, even with the Atlantis -of the myths. And the monogenesis or polygenesis of the human race is a -desperate head-splitter, open to all conjectures. The appearance upon -the earth of the _genus homo_ is open to vain conjectures, as is his -affinity or relationship to the animals. The history of the earth, of -the solar system, of the whole cosmos, is lost in the obscurity of its -origin. But obscurity does not dwell alone among the 'origins'; the -whole of history, even that of modern Europe which is nearest to us, -is obscure. Who can really say what motives determined a Danton or a -Robespierre, a Napoleon or an Alexander of Russia? And how numerous are -the obscurities and the lacunæ that relate to the acts themselves--that -is to say, to their externalization! Mountains of books have been -written upon the days of September, upon the eighteenth of Brumaire, -upon the burning of Moscow; but who can tell how these things really -happened? Even those who were direct witnesses are not able to say, for -they have handed down to us diverse and conflicting narratives. But -let us leave great history. Will it not at least be possible for us to -know a little history completely, we will not say that of our country, -of our town, or of our family, but the least little history of any one -of ourselves: what he really wanted when (many years ago or yesterday) -he abandoned himself to this or that motive of passion, and uttered -this or that word; how he reached this or that particular conclusion -or decided upon some particular course of action; whether the motives -that urged him in a particular direction were lofty or base, moral or -egoistic, inspired by duty or by vanity, pure or impure? - -It is enough to make one lose one's head, as those scrupulous people -are aware, who the more they attempt to perfect their examination -of conscience the more they are confused. No other counsel can be -offered to them than that of examining themselves certainly, but not -overmuch, of looking rather ahead than behind, or only looking behind -to the extent that it is necessary to look. We certainly know our own -history and that of the world that surrounds us, but how little and how -meagrely in comparison with our infinite desire for knowledge! - -The best way of ending this vexation of spirit is that which I have -followed, that of pushing it to its extreme limit, and then of -imagining for a moment that all the interrogations mentioned, together -with the infinite others that could be mentioned, have been satisfied; -satisfied as interrogations that continued to the infinite can be -satisfied--that is to say, by affording an immediate answer to them, -one after the other, and by causing the spirit to enter the path of a -vertiginous process of satisfactions, always obtained to the infinite. -Now, were all those interrogations satisfactorily answered, were we -in possession of all the answers to them, what should we do? The road -of progress to the infinite is as wide as that to hell, and if it -does not lead to hell it certainly leads to the madhouse. And that -infinite, which grows bigger the moment we first touch it, does not -avail us; indeed it fills us with fear. Only the poor finite assists -us, the determined, the concrete, which is grasped by thought and which -lends itself as base for our existence and as point of departure for -our action. Thus even were all the particular infinities of infinite -history offered for the gratification of our desire, there would be -nothing else left for us to do but to clear our minds of them, to -_forget_ them, and to concentrate upon that particular point alone -which corresponds to a problem and constitutes living, active history, -_contemporary history_. - -And this is what the spirit in its development accomplishes, because -there is no fact that is not known at the moment of its being done, by -means of the consciousness that germinates perpetually upon action; -and there is no fact that is not forgotten sooner or later, but may -be recalled, as we remarked when speaking of dead history revived at -the touch of life, of the past that by means of the contemporaneous -becomes again contemporaneous. Tolstoi got this thought fixed in his -mind: not only is no one, not even a Napoleon, able to predetermine -with exactitude the happenings of a battle, but no one can know how -it really did happen, because on the very evening of its ending an -artificial, legendary history appears, which only a credulous spirit -could mistake for real history; yet it is upon this that professional -historians work, integrating or tempering imagination with imagination. -But the battle is known as it gradually develops, and then as the -turmoil that it causes is dissipated, so too is dissipated the turmoil -of that consciousness, and the only thing of importance is the -actuality of the new situation and the 'new disposition of soul that -has been produced, expressed in poetical legends or availing itself -of artificial fictions. And each one of us at every moment knows and -forgets the majority of his thoughts and acts (what a misfortune -it would be if he did not do so, for his life would be a tiresome -computation of his smallest movements!); but he does not forget, and -preserves for a greater or less time, those thoughts and sentiments -which represent memorable crises and problems relating to his future. -Sometimes we assist with astonishment at the awakening in us of -sentiments and thoughts that we had believed to be irrevocable. Thus -it must be said that we know at every moment all the history that we -need to know; and since what remains over does not matter to us, we do -not possess the means of knowing it, or we shall possess it when the -need arises. That 'remaining' history is the eternal phantom of the -'thing in itself,' which is neither 'thing' nor 'in itself,' but only -the imaginative projection of the infinity of our action and of our -knowledge. - -The imaginative projection of the thing in itself, with the agnosticism -that is its result, is caused in philosophy by the natural sciences, -which posit a reality made extrinsic and material and therefore -unintelligible. Chroniclism also occasions historical agnosticism -in an analogous manner at the naturalistic moment of history, for -it posits a dead and unintelligible history. Allowing itself to be -seduced by this allurement it strays from the path of concrete truth, -while the soul feels itself suddenly filled with infinite questions, -most vain and desperate. In like manner, he who strays from or has -not yet entered the fruitful path of a diligent life, feels his soul -full to overflowing of infinite desires, of actions that cannot be -realized, of pleasures out of reach, and consequently suffers the pains -of a Tantalus. But the wisdom of life warns us not to lose ourselves -in _absurd desires_, as the wisdom of thought warns us not to lose -ourselves in _problems that are vain_. - - - -II - - -But if we cannot know anything but the finite and the particular, -always indeed only _this_ particular and _this_ finite, must we then -renounce (a dolorous renunciation 1) knowledge of _universal history_? -Without doubt, but with the double corollary that we are renouncing -what we have never possessed, because we could not possess it, and that -in consequence such renunciation is not at all painful. - -'Universal history,' too, is not a concrete act or tact, but a 'claim,' -and a claim due to chroniclism and to its 'thing in itself,' and -to the strange proposal of closing the infinite progression, which -had been improperly opened, by means of progress to the infinite. -Universal history really tries to form a picture of all the things -that have happened to the human race, from its origins upon the earth -to the present moment. Indeed, it claims to do this from the origin of -things, or the creation, to the end of the world, since it would not -otherwise be truly universal. Hence its tendency to fill the abysses -of prehistory and of the origins with theological or naturalistic -fictions and to trace somehow the future, either with revelations -and prophecies, as in Christian universal history (which went as far -as Antichrist and the Last Judgment), or with previsions, as in the -universal histories of positivism, democratism, and socialism. - -Such was its claim, but the result turns out to be different from -the intention, and it gets what it can--that is to say, a chronicle -that is always more or less of a mixture, or a poetical history -expressing some aspiration of the heart of man, or a true and proper -history, which is not universal, but _particular_, although it -embraces the lives of many peoples and of many times. Most frequently -these different elements are to be discerned side by side in the -same literary composition. Omitting chronicles more or less wide in -scope (though always narrow), poetical histories, and the various -contaminations of several different forms, we immediately perceive, -not as a result of logical deduction alone, but with a simple glance -at any one of the 'universal histories,' that 'universal histories,' -in so far as they are histories, or in that part of them in which they -are histories, resolve themselves into nothing else but particular -histories'--that is to say, they are due to a particular interest -centred in a particular problem, and comprehend only those facts that -form part of that interest and afford an answer to that particular -problem. For antiquity the example of the work of Polybius should -suffice for all, since it was he who most vigorously insisted upon -the need for a 'universal history' (καθολική ιστορία, ή των καθόλου -πραγμάτων σΰνταξις). For the Christian period we may cite the Civitas -Dei of Augustine, and for modern times the _Philosophy of History_ -of Hegel (he also called it universal history, or _philosophische -Weltgeschichte_). But we observe here that the universal history which -Polybius desired and created was that more vast, more complex, more -political, and graver history which Roman hegemony and the formation -of the Roman world required, and therefore that it embraced only those -peoples which came into relation and conflict with Rome, and limited -itself almost altogether to the history of political institutions and -of military dispositions, according to the spiritual tendencies of -the author. Augustine, in his turn, attempted to render intelligible -the penetration of Paganism by Christianity, and with this object in -view he made use of the idea of two enemy cities, the terrestrial -and the celestial, of which the first was sometimes the adversary of -and sometimes preparatory to the second. Finally, Hegel treated the -same problem in his universal history as in his particular history -of philosophy--that is to say, the manner in which the spirit of a -philosophy of servitude to nature, or to the transcendental God, has -elevated itself to the consciousness of liberty. He cut out prehistory -from the philosophy of history, as he had cut it out from the history -of philosophy, and considered Oriental history very summarily, since it -did not offer much of interest to the prosecution of his design. - -Naturalistic or cosmological romances will always be composed by those -who feel inspired to write them, and they will always find eager and -appreciative readers, especially among the lazy, who are pleased to -possess the 'secret of the world' in a few pages. And more or less -vast compilations will always be made of the histories of the East -and the West, of the Americas and Africa and Oceania. The strength -of a single individual does not suffice for these, even as regards -their compilation, so we now find groups of learned men or compilers -associated in that object (as though to give ocular evidence of the -absence of all intimate connexion). We have even seen recently certain -attempts at universal histories arranged on geographical principles, -like so many histories set side by side--European, Asiatic, African, -and so on--which insensibly assume the form of a historical dictionary. -And this or that particular history can always usefully take the name -of a 'universal history,' in the old sense of Polybius--that is to -say, as opposed to books that are less actual, less serious, and less -satisfactory, the books of those 'writers of particular things' (οἱ τάς -ἐπί μέρους γράφοντες πράξεις) who are led to make little things great -(τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλα ποιεῑν) and to indulge in lengthy anecdotes unworthy -of being recorded (περὶ τῶν μηδὲ μνήμης άξιων), and that owing to the -lack of a criterion (δί' ἀκρισίαν). In this sense, those times and -peoples whose politico-social development had produced, as it were, -a narrowing of the historical circle would be well advised to break -away from minute details and to envisage 'universal history'--that -is to say, a vaster history, which lies beyond particular histories. -This applies in particular to our Italy, which, since it had a -universalistic function at the time of the Renaissance, had universal -vision, and told the history of all the peoples in its own way, and -then limited itself to local history, then again elevated itself -to national history, and should now, even more than in the past, -extend itself over the vast fields of the history of all times past -and present. But the word 'universal,' which has value for the ends -above mentioned, will never designate the possession of a 'universal -history,' in the sense that we have refused to it. Such a history -disappears in the world of illusions, together with similar Utopias, -such, for instance, as the art that should serve as model for all -times, or universal justice valid for all time. - - -III - -But in the same way that by the dissipation of the illusion of -universal art and of universal justice the intrinsically universal -character of particular art and of particular justice is not cancelled -(of the _Iliad_ or of the constitution of the Roman family), to negate -universal history does not mean to negate the universal in history. -Here, too, must be repeated what was said of the vain search for God -throughout the infinite series of the finite and found at every point -of it: _Und du bist ganz vor mir!_ That particular and that finite -is determined, in its particularity and finitude, by thought, and -therefore known together with the universal, the universal in that -particular form. The merely finite and particular does not exist -save as an abstraction. There is no abstract finite in poetry and in -art itself, which is the reign of the individual; but there is the -ingenuous finite, which is the undistinguished unity of finite and -infinite, which will be distinguished in the sphere of thought and -will in that way attain to a more lofty form of unity. And history -is thought, and, as such, thought of the universal, of the universal -in its concreteness, and therefore always determined in a particular -manner. There is no fact, however small it be, that can be otherwise -conceived (realized and qualified) than as universal. In its most -simple form--that is to say, in its essential form--history expresses -itself with judgments, inseparable syntheses of individual and -universal. And the individual is called the _subject_ of the judgment, -the universal the _predicate_, by old terminological tradition, -which it will perhaps be convenient to preserve. But for him who -dominates words with thought, the _true subject_ of history is just -the _predicate_, and the _true predicate_ the _subject_--that is to -say, the universal is determined in the judgment by individualizing -it. If this argument seems too abstruse and amounts to a philosophical -subtlety, it may be rendered obvious and altogether different from -a private possession of those known as philosophers by means of the -simple observation that everyone who reflects, upon being asked what is -the subject of the history of poetry, will certainly not reply Dante -or Shakespeare, or Italian or English poetry, or the series of poems -that are known to us, but _poetry_--that is to say, a universal; and -again, when asked what is the subject of social and political history, -the answer will not be Greece or Rome, France or Germany, or even all -these and others such combined, but _culture, civilization, progress, -liberty,_ or any other similar word--that is to say, a universal. - -And here we can remove a great stumbling-block to the recognition -of the _identity of philosophy with history_. I have attempted to -renovate, modify, and establish this doctrine with many analyses and -with many arguments in another volume of my works.[1] It is, however, -frequently very difficult, being rather an object of irresistible -argument than of complete persuasion and adhesion. Seeking for the -various causes of this difficulty, I have come upon one which seems -to me to be the principal and fundamental. This is precisely the -conception of history not as living contemporary history, but as -history that is dead and belongs to the past, as _chronicle_ (or -philological history, which, as we know, can be reduced to chronicle). -It is undeniable that when history is taken as chronicle its identity -with philosophy cannot be made clear to the mind, because it does not -exist. But when chronicle has been reduced to its proper practical and -mnemonical function, and history has been raised to the knowledge of -the _eternal present_, it reveals itself as all one with philosophy, -which for its part is never anything but the thought of the eternal -present. This, be it well understood, provided always that the dualism -of ideas and facts has been superseded, of _vérités de raison_ and -_vérités de fait_, the concept of philosophy as contemplation of -vérités de raison, and that of history as the amassing of brute facts, -of coarse _vérités de fait_. We have recently found this tenacious -dualism in the act of renewing itself, disguised beneath the axiom that -_le propre de l'histoire est de savoir, le propre de la philosophie -est de comprendre_. This amounts to the absurd distinction of knowing -without understanding and of understanding without knowing, which would -thus be the doubly dis-heartening theoretical fate of man. But such a -dualism and the conception of the world which accompanies it, far from -being true philosophy, are the perpetual source whence springs that -imperfect attempt at philosophizing which is called _religion_ when -one is within its magic circle, _mythology_ when one has left it. Will -it be useful to attack transcendency, and to claim the character of -immanence for reality and for philosophy? It will certainly be of use; -but I do not feel the necessity of doing so, at any rate here and now. - -And since history, properly understood, abolishes the idea of a -_universal history_, so philosophy, immanent and identical with -history, abolishes the idea of a _universal philosophy_--that is to -say, of the _closed_ system. The two negations correspond and are -indeed fundamentally one (because closed systems, like universal -histories, are cosmological romances), and both receive empirical -confirmation from the tendency of the best spirits of our day to -refrain from 'universal histories' and from 'definitive systems,' -leaving both to compilers, to believers, and to the credulous of -every sort. This tendency was implicit in the last great philosophy, -that of Hegel, but it was opposed in its own self by old survivals -and altogether betrayed in execution, so that this philosophy also -converts itself into a cosmological romance. Thus it may be said -that what at the beginning of the nineteenth century was merely a -simple _presentiment_ becomes changed into _firm consciousness_ at -the beginning of the twentieth. This defies the fears of the timid -lest the knowledge of the universal should be thus compromised, -and indeed maintains that only in this way can such knowledge be -truly and perpetually acquired, because dynamically obtained. Thus -history becoming _actual history_ and philosophy becoming _historical -philosophy_ have freed themselves, the one from the anxiety of not -being able to know that which is not known, only because it was or will -be known, and the other from the despair of never being able to attain -to definite truth--that is to say, both are freed from the phantom of -the 'thing in itself.' - - -[1] In the _Logic_, especially in Part II, Chapter IV. - - - - -IV - - -IDEAL GENESIS AND DISSOLUTION OF THE 'PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY' - - - -I - - -The conception of the so-called 'philosophy of history' is perpetually -opposed to and resisted by the deterministic conception of history. Not -only is this clearly to be seen from inspection, but it is also quite -evident logically, because the 'philosophy of history' represents the -transcendental conception of the real, determinism the immanent. - -But on examining the facts it is not less certain that historical -determinism perpetually generates the 'philosophy of history'; nor -is this fact less evidently logical than the preceding, because -determinism is naturalism, and therefore immanent, certainly, but -insufficiently and falsely immanent. Hence it should rather be -said that it wishes to be, but is not, immanent, and whatever its -efforts may be in the contrary direction, it becomes converted into -transcendency. All this does not present any difficulty to one who -has clearly in mind the conceptions of the transcendent and of the -immanent, of the philosophy of history as transcendency and of the -deterministic or naturalistic conception of history as a false -immanence. But it will be of use to see in more detail how this process -of agreements and oppositions is developed and solved with reference to -the problem of history. - -"First collect the facts, then connect them causally"; this is the way -that the work of the historian is represented in the deterministic -conception. _Après la collection des faits, la recherche des causes,_ -to repeat the very common formula in the very words of one of the most -eloquent and picturesque theorists of that school, Taine. Facts are -brute, dense, real indeed, but not illumined with the light of science, -not intellectualized. This intelligible character must be conferred -upon them by means of the search for causes. But it is very well known -what happens when one fact is linked to another as its cause, forming a -chain of causes and effects: we thus inaugurate an infinite regression, -and we never succeed in finding the cause or causes to which we can -finally attach the chain that we have been so industriously putting -together. - -Some, maybe many, of the theorists of history get out of the difficulty -in a truly simple manner: they break or let fall at a certain point -their chain, which is already broken at another point at the other -end (the effect which they have undertaken to consider). They operate -with their fragment of chain as though it were something perfect and -closed in itself, as though a straight line divided at two points -should include space and be a figure. Hence, too, the doctrine that we -find among the methodologists of history: that it is only necessary -for history to seek out 'proximate' causes. This doctrine is intended -to supply a logical foundation to the above process. But who can ever -say what are the 'proximate causes'? Thought, since it is admitted -that it is unfortunately obliged to think according to the chain of -causes, will never wish to know anything but 'true' causes, be they -near or distant in space and time (space, like time, _ne fait rien -à l'affaire_). In reality, this theory is a fig-leaf, placed there -to cover a proceeding of which the historian, who is a thinker and a -critic, is ashamed, an act of will which is useful, but which for that -very reason is wilful. The fig-leaf, however, is a sign of modesty, and -as such has its value, because, if shame be lost, there is a risk that -it will finally be declared that the 'causes' at which an arbitrary -halt has been made are the 'ultimate' causes, the 'true' causes, thus -raising the caprice of the individual to the rank of an act creative -of the world, treating it as though it were God, the God of certain -theologians, whose caprice is truth. I should not wish again to quote -Taine just after having said this, for he is a most estimable author, -not on account of his mental constitution, but of his enthusiastic -faith in science; yet it suits me to quote him nevertheless. Taine, -in his search for causes, having reached a cause which he sometimes -calls the 'race' and sometimes the 'age,' as for instance in his -history of English literature, when he reaches the concept of the -'man of the North' or 'German,' with the character and intellect that -would be suitable to such a person--coldness of the senses, love -of abstract ideas, grossness of taste, and contempt for order and -regularity--gravely affirms: _Là s'arrête la recherche: on est tombé -sur quelque disposition primitive, sur quelque trait propre à toutes -les sensations, à toutes les conceptions d'un siècle ou d'une race, sur -quelque particularité inséparable de toutes les démarches de son esprit -et de son cour. Ce sont là les grandes causes, les causes universelles -et permanentes._ What that primitive and insurmountable thing contained -was known to Taine's imagination, but criticism is ignorant of it; for -criticism demands that the genesis of the facts or groups of facts -designated as 'age' and 'race' should be given, and in demanding their -genesis declares that they are neither 'universal' nor 'permanent,' -because no universal and permanent 'facts' are known, as far as I -am aware, certainly not _le Germain_ and _l'homme du Nord_; nor are -mummies facts, though they last some thousands of years, but not for -ever--they change gradually, but they do change. - -Thus whoever adopts the deterministic conception of history, provided -that he decides to abstain from cutting short the inquiry that he has -undertaken in an arbitrary and fanciful manner, is of necessity obliged -to recognize that the method adopted does not attain the desired end. -And since he has begun to think history, although by means of an -insufficient method, no course remains to him save that of beginning -all over again and following a different path, or that of going -forward but changing his direction. The naturalistic presupposition, -which still holds its ground ("first collect the facts, then seek -the causes": what is more evident and more unavoidable than that?), -necessarily leads to the second alternative. But to adopt the second -alternative is to supersede determinism, it is to transcend nature -and its causes, it is to propose a method opposite to that hitherto -followed--that is to say, to renounce the category of cause for -another, which cannot be anything but that of end, an extrinsic and -transcendental end, which is the analogous opposite, corresponding to -the cause. Now the search for the transcendental end is the 'philosophy -of history.' - -The consequent naturalist (I mean by this he who 'continues to think,' -or, as is generally said, to draw the consequences) cannot avoid this -inquiry, nor does he ever avoid it, in whatever manner he conceive -his new inquiry. This he cannot even do, when he tries, by declaring -that the end or 'ultimate cause' is unknowable, because (as elsewhere -remarked) an unknowable affirmed is an unknowable in some way known. -Naturalism is always crowned with a philosophy of history, whatever -its mode of formulation: whether it explain the universe as composed -of atoms that strike one another and produce history by means of their -various shocks and gyrations, to which they can also put an end by -returning to their primitive state of dispersion, whether the hidden -God be termed Matter or the Unconscious or something else, or whether, -finally, He be conceived as an Intelligence which avails itself of -the chain of causes in order to actualize His counsels. And every -philosopher of history is on the other hand a naturalist, because he -is a dualist and conceives a God and a world, an idea and a fact in -addition to or beneath the Idea, a kingdom of ends and a kingdom or -sub-kingdom of causes, a celestial city and one that is more or less -diabolical or terrene. Take any deterministic historical work and you -will find or discover in it, explicit or understood, transcendency (in -Taine, for example, it goes by the name of 'race' or of '_siècle,_' -which are true and proper deities); take any work of 'philosophy of -history' and dualism and naturalism will be found there (in Hegel, for -example, when he admits rebellious and impotent facts which resist or -are unworthy the dominion of the idea). And we shall see more and more -clearly how from the entrails of naturalism comes inevitably forth the -'philosophy of history.' - - - -II - - -But the 'philosophy of history' is just as contradictory as the -deterministic conception from which it arises and to which it is -opposed. Having both accepted and superseded the method of linking -brute facts together, it no longer finds facts to link (for these -have already been linked together, as well as might be, by means -of the category of cause), but brute facts, on which it must confer -rather a 'meaning' than a linking, representing them as aspects of a -transcendental process, a theophany. Now those facts, in so far as -they are brute facts, are mute, and the transcendency of the process -requires an organ, not that of thought that thinks or produces facts, -but an extra-logical organ, in order to be conceived and represented -(such, for example, as thought which proceeds abstractly _a priori,_ -in the manner of Fichte), and this is not to be found in the spirit, -save as a negative moment, as the void of effective logical thought. -The void of logical thought is immediately filled with _praxis,_ or -what is called sentiment, which then appears as poetry, by theoretical -refraction. There is an evident poetical character running through all -'philosophies of history.' Those of antiquity represented historical -events as strife between the gods of certain peoples or of certain -races or protectors of certain individuals, or between the god of light -and truth and the powers of darkness and lies. They thus expressed the -aspirations of peoples, groups, or individuals toward hegemony, or of -man toward goodness and truth. The most modern of modern forms is that -inspired by various national and ethical feelings (the Italian, the -Germanic, the Slav, etc.), or which represents the course of history as -leading to the kingdom of liberty, or as the passage from the Eden of -primitive communism, through the Middle Ages of slavery, servitude, and -wages, toward the restoration of communism, which shall no longer be -unconscious but conscious, no longer Edenic but human. In poetry, facts -are no longer facts but words, not reality but images, and so there -would be no occasion to censure them, if it remained pure poetry. -But it does not so remain, because those images and words are placed -there as ideas and facts--that is to say, as myths: progress, liberty, -economy, technique, science are myths, in so far as they are looked -upon as agents external to the facts. They are myths no less than God -and the Devil, Mars and Venus, Jove and Baal, or any other cruder forms -of divinity. And this is the reason why the deterministic conception, -after it has produced the 'philosophy of history,' which opposes it, -is obliged to oppose its own daughter in its turn, and to appeal from -the realm of ends to that of causal connexions, from imagination to -observation, from myths to facts. - -The reciprocal confutation of historical determinism and the philosophy -of history, which makes of each a void or a nothing--that is to say, -a single void or nothing--seems to the eclectics as usual to be the -reciprocal fulfilment of two entities, which effect or should effect -an alliance for mutual support. And since eclecticism flourishes in -contemporary philosophy, mutato nomine, it is not surprising that -besides the duty of investigating the causes to history also is -assigned that of ascertaining the 'meaning' or the 'general plan' of -the course of history (see the works on the philosophy of history of -Labriola, Simmel, and Rickert). Since, too, writers on method are -wont to be empirical and therefore eclectic, we find that with them -also history is divided into the history which unites and criticizes -documents and reconstructs events, and 'philosophy of history' (see -Bernheim's manual, typical of all of them). Finally, since ordinary -thought is eclectic, nothing is more easy than to find agreement as to -the thesis that simple history, which presents the series of facts, -does not suffice, but that it is necessary that thought should return -to the already constituted chain of events, in order to discover -there the hidden design and to answer the questions as to whence we -come and whither we go. This amounts to saying that a 'philosophy of -history' must be posited side by side with history. This eclecticism, -which gives substance to two opposite voids and makes them join -hands, sometimes attempts to surpass itself and to mingle those two -fallacious sciences or parts of science. Then we hear 'philosophy of -history' defended, but with the caution that it must be conducted with -'scientific' and 'positive' method, by means of the search for the -cause, thus revealing the action of divine reason or providence.[1] -Ordinary thought quickly consents to this programme, but afterward -fails to carry it out.[2] - -There is nothing new here either for those who know: 'philosophy -of history' to be constructed by means of 'positive methods,' -transcendency to be demonstrated by means of the methods of false -immanence, is the exact equivalent in the field of historical studies -to that "metaphysic to be constructed by means of the experimental -method" which was recommended by the neocritics (Zeller and others), -for it claimed, not indeed to supersede two voids that reciprocally -confute one another, but to make them agree together, and, after -having given substance to them, to combine them in a single substance. -I should not like to describe the impossibilities contained in the -above as the prodigies of an alchemist (the metaphor seems to be too -lofty), but rather as the medleys of bad cooks. - - -[1] See, for example, the work of Flint; but since, less radical than -Flint, Hegel and the Hegelians themselves also ended in admitting the -concourse of the two opposed methods, traces of this perversion are -also to be found in their 'philosophies of history.' Here, too, is to -be noted the false analogy by which Hegel was led to discover the same -relation between a priori and historical facts as between mathematics -and natural facts: _Man muss mit dem Kreise dessen, worin die -Prinzipien fallen, wenn man es so nennen will, a priori vertraut sein, -so gut als Kepler mit den Ellipsen, mit Kuben und Quadraten und mit den -Gedanken von Verhältnissen derselben_ a priori _schon vorher bekannt -sein musste, ehe er aus den empirischen Daten seine unsterblichen -Gesetze, welche aus Bestimmungen jener Kreise von Vorstellungen -bestehen, erfinden konnte._ (_Cf. Vorles. üb. d. Philos, d. Gesch.,_ -ed. Brunstäd, pp. 107-108.) - -[2] Not even the above-mentioned Flint carried it out, for he lost -him-self in preliminaries of historical documentation and never -proceeded to the promised construction. - - - -III - - -The true remedy for the contradictions of historical determinism and of -the 'philosophy of history' is quite other than this. To obtain it, we -must accept the result of the preceding confutation, which shows that -both are futile, and reject, as lacking thought, both the 'designs' -of the philosophy of history and the causal chains of determinism. -When these two shadows have been dispersed we shall find ourselves -at the starting-place: we are again face to face with disconnected -brute facts, with facts that are connected, but not understood, for -which determinism had tried to employ the cement of causality, the -'philosophy of history,' the magic wand of finality. What shall we -do with these facts? How shall we make them clear rather than dense -as they were, organic rather than inorganic, intelligible rather -than unintelligible? Truly, it seems difficult to do anything with -them, especially to effect their desired transformation. The spirit -is helpless before that which is, or is supposed to be, external to -it. And when facts are understood in that way we are apt to assume -again that attitude of contempt of the philosophers for history which -has been well-nigh constant since antiquity almost to the end of the -eighteenth century (for Aristotle history was "less philosophical" and -less serious than poetry, for Sextus Empiricus it was "unmethodical -material"; Kant did not feel or understand history). The attitude -amounts to this: leave ideas to the philosophers and brute facts to the -historians--let us be satisfied with serious things and leave their -toys to the children. - -But before having recourse to such a temptation, it will be prudent -to ask counsel of methodical doubt (which is always most useful), and -to direct the attention precisely upon those brute and disconnected -facts from which the causal method claims to start and before which we, -who are now abandoned by it and by its complement, the philosophy of -history, appear to find ourselves again. Methodical doubt will suggest -above all things the thought that those facts are a _presupposition_ -that has _not been proved_, and it will lead to the inquiry as to -_whether the proof can be obtained_. Having attempted the proof, we -shall finally arrive at the conclusion that _those facts really do not -exist._ - -For who, as a matter of fact, affirms their existence? Precisely the -spirit, at the moment when it is about to undertake the search for -causes. But when accomplishing that act the spirit does not already -possess the brute facts (_d'abord la collection des faits_) and then -seek the causes (_après, la recherche des causes_); but it makes -the _facts brute_ by that very act--that is to say, it posits them -itself in that way, because it is of use to it so to posit them. -The search for causes, undertaken by history, is not in any way -different from the procedure of naturalism, already several times -illustrated, which abstractly analyses and classifies reality. And -to illustrate abstractly and to classify implies at the same time to -judge in classifying--that is to say, to treat facts, not as acts of -the spirit, conscious in the spirit that thinks them, but as external -brute facts. The _Divine Comedy_ is that poem which we create again -in our imagination in all its particulars as we read it and which we -understand critically as a particular determination of the spirit, -and to which we therefore assign its place in history, with all its -surroundings and all its relations. But when this actuality of our -thought and imagination has come to an end--that is to say, when that -mental process is completed--we are able, by means of a new act of -the spirit, separately to analyse its elements. Thus, for instance, -we shall classify the concepts relating to 'Florentine civilization,' -or to 'political poetry,' and say that the _Divine Comedy_ was an -effect of Florentine civilization, and this in its turn an effect -of the strife of the communes, and the like. We shall also thus -have prepared the way for those absurd problems which used to annoy -de Sanctis so much in relation to the work of Dante, and which he -admirably described when he said that they arise only when lively -æsthetic expression has grown cold and poetical work has fallen into -the hands of dullards addicted to trifles. But if we stop in time and -do not enter the path of those absurdities, if we restrict ourselves -purely and simply to the naturalistic moment, to classification, and -to the classificatory judgment (which is also causal connexion), in an -altogether practical manner, without drawing any deductions from it, we -shall have done nothing that is not perfectly legitimate; indeed, we -shall be exercising our right and bowing to a rational necessity, which -is that of naturalizing, when naturalization is of use, but not beyond -those limits. Thus the materialization of the facts and the external -or causal binding of them together are altogether justified as pure -naturalism. And even the maxim which bids us to stop at 'proximate' -causes--that is to say, not to force classification so far that it -loses all practical utility--will find its justification. To place -the concept of the _Divine Comedy_ in relation to that of 'Florentine -civilization' may be of use, but it will be of no use whatever, -or infinitely less use, to place it in relation to the class of -'Indo-European civilization' or to the 'civilization of the white man.' - - - -IV - - -Let us then return with greater confidence to the point of departure, -the true point of departure--that is to say, not to that of facts -already disorganized and naturalized, but to that of the mind -that thinks and constructs the fact. Let us raise up the debased -countenances of the calumniated 'brute facts,' and we shall see the -light of thought resplendent upon their foreheads. And that true point -of departure will reveal itself not merely as a point of departure, but -both as a point of arrival and of departure, not as the first step in -historical construction, but the whole of history in its construction, -which is also its self-construction. Historical determinism, and all -the more 'philosophy of history,' leave the _reality of history_ behind -them, though they directed their journey thither, a journey which -became so erratic and so full of useless repetitions. - -We shall make the ingenuous Taine confess that what we are saying -is the truth when we ask him what he means by the _collection des -faits_ and learn from him in reply that the collection in question -consists of two stages or moments, in the first of which documents -are revived in order to attain, _à travers la distance des temps, -l'homme vivant, agissant, doué de passions, muni d'habitudes, avec -sa voix et sa physionomie, avec ses gestes et ses habits, distinct -et complet comme celui que tout à l'heure nous avons quitté dans la -rue;_ and in the second is sought and found _sous l'homme extérieur -l'homme intérieur, "l'homme invisible," "le centre," "le groupe des -facultés et des sentiments qui produit le reste," "le drame intérieur," -"la psychologie."_ Something very different, then, from collections -de faits I If the things mentioned by our author really do come to -pass, if we really do make live again in imagination individuals and -events, and if we think what is within them--that is to say, if we -think the synthesis of intuition and concept, which is thought in its -concreteness--history is already achieved: what more is wanted? There -is nothing more to seek. Taine replies: "We must seek causes." That is -to say, we must slay the living 'fact' thought by thought, separate -its abstract elements--a useful thing, no doubt, but useful for memory -and practice. Or, as is the custom of Taine, we must misunderstand and -exaggerate the value of the function of this abstract analysis, to lose -ourselves in the mythology of races and ages, or in other different but -none the less similar things. Let us beware how we slay poor facts, if -we wish to think as historians, and in so far as we are such and really -think in that way we shall not feel the necessity for having recourse -either to the extrinsic bond of causes, historical determinism, or to -that which is equally extrinsic of transcendental ends, philosophy of -history. The fact historically thought has no cause and no end outside -itself, but only in itself, coincident with its real qualities and with -its qualitative reality. Because (it is well to note in passing) the -determination of facts as real facts indeed, but of _unknown nature_, -asserted but not understood, is itself also an illusion of naturalism -(which thus heralds its other illusion, that of the 'philosophy of -history'). In thought, reality and quality, existence and essence, are -all one, and it is not possible to affirm a fact as real without at the -same time knowing what fact it is--that is, without qualifying it. - -Returning to and remaining in or moving in the concrete fact, or, -rather, making of oneself thought that thinks the fact concretely, we -experience the continual formation and the continual progress of our -historical thought and also make clear to ourselves the history of -historiography, which proceeds in the same manner. And we see how (I -limit myself to this, in order not to allow the eye to wander too far) -from the days of the Greeks to our own historical understanding has -always been enriching and deepening itself, not because abstract causes -and transcendental ends of human things have ever been recovered, -but only because an ever increasing consciousness of them has been -acquired. Politics and morality, religion and philosophy and art, -science and culture and economy, have become more complex concepts and -at the same time better determined and unified both in themselves and -with respect to the whole. Correlatively with this, the histories of -these forms of activity have become ever more complex and more firmly -united. We know 'the causes' of civilization as little as did the -Greeks; and we know as little as they of the god or gods who control -the fortunes of humanity. But we know the theory of civilization better -than did the Greeks, and, for instance, we know (as they did not know, -or did not know with equal clearness and security) that poetry is an -eternal form of the theoretic spirit, that regression or decadence is a -relative concept, that the world is not divided into ideas and shadows -of ideas, or into potencies and acts, that slavery is not a category -of the real, but a historical form of economic, and so forth. Thus it -no longer occurs to anyone (save to the survivals or fossils, still to -be found among us) to write the history of poetry on the principle of -the pedagogic ends that the poets are supposed to have had in view: -on the contrary, we strive to determine the forms expressive of their -sentiments. We are not at all bewildered when we find ourselves before -what are called 'decadences,' but we seek out what new and greater -thing was being developed by means of their dialectic. We do not -consider the work of man to be miserable and illusory, and aspiration -and admiration for the skies and for the ascesis joined thereunto -and averse to earth as alone worthy of admiration and imitation. We -recognize the reality of power in the act, and in the shadows the -solidity of the ideas, and on earth heaven. Finally, we do not find -that the possibility of social life is lost owing to the disappearance -of the system of slavery. Such a disappearance would have been the -catastrophe of reality, if slaves were natural to reality--and so forth. - -This conception of history and the consideration of historiographical -work in itself make it possible for us to be just toward historical -determinism and to the 'philosophy of history,' which, by their -continual reappearance, have continually pointed to the gaps in our -knowledge, both historical and philosophical, and with their false -provisional solutions have heralded the correct solutions of the new -problems which we have been propounding. Nor has it been said that -they will henceforth cease to exercise such a function (which is the -beneficial function of Utopias of every sort). And although historical -determinism and the 'philosophy of history' have no history, because -they do not develop, they yet receive a content from the relation in -which they stand to history, which does develop--that is to say, -history develops in them, notwithstanding their covering, extrinsic -to their content, which compels to think even him who proposes to -schematize and to imagine without thinking. For there is a great -difference between the determinism that can now appear, after Descartes -and Vico and Kant and Hegel, and that which appeared after Aristotle; -between the philosophy of history of Hegel and Marx and that of -gnosticism and Christianity. Transcendency and false immanency are at -work in both these conceptions respectively; but the abstract forms -and mythologies that have appeared in more mature epochs of thought -contain this new maturity in themselves. In proof of this, let us -pause but a moment (passing by the various forms of naturalism) at -the case of the 'philosophy of history.' We observe already a great -difference between the philosophy of history, as it appears in the -Homeric world, and that of Herodotus, with whom the conception of the -anger of the gods is a simulacrum of the moral law, which spares the -humble and treads the proud underfoot; from Herodotus to the Fate of -the Stoics, a law to which the gods themselves are subjected, and from -this to the conception of Providence, which appears in late antiquity -as wisdom that rules the world; from this pagan providence again to -Christianity, which is divine justice, evangelical preparation, and -educative care of the human race, and so on, to the refined providence -of the theologians, which as a rule excludes divine intervention -and operates by means of secondary causes, to that of Vico, which -operates as dialectic of the spirit, to the Idea of Hegel, which is the -gradual conquest of the consciousness of self, which liberty achieves -during the course of history, till we finally reach the mythology of -progress and of civilization, which still persists and is supposed to -tend toward the final abolition of prejudices and superstitions, to -be carried out by means of the increasing power and divulgation of -positive science. - -In this way the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism -sometimes attain to the thinness and transparency of a veil, which -covers and at the same time reveals the concreteness of the real in -thought. Mechanical causes thus appear idealized, transcendent deities -humanized, and facts are in great part divested of their brutal aspect. -But however thin the veil may be, it remains a veil, and however -clear the truth may be, it is not altogether clear, for at bottom -the false persuasion still persists that history is constructed with -the 'material' of brute facts, with the 'cement' of causes, and with -the 'magic' of ends, as with three successive or concurrent methods. -The same thing occurs with religion, which in lofty minds liberates -itself almost altogether from vulgar beliefs, as do its ethics from the -heteronomy of the divine command and from the utilitarianism of rewards -and punishments. Almost altogether, but not altogether, and for this -reason religion will never be philosophy, save by negating itself, and -thus the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism will become -history only by negating themselves. The reason is that as long as they -proceed in a positive manner dualism will also persist, and with it the -torment of scepticism and agnosticism as a consequence. - -The negation of the philosophy of history, in history understood -concretely, is its ideal dissolution, and since that so-called -philosophy is nothing but an abstract and negative moment, our reason -for affirming that _the philosophy of history_ is dead is clear. It -is dead in its positivity, dead as a body of doctrine, dead in this -way, with all the other conceptions and forms of the transcendental. -I do not wish to attach to my brief (but in my opinion sufficient) -treatment of the argument the addition of an explanation which to some -will appear to be (as it appears to me) but little philosophical and -even somewhat trivial. Notwithstanding, since I prefer the accusation -of semi-triviality to that of equivocation, I shall add that since the -criticism of the 'concepts' of cause and transcendental finality does -not forbid the use of these 'words,' when they are simple words (to -talk, for example, in an imaginative way of liberty as of a goddess, or -to say, when about to undertake a study of Dante, that our intention is -to 'seek the cause' or 'causes' of this or that work or act of his), -so nothing forbids our continuing to talk of 'philosophy of history' -and of philosophizing history, meaning the necessity of treating or of -a better treatment of this or that historical problem. Neither does -anything forbid our calling the researches of historical gnoseology -'philosophy of history,' although in this case we are treating the -history, not properly of _history_, but of _historiography_, two things -which are wont to be designated with the same word in Italian as in -other languages. Neither do we wish to prevent the statement (as did a -German professor years ago) that the 'philosophy of history' must be -treated as 'sociology'--that is to say, the adornment with that ancient -title of so-called sociology, the empirical science of the state, of -society and of culture. - -These denominations are all permissible in virtue of the same right -as that invoked by the adventurer Casanova when he went before the -magistrates in order to justify himself for having changed his -name--"the right of every man to the letters of the alphabet." But the -question treated above is not one of the letters of the alphabet. The -'philosophy of history,' of which we have briefly shown the genesis and -the dissolution, is not one that is used in various senses, but a most -definite mode of conceiving history--the transcendental mode. - - - - -V - - -THE POSITIVITY OF HISTORY - - -We therefore meet the well-known saying of Fustel de Coulanges that -there are certainly "history and philosophy, but not the philosophy -of history," with the following: there is neither philosophy nor -history, nor philosophy of history, but history which is philosophy -and philosophy which is history and is intrinsic to history. For this -reason, all the controversies--and foremost of all those concerned -with progress--which philosophers, methodologists of history, and -sociologists believe to belong to their especial province, and flaunt -at the beginning and the end of their treatises, are reduced for us to -simple problems of philosophy, with historical motivation, all of them -connected with the problems of which philosophy treats. - -In controversies relating to progress it is asked whether the work of -man be fertile or sterile, whether it be lost or preserved, whether -history have an end, and if so of what sort, whether this end be -attainable in time or only in the infinite, whether history be progress -or regress, or an interchange between progress and regress, greatness -and decadence, whether good or evil prevail in it, and the like. When -these questions have been considered with a little attention we shall -see that they resolve themselves substantially into three points: the -conception of development, that of end, and that of value. That is to -say, they are concerned with the whole of reality, and with history -only when it is precisely the whole of reality. For this reason they -do not belong to supposed particular sciences, to the philosophy of -history, or to sociology, but to philosophy and to history in so far -as it is philosophy. When the ordinary current terminology has been -translated into philosophical terms it calls forth immediately the -thesis, antithesis, and synthesis by means of which those problems -have been thought and solved during the course of philosophy, to -which the reader desirous of instruction must be referred. We can -only mention here that the conception of reality as development is -nothing but the synthesis of the two one-sided opposites, consisting -of permanency without change and of change without permanency, of -an identity without diversity and of a diversity without identity, -for development is a perpetual surpassing, which is at the same -time a perpetual conservation. From this point of view one of the -conceptions that has had the greatest vogue in historical books, that -of _historical circles,_ is revealed as an equivocal attempt to issue -forth from a double one-sidedness and a falling back into it, owing to -an equivocation. Because either the series of circles is conceived as -composed of identicals and we have only permanency, or it is conceived -as of things diverse and we have only change. But if, on the contrary, -we conceive it as circularity that is perpetually identical and at the -same time perpetually diverse, in this sense it coincides with the -conception of development itself. - -In like manner, the opposite theses, as to the attainment or the -impossibility of attainment of the end of history, reveal their common -defect of positing the end as _extrinsic_ to history, conceiving -of it either as that which can be reached in time (_progressus ad -finitum_), or as that which can never be attained, but only infinitely -approximated (_progressus ad infinitum_). But where the end has been -correctly conceived as _internal_--that is to say, all one with -development itself--we must conclude that it is attained at every -instant, and at the same time not attained, because every attainment -is the formation of a new prospect, whence we have at every moment the -satisfaction of possession, and arising from this the dissatisfaction -which drives us to seek a new possession.[1] - -Finally, the conceptions of history as a passage from evil to good -(progress), or from good to evil (decadence, regression), take their -origin from the same error of entifying and making extrinsic good and -evil, joy and sorrow (which are the dialectical construction of reality -itself). To unite them in the eclectic conception of an alternation of -good and evil, of progress and regress, is incorrect. The true solution -is that of progress understood not as a passage from evil to good, as -though from one state to another, but as the passage from the good to -the better, in which the evil is the good itself seen in the light of -the better. - -These are all philosophical solutions which are at variance with -the superficial theses of controversialists (dictated to them by -sentimental motives or imaginative combinations, really mythological -or resulting in mythologies), to the same extent that they are in -accordance with profound human convictions and with the tireless toil, -the trust, the courage, which constitute their ethical manifestations. - -By drawing the consequences of the dialectical conception of progress -something more immediately effective can be achieved in respect to the -practice and history of historiography. For we find in that conception -the origin of a historical maxim, in the mouth of every one, yet -frequently misunderstood and frequently violated--that is to say, that -to history pertains not to _judge,_ but to _explain,_ and that it -should be not _subjective_ but _objective._ - -Misunderstood, because the judging in question is often taken in the -sense of logical judgment, of that judgment which is thinking itself, -and the subjectivity, which would thus be excluded, would be neither -more nor less than the subjectivity of thought. In consequence of this -misunderstanding we hear historians being advised to purge themselves -of theories, to refrain from the disputes arising from them, to -restrict themselves to facts, collecting, arranging, and squeezing out -the sap (even by the statistical method). It is impossible to follow -such advice as this, as may easily be seen, for such 'abstention from -thought' reveals itself as really abstention from 'seriousness of -thought,' as a surreptitious attaching of value to the most vulgar and -contradictory thoughts, transmitted by tradition, wandering about idly -in the mind, or flashing out as the result of momentary caprice. The -maxim is altogether false, understood or misunderstood in this way, -and it must be taken by its opposite--namely, that history must always -judge strictly, and that it must always be energetically subjective -without allowing itself to be confused by the conflicts in which -thought engages or by the risks that it runs. For it is thought itself, -and thought alone, which gets over its own difficulties and dangers, -without falling even here into that frivolous eclecticism which tries -to find a middle term between our judgment and that of others, and -suggests various neutral and insipid forms of judgment. - -But the true and legitimate meaning, the original motive for that -'judging,' that 'subjectivity,' which it condemns, is that history -should not apply to the deeds and the personages that are its material -the qualifications of good and evil, as though there really were -good and evil facts in the world, people who are good and people -who are evil. And it is certainly not to be denied that innumerable -historiographers, or those who claim to be historiographers, have -really striven and still strive along those lines, in the vain and -presumptuous attempt to reward the good and punish the evil, to qualify -historical epochs as representing progress or decadence--in a word, -to settle what is good and what is evil, as though it were a question -of separating one element from another in a compound, hydrogen from, -oxygen. - -Whoever desires to observe intrinsically the above maxim, and by -doing so to set himself in accordance with the dialectic conception -of progress, must in truth look upon every trace or vestige of -propositions affirming evil, regression, or decadence as real facts, -as a sign of imperfection--in a word, he must condemn every trace -or vestige of _negative_ judgments. If the course of history is not -the passage from evil to good, or alternative good and evil, but the -passage from the good to the better, if history should explain and -not condemn, it will pronounce only _positive_ judgments, and will -forge chains of good, so solid and so closely linked that it will -not be possible to introduce into them even a little link of evil or -to interpose empty spaces, which in so far as they are empty would -not represent good but evil. A fact that seems to be only evil, an -epoch that appears to be one of complete decadence, can be nothing -but a _non-historical_ fact--that is to say, one which has not been -historically treated, not penetrated by thought, and which has remained -the prey of sentiment and imagination. - -Whence comes the phenomenology of good and evil, of sin and repentance, -of decadence and resurrection, save from the consciousness of the -agent, from the act which is in labour to produce a new form of -life?[2] And in that act the adversary who opposed us is in the -wrong; the state from which we wish to escape, and from which we -are escaping, is unhappy; the new one toward which we are tending -becomes symbolized as a dreamed-of felicity to be attained, or as -a past condition to restore, which is therefore most beautiful in -recollection (which here is not recollection, but imagination). Every -one knows how these things present them-selves to us in the course -of history, manifesting themselves in poetry, in Utopias, in stories -with a moral, in detractions, in apologies, in myths of love, of -hate, and the like. To the heretics of the Middle Ages and to the -Protestant reformers the condition of the primitive Christians seemed -to be most lovely and most holy, that of papal Christians most evil -and debased. The Sparta of Lycurgus and the Rome of Cincinnatus seemed -to the Jacobins to be as admirable as France under the Carlovingians -and the Capetians was detestable. The humanists looked upon the lives -of the ancient poets and sages as luminous and the life of the Middle -Ages as dense darkness. Even in times near our own has been witnessed -the glorification of the Lombard communes and the depreciation of -the Holy Roman Empire, and the very opposite of this, according as -the facts relating to these historical events were reflected in the -consciousness of an Italian longing for the independence of Italy or -of a German upholding the holy German empire of Prussian hegemony. -And this will always happen, because such is the phenomenology of the -practical consciousness, and these practical valuations will always -be present to some extent in the works of historians. As works, these -are not and cannot ever be pure history, quintessential history; if in -no other way, then in their phrasing and use of metaphors they will -reflect the repercussion of practical needs and efforts directed toward -the future. But the historical consciousness, as such, is logical and -not practical consciousness, and indeed makes the other its object; -history once lived has become in it thought, and the antitheses of will -and feeling that formerly offered resistance have no longer a place in -thought. - -For if there are no good and evil facts, but facts that are always good -when understood in their intimate being and concreteness, there are not -opposite sides, but that wider side that embraces both the adversaries -and which happens just to be historical consideration. Historical -consideration, therefore, recognizes as of equal right the Church of -the catacombs and that of Gregory VII, the tribunes of the Roman people -and the feudal barons, the Lombard League and the Emperor Barbarossa. -History never metes out justice, but always _justifies_; she could not -carry out the former act without making herself unjust--that is to say, -confounding thought with life, taking the attractions and repulsions of -sentiment for the judgments of thought. - -Poetry is satisfied with the expression of sentiment, and it is worthy -of note that a considerable historian, Schlosser, wishing to reserve -for himself the right and duty of judging historical facts with -Kantian austerity and abstraction, kept his eyes fixed on the _Divine -Comedy_--that is to say, a poetical work--as his model of treatment. -And since there are poetical elements in all myths, we understand why -the conception of history known as _dualistic_--that is to say, of -history as composed of two currents, which mix but never resolve in one -another their waters of good and evil, truth and error, rationality and -irrationality--should have formed a conspicuous part, not only of the -Christian religion, but also of the mythologies (for they really are -such) of humanism and of illuminism. But the detection of this problem -of the duality of values and its solution in the superior unity of -the conception of development is the work of the nineteenth century, -which on this account and on account of other solutions of the same -kind (certainly not on account of its philological and archæological -richness, which was relatively common to the four preceding centuries) -has been well called 'the century of history.' - -Not only, therefore, is history unable to discriminate between facts -that are good and facts that are evil, and between epochs that are -progressive and those that are regressive, but it does not begin until -the psychological conditions which rendered possible such antitheses -have been superseded and substituted by an act of the spirit, which -seeks to ascertain what function the fact or the epoch previously -condemned has fulfilled--that is to say, what it has produced of its -own in the course of development, and therefore what it has produced. -And since all facts and epochs are productive in their own way, not -only is not one of them to be condemned in the light of history, but -all are to be praised and venerated. A condemned fact, a fact that is -repugnant, is not yet a historical proposition, it is hardly even the -premiss of a historical problem to be formulated. A negative history is -a non-history so long as its negative process substitutes itself for -thought, which is affirmative, and does not maintain itself within its -practical and moral bounds and limit itself to poetical expressions and -empirical modes of representation, in respect of all of which we can -certainly speak (speak and not think), as we do speak at every moment, -of bad men and periods of decadence and regression. - -If the vice of negative history arises from the separation, the -solidification, and the opposition of the dialectical antitheses -of good and evil and the transformation of the ideal moments of -development into entities, that other deviation of history which -may be known as elegiac history arises from the misunderstanding of -another necessity of that conception--that is to say, the perpetual -constancy, the perpetual conservation of what has been acquired. But -this is also false by definition. What is preserved and enriched -in the course of history is history itself, spirituality. The past -does not live otherwise than in the present, as the force of the -present, resolved and transformed in the present. Every particular -form, individual, action, institution, work, thought, is destined to -perish: even art, which is called eternal (and is so in a certain -sense), perishes, for it does not live, save to the extent that it -is reproduced, and therefore transfigured and surrounded with new -light, in the spirit of posterity. Finally, truth itself perishes, -particular and determined truth, because it is not rethinkable, save -when included in the system of a vaster truth, and therefore at the -same time transformed. But those who do not rise to the conception of -pure historical consideration, those who attach themselves with their -whole soul to an individual, a work, a belief, an institution, and -attach themselves so strongly that they cannot separate themselves -from it in order to objectify it before themselves and think it, are -prone to attribute the immortality which belongs to the spirit in -universal to the spirit in one of its particular and determined forms; -and since that form, notwithstanding their efforts, dies, and dies -in their arms, the universe darkens before their gaze, and the only -history that they can relate is the sad one of the agony and death of -beautiful things. This too is poetry, and very lofty poetry. Who can do -otherwise than weep at the loss of a beloved one, at separation from -something dear to him, cannot see the sun extinguished and the earth -tremble and the birds cease their flight and fall to earth, like Dante, -on the loss of his beloved "who was so beautiful"? But history is never -_history of death_, but _history of life_, and all know that the proper -commemoration of the dead is the knowledge of what they did in life, -of what they produced that is working in us, the history of their life -and not of their death, which it behoves a gentle soul to veil, a soul -barbarous and perverse to exhibit in its miserable nakedness and to -contemplate with unhealthy persistence. For this reason all histories -which narrate the death and not the life of peoples, of states, of -institutions, of customs, of literary and artistic ideals, of religious -conceptions, are to be considered false, or, we repeat, simply poetry, -where they attain to the level of poetry. People grow sad and suffer -and lament because that which was is no longer. This would resolve -itself into a mere tautology (because if it was, it is evident that it -is no longer), were it not conjoined to the neglect of recognizing what -of that past has not perished--that is to say, that past in so far as -it is not past but present, the eternal life of the past. It is in this -neglect, in the incorrect view arising out of it, that the falsity of -such histories resides. - -It sometimes happens that historians, intent upon narrating those -scenes of anguish in a lugubrious manner and upon celebrating the -funerals which it pleases them to call histories, remain partly -astounded and partly scandalized when they hear a peal of laughter, a -cry of joy, a sigh of satisfaction, or find an enthusiastic impulse -springing up from the documents that they are searching. How, they -ask, could men live, make love, reproduce their species, sing, paint, -discuss, when the trumps were sounding east and west to announce the -end of the world? But they do not see that such an end of the world -exists only in their own imaginations, rich in elegiac motives, but -poor in understanding. They do not perceive that such importunate -trumpet-calls have never in reality existed. These are very useful, -on the other hand, for reminding those who may have forgotten it that -history always pursues her indefatigable work, and that her apparent -agonies are the travail of a new birth, and that what are believed to -be her expiring sighs are moans that announce the birth of a new world. -History differs from the individual who dies because, in the words of -Alcmæon of Crete, he is not able τὴν ἀρχήν τῷ τέλει προσάψαι, to join -his beginning to his end: history never dies, because she always joins -her beginning to her end. - - -[1] For the complete development of these conceptions, see my study -of _The Conception of Becoming_, in the _Saggio sullo Hegel seguito -da altri scritti di storia della filosofia_, pp. 149-175 (Bari, -1913). (English translation of the work on Hegel by Douglas Ainslie. -Macmillan, London.) - -[2] For what relates to this section, see my treatment of _Judgments of -Value,_ in the work before cited. - - - - -VI - - -THE HUMANITY OF HISTORY - - -Enfranchising itself from servitude to extra-mundane caprice and -to blind natural necessity, freeing itself from transcendency and -from false immanence (which is in its turn transcendency), thought -conceives history as the work of man, as the product of human will -and intellect, and in this manner enters that form of history which -we shall call _humanistic._ This humanism first appears as in simple -contrast to nature or to extra-mundane powers, and posits dualism. -On the one side is man, with his strength, his intelligence, his -reason, his prudence, his will for the good; on the other there is -something that resists him, strives against him, upsets his wisest -plans, breaks the web that he has been weaving and obliges him to weave -it all over again. History, envisaged from the view-point of this -conception, is developed entirely from the first of these two sides, -because the other does not afford a dialectical element which can be -continually met and superseded by the first, giving rise to a sort of -interior collaboration, but represents the absolutely extraneous, the -capricious, the accidental, the meddler, the ghost at the feast. Only -in the former do we find rationality combined with human endeavour, -and thus the possibility of a rational explication of history. What -comes from the other side is announced, but not explained: it is not -material for history, but at the most for chronicle. This first form of -humanistic history is known under the various names of _rationalistic, -intellectualistic, abstractistic, individualistic, psychological_ -history, and especially under that of _pragmatic_ history. It is a -form generally condemned by the consciousness of our times, which has -employed these designations, especially _rationalism_ and _pragmatism_, -to represent a particular sort of historiographical insufficiency and -inferiority, and has made proverbial the most characteristic pragmatic -explanations of institutions and events, as types of misrepresentation -into which one must beware of falling if one wish to think history -seriously. But as happens in the progress of culture and science, even -if the condemnation be cordially accepted and no hesitation entertained -as to drawing practical consequences from it in the field of actuality, -there is not an equally clear consciousness of the reasons for this, -or of the thought process by means of which it has been attained. This -process we may briefly describe as follows. - -Pragmatic finds the reasons for historical facts in man, but in man -_in so far as he is an individual made abstract_, and thus opposed -as such not only to the universe, but to other men, who have also -been made abstract. History thus appears to consist of the mechanical -action and reaction of beings, each one of whom is shut up in himself. -Now no historical process is intelligible under such an arrangement, -for the sum of the addition is always superior to the numbers added. -To such an extent is this true that, not knowing which way to turn -in order to make the sum come out right, it became necessary to -excogitate the doctrine of 'little causes,' which were supposed to -produce 'great effects.' This doctrine is absurd, for it is clear -that great effects can only have real causes (if the illegitimate -conceptions of great and small, of cause and effect, be applicable -here). Such a formula, then, far from expressing the law of historical -facts, unconsciously expresses the defects of the doctrine, which -is inadequate for its purpose. And since the rational explanation -fails, there arise crowds of fancies to take its place, which are all -conceived upon the fundamental motive of the abstract individual. The -pragmatic explanation of religions is characteristic of this; these -are supposed to have been produced and maintained in the world by the -economic cunning of the priests, taking advantage of the ignorance -and credulity of the masses. But historical pragmatic does not -always present itself in the guise of this egoistic and pessimistic -inspiration. It is not fair to accuse it of egoism and utilitarianism, -when the true accusation should, as we have already said, be levelled -at its abstract individualism. This abstract individualism could be and -sometimes was conceived even as highly moral, for we certainly find -among the pragmatics sage legislators, good kings, and great men, who -benefit humanity by means of science, inventions, and well-organized -institutions. And if the greedy priest arranged the deceit of -religions, if the cruel despot oppressed weak and innocent people, and -if error was prolific and engendered the strangest and most foolish -customs, yet the goodness of the enlightened monarch and legislator -created the happy epochs, caused the arts to flourish, encouraged -poets, aided discoveries, encouraged industries. From these pragmatic -conceptions is derived the verbal usage whereby we speak of the age of -Pericles, of that of Augustus, of that of Leo X, or of that of Louis -XIV. And since fanciful explanations do not limit themselves merely -to individuals physically existing, but also employ facts and small -details, which are also made abstract and shut up in themselves, being -thus also turned into what Vico describes as 'imaginative universals,' -in like manner all these modes of explanation known as 'catastrophic' -and making hinge the salvation or the ruin of a whole society upon the -virtue of some single fact are also derived from pragmatic. Examples -of this, which have also become proverbial, because they refer to -concepts that have been persistently criticized by the historians of -our time, are the fall of the Roman Empire, explained as the result -of barbarian invasions, European civilization of the twelfth and -thirteenth centuries, as the result of the Crusades, the renascence -of classical literatures, as the result of the Turkish conquest of -Constantinople and of the immigration of the learned Byzantines into -Italy--and the like. And in just the same way as when the conception -of the single individual did not furnish a sufficient explanation -recourse was for that reason had to a multiplicity of individuals, to -their co-operation and conflicting action, so here, when the sole cause -adduced soon proved itself too narrow, an attempt was made to make up -for the insufficiency of the method by the search for and enumeration -of multiple historical causes. This enumeration threatened to proceed -to the infinite, but, finite or infinite as it might be, it never -explained the process to be explained, for the obvious reason that the -continuous is never made out of the discontinuous, however much the -latter may be multiplied and solidified. The so-called theory of the -causes or factors of history, which survives in modern consciousness, -together with several other mental habits of pragmatic, although -generally inclined to follow other paths, is rather a confession of -powerlessness to dominate history by means of individual causes, -or causes individually conceived, than a theory; far from being a -solution, it is but a reopening of the problem. - -Pragmatic therefore fails to remain human--that is to say, to develop -itself as rationality; even in the human side to which it clings and -in which it wishes to maintain and oppose itself to the natural or -extra-natural; and having already made individuals irrational and -unhuman by making them abstract, it gradually has recourse to other -historical factors, and arrives finally at natural causes, which do -not differ at all in their abstractness from other individual causes. -This means that pragmatic, which had previously asserted itself as -humanism, falls back into naturalism, from which it had distinctly -separated itself. And it falls into it all the more, seeing that, as -has been noted, human individuals have been made abstract, not only -among themselves, but toward the rest of the universe, which remains -facing them, as though it were an enemy. What is it that really rules -history according to this conception? Is it man, or extra-human powers, -natural or divine? The claim that history exists only as an individual -experience is not maintainable; and in the pragmatic conception another -agent in history is always presumed, an extra-human being which, at -different times and to different thinkers, is known as fate, chance, -fortune, nature, God, or by some other name. During the period at which -pragmatic history flourished, and there was much talk of reason and -wisdom, an expression of a monarchical or courtly tinge is to be found -upon the lips of a monarch and of a philosopher who was his friend: -homage was paid to _sa Majesté le Hasard!_ Here too there is an attempt -to patch up the difficulty and to seek eclectic solutions; in order -to get out of it, we find pragmatic affirming that human affairs are -conducted half by prudence and half by fortune, that intelligence -contributes one part, fortune another, and so on. But who will assign -the just share to the two competitors? Will not he who does assign it -be the true and only maker of history? And since he who does assign -it cannot be man, we see once again how pragmatic leads directly to -transcendency and irrationality through its naturalism. It leads to -irrationality, accompanied by all its following of inconveniences -and by all the other dualisms that it brings with it and which are -particular aspects of itself, such as the impossibility of development, -regressions, the triumph of evil. The individual, engaged with external -forces however conceived, sometimes wins, at other times loses; his -victory itself is precarious, and the enemy is always victorious, -inflicting losses upon him and making his victories precarious. -Individuals are ants crushed by a piece of rock, and if some ant -escapes from the mass that falls upon it and reproduces the species, -which begins again the labour from the beginning, the rock will fall, -or always may fall, upon the new generation and may crush all of its -members, so that it is the arbiter of the lives of the industrious -ants, to which it does much injury and no good. This is as pessimistic -a view as can be conceived. - -These difficulties and vain-tentatives of pragmatic historiography have -caused it to be looked upon with disfavour and to be rejected in favour -of a superior conception, which preserves the initial humanistic motive -and, removing from it the abstractness of the atomicized individual, -assures it against any falling back into agnosticism, transcendency, -or the despair caused by pessimism. The conception that has completed -the criticism of pragmatic and the redemption of humanism has been -variously and more or less well formulated in the course of the -history of thought as mind or reason that constructs history, as the -'providence' of mind or the 'astuteness' of reason. - -The great value of this conception is that it changes humanism from -abstract to concrete, from monadistic or atomistic to idealistic, -from something barely human into something cosmic, from unhuman -humanism, such as that of man shut up in himself and opposed to man, -into humanism that is really human, the humanity common to men, -indeed to the whole universe, which is all humanity, even in its most -hidden recesses--that is to say, spirituality. And history, according -to this conception, as it is no longer the work of nature or of an -extra-mundane God, so it is not the impotent work of the empirical -and unreal individual, interrupted at every moment, but the work -of that individual which is truly real and is the eternal spirit -individualizing itself. For this reason it has no adversary at all -opposed to it, but every adversary is at the same time its subject ---that is to say, is one of the aspects of that dialecticism which -constitutes its inner being. Again, it does not seek its principle of -explanation in a particular act of thought or will, or in a single -individual or in a multitude of individuals, or in an event given as -the cause of other events, or in a collection of events that form the -cause of a single event, but seeks and places it in the process itself, -which is born of thought and returns to thought, and is intelligible -through the auto-intelligibility of thought, which never has need of -appealing to anything external to itself in order to understand itself. -The explanation of history becomes so truly, because it coincides with -its explication; whereas explanation by means of abstract causes is a -breaking up of the process; the living having been slain, there is a -forced attempt made to obtain life by setting the severed head again -upon the shoulders. - -When the historians of our day, and the many sensible folk who do not -make a profession of philosophy, repeat that the history of the world -does not depend upon the will of individuals, upon such accidents as -the length of Cleopatra's nose, or upon anecdotes; that no historical -event has ever been the result of deception or misunderstanding, but -that all have been due to persuasion and necessity; that there is some -one who has more intelligence than any individual whatever--the world; -that the explanation of a fact is always to be sought in the entire -organism and not in a single part torn from the other parts; that -history could not have been developed otherwise than it has developed, -and that it obeys its own iron logic; that every fact has its reason -and that no individual is completely wrong; and numberless propositions -of the same sort, which I have assembled promiscuously--they are -perhaps not aware that with such henceforth obvious statements they -are repeating the criticism of pragmatic history (and implicitly that -of theological and naturalistic history) and affirming the truth of -idealistic history. Were they aware of this, they would not mingle -with these propositions others which are their direct contradiction, -relating to causes, accidents, decadences, climates, races, and so -on, which represent the detritus of the conception that has been -superseded. For the rest, it is characteristic of the consciousness -called common or vulgar to drag along with it an abundant detritus of -old, dead concepts mingled with the new ones; but this does not detract -from the importance of its enforced recognition of the new concept, -which it substantially follows in its judgments. - -Owing to the already mentioned resolution of all historiographical -questions into general philosophy, it would not be possible to -give copious illustrations of the new concept of history which the -nineteenth century has accepted in place of the pragmatic conception -without giving a lengthy exposition of general philosophy, which, in -addition to the particular inconvenience its presence would have here, -would lead to the repetition of things elsewhere explained. Taking the -position that history is the work, not of the abstract individual, but -of reason or providence, as admitted, I intend rather to correct an -erroneous mode of expressing that doctrine which I believe that I have -detected. I mean the form given to it by Vico and by Hegel, according -to which Providence or Reason makes use of the particular ends and -passions of men, in order to conduct them unconsciously to more lofty -spiritual conditions, making use for this purpose of benevolent cunning. - -Were this form exact, or were it necessary to take it literally (and -not simply as an imaginative and provisional expression of the truth), -I greatly fear that a shadow of dualism and transcendency would appear -in the heart of the idealistic conception. For in this position of -theirs toward the Idea or Providence, individuals would have to be -considered, if not as _deluded_ (satisfied indeed beyond their desires -and hopes), then certainly as _illuded_, even though benevolently -illuded. Individuals and Providence, or individuals and Reason, would -not make one, but two; and the individual would be inferior and the -Idea superior--that is to say, dualism and the reciprocal transcendency -of God and the world would persist. This, on the other hand, would not -be at variance from the historical point of view with what has been -several times observed as to the theological residue at the bottom -of Hegel's, and yet more of Vico's, thought. Now the claim of the -idealistic conception is that individual and Idea make one and not -two--that is to say, perfectly coincide and are identified. For this -reason, there must be no talking (save metaphorically) of the wisdom of -the Idea and of the folly or illusion of individuals. - -Nevertheless it seems indubitably certain that the individual acts -through the medium of infinite illusions, proposing to himself ends -that he fails to attain and attaining ends that he has not seen. -Schopenhauer (imitating Hegel) has made popular the illusions of -love, by means of which the will leads the individual to propagate -the species; and we all know that illusions are not limited to those -that men and women exercise toward one another (_les tromperies -réciproques_), but that they enter into our every act, which is always -accompanied by hopes and mirages that are not followed by realization. -And the illusion of illusions seems to be this: that the individual -believes himself to be toiling to live and to intensify his life more -and more, whereas he is really toiling to die. He wishes to see his -work completed as the affirmation of his life, and its completion is -the passing away of the work; he toils to obtain peace in life, but -peace is on the contrary death, which alone is peace. How then are we -to deny this dualism between the illusion of the individual and the -reality of the work, between the individual and the Idea? How are we to -refute the only explanation which seems to compose in some measure the -discord--namely, that the Idea turns the illusions of the individual to -its own ends, even though this doctrine lead inevitably to a sort of -transcendency of the Idea? - -But the real truth is that what results from the observations and -objections above exposed is not the illusion of the individual who -loves, who tries to complete his work, who sighs for peace, but rather -the illusion of him who believes that the individual is illuded: the -illusory is the illusion itself. And this illusion appears in the -phenomenology of the spirit as the result of the well-known abstractive -process, which breaks up unity in an arbitrary manner and in this case -separates the result from the process or actual acting, in which alone -the former is real; the accompaniment from the accompanied, which is -all one with the accompaniment, because there is not spirit and its -escort, but only the one spirit in its development, the single moments -of the process, of the continuity, which is their soul; and so on. -That illusion arises in the individual when he begins to reflect upon -himself, and at the beginning of that reflection, which is at the same -time a dialectical process. But in concrete reflection, or rather in -concrete consciousness, he discovers that there is no end that has not -been realized, as well as it could, in the process, in which it was -never an absolute end--that is to say, an abstract end, but both a -means and an end. - -To return to the popular theory of Schopenhauer, only he who looks -upon men as animals, or worse than animals, can believe that love is a -process that leads only to the biological propagation of the species, -when every man knows that he fecundates his own soul above all prior -to the marriage couch, and that images and thoughts and projects and -actions are created before children and in addition to them. Certainly, -we are conscious of the moments of an action as it develops--that is -to say, of its passage and not of its totality seen in the light of -a new spiritual situation, such as we strive to obtain when, as we -say, we leave the tumult behind us and set ourselves to write our own -history. But there is no illusion, either now or then; neither now nor -then is there the abstract individual face to face with a Providence -who succeeds in deceiving him for beneficial ends, acting rather as -a doctor than as a serious educator, and treating the race of men as -though they were animals to train and make use of, instead of men to -educate--that is to say, develop. - -After having concentrated the mind upon a thought of Vico and of -Hegel, can it be possible to set ourselves down to examine those of -others which afford material to the controversies of historians and -methodologists of history of our time? These represent the usual form -in which appear the problems concerning the relation between the -individual and the Idea, between pragmatic and idealistic history. -Perhaps the patience necessary for the descent into low haunts is -meritorious and our duty; perhaps there may be some useful conclusion -to be drawn from these common disputes; but I must beg to be excused -for not taking part in them and for limiting myself to the sole remark -that the question which has been for some time discussed, whether -history be the history of 'masses' or of 'individuals,' would be -laughable in its very enunciation, if we were to understand by 'mass' -what the word implies, a complex of individuals. And since it is not -a good method to attribute laughable ideas to adversaries, it may be -supposed that on this occasion what is meant by 'mass' is something -else, which moves the mass of individuals. In this case, anyone can see -that the problem is the same as that which has just been examined. The -conflict between 'collectivistic' and 'individualistic' historiography -will never be composed so long as the former assigns to collectivity -the power that is creative of ideas and institutions, and the latter -assigns it to the individual of genius, for both affirmations are true -in what they include and false in what they exclude--that is to say, -not only in their exclusion of the opposed thesis, but also in the -tacit exclusion, which they both make, of totality as idea. - -A warning as to a historiographical method, so similar in appearance -to that which I have been defending as to be confounded with it, may -perhaps be more opportune. This method, which is variously called -_sociological, institutional,_ and _of values,_ preserves among the -variety of its content and the inequality of mental level noticeable -in its supporters the general and constant characteristic of believing -that true history consists of the history of societies, institutions, -and human values, not of individual values. The history of individuals, -according to this view, is excluded, as being a parallel or inferior -history, and its inferiority is held to be due either to the slight -degree of interest that it is capable of arousing or to its lack of -intelligibility. In the latter case (by an inversion on this occasion -of the attitude of contempt which was noted in pragmatic history) it -is handed over to chronicle or romance. But in such dualism as this, -and in the disagreement which persists owing to that dualism, lies the -profound difference between the empirical and naturalistic conceptions -of value, of institutions, and of societies, and the idealistic -conception. This conception does not contemplate the establishment of -an abstract history of the spirit, of the abstract universal, side by -side with or beyond abstract individualistic or pragmatic history, -but the understanding that individual and idea, taken separately, are -two equivalent abstractions, each equally unfitted for supplying -its subject to history, and that true history is the history of the -individual in so far as he is universal and of the universal in so -far as individual. It is not a question of abolishing Pericles to the -advantage of politics, or Plato to the advantage of philosophy, or -Sophocles to the advantage of tragedy; but to think and to represent -politics, philosophy, and tragedy as Pericles, Plato, and Sophocles, -and these as each one of the others in one of their particular -moments. Because if each one of these is the shadow of a dream outside -its relation with the spirit, so likewise is the spirit outside its -individualizations, and to attain to universality in the conception of -history is to render both equally secure with that security which they -mutually confer upon one another. Were the existence of Pericles, of -Sophocles, and of Plato indifferent, would not the existence of the -idea have for that very reason been pronounced indifferent? Let him who -cuts individuals out of history but pay close attention and he will -perceive that either he has not cut them out at all, as he imagined, or -he has cut out with them history itself. - - - - -VII - - -CHOICE AND PERIODIZATION - - -Since a fact is historical in so far as it is thought, and since -nothing exists outside thought, there can be no sense whatever in the -question, What are _historical facts_ and what are _non-historical -facts?_ A non-historical fact would be a fact that has not been thought -and would therefore be non-existent, and so far no one has yet met -with a non-existent fact. A historical thought links itself to and -follows another historical thought, and then another, and yet another; -and however far we navigate the great sea of being, we never leave the -well-defined sea of thought. But it remains to be explained how the -illusion is formed that there are two orders of facts, historical and -non-historical. The explanation is easy when we recollect what has been -said as to the chroniclizing of history which dies as history, leaving -behind it the mute traces of its life, and also as to the function of -erudition or philology, which preserves these traces for the ends of -culture, arranging scattered items of news, documents, and monuments -in an orderly manner. News, documents, and monuments are innumerable, -and to collect them all would not only be impossible, but contrary to -the ends themselves of culture, which, though aided in its work by the -moderate and even copious supply of such things, would be hindered and -suffocated by their exuberance, not to say infinity. We consequently -observe that the annotator of news transcribes some items and omits -the rest; the collector of papers arranges and ties up in a bundle a -certain number of them, tearing up or burning or sending to the dealer -in such things a very large quantity, which forms the majority; the -collector of antiques places some objects in glass cases, others in -temporary safe custody, others he resolutely destroys or allows to be -destroyed; if he does otherwise, he is not an intelligent collector, -but a maniacal amasser, well fitted to provide (as he has provided) -the comic type of the antiquarian for fiction and comedy. For this -reason, not only are papers jealously collected and preserved in -public archives, and lists made of them, but efforts are also made -to discard those that are useless. It is for this reason that in the -recensions of philologists we always hear the same song in praise of -the learned man who has made a 'sober' use of documents, of blame for -him who has followed a different method and included what is vain and -superfluous in his volumes of annals, of selections from archives, -or of collections of documents. All learned men and philologists, in -fact, select, and all are advised to select. And what is the logical -criterion of this selection? There is none: no logical criterion can -be named that shall determine what news or what documents are or are -not useful and important, just because we are here occupied with a -practical and not with a scientific problem. Indeed, this lack of a -logical criterion is the foundation of the sophism that tyrannizes -over maniacal collectors, who reasonably affirm that everything can -be of use, and would therefore unreasonably preserve everything--they -wear themselves out in accumulating old clothes and odds and ends -of all sorts, over which they mount guard with jealous affection. -The criterion is the choice itself, conditioned, like every economic -act, by knowledge of the actual situation, and in this case by the -practical and scientific needs of a definite moment or epoch. This -selection is certainly conducted with intelligence, but not with the -application of a philosophic criterion, and is justified only in and -by itself. For this reason we speak of the fine tact, or scent, or -instinct of the collector or learned man. Such a process of selection -may quite well make use of apparent logical distinctions, as those -between public and private facts, capital and secondary documents, -beautiful or ugly, significant or insignificant monuments; but in -final analysis the decision is always given from practical motives, -and is summed up in the act of preserving or neglecting. Now from this -preserving or neglecting, in which our action is realized, is afterward -invented an _objective_ quality, attributed to facts, which leads to -their being spoken of as 'facts that are worthy' and 'facts that are -not worthy of history,' of 'historical' and 'non-historical' facts. But -all this is an affair of imagination, of vocabulary, and of rhetoric, -which in no way changes the substance of things. - -When history is confounded with erudition and the methods of the -one are unduly transferred to the other, and when the metaphorical -distinction that has just been noted is taken in a literal sense, we -are asked how it is possible to avoid going astray in the infinity of -facts, and with what criterion it is possible to effect the separation -of 'historical' facts from 'those that are not worthy of history.' -But there is no fear of going astray in history, because, as we have -seen, the problem is in every case prepared by life, and in every case -the problem is solved by thought, which passes from the confusion of -life to the distinctness of consciousness; a given problem with a -given solution: a problem that generates other problems, but is never -a problem of choice between two or more facts, but on each occasion -a creation of the unique fact, the fact thought. Choice does not -appear in it, any more than in art, which passes from the obscurity -of sentiment to the clearness of the representation, and is never -embarrassed between the images to be chosen, because itself creates the -image, the unity of the image. - -By thus confounding two things, not only is an insoluble problem -created, but the very distinction between facts that can and facts -that cannot be neglected is also denaturalized and rendered void. -This distinction is quite valid as regards erudition, for facts that -can be neglected are always facts--that is to say, they are traces of -facts, in the form of news, documents, and monuments, and for this -reason one can understand how they can be looked upon as a class to -be placed side by side with the other class of facts that cannot be -neglected. But non-historical facts--that is to say, facts that have -not been thought--would be nothing, and when placed beside historical -facts--that is to say, thought as a species of the same genus--they -would communicate their nullity to those also, and would dissolve their -own distinctness, together with the concept of history. - -After this, it does not seem necessary to examine the characteristics -that have been proposed as the basis for this division of facts into -historical and non-historical. The assumption being false, the manner -in which it is treated in its particulars remains indifferent and -without importance in respect to the fundamental criticism of the -division itself. It may happen (and this is usually the case) that -the characteristics and the differences enunciated have some truth in -themselves, or at least offer some problem for solution: for example, -when by historical facts are meant general facts and by non-historical -facts those that are individual. Here we find the problem of the -relation of the individual and the universal. Or, again, by historical -facts are sometimes meant those that treat of history proper, and by -non-historical the stray references of chronicles, and here we find the -problem as to the relation between history and chronicle. But regarded -as an attempt to decide logically of what facts history should treat -and what neglect, and to assign to each its quality, such divisions are -all equally erroneous. - -The _periodization_ of history is subject to the same criticism. To -_think_ history is certainly _to divide it into periods_, because -thought is organism, dialectic, drama, and as such has its periods, its -beginning, its middle, and its end, and all the other ideal pauses that -a drama implies and demands. But those pauses are ideal and therefore -inseparable from thought, with which they are one, as the shadow is one -with the body, silence with sound: they are identical and changeable -with it. Christian thinkers divided history into that which preceded -and that which followed the redemption, and this periodization was not -an addition to Christian thought, but Christian thought itself. We -modern Europeans divide it into antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern -times. This periodization has been subject to a great deal of refined -criticism on the part of those who hold that it came to be introduced -anyhow, almost dishonestly, without the authority of great names, and -without the advice of the philosophers and the methodologists being -asked on the matter. But it has maintained itself and will maintain -itself so long as our consciousness shall persist in its present phase. -The fact of its having been insensibly formed would appear to be -rather a merit than a demerit, because this means that it was not due -to the caprice of an individual, but has followed the development of -modern consciousness itself. When antiquity has nothing more to tell us -who still feel the need of studying Greek and Latin, Greek philosophy -and Roman law; when the Middle Ages have been superseded (and they have -not been superseded yet); when a new social form, different from that -which emerged from the ruins of the Middle Ages, has supplanted our -own; then the problem itself and the historical outlook which derives -from it will also be changed, and perhaps antiquity and the Middle Ages -and modern times will all be contained within a single epoch, and the -pauses be otherwise distributed. And what has been said of these great -periods is to be understood of all the others, which vary according to -the variety of historical material and the various modes of viewing it. -It has sometimes been said that every periodization has a 'relative' -value. But we must say 'both relative and absolute,' like all thought, -it being understood that the periodization is intrinsic to thought and -determined by the determination of thought. - -However, the practical needs of chroniclism and of learning make -themselves felt here also. Just as in metrical treatises the internal -rhythm of a poem is resolved into external rhythm and divided into -syllables and feet, into long and short vowels, tonic and rhythmic -accents, into strophes and series of strophes, and so on, so the -internal time of historical thought (that time which is thought -itself) is derived from chroniclism converted into external time, or -temporal series, of which the elements are spatially separated from one -another. Scheme and facts are no longer one, but two, and the facts -are disposed according to the scheme, and divided according to the -scheme into major and minor cycles (for example, according to hours, -days, months, years, centuries, and millenniums, where the calculation -is based upon the rotations and revolutions of the earth upon itself -and round the sun). Such is _chronology_, by means of which we know -that the histories of Sparta, Athens, and Rome filled the thousand -years preceding Christ, that of the Lombards, the Visigoths, and the -Franks the first millennium after Christ, and that we are still in the -second millennium. This mode of chronology can be pursued by means of -particularizing incidents thus: that the Empire of the West ended in -A.D. 476 (although it did not really end then or had already ended -previously); that Charlemagne the Frank was crowned Emperor at Rome -by Pope Leo III in the year 800; that America was discovered in 1492, -and that the Thirty Years War ended in 1648. It is of the greatest -use to us to know these things, or (since we really _know_ nothing -in this way) to acquire the capacity of so checking references to -facts that we are able to find them easily and promptly when occasion -arises. Certainly no one thinks of speaking ill of chronologies and -chronographies and tables and synoptic views of history, although in -using them we run the risk (and in what thing done by man does he not -run a risk?) of seeing worthy folk impressed with the belief that the -number produces the event, as the hand of the clock, when it touches -the sign of the hour, makes the clock strike; or (as an old professor -of mine used to say) that the curtain fell upon the acting of ancient -history in 476, to rise again immediately afterward on the beginning of -the Middle Ages. - -But such fancies are not limited to the minds of the ingenuous and -inattentive; they constitute the base of that error owing to which a -distinction of periods, which shall be what is called _objective and -natural_, is desired and sought after. Christian chronographers had -already introduced this ontological meaning into chronology, making -the millenniums of the world's history correspond with the days of -the creation or the ages of man's life. Finally, Ferrari in Italy and -Lorenz in Germany (the latter ignorant of his Italian predecessor) -conceived a theory of historical periods according to generations, -calculated in periods of thirty-one years and a fraction, or of -thirty-three years and a fraction, and grouped as tetrads or triads, in -periods of a hundred and twenty-five years or a century. But, without -dwelling upon numerical and chronographic schemes, all doctrines that -represent the history of nations as proceeding according to the stages -of development of the individual, of his psychological development, -of the categories of the spirit, or of anything else, are due to -the same error, which is that of rendering periodization external -and natural. All are mythological, if taken in the naturalistic -sense, save when these designations are employed empirically--that -is to say, when chronology is used in chroniclism and erudition in a -legitimate manner. We must also repeat a warning as to the care to be -employed in recognizing important problems, which sometimes have first -appeared through the medium of those erroneous inquiries, and as to -the truths that have been seen or caught a glimpse of by these means. -This exempts us (as we remarked above in relation to the criteria of -choice) from examining those doctrines in the particularity of their -various determinations, because in this respect, if their assumption be -obviously fantastic, their value is consequently _nil_. _Nil_, as the -value of all those æsthetic constructions is _nil_ which claim to pass -from the abstractions, by means of which they reduce the organism of -the work of art to fragments for practical ends, to the explanation of -the nature of art and to the judgment and history of the creations of -human imagination. - - - - -VIII - - -DISTINCTION (SPECIAL HISTORIES) AND DIVISION - - -The conception of history that we have reached--namely, that which has -not its documents outside itself, but in itself, which has not its -final and causal explanation outside itself, but within itself, which -has not philosophy outside itself, but coincides with philosophy, which -has not the reason for its definite form and rhythm outside itself, but -within itself--identifies history with the act of thought itself, which -is always philosophy and history together. And with this it debarrasses -it of the props and plasters applied to it as though to an invalid in -need of external assistance. For they really did produce an infirmity -through their very insistence in first imagining and then treating a -non-existent infirmity. - -Doubtless the autonomy thus attained is a great advantage; but at first -sight it is not free from a grave objection. When all the fallacious -distinctions formerly believed in have been cancelled, it seems that -nothing remains for history as an act of thought but the immediate -consciousness of the individual-universal, in which all distinctions -are submerged and lost. And this is mysticism, which is admirably -adapted for feeling oneself at unity with God, but is not adapted for -thinking the world nor for acting in the world. - -Nor does it seem useful to add that unity with God does not exclude -consciousness of diversity, of change, of becoming. For it can -be objected that consciousness of diversity either derives from -the individual and intuitive element, and in this case it is -incomprehensible how such an element can subsist in its proper form of -intuition, in thought, which always universalizes; or if it is said -to be the result of the act of thought itself, then the distinction, -believed to have been abolished, reappears in a strengthened form, -and the asserted indistinct simplicity of thought remains shaken. A -mysticism which should insist upon particularity and diversity, a -_historical mysticism,_ in fact, would be a contradiction in terms, for -mysticism is unhistorical and anti-historical by its very nature. - -But these objections retain their validity precisely when the act of -thought is conceived in the mystical manner--that is to say, not as -an act of thought, but as something negative, the simple result of -the negation by reason of empirical distinctions, which certainly -leaves thought free of illusions, but not yet truly full of itself. -To sum up, mysticism, which is a violent reaction from naturalism and -transcendency, yet retains traces of what it has denied, because it -is incapable of substituting anything for it, and thus maintains its -presence, in however negative a manner. But the really efficacious -negation of empiricism and transcendency, their positive negation, is -brought about not by means of mysticism, but of _idealism_; not in -the immediate, but in the _mediated_ consciousness; not in indistinct -unity, but in the unity that is _distinction_, and as such truly -thought. - -The act of thought is the consciousness of the spirit that is -consciousness; and therefore that act is auto-consciousness. And -auto-consciousness implies distinction in unity, distinction between -subject and object, theory and practice, thought and will, universal -and particular, imagination and intellect, utility and morality, or -however these distinctions of and in unity are formulated, and whatever -may be the historical forms and denominations which the eternal system -of distinctions, _perennis philosophia,_ may assume. To think is to -judge, and to judge is to distinguish while unifying, in which the -distinguishing is not less real than the unifying, and the unifying -than the distinguishing--that is to say, they are real, not as two -diverse realities, but as one reality, which is dialectical unity -(whether it be called unity or distinction). - -The first consequence to be drawn from this conception of the spirit -and of thought is that when empirical distinctions have been overthrown -history does not fall into the indistinct; when the will-o'-the-wisps -have been extinguished, darkness does not supervene, because the light -of the distinction is to be found in history itself. History is thought -by judging it, with that judgment which is not, as we have shown, -the evaluation of sentiments, but the intrinsic knowledge of facts. -And here its unity with philosophy is all the more evident, because -the better philosophy penetrates and refines its distinctions, the -better it penetrates the particular; and the closer its embrace of the -particular, the closer its possession of its own proper conceptions. -Philosophy and historiography progress together, indissolubly united. - -Another consequence to be deduced from the above, and one which -will perhaps seem to be more clearly connected with the practice of -historiography, is the refutation of the false idea of a _general -history,_ superior to _special histories._ This has been called a -history of histories, and is supposed to be true and proper history, -having beneath it political, economic, and institutional histories, -moral history or the history of the sentiments and ethical ideals, the -history of poetry and art, the history of thought and of philosophy. -But were this so, a dualism would arise, with the usual result of every -dualism, that each one of the two terms, having been ill distinguished, -reveals itself as empty. In this case, either general history shows -itself to be empty, having nothing to do when the special histories -have accomplished their work, or particular histories do so, when -they fail even to pick up the crumbs of the banquet, all of which has -been voraciously devoured by the other. Sometimes recourse is had to -a feeble expedient, and to general history is accorded the treatment -of one of the subjects of the special histories, the latter being -then grouped apart from that. Of this arrangement the best that can -be said is that it is purely verbal and does not designate a logical -distinction and opposition, and the worst that can happen is that a -real value should be attributed to it, because in this case a fantastic -hierarchy is established, which makes it impossible to understand the -genuine development of the facts. And there is practically no special -history that has not been promoted to be a general history, now as -_political_ or _social_ history, to which those of literature, art, -philosophy, religion, and the lesser sides of life should supply an -appendix; now as _history of the ideas or progress of the mind,_ where -social history and all the others are placed in the second line; now as -_economic history,_ where all the others are looked upon as histories -or chronicles of 'superstructures' derived from economic development in -an illusory manner, while the former is held to have developed in some -mysterious way by means of unknown powers, without thought and will, -or producing thought and will, in fancies and velleities, like so many -bubbles on the surface of its course. We must be firm in maintaining -against the theory of _general_ history that there _does not exist -anything real but special histories,_ because thought thinks facts to -the extent that it discerns a special aspect of them, and only and -always constructs histories of ideas, of imaginations, of political -actions, of apostolates, and the like. - -But it is equally just and advantageous to maintain the opposite -thesis: that _nothing exists but general history._ In this way is -refuted the false notion of the speciality of histories, understood as -a juxtaposition of specialities. This fallacy is correctly noted by the -critics in all histories which expose the various orders of facts one -after the other as so many strata and (to employ the critics' word) -compartments or little boxes, containing political history, industrial -and commercial history, history of customs, religious history, history -of literature and of art, and so on, under so many separate headings. -These divisions are merely literary, they may possess some utility as -such, but in the case under consideration they do not fulfil merely -a literary function, but attempt that of historical understanding, -and thereby give evidence of their defect, in thus presenting these -histories as without relation between one another, not dialecticized, -but aggregated. It is quite clear that _history_ remains to be -written after the writing of those _histories_ in this disjointed -manner. Abstract distinction and abstract unity are both equally -misunderstandings of concrete distinction and concrete unity, which is -relation. - -And when the relation is not broken and history is thought in the -concrete, it is seen that to think one aspect is to think all the -others at the same time. Thus it is impossible to understand completely -the doctrine, say, of a philosopher, without having to some extent -recourse to the personality of the man himself, and, by distinguishing -the philosopher from the man, at the same time qualifying not only the -philosopher but the man, and uniting these two distinct characteristics -as a relation of life and philosophy. The same is to be said of the -distinction between the philosopher as philosopher and as orator -or artist, as subject to his private passions or as rising to the -execution of his duty, and so on. This means that we cannot think the -history of philosophy save as at the same time social, political, -literary, religious, and ethical history, and so on. This is the source -of the illusion that one in particular of these histories is the -whole of them, or that that one from which a start is made, and which -answers to the predilections and to the competence of the writer, is -the foundation of all the others. It also explains why it is sometimes -said that the 'history of philosophy' is also the 'philosophy of -history,' or that 'social history' is the true 'history of philosophy,' -and so on. A history of philosophy thoroughly thought out is truly the -whole of history (and in like manner a history of literature or of any -other form of the spirit), not because it annuls the other in itself, -but because all the others are present in it. Hence the demand that -historians shall acquire universal minds and a doctrine that shall -also be in a way universal, and the hatred of specialist historians, -pure philosophers, pure men of letters, pure politicians, or pure -economists, who, owing precisely to their one-sidedness, fail even to -understand the speciality that they claim to know in its purity, but -possess only in skeleton form that is to say, in its abstractness. - -And here a distinction becomes clear to us, with which it is impossible -to dispense in thinking history: the distinction between _form_ and -_matter_, owing to which, for example, we understand art by referring -it to matter (emotions, sentiments, passions, etc.) to which the artist -has given form; or philosophy by referring it to the facts which -gave rise to the problems that the thinker formulated and solved, or -the action of the politician by referring it to the aspirations and -ideas with which he was faced, and which supplied the material he has -shaped with genius, as an artist of practical life--that is to say, we -understand these things by always distinguishing an _external_ from -an _internal_ history, or an external history that is made into an -internal history. This distinction of matter and form, of external and -internal, would give rise again to the worst sort of dualism, would -lead us to think of the pragmatical imagination of man who strives -against his enemy nature, if it did not assume an altogether internal -and dialectical meaning in its true conception. Because from what has -been said it is easy to see that external and internal are not two -realities or two forms of reality, but that external and internal, -matter and form, both appear in turn as form in respect to one another, -and this materialization of each to idealize itself in the other -is the perpetual movement of the spirit as relation and circle: a -circle that is progress just because neither of these forms has the -privilege of functioning solely as form, and neither has the misfortune -of functioning solely as matter. What is the matter of artistic and -philosophical history? What is called social and moral history? And -what is the matter of this history? Artistic and philosophical history. -From this clearing up of the relation between matter and form, that -false mode of history is refuted which sets facts on one side and ideas -on the other, as two rival elements, and is therefore never able to -pay its debt and show how ideas are generated from facts and facts -from ideas, because that generation must be conceived in its truth as a -perpetually rendering vain of one of the elements in the unity of the -other. - -If history is based upon distinction (unity) and coincides with -philosophy, the high importance that research into the autonomy of one -or the other special history attains in historiographical development -is perfectly comprehensible, but this is merely the reflection of -philosophical research, and is often troubled and lacking in precision. -All know what a powerful stimulus the new conception of imagination -and art gave to the conception of history, and therefore also to -mythology and religion, which were being developed with slowness and -difficulty during the eighteenth to triumph at the beginning of the -nineteenth century. This is set down to the creation of the history -of poetry and myth in the works of Vico in the first place and then -of Herder and others, and of the history of the figurative arts in -the works of Winckelmann and others. And to the clearer conception of -philosophy, law, customs, and language is due their renewal in the -respective historiographical fields, at the hands of Hegel, Savigny, -and Humboldt, and other creators and improvers of history, celebrated -on this account. This also explains why there has been so much dispute -as to whether history should be described as history of the state or as -history of culture, and as to whether the history of culture represents -an original aspect beyond that of the state or greater than it, as to -whether the progress narrated in history is only intellectual or also -practical and moral, and so on. These discussions must be referred to -the fundamental philosophical inquiry into the forms of the spirit, -their distinction and relation, and to the precise mode of relation of -each one to the other.[1] - -But although history distinguishes and unifies, it never -_divides_--that is to say, _separates_; and the _divisions of history_ -which have been and are made do not originate otherwise than as the -result of the same practical and abstractive process that we have -seen break up the actuality of living history to collect and arrange -the inert materials in the temporal scheme, rendered extrinsic. -Histories already produced, and as such past, receive in this way -titles (every thought is 'without title' in its actuality--that is to -say, it has only itself for title), and each one is separated from -the other, and all of them, thus separated, are classified under more -or less general empirical conceptions, by means of classifications -that more or less cross one another. We may admire copious lists of -this sort in the books of methodologists, all of them proceeding, -as is inevitable, according to one or the other of these general -criteria: the criterion of the _quality_ of the objects (histories -of religions, customs, ideas, institutions, etc., etc.), and that of -_temporal-spatial_ arrangement (European, Asiatic, American, ancient, -medieval, of modern times, of ancient Greece, of ancient Rome, of -modern Greece, of the Rome of the Middle Ages, etc.); in conformity -with the abstract procedure which, when dividing the concept, is led -to posit on the one hand _abstract forms of the spirit_ (objects) and -on the other _abstract intuitions_ (space and time). I shall not say -that those titles and divisions are useless, nor even those tables, -but shall limit myself to the' remark that the history of philosophy, -of art, or of any other ideally distinct history, when understood as a -definite book or discourse, becomes empirical for the reason already -given, that true distinction is ideal, and a discourse or a book in -its concreteness contains not only distinction but unity and totality, -and to look upon either as incorporating only one side of the real is -arbitrary. And I shall also observe that as there are histories of -philosophy and of art in the empirical sense, so also nothing forbids -our talking in the same sense of a general history, separate from -special histories, indeed even of a history of progress and one of -decadence, of good and evil, of truth and error. - -The confusion between division and distinction--that is to say, between -the empirical consideration that breaks up history into special -histories and the philosophical consideration which always unifies -and distinguishes as it unifies--is the cause of errors analogous to -those that we have seen to result from such a process. To this are due -above all the many disquisitions on the 'problem' and on the 'limits' -of this or that history or group of special histories empirically -constituted. The problem does not exist, and the limits are impossible -to assign because they are conventional, as is finally recognized with -much trouble, and as could be recognized with much less trouble if a -start were made, not from the periphery, but from the centre--that is -to say, from gnoseological analysis. A graver error is the creation of -an infinity of _entia imaginationis_, taken for metaphysical entities -and forms of the spirit, and the pretension that arises from this of -developing the history of abstractions as though they were so many -forms of the spirit with independent lives of their own, whereas the -spirit is one. Hence the innumerable otiose problems with fantastic -solutions met with in historical books, which it is here unnecessary -to record. Every one is now able to draw these obvious consequences -for himself and to make appropriate reflections concerning them. It -is further obvious that the _entia imaginations,_ in the same way as -the 'choice' of facts, and the chronological schematization or dating -of them, enter as a subsidiary element into any concrete exposition of -historical thought, because the distinction of thinking and abstraction -is an ideal distinction, which operates only in the unity of the spirit. - - -[1] See Appendix II. - - - - -IX - - -THE 'HISTORY OF NATURE' AND HISTORY - - -We must cease the process of classifying referred to just now, and -also that of the illusion of naturalism connected with it, by means -of which imaginary entities created by abstraction are changed into -historical facts and classificatory schemes into history, if we wish -to understand the difference between history that is history and that -due to what are called the natural sciences. This is also called -history--_'history of nature'_--but is so only in name. Some few years -ago a lively protest was made[1] against the confusion of these two -forms of mental labour, one of which offers us genuine history, such as -might, for instance, be that of the Peloponnesian War or of Hannibal's -wars or of ancient Egyptian civilization, and the other a spurious -history, such as that known as the history of animal organisms, of the -earth's structure or geology, of the formation of the solar system -or cosmogony. It was observed with reason that in many treatises -the one has been wrongly connected with the other--that is to say, -history of civilization with history of nature, as though the former -follows the latter historically. The bottomless abyss between the two -was pointed out. This has been observed, however, in a confused way -by all, and better by historians of purely historical temperament, -who have an instinctive repugnance for natural history and hold -themselves carefully aloof from it. It was remembered with reason that -the history of historians has always the individually determinate as -its object, and proceeds by internal reconstruction, whereas that of -the naturalists depends upon types and abstractions and proceeds by -analogies. Finally, this so-called history or _quasi-history_ was very -accurately defined as an apparently chronological arrangement of things -spatially distinct, and it was proposed to describe it with a new and -proper name, that of _Metastoria._ - -Indeed, constructions of this sort are really nothing but -classificatory schemes, from the more simple to the more complex. -Their terms are obtained by abstract analyses and generalization, and -their series appears to the imagination as a history of the successive -development of the more complex from the more simple. Their right to -exist as classificatory schemes is incontestable, and their utility is -also incontestable, for they avail themselves of imagination to assist -learning and to aid the memory. - -This only becomes contestable when they are estranged from themselves, -lose their real nature, lay claim to illegitimate functions, and -take their imaginary historicity too seriously. We find this in the -metaphysic of naturalism, especially in _evolutionism,_ which has -been its most recent form. This is due, not so much to the men of -science (who are as a rule cautious and possess a more or less clear -consciousness of the limits of those schemes and series) as to the -dilettante scientists and dilettante philosophers to whom we owe the -many books that undertake to narrate the origin of the world, and -which, aided by the acrisia of their authors, run on without meeting -any obstacle, from the cell, indeed from the nebula, to the French -Revolution, and even to the socialist movements of the nineteenth -century. 'Universal histories,' and therefore cosmological romances -(as we have already remarked in relation to universal histories), are -composed, not of pure thought, which is criticism, but of thought -mingled with imagination, which finds its outlet in myths. It is -useless to prove in detail that the evolutionists of to-day are -creators of myths, and that they weary themselves with attempts to -write the first chapters of Genesis in modern style (their description -is more elaborate, but they confuse such description with history in -a manner by no means inferior to that of Babylonian or Israelitish -priests), because this becomes evident as soon as such works are placed -in their proper position. Their logical origin will at once make clear -their true character. - -But setting aside these scientific monstrosities, already condemned -by the constant attitude of restraint and scepsis toward them on the -part of all scientifically trained minds--condemned, too, by the -very fact that they have had to seek and have found their fortune -at the hands of the crowd or 'great public,' and have fallen to the -rank of popular propaganda--we must here determine more precisely -how these classificatory schemes of historiographical appearance are -formed and how they operate. With this object, it is well to observe -that classificatory schemes and apparent histories do not appear to -be confined to the field of what are called the natural sciences or -sub-human world, but appear also in that of the moral sciences or -sciences of the human world. And to adduce simple and perspicuous -examples, it often happens that in the abstract analysis of language -and the positing of the types of the parts of speech, noun, verb, -adjective, pronoun, and so on, or in the analysis of the word into -syllables and sounds, or of style into proper or metaphorical words -and into various classes of metaphors, we construct classes that go -from the more simple to the more complex. This gives rise to the -illusion of history of language, exposed as the successive acquisition -of the various parts of speech or as the passage from the single -sound to the syllable (monosyllabic languages), from the syllable to -the aggregate of syllables (plurisyllabic languages), from words to -propositions, metres, rhymes, and so on. These are imaginary histories -that have never been developed elsewhere than in the studies of -scientists. In like manner, literary styles that have been abstractly -distinguished and arranged in series of increasing complexity (for -example, lyric, epic, drama) have given rise and continue to give -rise to the thought of a schematic arrangement of poetry, which, for -example, should appear during a first period as lyric, a second as -epic, a third as drama. - -The same has happened with regard to the classifications of abstract -political, economic, philosophical forms, and so on, all of which have -been followed by their shadows in the shape of imaginative history. The -repugnance that historians experience in attaching their narratives -to naturalistic-mythological prologues--that is to say, in linking -together in matrimony a living being and a corpse--is also proved by -their reluctance to admit scraps of abstract history into concrete -history, for they at once reveal their heterogeneity in regard to one -another by their mere appearance. De Sanctis has often been reproached -for not having begun his _History of Italian Literature_ with an -account of the origins of the Italian language and of its relations -with Latin, and even with the linguistic family of Indo-European -languages, and of the races that inhabit the various parts of Italy. -An attempt has even been made to correct the design of that classic -work by supplying, with a complete lack of historical sense, the -introductions and additions that are not needed. But de Sanctis, -who took great pains to select the best point of departure for the -narrative of the history of Italian literature, and finally decided -to begin with a brief sketch of the state of culture at the Suabian -court and of the Sicilian poetical school, did not hesitate a moment -in rejecting all abstractions of languages and races which to his true -historical sense did not appear to be reconcilable with the _tenzone_ -of Ciullo, with the rhythms of Friar Jacob, or with the ballades of -Guido Cavalcanti, which are quite concrete things. - -We must also remember that plans for classification and -pseudo-historical arrangements of their analogies are created not only -upon the bodies of histories that are living and really reproducible -and rethinkable, but also upon those that are dead--that is to say, -upon news items, documents, and monuments. This observation makes -more complete the identification of imaginary histories arising from -the natural sciences with those which have their source in the moral -sciences. The foundation of both is therefore very often not historical -intelligence, but, on the contrary, the lack of it, and their end not -only that of aiding living history and keeping it alive, but also the -mediate end of assisting in the prompt handling of the remains and the -cinders of the vanished world, the inert residues of history. - -The efficacy of this enlargement of the concept of abstract history, -which is analogical or naturalizing in respect to the field known -as 'spiritual' (and thus separated from that empirically known as -'natural'), cannot be doubted by one who knows and remembers the great -consequences that philosophy draws from the resolution of the realistic -concept of 'nature' in the idealistic conception of 'construction,' -which the human spirit makes of reality, looking upon it as nature. -Kant worked upon the solution of this problem indefatigably and with -subtlety; he gave to it the direction that it has followed down to -our own days. And the consequence that we draw from it, in respect -to the problem that now occupies us, is that an error was committed -when, moved by the legitimate desire of distinguishing abstract from -concrete history, naturalizing history from thinking history, genuine -from fictitious history, a sort of agnosticism was reached, as a final -result, by means of limiting history to the field of humanity, which -was said to be cognoscible, and declaring all the rest to be the object -of metastoria and the limit of human knowledge. This conclusion would -lead again to a sort of dualism, though in a lofty sphere. But if -metastoria also appears, as we have seen, in the human field, it is -clear that the distinction as formulated stands in need of correction; -and the agnosticism founded upon it vacillates and falls. There is not -a double object before thought, man and nature, the one capable of -treatment in one way, the other in another way, the first cognizable, -and the second uncognizable and capable only of being constructed -abstractly; but thought always thinks history, the history of reality -that is one, and beyond thought there is nothing, for the natural -object becomes a myth when it is affirmed as object, and shows itself -in its true reality as nothing else but the human spirit itself, which -schematized history that has been lived and thought, or the materials -of the history that has already been lived and thought. The saying that -nature has no history is to be understood in the sense that nature as -a rational being capable of thought has not history, because it is -not--or, let us say, it is nothing that is real. The opposite saying, -that nature is also formative and possesses historical life, is to be -taken in the other sense that reality, the sole reality (comprehending -man and nature in itself, which are only empirically and abstractly -separate), is all development and life. - -What substantial difference can ever be discovered on the one hand -between geological stratifications and the remains of vegetables -and animals, of which it is possible to construct a prospective and -indeed a serial arrangement, but which it is never possible to rethink -in the living dialectic of their genesis, and on the other hand the -relics of what is called human history, and not only that called -prehistorical, but even the historical documents of our history of -yesterday, which we have forgotten and no longer understand, and which -we can certainly classify and arrange in a series, and build castles -in the air about or allow our fancies to wander among, but which it is -no longer possible really to think again? Both cases, which have been -arbitrarily distinguished, are reducible to one single case. Even in -what is called 'human history' there exists a 'natural history,' and -what is called 'natural history' also was once 'human' history--that -is to say, spiritual, although to us who have left it so far behind -it seems to be almost foreign, so mummified and mechanicized has it -become, if we glance at it but summarily and from the outside. Do you -wish to understand the true history of a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic -man? First of all, try if it be possible to make yourself mentally -into a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic man; and if it be not possible, -or you do not care to do this, content yourself with describing and -classifying and arranging in a series the skulls, the utensils, and -the inscriptions belonging to those neolithic peoples. Do you wish to -understand the history of a blade of grass? First and foremost, try -to make yourself into a blade of grass, and if you do not succeed, -content yourself with analysing the parts and even with disposing them -in a kind of imaginative history. This leads to the idea from which -I started in making these observations about historiography, as to -history being _contemporary_ history and chronicle being past history. -We take advantage of the idea and at the same time confirm that truth -by solving with its aid the antithesis between a history that is -'history' and a 'history of nature,' which, although it is history, -was supposed to obey laws strangely at variance with those of the only -history. It solves this antithesis by placing the second in the lower -rank of _pseudo-history._ - - -[1] By the economist Professor Gotti, at the seventh congress of -German historians, held at Heidelberg. The lecture can be read in -print under the anything but clear or exact title of _Die Grenzen der -Geschichte_ (Leipzig, Duncker u. Humblot, 1904). - - - - -APPENDIX I - - -ATTESTED EVIDENCE - - -If true history is that of which an interior verification is possible, -and is therefore history ideally contemporary and present, and if -history by witnesses is lacking in truth and is not even false, but -just neither false nor true (not a _hoc est_ but a _fertur_), a -legitimate question arises as to the origin and function of those -innumerable propositions resumed from evidence critically thrashed out -and 'held to be true,' although not verified, and perhaps never to be -verified, but nevertheless employed even in most serious historical -treatment. When we are writing the history of the doctrine known as -the _coincidentia oppositorum,_ or of the poem called _I sepolcri,_ -the Latin of the Cardinal di Cusa and the verse of Foscolo obviously -belong to us, both as to the thoughts and the actual words, pronounced -by ourselves to ourselves, and the certainty of those historical facts -is at the same time logical truth. But that the _De docta ignorantia_ -was written between the end of 1439 and the early part of 1440, and -Foscolo's poem on the return of the poet to Italy after his long -military service in France, is evidence founded upon proofs, as to -which we can only say that they are to be considered valid, because -they have been to some extent _attested,_ but we cannot claim them to -be true. No amount of acute mental labour upon them can prevent another -document or the better reading of an old document destroying them. -Nevertheless, no one will treat of the works of the Cusan or of Foscolo -without availing himself of the biographical details as to their -authors which have been preserved. - -An esteemed methodologist of our day has been tempted to found the -faith placed in this order of evidence upon a sort of telepathy of -the past, an almost spiritualistic revival. But there is nothing -so mysterious in the genesis of that belief as to need a risky and -fantastic explanation, to which even Horace's Jew would not give -credence. On the contrary, it is a question of something that we can -observe in process of formation in our private life of every day. We -are noting down in our diary, for instance, certain of our acts, or -striking the balance of our account. After a certain interval has -elapsed those facts fade from memory and the only way of affirming to -ourselves that they have happened and must be considered true is the -evidence of our notes: the document bears witness; trust the book. We -behave in a similar way in respect to the statements of others on the -authority of their diaries or account-books. We presume that if the -thing has been written down it answers to the truth. Doubtless this -assumption, like every assumption, may turn out to be false in fact, -owing to the note having been made in a moment of distraction or of -hallucination, or too late, when the memory of the fact was already -imprecise and lacking in certainty, or because it was capriciously -made or made with the object of deceiving others. But just for this -reason, written evidence is not usually accepted with closed eyes; -its verisimilitude is examined and we confront it with other written -evidence, we investigate the probity and accuracy of the writer or -witness. It is just for this reason that the penal code threatens with -pains and penalties those who alter or falsify documents. And although -these and other subtle and severe precautions do not in certain cases -prevent fraud, deception, and error (in the same way that the tribunals -established for the purpose of condemning the guilty often send away -the guilty unpunished and sometimes condemn the innocent), yet the use -of documents and evidence works out on the whole in accordance with the -truth; it is held to be useful and worthy of support and encouragement, -because the injuries that it is liable to cause are greatly inferior to -those that it prevents. - -Now what men do with regard to their private affairs in daily life may -be said to be done on a large scale by the human race when it delivers -itself of the load of innumerable facts and fixes them externally where -they are recoverable in a weakened form as unverifiable documentary -evidence, yet are nevertheless such that as a whole we are justified -in looking upon them end treating them as true. Historical faith -then is not the result of telepathy or spiritualism, but of a wise -economic provision, which the spirit continues to realize. In this -way we understand historical work directed toward the prevention of -alterations and deformations, and its acceptation of certain testimony, -as 'what must be held to be true in the present state of science,' and -its graduation of the rest as uncertain, probable, and most probable -to be sometimes accepted in the expectation of ulterior inquiries. -Finally, it explains the dislike of 'hypercriticism' when, not content -with a constant refinement of criticism, hypercriticism contests the -value of the most ingenuous and authoritative testimony. The reason is -that it thus breaks the rules of the game that is being played _sub -regula,_ and only serves at the most to remind those apt to forget it -that history by evidence is at bottom an altogether external history, -never fundamental, true history, which is contemporary and present. - -This genesis or nature of 'attested' evidence already contains the -answer to the other question as to its function. It is clear that this -cannot be to posit true history or to take its place, but to supply it -with those secondary particulars which it would not be worth while to -make the effort of keeping alive and complete in the mind, for this -effort would result in damaging what is most important to us. Finally, -whether the De docta ignorantia were written some time earlier or -later is something that may quite well be determined by a different -interpretation of this or that thought of Cusanus, but it does not -affect the function that the doctrine of the coincidence of opposites -exercises in the formation of logical science. Again, whether the -Sepolcri was composed or planned prior to Foscolo's visit to France -would without doubt change to some extent our representation of the -gradual development of the soul and genius of the poet, but it would -hardly at all change our mode of interpreting his great ode. Those -who despair of historical truth, owing to the lack of a verifiable -certainty of some particulars, or to the uncertainty and dubiety that -surrounds it, resemble him who, having forgotten the chronicle of his -life in this or that year, should think that he did not know himself -in his present condition, which is both the recapitulation of his past -and carries with it his past in all that it really concerns him to -know. But, on the other hand, attested evidence that has been field -to be true is a stimulus to us to search ourselves more closely, an -enrichment of what we have found by means of analysis and meditation -and a confirmation or proof of our thoughts, which are not to be -neglected, especially when true evidence and attested evidence agree -with one another. To refuse the assistance and the facilities afforded -by attested evidence, owing to the fear that some of it may prove -false, or because all of it possesses an external and somewhat general -and vague character, would be to refuse _the authority of the human -race,_ and so to commit the sin of Descartes and of Malebranche. This -great refusal does not concern or assist the understanding of history. -All that does matter and does assist is that authority--including the -authority of the human race--should never be allowed to take the place -of the _thought of humanity,_ to which, in any case, belongs the first -place. - - - - -APPENDIX II - - -ANALOGY AND ANOMALY OF SPECIAL HISTORIES - - -In the course of the preceding theoretical explanations we have denied -both the idea of a _universal history_ (in time and space)[1] and that -of a _general history_ (of the spirit in its indiscriminate generality -or unity),[2] and have insisted instead upon the opposite view with its -two clauses: that history is always _particular_ and always _special,_ -and that these two determinations constitute precisely concrete and -effective _universality_ and concrete and effective _unity._ What has -been declared impossible, then, does not represent in any way a loss, -for it is on the one hand fictitious universality or the universality -of _fancy,_ and on the other abstract _universality,_ or, if it be -preferred, _confused_ universality. So-called universal histories -have therefore shown themselves to be particular histories, which -have assumed that title for purposes of literary notoriety, or as -collections, views, and chroniclistical compilations of particular -histories, or, finally, as romances. In like manner, general inclusive -histories are either so only in name, or set different histories side -by side, or they are metaphysical and metaphorical playthings. - -As a result of this double but converging negation, it is also -advisable to refute a common and deeply rooted belief (which we -ourselves at one time shared to some extent)[3] that we should arrive -at the re-establishment of the universality of the fancy: or that -there are some among the special histories, constituted according -to the various forms of the spirit (general and individual only -in so far as every form of the spirit is the whole spirit in that -form), which require universal treatment and others only treatment -as monographs. The typical instance generally adduced is that of -the difference between the history of philosophy and the history of -poetry or of art. The subject of the former is supposed to be the one -great philosophical problem that interests all men, of the latter -the sentimental or imaginative problems of particular moments, or at -the most of particular artists. Thus the former is supposed to be -continuous, the latter discontinuous, the former capable of complete -universal vision, the second only of a sequence of particular visions. -But a more 'realistic' conception of philosophy deprives it of this -privilege as compared with the history of art and poetry or of any -other special history; for, appearances notwithstanding, it is not -true that men have concentrated upon one philosophical problem only, -whose successive solutions, less and less inadequate, compose a single -line of progress, the universal history of the human spirit, affording -support and unification to all other histories. The opposite is the -truth: the philosophical problems that men have treated of and will -treat of are infinite, and each one of them is always particularly -and individually determined. The illusion as to the uniqueness of the -problem is due to logical misapprehension, increased by historical -contingencies, whence a problem which owing to religious motives seemed -supreme has been looked upon as unique or fundamental, and groupings -and generalizations made for practical ends have been held to be real -identity and unity.[4] 'Universal' histories of philosophy, too, like -the others, when we examine them with a good magnifying glass, are -revealed as either particular histories of the problem that engages the -philosopher-historian, or arbitrary artificial constructions, or tables -and collections of many different historical sequences, in the manner -of a manual or encyclopædia of philosophical history. Certainly nothing -forbids the composition of abridgments of philosophical histories, -containing classifications of particular problems and representing the -principal thinkers of all peoples and of all times as occupied with one -or another class of problem. This, however, is always a chroniclistical -and naturalistic method of treating the history of philosophy, which -only really lives when a new thinker connects the problems already set -in the past and its intrinsic antecedents with the definite problem -that occupies his attention. He provisionally sets aside others with -a different connexion, though without for that reason suppressing -them, intending rather to recall them when another problem makes -their presence necessary. It is for this reason that even in those -abridgments that seem to be the most complete and 'objective' (that -is to say, 'material') a certain selection does appear, due to the -theoretical interest of the writer, who never altogether ceases to be a -historiographer-philosopher. The procedure is in fact just that of the -history of art and poetry, where what is really historical treatment, -living and complete, is the thought or criticism of individual poetical -personalities, and the rest a table of criticisms, an abridgment due -to contiguity of time or place, affinity of matter or similarity of -temperament, or to degrees of artistic excellence. Nor must we say that -every philosophic problem is linked to all the others and is always a -problem of the whole of philosophy, thus differing from the cases of -poetry and art, for there is no diversity here either, and the whole of -history and the entire universe are immanent in every single work of -art. - -Now that we have likewise reduced philosophies of history to the rank -of particular histories, it is scarcely necessary to demonstrate -that the demand being made in several quarters for a 'universal' -or 'general' history of science is without foundation. For such -a history would be impossible to write, even if we were able to -identify or compare the history of science with chat of philosophy. -But it is doubly impossible both because there are comprised under -the name of 'science' such diverse forms as sciences of observation -and mathematical sciences, and also because in each of these classes -themselves the several disciplines remain separate, owing to the -irreducible variety of data and postulates from which they spring. -If, as we have pointed out, every particular philosophical problem -links and places itself in harmony with all other philosophical -problems, every scientific problem tends, on the contrary, to shut -itself up in itself, and there is no more destructive tendency in -science than that of 'explaining' all the facts by means of a 'single -principle,' substituting, that is to say, an unfruitful metaphysic -for fruitful science, allowing an empty word to act as a magic wand, -and by 'explaining everything' to 'explain' nothing at all. The unity -admitted by the history of the sciences is not that which connects -one theory with another and one science with another in an imaginary -general history of science, but that which connects each science and -each theory with the intellectual and social complex of the moment in -which it appeared. But even here too we must utter the warning that in -thus explaining their true nature we do not wish to contest the right -to existence of tables and encyclopædias of the history of science, -far less to throw discredit upon the present direction of studies, by -means of which, at the call of the history of the sciences, useful -Research is stimulated in directions that have been long neglected. -Nor do we intend to move any objection to histories of science in the -form of tables and encyclopædias on the ground that it is impossible -for the same student to be equally competent as to problems of quite -different nature, such as are those of the various sciences; for it -is inconceivable that a philosopher exists with a capacity equal to -the understanding of each and every philosophical problem (indeed, the -mind of the best solver of certain problems is usually the more closed -to others); or that a critic and historian of poetry and art exists -who tastes and enjoys equally all forms of poetry and art, however -versatile he be. Each one has his sphere marked out more or less -narrowly, and each is universal only by means of his particularity. - -Finally, we shall not repeat the same demonstration for political -history and ethics, where the claim to represent the whole of history -in a single line of development has had less occasion to manifest -itself. It is usually more readily admitted there that every history -is particular--that is to say, determined by the political and ethical -problem or problems with which history is concerned in time and place, -and which every history therefore occasionally rethinks from the -beginning. The _analogy,_ then, between different kinds of special -history is to be considered perfect, and the anomaly between them -excluded, for they all obey the principle of particularity, that is, -particular universality (whatever be the appearance to the contrary). -But if, as histories, they all proceed according to the nature of what -we have explained as historiography, in so far as they are _special_ -each one conforms to the concept of its speciality. It is in this sense -alone that each one is anomalous in respect to the others, preserving, -that is to say, its own peculiar nature. We have explained that the -claim to treat the history of poetry and of art in the same way as -philosophy is erroneous, not only because it misconceives the true -concept of history, but also because it misrepresents the nature of -art, conceiving it as philosophy and dissipating it in a dialectic -of concepts, or because it leaves out, in the history of art, just -that by reason of which art is art, looking upon it as something -secondary, or at best giving it a place beside the social or conceptual -activities. This error is precisely analogous to that of those who -from time to time suggest what they term the 'psychological' reform of -philosophy--that is to say, they would like to treat it as dependent -upon the psychology of philosophers and of the social environment, thus -placing it on a level, sometimes with the history of the sentiments, -at others with that of fancies and Utopias, or with what is not -the history of philosophizing. Such persons lack the knowledge of -what _philosophy_ is, as the others lack the knowledge of _poetry_ -and _art_. Anyone desirous of arriving at a rapid knowledge of the -difference between the history of philosophy and the history of poetry -should observe how the one, owing to the nature of its object, is led -to examine theories in so far as they are the _work of pure mind,_ -and therefore to develop a history in which thoughts represent the -_dramatis personæ,_ while the other is led by the nature of its object -to examine works of art in so far as they are works of imagination, -which gives expression to movements of feeling, and therefore to -develop a history of imaginative and sensitive points of view. The -former, therefore, though it does not neglect actions, events, and -imagination, regards them as the _humus_ of pure thought and takes -the form of a history of concepts _without persons,_ either real or -imaginary, while the latter, which also does not neglect actions, -events, and thoughts in its turn regards them as the humus of imaginary -creations and takes the form of a history of ideal or imaginary -_personalities,_ which have divested themselves of the ballast of -practical interests and of the curb of concepts. The plans, too, which -they draw up and with which they cannot dispense, any more than can any -human dialectic, answer to these different tendencies--that is to say, -with the one they are schemes or general types of modes of thinking, -with the other schemes containing ideal personalities. - -If the history of philosophy has several times tried to devour the -history of poetry and art, it may also be said to have several times -tried to devour the _history of practice,_ that of politics and ethics, -or 'social history,' as people prefer to call it in our day. It has -also been asserted that such history should be set free from the -chroniclism in which it had become involved and assume a scientific and -rigorous form. To do this, it was heedful to reduce it to a history -of 'ideas,' which are the true and essential practical acts, because -they generate them--that is to say, the error which we noted above in -respect to poetry and art has here been repeated. What is peculiar to -practical acts has been neglected, and only the 'ideas,' which are -their antecedents and consequents, have been retained. But on other -occasions the 'ideas' to which it was claimed to reduce practical -acts were not really ideas or intellectual formations, but truly -practical acts, sentiments, dispositions, customs, institutions. The -originality of political and ethical history was thus unconsciously -confirmed. Its object is just what can be designated with the single -word _institutions,_ taking the word in its widest signification--that -is to say, understanding by it all practical arrangements of human -individuals and societies, from the most recondite sentiments to the -most obvious modes of life (which, too, are always will in action). -All are equally historical productions, the sole effective historical -productions perceivable according to the practical form of the -spirit. If the patrimony of judgments, as the capital with and upon -which our modern thought works, is the result of a long history, of -which we become conscious from time to time, illustrating now one -and now another of its particular aspects at the solicitation of new -needs, so also what we can now practically _do_, all our sentiments -as so-called civilized men--courage, honour, dignity, love, modesty, -and the like--all our institutions in the strict sense of the term -(which are themselves due to attitudes of the spirit, utilitarian or -moral)--the family, the state, commerce, industry, military affairs, -and so on--have a long history; and according as one or other of those -sentiments or institutions enters upon a crisis, as the result of new -wants, we attempt to ascertain its true 'nature'--that is to say, its -historical genesis. Anyone who has followed the developments of modern -social historiography with care and attention has been able to see -clearly that its aim is precisely to arrange the _chroniclistic chaos_ -of disaggregated notes of events in _ordered series of histories of -social values,_ and that its field of research is the history of the -human soul in its practical aspect; either when it produces general -histories of _civilization_ (always due to particular motives and -limited by them), or when it presents histories _of classes, peoples, -social currents, sentiments, institutions,_ and so forth. - -_Biography,_ too (only when not limited to a mere chroniclistic -collection of the experiences of an individual or to a poetical -portrait, improperly regarded as a historical work), is the history of -an 'institution' in the philosophical acceptation of the word and forms -part of the history of practice: because the individual, in the same -way as a people or a social class, is the formation of a character, or -complex of specific attitudes and actions consequent upon them; and it -is of this that historical biography consists, not of the individual -looked upon as external or private or physical, or whatever it be -called. - -We might be expected to indicate the place or function of the _history -of science_ and of _religion,_ in order to render to a certain extent -complete this rapid review of special histories, in which general -history realizes itself in turn--it never exists outside of them. But -if science differs from philosophy in being partly theoretical and -partly practical, and religion is an attempt to explain reality by -means of myth and to direct the work of man according to an ideal, it -is evident that the history of science enters to some extent into the -history of philosophical thought and to some extent forms part of that -of needs and institutions; indeed, since the moment which sets science -to work and endows it with its peculiar character is the practical or -suitable moment, it really belongs to the history of institutions in -the very wide sense described; and the history of religion forms to -some extent part of the history of institutions and to some extent -part of the history of philosophy; indeed, since the dominating moment -is here mythical conception or philosophical effort, the history of -religion is substantially that of philosophy. Other more particular -disquisitions in connexion with this argument would be out of place -in the present treatise, which is not especially concerned with the -theory and methodology of particular special histories (coincident with -the treatment of the various spheres of philosophy, æsthetics, logic, -etc.), and aims only at indicating the directions in which they must -necessarily develop.[5] - - -[1] _Supra,_ pp. 55-59. - -[2] _Supra,_ pp. 119-122. - -[3] In the _Æsthetic,_ I, ch. xvii. - -[4] See Appendix III. - -[5] It will be of further use to draw attention here, in a note, to -the already mentioned distinction between the history of practice in -politics and in ethics, because thus alone can be set at rest the -variance which runs through historiography, between political history -or history of states and history of humanity or of civilization, -especially from the eighteenth century onward. In Germany it is -one of the elements in the intricate debate between _Geschichte_ -and _Kulturgeschichte,_ and it has sometimes been described as a -conflict between French historiography (Voltaire and his followers), -or _histoire de la civilisation,_ and the Germanic (Möser and his -followers), or history of the state. One side would absorb and -subject the history of culture or social history to that of the -state, the other would do the opposite; and the eclectics, as usual, -without knowing much about it, place the one beside the other, inert, -history of politics and history of civilization, thus destroying the -unity of history. The truth is that political history and history -of civilization have the same relations between one another in the -practical field as those between the history of poetry or of art and -the history of philosophy or thought in the theoretical field. They -correspond to two eternal moments of the spirit--that of the pure will, -or economic moment, and that of the ethical will. Hence we also see why -some will always be attracted rather by the one than the other form of -history: according as to whether they are moved chiefly by political or -chiefly by moral interests. - - - - -APPENDIX III - - -PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY - - -Having established the unity of philosophy and historiography, and -shown that the division between the two has but a literary and didactic -value, because it is founded upon the possibility of placing in the -foreground of verbal exposition now one and now the other of the two -dialectical elements of that unity, it is well to make quite clear what -is the true object of the treatises bearing the traditional title of -philosophic 'theory' or 'system': to what (in a word) _philosophy can -be reduced._ - -Philosophy, in consequence of the new relation in which it has been -placed, cannot of necessity be anything but the _methodological moment -of historiography_: a dilucidation of the categories constitutive -of historical judgments, or of the concepts that direct historical -interpretation. And since historiography has for content the concrete -life of the spirit, and this life is life of imagination and of -thought, of action and of morality (or of something else, if anything -else can be thought of), and in this variety of its forms remains -always one, the dilucidation moves in distinguishing between æsthetic -and logic, between economic and ethic, uniting and dissolving them -all in the philosophy of the spirit. If a philosophical problem shows -itself to be altogether sterile for the historical judgment, we have -there the proof that such problem is otiose, badly stated, and in -reality does not exist. If the solution of a problem--that is to -say, of a philosophical proposition--instead of making history more -intelligible, leaves it obscure or confounds it with others, or leaps -over it and lightly condemns or negates it, we have there the proof -that such proposition and the philosophy with which it is connected -are arbitrary, though it may preserve interest in other respects, as a -manifestation of sentiment or of imagination. - -The definition of philosophy as 'methodology' is not at first exempt -from doubts, even on the part of one ready to accept in general the -tendency that it represents; because philosophy and methodology are -terms often contrasted, and a philosophy that leads to a methodology -is apt to be tainted with empiricism. But certainly the methodology -of which we are here speaking is not at all empirical; indeed, it -appears just for the purpose of correcting and taking the place of the -empirical methodology of professional historians and of other such -specialists in all that greater part of it where it is a true and -proper, though defective, attempt toward the philosophical solution -of the theoretical problems raised by the study of history, or toward -philosophical methodology and philosophy as methodology. - -If, however, the above-mentioned dispute is settled as soon as stated, -this cannot be said of another, where our position finds itself opposed -to a widely diffused and ancient conception of philosophy as the -solver of the mystery of the universe, knowledge of ultimate reality, -revelation of the world of noumena, which is held to be beyond the -world of phenomena, in which we move in ordinary life and in which -history also moves. This is not the place to give the history of that -idea; but we must at least say this, that its origin is religious or -mythological, and that it persisted even among those philosophers -who were most successful in directing thought toward our earth as the -sole reality, and initiated the new philosophy as methodology of the -judgment or of historical knowledge. It persisted in Kant, who admitted -it as the limit of his criticism; it persisted in Hegel, who framed his -subtle researches in logic and philosophy of the spirit in a sort of -mythology of the Idea. - -Nevertheless, the diversity of the two conceptions manifested itself -in an ever-increasing ratio, finding expression in various formulas -of the nineteenth century, such as _psychology against metaphysic,_ -a philosophy of _experience and immanence, aprioristic_ against -_transcendental_ philosophy, _positivism_ against _idealism_; and -although the polemic was as a rule ill conducted, going beyond the -mark and ending by unconsciously embracing that very metaphysic, -transcendency, and apriority, that very abstract idealism, which it -had set out to combat, the sentiment that inspired it was legitimate. -And the philosophy of methodology has made it its own, has combated -the same adversary with better arms, has certainly insisted upon a -psychological view, but a speculative psychological view, immanent -in history, but dialectically immanent, differing in this from -positivism, that while the latter made necessary the contingent, it -made the contingent necessary, thus affirming the right of thought to -the hegemony. Such a philosophy is just philosophy as history (and so -history as philosophy), and the determination of the philosophical -moment in the purely categorical and methodological moment. - -The greater vigour of this conception in respect to the opposite, -the superiority of philosophy as _methodology_ over philosophy as -_metaphysic,_ is shown by the capacity of the former to solve the -problems of the latter by criticizing them and pointing out their -origin. Metaphysic, on the other hand, is incapable of solving not only -the problems of methodology, but even its own problems, without having -recourse to the fantastic and arbitrary. Thus questions as to the -reality of the external world, of soul-substance, of the unknowable, -of dualisms and of antitheses, and so forth, have disappeared in -gnoseological doctrines, which have substituted better conceptions for -those which we formerly possessed concerning the logic of the sciences, -explaining those questions as eternally renascent aspects of the -dialectic or phenomenology of knowledge. - -The view of philosophy as metaphysic is, however, so inveterate and so -tenacious that it is not surprising that it should still give some sign -of life in the minds of those who have set themselves free of it in -general, but have not applied themselves to eradicating it in all its -particulars, nor closed all the doors by which it may return in a more -or less unexpected manner. And if we rarely find it openly and directly -displayed now, we may yet discern or suspect it in one or other of its -aspects or attitudes, persisting like kinks of the mind, or unconscious -preconceptions, which threaten to drive philosophy as methodology back -into the wrong path, and to prepare the return, though but for a brief -period, of the metaphysic that has been superseded. - -It seems to me opportune to provide here a clear statement of some of -these preconceptions, tendencies, and habits, pointing out the errors -which they contain and entail. - -First of all the survivals of the past that are still common comes the -view of philosophy as having a fundamental problem to solve. Now the -conception of a fundamental problem is intrinsically at variance with -that of philosophy as history, and with the treatment of philosophy -as methodology of history, which posits, and cannot do otherwise -than posit, the _infinity_ of philosophical problems, all certainly -connected with one another, but not one of which can be considered -fundamental, for just the same reason that no single part of an -organism is the foundation of all the others, but each one is in its -turn foundation and founded. If, indeed, methodology take the substance -of its problems from history, history in its most modest but concrete -form of history of ourselves, of each one of us as an individual, this -shows us that we pass on from one to another particular philosophical -problem at the promptings of our life as it is lived, and that one or -the other group or class of problems holds the field or has especial -interest for us, according to the epochs of our life. And we find the -same to be the case if we look at the wider but less definite spectacle -afforded by the already mentioned general history of philosophy--that -is to say, that according to times and peoples, philosophical problems -relating sometimes to morality, sometimes to politics, to religion, -or to the natural sciences and mathematics, have in turn the upper -hand. Every particular philosophical problem has been a problem of the -whole of philosophy, either openly or by inference, but we never meet -with a _general problem of philosophy,_ owing to the contradiction -thereby implied. And if there does seem to be one (and it certainly -does seem so), it is really a question of appearances, due to the -fact that modern philosophy, which comes to us from the Middle Ages -and was elaborated during the religious struggles of the Renaissance, -has preserved a strong imprint of _theology_ in its didactic form, -not less than in the psychological disposition of the greater part of -those addicted to it. Hence arises the fundamental and almost unique -importance usurped by the problem of thought and being, which after -all was nothing more than the old problem of this world and the next, -of earth and heaven, in a critical and gnoseological form. But those -who destroyed or who initiated the destruction of heaven and of the -other world and of transcendental philosophy by immanent philosophy -began at the same moment to corrode the conception of a fundamental -problem, although they were not fully aware of this (for we have said -above that they remained trammelled in the philosophy of the Thing -in Itself or in the Mythology of the Idea). That problem was rightly -fundamental for religious spirits, who held that the whole intellectual -and practical dominion of the world was nothing, unless they had saved -their own souls or their own thought in another world, in the knowledge -of a world of noumena and reality. But such it was not destined to -remain for the philosophers, henceforth restricted to the world alone -or to nature, which has no skin and no kernel and is all of a piece. -What would happen were we to resume belief in a fundamental problem, -dominating all others? The other problems would either have to be -considered as all dependent upon it and therefore solved with it, or -as problems no longer philosophical but empirical. That is to say, all -the problems appearing every day anew in science and life would lose -their value, either becoming a tautology of the fundamental solution or -being committed to empirical treatment. Thus the distinction between -philosophy and methodology, between metaphysic and philosophy of the -spirit, would reappear, the first transcendental as regards the second, -the second aphilosophical as regards the first. - -Another view, arising from the old metaphysical conception of the -function of philosophy, leads to the rejection of distinction in favour -of _unity,_ thus conforming to the theological conception that all -distinctions are unified by absorption in God, and to the religious -point of view, which forgets the world and its necessities in the -vision of God. From this ensues a disposition which may be described -as something between indifferent, accommodating, or weak, in respect -of particular problems, and the pernicious doctrine of the double -faculty is almost tacitly renewed, that is, of intellectual intuition -or other superior cognoscitive faculty, peculiar to the philosopher -and leading to the vision of true reality, and of criticism or thought -prone to interest itself in the contingent and thus greatly inferior -in degree and free to proceed with a lack of speculative rigour not -permissible in the other. Such a disposition led to the worst possible -consequences in the philosophical treatises of the Hegelian school, -where the disciples (differing from the master) generally gave evidence -of having meditated but little or not at all upon the problems of the -various spiritual forms, freely accepting vulgar opinions concerning -them, or engaging in them with the indifference of men sure of the -essential, and therefore cutting and mutilating them without pity, in -order to force them into their pre-established schemes with all haste, -thus getting rid of difficulties by means of this illusory arrangement. -Hence the emptiness and tiresomeness of their philosophies, from -which the historian, or the man whose attention is directed to the -understanding of the particular and the concrete, failed to learn -anything that could be of use to him in the direction of his own -studies and in the clearer formulation of his own judgments. And since -the mythology of the idea reappeared in positivism as mythology of -evolution, here too particular problems (which are indeed the only -philosophical problems) received merely schematic and empty treatment -and did not progress at all. Philosophy as history and methodology of -history restores honour to the virtue of acuteness or discernment, -which the theological unitarianism of metaphysic tended to depreciate: -discernment, which is prosaic but severe, hard and laborious but -prolific, which sometimes assumes the unsympathetic aspect of -scholasticism and pedantry, but is also of use in this aspect, like -every discipline, and holds that the neglect of distinction for unity -is also intimately opposed to the conception of philosophy as history. - -A third tendency (I beg to be allowed to proceed by enumeration of the -various sides of the same mental attitude for reasons of convenience), -a third tendency also seeks the _definitive_ philosophy, untaught by -the historical fact that no philosophy has ever been definitive or has -set a limit to thought, or has ever been thoroughly convinced that -the perpetual changing of philosophy with the world which perpetually -changes is not by any means a defect, but is the nature itself of -thought and reality. Or, rather, such teaching, and the proposition -that follows it, do not fail altogether of acceptance, and they are -led to believe that the spirit, ever growing upon itself, produces -thoughts and systems that are ever new. But since they have retained -the presupposition of a fundamental problem which (as we have said) -substantially consists of the ancient problem of religion alone, -and each problem well determined implies a single solution, the -solution given of the 'fundamental problem' naturally claims to be -the definitive solution of the problem of philosophy itself. A new -solution could not appear without a new problem (owing to the logical -unity of problem and solution); but that problem, which is superior -to all the others, is on the contrary the only one. Thus a definitive -philosophy, assumed in the conception of the fundamental problem, is at -variance with historical experience, and more irreconcilably, because -in a more evidently logical manner, with philosophy as history, which, -admitting infinite problems, denies the claim for and the expectation -of a definitive philosophy. Every philosophy is definitive for the -problem which it solves, but not for the one that appears immediately -afterward, at the foot of the first, nor for the other problems which -will arise from the solution of this. To close the series would be to -turn from philosophy to religion and to rest in God. - -Indeed, the fourth preconception, which we now proceed to state, and -which links itself with the preceding, and, together with all the -preceding, to the theological nature of the old metaphysic, concerns -the _figure of the philosopher,_ as Buddha or the Awakened One, who -posits himself as superior to others (and to himself in the moments -when he is not a philosopher), because he holds himself to be free from -human passions, illusions, and agitations by means of philosophy. This -is the case with the believer, who fixes his mind upon God and shakes -off earthly cares, like the lover, who feels himself blessed in the -possession of the beloved and defies the whole world. But the world -soon takes its revenge both upon the believer and the lover, and does -not fail to insist upon its rights. Such an illusion is impossible for -the philosophical historian, who differs from the other in feeling -himself irresistibly involved in the course of history, as at once both -subject and object, and who is therefore led to negate felicity or -beatitude, as he negates every other abstraction (because, as has been -well said, _le bonheur est le contraire de la sensation de vivre_), and -to accept life as it is, as joy that overcomes sorrow and perpetually -produces new sorrows and new unstable joys. And history, which he -thinks as the only truth, is the work of tireless thought, which -conditions practical work, as practical work conditions the new work of -thought. Thus the primacy formerly attributed to the contemplative life -is now transferred not to active life, but to life in its integrity, -which is at once thought and action. And every man is a philosopher -(in his circle, however wide or narrow it may appear), and every -philosopher is a man, indissolubly linked to the conditions of human -life, which it is not given to anyone to transcend. The mystical or -apocalyptic philosopher of the Græco-Roman decadence was well able to -separate himself from the world: the great thinkers, like Hegel, who -inaugurated the epoch of modern philosophy, although they denied the -primacy of the abstract contemplative life, were liable to fall back -into the error of belief in this supremacy and to conceive a sphere of -absolute spirit, a process of liberation through art, religion, and -philosophy, as a means of reaching it; but the once sublime figure of -the philosopher blessed in the absolute, when we try to revive it in -this modern world of ours, becomes tinged with the comic. It is true -that satire has now but little material upon which to exercise itself, -and is reduced to aiming its shafts at the 'professors of philosophy' -(according to the type of philosopher that has been created by modern -universities, which is partly the heir of the 'master of theology' -of the Middle Ages): against the professors, that is to say, to the -extent that they continue to repeat mechanically abstract general -propositions, and seem to be unmoved by the passions and the problems -that press upon them from all sides and vainly ask for more concrete -and actual treatment. But the function and the social figure of the -philosopher have profoundly changed, and we have not said that the -manner of being of the 'professors of philosophy' will not also change -in its turn--that is to say, that the way of teaching philosophy in -the universities and schools is not on the verge of experiencing a -crisis, which will eliminate the last remains of the medieval fashion -of formalistic philosophizing. A strong advance in philosophical -culture should lead to this result: that all students of human affairs, -jurists, economists, moralists, men of letters--in other words, all -students of historical matters--should become conscious and disciplined -philosophers, and that thus the philosopher in general, the _purus -philosophus,_ should find no place left for him among the professional -specifications of knowledge. With the disappearance of the philosopher -'in general' would also disappear the last social vestige of the -teleologist or metaphysician, and of the Buddha or Awakened One. - -There is also a prejudice which to some extent inquinates the manner -of _culture_ of students of philosophy. They are accustomed to have -recourse almost exclusively to the books of philosophers, indeed of -philosophers 'in general,' of the metaphysical system-makers, in the -same way as the student of theology formed himself upon the sacred -texts. This method of culture, which is perfectly consequent when -a start is made from the presupposition of a fundamental or single -problem, of which it is necessary to know the different diverging -and progressive solutions which have been attempted, is altogether -inconsequent and inadequate in the case of a historical and immanent -philosophy, which draws its material from all the most varied -impressions of life and from all intuitions and reflections upon life. -That form of culture is the reason for the aridity of the treatment of -certain particular problems, for which is necessary a continued contact -with daily experience (art and art criticism for æsthetic, politics, -economy, judicial trials for the philosophy of rights, positive and -mathematical sciences for the gnoseology of the sciences, and so on). -To it is also due the aridity of treatment of those parts of philosophy -themselves which are traditionally considered to constitute 'general -philosophy,' for they too had their origin in life, and we must refer -them back to life if we are to give a satisfactory interpretation of -their propositions; we must plunge them into life again to develop -them and to find in them new aspects. The _whole of history_ is the -foundation of philosophy as history, and to limit its foundation to -the _history of philosophy_ alone, and of 'general' or 'metaphysical' -philosophy, is impossible, save by unconsciously adhering to the old -idea of philosophy, not as methodology but as metaphysic, which is the -fifth of the prejudices that we are enumerating. - -This enumeration can be both lengthened and ended with the mention of a -sixth preconception, relating to _philosophical exposition._ Owing to -this, philosophy is expected to have either an architectural form, as -though it were a temple consecrated to the Eternal, or a warm poetical -form, as though it were a hymn to the Eternal. But these forms were -part of the old content, and that form is now changed. Philosophy -shows itself to be a dilucidation of the categories of historical -interpretation rather than the grandiose architecture of a temple or a -sacred hymn running on conventional lines. Philosophy is discussion, -polemic, rigorous didactic exposition, which is certainly coloured -with the sentiments of the writer, like every other literary form, -able also at times to raise its voice (or on the other hand to become -slight and playful, according to circumstances), but not constrained to -observe rules which appear to be proper to a theological or religious -content. Philosophy treated as methodology has, so to speak, caused -philosophical exposition to descend from poetry to prose. - -All the preconceptions, habits, and tendencies which I have briefly -described should in my opinion be carefully sought out and eliminated, -for it is they that impede philosophy from taking the form and -proceeding in the mode suitable and adequate to the consciousness of -the unity with history which it has reached. If we look merely at -the enormous amount of psychological observations and moral doubts -accumulated in the course of the nineteenth century by poetry, fiction, -and drama, those voices of our society, and consider that in great part -it remains without critical treatment, some idea can be formed of the -immense amount of work that falls to philosophy to accomplish. And if -on the other hand we observe the multitude of anxious questions that -the great European War has everywhere raised--as to the state, as to -history, as to rights, as to the functions of the different peoples, as -to civilization, culture, and barbarism, as to science, art, religion, -as to the end and ideal of life, and so on--we realize the duty of -philosophers to issue forth from the theologico-metaphysical circle in -which they remain confined even when they refuse to hear of theology -and metaphysic. For notwithstanding their protests, and notwithstanding -the new conception accepted and professed by them, they really remain -intellectually and spiritually attached to the old ideas. - -Even the _history itself of philosophy_ has hitherto been renewed only -to a small extent, in conformity with the new conception of philosophy. -This new conception invites us to direct our attention to thoughts -and thinkers, long neglected or placed in the second rank and not -considered to be truly philosophers because they did not treat directly -the 'fundamental problem' of philosophy or the great _peut-être,_ but -were occupied with 'particular problems.' These particular problems, -how-ever, were destined to produce eventually a change of view as -regards the 'general problem,' which emerged itself reduced to the -rank of a 'particular' problem. It is simply the result of prejudice -to look upon a Machiavelli, who posited the conception of the modern -state, a Baltasar Gracian, who examined the question of acuteness in -practical matters, a Pascal, who criticized the spirit of Jesuitry, a -Vico, who renewed all the sciences of the spirit, or a Hamann, with -his keen sense of the value of tradition, as minor philosophers, I do -not say in comparison with some metaphysician of little originality, -but even when compared with a Descartes or a Spinoza, who dealt with -_other_ but not _superior_ problems. A schematic and bloodless history -of philosophy corresponded, in fact, with the philosophy of the -'fundamental problem.' A far richer, more varied and pliant philosophy -should correspond with philosophy as methodology, which holds to be -philosophy not only what appertains to the problems of immanency, of -transcendency, of this world and the next, but everything that has -been of avail in increasing the patrimony of guiding conceptions, the -understanding of actual history, and the formation of the reality of -thought in which we live. - - - - -PART II - - -CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY - - - - -I - - -PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS - - -We possess many works relating to the history of historiography, both -special, dealing with individual authors, and more or less general, -dealing with groups of authors (histories of historiography confined -to one people and to a definite period, or altogether 'universal' -histories). Not only have we bibliographical works and works of -erudition, but criticism, some of it excellent, especially in the case -of German scientific literature, ever the most vigilant of all in not -leaving unexplored any nook or cranny of the dominion of knowledge. -It cannot, therefore, form part of my design to treat the theme from -its foundations: but I propose to make a sort of appendix or critical -annotation to the collection of books and essays that I have read upon -the argument. I will not say that these are all, or even that they are -all those of any importance, but they ire certainly a considerable -number. By means of this annotation I shall try to establish, on the -one hand, in an exact manner and in conformity with the principles -explained, the method of such a history, regarding which I observe -that there still exist confusion and perplexity, even among the best, -which lead to errors of judgment or at least of plan, and on the -other hand I shall try to outline the principal periods in a summary -manner, both with the view of exemplifying the method established, -and, as it were, of illustrating historically the concepts exposed in -the preceding theoretical pages, which might otherwise retain here and -there something of an abstract appearance. - -Beginning with methodical delimitations, I shall note in the first -place that in a history of historiography as such, historical writings -cannot be looked upon from the point of view proper to a _history of -literature_--that is to say, as expressions of individual sentiments, -as forms of art. Doubtless they are this also, and have a perfect right -to form part of histories of literature, as the treatises and systems -of the philosophers, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, of Bruno, -of Leibnitz, and of Hegel; but in this case both are regarded not as -works of history and of philosophy, but of literature and poetry; and -the empirical scale of values which constitute the different modes -of history in the cases of the same authors is different, because -in a history of literature the place of a Plato will always be more -considerable than that of an Aristotle, that of a Bruno than that of -a Leibnitz, owing to the greater amount of passion and the greater -richness of artistic problems contained in the former of each pair. -The fact that in many volumes of literary history such diversity of -treatment is not observed, and historians are talked of historically -and not in a literary manner and philosophers philosophically rather -than in a literary manner, is due to the substitution in such -works of incoherent compilation for work that is properly critical -and scientific. But the distinction between the two aspects is -important for this reason also, that erroneous judgments, praise, and -censure, alike unjustified, are apt to appear, owing to the careless -transference of the scale of values from one history to another. The -slight esteem in which Polybius was held in antiquity and for some -time after, because 'he did not write well' in comparison with the -splendour of Livy or with the emotional intensity of Tacitus, is an -instance of this, as is likewise in Italy the excessive praise lavished -upon certain historians who were little more than correct and elegant -writers of prose in comparison with others who were negligent and crude -in their form, but serious students. Ulrici,[1] in his youthful book -on ancient historiography, which despite its heaviness and verbosity -of exposition has great merits, after having discussed the 'scientific -value' of that historiography, also speaks at great length of 'artistic -value'; but setting aside what of arbitrary is to be found in some of -the laws that he applies to historiography as art, in conformity with -the æsthetic ideas of his time, it is evident that the second subject -of which he treats does not coalesce with the first and is only placed -side by side with it in the same way as those sections of works dealing -with historical method are not connected but simply juxtaposed, and -after having studied in their own way the formation of historical -thought, the collection of materials or 'heuristic,' up to final -'comprehension,' begin to discuss the form of the 'exposition,' and in -so doing continue without being aware of it the method of rhetorical -treatises on the art of history composed during the Renaissance. These -have their chief exponent in Vossius (1623). We cannot abstain from -sometimes mentioning the literary form of the works of historians, -nor from according their laurels to works of remarkable literary -value, while noting their unsatisfactory historiographical methods; -but to touch here and there upon, to discuss, to characterize, to -eliminate, is of secondary importance and does not form part of the -proper function of historiography, whose object is the _development of -historiographical thought._ - -The distinction between this history and that of _philology_ or -_erudition_ is less apparent but not less indubitable, always, be it -well understood, in the sense explained, of a distinction that is not -a separation. This warning should be understood in respect of other -exclusions that we are about to effect, without our being obliged -to repeat it at every step; for the connexion between history and -philology is undeniable, not less than that between history and art, -or history and practical life. But that does not prevent philology -in itself being the collection, the rearrangement, the purification -of material, and not history. Owing to this quality it forms a part -rather of the history of culture than of that of thought. It would be -impossible to disassociate it from the history of libraries, archives, -museums, universities, seminaries, _écoles des chartes,_ academical -and editorial enterprises, and from other institutions and proceedings -of an entirely practical nature. Fueter has therefore been right in -excluding from his theme in his recent work on the history of modern -historiography[2] "the history of merely philological research and -criticism." This has not prevented him from taking store where apposite -of the school of Biondo or of that of Maurini, or of the perfecting of -the method of seeking for the sources attained by the German school -in the nineteenth century. The confusion and lack of development -observable in the old and solid work of Wachler[3] is perhaps due to -his having failed to make this distinction, to which recourse can also -be had with advantage elsewhere. Wachler's work, entitled and conceived -as "history of research and of the historical art from the Renaissance -of letters in Europe onward," ended by assuming the appearance of a -repertory or bibliographical catalogue. - -The obstacles to be encountered by the distinction between the history -of historiography and that of the _practical tendencies,_ or tendencies -of the _social and political spirit,_ are more intricate. These indeed -become incorporated with or at least leave their mark upon the works -of historians; but it is just because we can only with difficulty -perceive the line of demarcation that it is indispensable to make it -quite clear. Such tendencies, such social and political spirit, belong -rather to the matter than to the theoretical form of history; they are -not so much historiography as history in the act and in its _fieri._ -Machiavelli is a historian in so far as he tries to understand the -course of events; he is a politician, or at least a publicist, when -he posits and desires a prince, founder of a strong national state, -as his ideal, reflecting this in his history. This history, in so -far as it portrays that ideal and the inspiration and teaching that -accompany it, here and there becomes fable (_fabula docet_). Thus -Machiavelli belongs partly to the history of thought in the Renaissance -and partly to the history of the practice of the Renaissance. Nor does -this happen solely in political and social historiography, but also -in literary and artistic, because there is not perhaps a critic in -the world, however unprejudiced and broad in his ideas, who does not -manifest tendencies in the direction of a literary renovation of his -epoch together with his actual judgments and reconstructions. Now to -the extent that he does this, even if it be in the same book and on -the same page or in the same period, he is no longer a critic, but -a practical reformer of art. In one domain of history alone is this -pacific accompaniment of interpretations and aspirations impossible--in -the history of philosophy, because when, as here, there is a difference -between historical interpretation and the tendency of the philosopher, -the difference reveals the insufficiency of the interpretation itself: -in other words, if the theory of the historian of philosophy is at war -with the theories of which he claims to expound the history, his theory -must be false, just because it does not avail to justify the history -of the theories. But this exception does not annul the distinction -in other fields; indeed, it confirms it, and is not an exception in -the empirical sense, as it appears to be: thought distinguishes and -is distinguished from sentiment and will, but it is not distinguished -from itself, precisely because it is the principle of distinction. -A methodological corollary of this distinction between history of -historiography and history of practical tendencies is that the -introduction into the first of considerations belonging to the second -is to be held erroneous. Here I think Fueter has sinned to some extent -in the book to which I have already referred, where he divides his -material into humanistic, political, party, imperial, particularist, -Protestant, Catholic, Jesuitic, illuministic, romanticist, erudite, -lirico-subjective, national, statolatral, historiographical, and the -like. Only some of the above divisions belong to, or can properly be -reduced to, historiographical concepts, while the majority refer to -social and political life. Hence the lack of sound organization that -we observe in this book, which is yet so lively and ingenious: its -divisions follow one another without sufficient logicality, continuity, -and necessity, and are not the result of a single thought which posits -them and develops itself through them. If, on the other hand, the -genuinely historiographical portions, which have become mingled with -it, should be eliminated, what remained could certainly be organized, -but as social and political history, no longer as historiography, -because the works of historians would be consulted only as documents -showing the tendencies of the times in which they were written. -Machiavelli, for instance, (to use the same example) would there figure -as an Italian patriot and defender of absolute power, while Vico (a -much greater historian than Machiavelli) would not be able to appear at -all, or hardly at all, because his relation with the political life of -his time was remote and general. - -What I have been expounding may be resumed by saying that the history -of historiography is neither _literary_ history nor the history of -cultural, social, political, moral doings, which are of a _practical_ -nature, but that it is certainly all these things, by reason of the -unbreakable unity of history, though with it the _accent_ does not fall -upon practical facts, but rather upon _historiographical thought,_ -which is its proper subject. - -Having pointed out or recalled these distinctions, which, as we have -seen, are sometimes neglected with evil results, we must now utter a -warning against other distinctions, employed without rational basis, -which rather overcloud and trouble the history of historiography than -shed light upon it. - -Fueter (I cite him again, although the error is not peculiar to -him) declares that he has dealt in his book with _historiographical -theories_ and with _historical method_ only in so far as they seem -to have had influence upon actual historiography. The history of -historicity (here is the reason he gives for the method he has -followed) is as little the history of historiography as is the history -of dramatic theories the history of the drama. This he considers to -be proved by the fact that theory and practice often follow different -paths, as, for instance, in Lope de Vega, whose theory of the drama -and actual dramatic work were two different things, to such an extent -that it was said of the Spanish dramatist that although he reverenced -the poetical art, when he sat down to compose "he locked up the correct -rules under seven keys." This argument is without doubt specious, and I -was myself formerly seduced by it; but it is fallacious, as I realized -when I thought it over again, and I now affirm it to be an error with -all the conviction and authority of one who criticizes an error at one -time his own. The argument is founded upon a false analogy between the -production of art and that of history. Art, which is the work of the -imagination, can be well distinguished from the theory of art, which -is the work of reflection; artistic genius produces the former, the -speculative intellect the latter, and it often happens with artists -that the speculative intellect is inferior to their genius, so that -they do one thing and say another, or say one thing and do another, -without its being possible to accuse them of logical incoherence, -because the incoherence is between two discordant thoughts, never -between a thought and an act of the imagination. But history and theory -of history are both of them works of thought, bound to one another in -the same way as thought is bound to itself, since it is one. Thus no -historian but possesses in a more or less reflective way his theory of -history, because, not to put too fine a point upon it, every historian -implicitly or explicitly conducts a polemic against other historians -(against other 'versions' and 'judgments' of a fact), and how could -he ever conduct a polemic or criticize others if he did not himself -possess a conception of what history is and ought to be, to which to -refer, a theory of history? The artist, on the other hand, in so far -as he is an artist, does not polemize or criticize, but forms. It -may quite well happen that an erroneous theory of historiography is -expounded, while on the contrary the history as narrated may turn out -to be well constructed. This is, of course, to be incoherent, but is -so neither more nor less than when progress is effected in one branch -of historiography, while there is backwardness in another. There may -obtain, on the contrary, an excellent theory of history, where history -itself is bad; but in the same way that in one field of historiography -there is the sense of and striving for a better method, while there -is adherence to old methods in all the other fields. The history of -historiography is the history of historical thought; and here it is -impossible to distinguish theory of history from history. - -Another exclusion which Fueter declares that he has made is that of -the _philosophy of history._ He does not give the reason for this, but -allows it to be understood, for he evidently holds that philosophies of -history do not possess a purely scientific character and are lacking -in truth. But not only are what are called 'philosophies of history' -erroneous conceptions of history, but so also are the naturalistic or -deterministic conceptions opposed to them, and all the various forms of -pseudo-history which have been described above, philological history, -poetical history, rhetorical history. I do not find that he has -excluded these from his history, any more than he has really excluded -the theological and transcendental conception of history (philosophy -of history); indeed, he constantly refers to it. Justice and logic -would insist upon all or none being excluded--all really excluded, -and not merely in words. But to exclude all of them, it may be said, -would be anything but intelligent, because how could the history of -history ever be told in such a void? What is this history but the -struggle of scientific historiography against inadequate scientific -formulas? Certainly the former is the protagonist, but how could a -drama be presented with a protagonist lacking antagonists? And even -if historical philology be not considered directly, but referred back -to philology, if poetical history be referred back to literature, -rhetorical or practical to social and political history, it would -nevertheless be necessary always to take account of the conversion that -often occurs of those various mental constructions into assertions -of reality, taken in exchange for and given the value of true and -proper histories. In this sense they become in turn _deterministic_ -or _transcendental_ conceptions of history, and both of them logical -or illogical representations of all the others, and end by becoming -equivalent to one another dialectically, and are always before the -eyes of the historian, because the perpetual condition and the -perpetual sign of the progress of historical thought reside in their -movement, which passes from transcendency or false immanence to pure -immanence, to return to them and enter into a more profound conception -of immanency. To exclude philosophies of history from the history of -historiography does not, therefore, seem to me to be justifiable, -for the same reason as it seems to be unjustifiable to exclude from -it historiographical theories, which are the consciousness that -historiography acquires of itself: owing to their homogeneity, I say, -owing indeed to their identity with history, of which they do not form -accidental ingredients or material elements, but constitute the very -essence. A proof of this is to be found in the _Historical Philosophy -of France_ of Flint. He proceeds from a presumption that is perhaps the -opposite of that of Fueter--that is to say, he treats of the philosophy -of history, and not of history, but finds it impossible to maintain -the dykes between the two. His treatise, therefore, when artificial -obstacles have been overcome, runs like a single river and reveals -to our view the whole history of historical French thought, to which -Bossuet and Rollin, Condorcet and Voltaire, Auguste Comte and Michelet -or Tocqueville equally belong. - -At this point it will probably be objected (although Fueter does not -propound this objection, it is probable that it is at the back of -his mind) that what is desired in a history of historiography is not -so much a history of _historical thought_ as a history of _history -in the concrete_: of the _Storie fiorentine_ of Machiavelli, of the -_Siècle de Louis XIV_ of Voltaire, or of the _Römische Geschichte_ of -Niebuhr: that would be a general history, while what is desired is a -specific history. But it is well to pay close attention to the meaning -of such a request and to the possibility of what is asked. If I set -out to write the history of the _Storie fiorentine_ of Machiavelli, in -respect to the particular material with which it deals, I shall rewrite -the history of Florence, criticizing and completing Machiavelli, and -shall thus be, for instance, a Villari, a Davidsohn, or a Salvemini. -If I set out to write the history of the material of Voltaire's work, -I shall criticize Voltaire and outline a new _Siècle de Louis XIV_, -as has been done, for example, by Philippson. And if I set to work to -examine and rethink the work of Niebuhr in respect to its particular -material, I shall be a new historian of Rome, a Mommsen or (to quote -the most recent writers) a Hector Pais or a Gaetano de Sanctis. But is -this what is desired? Certainly not. But if this be not desired, if the -particular materials of those histories are not to be taken account of, -what else remains save the 'way' in which they have been conceived, the -'mental form' by means of which they construct their narratives, and -therefore their theory and their historical 'thought'? - -Now, if this truth be admitted (and I do not see how it can be -contested) it is not possible to reject an ulterior consequence which, -although it is wont to arouse in some the sensation of a paradox, -does not do so in us, for we find it altogether in accordance with -the conception of the identity of history with, philosophy that we -have defended. Is a thought that is not thought conceivable? Is it -permissible to distinguish between the _thought of the historian_ and -the _thought of the philosopher_? Are there perhaps two different -thoughts in the world? To persist in maintaining that the thought of -the historian thinks the fact and not the theory is prevented by the -preceding admission, if by nothing else: that the historian always -thinks at least both the theory of history and the historical fact. But -this admission entails his thinking the theory of all the things that -he narrates, together with the theory of history. And indeed he could -not narrate without understanding them. Fueter extols the merit of -Winckelmann, who was the first to conceive a history, not of artists, -but of art, of a pure spiritual activity, and that of Giannone, who -was the first to attempt a history of the life of jurisprudence. But -these writers made the progress they did because they had a new -and more accurate conception of art and of rights, and if they went -wrong as to certain points, that is because they did not always think -those conceptions with equal exactitude. Winckelmann, for instance, -materialized the spiritual activity of the artist when he posited an -abstract, fixed material ideal of beauty, and gave an abstract history -of artistic styles without regard to the temperaments, historical -circumstances, and individualities of the artists themselves. Giannone -failed to supersede the dualism of Church and State. Without indulging -in other too particular examples, it is evident at the first glance -that ancient historiography concords with the ancient conception of -religion of the state, of ethic, and of the whole of reality; the -medieval with Christian theology and ethic; that of the first half of -the nineteenth century with the idealistic and romantic philosophy, -that of the second half with naturalistic and positivistic philosophy. -Thus, _ex parte historicorum_, there is no way of distinguishing -historical and philosophical thought, which are perfectly commingled in -the narratives. But there is also no possibility of maintaining such -a distinction _ex parte philosophorum_ either, because, as all know, -or at least say, each period has the philosophy proper to it, which -is the consciousness of that period, and as such is its history, at -least in germ; or, as we have put it, philosophy and history coincide. -And if they coincide, the history of philosophy and the history of -historiography also coincide: the one is not only not distinguishable -from the other, but is not even subordinate to the other, for it is all -one with it. - -The historiography of philosophy has already begun to open its arms, -inviting and receiving the works of the historians. Every day it -understands better that a history of Greek thought is not complete -without taking count of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius, nor of -Roman thought without Livy and Tacitus, nor of the thought of the -Renaissance without Machiavelli and Guicciardini. It must open them yet -wider and clasp to its bosom even the humble medieval historiographers -who noted the _Gesta episcoporum_ or _Historiolæ translationum_ or Vitæ -sanctorum, or who bear witness to the Christian faith, according to -their powers and in their own way, it is true, but not less than the -great Augustine according to his powers. It must receive not only the -hagiographical writers, but even obtuse philologists or sociologists -who have amused us during the last decades and bear witness to the -creed of positivism not other-wise than as Spencer or Haeckel in their -systems. By means of this amplification of concepts and enrichment of -material, the historiography of philosophy will place itself in the -position of being able to show that philosophy is a force diffused -throughout life, and not the particular invention and cult of certain -men who are philosophers, and will obtain the means that have hitherto -been lacking to effect a close conjunction with the whole historical -movement. - -In its turn the history of historiography will gain by the fusion, -because it will find its own directive principles in philosophy, and by -its means will be rendered capable of understanding both the problems -of history in general and those of its various aspects as history of -art and of philosophy, of economic and moral life. To seek elsewhere -the criterion of explanation is vain. Fueter, who takes a glance at -the most recent historiography, that posterior to 1870, at the end of -his book, discerns in it the new consciousness that gives the highest -place to political and military power and marks the end of the old -liberalism, the strengthening of such consciousness by means of the -Darwinian theories concerning the struggle for life, the influence of -a more intense economical and industrial life and a greater intensity -of world politics, the repercussion of Egyptian and Orientalistic -discoveries, which have aided in disproving the illusion of Europe as -the centre of the world, the attraction exercised by the theory of -races, and so on. These observations are just, but they do not reach -the heart and brain of the most recent historiography; they merely -revolve round its body. The heart or brain is, as I have observed, -naturalism, the ideal of historical culture inspired and to be inspired -by the natural sciences. So true is this that Fueter himself burns a -few grains of incense before this idol, sighing for a form of history -that shall be beautiful with the beauty of a well-made machine, -rivalling a book on physics such as the _Theory of Tones_ of Helmholtz. -The truth is that the ideal of the natural sciences, instead of being -the perfection, is one of the many crises that historical thought has -passed through and will pass through. Historical thought is dialectic -of development, and not by any means a deterministic explanation by -means of causes which does not explain anything because it does not -develop anything. But whatever we may think of this, it is certain that -naturalism--that is, the criticism of naturalism--can alone supply the -clue for unravelling the web of the historiography of the last ten -years; the same events and historical movements enumerated above have -acted in the particular way in which they have acted owing to being -constantly framed in naturalistic thought. - -For the rest, nothing forbids, and it may even serve a useful purpose, -that the history of philosophy and the history of historiography -should receive literary treatment in different books, for altogether -practical reasons, such, for instance, as the abundance of material and -the different training and acquirements needed for the treatment of the -different classes of material. But what is _apparently disunited_ by -practice thought _really_ unifies; and this real unification is what -I have wished to inculcate, without the pedantic idea ever passing -through my mind of dictating rules for composing books, as to which -it is desirable to leave all liberty of inclusion and exclusion to -writers, in conformity with their various intentions. - - -[1] _Charakteristik der antiken Historiographie_ (Berlin, 1833). - -[2] _Geschichte der neueren Historiographie_ (München u. Berlin, -Oldenburg, 1911). - -[3] _Geschichte der historischen Forschung und Kunst seit der -Wiederherstellung der literarischen Cultur in Europa_ (Göttingen, -1812-20). - - - - -II - - -GRÆCO-ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY - - -After what we have said as to the nature of periodization,[1] the -usual custom, to which I too bow here, of beginning the history of -historiography with that of the Greeks, and with the Greeks of the -fifth or sixth century before Christ, will be taken for what it is -really worth, but it must not be thought that we thus intend to -announce the beginning of historiography, its first appearance in the -world, when, on the contrary, all we wish to say is that our interest -in the investigation of its course becomes more vivid at that point. -History, like philosophy, has no historical beginning, but only an -ideal or metaphysical beginning, in so far as it is an activity of -thought, which is outside time. Historically speaking, it is quite -clear that prior to Herodotus, prior to the logographs, prior indeed -to Hesiod and to Homer, history was already, because it is impossible -to conceive of men who do not think and do not narrate their deeds in -some way or other. This explanation might seem to be superfluous if the -confusion between historical beginning and ideal beginning had not led -to the fancy of a 'first philosophical step,' made by Thales or Zeno, -or by somebody else, by means of which thinking the first stone is -supposed to have been laid, as it was believed that by thinking another -last step the pinnacle of the edifice of philosophy was or would be -attained. But Thales and Herodotus should really be called rather the -'sons' of our interest in the development of those disciplines than -the 'fathers' of philosophy and history, and it is we whom those sons -salute as their 'fathers.' We have not usually much interest in what -occurred prior to them or among people more distant than they from -our point of view, not only because there is a scarcity of surviving -documents concerning them, but above all because they are forms of -thought which have but little connexion with our own actual problems. - -From its point of view, too, the distinction that we laid down between -history and philology suggests refraining from the search hitherto -made for the beginnings of Græco-Roman historiography by means of -composing lists of magistrates and of adding to these brief mention -of wars, treatises, embassies from colonies, religious festivities, -earthquakes, inundations, and the like, in the ῷροι and in the _annales -pontificum,_ in archives and museums made in temples, or indeed in the -chronological nails fixed to the walls, spoken of by Perizonius. Such -things are extrinsic to historiography and form the precedent, not of -it, but of chronicle and philology, which were not born for the first -time in the nineteenth or seventeenth century, or at any rate during -the Alexandrine period, but belong to all times, for in all times men -take note of what they remember and attempt to preserve such memorials -intact, to restore and to increase them. The precedent of history -cannot be something different from history, but is history itself, as -philosophy is the precedent of philosophy and the living of the living. -Nevertheless the thought of Herodotus and of the logographs really -does unite itself with religions, myths, theogonies, cosmogonies, -genealogies, and with legendary and epical tales, which were not -indeed poetry, or were not only poetry but also thoughts--that is to -say, metaphysics and histories. The whole of later historiography -developed from them by a dialectical process, for which they supplied -the presuppositions--that is to say, concepts, propositions of fact and -fancy mingled, and with that the stimulus better to seek out the truth -and to dissipate fancies. This dissipation took place more rapidly at -the time which it is usual to fix by convention as the beginning of -Greek historiography. - -At that time thought deserts mythological history and its ruder -form, prodigious or miraculous history, and enters earthly or human -history--that is to say, the general conception that is still ours, so -much so that it has been possible for an illustrious living historian -to propose the works of Thucydides as an example and model to the -historians of our times. Certainly that exit and that entrance did -not represent for the Greeks a complete breaking with the past; and -since earthly history could not have been altogether wanting in the -past, so it is not to be believed that the Greeks from the sixth and -seventh centuries onward should have abandoned all faith in mythology -and prodigies. These things persisted not only with the people and -among lesser or vulgar historiographers, but also left their traces -among some of the greatest. Nevertheless, looking at the whole from -above, as one should look at it, it is evident that the environment -is altogether changed from what it was. Even the many fables that we -read in Herodotus, and which were to be read in the logographs, are -rarely (as has been justly observed) put forward ingenuously, but are -usually given as by one who collects what others believe, and does -not for that reason accept those beliefs, even if he does not openly -evince his disbelief; or he collects them because he does not know -what to substitute for them, and rather as matter for reflection -and inquiry: _quæ nec confirmare argumentis neque refellere in animo -est,_ as Tacitus says, when he recounts the fables of the Germans: -_plura transcribo quam credo,_ declared Quintus Curtius. Herodotus is -certainly not Voltaire, nor is he indeed Thucydides (Thucydides, 'the -atheist'); but certainly he is no longer Homer or Hesiod. - -The following are a few examples of leading problems which ancient -historians had before them, dictated by the conditions and events -of Greek and Roman life; they were treated from a mental point of -view, which no longer found in those facts episodes of the rivalry of -Aphrodite and Hera (as formerly in the Trojan War), but varying complex -human struggles, due to human interests, expressing themselves in human -actions. How did the wars between the Greeks and the Persians originate -and develop? What were the origins of the Peloponnesian War? of the -expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes? How was the Roman power formed -in Latium, and how did it afterward extend in Italy and in the whole -world? How did the Romans succeed in depriving the Carthaginians of the -hegemony of the Mediterranean? What were the political institutions -developed in Athens, Rome, and Sparta, and what form did the social -struggle take in those cities? What did the Athenian _demos,_ the Roman -_plebs,_ the _eupatrides,_ and the _patres_ desire? What were the -virtues, the dispositions, the points of view, of the various peoples -which entered into conflict among themselves, Athenians, Lacedemonians, -Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Gauls, and Germans? What were the -characters of the great men who guided the destinies of the peoples, -Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander, Hannibal, and Scipio? These problems -were solved in a series of classical works by Thucydides, Xenophon, -Polybius, Livy, Tacitus, etc., and they will certainly not be blamed -for failing to exhaust their themes--that is, for failing to sound the -bottom of the universe, because there is no sounding the bottom of the -universe--nor because they solve those problems only in the terms in -which they had proposed them, neither more nor less than as we solve -the problems of our day in our own terms. Nor must we forget that since -modern historiography is still much as it was left by the Greeks, the -greater part of those events are still thought as they were by the -ancients, and although something has been added and a different light -illumines the whole, the work of the ancient historians is preserved in -our own: a true "eternal possession," as Thucydides intended that his -history should be. - -And just as historical thought had become invigorated in its passage -from the mythological to the human stage, so did research and philology -grow. Herodotus was already travelling, asking questions, and listening -to answers, distinguishing between the things that he had seen -with his own eyes and those which depended upon hearsay, opinion, -and conjecture; Thucydides was submitting to criticism different -traditions relating to the same fact, and even inserting documents in -his narrative. Later appeared legions of learned men and critics, who -compiled 'antiquities' and 'libraries,' and busied themselves also with -the reading of texts, with chronology and geography, thus affording -great assistance to historical studies. Such a fervour of philological -studies was eventually attained that it was recognized as necessary to -draw a clear distinction between the 'histories of antiquaries' (of -which a considerable number survive either entire or in fragments) -and 'histories of historians,' and Polybius several times said that it -is easy to compose history from books, because it suffices to take up -one's residence in a city where there exist rich libraries, but that -true history requires acquaintance with political and military affairs -and direct knowledge of places and of people; and Lucian repeated -that it is indispensable for the historian to have political sense, -άδίδακτον φυσέως δῶρον, a gift of nature not to be learned (the maxims -and practices praised as quite novel by Möser and Niebuhr are therefore -by no means new). The fact is that a more profound theoretical -consciousness corresponded with a more vigorous historiography, so -inseparable is the theory of history from history, advancing with it. -It was also known that history should not be made a simple instrument -of practice, of political intrigue, or of amusement, and that its -function is above all to aim at truth: _ne quid falsi dicere audeat, -ne quid veri non audeat._ In consequence of this, partisanship, even -for one's own country, was condemned (although it was recognized -chat solicitude and sympathy were permissible); and _quidquid Græcia -mendax audet in historia_ was blamed. It was known that history is not -chronicle (annales), which is limited to external things, recording (in -the words of Asellio, the ancient Roman historian) _quod factum, quoque -anno gestum sit,_ whereas history tries to understand _quo Consilio, -quaque ratione gesta sint._ And it was also known that history cannot -set herself the same task as poetry. We find Thucydides referring with -disdain to histories written with the object of gaining the prize in -oratorical competitions, and to those which indulge in fables to please -the vulgar. Polybius too inveighed against those who seek to emphasize -moving details, and depict women dishevelled and in tears, and -dreadful scenes, as though composing tragedies and as though it were -their business to create the marvellous and pleasing and not impart -truth and instruction. If it be a fact that rhetorical historiography -(a worsening of the imaginative and poetic) abounded in antiquity and -introduced its false gold even into some masterpieces, the general -tendency of the better historians was to set themselves free of ornate -rhetoricians and of cheap eloquence. But the ancient historians will -never fail of lofty poetical power and elevation for this reason (not -even the 'prosaic' Polybius, who sometimes paints most effective -pictures), but will ever retain what is proper to lofty historical -narrative. Cicero and Quintilian, Diogenes and Lucian, all recognize -that history must adopt _verba ferme poetarum,_ that it is _proxima -poetis et quodammodo carmen solutum,_ that _scribitur ad narrandum, -non ad demonstrandum,_ that ἔχει τι ποιητικόν, and the like. What the -best historians and theorists sought at that time was not the aridity -and dryness of mathematical or physical treatment (such as we often -hear desired in our day), but gravity, abstention from fabulous and -pleasing tales, or if not from fabulous then from frivolous tales, in -fact from competition with the rhetoricians and composers of histories -that were romances or gross caricatures of such. Above all they desired -that history should remain faithful to real life, since it is the -instrument of life, and a form of knowledge useful to the statesman and -to the lover of his country, and by no means docile to the capricious -requirements of the unoccupied seeking amusement. - -This theory of historiography, which may be found here and there in -a good many special treatises and in general treatises on the art of -speech, finds nowhere such complete and conscious expression as in the -frequent polemical interludes of Polybius in his _Histories,_ where -the polemic itself endows it with precision, concreteness, and savour. -Polybius is the Aristotle of ancient historiography: an Aristotle who -is both historical and theoretical, completing the Stagirite, who in -the vast expanse of his work had taken but little interest in history -properly so called. And since so great a part of the ancient narratives -lives in our own, so there is not one of the propositions recorded -that has not been included and has not been worthy of being included -in our treatises. And if, for example, the maxim that history should -be narrated by men of the world and not by the simply erudite or by -philologists, that it is born of practice and assists in practice, -has been often neglected, the blame falls on those who neglect it. A -further blunder committed by such writers has been to forget completely -the τι ποιητικόν and to pay court to an ideal of history something like -an anatomical map or a treatise of mechanics. - -But the defect that ancient historiography exposes to our gaze is of -another sort. The ancients did not observe it as a defect, or only -sometimes, in a vague and fugitive manner, without attaching weight to -it, for otherwise they would have remedied it when it occurred. The -modern spirit inquires how the sentiments and conceptions which are now -our ideal patrimony, and the institutions in which they are realized, -have been gradually formed. It wishes to understand the revolutionary -passages from primitive and Oriental to Græco-Roman culture, how -modern ethic was attained through ancient ethic, the modern through -the ancient state, the vast industry and international commerce of -the modern world through the ancient mode of economic production, -the passage from the myths of the Aryans to our philosophies, from -Mycenean to French or Swedish or Italian art of the twentieth century. -Hence there are special histories of culture, of philosophy, of poetry, -of the sciences, of technique, of economy, of morality, of religions, -and so on, which are preferred to histories of individuals or of -states themselves, in so far as they are abstract individuals. They -are illuminated and inspired throughout with the ideas of liberty, of -civilization, of humanity, and of progress. All this is not to be found -in ancient historiography, although it cannot be said to be altogether -absent, for with what could the mind of man have ever been occupied, -save by human ideals or 'values'? Nor should the error be made of -considering 'epochs' as something compact and static, whereas they are -various and in motion, or of rendering those divisions natural and -external which, as has been demonstrated, are nothing but the movement -of our thought as we think history, a fallacy linked with the other one -concerning the absolute beginning of history and the rendering temporal -of the forms of the spirit. Whoever is gifted with the patience of -the collector will meet here and there with suggestions and buddings -of those historiographical conceptions of which, generally speaking, -we have denied the existence in the writings of the ancients. He who -finds diversion in modernizing the old may travesty the thoughts of -the ancients, as they have been travestied, so as to render them -almost altogether similar to those of the moderns. In the first book -of Aristotle's _Metaphysics_, for instance, is to be admired a sketch -of the development of Greek philosophy, of the various naturalistic -interpretations which have been in turn proposed for the explanation -of the cosmos, and so on, up to the new orientation of the mind, when, -"compelled by truth itself," it turned toward a different order of -principles--that is to say, till the time of Anaxagoras, "who seems -to be a sober man among the intoxicated," thus continuing up to the -time of Socrates, who founded ethic and discovered the universal and -the definition. A sketch of the history of civilization is to be found -at the beginning of the _History_ of Thucydides, and Polybius will be -found discoursing of the progress that had been made in all the arts, -while Cicero, Quintilian, and several others trace the progress of -rights and of literature. There are also touches of human value in -conflict with one another in the narratives of the struggles between -Greeks and barbarians, between the truly civil and active life of -the former and the proud, lazy habits of the latter. Other similar -conceptions of human values will be found in many comparisons of -peoples, and above all in the way that Tacitus describes the Germans -as a new moral power rising up against that of ancient Rome, and -perhaps also in the repugnance which the same historian experiences -at seeing before him the Jews, who follow rites _contrarius ceteris -mortalibus._ Finally, Rome, mistress of the world, will sometimes -assume in our eyes the aspect of a transparent symbol of the human -ideal, analogous to Roman law, gradually idealized in the form of -natural law. But here it is rather a question of symbols than of -conceptions, of our own conclusions than of the thoughts proper to the -ancients. When, for instance, we examine the history of philosophy -of Aristotle as outlined by him, we find that it consists above all -in a rapid critical account to serve as propædeutic to his system; -and literary and artistic histories and histories of civilization -seem often to be weakened by the prejudice that these are not really -necessary mental forms, but luxuries and refinements. At the utmost -we can speak of exceptions, incidents, tentatives; which does not in -any way alter the comprehensive impression and general conclusion to -the effect that the ancients never possessed explicit histories of -civilization, philosophy, religions, literature, art, or rights: none, -in fact, of the many possessed by ourselves. Nor did they possess -'biography' in the sense that we do, as the history of the ideal -function of an individual in his own time and in the life of humanity, -nor the sense of development, and when they speak of primitive times -they rarely feel that they are primitive, but are rather disposed to -transfigure them poetically, in the same way that Dante did by the -mouth of Cacciaguida that Fiorenza which "stood soberly and modestly at -peace" within the circle of the ancient days. It was one of the "severe -labours" of our Vico to recover the crude reality of history beneath -these poetic idylls. In this work he was assisted, not by the ancient -historiographers, but by documents and mostly by languages. - -The physiognomy of the histories of the ancients as described very -accurately reflects the character of their philosophy, which never -attained to the conception of the spirit, and therefore also failed -to attain to that of humanity, liberty, and progress, which are -aspects or synonyms of the former. It certainly passed from physiology -or cosmology to ethic, logic, and rhetoric; but it schematized and -materialized these spiritual disciplines because it treated them -empirically. Thus their ethic did not rise above the custom of -Greece and Rome, nor their logic above abstract forms of reasoning -and discussing, nor their poetic above classes of literature. For -this reason all assume the form of precepts. 'Anti-historical -philosophy' has been universally recognized and described, but it -is anti-historical because anti-spiritual, anti-historical because -naturalistic. The ancients also failed to notice the deficiency -observed by us, for they were entirely occupied with the joy of the -effort of passing from myth to science and thus to the collection and -classification of the facts of reality. That is to say, they were -engrossed upon the sole problem which they set themselves to solve, -and solved so successfully that they supplied naturalism with the -instruments which it still employs: formal logic, grammar, the doctrine -of the virtues, the doctrine of literary classes, categories of civil -rights, and so forth. These were all Græco-Roman creations. - -But that ancient historians and philosophers were not explicitly aware -of the above defect in its proper terms, or rather in our modern terms, -does not mean that they were not to some extent exercised by it. In -every historical period exist problems theoretically formulated and for -that very reason solved, while others have not yet arrived at complete -theoretical maturity, but are seen, intuited, though not yet adequately -thought. If the former are the positive contribution of that time to -the chain whose links form the human spirit, the latter represent an -unsatisfied demand, which binds that time in another way to the coming -time. The great attention paid to the negative aspect of every epoch -sometimes leads to the forgetting of the other aspect, and to the -consequent imagining of a humanity that passes not from satisfaction -to satisfaction through dissatisfaction, but from dissatisfaction -to dissatisfaction and from error to error. But obscurities and -discordances are possible in so far as light and concord have been -previously attained. Thus they represent in their way progress, as is -to be seen from the history that we are recounting, where we find them -very numerous for the very reason that the age of mythologies and of -prodigies has been left behind. If Greece and Rome had not been both -more than Greece and more than Rome, if they had not been the human -spirit, which is infinitely greater than any Greece and any Rome--its -transitory individuations--they would have been satisfied with the -human portraits of their historians and would not have sought beyond. -But they did seek beyond--that is to say, those very historians and -philosophers sought; and since they had before them so many episodes -and dramas of human life, reconstructed by their thought, they asked -themselves what was the cause of those events, reasonably concluding -that such a cause might be one fact or another, a particular fact; and -for this reason they began to distinguish between facts and causes, -and, in the order of causes themselves, between cause and occasion, -as does Thucydides, or between beginning, cause, and occasion ἀρχή, -αἰτία, πρόφασις, like Polybius. They thus became involved in disputes -as to the true cause of this or that event, and ever since antiquity -attempts have been made to solve the enigma of the 'greatness' of -Rome, assuming in modern times the guise of a solemn experimentum of -historical thought and thus forming the diversion of those historians -who linger behind. The question was often generalized in the other -question as to the motive power behind all history; and here too appear -doctrines, afterward drawn out to great length, such as that the form -of the political constitution was the cause of all the rest, and that -other doctrine relating to climate and to the temperaments of peoples. -The doctrine principally proposed and accepted was that of the natural -law of the circle in human affairs, the perpetual alternation of -good and evil, or the passage through political forms, which always -returns to the form from which it has taken its start, or as growth -from infancy to manhood, declining into old age and decrepitude and -ending in death. But a law of this sort, which satisfied and still -satisfies the Oriental mind, did not satisfy the classical mind, -which had a lively sense of human effort and of the stimulus received -from obstacles encountered and conflicts endured. Hence therefore the -further questions: Does fate or immutable necessity oppress man, or is -he not rather the plaything of capricious fortune, or is he ruled by a -wise and sagacious providence? It was also asked whether the gods are -interested in human affairs or not. These questions met with answers -that are sometimes pious, advocating submission to the divine will and -wisdom, sometimes, again, inspired with the notion that the gods are -not concerned with human affairs themselves, but solely with vengeance -and punishment. All these conceptions lack firmness, and are for the -most part confused, since a general uncertainty and confession of -ignorance prevails in them: _in incerto judicium est,_ said Tacitus, -almost summing up the ancient argument on the subject in this epigram, -or rather finding non-thought, failure to understand, to be the result -of the argument. - -What we do not understand we do not dominate; on the contrary, it -dominates us, or at least menaces us, taking the form of evil; hence -the psychological attitude of the ancients toward history must be -described as pessimistic. They saw much greatness fall, but they never -discovered the greatness that does not fall and that rises up greater -after every fall. For this reason a flood of bitterness inundates -their histories. Happiness, beauty of human life, always seemed to be -something that had been and was no longer, and were it present would -have soon been lost. For the Romans and those professing the cult of -Rome, it was primitive, austere, victorious Rome; and all the Roman -historians, big and little, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus, Paterculus and -Florus, fix their gaze upon that image, as they lament the corruption -of later days. Once it was Rome that trampled the world underfoot; -but they knew that the triumphant queen must some day become slave -from queen that once she was. This thought manifests itself in the -most various forms, from the melancholy meditations of Scipio upon the -ruins of Carthage to the fearful expectation of the lordship which--as -Persia to Babylonia and Macedonia to Persia--must succeed to that of -the Romans (the theory of the 'four monarchies' has its origin in the -Græco-Roman world, whence it filtered into Palestine and into the -Book of Daniel). Sometimes repressed, sometimes outspoken, we hear -the anxious question: Who will be the successor and the gravedigger? -Will it be the menacing Parthian? Will it be the Germans, so rich in -new and mysterious energy?--all this, despite the proud consciousness -of ancient times that had uttered the words "Rome, the eternal city." -Certainly, that general pessimism is not altogether coherent, for no -pessimism can be so altogether, and here and there appear fugitive -hints of a perception of human progress in this or that part of life. -We find, for instance, Tacitus, bitterest of men, remarking that _nec -omnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra quoque ætas multa laudis et -artium imitanda tulit,_ and one of the speakers in the _De oratoribus_ -observes that literary forms change with the times and that it is -owing to the _vitio malignitatis humana_ that we hear the perpetual -praise of ancient things and the perpetual abuse of things modern. -Another interlocutor in the same dialogue draws attention to the -dialectic connexion between the turbulence of life and the greatness of -art, whence Rome _donec erravit, donec se partibus et dissensionibus -confecit,_ precisely at that time _tulit valentiorem eloquentiam._ -This linking together of good and evil is not altogether absent in -ancient philosophy, and is also to be found here and there in ancient -historiography. Sallust, for example, is of opinion that Rome remained -in good health so long as she had Carthage opposed to her and giving -her trouble. Readers of Cicero and of Seneca will be aware that the -idea of humanity also made considerable progress during the last -days of the Republic and the first days of the Empire, owing to the -influence of Stoicism. Divine providence too is courted, as was not -formerly the case, and we also find Diodorus Siculus undertaking to -treat the affairs of all nations as those of a single city (καθάπερ -μιᾶς πολέως). But these promises remain still weak, vague, and inert -(the _promissor_ Diodorus, for example, carried out none of his -grandiose prologue), and in any case they foretell the dissolution -of the classical world. During this epoch the problem as to the -signification of history remains unsolved, because the contradictory -conceptions above mentioned of fortune or of the gods, the belief in -a universal worsening of things, in a fall or a regression, which had -already been expressed in many ancient myths, were not by any means -solutions. - -Owing to their failure to realize spiritual value as the immanent -progressive force in history, even the loftiest of the ancient -historians were not able to maintain the unity and autonomy of -historiographical work, which in other respects they had discovered -and asserted. Although they had penetrated the deception exercised by -those histories that are really poetry, or lies and partisanship, or -collections of material and unintelligent piling up of erudition, or -instruments of pleasure, affording marvel for simple folk, yet they -were on the other hand incapable of ever setting themselves free of -the preconception of history as directed to an end of edification -and chiefly of instruction. This real heteronomy then appeared to -be autonomy. They are all agreed as to this: Thucydides proposed to -narrate past events in order to predict from them future events, -identical or similar, the perpetual return of human fortunes; Polybius -sought out the causes of facts in order that he might apply them to -analogous cases, and held those unexpected events to be of inferior -importance whose irregularities place them outside rules; Tacitus, in -conformity with his chief interest, which was rather moralistic than -social or political, held his chief end to be the collection of facts -notable for the vice or virtue which they contained, _ne virtutes -sileantur utque pravis dictis factìsque ex posteritate et infamia metus -sit._ Behind them came all the minor historians, all the hypocrites, -who repeated by imitation or involuntary echo or false unction and in a -superficial way what in the greater writers was the result of profound -thought, as, for instance, the Sallusts, the Diogenes, the Diodori, -the Plutarchs, and those that resemble them. Then there were all the -extractors of historical quintessences, of memorable deeds and words of -statesmen, captains, and philosophers, and even of women (the γυναικῶν -ἀρεταί). Ancient historiography has been called 'pragmatical,' and -such it is, in the double sense of the word, ancient and modern: in so -far as it limits itself to the earthly side of things and especially -to the political (the 'pragmatic' of Polybius), and in so far as it -adorns them with reflections and advice (the 'apodictic' of the same -historian-theorist). - -This heteronomous theory of history does not always remain merely -theory, prologue, or frame, but sometimes operates so as to lead to -the mingling of elements that are not historiographical with history, -such as, for instance, is the case with the 'speeches' or 'orations' of -historical personages, not delivered or not in agreement with what was -really said, but invented or arranged by the historian and put into the -mouths of the personages. This, in my opinion, has been wrongly looked -upon as a survival of the 'epic spirit' in ancient historiography, or -as a simple proof of the rhetorical ability of the narrators, because, -if the first explanation hold as to some of the popular writers and the -second as to certain rhetoricians, the origin of those falsifications -was with the greater historians nothing but the fulfilment of the -obligation of teaching and counselling accepted by them. But when such -ends had been assigned to history, its intrinsic quality of truth -and the line of demarcation which it drew between real and imaginary -could not but vacillate to some extent, since the imaginary sometimes -served excellently well and even better than the real for those ends. -And setting aside Plato, who despised all knowledge save that of the -transcendental ideas, did not Aristotle himself ask whether the greater -truth belonged to history or to poetry? Had he not indeed said that -history is 'less philosophical' than poetry? And if so why should not -history have availed itself of the aid of poetry and of imagination? -In any case, resistance could be opposed to this ulterior perversion -by seeking the truth with vigilant eye, and also by reducing the -share of the imaginary speeches and other parerga co the smallest -dimensions. But it was impossible to dispense with belief in the end -of instruction, because it was in any case necessary that history -should have some end, and a true end had not been discovered, and -the end of instruction performed almost the function of a metaphor of -the truth, since it was to some extent the nearest to the truth. In -Polybius critical vigilance, scientific austerity, a keen desire for -ample and severe history, attain to so high a level that one would feel -disposed to treat the historian of Megalopolis like one of those great -pagans that medieval imagination admitted to Paradise, or at least to -Purgatory, as worthy of having known the true God by extraordinary -means and as a reward for their intense moral conscience. But if we -envisage the matter with greater calmness we shall have to consign -Polybius also to the Limbo where those who "were before Christianity" -and "did not duly adore God" are received. They were men of great value -and reached the boundary, even touching it, but they never passed -beyond. - - -[1] See pp. 112-116. - - - - -III - - -MEDIEVAL HISTORIOGRAPHY - - -For the same reason that we must not look upon the beginning of -any history as an absolute beginning, or conceive of epochs in a -simplicistic manner, as though they were strictly limited to the -determinations represented by their general character, we must -be careful not to identify the humanistic conception of history -with the ancient epoch of historiography which it characterizes or -symbolizes--in fact, we must not make historical the ideal categories, -which are eternal. Græco-Roman historiography was without doubt -humanistic, but it was a Græco-Roman humanism--that is to say, it not -only had all the limitations that we have been pointing out, but also -the special physiognomy which such humanism assumes in the ancient -historians and thinkers, varying more or less in each one of them. -Not only was it thus humanistic, but other formations of the same -sort probably preceded, as they certainly followed, it in the course -of the centuries. It is perhaps attractive, but it is also artificial -(and contrary to the true concept of progress), to conceive of the -history of philosophy and of historiography as of a series of ideal -phases, which are traversed once only, and to transform philosophers -into categories and categories into philosophers, making synonymous -Democritus and the atom, Plato and the transcendental idea, Descartes -and dualism, Spinoza and pantheism, Leibnitz and monadism, whittling -down history to the dimensions of a _Dynastengeschichte_, as a German -critic has satirically described it, or treating it according to a -sort of 'line of buckets' theory, as an Englishman has humorously -described it. Hence, too, the view that history has not yet appeared in -the world, or that it has appeared for the first time and by flashes, -in response to the invocations made by the historian and the critic of -the present day. But every thinking of history is always adequate to -the moment at which it appears and always inadequate to the moment that -follows. - -The opportuneness of this warning is confirmed by the astonishment of -those who consider the passage from ancient to Christian or medieval -historiography; for what can be the meaning of this passage, in which -we find ourselves faced with a miraculous and mythological world all -over again, identical as it seems, in its general characteristics, -with that of the ancient historians, which has disappeared? It is -certainly not progress, but rather falling into a ditch, into which -also fall all the dearest illusions relating to the perpetual advance -of humanity. And the Middle Ages did seem to be a ditch or a declivity, -sometimes during the period itself and most clearly at the Renaissance, -and this image is still represented in common belief. Restricting -ourselves solely to the domain of historiography, and following up -the impression of astonishment at first caused by it, we end by -representing events at the beginning of the Middle Ages somewhat in the -way they appeared to our writer Adolfo Bartoli, in his introductory -volume to the _History of Italian Literature,_ which is all broken up -with cries of horror and with the gesture of covering the face lest -he should see so much ugliness. "We are in a world," writes Bartoli, -when speaking of Gregory of Tours, "where thought has descended so low -as to cause pity, in a world where a conception of history no longer -exists," and history also becomes "a humble handmaid to theology--that -is to say, an aberration of the spirit." And after Gregory of Tours -(continues Bartoli) there is a further fall: "Behold Fredigarius, in -whom credulity, ignorance, and confusion surpass every limit... there -survives in him nothing of a previous civilization." After Fredigarius, -with the monastic chronicle, we take another step down-ward toward -nothingness, though this would seem to be impossible. Here "we seem to -see the lean monk putting his trembling head out of the narrow window -of his cell every five or eleven years, to make sure that men are not -all dead, and then shutting himself up again in the prison, where he -lives only in the expectation of death." We must protest against such -shrinking back (which makes the critic of to-day look like the "lean -monk" whose appearance he has so vividly portrayed); we must assert -that mythology and miracle and transcendency certainly returned in -the Middle Ages--that is to say, that these ideal categories again -acted with almost equal force and that they almost reassumed their -ancient bulk, but they did not return _historically identical_ with -those of the pre-Hellenic world. We must seek in the heart of their -new manifestations for the effective progress which is certainly -accomplished by Gregory of Tours and Fredigarius, and even by the -monkish chroniclers. - -The divinity descends again to mingle anthropomorphically with the -affairs of men, as a most powerful or ultra-powerful personage among -the less powerful; the gods are now the saints, and Peter and Paul -intervene in favour of this or that people; St Mark, St Gregory, -St Andrew, or St January lead the array of the combatants, the one -vying with the other, and sometimes against the other, playing -malicious tricks upon one another; and in the performance or the -non-performance of an act of worship is again placed the loss or gain -of a battle: medieval poems and chronicles are full of such stories. -These conceptions are analogous to the antique, and indeed they are -their historical continuation. This is not only so (as has so often -been pointed out) owing to the attachment of this or that particular -of ancient faith to popular religion and to the transformation of -gods into saints and demons, but also, and above all, to a more -substantial reason. Ancient thought had left fortune, the divinity, -the inscrutable, at the edge of its humanism, with the result that -the prodigious was never completely eliminated even from the most -severe historians--the door at any rate was left open by which it -could return. All are aware with how many 'superstitions' philosophy, -science, history, and customs were impregnated during late antiquity, -which in this respect was not intellectually superior, but indeed -inferior, to the new Christian religion. In the latter the fables -gradually formed and miracles which were believed became spiritualized -and ceased to be 'superstitions'--that is to say, something extraneous -or discordant to the general humanistic conception--and set themselves -in harmony with the new supernaturalistic and transcendental -conception, of which they were the accompaniment. Thus myth and -miracle, becoming intensified in Christianity, became at the same time -different from ancient myths and miracles. - -They were different and more lofty, because they contained a more lofty -thought: the thought of spiritual worth, which was not peculiar to this -or to that people, but common to the whole of humanity. The ancients -had indeed touched upon this thought in speculation, but they had never -possessed it, and their philosophers had sought it in vain or attained -to it only in abstract speculation not capable of investing the whole -soul, as is the case with thoughts that are profoundly thought, and -as was the case with Christianity. Paulus Orosius expresses this in -his _Historæ adversus paganos_, in such accents as no Græco-Roman -historian had been able to utter: _Ubique patria, ubique lex et -religio mea est.... Latitudo orientis, septentrionis copiositas, -meridiana diffusio, magnarum insularum largissimæ tutissimæque sedes -mei juris et nominis sunt, quia ad Christianos et Romanos Romanus et -Christianus accedo._ To the virtue of the citizen is added that of man, -of spiritual man, who puts himself on a level with the truth by means -of his religious faith and by his work, which is humanly good. To the -illustrious men among the pagans are opposed illustrious men among the -Christians who are better than illustrious, being saints; and the new -Plutarch is found in the _Vitæ patrum_ or _eremitarum,_ in the lives -of the confessors of Christ, of the martyrs, of the propagators of -the true faith; the new epics describe the conflicts of the faithful -against unbelievers, of Christians against heretics and Islamites. -There is here a greater consciousness of conflict than the Greeks had -of the conflict between Greeks and barbarians, or freedmen and slaves, -which were usually looked upon rather as representing differences of -nature than of spiritual values. _Ecclesiastical history_ now appears, -no longer that of Athens or of Rome, but of religion and of the Church -which represented it in its strifes and in its triumphs--that is to -say, the strifes and triumphs of the truth. This was a thing without -precedent in the ancient world, whose histories of culture, of art -or philosophy, did not go beyond the empirical stage, as we have -seen, whereas ecclesiastical history has a spiritual value as its -subject, by means of which it illuminates and judges facts. To censure -ecclesiastical history because it overrules and oppresses profane -history will perhaps be justified, as we shall see, from certain -points of view and in a certain sense; but it is not justifiable as a -general criticism of the idea of that history, and, indeed, when we -formulate the censure in these terms we are unconsciously pronouncing -a warm eulogy of it. The _historia spiritalis_ (as we may also call -it, employing the title of Avito's poem) could not and in truth would -not consent to be a mere part, or to suffer rivals at its side: it -must dominate and affirm itself as the whole. And since history -becomes history of the truth with Christianity, it abandons at the -same time the fortuitous and chance, to which the ancients had often -abandoned it, and recognizes its own proper law, which is no longer -a natural law, blind fate, or even the influence of the stars (St -Augustine confutes this doctrine of the pagans), but rationality, -intelligence, _providence._ This conception was not unknown to ancient -philosophy, but is now set free from the frost of intellectualism and -abstractionism and becomes warm and fruitful. Providence guides and -disposes the course of events, directing them to an end, permitting -evils as punishments and as instruments of education, determining the -greatness and the catastrophes of empires, in order to prepare the -kingdom of God. This means that for the first time is really broken the -idea of the _circle,_ of the perpetual return of human affairs to their -starting-point, of the vain labour of the Danaïds (St Augustine also -combats the _circuitus_); history for the first time is here understood -_as progress_: a progress that the ancient historians did not succeed -in discovering, save in rare glimpses, thus falling into unconsolable -pessimism, whereas Christian pessimism is irradiated with hope. Hence -the importance to be attributed to the _succession of empires_ and to -the function fulfilled by each of them, and especially with regard -to the Roman Empire, which politically unified the world that Christ -came to unify spiritually, to the position of Judaism as opposed to -Christianity, and the like. These questions have been answered in -various ways, but on the common assumption that divine intelligence -had willed those events, that greatness and that decadence, those joys -and afflictions, and therefore that all had been necessary means of -the divine work, and that all had competed in and were competing in -the final end of history, linked one with the other, not as effects -following from a blind cause, but as stages of a process. Hence, too, -history understood as _universal_ history, no longer in the sense of -Polybius, who narrates the transactions of those states which enter -into relations with one another, but in the profounder sense of a -history of the universal, of the universal by excellence, which is -history in labour with God and toward God. By means of this spirit -which invests them, even the most neglected of the chronicles become -surrounded with a halo, which is wanting to the classical histories of -Greece and Rome, and which, however distant they be from our particular -view-points, yet in their general aspect makes them very near to our -heart and mind. - -Such are the new problems and the new solutions which Christianity -brought to historical thought, and it may be said of them, as of the -political and humanistic thought of the ancients, that they constitute -a solid possession of perpetual efficacy for the human spirit. Eusebius -of Cæsarea is to be placed beside Herodotus as 'father' of modern -historiography, however little disposed it may be to recognize its -parents in that barbaric author and in the others who were called -'fathers of the Church,' to whom, and particularly to St Augustine, it -yet owes so great a part of itself. What are our histories of culture, -of civilization, of progress, of humanity, of truth, save the form of -ecclesiastical history in harmony with our times--that is to say, of -the triumph and propagation of the faith, of the strife against the -powers of darkness, of the successive treatments of the new evangel, or -good news, made afresh with each succeeding epoch? Do not the modern -histories, which narrate the function performed or the pre-eminence -assumed by this or that nation in the work of civilization, correspond -to the _Gesta Dei per Francos_ and to other like formulas of medieval -historiography? And our universal histories are such not only in the -sense of Polybius, but also of the universal as ideal, purified and -elevated in the Christian sense; hence the religious sentiment which we -experience on approaching the solemnity of history. - -It will be observed that in presenting it in this way we to some extent -idealize the Christian conception; and this is true, but in the same -way and in the same measure as we have idealized ancient humanism, -which was not only humanism, but also transcendency and mystery. -Christian historiography, like ancient historiography, solved the -problems that were set to it, but it did not solve other problems that -were only formed afterward, because they were not set to it. A proof -of this is to be found in the caprices and the myths that accompanied -its fundamental conception. The prodigious and the miraculous, which, -as already observed, surrounded Christian historiography, bore witness -precisely to the incomplete ideality of the new and loftier God, -the thought of whom became converted into a myth, his action into -fabulous anecdotes. Yet when it was not a question of miracles, or when -these were reduced to small compass, attenuated and held back, if not -refuted, there nevertheless remained the miracle of the divinity and -of the truth, conceived as transcendent, separated from and opposed to -human affairs. This too was an attestation of the Christian spirit, in -so far as it surpassed the ancient spirit, not with the calmness and -security of thought, but with the violence of sentiment and with the -enthusiasm of the imagination. Transcendency led to a consideration of -worldly things as external and rebellious to divine things: hence the -dualism of God and the world, of a _civitas colestis_ and of another -that was _terrena,_ of a _civitas_ Dei and of a _civitas diaboli_ which -revived most ancient Oriental conceptions, such as Parseeism, and was -tempered, if not internally corrected, by means of the providential -course of history, internally compromised by that unconquered dualism. -The city of God destroyed the earthly city and took its place, but -did not justify it, although it tried to do so here and there, -in accordance with the logic of its providential and progressive -principle. St Augustine, obliged to explain the reasons of the fortune -of Rome, escaped from the difficulty with the sophism that God conceded -that greatness to the Romans as a reward for their virtues, earthly -though they were and not such as to lead to the attainment of heavenly -glories, but yet worthy the fleeting reward of earthly glory. Thus the -Romans remained always reprobate, but less reprehensible than other -reprobates; there could not have been true virtue where there had not -been true religion. The contests of ideas did not appear as conflicting -forms of the true in its becoming, but simply diabolical suggestions, -which disturbed the truth, which was complete and possessed by the -Church. Eusebius of Cæsarea treated heresies as the work of the -devil, because it was the devil who prompted Simon Magus, and then -Menander, and the two currents of gnosis represented by Saturninus and -Basil. Otto of Frisia contemplated the Roman Empire succeeding to the -Babylonian as son to father, and the kings of the Persians and the -Greeks almost as its tutors and pedagogues. In the political unity of -Rome he discovers a prelude to Christian unity, in order that the minds -of men should form themselves _ad majora intelligenda promptiores et -capaciores,_ be disciplined to the cult of a single man, the emperor, -and to the fear of a single dominant city, that they should learn _unam -quoque fidem tenendam._ But the same Otto imagines the whole world _a -primo homine ad Christum ... exceptis de Israelitico populo paucis, -errore deceptus, vanis superstitionibus deditus, dæmonum ludicris -captus, mundi illecebris irretitus,_ fighting _sub principe mundi -diabolo, until venit plenitudo temporis_ and God sent His son to earth. -The doctrine of salvation as a grace due to the good pleasure of God, -indebita Dei gratia, is not at all an accidental excrescence upon this -conception, but is its foundation or logical complement. Christian -humanity was destined to make itself unhuman, and St Augustine, however -much reverence he excites by the energy of his temperament, by his -gaze ever fixed above, offends us to an equal degree by his lack of -human sympathy, his harshness and cruelty; and the 'grace' of which he -speaks assumes in our eyes the aspect of odious favouritism and undue -exercise of power. It is nevertheless well to remember that by means -of these oscillations and deviations of sentiment and imagination -Christian historiography prepared the problem of the surpassing of -dualism. For if the search for the Christianity of the non-Christians, -for grace due to all men from their very character of men, the truth -of heresies, the goodness of pagan virtue, was a historical task that -has matured slowly in modern times, the division and opposition of -the two histories and the two cities, introduced by Christianity, was -a fundamental necessity, as their unity thought in the providential -divine Unity was a good preparation for it. - -Another well-known aspect of this dualism is _dogmatism,_ the -incapacity to understand the concrete particularization of itself by -the spirit in its various activities and forms. This explains the -accusation levelled against ecclesiastical history of overriding and -tyrannically oppressing the whole of the rest of history. This did in -fact take place, because ecclesiastical history, instead of developing -itself in the concrete universal of the spirit, remained rooted in a -particular determination of it. All human values were reduced to a -single value--that is to say, to firmness of Christian faith and to -service of the Church. This value, thus abstractly conceived, became -deprived of its natural virtue and declined to the level of a material -and immobile fact, and indeed the vivid, fluid Christian consciousness -after some centuries of development became solidified in dogmas. That -materialized and motionless dogma necessarily prevailed as a universal -measure, and men of all times were judged according to whether they had -or had not been touched with the divine grace, were pious or impious, -and the lives of the holy fathers and of believers were a Plutarch, -who excluded every other profane Plutarch. This was the dogmatism of -transcendency, which therefore resolved itself into _asceticism,_ in -the name of which the whole actual history of mankind is covered with -contempt, with horror, and with lamentation. This is particularly -noticeable in Augustine, in Orosius, and in Otto of Frisia, but is to -be perceived at least in germ as a tendency among all the historians or -chroniclers of the early Middle Ages. What thoughts are suggested by -the battle of Thermopylæ to Otto of Frisia? _Tædet hic inextricabilem -malorum texere cratem; tamen ad ostendendam mortalium miseriam, -summatim ea attingere volo._ And what by the deeds of Alexander?_ -Regni Macedonum monarchia, quæ al ipso cœpit, ipso mortuo cum ipso -finitur.... Civitas autem Christi firmata supra firmam petram_.... With -asceticism is linked the often noted and often ridiculed credulity -of the medieval historians (not to be confounded with the belief in -miracles, originating from religion): this credulity is generally -attributed to the prevalence of imagination, or to social conditions, -which rendered books rare and critical capacity difficult to find--that -is to say, to things which required to be explained in their turn. - -Indifference is, indeed, one of the principal sources of credulity, -because no one is ever credulous in the things that touch him closely -and of which he treats, while on the other hand all (as is proved -in daily life) are ready to lend an ear to more or less indifferent -talk. Asceticism, diminishing the interest for things of the world -and for history, assisted in the neglect and dispersion of books -and documents, promoted credulity toward everything heard or read, -unbridling the imagination, ever desirous of the wonderful and -curious, to the disadvantage of discernment. It did this not only -in history properly so called, but also in the science of nature or -natural history, which was also indifferent to one, who possessed the -ultimate truth of religion. The weak capacity for individualization -noticeable in medieval historiography must be attributed to ascetism, -which is usually satisfied with the general character of goodness -or badness (the 'portrait' is very rare in it, as in the figurative -arts of the same age), and it has even less consciousness of the -historical differences of place and time, travestying persons and -events in contemporary costume. It even goes so far as to compose -imaginary histories and false documents, which portray the supposed -type. This extends from Agnello of Ravenna, who declared that he wrote -also the lives of those bishops of Ravenna about whom he possessed no -information, _et credo_ (he said) _non mentitum esse,_ because, if -they filled so high a past, they must of necessity have been good, -charitable, zealous, and so forth, down to the false decretals of the -pseudo-Isidore. We also owe to asceticism the _form of chronicle_ as -its intimate cause, because, when the meaning of particular facts -was neglected, it only remained to note them as they were observed -or related, without any ideological connexion and with only the -chronological connexion. Thus we frequently find among the historians -of the Middle Ages the union (at first sight strange, yet not without -logical coherence) of a grandiose history, beginning with the creation -of the world and the dispersion of the races, and an arid chronicle, -following the other principle and becoming ever more particular and -more contingent as approach is gradually made to the times of the -authors. - -When on the one hand the two cities, the heavenly and the earthly, and -on the other the transcendency of the principle of explanation had -been conceived, the composition of dualism could not be sought for in -intelligence, but in myth, which put an end to the strife with the -triumph of one of the two adversaries: the myth of the fall, of the -redemption, of the expected reign of Christ, of the Last Judgment, and -of the final separation of the two cities, one ascending to Paradise -with the elect, the other driven back into hell with the wicked. This -mythology had its precedent in the Judaic expectations of a Messiah, -and also, from some points of view, in Orphism, and continued to -develop through gnosis, millenarism, and other heretical tentatives -and heresies, until it took a definite or almost a definite form in -St Augustine. It has been remarked that in this conception metaphysic -became identified with history, as an entirely new thought, altogether -opposed to Greek thought, and that it is a philosophical contribution -altogether novel and proper to Christianity. But we must add here that, -as mythology, it did not unite, but indeed confounded, metaphysic and -history, making the finite infinite, avoiding the fallacy of the circle -as perpetual return of things, but falling into the other fallacy of a -progress beginning and ending in time. History was therefore arranged -in spiritual epochs or phases, through which humanity was born, grew -up, and attained completion: there were six, seven, or eight epochs, -according to the various ways of dividing and calculating, which -sometimes corresponded to the ages of human life, sometimes to the days -of the creation, sometimes to both these schemes combined; or where -the hermeneutic of St Jerome upon the Book of Daniel was accepted, -the succession of events was distributed among the four _monarchies,_ -of which the last was the Roman, not only in order of time, but also -in that of the idea, because after the Roman Empire (the Middle Ages, -as we know, long nourished the illusion that that empire persisted in -the form of the Holy Roman Empire) there would be nothing else, and -the reign of Christ or of the Church and then of Antichrist and the -universal judgment were expected to follow without any intermission. -The end which history had not yet reached chronologically, being also -intrinsic to the system, was ideally constructible, as the Apocalypses -had already ideally constructed it, pervading theological works and -even histories, which in their last section (see the works of Otto of -Frisia for all of them) described the coming of Antichrist and the end -of the world: hence the idea of a _history of things future,_ continued -by the paradoxical Francesco Patrizzi, who gave utterance to his theory -in the sixteenth century in his dialogues _Upon History_ (1560). This -general historical picture might be here and there varied in its -particulars, but never shattered and confuted; it varied in orthodoxy -up to the time of Augustine, and afterward among the dissentients and -the heretics: most noteworthy of these variations was the _Eternal -Evangel_ of the followers of Gioacchino di Flora, who divided history -into three epochs, corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity: -the first that of the Old Testament or of the Father, the second -that of the New Testament or of the Son, the third and last, that of -the Spirit. These are but artificial combinations and transactions, -by means of which life always seeks to find a passage between the -preconceived schemes which compress and threaten to suffocate it. - -But such transactions did not avail to get the better of the discord -between reality and plan which everywhere revealed itself. Hence the -necessity of the _allegorical interpretation,_ so dear to the Middle -Ages. This consisted substantially in placing an imaginary figure -between the plan and the historical reality, a mixture of both, like a -bridge, but a bridge which could be crossed only in imagination. Thus -personages and events of sacred and profane history were allegorized, -and subtle numerical calculations made and continually reinforced with -new imaginary contributions, in order to discover correspondences -and parallelisms; and not only were the ages of life and the days of -creation placed on a parallel line with historical epochs, but so -also were the virtues and other conceptions. Such notions are still -to be found in books of devotion and in the preaching of the less -acute and less modernized of sacred orators. The 'reign of nature' -was also included in allegorical interpretation; and since history -and metaphysic had been set at variance with one another, so in like -manner was natural science set at variance with both of them, and all -appeared together in allegorical forms in the medieval encyclopædias, -the _Pantheons_ and _Mirrors of the World._ - -Notwithstanding these inevitable strayings, the new idea of history -as the spiritual drama of humanity, although it inclined toward myth, -yet acted with such energy as to weaken the ancient heteronomous -conception of history as directed toward the administration of abstract -instruction, useful in actual practice. History itself was now the -teaching, the knowledge of the life of the human race from its creation -upon the earth, through its struggles, up to its final state, which -was indicated in the near or remote horizon. History thus became the -work of God, teaching by His direct word and presence, which is to be -seen and heard in every part of it. Declarations are certainly not -wanting, indeed they abound, that the reading of histories is useful -as counselling, and particularly as inculcating, good behaviour and -abstention from evil. Sometimes it is a question of traditional and -conventional declarations, at others of particular designs: but -medieval historiography was not conceived, because it could not be -conceived, heteronomously. - -If asceticism mortified minds, and if the miraculous clouded them, it -is not necessary to believe, on the other hand, that either had the -power to depress reality altogether and for a long period. Indeed, -precisely because asceticism was arbitrary, and mythology imaginary, -they remained more or less abstract, in the same way as allegorical -interpretation, which was impotent to suppress the real determinations -of fact. It was all very well to despise and condemn the earthly city -in words, but it forced itself upon the attention, and if it did not -speak to the intellect it spoke to the souls and to the passions of -men. In its period of youthful vigour, also, Christianity was obliged -to tolerate profane history, dictated by economic, political, and -military interests, side by side with sacred history. And as in the -course of the Middle Ages, in addition to the religious poetry of the -sacred hymns and poems, there also existed an epic of territorial -conquests, of the shock of peoples and of feudal strife, so there -continued to exist a worldly history, more or less mingled and tempered -with religious history. We find even fervent Christians and the most -pious of priests yielding to the desire of collecting and handing down -the memory of their race: thus Gregory of Tours told of the Franks, -Paulus Diaconus of the Lombards, Bede of the Angles, Widekind of the -Saxons. Their gentle hearts of political partisans do not cease to -beat. Not only do they lament the misery and wickedness of humanity -in general, but also give vent to their particular feelings, as we -observe, for instance, in the monk Erchempertus, who, _ex intimo corde -ducens alta suspiria,_ resumes the thread of Paul's history to narrate -the deeds of his glorious Lombards (now hunted back into the southern -part of Italy alone and assaulted and imbushed on every side), _non -regnum sed excidium, non felicitatem sed miseriam, non triumphum sed -perniciem._ And Liutprand of Cremona, although he makes the deity -intervene as ruler and punisher on every occasion, and even the saints -in person do battle, does not fail, for instance, to note that when -Berengarius proceeded to take possession of the kingdom after the -death of Guido, the followers of the latter called for King Lambert, -_quia semper Itali geminis uti dominis volunt, quatinus alterum -alterius terrore coherceant_: which is also the definition of feudal -society. They were most credulous in many things, far from profound -and abandoned to their imagination, but they were not credulous, -indeed they were clear-sighted, shrewd and diffident in what concerned -the possessions and privileges of the churches and monasteries, of -families, and of the feudal group and the order of citizenship to which -each belonged. It is to these interests that we owe the formation of -archives, registers, chronologies, and the exercise of criticism as to -the authenticity and genuineness of documents. The conception of the -new Christian virtue oppressed, but did not quench, admiration (though -held sinful by the most severe) for the great name of ancient Rome, and -the many works of pagan civilization, its eloquence, its poetry, its -civil wisdom. Nor did it forbid admiration for Arabic or Judaic-Arabic -wisdom, of which the works were well received, notwithstanding -religious strife. Hence we may say that in the same way as Græco-Roman -humanism did not altogether exclude the supernatural, so the Christian -supernatural did not prevent human consideration of worldly passions -and earthly transactions. - -This becomes more and more evident as we pass from the early to the -late Middle Ages, when profane historiography progresses, as the result -of the struggles between Church and State, of the communal movement, -of the more frequent commercial communications between Europe and the -East, and the like. These are themselves the result of the development, -the maturing, and the modernization of thought, which grows with life -and makes life grow. Neither life nor thought remained attached to the -conceptions of the fathers of the Church, of Augustine, of Orosius, -to whom history offered nothing but the proof of the infinite evils -that afflict humanity, of the unceasing punishments of God, and of -the "deaths of the persecutors." In Otto of Frisia himself, who holds -more firmly than the others to the doctrines of Augustine, we find the -asperity of doctrine tempered by grace; and when he afterward proceeds -to narrate the struggle between the Church and the Empire, if it cannot -be said that he takes the side of the Empire, it also cannot be said -that he resolutely defends that of the Church, for the eschatological -visions that form so great a part of his work do not blind his -practical sense and political judgment. The party of the faith against -the faithless remained, however, always the 'great party,' the great -'struggle of classes' (elect and reprobate) and of 'states' (celestial -and earthly cities). But within this large framework we perceive other -figures more closely particularized, other parties and interests, -which gradually come to occupy the first, second, and third planes, -so that the struggle between God and the devil is forced ever more -and more into the background and becomes somewhat vague, something -always assumed to be present, but not felt to be active and urgent in -the soul, as something which is still talked of, but is not deeply -felt, or at least felt with the energy that the words would wish us -to believe, the words themselves often sounding like a refrain, as -pious as it is conventional. The miraculous gradually fills less and -less space and appears more rarely: God acts more willingly by means -of secondary causes, and respects natural laws; He rarely intervenes -directly in a revolutionary manner. The form of the chronicles, too, -becomes also less accidental and arid, the better among the chroniclers -here and there seeking a different 'order'--that is to say, really, a -better understanding--and we find (particularly from the thirteenth -century onward) the _ordo artificialis_ or internal opposed to the -_ordo naturalis_ or external chronological order. There are also -to be found those who distinguish between the _sub singulis annis -describere_ and the _sub stilo historico conglutinare_--that is to -say, the grouping together according to things described. The general -aspect of historiography changes not a little. Limiting ourselves -to Italian historiography alone, there are no longer little books -upon the miracles and the translations of the bodies of saints and -bishops, but chronicles of communes, all of them full of affection for -the feudal superiors or for the archbishop, for the imperial or the -anti-imperial side, for Milan or for Bergamo, or for Lodi. The sense -of tragedy, which weighed so heavily upon Erchempertus, returns with -new and stronger accents in the narrative of the deeds of Barbarossa -at Milan, entitled _Libellus tristititiæ et doloris, angustiæ et -tribulationis, passionum et tormentorum._ Love for one's city usurps -much of the space previously devoted to things celestial, and praises -of Milan, of Bergamo, of Venice, of Amalfi, of Naples, resound in the -pages of their chroniclers. Thus those vast chronicles are reached -which, although they begin with the Tower of Babel, yet lead to the -history of that city or of that event which makes the strongest appeal -to the feelings and best stimulates the industry of the writer, and -become mingled with the persons and things of the present or future -life. Giovanni Villani, a pilgrim to Rome to celebrate the papal -jubilee, is not inspired with the ascetic spirit or raised to heaven by -that solemn spectacle; but, on the contrary, "since he finds himself -in the holy city of Rome on that blessed pilgrimage, inspecting its -_great_ and _ancient possessions,_ and reading the _histories and the -great deeds_ of the Romans," he is inspired to compose the history of -his native Fiorenza, "daughter and creation of Rome" (of ancient Rome -prior to Christianity). His Fiorenza resembled Rome in its rise to -greatness and its following after great things, and was like Rome in -its fall. Thus the 'holy' and the 'blessed' do not lead him to holy -and blessed thoughts, but to thoughts of worldly greatness. To the -historiography of the communes answers the more seriously worldly, the -more formally and historically elaborated historiography of the Norman -and Suabian kingdom of Sicily. In the proem to its _Constitutiones_ -sovereigns are declared to be instituted _ipsa rerum necessitate -cogente, nec minus divinæ provisionis instinctu_; with its Romualdo -Guarna, its Abbot Telesino, its Malaterra, its Hugo Falcando and Pietro -da Eboli, its Riccardo da San Germano, with the pseudo-Jamsilla, and -Saba Malaspina. All of these have their heroes, Roger and William the -Normans, Frederick and Manfred the Suabians, and what they praise in -them is the sound political basis which they knew how to establish -and to maintain with a firm hand. _Eo tempore,_ says Falcando of -Roger, _Regnum Sicilia, strenuis et præclaris viris abundans, cum -terra marique plurimum posset, vicinis circumquoque gentibus terrorem -incusserat, summaque pace ac tranquillitate maxima fruebatur._ And -the so-called Jamsilla, of Frederick II: _Vir fuit magni cordis, -sed magnanitatem suam multa, qua in eo fuit, sapientia superavit, -ut nequaquam impetus eum ad aliquid faciendum impelleret, sed ad -omnia cum rationis maturitate procederet;... utpote qui philosophisæ -studiosus erat quam et ipse in se coluit, et in regno suo propagare -ordinavit. Tunc quidem ipsius felici tempore in regno Siciliæ erant -litterati pauci vel nulli; ipse vero imperator liberalium artium et -omnis approbatæ scientia scholas in regno ipso constituit ... ut -omnis conditionis et fortuna homines nullius occasione indigentiæ -a philosophiæ studio retraherentur._ The state, profane culture, -'philosophy,' impersonated in the heresiarch Frederick, are thus set in -clear relief. And while on the one hand more and more laical theories -of the state become joined to these political and cultural currents -(from Dante, indeed from Thomas Aquinas, to Marsilio of Padua), and -the first outlines of literary history (lives of the poets and of men -famous for their knowledge, and the rise of vernacular literatures) and -histories of manners (as in certain passages in Ricobaldo of Ferrara), -on the other hand scholasticism found its way to such problems and -conceptions by means of the works of Aristotle, which represented as -it were a first brief summary of ancient knowledge. It is unnecessary -to say that Dante's poem is the chief monument of this condition of -spirit, where the ideas of the Middle Ages are maintained, but the -political, poetical, and philosophical affections, the love of fame and -of glory, prove their vigour, although subordinated to those ideas and -restrained, as far as possible, by them. - -But those ideas are nevertheless maintained, even among the -imperialists and adversaries of the Church, and it is only in rare -spirits that we find a partly sceptical and partly mocking negation -of them. Transcendency, the prescience of God, Who ordains, directs, -and disposes of everything according to His will, bestows rewards -and punishments, and intervenes mysteriously, always maintains its -place in the distant background, in Dante as in Giovanni Villani, -as in all the historians and chroniclers. Toward the close of the -fifteenth century the theological conception makes a curious appearance -in the French historian Comines, arm in arm with the most alert and -unprejudiced policy of success at all costs. Worldliness, so rich, -so various, and so complex, was yet without an ideal standard of -comparison, and for this reason it was rather lived than thought, -showing itself rather in richness of detail than systematically. The -ancient elements of culture, which had passed from Aristotelianism -into scholasticism, failed to act powerfully, because that part of -Aristotelianism was particularly selected which was in harmony with -Christian thought already translated into Platonic terms and dogmatized -in a transcendental form by the fathers of the Church. Hence it has -even been possible to note a pause in historiographical interest, -where scholasticism has prevailed, a compendium of the type of that of -Martin Polonus being held sufficient to serve the end of quotations for -demonstration or for legal purposes. What was required upon entering -a new period of progress (there is always progress, but 'periods of -progress' are those in which the motion of the spirit seems to become -accelerated and the fruit that has been growing ripe for centuries is -rapidly plucked) was a direct conscious negation of transcendency and -of Christian miracle, of ascesis and of eschatology, both in life -and in thought a negation whose terms (heavenly and earthly life) had -certainly been noted by medieval historiography, but had been allowed -to endure and to progress, the one beside the other, without true and -proper contact and conflict arising between them. - - - - -IV - - -THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE - - -The negation of Christian transcendency was the work of the age of -the Renaissance, when, to employ the expression used by Fueter, -historiography became 'secularized.' In the histories of Leonardo Bruni -and of Bracciolini, who gave the first conspicuous examples of the -new attitude of historiographical thought, and in all others of the -same sort which followed them--among them those of Machiavelli and of -Guicciardini shine forth conspicuously--we find hardly any trace of -'miracles.' These are recorded solely with the intention of mocking at -them and of explaining them in an altogether human manner. An acute -analysis of individual characters and interests is substituted for the -intervention of divine providence and the actions of the popes, and -religious strifes themselves are apt to be interpreted according to -utilitarian passions and solely with an eye to their political bearing. -The scheme of the four monarchies with the advent of Antichrist -connected with it is allowed to disappear; histories are now narrated -_ab inclinatione imperii,_ and even universal histories, like the -_Enneads_ of Sabellicus, do not adhere to traditional ecclesiastical -tradition. Chronicles of the world, universal miraculous histories, -both theological and apocalyptic, become the literature of the people -and of those with little culture, or persist in countries of backward -culture, such as Germany at that time, or finally are limited to the -circle of Catholic or Protestant confessional historiography, both -of which retain so much of the Middle Ages, the Protestant perhaps -more than the Catholic (at least at a first glance), for the latter -contrived at least here and there to temporize and to accommodate -itself to the times. All this is shown very clearly and minutely by -Fueter, and I shall now proceed to take certain observations and some -information from his book, which I shall rearrange and complete with -some more of my own. In the political historiography of the late Middle -Ages, the theological conception had been, as we have said, thrown into -the background; but henceforward it is not to be found even there, -and if at times we hear its formulas, they are just like those of the -Crusade against the Turks, preaching the liberation of the tomb of -Christ. These were still repeated by preachers, writers of verse, and -rhetoricians (and continued to be repeated for three centuries), but -they found no response in political reality and in the conscience of -the people, because they were but empty sound. Nor was the negation -of theologism and the secularization of history accomplished only in -practice, unaccompanied with complete consciousness; for, although -many minds really did turn in the direction indicated by fate, or in -other words by the new mental necessity, and although the polemic -was not always open, but on the contrary often surrounded with many -precautions, evidence abounds of the agreement of the practice with -the theory of historiography. The criticism of so grave a theorist of -history as Bodin is opposed to the scheme of the four monarchies. He -makes it his object to combat the _inveteratum errorem de quattuor -imperiis,_ proving that the notion was capriciously taken from the -dream of Daniel, and that it in no way corresponded with the real -course of events. It would be superfluous to record here the celebrated -epigrams of Machiavelli and of Guicciardini, who satirized theology -and miracles. Guicciardini noted that all religions have boasted of -miracles, and therefore they are not proofs of any one of them, and -are perhaps nothing but "secrets of nature." He advised his readers -never to say that God had aided so-and-so because he was good and -had made so-and-so suffer because he was wicked, for we "often see -the opposite," and the counsels of divine providence are in fact -an abyss. Paolo Sarpi, although he admits that "it is a pious and -religious thought to attribute the disposition of every event to divine -providence," yet holds it "presumption" to determine "to what end -events are directed by that highest wisdom"; for men, being emotionally -attached to their opinions, "are persuaded that they are as much loved -and favoured by God as by themselves." Hence, for example, they argued -that God had caused Zwingli and Hecolampadius to die almost at the -same time, in order that he might punish and remove the ministers of -discord, whereas it is certain that "after the death of these two, the -evangelical cantons have made greater progress in the doctrine that -they received from both of them." Such a disposition of religious and -cautious spirits is yet more significant than that of the radical and -impetuous, openly irreverent, in the same way as the new importance -attributed to history is notable in the increase of historiographical -labour that is then everywhere noticeable, and in the formation of a -true and proper philological school, not only for antiquity, but for -the Middle Ages (Valla, Flavio Biondo, Calchi, Sigonio, Beato Renano, -etc.), which publishes and restores texts, criticizes the authenticity -and the value of sources, is occupied with the establishment of a -technical method of examining witnesses, and composes learned histories. - -Nothing is more natural than that the new form of historiography -should seem to be a return to Græco-Roman antiquity, as Christianity -had seemed to be a return to the story of Eden (the interlude of -paganism having been brought to an end by the redemption), or that the -Middle Ages should still seem to some to-day to be a falling back into -barbarous pre-Hellenic times. The illusion of the return was expressed -in the cult of classical antiquity, and in all those manifestations, -literary, artistic, moral, and customary, familiar to those who know -the Renaissance. In the special field with which we are at present -occupied, we find a curious document in support of the difficulty that -philologists and critics experienced in persuading themselves that the -Greek and Roman writers had perhaps been able to deceive themselves, to -lie, to falsify, to be led astray by passions and blinded by ignorance, -in the same way as those of the Middle Ages. Thus the latter were -severely criticized while the former were reverenced and accepted, for -it needed much time and labour to attain to an equal mental freedom -regarding the ancients, and the criticism of texts and of sources was -developed in respect to medieval history long before it attained to -a like freedom in respect to ancient history. But the greatest proof -and monument of the illusion of the return was the formation of the -_humanistic_ type of historiography, opposed to the medieval. This -had been chiefly confined to the form of chronicle and humanistic -historiography, although it accepted the arrangement by years and -seasons according to the examples set by the Greeks and Romans, -cancelled as far as possible numerical indications, and exerted itself -to run on unbrokenly, without chronological cuts and cross-cuts. -Latin had become barbarous in the Middle Ages and had accepted the -vocabularies of vulgar tongues, or those which designated new things -in a new way, whereas the humanistic historiographers translated and -disguised every thought and every narrative in Ciceronian Latin, or -at least Latin of the Golden Age. We frequently find picturesque -anecdotes in the medieval chronicles, and humanism, while it restored -its dignity to history, deprived it of that picturesque element, or -attenuated and polished it as it had done the things and customs of the -barbaric centuries. This humanistic type of historiography, like the -new philological erudition and criticism and the whole movement of the -Renaissance, was Italian work, and in Italy histories in the vulgar -tongue were soon modelled upon it, which found in the latinized prose -of Boccaccio an instrument well suited to their ends. From Italy it was -diffused among other countries, and as always happens when an industry -is transplanted into virgin soil, and workmen and technical experts are -invited to come from the country of its origin, so the first humanistic -historians of the other parts of Europe were Italians. Paolo Emilio -the Veronese, who _Gallis condidit historias,_ gave the French the -humanistic history of France in his _De rebus gestis Francorum,_ and -Polydore Virgil did the like for England, Lucio Marineo for Spain, and -many others for other countries, until indigenous experts appeared and -the aid of Italians became unnecessary. Later on it became necessary to -throw off this cloak, which was too loose or too tight--indeed, was not -cut to the model of modern thought. What there was in it of artificial, -of swollen, of false, was blamed--these defects being indeed clearly -indicated in the constructive principle of this literary form, which -was that of imitation. But anyone with a feeling for the past will -enjoy that historical humanistic prose as the expression of love for -antiquity and of the desire to rise to its level. This love and this -desire were so keen that they had no hesitation in reproducing things -external and indifferent in addition to what was better and sometimes -in default of it. Giambattista Vico, sometimes so sublimely puerile, is -still found lamenting, three centuries after the creation of humanistic -historiography, that "no sovereign has been found into whose mind has -entered the thought of preserving for ever in the best Latin style -a record of the famous War of the Spanish Succession, than which a -greater has never happened in the world since the Second Carthaginian -War, that of Cæsar with Pompey, and of Alexander with Darius." But what -of this? Quite recently, during the war in Tripoli, came the proposal -from the depths of one of the meridional provinces of Italy, one of -those little countrysides where the shadow of a humanist still exists, -that a Latin commentary should be composed upon that war entitled -_De bello libico._ This proposal was received with much laughter and -made even me smile, yet the smile was accompanied with a sort of -tender emotion, when I recalled how long and devotedly our fathers and -forefathers had pursued the ideal of a beautiful antiquity and of a -decorous historiography. - -Nevertheless, the belief in the effectivity or possibility of such a -return was, as we have said, an illusion; nothing of what has been -returns, nothing of what has been can be abolished; even when we -return to an old thought the new adversary makes the defence new and -the thought itself new. I read some time ago the work of a learned -French Catholic. While clearing the Middle Ages of certain absurd -accusations and confuting errors commonly circulated about them, he -maintained that the Middle Ages are the truly modern time, modern with -the eternal modernity of the true, and that therefore they should -not be called the Middle Ages, which term should be applied to the -period that has elapsed between the fifteenth century and our own -day, between the Reformation and positivism. As I read, I reflected -that such a theory is the worthy pendant to that other theory, which -places the Middle Ages beneath antiquity, and that both had some time -ago shown themselves false to historical thought, which knows nothing -of returns, but knows that the Middle Ages preserved antiquity deep -in its heart as the Renaissance preserved the Middle Ages. And what -is 'humanism' but a renewed formula of that 'humanity' of which the -ancient world knew little or nothing, and which Christianity and the -Middle Ages had so profoundly felt? What is the word 'renaissance' -or 'renewal' but a metaphor taken from the language of religion? And -setting aside the word, is not the conception of humanism perhaps the -affirmation of a spiritual and universal value, and in so far as it is -that, altogether foreign, as we know, to the mind of antiquity, and an -intrinsic continuation of the 'ecclesiastical' and 'spiritual' history -which appeared with Christianity? The conception of spiritual value -had without doubt become changed or enriched, for it contained within -itself more than a thousand years of mental experiences, thoughts, and -actions. But while it thus grew more rich, it preserved its original -character, and constituted the religion of the new times, with its -priests and martyrs, its polemic and its apologetic, its intolerance -(it destroyed or allowed to perish the monuments of the Middle Ages -and condemned its writers to oblivion), and sometimes even imitated the -forms of its worship (Navagaro used to burn a copy of Martial every -year as a holocaust to pure Latinity). And since humanity, philosophy, -science, literature, and especially art, politics, activity in all its -forms, now fill that conception of value which the Middle Ages had -placed in Christian religious faith alone, histories or outlines of -histories continue to appear as the outcome of these determinations, -which were certainly new in respect to medieval literature, but were -not less new in respect to Græco-Roman literature, where there was -nothing to compare to them, or only treatises composed in an empirical -and extrinsic manner. The new histories of values presented them selves -timidly, imitating in certain respects the few indent examples, but -they gave evidence of a fervour, an intelligence, an afflatus, which -led to a hope for that increase and development wanting to their -predecessors, which, instead of developing, had gradually become more -superficial and finally disappeared again into vagueness. Suffice it to -mention as representative of them all Vasari's _Lives of the Painters,_ -which are connected with the meditations and the researches upon art -contained in so many treatises, dialogues, and letters of Italians, and -are here and there shot through with flashes such as never shone in -antiquity. The same may be said of treatises on poetry and rhetoric, -and of the judgments which they contain as to poetry and of the new -history of poetry, then being attempted with more or less successful -results. The 'state' too, which forms the object of the meditations -of Machiavelli, is not the simple state of antiquity, city or empire, -but is almost the national state felt as something divine, to which -even the salvation of the soul must be sacrificed--that is to say, -as the institution in which the true salvation of the soul is to be -found. Even the pagan virtue which he and others opposed to Christian -virtue is very different from the pure Græco-Roman disposition of mind. -At that time a start was also made in the direction of investigating -the theory of rights, of political forms, of myths and beliefs, of -philosophical systems, to-day in full flower. And since that same -consciousness which had produced humanism had also widened the -boundaries of the known world, and had sought for and found people of -whom the Bible preserved no record and of whom the Græco-Roman writers -knew nothing, there appeared at that time a literature relating to -savages and to the indigenous civilizations of America (and also of -distant Asia, which had been better explored), from which arose the -first notions as to the primitive forms of human life. Thus were -widened the spiritual boundaries of humanity at the same time as the -material. - -We are not alone in perceiving the illusion of the 'return to -antiquity,' for the men of the Renaissance were not slow in doing this. -Not every one was content to suit himself to the humanistic literary -type. Some, like Machiavelli, threw away that cloak, too ample in its -folds and in its train, preferring to it the shorter modern dress. -Protests against pedantry and imitation are indeed frequently to be -heard during the course of the century. Philosophers rebelled against -Aristotle (first against the medieval and then against the ancient -Aristotle), and appeals were made to truth, which is superior both to -Plato and to Aristotle; men of letters advocated the new 'classes,' -and artists repeated that the great masters were 'nature' and the -'idea.' One feels in the air that the time is not far distant when the -question, "Who are the true ancients?"--that is to say, "Who are the -intellectually expert and mature?"--will be answered with, "We are"; -the symbol of antiquity will be broken and there will be found within -it the reality which is human thought, ever new in its manifestations. -Such an answer may possibly be slow in becoming clear and certain as an -object of common conviction, though it will eventually become so, and -now suffices to explain the true quality of that return antiquity, by -preventing the taking of the symbol for the thing symbolized. - -This symbolical covering, cause of prejudices and misunderstandings, -which enfolded the whole of humanism, was not the sole vice from -which the historiography of the Renaissance suffered. We do not, -of course, speak here of the bias with which all histories were -variously affected, according as they were written by men of letters -who were also courtiers and supported the interests of their masters, -or official historians of aristocratic and conservative states like -Venice, or men taking one or the other side in the conflicts within the -same state, such as the _ottimani_ (or aristocratic) and the popular -party of Florence, or upholders of opposed religious beliefs, such as -the group of reformed divines of Magdeburg and Baronio. We do not speak -here of the historians who became story-writers (they sometimes take to -history, like Bandello), or of those who collected information with a -view to exciting curiosity and creating scandal. These are things that -belong to all periods, and are not sufficient to qualify a particular -historiographical age. But if we examine only that which is or wished -to be historical thought, the historiography of the Renaissance -suffered from two other defects, each of which it had inherited from -one of its progenitors, antiquity and the Middle Ages. And above all -there came to it from antiquity the humanistic-abstract or pragmatical -conception, as it is called, which inclines to explain facts by the -individual in his singularity and in his atomism, or by means of -abstract political forms, and the like. For Machiavelli, the prince is -not only the ideal but the criterion that he adopts for the explanation -of events. He does not only appear in his treatises and political -opuscules, but in the Florentine Histories, where we meet with him at -the very beginning--after the terrible imaginative description of -the condition of Italy in the fifth century--in the great figure of -Theodoric, by whose 'virtue' and 'goodness' not only Rome and Italy, -but all the other parts of the Western empire, "arose free from the -continual scourgings which they had supported for so many years from so -many invasions, and became again happy and well-ordered communities." -The same figure reappears in many different forms in the course of -the centuries described in those histories. Finally, at the end of -the description of the social struggles of Florence, we read that -"this city had reached such a point that it could be easily adapted to -_any form of government_ by _a wise law-giver._" In like manner, the -_History of Italy_ by Guicciardini begins with the description of the -happiness of Italy at the end of the fifteenth century, "acquired at -various times and preserved for many reasons," not the least of which -was "the industry and genius of Lorenzo de' Medici," who "strove in -every way so to balance Italian affairs that they should not incline -more in one direction than another." He had allies in Ferdinand of -Aragon and Ludovic the Moor, "partly for the same and partly for other -reasons," and the Venetians were held in check by all three of them. -This perfect system of equilibrium was broken by the deaths of Lorenzo, -of Ferdinand, and of the Pope. All historians of this period express -themselves in the same way, and although a lively consciousness of the -spiritual values of humanity was in process of formation, as has been -seen, yet these were spoken of as though they depended upon the will -and the intelligence of individuals who were their masters, not the -contrary. In the history of painting, for example, the 'prince' for -Vasari is Giotto, "who, although born among inexpert artisans, alone -revived painting and reduced it to such a form as might be described as -good." Biographies are also constantly individualistic, for they never -succeed in perfectly uniting the individual with the work which he -creates and which in turn creates him. - -The idea of chance or fortune persisted alongside the pragmatic -conception, its ancient companion. Machiavelli assigns the course of -events half to fortune and half to human prudence, and although the -accent falls here upon prudence, the acknowledgment of the one does -not abolish the force of the other, so mysterious and transcendent. -Guicciardini attacks those who, while attributing everything to -prudence and virtue, exclude "the power of fortune," because we -see that human affairs "receive at all times great impulsions from -fortuitous events, which it is not within the power of man either to -foresee or to escape, and although the care and understanding of man -may moderate many things, nevertheless that alone does not suffice, -but good fortune is also necessary." It is true that here and there -there seems to appear another conception in Machiavelli, that of the -strength and logic of things, but it is only a fleeting shadow. It is -also a shadow for Guicciardini, when he adds that even if we wish to -attribute everything to prudence and virtue, "must at least admit that -it is necessary to fall upon or be born in times when the virtues or -qualities for which you value yourself are esteemed." Guicciardini -remains perplexed as to one point only, as though he had caught a -glimpse of something that is neither caprice of the individual nor -contingency of fortune: "When I consider to what accidents and dangers -of illness, of chance, of violence, of infinite sorts, is exposed the -life of man, the concurrence of how many things is needful that the -harvest of the year should be good, nothing surprises me more than to -see an old man or a good harvest." But even here we do not get beyond -uncertainty, which in this case manifests itself as astonishment. With -the renewal of the idea of fortune, even to a partial extent, with -the restitution of the cult of this pagan divinity, not only does -the God of Christianity disappear, but also the idea of rationality, -of finality, of development, affirmed during the medieval period. -The ancient Oriental idea of the circle in human affairs returns; -it dominated all the historians of the Renaissance, and above all -Machiavelli. History is an alternation of lives and deaths, of goods -and ills, of happiness and misery, of splendour and decadence. Vasari -understands the history of painting in the same way as that of all -the arts, which, "like human bodies, have their birth, their growth, -their old age, and their death." He is solicitous of preserving in his -book the memory of the artistic capacity of his time, lest the art -of painting, "either owing to the neglect of men or to the malignity -of the ages or to decree of heaven (which does not appear to wish -to maintain things here below for long in the same state), should -encounter the same disorder and ruin" as befell it in the Middle -Ages. Bodin, while criticizing and rejecting the scheme of the four -monarchies, and demonstrating the fallaciousness of the assertion that -gold deteriorates into copper, or even into clay, and celebrating the -splendour of letters, of commerce, of the geographical discoveries of -his age, does not, however, conclude in favour of progress, but of -the circle, blaming those who find everything inferior in antiquity, -_cum, æterna quadam lege naturæ, conversiti omnium rerum velut in orbem -redire videatur, ut aqua vitia virtutibus, ignoratio scientiæ, turpe -honesto consequens sit, ac tenebræ luci._ The sad, bitter, pessimistic -tone which we observe among ancient historians, which sometimes -bursts forth into the tragic, is also often to be met with among the -historians of the Renaissance, for they saw perish many things that -were very dear to them, and were constrained to tremble for those which -they still enjoyed, or at least to fear for them by anticipation, -certain that sooner or later they would yield their place to their -contraries. - -And since history thus conceived does not represent progress but a -circle, and is not directed by the historical law of development, -but by the natural law of the circle, which gives it regularity and -uniformity, it follows that the historiography of the Renaissance, -like the Græco-Roman, has its end outside itself, and affords nothing -but material suitable for exhortations toward the useful and the good, -for various forms of pleasure or as ornament for abstract truths. -Historians and theorists of history are all in agreement as to this, -with the exception of such eccentrics as Patrizzi, who expressed -doubts as to the utility of knowing what had happened and as to -the truth itself of narratives, but ended by contradicting himself -and also laying down an extrinsic end. "Each one of us can find, -both on his own account and on that of the public weal, many useful -documents in the knowledge of these so different and so important -examples," writes Guicciardini in the proem to his History of Italy. -"Hence will clearly appear, as the result of innumerable examples, -the instability of things human, how harmful they are often wont to -be to themselves, but ever to the people, the ill-conceived counsels -of those who rule, when, having only before their eyes either vain -errors or present cupidities, they are not mindful of the frequent -variations of fortune, and converting the power that has been granted -them for the common weal into an injury to others, they become the -authors of new perturbations, either as the result of lack of prudence -or of too much ambition." And Bodin holds that _non solum præsentia -commode explicantur, sed etiam futura colliguntur, certissimaque rerum -expetendarum ac fugiendarum præcepta constantur,_ from historical -narratives. Campanella thinks that history should be composed _ut sit -scientiarum fundamentum sufficiens_; Vossius formulates the definition -that was destined to appear for centuries in treatises: _cognitio -singularium, quorum memoriam conservari utile sit ad bene beateque -vivendum._ Historical knowledge therefore seemed at that time to be -the lowest and easiest form of knowledge (and this view has been held -down to our own days); to such an extent that Bodin, in addition -to the _utilitas_ and the _oblectatio,_ also recognized to history -_facilitas,_ so great a facility _ut, sine ullius artis adjumento, ipsa -per sese ab omnibus intelligatur._ When truth had been placed outside -historical narrative, all the historians of the Renaissance, like -their Greek and Roman predecessors, practised, and all the theorists -(from Pontanus in the _Actius_ to Vossius in the _Ars historica_) -defended, the use of more or less imaginary orations and exhortations, -not only as the result of bowing to ancient example, but through their -own convictions. Eventually M. de la Popelinière, in his _Histoire -des histoires, avec l'idée de l'histoire accomplie_ (1599), where -he inculcates in turn historical exactitude and sincerity with such -warm eloquence, suddenly turns round to defend imaginary _harangues -et concions,_ for this fine reason, that what is necessary is 'truth' -and not 'the words' in which it is expressed! The truth of history -was thus not history, but oratory and political science; and if the -historians of the Renaissance were hardly ever able to exercise oratory -(for which the political constitution of the time allowed little -scope), all or nearly all were authors of treatises upon political -science, differently inspired as compared with those of the Middle -Ages, which had ethical and religious thought behind them, resuming -and advancing the speculations of Aristotle and of ancient political -writers. In like manner, treatises on historical art, unknown to the -Middle Ages, but which rapidly multiplied in the Renaissance (see a -great number of them in the _Penus artis historicæ_ of 1579), resumed -and fertilized the researches of Græco-Roman theorists. It is to be -expected that the historiography of this period should represent some -of the defects of medieval historiography in another form, owing to -its character of reaction already mentioned and to the new divinity -that it had raised up upon the altars in place of the ancient divinity, -humanity. The Renaissance everywhere reveals its effort to oppose the -one term to the other, and since scholasticism had sought the things -of God and of the soul, it wished to restrict itself to the things -of nature. We find Guicciardini and a chorus of others describing the -investigations of philosophers and theologians and "of all those who -write things above nature or such as are not seen" as 'madnesses'; -and because scholasticism had defined science in the Aristotelian -manner as _de universalibus,_ Campanella opposed to this definition -his _Scientia est de singularibus._ In like manner its men of letters, -prejudiced in favour of Latin, at first refused to recognize the new -languages that had been formed during the Middle Ages, as well as -medieval literature and poetry; its jurists rejected the feudal in -favour of the Roman legal code, its politicians representative forms -in favour of absolute lordship and monarchy. It was then that first -appeared the conception of the Middle Ages as a whole, opposed to -another whole, formed of the ancient and the ancient-modern, into -which the Middle Ages were inserted like an irksome and painful wedge. -The word 'medieval' was certainly late in appearing as an official -designation, employed in the divisions and titles of histories (toward -the end of the seventeenth century, as it would seem, in the manuals -of Cellario); previously it had only just occurred here and there; but -the thought contained in it had been in the air for some time--that is -to say, in the soul of everybody--eked out with other words, such as -'barbarous' or 'Gothic' ages, and Vasari expresses it by means of the -distinction between ancient and 'old,' calling those things ancient -which occurred before the existence of Constantine, of Corinth, of -Athens, of Rome, and of other very famous cities built up to the time -of Nero, of the Vespasians, of Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus, and -'old' those "which had their origin from St Silvester onward." In -any case, the distinction was clear: on the one hand most brilliant -light, on the other dense darkness. After Constantine, writes the -same Vasari, "every sort of virtue" was lost, "beautiful" souls and -"lofty" intellects became corrupted into "most ugly" and "basest," -and the fervent zeal of the new religion did infinite damage to the -arts. This means neither more nor less than that _dualism,_ one of the -capital traits of the Middle Ages, was retained, although differently -determined, for now the god was (although not openly acknowledged) -antiquity, art, science, Greek and Roman life, and its adversary, the -reprobate and rebel, was the Middle Age, 'Gothic' temples, theology and -philosophy bristling with difficulties, the clumsy and cruel customs of -that age. But just because the respective functions of the two terms -were merely inverted, their opposition remained, and if Christianity -did not succeed in understanding Paganism and in recognizing its -father, so the Renaissance failed to recognize itself as the son of -the Middle Ages, and did not understand the positive and durable value -of the period that was closing. For this reason, both ages destroyed -or allowed to disappear the monuments of the previous age. This was -certainly far less the case with the Renaissance, which expressed -itself less violently and was deeply imbued with the thought of the -Middle Ages, and, owing to the idea of humanity, had an obscure feeling -of the importance of its predecessor. So much was this the case that -the school of learned men and philologists already mentioned was formed -at that time, with the new of investigating medieval antiquities. But -the learned are the learned--that is to say, they do not take an active -part in the struggles of their time, though busied with the collection -and arrangement of its chronicles and remains, which they often judge -in accordance with the vulgar opinion of their own time, so that it is -quite customary to find them despising the subject of their labours, -declaring that the poet whom they are studying has no value, or that -the period to which they are consecrating their entire life is ugly -and displeasing. It needed much to free the flame of intelligence from -the heaps of medieval antiquities accumulated for centuries by the -learned, and the Middle Ages were abhorred during the Renaissance, -even when they were investigated. The drama of love and hatred was not -dissimilar in its forms, nor less bitterly dualistic, although vastly -more interesting, than that which was then being played out between -Catholics and Protestants. The latter called the Pope Antichrist, and -the primacy of the Roman Church _mysterium iniquitatis,_ and compiled -a catalogue _testium veritatis_ of those who had opposed that iniquity -even while it prevailed. The Catholics returned the compliment with -remarks about Luther and the Reformation, and composed catalogues -of heretics, Satan's witnesses. But this strife was a relic of the -past, and would have ended by becoming gradually attenuated and -dispersed; whereas the other was an element of the future, and could -only be conquered by long effort and a new conception of the loftiest -character. - - - - -V - - -THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT - - -Meanwhile the historiography which immediately followed pushed the -double aporia of antiquity and of the Middle Ages to the extreme; and -it was owing to this radical unprejudiced procedure that it acquired -its definite physiognomy and the right of being considered a particular -historiographical period. The symbolical vesture, woven of memories of -the Græco-Roman world, with which the modern spirit had first clothed -itself, is now torn and thrown away. The thought that the ancients had -not been the oldest and wisest among the peoples, but the youngest -and the least expert, and that the true ancients, that is to say, the -most expert and mature in mind, are co be found in the men of the -modern world, had little by little made its way and become universally -accepted. Reason in its nudity, henceforth saluted by its proper -name, succeeds the example and the authority of the Græco-Romans, -which represented reason opposed to barbaric culture and customs. -Humanitarianism, the cult of humanity, also idolized by the name of -'nature,' that is to say, ingenuous general human nature, succeeds to -humanism, with its one-sided admirations for certain peoples and for -certain forms of life. Histories written in Latin become scarce or -are confined to the learned, and those written in national languages -are multiplied; criticism is exercised not only upon medieval -falsifications and fables, upon the writings of credulous and ignorant -monks in monasteries, but upon the pages of ancient historians, and the -first doubts appear as to the truth of the historical Roman tradition. -A feeling of sympathy, however, toward the ancients still persists, -whereas repugnance and abhorrence for the Middle Ages continue to -increase. All feel and say that they have emerged, not only from -darkness, but from the twilight before dawn, that the sun of reason -is high on the horizon, illuminating the intellect and irradiating -it with most vivid light. 'Light,' 'illumination,' and the like are -words pronounced on every occasion and with ever increasing conviction -and energy; hence the title 'age of light,' of 'enlightenment' or -of 'illumination,' given to the period extending from Descartes to -Kant. Another term began to circulate, at first used rarely and in -a restricted sense--'progress.' It gradually becomes more insistent -and familiar, and finally succeeds in supplying a criterion for the -judgment of facts, for the conduct of life, for the construction of -history, becomes the subject of special investigations, and of a new -kind of history, the history of the _progresses_ of the human spirit. - -But here we observe the persistence and the potency of Christian and -theological thought. The progress so much discussed was, so to speak, -a progress without _development,_ manifesting itself chiefly in a sigh -of satisfaction and security, as of one, favoured by fortune, who has -successfully encountered many obstacles and now looks serenely upon -the present, secure as to the future, with mind averted from the past, -or returning to it now and then for a brief moment only, in order to -lament its ugliness, to despise and to smile at it. Take as an example -of all the most intelligent and at the same time the best of the -historical representatives of enlightenment M. de Voltaire, who wrote -his _Essai sur les mœurs_ in order to aid his friend the Marquise du -Châtelet to _surmonter le dégoût_ caused her by _l'histoire moderne -depuis la décadence de l'Empire romain,_ treating the subject in a -satirical vein. Or take Condorcet's work, _l'Esquisse d'un tableau -historique des progrès de l'esprit humain,_ which appears at its end -like a last will and testament (and also as the testament of the man -who wrote it), and where we find the whole century in compendium. -It is as happy in the present, even in the midst of the slaughters -of the Revolution, as rosy in its views as to the future, as it is -full of contempt and sarcasm for the past, which had generated that -present. The felicity of the period upon which they were entering -was clearly stated. Voltaire says that at this time _les hommes ont -acquis plus de lumières d'un bout de l'Europe à l'autre que dans -tous les âges précédents._ Man now brandishes the arm which none can -resist: _la seule arme contre le monstre, c'est la Raison: la seule -manière d'empêcher les hommes d'être absurdes et méchants, c'est de -les éclairer; pour rendre le fanatisme exécrable, il ne faut que le -peindre._ Certainly it was not denied that there had been something -of good and beautiful in the past. They must have existed, if they -suffered from superstition and oppression. _On voit dans l'histoire -les erreurs et les préjugés se succéder tour à tour, et chasser la -vérité et la raison: on voit les habiles et les heureux enchaîner -les imbéciles et écraser les infortunés; et encore ces habiles et -ces heureux sont eux-mêmes les jouets de la fortune, ainsi quelles -esclaves qu'ils gouvernent._ And not only had the good existed, though -oppressed, but it had also been efficient in a certain measure: _au -milieu de ces saccagements et de ces destructions nous voyons un amour -de l'ordre qui anime en secret le genre humain et qui a prévenu sa -ruine totale: c'est un des ressorts de la nature, qui reprend toujours -sa force...._ And then the 'great epochs' must not be forgotten, the -'centuries' in which the arts nourished as the result of the work -of wise men and monarchs, les quatre âges heureux of history. But -between this sporadic good, weak or acting covertly, or appearing -only for a time and then disappearing, and that of the new era, the -quantitative and energetic difference is such that it is turned into -a qualitative difference: a moment comes when men learn to think, to -rectify their ideas, and past history seems like a tempestuous sea -to one who has landed upon solid earth. Certainly everything is not -to be praised in the new times; indeed, there is much to blame: _les -abus servent de lois dans presque toute la terre; et si les plus sages -des hommes s'assemblaient pour faire des lois, où est l'État dont -la forme subsistât entière?_ The distance from the ideal of reason -was still great and the new century had still to consider itself as -a simple step toward complete rationality and felicity. We find the -fancy of a social form limit even in Kant, who dragged after him -so much old intellectualistic and scholastic philosophy. Sometimes -indeed its final form was not discovered, and its place was taken by a -vertiginous succession of more and more radiant social forms. But the -series of these radiant forms, the progress toward the final form and -the destruction of abuses, really began in the age of enlightenment, -after some episodic attempts in that direction during previous ages, -for this age alone had entered upon the just, the wide, the sure -path, the path illumined with the light of reason. It sometimes even -happened in the course of that period that a doctrine leading to -Rousseau's inverted the usual view and placed _reason,_ not in modern -times or in the near or distant future, but in the past, and not in -the medieval, Græco-Roman, or Oriental past, but in the prehistoric -past, in the 'state of nature,' from which history represented the -deviation. But this theory, though differing in its mode of expression, -was altogether identical in substance with that generally accepted, -because a prehistoric 'state of nature' never had any existence in the -reality, which is history, but expressed an ideal to be attained in a -near or distant future, which had first been perceived in modern times -and was therefore really capable of moving in that direction, whether -in the sense of realization or return. The religious character of all -this new conception of the world cannot be obscure to anyone, for it -repeats the Christian conceptions of God as truth and justice (the lay -God), of the earthly paradise, the redemption, the millennium, and so -on, in laical terms, and in like manner with! Christianity sets the -whole of previous history in opposition to itself, to condemn it, while -hardly admiring here and there some consoling ray of itself. What does -it matter that religion, and especially Christianity, was then the -target for fiercest blows and shame and mockery, that all reticence was -abandoned, and people were no longer satisfied with the discreet smile -that had once blossomed on the lips of the Italian humanists, but broke -out into open and fanatical warfare? Even lay fanaticism is the result -of dogmatism. What does it matter that pious folk were shocked and saw -the ancient Satan in the lay God, as the enlightened discovered the -capricious, domineering, cruel tribal deity in the old God represented -by the priest? The possibility of reciprocal accusations confirms the -_dualism,_ active in the new as in the old conception, and rendering -it unsuitable for the understanding of development and of history. - -The historiographical _aporia_ of antiquity was also being increased -by abstract individualism or the 'pragmatic' conception. So true was -this that it was precisely at that time that the formula was resumed, -and pragmatism, as history of human ideas, sentiments, calculations, -and actions, as a narrative embellished with reflections, was opposed -to theological or medieval history and to the old ingenuous chronicles -or erudite collections of information and documents. Voltaire, who -combats and mocks at belief in divine designs and punishments and in -the leadership of a small barbarous population called upon to act as an -elect people and to be the axle of universal history (so that he may -substitute for it the lay theology which has been described), is the -same Voltaire who praises in Guicciardini and in Machiavelli the first -appearance of an _histoire bien faite._ The pragmatic mode of treatment -was extended even to the narrative of events relating to religion and -the Church and was applied by Mosheim and others in Germany. Owing to -this penetration of rationalism into ecclesiastical historiography and -into Protestant philosophy, it afterward seemed that the Reformation -had caused thought to progress, whereas, as regards this matter, -the Reformation simply received humanistic thought in the new form, -to which it had previously been opposed. If, in other respects, it -aided the advance of the historical conception in an original manner, -this was brought about, as we shall see, by means of another element -seething within it, mysticism. But meanwhile not even Catholicism -remained immune from the pragmatic, of which we find traces in the -_Discours_ of Bossuet, who represents the Augustinian conception, shorn -of its accessories, reduced and modernized, lacking the irreconcilable -dualism of the two cities and the Roman Empire as the ultimate and -everlasting empire, allowing natural causes preordained by God and -regulated by the laws to operate side by side with divine intervention, -and conceding a large share to the social and political conditions of -the various peoples. We do not speak of the last step taken by the same -author in his _Histoire des variations des églises_, when he conceived -the history of the Reformation objectively and in its internal motives, -presenting it as a rebellious movement directed against authority. -Even his adversary Voltaire recognized that Bossuet had not omitted -_d'autres causes_ in addition to the divine will favouring the elect -people, because he had several times taken count de l'esprit des -nations. Such was the strength of _l'esprit du siècle._ The pragmatic -conceptions of that time are still so well known and so near to us, -so persistent in so many of our narratives and historical manuals, -that it would be useless to describe them. When we direct our thoughts -to the historical works of the eighteenth century, there immediately -rises to the memory the general outline of a history in which priests -deceive, courtiers intrigue, wise monarchs conceive and realize good -institutions, combated and rendered almost vain through the malignity -of others and the ignorance of the people, though they remain -nevertheless a perpetual object of admiration for enlightened spirits. -The image of chance or caprice appears with the evocation of that -image, and mingling with the histories of these conflicts makes them -yet more complicated, their results yet stranger and more astonishing. -And what was the use, that is to say, the end, of historical narrative -in the view of those historians? Here also the reading of a few lines -of Voltaire affords the explanation: _Cet avantage consiste surtout -dans la comparaison qu'un homme d'état, un citoyen, peut faire des lois -et des mours étrangères avec celles de son pays: c'est ce qui excite -l'émulation des nations modernes dans les arts, dans l''agriculture, -dans le commerce. Les grandes fautes passées servent beaucoup à tout -genre. On ne saurait trop remettre devant les yeux les crimes et -les malheurs: on peut, quoi qu'on en dise, prévenir les uns et les -autres._ This thought is repeated with many verbal variations and is -to be found in nearly all the books of historiographie theory of the -time, continuing the Italian mode of the Renaissance in an easier -and more popular style. The words 'philosophy of history,' which had -later so much success, at first served to describe the assistance -obtainable from history in the shape of advice and useful precepts, -when investigated without prejudice--that is to say, with the one -'assumption' of reason. - -The external end assigned to history led to the same results as in -antiquity, when history became oratorical and even historico-pedagogic -romances were composed, and as in the Renaissance, when 'declamatory -orations' were preserved, and history was treated as material more -or less well adapted to certain ends, whence arose a certain amount -of indifference toward its truth, so that Machiavelli, for instance, -deduced laws and precepts from the decades of Livy, not only assuming -them to be true, but accepting them in those parts which he must have -recognized to be demonstrably fabulous. Orations began to disappear, -but their disappearance was due to good literary taste rather than -to anything else, which recognized how out of harmony were those -expedients with the new popular, prosaic, polemical tone that narrative -assumed in the eighteenth century. In exchange they got something -worse: lack of esteem for history, which was considered to be an -inferior reality, unworthy of the philosopher, who seeks for laws, for -what is constant, for the uniform, the general, and can find it in -himself and in the direct observation of external and internal nature, -natural and human, without making that long, useless, and dangerous -tour of facts narrated in the histories. Descartes, Malebranche, and -the long list of their successors do not need especial mention here, -for it is well known how mathematics and naturalism dominated and -depressed history at this period. But was historical truth at least an -inferior truth? After fuller reflection, it did not seem possible to -grant even this. In history, said Voltaire, the word 'certain,' which -is used to designate such knowledge as that "two and two make four," "I -think," "I suffer," "I exist," should be used very rarely, and in the -sole sense of "very probable." Others held that even this was saying -too much, for they altogether denied the truth of history and declared -that it was a collection of fables, of inventions and equivocations, or -of undemonstrable affirmations. Hence the scepticism or Pyrrhonism of -the eighteenth century, which showed itself on several occasions and -has left us a series of curious little books as a document of itself. -Such is, indeed, the inevitable result when historical knowledge is -looked upon as a mass of individual testimonies, dictated or altered by -the passions, or misunderstood through ignorance, good at the best for -supplying edifying and terrible examples in confirmation of the eternal -truths of reason, which, for the rest, shine with their own light. - -It would nevertheless be altogether erroneous to found upon the -exaggeration to which the theological and pragmatical views attained -in the historiography of the enlightenment, and see in it a decadence -or regression similar to that of the Renaissance and of other -predecessors. Not only were germs of error evolved at that time, not -only did the difficulties that had appeared in the previous period -become more acute, but there was also developed, and elevated to a -high degree of efficiency, that historiography of spiritual values -which Christian historiography had intensified and almost created, and -which the Renaissance had begun to transfer to the earth. Voltaire -as historiographer deserves to be defended (and this has recently -been done by several writers, admirably by Fueter), because he has -a lively perception of the need of bringing history back from the -treatment of the external to that of the internal and strives to -satisfy this need. For this reason, books that gave accounts of wars, -treaties, ceremonies, and solemnities seemed to him to be nothing but -'archives' or 'historical dictionaries,' useful for consultation on -certain occasions, but history, true history, he held to be something -altogether different. The duty of true history could not be to weight -the memory with external or material facts, or as he called them -events (événements), but to discover what was the society of men in -the past, _la société des hommes, comment on vivait dans l'intérieur -des familles, quels arts étaient cultivés,_ and to paint 'manners' -(_les mours_); not to lose itself in the multitude of insignificant -particulars (_petits faits_), but to collect only those that were of -importance (_considérables_) and to explain the spirit (_l'esprit_) -that had produced them. Owing to this preference that Voltaire accords -to manners over battles we find in him the conception (although it -remains without adequate treatment and gets lost in the ardour of -polemic) that it is not for history to trace the portrait of human -splendours and miseries (_les détails de la splendeur et de la misère -humaine_) but only of manners and of the arts, that is, of the -positive work; in his _Siècle de Louis XIV_ he says that he wishes to -illustrate the government of that monarch, not in so far as il a fait -du bien aux français, but in so far as il a fait du lien aux hommes. -What Voltaire undertook, and to no small extent achieved, forms the -principal object of all historians' labours at this period. Whoever -wishes to do so can see in Fueter's book how the great pictures -to be found in Voltaire's _Essai sur les mours_ and _Siècle_ were -imitated in the pages both of French writers and in those of other -European countries--for instance, in the celebrated introduction by -Robertson to his history of Charles V. It will also be noticed how the -special histories of this or that aspect of culture are multiplied -and perfected, as though several of the _desiderata_ mentioned by -Bacon in his classification of history had been thus supplied. The -history of philosophy abandons more and more the type of collections -of anecdotes and utterances of philosophers, to become the history -of systems, from Brucker to Buhle and to Tiedemann. The history of -art takes the shape of a special problem in Winckelmann's work and in -the works of his successors. In Voltaire's own books and in those of -his school it assumes that of literature; in those of Dubos and of -Montesquieu that of rights and of institutions; in Germany it leads to -the production of a work as original and realistic as the history of -Osnabrück by Möser. In the specialist work of Heeren, the history of -industry and commerce separates itself from the historical divisions -or digressions of economic treatises and takes a form of its own. The -history of social customs investigates (as in Sainte-Palaye's book -on _Ancienne chevalerie_) even the minutest aspects of social and -moral life. Had not Voltaire remarked about tournaments that _il se -fait des révolutions dans les plaisirs comme dans tout le reste?_ And -to limit ourselves to Italy, which at that time was also acting on -the initiative, though she soon afterward withdrew and received her -impulse from the other countries of Europe, it is well to remember -that in the eighteenth century Pietro Giannone, expressing the desires -and the attempts at their realization of a multitude of Neapolitan -compatriots and contemporaries, traced the civil history of the Kingdom -of Naples, giving much space to the relations between Church and State -and to the incidents of legislation. Many followed this example in -Italy and outside it (among the many were Montesquieu and Gibbon). In -Italy, too, Ludovico Antonio Muratori illustrated medieval life in -his _Antiquitates Italiæ,_ and Tiraboschi composed a great history of -Italian literature (understood as that of the whole culture of Italy), -notable not less for its erudition than for its clearness of design, -while other lesser writers, like Napoli Signorelli, in his _Vicende -della cultura delle due Sicilie_, particularized in certain regions, -sprinkling their history with the philosophy current at the time. The -Jesuit Bettinelli, too, imitated the historical books of Voltaire -for the history of letters, arts, and customs in Italy, Bonafede the -work of Brucker for the history of philosophy, and Lanzi, in a manner -far superior to those just mentioned, continued the path followed by -Winckelmann in his _History of Painting._ - -Not only did the historiography of the enlightenment render history -more 'interior' and develop it in its interiority, but it also -broadened it in space and time. Here too Voltaire represents in an -eminent degree the needs of his age, with his continual accusations of -narrowness and meanness levelled at the traditional image of universal -history, as composed of Hebrew or sacred history and Græco-Roman or -profane history, or, as he says, _histoires prétendues universelles, -fabriquées dans notre Occident._ A beginning was made with the use of -the material discovered, transported, and accumulated by explorers and -travellers from the Renaissance onward, of which a considerable part -had been contributed by the Jesuits and by missionaries. India and -China attracted attention, both on account of their antiquity and of -the high grade of civilization to which they had attained. Translations -of religious and literary Oriental texts were soon added to this, -and it became possible to discuss that civilization, not merely at -second-hand and according to the narratives of travellers. This -increase of knowledge relating to the East is paralleled by increase -of knowledge not only in relation to antiquity (these studies were -never dropped, but changed their centre, first from Italy to France -and Holland, then to England, and then to Germany), but also in regard -to the Middle Ages, in the works of the Benedictines, of Leibnitz, -Muratori, and very many others, who here also specialized both as -regards the objects of their researches and as to the regions or cities -in which they conducted them, as for instance De Meo in his _Annali -critici del Regno di Napoli._ - -With the increase of erudition, of the variety of documents and -information available, went hand in hand a more refined criticism as -to the authenticity of the one and of the value as evidence of the -other. Fueter does well to note the progress in method accomplished by -the Benedictines and by Leibnitz (who did not surpass those excellent -and learned monks in this respect, although he was a philosopher) up -to Muratori, who did not restrict himself to testing the genuineness -of tradition, but initiated criticism of the tendencies of individual -witnesses, of the interests and passions which colour and give -their shape to narratives. The en-lightened, with Voltaire at their -head, initiated another kind of criticism of a more intrinsic sort, -directed to things and to the knowledge of things (to literary, moral, -political, and military experience), recognizing the impossibility -that things should have happened in the way that they are said to have -happened by superficial, credulous, or prejudiced historians, and -attempting to reconstruct them in the only way that they could have -happened. We shall admire in Voltaire (especially in the _Siècle_) his -lack of confidence in the reports of courtiers and servants, accustomed -to forge calumnies and to interpret maliciously and anecdotically the -external actions of sovereigns and statesmen. - -This happened because the historiography of the enlightenment, while -it preserved and even exaggerated pragmatism, yet on the other -hand refined and spiritualized it, as will have been observed in -the expressions preferred by Voltaire and even in the theologizing -Bossuet: _l'esprit des nations, l'esprit du temps._ What that _esprit_ -was naturally remained vague, because the support of philosophy, -in which at that time those newly imported concepts introduced an -unexpected element of conflict, was lacking to refer it to the ideal -determinations of the spirit in its development and to conceive the -various epochs and the various nations as each playing its own part in -the spiritual drama. Thus it often happened that _esprit_ was perverted -into a fixed quality, such as _race_, if it were a question of nations, -and into a current or mode, if periods were spoken of, and was thus -naturalized and pragmatized. _Trois choses,_ wrote Voltaire, _influent -sans cesse sur l'esprit des hommes, le climat, le gouvernement, et -la religion: c'est la seule manière d'expliquer l'énigme du monde:_ -where the 'spirit' is lowered to the position of a product of natural, -and social circumstances. The suggestive word had, however, been -pronounced, and a clear consciousness of the terms themselves of the -social, political, and cultural struggle that was being carried on -would have little by little emerged. For the time being, climate, -government, religion, genius of the peoples, genius of the time, were -all more or less happy attempts to go beyond pragmatism and to place -causality in a universal order. This effort, and at the same time its -limit--that is to say, the falling back into the abstract and pragmatic -form of explanation--is also shown in the doctrine of the 'single -event,' which was believed to determine at a stroke the new epoch of -barbarism or of civilization. Thus at this time it was customary to -assign enormous importance to the Crusades or to the Turkish occupation -of Constantinople, as Fueter records, with special reference to -Richardson's history. Another consequence of the same embarrassment -was the slight degree of fusion attained in the various histories of -culture, of customs, and of the arts that were composed it this time. -The various manifestations of life were set down one after the other -without any success, or even any attempt at developing them organically. - -Doubtless the new and vigorous historiographical tendencies of the -enlightenment were then attacking other barriers opposed to them by -the already mentioned lay-theological dualism, in addition to those of -pragmatism and of naturalism. This lay-theology ended by negating the -principle of development itself, because the judgment of the past as -consisting of darkness and errors precluded any serious conception of -religion, poetry, philosophy, or of primitive and bygone institutions. -What did an institution of the great importance of 'divination' in -primitive civilizations amount to for Voltaire in the formative process -of observation and scientific deduction? The invention _du premier -fripon qui rencontra un imbécile._ Or oracles, also of such importance -in the life of antiquity? _Des fourberies._ To what amounted the -theological struggles between Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists -in connexion with the Eucharist? To the ridiculous spectacle of the -Papists _who mangeaient Dieu pour pain, les luthériens du pain et Dieu, -les calvinistes mangèrent le pain et ne mangèrent point Dieu._ What -was the only end that could be attained by the Jansenists? Boredom: a -sequence of tiresome _querelles théologiques_ and of petty querelles -de plume, so that nothing remains of the writers of that time who took -part in them but geometry, reasoned grammar, logic--that is to say, -only what _appartient à la raison; the querelles théologiques were -une maladie de plus dans l'esprit humain._ Nor does the philosophy -of earlier times receive better treatment. That of Plato was nothing -but _une mauvaise métaphysique,_ a tissue of arguments so bad that -it seems impossible they could have been admired and added to by -others yet more extravagant from century to century, until Locke was -reached: Locke, _qui seul a développé l'entendement humain dans un -livre où il n'y a que des vérités, et, ce qui rend l'ouvrage parfait, -toutes les vérités sont claires._ In poetry, modern work was placed -above ancient, the Gerusalemme above the Iliad, the Orlando above the -Odyssey, Dante seems obscure and awkward, Shakespeare a barbarian not -without talent. Medieval literature was beneath consideration: _On a -recueilli quelques malheureuses compositions de ce temps: c'est faire -un amas de cailloux tirés dantiques masures quand on est entouré de -palais._ Frederick of Prussia, who here showed himself a consistent -Voltairean, did not receive the new edition of the Nibelungenlied and -the other epic monuments of Germany graciously. In a word, the whole -of the past lost its value, or preserved only the negative value -of evil: _Que les citoyens d'une ville immense, où les arts, les -plaisirs, et la paix régnent aujourd'hui, où la raison même commence à -s'introduire, comparent les temps, et qu'ils se plaignent, s'ils osent. -C'est une réflexion qu'il faut faire presque à chaque page de cette -histoire._ The lack of the conception of development rendered sterile -the very acquisition of knowledge of distant things and people; and -although there was in certain respects merit in introducing India and -China into universal history, and although the criticism and satire -of the 'four monarchies' and of 'sacred' history was to a certain -extent justified, it is well to remember that in the notion mocked at -was satisfied the legitimate need for understanding history in its -relations with Christian and European civilized life; and that if it -had not been found possible (and it never was at that time) to form a -more complete chain, in which were Arabia, India and China, and the -American civilizations, and all the other newly discovered things, -these additional contributions to knowledge would have remained a mere -object for curiosity or imagination. India, China, and the East in -general were therefore of little more use in the eighteenth century -than to manifest an affection for tolerance, indeed for religious -indifferentism. Those distant countries, in which there was no -proselytizing frenzy, and which did not send missionaries to weary -Europe--though Europe did not spare them such visitations--were not -treated as historical realities, nor did they obtain their place in -the reality of spiritual development, but became longed-for ideals, -countries of dream. Those who in our day renew praises of Asiatic -toleration, contrasting it with European intolerance, and wax tender -over such wisdom and meekness, are not aware that in so doing they -are repeating uselessly and inopportunely what Voltaire has already -done; and if in this matter he did not aid the better understanding -of history, he at any rate fulfilled a practical and moral function -which was necessary for the conditions of his own time. The defective -conception of development, and not accidental circumstances, such as -the publicistic, journalistic, and literary tendencies of the original -among those historians, is also the profound reason for the failure of -contact and of union between the immense mass of erudition accumulated -by the sixteenth century philologists, and the historiography of the -enlightenment. How were those documents and collections to be employed -in the slow and laborious development of the spirit, if, according to -the new conception, instead of developing, the spirit was to leap, and -had indeed already made a great leap and left the past far behind? It -was sufficient to rummage from time to time among them and extract some -curious detail, which should fit in with the polemic of the moment. -_C'est un vaste magasin, où vous prendrez ce qui est à votre usage,_ -said Voltaire. Thus the learned and the enlightened, both of them -children of their time, remained divided among themselves, the former -incapable of rising to the level of history owing to their slight -vivacity of spirit, the latter overrunning it owing to their too great -vivacity, and reducing it to a form of journalism. - -All these limits, just because they are limits, assign its proper -sphere to the historiography of the enlightenment, but they must -not be taken as meaning that it had not made any progress. That -historiography, plunged in the work at the moment most urgent, -surrounded with the splendour of the truths that it was in the act -of revealing around it, failed to see those limits and its own -deficiencies, or saw them rarely and with difficulty. It was aware only -that it progressed and progressed rapidly, nor was it wrong in this -belief. Nor are those critics (among whom is Fueter) wrong who now -defend it from the bad reputation that has befallen it and celebrate -its many virtues, which we also have set in a clear light and have -added to, and whose connexion and unity we have proved. Yet we must -not leave that bad reputation unexplained, for it sounds far more -serious than the usual depreciation by every historical period of the -one that has preceded it, with the view of showing its inferiority -to the present. Here, on the contrary, we find a particular judgment -of depreciation, pronounced even by comparison with the periods -that preceded the enlightenment, so that this period, and not, for -example, the Renaissance, has especially received the epithet of -'anti-historical' ("the anti-historical eighteenth century"). We find -the explanation of this when we think of the dissipation then taking -place of all symbolical veils, received from _venerable antiquity,_ and -of the crude dualism and conflict which were being instigated at that -time between history and religion. The Renaissance was also itself an -affirmation of human reason, but at the moment of its breaking with -medieval tradition it was felt to be all the same tied to classical -tradition, which gave it an appearance of historical consciousness (an -appearance and not the reality). The philosophers of the Renaissance -often invoked and placed themselves under the protection of the -ancient philosophers, Plato against Aristotle, or the Greek Aristotle -against the Aristotle of the commentators. The lettered men of the -period sought to justify the new works of art and the new judgments -upon them by appealing to the precepts of antiquity, although they -sophisticated and subtilized what they found there. Philosophers, -artists, and critics turned their shoulders upon antiquity only when -and where no sort of conciliation was possible, and it was only the -boldest among them who ventured to do even this. The ancient republics -were taken as an example by the politicians, with Livy as their text, -as the Bible was by the Christians. Religion, which was exhausted or -had been extinguished in the souls of the cultured, was of necessity -preserved for the people as an instrument of government, a vulgar form -of philosophy: almost all are agreed as to this, from Machiavelli to -Bruno. The sage legislator or the 'prince' of Machiavelli and the -enlightened despot of Voltaire, who were both of them idealizations -of the absolute monarchies that had moulded Europe politically to -their will, have substantial affinities; but the sixteenth-century -politician, expert in human weaknesses and charged with all the -experience of the rich history of Greece and of Rome, studied finesse -and transactions, where the enlightened man of the eighteenth century, -encouraged by the ever renewed victories of the _Reason,_ raised -Reason's banner, and for her took his sword from the scabbard, without -feeling the smallest necessity for covering his face with a mask. King -Numa created a religion in order to deceive the people, and was praised -for it by Machiavelli; but Voltaire would have abused him for doing -so, as he abused all inventors of dogmas and promoters of fanaticism. -What more is to be said? The rationalism of the Renaissance was -especially the work of the Italian genius, so well balanced, so careful -to avoid excesses, so accommodating, so artistic; enlightenment, which -was especially the work of the French genius, was radical, consequent, -apt to run into extremes, logistical. - -When the genius of the two countries and the two epochs is compared, -the enlightenment is bound to appear anti-historical with respect -to the Renaissance, which, owing to the comparison thus drawn and -instituted with such an object, becomes endowed with a historical -sense and with a sense of development which it did not possess, having -also been essentially rationalistic and anti-historical, and, in a -certain sense, more so than the enlightenment. I say more than the -enlightenment, not only because the latter, as I have shown, greatly, -increased historical knowledge and ideas, but also precisely because it -caused all the contradictions latent in the Renaissance to break out. -This was an apparent regression in historical knowledge, but in reality -it was an addition to life, and therefore to historical consciousness -itself, as we clearly see immediately afterward. The triumph and -the catastrophe of the enlightenment was the French Revolution; and -this was at the same time the triumph and the catastrophe of its -historiography. - - - - -VI - - -THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ROMANTICISM - - -The reaction manifested itself with the sentimental return to the past, -and with the defence undertaken by the politicians of old institutions -worthy of being preserved or accorded new life. Hence arose two forms -of historical representation, which certainly belong in a measure to -all periods, but which were very vigorous at the romantic period: -_nostalgic_ historiography and historiography which _restored._ And -since the past of their desires, which supplied the material for -practical recommendations, was just that which the enlightenment -and the Revolution had combated and overthrown--the Middle Ages and -everything that resembled or seemed to resemble the Middle Ages--both -kinds of history were, so to say, medievalized. Just as a watercourse -which has been forcibly diverted from its natural bed noisily returns -to it as soon as obstructions are removed, so a great sigh of joy and -satisfaction, a warm emotion of tenderness, welled up in and reanimated -all breasts as, after so long a rationalistic ascesis, they again took -to themselves the old religion, the old national customs, regional and -local, again entered the old houses and castles and cathedrals, sang -again the old songs, dreamed again the old legends. In this tumult of -sentiment we do not at first observe the profound and irremediable -change that has taken place in the souls of all, borne witness to -by the anxiety, the emotion, the pathos of that apparent return. It -would be to belittle the nostalgic historiography of the romantic -movement to make it consist of certain special literary works, for in -reality it penetrated all or almost all the writings of that time, like -an irresistible current, to be found not only in lesser and poorer -spirits, such as De Barante, nor only in the more poetically disposed, -such as Chateaubriand, but in historians who present some of the most -important or purely scientific thoughts, for example Niebuhr. The life -of chivalry, the life of the cloister, the Crusades, the Hohenstaufen, -the Lombard and Flemish communes, the Christian kings of Spain at -strife with the Arabs, the Arabs themselves, England divided between -Saxons and Normans, the Switzerland of William Tell, the _chansons -de geste,_ the songs of the troubadours, _Gothic_ architecture -(characteristic vicissitude of a name, applied in contempt and then -turned into a symbol of affection), became at this time the object of -universal and national sympathy, as did the rough, ingenuous popular -literature, poetry, and art: translations or abbreviations of the -medieval chronicles were even reprinted for the enjoyment of a large -and eager circle of readers; the first medieval museums were formed; -an attempt was made to restore and complete ancient churches, castles, -and city palaces. Historiography entered into close relations and -exchange of ideas with the new literary form of historical romance, -which expressed the same nostalgia, first with Walter Scott and then -with his innumerable followers in all countries. (This literary form -was therefore quite different from the historical fiction of Manzoni, -which is free from such sentiment and whose historical element has a -moral foundation.) I have already remarked that this nostalgia was -far more modern of content than at first supposed; so much so that -every one was attracted to it by the motive that most appealed to -himself, whether religious or political, Old Catholic, mystical, -monarchical, constitutional, communal-republican, national-independent, -liberal-democratic, or aristocratic. Nevertheless, when the past was -taken as a poetic theme, there was a risk that the idealizing tendency -of the images would be at strife with critical reflection: hence the -cult of the Middle Ages, which had become a superstition, came to a -ridiculous end. Fueter quotes an acute remark of Ranke, relating to one -of the last worthy representatives of the romantic school, Giesebrecht, -author of the History of the German Empire, admirer and extoller of -the 'Christian-Germanic virtues,' of the power and excellence of the -medieval heroes. Ranke described all this as "at once too virile and -too puerile." But the puerility discernible at the sources of this -ideal current, before it falls into the comic, is rather the sublime -puerility of the poet's dream. - -The actual modern motives, which present themselves as sentiments in -nostalgic historiography, acquired a reflex form with the same or -other writers, as tendencies to the service of which their narratives -were bent. Here, too, it would be superfluous to give an account of -all the various forms and specifications of these tendencies (which -Fueter has already done admirably), from the persistent Rousseauism -of Giovanni Müller to Sismondi, or from the ideal of a free peasantry -of Niebuhr, the ultramontane ideal of Leo, the imperialistic-medieval -ideal of the already mentioned Giesebrecht and Ficker, the old liberal -of Raumer, the neo-liberal of Rotteck and Gervinus, the anglicizing -of Guizot and Dahlmann, or the democratic ideal of Michelet, to -the neo-Guelfish ideal of Troya and Balbo and Father Tosti, to the -Prussian hegemony of Droysen and of Treitschke, and so on. But all of -these, and other historians with a particular bias, lean, with rare -exceptions, on the past, and find the justification of their bias in -the dialectic of tradition or in tradition itself. Nobody any longer -cared to compose by the light of abstract reason alone. The extreme -typical instance is afforded by the socialistic school, which took the -romantic form in the person of its chief representative, Marx, who -endowed it with historiographical and scientific value. His work was -in complete opposition to the socialistic ideals that had appeared in -the eighteenth century, and he therefore boasted that they had passed -from the state of being a Utopia to that of a science. His science -was nothing less than historical necessity attributed to the new era -that he prophesied, and materialism itself no longer wished to be the -naturalistic materialism of a d'Holbach or a Helvétius, but presented -itself as 'historical materialism.' - -If nostalgic historiography is poetry and that with a purpose is -practical and political, the historiography, the true historiography, -of romanticism is not to be placed in either of the two, in so far as -it is considered an epoch in the history of thought. Certainly, poetry -and practice arose from a thought and led to a thought as its material -or problem: the French Revolution was certainly not the cause or the -effect of a philosophy, but both the cause and the effect, a philosophy -in the act, born from and generating the life that was then developed. -But thought in the form of thought, and not in the form of sentimental -love of the past or effort to revive a false past, is what determines -the scientific character of that historiography, which we desire to set -in a clear light. And it reacted in the form of thought against the -thought of the enlightenment, so crudely dualistic, by opposing to it -the conception of development. - -Not indeed that this concept was something entirely new, which had then -burst forth in bud for the first time: no speculative conception that -is really such can be absent at one time and appear at another. The -difference lies in this, that at a given period scientific problems -seem to apply to one rather than to another aspect of thought, which -is always present in its totality. So that when we say that the -conception of development was absent from antiquity and from the -eighteenth century, we utter a hyperbole. There are good reasons for -this hyperbole, but it remains a hyperbole and should not be taken -literally and understood materially. Nor are we to believe that there -was no suspicion or anticipation of the important scientific conception -of development prior to the romantic period. Traces of it may be found -in the pantheism of the great philosophers of the Renaissance, and -especially in Bruno, and in mysticism itself, in so far as it included -pantheism, and yet more distinctly in the reconstruction of the bare -bones of the theological conception with the conception of the course -of historical events as a gradual education of the human race, in -which the successive revelations should be the communication of books -of a gradually less and less elementary nature, from the first Hebrew -scriptures to the Gospels and to the revisions of the Gospels. Lessing -offers an example of this. Nor were the theorists of the enlightenment -always so terribly dualistic as those that I have mentioned, but here -and there one of them, such as Turgot, although he did not altogether -abandon the presupposition as to epochs of decadence, yet recognized -the progress of Christianity over antiquity and of modern times over -Christianity, and attempted even to trace the line of development -passing through the three ages, the mythological, the metaphysical, -and the scientific. Other thinkers, like Montesquieu, noticed the -relativity of institutions to customs and to periods; others, like -Rousseau, attached great importance to the strength of sentiment. -Enlightenment had also its adversaries during its own period, not -only as represented by political abstraction and fatuous optimism -(such as that of Galiani, for instance), but also in more important -respects, destined later to form the special subject of criticism, -such as contempt for tradition, for religion, and for poetry and arid -naturalism. Hence the smile of Hamann at the blind faith of Voltaire -and of Hume in the Newtonian astronomical doctrines and at their lack -of sense for moral doctrines. He held that a revival of poetry and -a linking of it with history were necessary, and considered history -to be (here he was just the opposite of Bodin) not the easiest but -the most difficult of all mental labours. But in the _Scienza nuova_ -of Vico (1725) was to be found a very rich and organic anticipation -of romantic thought (as should now be universally recognized and -known). Vico criticized the enlightenment only in its beginnings (when -it was still only natural jurisprudence and Cartesianism), yet he -nevertheless penetrated more deeply than others who came after him -into its hidden motives and measured more accurately its logical and -practical consequences. Thus he opposed to the superficial contempt -for the past in the name of abstract reason the unfolding of the human -mind in history, as sense, imagination, and intellect, as the divine -or animal age, the heroic age, and the human age. He held further -that no human age was in the wrong, for each had its own strength and -beauty, and each was the effect of its predecessor and the necessary -preparation for the one to follow, aristocracy for democracy, democracy -for monarchy, each one appearing at the right moment, or as the justice -of that moment. - -The conception of development did not, however, in the romantic -period, remain the thought of a solitary thinker without an audience, -but broadened until it became a general conviction; it did not -appear timidly shadowed forth, or contradictorily affirmed, but took -on body, coherence, and vigour, and dominated spirits. It is the -formative principle of the idealist philosophy, which culminated in -the system of Hegel. Few there were who resisted its strength, and -these, like Herbart, were still shut up in pre-Kantian dogmatism, -or tried to resist it and are more or less tinged with it, as is -the case with Schopenhauer and yet more with Comte and later with -positivistic evolutionism. It gives its intellectual backbone to the -whole of historiography (with the exception here too of lingerers and -reactionaries), and that historiography corrects for it, in greater or -less measure, the same one-sided tendencies which came to it from the -sentimental and political causes already described, from tenderness for -the near past or for "the good old times," and for the Middle Ages. -The whole of history is now understood as necessary development, and -is therefore implicitly, and more or less explicitly, all redeemed; it -is all learned with the feeling that it is sacred, a feeling reserved -in the Middle Ages for those parts of it only which represented the -opposition of God to the power of the devil. Thus the conception of -development was extended to classical antiquity, and then, with the -increase of knowledge and of attention, to Oriental civilizations. -Thus the Romans, the Ionians, the Dorians, the Egyptians, and the -Indians got back their life and were justified and loved in their -turn almost as much as the world of chivalry and the Christian world -had been loved. But the logical extension of the conception did not -find any obstacle among the philosophers and historians, even in the -repugnance that was felt for the times to which modern times were -opposed, such as the eighteenth century. The spectacle was witnessed -of the consecration of Jacobinism and of the French Revolution in -the very books of their adversaries, Hegel, for instance, finding in -those events both the triumph and the death, the one not less than the -other, the 'triumphant death' of the modern abstract subjectivity, -inaugurated by Descartes. Not only did the adversaries, but also the -executioners and their victims, make peace, and Socrates, the martyr of -free thought and the victim of intolerance, such as he was understood -to be by the intellectualists of the eighteenth century and those who -superstitiously repeat them in our own day, was condemned to the death -that he had well deserved, in the name of History, which does not admit -of spiritual revolutions without tragedies. The drafter, too, of the -_Manifesto of the Communists,_ as he was hastening on the business of -putting an end to the burgess class, both with his prayers and with -his works, gave vent to a warm and grandiose eulogium of the work -achieved by the burgess class, and in so doing showed himself to be the -faithful child of romantic thought; because, for anyone who held to the -ideology of the eighteenth century, capitalism and the burgess class -should have appeared to be nothing but distortions due to ignorance, -stupidity, and egoism, unworthy of any praise beyond a funeral -oration. The passions of the greater part of those historians were -most inflammable, not less than those of the enlightened, yet satire, -sarcasm, invective, at least among the superior intellects, vividly -encircled the historical understanding of the time, but did not oppress -or negate it. The general impression experienced from those narratives -is that of a serious effort to render justice to all, and we owe it to -the discipline thus imparted to the minds and souls of the thinkers -and historians of romanticism that it is only the least cultivated or -most fanatical among the priests and Catholics in general who continue -to curse Voltaire and the eighteenth century as the work of the devil. -In the same way, it is only vulgar democrats and anti-clericals, -akin to the former in their anachronism and the rest, who treat the -reaction, the restoration, and the Middle Ages with equal grossness. -Enlightenment and the Jacobinism connected with it was a religion, -as we have shown, and when it died it left behind it survivals or -superstitions. - -To conceive history as development is to conceive it as history of -ideal values, the only ones that have value, and it was for this -reason that in the romantic period there was an ever increasing -multiplication of those histories which had already increased to so -considerable an extent in the preceding period. But their novelty did -not consist in their external multiplication, but in their internal -maturation, which corrected those previously composed, consisting -either of learned collections of disconnected items of information, or -judgments indeed, but judgments based upon an external model, which -claimed to be constructed by pure reason and was in reality constructed -by arbitrary and capricious abstraction and imagination. And now the -history of poetry and of literature is no longer measured according -to the standard of the Roman-humanistic ideal, or according to the -classical ideal of the age of Louis XIV, or of the ratiocinative and -prosaic ideal of the eighteenth century, but discovers by degrees -its own measure in itself, and beginning with the first attempts of -Herder, of the Schlegels, and then of Villemain, of Sainte-Beuve, and -of Gervinus, and for antiquity of Wolf and Müller, finally reaches -the high standard represented by the _History of Italian Literature_ -of de Sanctis. Suddenly the history of art feels itself embarrassed -by the too narrow ideal of Lessing and of Winckelmann, and there is -a movement toward colour, toward landscape, toward pre-Hellenic and -post-Hellenic art, toward the romantic, the Gothic, the Renaissance, -and the baroque, a movement that extends from Meyer and Hirth to -Rumohr, Kluger, Schnaase, till it reaches Burckhardt and Ruskin. It -also tries here and there to break down the barriers of the schools and -to attain the really artistic personality of the artists. The history -of philosophy has its great crisis with Hegel, who leads it from the -abstract subjectivism of the followers of Kant to objectivity, and -recognizes the only true existence of philosophy to consist of the -history of thought, considered in its entirety, without neglecting any -one of its forms. Zeller, Fischer, and Erdmann in Germany, Cousin and -his school in France, Spaventa in Italy, follow Hegel in such objective -research. The like takes place in the history of religion, which tries -to adopt intrinsic criteria of judgment, after Spittler and Planck, the -last representatives of the rationalistic school, with Marheinecke, -Neander, Hase, and finds a peculiarly scientific form with Strauss, -Baur, and the Tübingen school; and from Eichhorn to Savigny, Gans, and -Lassalle in the history of rights. The conception of the State always -yields the leadership more and more to that of the nation in the -history called political, and 'nationality' substitutes the names of -'humanity,' 'liberty,' and 'equality,' and all the other ideas of the -preceding age that once were full of radiance, but are now dimmed. This -nationalism has wrongly been looked upon as a regression, in respect -of that universalism and cosmopolitanism, because (notwithstanding -its well-known sentimental exaggerations) it notably assists the -concrete conception of the universal living only in its historical -creations, such as nations, which are both products and factors of its -development. And the value of Europeanism is revived as the result -of this acquisition of consciousness of the value of nations. It had -been too much trampled upon during the period of the enlightenment, -owing to the naturalistic spirit which dominated at that time, and to -the reaction taking place against the historical schemes of antiquity -and Christianity, although it was surely evident that history written -by Europeans could not but be 'Europocentric,' and that it is only in -relation to the course of Græco-Roman civilization, which was Christian -and Occidental, that the civilizations developed along other lines -become actual and comprehensible to us, provided always that we do -not wish to change history into an exhibition of the different types -of civilization, with a prize for the best of them The difference is -also made clear for the same reason between history and pre-history, -between the history of man and the history of nature, which had been -illegitimately linked by the materialists and the naturalists. This is -to be found even in the works of Herder, who retains a good many of -the elements of the century of his birth mingled with those of the new -period. But it is above all in romantic historiography that we observe -the search for and very often the happy realization of an organic -linking together of all particular histories of spiritual values, by -relating religious, philosophical, poetical, artistic, juridical, and -moral facts as a function of a single motive of development. It then -becomes a commonplace that a literature cannot be understood without -understanding ideas and customs, or politics without philosophy, or -(as was realized rather later) rights and customs and ideas without -economy. And it is worth while recording as we pass by that there is -hardly one of these histories of values which has not been previously -presented or sketched by Vico, together with the indication of their -intrinsic unity. Histories of poetry, histories of myth, of rights, of -languages, of constitutions, of explicative or philosophical reason, -all are in Vico, although sometimes wrapped up in the historical -or sociological epoch with which each one of them was particularly -connected. Even modern biography (which illustrates what the individual -does and suffers in relation to the mission which he fulfils and to the -aspect of the Idea which becomes actual in him) has its first or one of -its first notable monuments in the autobiography of Vico--that is to -say, in the history of the works which Providence commanded and guided -him to accomplish "in diverse ways that seemed to be obstacles, but -were opportunities." - -This transformation of biography does not imply failure to recognize -individuality, but is, on the contrary, its elevation, for it finds -its true meaning in its relation with the universal, as the universal -its concreteness in the individual. And indeed individualizing power, -perception of physiognomies, of states of the soul, of the various -forms of the ideas, sense of the differences of times and places, -may be said to show themselves for the first time in romantic -historiography. That is to say, they do not show themselves rarely or -as by accident, nor any longer in the negative and summary form of -opposition between new and old, civil and barbarous, patriotic and -extraneous. It does not mean anything that some of those historians -lost themselves (though this happened rarely) in an abstract dialectic -of ideas, and that others more frequently allowed ideas to be submerged -in the external picturesqueness of customs and anecdotes, because we -find exaggerations, one-sidedness, lack of balance, at all periods and -in all progress of thought. Nor is the accusation of great importance -that the colouring of times and places preferred by the romantics -was false, because the important thing was precisely this attempt to -colour, whether the result were happy or the reverse (if the latter, -the picture had to be coloured again, but always coloured). A further -reason for this is that, as has been already admitted, there were -fancies and tendencies at work in romanticism beyond true and proper -historiography, which bestowed upon the times and places illustrated -that imaginary and exaggerated colouring suggested by the various -sentiments and interests. History, which is thought, was sometimes -idealized at this period as an imaginary living again in the past, and -people asked of history to be carried back into the old castles and -market-places of the Middle Ages; for their enjoyment they asked to -see the personages of the time in their own proper clothes and as they -moved about, to hear them speak the language, with the accent of the -time, to be made contemporary with the facts and to acquire them with -the ingenuous spirit of a contemporary. But to do this is not only -impossible for thought, but also for art, because art too surpasses -life, and it would be something useless, because it is not desired, -for what man really desires is to reproduce in imagination and to -rethink the past _from the present,_ not to tear himself away from the -present and fall back into the dead past. Certainly this last was an -illusion, proper to several romantics (who for that matter have their -successors in our own day), and in so far as it was an illusion either -remained a sterile effort or diffused itself in a lyrical sigh; but -an illusion of that kind was one of many aspects and did not form an -essential part of romantic historiography. - -We also owe it to romanticism that a relation was established for -the first time and a fusion effected between the learned and the -historians, between those who sought out material and thinkers. This, -as we have said, had not happened in the eighteenth century, nor, -to tell the truth, before it, in the great epochs of erudition of -Italian or Alexandrian humanism, for then antiquaries and politicians -each followed their own path, indifferent to one another, and the -only political ideal that sometimes gleamed from the bookshelves of -the antiquary (as Fueter acutely observes of Flavius Blondus) was -that of a government which by ensuring calm should permit the learned -to follow their peaceful avocations! But the watchword of romantic -historiography was anticipated in respect to this matter also by Vico, -in his formula of the _union_ of _philosophy_ with _philology,_ and of -the reciprocal _conversion_ of the _true_ with the _certain,_ of the -idea with the fact. This formula proves (we give it passing mention) -that the historical saying of Manzoni, to the effect that Vico should -be united with Muratori, was not altogether historically exact--that -is to say, philosophy with erudition, for Vico had already united -these two things, and their union constitutes the chief value of his -work. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its inaccuracy, the saying of -Manzoni also proves how romantic historiography had noted the intimate -connexion that prevails between erudition and thought in history, -which is the living and thinking again of the document that has been -preserved or restored by erudition, and indeed demands erudition that -it may be sought out and prepared. Neither did romanticism limit -itself to stating this claim in the abstract, but really created the -type of the philologist-thinker (who was sometimes also a poet), from -Niebuhr to Mommsen, from Thierry to Fustel de Coulanges, from Troya -to Balbo or Tosti. Then for the first time were the great collections -and repertories of the erudition of the seventeenth and eighteenth -centuries valued at their true worth; then were new collections -promoted, supplementary to or correcting them according to criteria -that were ever more rigorous in relation to the subject and to the -greater knowledge and means at disposal. Thus arose the work known -as the _Monumenta Germania historica_ and the German philological -school (which was once the last and became the first), the one a model -of undertakings of this sort, the other of the disciplines relating -to them, for the rest of Europe. The philological claim of the new -historiography, aided by the sentiment of nationality, also gave life -in our Italy to those historical societies, to those collections of -chronicles, of laws, of charters, of 'historical archives' or reviews, -institutions with which historiographical work is concerned in our day. -A notable example of the power to promote the most patient philology -inspired with purely historical needs is to be found, among others, in -the _Corpus inscriptionum latinarum,_ conceived and carried out by a -historian endowed with the passionate energy and the synthetic mind of -a Mommsen. In the eighteenth century (with one or two very rare and -partial exceptions) historians disdained parchment and in-folios, or -opened them impatiently, _bibentes et fugientes_ but in the nineteenth -century no serious spirit dared to affirm any longer that it was -possible to compose history without accurate, scrupulous, meticulous -study of the documents upon which it is to be founded. - -The pragmatic histories of the last centuries, therefore, melted -away at the simple touch of these new historiographical convictions, -rather than owing to direct and open criticism or polemic. The -word 'pragmatic,' which used to be a title of honour, began to be -pronounced with a tinge of contempt, to designate an inadequate form -of historical thought, and the historians of the enlightenment fell -into discredit, not only Voltaire and the French, but the Humes, the -Robertsons, and other English historians. They appeared now to be quite -without colour, lacking in historical sense, their minds fixed only -on the political aspect of things, superficial, vainly attempting to -explain great events by the intentions of individuals and by means of -little things or single details. The theory, too, of history as the -orator and teacher of virtue and prudential maxims also disappeared. -This theory had enjoyed a long and vigorous life during Græco-Roman -antiquity and again from the Renaissance onward (when I say that all -these things disappeared, the exception of the fossils is always to -be understood, for these persisted at that time and persist in our -own day, with the air of being alive). The attitude of the Christian -spirit toward history was resumed. This spirit contemplates it as -a single process, which does not repeat itself, as the work of -God, which teaches directly by means of His presence, not as matter -that exemplifies abstract teaching, extraneous to itself. The word -'pragmatic' was indeed pronounced with a smile from that time onward, -as were the formulas of _historia magister vitæ_ or that directed _ad -bene beateque vivendum_: let him who will believe these formulas--that -is to say, he who echoes traditional thoughts without rethinking them -and is satisfied with traditional and vulgar conceptions. What is the -use of history? "History itself," was the answer, and truly that is not -a little thing. - -The new century glorified itself with the title of 'the century of -history,' owing to its new departures, which were born or converged -in one. It had deified and at the same time humanized history, as had -never been done before, and had made of it a centre of reality and of -thought. That title of honour should be confirmed, if not to the whole -of the nineteenth century, then to its romantic or idealistic period. -But this confirmation should not prevent our observing, with equal -clearness, the _limit_ of that historicity, without which it would not -be possible to understand its later and further advance. History was -then at once deified and humanized; but did the divinity and humanity -truly flow together in one, or was there not at bottom some separation -between the two of them? Was the disagreement between ancient worldly -thought and ultramundane Christian thought really healed, or did it not -present itself again in a new form, though this form was attenuated and -more critical intellectually? And which of the two elements prevailed -in this disagreement in its abstractness, the human or rather the -divine? - -These questions suggest the answer, which is further suggested by -a memory familiar to all, namely, that the romantic period was not -only the splendid age of the great evolutionary histories, but also -the fatal age of the _philosophies of history,_ the transcendental -histories. And indeed, although the thought of immanence had grown -gradually more and more rich and profound during the Renaissance and -the enlightenment, and that of transcendency ever more evanescent, -the first had not for that reason absorbed the second in itself, -but had merely purified and rationalized it, as Hellenic philosophy -and Christian theology had tried to do in their own ways in their -own times. In the romantic period, purification and rationalization -continue, and here was the mistake as well as the merit of romanticism, -for it was no longer a question of setting right that ancient opinion, -but of radically inverting and remaking it. The transcendental -conception of history was no longer at that time called revelation -and apocalypse, but _philosophy of history,_ a title taken from the -enlightenment (principally from Voltaire), although it no longer had -the meaning formerly attributed to it of history examined with an -unprejudiced or philosophical spirit adorned with moral and political -reflections, but the meaning, altogether different, of a philosophical -search of the sphere above or below that of history--in fact, of -a theological search, which remained theological, however lay or -speculative it may have been. And since a search of this sort always -leads to a rationalized mythology, there is no reason why the name of -'mythology' should not be extended to the philosophy of history, or -the name of 'philosophy of history,' to mythology, as I have extended -it, calling all transcendental conceptions of history 'philosophy of -history,' for they all separate the fact and the idea, the event and -its explication, action and end, the world and God. And since the -philosophy of history is transcendental in its internal structure, -it is not surprising that it showed itself to be such in all the -very varied forms that it assumed in the romantic period, even among -philosophers as avid of immanence as Hegel, a great destroyer of -Platonism, who yet remained to a considerable extent engaged in it, -so tenacious is that enemy which every thinker carries in himself and -which he should tear from his heart, yet cannot resist. - -But without entering into a particular account of the assumptions -made by the romantics and idealists in the construction of their -'philosophies of history,' it will be sufficient to observe the -consequences, in order to point out the transcendental tendency -of their constructions. These were such as to compromise romantic -histories in the method and to damage them in the execution, though -they were at first so vigorously conceived as a unity of philosophy -and philology. One of the consequences was precisely the falling again -into contempt of erudition among those very people who adopted and -promoted it, and on other occasions a recommendation of it in words and -a contempt of it in deeds. This contradictory attitude was troubled -with an evil conscience, so much so that its recommendations sound but -little sincere, the contempt timid, when it shows itself, though it -is more often concealed. Nevertheless one discovers fleeting words of -revelation among these tortuosities and pretences, such as that of an -_a priori history_ (Fichte, Schelling, Krause, and, to a certain extent -at least, Hegel), which should be true history, deduced from the pure -concepts, or rendered divine in some vision of the seer of Patmos, a -history which should be more or less different from the confusion -of human events and facts, as philosophical history, leaving outside -it as refuse a merely _narrative_ history, which should serve as raw -material or as text for the sermons and precepts of the moralists and -politicians. And we see rising from the bosom of a philosophy, which -had tried to make history of itself, by making philosophy also history -(proof that the design had not been really translated into act), the -distinction between philosophy and history, between the historical and -the philosophical way of thinking, and the mutual antipathy and mutual -unfriendliness of the two orders of researchers. The 'professional' -historians were obliged to defend themselves against their progenitors -(the philosophers), and they ended by losing all pity for them, by -denying that they were philosophers and treating them as intruders and -charlatans. - -Unpleasantness and ill-will were all the more inevitable in that the -'philosophers of history'--that is to say, the historians obsessed -with transcendency--did not always remain content (nor could they do -so, speaking strictly) with the distinction between philosophical and -narrative history, and, as was natural, attempted to harmonize the -two histories, to make the facts harmonize with the schemes which -they had imagined or deduced. With this purpose in view, they found -themselves led to use violence toward facts, in favour of their system, -and this resulted in certain most important parts being cut out, in a -Procrustean manner, and in others that were accepted being perverted -to suit a meaning that was not genuine but imposed upon them. Even -the chronological divisions, which formed a merely practical aid to -narratives, were tortured (as was the custom in the Middle Ages) that -they might be elevated to the rank of ideal divisions. And not only -was the light of truth extinguished in the pursuit of these caprices, -not only were individual sympathies and antipathies introduced (take -as an instance typical of all of them the idealization of Hellas and -of this or that one of the Hellenic races), but there appeared a -thing yet more personally offensive to the victims--that is to say, -there penetrated into history, under the guise of lofty philosophy, -the personal loves and hates of the historian, in so far as he was a -party man, a churchman, or belonged to this or that people, state, -or race. This ended in the invention of Germanism, the crown and -perfection of the human race, a Germanism which, claiming to be the -purest expression of Arianism, would have restored the idea of the -elect people, and have one day undertaken the journey to the East. -Thus were in turn celebrated semi-absolute monarchy as the absolute -form of states, speculative Lutheranism as the absolute form of -religion, and other suchlike vainglorious vaunts, with which the pride -of Germany oppressed the European peoples and indeed the whole world, -and thus exacted payment in a certain way for the new philosophy with -which Germany had endowed the world. But it must not be imagined that -the pride of Germany was not combated with its own arms, for if the -English speculated but little and the French were too firm in their -belief in the _Gesta Dei per Francos_ (become the gestes of reason -and civilization), yet the peoples who found themselves in less happy -conditions, and felt more keenly the censure of inferiority or of -senility thus inflicted upon them, reacted: Gioberti wrote a _Primato -d'Italia,_ and Ciezkowski a _Paternostro,_ which foretold the future -primacy of the Slavonic people and more especially of the Poles. - -Yet another consequence of the 'philosophies of history' was the -reflourishing of 'universal histories,' in the fallacious signification -of complete histories of humanity, indeed of the cosmos, which the -Middle Ages had narrated in the chronicles ab origine mundi and _de -duabus civitatibus and de quattuor imperiis_, and the Renaissance and -enlightenment had reduced to mere vulgar compilations, finding the -centre for its own interest elsewhere. The _imagines mundi_ returned -with the philosophies of history, and such they were themselves, -transcendental universal histories, with the 'philosophy of nature' -belonging to them. The succession of the nations there took the place -of the series of empires: to each nation, as formerly to each empire, -was assigned a special function, which once fulfilled, it disappeared -or fell to pieces, having passed on the lamp of life, which must not -pass through the hands of any nation more than once. The German nation -was to play there the part of the Roman Empire, which should never -die, but exist perpetually, or until the consummation of the ages and -the Kingdom of God. To develop the various forms of the philosophy of -history would aid in making clear the internal contradictions of the -doctrine and in ascribing the reasons for the introduction of certain -corrections for the purpose of doing away with the contradictions -in question, but which in so doing introduced others. And in making -an examination of this kind a special place should be reserved for -Vico, who offers a 'philosophy of history' of a very complex sort, -which on the one side does not negate, but passes by in silence the -Christian and medieval conception (as it does not deny St Augustine's -conception of the two cities or of the elect and Gentile people, but -only seriously examines the history of the latter), while on the other -side it resumes the ancient Oriental motive of the circles (courses -and recourses), but understands the course as growth and development, -and the recourse as a dialectical return, which on the other hand -does not seem to give rise to progress, although it does not seem to -exclude it, and also does not exclude the autonomy of the free will or -the exception of contingency. In this conception the Middle Ages and -antiquity ferment, producing romantic and modern thought.[1] But in the -romantic period the idea of the circle (which yet contained a great -mental claim that demanded satisfaction) gave place to the idea of a -linear course, taken from Christianity and from progress to an end, -which concludes with a certain state as limit or with entrance into a -paradise of indefinite progress, of incessant joy without sorrow. In -a conception of this kind there is at one time a mixture of theology -and of illuminism, as in Herder, at another an attempt at a history -according to the ages of life and the forms of the spirit, as with -Fichte and his school; then again the idea realizes its logical ideal -in time, as in Hegel, or the shadow of a God reappears, as in the -deism of Laurent and of several others, or the God is that of the old -religion, but modernized, noble, judicious, liberal, as in moderate -Catholicism and Protestantism. And since the course has necessarily an -end in all these schemes, announced and described and therefore already -lived and passed by, attempts to prolong, to prorogue, or to vary that -end have not been wanting, such personages as the Abbots Gioacchini -arising and calling themselves the 'Slav apocalyptics' or by some other -name, and adding new eras to those described. But this did not change -anything in the general conception. And there was no change effected in -it by the philosophies of history of the second Schelling, for example, -which are usually called irrationalistic, or of the pessimists, because -it is clear that the decadence which they describe is a progress in the -opposite sense, a progress in evil and in suffering, having its end in -the acme of evil and pain, or leading indeed to a redemption and then -becoming a progress toward the good. But if the idea of circles, which -repeat themselves identically, oppresses historical consciousness, -which is the consciousness of perennial individuality and diversity, -this idea of progress to an end oppresses it in another way, because -it declares that all the creations of history are imperfect, save -the last, in which history comes to a standstill and which therefore -alone has absolute value, and which thus takes away from the value of -reality in favour of an abstraction, from existence in favour of the -inexistent. And both of these--that is to say, all the philosophies of -history, in whatever way determined--lay in ambush to overwhelm the -conceptions of development and the increase in historiographical value -obtained through it by romanticism; and when this injury did not occur -(as in several notable historians, who narrated history admirably, -although they professed to obey the rules of the abstract philosophy -of history, which they saluted from near or far, but took care not to -introduce into their narratives), it was a proof that the contradiction -had not been perceived, or at least perceived as we now perceive it, -in its profound dissonance. It was a sign that romanticism too had -problems upon which it laboured long and probed deeply, and others upon -which it did not work at all or only worked a little and kept waiting, -satisfying them more or less. History too, like the individual who -works, does 'one thing at a time,' neglecting or allowing to run on -with the help of slight provisional improvements the problems to which -it cannot for the time being attend, but ready to direct full attention -to them when its hands are free. - - -[1] The exposition and criticism of Vico's thought are copiously dealt -with in the second volume of my _Saggi filosofici i La filosofia di -Giambattista Vico_ (Bari, 1911). - - - - -VII - - -THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF POSITIVISM - - -The philosophies of history offended the historical consciousness -in three points, as to which it has every right to be jealous: the -integrity of historical events, the unity of the narration with the -document, and the immanence of development. And the opposition to the -'philosophy of history,' and to the historiography of romanticism in -general, broke out precisely at these three points, and was often -violent. This opposition had at bottom a common motive, as has been -shown clearly by the frequent sympathy and fraternizing among those -who represent it, though dissensions as to details are common among -them. It is, however, best to consider it in its triplicity for reasons -of clearness, and to describe it as that of the _historians,_ the -_philologists,_ and the _philosophers._ - -To the historians, by whom we mean those who had a special disposition -for the investigation of particular facts rather than theories, and a -greater acquaintance with and practice of historical than speculative -literature, is due the saying that history _should be history and -not philosophy._ Not that they ventured to deny philosophy, for on -the contrary they protested their reverence for it and even for -religion and theology, and condescended to make an occasional rapid -and cautious excursion into those waters; but they generally desired -to steer their way through the placid gulfs of historical truth, -avoiding the tempestuous oceans of the other discipline: philosophy was -relegated to the horizon of their works. Nor did they even contest, -at least in principle, the right of existence of those grandiose -constructions of 'universal history,' but they recommended and -preferred national or otherwise monographical histories, which can be -sufficiently studied in their particulars, substituting for universal -histories collections of histories of states and of peoples. And since -romanticism had introduced into those universal histories and into -the national histories themselves its various practical tendencies -(which the philosophy of history had then turned into dogmas), the -historians placed abstention from national and party tendencies upon -their programme, although they reserved the right of making felt their -patriotic and political aspirations, but, as they said, without for -that reason altering the narrative of the facts, which were supposed -to move along independently of their opinions, or chime in with them -spontaneously in the course of their natural development. And since -passion and the philosophic judgment had been confused and mutually -contaminated in romanticism, the abstention was extended also to -the judgment as to the quality of the facts narrated; the _reality_ -and not the value of the fact being held to be the province of the -historian, appeal being made to what theorists and philosophers had -thought about it, where a more profound consideration of the problem -was demanded. History should not be either German or French, Catholic -or Protestant, but it should also not pretend to apply a more ample -conception to the solution of these or similar antitheses, as the -philosophers of history had tried to do, but rather should neutralize -them all in a wise scepticism or agnosticism, and attenuate them in a -form of exposition conducted in the tone of a presidential summing-up, -where careful attention is paid to the opinions of opposed parties and -courtesy is observed toward all. There was diplomacy in this, and it -is not astonishing that many diplomatists or disciples of diplomacy -should collaborate in this form of history, and that the greatest of -all the historians of this school, Leopold Ranke, in whom are to be -found all the traits that we have described, should have had a special -predilection for diplomatic sources. He always, indeed, combated -philosophy, especially the Hegelian philosophy, and greatly contributed -to discredit it with the historians, but he did this decorously, -carefully avoiding the use of any word that might sound too rough or -too strong, professing the firm conviction that the hand of God shows -itself in history, a hand that we cannot grasp with ours, but which -touches our face and informs us of its action. He completed his long -and very fruitful labours in the form of monographs, avoiding universal -constructions. When, at the end of his life, he set to work to compose -a Weltgeschichte, he carefully separated it from the universe, -declaring that it would have been "lost in phantasms and philosophemes" -had he abandoned the safe ground of national histories and sought for -any other sort of universality than that of nations, which "acting upon -one another, appear one after the other and constitute a living whole." -In his first book he protested with fine irony that he was not able -to accept the grave charge of judging the past or of instructing the -present as to the future, which had been assigned to history, but he -felt himself capable only of showing "how things really had happened" -(wie es eigentlich gewesen) this was his object in all his work, and he -held fast to it, thus culling laurels unobtainable by others, attaining -even to the writing of the history of the popes of the period of the -Counter-Reformation, although he was a Lutheran and remained so all his -life. This history was received with favour in all Catholic countries. -His greatest achievement was to write of French history in a manner -that did not displease the French. A writer of the greatest elegance, -he was able to steer between the rocks, without even letting appear his -own religious or philosophical convictions, and without ever finding -himself under the obligation of forming a definite resolution, and -in any case never pressing too hard upon the conceptions themselves -to which he had recourse, such as 'historical ideas,' the perpetual -struggle between Church and State, and the conception of the State. -Ranke was the ideal and the master to many historians within, and to -some without, his own country. But even without his direct influence, -the type of history that he represented germinated everywhere, a little -earlier or later according to position and to the calming down of the -great political passions and philosophical fervour in the different -countries. This took place, for instance, in France earlier than in -Italy, where the idealistic philosophy and the national movement made -their strength felt in historiography after 1848, and even up to 1860. -But the type of history which I should almost be disposed to baptize -with the name of 'diplomatic,' taking seriously the designation that -I had at first employed jocosely, still meets with success among -the moderately disposed, who are lovers of culture, but do not wish -to become infected with party passions or to rack their brains with -philosophical speculations: but, as may be imagined, it is not always -treated with the intelligence, the balance, and the finesse of a -Leopold Ranke. - -The ambition of altogether rejecting the admission of thought into -history, which has been lacking to the diplomatic historians (because -they were without the necessary innocence for such an ambition), was, -on the other hand, possessed by the philologists, a most innocent -group. They were all the more disposed to abound in this sense, since -their opinion of themselves, which had formerly been most modest, had -been so notably increased, owing to the high degree of perfection -attained by research into chronicles and documents and by the recent -foundation (which indeed had not been a creation ex nihilo) of the -critical or historical method, which was employed in a fine and close -examination into the origin of sources and the reduction of these, and -in the internal criticism of texts. This pride of the philologists -prevailed, the method reaching its highest development in a country -like Germany, where haughty pedantry flourishes better than elsewhere, -and where, as a result of that most admirable thing, scientific -seriousness, 'scientificism' is much idolized. This word was also -ambitiously adopted for everything that concerns the surroundings and -the instruments of true and proper science, such as is the case with -the collection and criticism of narratives and documents. The old -school of learned men, French and Italian, who did not effect less -progress in 'method' than was attained during the nineteenth century in -Germany, did not dream that they were thus producing 'science,' much -less did they dream of vying with philosophy and theology, or that -they could drive them from their positions and take their places with -the documentary method. But in Germany every mean little copier of a -text, or collector of variants, or examiner of the relations of texts -and conjecturer as to the genuine text, raised himself to the level of -a scientific man and critic, and not only dared to look upon himself -as the equal of such men as Schelling, Hegel, Herder, or Schlegel, -but did so with disdain and contempt, calling them 'anti-methodical.' -This pseudo-scientific haughtiness diffused itself from Germany over -the other European countries, and has now reached America, though in -other countries than Germany it met more frequently with irreverent -spirits, who laughed at it. Then for the first time there manifested -itself that mode of historiography which I have termed 'philological' -or 'erudite' history. That is to say, the more or less judicious -compilations of sources which used to be called _Antiquitates, Annales, -Penus, Thesauri,_ presented themselves disguised as histories, which -alone were dignified and scientific. The faith of these historians -was reposed in a narrative of which every word could be supported by -a text, and there was nothing else whatever in their work, save what -was contained in the texts, torn from their contexts and repeated -without being thought by the philologist narrator. Their object -was that their histories should reach the rank of comprehensive -compilations, starting from those relating to particular times, -regions, and events, and finally attaining to the arrangement of the -whole of historical knowledge in great encyclopædias, out of which -articles are to be supplied, systematic or definitional, put together -by groups of specialists, directed by a specialist, for classical, -romantic, Germanic, Indo-European, and Semitic philology. With a view -to alleviating the aridity of their labours, the philologists sometimes -allowed themselves a little ornament in the shape of emotional -affections and ideal view-points. With this purpose, they had recourse -to memories of their student days, to the philosophical catchwords -which had been the fashion at the time, and to the ordinary sentiments -of the day toward politics, art, and morality. But they did all this -with great moderation, that they might not lose their reputation for -scientific gravity, and that they might not fail in respect toward -scientific philological history, which disdains the vain ornaments in -which philosophers, dilettantes, and charlatans delight. They ended -by tolerating historians of the type above described, but as a lesser -evil, and as a general rule inclined to pardon the sins arising out -of their commerce with 'ideas' in favour of the 'new documents' which -they had discovered or employed, and which they could always dig out of -their books as a useful residue, while purifying them from 'subjective' -admixtures--that is to say, from the elaboration of them which had -been attempted. Philosophy was known to them only as 'philosophy of -history,' but even thus rather by reason of its terrible ill-fame than -from direct acquaintance. They remembered and were ever ready to repeat -five or six anecdotes concerning errors in names and dates into which -celebrated philosophers had actually fallen, easily forgetful of the -innumerable errors into which they fell themselves (being more liable -as more exposed to danger); they almost persuaded themselves that -philosophy had been invented to alter the names and confuse the dates -which, had been confided to their amorous care, that it was the abyss -opened by the fiend to lead to the perdition of serious 'documentary -history.' - -The third band of those opposed to the philosophy of history was -composed of philosophers or of historian--philosophers, but of those -who rejected the name and selected another less open to suspicion, -or tempered it with some adjective, or accepted it indeed, but -with opportune explanations: they styled themselves positivists, -naturalists, sociologists, empiricists, criticists, or something of -that sort. Their purpose was to do something different from what the -philosophers of history had done, and since these had worked with the -conception of the _end,_ they all of them swore that they would work -with the conception of the _cause;_ they would search out the cause -of every fact, thus generalizing more and more widely the causes or -the cause of the entire course of history: those others had attempted -a _dynamic_ of history; they would work at a _mechanic_ of history, a -social physics. A special science arose, opposed to the philosophy of -history, in which that naturalistic and positivistic tendency became -exalted in its own eyes: sociology. Sociology classified facts of human -origin and determined the laws of mutual dependence which regulated -them, furnishing the narratives of historians with the principles of -explanation, by means of these laws. Historians, on the other hand, -diligently collected facts and offered them to sociology, that it might -press the juice out of them--that is to say, that it might classify -and deduce the laws that governed them. History and sociology, then, -stood to one another in the same relation as physiology and zoology, -physics and mineralogy, or in another relation of the same sort; they -differed from the physical and natural sciences only by their greater -complexity. The introduction of mathematical calculation seemed to -be the condition of progress for history as for all the sciences, -physical and natural. A new 'science' came forward to support this -notion, in the shape of that humble servant of practical administration -and inspired creation of bureaucracy known as statistics. And since -the whole of science was being modelled upon the idea of a factory -of condensation, so were 'syntheses' invoked and outlined for -history--that is to say, historical frameworks, in which the laws and -facts chat dominate single histories should be resumed, as though in a -sort of table or atlas, which should show at a glance causes and the -facts which arose from them. Need we recall the names and supporters -of this school--Comte, Buckle, Taine, and so on, until we come to those -recent historians who follow them, such as Lamprecht and Breysig? Need -we recall the most consequent and the most paradoxical programmes or -the school, as, for instance, Buckle's introduction to his history of -civilization or Bourdeau's book on the _Histoire des historiens?_ These -and similar positivistic doctrines are present to the memory, either -because they are nearest to us chronologically, or because the echo -of the noise they made in the world has not yet ceased, and we see -everywhere traces of their influence. Everywhere we see it, and above -all in the prejudice which they have solidly established (and which we -must patiently corrode and dissolve), that history, true history, is to -be constructed by means of the _naturalistic_ method, and that _causal_ -induction should be employed. Then there are the manifold naturalistic -conceptions with which they have imbued modern thought: race, heredity, -degeneration, imitation, influence, climate, historical factors, and so -forth. And here, too, as in the case of the philosophies of history, -since it suffices us to select only the essential in each fact, we -shall not dwell upon the various particular forms of it--that is to -say, upon the various modes in which historical causes were enunciated -and enumerated, and upon the various claims that one or other of them -was supreme: now the race, now the climate, now economy, now technique, -and so forth. Here, too, the study of the particular forms would be of -use to anyone who wished to develop in particular the dialectic and to -trace the internal dissolution of that school, to demonstrate in its -particular modes its intrinsic tendency to surpass itself, though it -failed to do so by that path. - -We have already mentioned that the three classes of opponents of -the 'philosophies of history' and the three methods by which they -proposed to supplant it--diplomatic, philological, and positivistic -history--showed that they disagreed among themselves. Confirmation of -this may now be found in the contempt of the diplomatic historians -for mere erudition and in their diffidence for the constructions of -positivism, the erudite, for their part, being fearful of perversions -of names and dates and shaking their heads at diplomatic histories -and the careless style of the men of the world who composed them. -Finally, the positivists looked upon the latter as people who did not -go to the bottom of things, to their general or natural causes, and -reproved the erudite with their incapacity for rising to the level -of laws and to the establishment of facts in accordance with these -laws, sociological, physiological, or pathological. But there is -further confirmation of what has been noted in respect to the common -conception that animated them all and of their substantial affinity, -because when the erudite wished to cloak themselves in a philosophy -of some sort, they very readily strutted about draped in some shreds -of positivistic thought or phraseology. They also participated in the -reserve and in the agnosticism of the positivists and the diplomatic -historians toward speculative problems, and in like manner it was -impossible not to recognize the justice of their claim that evidence -should be reliable and documents authentic. The diplomatic historians -agreed with them in the formula that history should not be philosophy -and that research should dispense with finality and follow the line -of causality. In fact, all three sorts of opponents, at one with the -transcendency of the philosophy of history, negated the unity of -history with philosophy, but in various degrees and with various -particular meanings, with various preliminary studies and in various -ways. And although these schools were in agreement as to what they -negated, all three of them become for us exposed to a criticism which -unites them beneath a single negation. For not even do the ability and -the intelligence of a Ranke avail to give vigour to the moderatism -and to maintain firmly the eclecticism of diplomatic history, and -the transaction breaks down before the failure on the part of those -who attempted it, owing to its being contrary to their own powers -and intrinsically impossible. The idea of an agnostic history turns -out to be fallacious--that is to say, of a history that is not -philosophical but does not deny philosophy, that is not theological -but is not anti-theological, limiting itself to nations and to their -reciprocal influence upon one another, because Ranke himself was -obliged to recognize powers or ideals that are superior to nations and -that as such require to be speculatively justified in a philosophy or -in a theology. In this way he laid himself open to the accusations -of the positivists, who discredited his ideas as 'mystical.' For the -same reason others were proceeding to reduce them little by little -from the position of ideals or movements of the spirit to natural and -physiological products, as was attempted by Lorenz, an ardent follower -of Ranke, who, with his doctrine of generation and of heredity, fell -into that physiologism and naturalism from which the master had -preserved himself. And when this passage from spirituality to nature -was accomplished, the dividing line between history and pre-history, -between history of civilization and history of nature, was also not -respected. On the other hand, a return was made to the 'philosophies -of history,' when ideas were interpreted as transcendental and as -answering to the designs of the divine will, which governs the world -according to a law and conducts it according to a plan of travel. The -boasted impartiality and objectivity, which was based upon a literary -device of half-words, of innuendoes, of prudent silences, was also -equally illusory, and the Jesuit who objected to Ranke and his history -of the popes will always prevail from the point of view of rigorous -criticism--either the Papacy is always and everywhere what it affirms -itself to be, an institution of the Son of God made man, or it is a -lie. Respect and caution are out of place here. _Tertium non datur._ -Indeed, it was not possible to escape from taking sides by adopting -that point of view; at the most a third party was thus formed, -consisting of the tolerant, the tepid, and the indifferent. The slight -coherence of Ranke's principles can be observed in that part of his -_Universal History_ where, when speaking of Tacitus he touches upon -his own experience as a teacher of history, he declares that "it is -impossible to speak of a tranquil and uniform progressive development -of historiography either among the ancients or the moderns, because the -object itself is formed in the course of time and is always different, -and conceptions depend upon the circumstances among which the author -lives and writes." He thus comes to perform an act of resignation -before blind contingentism, and the present historical sketch shows -how unjust this is, for it has traced the organic and progressive -development of historical thought from the Greeks to modern times. And -the whole of the _Universal History_ is there to prove, on the other -hand, that his slight coherence of ideas, or web of ideas that he left -intentionally vague, made it difficult for him to give life to a vast -historical narrative, so lacking in connexion, so heavy, and sometimes -even issuing in extraneous reflections, such, for example, as those -in the first pages of the first volume, where there is a comparison -of Saul and Samuel with the emperors at strife with the popes, and of -the policy of Rehoboam and Jeroboam with the political strife between -the centralizing states and the centrifugal regions of modern times. -We find in general in Ranke an inevitable tendency to subside into the -pragmatic method. And what has been said of Ranke is to be repeated -of his disciples and of those who cultivated the same conciliatory -type of history. As for philological history, the description that -has been given of the programme makes clear its nullity, for it leads -by a most direct route to a double absurdity. When the most rigorous -methods of examining witnesses is really applied, there is no witness -that cannot be suspected and questioned, and philological history -leads to the negation of the truth of that history which it wishes to -construct. And if value be attributed to certain evidence arbitrarily -and for external reasons, there is no extravagance that may not be -accepted, because there is no extravagance that may not have honest, -candid, and intelligent men on its side. It is not possible to reject -even miracles by the philological method, since these repose upon the -same attestations which make certain a war or a peace treaty, as Lorenz -has shown by examining the miracles of St Bernard in the light of the -severest philological criticism. In order to save himself from the -admission of the inconceivable and of the nullification of history, -which follows the nullification of witnesses, there remains nothing -but appeal to thought, which reconstitutes history from the inside, -and is evidence to itself, and denies what is unthinkable for the very -reason that it is not to be thought. This appeal is the declaration of -bankruptcy for philological history. We may certainly say that this -form of history more or less sustains itself as history, to the extent -that it has recourse to all the aids furnished by history proper, and -contradicts itself; or it contradicts itself and yet does not sustain -itself, or only for a little while and in appearance, by again adopting -the methods of pragmaticism, of transcendency, and of positivism. And -the last of these in its turn encounters the same experiences in a -different order, because its principle of history that explains facts -causally presupposes the facts, which as such are thought and therefore -are in a way already explained. Hence a vicious circle, evident in the -connexion between history and sociology, each one of which is to be -based upon and at the same time to afford a base for the other, much -in the same way as a column which should support a capital and at the -same time spring from it. But if, with a view to breaking the circle, -history be taken as the base and sociology as its fulfilment, then the -latter will no longer be the explanation of the former, which will find -its explanation elsewhere. And this will be, according to taste, either -an unknown principle or some form of thought that acts in the same way -as God, and in both cases a transcendental principle. Hence we have the -fact of positivism leading to philosophies of history, as exemplified -in the Apocalypses and the Gospels of Comte, of Buckle, and of others -of like sort: they are all most reverent theologians, but chaotic, -falling back into those fallacious conceptions which had been refuted -by romantic historiography. - -Truly, when faced with such histories as these, superficial or -unintelligent or rude and fantastic, romanticism, conscious of the -altitude to which it had elevated the study of the development of human -affairs, might have exclaimed (and indeed it did exclaim by the mouth -of its epigoni) to its adversaries and successors, in imitation of the -tone of Bonaparte on the 18th of Brumaire: "What have you done with the -history which I left to you so brilliant? Were these the new methods, -by means of which you promised to solve the problems which I had not -been able to solve? I see nothing in them but _revers et misère!_" But -we who have never met with absolute regressions during the secular -development of historiography shall not allow ourselves to be carried -away upon the polemical waves now beating against the positivistic and -naturalistic school which is our present or recent adversary, to the -point of losing sight of what it possessed that was substantially its -own, and owing to which it really did represent progress. We shall also -refrain from drawing comparisons between romanticism and positivism, -by measuring the merits of both, and concluding with the assertion -of the superiority of the former; because it is well known that such -examinations of degrees of merit, the field of professors, are not -permissible in history, where what follows ideally after is virtually -superior to that from which it is derived, notwithstanding appearances -to the contrary. And in the first place, it would be erroneous, -strictly speaking, to believe that what had been won by romanticism had -been lost in positivism, because when the histories of this period are -looked upon from other points of view and with greater attention, we -see how they were all preserved. Romanticism had abolished historical -dualism, for which there existed in reality positive and negative, -elect and outcast, facts. Positivism repeated that all facts are -facts and all have an equal right to enter history. Romanticism had -substituted the conception of development for the abysses and the -chasms that previous historiography had introduced into the course -of events, and positivism repeated that conception, calling it -_evolution._ Romanticism had established periods in development, either -in the form of a cycle of phases, like Vico, or as phases without -a circle and in linear order, like the German romantics, and had -exemplified the various phases as a series of the forms of the spirit -or of psychological forms, and positivism renewed these conceptions -(although owing to the lack of culture usual with its adherents it -often believed that it had made discoveries never made before), as can -be proved by a long series of examples. These range from the _three -ages_ of mental development of Comte to the _eight phases_ of social -development or _four political periods_ which are respectively the -'novelties' of the contemporaries Lamprecht and Breysig. Romanticism, -judging that the explanation of events by means of the caprices, the -calculations, and the designs of individuals taken atomistically was -frivolous, took as the subject of history the universals, the Idea, -ideas, the spirit, nations and liberty and positivism; it also rejected -individualistic atomicism, talking of _masses, races, societies, -technique, economy, science, social tendencies_; of everything, in -fact, with the exception that the caprice of Tizius and Caius was -now no longer admitted. Romanticism had now not only reinforced the -histories of ideal values, but had conceived them as in organic -connexion; positivism in its turn insisted upon the _interdependence -of social factors_ and upon the unity of the real, and attempted to -fill up the interstices of the various special histories by means of -the history of _civilization_ and of _culture,_ and so-called _social_ -history, containing in itself politics, literature, philosophy, -religion, and every other class of facts. Romanticism had overthrown -heteronomous, instructive, moralizing, serviceable history, and -positivism in its turn boasted that its history was a _science,_ an -end in itself, like every other science, although like every science -it afforded the basis for practice, and was therefore capable of -application. Romanticism had enhanced the esteem for erudition, and -had given an impetus to intercourse between it and history. But whence -did the erudition and philology of the positivistic period derive -that pride which made them believe that they were themselves history, -save from the consciousness that they had inherited from romanticism, -which they had preserved and exaggerated? Whence did they inherit the -substance of their method save (as Fueter well notes) from the romantic -search for the primitive, the genuine, the ingenuous, which manifested -itself in Wolf, who inaugurated the method? It is well to remember that -Wolf was a pre-romantic, an admirer of Ossian and of popular poetry. -And, finally, what is the meaning of the efforts of positivism to -seek out the _causes_ of history, the series of historical facts, the -_unity_ of the factors and their dependence upon a _supreme cause,_ -save the speculations of the romantics themselves upon the manner, -the end, and the value of development? Whoever pays attention to all -these and other resemblances which we could enumerate must conclude -that positivism is to romanticism as was the enlightenment to the -Renaissance--that is to say, it is not so much its antithesis as it is -the logical prosecution and the exaggeration of its presuppositions. -Even its final conversion into theology corresponds to that of -romanticism. This is for the rest an obvious matter, for transcendency -is always transcendency, whether it be thought of as that of a God -or of reason, of nature or of matter. But thinking of it as Matter -or Nature, this naturalistic and materialistic travesty, which at -first seems odious or ridiculous, of the problems and conceptions of -romanticism, of the idea into cause, of development into evolution, -of the spirit into mass and the like, to which one would at first be -inclined to attribute the inferiority of positivistic historiography, -is, on the contrary, for the close observer the progress made by it -upon romanticism. That travesty contains the energetic negation of -history as moved by extramundane forces, by external finalities, -by transcendental laws, just both in its motive and in its general -tendency, and the correlative affirmation that its law must be sought -in reality, which is one and is called 'nature.' The positivism, -which on no account wished to hear anything of 'metaphysic,' had in -mind the dogmatic and transcendental metaphysic, which had filtered -into the thought of Kant and of his successors; and the target of its -contempt was a good one, although it ended by confusing metaphysic -with philosophy in general, or dogmatic with critical metaphysic, -the metaphysic of being with that of the mind, and was not itself -altogether free from that which it undertook to combat. But this does -not prevent its repugnance to 'metaphysic' and, restricting ourselves -to what is our more immediate interest, to the 'philosophy of history' -from having produced durable results. Thanks to positivism historical -works became less naïve and richer in facts, especially in that class -of facts which romanticism had neglected, such as the dispositions -that are called natural, the processes that are called degenerative or -pathological, the spiritual complications that are called psychological -illusions, the interests that are called material, the production and -the distribution of wealth, or economic activity, the facts of force -and violence, or of political and revolutionary power. Positivism, -intent upon the negation of transcendency and upon the observation of -what appertained to it, felt itself to be, and was in that respect, in -the right. And each one of us who pays due attention to that order of -things and renews that negation is gathering the fruit of positivism, -and in that respect is a positivist. Its very contradictions had the -merit of making more evident the contradictions latent in romantic -historiography. This merit must be admitted to the most extravagant -doctrines of the positivists, such as that of Taine, that knowledge -is a true hallucination and that human wisdom is an accident (_une -rencontre_), which presumed irrationality to be the normal condition, -much as Lombroso believed that genius is madness. Another instance -of this is the attempt to discover in what way heterogeneity and -historical diversity come into existence, if homogeneity is posited; -and again the methodical canon that the explanation of history is to -be found in causality, but is to stop at genius and virtue, which are -without it, because they refuse to accept of causal explanation, or -the frightful Unknowable, which was placed at the head of histories -of the real, after so great a fuss being made about that Titan -science which was ready to scale the skies. But since romanticism -had left spirit and nature without fusion, the one facing the other, -it was just that if in the first place spirit swallowed up nature -without being able to digest it (because, as had been laid down, it -was indigestible), now nature was engaged in doing the same thing to -spirit, and with the same result. So just and logical was this that -not a few of the old idealists went over to the crassest materialism -and positivism, and that confession of not being able to see their way -in the confusion was at once instructive and suggestive, as was also -the perplexity decorated with the name of 'agnosticism.' And as the -precise affirmation of the positivity of history represented an advance -in thought, so the antithesis of materialism, pushed to an extreme, was -an advance in the preparation of the new problem and in the new way of -solving the relation between spirit and nature. _Oportet ut scandala, -eveniant,_ and this means that even scandal, the scandal of the absurd, -and of offensive false criticisms of human conscience, is an advance. - - - - -VIII - - -THE NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY CONCLUSION - - -The romantic current not only maintained itself in its excesses during -the dominion of positivism, and, as we have shown, insinuated itself -even into its naturalistic antithesis, but it also persisted in its -genuine form. And although we have not spoken of pedantic imitators -and conservatives--whose significance is slight in the history of -thought, that is to say, confined to the narrow sphere in which they -were compelled to think for themselves--we have nevertheless recorded -the preservation of romanticism in the eclecticism of Ranke, who -adhered to the theories of Humboldt (another 'diplomatist'). Idealistic -and romantic motives continued to illuminate the intellect and soul -among the philosophers, from Humboldt to Lotze and from Hartmann to -Wundt and those who corresponded to them in other countries. The like -occurred in historiography properly so called, and could not but -happen, because, if the formulas of agnosticism and of positivism had -been followed to the letter, all light of thought would have been -extinguished in blind mechanicism--that is to say, in nothing--and no -historical representation would have been possible. Thus political, -social, philosophical, literary, and artistic history continued to -make acquisitions, if not equally important with those of the romantic -period (the surroundings were far more favourable to the natural -sciences and to mathematics than to history), yet noteworthy. This is -set forth in a copious volume upon historiography (I refer to the work -of Fueter already several times mentioned in this connexion). There -due honour will be found accorded to the great work accomplished by -Ranke, which the rapidity of my course of exposition has induced me to -illustrate rather in its negative aspects, causing me, for instance, -to allude solely to the contradictions in the _History of the Popes,_ -which is notwithstanding a masterpiece. The cogent quality of the -romantic spirit at its best is revealed in the typical instance of -Taine, who is so ingenuously naturalistic in his propositions and in -the directive principles of his work, yet so unrestrainedly romantic -in particular instances, as, for example, in his characterization of -the French poets or of the Dutch and Italian painters. All this led to -his ending in the exaggerated anti-Jacobin romanticism of his _Origines -de la France contemporaine,_ in the same way that Zola and the other -verists, those verbal enemies of romanticism, were lyrical in all -their fiction, and the leader of the school was induced to conclude -his works with the abstract lyricism of the _Quatre évangiles._ What -has been observed of Taine is to be applied to Buckle and to the -other naturalists and positivists, obliged to be historical against -their will, and to the positivists who became followers of historical -materialism, and found the dialectic established in their house without -being able to explain what it was or whence it came. Not all theorists -of historiography showed themselves to be so resolutely and madly -naturalistic as Bourdeau and one or two others; indeed these were few -in number and of inferior reputation. Eclecticism prevailed among -the majority of them, a combination of necessity and of liberty, of -masses and individuals, of cause and end, of nature and spirit: even -the philosophy of history was admitted, if in no other form, then as a -_desideratum_ or a problem to be discussed at a convenient time (even -though that were the Greek Kalends). Eclecticism, too, presented the -greatest variety, from the low level of a trivial arranging of concepts -in an artificial manner to the lofty heights of interior labour, from -which it seemed at every moment that a new gospel, no longer eclectic, -must issue. - -This last form of eclecticism and the open attempts to renew romantic -idealism more or less completely, as well as romantic methods of -historiography, have become more frequent since modern consciousness -has withdrawn itself from positivism and has declared its bankruptcy. -But all this is of importance rather as a symptom of a real advance in -thought. And the new modern philosophies of intuition and philosophy -of values must be looked upon rather as symptoms than as representing -progress in thought (I mean in general, and not in the particular -thoughts and theories which often form a real contribution). The former -of these, however, while it correctly criticizes science as an economic -construction useless for true knowledge, then proceeds to shut itself -up in immediate consciousness, a sort of mysticism, where historical -dialectic finds itself submerged and suffocated; and the latter, -placing the conception of value as guardian of the spirit in opposition -to the conceptions of science like "a philosophical _cave canem_" (as -our imaginative Tari would have said), leaves open a dualism, which -stands in the way of the unity of history and of thought as history. -When we look around us, therefore, we do not discover that _new -philosophy_ which shall lay the foundations and at the same time afford -justification for the new historiography by solving the antithesis -between imaginative romanticism and materialistic positivism. And it -is clear that we are not even able to discuss such a philosophy as a -_demand,_ because the demand for a particular philosophy is itself the -thinking of that particular philosophy, and therefore is not a demand -but an actuality. Hence the dilemma either of saying nothing about it, -and in this case of not speaking even of positivism as a period that -has been closed and superseded, or of speaking of the new philosophy as -of something that lives and exists, precisely because it does live and -exist. And since to renounce talking of it has been rendered impossible -by the very criticism chat we have devoted to it, nothing remains save -to recognize that philosophy as something that exists, not as something -to be invoked. Only we must not _look around us_ in order to see where -it is, but return to _ourselves_ and have recourse to the thought -that has animated this historical sketch of historiography and to all -the historical explanations that have preceded it. In the philosophy -that we have delineated, reality is affirmed to be spirit, not such -that it is above the world or wanders about the world, but such as -coincides with the world; and nature has been shown as a moment and a -product of this spirit itself, and therefore the dualism (at least that -which has troubled thought from Thales to Spencer) is superseded, and -transcendency of all sorts, whether materialistic or theological in its -origin, has also been superseded with it. Spirit, which is the world, -is the spirit which develops, and is therefore both one and diverse, an -eternal solution and an eternal problem, and its self-consciousness is -philosophy, which is its history, or history, which is its philosophy, -each substantially identical with the other; and consciousness is -identical with self-consciousness--that is to say, distinct and one -with it at the same time, as life and thought. This philosophy, which -is in us and is ours, enables us to recognize it--that is to say, to -recognize ourselves outside of us--in the thought of other men which is -also our thought, and to discover it more or less clearly and perfectly -in the other forms of contemporary philosophy, and more or less clearly -in contemporary historiography. We have frequent opportunities of -effecting this recognition, which is productive of much spiritual -comfort. Quite lately, for instance, while I was writing these pages, -the historical work of a historian, a pure historian, came into my -hands (I select this instance among many) where I read words at the -very beginning which seemed to be my very own: "My book is based upon -the conviction that German historical inquiry must elevate itself to -freer movement and contact with the great forces of political life and -culture, without renouncing the precious tradition of its method, and -that it must plunge into philosophy and politics, without experiencing -injury in its end or essence, for thus alone can it develop its -intimate essence and be both universal and national."[1] This is the -philosophy of our time, which is the initiator of a new philosophical -and historiographical period. But it is not possible to write the -history of this philosophy and of this historiography, which is subject -and not _object_, not for the reason generally adopted, which we -have found to be false, since it separates the fact of consciousness -from the fact, but for the other reason that the history which we -are constructing is a history of 'epochs' or of 'great periods,' and -the new period is new, just because it is not a period--that is -to say, something closed. Not only are we not able to describe its -chronological and geographical outline, because we are ignorant as to -what measure of time it will fill (will it develop rapidly in thirty -or forty years, or will it encounter obstacles, yet nevertheless -continue its course for centuries?), what extent of countries it -will include (will it remain for long Italian or German, confined to -certain Italian or German circles, or will it diffuse itself rapidly -in all countries, both in general culture and in public instruction?), -but we are unable to limit _logically_ what may be its value outside -these considerations. The reason for this is that in order to be able -to describe its limitations, it must necessarily have developed its -antitheses--that is to say, the new problems that will infallibly arise -from its solutions, and this has not happened: we are ourselves on -the waves and we have not furled our sails in port preparatory to a -new voyage. _Bis hierher ist das Bewusstsein gekommen_ (Knowledge has -reached this point in its development), said Hegel, at the end of his -lectures upon the philosophy of history; and yet he had not the right -to say so, because his development, which went from the unconsciousness -of liberty to the full consciousness of it in the German world and in -the system of absolute idealism, did not admit of prosecution. But -we are well able to say so, for we have overcome the abstractness of -Hegelianism. - - -[1] Friedrich Meinecke, _Weltbürgerthum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur -Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates,_ second edition, preface, p. -vii. (München u. Berlin, Oldenburg, 1911.) - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Theory & History of Historiography, by -Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORY & HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY *** - -***** This file should be named 54642-0.txt or 54642-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/6/4/54642/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Theory & History of Historiography - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Translator: Douglas Ainslie - -Release Date: May 2, 2017 [EBook #54642] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORY & HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Internet Archive. - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h1>THEORY & HISTORY</h1> - -<h1>OF HISTORIOGRAPHY</h1> - -<h3>by</h3> - -<h2>BENEDETTO CROCE</h2> - -<h4>authorized translation</h4> - -<h5>BY</h5> - -<h4>DOUGLAS AINSLIE</h4> - - -<h5>LONDON</h5> - -<h5>GEORGE G. HARRAP & COMPANY</h5> - -<h5>1921</h5> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</a></h4> - -<h5>TO THE FIRST ITALIAN EDITION</h5> - - -<p>Almost all the writings which compose the present treatise were printed -in the proceedings of Italian academies and in Italian reviews between -1912 and 1913. Since they formed part of a general scheme, their -collection in book form presented no difficulties. This volume has -appeared in German under the title <i>Zur Theorie und Geschichte der -Historiographie</i> (Tübingen, Mohr, 1915).</p> - -<p>On publishing in book form in Italian, I made a few slight alterations -here and there and added three brief essays, placed as an appendix to -the first part.</p> - -<p>The description of the volume as forming the fourth of my <i>Philosophy -of the Spirit</i> requires some explanation; for it does not really form -a new systematic part of the philosophy, and is rather to be looked -upon as a deepening and amplification of the theory of historiography, -already outlined in certain chapters of the second part, namely the -<i>Logic</i>. But the problem of historical comprehension is that toward -which pointed all my investigations as to the modes of the spirit, -their distinction and unity, their truly concrete life, which is -development and history, and as to historical thought, which is the -self-consciousness of this life. In a certain sense, therefore, this -resumption of the treatment of historiography on the completion of the -wide circle, this drawing forth of it from the limits of the first -treatment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> of the subject, was the most natural conclusion that could -be given to the whole work. The character of 'conclusion' both explains -and justifies the literary form of this last volume, which is more -compressed and less didactic than that of the previous volumes.</p> - -<p>B. C.</p> - -<p>Naples: May 1916</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_NOTE" id="TRANSLATORS_NOTE">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE</a></h4> - - -<p>The author himself explains the precise connexion of the present work -with the other three volumes of the <i>Philosophy of the Spirit</i>, to -which it now forms the conclusion.</p> - -<p>I had not contemplated translating this treatise, when engaged upon -the others, for the reason that it was not in existence in its present -form, and an external parallel to its position as the last, the late -comer of the four masterpieces, is to be found in the fact of its -publication by another firm than that which produced the preceding -volumes. This diversity in unity will, I am convinced, by no means act -as a bar to the dissemination of the original thought contained in its -pages, none of which will, I trust, escape the diligent reader through -the close meshes of the translation.</p> - -<p>The volume is similar in format to the <i>Logic</i>, the <i>Philosophy of the -Practical</i>, and the <i>Æsthetic</i>. The last is now out of print, but will -reappear translated by me from the definitive fourth Italian edition, -greatly exceeding in bulk the previous editions.</p> - -<p>The present translation is from the second Italian edition, published -in 1919. In this the author made some slight verbal corrections and -a few small additions. I have, as always, followed the text with the -closest respect.</p> - - -<p>D. A.</p> - -<p>The Athenæum, London</p> - -<p>November 1920</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> - -<h4><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h4> - -<p class="center"> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">PART I</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">I.</span><br /> -History and Chronicle <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_11">11</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">II.</span><br /> -Pseudo-Histories <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_27">27</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">III.</span><br /> -History as History of the Universal.<br /> -Criticism of 'Universal History' <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_51">51</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">IV.</span><br /> -Ideal Genesis and Dissolution<br /> -of the 'Philosophy of History' <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">V.</span><br /> -The Positivity of History <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_83">83</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VI.</span><br /> -The Humanity of History <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_94">94</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VII.</span><br /> -Choice and Periodization <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_108">108</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VIII.</span><br /> -Distinction (Special Histories) and Division <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_117">117</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">IX.</span><br /> -The 'History of Nature' and History <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">APPENDICES</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">I.</span><br /> -Attested Evidence <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">II.</span><br /> -Analogy and Anomaly of Special Histories <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_141">141</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">III.</span><br /> -Philosophy and Methodology <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">PART II</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY</span><br /> -<br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">I.</span><br /> -Preliminary Questions <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">II.</span><br /> -Græco-Roman Historiography <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_181">181</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">III.</span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> -Medieval Historiography <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">IV.</span><br /> -The Historiography of the Renaissance <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">V.</span><br /> -The Historiography of the Enlightenment <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_243">243</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VI.</span><br /> -The Historiography of Romanticism <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_264">264</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VII.</span><br /> -The Historiography of Positivism <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_289">289</a></span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VIII.</span><br /> -The New Historiography. Conclusion <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_309">309</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Index of Names <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_315">315</a></span><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h4><a name="PART_I" id="PART_I">PART I</a></h4> - - -<h3>THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY</h3> - -<hr /> -<h4>I</h4> - - -<h4>HISTORY AND CHRONICLE</h4> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<h5>I</h5> - - -<p>'Contemporary history' is wont to be called the history of a passage -of time, looked upon as a most recent past, whether it be that of the -last fifty years, a decade, a year, a month, a day, or indeed of the -last hour or of the last minute. But if we think and speak rigorously, -the term 'contemporaneous' can be applied only to that history which -comes into being immediately after the act which is being accomplished, -as consciousness of that act: it is, for instance, the history that -I make of myself while I am in the act of composing these pages; it -is the thought of my composition, linked of necessity to the work -of composition. 'Contemporary' would be well employed in this case, -just because this, like every act of the spirit, is outside time (of -the first and after) and is formed 'at the same time' as the act to -which it is linked, and from which it is distinguished by means of a -distinction not chronological but ideal. 'Non-contemporary history,' -'past history,' would, on the other hand, be that which finds itself -in the presence of a history already formed, and which thus comes into -being as a criticism of that history, whether it be thousands of years -or hardly an hour old.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span></p> - -<p>But if we look more closely, we perceive that this history -already formed, which is called or which we would like to call -'non-contemporary' or 'past' history, if it really is history, that -is to say, if it mean something and is not an empty echo, is also -<i>contemporary</i>, and does not in any way differ from the other. As in -the former case, the condition of its existence is that the deed of -which the history is told must vibrate in the soul of the historian, -or (to employ the expression of professed historians) that the -documents are before the historian and that they are intelligible. -That a narrative or a series of narratives of the fact is united -and mingled with it merely means that the fact has proved more -rich, not that it has lost its quality of being present: what were -narratives or judgments before are now themselves facts, 'documents' -to be interpreted and judged. History is never constructed from -narratives, but always from documents, or from narratives that have -been reduced to documents and treated as such. Thus if contemporary -history springs straight from life, so too does that history which -is called non-contemporary, for it is evident that only an interest -in the life of the present can move one to investigate past fact. -Therefore this past fact does not answer to a past interest, but to a -present interest, in so far as it is unified with an interest of the -present life. This has been said again and again in a hundred ways by -historians in their empirical formulas, and constitutes the reason, if -not the deeper content, of the success of the very trite saying that -history is <i>magister vitæ</i>.</p> - -<p>I have recalled these forms of historical technique in order to remove -the aspect of paradox from the proposition that 'every true history is -contemporary history.' But the justice of this proposition is easily -confirmed and copiously and perspicuously exemplified in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> reality -of historiographical work, provided always that we do not fall into -the error of taking the works of the historians all together, or -certain groups of them confusedly, and of applying them to an abstract -man or to ourselves considered abstractly, and of then asking what -present interest leads to the writing or reading of such histories: for -instance, what is the present interest of the history which recounts -the Peloponnesian or the Mithradatic War, of the events connected with -Mexican art, or with Arabic philosophy. For me at the present moment -they are without interest, and therefore for me at this present moment -those histories are not histories, but at the most simply titles of -historical works. They have been or will be histories in those that -have thought or will think them, and in me too when I have thought -or shall think them, re-elaborating them according to my spiritual -needs. If, on the other hand, we limit ourselves to real history, to -the history that one really thinks in the act of thinking, it will be -easily seen that this is perfectly identical with the most personal and -contemporary of histories. When the development of the culture of my -historical moment presents to me (it would be superfluous and perhaps -also inexact to add to myself as an individual) the problem of Greek -civilization or of Platonic philosophy or of a particular mode of -Attic manners, that problem is related to my being in the same way as -the history of a bit of business in which I am engaged, or of a love -affair in which I am indulging, or of a danger that threatens me. I -examine it with the same anxiety and am troubled with the same sense of -unhappiness until I have succeeded in solving it. Hellenic life is on -that occasion present in me; it solicits, it attracts and torments me, -in the same way as the appearance of the adversary, of the loved<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> one, -or of the beloved son for whom one trembles. Thus too it happens or has -happened or will happen in the case of the Mithradatic War, of Mexican -art, and of all the other things that I have mentioned above by way of -example.</p> - -<p>Having laid it down that contemporaneity is not the characteristic -of a class of histories (as is held with good reason in empirical -classifications), but an intrinsic characteristic of every history, -we must conceive the relation of history to life as that of <i>unity</i>; -certainly not in the sense of abstract identity, but of synthetic -unity, which implies both the distinction and the unity of the terms. -Thus to talk of a history of which the documents are lacking would -appear to be as extravagant as to talk of the existence of something as -to which it is also affirmed that it is without one of the essential -conditions of existence. A history without relation to the document -would be an unverifiable history; and since the reality of history lies -in this verifiability, and the narrative in which it is given concrete -form is historical narrative only in so far as it is a <i>critical -exposition</i> of the document (intuition and reflection, consciousness -and auto-consciousness, etc.), a history of that sort, being without -meaning and without truth, would be inexistent as history. How could -a history of painting be composed by one who had not seen and enjoyed -the works of which he proposed to describe the genesis critically? And -how far could anyone understand the works in question who was without -the artistic experience assumed by the narrator? How could there be a -history of philosophy without the works or at least fragments of the -works of the philosophers? How could there be a history of a sentiment -or of a custom, for example that of Christian humility or of knightly -chivalry, without the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> capacity for living again, or rather without an -actual living again of these particular states of the individual soul?</p> - -<p>On the other hand, once the indissoluble link between life and thought -in history has been effected, the doubts that have been expressed as to -the <i>certainty</i> and the <i>utility</i> of history disappear altogether in -a moment. How could that which is a <i>present</i> producing of our spirit -ever be <i>uncertain</i>? How could that knowledge be <i>useless</i> which solves -a problem that has come forth from the bosom of <i>life</i>?</p> - -<hr /> -<h5>II</h5> - - -<p>But can the link between document and narrative, between life and -history, ever be broken? An affirmative answer to this has been given -when referring to those histories of which the documents have been -lost, or, to put the case in a more general and fundamental manner, -those histories whose documents are no longer alive in the human -spirit. And this has also been implied when saying that we all of us in -turn find ourselves thus placed with respect to this or that part of -history. The history of Hellenic painting is in great part a history -without documents for us, as are all histories of peoples concerning -whom one does not know exactly where they lived, the thoughts and -feelings chat they experienced, or the individual appearance of the -works that they accomplished; those literatures and philosophies, too, -as to which we do not know their theses, or even when we possess these -and are able to read them through, yet fail to grasp their intimate -spirit, either owing to the lack of complementary knowledge or because -of our obstinate temperamental reluctance, or owing to our momentary -distraction.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span></p> - -<p>If, in these cases, when that connexion is broken, we can no longer -call what remains history (because history was nothing but that -connexion), and it can henceforth only be called history in the sense -that we call a man the corpse of a man, what remains is not for -that reason nothing (not even the corpse is really nothing). Were -it nothing, it would be the same as saying that the connexion is -indissoluble, because nothingness is never effectual. And if it be not -nothing, if it be something, what is narrative without the document?</p> - -<p>A history of Hellenic painting, according to the accounts that have -been handed down or have been constructed by the learned of our times, -when closely inspected, resolves itself into a series of names of -painters (Apollodorus, Polygnotus, Zeuxis, Apelles, etc.), surrounded -with biographical anecdotes, and into a series of subjects for -painting (the burning of Troy, the contest of the Amazons, the battle -of Marathon, Achilles, Calumny, etc.), of which certain particulars -are given in the descriptions that have reached us; or a graduated -series, going from praise to blame, of these painters and their works, -together with names, anecdotes, subjects, judgments, arranged more or -less chronologically. But the names of painters separated from the -direct knowledge of their works are empty names; the anecdotes are -empty, as are the descriptions of subjects, the judgment of approval -or of disapproval, and the chronological arrangement, because merely -arithmetical and lacking real development; and the reason why we do -not realize it in thought is that the elements which should constitute -it are wanting. If those verbal forms possess any significance, we owe -it to what little we know of antique paintings from fragments, from -secondary works that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> have come down to us in copies, or in analogous -works in the other arts, or in poetry. With the exception, however, of -that little, the history of Hellenic art is, as such, a tissue of empty -words.</p> - -<p>We can, if we like, say that it is 'empty of determinate content,' -because we do not deny that when we pronounce the name of a painter -we think of some painter, and indeed of a painter who is an Athenian, -and that when we utter the word 'battle,' or 'Helen,' we think of -a battle, indeed of a battle of hoplites, or of a beautiful woman, -similar to those familiar to us in Hellenic sculpture. But we can -think indifferently of any one of the numerous facts that those names -recall. For this reason their content is indeterminate, and this -indetermination of content is their emptiness.</p> - - -<p>All histories separated from their living documents resemble these -examples and are empty narratives, and since they are empty they are -without truth. Is it true or not that there existed a painter named -Polygnotus and that he painted a portrait of Miltiades in the Poecile? -We shall be told that it is true, because one person or several -people, who knew him and saw the work in question, bear witness to -its existence. But we must reply that it was true for this or that -witness, and that for us it is neither true nor false, or (which comes -to the same thing) that it is true only on the evidence of those -witnesses—that is to say, for an extrinsic reason, whereas truth -always requires intrinsic reasons. And since that proposition is not -true (neither true nor false), it is not useful either, because where -there is nothing the king loses his rights, and where the elements of a -problem are wanting the effective will and the effective need to solve -it are also wanting, along with the possibility of its solution. Thus -to quote those empty judgments is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> quite useless for our actual lives. -Life is a present, and that history which has become an empty narration -is a past: it is an irrevocable past, if not absolutely so, καθ' αὑτό, -then certainly for the present moment.</p> - -<p>The empty words remain, and the empty words are sounds, or the graphic -signs which represent them, and they hold together and maintain -themselves, not by an act of thought that thinks them (in which case -they would soon be filled), but by an act of will, which thinks it -useful for certain ends of its own to preserve those words, however -empty or half empty they may be. Mere narrative, then, is nothing but a -complex of empty words or formulas asserted by an act of the will.</p> - -<p>Now with this definition we have succeeded in giving neither more -nor less than the true distinction, hitherto sought in vain, between -<i>history</i> and <i>chronicle</i>. It has been sought in vain, because it has -generally been sought in a difference in the <i>quality</i> of the facts -which each difference took as its object. Thus, for instance, the -record of <i>individual</i> facts has been attributed to chronicle, to -history that of <i>general</i> facts; to chronicle the record of <i>private</i>, -to history that of <i>public</i> facts: as though the general were not -always individual and the individual general, and the public were not -always also private and the private public! Or else the record of -<i>important</i> facts (memorable things) has been attributed to history, to -chronicle that of the <i>unimportant</i>: as though the importance of facts -were not relative to the situation in which we find ourselves, and as -though for a man annoyed by a mosquito the evolutions of the minute -insect were not of greater importance than the expedition of Xerxes! -Certainly, we are sensible of a just sentiment in these fallacious -distinctions—namely, that of placing the difference between history -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> chronicle in the conception of what <i>interests</i> and of what does -not <i>interest</i> (the general interests and not the particular, the -great interests and not the little, etc.). A just sentiment is also -to be noted in other considerations that are wont to be adduced, such -as the close bond between events that there is in history and the -<i>disconnectedness</i> that appears on the other hand in chronicle, the -<i>logical</i> order of the first, the purely <i>chronological</i> order of the -second, the penetration of the first into the <i>core</i> of events and -the limitation of the second to the superficial or <i>external</i>, and -the like. But the differential character is here rather metaphorized -than thought, and when metaphors are not employed as simple forms -expressive of thought we lose a moment after what has just been gained. -The truth is that chronicle and history are not distinguishable as -two forms of history, mutually complementary, or as one subordinate -to the other, but as two different spiritual <i>attitudes</i>. History is -living chronicle, chronicle is dead history; history is contemporary -history, chronicle is past history; history is principally an act of -thought, chronicle an act of will. Every history becomes chronicle -when it is no longer thought, but only recorded in abstract words, -which were once upon a time concrete and expressive. The history of -philosophy even is chronicle, when written or read by those who do not -understand philosophy: history would even be what we are now disposed -to read as chronicle, as when, for instance, the monk of Monte Cassino -notes: 1001. <i>Beatus Dominicus migravit ad Christum</i>. 1002. <i>Hoc anno -venerunt Saraceni super Capuam</i>. 1004. <i>Terremotus ingens hunc montem -exagitavit</i>, etc.; for those facts were present to him when he wept -over the death of the departed Dominic, or was terrified by the natural -human<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> scourges that convulsed his native land, seeing the hand of God -in that succession of events. This does not prevent that history from -assuming the form of chronicle when that same monk of Monte Cassino -wrote down cold formulas, without representing to himself or thinking -their content, with the sole intention of not allowing those memories -to be lost and of handing them down to those who should inhabit Monte -Cassino after him.</p> - -<p>But the discovery of the real distinction between chronicle and -history, which is a formal distinction (that is to say, a truly real -distinction), not only frees us from the sterile and fatiguing search -after material distinctions (that is to say, imaginary distinctions), -but it also enables us to reject a very common presupposition—namely, -that of the <i>priority</i> of chronicle in respect to history. <i>Primo -annales</i> [chronicles] <i>fuere, post historiæ factæ sunt</i>, the saying of -the old grammarian, Mario Vittorino, has been repeated, generalized, -and universalized. But precisely the opposite of this is the outcome of -the inquiry into the character and therefore into the genesis of the -two operations or attitudes: <i>first comes history, then chronicle</i>. -First comes the living being, then the corpse; and to make history the -child of chronicle is the same thing as to make the living be born from -the corpse, which is the residue of life, as chronicle is the residue -of history.</p> - -<hr /> -<h5>III</h5> - - -<p>History, separated from the living document and turned into chronicle, -is no longer a spiritual act, but a thing, a complex of sounds and -of other signs. But the document also, when separated from life, is -nothing but a thing like another, a complex of sounds or of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> other -signs—for example, the sounds and the letters in which a law was once -communicated; the lines cut into a block of marble, which manifested a -religious sentiment by means of the figure of a god; a heap of bones, -which were at one time the expression of a man or of an animal.</p> - -<p>Do such things as empty narratives and dead documents exist? In a -certain sense, no, because external things do not exist outside the -spirit; and we already know that chronicle, as empty narrative, exists -in so far as the spirit produces it and holds it firmly with an act of -will (and it may be opportune to observe once more that such an act -carries always with it a new act of consciousness and of thought): -with an act of will, which abstracts the sound from the thought, -in which dwelt the certainty and concreteness of the sound. In the -same way, these dead documents exist to the extent that they are the -manifestations of a new life, as the lifeless corpse is really itself -also a process of vital creation, although it appears to be one of -decomposition and something dead in respect of a particular form of -life. But in the same way as those empty sounds, which once contained -the thought of a history, are eventually called <i>narratives</i>, in memory -of the thought they contained, thus do those manifestations of a new -life continue to be looked upon as remnants of the life that preceded -them and is indeed extinguished.</p> - -<p>Now observe how, by means of this string of deductions, we have -put ourselves into the position of being able to account for the -partition of historical <i>sources</i> into <i>narratives</i> and <i>documents</i>, -as we find it among some of our modern methodologists, or, as it -is also formulated, into <i>traditions</i> and <i>residues</i> or <i>remains</i> -(<i>Überbleibsel</i>, <i>Überreste</i>). This partition is irrational from -the empirical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> point of view, and may be of use as indicating the -inopportunity of the introduction of a speculative thought into -empiricism. It is so irrational that one immediately runs against -the difficulty of not being able to distinguish what one wished to -distinguish. An empty 'narrative' considered as a thing is tantamount -to any other thing whatever which is called a 'document.' And, on -the other hand, if we maintain the distinction we incur the further -difficulty of having to base our historical construction upon two -different orders of data (one foot on the bank and the other in -the river)—that is to say, we shall have to recur to two parallel -instances, one of which is perpetually referring us back to the other. -And when we seek to determine the relation of the two kinds of sources -with a view to avoiding the inconvenient parallelism, what happens is -this: either the relation is stated to depend upon the superiority -of the one over the other, and the distinction vanishes, because the -superior form absorbs into itself and annuls the inferior form; or -a third term is established, in which the two forms are supposed to -become united with a distinction: but this is another way of declaring -them to be inexistent in that abstractness. For this reason it does not -seem to me to be without significance that the partition of accounts -and documents should not have been adopted by the most empirical of the -methodologists. They do not involve themselves in these subtleties, -but content themselves with grouping the historical sources into those -that are <i>written</i> and those that are <i>represented</i>, or in other -similar ways. In Germany, however, Droysen availed himself of these -distinctions between narratives and documents, traditions, etc., in -his valuable <i>Elements of Historicism</i> (he had strong leanings toward -philosophy), and they have been employed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> also by other methodologists, -who are hybrid empiricists, 'systematists,' or 'pedants,' as they -are looked upon in our Latin countries. This is due to the copious -philosophical traditions of Germany. The pedantry certainly exists, -and it is to be found just in that inopportune philosophy. But what -an excellent thing is that pedantry and the contradictions which it -entails, how it arouses the mind from its empirical slumbers and makes -it see that in place of supposed things there are in reality spiritual -acts, where the terms of an irreconcilable dualism were supposed -to be in conflict, relation and unity, on the contrary, prevail! -The partition of the sources into narratives and documents, and the -superiority attributed to documents over narratives, and the alleged -necessity of narrative as a subordinate but ineradicable element, -almost form a mythology or allegory, which represents in an imaginative -manner the relation between life and thought, between document and -criticism in historical thought.</p> - -<p>And document and criticism, life and thought, are the true <i>sources</i> -of history—that is to say, the two elements of historical synthesis; -and as such, they do not stand face to face with history, or face to -face with the synthesis, in the same way as fountains are represented -as being face to face with those who go to them with a pail, but they -form part of history itself, they are within the synthesis, they -form a constituent part of it and are constituted by it. Hence the -idea of a history with its sources outside itself is another fancy -to be dispelled, together with that of history being the opposite of -chronicle. The two erroneous fancies converge to form one. Sources, in -the extrinsic sense of the empiricists, like things, are equally with -chronicle, which is a class of those things, not anterior but posterior -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> history. History would indeed be in a fix if it expected to be -born of what comes after it, to be born of external things! Thing, not -thought, is born of thing: a history derived from things would be a -thing—that is to say, just the inexistent of which we were talking a -moment ago.</p> - -<p>But there must be a reason why chronicle as well as documents seems -to precede history and to be its extrinsic source. The human spirit -preserves the mortal remains of history, empty narratives and -chronicles, and the same spirit collects the traces of past life, -remains and documents, striving as far as possible to preserve them -unchanged and to restore them as they deteriorate. What is the object -of these acts of will which go to the preservation of what is empty -and dead? Perhaps illusion or foolishness, which preserves a little -while the worn-out elements of mortality on the confines of Dis by -means of the erection of mausoleums and sepulchres? But sepulchres -are not foolishness and illusion; they are, on the contrary, an act -of morality, by which is affirmed the immortality of the work done by -individuals. Although dead, they live in our memory and will live in -the memory of times to come. And that collecting of dead documents and -writing down of empty histories is an act of life which serves life. -The moment will come when they will serve to reproduce past history, -enriched and made present to our spirit.</p> - -<p>For dead history revives, and past history again becomes present, as -the development of life demands them. The Romans and the Greeks lay -in their sepulchres, until awakened at the Renaissance by the new -maturity of the European spirit. The primitive forms of civilization, -so gross and so barbaric, lay forgotten, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> but little regarded, or -misunderstood, until that new phase of the European spirit, which was -known as Romanticism or Restoration, 'sympathized' with them—that is -to say, recognized them as its own proper present interest. Thus great -tracts of history which are now chronicle for us, many documents now -mute, will in their turn be traversed with new flashes of life and will -speak again.</p> - -<p>These revivals have altogether interior motives, and no wealth of -documents or of narratives will bring them about; indeed, it is they -themselves that copiously collect and place before themselves the -documents and narratives, which without them would remain scattered -and inert. And it will be impossible ever to understand anything of -the effective process of historical thought unless we start from the -principle that the spirit itself is history, maker of history at every -moment of its existence, and also the result of all anterior history. -Thus the spirit bears with it all its history, which coincides with -itself. To forget one aspect of history and to remember another one -is nothing but the rhythm of the life of the spirit, which operates -by determining and individualizing itself, and by always rendering -indeterminate and disindividualizing previous determinations and -individualizations, in order to create others more copious. The spirit, -so to speak, lives again its own history without those external -things called narratives and documents; but those external things are -instruments that it makes for itself, acts preparatory to that internal -vital evocation in whose process they are resolved. The spirit asserts -and jealously preserves 'records of the past' for that purpose.</p> - -<p>What we all of us do at every moment when we note dates and other -matters concerning our private<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> affairs (chronicles) in our -pocket-books, or when we place in their little caskets ribbons and -dried flowers (I beg to be allowed to select these pleasant images, -when giving instances of the collection of 'documents'), is done on a -large scale by a certain class of workers called <i>philologists</i>, as -though at the invitation of the whole of society. They are specially -known as the <i>erudite</i> when they collect evidence and narrations, -as <i>archæologists</i> and <i>archivists</i> when they collect documents and -monuments, as the places where such objects are kept (the "silent white -abodes of the dead") are called libraries, archives, and museums. -Can there be any ill-feeling against these men of erudition, these -archivists and archæologists, who fulfil a necessary and therefore -a useful and important function? The fact remains that there is a -tendency to mock at them and to regard them with compassion. It is -true enough that they sometimes afford a hold for derision with their -ingenuous belief that they have history under lock and key and are -able to unlock the 'sources' at which thirsty humanity may quench its -desire for knowledge; but we know that history is in all of us and that -its sources are in our own breasts. For it is in our own breasts alone -that is to be found that crucible in which the <i>certain</i> is converted -into the <i>true</i>, and <i>philology</i>, joining with <i>philosophy</i>, produces -<i>history</i>.</p> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4>II</h4> - - -<h4>PSEUDO-HISTORIES</h4> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<h5>I</h5> - - -<p>History, chronicle, and philology, of which we have seen the origin, -are series of mental forms, which, although distinct from one another, -must all of them be looked upon as physiological—that is to say, true -and rational. But logical sequence now leads me from physiology to -pathology—to those forms that are not forms but deformations, not true -but erroneous, not rational but irrational.</p> - -<p>The ingenuous belief cherished by the philologists that they have -history locked up in their libraries, museums, and archives (something -in the same manner as the genius of the <i>Arabian Nights</i>, who was -shut up in a small vase in the form of compressed smoke) does not -remain inactive, and gives rise to the idea of a history constructed -with things, traditions, and documents (empty traditions and dead -documents), and this affords an instance of what may be called -<i>philological</i> history. I say the idea and not the reality, because -it is simply impossible to compose a history with external things, -whatever efforts may be made and whatever trouble be taken. Chronicles -that have been weeded, chopped up into fragments, recombined, -rearranged, always remain nevertheless chronicles—that is to say, -empty narratives; and documents that have been restored, reproduced, -described, brought into line, remain documents—that is to say, silent -things. Philological history consists of the pouring out of one or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> -more books into a new book. This operation bears an appropriate name -in current language and is known as 'compilation.' These compilations -are frequently convenient, because they save the trouble of having -recourse to several books at the same time; but they do not contain -any historical thought. Modern chronological philologists regard -medieval chroniclers and the old Italian historians (from Machiavelli -and Guicciardini down to Giannone) with a feeling of superiority. -These writers 'transcribed,' as they called it, their 'sources' in -the parts of their books that are devoted to narrative—that is -to say, chronicle. Yet they themselves do not and cannot behave -otherwise, because when history is being composed from 'sources' as -external things there is never anything else to do but to transcribe -the sources. Transcription is varied by sometimes summarizing and -sometimes altering the words, and this is sometimes a question of -good taste and sometimes a literary pretence; it is also a verifying -of quotations, which is sometimes a proof of loyalty and exactitude, -sometimes a make-believe and a making oneself believe that the feet -are planted firmly on the earth, on the soil of truth, believed to -be narrative and quotation from the document. How very many of such -philological historians there are in our time, especially since the -so-called 'philological method' has been exaggerated—that is to say, -a one-sided value has been attributed to it! These histories have -indeed a dignified and scientific appearance, but unfortunately <i>fehlt -leider! das geistige Band</i>, the spiritual tie is wanting. They really -consist at bottom of nothing but learned or very learned 'chronicles,' -sometimes of use for purposes of consultation, but lacking words that -nourish and keep warm the minds and souls of men.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p> - -<p>Nevertheless, since we have demonstrated that philological history -really presents chronicles and documents and not histories, it might -be asked upon what possible ground do we accuse it of irrationality -and error, seeing that we have regarded the formation of chronicles, -the collection of documents, and all the care that is expended Upon -them as most rational? But error never lies in the fact, but only in -the 'claim' or 'idea' that accompanies the fact. And in this case -the idea or claim is that which has been defined above as properly -belonging to philological history—namely, that of composing histories -with documents and narratives. This claim can be said to exercise a -rational function also, to the extent that it lays down the claim, -though without satisfying it, that history should go beyond the mere -chronicle or document. But in so far as it makes the claim, without -itself fulfilling it, this mode of history must be characterized as -contradictory and absurd.</p> - -<p>And since the claim is absurd, philological history remains without -truth as being that which, like chronicle, has not got truth within -it, but derives it from the authority to which it appeals. It will be -claimed for philology that it tests authorities and selects those most -worthy of faith. But without dwelling upon the fact that chronicle -also, and chronicle of the crudest, most ignorant and credulous sort, -proceeded in a like manner by testing and selecting those authorities -which seemed to it to be the most worthy of faith, it is always a -question of faith (that is to say, of the thought of others and of -thought belonging to the past) and not of criticism (that is to say, -of our own thought in the act), of verisimilitude and not of that -certainty which is truth. Hence philological history can certainly be -<i>correct</i>, but not <i>true</i> (<i>richtig</i> and not <i>wahr</i>). And as it is -without truth,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> so is it without true historical interest—that is to -say, it sheds no light upon an order of facts answering to a practical -and ethical want; it may embrace any matter indifferently, however -remote it be from the practical and ethical soul of the compiler. -Thus, as a pure philologist, I enjoy the free choice of indifference, -and the history of Italy for the last half-century has the same value -for me as that of the Chinese dynasty of the Tsin. I shall turn from -one to the other, moved, no doubt, by a certain interest, but by an -extra-historical interest, of the sort formed in the special circle of -philology.</p> - -<p>This procedure, which is without truth and without passion, and is -proper to philological history, explains the marked contrast so -constantly renewed between the philological historians and historians -properly so called. These latter, intent as they are upon the solution -of vital problems, grow impatient to find themselves offered in reply -the frigid products of philology, or become angry at the persistent -assertion that such is history, and that it must be treated in such -a spirit and with such methods. Perhaps the finest explosion of such -a feeling of anger and annoyance is to be found in the <i>Letters on -the Study of History</i> (1751) of Bolingbroke, in which erudition is -treated as neither more nor less than sumptuous ignorance, and learned -disquisitions upon ancient or primitive history are admitted at the -most as resembling those 'eccentric preludes' which precede concerts -and aid in setting the instruments in tune and that can only be -mistaken for harmony by some one without ear, just in the same way as -only he who is without historic sense can confuse those exhibitions of -erudition with true history. As an antithesis to them he suggests as -an ideal a kind of 'political maps,'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> for the use of the intellect and -not of the memory, indicating the <i>Storie fiorentine</i> of Machiavelli -and the <i>Trattato dei benefici</i> of Fra Paolo as writings that approach -that ideal. Finally he maintains that for true and living history we -should not go beyond the beginning of the sixteenth century, beyond -Charles V and Henry VIII, when the political and social history of -Europe first appeared—a system which still persisted at the beginning -of the eighteenth century. He then proceeds to paint a picture of those -two centuries of history, for the use, not of the curious and the -erudite, but of politicians, too one, I think, would wish to deny the -just sentiment for history which animates these demands, set forth in -so vivacious a manner. Bolingbroke, however, did not rise, nor was it -possible for him to rise, to the conception of the death and rebirth of -every history (which is the rigorously speculative concept of 'actual' -and 'contemporary' history), owing to the conditions of culture of -his time, nor did he suspect that primitive barbaric history, which -he threw into a corner as useless dead leaves, would reappear quite -fresh half a century later, as the result of the reaction against -intellectualism and Jacobinism, and that this reaction would have as -one of its principal promoters a publicist of his own country, Burke, -nor indeed that it had already reappeared in his own time in a corner -of Italy, in the mind and soul of Giambattista Vico. I shall not adduce -further instances of the conflict between effective and philological -historians, after this conspicuous one of Bolingbroke, because it is -exceedingly well known, and the strife is resumed under our very eyes -at every moment. I shall only add that it is certainly deplorable -(though altogether natural, because blows are not measured in a -struggle) that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> polemic against the 'philologists' should have been -transferred so as to include also the philologues pure and simple. For -these latter, the poor learned ones, archivists and archæologists, are -harmless, beneficent little souls. If they should be destroyed, as is -sometimes prophesied in the heat of controversy, the fertility of the -spiritual field would be not only diminished, but ruined altogether, -and we should be obliged to promote to the utmost of our power the -reintroduction of those coefficients of our culture, very much in the -same way as is said to have been the case with French agriculture after -the improvident harrying of the harmless and beneficent wasps which -went on for several years.</p> - -<p>Whatever of justified or justifiable is to be found in the statements -as to the <i>uncertainty</i> and <i>uselessness</i> of history is also due to -the revolt of the pure historic sense against philological history. -This is to be assumed from observing that even the most radical of -those opponents (Fontenelle, Volney, Delfico, etc.) end by admitting -or demanding some form of history as not useless or uncertain, or not -altogether useless and uncertain, and from the fact that all their -shafts are directed against philological history and that founded upon -authority, of which the only appropriate definition is that of Rousseau -(in the <i>Émile</i>), as <i>l'art de choisir entre plusieurs mensonges, celui -qui ressemble mieux à la vérité.</i></p> - -<p>In all other respects—that is to say, as regards the part due to -sensational and naturalistic assumptions—historical scepticism -contradicts itself here, like every form of scepticism, for the natural -sciences themselves, thus raised to the rank of model, are founded upon -perceptions, observations, and experiments—that is to say, upon facts -historically ascertained—and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> 'sensations,' upon which the whole -truth of knowledge is based, are not themselves knowledge, save to the -extent that they assume the form of affirmations—that is to say, in so -far as they are history.</p> - -<p>But the truth is that philological history, like every other sort of -error, does not fall before the enemy's attack, but rather solely -from internal causes, and it is its own professors that destroy it, -when they conceive of it as without connexion with life, as merely -a learned exercise (note the many histories that are treatments of -scholastic themes, undertaken with a view to training in the art of -research, interpretation, and exposition, and the many others that -are continuations of this direction outside the school and are due to -tendency there imparted), and when they themselves evince uncertainty, -surrounding every statement that they make with <i>doubts</i>. The -distinction between <i>criticism</i> and <i>hypercriticism</i> has been drawn -with a view to arresting this spontaneous dissolution of historical -philology; thus we find the former praised and allowed, while the -latter is blamed and forbidden. But the distinction is one of the -customary sort, by means of which lack of intelligence disguised as -love of moderation contrives to chip off the edges from the antitheses -that it fails to solve. Hypercriticism is the prosecution of criticism; -it is criticism itself, and to divide criticism into a more and a less, -and to admit the less and deny the more, is extravagant, to say the -least of it. No 'authorities' are certain while others are uncertain, -but all are uncertain, varying in uncertainty in an extrinsic and -conjectural manner. Who can guarantee himself against the false -statement made by the usually diligent and trustworthy witness in a -moment of distraction or of passion? A sixteenth-century inscription, -still to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> be read in one of the old byways of Naples, wisely prays -God (and historical philologists should pray to Him fervently every -morning) to deliver us now and for ever from <i>the lies of honest -men</i>. Thus historians who push criticism to the point of so-called -hypercriticism perform a most instructive philosophical duty when they -render the whole of such work vain, and therefore fit to be called -by the title of Sanchez's work <i>Quod nihil scitur</i>. I recollect the -remark made to me when I was occupied with research work in my young -days by a friend of but slight literary knowledge, to whom I had lent -a very critical, indeed hypercritical, history of ancient Rome. When -he had finished reading it he returned the book to me, remarking that -he had acquired the proud conviction of being "the most learned of -philologists," because the latter arrive at the conclusion that they -know nothing as the result of exhausting toil, while he knew nothing -without any effort at all, simply as a generous gift of nature.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - - -<hr /> -<h5>II</h5> - - -<p>The consequence of this spontaneous dissolution of philological history -should be the negation of history claimed to have been written with -the aid of narratives and documents conceived as external things, and -the consignment of these to their proper lower place as mere aids to -historical knowledge, as it determines and redetermines itself in the -development of the spirit. But if such consequences are distasteful -and the project is persevered in of thus writing history in spite of -repeated failures, the further problem then presents itself as to -how the cold indifference of philological history and its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> intrinsic -uncertainty can be healed without changing those presumptions. The -problem, itself fallacious, can receive but a fallacious solution, -expressed by the substitution of the interest of <i>sentiment</i> for -the lack of interest of thought and of <i>æsthetic</i> coherence of -representation for the logical coherence here unobtainable. The new -erroneous form of history thus obtained is <i>poetical history.</i></p> - -<p>Numerous examples of this kind of history are afforded by the -affectionate biographies of persons much beloved and venerated and by -the satirical biographies of the detested; patriotic histories which -vaunt the glory and lament the misadventures of the people to which the -author belongs and with which he sympathizes, and those that shed a -sinister light upon the enemy people, adversary of his own; universal -history, illuminated with the ideals of liberalism or humanitarianism, -that composed by a socialist, depicting the acts, as Marx said, of the -"cavalier of the sorry countenance," in other words of the capitalist, -that of the anti-Semite, who shows the Jew to be everywhere the source -of human misfortune and of human turpitude and the persecution of the -Jew to be the acme of human splendour and happiness. Nor is poetical -history exhausted with this fundamental and general description of -love and hate (love that is hate and hate that is love), for it passes -through all the most intricate forms, the fine gradations of sentiment. -Thus we have poetical histories which are amorous, melancholy, -nostalgic, pessimistic, resigned, confident, cheerful, and as many -other sorts as one can imagine. Herodotus celebrates the romance of the -jealousies of the gods, Livy the epos of Roman virtue, Tacitus composes -horrible tragedies, Elizabethan dramas in sculptural Latin prose. If -we turn to the most modern among the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> moderns, we find Droysen giving -expression to his lyrical aspiration toward the strong centralized -state in his history of Macedonia, that Prussia of Hellas; Grote to his -aspirations toward democratic institutions, as symbolized in Athens; -Mommsen to those directed toward empire, as symbolized in Cæsar; -Balbo pouring forth all his ardours for Latin independence, employing -for that purpose all the records of Latin battles and beginning with -nothing less than those between the Itali and Etrusci against the -Pelasgi; Thierry celebrating the middle class in the history of the -Third Estate represented by Jacques Bonhomme; the Goncourts writing -voluptuous fiction round the figures of Mme de Pompadour, of Mme Du -Barry, of Marie Antoinette, more careful of the material and cut of -garments than of thoughts; and, finally, De Barante, in his history of -the Dukes of Burgundy, having his eye upon knights and ladies, arms and -love.</p> - -<p>It may seem that the indifference of philological history is thus -truly conquered and historical material dominated by a principle and -criterion of <i>values</i>. This is the demand persistently addressed to -history from all sides in our day by methodologists and philosophers. -But I have avoided the word 'value' hitherto, owing to its equivocal -meaning, apt to deceive many. For since history is history of the -spirit, and since spirit is value, and indeed the only value that is -possible to conceive, that history is clearly always history of values; -and since the spirit becomes transparent to itself as thought in the -consciousness of the historian, the value that rules the writing of -history is the value of thought. But precisely for this reason its -principle of determination cannot be the value known as the value of -'sentiment,' which is life and not thought, and when this life finds<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> -expression and representation, before it has been dominated by thought, -we have poetry, not history. In order to turn poetical biography into -truly historical biography we must repress our loves, our tears, our -scorn, and seek what function the individual has fulfilled in social -activity or civilization; and we must do the same for national history -as for that of humanity, and for every group of facts, small or great, -as for every order of events. We must supersede—that is to say, -transform—values of <i>sentiment</i> with values of <i>thought</i>. If we do not -find ourselves able to rise to this 'subjectivity' of thought, we shall -produce poetry and not history: the historical problem will remain -intact, or, rather, it will not yet have come into being, but will do -so when the requisite conditions are present. The interest that stirs -us in the former case is not that of life which becomes thought, but of -life which becomes intuition and imagination.</p> - -<p>And since we have entered the domain of poetry, while the historical -problem remains beyond, erudition Or philology, from which we seem -to have started, remains something on this side—that is to say, is -altogether surpassed. In philological history, notwithstanding the -claims made by it, chronicles and documents persist in their crude -natural and undigested state. But these are profoundly changed in -poetical history; or, to speak with greater accuracy, they are simply -dissolved. Let us ignore the case (common enough) of the historian -who, with a view to obtaining artistic effects, intentionally mingles -his inventions with the data provided by the chronicles and documents, -endeavouring to make them pass for history—that is to say, he renders -himself guilty of a lie and is the cause of confusion. But the -alteration that is continuous and inherent to historiography consists -of the choice and connexion of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> the details themselves, selected from -the 'sources,' rather owing to motives of sentiment than of thought. -This, closely considered, is really an invention or imagining of the -facts; the new connexion becomes concrete in a newly imagined fact. And -since the data that are taken from the 'sources' do not always lend -themselves with docility to the required connexion, it is considered -permissible to <i>solliciter doucement les textes</i> (as, if I am not -mistaken, Renan, one of the historian-poets, remarked) and to add -imaginary particulars, though in a conjectural form, to the actual -data. Vossius blamed those Grecian historians, and historians of other -nations, who, when they invent fables, <i>ad effugiendam vanitatis notam -satis fore putant si addant solemne suum 'aiunt,' 'fertur,' vel aliquid -quod tantundem valeat</i>. But even in our own day it would be diverting -and instructive to catalogue the forms of insinuation employed by -historians who pass for being most weighty, with a view to introducing -their own personal imaginings: 'perhaps,' 'it would seem,' 'one would -say,' 'it is pleasant to think,' 'we may infer,' 'it is probable,' 'it -is evident,' and the like; and to note how they sometimes come to omit -these warnings and recount things that they have themselves imagined -as though they had seen them, in order to complete their picture, -regarding which they would be much embarrassed if some one, indiscreet -as an <i>enfant terrible</i>, should chance to ask them: "How do you know -it?" "Who told you this?" Recourse has been had to the methodological -theory of "imagination necessary for the historian who does not wish -to become a mere chronicler," to an imagination, that is to say, which -shall be reconstructive and integrating; or, as is also said, to -"the necessity of integrating the historical datum with our personal -psychology<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> or psychological knowledge." This theory, similar to that -of value in history, also contains an equivocation. For doubtless -imagination is indispensable to the historian: empty criticism, empty -narrative, the concept without intuition or imagination, are altogether -sterile; and this has been said and said again in these pages, when -we have demanded the vivid experience of the events whose history we -have undertaken to relate, which also means their re-elaboration as -intuition and imagination. Without this imaginative reconstruction or -integration it is not possible to write history, or to read it, or to -understand it. But this sort of imagination, which is really quite -indispensable to the historian, is the imagination that is inseparable -from the historical synthesis, the imagination in and for thought, the -concreteness of thought, which is never an abstract concept, but always -a relation and a judgment, not indetermination but determination. It -is nevertheless to be radically distinguished from the free poetic -imagination, dear to those historians who see and hear the face and -the voice of Jesus on the Lake of Tiberias, or follow Heraclitus on -his daily walks among the hills of Ephesus, or repeat again the secret -colloquies between Francis of Assisi and the sweet Umbrian countryside.</p> - -<p>Here too we shall be asked of what error, then, we can accuse poetical -history, if it be poetry (a necessary form of the spirit and one of the -dearest to the heart of man) and not history. But here also we must -reply—in manner analogous to our reply in the case of philological -history—that the error does not lie in what is done, but in what is -claimed to be done: not in creating poetry, but in calling histories -that are poetry poetical histories, which is a contradiction in terms. -So far am I from entertaining the thought of objecting to poetry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> -woven out of historical data that I wish to affirm that a great part -of pure poetry, especially in modern times, is to be found in books -that are called histories. The epic, for instance, did not, as is -believed, die in the nineteenth century, but it is not to be found in -the 'epic poems' of Botta, of Bagnoli, of Bellini, or of Bandettini, -where it is sought by short-sighted classifiers of literature, but in -narratives of the history of the Risorgimento, where are poured forth -epic, drama, satire, idyll, elegy, and as many other 'kinds of poetry' -as may be desired. The historiography of the Risorgimento is in great -part a poetical historiography, rich in legends which still await -the historian, or have met with him only occasionally and by chance, -exactly like ancient or medieval epic, which, if it were really poetry, -was yet believed by its hearers, and often perhaps by its composers -themselves, to be history. And I claim for others and for myself -the right to imagine history as dictated by my personal feeling; to -imagine, for instance, an Italy as fair as a beloved woman, as dear as -the tenderest of mothers, as austere as a venerated ancestress, to seek -out her doings through the centuries and even to prophesy her future, -and to create for myself in history idols of hatred and of love, to -embellish yet more the charming, if I will, and to make the unpleasant -yet more unpleasant. I claim to seek out every memory and every -particular, the expressions of countenance, the gestures, the garments, -the dwellings, every kind of insignificant particular (insignificant -for others or in other respects, but not for me at that moment), almost -physically to approach my friends and my mistresses, of both of which -I possess a fine circle or harem in history. But it remains evident -that when I or others have the intention of writing history, true -history and not poetical history,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> we shall clear away myths and idols, -friends and mistresses, devoting our attention solely to the problem of -history, which is spirit or value (or if less philosophical and more -colloquial terms be preferred, culture, civilization, progress), and we -shall look upon them with the two eyes and the single sight of thought. -And when some one, in that sphere or at that altitude, begins to talk -to us of the sentiments that but a short while ago were tumultuous in -our breasts, we shall listen to him as to one who talks of things that -are henceforth distant and dead, in which we no longer participate, -because the only sentiment that now fills our soul is the sentiment of -truth, the search for historical truth.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See Appendix I.</p></div> - - -<hr /> -<h5>III</h5> - - -<p>With poetical history—that is to say, with the falling back of history -into a form ideally anterior, that of poetry—the cycle of erroneous -forms of history (or of erroneous theoretical forms) is complete. -But my discourse would not perhaps be complete were I to remain -silent as to a so-called form of history which had great importance -in antiquity when it developed its own theory. It continues to have -some importance in our own day, although now inclined to conceal its -face, to change its garments, and to disguise itself. This is the -history known in antiquity as <i>oratory</i> or <i>rhetoric</i>. Its object was -to teach philosophy by example, to incite to virtuous conduct, to -impart instruction as to the best political and military institutions, -or simply to delight, according to the various intentions of the -rhetoricians. And even in our own day this type of history is demanded -and supplied not only in the elementary schools (where it seems to -be understood that the bitter of wisdom<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> should be imbibed by youth -mingled with the sweet of fable), but among grown men. It is closely -linked up with politics, where it is a question of politics, or with -religion, philosophy, morality, and the like, where they are concerned, -or with diversions, as in the case of anecdotes, of strange events, -of scandalous and terrifying histories. But can this, I ask, be -considered, I do not say history, but an erroneous (theoretical) form -of history? The structure of rhetorical history presupposes a <i>history -that already exists</i>, or at least a poetical history, narrated with -a <i>practical end</i>. The end would be to induce an emotion leading to -virtue, to remorse, to shame, or to enthusiasm; or perhaps to provide -repose for the soul, such as is supplied by games; or to introduce into -the mind a historical, philosophical, or scientific truth (<i>movere, -delectare, docere,</i> or in whatever way it may be decided to classify -these ends); but it will always be an end—that is to say, a practical -act, which avails itself of the telling of the history as a means -or as one of its means. Hence rhetorical history (which would be -more correctly termed <i>practicistical</i> history) is composed of two -elements, history and the practical end, converging into one, which -is the practical act. For this reason one cannot attack it, but only -its theory, which is the already mentioned theory, so celebrated in -antiquity, of history as opus oratorium, as φιλοσοφία ἐκ παραδειγμάτων, -as ἀποδεικτική, as νίκης γύμνασμα (if warlike), or γνωμης παίδενμα (if -political), or as evocative of ἡδονή, and the like. This doctrine is -altogether analogous to the hedonistic and pedagogic doctrine relating -to poetry which at that time dominated. It was believed possible to -assign an end to poetry, whereas an <i>extrinsic end</i> was assigned to it, -and poetry was thus passed over without being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> touched. Practicistical -history (which, however, is not history) is exempt from censure as -a practical act: each one of us is not content with inquiring into -history, but also acts, and in acting can quite well avail himself of -the re-evocation of this or that image, with a view to stimulating his -own work, or (which comes to the same thing) the work of others. He -can, indeed, read and re-read all the books that have from time to time -been of assistance to him, as Cato the younger had recourse to reading -the <i>Phædo</i> in order to prepare himself for suicide, while others have -prepared themselves for it by reading <i>Werther, Ortis,</i> or the poems of -Leopardi. From the time of the Renaissance to the eighteenth century, -many others prepared themselves for conspiracies and tyrannicides by -reading Plutarch, and so much was this the case that one of them, the -youthful Boscoli, when condemned to death for a conspiracy against the -Medici, remarked in his last hour to Della Robbia (who recounts the -incident), "Get Brutus out of my head!"—Brutus, not, that is to say, -the history of Brutus that he had read and thought about, but that by -which he had been fascinated and urged on to commit the crime. For the -rest, true and proper history is not that Brutus which procreated the -modern Bruti with their daggers, but Brutus as thought and situated in -the world of thought.</p> - -<p>One might be induced to assign a special place to the history now known -as biased, because, on the one hand, it seems that it is not a simple -history of sentiment and poetry, since it has an end to attain, and -on the other because such end is not imposed upon it from without, -but coincides with the conception of history itself. Hence it would -seem fitting to look upon it as a form of history standing half-way -between poetry and practicism,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> a mixture of the two. But mixed forms -and hybrid products exist only in the fictitious classifications -of empiricists, never in the reality of the spirit, and biased -history, when closely examined, is really either poetical history or -practicistical history. An exception must always be made of the books -in which the two moments are sometimes to be found side by side, as -indeed one usually finds true history and chronicle and the document -and philological and poetical history side by side. What gives the -illusion of a mingling or of a special form of history is the fact that -many take their point of departure from poetical inspiration (love of -country, faith in their country, enthusiasm for a great man, and so on) -and end with practical calculations: they begin with poetry and end -with the allegations of the special pleader, and sometimes, although -more rarely, they follow an opposite course. This duplication is to be -observed in the numerous histories of parties that have been composed -since the world was a world, and it is not difficult to discover in -what parts of them we have manifestations of poetry and in what parts -of calculation. Good taste and criticism are continually effecting this -separation for history, as for art and poetry in general.</p> - -<p>It is true that good taste loves and accepts poetry and discriminates -between the practical intentions of the poet and those of the -historian-poet; but those intentions are received and admitted by the -moral conscience, provided always that they are good intentions and -consequently good actions; and although people are disposed to speak -ill of advocates in general, it is certain that the honest advocate -and the prudent orator cannot be dispensed with in social life. Nor -has so-called practicistical history ever been dispensed with, either<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> -according to the Græco-Roman practice, which was that of proposing -portraits of statesmen, of captains, and of heroic women as models for -the soul, or according to that of the Middle Ages, which was to repeat -the lives of saints and hermits of the desert, or of knights strong -of arm and of unshakable faith, or in our own modern world, which -recommends as edifying and stimulating reading the lives and 'legends' -of inventors, of business men, of explorers, and of millionaires. -Educative histories, composed with the view of promoting definite -practical or moral dispositions, really exist, and every Italian knows -how great were the effects of Colletta's and Balbo's histories and the -like during the period of the Risorgimento, and everyone knows books -that have 'inspired' him or inculcated in him the love of his own -country, of his town and steeple.</p> - -<p>This moral efficacy, which belongs to morality and not to history, has -had so strong a hold upon the mind that the prejudice still survives -of assigning a moral function to history (as also to poetry) in the -field of teaching. This prejudice is still to be found inspiring even -Labriola's pedagogic essay on <i>The Teaching of History</i>. But if we -mean by the word 'history' both history that is thought as well as -that which, on the contrary, is poetry, philology, or moral will, it -is clear that 'history' will enter the educational process not under -one form alone, but under all these forms. But as history proper it -will only enter it under one of them, which is not that of moral -education, exclusively or abstractly considered, but of the education -or development of thought.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span></p> - - -<hr /> -<h5>IV</h5> - - -<p>Much is said, now even more than formerly, of the necessity of a -'reform of history,' but to me there does not seem to be anything -to reform. Nothing to reform in the sense attributed to such a -demand—namely, that of moulding a <i>new form of history</i> or of creating -for the first time <i>true history</i>. History is, has been, and always -will be the same, what we have called living history, history that is -(ideally) contemporary; and chronicle, philological history, poetical -history, and (let us call it history nevertheless) practicistical -history are, have been, and always will be the same. Those who -undertake the task of creating a new history always succeed in setting -up philological history against poetical history, or poetical history -against philological history, or contemporary history against both -of them, and so on. Unless, indeed, as is the case with Buckle and -the many tiresome sociologists and positivists of the last ten years, -they lament with great pomposity and no less lack of intelligence as -to what history is that it lacks the capacity of observation and of -experiment (that is to say, the naturalistic abstraction of observation -and experiment), boasting that they 'reduce history to natural -science'—that is to say, by the employment of a circle, as vicious as -it is grotesque, to a mental form which is its pale derivative.</p> - -<p>In another sense, everything is certainly to be reformed in -history, and history is at every moment labouring to render herself -perfect—that is to say, is enriching herself and probing more deeply -into herself. There is no history that completely satisfies us, -because any construction of ours generates new facts and new problems -and solicits new solutions. Thus the history of Rome, of Greece, and -of Christianity, of the Reformation, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> the French Revolution, of -philosophy, of literature, and of any other subject is always being -told afresh and always differently. But history reforms herself, -remaining herself always, and the strength of her development lies -precisely in thus enduring.</p> - -<p>The demand for radical or abstract reform also cannot be given that -other meaning of a reform of the 'idea of history,' of the discovery -that is to be made or is finally made of the <i>true concept</i> of -history. At all periods the distinction has to some extent been -made between histories that are histories and those others that -are works of imagination or chronicles. This could be demonstrated -from the observations met with at all times among historians and -methodologists, and from the confessions that even the most confused of -them involuntarily let fall. It is also to be inferred with certainty -from the nature itself of the human spirit, although the words in -which those distinctions are expressed have not been written or are -not preserved. And such a concept and distinction are renewed at -every moment by history itself, which becomes ever more copious, more -profound. This is to be looked upon as certain, and is for that matter -made evident by the history of historiography, which has certainly -accomplished some progress since the days of Diogenes of Halicarnassus -and of Cicero to those of Hegel and of Humboldt. Other problems have -been formed in our own day, some of which I attempt to solve in this -book. I am well aware that it affords solutions only to some among the -many, and especially that it does not solve (simply because it cannot) -those that are not yet formed, but which will inevitably be formed in -the future.</p> - -<p>In any case it will be thought that the clearness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> acquired by the -historical consciousness as to the nature of its own work will at -least avail to destroy the erroneous forms of history, that since we -have shown that philological history or chronicle is not history, and -that poetical history is poetry and not history, the 'facts' that -correspond to those beliefs must disappear, or become ever more limited -in extension, to the point of disappearing altogether in a near or -distant future, as catapults have disappeared before guns and as we see -carriages disappearing before, automobiles.</p> - -<p>And this would be truly possible were these erroneous forms to become -concrete in 'facts,' were they not, as I have said above, mere -'claims.' If error and evil were a fact, humanity would have long ago -abolished it—that is to say, superseded it, in the same way as it has -superseded slavery and serfdom and the method of simple barter and so -many other things that were facts, that is to say, its own transitory -forms. But error (and evil, which is one with it) is not a fact; it -does not possess empirical existence; it is nothing but the negative or -dialectical moment of the spirit, necessary for the concreteness of the -positive moment, for the reality of the spirit. For this reason it is -eternal and indestructible, and to destroy it by abstraction (since it -cannot be done by thought) is equivalent to imagining the death of the -spirit, as confirmed in the saying that abstraction is death.</p> - -<p>And without occupying further space with the ex-position of a doctrine -that would entail too wide a digression,<a name="FNanchor_1_2" id="FNanchor_1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_2" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> I shall observe that a -glance at the history of history proves the salutary nature of error, -which is not a Caliban, but rather an Ariel, who breathes everywhere, -calling forth and exciting, but can never be grasped as a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> solid thing. -And with a view to seeking examples only in those general forms that -have been hitherto examined, polemical and tendencious historiography -is certainly to be termed error. This prevailed during the period of -the enlightenment, and reduced history to a pleading against priests -and tyrants. But who would have wished simply to return from this to -the learned and apathetic history of the Benedictines and of the other -authors of folios? The polemic and its direction expressed the need -for living history, though not in an altogether satisfactory form, -and this need was followed by the creation of a new historiography -during the period of romanticism. The type of merely philological -history, promulgated in Germany after 1820, and afterward disseminated -throughout Europe, was also certainly error; but it was likewise an -instrument of liberation from the more or less fantastic and arbitrary -histories improvised by the philosophers. But who would wish to turn -back from them to the 'philosophies of history'? The type of history, -sometimes tendencious, but more often poetical, which followed in the -wake of the national Italian movement, was also error—that is to say, -it led to the loss of historical calm. But that poetical consciousness -which surpassed itself when laying claim to historical truth was -bound sooner or later to generate (as had been the case on a larger -scale in the eighteenth century) a history linked with the interests -of life without becoming servile and allowing itself to be led away -by the phantoms of love and hate suggested by them. Further examples -could be adduced, but the example of examples is that which happens -within each of us when we are dealing with historical material. We -see our sympathies and antipathies arise in turn as we proceed (our -poetical history),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> our intentions as practical men (our rhetorical -history), our chroniclistical memories (our philological history); we -mentally supersede these forms in turn, and in doing so find ourselves -in possession of a new and more profound historical truth. Thus does -history affirm itself, distinguishing itself from non-histories and -conquering the dialectical moments which arise from these. It was -for this reason that I said that there is never anything of anything -to reform in the <i>abstract,</i> but <i>everything of everything</i> in the -<i>concrete</i>.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_2" id="Footnote_1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_2"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See <i>Logic as Science of Pure Concept.</i>—D. A.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p></div> - -<h4><a name="III" id="III">III</a></h4> - - -<h4>HISTORY AS HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSAL CRITICISM OF 'UNIVERSAL HISTORY</h4> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<h5>I</h5> - - -<p>Returning from this dialectical round to the concept of history as -'contemporary history,' a new doubt assails and torments us. For if -the proof given has freed that concept from one of the most insistent -forms of historical scepticism (the scepticism that arises from the -lack of reliability of 'testimony'), it does not seem that it has been -freed or ever can be freed from that other form of scepticism, more -properly termed 'agnosticism,' which does not absolutely deny the truth -of history, but denies to it <i>complete</i> truth. But in ultimate analysis -this is to deny to it real knowledge, because unsound knowledge, half -knowledge, also reduces the vigour of the part that it asserts to be -known. It is, however, commonly asserted that only a part of history, a -very small part, is known to us: a faint glimmer which renders yet more -sensible the vast gloom that surrounds our knowledge on all sides.</p> - -<p>In truth, what do we know of the origins of Rome or of the Greek -states, and of the people who preceded the Greek and Roman -civilizations in those countries, notwithstanding all the researches -of the learned? And if a fragment of the life of these people does -remain to us, how uncertain is its interpretation! If some tradition -has been handed down to us, how poor, confused, and contradictory it -is! And we know still less of the people<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> who preceded those people, of -the immigrations from Asia and Africa into Europe or inversely, and of -relations with other countries beyond the ocean, even with the Atlantis -of the myths. And the monogenesis or polygenesis of the human race is a -desperate head-splitter, open to all conjectures. The appearance upon -the earth of the <i>genus homo</i> is open to vain conjectures, as is his -affinity or relationship to the animals. The history of the earth, of -the solar system, of the whole cosmos, is lost in the obscurity of its -origin. But obscurity does not dwell alone among the 'origins'; the -whole of history, even that of modern Europe which is nearest to us, -is obscure. Who can really say what motives determined a Danton or a -Robespierre, a Napoleon or an Alexander of Russia? And how numerous are -the obscurities and the lacunæ that relate to the acts themselves—that -is to say, to their externalization! Mountains of books have been -written upon the days of September, upon the eighteenth of Brumaire, -upon the burning of Moscow; but who can tell how these things really -happened? Even those who were direct witnesses are not able to say, for -they have handed down to us diverse and conflicting narratives. But -let us leave great history. Will it not at least be possible for us to -know a little history completely, we will not say that of our country, -of our town, or of our family, but the least little history of any one -of ourselves: what he really wanted when (many years ago or yesterday) -he abandoned himself to this or that motive of passion, and uttered -this or that word; how he reached this or that particular conclusion -or decided upon some particular course of action; whether the motives -that urged him in a particular direction were lofty or base, moral or -egoistic, inspired by duty or by vanity, pure or impure?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is enough to make one lose one's head, as those scrupulous people -are aware, who the more they attempt to perfect their examination -of conscience the more they are confused. No other counsel can be -offered to them than that of examining themselves certainly, but not -overmuch, of looking rather ahead than behind, or only looking behind -to the extent that it is necessary to look. We certainly know our own -history and that of the world that surrounds us, but how little and how -meagrely in comparison with our infinite desire for knowledge!</p> - -<p>The best way of ending this vexation of spirit is that which I have -followed, that of pushing it to its extreme limit, and then of -imagining for a moment that all the interrogations mentioned, together -with the infinite others that could be mentioned, have been satisfied; -satisfied as interrogations that continued to the infinite can be -satisfied—that is to say, by affording an immediate answer to them, -one after the other, and by causing the spirit to enter the path of a -vertiginous process of satisfactions, always obtained to the infinite. -Now, were all those interrogations satisfactorily answered, were we -in possession of all the answers to them, what should we do? The road -of progress to the infinite is as wide as that to hell, and if it -does not lead to hell it certainly leads to the madhouse. And that -infinite, which grows bigger the moment we first touch it, does not -avail us; indeed it fills us with fear. Only the poor finite assists -us, the determined, the concrete, which is grasped by thought and which -lends itself as base for our existence and as point of departure for -our action. Thus even were all the particular infinities of infinite -history offered for the gratification of our desire, there would be -nothing else left for us to do but to clear our minds of them, to -<i>forget</i> them, and to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> concentrate upon that particular point alone -which corresponds to a problem and constitutes living, active history, -<i>contemporary history</i>.</p> - -<p>And this is what the spirit in its development accomplishes, because -there is no fact that is not known at the moment of its being done, by -means of the consciousness that germinates perpetually upon action; -and there is no fact that is not forgotten sooner or later, but may -be recalled, as we remarked when speaking of dead history revived at -the touch of life, of the past that by means of the contemporaneous -becomes again contemporaneous. Tolstoi got this thought fixed in his -mind: not only is no one, not even a Napoleon, able to predetermine -with exactitude the happenings of a battle, but no one can know how -it really did happen, because on the very evening of its ending an -artificial, legendary history appears, which only a credulous spirit -could mistake for real history; yet it is upon this that professional -historians work, integrating or tempering imagination with imagination. -But the battle is known as it gradually develops, and then as the -turmoil that it causes is dissipated, so too is dissipated the turmoil -of that consciousness, and the only thing of importance is the -actuality of the new situation and the 'new disposition of soul that -has been produced, expressed in poetical legends or availing itself -of artificial fictions. And each one of us at every moment knows and -forgets the majority of his thoughts and acts (what a misfortune -it would be if he did not do so, for his life would be a tiresome -computation of his smallest movements!); but he does not forget, and -preserves for a greater or less time, those thoughts and sentiments -which represent memorable crises and problems relating to his future. -Sometimes we assist with astonishment at the awakening<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> in us of -sentiments and thoughts that we had believed to be irrevocable. Thus -it must be said that we know at every moment all the history that we -need to know; and since what remains over does not matter to us, we do -not possess the means of knowing it, or we shall possess it when the -need arises. That 'remaining' history is the eternal phantom of the -'thing in itself,' which is neither 'thing' nor 'in itself,' but only -the imaginative projection of the infinity of our action and of our -knowledge.</p> - -<p>The imaginative projection of the thing in itself, with the agnosticism -that is its result, is caused in philosophy by the natural sciences, -which posit a reality made extrinsic and material and therefore -unintelligible. Chroniclism also occasions historical agnosticism -in an analogous manner at the naturalistic moment of history, for -it posits a dead and unintelligible history. Allowing itself to be -seduced by this allurement it strays from the path of concrete truth, -while the soul feels itself suddenly filled with infinite questions, -most vain and desperate. In like manner, he who strays from or has -not yet entered the fruitful path of a diligent life, feels his soul -full to overflowing of infinite desires, of actions that cannot be -realized, of pleasures out of reach, and consequently suffers the pains -of a Tantalus. But the wisdom of life warns us not to lose ourselves -in <i>absurd desires</i>, as the wisdom of thought warns us not to lose -ourselves in <i>problems that are vain</i>.</p> - - -<hr /> -<h5>II</h5> - - -<p>But if we cannot know anything but the finite and the particular, -always indeed only <i>this</i> particular and <i>this</i> finite, must we then -renounce (a dolorous renunciation 1)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> knowledge of <i>universal history</i>? -Without doubt, but with the double corollary that we are renouncing -what we have never possessed, because we could not possess it, and that -in consequence such renunciation is not at all painful.</p> - -<p>'Universal history,' too, is not a concrete act or tact, but a 'claim,' -and a claim due to chroniclism and to its 'thing in itself,' and -to the strange proposal of closing the infinite progression, which -had been improperly opened, by means of progress to the infinite. -Universal history really tries to form a picture of all the things -that have happened to the human race, from its origins upon the earth -to the present moment. Indeed, it claims to do this from the origin of -things, or the creation, to the end of the world, since it would not -otherwise be truly universal. Hence its tendency to fill the abysses -of prehistory and of the origins with theological or naturalistic -fictions and to trace somehow the future, either with revelations -and prophecies, as in Christian universal history (which went as far -as Antichrist and the Last Judgment), or with previsions, as in the -universal histories of positivism, democratism, and socialism.</p> - -<p>Such was its claim, but the result turns out to be different from -the intention, and it gets what it can—that is to say, a chronicle -that is always more or less of a mixture, or a poetical history -expressing some aspiration of the heart of man, or a true and proper -history, which is not universal, but <i>particular</i>, although it -embraces the lives of many peoples and of many times. Most frequently -these different elements are to be discerned side by side in the -same literary composition. Omitting chronicles more or less wide in -scope (though always narrow), poetical histories, and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> various -contaminations of several different forms, we immediately perceive, -not as a result of logical deduction alone, but with a simple glance -at any one of the 'universal histories,' that 'universal histories,' -in so far as they are histories, or in that part of them in which they -are histories, resolve themselves into nothing else but particular -histories'—that is to say, they are due to a particular interest -centred in a particular problem, and comprehend only those facts that -form part of that interest and afford an answer to that particular -problem. For antiquity the example of the work of Polybius should -suffice for all, since it was he who most vigorously insisted upon -the need for a 'universal history' (καθολική ιστορία, ή των καθόλου -πραγμάτων σΰνταξις). For the Christian period we may cite the Civitas -Dei of Augustine, and for modern times the <i>Philosophy of History</i> -of Hegel (he also called it universal history, or <i>philosophische -Weltgeschichte</i>). But we observe here that the universal history which -Polybius desired and created was that more vast, more complex, more -political, and graver history which Roman hegemony and the formation -of the Roman world required, and therefore that it embraced only those -peoples which came into relation and conflict with Rome, and limited -itself almost altogether to the history of political institutions and -of military dispositions, according to the spiritual tendencies of -the author. Augustine, in his turn, attempted to render intelligible -the penetration of Paganism by Christianity, and with this object in -view he made use of the idea of two enemy cities, the terrestrial -and the celestial, of which the first was sometimes the adversary of -and sometimes preparatory to the second. Finally, Hegel treated the -same problem in his universal history as in his particular history -of philosophy—that is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> to say, the manner in which the spirit of a -philosophy of servitude to nature, or to the transcendental God, has -elevated itself to the consciousness of liberty. He cut out prehistory -from the philosophy of history, as he had cut it out from the history -of philosophy, and considered Oriental history very summarily, since it -did not offer much of interest to the prosecution of his design.</p> - -<p>Naturalistic or cosmological romances will always be composed by those -who feel inspired to write them, and they will always find eager and -appreciative readers, especially among the lazy, who are pleased to -possess the 'secret of the world' in a few pages. And more or less -vast compilations will always be made of the histories of the East -and the West, of the Americas and Africa and Oceania. The strength -of a single individual does not suffice for these, even as regards -their compilation, so we now find groups of learned men or compilers -associated in that object (as though to give ocular evidence of the -absence of all intimate connexion). We have even seen recently certain -attempts at universal histories arranged on geographical principles, -like so many histories set side by side—European, Asiatic, African, -and so on—which insensibly assume the form of a historical dictionary. -And this or that particular history can always usefully take the name -of a 'universal history,' in the old sense of Polybius—that is to -say, as opposed to books that are less actual, less serious, and less -satisfactory, the books of those 'writers of particular things' (οἱ τάς -ἐπί μέρους γράφοντες πράξεις) who are led to make little things great -(τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλα ποιεῑν) and to indulge in lengthy anecdotes unworthy -of being recorded (περὶ τῶν μηδὲ μνήμης άξιων), and that owing to the -lack of a criterion (δί'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> ἀκρισίαν). In this sense, those times and -peoples whose politico-social development had produced, as it were, -a narrowing of the historical circle would be well advised to break -away from minute details and to envisage 'universal history'—that -is to say, a vaster history, which lies beyond particular histories. -This applies in particular to our Italy, which, since it had a -universalistic function at the time of the Renaissance, had universal -vision, and told the history of all the peoples in its own way, and -then limited itself to local history, then again elevated itself -to national history, and should now, even more than in the past, -extend itself over the vast fields of the history of all times past -and present. But the word 'universal,' which has value for the ends -above mentioned, will never designate the possession of a 'universal -history,' in the sense that we have refused to it. Such a history -disappears in the world of illusions, together with similar Utopias, -such, for instance, as the art that should serve as model for all -times, or universal justice valid for all time.</p> - - -<hr /> -<h5>III</h5> - - -<p>But in the same way that by the dissipation of the illusion of -universal art and of universal justice the intrinsically universal -character of particular art and of particular justice is not cancelled -(of the <i>Iliad</i> or of the constitution of the Roman family), to negate -universal history does not mean to negate the universal in history. -Here, too, must be repeated what was said of the vain search for God -throughout the infinite series of the finite and found at every point -of it: <i>Und du bist ganz vor mir!</i> That particular and that finite -is determined, in its particularity and finitude, by thought, and -therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> known together with the universal, the universal in that -particular form. The merely finite and particular does not exist -save as an abstraction. There is no abstract finite in poetry and in -art itself, which is the reign of the individual; but there is the -ingenuous finite, which is the undistinguished unity of finite and -infinite, which will be distinguished in the sphere of thought and -will in that way attain to a more lofty form of unity. And history -is thought, and, as such, thought of the universal, of the universal -in its concreteness, and therefore always determined in a particular -manner. There is no fact, however small it be, that can be otherwise -conceived (realized and qualified) than as universal. In its most -simple form—that is to say, in its essential form—history expresses -itself with judgments, inseparable syntheses of individual and -universal. And the individual is called the <i>subject</i> of the judgment, -the universal the <i>predicate</i>, by old terminological tradition, -which it will perhaps be convenient to preserve. But for him who -dominates words with thought, the <i>true subject</i> of history is just -the <i>predicate</i>, and the <i>true predicate</i> the <i>subject</i>—that is to -say, the universal is determined in the judgment by individualizing -it. If this argument seems too abstruse and amounts to a philosophical -subtlety, it may be rendered obvious and altogether different from -a private possession of those known as philosophers by means of the -simple observation that everyone who reflects, upon being asked what is -the subject of the history of poetry, will certainly not reply Dante -or Shakespeare, or Italian or English poetry, or the series of poems -that are known to us, but <i>poetry</i>—that is to say, a universal; and -again, when asked what is the subject of social and political history, -the answer will not be Greece or Rome, France or Germany, or even all -these and others such combined,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> but <i>culture, civilization, progress, -liberty,</i> or any other similar word—that is to say, a universal.</p> - -<p>And here we can remove a great stumbling-block to the recognition -of the <i>identity of philosophy with history</i>. I have attempted to -renovate, modify, and establish this doctrine with many analyses and -with many arguments in another volume of my works.<a name="FNanchor_1_3" id="FNanchor_1_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_3" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> It is, however, -frequently very difficult, being rather an object of irresistible -argument than of complete persuasion and adhesion. Seeking for the -various causes of this difficulty, I have come upon one which seems -to me to be the principal and fundamental. This is precisely the -conception of history not as living contemporary history, but as -history that is dead and belongs to the past, as <i>chronicle</i> (or -philological history, which, as we know, can be reduced to chronicle). -It is undeniable that when history is taken as chronicle its identity -with philosophy cannot be made clear to the mind, because it does not -exist. But when chronicle has been reduced to its proper practical and -mnemonical function, and history has been raised to the knowledge of -the <i>eternal present</i>, it reveals itself as all one with philosophy, -which for its part is never anything but the thought of the eternal -present. This, be it well understood, provided always that the dualism -of ideas and facts has been superseded, of <i>vérités de raison</i> and -<i>vérités de fait</i>, the concept of philosophy as contemplation of -vérités de raison, and that of history as the amassing of brute facts, -of coarse <i>vérités de fait</i>. We have recently found this tenacious -dualism in the act of renewing itself, disguised beneath the axiom that -<i>le propre de l'histoire est de savoir, le propre de la philosophie -est de comprendre</i>. This amounts to the absurd distinction of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> knowing -without understanding and of understanding without knowing, which would -thus be the doubly dis-heartening theoretical fate of man. But such a -dualism and the conception of the world which accompanies it, far from -being true philosophy, are the perpetual source whence springs that -imperfect attempt at philosophizing which is called <i>religion</i> when -one is within its magic circle, <i>mythology</i> when one has left it. Will -it be useful to attack transcendency, and to claim the character of -immanence for reality and for philosophy? It will certainly be of use; -but I do not feel the necessity of doing so, at any rate here and now.</p> - -<p>And since history, properly understood, abolishes the idea of a -<i>universal history</i>, so philosophy, immanent and identical with -history, abolishes the idea of a <i>universal philosophy</i>—that is to -say, of the <i>closed</i> system. The two negations correspond and are -indeed fundamentally one (because closed systems, like universal -histories, are cosmological romances), and both receive empirical -confirmation from the tendency of the best spirits of our day to -refrain from 'universal histories' and from 'definitive systems,' -leaving both to compilers, to believers, and to the credulous of -every sort. This tendency was implicit in the last great philosophy, -that of Hegel, but it was opposed in its own self by old survivals -and altogether betrayed in execution, so that this philosophy also -converts itself into a cosmological romance. Thus it may be said -that what at the beginning of the nineteenth century was merely a -simple <i>presentiment</i> becomes changed into <i>firm consciousness</i> at -the beginning of the twentieth. This defies the fears of the timid -lest the knowledge of the universal should be thus compromised, -and indeed maintains that only in this way can such knowledge be -truly and perpetually acquired, because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> dynamically obtained. Thus -history becoming <i>actual history</i> and philosophy becoming <i>historical -philosophy</i> have freed themselves, the one from the anxiety of not -being able to know that which is not known, only because it was or will -be known, and the other from the despair of never being able to attain -to definite truth—that is to say, both are freed from the phantom of -the 'thing in itself.'</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_3" id="Footnote_1_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_3"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> In the <i>Logic</i>, especially in Part II, Chapter IV.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span></p></div> - -<h4><a name="IV" id="IV">IV</a></h4> - - -<h4>IDEAL GENESIS AND DISSOLUTION OF THE 'PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY'</h4> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<h5>I</h5> - - -<p>The conception of the so-called 'philosophy of history' is perpetually -opposed to and resisted by the deterministic conception of history. Not -only is this clearly to be seen from inspection, but it is also quite -evident logically, because the 'philosophy of history' represents the -transcendental conception of the real, determinism the immanent.</p> - -<p>But on examining the facts it is not less certain that historical -determinism perpetually generates the 'philosophy of history'; nor -is this fact less evidently logical than the preceding, because -determinism is naturalism, and therefore immanent, certainly, but -insufficiently and falsely immanent. Hence it should rather be -said that it wishes to be, but is not, immanent, and whatever its -efforts may be in the contrary direction, it becomes converted into -transcendency. All this does not present any difficulty to one who -has clearly in mind the conceptions of the transcendent and of the -immanent, of the philosophy of history as transcendency and of the -deterministic or naturalistic conception of history as a false -immanence. But it will be of use to see in more detail how this process -of agreements and oppositions is developed and solved with reference to -the problem of history.</p> - -<p>"First collect the facts, then connect them causally"; this is the way -that the work of the historian is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> represented in the deterministic -conception. <i>Après la collection des faits, la recherche des causes,</i> -to repeat the very common formula in the very words of one of the most -eloquent and picturesque theorists of that school, Taine. Facts are -brute, dense, real indeed, but not illumined with the light of science, -not intellectualized. This intelligible character must be conferred -upon them by means of the search for causes. But it is very well known -what happens when one fact is linked to another as its cause, forming a -chain of causes and effects: we thus inaugurate an infinite regression, -and we never succeed in finding the cause or causes to which we can -finally attach the chain that we have been so industriously putting -together.</p> - -<p>Some, maybe many, of the theorists of history get out of the difficulty -in a truly simple manner: they break or let fall at a certain point -their chain, which is already broken at another point at the other -end (the effect which they have undertaken to consider). They operate -with their fragment of chain as though it were something perfect and -closed in itself, as though a straight line divided at two points -should include space and be a figure. Hence, too, the doctrine that we -find among the methodologists of history: that it is only necessary -for history to seek out 'proximate' causes. This doctrine is intended -to supply a logical foundation to the above process. But who can ever -say what are the 'proximate causes'? Thought, since it is admitted -that it is unfortunately obliged to think according to the chain of -causes, will never wish to know anything but 'true' causes, be they -near or distant in space and time (space, like time, <i>ne fait rien -à l'affaire</i>). In reality, this theory is a fig-leaf, placed there -to cover a proceeding of which the historian, who is a thinker and a -critic, is ashamed,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> an act of will which is useful, but which for that -very reason is wilful. The fig-leaf, however, is a sign of modesty, and -as such has its value, because, if shame be lost, there is a risk that -it will finally be declared that the 'causes' at which an arbitrary -halt has been made are the 'ultimate' causes, the 'true' causes, thus -raising the caprice of the individual to the rank of an act creative -of the world, treating it as though it were God, the God of certain -theologians, whose caprice is truth. I should not wish again to quote -Taine just after having said this, for he is a most estimable author, -not on account of his mental constitution, but of his enthusiastic -faith in science; yet it suits me to quote him nevertheless. Taine, -in his search for causes, having reached a cause which he sometimes -calls the 'race' and sometimes the 'age,' as for instance in his -history of English literature, when he reaches the concept of the -'man of the North' or 'German,' with the character and intellect that -would be suitable to such a person—coldness of the senses, love -of abstract ideas, grossness of taste, and contempt for order and -regularity—gravely affirms: <i>Là s'arrête la recherche: on est tombé -sur quelque disposition primitive, sur quelque trait propre à toutes -les sensations, à toutes les conceptions d'un siècle ou d'une race, sur -quelque particularité inséparable de toutes les démarches de son esprit -et de son cour. Ce sont là les grandes causes, les causes universelles -et permanentes.</i> What that primitive and insurmountable thing contained -was known to Taine's imagination, but criticism is ignorant of it; for -criticism demands that the genesis of the facts or groups of facts -designated as 'age' and 'race' should be given, and in demanding their -genesis declares that they are neither 'universal' nor 'permanent,' -because no universal and permanent 'facts' are known, as far<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> as I -am aware, certainly not <i>le Germain</i> and <i>l'homme du Nord</i>; nor are -mummies facts, though they last some thousands of years, but not for -ever—they change gradually, but they do change.</p> - -<p>Thus whoever adopts the deterministic conception of history, provided -that he decides to abstain from cutting short the inquiry that he has -undertaken in an arbitrary and fanciful manner, is of necessity obliged -to recognize that the method adopted does not attain the desired end. -And since he has begun to think history, although by means of an -insufficient method, no course remains to him save that of beginning -all over again and following a different path, or that of going -forward but changing his direction. The naturalistic presupposition, -which still holds its ground ("first collect the facts, then seek -the causes": what is more evident and more unavoidable than that?), -necessarily leads to the second alternative. But to adopt the second -alternative is to supersede determinism, it is to transcend nature -and its causes, it is to propose a method opposite to that hitherto -followed—that is to say, to renounce the category of cause for -another, which cannot be anything but that of end, an extrinsic and -transcendental end, which is the analogous opposite, corresponding to -the cause. Now the search for the transcendental end is the 'philosophy -of history.'</p> - -<p>The consequent naturalist (I mean by this he who 'continues to think,' -or, as is generally said, to draw the consequences) cannot avoid this -inquiry, nor does he ever avoid it, in whatever manner he conceive -his new inquiry. This he cannot even do, when he tries, by declaring -that the end or 'ultimate cause' is unknowable, because (as elsewhere -remarked) an unknowable affirmed is an unknowable in some way known. -Naturalism is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> always crowned with a philosophy of history, whatever -its mode of formulation: whether it explain the universe as composed -of atoms that strike one another and produce history by means of their -various shocks and gyrations, to which they can also put an end by -returning to their primitive state of dispersion, whether the hidden -God be termed Matter or the Unconscious or something else, or whether, -finally, He be conceived as an Intelligence which avails itself of -the chain of causes in order to actualize His counsels. And every -philosopher of history is on the other hand a naturalist, because he -is a dualist and conceives a God and a world, an idea and a fact in -addition to or beneath the Idea, a kingdom of ends and a kingdom or -sub-kingdom of causes, a celestial city and one that is more or less -diabolical or terrene. Take any deterministic historical work and you -will find or discover in it, explicit or understood, transcendency (in -Taine, for example, it goes by the name of 'race' or of '<i>siècle,</i>' -which are true and proper deities); take any work of 'philosophy of -history' and dualism and naturalism will be found there (in Hegel, for -example, when he admits rebellious and impotent facts which resist or -are unworthy the dominion of the idea). And we shall see more and more -clearly how from the entrails of naturalism comes inevitably forth the -'philosophy of history.'</p> - - -<hr /> -<h5>II</h5> - - -<p>But the 'philosophy of history' is just as contradictory as the -deterministic conception from which it arises and to which it is -opposed. Having both accepted and superseded the method of linking -brute facts together, it no longer finds facts to link (for these -have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> already been linked together, as well as might be, by means -of the category of cause), but brute facts, on which it must confer -rather a 'meaning' than a linking, representing them as aspects of a -transcendental process, a theophany. Now those facts, in so far as -they are brute facts, are mute, and the transcendency of the process -requires an organ, not that of thought that thinks or produces facts, -but an extra-logical organ, in order to be conceived and represented -(such, for example, as thought which proceeds abstractly <i>a priori,</i> -in the manner of Fichte), and this is not to be found in the spirit, -save as a negative moment, as the void of effective logical thought. -The void of logical thought is immediately filled with <i>praxis,</i> or -what is called sentiment, which then appears as poetry, by theoretical -refraction. There is an evident poetical character running through all -'philosophies of history.' Those of antiquity represented historical -events as strife between the gods of certain peoples or of certain -races or protectors of certain individuals, or between the god of light -and truth and the powers of darkness and lies. They thus expressed the -aspirations of peoples, groups, or individuals toward hegemony, or of -man toward goodness and truth. The most modern of modern forms is that -inspired by various national and ethical feelings (the Italian, the -Germanic, the Slav, etc.), or which represents the course of history as -leading to the kingdom of liberty, or as the passage from the Eden of -primitive communism, through the Middle Ages of slavery, servitude, and -wages, toward the restoration of communism, which shall no longer be -unconscious but conscious, no longer Edenic but human. In poetry, facts -are no longer facts but words, not reality but images, and so there -would be no occasion to censure them, if it remained pure poetry.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> -But it does not so remain, because those images and words are placed -there as ideas and facts—that is to say, as myths: progress, liberty, -economy, technique, science are myths, in so far as they are looked -upon as agents external to the facts. They are myths no less than God -and the Devil, Mars and Venus, Jove and Baal, or any other cruder forms -of divinity. And this is the reason why the deterministic conception, -after it has produced the 'philosophy of history,' which opposes it, -is obliged to oppose its own daughter in its turn, and to appeal from -the realm of ends to that of causal connexions, from imagination to -observation, from myths to facts.</p> - -<p>The reciprocal confutation of historical determinism and the philosophy -of history, which makes of each a void or a nothing—that is to say, -a single void or nothing—seems to the eclectics as usual to be the -reciprocal fulfilment of two entities, which effect or should effect -an alliance for mutual support. And since eclecticism flourishes in -contemporary philosophy, mutato nomine, it is not surprising that -besides the duty of investigating the causes to history also is -assigned that of ascertaining the 'meaning' or the 'general plan' of -the course of history (see the works on the philosophy of history of -Labriola, Simmel, and Rickert). Since, too, writers on method are -wont to be empirical and therefore eclectic, we find that with them -also history is divided into the history which unites and criticizes -documents and reconstructs events, and 'philosophy of history' (see -Bernheim's manual, typical of all of them). Finally, since ordinary -thought is eclectic, nothing is more easy than to find agreement as to -the thesis that simple history, which presents the series of facts, -does not suffice, but that it is necessary that thought should return -to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> already constituted chain of events, in order to discover -there the hidden design and to answer the questions as to whence we -come and whither we go. This amounts to saying that a 'philosophy of -history' must be posited side by side with history. This eclecticism, -which gives substance to two opposite voids and makes them join -hands, sometimes attempts to surpass itself and to mingle those two -fallacious sciences or parts of science. Then we hear 'philosophy of -history' defended, but with the caution that it must be conducted with -'scientific' and 'positive' method, by means of the search for the -cause, thus revealing the action of divine reason or providence.<a name="FNanchor_1_4" id="FNanchor_1_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_4" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -Ordinary thought quickly consents to this programme, but afterward -fails to carry it out.<a name="FNanchor_2_5" id="FNanchor_2_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_5" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>There is nothing new here either for those who know: 'philosophy -of history' to be constructed by means of 'positive methods,' -transcendency to be demonstrated by means of the methods of false -immanence, is the exact equivalent in the field of historical studies -to that "metaphysic to be constructed by means of the experimental -method" which was recommended by the neocritics (Zeller and others), -for it claimed, not indeed to supersede two voids that reciprocally -confute one another,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> but to make them agree together, and, after -having given substance to them, to combine them in a single substance. -I should not like to describe the impossibilities contained in the -above as the prodigies of an alchemist (the metaphor seems to be too -lofty), but rather as the medleys of bad cooks.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_4" id="Footnote_1_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_4"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See, for example, the work of Flint; but since, less -radical than Flint, Hegel and the Hegelians themselves also ended in -admitting the concourse of the two opposed methods, traces of this -perversion are also to be found in their 'philosophies of history.' -Here, too, is to be noted the false analogy by which Hegel was led -to discover the same relation between a priori and historical facts -as between mathematics and natural facts: <i>Man muss mit dem Kreise -dessen, worin die Prinzipien fallen, wenn man es so nennen will, a -priori vertraut sein, so gut als Kepler mit den Ellipsen, mit Kuben und -Quadraten und mit den Gedanken von Verhältnissen derselben</i> a priori -<i>schon vorher bekannt sein musste, ehe er aus den empirischen Daten -seine unsterblichen Gesetze, welche aus Bestimmungen jener Kreise von -Vorstellungen bestehen, erfinden konnte.</i> (<i>Cf. Vorles. üb. d. Philos, -d. Gesch.,</i> ed. Brunstäd, pp. 107-108.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_5" id="Footnote_2_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_5"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Not even the above-mentioned Flint carried it out, for he -lost him-self in preliminaries of historical documentation and never -proceeded to the promised construction.</p></div> - - -<hr /> -<h5>III</h5> - - -<p>The true remedy for the contradictions of historical determinism and of -the 'philosophy of history' is quite other than this. To obtain it, we -must accept the result of the preceding confutation, which shows that -both are futile, and reject, as lacking thought, both the 'designs' -of the philosophy of history and the causal chains of determinism. -When these two shadows have been dispersed we shall find ourselves -at the starting-place: we are again face to face with disconnected -brute facts, with facts that are connected, but not understood, for -which determinism had tried to employ the cement of causality, the -'philosophy of history,' the magic wand of finality. What shall we -do with these facts? How shall we make them clear rather than dense -as they were, organic rather than inorganic, intelligible rather -than unintelligible? Truly, it seems difficult to do anything with -them, especially to effect their desired transformation. The spirit -is helpless before that which is, or is supposed to be, external to -it. And when facts are understood in that way we are apt to assume -again that attitude of contempt of the philosophers for history which -has been well-nigh constant since antiquity almost to the end of the -eighteenth century (for Aristotle history was "less philosophical" and -less serious than poetry,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> for Sextus Empiricus it was "unmethodical -material"; Kant did not feel or understand history). The attitude -amounts to this: leave ideas to the philosophers and brute facts to the -historians—let us be satisfied with serious things and leave their -toys to the children.</p> - -<p>But before having recourse to such a temptation, it will be prudent -to ask counsel of methodical doubt (which is always most useful), and -to direct the attention precisely upon those brute and disconnected -facts from which the causal method claims to start and before which we, -who are now abandoned by it and by its complement, the philosophy of -history, appear to find ourselves again. Methodical doubt will suggest -above all things the thought that those facts are a <i>presupposition</i> -that has <i>not been proved</i>, and it will lead to the inquiry as to -<i>whether the proof can be obtained</i>. Having attempted the proof, we -shall finally arrive at the conclusion that <i>those facts really do not -exist.</i></p> - -<p>For who, as a matter of fact, affirms their existence? Precisely the -spirit, at the moment when it is about to undertake the search for -causes. But when accomplishing that act the spirit does not already -possess the brute facts (<i>d'abord la collection des faits</i>) and then -seek the causes (<i>après, la recherche des causes</i>); but it makes -the <i>facts brute</i> by that very act—that is to say, it posits them -itself in that way, because it is of use to it so to posit them. -The search for causes, undertaken by history, is not in any way -different from the procedure of naturalism, already several times -illustrated, which abstractly analyses and classifies reality. And -to illustrate abstractly and to classify implies at the same time to -judge in classifying—that is to say, to treat facts, not as acts of -the spirit, conscious in the spirit that thinks them, but as external -brute facts. The <i>Divine Comedy</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> is that poem which we create again -in our imagination in all its particulars as we read it and which we -understand critically as a particular determination of the spirit, -and to which we therefore assign its place in history, with all its -surroundings and all its relations. But when this actuality of our -thought and imagination has come to an end—that is to say, when that -mental process is completed—we are able, by means of a new act of -the spirit, separately to analyse its elements. Thus, for instance, -we shall classify the concepts relating to 'Florentine civilization,' -or to 'political poetry,' and say that the <i>Divine Comedy</i> was an -effect of Florentine civilization, and this in its turn an effect -of the strife of the communes, and the like. We shall also thus -have prepared the way for those absurd problems which used to annoy -de Sanctis so much in relation to the work of Dante, and which he -admirably described when he said that they arise only when lively -æsthetic expression has grown cold and poetical work has fallen into -the hands of dullards addicted to trifles. But if we stop in time and -do not enter the path of those absurdities, if we restrict ourselves -purely and simply to the naturalistic moment, to classification, and -to the classificatory judgment (which is also causal connexion), in an -altogether practical manner, without drawing any deductions from it, we -shall have done nothing that is not perfectly legitimate; indeed, we -shall be exercising our right and bowing to a rational necessity, which -is that of naturalizing, when naturalization is of use, but not beyond -those limits. Thus the materialization of the facts and the external -or causal binding of them together are altogether justified as pure -naturalism. And even the maxim which bids us to stop at 'proximate' -causes—that is to say, not to force classification so far<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> that it -loses all practical utility—will find its justification. To place -the concept of the <i>Divine Comedy</i> in relation to that of 'Florentine -civilization' may be of use, but it will be of no use whatever, -or infinitely less use, to place it in relation to the class of -'Indo-European civilization' or to the 'civilization of the white man.'</p> - - -<hr /> -<h5>IV</h5> - - -<p>Let us then return with greater confidence to the point of departure, -the true point of departure—that is to say, not to that of facts -already disorganized and naturalized, but to that of the mind -that thinks and constructs the fact. Let us raise up the debased -countenances of the calumniated 'brute facts,' and we shall see the -light of thought resplendent upon their foreheads. And that true point -of departure will reveal itself not merely as a point of departure, but -both as a point of arrival and of departure, not as the first step in -historical construction, but the whole of history in its construction, -which is also its self-construction. Historical determinism, and all -the more 'philosophy of history,' leave the <i>reality of history</i> behind -them, though they directed their journey thither, a journey which -became so erratic and so full of useless repetitions.</p> - -<p>We shall make the ingenuous Taine confess that what we are saying -is the truth when we ask him what he means by the <i>collection des -faits</i> and learn from him in reply that the collection in question -consists of two stages or moments, in the first of which documents -are revived in order to attain, <i>à travers la distance des temps, -l'homme vivant, agissant, doué de passions, muni d'habitudes, avec -sa voix et sa physionomie, avec ses gestes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> et ses habits, distinct -et complet comme celui que tout à l'heure nous avons quitté dans la -rue;</i> and in the second is sought and found <i>sous l'homme extérieur -l'homme intérieur, "l'homme invisible," "le centre," "le groupe des -facultés et des sentiments qui produit le reste," "le drame intérieur," -"la psychologie."</i> Something very different, then, from collections -de faits I If the things mentioned by our author really do come to -pass, if we really do make live again in imagination individuals and -events, and if we think what is within them—that is to say, if we -think the synthesis of intuition and concept, which is thought in its -concreteness—history is already achieved: what more is wanted? There -is nothing more to seek. Taine replies: "We must seek causes." That is -to say, we must slay the living 'fact' thought by thought, separate -its abstract elements—a useful thing, no doubt, but useful for memory -and practice. Or, as is the custom of Taine, we must misunderstand and -exaggerate the value of the function of this abstract analysis, to lose -ourselves in the mythology of races and ages, or in other different but -none the less similar things. Let us beware how we slay poor facts, if -we wish to think as historians, and in so far as we are such and really -think in that way we shall not feel the necessity for having recourse -either to the extrinsic bond of causes, historical determinism, or to -that which is equally extrinsic of transcendental ends, philosophy of -history. The fact historically thought has no cause and no end outside -itself, but only in itself, coincident with its real qualities and with -its qualitative reality. Because (it is well to note in passing) the -determination of facts as real facts indeed, but of <i>unknown nature</i>, -asserted but not understood, is itself also an illusion of naturalism -(which thus heralds its other illusion, that of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> 'philosophy of -history'). In thought, reality and quality, existence and essence, are -all one, and it is not possible to affirm a fact as real without at the -same time knowing what fact it is—that is, without qualifying it.</p> - -<p>Returning to and remaining in or moving in the concrete fact, or, -rather, making of oneself thought that thinks the fact concretely, we -experience the continual formation and the continual progress of our -historical thought and also make clear to ourselves the history of -historiography, which proceeds in the same manner. And we see how (I -limit myself to this, in order not to allow the eye to wander too far) -from the days of the Greeks to our own historical understanding has -always been enriching and deepening itself, not because abstract causes -and transcendental ends of human things have ever been recovered, -but only because an ever increasing consciousness of them has been -acquired. Politics and morality, religion and philosophy and art, -science and culture and economy, have become more complex concepts and -at the same time better determined and unified both in themselves and -with respect to the whole. Correlatively with this, the histories of -these forms of activity have become ever more complex and more firmly -united. We know 'the causes' of civilization as little as did the -Greeks; and we know as little as they of the god or gods who control -the fortunes of humanity. But we know the theory of civilization better -than did the Greeks, and, for instance, we know (as they did not know, -or did not know with equal clearness and security) that poetry is an -eternal form of the theoretic spirit, that regression or decadence is a -relative concept, that the world is not divided into ideas and shadows -of ideas, or into potencies and acts, that slavery is not a category -of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> real, but a historical form of economic, and so forth. Thus it -no longer occurs to anyone (save to the survivals or fossils, still to -be found among us) to write the history of poetry on the principle of -the pedagogic ends that the poets are supposed to have had in view: -on the contrary, we strive to determine the forms expressive of their -sentiments. We are not at all bewildered when we find ourselves before -what are called 'decadences,' but we seek out what new and greater -thing was being developed by means of their dialectic. We do not -consider the work of man to be miserable and illusory, and aspiration -and admiration for the skies and for the ascesis joined thereunto -and averse to earth as alone worthy of admiration and imitation. We -recognize the reality of power in the act, and in the shadows the -solidity of the ideas, and on earth heaven. Finally, we do not find -that the possibility of social life is lost owing to the disappearance -of the system of slavery. Such a disappearance would have been the -catastrophe of reality, if slaves were natural to reality—and so forth.</p> - -<p>This conception of history and the consideration of historiographical -work in itself make it possible for us to be just toward historical -determinism and to the 'philosophy of history,' which, by their -continual reappearance, have continually pointed to the gaps in our -knowledge, both historical and philosophical, and with their false -provisional solutions have heralded the correct solutions of the new -problems which we have been propounding. Nor has it been said that -they will henceforth cease to exercise such a function (which is the -beneficial function of Utopias of every sort). And although historical -determinism and the 'philosophy of history' have no history, because -they do not develop, they yet receive a content from the relation in -which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> they stand to history, which does develop—that is to say, -history develops in them, notwithstanding their covering, extrinsic -to their content, which compels to think even him who proposes to -schematize and to imagine without thinking. For there is a great -difference between the determinism that can now appear, after Descartes -and Vico and Kant and Hegel, and that which appeared after Aristotle; -between the philosophy of history of Hegel and Marx and that of -gnosticism and Christianity. Transcendency and false immanency are at -work in both these conceptions respectively; but the abstract forms -and mythologies that have appeared in more mature epochs of thought -contain this new maturity in themselves. In proof of this, let us -pause but a moment (passing by the various forms of naturalism) at -the case of the 'philosophy of history.' We observe already a great -difference between the philosophy of history, as it appears in the -Homeric world, and that of Herodotus, with whom the conception of the -anger of the gods is a simulacrum of the moral law, which spares the -humble and treads the proud underfoot; from Herodotus to the Fate of -the Stoics, a law to which the gods themselves are subjected, and from -this to the conception of Providence, which appears in late antiquity -as wisdom that rules the world; from this pagan providence again to -Christianity, which is divine justice, evangelical preparation, and -educative care of the human race, and so on, to the refined providence -of the theologians, which as a rule excludes divine intervention -and operates by means of secondary causes, to that of Vico, which -operates as dialectic of the spirit, to the Idea of Hegel, which is the -gradual conquest of the consciousness of self, which liberty achieves -during the course of history, till we finally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> reach the mythology of -progress and of civilization, which still persists and is supposed to -tend toward the final abolition of prejudices and superstitions, to -be carried out by means of the increasing power and divulgation of -positive science.</p> - -<p>In this way the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism -sometimes attain to the thinness and transparency of a veil, which -covers and at the same time reveals the concreteness of the real in -thought. Mechanical causes thus appear idealized, transcendent deities -humanized, and facts are in great part divested of their brutal aspect. -But however thin the veil may be, it remains a veil, and however -clear the truth may be, it is not altogether clear, for at bottom -the false persuasion still persists that history is constructed with -the 'material' of brute facts, with the 'cement' of causes, and with -the 'magic' of ends, as with three successive or concurrent methods. -The same thing occurs with religion, which in lofty minds liberates -itself almost altogether from vulgar beliefs, as do its ethics from the -heteronomy of the divine command and from the utilitarianism of rewards -and punishments. Almost altogether, but not altogether, and for this -reason religion will never be philosophy, save by negating itself, and -thus the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism will become -history only by negating themselves. The reason is that as long as they -proceed in a positive manner dualism will also persist, and with it the -torment of scepticism and agnosticism as a consequence.</p> - -<p>The negation of the philosophy of history, in history understood -concretely, is its ideal dissolution, and since that so-called -philosophy is nothing but an abstract and negative moment, our reason -for affirming that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> <i>the philosophy of history</i> is dead is clear. It -is dead in its positivity, dead as a body of doctrine, dead in this -way, with all the other conceptions and forms of the transcendental. -I do not wish to attach to my brief (but in my opinion sufficient) -treatment of the argument the addition of an explanation which to some -will appear to be (as it appears to me) but little philosophical and -even somewhat trivial. Notwithstanding, since I prefer the accusation -of semi-triviality to that of equivocation, I shall add that since the -criticism of the 'concepts' of cause and transcendental finality does -not forbid the use of these 'words,' when they are simple words (to -talk, for example, in an imaginative way of liberty as of a goddess, or -to say, when about to undertake a study of Dante, that our intention is -to 'seek the cause' or 'causes' of this or that work or act of his), -so nothing forbids our continuing to talk of 'philosophy of history' -and of philosophizing history, meaning the necessity of treating or of -a better treatment of this or that historical problem. Neither does -anything forbid our calling the researches of historical gnoseology -'philosophy of history,' although in this case we are treating the -history, not properly of <i>history</i>, but of <i>historiography</i>, two things -which are wont to be designated with the same word in Italian as in -other languages. Neither do we wish to prevent the statement (as did a -German professor years ago) that the 'philosophy of history' must be -treated as 'sociology'—that is to say, the adornment with that ancient -title of so-called sociology, the empirical science of the state, of -society and of culture.</p> - -<p>These denominations are all permissible in virtue of the same right -as that invoked by the adventurer Casanova when he went before the -magistrates in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> order to justify himself for having changed his -name—"the right of every man to the letters of the alphabet." But the -question treated above is not one of the letters of the alphabet. The -'philosophy of history,' of which we have briefly shown the genesis and -the dissolution, is not one that is used in various senses, but a most -definite mode of conceiving history—the transcendental mode.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span></p> - -<h4><a name="V" id="V">V</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE POSITIVITY OF HISTORY</h4> - - -<p>We therefore meet the well-known saying of Fustel de Coulanges that -there are certainly "history and philosophy, but not the philosophy -of history," with the following: there is neither philosophy nor -history, nor philosophy of history, but history which is philosophy -and philosophy which is history and is intrinsic to history. For this -reason, all the controversies—and foremost of all those concerned -with progress—which philosophers, methodologists of history, and -sociologists believe to belong to their especial province, and flaunt -at the beginning and the end of their treatises, are reduced for us to -simple problems of philosophy, with historical motivation, all of them -connected with the problems of which philosophy treats.</p> - -<p>In controversies relating to progress it is asked whether the work of -man be fertile or sterile, whether it be lost or preserved, whether -history have an end, and if so of what sort, whether this end be -attainable in time or only in the infinite, whether history be progress -or regress, or an interchange between progress and regress, greatness -and decadence, whether good or evil prevail in it, and the like. When -these questions have been considered with a little attention we shall -see that they resolve themselves substantially into three points: the -conception of development, that of end, and that of value. That is to -say, they are concerned with the whole of reality, and with history -only when it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> precisely the whole of reality. For this reason they -do not belong to supposed particular sciences, to the philosophy of -history, or to sociology, but to philosophy and to history in so far -as it is philosophy. When the ordinary current terminology has been -translated into philosophical terms it calls forth immediately the -thesis, antithesis, and synthesis by means of which those problems -have been thought and solved during the course of philosophy, to -which the reader desirous of instruction must be referred. We can -only mention here that the conception of reality as development is -nothing but the synthesis of the two one-sided opposites, consisting -of permanency without change and of change without permanency, of -an identity without diversity and of a diversity without identity, -for development is a perpetual surpassing, which is at the same -time a perpetual conservation. From this point of view one of the -conceptions that has had the greatest vogue in historical books, that -of <i>historical circles,</i> is revealed as an equivocal attempt to issue -forth from a double one-sidedness and a falling back into it, owing to -an equivocation. Because either the series of circles is conceived as -composed of identicals and we have only permanency, or it is conceived -as of things diverse and we have only change. But if, on the contrary, -we conceive it as circularity that is perpetually identical and at the -same time perpetually diverse, in this sense it coincides with the -conception of development itself.</p> - -<p>In like manner, the opposite theses, as to the attainment or the -impossibility of attainment of the end of history, reveal their common -defect of positing the end as <i>extrinsic</i> to history, conceiving -of it either as that which can be reached in time (<i>progressus ad -finitum</i>),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> or as that which can never be attained, but only infinitely -approximated (<i>progressus ad infinitum</i>). But where the end has been -correctly conceived as <i>internal</i>—that is to say, all one with -development itself—we must conclude that it is attained at every -instant, and at the same time not attained, because every attainment -is the formation of a new prospect, whence we have at every moment the -satisfaction of possession, and arising from this the dissatisfaction -which drives us to seek a new possession.<a name="FNanchor_1_6" id="FNanchor_1_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_6" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>Finally, the conceptions of history as a passage from evil to good -(progress), or from good to evil (decadence, regression), take their -origin from the same error of entifying and making extrinsic good and -evil, joy and sorrow (which are the dialectical construction of reality -itself). To unite them in the eclectic conception of an alternation of -good and evil, of progress and regress, is incorrect. The true solution -is that of progress understood not as a passage from evil to good, as -though from one state to another, but as the passage from the good to -the better, in which the evil is the good itself seen in the light of -the better.</p> - -<p>These are all philosophical solutions which are at variance with -the superficial theses of controversialists (dictated to them by -sentimental motives or imaginative combinations, really mythological -or resulting in mythologies), to the same extent that they are in -accordance with profound human convictions and with the tireless toil, -the trust, the courage, which constitute their ethical manifestations.</p> - -<p>By drawing the consequences of the dialectical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> conception of progress -something more immediately effective can be achieved in respect to the -practice and history of historiography. For we find in that conception -the origin of a historical maxim, in the mouth of every one, yet -frequently misunderstood and frequently violated—that is to say, that -to history pertains not to <i>judge,</i> but to <i>explain,</i> and that it -should be not <i>subjective</i> but <i>objective.</i></p> - -<p>Misunderstood, because the judging in question is often taken in the -sense of logical judgment, of that judgment which is thinking itself, -and the subjectivity, which would thus be excluded, would be neither -more nor less than the subjectivity of thought. In consequence of this -misunderstanding we hear historians being advised to purge themselves -of theories, to refrain from the disputes arising from them, to -restrict themselves to facts, collecting, arranging, and squeezing out -the sap (even by the statistical method). It is impossible to follow -such advice as this, as may easily be seen, for such 'abstention from -thought' reveals itself as really abstention from 'seriousness of -thought,' as a surreptitious attaching of value to the most vulgar and -contradictory thoughts, transmitted by tradition, wandering about idly -in the mind, or flashing out as the result of momentary caprice. The -maxim is altogether false, understood or misunderstood in this way, -and it must be taken by its opposite—namely, that history must always -judge strictly, and that it must always be energetically subjective -without allowing itself to be confused by the conflicts in which -thought engages or by the risks that it runs. For it is thought itself, -and thought alone, which gets over its own difficulties and dangers, -without falling even here into that frivolous eclecticism which tries -to find a middle term between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> our judgment and that of others, and -suggests various neutral and insipid forms of judgment.</p> - -<p>But the true and legitimate meaning, the original motive for that -'judging,' that 'subjectivity,' which it condemns, is that history -should not apply to the deeds and the personages that are its material -the qualifications of good and evil, as though there really were -good and evil facts in the world, people who are good and people -who are evil. And it is certainly not to be denied that innumerable -historiographers, or those who claim to be historiographers, have -really striven and still strive along those lines, in the vain and -presumptuous attempt to reward the good and punish the evil, to qualify -historical epochs as representing progress or decadence—in a word, -to settle what is good and what is evil, as though it were a question -of separating one element from another in a compound, hydrogen from, -oxygen.</p> - -<p>Whoever desires to observe intrinsically the above maxim, and by -doing so to set himself in accordance with the dialectic conception -of progress, must in truth look upon every trace or vestige of -propositions affirming evil, regression, or decadence as real facts, -as a sign of imperfection—in a word, he must condemn every trace -or vestige of <i>negative</i> judgments. If the course of history is not -the passage from evil to good, or alternative good and evil, but the -passage from the good to the better, if history should explain and -not condemn, it will pronounce only <i>positive</i> judgments, and will -forge chains of good, so solid and so closely linked that it will -not be possible to introduce into them even a little link of evil or -to interpose empty spaces, which in so far as they are empty would -not represent good but evil. A fact that seems to be only evil, an -epoch that appears<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> to be one of complete decadence, can be nothing -but a <i>non-historical</i> fact—that is to say, one which has not been -historically treated, not penetrated by thought, and which has remained -the prey of sentiment and imagination.</p> - -<p>Whence comes the phenomenology of good and evil, of sin and repentance, -of decadence and resurrection, save from the consciousness of the -agent, from the act which is in labour to produce a new form of -life?<a name="FNanchor_2_7" id="FNanchor_2_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_7" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> And in that act the adversary who opposed us is in the -wrong; the state from which we wish to escape, and from which we -are escaping, is unhappy; the new one toward which we are tending -becomes symbolized as a dreamed-of felicity to be attained, or as -a past condition to restore, which is therefore most beautiful in -recollection (which here is not recollection, but imagination). Every -one knows how these things present them-selves to us in the course -of history, manifesting themselves in poetry, in Utopias, in stories -with a moral, in detractions, in apologies, in myths of love, of -hate, and the like. To the heretics of the Middle Ages and to the -Protestant reformers the condition of the primitive Christians seemed -to be most lovely and most holy, that of papal Christians most evil -and debased. The Sparta of Lycurgus and the Rome of Cincinnatus seemed -to the Jacobins to be as admirable as France under the Carlovingians -and the Capetians was detestable. The humanists looked upon the lives -of the ancient poets and sages as luminous and the life of the Middle -Ages as dense darkness. Even in times near our own has been witnessed -the glorification of the Lombard communes and the depreciation of -the Holy Roman Empire, and the very opposite of this, according as -the facts relating to these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> historical events were reflected in the -consciousness of an Italian longing for the independence of Italy or -of a German upholding the holy German empire of Prussian hegemony. -And this will always happen, because such is the phenomenology of the -practical consciousness, and these practical valuations will always -be present to some extent in the works of historians. As works, these -are not and cannot ever be pure history, quintessential history; if in -no other way, then in their phrasing and use of metaphors they will -reflect the repercussion of practical needs and efforts directed toward -the future. But the historical consciousness, as such, is logical and -not practical consciousness, and indeed makes the other its object; -history once lived has become in it thought, and the antitheses of will -and feeling that formerly offered resistance have no longer a place in -thought.</p> - -<p>For if there are no good and evil facts, but facts that are always good -when understood in their intimate being and concreteness, there are not -opposite sides, but that wider side that embraces both the adversaries -and which happens just to be historical consideration. Historical -consideration, therefore, recognizes as of equal right the Church of -the catacombs and that of Gregory VII, the tribunes of the Roman people -and the feudal barons, the Lombard League and the Emperor Barbarossa. -History never metes out justice, but always <i>justifies</i>; she could not -carry out the former act without making herself unjust—that is to say, -confounding thought with life, taking the attractions and repulsions of -sentiment for the judgments of thought.</p> - -<p>Poetry is satisfied with the expression of sentiment, and it is worthy -of note that a considerable historian, Schlosser, wishing to reserve -for himself the right and duty of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> judging historical facts with -Kantian austerity and abstraction, kept his eyes fixed on the <i>Divine -Comedy</i>—that is to say, a poetical work—as his model of treatment. -And since there are poetical elements in all myths, we understand why -the conception of history known as <i>dualistic</i>—that is to say, of -history as composed of two currents, which mix but never resolve in one -another their waters of good and evil, truth and error, rationality and -irrationality—should have formed a conspicuous part, not only of the -Christian religion, but also of the mythologies (for they really are -such) of humanism and of illuminism. But the detection of this problem -of the duality of values and its solution in the superior unity of -the conception of development is the work of the nineteenth century, -which on this account and on account of other solutions of the same -kind (certainly not on account of its philological and archæological -richness, which was relatively common to the four preceding centuries) -has been well called 'the century of history.'</p> - -<p>Not only, therefore, is history unable to discriminate between facts -that are good and facts that are evil, and between epochs that are -progressive and those that are regressive, but it does not begin until -the psychological conditions which rendered possible such antitheses -have been superseded and substituted by an act of the spirit, which -seeks to ascertain what function the fact or the epoch previously -condemned has fulfilled—that is to say, what it has produced of its -own in the course of development, and therefore what it has produced. -And since all facts and epochs are productive in their own way, not -only is not one of them to be condemned in the light of history, but -all are to be praised and venerated. A condemned fact, a fact that is -repugnant, is not yet a historical proposition, it is hardly even the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -premiss of a historical problem to be formulated. A negative history is -a non-history so long as its negative process substitutes itself for -thought, which is affirmative, and does not maintain itself within its -practical and moral bounds and limit itself to poetical expressions and -empirical modes of representation, in respect of all of which we can -certainly speak (speak and not think), as we do speak at every moment, -of bad men and periods of decadence and regression.</p> - -<p>If the vice of negative history arises from the separation, the -solidification, and the opposition of the dialectical antitheses -of good and evil and the transformation of the ideal moments of -development into entities, that other deviation of history which -may be known as elegiac history arises from the misunderstanding of -another necessity of that conception—that is to say, the perpetual -constancy, the perpetual conservation of what has been acquired. But -this is also false by definition. What is preserved and enriched -in the course of history is history itself, spirituality. The past -does not live otherwise than in the present, as the force of the -present, resolved and transformed in the present. Every particular -form, individual, action, institution, work, thought, is destined to -perish: even art, which is called eternal (and is so in a certain -sense), perishes, for it does not live, save to the extent that it -is reproduced, and therefore transfigured and surrounded with new -light, in the spirit of posterity. Finally, truth itself perishes, -particular and determined truth, because it is not rethinkable, save -when included in the system of a vaster truth, and therefore at the -same time transformed. But those who do not rise to the conception of -pure historical consideration, those who attach themselves with their -whole soul to an individual, a work, a belief, an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> institution, and -attach themselves so strongly that they cannot separate themselves -from it in order to objectify it before themselves and think it, are -prone to attribute the immortality which belongs to the spirit in -universal to the spirit in one of its particular and determined forms; -and since that form, notwithstanding their efforts, dies, and dies -in their arms, the universe darkens before their gaze, and the only -history that they can relate is the sad one of the agony and death of -beautiful things. This too is poetry, and very lofty poetry. Who can do -otherwise than weep at the loss of a beloved one, at separation from -something dear to him, cannot see the sun extinguished and the earth -tremble and the birds cease their flight and fall to earth, like Dante, -on the loss of his beloved "who was so beautiful"? But history is never -<i>history of death</i>, but <i>history of life</i>, and all know that the proper -commemoration of the dead is the knowledge of what they did in life, -of what they produced that is working in us, the history of their life -and not of their death, which it behoves a gentle soul to veil, a soul -barbarous and perverse to exhibit in its miserable nakedness and to -contemplate with unhealthy persistence. For this reason all histories -which narrate the death and not the life of peoples, of states, of -institutions, of customs, of literary and artistic ideals, of religious -conceptions, are to be considered false, or, we repeat, simply poetry, -where they attain to the level of poetry. People grow sad and suffer -and lament because that which was is no longer. This would resolve -itself into a mere tautology (because if it was, it is evident that it -is no longer), were it not conjoined to the neglect of recognizing what -of that past has not perished—that is to say, that past in so far as -it is not past but present, the eternal life of the past. It is in this -neglect,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> in the incorrect view arising out of it, that the falsity of -such histories resides.</p> - -<p>It sometimes happens that historians, intent upon narrating those -scenes of anguish in a lugubrious manner and upon celebrating the -funerals which it pleases them to call histories, remain partly -astounded and partly scandalized when they hear a peal of laughter, a -cry of joy, a sigh of satisfaction, or find an enthusiastic impulse -springing up from the documents that they are searching. How, they -ask, could men live, make love, reproduce their species, sing, paint, -discuss, when the trumps were sounding east and west to announce the -end of the world? But they do not see that such an end of the world -exists only in their own imaginations, rich in elegiac motives, but -poor in understanding. They do not perceive that such importunate -trumpet-calls have never in reality existed. These are very useful, -on the other hand, for reminding those who may have forgotten it that -history always pursues her indefatigable work, and that her apparent -agonies are the travail of a new birth, and that what are believed to -be her expiring sighs are moans that announce the birth of a new world. -History differs from the individual who dies because, in the words of -Alcmæon of Crete, he is not able τὴν ἀρχήν τῷ τέλει προσάψαι, to join -his beginning to his end: history never dies, because she always joins -her beginning to her end.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_6" id="Footnote_1_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_6"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> For the complete development of these conceptions, see -my study of <i>The Conception of Becoming</i>, in the <i>Saggio sullo Hegel -seguito da altri scritti di storia della filosofia</i>, pp. 149-175 (Bari, -1913). (English translation of the work on Hegel by Douglas Ainslie. -Macmillan, London.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_7" id="Footnote_2_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_7"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For what relates to this section, see my treatment of -<i>Judgments of Value,</i> in the work before cited.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p></div> - -<h4><a name="VI" id="VI">VI</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE HUMANITY OF HISTORY</h4> - - -<p>Enfranchising itself from servitude to extra-mundane caprice and -to blind natural necessity, freeing itself from transcendency and -from false immanence (which is in its turn transcendency), thought -conceives history as the work of man, as the product of human will -and intellect, and in this manner enters that form of history which -we shall call <i>humanistic.</i> This humanism first appears as in simple -contrast to nature or to extra-mundane powers, and posits dualism. -On the one side is man, with his strength, his intelligence, his -reason, his prudence, his will for the good; on the other there is -something that resists him, strives against him, upsets his wisest -plans, breaks the web that he has been weaving and obliges him to weave -it all over again. History, envisaged from the view-point of this -conception, is developed entirely from the first of these two sides, -because the other does not afford a dialectical element which can be -continually met and superseded by the first, giving rise to a sort of -interior collaboration, but represents the absolutely extraneous, the -capricious, the accidental, the meddler, the ghost at the feast. Only -in the former do we find rationality combined with human endeavour, -and thus the possibility of a rational explication of history. What -comes from the other side is announced, but not explained: it is not -material for history, but at the most for chronicle. This first form of -humanistic history is known under the various names of <i>rationalistic, -intellectualistic,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> abstractistic, individualistic, psychological</i> -history, and especially under that of <i>pragmatic</i> history. It is a -form generally condemned by the consciousness of our times, which has -employed these designations, especially <i>rationalism</i> and <i>pragmatism</i>, -to represent a particular sort of historiographical insufficiency and -inferiority, and has made proverbial the most characteristic pragmatic -explanations of institutions and events, as types of misrepresentation -into which one must beware of falling if one wish to think history -seriously. But as happens in the progress of culture and science, even -if the condemnation be cordially accepted and no hesitation entertained -as to drawing practical consequences from it in the field of actuality, -there is not an equally clear consciousness of the reasons for this, -or of the thought process by means of which it has been attained. This -process we may briefly describe as follows.</p> - -<p>Pragmatic finds the reasons for historical facts in man, but in man -<i>in so far as he is an individual made abstract</i>, and thus opposed -as such not only to the universe, but to other men, who have also -been made abstract. History thus appears to consist of the mechanical -action and reaction of beings, each one of whom is shut up in himself. -Now no historical process is intelligible under such an arrangement, -for the sum of the addition is always superior to the numbers added. -To such an extent is this true that, not knowing which way to turn -in order to make the sum come out right, it became necessary to -excogitate the doctrine of 'little causes,' which were supposed to -produce 'great effects.' This doctrine is absurd, for it is clear -that great effects can only have real causes (if the illegitimate -conceptions of great and small, of cause and effect, be applicable -here). Such a formula, then, far from expressing the law of historical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> -facts, unconsciously expresses the defects of the doctrine, which -is inadequate for its purpose. And since the rational explanation -fails, there arise crowds of fancies to take its place, which are all -conceived upon the fundamental motive of the abstract individual. The -pragmatic explanation of religions is characteristic of this; these -are supposed to have been produced and maintained in the world by the -economic cunning of the priests, taking advantage of the ignorance -and credulity of the masses. But historical pragmatic does not -always present itself in the guise of this egoistic and pessimistic -inspiration. It is not fair to accuse it of egoism and utilitarianism, -when the true accusation should, as we have already said, be levelled -at its abstract individualism. This abstract individualism could be and -sometimes was conceived even as highly moral, for we certainly find -among the pragmatics sage legislators, good kings, and great men, who -benefit humanity by means of science, inventions, and well-organized -institutions. And if the greedy priest arranged the deceit of -religions, if the cruel despot oppressed weak and innocent people, and -if error was prolific and engendered the strangest and most foolish -customs, yet the goodness of the enlightened monarch and legislator -created the happy epochs, caused the arts to flourish, encouraged -poets, aided discoveries, encouraged industries. From these pragmatic -conceptions is derived the verbal usage whereby we speak of the age of -Pericles, of that of Augustus, of that of Leo X, or of that of Louis -XIV. And since fanciful explanations do not limit themselves merely -to individuals physically existing, but also employ facts and small -details, which are also made abstract and shut up in themselves, being -thus also turned into what Vico describes as 'imaginative universals,' -in like manner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> all these modes of explanation known as 'catastrophic' -and making hinge the salvation or the ruin of a whole society upon the -virtue of some single fact are also derived from pragmatic. Examples -of this, which have also become proverbial, because they refer to -concepts that have been persistently criticized by the historians of -our time, are the fall of the Roman Empire, explained as the result -of barbarian invasions, European civilization of the twelfth and -thirteenth centuries, as the result of the Crusades, the renascence -of classical literatures, as the result of the Turkish conquest of -Constantinople and of the immigration of the learned Byzantines into -Italy—and the like. And in just the same way as when the conception -of the single individual did not furnish a sufficient explanation -recourse was for that reason had to a multiplicity of individuals, to -their co-operation and conflicting action, so here, when the sole cause -adduced soon proved itself too narrow, an attempt was made to make up -for the insufficiency of the method by the search for and enumeration -of multiple historical causes. This enumeration threatened to proceed -to the infinite, but, finite or infinite as it might be, it never -explained the process to be explained, for the obvious reason that the -continuous is never made out of the discontinuous, however much the -latter may be multiplied and solidified. The so-called theory of the -causes or factors of history, which survives in modern consciousness, -together with several other mental habits of pragmatic, although -generally inclined to follow other paths, is rather a confession of -powerlessness to dominate history by means of individual causes, -or causes individually conceived, than a theory; far from being a -solution, it is but a reopening of the problem.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> - -<p>Pragmatic therefore fails to remain human—that is to say, to develop -itself as rationality; even in the human side to which it clings and -in which it wishes to maintain and oppose itself to the natural or -extra-natural; and having already made individuals irrational and -unhuman by making them abstract, it gradually has recourse to other -historical factors, and arrives finally at natural causes, which do -not differ at all in their abstractness from other individual causes. -This means that pragmatic, which had previously asserted itself as -humanism, falls back into naturalism, from which it had distinctly -separated itself. And it falls into it all the more, seeing that, as -has been noted, human individuals have been made abstract, not only -among themselves, but toward the rest of the universe, which remains -facing them, as though it were an enemy. What is it that really rules -history according to this conception? Is it man, or extra-human powers, -natural or divine? The claim that history exists only as an individual -experience is not maintainable; and in the pragmatic conception another -agent in history is always presumed, an extra-human being which, at -different times and to different thinkers, is known as fate, chance, -fortune, nature, God, or by some other name. During the period at which -pragmatic history flourished, and there was much talk of reason and -wisdom, an expression of a monarchical or courtly tinge is to be found -upon the lips of a monarch and of a philosopher who was his friend: -homage was paid to <i>sa Majesté le Hasard!</i> Here too there is an attempt -to patch up the difficulty and to seek eclectic solutions; in order -to get out of it, we find pragmatic affirming that human affairs are -conducted half by prudence and half by fortune, that intelligence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> -contributes one part, fortune another, and so on. But who will assign -the just share to the two competitors? Will not he who does assign it -be the true and only maker of history? And since he who does assign -it cannot be man, we see once again how pragmatic leads directly to -transcendency and irrationality through its naturalism. It leads to -irrationality, accompanied by all its following of inconveniences -and by all the other dualisms that it brings with it and which are -particular aspects of itself, such as the impossibility of development, -regressions, the triumph of evil. The individual, engaged with external -forces however conceived, sometimes wins, at other times loses; his -victory itself is precarious, and the enemy is always victorious, -inflicting losses upon him and making his victories precarious. -Individuals are ants crushed by a piece of rock, and if some ant -escapes from the mass that falls upon it and reproduces the species, -which begins again the labour from the beginning, the rock will fall, -or always may fall, upon the new generation and may crush all of its -members, so that it is the arbiter of the lives of the industrious -ants, to which it does much injury and no good. This is as pessimistic -a view as can be conceived.</p> - -<p>These difficulties and vain-tentatives of pragmatic historiography have -caused it to be looked upon with disfavour and to be rejected in favour -of a superior conception, which preserves the initial humanistic motive -and, removing from it the abstractness of the atomicized individual, -assures it against any falling back into agnosticism, transcendency, -or the despair caused by pessimism. The conception that has completed -the criticism of pragmatic and the redemption of humanism has been -variously and more or less well<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> formulated in the course of the -history of thought as mind or reason that constructs history, as the -'providence' of mind or the 'astuteness' of reason.</p> - -<p>The great value of this conception is that it changes humanism from -abstract to concrete, from monadistic or atomistic to idealistic, -from something barely human into something cosmic, from unhuman -humanism, such as that of man shut up in himself and opposed to man, -into humanism that is really human, the humanity common to men, -indeed to the whole universe, which is all humanity, even in its most -hidden recesses—that is to say, spirituality. And history, according -to this conception, as it is no longer the work of nature or of an -extra-mundane God, so it is not the impotent work of the empirical -and unreal individual, interrupted at every moment, but the work -of that individual which is truly real and is the eternal spirit -individualizing itself. For this reason it has no adversary at all -opposed to it, but every adversary is at the same time its subject -—that is to say, is one of the aspects of that dialecticism which -constitutes its inner being. Again, it does not seek its principle of -explanation in a particular act of thought or will, or in a single -individual or in a multitude of individuals, or in an event given as -the cause of other events, or in a collection of events that form the -cause of a single event, but seeks and places it in the process itself, -which is born of thought and returns to thought, and is intelligible -through the auto-intelligibility of thought, which never has need of -appealing to anything external to itself in order to understand itself. -The explanation of history becomes so truly, because it coincides with -its explication; whereas explanation by means of abstract causes is a -breaking up of the process; the living having been slain, there is a -forced attempt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> made to obtain life by setting the severed head again -upon the shoulders.</p> - -<p>When the historians of our day, and the many sensible folk who do not -make a profession of philosophy, repeat that the history of the world -does not depend upon the will of individuals, upon such accidents as -the length of Cleopatra's nose, or upon anecdotes; that no historical -event has ever been the result of deception or misunderstanding, but -that all have been due to persuasion and necessity; that there is some -one who has more intelligence than any individual whatever—the world; -that the explanation of a fact is always to be sought in the entire -organism and not in a single part torn from the other parts; that -history could not have been developed otherwise than it has developed, -and that it obeys its own iron logic; that every fact has its reason -and that no individual is completely wrong; and numberless propositions -of the same sort, which I have assembled promiscuously—they are -perhaps not aware that with such henceforth obvious statements they -are repeating the criticism of pragmatic history (and implicitly that -of theological and naturalistic history) and affirming the truth of -idealistic history. Were they aware of this, they would not mingle -with these propositions others which are their direct contradiction, -relating to causes, accidents, decadences, climates, races, and so -on, which represent the detritus of the conception that has been -superseded. For the rest, it is characteristic of the consciousness -called common or vulgar to drag along with it an abundant detritus of -old, dead concepts mingled with the new ones; but this does not detract -from the importance of its enforced recognition of the new concept, -which it substantially follows in its judgments.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span></p> - -<p>Owing to the already mentioned resolution of all historiographical -questions into general philosophy, it would not be possible to -give copious illustrations of the new concept of history which the -nineteenth century has accepted in place of the pragmatic conception -without giving a lengthy exposition of general philosophy, which, in -addition to the particular inconvenience its presence would have here, -would lead to the repetition of things elsewhere explained. Taking the -position that history is the work, not of the abstract individual, but -of reason or providence, as admitted, I intend rather to correct an -erroneous mode of expressing that doctrine which I believe that I have -detected. I mean the form given to it by Vico and by Hegel, according -to which Providence or Reason makes use of the particular ends and -passions of men, in order to conduct them unconsciously to more lofty -spiritual conditions, making use for this purpose of benevolent cunning.</p> - -<p>Were this form exact, or were it necessary to take it literally (and -not simply as an imaginative and provisional expression of the truth), -I greatly fear that a shadow of dualism and transcendency would appear -in the heart of the idealistic conception. For in this position of -theirs toward the Idea or Providence, individuals would have to be -considered, if not as <i>deluded</i> (satisfied indeed beyond their desires -and hopes), then certainly as <i>illuded</i>, even though benevolently -illuded. Individuals and Providence, or individuals and Reason, would -not make one, but two; and the individual would be inferior and the -Idea superior—that is to say, dualism and the reciprocal transcendency -of God and the world would persist. This, on the other hand, would not -be at variance from the historical point<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> of view with what has been -several times observed as to the theological residue at the bottom -of Hegel's, and yet more of Vico's, thought. Now the claim of the -idealistic conception is that individual and Idea make one and not -two—that is to say, perfectly coincide and are identified. For this -reason, there must be no talking (save metaphorically) of the wisdom of -the Idea and of the folly or illusion of individuals.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless it seems indubitably certain that the individual acts -through the medium of infinite illusions, proposing to himself ends -that he fails to attain and attaining ends that he has not seen. -Schopenhauer (imitating Hegel) has made popular the illusions of -love, by means of which the will leads the individual to propagate -the species; and we all know that illusions are not limited to those -that men and women exercise toward one another (<i>les tromperies -réciproques</i>), but that they enter into our every act, which is always -accompanied by hopes and mirages that are not followed by realization. -And the illusion of illusions seems to be this: that the individual -believes himself to be toiling to live and to intensify his life more -and more, whereas he is really toiling to die. He wishes to see his -work completed as the affirmation of his life, and its completion is -the passing away of the work; he toils to obtain peace in life, but -peace is on the contrary death, which alone is peace. How then are we -to deny this dualism between the illusion of the individual and the -reality of the work, between the individual and the Idea? How are we to -refute the only explanation which seems to compose in some measure the -discord—namely, that the Idea turns the illusions of the individual to -its own ends, even though this doctrine lead inevitably to a sort of -transcendency of the Idea?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> - -<p>But the real truth is that what results from the observations and -objections above exposed is not the illusion of the individual who -loves, who tries to complete his work, who sighs for peace, but rather -the illusion of him who believes that the individual is illuded: the -illusory is the illusion itself. And this illusion appears in the -phenomenology of the spirit as the result of the well-known abstractive -process, which breaks up unity in an arbitrary manner and in this case -separates the result from the process or actual acting, in which alone -the former is real; the accompaniment from the accompanied, which is -all one with the accompaniment, because there is not spirit and its -escort, but only the one spirit in its development, the single moments -of the process, of the continuity, which is their soul; and so on. -That illusion arises in the individual when he begins to reflect upon -himself, and at the beginning of that reflection, which is at the same -time a dialectical process. But in concrete reflection, or rather in -concrete consciousness, he discovers that there is no end that has not -been realized, as well as it could, in the process, in which it was -never an absolute end—that is to say, an abstract end, but both a -means and an end.</p> - -<p>To return to the popular theory of Schopenhauer, only he who looks -upon men as animals, or worse than animals, can believe that love is a -process that leads only to the biological propagation of the species, -when every man knows that he fecundates his own soul above all prior -to the marriage couch, and that images and thoughts and projects and -actions are created before children and in addition to them. Certainly, -we are conscious of the moments of an action as it develops—that is -to say, of its passage and not of its totality seen in the light of -a new spiritual situation, such as we strive to obtain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> when, as we -say, we leave the tumult behind us and set ourselves to write our own -history. But there is no illusion, either now or then; neither now nor -then is there the abstract individual face to face with a Providence -who succeeds in deceiving him for beneficial ends, acting rather as -a doctor than as a serious educator, and treating the race of men as -though they were animals to train and make use of, instead of men to -educate—that is to say, develop.</p> - -<p>After having concentrated the mind upon a thought of Vico and of -Hegel, can it be possible to set ourselves down to examine those of -others which afford material to the controversies of historians and -methodologists of history of our time? These represent the usual form -in which appear the problems concerning the relation between the -individual and the Idea, between pragmatic and idealistic history. -Perhaps the patience necessary for the descent into low haunts is -meritorious and our duty; perhaps there may be some useful conclusion -to be drawn from these common disputes; but I must beg to be excused -for not taking part in them and for limiting myself to the sole remark -that the question which has been for some time discussed, whether -history be the history of 'masses' or of 'individuals,' would be -laughable in its very enunciation, if we were to understand by 'mass' -what the word implies, a complex of individuals. And since it is not -a good method to attribute laughable ideas to adversaries, it may be -supposed that on this occasion what is meant by 'mass' is something -else, which moves the mass of individuals. In this case, anyone can see -that the problem is the same as that which has just been examined. The -conflict between 'collectivistic' and 'individualistic' historiography -will never be composed so long as the former<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> assigns to collectivity -the power that is creative of ideas and institutions, and the latter -assigns it to the individual of genius, for both affirmations are true -in what they include and false in what they exclude—that is to say, -not only in their exclusion of the opposed thesis, but also in the -tacit exclusion, which they both make, of totality as idea.</p> - -<p>A warning as to a historiographical method, so similar in appearance -to that which I have been defending as to be confounded with it, may -perhaps be more opportune. This method, which is variously called -<i>sociological, institutional,</i> and <i>of values,</i> preserves among the -variety of its content and the inequality of mental level noticeable -in its supporters the general and constant characteristic of believing -that true history consists of the history of societies, institutions, -and human values, not of individual values. The history of individuals, -according to this view, is excluded, as being a parallel or inferior -history, and its inferiority is held to be due either to the slight -degree of interest that it is capable of arousing or to its lack of -intelligibility. In the latter case (by an inversion on this occasion -of the attitude of contempt which was noted in pragmatic history) it -is handed over to chronicle or romance. But in such dualism as this, -and in the disagreement which persists owing to that dualism, lies the -profound difference between the empirical and naturalistic conceptions -of value, of institutions, and of societies, and the idealistic -conception. This conception does not contemplate the establishment of -an abstract history of the spirit, of the abstract universal, side by -side with or beyond abstract individualistic or pragmatic history, -but the understanding that individual and idea, taken separately, are -two equivalent abstractions, each equally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> unfitted for supplying -its subject to history, and that true history is the history of the -individual in so far as he is universal and of the universal in so -far as individual. It is not a question of abolishing Pericles to the -advantage of politics, or Plato to the advantage of philosophy, or -Sophocles to the advantage of tragedy; but to think and to represent -politics, philosophy, and tragedy as Pericles, Plato, and Sophocles, -and these as each one of the others in one of their particular -moments. Because if each one of these is the shadow of a dream outside -its relation with the spirit, so likewise is the spirit outside its -individualizations, and to attain to universality in the conception of -history is to render both equally secure with that security which they -mutually confer upon one another. Were the existence of Pericles, of -Sophocles, and of Plato indifferent, would not the existence of the -idea have for that very reason been pronounced indifferent? Let him who -cuts individuals out of history but pay close attention and he will -perceive that either he has not cut them out at all, as he imagined, or -he has cut out with them history itself.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span></p> - -<h4><a name="VII" id="VII">VII</a></h4> - - -<h4>CHOICE AND PERIODIZATION</h4> - - -<p>Since a fact is historical in so far as it is thought, and since -nothing exists outside thought, there can be no sense whatever in the -question, What are <i>historical facts</i> and what are <i>non-historical -facts?</i> A non-historical fact would be a fact that has not been thought -and would therefore be non-existent, and so far no one has yet met -with a non-existent fact. A historical thought links itself to and -follows another historical thought, and then another, and yet another; -and however far we navigate the great sea of being, we never leave the -well-defined sea of thought. But it remains to be explained how the -illusion is formed that there are two orders of facts, historical and -non-historical. The explanation is easy when we recollect what has been -said as to the chroniclizing of history which dies as history, leaving -behind it the mute traces of its life, and also as to the function of -erudition or philology, which preserves these traces for the ends of -culture, arranging scattered items of news, documents, and monuments -in an orderly manner. News, documents, and monuments are innumerable, -and to collect them all would not only be impossible, but contrary to -the ends themselves of culture, which, though aided in its work by the -moderate and even copious supply of such things, would be hindered and -suffocated by their exuberance, not to say infinity. We consequently -observe that the annotator of news transcribes some items and omits -the rest; the collector<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> of papers arranges and ties up in a bundle a -certain number of them, tearing up or burning or sending to the dealer -in such things a very large quantity, which forms the majority; the -collector of antiques places some objects in glass cases, others in -temporary safe custody, others he resolutely destroys or allows to be -destroyed; if he does otherwise, he is not an intelligent collector, -but a maniacal amasser, well fitted to provide (as he has provided) -the comic type of the antiquarian for fiction and comedy. For this -reason, not only are papers jealously collected and preserved in -public archives, and lists made of them, but efforts are also made -to discard those that are useless. It is for this reason that in the -recensions of philologists we always hear the same song in praise of -the learned man who has made a 'sober' use of documents, of blame for -him who has followed a different method and included what is vain and -superfluous in his volumes of annals, of selections from archives, -or of collections of documents. All learned men and philologists, in -fact, select, and all are advised to select. And what is the logical -criterion of this selection? There is none: no logical criterion can -be named that shall determine what news or what documents are or are -not useful and important, just because we are here occupied with a -practical and not with a scientific problem. Indeed, this lack of a -logical criterion is the foundation of the sophism that tyrannizes -over maniacal collectors, who reasonably affirm that everything can -be of use, and would therefore unreasonably preserve everything—they -wear themselves out in accumulating old clothes and odds and ends -of all sorts, over which they mount guard with jealous affection. -The criterion is the choice itself, conditioned, like every economic -act, by knowledge of the actual situation, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> in this case by the -practical and scientific needs of a definite moment or epoch. This -selection is certainly conducted with intelligence, but not with the -application of a philosophic criterion, and is justified only in and -by itself. For this reason we speak of the fine tact, or scent, or -instinct of the collector or learned man. Such a process of selection -may quite well make use of apparent logical distinctions, as those -between public and private facts, capital and secondary documents, -beautiful or ugly, significant or insignificant monuments; but in -final analysis the decision is always given from practical motives, -and is summed up in the act of preserving or neglecting. Now from this -preserving or neglecting, in which our action is realized, is afterward -invented an <i>objective</i> quality, attributed to facts, which leads to -their being spoken of as 'facts that are worthy' and 'facts that are -not worthy of history,' of 'historical' and 'non-historical' facts. But -all this is an affair of imagination, of vocabulary, and of rhetoric, -which in no way changes the substance of things.</p> - -<p>When history is confounded with erudition and the methods of the -one are unduly transferred to the other, and when the metaphorical -distinction that has just been noted is taken in a literal sense, we -are asked how it is possible to avoid going astray in the infinity of -facts, and with what criterion it is possible to effect the separation -of 'historical' facts from 'those that are not worthy of history.' -But there is no fear of going astray in history, because, as we have -seen, the problem is in every case prepared by life, and in every case -the problem is solved by thought, which passes from the confusion of -life to the distinctness of consciousness; a given problem with a -given solution: a problem that generates other problems, but is never<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> -a problem of choice between two or more facts, but on each occasion -a creation of the unique fact, the fact thought. Choice does not -appear in it, any more than in art, which passes from the obscurity -of sentiment to the clearness of the representation, and is never -embarrassed between the images to be chosen, because itself creates the -image, the unity of the image.</p> - -<p>By thus confounding two things, not only is an insoluble problem -created, but the very distinction between facts that can and facts -that cannot be neglected is also denaturalized and rendered void. -This distinction is quite valid as regards erudition, for facts that -can be neglected are always facts—that is to say, they are traces of -facts, in the form of news, documents, and monuments, and for this -reason one can understand how they can be looked upon as a class to -be placed side by side with the other class of facts that cannot be -neglected. But non-historical facts—that is to say, facts that have -not been thought—would be nothing, and when placed beside historical -facts—that is to say, thought as a species of the same genus—they -would communicate their nullity to those also, and would dissolve their -own distinctness, together with the concept of history.</p> - -<p>After this, it does not seem necessary to examine the characteristics -that have been proposed as the basis for this division of facts into -historical and non-historical. The assumption being false, the manner -in which it is treated in its particulars remains indifferent and -without importance in respect to the fundamental criticism of the -division itself. It may happen (and this is usually the case) that -the characteristics and the differences enunciated have some truth in -themselves, or at least offer some problem for solution: for example, -when by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> historical facts are meant general facts and by non-historical -facts those that are individual. Here we find the problem of the -relation of the individual and the universal. Or, again, by historical -facts are sometimes meant those that treat of history proper, and by -non-historical the stray references of chronicles, and here we find the -problem as to the relation between history and chronicle. But regarded -as an attempt to decide logically of what facts history should treat -and what neglect, and to assign to each its quality, such divisions are -all equally erroneous.</p> - -<p>The <i>periodization</i> of history is subject to the same criticism. To -<i>think</i> history is certainly <i>to divide it into periods</i>, because -thought is organism, dialectic, drama, and as such has its periods, its -beginning, its middle, and its end, and all the other ideal pauses that -a drama implies and demands. But those pauses are ideal and therefore -inseparable from thought, with which they are one, as the shadow is one -with the body, silence with sound: they are identical and changeable -with it. Christian thinkers divided history into that which preceded -and that which followed the redemption, and this periodization was not -an addition to Christian thought, but Christian thought itself. We -modern Europeans divide it into antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern -times. This periodization has been subject to a great deal of refined -criticism on the part of those who hold that it came to be introduced -anyhow, almost dishonestly, without the authority of great names, and -without the advice of the philosophers and the methodologists being -asked on the matter. But it has maintained itself and will maintain -itself so long as our consciousness shall persist in its present phase. -The fact of its having been insensibly formed would appear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> to be -rather a merit than a demerit, because this means that it was not due -to the caprice of an individual, but has followed the development of -modern consciousness itself. When antiquity has nothing more to tell us -who still feel the need of studying Greek and Latin, Greek philosophy -and Roman law; when the Middle Ages have been superseded (and they have -not been superseded yet); when a new social form, different from that -which emerged from the ruins of the Middle Ages, has supplanted our -own; then the problem itself and the historical outlook which derives -from it will also be changed, and perhaps antiquity and the Middle Ages -and modern times will all be contained within a single epoch, and the -pauses be otherwise distributed. And what has been said of these great -periods is to be understood of all the others, which vary according to -the variety of historical material and the various modes of viewing it. -It has sometimes been said that every periodization has a 'relative' -value. But we must say 'both relative and absolute,' like all thought, -it being understood that the periodization is intrinsic to thought and -determined by the determination of thought.</p> - -<p>However, the practical needs of chroniclism and of learning make -themselves felt here also. Just as in metrical treatises the internal -rhythm of a poem is resolved into external rhythm and divided into -syllables and feet, into long and short vowels, tonic and rhythmic -accents, into strophes and series of strophes, and so on, so the -internal time of historical thought (that time which is thought -itself) is derived from chroniclism converted into external time, or -temporal series, of which the elements are spatially separated from one -another. Scheme and facts are no longer one, but two, and the facts -are disposed according to the scheme,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> and divided according to the -scheme into major and minor cycles (for example, according to hours, -days, months, years, centuries, and millenniums, where the calculation -is based upon the rotations and revolutions of the earth upon itself -and round the sun). Such is <i>chronology</i>, by means of which we know -that the histories of Sparta, Athens, and Rome filled the thousand -years preceding Christ, that of the Lombards, the Visigoths, and the -Franks the first millennium after Christ, and that we are still in the -second millennium. This mode of chronology can be pursued by means of -particularizing incidents thus: that the Empire of the West ended in -A.D. 476 (although it did not really end then or had already ended -previously); that Charlemagne the Frank was crowned Emperor at Rome -by Pope Leo III in the year 800; that America was discovered in 1492, -and that the Thirty Years War ended in 1648. It is of the greatest -use to us to know these things, or (since we really <i>know</i> nothing -in this way) to acquire the capacity of so checking references to -facts that we are able to find them easily and promptly when occasion -arises. Certainly no one thinks of speaking ill of chronologies and -chronographies and tables and synoptic views of history, although in -using them we run the risk (and in what thing done by man does he not -run a risk?) of seeing worthy folk impressed with the belief that the -number produces the event, as the hand of the clock, when it touches -the sign of the hour, makes the clock strike; or (as an old professor -of mine used to say) that the curtain fell upon the acting of ancient -history in 476, to rise again immediately afterward on the beginning of -the Middle Ages.</p> - -<p>But such fancies are not limited to the minds of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> ingenuous and -inattentive; they constitute the base of that error owing to which a -distinction of periods, which shall be what is called <i>objective and -natural</i>, is desired and sought after. Christian chronographers had -already introduced this ontological meaning into chronology, making -the millenniums of the world's history correspond with the days of -the creation or the ages of man's life. Finally, Ferrari in Italy and -Lorenz in Germany (the latter ignorant of his Italian predecessor) -conceived a theory of historical periods according to generations, -calculated in periods of thirty-one years and a fraction, or of -thirty-three years and a fraction, and grouped as tetrads or triads, in -periods of a hundred and twenty-five years or a century. But, without -dwelling upon numerical and chronographic schemes, all doctrines that -represent the history of nations as proceeding according to the stages -of development of the individual, of his psychological development, -of the categories of the spirit, or of anything else, are due to -the same error, which is that of rendering periodization external -and natural. All are mythological, if taken in the naturalistic -sense, save when these designations are employed empirically—that -is to say, when chronology is used in chroniclism and erudition in a -legitimate manner. We must also repeat a warning as to the care to be -employed in recognizing important problems, which sometimes have first -appeared through the medium of those erroneous inquiries, and as to -the truths that have been seen or caught a glimpse of by these means. -This exempts us (as we remarked above in relation to the criteria of -choice) from examining those doctrines in the particularity of their -various determinations, because in this respect, if their assumption be -obviously fantastic, their value is consequently <i>nil</i>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> <i>Nil</i>, as the -value of all those æsthetic constructions is <i>nil</i> which claim to pass -from the abstractions, by means of which they reduce the organism of -the work of art to fragments for practical ends, to the explanation of -the nature of art and to the judgment and history of the creations of -human imagination.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span></p> - -<h4><a name="VIII" id="VIII">VIII</a></h4> - - -<h4>DISTINCTION (SPECIAL HISTORIES) AND DIVISION</h4> - - -<p>The conception of history that we have reached—namely, that which has -not its documents outside itself, but in itself, which has not its -final and causal explanation outside itself, but within itself, which -has not philosophy outside itself, but coincides with philosophy, which -has not the reason for its definite form and rhythm outside itself, but -within itself—identifies history with the act of thought itself, which -is always philosophy and history together. And with this it debarrasses -it of the props and plasters applied to it as though to an invalid in -need of external assistance. For they really did produce an infirmity -through their very insistence in first imagining and then treating a -non-existent infirmity.</p> - -<p>Doubtless the autonomy thus attained is a great advantage; but at first -sight it is not free from a grave objection. When all the fallacious -distinctions formerly believed in have been cancelled, it seems that -nothing remains for history as an act of thought but the immediate -consciousness of the individual-universal, in which all distinctions -are submerged and lost. And this is mysticism, which is admirably -adapted for feeling oneself at unity with God, but is not adapted for -thinking the world nor for acting in the world.</p> - -<p>Nor does it seem useful to add that unity with God does not exclude -consciousness of diversity, of change, of becoming. For it can -be objected that consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> of diversity either derives from -the individual and intuitive element, and in this case it is -incomprehensible how such an element can subsist in its proper form of -intuition, in thought, which always universalizes; or if it is said -to be the result of the act of thought itself, then the distinction, -believed to have been abolished, reappears in a strengthened form, -and the asserted indistinct simplicity of thought remains shaken. A -mysticism which should insist upon particularity and diversity, a -<i>historical mysticism,</i> in fact, would be a contradiction in terms, for -mysticism is unhistorical and anti-historical by its very nature.</p> - -<p>But these objections retain their validity precisely when the act of -thought is conceived in the mystical manner—that is to say, not as -an act of thought, but as something negative, the simple result of -the negation by reason of empirical distinctions, which certainly -leaves thought free of illusions, but not yet truly full of itself. -To sum up, mysticism, which is a violent reaction from naturalism and -transcendency, yet retains traces of what it has denied, because it -is incapable of substituting anything for it, and thus maintains its -presence, in however negative a manner. But the really efficacious -negation of empiricism and transcendency, their positive negation, is -brought about not by means of mysticism, but of <i>idealism</i>; not in -the immediate, but in the <i>mediated</i> consciousness; not in indistinct -unity, but in the unity that is <i>distinction</i>, and as such truly -thought.</p> - -<p>The act of thought is the consciousness of the spirit that is -consciousness; and therefore that act is auto-consciousness. And -auto-consciousness implies distinction in unity, distinction between -subject and object, theory and practice, thought and will, universal -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> particular, imagination and intellect, utility and morality, or -however these distinctions of and in unity are formulated, and whatever -may be the historical forms and denominations which the eternal system -of distinctions, <i>perennis philosophia,</i> may assume. To think is to -judge, and to judge is to distinguish while unifying, in which the -distinguishing is not less real than the unifying, and the unifying -than the distinguishing—that is to say, they are real, not as two -diverse realities, but as one reality, which is dialectical unity -(whether it be called unity or distinction).</p> - -<p>The first consequence to be drawn from this conception of the spirit -and of thought is that when empirical distinctions have been overthrown -history does not fall into the indistinct; when the will-o'-the-wisps -have been extinguished, darkness does not supervene, because the light -of the distinction is to be found in history itself. History is thought -by judging it, with that judgment which is not, as we have shown, -the evaluation of sentiments, but the intrinsic knowledge of facts. -And here its unity with philosophy is all the more evident, because -the better philosophy penetrates and refines its distinctions, the -better it penetrates the particular; and the closer its embrace of the -particular, the closer its possession of its own proper conceptions. -Philosophy and historiography progress together, indissolubly united.</p> - -<p>Another consequence to be deduced from the above, and one which -will perhaps seem to be more clearly connected with the practice of -historiography, is the refutation of the false idea of a <i>general -history,</i> superior to <i>special histories.</i> This has been called a -history of histories, and is supposed to be true and proper history, -having beneath it political, economic, and institutional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> histories, -moral history or the history of the sentiments and ethical ideals, the -history of poetry and art, the history of thought and of philosophy. -But were this so, a dualism would arise, with the usual result of every -dualism, that each one of the two terms, having been ill distinguished, -reveals itself as empty. In this case, either general history shows -itself to be empty, having nothing to do when the special histories -have accomplished their work, or particular histories do so, when -they fail even to pick up the crumbs of the banquet, all of which has -been voraciously devoured by the other. Sometimes recourse is had to -a feeble expedient, and to general history is accorded the treatment -of one of the subjects of the special histories, the latter being -then grouped apart from that. Of this arrangement the best that can -be said is that it is purely verbal and does not designate a logical -distinction and opposition, and the worst that can happen is that a -real value should be attributed to it, because in this case a fantastic -hierarchy is established, which makes it impossible to understand the -genuine development of the facts. And there is practically no special -history that has not been promoted to be a general history, now as -<i>political</i> or <i>social</i> history, to which those of literature, art, -philosophy, religion, and the lesser sides of life should supply an -appendix; now as <i>history of the ideas or progress of the mind,</i> where -social history and all the others are placed in the second line; now as -<i>economic history,</i> where all the others are looked upon as histories -or chronicles of 'superstructures' derived from economic development in -an illusory manner, while the former is held to have developed in some -mysterious way by means of unknown powers, without thought and will, -or producing thought and will, in fancies and velleities, like so many -bubbles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> on the surface of its course. We must be firm in maintaining -against the theory of <i>general</i> history that there <i>does not exist -anything real but special histories,</i> because thought thinks facts to -the extent that it discerns a special aspect of them, and only and -always constructs histories of ideas, of imaginations, of political -actions, of apostolates, and the like.</p> - -<p>But it is equally just and advantageous to maintain the opposite -thesis: that <i>nothing exists but general history.</i> In this way is -refuted the false notion of the speciality of histories, understood as -a juxtaposition of specialities. This fallacy is correctly noted by the -critics in all histories which expose the various orders of facts one -after the other as so many strata and (to employ the critics' word) -compartments or little boxes, containing political history, industrial -and commercial history, history of customs, religious history, history -of literature and of art, and so on, under so many separate headings. -These divisions are merely literary, they may possess some utility as -such, but in the case under consideration they do not fulfil merely -a literary function, but attempt that of historical understanding, -and thereby give evidence of their defect, in thus presenting these -histories as without relation between one another, not dialecticized, -but aggregated. It is quite clear that <i>history</i> remains to be -written after the writing of those <i>histories</i> in this disjointed -manner. Abstract distinction and abstract unity are both equally -misunderstandings of concrete distinction and concrete unity, which is -relation.</p> - -<p>And when the relation is not broken and history is thought in the -concrete, it is seen that to think one aspect is to think all the -others at the same time. Thus it is impossible to understand completely -the doctrine, say, of a philosopher, without having to some extent -recourse<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> to the personality of the man himself, and, by distinguishing -the philosopher from the man, at the same time qualifying not only the -philosopher but the man, and uniting these two distinct characteristics -as a relation of life and philosophy. The same is to be said of the -distinction between the philosopher as philosopher and as orator -or artist, as subject to his private passions or as rising to the -execution of his duty, and so on. This means that we cannot think the -history of philosophy save as at the same time social, political, -literary, religious, and ethical history, and so on. This is the source -of the illusion that one in particular of these histories is the -whole of them, or that that one from which a start is made, and which -answers to the predilections and to the competence of the writer, is -the foundation of all the others. It also explains why it is sometimes -said that the 'history of philosophy' is also the 'philosophy of -history,' or that 'social history' is the true 'history of philosophy,' -and so on. A history of philosophy thoroughly thought out is truly the -whole of history (and in like manner a history of literature or of any -other form of the spirit), not because it annuls the other in itself, -but because all the others are present in it. Hence the demand that -historians shall acquire universal minds and a doctrine that shall -also be in a way universal, and the hatred of specialist historians, -pure philosophers, pure men of letters, pure politicians, or pure -economists, who, owing precisely to their one-sidedness, fail even to -understand the speciality that they claim to know in its purity, but -possess only in skeleton form that is to say, in its abstractness.</p> - -<p>And here a distinction becomes clear to us, with which it is impossible -to dispense in thinking history: the distinction between <i>form</i> and -<i>matter</i>, owing to which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> for example, we understand art by referring -it to matter (emotions, sentiments, passions, etc.) to which the artist -has given form; or philosophy by referring it to the facts which -gave rise to the problems that the thinker formulated and solved, or -the action of the politician by referring it to the aspirations and -ideas with which he was faced, and which supplied the material he has -shaped with genius, as an artist of practical life—that is to say, we -understand these things by always distinguishing an <i>external</i> from -an <i>internal</i> history, or an external history that is made into an -internal history. This distinction of matter and form, of external and -internal, would give rise again to the worst sort of dualism, would -lead us to think of the pragmatical imagination of man who strives -against his enemy nature, if it did not assume an altogether internal -and dialectical meaning in its true conception. Because from what has -been said it is easy to see that external and internal are not two -realities or two forms of reality, but that external and internal, -matter and form, both appear in turn as form in respect to one another, -and this materialization of each to idealize itself in the other -is the perpetual movement of the spirit as relation and circle: a -circle that is progress just because neither of these forms has the -privilege of functioning solely as form, and neither has the misfortune -of functioning solely as matter. What is the matter of artistic and -philosophical history? What is called social and moral history? And -what is the matter of this history? Artistic and philosophical history. -From this clearing up of the relation between matter and form, that -false mode of history is refuted which sets facts on one side and ideas -on the other, as two rival elements, and is therefore never able to -pay its debt and show how ideas<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> are generated from facts and facts -from ideas, because that generation must be conceived in its truth as a -perpetually rendering vain of one of the elements in the unity of the -other.</p> - -<p>If history is based upon distinction (unity) and coincides with -philosophy, the high importance that research into the autonomy of one -or the other special history attains in historiographical development -is perfectly comprehensible, but this is merely the reflection of -philosophical research, and is often troubled and lacking in precision. -All know what a powerful stimulus the new conception of imagination -and art gave to the conception of history, and therefore also to -mythology and religion, which were being developed with slowness and -difficulty during the eighteenth to triumph at the beginning of the -nineteenth century. This is set down to the creation of the history -of poetry and myth in the works of Vico in the first place and then -of Herder and others, and of the history of the figurative arts in -the works of Winckelmann and others. And to the clearer conception of -philosophy, law, customs, and language is due their renewal in the -respective historiographical fields, at the hands of Hegel, Savigny, -and Humboldt, and other creators and improvers of history, celebrated -on this account. This also explains why there has been so much dispute -as to whether history should be described as history of the state or as -history of culture, and as to whether the history of culture represents -an original aspect beyond that of the state or greater than it, as to -whether the progress narrated in history is only intellectual or also -practical and moral, and so on. These discussions must be referred to -the fundamental philosophical inquiry into the forms of the spirit, -their distinction and relation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> and to the precise mode of relation of -each one to the other.<a name="FNanchor_1_8" id="FNanchor_1_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_8" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>But although history distinguishes and unifies, it never -<i>divides</i>—that is to say, <i>separates</i>; and the <i>divisions of history</i> -which have been and are made do not originate otherwise than as the -result of the same practical and abstractive process that we have -seen break up the actuality of living history to collect and arrange -the inert materials in the temporal scheme, rendered extrinsic. -Histories already produced, and as such past, receive in this way -titles (every thought is 'without title' in its actuality—that is to -say, it has only itself for title), and each one is separated from -the other, and all of them, thus separated, are classified under more -or less general empirical conceptions, by means of classifications -that more or less cross one another. We may admire copious lists of -this sort in the books of methodologists, all of them proceeding, -as is inevitable, according to one or the other of these general -criteria: the criterion of the <i>quality</i> of the objects (histories -of religions, customs, ideas, institutions, etc., etc.), and that of -<i>temporal-spatial</i> arrangement (European, Asiatic, American, ancient, -medieval, of modern times, of ancient Greece, of ancient Rome, of -modern Greece, of the Rome of the Middle Ages, etc.); in conformity -with the abstract procedure which, when dividing the concept, is led -to posit on the one hand <i>abstract forms of the spirit</i> (objects) and -on the other <i>abstract intuitions</i> (space and time). I shall not say -that those titles and divisions are useless, nor even those tables, -but shall limit myself to the' remark that the history of philosophy, -of art, or of any other ideally distinct history, when understood as a -definite book or discourse, becomes empirical for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> the reason already -given, that true distinction is ideal, and a discourse or a book in -its concreteness contains not only distinction but unity and totality, -and to look upon either as incorporating only one side of the real is -arbitrary. And I shall also observe that as there are histories of -philosophy and of art in the empirical sense, so also nothing forbids -our talking in the same sense of a general history, separate from -special histories, indeed even of a history of progress and one of -decadence, of good and evil, of truth and error.</p> - -<p>The confusion between division and distinction—that is to say, between -the empirical consideration that breaks up history into special -histories and the philosophical consideration which always unifies -and distinguishes as it unifies—is the cause of errors analogous to -those that we have seen to result from such a process. To this are due -above all the many disquisitions on the 'problem' and on the 'limits' -of this or that history or group of special histories empirically -constituted. The problem does not exist, and the limits are impossible -to assign because they are conventional, as is finally recognized with -much trouble, and as could be recognized with much less trouble if a -start were made, not from the periphery, but from the centre—that is -to say, from gnoseological analysis. A graver error is the creation of -an infinity of <i>entia imaginationis</i>, taken for metaphysical entities -and forms of the spirit, and the pretension that arises from this of -developing the history of abstractions as though they were so many -forms of the spirit with independent lives of their own, whereas the -spirit is one. Hence the innumerable otiose problems with fantastic -solutions met with in historical books, which it is here unnecessary -to record. Every one is now able to draw these obvious consequences -for himself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> and to make appropriate reflections concerning them. It -is further obvious that the <i>entia imaginations,</i> in the same way as -the 'choice' of facts, and the chronological schematization or dating -of them, enter as a subsidiary element into any concrete exposition of -historical thought, because the distinction of thinking and abstraction -is an ideal distinction, which operates only in the unity of the spirit.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_8" id="Footnote_1_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_8"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See Appendix II.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span></p></div> - -<h4><a name="IX" id="IX">IX</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE 'HISTORY OF NATURE' AND HISTORY</h4> - - -<p>We must cease the process of classifying referred to just now, and -also that of the illusion of naturalism connected with it, by means -of which imaginary entities created by abstraction are changed into -historical facts and classificatory schemes into history, if we wish -to understand the difference between history that is history and that -due to what are called the natural sciences. This is also called -history—<i>'history of nature'</i>—but is so only in name. Some few years -ago a lively protest was made<a name="FNanchor_1_9" id="FNanchor_1_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_9" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> against the confusion of these two -forms of mental labour, one of which offers us genuine history, such as -might, for instance, be that of the Peloponnesian War or of Hannibal's -wars or of ancient Egyptian civilization, and the other a spurious -history, such as that known as the history of animal organisms, of the -earth's structure or geology, of the formation of the solar system -or cosmogony. It was observed with reason that in many treatises -the one has been wrongly connected with the other—that is to say, -history of civilization with history of nature, as though the former -follows the latter historically. The bottomless abyss between the two -was pointed out. This has been observed, however, in a confused way -by all, and better by historians of purely historical temperament, -who have an instinctive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> repugnance for natural history and hold -themselves carefully aloof from it. It was remembered with reason that -the history of historians has always the individually determinate as -its object, and proceeds by internal reconstruction, whereas that of -the naturalists depends upon types and abstractions and proceeds by -analogies. Finally, this so-called history or <i>quasi-history</i> was very -accurately defined as an apparently chronological arrangement of things -spatially distinct, and it was proposed to describe it with a new and -proper name, that of <i>Metastoria.</i></p> - -<p>Indeed, constructions of this sort are really nothing but -classificatory schemes, from the more simple to the more complex. -Their terms are obtained by abstract analyses and generalization, and -their series appears to the imagination as a history of the successive -development of the more complex from the more simple. Their right to -exist as classificatory schemes is incontestable, and their utility is -also incontestable, for they avail themselves of imagination to assist -learning and to aid the memory.</p> - -<p>This only becomes contestable when they are estranged from themselves, -lose their real nature, lay claim to illegitimate functions, and -take their imaginary historicity too seriously. We find this in the -metaphysic of naturalism, especially in <i>evolutionism,</i> which has -been its most recent form. This is due, not so much to the men of -science (who are as a rule cautious and possess a more or less clear -consciousness of the limits of those schemes and series) as to the -dilettante scientists and dilettante philosophers to whom we owe the -many books that undertake to narrate the origin of the world, and -which, aided by the acrisia of their authors, run on without meeting -any obstacle, from the cell, indeed from the nebula, to the French -Revolution,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> and even to the socialist movements of the nineteenth -century. 'Universal histories,' and therefore cosmological romances -(as we have already remarked in relation to universal histories), are -composed, not of pure thought, which is criticism, but of thought -mingled with imagination, which finds its outlet in myths. It is -useless to prove in detail that the evolutionists of to-day are -creators of myths, and that they weary themselves with attempts to -write the first chapters of Genesis in modern style (their description -is more elaborate, but they confuse such description with history in -a manner by no means inferior to that of Babylonian or Israelitish -priests), because this becomes evident as soon as such works are placed -in their proper position. Their logical origin will at once make clear -their true character.</p> - -<p>But setting aside these scientific monstrosities, already condemned -by the constant attitude of restraint and scepsis toward them on the -part of all scientifically trained minds—condemned, too, by the -very fact that they have had to seek and have found their fortune -at the hands of the crowd or 'great public,' and have fallen to the -rank of popular propaganda—we must here determine more precisely -how these classificatory schemes of historiographical appearance are -formed and how they operate. With this object, it is well to observe -that classificatory schemes and apparent histories do not appear to -be confined to the field of what are called the natural sciences or -sub-human world, but appear also in that of the moral sciences or -sciences of the human world. And to adduce simple and perspicuous -examples, it often happens that in the abstract analysis of language -and the positing of the types of the parts of speech, noun, verb, -adjective, pronoun, and so on, or in the analysis of the word into -syllables and sounds, or of style into proper or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> metaphorical words -and into various classes of metaphors, we construct classes that go -from the more simple to the more complex. This gives rise to the -illusion of history of language, exposed as the successive acquisition -of the various parts of speech or as the passage from the single -sound to the syllable (monosyllabic languages), from the syllable to -the aggregate of syllables (plurisyllabic languages), from words to -propositions, metres, rhymes, and so on. These are imaginary histories -that have never been developed elsewhere than in the studies of -scientists. In like manner, literary styles that have been abstractly -distinguished and arranged in series of increasing complexity (for -example, lyric, epic, drama) have given rise and continue to give -rise to the thought of a schematic arrangement of poetry, which, for -example, should appear during a first period as lyric, a second as -epic, a third as drama.</p> - -<p>The same has happened with regard to the classifications of abstract -political, economic, philosophical forms, and so on, all of which have -been followed by their shadows in the shape of imaginative history. The -repugnance that historians experience in attaching their narratives -to naturalistic-mythological prologues—that is to say, in linking -together in matrimony a living being and a corpse—is also proved by -their reluctance to admit scraps of abstract history into concrete -history, for they at once reveal their heterogeneity in regard to one -another by their mere appearance. De Sanctis has often been reproached -for not having begun his <i>History of Italian Literature</i> with an -account of the origins of the Italian language and of its relations -with Latin, and even with the linguistic family of Indo-European -languages, and of the races that inhabit the various parts of Italy. -An attempt has even been made to correct the design of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> that classic -work by supplying, with a complete lack of historical sense, the -introductions and additions that are not needed. But de Sanctis, -who took great pains to select the best point of departure for the -narrative of the history of Italian literature, and finally decided -to begin with a brief sketch of the state of culture at the Suabian -court and of the Sicilian poetical school, did not hesitate a moment -in rejecting all abstractions of languages and races which to his true -historical sense did not appear to be reconcilable with the <i>tenzone</i> -of Ciullo, with the rhythms of Friar Jacob, or with the ballades of -Guido Cavalcanti, which are quite concrete things.</p> - -<p>We must also remember that plans for classification and -pseudo-historical arrangements of their analogies are created not only -upon the bodies of histories that are living and really reproducible -and rethinkable, but also upon those that are dead—that is to say, -upon news items, documents, and monuments. This observation makes -more complete the identification of imaginary histories arising from -the natural sciences with those which have their source in the moral -sciences. The foundation of both is therefore very often not historical -intelligence, but, on the contrary, the lack of it, and their end not -only that of aiding living history and keeping it alive, but also the -mediate end of assisting in the prompt handling of the remains and the -cinders of the vanished world, the inert residues of history.</p> - -<p>The efficacy of this enlargement of the concept of abstract history, -which is analogical or naturalizing in respect to the field known -as 'spiritual' (and thus separated from that empirically known as -'natural'), cannot be doubted by one who knows and remembers the great -consequences that philosophy draws from the resolution of the realistic -concept of 'nature' in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> idealistic conception of 'construction,' -which the human spirit makes of reality, looking upon it as nature. -Kant worked upon the solution of this problem indefatigably and with -subtlety; he gave to it the direction that it has followed down to -our own days. And the consequence that we draw from it, in respect -to the problem that now occupies us, is that an error was committed -when, moved by the legitimate desire of distinguishing abstract from -concrete history, naturalizing history from thinking history, genuine -from fictitious history, a sort of agnosticism was reached, as a final -result, by means of limiting history to the field of humanity, which -was said to be cognoscible, and declaring all the rest to be the object -of metastoria and the limit of human knowledge. This conclusion would -lead again to a sort of dualism, though in a lofty sphere. But if -metastoria also appears, as we have seen, in the human field, it is -clear that the distinction as formulated stands in need of correction; -and the agnosticism founded upon it vacillates and falls. There is not -a double object before thought, man and nature, the one capable of -treatment in one way, the other in another way, the first cognizable, -and the second uncognizable and capable only of being constructed -abstractly; but thought always thinks history, the history of reality -that is one, and beyond thought there is nothing, for the natural -object becomes a myth when it is affirmed as object, and shows itself -in its true reality as nothing else but the human spirit itself, which -schematized history that has been lived and thought, or the materials -of the history that has already been lived and thought. The saying that -nature has no history is to be understood in the sense that nature as -a rational being capable of thought has not history, because it is -not—or, let us say, it is nothing that is real. The opposite saying,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> -that nature is also formative and possesses historical life, is to be -taken in the other sense that reality, the sole reality (comprehending -man and nature in itself, which are only empirically and abstractly -separate), is all development and life.</p> - -<p>What substantial difference can ever be discovered on the one hand -between geological stratifications and the remains of vegetables -and animals, of which it is possible to construct a prospective and -indeed a serial arrangement, but which it is never possible to rethink -in the living dialectic of their genesis, and on the other hand the -relics of what is called human history, and not only that called -prehistorical, but even the historical documents of our history of -yesterday, which we have forgotten and no longer understand, and which -we can certainly classify and arrange in a series, and build castles -in the air about or allow our fancies to wander among, but which it is -no longer possible really to think again? Both cases, which have been -arbitrarily distinguished, are reducible to one single case. Even in -what is called 'human history' there exists a 'natural history,' and -what is called 'natural history' also was once 'human' history—that -is to say, spiritual, although to us who have left it so far behind -it seems to be almost foreign, so mummified and mechanicized has it -become, if we glance at it but summarily and from the outside. Do you -wish to understand the true history of a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic -man? First of all, try if it be possible to make yourself mentally -into a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic man; and if it be not possible, -or you do not care to do this, content yourself with describing and -classifying and arranging in a series the skulls, the utensils, and -the inscriptions belonging to those neolithic peoples. Do you wish to -understand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> the history of a blade of grass? First and foremost, try -to make yourself into a blade of grass, and if you do not succeed, -content yourself with analysing the parts and even with disposing them -in a kind of imaginative history. This leads to the idea from which -I started in making these observations about historiography, as to -history being <i>contemporary</i> history and chronicle being past history. -We take advantage of the idea and at the same time confirm that truth -by solving with its aid the antithesis between a history that is -'history' and a 'history of nature,' which, although it is history, -was supposed to obey laws strangely at variance with those of the only -history. It solves this antithesis by placing the second in the lower -rank of <i>pseudo-history.</i></p> - -<div class="footnote"> -<p><a name="Footnote_1_9" id="Footnote_1_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_9"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> By the economist Professor Gotti, at the seventh congress -of German historians, held at Heidelberg. The lecture can be read in -print under the anything but clear or exact title of <i>Die Grenzen der -Geschichte</i> (Leipzig, Duncker u. Humblot, 1904).</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p> - -<h5><a name="APPENDIX_I" id="APPENDIX_I">APPENDIX I</a></h5> - - -<h5>ATTESTED EVIDENCE</h5> - - -<p>If true history is that of which an interior verification is possible, -and is therefore history ideally contemporary and present, and if -history by witnesses is lacking in truth and is not even false, but -just neither false nor true (not a <i>hoc est</i> but a <i>fertur</i>), a -legitimate question arises as to the origin and function of those -innumerable propositions resumed from evidence critically thrashed out -and 'held to be true,' although not verified, and perhaps never to be -verified, but nevertheless employed even in most serious historical -treatment. When we are writing the history of the doctrine known as -the <i>coincidentia oppositorum,</i> or of the poem called <i>I sepolcri,</i> -the Latin of the Cardinal di Cusa and the verse of Foscolo obviously -belong to us, both as to the thoughts and the actual words, pronounced -by ourselves to ourselves, and the certainty of those historical facts -is at the same time logical truth. But that the <i>De docta ignorantia</i> -was written between the end of 1439 and the early part of 1440, and -Foscolo's poem on the return of the poet to Italy after his long -military service in France, is evidence founded upon proofs, as to -which we can only say that they are to be considered valid, because -they have been to some extent <i>attested,</i> but we cannot claim them to -be true. No amount of acute mental labour upon them can prevent another -document or the better reading of an old document destroying them. -Nevertheless, no one will treat of the works of the Cusan or of Foscolo -without availing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> himself of the biographical details as to their -authors which have been preserved.</p> - -<p>An esteemed methodologist of our day has been tempted to found the -faith placed in this order of evidence upon a sort of telepathy of -the past, an almost spiritualistic revival. But there is nothing -so mysterious in the genesis of that belief as to need a risky and -fantastic explanation, to which even Horace's Jew would not give -credence. On the contrary, it is a question of something that we can -observe in process of formation in our private life of every day. We -are noting down in our diary, for instance, certain of our acts, or -striking the balance of our account. After a certain interval has -elapsed those facts fade from memory and the only way of affirming to -ourselves that they have happened and must be considered true is the -evidence of our notes: the document bears witness; trust the book. We -behave in a similar way in respect to the statements of others on the -authority of their diaries or account-books. We presume that if the -thing has been written down it answers to the truth. Doubtless this -assumption, like every assumption, may turn out to be false in fact, -owing to the note having been made in a moment of distraction or of -hallucination, or too late, when the memory of the fact was already -imprecise and lacking in certainty, or because it was capriciously -made or made with the object of deceiving others. But just for this -reason, written evidence is not usually accepted with closed eyes; -its verisimilitude is examined and we confront it with other written -evidence, we investigate the probity and accuracy of the writer or -witness. It is just for this reason that the penal code threatens with -pains and penalties those who alter or falsify documents. And although -these and other subtle and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> severe precautions do not in certain cases -prevent fraud, deception, and error (in the same way that the tribunals -established for the purpose of condemning the guilty often send away -the guilty unpunished and sometimes condemn the innocent), yet the use -of documents and evidence works out on the whole in accordance with the -truth; it is held to be useful and worthy of support and encouragement, -because the injuries that it is liable to cause are greatly inferior to -those that it prevents.</p> - -<p>Now what men do with regard to their private affairs in daily life may -be said to be done on a large scale by the human race when it delivers -itself of the load of innumerable facts and fixes them externally where -they are recoverable in a weakened form as unverifiable documentary -evidence, yet are nevertheless such that as a whole we are justified -in looking upon them end treating them as true. Historical faith -then is not the result of telepathy or spiritualism, but of a wise -economic provision, which the spirit continues to realize. In this -way we understand historical work directed toward the prevention of -alterations and deformations, and its acceptation of certain testimony, -as 'what must be held to be true in the present state of science,' and -its graduation of the rest as uncertain, probable, and most probable -to be sometimes accepted in the expectation of ulterior inquiries. -Finally, it explains the dislike of 'hypercriticism' when, not content -with a constant refinement of criticism, hypercriticism contests the -value of the most ingenuous and authoritative testimony. The reason is -that it thus breaks the rules of the game that is being played <i>sub -regula,</i> and only serves at the most to remind those apt to forget it -that history by evidence is at bottom an altogether<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> external history, -never fundamental, true history, which is contemporary and present.</p> - -<p>This genesis or nature of 'attested' evidence already contains the -answer to the other question as to its function. It is clear that this -cannot be to posit true history or to take its place, but to supply it -with those secondary particulars which it would not be worth while to -make the effort of keeping alive and complete in the mind, for this -effort would result in damaging what is most important to us. Finally, -whether the De docta ignorantia were written some time earlier or -later is something that may quite well be determined by a different -interpretation of this or that thought of Cusanus, but it does not -affect the function that the doctrine of the coincidence of opposites -exercises in the formation of logical science. Again, whether the -Sepolcri was composed or planned prior to Foscolo's visit to France -would without doubt change to some extent our representation of the -gradual development of the soul and genius of the poet, but it would -hardly at all change our mode of interpreting his great ode. Those -who despair of historical truth, owing to the lack of a verifiable -certainty of some particulars, or to the uncertainty and dubiety that -surrounds it, resemble him who, having forgotten the chronicle of his -life in this or that year, should think that he did not know himself -in his present condition, which is both the recapitulation of his past -and carries with it his past in all that it really concerns him to -know. But, on the other hand, attested evidence that has been field -to be true is a stimulus to us to search ourselves more closely, an -enrichment of what we have found by means of analysis and meditation -and a confirmation or proof of our thoughts, which are not to be -neglected, especially when true evidence and attested evidence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> agree -with one another. To refuse the assistance and the facilities afforded -by attested evidence, owing to the fear that some of it may prove -false, or because all of it possesses an external and somewhat general -and vague character, would be to refuse <i>the authority of the human -race,</i> and so to commit the sin of Descartes and of Malebranche. This -great refusal does not concern or assist the understanding of history. -All that does matter and does assist is that authority—including the -authority of the human race—should never be allowed to take the place -of the <i>thought of humanity,</i> to which, in any case, belongs the first -place.</p> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span></p> - - -<hr /> - -<h5><a name="APPENDIX_II" id="APPENDIX_II">APPENDIX II</a></h5> - - -<h5>ANALOGY AND ANOMALY OF SPECIAL HISTORIES</h5> - - -<p>In the course of the preceding theoretical explanations we have denied -both the idea of a <i>universal history</i> (in time and space)<a name="FNanchor_1_10" id="FNanchor_1_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_10" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and that -of a <i>general history</i> (of the spirit in its indiscriminate generality -or unity),<a name="FNanchor_2_11" id="FNanchor_2_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_11" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and have insisted instead upon the opposite view with its -two clauses: that history is always <i>particular</i> and always <i>special,</i> -and that these two determinations constitute precisely concrete and -effective <i>universality</i> and concrete and effective <i>unity.</i> What has -been declared impossible, then, does not represent in any way a loss, -for it is on the one hand fictitious universality or the universality -of <i>fancy,</i> and on the other abstract <i>universality,</i> or, if it be -preferred, <i>confused</i> universality. So-called universal histories -have therefore shown themselves to be particular histories, which -have assumed that title for purposes of literary notoriety, or as -collections, views, and chroniclistical compilations of particular -histories, or, finally, as romances. In like manner, general inclusive -histories are either so only in name, or set different histories side -by side, or they are metaphysical and metaphorical playthings.</p> - -<p>As a result of this double but converging negation, it is also -advisable to refute a common and deeply rooted belief (which we -ourselves at one time shared to some extent)<a name="FNanchor_3_12" id="FNanchor_3_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_12" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> that we should arrive -at the re-establishment of the universality of the fancy: or that -there are some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> among the special histories, constituted according -to the various forms of the spirit (general and individual only -in so far as every form of the spirit is the whole spirit in that -form), which require universal treatment and others only treatment -as monographs. The typical instance generally adduced is that of -the difference between the history of philosophy and the history of -poetry or of art. The subject of the former is supposed to be the one -great philosophical problem that interests all men, of the latter -the sentimental or imaginative problems of particular moments, or at -the most of particular artists. Thus the former is supposed to be -continuous, the latter discontinuous, the former capable of complete -universal vision, the second only of a sequence of particular visions. -But a more 'realistic' conception of philosophy deprives it of this -privilege as compared with the history of art and poetry or of any -other special history; for, appearances notwithstanding, it is not -true that men have concentrated upon one philosophical problem only, -whose successive solutions, less and less inadequate, compose a single -line of progress, the universal history of the human spirit, affording -support and unification to all other histories. The opposite is the -truth: the philosophical problems that men have treated of and will -treat of are infinite, and each one of them is always particularly -and individually determined. The illusion as to the uniqueness of the -problem is due to logical misapprehension, increased by historical -contingencies, whence a problem which owing to religious motives seemed -supreme has been looked upon as unique or fundamental, and groupings -and generalizations made for practical ends have been held to be real -identity and unity.<a name="FNanchor_4_13" id="FNanchor_4_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_13" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> 'Universal'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> histories of philosophy, too, like -the others, when we examine them with a good magnifying glass, are -revealed as either particular histories of the problem that engages the -philosopher-historian, or arbitrary artificial constructions, or tables -and collections of many different historical sequences, in the manner -of a manual or encyclopædia of philosophical history. Certainly nothing -forbids the composition of abridgments of philosophical histories, -containing classifications of particular problems and representing the -principal thinkers of all peoples and of all times as occupied with one -or another class of problem. This, however, is always a chroniclistical -and naturalistic method of treating the history of philosophy, which -only really lives when a new thinker connects the problems already set -in the past and its intrinsic antecedents with the definite problem -that occupies his attention. He provisionally sets aside others with -a different connexion, though without for that reason suppressing -them, intending rather to recall them when another problem makes -their presence necessary. It is for this reason that even in those -abridgments that seem to be the most complete and 'objective' (that -is to say, 'material') a certain selection does appear, due to the -theoretical interest of the writer, who never altogether ceases to be a -historiographer-philosopher. The procedure is in fact just that of the -history of art and poetry, where what is really historical treatment, -living and complete, is the thought or criticism of individual poetical -personalities, and the rest a table of criticisms, an abridgment due -to contiguity of time or place, affinity of matter or similarity of -temperament, or to degrees of artistic excellence. Nor must we say that -every philosophic problem is linked to all the others and is always a -problem of the whole of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> philosophy, thus differing from the cases of -poetry and art, for there is no diversity here either, and the whole of -history and the entire universe are immanent in every single work of -art.</p> - -<p>Now that we have likewise reduced philosophies of history to the rank -of particular histories, it is scarcely necessary to demonstrate -that the demand being made in several quarters for a 'universal' -or 'general' history of science is without foundation. For such -a history would be impossible to write, even if we were able to -identify or compare the history of science with chat of philosophy. -But it is doubly impossible both because there are comprised under -the name of 'science' such diverse forms as sciences of observation -and mathematical sciences, and also because in each of these classes -themselves the several disciplines remain separate, owing to the -irreducible variety of data and postulates from which they spring. -If, as we have pointed out, every particular philosophical problem -links and places itself in harmony with all other philosophical -problems, every scientific problem tends, on the contrary, to shut -itself up in itself, and there is no more destructive tendency in -science than that of 'explaining' all the facts by means of a 'single -principle,' substituting, that is to say, an unfruitful metaphysic -for fruitful science, allowing an empty word to act as a magic wand, -and by 'explaining everything' to 'explain' nothing at all. The unity -admitted by the history of the sciences is not that which connects -one theory with another and one science with another in an imaginary -general history of science, but that which connects each science and -each theory with the intellectual and social complex of the moment in -which it appeared. But even here too we must utter the warning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> that in -thus explaining their true nature we do not wish to contest the right -to existence of tables and encyclopædias of the history of science, -far less to throw discredit upon the present direction of studies, by -means of which, at the call of the history of the sciences, useful -Research is stimulated in directions that have been long neglected. -Nor do we intend to move any objection to histories of science in the -form of tables and encyclopædias on the ground that it is impossible -for the same student to be equally competent as to problems of quite -different nature, such as are those of the various sciences; for it -is inconceivable that a philosopher exists with a capacity equal to -the understanding of each and every philosophical problem (indeed, the -mind of the best solver of certain problems is usually the more closed -to others); or that a critic and historian of poetry and art exists -who tastes and enjoys equally all forms of poetry and art, however -versatile he be. Each one has his sphere marked out more or less -narrowly, and each is universal only by means of his particularity.</p> - -<p>Finally, we shall not repeat the same demonstration for political -history and ethics, where the claim to represent the whole of history -in a single line of development has had less occasion to manifest -itself. It is usually more readily admitted there that every history -is particular—that is to say, determined by the political and ethical -problem or problems with which history is concerned in time and place, -and which every history therefore occasionally rethinks from the -beginning. The <i>analogy,</i> then, between different kinds of special -history is to be considered perfect, and the anomaly between them -excluded, for they all obey the principle of particularity, that is, -particular universality (whatever be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> the appearance to the contrary). -But if, as histories, they all proceed according to the nature of what -we have explained as historiography, in so far as they are <i>special</i> -each one conforms to the concept of its speciality. It is in this sense -alone that each one is anomalous in respect to the others, preserving, -that is to say, its own peculiar nature. We have explained that the -claim to treat the history of poetry and of art in the same way as -philosophy is erroneous, not only because it misconceives the true -concept of history, but also because it misrepresents the nature of -art, conceiving it as philosophy and dissipating it in a dialectic -of concepts, or because it leaves out, in the history of art, just -that by reason of which art is art, looking upon it as something -secondary, or at best giving it a place beside the social or conceptual -activities. This error is precisely analogous to that of those who -from time to time suggest what they term the 'psychological' reform of -philosophy—that is to say, they would like to treat it as dependent -upon the psychology of philosophers and of the social environment, thus -placing it on a level, sometimes with the history of the sentiments, -at others with that of fancies and Utopias, or with what is not -the history of philosophizing. Such persons lack the knowledge of -what <i>philosophy</i> is, as the others lack the knowledge of <i>poetry</i> -and <i>art</i>. Anyone desirous of arriving at a rapid knowledge of the -difference between the history of philosophy and the history of poetry -should observe how the one, owing to the nature of its object, is led -to examine theories in so far as they are the <i>work of pure mind,</i> -and therefore to develop a history in which thoughts represent the -<i>dramatis personæ,</i> while the other is led by the nature of its object -to examine works of art in so far as they are works of imagination, -which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> gives expression to movements of feeling, and therefore to -develop a history of imaginative and sensitive points of view. The -former, therefore, though it does not neglect actions, events, and -imagination, regards them as the <i>humus</i> of pure thought and takes -the form of a history of concepts <i>without persons,</i> either real or -imaginary, while the latter, which also does not neglect actions, -events, and thoughts in its turn regards them as the humus of imaginary -creations and takes the form of a history of ideal or imaginary -<i>personalities,</i> which have divested themselves of the ballast of -practical interests and of the curb of concepts. The plans, too, which -they draw up and with which they cannot dispense, any more than can any -human dialectic, answer to these different tendencies—that is to say, -with the one they are schemes or general types of modes of thinking, -with the other schemes containing ideal personalities.</p> - -<p>If the history of philosophy has several times tried to devour the -history of poetry and art, it may also be said to have several times -tried to devour the <i>history of practice,</i> that of politics and ethics, -or 'social history,' as people prefer to call it in our day. It has -also been asserted that such history should be set free from the -chroniclism in which it had become involved and assume a scientific and -rigorous form. To do this, it was heedful to reduce it to a history -of 'ideas,' which are the true and essential practical acts, because -they generate them—that is to say, the error which we noted above in -respect to poetry and art has here been repeated. What is peculiar to -practical acts has been neglected, and only the 'ideas,' which are -their antecedents and consequents, have been retained. But on other -occasions the 'ideas' to which it was claimed to reduce practical -acts were not really ideas or intellectual formations, but truly -practical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> acts, sentiments, dispositions, customs, institutions. The -originality of political and ethical history was thus unconsciously -confirmed. Its object is just what can be designated with the single -word <i>institutions,</i> taking the word in its widest signification—that -is to say, understanding by it all practical arrangements of human -individuals and societies, from the most recondite sentiments to the -most obvious modes of life (which, too, are always will in action). -All are equally historical productions, the sole effective historical -productions perceivable according to the practical form of the -spirit. If the patrimony of judgments, as the capital with and upon -which our modern thought works, is the result of a long history, of -which we become conscious from time to time, illustrating now one -and now another of its particular aspects at the solicitation of new -needs, so also what we can now practically <i>do</i>, all our sentiments -as so-called civilized men—courage, honour, dignity, love, modesty, -and the like—all our institutions in the strict sense of the term -(which are themselves due to attitudes of the spirit, utilitarian or -moral)—the family, the state, commerce, industry, military affairs, -and so on—have a long history; and according as one or other of those -sentiments or institutions enters upon a crisis, as the result of new -wants, we attempt to ascertain its true 'nature'—that is to say, its -historical genesis. Anyone who has followed the developments of modern -social historiography with care and attention has been able to see -clearly that its aim is precisely to arrange the <i>chroniclistic chaos</i> -of disaggregated notes of events in <i>ordered series of histories of -social values,</i> and that its field of research is the history of the -human soul in its practical aspect; either when it produces general -histories of <i>civilization</i> (always due to particular motives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> and -limited by them), or when it presents histories <i>of classes, peoples, -social currents, sentiments, institutions,</i> and so forth.</p> - -<p><i>Biography,</i> too (only when not limited to a mere chroniclistic -collection of the experiences of an individual or to a poetical -portrait, improperly regarded as a historical work), is the history of -an 'institution' in the philosophical acceptation of the word and forms -part of the history of practice: because the individual, in the same -way as a people or a social class, is the formation of a character, or -complex of specific attitudes and actions consequent upon them; and it -is of this that historical biography consists, not of the individual -looked upon as external or private or physical, or whatever it be -called.</p> - -<p>We might be expected to indicate the place or function of the <i>history -of science</i> and of <i>religion,</i> in order to render to a certain extent -complete this rapid review of special histories, in which general -history realizes itself in turn—it never exists outside of them. But -if science differs from philosophy in being partly theoretical and -partly practical, and religion is an attempt to explain reality by -means of myth and to direct the work of man according to an ideal, it -is evident that the history of science enters to some extent into the -history of philosophical thought and to some extent forms part of that -of needs and institutions; indeed, since the moment which sets science -to work and endows it with its peculiar character is the practical or -suitable moment, it really belongs to the history of institutions in -the very wide sense described; and the history of religion forms to -some extent part of the history of institutions and to some extent -part of the history of philosophy; indeed, since the dominating moment -is here mythical conception or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> philosophical effort, the history of -religion is substantially that of philosophy. Other more particular -disquisitions in connexion with this argument would be out of place -in the present treatise, which is not especially concerned with the -theory and methodology of particular special histories (coincident with -the treatment of the various spheres of philosophy, æsthetics, logic, -etc.), and aims only at indicating the directions in which they must -necessarily develop.<a name="FNanchor_5_14" id="FNanchor_5_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_14" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_10" id="Footnote_1_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_10"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Supra,</i> pp. 55-59.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_11" id="Footnote_2_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_11"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Supra,</i> pp. 119-122.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_12" id="Footnote_3_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_12"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In the <i>Æsthetic,</i> I, ch. xvii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_13" id="Footnote_4_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_13"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See Appendix III.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_14" id="Footnote_5_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_14"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> It will be of further use to draw attention here, in -a note, to the already mentioned distinction between the history -of practice in politics and in ethics, because thus alone can be -set at rest the variance which runs through historiography, between -political history or history of states and history of humanity or -of civilization, especially from the eighteenth century onward. In -Germany it is one of the elements in the intricate debate between -<i>Geschichte</i> and <i>Kulturgeschichte,</i> and it has sometimes been -described as a conflict between French historiography (Voltaire and -his followers), or <i>histoire de la civilisation,</i> and the Germanic -(Möser and his followers), or history of the state. One side would -absorb and subject the history of culture or social history to that -of the state, the other would do the opposite; and the eclectics, as -usual, without knowing much about it, place the one beside the other, -inert, history of politics and history of civilization, thus destroying -the unity of history. The truth is that political history and history -of civilization have the same relations between one another in the -practical field as those between the history of poetry or of art and -the history of philosophy or thought in the theoretical field. They -correspond to two eternal moments of the spirit—that of the pure will, -or economic moment, and that of the ethical will. Hence we also see why -some will always be attracted rather by the one than the other form of -history: according as to whether they are moved chiefly by political or -chiefly by moral interests.</p> - - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span></p></div> - - -<h5><a name="APPENDIX_III" id="APPENDIX_III">APPENDIX III</a></h5> - - -<h5>PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY</h5> - - -<p>Having established the unity of philosophy and historiography, and -shown that the division between the two has but a literary and didactic -value, because it is founded upon the possibility of placing in the -foreground of verbal exposition now one and now the other of the two -dialectical elements of that unity, it is well to make quite clear what -is the true object of the treatises bearing the traditional title of -philosophic 'theory' or 'system': to what (in a word) <i>philosophy can -be reduced.</i></p> - -<p>Philosophy, in consequence of the new relation in which it has been -placed, cannot of necessity be anything but the <i>methodological moment -of historiography</i>: a dilucidation of the categories constitutive -of historical judgments, or of the concepts that direct historical -interpretation. And since historiography has for content the concrete -life of the spirit, and this life is life of imagination and of -thought, of action and of morality (or of something else, if anything -else can be thought of), and in this variety of its forms remains -always one, the dilucidation moves in distinguishing between æsthetic -and logic, between economic and ethic, uniting and dissolving them -all in the philosophy of the spirit. If a philosophical problem shows -itself to be altogether sterile for the historical judgment, we have -there the proof that such problem is otiose, badly stated, and in -reality does not exist. If the solution of a problem—that is to -say, of a philosophical proposition—instead<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> of making history more -intelligible, leaves it obscure or confounds it with others, or leaps -over it and lightly condemns or negates it, we have there the proof -that such proposition and the philosophy with which it is connected -are arbitrary, though it may preserve interest in other respects, as a -manifestation of sentiment or of imagination.</p> - -<p>The definition of philosophy as 'methodology' is not at first exempt -from doubts, even on the part of one ready to accept in general the -tendency that it represents; because philosophy and methodology are -terms often contrasted, and a philosophy that leads to a methodology -is apt to be tainted with empiricism. But certainly the methodology -of which we are here speaking is not at all empirical; indeed, it -appears just for the purpose of correcting and taking the place of the -empirical methodology of professional historians and of other such -specialists in all that greater part of it where it is a true and -proper, though defective, attempt toward the philosophical solution -of the theoretical problems raised by the study of history, or toward -philosophical methodology and philosophy as methodology.</p> - -<p>If, however, the above-mentioned dispute is settled as soon as stated, -this cannot be said of another, where our position finds itself opposed -to a widely diffused and ancient conception of philosophy as the -solver of the mystery of the universe, knowledge of ultimate reality, -revelation of the world of noumena, which is held to be beyond the -world of phenomena, in which we move in ordinary life and in which -history also moves. This is not the place to give the history of that -idea; but we must at least say this, that its origin is religious or -mythological, and that it persisted even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> among those philosophers -who were most successful in directing thought toward our earth as the -sole reality, and initiated the new philosophy as methodology of the -judgment or of historical knowledge. It persisted in Kant, who admitted -it as the limit of his criticism; it persisted in Hegel, who framed his -subtle researches in logic and philosophy of the spirit in a sort of -mythology of the Idea.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the diversity of the two conceptions manifested itself -in an ever-increasing ratio, finding expression in various formulas -of the nineteenth century, such as <i>psychology against metaphysic,</i> -a philosophy of <i>experience and immanence, aprioristic</i> against -<i>transcendental</i> philosophy, <i>positivism</i> against <i>idealism</i>; and -although the polemic was as a rule ill conducted, going beyond the -mark and ending by unconsciously embracing that very metaphysic, -transcendency, and apriority, that very abstract idealism, which it -had set out to combat, the sentiment that inspired it was legitimate. -And the philosophy of methodology has made it its own, has combated -the same adversary with better arms, has certainly insisted upon a -psychological view, but a speculative psychological view, immanent -in history, but dialectically immanent, differing in this from -positivism, that while the latter made necessary the contingent, it -made the contingent necessary, thus affirming the right of thought to -the hegemony. Such a philosophy is just philosophy as history (and so -history as philosophy), and the determination of the philosophical -moment in the purely categorical and methodological moment.</p> - -<p>The greater vigour of this conception in respect to the opposite, -the superiority of philosophy as <i>methodology</i> over philosophy as -<i>metaphysic,</i> is shown by the capacity of the former to solve the -problems of the latter by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> criticizing them and pointing out their -origin. Metaphysic, on the other hand, is incapable of solving not only -the problems of methodology, but even its own problems, without having -recourse to the fantastic and arbitrary. Thus questions as to the -reality of the external world, of soul-substance, of the unknowable, -of dualisms and of antitheses, and so forth, have disappeared in -gnoseological doctrines, which have substituted better conceptions for -those which we formerly possessed concerning the logic of the sciences, -explaining those questions as eternally renascent aspects of the -dialectic or phenomenology of knowledge.</p> - -<p>The view of philosophy as metaphysic is, however, so inveterate and so -tenacious that it is not surprising that it should still give some sign -of life in the minds of those who have set themselves free of it in -general, but have not applied themselves to eradicating it in all its -particulars, nor closed all the doors by which it may return in a more -or less unexpected manner. And if we rarely find it openly and directly -displayed now, we may yet discern or suspect it in one or other of its -aspects or attitudes, persisting like kinks of the mind, or unconscious -preconceptions, which threaten to drive philosophy as methodology back -into the wrong path, and to prepare the return, though but for a brief -period, of the metaphysic that has been superseded.</p> - -<p>It seems to me opportune to provide here a clear statement of some of -these preconceptions, tendencies, and habits, pointing out the errors -which they contain and entail.</p> - -<p>First of all the survivals of the past that are still common comes the -view of philosophy as having a fundamental problem to solve. Now the -conception of a fundamental problem is intrinsically at variance with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> -that of philosophy as history, and with the treatment of philosophy -as methodology of history, which posits, and cannot do otherwise -than posit, the <i>infinity</i> of philosophical problems, all certainly -connected with one another, but not one of which can be considered -fundamental, for just the same reason that no single part of an -organism is the foundation of all the others, but each one is in its -turn foundation and founded. If, indeed, methodology take the substance -of its problems from history, history in its most modest but concrete -form of history of ourselves, of each one of us as an individual, this -shows us that we pass on from one to another particular philosophical -problem at the promptings of our life as it is lived, and that one or -the other group or class of problems holds the field or has especial -interest for us, according to the epochs of our life. And we find the -same to be the case if we look at the wider but less definite spectacle -afforded by the already mentioned general history of philosophy—that -is to say, that according to times and peoples, philosophical problems -relating sometimes to morality, sometimes to politics, to religion, -or to the natural sciences and mathematics, have in turn the upper -hand. Every particular philosophical problem has been a problem of the -whole of philosophy, either openly or by inference, but we never meet -with a <i>general problem of philosophy,</i> owing to the contradiction -thereby implied. And if there does seem to be one (and it certainly -does seem so), it is really a question of appearances, due to the -fact that modern philosophy, which comes to us from the Middle Ages -and was elaborated during the religious struggles of the Renaissance, -has preserved a strong imprint of <i>theology</i> in its didactic form, -not less than in the psychological disposition of the greater part of -those addicted to it.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> Hence arises the fundamental and almost unique -importance usurped by the problem of thought and being, which after -all was nothing more than the old problem of this world and the next, -of earth and heaven, in a critical and gnoseological form. But those -who destroyed or who initiated the destruction of heaven and of the -other world and of transcendental philosophy by immanent philosophy -began at the same moment to corrode the conception of a fundamental -problem, although they were not fully aware of this (for we have said -above that they remained trammelled in the philosophy of the Thing -in Itself or in the Mythology of the Idea). That problem was rightly -fundamental for religious spirits, who held that the whole intellectual -and practical dominion of the world was nothing, unless they had saved -their own souls or their own thought in another world, in the knowledge -of a world of noumena and reality. But such it was not destined to -remain for the philosophers, henceforth restricted to the world alone -or to nature, which has no skin and no kernel and is all of a piece. -What would happen were we to resume belief in a fundamental problem, -dominating all others? The other problems would either have to be -considered as all dependent upon it and therefore solved with it, or -as problems no longer philosophical but empirical. That is to say, all -the problems appearing every day anew in science and life would lose -their value, either becoming a tautology of the fundamental solution or -being committed to empirical treatment. Thus the distinction between -philosophy and methodology, between metaphysic and philosophy of the -spirit, would reappear, the first transcendental as regards the second, -the second aphilosophical as regards the first.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span></p> - -<p>Another view, arising from the old metaphysical conception of the -function of philosophy, leads to the rejection of distinction in favour -of <i>unity,</i> thus conforming to the theological conception that all -distinctions are unified by absorption in God, and to the religious -point of view, which forgets the world and its necessities in the -vision of God. From this ensues a disposition which may be described -as something between indifferent, accommodating, or weak, in respect -of particular problems, and the pernicious doctrine of the double -faculty is almost tacitly renewed, that is, of intellectual intuition -or other superior cognoscitive faculty, peculiar to the philosopher -and leading to the vision of true reality, and of criticism or thought -prone to interest itself in the contingent and thus greatly inferior -in degree and free to proceed with a lack of speculative rigour not -permissible in the other. Such a disposition led to the worst possible -consequences in the philosophical treatises of the Hegelian school, -where the disciples (differing from the master) generally gave evidence -of having meditated but little or not at all upon the problems of the -various spiritual forms, freely accepting vulgar opinions concerning -them, or engaging in them with the indifference of men sure of the -essential, and therefore cutting and mutilating them without pity, in -order to force them into their pre-established schemes with all haste, -thus getting rid of difficulties by means of this illusory arrangement. -Hence the emptiness and tiresomeness of their philosophies, from -which the historian, or the man whose attention is directed to the -understanding of the particular and the concrete, failed to learn -anything that could be of use to him in the direction of his own -studies and in the clearer formulation of his own judgments. And since -the mythology of the idea<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> reappeared in positivism as mythology of -evolution, here too particular problems (which are indeed the only -philosophical problems) received merely schematic and empty treatment -and did not progress at all. Philosophy as history and methodology of -history restores honour to the virtue of acuteness or discernment, -which the theological unitarianism of metaphysic tended to depreciate: -discernment, which is prosaic but severe, hard and laborious but -prolific, which sometimes assumes the unsympathetic aspect of -scholasticism and pedantry, but is also of use in this aspect, like -every discipline, and holds that the neglect of distinction for unity -is also intimately opposed to the conception of philosophy as history.</p> - -<p>A third tendency (I beg to be allowed to proceed by enumeration of the -various sides of the same mental attitude for reasons of convenience), -a third tendency also seeks the <i>definitive</i> philosophy, untaught by -the historical fact that no philosophy has ever been definitive or has -set a limit to thought, or has ever been thoroughly convinced that -the perpetual changing of philosophy with the world which perpetually -changes is not by any means a defect, but is the nature itself of -thought and reality. Or, rather, such teaching, and the proposition -that follows it, do not fail altogether of acceptance, and they are -led to believe that the spirit, ever growing upon itself, produces -thoughts and systems that are ever new. But since they have retained -the presupposition of a fundamental problem which (as we have said) -substantially consists of the ancient problem of religion alone, -and each problem well determined implies a single solution, the -solution given of the 'fundamental problem' naturally claims to be -the definitive solution of the problem of philosophy itself.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> A new -solution could not appear without a new problem (owing to the logical -unity of problem and solution); but that problem, which is superior -to all the others, is on the contrary the only one. Thus a definitive -philosophy, assumed in the conception of the fundamental problem, is at -variance with historical experience, and more irreconcilably, because -in a more evidently logical manner, with philosophy as history, which, -admitting infinite problems, denies the claim for and the expectation -of a definitive philosophy. Every philosophy is definitive for the -problem which it solves, but not for the one that appears immediately -afterward, at the foot of the first, nor for the other problems which -will arise from the solution of this. To close the series would be to -turn from philosophy to religion and to rest in God.</p> - -<p>Indeed, the fourth preconception, which we now proceed to state, and -which links itself with the preceding, and, together with all the -preceding, to the theological nature of the old metaphysic, concerns -the <i>figure of the philosopher,</i> as Buddha or the Awakened One, who -posits himself as superior to others (and to himself in the moments -when he is not a philosopher), because he holds himself to be free from -human passions, illusions, and agitations by means of philosophy. This -is the case with the believer, who fixes his mind upon God and shakes -off earthly cares, like the lover, who feels himself blessed in the -possession of the beloved and defies the whole world. But the world -soon takes its revenge both upon the believer and the lover, and does -not fail to insist upon its rights. Such an illusion is impossible for -the philosophical historian, who differs from the other in feeling -himself irresistibly involved in the course of history, as at once both -subject and object, and who is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> therefore led to negate felicity or -beatitude, as he negates every other abstraction (because, as has been -well said, <i>le bonheur est le contraire de la sensation de vivre</i>), and -to accept life as it is, as joy that overcomes sorrow and perpetually -produces new sorrows and new unstable joys. And history, which he -thinks as the only truth, is the work of tireless thought, which -conditions practical work, as practical work conditions the new work of -thought. Thus the primacy formerly attributed to the contemplative life -is now transferred not to active life, but to life in its integrity, -which is at once thought and action. And every man is a philosopher -(in his circle, however wide or narrow it may appear), and every -philosopher is a man, indissolubly linked to the conditions of human -life, which it is not given to anyone to transcend. The mystical or -apocalyptic philosopher of the Græco-Roman decadence was well able to -separate himself from the world: the great thinkers, like Hegel, who -inaugurated the epoch of modern philosophy, although they denied the -primacy of the abstract contemplative life, were liable to fall back -into the error of belief in this supremacy and to conceive a sphere of -absolute spirit, a process of liberation through art, religion, and -philosophy, as a means of reaching it; but the once sublime figure of -the philosopher blessed in the absolute, when we try to revive it in -this modern world of ours, becomes tinged with the comic. It is true -that satire has now but little material upon which to exercise itself, -and is reduced to aiming its shafts at the 'professors of philosophy' -(according to the type of philosopher that has been created by modern -universities, which is partly the heir of the 'master of theology' -of the Middle Ages): against the professors, that is to say, to the -extent that they continue to repeat mechanically<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> abstract general -propositions, and seem to be unmoved by the passions and the problems -that press upon them from all sides and vainly ask for more concrete -and actual treatment. But the function and the social figure of the -philosopher have profoundly changed, and we have not said that the -manner of being of the 'professors of philosophy' will not also change -in its turn—that is to say, that the way of teaching philosophy in -the universities and schools is not on the verge of experiencing a -crisis, which will eliminate the last remains of the medieval fashion -of formalistic philosophizing. A strong advance in philosophical -culture should lead to this result: that all students of human affairs, -jurists, economists, moralists, men of letters—in other words, all -students of historical matters—should become conscious and disciplined -philosophers, and that thus the philosopher in general, the <i>purus -philosophus,</i> should find no place left for him among the professional -specifications of knowledge. With the disappearance of the philosopher -'in general' would also disappear the last social vestige of the -teleologist or metaphysician, and of the Buddha or Awakened One.</p> - -<p>There is also a prejudice which to some extent inquinates the manner -of <i>culture</i> of students of philosophy. They are accustomed to have -recourse almost exclusively to the books of philosophers, indeed of -philosophers 'in general,' of the metaphysical system-makers, in the -same way as the student of theology formed himself upon the sacred -texts. This method of culture, which is perfectly consequent when -a start is made from the presupposition of a fundamental or single -problem, of which it is necessary to know the different diverging -and progressive solutions which have been attempted, is altogether -inconsequent and inadequate in the case of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> a historical and immanent -philosophy, which draws its material from all the most varied -impressions of life and from all intuitions and reflections upon life. -That form of culture is the reason for the aridity of the treatment of -certain particular problems, for which is necessary a continued contact -with daily experience (art and art criticism for æsthetic, politics, -economy, judicial trials for the philosophy of rights, positive and -mathematical sciences for the gnoseology of the sciences, and so on). -To it is also due the aridity of treatment of those parts of philosophy -themselves which are traditionally considered to constitute 'general -philosophy,' for they too had their origin in life, and we must refer -them back to life if we are to give a satisfactory interpretation of -their propositions; we must plunge them into life again to develop -them and to find in them new aspects. The <i>whole of history</i> is the -foundation of philosophy as history, and to limit its foundation to -the <i>history of philosophy</i> alone, and of 'general' or 'metaphysical' -philosophy, is impossible, save by unconsciously adhering to the old -idea of philosophy, not as methodology but as metaphysic, which is the -fifth of the prejudices that we are enumerating.</p> - -<p>This enumeration can be both lengthened and ended with the mention of a -sixth preconception, relating to <i>philosophical exposition.</i> Owing to -this, philosophy is expected to have either an architectural form, as -though it were a temple consecrated to the Eternal, or a warm poetical -form, as though it were a hymn to the Eternal. But these forms were -part of the old content, and that form is now changed. Philosophy -shows itself to be a dilucidation of the categories of historical -interpretation rather than the grandiose architecture of a temple or a -sacred hymn running on conventional lines.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> Philosophy is discussion, -polemic, rigorous didactic exposition, which is certainly coloured -with the sentiments of the writer, like every other literary form, -able also at times to raise its voice (or on the other hand to become -slight and playful, according to circumstances), but not constrained to -observe rules which appear to be proper to a theological or religious -content. Philosophy treated as methodology has, so to speak, caused -philosophical exposition to descend from poetry to prose.</p> - -<p>All the preconceptions, habits, and tendencies which I have briefly -described should in my opinion be carefully sought out and eliminated, -for it is they that impede philosophy from taking the form and -proceeding in the mode suitable and adequate to the consciousness of -the unity with history which it has reached. If we look merely at -the enormous amount of psychological observations and moral doubts -accumulated in the course of the nineteenth century by poetry, fiction, -and drama, those voices of our society, and consider that in great part -it remains without critical treatment, some idea can be formed of the -immense amount of work that falls to philosophy to accomplish. And if -on the other hand we observe the multitude of anxious questions that -the great European War has everywhere raised—as to the state, as to -history, as to rights, as to the functions of the different peoples, as -to civilization, culture, and barbarism, as to science, art, religion, -as to the end and ideal of life, and so on—we realize the duty of -philosophers to issue forth from the theologico-metaphysical circle in -which they remain confined even when they refuse to hear of theology -and metaphysic. For notwithstanding their protests, and notwithstanding -the new conception accepted and professed by them,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> they really remain -intellectually and spiritually attached to the old ideas.</p> - -<p>Even the <i>history itself of philosophy</i> has hitherto been renewed only -to a small extent, in conformity with the new conception of philosophy. -This new conception invites us to direct our attention to thoughts -and thinkers, long neglected or placed in the second rank and not -considered to be truly philosophers because they did not treat directly -the 'fundamental problem' of philosophy or the great <i>peut-être,</i> but -were occupied with 'particular problems.' These particular problems, -how-ever, were destined to produce eventually a change of view as -regards the 'general problem,' which emerged itself reduced to the -rank of a 'particular' problem. It is simply the result of prejudice -to look upon a Machiavelli, who posited the conception of the modern -state, a Baltasar Gracian, who examined the question of acuteness in -practical matters, a Pascal, who criticized the spirit of Jesuitry, a -Vico, who renewed all the sciences of the spirit, or a Hamann, with -his keen sense of the value of tradition, as minor philosophers, I do -not say in comparison with some metaphysician of little originality, -but even when compared with a Descartes or a Spinoza, who dealt with -<i>other</i> but not <i>superior</i> problems. A schematic and bloodless history -of philosophy corresponded, in fact, with the philosophy of the -'fundamental problem.' A far richer, more varied and pliant philosophy -should correspond with philosophy as methodology, which holds to be -philosophy not only what appertains to the problems of immanency, of -transcendency, of this world and the next, but everything that has -been of avail in increasing the patrimony of guiding conceptions, the -understanding of actual history, and the formation of the reality of -thought in which we live.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II">PART II</a></h5> - - -<h3>CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY</h3> - - -<hr /> - -<h4>I</h4> - - -<h4>PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS</h4> - - -<p>We possess many works relating to the history of historiography, both -special, dealing with individual authors, and more or less general, -dealing with groups of authors (histories of historiography confined -to one people and to a definite period, or altogether 'universal' -histories). Not only have we bibliographical works and works of -erudition, but criticism, some of it excellent, especially in the case -of German scientific literature, ever the most vigilant of all in not -leaving unexplored any nook or cranny of the dominion of knowledge. -It cannot, therefore, form part of my design to treat the theme from -its foundations: but I propose to make a sort of appendix or critical -annotation to the collection of books and essays that I have read upon -the argument. I will not say that these are all, or even that they are -all those of any importance, but they ire certainly a considerable -number. By means of this annotation I shall try to establish, on the -one hand, in an exact manner and in conformity with the principles -explained, the method of such a history, regarding which I observe -that there still exist confusion and perplexity, even among the best, -which lead to errors of judgment or at least of plan, and on the -other hand I shall try to outline<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> the principal periods in a summary -manner, both with the view of exemplifying the method established, -and, as it were, of illustrating historically the concepts exposed in -the preceding theoretical pages, which might otherwise retain here and -there something of an abstract appearance.</p> - -<p>Beginning with methodical delimitations, I shall note in the first -place that in a history of historiography as such, historical writings -cannot be looked upon from the point of view proper to a <i>history of -literature</i>—that is to say, as expressions of individual sentiments, -as forms of art. Doubtless they are this also, and have a perfect right -to form part of histories of literature, as the treatises and systems -of the philosophers, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, of Bruno, -of Leibnitz, and of Hegel; but in this case both are regarded not as -works of history and of philosophy, but of literature and poetry; and -the empirical scale of values which constitute the different modes -of history in the cases of the same authors is different, because -in a history of literature the place of a Plato will always be more -considerable than that of an Aristotle, that of a Bruno than that of -a Leibnitz, owing to the greater amount of passion and the greater -richness of artistic problems contained in the former of each pair. -The fact that in many volumes of literary history such diversity of -treatment is not observed, and historians are talked of historically -and not in a literary manner and philosophers philosophically rather -than in a literary manner, is due to the substitution in such -works of incoherent compilation for work that is properly critical -and scientific. But the distinction between the two aspects is -important for this reason also, that erroneous judgments, praise, and -censure, alike unjustified, are apt to appear, owing to the careless -transference of the scale of values from one history to another.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> The -slight esteem in which Polybius was held in antiquity and for some -time after, because 'he did not write well' in comparison with the -splendour of Livy or with the emotional intensity of Tacitus, is an -instance of this, as is likewise in Italy the excessive praise lavished -upon certain historians who were little more than correct and elegant -writers of prose in comparison with others who were negligent and crude -in their form, but serious students. Ulrici,<a name="FNanchor_1_15" id="FNanchor_1_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_15" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> in his youthful book -on ancient historiography, which despite its heaviness and verbosity -of exposition has great merits, after having discussed the 'scientific -value' of that historiography, also speaks at great length of 'artistic -value'; but setting aside what of arbitrary is to be found in some of -the laws that he applies to historiography as art, in conformity with -the æsthetic ideas of his time, it is evident that the second subject -of which he treats does not coalesce with the first and is only placed -side by side with it in the same way as those sections of works dealing -with historical method are not connected but simply juxtaposed, and -after having studied in their own way the formation of historical -thought, the collection of materials or 'heuristic,' up to final -'comprehension,' begin to discuss the form of the 'exposition,' and in -so doing continue without being aware of it the method of rhetorical -treatises on the art of history composed during the Renaissance. These -have their chief exponent in Vossius (1623). We cannot abstain from -sometimes mentioning the literary form of the works of historians, -nor from according their laurels to works of remarkable literary -value, while noting their unsatisfactory historiographical methods; -but to touch here and there upon, to discuss, to characterize, to -eliminate, is of secondary importance and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> does not form part of the -proper function of historiography, whose object is the <i>development of -historiographical thought.</i></p> - -<p>The distinction between this history and that of <i>philology</i> or -<i>erudition</i> is less apparent but not less indubitable, always, be it -well understood, in the sense explained, of a distinction that is not -a separation. This warning should be understood in respect of other -exclusions that we are about to effect, without our being obliged -to repeat it at every step; for the connexion between history and -philology is undeniable, not less than that between history and art, -or history and practical life. But that does not prevent philology -in itself being the collection, the rearrangement, the purification -of material, and not history. Owing to this quality it forms a part -rather of the history of culture than of that of thought. It would be -impossible to disassociate it from the history of libraries, archives, -museums, universities, seminaries, <i>écoles des chartes,</i> academical -and editorial enterprises, and from other institutions and proceedings -of an entirely practical nature. Fueter has therefore been right in -excluding from his theme in his recent work on the history of modern -historiography<a name="FNanchor_2_16" id="FNanchor_2_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_16" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> "the history of merely philological research and -criticism." This has not prevented him from taking store where apposite -of the school of Biondo or of that of Maurini, or of the perfecting of -the method of seeking for the sources attained by the German school -in the nineteenth century. The confusion and lack of development -observable in the old and solid work of Wachler<a name="FNanchor_3_17" id="FNanchor_3_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_17" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> is perhaps due to -his having failed to make<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> this distinction, to which recourse can also -be had with advantage elsewhere. Wachler's work, entitled and conceived -as "history of research and of the historical art from the Renaissance -of letters in Europe onward," ended by assuming the appearance of a -repertory or bibliographical catalogue.</p> - -<p>The obstacles to be encountered by the distinction between the history -of historiography and that of the <i>practical tendencies,</i> or tendencies -of the <i>social and political spirit,</i> are more intricate. These indeed -become incorporated with or at least leave their mark upon the works -of historians; but it is just because we can only with difficulty -perceive the line of demarcation that it is indispensable to make it -quite clear. Such tendencies, such social and political spirit, belong -rather to the matter than to the theoretical form of history; they are -not so much historiography as history in the act and in its <i>fieri.</i> -Machiavelli is a historian in so far as he tries to understand the -course of events; he is a politician, or at least a publicist, when -he posits and desires a prince, founder of a strong national state, -as his ideal, reflecting this in his history. This history, in so -far as it portrays that ideal and the inspiration and teaching that -accompany it, here and there becomes fable (<i>fabula docet</i>). Thus -Machiavelli belongs partly to the history of thought in the Renaissance -and partly to the history of the practice of the Renaissance. Nor does -this happen solely in political and social historiography, but also -in literary and artistic, because there is not perhaps a critic in -the world, however unprejudiced and broad in his ideas, who does not -manifest tendencies in the direction of a literary renovation of his -epoch together with his actual judgments and reconstructions. Now to -the extent that he does this,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> even if it be in the same book and on -the same page or in the same period, he is no longer a critic, but -a practical reformer of art. In one domain of history alone is this -pacific accompaniment of interpretations and aspirations impossible—in -the history of philosophy, because when, as here, there is a difference -between historical interpretation and the tendency of the philosopher, -the difference reveals the insufficiency of the interpretation itself: -in other words, if the theory of the historian of philosophy is at war -with the theories of which he claims to expound the history, his theory -must be false, just because it does not avail to justify the history -of the theories. But this exception does not annul the distinction -in other fields; indeed, it confirms it, and is not an exception in -the empirical sense, as it appears to be: thought distinguishes and -is distinguished from sentiment and will, but it is not distinguished -from itself, precisely because it is the principle of distinction. -A methodological corollary of this distinction between history of -historiography and history of practical tendencies is that the -introduction into the first of considerations belonging to the second -is to be held erroneous. Here I think Fueter has sinned to some extent -in the book to which I have already referred, where he divides his -material into humanistic, political, party, imperial, particularist, -Protestant, Catholic, Jesuitic, illuministic, romanticist, erudite, -lirico-subjective, national, statolatral, historiographical, and the -like. Only some of the above divisions belong to, or can properly be -reduced to, historiographical concepts, while the majority refer to -social and political life. Hence the lack of sound organization that -we observe in this book, which is yet so lively and ingenious: its -divisions follow one another without sufficient logicality, continuity, -and necessity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> and are not the result of a single thought which posits -them and develops itself through them. If, on the other hand, the -genuinely historiographical portions, which have become mingled with -it, should be eliminated, what remained could certainly be organized, -but as social and political history, no longer as historiography, -because the works of historians would be consulted only as documents -showing the tendencies of the times in which they were written. -Machiavelli, for instance, (to use the same example) would there figure -as an Italian patriot and defender of absolute power, while Vico (a -much greater historian than Machiavelli) would not be able to appear at -all, or hardly at all, because his relation with the political life of -his time was remote and general.</p> - -<p>What I have been expounding may be resumed by saying that the history -of historiography is neither <i>literary</i> history nor the history of -cultural, social, political, moral doings, which are of a <i>practical</i> -nature, but that it is certainly all these things, by reason of the -unbreakable unity of history, though with it the <i>accent</i> does not fall -upon practical facts, but rather upon <i>historiographical thought,</i> -which is its proper subject.</p> - -<p>Having pointed out or recalled these distinctions, which, as we have -seen, are sometimes neglected with evil results, we must now utter a -warning against other distinctions, employed without rational basis, -which rather overcloud and trouble the history of historiography than -shed light upon it.</p> - -<p>Fueter (I cite him again, although the error is not peculiar to -him) declares that he has dealt in his book with <i>historiographical -theories</i> and with <i>historical method</i> only in so far as they seem -to have had influence upon actual historiography. The history of -historicity (here<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> is the reason he gives for the method he has -followed) is as little the history of historiography as is the history -of dramatic theories the history of the drama. This he considers to -be proved by the fact that theory and practice often follow different -paths, as, for instance, in Lope de Vega, whose theory of the drama -and actual dramatic work were two different things, to such an extent -that it was said of the Spanish dramatist that although he reverenced -the poetical art, when he sat down to compose "he locked up the correct -rules under seven keys." This argument is without doubt specious, and I -was myself formerly seduced by it; but it is fallacious, as I realized -when I thought it over again, and I now affirm it to be an error with -all the conviction and authority of one who criticizes an error at one -time his own. The argument is founded upon a false analogy between the -production of art and that of history. Art, which is the work of the -imagination, can be well distinguished from the theory of art, which -is the work of reflection; artistic genius produces the former, the -speculative intellect the latter, and it often happens with artists -that the speculative intellect is inferior to their genius, so that -they do one thing and say another, or say one thing and do another, -without its being possible to accuse them of logical incoherence, -because the incoherence is between two discordant thoughts, never -between a thought and an act of the imagination. But history and theory -of history are both of them works of thought, bound to one another in -the same way as thought is bound to itself, since it is one. Thus no -historian but possesses in a more or less reflective way his theory of -history, because, not to put too fine a point upon it, every historian -implicitly or explicitly conducts a polemic against other historians -(against other 'versions'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> and 'judgments' of a fact), and how could -he ever conduct a polemic or criticize others if he did not himself -possess a conception of what history is and ought to be, to which to -refer, a theory of history? The artist, on the other hand, in so far -as he is an artist, does not polemize or criticize, but forms. It -may quite well happen that an erroneous theory of historiography is -expounded, while on the contrary the history as narrated may turn out -to be well constructed. This is, of course, to be incoherent, but is -so neither more nor less than when progress is effected in one branch -of historiography, while there is backwardness in another. There may -obtain, on the contrary, an excellent theory of history, where history -itself is bad; but in the same way that in one field of historiography -there is the sense of and striving for a better method, while there -is adherence to old methods in all the other fields. The history of -historiography is the history of historical thought; and here it is -impossible to distinguish theory of history from history.</p> - -<p>Another exclusion which Fueter declares that he has made is that of -the <i>philosophy of history.</i> He does not give the reason for this, but -allows it to be understood, for he evidently holds that philosophies of -history do not possess a purely scientific character and are lacking -in truth. But not only are what are called 'philosophies of history' -erroneous conceptions of history, but so also are the naturalistic or -deterministic conceptions opposed to them, and all the various forms of -pseudo-history which have been described above, philological history, -poetical history, rhetorical history. I do not find that he has -excluded these from his history, any more than he has really excluded -the theological and transcendental conception of history (philosophy -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> history); indeed, he constantly refers to it. Justice and logic -would insist upon all or none being excluded—all really excluded, -and not merely in words. But to exclude all of them, it may be said, -would be anything but intelligent, because how could the history of -history ever be told in such a void? What is this history but the -struggle of scientific historiography against inadequate scientific -formulas? Certainly the former is the protagonist, but how could a -drama be presented with a protagonist lacking antagonists? And even -if historical philology be not considered directly, but referred back -to philology, if poetical history be referred back to literature, -rhetorical or practical to social and political history, it would -nevertheless be necessary always to take account of the conversion that -often occurs of those various mental constructions into assertions -of reality, taken in exchange for and given the value of true and -proper histories. In this sense they become in turn <i>deterministic</i> -or <i>transcendental</i> conceptions of history, and both of them logical -or illogical representations of all the others, and end by becoming -equivalent to one another dialectically, and are always before the -eyes of the historian, because the perpetual condition and the -perpetual sign of the progress of historical thought reside in their -movement, which passes from transcendency or false immanence to pure -immanence, to return to them and enter into a more profound conception -of immanency. To exclude philosophies of history from the history of -historiography does not, therefore, seem to me to be justifiable, -for the same reason as it seems to be unjustifiable to exclude from -it historiographical theories, which are the consciousness that -historiography acquires of itself: owing to their homogeneity, I say, -owing indeed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> their identity with history, of which they do not form -accidental ingredients or material elements, but constitute the very -essence. A proof of this is to be found in the <i>Historical Philosophy -of France</i> of Flint. He proceeds from a presumption that is perhaps the -opposite of that of Fueter—that is to say, he treats of the philosophy -of history, and not of history, but finds it impossible to maintain -the dykes between the two. His treatise, therefore, when artificial -obstacles have been overcome, runs like a single river and reveals -to our view the whole history of historical French thought, to which -Bossuet and Rollin, Condorcet and Voltaire, Auguste Comte and Michelet -or Tocqueville equally belong.</p> - -<p>At this point it will probably be objected (although Fueter does not -propound this objection, it is probable that it is at the back of -his mind) that what is desired in a history of historiography is not -so much a history of <i>historical thought</i> as a history of <i>history -in the concrete</i>: of the <i>Storie fiorentine</i> of Machiavelli, of the -<i>Siècle de Louis XIV</i> of Voltaire, or of the <i>Römische Geschichte</i> of -Niebuhr: that would be a general history, while what is desired is a -specific history. But it is well to pay close attention to the meaning -of such a request and to the possibility of what is asked. If I set -out to write the history of the <i>Storie fiorentine</i> of Machiavelli, in -respect to the particular material with which it deals, I shall rewrite -the history of Florence, criticizing and completing Machiavelli, and -shall thus be, for instance, a Villari, a Davidsohn, or a Salvemini. -If I set out to write the history of the material of Voltaire's work, -I shall criticize Voltaire and outline a new <i>Siècle de Louis XIV</i>, -as has been done, for example, by Philippson. And if I set to work to -examine and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> rethink the work of Niebuhr in respect to its particular -material, I shall be a new historian of Rome, a Mommsen or (to quote -the most recent writers) a Hector Pais or a Gaetano de Sanctis. But is -this what is desired? Certainly not. But if this be not desired, if the -particular materials of those histories are not to be taken account of, -what else remains save the 'way' in which they have been conceived, the -'mental form' by means of which they construct their narratives, and -therefore their theory and their historical 'thought'?</p> - -<p>Now, if this truth be admitted (and I do not see how it can be -contested) it is not possible to reject an ulterior consequence which, -although it is wont to arouse in some the sensation of a paradox, -does not do so in us, for we find it altogether in accordance with -the conception of the identity of history with, philosophy that we -have defended. Is a thought that is not thought conceivable? Is it -permissible to distinguish between the <i>thought of the historian</i> and -the <i>thought of the philosopher</i>? Are there perhaps two different -thoughts in the world? To persist in maintaining that the thought of -the historian thinks the fact and not the theory is prevented by the -preceding admission, if by nothing else: that the historian always -thinks at least both the theory of history and the historical fact. But -this admission entails his thinking the theory of all the things that -he narrates, together with the theory of history. And indeed he could -not narrate without understanding them. Fueter extols the merit of -Winckelmann, who was the first to conceive a history, not of artists, -but of art, of a pure spiritual activity, and that of Giannone, who -was the first to attempt a history of the life of jurisprudence. But -these writers made the progress they did because they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> had a new -and more accurate conception of art and of rights, and if they went -wrong as to certain points, that is because they did not always think -those conceptions with equal exactitude. Winckelmann, for instance, -materialized the spiritual activity of the artist when he posited an -abstract, fixed material ideal of beauty, and gave an abstract history -of artistic styles without regard to the temperaments, historical -circumstances, and individualities of the artists themselves. Giannone -failed to supersede the dualism of Church and State. Without indulging -in other too particular examples, it is evident at the first glance -that ancient historiography concords with the ancient conception of -religion of the state, of ethic, and of the whole of reality; the -medieval with Christian theology and ethic; that of the first half of -the nineteenth century with the idealistic and romantic philosophy, -that of the second half with naturalistic and positivistic philosophy. -Thus, <i>ex parte historicorum</i>, there is no way of distinguishing -historical and philosophical thought, which are perfectly commingled in -the narratives. But there is also no possibility of maintaining such -a distinction <i>ex parte philosophorum</i> either, because, as all know, -or at least say, each period has the philosophy proper to it, which -is the consciousness of that period, and as such is its history, at -least in germ; or, as we have put it, philosophy and history coincide. -And if they coincide, the history of philosophy and the history of -historiography also coincide: the one is not only not distinguishable -from the other, but is not even subordinate to the other, for it is all -one with it.</p> - -<p>The historiography of philosophy has already begun to open its arms, -inviting and receiving the works of the historians. Every day it -understands better that a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> history of Greek thought is not complete -without taking count of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius, nor of -Roman thought without Livy and Tacitus, nor of the thought of the -Renaissance without Machiavelli and Guicciardini. It must open them yet -wider and clasp to its bosom even the humble medieval historiographers -who noted the <i>Gesta episcoporum</i> or <i>Historiolæ translationum</i> or Vitæ -sanctorum, or who bear witness to the Christian faith, according to -their powers and in their own way, it is true, but not less than the -great Augustine according to his powers. It must receive not only the -hagiographical writers, but even obtuse philologists or sociologists -who have amused us during the last decades and bear witness to the -creed of positivism not other-wise than as Spencer or Haeckel in their -systems. By means of this amplification of concepts and enrichment of -material, the historiography of philosophy will place itself in the -position of being able to show that philosophy is a force diffused -throughout life, and not the particular invention and cult of certain -men who are philosophers, and will obtain the means that have hitherto -been lacking to effect a close conjunction with the whole historical -movement.</p> - -<p>In its turn the history of historiography will gain by the fusion, -because it will find its own directive principles in philosophy, and by -its means will be rendered capable of understanding both the problems -of history in general and those of its various aspects as history of -art and of philosophy, of economic and moral life. To seek elsewhere -the criterion of explanation is vain. Fueter, who takes a glance at -the most recent historiography, that posterior to 1870, at the end of -his book, discerns in it the new consciousness that gives the highest -place to political and military<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> power and marks the end of the old -liberalism, the strengthening of such consciousness by means of the -Darwinian theories concerning the struggle for life, the influence of -a more intense economical and industrial life and a greater intensity -of world politics, the repercussion of Egyptian and Orientalistic -discoveries, which have aided in disproving the illusion of Europe as -the centre of the world, the attraction exercised by the theory of -races, and so on. These observations are just, but they do not reach -the heart and brain of the most recent historiography; they merely -revolve round its body. The heart or brain is, as I have observed, -naturalism, the ideal of historical culture inspired and to be inspired -by the natural sciences. So true is this that Fueter himself burns a -few grains of incense before this idol, sighing for a form of history -that shall be beautiful with the beauty of a well-made machine, -rivalling a book on physics such as the <i>Theory of Tones</i> of Helmholtz. -The truth is that the ideal of the natural sciences, instead of being -the perfection, is one of the many crises that historical thought has -passed through and will pass through. Historical thought is dialectic -of development, and not by any means a deterministic explanation by -means of causes which does not explain anything because it does not -develop anything. But whatever we may think of this, it is certain that -naturalism—that is, the criticism of naturalism—can alone supply the -clue for unravelling the web of the historiography of the last ten -years; the same events and historical movements enumerated above have -acted in the particular way in which they have acted owing to being -constantly framed in naturalistic thought.</p> - -<p>For the rest, nothing forbids, and it may even serve a useful purpose, -that the history of philosophy and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> history of historiography -should receive literary treatment in different books, for altogether -practical reasons, such, for instance, as the abundance of material and -the different training and acquirements needed for the treatment of the -different classes of material. But what is <i>apparently disunited</i> by -practice thought <i>really</i> unifies; and this real unification is what -I have wished to inculcate, without the pedantic idea ever passing -through my mind of dictating rules for composing books, as to which -it is desirable to leave all liberty of inclusion and exclusion to -writers, in conformity with their various intentions.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_15" id="Footnote_1_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_15"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Charakteristik der antiken Historiographie</i> (Berlin, -1833).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_16" id="Footnote_2_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_16"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Geschichte der neueren Historiographie</i> (München u. -Berlin, Oldenburg, 1911).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_17" id="Footnote_3_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_17"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Geschichte der historischen Forschung und Kunst seit -der Wiederherstellung der literarischen Cultur in Europa</i> (Göttingen, -1812-20).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4>II</h4> - - -<h4>GRÆCO-ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY</h4> - - -<p>After what we have said as to the nature of periodization,<a name="FNanchor_1_18" id="FNanchor_1_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_18" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> the -usual custom, to which I too bow here, of beginning the history of -historiography with that of the Greeks, and with the Greeks of the -fifth or sixth century before Christ, will be taken for what it is -really worth, but it must not be thought that we thus intend to -announce the beginning of historiography, its first appearance in the -world, when, on the contrary, all we wish to say is that our interest -in the investigation of its course becomes more vivid at that point. -History, like philosophy, has no historical beginning, but only an -ideal or metaphysical beginning, in so far as it is an activity of -thought, which is outside time. Historically speaking, it is quite -clear that prior to Herodotus, prior to the logographs, prior indeed -to Hesiod and to Homer, history was already, because it is impossible -to conceive of men who do not think and do not narrate their deeds in -some way or other. This explanation might seem to be superfluous if the -confusion between historical beginning and ideal beginning had not led -to the fancy of a 'first philosophical step,' made by Thales or Zeno, -or by somebody else, by means of which thinking the first stone is -supposed to have been laid, as it was believed that by thinking another -last step the pinnacle of the edifice of philosophy was or would be -attained. But Thales and Herodotus should really be called rather the -'sons' of our interest in the development of those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> disciplines than -the 'fathers' of philosophy and history, and it is we whom those sons -salute as their 'fathers.' We have not usually much interest in what -occurred prior to them or among people more distant than they from -our point of view, not only because there is a scarcity of surviving -documents concerning them, but above all because they are forms of -thought which have but little connexion with our own actual problems.</p> - -<p>From its point of view, too, the distinction that we laid down between -history and philology suggests refraining from the search hitherto -made for the beginnings of Græco-Roman historiography by means of -composing lists of magistrates and of adding to these brief mention -of wars, treatises, embassies from colonies, religious festivities, -earthquakes, inundations, and the like, in the ῷροι and in the <i>annales -pontificum,</i> in archives and museums made in temples, or indeed in the -chronological nails fixed to the walls, spoken of by Perizonius. Such -things are extrinsic to historiography and form the precedent, not of -it, but of chronicle and philology, which were not born for the first -time in the nineteenth or seventeenth century, or at any rate during -the Alexandrine period, but belong to all times, for in all times men -take note of what they remember and attempt to preserve such memorials -intact, to restore and to increase them. The precedent of history -cannot be something different from history, but is history itself, as -philosophy is the precedent of philosophy and the living of the living. -Nevertheless the thought of Herodotus and of the logographs really -does unite itself with religions, myths, theogonies, cosmogonies, -genealogies, and with legendary and epical tales, which were not -indeed poetry, or were not only poetry but also thoughts—that is to -say, metaphysics and histories.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> The whole of later historiography -developed from them by a dialectical process, for which they supplied -the presuppositions—that is to say, concepts, propositions of fact and -fancy mingled, and with that the stimulus better to seek out the truth -and to dissipate fancies. This dissipation took place more rapidly at -the time which it is usual to fix by convention as the beginning of -Greek historiography.</p> - -<p>At that time thought deserts mythological history and its ruder -form, prodigious or miraculous history, and enters earthly or human -history—that is to say, the general conception that is still ours, so -much so that it has been possible for an illustrious living historian -to propose the works of Thucydides as an example and model to the -historians of our times. Certainly that exit and that entrance did -not represent for the Greeks a complete breaking with the past; and -since earthly history could not have been altogether wanting in the -past, so it is not to be believed that the Greeks from the sixth and -seventh centuries onward should have abandoned all faith in mythology -and prodigies. These things persisted not only with the people and -among lesser or vulgar historiographers, but also left their traces -among some of the greatest. Nevertheless, looking at the whole from -above, as one should look at it, it is evident that the environment -is altogether changed from what it was. Even the many fables that we -read in Herodotus, and which were to be read in the logographs, are -rarely (as has been justly observed) put forward ingenuously, but are -usually given as by one who collects what others believe, and does -not for that reason accept those beliefs, even if he does not openly -evince his disbelief; or he collects them because he does not know -what to substitute for them, and rather as matter for reflection<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> -and inquiry: <i>quæ nec confirmare argumentis neque refellere in animo -est,</i> as Tacitus says, when he recounts the fables of the Germans: -<i>plura transcribo quam credo,</i> declared Quintus Curtius. Herodotus is -certainly not Voltaire, nor is he indeed Thucydides (Thucydides, 'the -atheist'); but certainly he is no longer Homer or Hesiod.</p> - -<p>The following are a few examples of leading problems which ancient -historians had before them, dictated by the conditions and events -of Greek and Roman life; they were treated from a mental point of -view, which no longer found in those facts episodes of the rivalry of -Aphrodite and Hera (as formerly in the Trojan War), but varying complex -human struggles, due to human interests, expressing themselves in human -actions. How did the wars between the Greeks and the Persians originate -and develop? What were the origins of the Peloponnesian War? of the -expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes? How was the Roman power formed -in Latium, and how did it afterward extend in Italy and in the whole -world? How did the Romans succeed in depriving the Carthaginians of the -hegemony of the Mediterranean? What were the political institutions -developed in Athens, Rome, and Sparta, and what form did the social -struggle take in those cities? What did the Athenian <i>demos,</i> the Roman -<i>plebs,</i> the <i>eupatrides,</i> and the <i>patres</i> desire? What were the -virtues, the dispositions, the points of view, of the various peoples -which entered into conflict among themselves, Athenians, Lacedemonians, -Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Gauls, and Germans? What were the -characters of the great men who guided the destinies of the peoples, -Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander, Hannibal, and Scipio? These problems -were solved in a series of classical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> works by Thucydides, Xenophon, -Polybius, Livy, Tacitus, etc., and they will certainly not be blamed -for failing to exhaust their themes—that is, for failing to sound the -bottom of the universe, because there is no sounding the bottom of the -universe—nor because they solve those problems only in the terms in -which they had proposed them, neither more nor less than as we solve -the problems of our day in our own terms. Nor must we forget that since -modern historiography is still much as it was left by the Greeks, the -greater part of those events are still thought as they were by the -ancients, and although something has been added and a different light -illumines the whole, the work of the ancient historians is preserved in -our own: a true "eternal possession," as Thucydides intended that his -history should be.</p> - -<p>And just as historical thought had become invigorated in its passage -from the mythological to the human stage, so did research and philology -grow. Herodotus was already travelling, asking questions, and listening -to answers, distinguishing between the things that he had seen -with his own eyes and those which depended upon hearsay, opinion, -and conjecture; Thucydides was submitting to criticism different -traditions relating to the same fact, and even inserting documents in -his narrative. Later appeared legions of learned men and critics, who -compiled 'antiquities' and 'libraries,' and busied themselves also with -the reading of texts, with chronology and geography, thus affording -great assistance to historical studies. Such a fervour of philological -studies was eventually attained that it was recognized as necessary to -draw a clear distinction between the 'histories of antiquaries' (of -which a considerable number survive either entire or in fragments)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> -and 'histories of historians,' and Polybius several times said that it -is easy to compose history from books, because it suffices to take up -one's residence in a city where there exist rich libraries, but that -true history requires acquaintance with political and military affairs -and direct knowledge of places and of people; and Lucian repeated -that it is indispensable for the historian to have political sense, -άδίδακτον φυσέως δῶρον, a gift of nature not to be learned (the maxims -and practices praised as quite novel by Möser and Niebuhr are therefore -by no means new). The fact is that a more profound theoretical -consciousness corresponded with a more vigorous historiography, so -inseparable is the theory of history from history, advancing with it. -It was also known that history should not be made a simple instrument -of practice, of political intrigue, or of amusement, and that its -function is above all to aim at truth: <i>ne quid falsi dicere audeat, -ne quid veri non audeat.</i> In consequence of this, partisanship, even -for one's own country, was condemned (although it was recognized -chat solicitude and sympathy were permissible); and <i>quidquid Græcia -mendax audet in historia</i> was blamed. It was known that history is not -chronicle (annales), which is limited to external things, recording (in -the words of Asellio, the ancient Roman historian) <i>quod factum, quoque -anno gestum sit,</i> whereas history tries to understand <i>quo Consilio, -quaque ratione gesta sint.</i> And it was also known that history cannot -set herself the same task as poetry. We find Thucydides referring with -disdain to histories written with the object of gaining the prize in -oratorical competitions, and to those which indulge in fables to please -the vulgar. Polybius too inveighed against those who seek to emphasize -moving details, and depict women dishevelled and in tears, and -dreadful<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> scenes, as though composing tragedies and as though it were -their business to create the marvellous and pleasing and not impart -truth and instruction. If it be a fact that rhetorical historiography -(a worsening of the imaginative and poetic) abounded in antiquity and -introduced its false gold even into some masterpieces, the general -tendency of the better historians was to set themselves free of ornate -rhetoricians and of cheap eloquence. But the ancient historians will -never fail of lofty poetical power and elevation for this reason (not -even the 'prosaic' Polybius, who sometimes paints most effective -pictures), but will ever retain what is proper to lofty historical -narrative. Cicero and Quintilian, Diogenes and Lucian, all recognize -that history must adopt <i>verba ferme poetarum,</i> that it is <i>proxima -poetis et quodammodo carmen solutum,</i> that <i>scribitur ad narrandum, -non ad demonstrandum,</i> that ἔχει τι ποιητικόν, and the like. What the -best historians and theorists sought at that time was not the aridity -and dryness of mathematical or physical treatment (such as we often -hear desired in our day), but gravity, abstention from fabulous and -pleasing tales, or if not from fabulous then from frivolous tales, in -fact from competition with the rhetoricians and composers of histories -that were romances or gross caricatures of such. Above all they desired -that history should remain faithful to real life, since it is the -instrument of life, and a form of knowledge useful to the statesman and -to the lover of his country, and by no means docile to the capricious -requirements of the unoccupied seeking amusement.</p> - -<p>This theory of historiography, which may be found here and there in -a good many special treatises and in general treatises on the art of -speech, finds nowhere such complete and conscious expression as in the -frequent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> polemical interludes of Polybius in his <i>Histories,</i> where -the polemic itself endows it with precision, concreteness, and savour. -Polybius is the Aristotle of ancient historiography: an Aristotle who -is both historical and theoretical, completing the Stagirite, who in -the vast expanse of his work had taken but little interest in history -properly so called. And since so great a part of the ancient narratives -lives in our own, so there is not one of the propositions recorded -that has not been included and has not been worthy of being included -in our treatises. And if, for example, the maxim that history should -be narrated by men of the world and not by the simply erudite or by -philologists, that it is born of practice and assists in practice, -has been often neglected, the blame falls on those who neglect it. A -further blunder committed by such writers has been to forget completely -the τι ποιητικόν and to pay court to an ideal of history something like -an anatomical map or a treatise of mechanics.</p> - -<p>But the defect that ancient historiography exposes to our gaze is of -another sort. The ancients did not observe it as a defect, or only -sometimes, in a vague and fugitive manner, without attaching weight to -it, for otherwise they would have remedied it when it occurred. The -modern spirit inquires how the sentiments and conceptions which are now -our ideal patrimony, and the institutions in which they are realized, -have been gradually formed. It wishes to understand the revolutionary -passages from primitive and Oriental to Græco-Roman culture, how -modern ethic was attained through ancient ethic, the modern through -the ancient state, the vast industry and international commerce of -the modern world through the ancient mode of economic production, -the passage from the myths of the Aryans to our philosophies,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> from -Mycenean to French or Swedish or Italian art of the twentieth century. -Hence there are special histories of culture, of philosophy, of poetry, -of the sciences, of technique, of economy, of morality, of religions, -and so on, which are preferred to histories of individuals or of -states themselves, in so far as they are abstract individuals. They -are illuminated and inspired throughout with the ideas of liberty, of -civilization, of humanity, and of progress. All this is not to be found -in ancient historiography, although it cannot be said to be altogether -absent, for with what could the mind of man have ever been occupied, -save by human ideals or 'values'? Nor should the error be made of -considering 'epochs' as something compact and static, whereas they are -various and in motion, or of rendering those divisions natural and -external which, as has been demonstrated, are nothing but the movement -of our thought as we think history, a fallacy linked with the other one -concerning the absolute beginning of history and the rendering temporal -of the forms of the spirit. Whoever is gifted with the patience of -the collector will meet here and there with suggestions and buddings -of those historiographical conceptions of which, generally speaking, -we have denied the existence in the writings of the ancients. He who -finds diversion in modernizing the old may travesty the thoughts of -the ancients, as they have been travestied, so as to render them -almost altogether similar to those of the moderns. In the first book -of Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics</i>, for instance, is to be admired a sketch -of the development of Greek philosophy, of the various naturalistic -interpretations which have been in turn proposed for the explanation -of the cosmos, and so on, up to the new orientation of the mind, when, -"compelled by truth itself," it turned toward a different order of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> -principles—that is to say, till the time of Anaxagoras, "who seems -to be a sober man among the intoxicated," thus continuing up to the -time of Socrates, who founded ethic and discovered the universal and -the definition. A sketch of the history of civilization is to be found -at the beginning of the <i>History</i> of Thucydides, and Polybius will be -found discoursing of the progress that had been made in all the arts, -while Cicero, Quintilian, and several others trace the progress of -rights and of literature. There are also touches of human value in -conflict with one another in the narratives of the struggles between -Greeks and barbarians, between the truly civil and active life of -the former and the proud, lazy habits of the latter. Other similar -conceptions of human values will be found in many comparisons of -peoples, and above all in the way that Tacitus describes the Germans -as a new moral power rising up against that of ancient Rome, and -perhaps also in the repugnance which the same historian experiences -at seeing before him the Jews, who follow rites <i>contrarius ceteris -mortalibus.</i> Finally, Rome, mistress of the world, will sometimes -assume in our eyes the aspect of a transparent symbol of the human -ideal, analogous to Roman law, gradually idealized in the form of -natural law. But here it is rather a question of symbols than of -conceptions, of our own conclusions than of the thoughts proper to the -ancients. When, for instance, we examine the history of philosophy -of Aristotle as outlined by him, we find that it consists above all -in a rapid critical account to serve as propædeutic to his system; -and literary and artistic histories and histories of civilization -seem often to be weakened by the prejudice that these are not really -necessary mental forms, but luxuries and refinements. At the utmost -we can speak of exceptions, incidents, tentatives; which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> does not in -any way alter the comprehensive impression and general conclusion to -the effect that the ancients never possessed explicit histories of -civilization, philosophy, religions, literature, art, or rights: none, -in fact, of the many possessed by ourselves. Nor did they possess -'biography' in the sense that we do, as the history of the ideal -function of an individual in his own time and in the life of humanity, -nor the sense of development, and when they speak of primitive times -they rarely feel that they are primitive, but are rather disposed to -transfigure them poetically, in the same way that Dante did by the -mouth of Cacciaguida that Fiorenza which "stood soberly and modestly at -peace" within the circle of the ancient days. It was one of the "severe -labours" of our Vico to recover the crude reality of history beneath -these poetic idylls. In this work he was assisted, not by the ancient -historiographers, but by documents and mostly by languages.</p> - -<p>The physiognomy of the histories of the ancients as described very -accurately reflects the character of their philosophy, which never -attained to the conception of the spirit, and therefore also failed -to attain to that of humanity, liberty, and progress, which are -aspects or synonyms of the former. It certainly passed from physiology -or cosmology to ethic, logic, and rhetoric; but it schematized and -materialized these spiritual disciplines because it treated them -empirically. Thus their ethic did not rise above the custom of -Greece and Rome, nor their logic above abstract forms of reasoning -and discussing, nor their poetic above classes of literature. For -this reason all assume the form of precepts. 'Anti-historical -philosophy' has been universally recognized and described, but it -is anti-historical because anti-spiritual, anti-historical because -naturalistic.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> The ancients also failed to notice the deficiency -observed by us, for they were entirely occupied with the joy of the -effort of passing from myth to science and thus to the collection and -classification of the facts of reality. That is to say, they were -engrossed upon the sole problem which they set themselves to solve, -and solved so successfully that they supplied naturalism with the -instruments which it still employs: formal logic, grammar, the doctrine -of the virtues, the doctrine of literary classes, categories of civil -rights, and so forth. These were all Græco-Roman creations.</p> - -<p>But that ancient historians and philosophers were not explicitly aware -of the above defect in its proper terms, or rather in our modern terms, -does not mean that they were not to some extent exercised by it. In -every historical period exist problems theoretically formulated and for -that very reason solved, while others have not yet arrived at complete -theoretical maturity, but are seen, intuited, though not yet adequately -thought. If the former are the positive contribution of that time to -the chain whose links form the human spirit, the latter represent an -unsatisfied demand, which binds that time in another way to the coming -time. The great attention paid to the negative aspect of every epoch -sometimes leads to the forgetting of the other aspect, and to the -consequent imagining of a humanity that passes not from satisfaction -to satisfaction through dissatisfaction, but from dissatisfaction -to dissatisfaction and from error to error. But obscurities and -discordances are possible in so far as light and concord have been -previously attained. Thus they represent in their way progress, as is -to be seen from the history that we are recounting, where we find them -very numerous for the very reason that the age of mythologies and of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> -prodigies has been left behind. If Greece and Rome had not been both -more than Greece and more than Rome, if they had not been the human -spirit, which is infinitely greater than any Greece and any Rome—its -transitory individuations—they would have been satisfied with the -human portraits of their historians and would not have sought beyond. -But they did seek beyond—that is to say, those very historians and -philosophers sought; and since they had before them so many episodes -and dramas of human life, reconstructed by their thought, they asked -themselves what was the cause of those events, reasonably concluding -that such a cause might be one fact or another, a particular fact; and -for this reason they began to distinguish between facts and causes, -and, in the order of causes themselves, between cause and occasion, -as does Thucydides, or between beginning, cause, and occasion ἀρχή, -αἰτία, πρόφασις, like Polybius. They thus became involved in disputes -as to the true cause of this or that event, and ever since antiquity -attempts have been made to solve the enigma of the 'greatness' of -Rome, assuming in modern times the guise of a solemn experimentum of -historical thought and thus forming the diversion of those historians -who linger behind. The question was often generalized in the other -question as to the motive power behind all history; and here too appear -doctrines, afterward drawn out to great length, such as that the form -of the political constitution was the cause of all the rest, and that -other doctrine relating to climate and to the temperaments of peoples. -The doctrine principally proposed and accepted was that of the natural -law of the circle in human affairs, the perpetual alternation of -good and evil, or the passage through political forms, which always -returns to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> form from which it has taken its start, or as growth -from infancy to manhood, declining into old age and decrepitude and -ending in death. But a law of this sort, which satisfied and still -satisfies the Oriental mind, did not satisfy the classical mind, -which had a lively sense of human effort and of the stimulus received -from obstacles encountered and conflicts endured. Hence therefore the -further questions: Does fate or immutable necessity oppress man, or is -he not rather the plaything of capricious fortune, or is he ruled by a -wise and sagacious providence? It was also asked whether the gods are -interested in human affairs or not. These questions met with answers -that are sometimes pious, advocating submission to the divine will and -wisdom, sometimes, again, inspired with the notion that the gods are -not concerned with human affairs themselves, but solely with vengeance -and punishment. All these conceptions lack firmness, and are for the -most part confused, since a general uncertainty and confession of -ignorance prevails in them: <i>in incerto judicium est,</i> said Tacitus, -almost summing up the ancient argument on the subject in this epigram, -or rather finding non-thought, failure to understand, to be the result -of the argument.</p> - -<p>What we do not understand we do not dominate; on the contrary, it -dominates us, or at least menaces us, taking the form of evil; hence -the psychological attitude of the ancients toward history must be -described as pessimistic. They saw much greatness fall, but they never -discovered the greatness that does not fall and that rises up greater -after every fall. For this reason a flood of bitterness inundates -their histories. Happiness, beauty of human life, always seemed to be -something that had been and was no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> longer, and were it present would -have soon been lost. For the Romans and those professing the cult of -Rome, it was primitive, austere, victorious Rome; and all the Roman -historians, big and little, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus, Paterculus and -Florus, fix their gaze upon that image, as they lament the corruption -of later days. Once it was Rome that trampled the world underfoot; -but they knew that the triumphant queen must some day become slave -from queen that once she was. This thought manifests itself in the -most various forms, from the melancholy meditations of Scipio upon the -ruins of Carthage to the fearful expectation of the lordship which—as -Persia to Babylonia and Macedonia to Persia—must succeed to that of -the Romans (the theory of the 'four monarchies' has its origin in the -Græco-Roman world, whence it filtered into Palestine and into the -Book of Daniel). Sometimes repressed, sometimes outspoken, we hear -the anxious question: Who will be the successor and the gravedigger? -Will it be the menacing Parthian? Will it be the Germans, so rich in -new and mysterious energy?—all this, despite the proud consciousness -of ancient times that had uttered the words "Rome, the eternal city." -Certainly, that general pessimism is not altogether coherent, for no -pessimism can be so altogether, and here and there appear fugitive -hints of a perception of human progress in this or that part of life. -We find, for instance, Tacitus, bitterest of men, remarking that <i>nec -omnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra quoque ætas multa laudis et -artium imitanda tulit,</i> and one of the speakers in the <i>De oratoribus</i> -observes that literary forms change with the times and that it is -owing to the <i>vitio malignitatis humana</i> that we hear the perpetual -praise of ancient things and the perpetual abuse of things modern.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> -Another interlocutor in the same dialogue draws attention to the -dialectic connexion between the turbulence of life and the greatness of -art, whence Rome <i>donec erravit, donec se partibus et dissensionibus -confecit,</i> precisely at that time <i>tulit valentiorem eloquentiam.</i> -This linking together of good and evil is not altogether absent in -ancient philosophy, and is also to be found here and there in ancient -historiography. Sallust, for example, is of opinion that Rome remained -in good health so long as she had Carthage opposed to her and giving -her trouble. Readers of Cicero and of Seneca will be aware that the -idea of humanity also made considerable progress during the last -days of the Republic and the first days of the Empire, owing to the -influence of Stoicism. Divine providence too is courted, as was not -formerly the case, and we also find Diodorus Siculus undertaking to -treat the affairs of all nations as those of a single city (καθάπερ -μιᾶς πολέως). But these promises remain still weak, vague, and inert -(the <i>promissor</i> Diodorus, for example, carried out none of his -grandiose prologue), and in any case they foretell the dissolution -of the classical world. During this epoch the problem as to the -signification of history remains unsolved, because the contradictory -conceptions above mentioned of fortune or of the gods, the belief in -a universal worsening of things, in a fall or a regression, which had -already been expressed in many ancient myths, were not by any means -solutions.</p> - -<p>Owing to their failure to realize spiritual value as the immanent -progressive force in history, even the loftiest of the ancient -historians were not able to maintain the unity and autonomy of -historiographical work, which in other respects they had discovered -and asserted. Although they had penetrated the deception exercised by -those histories that are really poetry, or lies and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> partisanship, or -collections of material and unintelligent piling up of erudition, or -instruments of pleasure, affording marvel for simple folk, yet they -were on the other hand incapable of ever setting themselves free of -the preconception of history as directed to an end of edification -and chiefly of instruction. This real heteronomy then appeared to -be autonomy. They are all agreed as to this: Thucydides proposed to -narrate past events in order to predict from them future events, -identical or similar, the perpetual return of human fortunes; Polybius -sought out the causes of facts in order that he might apply them to -analogous cases, and held those unexpected events to be of inferior -importance whose irregularities place them outside rules; Tacitus, in -conformity with his chief interest, which was rather moralistic than -social or political, held his chief end to be the collection of facts -notable for the vice or virtue which they contained, <i>ne virtutes -sileantur utque pravis dictis factìsque ex posteritate et infamia metus -sit.</i> Behind them came all the minor historians, all the hypocrites, -who repeated by imitation or involuntary echo or false unction and in a -superficial way what in the greater writers was the result of profound -thought, as, for instance, the Sallusts, the Diogenes, the Diodori, -the Plutarchs, and those that resemble them. Then there were all the -extractors of historical quintessences, of memorable deeds and words of -statesmen, captains, and philosophers, and even of women (the γυναικῶν -ἀρεταί). Ancient historiography has been called 'pragmatical,' and -such it is, in the double sense of the word, ancient and modern: in so -far as it limits itself to the earthly side of things and especially -to the political (the 'pragmatic' of Polybius), and in so far as it -adorns them with reflections and advice (the 'apodictic' of the same -historian-theorist).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span></p> - -<p>This heteronomous theory of history does not always remain merely -theory, prologue, or frame, but sometimes operates so as to lead to -the mingling of elements that are not historiographical with history, -such as, for instance, is the case with the 'speeches' or 'orations' of -historical personages, not delivered or not in agreement with what was -really said, but invented or arranged by the historian and put into the -mouths of the personages. This, in my opinion, has been wrongly looked -upon as a survival of the 'epic spirit' in ancient historiography, or -as a simple proof of the rhetorical ability of the narrators, because, -if the first explanation hold as to some of the popular writers and the -second as to certain rhetoricians, the origin of those falsifications -was with the greater historians nothing but the fulfilment of the -obligation of teaching and counselling accepted by them. But when such -ends had been assigned to history, its intrinsic quality of truth -and the line of demarcation which it drew between real and imaginary -could not but vacillate to some extent, since the imaginary sometimes -served excellently well and even better than the real for those ends. -And setting aside Plato, who despised all knowledge save that of the -transcendental ideas, did not Aristotle himself ask whether the greater -truth belonged to history or to poetry? Had he not indeed said that -history is 'less philosophical' than poetry? And if so why should not -history have availed itself of the aid of poetry and of imagination? -In any case, resistance could be opposed to this ulterior perversion -by seeking the truth with vigilant eye, and also by reducing the -share of the imaginary speeches and other parerga co the smallest -dimensions. But it was impossible to dispense with belief in the end -of instruction, because it was in any case necessary that history -should have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> some end, and a true end had not been discovered, and -the end of instruction performed almost the function of a metaphor of -the truth, since it was to some extent the nearest to the truth. In -Polybius critical vigilance, scientific austerity, a keen desire for -ample and severe history, attain to so high a level that one would feel -disposed to treat the historian of Megalopolis like one of those great -pagans that medieval imagination admitted to Paradise, or at least to -Purgatory, as worthy of having known the true God by extraordinary -means and as a reward for their intense moral conscience. But if we -envisage the matter with greater calmness we shall have to consign -Polybius also to the Limbo where those who "were before Christianity" -and "did not duly adore God" are received. They were men of great value -and reached the boundary, even touching it, but they never passed -beyond.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_18" id="Footnote_1_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_18"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See pp. 112-116.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4>III</h4> - - -<h4>MEDIEVAL HISTORIOGRAPHY</h4> - - -<p>For the same reason that we must not look upon the beginning of -any history as an absolute beginning, or conceive of epochs in a -simplicistic manner, as though they were strictly limited to the -determinations represented by their general character, we must -be careful not to identify the humanistic conception of history -with the ancient epoch of historiography which it characterizes or -symbolizes—in fact, we must not make historical the ideal categories, -which are eternal. Græco-Roman historiography was without doubt -humanistic, but it was a Græco-Roman humanism—that is to say, it not -only had all the limitations that we have been pointing out, but also -the special physiognomy which such humanism assumes in the ancient -historians and thinkers, varying more or less in each one of them. -Not only was it thus humanistic, but other formations of the same -sort probably preceded, as they certainly followed, it in the course -of the centuries. It is perhaps attractive, but it is also artificial -(and contrary to the true concept of progress), to conceive of the -history of philosophy and of historiography as of a series of ideal -phases, which are traversed once only, and to transform philosophers -into categories and categories into philosophers, making synonymous -Democritus and the atom, Plato and the transcendental idea, Descartes -and dualism, Spinoza and pantheism, Leibnitz and monadism, whittling -down history to the dimensions of a <i>Dynastengeschichte</i>, as a German -critic has satirically described it, or treating it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> according to a -sort of 'line of buckets' theory, as an Englishman has humorously -described it. Hence, too, the view that history has not yet appeared in -the world, or that it has appeared for the first time and by flashes, -in response to the invocations made by the historian and the critic of -the present day. But every thinking of history is always adequate to -the moment at which it appears and always inadequate to the moment that -follows.</p> - -<p>The opportuneness of this warning is confirmed by the astonishment of -those who consider the passage from ancient to Christian or medieval -historiography; for what can be the meaning of this passage, in which -we find ourselves faced with a miraculous and mythological world all -over again, identical as it seems, in its general characteristics, -with that of the ancient historians, which has disappeared? It is -certainly not progress, but rather falling into a ditch, into which -also fall all the dearest illusions relating to the perpetual advance -of humanity. And the Middle Ages did seem to be a ditch or a declivity, -sometimes during the period itself and most clearly at the Renaissance, -and this image is still represented in common belief. Restricting -ourselves solely to the domain of historiography, and following up -the impression of astonishment at first caused by it, we end by -representing events at the beginning of the Middle Ages somewhat in the -way they appeared to our writer Adolfo Bartoli, in his introductory -volume to the <i>History of Italian Literature,</i> which is all broken up -with cries of horror and with the gesture of covering the face lest -he should see so much ugliness. "We are in a world," writes Bartoli, -when speaking of Gregory of Tours, "where thought has descended so low -as to cause pity, in a world where a conception of history no longer -exists," and history also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> becomes "a humble handmaid to theology—that -is to say, an aberration of the spirit." And after Gregory of Tours -(continues Bartoli) there is a further fall: "Behold Fredigarius, in -whom credulity, ignorance, and confusion surpass every limit... there -survives in him nothing of a previous civilization." After Fredigarius, -with the monastic chronicle, we take another step down-ward toward -nothingness, though this would seem to be impossible. Here "we seem to -see the lean monk putting his trembling head out of the narrow window -of his cell every five or eleven years, to make sure that men are not -all dead, and then shutting himself up again in the prison, where he -lives only in the expectation of death." We must protest against such -shrinking back (which makes the critic of to-day look like the "lean -monk" whose appearance he has so vividly portrayed); we must assert -that mythology and miracle and transcendency certainly returned in -the Middle Ages—that is to say, that these ideal categories again -acted with almost equal force and that they almost reassumed their -ancient bulk, but they did not return <i>historically identical</i> with -those of the pre-Hellenic world. We must seek in the heart of their -new manifestations for the effective progress which is certainly -accomplished by Gregory of Tours and Fredigarius, and even by the -monkish chroniclers.</p> - -<p>The divinity descends again to mingle anthropomorphically with the -affairs of men, as a most powerful or ultra-powerful personage among -the less powerful; the gods are now the saints, and Peter and Paul -intervene in favour of this or that people; St Mark, St Gregory, -St Andrew, or St January lead the array of the combatants, the one -vying with the other, and sometimes against the other, playing -malicious tricks upon one another; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> in the performance or the -non-performance of an act of worship is again placed the loss or gain -of a battle: medieval poems and chronicles are full of such stories. -These conceptions are analogous to the antique, and indeed they are -their historical continuation. This is not only so (as has so often -been pointed out) owing to the attachment of this or that particular -of ancient faith to popular religion and to the transformation of -gods into saints and demons, but also, and above all, to a more -substantial reason. Ancient thought had left fortune, the divinity, -the inscrutable, at the edge of its humanism, with the result that -the prodigious was never completely eliminated even from the most -severe historians—the door at any rate was left open by which it -could return. All are aware with how many 'superstitions' philosophy, -science, history, and customs were impregnated during late antiquity, -which in this respect was not intellectually superior, but indeed -inferior, to the new Christian religion. In the latter the fables -gradually formed and miracles which were believed became spiritualized -and ceased to be 'superstitions'—that is to say, something extraneous -or discordant to the general humanistic conception—and set themselves -in harmony with the new supernaturalistic and transcendental -conception, of which they were the accompaniment. Thus myth and -miracle, becoming intensified in Christianity, became at the same time -different from ancient myths and miracles.</p> - -<p>They were different and more lofty, because they contained a more lofty -thought: the thought of spiritual worth, which was not peculiar to this -or to that people, but common to the whole of humanity. The ancients -had indeed touched upon this thought in speculation, but they had never -possessed it, and their philosophers had sought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> it in vain or attained -to it only in abstract speculation not capable of investing the whole -soul, as is the case with thoughts that are profoundly thought, and -as was the case with Christianity. Paulus Orosius expresses this in -his <i>Historæ adversus paganos</i>, in such accents as no Græco-Roman -historian had been able to utter: <i>Ubique patria, ubique lex et -religio mea est.... Latitudo orientis, septentrionis copiositas, -meridiana diffusio, magnarum insularum largissimæ tutissimæque sedes -mei juris et nominis sunt, quia ad Christianos et Romanos Romanus et -Christianus accedo.</i> To the virtue of the citizen is added that of man, -of spiritual man, who puts himself on a level with the truth by means -of his religious faith and by his work, which is humanly good. To the -illustrious men among the pagans are opposed illustrious men among the -Christians who are better than illustrious, being saints; and the new -Plutarch is found in the <i>Vitæ patrum</i> or <i>eremitarum,</i> in the lives -of the confessors of Christ, of the martyrs, of the propagators of -the true faith; the new epics describe the conflicts of the faithful -against unbelievers, of Christians against heretics and Islamites. -There is here a greater consciousness of conflict than the Greeks had -of the conflict between Greeks and barbarians, or freedmen and slaves, -which were usually looked upon rather as representing differences of -nature than of spiritual values. <i>Ecclesiastical history</i> now appears, -no longer that of Athens or of Rome, but of religion and of the Church -which represented it in its strifes and in its triumphs—that is to -say, the strifes and triumphs of the truth. This was a thing without -precedent in the ancient world, whose histories of culture, of art -or philosophy, did not go beyond the empirical stage, as we have -seen, whereas ecclesiastical history has a spiritual value as its -subject,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> by means of which it illuminates and judges facts. To censure -ecclesiastical history because it overrules and oppresses profane -history will perhaps be justified, as we shall see, from certain -points of view and in a certain sense; but it is not justifiable as a -general criticism of the idea of that history, and, indeed, when we -formulate the censure in these terms we are unconsciously pronouncing -a warm eulogy of it. The <i>historia spiritalis</i> (as we may also call -it, employing the title of Avito's poem) could not and in truth would -not consent to be a mere part, or to suffer rivals at its side: it -must dominate and affirm itself as the whole. And since history -becomes history of the truth with Christianity, it abandons at the -same time the fortuitous and chance, to which the ancients had often -abandoned it, and recognizes its own proper law, which is no longer -a natural law, blind fate, or even the influence of the stars (St -Augustine confutes this doctrine of the pagans), but rationality, -intelligence, <i>providence.</i> This conception was not unknown to ancient -philosophy, but is now set free from the frost of intellectualism and -abstractionism and becomes warm and fruitful. Providence guides and -disposes the course of events, directing them to an end, permitting -evils as punishments and as instruments of education, determining the -greatness and the catastrophes of empires, in order to prepare the -kingdom of God. This means that for the first time is really broken the -idea of the <i>circle,</i> of the perpetual return of human affairs to their -starting-point, of the vain labour of the Danaïds (St Augustine also -combats the <i>circuitus</i>); history for the first time is here understood -<i>as progress</i>: a progress that the ancient historians did not succeed -in discovering, save in rare glimpses, thus falling into unconsolable -pessimism, whereas Christian pessimism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> is irradiated with hope. Hence -the importance to be attributed to the <i>succession of empires</i> and to -the function fulfilled by each of them, and especially with regard -to the Roman Empire, which politically unified the world that Christ -came to unify spiritually, to the position of Judaism as opposed to -Christianity, and the like. These questions have been answered in -various ways, but on the common assumption that divine intelligence -had willed those events, that greatness and that decadence, those joys -and afflictions, and therefore that all had been necessary means of -the divine work, and that all had competed in and were competing in -the final end of history, linked one with the other, not as effects -following from a blind cause, but as stages of a process. Hence, too, -history understood as <i>universal</i> history, no longer in the sense of -Polybius, who narrates the transactions of those states which enter -into relations with one another, but in the profounder sense of a -history of the universal, of the universal by excellence, which is -history in labour with God and toward God. By means of this spirit -which invests them, even the most neglected of the chronicles become -surrounded with a halo, which is wanting to the classical histories of -Greece and Rome, and which, however distant they be from our particular -view-points, yet in their general aspect makes them very near to our -heart and mind.</p> - -<p>Such are the new problems and the new solutions which Christianity -brought to historical thought, and it may be said of them, as of the -political and humanistic thought of the ancients, that they constitute -a solid possession of perpetual efficacy for the human spirit. Eusebius -of Cæsarea is to be placed beside Herodotus as 'father' of modern -historiography, however little disposed it may be to recognize its -parents in that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> barbaric author and in the others who were called -'fathers of the Church,' to whom, and particularly to St Augustine, it -yet owes so great a part of itself. What are our histories of culture, -of civilization, of progress, of humanity, of truth, save the form of -ecclesiastical history in harmony with our times—that is to say, of -the triumph and propagation of the faith, of the strife against the -powers of darkness, of the successive treatments of the new evangel, or -good news, made afresh with each succeeding epoch? Do not the modern -histories, which narrate the function performed or the pre-eminence -assumed by this or that nation in the work of civilization, correspond -to the <i>Gesta Dei per Francos</i> and to other like formulas of medieval -historiography? And our universal histories are such not only in the -sense of Polybius, but also of the universal as ideal, purified and -elevated in the Christian sense; hence the religious sentiment which we -experience on approaching the solemnity of history.</p> - -<p>It will be observed that in presenting it in this way we to some extent -idealize the Christian conception; and this is true, but in the same -way and in the same measure as we have idealized ancient humanism, -which was not only humanism, but also transcendency and mystery. -Christian historiography, like ancient historiography, solved the -problems that were set to it, but it did not solve other problems that -were only formed afterward, because they were not set to it. A proof -of this is to be found in the caprices and the myths that accompanied -its fundamental conception. The prodigious and the miraculous, which, -as already observed, surrounded Christian historiography, bore witness -precisely to the incomplete ideality of the new and loftier God, -the thought of whom became converted into a myth, his action into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> -fabulous anecdotes. Yet when it was not a question of miracles, or when -these were reduced to small compass, attenuated and held back, if not -refuted, there nevertheless remained the miracle of the divinity and -of the truth, conceived as transcendent, separated from and opposed to -human affairs. This too was an attestation of the Christian spirit, in -so far as it surpassed the ancient spirit, not with the calmness and -security of thought, but with the violence of sentiment and with the -enthusiasm of the imagination. Transcendency led to a consideration of -worldly things as external and rebellious to divine things: hence the -dualism of God and the world, of a <i>civitas colestis</i> and of another -that was <i>terrena,</i> of a <i>civitas</i> Dei and of a <i>civitas diaboli</i> which -revived most ancient Oriental conceptions, such as Parseeism, and was -tempered, if not internally corrected, by means of the providential -course of history, internally compromised by that unconquered dualism. -The city of God destroyed the earthly city and took its place, but -did not justify it, although it tried to do so here and there, -in accordance with the logic of its providential and progressive -principle. St Augustine, obliged to explain the reasons of the fortune -of Rome, escaped from the difficulty with the sophism that God conceded -that greatness to the Romans as a reward for their virtues, earthly -though they were and not such as to lead to the attainment of heavenly -glories, but yet worthy the fleeting reward of earthly glory. Thus the -Romans remained always reprobate, but less reprehensible than other -reprobates; there could not have been true virtue where there had not -been true religion. The contests of ideas did not appear as conflicting -forms of the true in its becoming, but simply diabolical suggestions, -which disturbed the truth, which was complete and possessed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> by the -Church. Eusebius of Cæsarea treated heresies as the work of the -devil, because it was the devil who prompted Simon Magus, and then -Menander, and the two currents of gnosis represented by Saturninus and -Basil. Otto of Frisia contemplated the Roman Empire succeeding to the -Babylonian as son to father, and the kings of the Persians and the -Greeks almost as its tutors and pedagogues. In the political unity of -Rome he discovers a prelude to Christian unity, in order that the minds -of men should form themselves <i>ad majora intelligenda promptiores et -capaciores,</i> be disciplined to the cult of a single man, the emperor, -and to the fear of a single dominant city, that they should learn <i>unam -quoque fidem tenendam.</i> But the same Otto imagines the whole world <i>a -primo homine ad Christum ... exceptis de Israelitico populo paucis, -errore deceptus, vanis superstitionibus deditus, dæmonum ludicris -captus, mundi illecebris irretitus,</i> fighting <i>sub principe mundi -diabolo, until venit plenitudo temporis</i> and God sent His son to earth. -The doctrine of salvation as a grace due to the good pleasure of God, -indebita Dei gratia, is not at all an accidental excrescence upon this -conception, but is its foundation or logical complement. Christian -humanity was destined to make itself unhuman, and St Augustine, however -much reverence he excites by the energy of his temperament, by his -gaze ever fixed above, offends us to an equal degree by his lack of -human sympathy, his harshness and cruelty; and the 'grace' of which he -speaks assumes in our eyes the aspect of odious favouritism and undue -exercise of power. It is nevertheless well to remember that by means -of these oscillations and deviations of sentiment and imagination -Christian historiography prepared the problem of the surpassing of -dualism. For if the search for the Christianity of the non-Christians,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> -for grace due to all men from their very character of men, the truth -of heresies, the goodness of pagan virtue, was a historical task that -has matured slowly in modern times, the division and opposition of -the two histories and the two cities, introduced by Christianity, was -a fundamental necessity, as their unity thought in the providential -divine Unity was a good preparation for it.</p> - -<p>Another well-known aspect of this dualism is <i>dogmatism,</i> the -incapacity to understand the concrete particularization of itself by -the spirit in its various activities and forms. This explains the -accusation levelled against ecclesiastical history of overriding and -tyrannically oppressing the whole of the rest of history. This did in -fact take place, because ecclesiastical history, instead of developing -itself in the concrete universal of the spirit, remained rooted in a -particular determination of it. All human values were reduced to a -single value—that is to say, to firmness of Christian faith and to -service of the Church. This value, thus abstractly conceived, became -deprived of its natural virtue and declined to the level of a material -and immobile fact, and indeed the vivid, fluid Christian consciousness -after some centuries of development became solidified in dogmas. That -materialized and motionless dogma necessarily prevailed as a universal -measure, and men of all times were judged according to whether they had -or had not been touched with the divine grace, were pious or impious, -and the lives of the holy fathers and of believers were a Plutarch, -who excluded every other profane Plutarch. This was the dogmatism of -transcendency, which therefore resolved itself into <i>asceticism,</i> in -the name of which the whole actual history of mankind is covered with -contempt, with horror,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> and with lamentation. This is particularly -noticeable in Augustine, in Orosius, and in Otto of Frisia, but is to -be perceived at least in germ as a tendency among all the historians or -chroniclers of the early Middle Ages. What thoughts are suggested by -the battle of Thermopylæ to Otto of Frisia? <i>Tædet hic inextricabilem -malorum texere cratem; tamen ad ostendendam mortalium miseriam, -summatim ea attingere volo.</i> And what by the deeds of Alexander?<i> -Regni Macedonum monarchia, quæ al ipso cœpit, ipso mortuo cum ipso -finitur.... Civitas autem Christi firmata supra firmam petram</i>.... With -asceticism is linked the often noted and often ridiculed credulity -of the medieval historians (not to be confounded with the belief in -miracles, originating from religion): this credulity is generally -attributed to the prevalence of imagination, or to social conditions, -which rendered books rare and critical capacity difficult to find—that -is to say, to things which required to be explained in their turn.</p> - -<p>Indifference is, indeed, one of the principal sources of credulity, -because no one is ever credulous in the things that touch him closely -and of which he treats, while on the other hand all (as is proved -in daily life) are ready to lend an ear to more or less indifferent -talk. Asceticism, diminishing the interest for things of the world -and for history, assisted in the neglect and dispersion of books -and documents, promoted credulity toward everything heard or read, -unbridling the imagination, ever desirous of the wonderful and -curious, to the disadvantage of discernment. It did this not only -in history properly so called, but also in the science of nature or -natural history, which was also indifferent to one, who possessed the -ultimate truth of religion. The weak capacity for individualization -noticeable in medieval<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> historiography must be attributed to ascetism, -which is usually satisfied with the general character of goodness -or badness (the 'portrait' is very rare in it, as in the figurative -arts of the same age), and it has even less consciousness of the -historical differences of place and time, travestying persons and -events in contemporary costume. It even goes so far as to compose -imaginary histories and false documents, which portray the supposed -type. This extends from Agnello of Ravenna, who declared that he wrote -also the lives of those bishops of Ravenna about whom he possessed no -information, <i>et credo</i> (he said) <i>non mentitum esse,</i> because, if -they filled so high a past, they must of necessity have been good, -charitable, zealous, and so forth, down to the false decretals of the -pseudo-Isidore. We also owe to asceticism the <i>form of chronicle</i> as -its intimate cause, because, when the meaning of particular facts -was neglected, it only remained to note them as they were observed -or related, without any ideological connexion and with only the -chronological connexion. Thus we frequently find among the historians -of the Middle Ages the union (at first sight strange, yet not without -logical coherence) of a grandiose history, beginning with the creation -of the world and the dispersion of the races, and an arid chronicle, -following the other principle and becoming ever more particular and -more contingent as approach is gradually made to the times of the -authors.</p> - -<p>When on the one hand the two cities, the heavenly and the earthly, and -on the other the transcendency of the principle of explanation had -been conceived, the composition of dualism could not be sought for in -intelligence, but in myth, which put an end to the strife with the -triumph of one of the two adversaries:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> the myth of the fall, of the -redemption, of the expected reign of Christ, of the Last Judgment, and -of the final separation of the two cities, one ascending to Paradise -with the elect, the other driven back into hell with the wicked. This -mythology had its precedent in the Judaic expectations of a Messiah, -and also, from some points of view, in Orphism, and continued to -develop through gnosis, millenarism, and other heretical tentatives -and heresies, until it took a definite or almost a definite form in -St Augustine. It has been remarked that in this conception metaphysic -became identified with history, as an entirely new thought, altogether -opposed to Greek thought, and that it is a philosophical contribution -altogether novel and proper to Christianity. But we must add here that, -as mythology, it did not unite, but indeed confounded, metaphysic and -history, making the finite infinite, avoiding the fallacy of the circle -as perpetual return of things, but falling into the other fallacy of a -progress beginning and ending in time. History was therefore arranged -in spiritual epochs or phases, through which humanity was born, grew -up, and attained completion: there were six, seven, or eight epochs, -according to the various ways of dividing and calculating, which -sometimes corresponded to the ages of human life, sometimes to the days -of the creation, sometimes to both these schemes combined; or where -the hermeneutic of St Jerome upon the Book of Daniel was accepted, -the succession of events was distributed among the four <i>monarchies,</i> -of which the last was the Roman, not only in order of time, but also -in that of the idea, because after the Roman Empire (the Middle Ages, -as we know, long nourished the illusion that that empire persisted in -the form of the Holy Roman Empire) there would be nothing else, and -the reign of Christ or of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> Church and then of Antichrist and the -universal judgment were expected to follow without any intermission. -The end which history had not yet reached chronologically, being also -intrinsic to the system, was ideally constructible, as the Apocalypses -had already ideally constructed it, pervading theological works and -even histories, which in their last section (see the works of Otto of -Frisia for all of them) described the coming of Antichrist and the end -of the world: hence the idea of a <i>history of things future,</i> continued -by the paradoxical Francesco Patrizzi, who gave utterance to his theory -in the sixteenth century in his dialogues <i>Upon History</i> (1560). This -general historical picture might be here and there varied in its -particulars, but never shattered and confuted; it varied in orthodoxy -up to the time of Augustine, and afterward among the dissentients and -the heretics: most noteworthy of these variations was the <i>Eternal -Evangel</i> of the followers of Gioacchino di Flora, who divided history -into three epochs, corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity: -the first that of the Old Testament or of the Father, the second -that of the New Testament or of the Son, the third and last, that of -the Spirit. These are but artificial combinations and transactions, -by means of which life always seeks to find a passage between the -preconceived schemes which compress and threaten to suffocate it.</p> - -<p>But such transactions did not avail to get the better of the discord -between reality and plan which everywhere revealed itself. Hence the -necessity of the <i>allegorical interpretation,</i> so dear to the Middle -Ages. This consisted substantially in placing an imaginary figure -between the plan and the historical reality, a mixture of both, like a -bridge, but a bridge which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> could be crossed only in imagination. Thus -personages and events of sacred and profane history were allegorized, -and subtle numerical calculations made and continually reinforced with -new imaginary contributions, in order to discover correspondences -and parallelisms; and not only were the ages of life and the days of -creation placed on a parallel line with historical epochs, but so -also were the virtues and other conceptions. Such notions are still -to be found in books of devotion and in the preaching of the less -acute and less modernized of sacred orators. The 'reign of nature' -was also included in allegorical interpretation; and since history -and metaphysic had been set at variance with one another, so in like -manner was natural science set at variance with both of them, and all -appeared together in allegorical forms in the medieval encyclopædias, -the <i>Pantheons</i> and <i>Mirrors of the World.</i></p> - -<p>Notwithstanding these inevitable strayings, the new idea of history -as the spiritual drama of humanity, although it inclined toward myth, -yet acted with such energy as to weaken the ancient heteronomous -conception of history as directed toward the administration of abstract -instruction, useful in actual practice. History itself was now the -teaching, the knowledge of the life of the human race from its creation -upon the earth, through its struggles, up to its final state, which -was indicated in the near or remote horizon. History thus became the -work of God, teaching by His direct word and presence, which is to be -seen and heard in every part of it. Declarations are certainly not -wanting, indeed they abound, that the reading of histories is useful -as counselling, and particularly as inculcating, good behaviour and -abstention from evil. Sometimes it is a question of traditional and -conventional declaration<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span>s, at others of particular designs: but -medieval historiography was not conceived, because it could not be -conceived, heteronomously.</p> - -<p>If asceticism mortified minds, and if the miraculous clouded them, it -is not necessary to believe, on the other hand, that either had the -power to depress reality altogether and for a long period. Indeed, -precisely because asceticism was arbitrary, and mythology imaginary, -they remained more or less abstract, in the same way as allegorical -interpretation, which was impotent to suppress the real determinations -of fact. It was all very well to despise and condemn the earthly city -in words, but it forced itself upon the attention, and if it did not -speak to the intellect it spoke to the souls and to the passions of -men. In its period of youthful vigour, also, Christianity was obliged -to tolerate profane history, dictated by economic, political, and -military interests, side by side with sacred history. And as in the -course of the Middle Ages, in addition to the religious poetry of the -sacred hymns and poems, there also existed an epic of territorial -conquests, of the shock of peoples and of feudal strife, so there -continued to exist a worldly history, more or less mingled and tempered -with religious history. We find even fervent Christians and the most -pious of priests yielding to the desire of collecting and handing down -the memory of their race: thus Gregory of Tours told of the Franks, -Paulus Diaconus of the Lombards, Bede of the Angles, Widekind of the -Saxons. Their gentle hearts of political partisans do not cease to -beat. Not only do they lament the misery and wickedness of humanity -in general, but also give vent to their particular feelings, as we -observe, for instance, in the monk Erchempertus, who, <i>ex intimo corde -ducens alta suspiria,</i> resumes the thread of Paul's history to narrate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> -the deeds of his glorious Lombards (now hunted back into the southern -part of Italy alone and assaulted and imbushed on every side), <i>non -regnum sed excidium, non felicitatem sed miseriam, non triumphum sed -perniciem.</i> And Liutprand of Cremona, although he makes the deity -intervene as ruler and punisher on every occasion, and even the saints -in person do battle, does not fail, for instance, to note that when -Berengarius proceeded to take possession of the kingdom after the -death of Guido, the followers of the latter called for King Lambert, -<i>quia semper Itali geminis uti dominis volunt, quatinus alterum -alterius terrore coherceant</i>: which is also the definition of feudal -society. They were most credulous in many things, far from profound -and abandoned to their imagination, but they were not credulous, -indeed they were clear-sighted, shrewd and diffident in what concerned -the possessions and privileges of the churches and monasteries, of -families, and of the feudal group and the order of citizenship to which -each belonged. It is to these interests that we owe the formation of -archives, registers, chronologies, and the exercise of criticism as to -the authenticity and genuineness of documents. The conception of the -new Christian virtue oppressed, but did not quench, admiration (though -held sinful by the most severe) for the great name of ancient Rome, and -the many works of pagan civilization, its eloquence, its poetry, its -civil wisdom. Nor did it forbid admiration for Arabic or Judaic-Arabic -wisdom, of which the works were well received, notwithstanding -religious strife. Hence we may say that in the same way as Græco-Roman -humanism did not altogether exclude the supernatural, so the Christian -supernatural did not prevent human consideration of worldly passions -and earthly transactions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span></p> - -<p>This becomes more and more evident as we pass from the early to the -late Middle Ages, when profane historiography progresses, as the result -of the struggles between Church and State, of the communal movement, -of the more frequent commercial communications between Europe and the -East, and the like. These are themselves the result of the development, -the maturing, and the modernization of thought, which grows with life -and makes life grow. Neither life nor thought remained attached to the -conceptions of the fathers of the Church, of Augustine, of Orosius, -to whom history offered nothing but the proof of the infinite evils -that afflict humanity, of the unceasing punishments of God, and of -the "deaths of the persecutors." In Otto of Frisia himself, who holds -more firmly than the others to the doctrines of Augustine, we find the -asperity of doctrine tempered by grace; and when he afterward proceeds -to narrate the struggle between the Church and the Empire, if it cannot -be said that he takes the side of the Empire, it also cannot be said -that he resolutely defends that of the Church, for the eschatological -visions that form so great a part of his work do not blind his -practical sense and political judgment. The party of the faith against -the faithless remained, however, always the 'great party,' the great -'struggle of classes' (elect and reprobate) and of 'states' (celestial -and earthly cities). But within this large framework we perceive other -figures more closely particularized, other parties and interests, -which gradually come to occupy the first, second, and third planes, -so that the struggle between God and the devil is forced ever more -and more into the background and becomes somewhat vague, something -always assumed to be present, but not felt to be active and urgent in -the soul, as something<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> which is still talked of, but is not deeply -felt, or at least felt with the energy that the words would wish us -to believe, the words themselves often sounding like a refrain, as -pious as it is conventional. The miraculous gradually fills less and -less space and appears more rarely: God acts more willingly by means -of secondary causes, and respects natural laws; He rarely intervenes -directly in a revolutionary manner. The form of the chronicles, too, -becomes also less accidental and arid, the better among the chroniclers -here and there seeking a different 'order'—that is to say, really, a -better understanding—and we find (particularly from the thirteenth -century onward) the <i>ordo artificialis</i> or internal opposed to the -<i>ordo naturalis</i> or external chronological order. There are also -to be found those who distinguish between the <i>sub singulis annis -describere</i> and the <i>sub stilo historico conglutinare</i>—that is to -say, the grouping together according to things described. The general -aspect of historiography changes not a little. Limiting ourselves -to Italian historiography alone, there are no longer little books -upon the miracles and the translations of the bodies of saints and -bishops, but chronicles of communes, all of them full of affection for -the feudal superiors or for the archbishop, for the imperial or the -anti-imperial side, for Milan or for Bergamo, or for Lodi. The sense -of tragedy, which weighed so heavily upon Erchempertus, returns with -new and stronger accents in the narrative of the deeds of Barbarossa -at Milan, entitled <i>Libellus tristititiæ et doloris, angustiæ et -tribulationis, passionum et tormentorum.</i> Love for one's city usurps -much of the space previously devoted to things celestial, and praises -of Milan, of Bergamo, of Venice, of Amalfi, of Naples, resound in the -pages of their chroniclers. Thus those vast chronicles are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> reached -which, although they begin with the Tower of Babel, yet lead to the -history of that city or of that event which makes the strongest appeal -to the feelings and best stimulates the industry of the writer, and -become mingled with the persons and things of the present or future -life. Giovanni Villani, a pilgrim to Rome to celebrate the papal -jubilee, is not inspired with the ascetic spirit or raised to heaven by -that solemn spectacle; but, on the contrary, "since he finds himself -in the holy city of Rome on that blessed pilgrimage, inspecting its -<i>great</i> and <i>ancient possessions,</i> and reading the <i>histories and the -great deeds</i> of the Romans," he is inspired to compose the history of -his native Fiorenza, "daughter and creation of Rome" (of ancient Rome -prior to Christianity). His Fiorenza resembled Rome in its rise to -greatness and its following after great things, and was like Rome in -its fall. Thus the 'holy' and the 'blessed' do not lead him to holy -and blessed thoughts, but to thoughts of worldly greatness. To the -historiography of the communes answers the more seriously worldly, the -more formally and historically elaborated historiography of the Norman -and Suabian kingdom of Sicily. In the proem to its <i>Constitutiones</i> -sovereigns are declared to be instituted <i>ipsa rerum necessitate -cogente, nec minus divinæ provisionis instinctu</i>; with its Romualdo -Guarna, its Abbot Telesino, its Malaterra, its Hugo Falcando and Pietro -da Eboli, its Riccardo da San Germano, with the pseudo-Jamsilla, and -Saba Malaspina. All of these have their heroes, Roger and William the -Normans, Frederick and Manfred the Suabians, and what they praise in -them is the sound political basis which they knew how to establish -and to maintain with a firm hand. <i>Eo tempore,</i> says Falcando of -Roger, <i>Regnum Sicilia, strenuis et præclaris viris abundans,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> cum -terra marique plurimum posset, vicinis circumquoque gentibus terrorem -incusserat, summaque pace ac tranquillitate maxima fruebatur.</i> And -the so-called Jamsilla, of Frederick II: <i>Vir fuit magni cordis, -sed magnanitatem suam multa, qua in eo fuit, sapientia superavit, -ut nequaquam impetus eum ad aliquid faciendum impelleret, sed ad -omnia cum rationis maturitate procederet;... utpote qui philosophisæ -studiosus erat quam et ipse in se coluit, et in regno suo propagare -ordinavit. Tunc quidem ipsius felici tempore in regno Siciliæ erant -litterati pauci vel nulli; ipse vero imperator liberalium artium et -omnis approbatæ scientia scholas in regno ipso constituit ... ut -omnis conditionis et fortuna homines nullius occasione indigentiæ -a philosophiæ studio retraherentur.</i> The state, profane culture, -'philosophy,' impersonated in the heresiarch Frederick, are thus set in -clear relief. And while on the one hand more and more laical theories -of the state become joined to these political and cultural currents -(from Dante, indeed from Thomas Aquinas, to Marsilio of Padua), and -the first outlines of literary history (lives of the poets and of men -famous for their knowledge, and the rise of vernacular literatures) and -histories of manners (as in certain passages in Ricobaldo of Ferrara), -on the other hand scholasticism found its way to such problems and -conceptions by means of the works of Aristotle, which represented as -it were a first brief summary of ancient knowledge. It is unnecessary -to say that Dante's poem is the chief monument of this condition of -spirit, where the ideas of the Middle Ages are maintained, but the -political, poetical, and philosophical affections, the love of fame and -of glory, prove their vigour, although subordinated to those ideas and -restrained, as far as possible, by them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span></p> - -<p>But those ideas are nevertheless maintained, even among the -imperialists and adversaries of the Church, and it is only in rare -spirits that we find a partly sceptical and partly mocking negation -of them. Transcendency, the prescience of God, Who ordains, directs, -and disposes of everything according to His will, bestows rewards -and punishments, and intervenes mysteriously, always maintains its -place in the distant background, in Dante as in Giovanni Villani, -as in all the historians and chroniclers. Toward the close of the -fifteenth century the theological conception makes a curious appearance -in the French historian Comines, arm in arm with the most alert and -unprejudiced policy of success at all costs. Worldliness, so rich, -so various, and so complex, was yet without an ideal standard of -comparison, and for this reason it was rather lived than thought, -showing itself rather in richness of detail than systematically. The -ancient elements of culture, which had passed from Aristotelianism -into scholasticism, failed to act powerfully, because that part of -Aristotelianism was particularly selected which was in harmony with -Christian thought already translated into Platonic terms and dogmatized -in a transcendental form by the fathers of the Church. Hence it has -even been possible to note a pause in historiographical interest, -where scholasticism has prevailed, a compendium of the type of that of -Martin Polonus being held sufficient to serve the end of quotations for -demonstration or for legal purposes. What was required upon entering -a new period of progress (there is always progress, but 'periods of -progress' are those in which the motion of the spirit seems to become -accelerated and the fruit that has been growing ripe for centuries is -rapidly plucked) was a direct conscious negation of transcendency and -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> Christian miracle, of ascesis and of eschatology, both in life -and in thought a negation whose terms (heavenly and earthly life) had -certainly been noted by medieval historiography, but had been allowed -to endure and to progress, the one beside the other, without true and -proper contact and conflict arising between them.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>IV</h4> - - -<h4>THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE</h4> - - -<p>The negation of Christian transcendency was the work of the age of -the Renaissance, when, to employ the expression used by Fueter, -historiography became 'secularized.' In the histories of Leonardo Bruni -and of Bracciolini, who gave the first conspicuous examples of the -new attitude of historiographical thought, and in all others of the -same sort which followed them—among them those of Machiavelli and of -Guicciardini shine forth conspicuously—we find hardly any trace of -'miracles.' These are recorded solely with the intention of mocking at -them and of explaining them in an altogether human manner. An acute -analysis of individual characters and interests is substituted for the -intervention of divine providence and the actions of the popes, and -religious strifes themselves are apt to be interpreted according to -utilitarian passions and solely with an eye to their political bearing. -The scheme of the four monarchies with the advent of Antichrist -connected with it is allowed to disappear; histories are now narrated -<i>ab inclinatione imperii,</i> and even universal histories, like the -<i>Enneads</i> of Sabellicus, do not adhere to traditional ecclesiastical -tradition. Chronicles of the world, universal miraculous histories, -both theological and apocalyptic, become the literature of the people -and of those with little culture, or persist in countries of backward -culture, such as Germany at that time, or finally are limited to the -circle<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> of Catholic or Protestant confessional historiography, both -of which retain so much of the Middle Ages, the Protestant perhaps -more than the Catholic (at least at a first glance), for the latter -contrived at least here and there to temporize and to accommodate -itself to the times. All this is shown very clearly and minutely by -Fueter, and I shall now proceed to take certain observations and some -information from his book, which I shall rearrange and complete with -some more of my own. In the political historiography of the late Middle -Ages, the theological conception had been, as we have said, thrown into -the background; but henceforward it is not to be found even there, -and if at times we hear its formulas, they are just like those of the -Crusade against the Turks, preaching the liberation of the tomb of -Christ. These were still repeated by preachers, writers of verse, and -rhetoricians (and continued to be repeated for three centuries), but -they found no response in political reality and in the conscience of -the people, because they were but empty sound. Nor was the negation -of theologism and the secularization of history accomplished only in -practice, unaccompanied with complete consciousness; for, although -many minds really did turn in the direction indicated by fate, or in -other words by the new mental necessity, and although the polemic -was not always open, but on the contrary often surrounded with many -precautions, evidence abounds of the agreement of the practice with -the theory of historiography. The criticism of so grave a theorist of -history as Bodin is opposed to the scheme of the four monarchies. He -makes it his object to combat the <i>inveteratum errorem de quattuor -imperiis,</i> proving that the notion was capriciously taken from the -dream of Daniel, and that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> it in no way corresponded with the real -course of events. It would be superfluous to record here the celebrated -epigrams of Machiavelli and of Guicciardini, who satirized theology -and miracles. Guicciardini noted that all religions have boasted of -miracles, and therefore they are not proofs of any one of them, and -are perhaps nothing but "secrets of nature." He advised his readers -never to say that God had aided so-and-so because he was good and -had made so-and-so suffer because he was wicked, for we "often see -the opposite," and the counsels of divine providence are in fact -an abyss. Paolo Sarpi, although he admits that "it is a pious and -religious thought to attribute the disposition of every event to divine -providence," yet holds it "presumption" to determine "to what end -events are directed by that highest wisdom"; for men, being emotionally -attached to their opinions, "are persuaded that they are as much loved -and favoured by God as by themselves." Hence, for example, they argued -that God had caused Zwingli and Hecolampadius to die almost at the -same time, in order that he might punish and remove the ministers of -discord, whereas it is certain that "after the death of these two, the -evangelical cantons have made greater progress in the doctrine that -they received from both of them." Such a disposition of religious and -cautious spirits is yet more significant than that of the radical and -impetuous, openly irreverent, in the same way as the new importance -attributed to history is notable in the increase of historiographical -labour that is then everywhere noticeable, and in the formation of a -true and proper philological school, not only for antiquity, but for -the Middle Ages (Valla, Flavio Biondo, Calchi, Sigonio, Beato Renano, -etc.), which publishes and restores texts, criticizes the authenticity -and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> value of sources, is occupied with the establishment of a -technical method of examining witnesses, and composes learned histories.</p> - -<p>Nothing is more natural than that the new form of historiography -should seem to be a return to Græco-Roman antiquity, as Christianity -had seemed to be a return to the story of Eden (the interlude of -paganism having been brought to an end by the redemption), or that the -Middle Ages should still seem to some to-day to be a falling back into -barbarous pre-Hellenic times. The illusion of the return was expressed -in the cult of classical antiquity, and in all those manifestations, -literary, artistic, moral, and customary, familiar to those who know -the Renaissance. In the special field with which we are at present -occupied, we find a curious document in support of the difficulty that -philologists and critics experienced in persuading themselves that the -Greek and Roman writers had perhaps been able to deceive themselves, to -lie, to falsify, to be led astray by passions and blinded by ignorance, -in the same way as those of the Middle Ages. Thus the latter were -severely criticized while the former were reverenced and accepted, for -it needed much time and labour to attain to an equal mental freedom -regarding the ancients, and the criticism of texts and of sources was -developed in respect to medieval history long before it attained to -a like freedom in respect to ancient history. But the greatest proof -and monument of the illusion of the return was the formation of the -<i>humanistic</i> type of historiography, opposed to the medieval. This -had been chiefly confined to the form of chronicle and humanistic -historiography, although it accepted the arrangement by years and -seasons according to the examples set by the Greeks and Romans, -cancelled as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> far as possible numerical indications, and exerted itself -to run on unbrokenly, without chronological cuts and cross-cuts. -Latin had become barbarous in the Middle Ages and had accepted the -vocabularies of vulgar tongues, or those which designated new things -in a new way, whereas the humanistic historiographers translated and -disguised every thought and every narrative in Ciceronian Latin, or -at least Latin of the Golden Age. We frequently find picturesque -anecdotes in the medieval chronicles, and humanism, while it restored -its dignity to history, deprived it of that picturesque element, or -attenuated and polished it as it had done the things and customs of the -barbaric centuries. This humanistic type of historiography, like the -new philological erudition and criticism and the whole movement of the -Renaissance, was Italian work, and in Italy histories in the vulgar -tongue were soon modelled upon it, which found in the latinized prose -of Boccaccio an instrument well suited to their ends. From Italy it was -diffused among other countries, and as always happens when an industry -is transplanted into virgin soil, and workmen and technical experts are -invited to come from the country of its origin, so the first humanistic -historians of the other parts of Europe were Italians. Paolo Emilio -the Veronese, who <i>Gallis condidit historias,</i> gave the French the -humanistic history of France in his <i>De rebus gestis Francorum,</i> and -Polydore Virgil did the like for England, Lucio Marineo for Spain, and -many others for other countries, until indigenous experts appeared and -the aid of Italians became unnecessary. Later on it became necessary to -throw off this cloak, which was too loose or too tight—indeed, was not -cut to the model of modern thought. What there was in it of artificial, -of swollen, of false, was blamed—these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> defects being indeed clearly -indicated in the constructive principle of this literary form, which -was that of imitation. But anyone with a feeling for the past will -enjoy that historical humanistic prose as the expression of love for -antiquity and of the desire to rise to its level. This love and this -desire were so keen that they had no hesitation in reproducing things -external and indifferent in addition to what was better and sometimes -in default of it. Giambattista Vico, sometimes so sublimely puerile, is -still found lamenting, three centuries after the creation of humanistic -historiography, that "no sovereign has been found into whose mind has -entered the thought of preserving for ever in the best Latin style -a record of the famous War of the Spanish Succession, than which a -greater has never happened in the world since the Second Carthaginian -War, that of Cæsar with Pompey, and of Alexander with Darius." But what -of this? Quite recently, during the war in Tripoli, came the proposal -from the depths of one of the meridional provinces of Italy, one of -those little countrysides where the shadow of a humanist still exists, -that a Latin commentary should be composed upon that war entitled -<i>De bello libico.</i> This proposal was received with much laughter and -made even me smile, yet the smile was accompanied with a sort of -tender emotion, when I recalled how long and devotedly our fathers and -forefathers had pursued the ideal of a beautiful antiquity and of a -decorous historiography.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the belief in the effectivity or possibility of such a -return was, as we have said, an illusion; nothing of what has been -returns, nothing of what has been can be abolished; even when we -return to an old thought the new adversary makes the defence new and -the thought itself new. I read some time<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> ago the work of a learned -French Catholic. While clearing the Middle Ages of certain absurd -accusations and confuting errors commonly circulated about them, he -maintained that the Middle Ages are the truly modern time, modern with -the eternal modernity of the true, and that therefore they should -not be called the Middle Ages, which term should be applied to the -period that has elapsed between the fifteenth century and our own -day, between the Reformation and positivism. As I read, I reflected -that such a theory is the worthy pendant to that other theory, which -places the Middle Ages beneath antiquity, and that both had some time -ago shown themselves false to historical thought, which knows nothing -of returns, but knows that the Middle Ages preserved antiquity deep -in its heart as the Renaissance preserved the Middle Ages. And what -is 'humanism' but a renewed formula of that 'humanity' of which the -ancient world knew little or nothing, and which Christianity and the -Middle Ages had so profoundly felt? What is the word 'renaissance' -or 'renewal' but a metaphor taken from the language of religion? And -setting aside the word, is not the conception of humanism perhaps the -affirmation of a spiritual and universal value, and in so far as it is -that, altogether foreign, as we know, to the mind of antiquity, and an -intrinsic continuation of the 'ecclesiastical' and 'spiritual' history -which appeared with Christianity? The conception of spiritual value -had without doubt become changed or enriched, for it contained within -itself more than a thousand years of mental experiences, thoughts, and -actions. But while it thus grew more rich, it preserved its original -character, and constituted the religion of the new times, with its -priests and martyrs, its polemic and its apologetic, its intolerance -(it destroyed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> or allowed to perish the monuments of the Middle Ages -and condemned its writers to oblivion), and sometimes even imitated the -forms of its worship (Navagaro used to burn a copy of Martial every -year as a holocaust to pure Latinity). And since humanity, philosophy, -science, literature, and especially art, politics, activity in all its -forms, now fill that conception of value which the Middle Ages had -placed in Christian religious faith alone, histories or outlines of -histories continue to appear as the outcome of these determinations, -which were certainly new in respect to medieval literature, but were -not less new in respect to Græco-Roman literature, where there was -nothing to compare to them, or only treatises composed in an empirical -and extrinsic manner. The new histories of values presented them selves -timidly, imitating in certain respects the few indent examples, but -they gave evidence of a fervour, an intelligence, an afflatus, which -led to a hope for that increase and development wanting to their -predecessors, which, instead of developing, had gradually become more -superficial and finally disappeared again into vagueness. Suffice it to -mention as representative of them all Vasari's <i>Lives of the Painters,</i> -which are connected with the meditations and the researches upon art -contained in so many treatises, dialogues, and letters of Italians, and -are here and there shot through with flashes such as never shone in -antiquity. The same may be said of treatises on poetry and rhetoric, -and of the judgments which they contain as to poetry and of the new -history of poetry, then being attempted with more or less successful -results. The 'state' too, which forms the object of the meditations -of Machiavelli, is not the simple state of antiquity, city or empire, -but is almost the national state felt as something divine,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> to which -even the salvation of the soul must be sacrificed—that is to say, -as the institution in which the true salvation of the soul is to be -found. Even the pagan virtue which he and others opposed to Christian -virtue is very different from the pure Græco-Roman disposition of mind. -At that time a start was also made in the direction of investigating -the theory of rights, of political forms, of myths and beliefs, of -philosophical systems, to-day in full flower. And since that same -consciousness which had produced humanism had also widened the -boundaries of the known world, and had sought for and found people of -whom the Bible preserved no record and of whom the Græco-Roman writers -knew nothing, there appeared at that time a literature relating to -savages and to the indigenous civilizations of America (and also of -distant Asia, which had been better explored), from which arose the -first notions as to the primitive forms of human life. Thus were -widened the spiritual boundaries of humanity at the same time as the -material.</p> - -<p>We are not alone in perceiving the illusion of the 'return to -antiquity,' for the men of the Renaissance were not slow in doing this. -Not every one was content to suit himself to the humanistic literary -type. Some, like Machiavelli, threw away that cloak, too ample in its -folds and in its train, preferring to it the shorter modern dress. -Protests against pedantry and imitation are indeed frequently to be -heard during the course of the century. Philosophers rebelled against -Aristotle (first against the medieval and then against the ancient -Aristotle), and appeals were made to truth, which is superior both to -Plato and to Aristotle; men of letters advocated the new 'classes,' -and artists repeated that the great masters were 'nature' and the -'idea.' One feels in the air that the time is not far<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> distant when the -question, "Who are the true ancients?"—that is to say, "Who are the -intellectually expert and mature?"—will be answered with, "We are"; -the symbol of antiquity will be broken and there will be found within -it the reality which is human thought, ever new in its manifestations. -Such an answer may possibly be slow in becoming clear and certain as an -object of common conviction, though it will eventually become so, and -now suffices to explain the true quality of that return antiquity, by -preventing the taking of the symbol for the thing symbolized.</p> - -<p>This symbolical covering, cause of prejudices and misunderstandings, -which enfolded the whole of humanism, was not the sole vice from -which the historiography of the Renaissance suffered. We do not, -of course, speak here of the bias with which all histories were -variously affected, according as they were written by men of letters -who were also courtiers and supported the interests of their masters, -or official historians of aristocratic and conservative states like -Venice, or men taking one or the other side in the conflicts within the -same state, such as the <i>ottimani</i> (or aristocratic) and the popular -party of Florence, or upholders of opposed religious beliefs, such as -the group of reformed divines of Magdeburg and Baronio. We do not speak -here of the historians who became story-writers (they sometimes take to -history, like Bandello), or of those who collected information with a -view to exciting curiosity and creating scandal. These are things that -belong to all periods, and are not sufficient to qualify a particular -historiographical age. But if we examine only that which is or wished -to be historical thought, the historiography of the Renaissance -suffered from two other defects, each of which it had inherited from -one of its progenitors,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> antiquity and the Middle Ages. And above all -there came to it from antiquity the humanistic-abstract or pragmatical -conception, as it is called, which inclines to explain facts by the -individual in his singularity and in his atomism, or by means of -abstract political forms, and the like. For Machiavelli, the prince is -not only the ideal but the criterion that he adopts for the explanation -of events. He does not only appear in his treatises and political -opuscules, but in the Florentine Histories, where we meet with him at -the very beginning—after the terrible imaginative description of -the condition of Italy in the fifth century—in the great figure of -Theodoric, by whose 'virtue' and 'goodness' not only Rome and Italy, -but all the other parts of the Western empire, "arose free from the -continual scourgings which they had supported for so many years from so -many invasions, and became again happy and well-ordered communities." -The same figure reappears in many different forms in the course of -the centuries described in those histories. Finally, at the end of -the description of the social struggles of Florence, we read that -"this city had reached such a point that it could be easily adapted to -<i>any form of government</i> by <i>a wise law-giver.</i>" In like manner, the -<i>History of Italy</i> by Guicciardini begins with the description of the -happiness of Italy at the end of the fifteenth century, "acquired at -various times and preserved for many reasons," not the least of which -was "the industry and genius of Lorenzo de' Medici," who "strove in -every way so to balance Italian affairs that they should not incline -more in one direction than another." He had allies in Ferdinand of -Aragon and Ludovic the Moor, "partly for the same and partly for other -reasons," and the Venetians were held in check by all three of them.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> -This perfect system of equilibrium was broken by the deaths of Lorenzo, -of Ferdinand, and of the Pope. All historians of this period express -themselves in the same way, and although a lively consciousness of the -spiritual values of humanity was in process of formation, as has been -seen, yet these were spoken of as though they depended upon the will -and the intelligence of individuals who were their masters, not the -contrary. In the history of painting, for example, the 'prince' for -Vasari is Giotto, "who, although born among inexpert artisans, alone -revived painting and reduced it to such a form as might be described as -good." Biographies are also constantly individualistic, for they never -succeed in perfectly uniting the individual with the work which he -creates and which in turn creates him.</p> - -<p>The idea of chance or fortune persisted alongside the pragmatic -conception, its ancient companion. Machiavelli assigns the course of -events half to fortune and half to human prudence, and although the -accent falls here upon prudence, the acknowledgment of the one does -not abolish the force of the other, so mysterious and transcendent. -Guicciardini attacks those who, while attributing everything to -prudence and virtue, exclude "the power of fortune," because we -see that human affairs "receive at all times great impulsions from -fortuitous events, which it is not within the power of man either to -foresee or to escape, and although the care and understanding of man -may moderate many things, nevertheless that alone does not suffice, -but good fortune is also necessary." It is true that here and there -there seems to appear another conception in Machiavelli, that of the -strength and logic of things, but it is only a fleeting shadow. It is -also a shadow for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> Guicciardini, when he adds that even if we wish to -attribute everything to prudence and virtue, "must at least admit that -it is necessary to fall upon or be born in times when the virtues or -qualities for which you value yourself are esteemed." Guicciardini -remains perplexed as to one point only, as though he had caught a -glimpse of something that is neither caprice of the individual nor -contingency of fortune: "When I consider to what accidents and dangers -of illness, of chance, of violence, of infinite sorts, is exposed the -life of man, the concurrence of how many things is needful that the -harvest of the year should be good, nothing surprises me more than to -see an old man or a good harvest." But even here we do not get beyond -uncertainty, which in this case manifests itself as astonishment. With -the renewal of the idea of fortune, even to a partial extent, with -the restitution of the cult of this pagan divinity, not only does -the God of Christianity disappear, but also the idea of rationality, -of finality, of development, affirmed during the medieval period. -The ancient Oriental idea of the circle in human affairs returns; -it dominated all the historians of the Renaissance, and above all -Machiavelli. History is an alternation of lives and deaths, of goods -and ills, of happiness and misery, of splendour and decadence. Vasari -understands the history of painting in the same way as that of all -the arts, which, "like human bodies, have their birth, their growth, -their old age, and their death." He is solicitous of preserving in his -book the memory of the artistic capacity of his time, lest the art -of painting, "either owing to the neglect of men or to the malignity -of the ages or to decree of heaven (which does not appear to wish -to maintain things here below for long in the same state), should -encounter the same disorder and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> ruin" as befell it in the Middle -Ages. Bodin, while criticizing and rejecting the scheme of the four -monarchies, and demonstrating the fallaciousness of the assertion that -gold deteriorates into copper, or even into clay, and celebrating the -splendour of letters, of commerce, of the geographical discoveries of -his age, does not, however, conclude in favour of progress, but of -the circle, blaming those who find everything inferior in antiquity, -<i>cum, æterna quadam lege naturæ, conversiti omnium rerum velut in orbem -redire videatur, ut aqua vitia virtutibus, ignoratio scientiæ, turpe -honesto consequens sit, ac tenebræ luci.</i> The sad, bitter, pessimistic -tone which we observe among ancient historians, which sometimes -bursts forth into the tragic, is also often to be met with among the -historians of the Renaissance, for they saw perish many things that -were very dear to them, and were constrained to tremble for those which -they still enjoyed, or at least to fear for them by anticipation, -certain that sooner or later they would yield their place to their -contraries.</p> - -<p>And since history thus conceived does not represent progress but a -circle, and is not directed by the historical law of development, -but by the natural law of the circle, which gives it regularity and -uniformity, it follows that the historiography of the Renaissance, -like the Græco-Roman, has its end outside itself, and affords nothing -but material suitable for exhortations toward the useful and the good, -for various forms of pleasure or as ornament for abstract truths. -Historians and theorists of history are all in agreement as to this, -with the exception of such eccentrics as Patrizzi, who expressed -doubts as to the utility of knowing what had happened and as to -the truth itself of narratives, but ended by contradicting himself -and also laying<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> down an extrinsic end. "Each one of us can find, -both on his own account and on that of the public weal, many useful -documents in the knowledge of these so different and so important -examples," writes Guicciardini in the proem to his History of Italy. -"Hence will clearly appear, as the result of innumerable examples, -the instability of things human, how harmful they are often wont to -be to themselves, but ever to the people, the ill-conceived counsels -of those who rule, when, having only before their eyes either vain -errors or present cupidities, they are not mindful of the frequent -variations of fortune, and converting the power that has been granted -them for the common weal into an injury to others, they become the -authors of new perturbations, either as the result of lack of prudence -or of too much ambition." And Bodin holds that <i>non solum præsentia -commode explicantur, sed etiam futura colliguntur, certissimaque rerum -expetendarum ac fugiendarum præcepta constantur,</i> from historical -narratives. Campanella thinks that history should be composed <i>ut sit -scientiarum fundamentum sufficiens</i>; Vossius formulates the definition -that was destined to appear for centuries in treatises: <i>cognitio -singularium, quorum memoriam conservari utile sit ad bene beateque -vivendum.</i> Historical knowledge therefore seemed at that time to be -the lowest and easiest form of knowledge (and this view has been held -down to our own days); to such an extent that Bodin, in addition -to the <i>utilitas</i> and the <i>oblectatio,</i> also recognized to history -<i>facilitas,</i> so great a facility <i>ut, sine ullius artis adjumento, ipsa -per sese ab omnibus intelligatur.</i> When truth had been placed outside -historical narrative, all the historians of the Renaissance, like -their Greek and Roman predecessors, practised, and all the theorists<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> -(from Pontanus in the <i>Actius</i> to Vossius in the <i>Ars historica</i>) -defended, the use of more or less imaginary orations and exhortations, -not only as the result of bowing to ancient example, but through their -own convictions. Eventually M. de la Popelinière, in his <i>Histoire -des histoires, avec l'idée de l'histoire accomplie</i> (1599), where -he inculcates in turn historical exactitude and sincerity with such -warm eloquence, suddenly turns round to defend imaginary <i>harangues -et concions,</i> for this fine reason, that what is necessary is 'truth' -and not 'the words' in which it is expressed! The truth of history -was thus not history, but oratory and political science; and if the -historians of the Renaissance were hardly ever able to exercise oratory -(for which the political constitution of the time allowed little -scope), all or nearly all were authors of treatises upon political -science, differently inspired as compared with those of the Middle -Ages, which had ethical and religious thought behind them, resuming -and advancing the speculations of Aristotle and of ancient political -writers. In like manner, treatises on historical art, unknown to the -Middle Ages, but which rapidly multiplied in the Renaissance (see a -great number of them in the <i>Penus artis historicæ</i> of 1579), resumed -and fertilized the researches of Græco-Roman theorists. It is to be -expected that the historiography of this period should represent some -of the defects of medieval historiography in another form, owing to -its character of reaction already mentioned and to the new divinity -that it had raised up upon the altars in place of the ancient divinity, -humanity. The Renaissance everywhere reveals its effort to oppose the -one term to the other, and since scholasticism had sought the things -of God and of the soul, it wished to restrict itself to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> things -of nature. We find Guicciardini and a chorus of others describing the -investigations of philosophers and theologians and "of all those who -write things above nature or such as are not seen" as 'madnesses'; -and because scholasticism had defined science in the Aristotelian -manner as <i>de universalibus,</i> Campanella opposed to this definition -his <i>Scientia est de singularibus.</i> In like manner its men of letters, -prejudiced in favour of Latin, at first refused to recognize the new -languages that had been formed during the Middle Ages, as well as -medieval literature and poetry; its jurists rejected the feudal in -favour of the Roman legal code, its politicians representative forms -in favour of absolute lordship and monarchy. It was then that first -appeared the conception of the Middle Ages as a whole, opposed to -another whole, formed of the ancient and the ancient-modern, into -which the Middle Ages were inserted like an irksome and painful wedge. -The word 'medieval' was certainly late in appearing as an official -designation, employed in the divisions and titles of histories (toward -the end of the seventeenth century, as it would seem, in the manuals -of Cellario); previously it had only just occurred here and there; but -the thought contained in it had been in the air for some time—that is -to say, in the soul of everybody—eked out with other words, such as -'barbarous' or 'Gothic' ages, and Vasari expresses it by means of the -distinction between ancient and 'old,' calling those things ancient -which occurred before the existence of Constantine, of Corinth, of -Athens, of Rome, and of other very famous cities built up to the time -of Nero, of the Vespasians, of Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus, and -'old' those "which had their origin from St Silvester onward." In -any case, the distinction was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> clear: on the one hand most brilliant -light, on the other dense darkness. After Constantine, writes the -same Vasari, "every sort of virtue" was lost, "beautiful" souls and -"lofty" intellects became corrupted into "most ugly" and "basest," -and the fervent zeal of the new religion did infinite damage to the -arts. This means neither more nor less than that <i>dualism,</i> one of the -capital traits of the Middle Ages, was retained, although differently -determined, for now the god was (although not openly acknowledged) -antiquity, art, science, Greek and Roman life, and its adversary, the -reprobate and rebel, was the Middle Age, 'Gothic' temples, theology and -philosophy bristling with difficulties, the clumsy and cruel customs of -that age. But just because the respective functions of the two terms -were merely inverted, their opposition remained, and if Christianity -did not succeed in understanding Paganism and in recognizing its -father, so the Renaissance failed to recognize itself as the son of -the Middle Ages, and did not understand the positive and durable value -of the period that was closing. For this reason, both ages destroyed -or allowed to disappear the monuments of the previous age. This was -certainly far less the case with the Renaissance, which expressed -itself less violently and was deeply imbued with the thought of the -Middle Ages, and, owing to the idea of humanity, had an obscure feeling -of the importance of its predecessor. So much was this the case that -the school of learned men and philologists already mentioned was formed -at that time, with the new of investigating medieval antiquities. But -the learned are the learned—that is to say, they do not take an active -part in the struggles of their time, though busied with the collection -and arrangement of its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> chronicles and remains, which they often judge -in accordance with the vulgar opinion of their own time, so that it is -quite customary to find them despising the subject of their labours, -declaring that the poet whom they are studying has no value, or that -the period to which they are consecrating their entire life is ugly -and displeasing. It needed much to free the flame of intelligence from -the heaps of medieval antiquities accumulated for centuries by the -learned, and the Middle Ages were abhorred during the Renaissance, -even when they were investigated. The drama of love and hatred was not -dissimilar in its forms, nor less bitterly dualistic, although vastly -more interesting, than that which was then being played out between -Catholics and Protestants. The latter called the Pope Antichrist, and -the primacy of the Roman Church <i>mysterium iniquitatis,</i> and compiled -a catalogue <i>testium veritatis</i> of those who had opposed that iniquity -even while it prevailed. The Catholics returned the compliment with -remarks about Luther and the Reformation, and composed catalogues -of heretics, Satan's witnesses. But this strife was a relic of the -past, and would have ended by becoming gradually attenuated and -dispersed; whereas the other was an element of the future, and could -only be conquered by long effort and a new conception of the loftiest -character.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>V</h4> - - -<h4>THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT</h4> - - -<p>Meanwhile the historiography which immediately followed pushed the -double aporia of antiquity and of the Middle Ages to the extreme; and -it was owing to this radical unprejudiced procedure that it acquired -its definite physiognomy and the right of being considered a particular -historiographical period. The symbolical vesture, woven of memories of -the Græco-Roman world, with which the modern spirit had first clothed -itself, is now torn and thrown away. The thought that the ancients had -not been the oldest and wisest among the peoples, but the youngest -and the least expert, and that the true ancients, that is to say, the -most expert and mature in mind, are co be found in the men of the -modern world, had little by little made its way and become universally -accepted. Reason in its nudity, henceforth saluted by its proper -name, succeeds the example and the authority of the Græco-Romans, -which represented reason opposed to barbaric culture and customs. -Humanitarianism, the cult of humanity, also idolized by the name of -'nature,' that is to say, ingenuous general human nature, succeeds to -humanism, with its one-sided admirations for certain peoples and for -certain forms of life. Histories written in Latin become scarce or -are confined to the learned, and those written in national languages -are multiplied; criticism is exercised not only upon medieval -falsifications and fables, upon the writings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> of credulous and ignorant -monks in monasteries, but upon the pages of ancient historians, and the -first doubts appear as to the truth of the historical Roman tradition. -A feeling of sympathy, however, toward the ancients still persists, -whereas repugnance and abhorrence for the Middle Ages continue to -increase. All feel and say that they have emerged, not only from -darkness, but from the twilight before dawn, that the sun of reason -is high on the horizon, illuminating the intellect and irradiating -it with most vivid light. 'Light,' 'illumination,' and the like are -words pronounced on every occasion and with ever increasing conviction -and energy; hence the title 'age of light,' of 'enlightenment' or -of 'illumination,' given to the period extending from Descartes to -Kant. Another term began to circulate, at first used rarely and in -a restricted sense—'progress.' It gradually becomes more insistent -and familiar, and finally succeeds in supplying a criterion for the -judgment of facts, for the conduct of life, for the construction of -history, becomes the subject of special investigations, and of a new -kind of history, the history of the <i>progresses</i> of the human spirit.</p> - -<p>But here we observe the persistence and the potency of Christian and -theological thought. The progress so much discussed was, so to speak, -a progress without <i>development,</i> manifesting itself chiefly in a sigh -of satisfaction and security, as of one, favoured by fortune, who has -successfully encountered many obstacles and now looks serenely upon -the present, secure as to the future, with mind averted from the past, -or returning to it now and then for a brief moment only, in order to -lament its ugliness, to despise and to smile at it. Take as an example -of all the most intelligent and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> at the same time the best of the -historical representatives of enlightenment M. de Voltaire, who wrote -his <i>Essai sur les mœurs</i> in order to aid his friend the Marquise du -Châtelet to <i>surmonter le dégoût</i> caused her by <i>l'histoire moderne -depuis la décadence de l'Empire romain,</i> treating the subject in a -satirical vein. Or take Condorcet's work, <i>l'Esquisse d'un tableau -historique des progrès de l'esprit humain,</i> which appears at its end -like a last will and testament (and also as the testament of the man -who wrote it), and where we find the whole century in compendium. -It is as happy in the present, even in the midst of the slaughters -of the Revolution, as rosy in its views as to the future, as it is -full of contempt and sarcasm for the past, which had generated that -present. The felicity of the period upon which they were entering -was clearly stated. Voltaire says that at this time <i>les hommes ont -acquis plus de lumières d'un bout de l'Europe à l'autre que dans -tous les âges précédents.</i> Man now brandishes the arm which none can -resist: <i>la seule arme contre le monstre, c'est la Raison: la seule -manière d'empêcher les hommes d'être absurdes et méchants, c'est de -les éclairer; pour rendre le fanatisme exécrable, il ne faut que le -peindre.</i> Certainly it was not denied that there had been something -of good and beautiful in the past. They must have existed, if they -suffered from superstition and oppression. <i>On voit dans l'histoire -les erreurs et les préjugés se succéder tour à tour, et chasser la -vérité et la raison: on voit les habiles et les heureux enchaîner -les imbéciles et écraser les infortunés; et encore ces habiles et -ces heureux sont eux-mêmes les jouets de la fortune, ainsi quelles -esclaves qu'ils gouvernent.</i> And not only had the good existed, though -oppressed, but it had also been efficient in a certain measure: <i>au -milieu de ces saccagements et de ces destructions nous voyons un<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> amour -de l'ordre qui anime en secret le genre humain et qui a prévenu sa -ruine totale: c'est un des ressorts de la nature, qui reprend toujours -sa force....</i> And then the 'great epochs' must not be forgotten, the -'centuries' in which the arts nourished as the result of the work -of wise men and monarchs, les quatre âges heureux of history. But -between this sporadic good, weak or acting covertly, or appearing -only for a time and then disappearing, and that of the new era, the -quantitative and energetic difference is such that it is turned into -a qualitative difference: a moment comes when men learn to think, to -rectify their ideas, and past history seems like a tempestuous sea -to one who has landed upon solid earth. Certainly everything is not -to be praised in the new times; indeed, there is much to blame: <i>les -abus servent de lois dans presque toute la terre; et si les plus sages -des hommes s'assemblaient pour faire des lois, où est l'État dont -la forme subsistât entière?</i> The distance from the ideal of reason -was still great and the new century had still to consider itself as -a simple step toward complete rationality and felicity. We find the -fancy of a social form limit even in Kant, who dragged after him -so much old intellectualistic and scholastic philosophy. Sometimes -indeed its final form was not discovered, and its place was taken by a -vertiginous succession of more and more radiant social forms. But the -series of these radiant forms, the progress toward the final form and -the destruction of abuses, really began in the age of enlightenment, -after some episodic attempts in that direction during previous ages, -for this age alone had entered upon the just, the wide, the sure -path, the path illumined with the light of reason. It sometimes even -happened in the course of that period that a doctrine leading to -Rousseau's inverted the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> usual view and placed <i>reason,</i> not in modern -times or in the near or distant future, but in the past, and not in -the medieval, Græco-Roman, or Oriental past, but in the prehistoric -past, in the 'state of nature,' from which history represented the -deviation. But this theory, though differing in its mode of expression, -was altogether identical in substance with that generally accepted, -because a prehistoric 'state of nature' never had any existence in the -reality, which is history, but expressed an ideal to be attained in a -near or distant future, which had first been perceived in modern times -and was therefore really capable of moving in that direction, whether -in the sense of realization or return. The religious character of all -this new conception of the world cannot be obscure to anyone, for it -repeats the Christian conceptions of God as truth and justice (the lay -God), of the earthly paradise, the redemption, the millennium, and so -on, in laical terms, and in like manner with! Christianity sets the -whole of previous history in opposition to itself, to condemn it, while -hardly admiring here and there some consoling ray of itself. What does -it matter that religion, and especially Christianity, was then the -target for fiercest blows and shame and mockery, that all reticence was -abandoned, and people were no longer satisfied with the discreet smile -that had once blossomed on the lips of the Italian humanists, but broke -out into open and fanatical warfare? Even lay fanaticism is the result -of dogmatism. What does it matter that pious folk were shocked and saw -the ancient Satan in the lay God, as the enlightened discovered the -capricious, domineering, cruel tribal deity in the old God represented -by the priest? The possibility of reciprocal accusations confirms the -<i>dualism,</i> active in the new as in the old conception, and rendering -it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> unsuitable for the understanding of development and of history.</p> - -<p>The historiographical <i>aporia</i> of antiquity was also being increased -by abstract individualism or the 'pragmatic' conception. So true was -this that it was precisely at that time that the formula was resumed, -and pragmatism, as history of human ideas, sentiments, calculations, -and actions, as a narrative embellished with reflections, was opposed -to theological or medieval history and to the old ingenuous chronicles -or erudite collections of information and documents. Voltaire, who -combats and mocks at belief in divine designs and punishments and in -the leadership of a small barbarous population called upon to act as an -elect people and to be the axle of universal history (so that he may -substitute for it the lay theology which has been described), is the -same Voltaire who praises in Guicciardini and in Machiavelli the first -appearance of an <i>histoire bien faite.</i> The pragmatic mode of treatment -was extended even to the narrative of events relating to religion and -the Church and was applied by Mosheim and others in Germany. Owing to -this penetration of rationalism into ecclesiastical historiography and -into Protestant philosophy, it afterward seemed that the Reformation -had caused thought to progress, whereas, as regards this matter, -the Reformation simply received humanistic thought in the new form, -to which it had previously been opposed. If, in other respects, it -aided the advance of the historical conception in an original manner, -this was brought about, as we shall see, by means of another element -seething within it, mysticism. But meanwhile not even Catholicism -remained immune from the pragmatic, of which we find traces in the -<i>Discours</i> of Bossuet, who represents the Augustinian conception, shorn -of its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> accessories, reduced and modernized, lacking the irreconcilable -dualism of the two cities and the Roman Empire as the ultimate and -everlasting empire, allowing natural causes preordained by God and -regulated by the laws to operate side by side with divine intervention, -and conceding a large share to the social and political conditions of -the various peoples. We do not speak of the last step taken by the same -author in his <i>Histoire des variations des églises</i>, when he conceived -the history of the Reformation objectively and in its internal motives, -presenting it as a rebellious movement directed against authority. -Even his adversary Voltaire recognized that Bossuet had not omitted -<i>d'autres causes</i> in addition to the divine will favouring the elect -people, because he had several times taken count de l'esprit des -nations. Such was the strength of <i>l'esprit du siècle.</i> The pragmatic -conceptions of that time are still so well known and so near to us, -so persistent in so many of our narratives and historical manuals, -that it would be useless to describe them. When we direct our thoughts -to the historical works of the eighteenth century, there immediately -rises to the memory the general outline of a history in which priests -deceive, courtiers intrigue, wise monarchs conceive and realize good -institutions, combated and rendered almost vain through the malignity -of others and the ignorance of the people, though they remain -nevertheless a perpetual object of admiration for enlightened spirits. -The image of chance or caprice appears with the evocation of that -image, and mingling with the histories of these conflicts makes them -yet more complicated, their results yet stranger and more astonishing. -And what was the use, that is to say, the end, of historical narrative -in the view of those historians? Here also the reading of a few lines -of Voltaire affords<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> the explanation: <i>Cet avantage consiste surtout -dans la comparaison qu'un homme d'état, un citoyen, peut faire des lois -et des mours étrangères avec celles de son pays: c'est ce qui excite -l'émulation des nations modernes dans les arts, dans l''agriculture, -dans le commerce. Les grandes fautes passées servent beaucoup à tout -genre. On ne saurait trop remettre devant les yeux les crimes et -les malheurs: on peut, quoi qu'on en dise, prévenir les uns et les -autres.</i> This thought is repeated with many verbal variations and is -to be found in nearly all the books of historiographie theory of the -time, continuing the Italian mode of the Renaissance in an easier -and more popular style. The words 'philosophy of history,' which had -later so much success, at first served to describe the assistance -obtainable from history in the shape of advice and useful precepts, -when investigated without prejudice—that is to say, with the one -'assumption' of reason.</p> - -<p>The external end assigned to history led to the same results as in -antiquity, when history became oratorical and even historico-pedagogic -romances were composed, and as in the Renaissance, when 'declamatory -orations' were preserved, and history was treated as material more -or less well adapted to certain ends, whence arose a certain amount -of indifference toward its truth, so that Machiavelli, for instance, -deduced laws and precepts from the decades of Livy, not only assuming -them to be true, but accepting them in those parts which he must have -recognized to be demonstrably fabulous. Orations began to disappear, -but their disappearance was due to good literary taste rather than -to anything else, which recognized how out of harmony were those -expedients with the new popular, prosaic, polemical tone that narrative -assumed in the eighteenth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> century. In exchange they got something -worse: lack of esteem for history, which was considered to be an -inferior reality, unworthy of the philosopher, who seeks for laws, for -what is constant, for the uniform, the general, and can find it in -himself and in the direct observation of external and internal nature, -natural and human, without making that long, useless, and dangerous -tour of facts narrated in the histories. Descartes, Malebranche, and -the long list of their successors do not need especial mention here, -for it is well known how mathematics and naturalism dominated and -depressed history at this period. But was historical truth at least an -inferior truth? After fuller reflection, it did not seem possible to -grant even this. In history, said Voltaire, the word 'certain,' which -is used to designate such knowledge as that "two and two make four," "I -think," "I suffer," "I exist," should be used very rarely, and in the -sole sense of "very probable." Others held that even this was saying -too much, for they altogether denied the truth of history and declared -that it was a collection of fables, of inventions and equivocations, or -of undemonstrable affirmations. Hence the scepticism or Pyrrhonism of -the eighteenth century, which showed itself on several occasions and -has left us a series of curious little books as a document of itself. -Such is, indeed, the inevitable result when historical knowledge is -looked upon as a mass of individual testimonies, dictated or altered by -the passions, or misunderstood through ignorance, good at the best for -supplying edifying and terrible examples in confirmation of the eternal -truths of reason, which, for the rest, shine with their own light.</p> - -<p>It would nevertheless be altogether erroneous to found upon the -exaggeration to which the theological<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> and pragmatical views attained -in the historiography of the enlightenment, and see in it a decadence -or regression similar to that of the Renaissance and of other -predecessors. Not only were germs of error evolved at that time, not -only did the difficulties that had appeared in the previous period -become more acute, but there was also developed, and elevated to a -high degree of efficiency, that historiography of spiritual values -which Christian historiography had intensified and almost created, and -which the Renaissance had begun to transfer to the earth. Voltaire -as historiographer deserves to be defended (and this has recently -been done by several writers, admirably by Fueter), because he has -a lively perception of the need of bringing history back from the -treatment of the external to that of the internal and strives to -satisfy this need. For this reason, books that gave accounts of wars, -treaties, ceremonies, and solemnities seemed to him to be nothing but -'archives' or 'historical dictionaries,' useful for consultation on -certain occasions, but history, true history, he held to be something -altogether different. The duty of true history could not be to weight -the memory with external or material facts, or as he called them -events (événements), but to discover what was the society of men in -the past, <i>la société des hommes, comment on vivait dans l'intérieur -des familles, quels arts étaient cultivés,</i> and to paint 'manners' -(<i>les mours</i>); not to lose itself in the multitude of insignificant -particulars (<i>petits faits</i>), but to collect only those that were of -importance (<i>considérables</i>) and to explain the spirit (<i>l'esprit</i>) -that had produced them. Owing to this preference that Voltaire accords -to manners over battles we find in him the conception (although it -remains without adequate treatment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> and gets lost in the ardour of -polemic) that it is not for history to trace the portrait of human -splendours and miseries (<i>les détails de la splendeur et de la misère -humaine</i>) but only of manners and of the arts, that is, of the -positive work; in his <i>Siècle de Louis XIV</i> he says that he wishes to -illustrate the government of that monarch, not in so far as il a fait -du bien aux français, but in so far as il a fait du lien aux hommes. -What Voltaire undertook, and to no small extent achieved, forms the -principal object of all historians' labours at this period. Whoever -wishes to do so can see in Fueter's book how the great pictures -to be found in Voltaire's <i>Essai sur les mours</i> and <i>Siècle</i> were -imitated in the pages both of French writers and in those of other -European countries—for instance, in the celebrated introduction by -Robertson to his history of Charles V. It will also be noticed how the -special histories of this or that aspect of culture are multiplied -and perfected, as though several of the <i>desiderata</i> mentioned by -Bacon in his classification of history had been thus supplied. The -history of philosophy abandons more and more the type of collections -of anecdotes and utterances of philosophers, to become the history -of systems, from Brucker to Buhle and to Tiedemann. The history of -art takes the shape of a special problem in Winckelmann's work and in -the works of his successors. In Voltaire's own books and in those of -his school it assumes that of literature; in those of Dubos and of -Montesquieu that of rights and of institutions; in Germany it leads to -the production of a work as original and realistic as the history of -Osnabrück by Möser. In the specialist work of Heeren, the history of -industry and commerce separates itself from the historical divisions -or digressions of economic treatises and takes a form of its own. The -history of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> social customs investigates (as in Sainte-Palaye's book -on <i>Ancienne chevalerie</i>) even the minutest aspects of social and -moral life. Had not Voltaire remarked about tournaments that <i>il se -fait des révolutions dans les plaisirs comme dans tout le reste?</i> And -to limit ourselves to Italy, which at that time was also acting on -the initiative, though she soon afterward withdrew and received her -impulse from the other countries of Europe, it is well to remember -that in the eighteenth century Pietro Giannone, expressing the desires -and the attempts at their realization of a multitude of Neapolitan -compatriots and contemporaries, traced the civil history of the Kingdom -of Naples, giving much space to the relations between Church and State -and to the incidents of legislation. Many followed this example in -Italy and outside it (among the many were Montesquieu and Gibbon). In -Italy, too, Ludovico Antonio Muratori illustrated medieval life in -his <i>Antiquitates Italiæ,</i> and Tiraboschi composed a great history of -Italian literature (understood as that of the whole culture of Italy), -notable not less for its erudition than for its clearness of design, -while other lesser writers, like Napoli Signorelli, in his <i>Vicende -della cultura delle due Sicilie</i>, particularized in certain regions, -sprinkling their history with the philosophy current at the time. The -Jesuit Bettinelli, too, imitated the historical books of Voltaire -for the history of letters, arts, and customs in Italy, Bonafede the -work of Brucker for the history of philosophy, and Lanzi, in a manner -far superior to those just mentioned, continued the path followed by -Winckelmann in his <i>History of Painting.</i></p> - -<p>Not only did the historiography of the enlightenment render history -more 'interior' and develop it in its interiority, but it also -broadened it in space and time. Here too Voltaire represents in an -eminent degree the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> needs of his age, with his continual accusations of -narrowness and meanness levelled at the traditional image of universal -history, as composed of Hebrew or sacred history and Græco-Roman or -profane history, or, as he says, <i>histoires prétendues universelles, -fabriquées dans notre Occident.</i> A beginning was made with the use of -the material discovered, transported, and accumulated by explorers and -travellers from the Renaissance onward, of which a considerable part -had been contributed by the Jesuits and by missionaries. India and -China attracted attention, both on account of their antiquity and of -the high grade of civilization to which they had attained. Translations -of religious and literary Oriental texts were soon added to this, -and it became possible to discuss that civilization, not merely at -second-hand and according to the narratives of travellers. This -increase of knowledge relating to the East is paralleled by increase -of knowledge not only in relation to antiquity (these studies were -never dropped, but changed their centre, first from Italy to France -and Holland, then to England, and then to Germany), but also in regard -to the Middle Ages, in the works of the Benedictines, of Leibnitz, -Muratori, and very many others, who here also specialized both as -regards the objects of their researches and as to the regions or cities -in which they conducted them, as for instance De Meo in his <i>Annali -critici del Regno di Napoli.</i></p> - -<p>With the increase of erudition, of the variety of documents and -information available, went hand in hand a more refined criticism as -to the authenticity of the one and of the value as evidence of the -other. Fueter does well to note the progress in method accomplished by -the Benedictines and by Leibnitz (who did not surpass those excellent -and learned monks in this respect,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> although he was a philosopher) up -to Muratori, who did not restrict himself to testing the genuineness -of tradition, but initiated criticism of the tendencies of individual -witnesses, of the interests and passions which colour and give -their shape to narratives. The en-lightened, with Voltaire at their -head, initiated another kind of criticism of a more intrinsic sort, -directed to things and to the knowledge of things (to literary, moral, -political, and military experience), recognizing the impossibility -that things should have happened in the way that they are said to have -happened by superficial, credulous, or prejudiced historians, and -attempting to reconstruct them in the only way that they could have -happened. We shall admire in Voltaire (especially in the <i>Siècle</i>) his -lack of confidence in the reports of courtiers and servants, accustomed -to forge calumnies and to interpret maliciously and anecdotically the -external actions of sovereigns and statesmen.</p> - -<p>This happened because the historiography of the enlightenment, while -it preserved and even exaggerated pragmatism, yet on the other -hand refined and spiritualized it, as will have been observed in -the expressions preferred by Voltaire and even in the theologizing -Bossuet: <i>l'esprit des nations, l'esprit du temps.</i> What that <i>esprit</i> -was naturally remained vague, because the support of philosophy, -in which at that time those newly imported concepts introduced an -unexpected element of conflict, was lacking to refer it to the ideal -determinations of the spirit in its development and to conceive the -various epochs and the various nations as each playing its own part in -the spiritual drama. Thus it often happened that <i>esprit</i> was perverted -into a fixed quality, such as <i>race</i>, if it were a question of nations, -and into a current or mode,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> if periods were spoken of, and was thus -naturalized and pragmatized. <i>Trois choses,</i> wrote Voltaire, <i>influent -sans cesse sur l'esprit des hommes, le climat, le gouvernement, et -la religion: c'est la seule manière d'expliquer l'énigme du monde:</i> -where the 'spirit' is lowered to the position of a product of natural, -and social circumstances. The suggestive word had, however, been -pronounced, and a clear consciousness of the terms themselves of the -social, political, and cultural struggle that was being carried on -would have little by little emerged. For the time being, climate, -government, religion, genius of the peoples, genius of the time, were -all more or less happy attempts to go beyond pragmatism and to place -causality in a universal order. This effort, and at the same time its -limit—that is to say, the falling back into the abstract and pragmatic -form of explanation—is also shown in the doctrine of the 'single -event,' which was believed to determine at a stroke the new epoch of -barbarism or of civilization. Thus at this time it was customary to -assign enormous importance to the Crusades or to the Turkish occupation -of Constantinople, as Fueter records, with special reference to -Richardson's history. Another consequence of the same embarrassment -was the slight degree of fusion attained in the various histories of -culture, of customs, and of the arts that were composed it this time. -The various manifestations of life were set down one after the other -without any success, or even any attempt at developing them organically.</p> - -<p>Doubtless the new and vigorous historiographical tendencies of the -enlightenment were then attacking other barriers opposed to them by -the already mentioned lay-theological dualism, in addition to those of -pragmatism and of naturalism. This lay-theology ended by negating the -principle of development itself, because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> the judgment of the past as -consisting of darkness and errors precluded any serious conception of -religion, poetry, philosophy, or of primitive and bygone institutions. -What did an institution of the great importance of 'divination' in -primitive civilizations amount to for Voltaire in the formative process -of observation and scientific deduction? The invention <i>du premier -fripon qui rencontra un imbécile.</i> Or oracles, also of such importance -in the life of antiquity? <i>Des fourberies.</i> To what amounted the -theological struggles between Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists -in connexion with the Eucharist? To the ridiculous spectacle of the -Papists <i>who mangeaient Dieu pour pain, les luthériens du pain et Dieu, -les calvinistes mangèrent le pain et ne mangèrent point Dieu.</i> What -was the only end that could be attained by the Jansenists? Boredom: a -sequence of tiresome <i>querelles théologiques</i> and of petty querelles -de plume, so that nothing remains of the writers of that time who took -part in them but geometry, reasoned grammar, logic—that is to say, -only what <i>appartient à la raison; the querelles théologiques were -une maladie de plus dans l'esprit humain.</i> Nor does the philosophy -of earlier times receive better treatment. That of Plato was nothing -but <i>une mauvaise métaphysique,</i> a tissue of arguments so bad that -it seems impossible they could have been admired and added to by -others yet more extravagant from century to century, until Locke was -reached: Locke, <i>qui seul a développé l'entendement humain dans un -livre où il n'y a que des vérités, et, ce qui rend l'ouvrage parfait, -toutes les vérités sont claires.</i> In poetry, modern work was placed -above ancient, the Gerusalemme above the Iliad, the Orlando above the -Odyssey, Dante seems obscure and awkward, Shakespeare a barbarian not -without talent. Medieval literature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> was beneath consideration: <i>On a -recueilli quelques malheureuses compositions de ce temps: c'est faire -un amas de cailloux tirés dantiques masures quand on est entouré de -palais.</i> Frederick of Prussia, who here showed himself a consistent -Voltairean, did not receive the new edition of the Nibelungenlied and -the other epic monuments of Germany graciously. In a word, the whole -of the past lost its value, or preserved only the negative value -of evil: <i>Que les citoyens d'une ville immense, où les arts, les -plaisirs, et la paix régnent aujourd'hui, où la raison même commence à -s'introduire, comparent les temps, et qu'ils se plaignent, s'ils osent. -C'est une réflexion qu'il faut faire presque à chaque page de cette -histoire.</i> The lack of the conception of development rendered sterile -the very acquisition of knowledge of distant things and people; and -although there was in certain respects merit in introducing India and -China into universal history, and although the criticism and satire -of the 'four monarchies' and of 'sacred' history was to a certain -extent justified, it is well to remember that in the notion mocked at -was satisfied the legitimate need for understanding history in its -relations with Christian and European civilized life; and that if it -had not been found possible (and it never was at that time) to form a -more complete chain, in which were Arabia, India and China, and the -American civilizations, and all the other newly discovered things, -these additional contributions to knowledge would have remained a mere -object for curiosity or imagination. India, China, and the East in -general were therefore of little more use in the eighteenth century -than to manifest an affection for tolerance, indeed for religious -indifferentism. Those distant countries, in which there was no -proselytizing frenzy, and which did not send missionaries to weary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> -Europe—though Europe did not spare them such visitations—were not -treated as historical realities, nor did they obtain their place in -the reality of spiritual development, but became longed-for ideals, -countries of dream. Those who in our day renew praises of Asiatic -toleration, contrasting it with European intolerance, and wax tender -over such wisdom and meekness, are not aware that in so doing they -are repeating uselessly and inopportunely what Voltaire has already -done; and if in this matter he did not aid the better understanding -of history, he at any rate fulfilled a practical and moral function -which was necessary for the conditions of his own time. The defective -conception of development, and not accidental circumstances, such as -the publicistic, journalistic, and literary tendencies of the original -among those historians, is also the profound reason for the failure of -contact and of union between the immense mass of erudition accumulated -by the sixteenth century philologists, and the historiography of the -enlightenment. How were those documents and collections to be employed -in the slow and laborious development of the spirit, if, according to -the new conception, instead of developing, the spirit was to leap, and -had indeed already made a great leap and left the past far behind? It -was sufficient to rummage from time to time among them and extract some -curious detail, which should fit in with the polemic of the moment. -<i>C'est un vaste magasin, où vous prendrez ce qui est à votre usage,</i> -said Voltaire. Thus the learned and the enlightened, both of them -children of their time, remained divided among themselves, the former -incapable of rising to the level of history owing to their slight -vivacity of spirit, the latter overrunning it owing to their too great -vivacity, and reducing it to a form of journalism.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span></p> - -<p>All these limits, just because they are limits, assign its proper -sphere to the historiography of the enlightenment, but they must -not be taken as meaning that it had not made any progress. That -historiography, plunged in the work at the moment most urgent, -surrounded with the splendour of the truths that it was in the act -of revealing around it, failed to see those limits and its own -deficiencies, or saw them rarely and with difficulty. It was aware only -that it progressed and progressed rapidly, nor was it wrong in this -belief. Nor are those critics (among whom is Fueter) wrong who now -defend it from the bad reputation that has befallen it and celebrate -its many virtues, which we also have set in a clear light and have -added to, and whose connexion and unity we have proved. Yet we must -not leave that bad reputation unexplained, for it sounds far more -serious than the usual depreciation by every historical period of the -one that has preceded it, with the view of showing its inferiority -to the present. Here, on the contrary, we find a particular judgment -of depreciation, pronounced even by comparison with the periods -that preceded the enlightenment, so that this period, and not, for -example, the Renaissance, has especially received the epithet of -'anti-historical' ("the anti-historical eighteenth century"). We find -the explanation of this when we think of the dissipation then taking -place of all symbolical veils, received from <i>venerable antiquity,</i> and -of the crude dualism and conflict which were being instigated at that -time between history and religion. The Renaissance was also itself an -affirmation of human reason, but at the moment of its breaking with -medieval tradition it was felt to be all the same tied to classical -tradition, which gave it an appearance of historical consciousness (an -appearance and not the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> reality). The philosophers of the Renaissance -often invoked and placed themselves under the protection of the -ancient philosophers, Plato against Aristotle, or the Greek Aristotle -against the Aristotle of the commentators. The lettered men of the -period sought to justify the new works of art and the new judgments -upon them by appealing to the precepts of antiquity, although they -sophisticated and subtilized what they found there. Philosophers, -artists, and critics turned their shoulders upon antiquity only when -and where no sort of conciliation was possible, and it was only the -boldest among them who ventured to do even this. The ancient republics -were taken as an example by the politicians, with Livy as their text, -as the Bible was by the Christians. Religion, which was exhausted or -had been extinguished in the souls of the cultured, was of necessity -preserved for the people as an instrument of government, a vulgar form -of philosophy: almost all are agreed as to this, from Machiavelli to -Bruno. The sage legislator or the 'prince' of Machiavelli and the -enlightened despot of Voltaire, who were both of them idealizations -of the absolute monarchies that had moulded Europe politically to -their will, have substantial affinities; but the sixteenth-century -politician, expert in human weaknesses and charged with all the -experience of the rich history of Greece and of Rome, studied finesse -and transactions, where the enlightened man of the eighteenth century, -encouraged by the ever renewed victories of the <i>Reason,</i> raised -Reason's banner, and for her took his sword from the scabbard, without -feeling the smallest necessity for covering his face with a mask. King -Numa created a religion in order to deceive the people, and was praised -for it by Machiavelli; but Voltaire would have abused him for doing -so,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> as he abused all inventors of dogmas and promoters of fanaticism. -What more is to be said? The rationalism of the Renaissance was -especially the work of the Italian genius, so well balanced, so careful -to avoid excesses, so accommodating, so artistic; enlightenment, which -was especially the work of the French genius, was radical, consequent, -apt to run into extremes, logistical.</p> - -<p>When the genius of the two countries and the two epochs is compared, -the enlightenment is bound to appear anti-historical with respect -to the Renaissance, which, owing to the comparison thus drawn and -instituted with such an object, becomes endowed with a historical -sense and with a sense of development which it did not possess, having -also been essentially rationalistic and anti-historical, and, in a -certain sense, more so than the enlightenment. I say more than the -enlightenment, not only because the latter, as I have shown, greatly, -increased historical knowledge and ideas, but also precisely because it -caused all the contradictions latent in the Renaissance to break out. -This was an apparent regression in historical knowledge, but in reality -it was an addition to life, and therefore to historical consciousness -itself, as we clearly see immediately afterward. The triumph and -the catastrophe of the enlightenment was the French Revolution; and -this was at the same time the triumph and the catastrophe of its -historiography.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>VI</h4> - - -<h4>THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ROMANTICISM</h4> - - -<p>The reaction manifested itself with the sentimental return to the past, -and with the defence undertaken by the politicians of old institutions -worthy of being preserved or accorded new life. Hence arose two forms -of historical representation, which certainly belong in a measure to -all periods, but which were very vigorous at the romantic period: -<i>nostalgic</i> historiography and historiography which <i>restored.</i> And -since the past of their desires, which supplied the material for -practical recommendations, was just that which the enlightenment -and the Revolution had combated and overthrown—the Middle Ages and -everything that resembled or seemed to resemble the Middle Ages—both -kinds of history were, so to say, medievalized. Just as a watercourse -which has been forcibly diverted from its natural bed noisily returns -to it as soon as obstructions are removed, so a great sigh of joy and -satisfaction, a warm emotion of tenderness, welled up in and reanimated -all breasts as, after so long a rationalistic ascesis, they again took -to themselves the old religion, the old national customs, regional and -local, again entered the old houses and castles and cathedrals, sang -again the old songs, dreamed again the old legends. In this tumult of -sentiment we do not at first observe the profound and irremediable -change that has taken place in the souls of all, borne witness to -by the anxiety, the emotion, the pathos of that apparent return. It -would be to belittle the nostalgic historiography<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> of the romantic -movement to make it consist of certain special literary works, for in -reality it penetrated all or almost all the writings of that time, like -an irresistible current, to be found not only in lesser and poorer -spirits, such as De Barante, nor only in the more poetically disposed, -such as Chateaubriand, but in historians who present some of the most -important or purely scientific thoughts, for example Niebuhr. The life -of chivalry, the life of the cloister, the Crusades, the Hohenstaufen, -the Lombard and Flemish communes, the Christian kings of Spain at -strife with the Arabs, the Arabs themselves, England divided between -Saxons and Normans, the Switzerland of William Tell, the <i>chansons -de geste,</i> the songs of the troubadours, <i>Gothic</i> architecture -(characteristic vicissitude of a name, applied in contempt and then -turned into a symbol of affection), became at this time the object of -universal and national sympathy, as did the rough, ingenuous popular -literature, poetry, and art: translations or abbreviations of the -medieval chronicles were even reprinted for the enjoyment of a large -and eager circle of readers; the first medieval museums were formed; -an attempt was made to restore and complete ancient churches, castles, -and city palaces. Historiography entered into close relations and -exchange of ideas with the new literary form of historical romance, -which expressed the same nostalgia, first with Walter Scott and then -with his innumerable followers in all countries. (This literary form -was therefore quite different from the historical fiction of Manzoni, -which is free from such sentiment and whose historical element has a -moral foundation.) I have already remarked that this nostalgia was -far more modern of content than at first supposed; so much so that -every one was attracted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> to it by the motive that most appealed to -himself, whether religious or political, Old Catholic, mystical, -monarchical, constitutional, communal-republican, national-independent, -liberal-democratic, or aristocratic. Nevertheless, when the past was -taken as a poetic theme, there was a risk that the idealizing tendency -of the images would be at strife with critical reflection: hence the -cult of the Middle Ages, which had become a superstition, came to a -ridiculous end. Fueter quotes an acute remark of Ranke, relating to one -of the last worthy representatives of the romantic school, Giesebrecht, -author of the History of the German Empire, admirer and extoller of -the 'Christian-Germanic virtues,' of the power and excellence of the -medieval heroes. Ranke described all this as "at once too virile and -too puerile." But the puerility discernible at the sources of this -ideal current, before it falls into the comic, is rather the sublime -puerility of the poet's dream.</p> - -<p>The actual modern motives, which present themselves as sentiments in -nostalgic historiography, acquired a reflex form with the same or -other writers, as tendencies to the service of which their narratives -were bent. Here, too, it would be superfluous to give an account of -all the various forms and specifications of these tendencies (which -Fueter has already done admirably), from the persistent Rousseauism -of Giovanni Müller to Sismondi, or from the ideal of a free peasantry -of Niebuhr, the ultramontane ideal of Leo, the imperialistic-medieval -ideal of the already mentioned Giesebrecht and Ficker, the old liberal -of Raumer, the neo-liberal of Rotteck and Gervinus, the anglicizing -of Guizot and Dahlmann, or the democratic ideal of Michelet, to -the neo-Guelfish ideal of Troya and Balbo and Father Tosti, to the -Prussian hegemony of Droysen and of Treitschke, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> so on. But all of -these, and other historians with a particular bias, lean, with rare -exceptions, on the past, and find the justification of their bias in -the dialectic of tradition or in tradition itself. Nobody any longer -cared to compose by the light of abstract reason alone. The extreme -typical instance is afforded by the socialistic school, which took the -romantic form in the person of its chief representative, Marx, who -endowed it with historiographical and scientific value. His work was -in complete opposition to the socialistic ideals that had appeared in -the eighteenth century, and he therefore boasted that they had passed -from the state of being a Utopia to that of a science. His science -was nothing less than historical necessity attributed to the new era -that he prophesied, and materialism itself no longer wished to be the -naturalistic materialism of a d'Holbach or a Helvétius, but presented -itself as 'historical materialism.'</p> - -<p>If nostalgic historiography is poetry and that with a purpose is -practical and political, the historiography, the true historiography, -of romanticism is not to be placed in either of the two, in so far as -it is considered an epoch in the history of thought. Certainly, poetry -and practice arose from a thought and led to a thought as its material -or problem: the French Revolution was certainly not the cause or the -effect of a philosophy, but both the cause and the effect, a philosophy -in the act, born from and generating the life that was then developed. -But thought in the form of thought, and not in the form of sentimental -love of the past or effort to revive a false past, is what determines -the scientific character of that historiography, which we desire to set -in a clear light. And it reacted in the form of thought against the -thought of the enlightenment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span>, so crudely dualistic, by opposing to it -the conception of development.</p> - -<p>Not indeed that this concept was something entirely new, which had then -burst forth in bud for the first time: no speculative conception that -is really such can be absent at one time and appear at another. The -difference lies in this, that at a given period scientific problems -seem to apply to one rather than to another aspect of thought, which -is always present in its totality. So that when we say that the -conception of development was absent from antiquity and from the -eighteenth century, we utter a hyperbole. There are good reasons for -this hyperbole, but it remains a hyperbole and should not be taken -literally and understood materially. Nor are we to believe that there -was no suspicion or anticipation of the important scientific conception -of development prior to the romantic period. Traces of it may be found -in the pantheism of the great philosophers of the Renaissance, and -especially in Bruno, and in mysticism itself, in so far as it included -pantheism, and yet more distinctly in the reconstruction of the bare -bones of the theological conception with the conception of the course -of historical events as a gradual education of the human race, in -which the successive revelations should be the communication of books -of a gradually less and less elementary nature, from the first Hebrew -scriptures to the Gospels and to the revisions of the Gospels. Lessing -offers an example of this. Nor were the theorists of the enlightenment -always so terribly dualistic as those that I have mentioned, but here -and there one of them, such as Turgot, although he did not altogether -abandon the presupposition as to epochs of decadence, yet recognized -the progress of Christianity over antiquity and of modern times<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> over -Christianity, and attempted even to trace the line of development -passing through the three ages, the mythological, the metaphysical, -and the scientific. Other thinkers, like Montesquieu, noticed the -relativity of institutions to customs and to periods; others, like -Rousseau, attached great importance to the strength of sentiment. -Enlightenment had also its adversaries during its own period, not -only as represented by political abstraction and fatuous optimism -(such as that of Galiani, for instance), but also in more important -respects, destined later to form the special subject of criticism, -such as contempt for tradition, for religion, and for poetry and arid -naturalism. Hence the smile of Hamann at the blind faith of Voltaire -and of Hume in the Newtonian astronomical doctrines and at their lack -of sense for moral doctrines. He held that a revival of poetry and -a linking of it with history were necessary, and considered history -to be (here he was just the opposite of Bodin) not the easiest but -the most difficult of all mental labours. But in the <i>Scienza nuova</i> -of Vico (1725) was to be found a very rich and organic anticipation -of romantic thought (as should now be universally recognized and -known). Vico criticized the enlightenment only in its beginnings (when -it was still only natural jurisprudence and Cartesianism), yet he -nevertheless penetrated more deeply than others who came after him -into its hidden motives and measured more accurately its logical and -practical consequences. Thus he opposed to the superficial contempt -for the past in the name of abstract reason the unfolding of the human -mind in history, as sense, imagination, and intellect, as the divine -or animal age, the heroic age, and the human age. He held further -that no human age was in the wrong, for each had its own strength and -beauty,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> and each was the effect of its predecessor and the necessary -preparation for the one to follow, aristocracy for democracy, democracy -for monarchy, each one appearing at the right moment, or as the justice -of that moment.</p> - -<p>The conception of development did not, however, in the romantic -period, remain the thought of a solitary thinker without an audience, -but broadened until it became a general conviction; it did not -appear timidly shadowed forth, or contradictorily affirmed, but took -on body, coherence, and vigour, and dominated spirits. It is the -formative principle of the idealist philosophy, which culminated in -the system of Hegel. Few there were who resisted its strength, and -these, like Herbart, were still shut up in pre-Kantian dogmatism, -or tried to resist it and are more or less tinged with it, as is -the case with Schopenhauer and yet more with Comte and later with -positivistic evolutionism. It gives its intellectual backbone to the -whole of historiography (with the exception here too of lingerers and -reactionaries), and that historiography corrects for it, in greater or -less measure, the same one-sided tendencies which came to it from the -sentimental and political causes already described, from tenderness for -the near past or for "the good old times," and for the Middle Ages. -The whole of history is now understood as necessary development, and -is therefore implicitly, and more or less explicitly, all redeemed; it -is all learned with the feeling that it is sacred, a feeling reserved -in the Middle Ages for those parts of it only which represented the -opposition of God to the power of the devil. Thus the conception of -development was extended to classical antiquity, and then, with the -increase of knowledge and of attention, to Oriental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> civilizations. -Thus the Romans, the Ionians, the Dorians, the Egyptians, and the -Indians got back their life and were justified and loved in their -turn almost as much as the world of chivalry and the Christian world -had been loved. But the logical extension of the conception did not -find any obstacle among the philosophers and historians, even in the -repugnance that was felt for the times to which modern times were -opposed, such as the eighteenth century. The spectacle was witnessed -of the consecration of Jacobinism and of the French Revolution in -the very books of their adversaries, Hegel, for instance, finding in -those events both the triumph and the death, the one not less than the -other, the 'triumphant death' of the modern abstract subjectivity, -inaugurated by Descartes. Not only did the adversaries, but also the -executioners and their victims, make peace, and Socrates, the martyr of -free thought and the victim of intolerance, such as he was understood -to be by the intellectualists of the eighteenth century and those who -superstitiously repeat them in our own day, was condemned to the death -that he had well deserved, in the name of History, which does not admit -of spiritual revolutions without tragedies. The drafter, too, of the -<i>Manifesto of the Communists,</i> as he was hastening on the business of -putting an end to the burgess class, both with his prayers and with -his works, gave vent to a warm and grandiose eulogium of the work -achieved by the burgess class, and in so doing showed himself to be the -faithful child of romantic thought; because, for anyone who held to the -ideology of the eighteenth century, capitalism and the burgess class -should have appeared to be nothing but distortions due to ignorance, -stupidity, and egoism, unworthy of any praise beyond a funeral -oration. The passions of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> greater part of those historians were -most inflammable, not less than those of the enlightened, yet satire, -sarcasm, invective, at least among the superior intellects, vividly -encircled the historical understanding of the time, but did not oppress -or negate it. The general impression experienced from those narratives -is that of a serious effort to render justice to all, and we owe it to -the discipline thus imparted to the minds and souls of the thinkers -and historians of romanticism that it is only the least cultivated or -most fanatical among the priests and Catholics in general who continue -to curse Voltaire and the eighteenth century as the work of the devil. -In the same way, it is only vulgar democrats and anti-clericals, -akin to the former in their anachronism and the rest, who treat the -reaction, the restoration, and the Middle Ages with equal grossness. -Enlightenment and the Jacobinism connected with it was a religion, -as we have shown, and when it died it left behind it survivals or -superstitions.</p> - -<p>To conceive history as development is to conceive it as history of -ideal values, the only ones that have value, and it was for this -reason that in the romantic period there was an ever increasing -multiplication of those histories which had already increased to so -considerable an extent in the preceding period. But their novelty did -not consist in their external multiplication, but in their internal -maturation, which corrected those previously composed, consisting -either of learned collections of disconnected items of information, or -judgments indeed, but judgments based upon an external model, which -claimed to be constructed by pure reason and was in reality constructed -by arbitrary and capricious abstraction and imagination. And now the -history of poetry and of literature is no longer measured according<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> -to the standard of the Roman-humanistic ideal, or according to the -classical ideal of the age of Louis XIV, or of the ratiocinative and -prosaic ideal of the eighteenth century, but discovers by degrees -its own measure in itself, and beginning with the first attempts of -Herder, of the Schlegels, and then of Villemain, of Sainte-Beuve, and -of Gervinus, and for antiquity of Wolf and Müller, finally reaches -the high standard represented by the <i>History of Italian Literature</i> -of de Sanctis. Suddenly the history of art feels itself embarrassed -by the too narrow ideal of Lessing and of Winckelmann, and there is -a movement toward colour, toward landscape, toward pre-Hellenic and -post-Hellenic art, toward the romantic, the Gothic, the Renaissance, -and the baroque, a movement that extends from Meyer and Hirth to -Rumohr, Kluger, Schnaase, till it reaches Burckhardt and Ruskin. It -also tries here and there to break down the barriers of the schools and -to attain the really artistic personality of the artists. The history -of philosophy has its great crisis with Hegel, who leads it from the -abstract subjectivism of the followers of Kant to objectivity, and -recognizes the only true existence of philosophy to consist of the -history of thought, considered in its entirety, without neglecting any -one of its forms. Zeller, Fischer, and Erdmann in Germany, Cousin and -his school in France, Spaventa in Italy, follow Hegel in such objective -research. The like takes place in the history of religion, which tries -to adopt intrinsic criteria of judgment, after Spittler and Planck, the -last representatives of the rationalistic school, with Marheinecke, -Neander, Hase, and finds a peculiarly scientific form with Strauss, -Baur, and the Tübingen school; and from Eichhorn to Savigny, Gans, and -Lassalle in the history of rights. The conception of the State always -yields<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> the leadership more and more to that of the nation in the -history called political, and 'nationality' substitutes the names of -'humanity,' 'liberty,' and 'equality,' and all the other ideas of the -preceding age that once were full of radiance, but are now dimmed. This -nationalism has wrongly been looked upon as a regression, in respect -of that universalism and cosmopolitanism, because (notwithstanding -its well-known sentimental exaggerations) it notably assists the -concrete conception of the universal living only in its historical -creations, such as nations, which are both products and factors of its -development. And the value of Europeanism is revived as the result -of this acquisition of consciousness of the value of nations. It had -been too much trampled upon during the period of the enlightenment, -owing to the naturalistic spirit which dominated at that time, and to -the reaction taking place against the historical schemes of antiquity -and Christianity, although it was surely evident that history written -by Europeans could not but be 'Europocentric,' and that it is only in -relation to the course of Græco-Roman civilization, which was Christian -and Occidental, that the civilizations developed along other lines -become actual and comprehensible to us, provided always that we do -not wish to change history into an exhibition of the different types -of civilization, with a prize for the best of them The difference is -also made clear for the same reason between history and pre-history, -between the history of man and the history of nature, which had been -illegitimately linked by the materialists and the naturalists. This is -to be found even in the works of Herder, who retains a good many of -the elements of the century of his birth mingled with those of the new -period. But it is above all in romantic historiography that we observe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> -the search for and very often the happy realization of an organic -linking together of all particular histories of spiritual values, by -relating religious, philosophical, poetical, artistic, juridical, and -moral facts as a function of a single motive of development. It then -becomes a commonplace that a literature cannot be understood without -understanding ideas and customs, or politics without philosophy, or -(as was realized rather later) rights and customs and ideas without -economy. And it is worth while recording as we pass by that there is -hardly one of these histories of values which has not been previously -presented or sketched by Vico, together with the indication of their -intrinsic unity. Histories of poetry, histories of myth, of rights, of -languages, of constitutions, of explicative or philosophical reason, -all are in Vico, although sometimes wrapped up in the historical -or sociological epoch with which each one of them was particularly -connected. Even modern biography (which illustrates what the individual -does and suffers in relation to the mission which he fulfils and to the -aspect of the Idea which becomes actual in him) has its first or one of -its first notable monuments in the autobiography of Vico—that is to -say, in the history of the works which Providence commanded and guided -him to accomplish "in diverse ways that seemed to be obstacles, but -were opportunities."</p> - -<p>This transformation of biography does not imply failure to recognize -individuality, but is, on the contrary, its elevation, for it finds -its true meaning in its relation with the universal, as the universal -its concreteness in the individual. And indeed individualizing power, -perception of physiognomies, of states of the soul, of the various -forms of the ideas, sense of the differences of times and places, -may be said to show themselves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> for the first time in romantic -historiography. That is to say, they do not show themselves rarely or -as by accident, nor any longer in the negative and summary form of -opposition between new and old, civil and barbarous, patriotic and -extraneous. It does not mean anything that some of those historians -lost themselves (though this happened rarely) in an abstract dialectic -of ideas, and that others more frequently allowed ideas to be submerged -in the external picturesqueness of customs and anecdotes, because we -find exaggerations, one-sidedness, lack of balance, at all periods and -in all progress of thought. Nor is the accusation of great importance -that the colouring of times and places preferred by the romantics -was false, because the important thing was precisely this attempt to -colour, whether the result were happy or the reverse (if the latter, -the picture had to be coloured again, but always coloured). A further -reason for this is that, as has been already admitted, there were -fancies and tendencies at work in romanticism beyond true and proper -historiography, which bestowed upon the times and places illustrated -that imaginary and exaggerated colouring suggested by the various -sentiments and interests. History, which is thought, was sometimes -idealized at this period as an imaginary living again in the past, and -people asked of history to be carried back into the old castles and -market-places of the Middle Ages; for their enjoyment they asked to -see the personages of the time in their own proper clothes and as they -moved about, to hear them speak the language, with the accent of the -time, to be made contemporary with the facts and to acquire them with -the ingenuous spirit of a contemporary. But to do this is not only -impossible for thought, but also for art, because art too surpasses -life, and it would be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> something useless, because it is not desired, -for what man really desires is to reproduce in imagination and to -rethink the past <i>from the present,</i> not to tear himself away from the -present and fall back into the dead past. Certainly this last was an -illusion, proper to several romantics (who for that matter have their -successors in our own day), and in so far as it was an illusion either -remained a sterile effort or diffused itself in a lyrical sigh; but -an illusion of that kind was one of many aspects and did not form an -essential part of romantic historiography.</p> - -<p>We also owe it to romanticism that a relation was established for -the first time and a fusion effected between the learned and the -historians, between those who sought out material and thinkers. This, -as we have said, had not happened in the eighteenth century, nor, -to tell the truth, before it, in the great epochs of erudition of -Italian or Alexandrian humanism, for then antiquaries and politicians -each followed their own path, indifferent to one another, and the -only political ideal that sometimes gleamed from the bookshelves of -the antiquary (as Fueter acutely observes of Flavius Blondus) was -that of a government which by ensuring calm should permit the learned -to follow their peaceful avocations! But the watchword of romantic -historiography was anticipated in respect to this matter also by Vico, -in his formula of the <i>union</i> of <i>philosophy</i> with <i>philology,</i> and of -the reciprocal <i>conversion</i> of the <i>true</i> with the <i>certain,</i> of the -idea with the fact. This formula proves (we give it passing mention) -that the historical saying of Manzoni, to the effect that Vico should -be united with Muratori, was not altogether historically exact—that -is to say, philosophy with erudition, for Vico had already united -these two things, and their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> union constitutes the chief value of his -work. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its inaccuracy, the saying of -Manzoni also proves how romantic historiography had noted the intimate -connexion that prevails between erudition and thought in history, -which is the living and thinking again of the document that has been -preserved or restored by erudition, and indeed demands erudition that -it may be sought out and prepared. Neither did romanticism limit -itself to stating this claim in the abstract, but really created the -type of the philologist-thinker (who was sometimes also a poet), from -Niebuhr to Mommsen, from Thierry to Fustel de Coulanges, from Troya -to Balbo or Tosti. Then for the first time were the great collections -and repertories of the erudition of the seventeenth and eighteenth -centuries valued at their true worth; then were new collections -promoted, supplementary to or correcting them according to criteria -that were ever more rigorous in relation to the subject and to the -greater knowledge and means at disposal. Thus arose the work known -as the <i>Monumenta Germania historica</i> and the German philological -school (which was once the last and became the first), the one a model -of undertakings of this sort, the other of the disciplines relating -to them, for the rest of Europe. The philological claim of the new -historiography, aided by the sentiment of nationality, also gave life -in our Italy to those historical societies, to those collections of -chronicles, of laws, of charters, of 'historical archives' or reviews, -institutions with which historiographical work is concerned in our day. -A notable example of the power to promote the most patient philology -inspired with purely historical needs is to be found, among others, in -the <i>Corpus inscriptionum latinarum,</i> conceived and carried out by a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> -historian endowed with the passionate energy and the synthetic mind of -a Mommsen. In the eighteenth century (with one or two very rare and -partial exceptions) historians disdained parchment and in-folios, or -opened them impatiently, <i>bibentes et fugientes</i> but in the nineteenth -century no serious spirit dared to affirm any longer that it was -possible to compose history without accurate, scrupulous, meticulous -study of the documents upon which it is to be founded.</p> - -<p>The pragmatic histories of the last centuries, therefore, melted -away at the simple touch of these new historiographical convictions, -rather than owing to direct and open criticism or polemic. The -word 'pragmatic,' which used to be a title of honour, began to be -pronounced with a tinge of contempt, to designate an inadequate form -of historical thought, and the historians of the enlightenment fell -into discredit, not only Voltaire and the French, but the Humes, the -Robertsons, and other English historians. They appeared now to be quite -without colour, lacking in historical sense, their minds fixed only -on the political aspect of things, superficial, vainly attempting to -explain great events by the intentions of individuals and by means of -little things or single details. The theory, too, of history as the -orator and teacher of virtue and prudential maxims also disappeared. -This theory had enjoyed a long and vigorous life during Græco-Roman -antiquity and again from the Renaissance onward (when I say that all -these things disappeared, the exception of the fossils is always to -be understood, for these persisted at that time and persist in our -own day, with the air of being alive). The attitude of the Christian -spirit toward history was resumed. This spirit contemplates it as -a single process, which does not repeat itself, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> the work of -God, which teaches directly by means of His presence, not as matter -that exemplifies abstract teaching, extraneous to itself. The word -'pragmatic' was indeed pronounced with a smile from that time onward, -as were the formulas of <i>historia magister vitæ</i> or that directed <i>ad -bene beateque vivendum</i>: let him who will believe these formulas—that -is to say, he who echoes traditional thoughts without rethinking them -and is satisfied with traditional and vulgar conceptions. What is the -use of history? "History itself," was the answer, and truly that is not -a little thing.</p> - -<p>The new century glorified itself with the title of 'the century of -history,' owing to its new departures, which were born or converged -in one. It had deified and at the same time humanized history, as had -never been done before, and had made of it a centre of reality and of -thought. That title of honour should be confirmed, if not to the whole -of the nineteenth century, then to its romantic or idealistic period. -But this confirmation should not prevent our observing, with equal -clearness, the <i>limit</i> of that historicity, without which it would not -be possible to understand its later and further advance. History was -then at once deified and humanized; but did the divinity and humanity -truly flow together in one, or was there not at bottom some separation -between the two of them? Was the disagreement between ancient worldly -thought and ultramundane Christian thought really healed, or did it not -present itself again in a new form, though this form was attenuated and -more critical intellectually? And which of the two elements prevailed -in this disagreement in its abstractness, the human or rather the -divine?</p> - -<p>These questions suggest the answer, which is further<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> suggested by -a memory familiar to all, namely, that the romantic period was not -only the splendid age of the great evolutionary histories, but also -the fatal age of the <i>philosophies of history,</i> the transcendental -histories. And indeed, although the thought of immanence had grown -gradually more and more rich and profound during the Renaissance and -the enlightenment, and that of transcendency ever more evanescent, -the first had not for that reason absorbed the second in itself, -but had merely purified and rationalized it, as Hellenic philosophy -and Christian theology had tried to do in their own ways in their -own times. In the romantic period, purification and rationalization -continue, and here was the mistake as well as the merit of romanticism, -for it was no longer a question of setting right that ancient opinion, -but of radically inverting and remaking it. The transcendental -conception of history was no longer at that time called revelation -and apocalypse, but <i>philosophy of history,</i> a title taken from the -enlightenment (principally from Voltaire), although it no longer had -the meaning formerly attributed to it of history examined with an -unprejudiced or philosophical spirit adorned with moral and political -reflections, but the meaning, altogether different, of a philosophical -search of the sphere above or below that of history—in fact, of -a theological search, which remained theological, however lay or -speculative it may have been. And since a search of this sort always -leads to a rationalized mythology, there is no reason why the name of -'mythology' should not be extended to the philosophy of history, or -the name of 'philosophy of history,' to mythology, as I have extended -it, calling all transcendental conceptions of history 'philosophy of -history,' for they all separate the fact and the idea, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> event and -its explication, action and end, the world and God. And since the -philosophy of history is transcendental in its internal structure, -it is not surprising that it showed itself to be such in all the -very varied forms that it assumed in the romantic period, even among -philosophers as avid of immanence as Hegel, a great destroyer of -Platonism, who yet remained to a considerable extent engaged in it, -so tenacious is that enemy which every thinker carries in himself and -which he should tear from his heart, yet cannot resist.</p> - -<p>But without entering into a particular account of the assumptions -made by the romantics and idealists in the construction of their -'philosophies of history,' it will be sufficient to observe the -consequences, in order to point out the transcendental tendency -of their constructions. These were such as to compromise romantic -histories in the method and to damage them in the execution, though -they were at first so vigorously conceived as a unity of philosophy -and philology. One of the consequences was precisely the falling again -into contempt of erudition among those very people who adopted and -promoted it, and on other occasions a recommendation of it in words and -a contempt of it in deeds. This contradictory attitude was troubled -with an evil conscience, so much so that its recommendations sound but -little sincere, the contempt timid, when it shows itself, though it -is more often concealed. Nevertheless one discovers fleeting words of -revelation among these tortuosities and pretences, such as that of an -<i>a priori history</i> (Fichte, Schelling, Krause, and, to a certain extent -at least, Hegel), which should be true history, deduced from the pure -concepts, or rendered divine in some vision of the seer of Patmos, a -history which should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> be more or less different from the confusion -of human events and facts, as philosophical history, leaving outside -it as refuse a merely <i>narrative</i> history, which should serve as raw -material or as text for the sermons and precepts of the moralists and -politicians. And we see rising from the bosom of a philosophy, which -had tried to make history of itself, by making philosophy also history -(proof that the design had not been really translated into act), the -distinction between philosophy and history, between the historical and -the philosophical way of thinking, and the mutual antipathy and mutual -unfriendliness of the two orders of researchers. The 'professional' -historians were obliged to defend themselves against their progenitors -(the philosophers), and they ended by losing all pity for them, by -denying that they were philosophers and treating them as intruders and -charlatans.</p> - -<p>Unpleasantness and ill-will were all the more inevitable in that the -'philosophers of history'—that is to say, the historians obsessed -with transcendency—did not always remain content (nor could they do -so, speaking strictly) with the distinction between philosophical and -narrative history, and, as was natural, attempted to harmonize the -two histories, to make the facts harmonize with the schemes which -they had imagined or deduced. With this purpose in view, they found -themselves led to use violence toward facts, in favour of their system, -and this resulted in certain most important parts being cut out, in a -Procrustean manner, and in others that were accepted being perverted -to suit a meaning that was not genuine but imposed upon them. Even -the chronological divisions, which formed a merely practical aid to -narratives, were tortured (as was the custom in the Middle Ages) that -they might<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> be elevated to the rank of ideal divisions. And not only -was the light of truth extinguished in the pursuit of these caprices, -not only were individual sympathies and antipathies introduced (take -as an instance typical of all of them the idealization of Hellas and -of this or that one of the Hellenic races), but there appeared a -thing yet more personally offensive to the victims—that is to say, -there penetrated into history, under the guise of lofty philosophy, -the personal loves and hates of the historian, in so far as he was a -party man, a churchman, or belonged to this or that people, state, -or race. This ended in the invention of Germanism, the crown and -perfection of the human race, a Germanism which, claiming to be the -purest expression of Arianism, would have restored the idea of the -elect people, and have one day undertaken the journey to the East. -Thus were in turn celebrated semi-absolute monarchy as the absolute -form of states, speculative Lutheranism as the absolute form of -religion, and other suchlike vainglorious vaunts, with which the pride -of Germany oppressed the European peoples and indeed the whole world, -and thus exacted payment in a certain way for the new philosophy with -which Germany had endowed the world. But it must not be imagined that -the pride of Germany was not combated with its own arms, for if the -English speculated but little and the French were too firm in their -belief in the <i>Gesta Dei per Francos</i> (become the gestes of reason -and civilization), yet the peoples who found themselves in less happy -conditions, and felt more keenly the censure of inferiority or of -senility thus inflicted upon them, reacted: Gioberti wrote a <i>Primato -d'Italia,</i> and Ciezkowski a <i>Paternostro,</i> which foretold the future -primacy of the Slavonic people and more especially of the Poles.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span></p> - -<p>Yet another consequence of the 'philosophies of history' was the -reflourishing of 'universal histories,' in the fallacious signification -of complete histories of humanity, indeed of the cosmos, which the -Middle Ages had narrated in the chronicles ab origine mundi and <i>de -duabus civitatibus and de quattuor imperiis</i>, and the Renaissance and -enlightenment had reduced to mere vulgar compilations, finding the -centre for its own interest elsewhere. The <i>imagines mundi</i> returned -with the philosophies of history, and such they were themselves, -transcendental universal histories, with the 'philosophy of nature' -belonging to them. The succession of the nations there took the place -of the series of empires: to each nation, as formerly to each empire, -was assigned a special function, which once fulfilled, it disappeared -or fell to pieces, having passed on the lamp of life, which must not -pass through the hands of any nation more than once. The German nation -was to play there the part of the Roman Empire, which should never -die, but exist perpetually, or until the consummation of the ages and -the Kingdom of God. To develop the various forms of the philosophy of -history would aid in making clear the internal contradictions of the -doctrine and in ascribing the reasons for the introduction of certain -corrections for the purpose of doing away with the contradictions -in question, but which in so doing introduced others. And in making -an examination of this kind a special place should be reserved for -Vico, who offers a 'philosophy of history' of a very complex sort, -which on the one side does not negate, but passes by in silence the -Christian and medieval conception (as it does not deny St Augustine's -conception of the two cities or of the elect and Gentile people, but -only seriously examines the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> history of the latter), while on the other -side it resumes the ancient Oriental motive of the circles (courses -and recourses), but understands the course as growth and development, -and the recourse as a dialectical return, which on the other hand -does not seem to give rise to progress, although it does not seem to -exclude it, and also does not exclude the autonomy of the free will or -the exception of contingency. In this conception the Middle Ages and -antiquity ferment, producing romantic and modern thought.<a name="FNanchor_1_19" id="FNanchor_1_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_19" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But in the -romantic period the idea of the circle (which yet contained a great -mental claim that demanded satisfaction) gave place to the idea of a -linear course, taken from Christianity and from progress to an end, -which concludes with a certain state as limit or with entrance into a -paradise of indefinite progress, of incessant joy without sorrow. In -a conception of this kind there is at one time a mixture of theology -and of illuminism, as in Herder, at another an attempt at a history -according to the ages of life and the forms of the spirit, as with -Fichte and his school; then again the idea realizes its logical ideal -in time, as in Hegel, or the shadow of a God reappears, as in the -deism of Laurent and of several others, or the God is that of the old -religion, but modernized, noble, judicious, liberal, as in moderate -Catholicism and Protestantism. And since the course has necessarily an -end in all these schemes, announced and described and therefore already -lived and passed by, attempts to prolong, to prorogue, or to vary that -end have not been wanting, such personages as the Abbots Gioacchini -arising and calling themselves the 'Slav apocalyptics' or by some other -name, and adding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> new eras to those described. But this did not change -anything in the general conception. And there was no change effected in -it by the philosophies of history of the second Schelling, for example, -which are usually called irrationalistic, or of the pessimists, because -it is clear that the decadence which they describe is a progress in the -opposite sense, a progress in evil and in suffering, having its end in -the acme of evil and pain, or leading indeed to a redemption and then -becoming a progress toward the good. But if the idea of circles, which -repeat themselves identically, oppresses historical consciousness, -which is the consciousness of perennial individuality and diversity, -this idea of progress to an end oppresses it in another way, because -it declares that all the creations of history are imperfect, save -the last, in which history comes to a standstill and which therefore -alone has absolute value, and which thus takes away from the value of -reality in favour of an abstraction, from existence in favour of the -inexistent. And both of these—that is to say, all the philosophies of -history, in whatever way determined—lay in ambush to overwhelm the -conceptions of development and the increase in historiographical value -obtained through it by romanticism; and when this injury did not occur -(as in several notable historians, who narrated history admirably, -although they professed to obey the rules of the abstract philosophy -of history, which they saluted from near or far, but took care not to -introduce into their narratives), it was a proof that the contradiction -had not been perceived, or at least perceived as we now perceive it, -in its profound dissonance. It was a sign that romanticism too had -problems upon which it laboured long and probed deeply, and others upon -which it did not work at all or only worked a little and kept waiting,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> -satisfying them more or less. History too, like the individual who -works, does 'one thing at a time,' neglecting or allowing to run on -with the help of slight provisional improvements the problems to which -it cannot for the time being attend, but ready to direct full attention -to them when its hands are free.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_19" id="Footnote_1_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_19"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The exposition and criticism of Vico's thought are -copiously dealt with in the second volume of my <i>Saggi filosofici i La -filosofia di Giambattista Vico</i> (Bari, 1911).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h4>VII</h4> - - -<h4>THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF POSITIVISM</h4> - - -<p>The philosophies of history offended the historical consciousness -in three points, as to which it has every right to be jealous: the -integrity of historical events, the unity of the narration with the -document, and the immanence of development. And the opposition to the -'philosophy of history,' and to the historiography of romanticism in -general, broke out precisely at these three points, and was often -violent. This opposition had at bottom a common motive, as has been -shown clearly by the frequent sympathy and fraternizing among those -who represent it, though dissensions as to details are common among -them. It is, however, best to consider it in its triplicity for reasons -of clearness, and to describe it as that of the <i>historians,</i> the -<i>philologists,</i> and the <i>philosophers.</i></p> - -<p>To the historians, by whom we mean those who had a special disposition -for the investigation of particular facts rather than theories, and a -greater acquaintance with and practice of historical than speculative -literature, is due the saying that history <i>should be history and -not philosophy.</i> Not that they ventured to deny philosophy, for on -the contrary they protested their reverence for it and even for -religion and theology, and condescended to make an occasional rapid -and cautious excursion into those waters; but they generally desired -to steer their way through the placid gulfs of historical truth, -avoiding the tempestuous oceans of the other discipline: philosophy was -relegated to the horizon of their works. Nor did they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> even contest, -at least in principle, the right of existence of those grandiose -constructions of 'universal history,' but they recommended and -preferred national or otherwise monographical histories, which can be -sufficiently studied in their particulars, substituting for universal -histories collections of histories of states and of peoples. And since -romanticism had introduced into those universal histories and into -the national histories themselves its various practical tendencies -(which the philosophy of history had then turned into dogmas), the -historians placed abstention from national and party tendencies upon -their programme, although they reserved the right of making felt their -patriotic and political aspirations, but, as they said, without for -that reason altering the narrative of the facts, which were supposed -to move along independently of their opinions, or chime in with them -spontaneously in the course of their natural development. And since -passion and the philosophic judgment had been confused and mutually -contaminated in romanticism, the abstention was extended also to -the judgment as to the quality of the facts narrated; the <i>reality</i> -and not the value of the fact being held to be the province of the -historian, appeal being made to what theorists and philosophers had -thought about it, where a more profound consideration of the problem -was demanded. History should not be either German or French, Catholic -or Protestant, but it should also not pretend to apply a more ample -conception to the solution of these or similar antitheses, as the -philosophers of history had tried to do, but rather should neutralize -them all in a wise scepticism or agnosticism, and attenuate them in a -form of exposition conducted in the tone of a presidential summing-up, -where careful attention is paid to the opinions of opposed parties and -courtesy is observed toward all. There was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> diplomacy in this, and it -is not astonishing that many diplomatists or disciples of diplomacy -should collaborate in this form of history, and that the greatest of -all the historians of this school, Leopold Ranke, in whom are to be -found all the traits that we have described, should have had a special -predilection for diplomatic sources. He always, indeed, combated -philosophy, especially the Hegelian philosophy, and greatly contributed -to discredit it with the historians, but he did this decorously, -carefully avoiding the use of any word that might sound too rough or -too strong, professing the firm conviction that the hand of God shows -itself in history, a hand that we cannot grasp with ours, but which -touches our face and informs us of its action. He completed his long -and very fruitful labours in the form of monographs, avoiding universal -constructions. When, at the end of his life, he set to work to compose -a Weltgeschichte, he carefully separated it from the universe, -declaring that it would have been "lost in phantasms and philosophemes" -had he abandoned the safe ground of national histories and sought for -any other sort of universality than that of nations, which "acting upon -one another, appear one after the other and constitute a living whole." -In his first book he protested with fine irony that he was not able -to accept the grave charge of judging the past or of instructing the -present as to the future, which had been assigned to history, but he -felt himself capable only of showing "how things really had happened" -(wie es eigentlich gewesen) this was his object in all his work, and he -held fast to it, thus culling laurels unobtainable by others, attaining -even to the writing of the history of the popes of the period of the -Counter-Reformation, although he was a Lutheran and remained so all his -life. This history was received with favour in all Catholic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> countries. -His greatest achievement was to write of French history in a manner -that did not displease the French. A writer of the greatest elegance, -he was able to steer between the rocks, without even letting appear his -own religious or philosophical convictions, and without ever finding -himself under the obligation of forming a definite resolution, and -in any case never pressing too hard upon the conceptions themselves -to which he had recourse, such as 'historical ideas,' the perpetual -struggle between Church and State, and the conception of the State. -Ranke was the ideal and the master to many historians within, and to -some without, his own country. But even without his direct influence, -the type of history that he represented germinated everywhere, a little -earlier or later according to position and to the calming down of the -great political passions and philosophical fervour in the different -countries. This took place, for instance, in France earlier than in -Italy, where the idealistic philosophy and the national movement made -their strength felt in historiography after 1848, and even up to 1860. -But the type of history which I should almost be disposed to baptize -with the name of 'diplomatic,' taking seriously the designation that -I had at first employed jocosely, still meets with success among -the moderately disposed, who are lovers of culture, but do not wish -to become infected with party passions or to rack their brains with -philosophical speculations: but, as may be imagined, it is not always -treated with the intelligence, the balance, and the finesse of a -Leopold Ranke.</p> - -<p>The ambition of altogether rejecting the admission of thought into -history, which has been lacking to the diplomatic historians (because -they were without the necessary innocence for such an ambition), was, -on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> other hand, possessed by the philologists, a most innocent -group. They were all the more disposed to abound in this sense, since -their opinion of themselves, which had formerly been most modest, had -been so notably increased, owing to the high degree of perfection -attained by research into chronicles and documents and by the recent -foundation (which indeed had not been a creation ex nihilo) of the -critical or historical method, which was employed in a fine and close -examination into the origin of sources and the reduction of these, and -in the internal criticism of texts. This pride of the philologists -prevailed, the method reaching its highest development in a country -like Germany, where haughty pedantry flourishes better than elsewhere, -and where, as a result of that most admirable thing, scientific -seriousness, 'scientificism' is much idolized. This word was also -ambitiously adopted for everything that concerns the surroundings and -the instruments of true and proper science, such as is the case with -the collection and criticism of narratives and documents. The old -school of learned men, French and Italian, who did not effect less -progress in 'method' than was attained during the nineteenth century in -Germany, did not dream that they were thus producing 'science,' much -less did they dream of vying with philosophy and theology, or that -they could drive them from their positions and take their places with -the documentary method. But in Germany every mean little copier of a -text, or collector of variants, or examiner of the relations of texts -and conjecturer as to the genuine text, raised himself to the level of -a scientific man and critic, and not only dared to look upon himself -as the equal of such men as Schelling, Hegel, Herder, or Schlegel, -but did so with disdain and contempt, calling them 'anti-methodical.' -This pseudo-scientific<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> haughtiness diffused itself from Germany over -the other European countries, and has now reached America, though in -other countries than Germany it met more frequently with irreverent -spirits, who laughed at it. Then for the first time there manifested -itself that mode of historiography which I have termed 'philological' -or 'erudite' history. That is to say, the more or less judicious -compilations of sources which used to be called <i>Antiquitates, Annales, -Penus, Thesauri,</i> presented themselves disguised as histories, which -alone were dignified and scientific. The faith of these historians -was reposed in a narrative of which every word could be supported by -a text, and there was nothing else whatever in their work, save what -was contained in the texts, torn from their contexts and repeated -without being thought by the philologist narrator. Their object -was that their histories should reach the rank of comprehensive -compilations, starting from those relating to particular times, -regions, and events, and finally attaining to the arrangement of the -whole of historical knowledge in great encyclopædias, out of which -articles are to be supplied, systematic or definitional, put together -by groups of specialists, directed by a specialist, for classical, -romantic, Germanic, Indo-European, and Semitic philology. With a view -to alleviating the aridity of their labours, the philologists sometimes -allowed themselves a little ornament in the shape of emotional -affections and ideal view-points. With this purpose, they had recourse -to memories of their student days, to the philosophical catchwords -which had been the fashion at the time, and to the ordinary sentiments -of the day toward politics, art, and morality. But they did all this -with great moderation, that they might not lose their reputation for -scientific gravity, and that they might not fail in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> respect toward -scientific philological history, which disdains the vain ornaments in -which philosophers, dilettantes, and charlatans delight. They ended -by tolerating historians of the type above described, but as a lesser -evil, and as a general rule inclined to pardon the sins arising out -of their commerce with 'ideas' in favour of the 'new documents' which -they had discovered or employed, and which they could always dig out of -their books as a useful residue, while purifying them from 'subjective' -admixtures—that is to say, from the elaboration of them which had -been attempted. Philosophy was known to them only as 'philosophy of -history,' but even thus rather by reason of its terrible ill-fame than -from direct acquaintance. They remembered and were ever ready to repeat -five or six anecdotes concerning errors in names and dates into which -celebrated philosophers had actually fallen, easily forgetful of the -innumerable errors into which they fell themselves (being more liable -as more exposed to danger); they almost persuaded themselves that -philosophy had been invented to alter the names and confuse the dates -which, had been confided to their amorous care, that it was the abyss -opened by the fiend to lead to the perdition of serious 'documentary -history.'</p> - -<p>The third band of those opposed to the philosophy of history was -composed of philosophers or of historian—philosophers, but of those -who rejected the name and selected another less open to suspicion, -or tempered it with some adjective, or accepted it indeed, but -with opportune explanations: they styled themselves positivists, -naturalists, sociologists, empiricists, criticists, or something of -that sort. Their purpose was to do something different from what the -philosophers of history had done, and since these had worked with the -conception<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> of the <i>end,</i> they all of them swore that they would work -with the conception of the <i>cause;</i> they would search out the cause -of every fact, thus generalizing more and more widely the causes or -the cause of the entire course of history: those others had attempted -a <i>dynamic</i> of history; they would work at a <i>mechanic</i> of history, a -social physics. A special science arose, opposed to the philosophy of -history, in which that naturalistic and positivistic tendency became -exalted in its own eyes: sociology. Sociology classified facts of human -origin and determined the laws of mutual dependence which regulated -them, furnishing the narratives of historians with the principles of -explanation, by means of these laws. Historians, on the other hand, -diligently collected facts and offered them to sociology, that it might -press the juice out of them—that is to say, that it might classify -and deduce the laws that governed them. History and sociology, then, -stood to one another in the same relation as physiology and zoology, -physics and mineralogy, or in another relation of the same sort; they -differed from the physical and natural sciences only by their greater -complexity. The introduction of mathematical calculation seemed to -be the condition of progress for history as for all the sciences, -physical and natural. A new 'science' came forward to support this -notion, in the shape of that humble servant of practical administration -and inspired creation of bureaucracy known as statistics. And since -the whole of science was being modelled upon the idea of a factory -of condensation, so were 'syntheses' invoked and outlined for -history—that is to say, historical frameworks, in which the laws and -facts chat dominate single histories should be resumed, as though in a -sort of table or atlas, which should show at a glance causes and the -facts which arose from them.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> Need we recall the names and supporters -of this school—Comte, Buckle, Taine, and so on, until we come to those -recent historians who follow them, such as Lamprecht and Breysig? Need -we recall the most consequent and the most paradoxical programmes or -the school, as, for instance, Buckle's introduction to his history of -civilization or Bourdeau's book on the <i>Histoire des historiens?</i> These -and similar positivistic doctrines are present to the memory, either -because they are nearest to us chronologically, or because the echo -of the noise they made in the world has not yet ceased, and we see -everywhere traces of their influence. Everywhere we see it, and above -all in the prejudice which they have solidly established (and which we -must patiently corrode and dissolve), that history, true history, is to -be constructed by means of the <i>naturalistic</i> method, and that <i>causal</i> -induction should be employed. Then there are the manifold naturalistic -conceptions with which they have imbued modern thought: race, heredity, -degeneration, imitation, influence, climate, historical factors, and so -forth. And here, too, as in the case of the philosophies of history, -since it suffices us to select only the essential in each fact, we -shall not dwell upon the various particular forms of it—that is to -say, upon the various modes in which historical causes were enunciated -and enumerated, and upon the various claims that one or other of them -was supreme: now the race, now the climate, now economy, now technique, -and so forth. Here, too, the study of the particular forms would be of -use to anyone who wished to develop in particular the dialectic and to -trace the internal dissolution of that school, to demonstrate in its -particular modes its intrinsic tendency to surpass itself, though it -failed to do so by that path.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span></p> - -<p>We have already mentioned that the three classes of opponents of -the 'philosophies of history' and the three methods by which they -proposed to supplant it—diplomatic, philological, and positivistic -history—showed that they disagreed among themselves. Confirmation of -this may now be found in the contempt of the diplomatic historians -for mere erudition and in their diffidence for the constructions of -positivism, the erudite, for their part, being fearful of perversions -of names and dates and shaking their heads at diplomatic histories -and the careless style of the men of the world who composed them. -Finally, the positivists looked upon the latter as people who did not -go to the bottom of things, to their general or natural causes, and -reproved the erudite with their incapacity for rising to the level -of laws and to the establishment of facts in accordance with these -laws, sociological, physiological, or pathological. But there is -further confirmation of what has been noted in respect to the common -conception that animated them all and of their substantial affinity, -because when the erudite wished to cloak themselves in a philosophy -of some sort, they very readily strutted about draped in some shreds -of positivistic thought or phraseology. They also participated in the -reserve and in the agnosticism of the positivists and the diplomatic -historians toward speculative problems, and in like manner it was -impossible not to recognize the justice of their claim that evidence -should be reliable and documents authentic. The diplomatic historians -agreed with them in the formula that history should not be philosophy -and that research should dispense with finality and follow the line -of causality. In fact, all three sorts of opponents, at one with the -transcendency of the philosophy of history, negated the unity of -history with philosophy, but in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> various degrees and with various -particular meanings, with various preliminary studies and in various -ways. And although these schools were in agreement as to what they -negated, all three of them become for us exposed to a criticism which -unites them beneath a single negation. For not even do the ability and -the intelligence of a Ranke avail to give vigour to the moderatism -and to maintain firmly the eclecticism of diplomatic history, and -the transaction breaks down before the failure on the part of those -who attempted it, owing to its being contrary to their own powers -and intrinsically impossible. The idea of an agnostic history turns -out to be fallacious—that is to say, of a history that is not -philosophical but does not deny philosophy, that is not theological -but is not anti-theological, limiting itself to nations and to their -reciprocal influence upon one another, because Ranke himself was -obliged to recognize powers or ideals that are superior to nations and -that as such require to be speculatively justified in a philosophy or -in a theology. In this way he laid himself open to the accusations -of the positivists, who discredited his ideas as 'mystical.' For the -same reason others were proceeding to reduce them little by little -from the position of ideals or movements of the spirit to natural and -physiological products, as was attempted by Lorenz, an ardent follower -of Ranke, who, with his doctrine of generation and of heredity, fell -into that physiologism and naturalism from which the master had -preserved himself. And when this passage from spirituality to nature -was accomplished, the dividing line between history and pre-history, -between history of civilization and history of nature, was also not -respected. On the other hand, a return was made to the 'philosophies -of history,' when ideas were interpreted as transcendental and as -answering to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> designs of the divine will, which governs the world -according to a law and conducts it according to a plan of travel. The -boasted impartiality and objectivity, which was based upon a literary -device of half-words, of innuendoes, of prudent silences, was also -equally illusory, and the Jesuit who objected to Ranke and his history -of the popes will always prevail from the point of view of rigorous -criticism—either the Papacy is always and everywhere what it affirms -itself to be, an institution of the Son of God made man, or it is a -lie. Respect and caution are out of place here. <i>Tertium non datur.</i> -Indeed, it was not possible to escape from taking sides by adopting -that point of view; at the most a third party was thus formed, -consisting of the tolerant, the tepid, and the indifferent. The slight -coherence of Ranke's principles can be observed in that part of his -<i>Universal History</i> where, when speaking of Tacitus he touches upon -his own experience as a teacher of history, he declares that "it is -impossible to speak of a tranquil and uniform progressive development -of historiography either among the ancients or the moderns, because the -object itself is formed in the course of time and is always different, -and conceptions depend upon the circumstances among which the author -lives and writes." He thus comes to perform an act of resignation -before blind contingentism, and the present historical sketch shows -how unjust this is, for it has traced the organic and progressive -development of historical thought from the Greeks to modern times. And -the whole of the <i>Universal History</i> is there to prove, on the other -hand, that his slight coherence of ideas, or web of ideas that he left -intentionally vague, made it difficult for him to give life to a vast -historical narrative, so lacking in connexion, so heavy, and sometimes -even issuing in extraneous reflections, such, for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> example, as those -in the first pages of the first volume, where there is a comparison -of Saul and Samuel with the emperors at strife with the popes, and of -the policy of Rehoboam and Jeroboam with the political strife between -the centralizing states and the centrifugal regions of modern times. -We find in general in Ranke an inevitable tendency to subside into the -pragmatic method. And what has been said of Ranke is to be repeated -of his disciples and of those who cultivated the same conciliatory -type of history. As for philological history, the description that -has been given of the programme makes clear its nullity, for it leads -by a most direct route to a double absurdity. When the most rigorous -methods of examining witnesses is really applied, there is no witness -that cannot be suspected and questioned, and philological history -leads to the negation of the truth of that history which it wishes to -construct. And if value be attributed to certain evidence arbitrarily -and for external reasons, there is no extravagance that may not be -accepted, because there is no extravagance that may not have honest, -candid, and intelligent men on its side. It is not possible to reject -even miracles by the philological method, since these repose upon the -same attestations which make certain a war or a peace treaty, as Lorenz -has shown by examining the miracles of St Bernard in the light of the -severest philological criticism. In order to save himself from the -admission of the inconceivable and of the nullification of history, -which follows the nullification of witnesses, there remains nothing -but appeal to thought, which reconstitutes history from the inside, -and is evidence to itself, and denies what is unthinkable for the very -reason that it is not to be thought. This appeal is the declaration of -bankruptcy for philological history. We may certainly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> say that this -form of history more or less sustains itself as history, to the extent -that it has recourse to all the aids furnished by history proper, and -contradicts itself; or it contradicts itself and yet does not sustain -itself, or only for a little while and in appearance, by again adopting -the methods of pragmaticism, of transcendency, and of positivism. And -the last of these in its turn encounters the same experiences in a -different order, because its principle of history that explains facts -causally presupposes the facts, which as such are thought and therefore -are in a way already explained. Hence a vicious circle, evident in the -connexion between history and sociology, each one of which is to be -based upon and at the same time to afford a base for the other, much -in the same way as a column which should support a capital and at the -same time spring from it. But if, with a view to breaking the circle, -history be taken as the base and sociology as its fulfilment, then the -latter will no longer be the explanation of the former, which will find -its explanation elsewhere. And this will be, according to taste, either -an unknown principle or some form of thought that acts in the same way -as God, and in both cases a transcendental principle. Hence we have the -fact of positivism leading to philosophies of history, as exemplified -in the Apocalypses and the Gospels of Comte, of Buckle, and of others -of like sort: they are all most reverent theologians, but chaotic, -falling back into those fallacious conceptions which had been refuted -by romantic historiography.</p> - -<p>Truly, when faced with such histories as these, superficial or -unintelligent or rude and fantastic, romanticism, conscious of the -altitude to which it had elevated the study of the development of human -affairs, might have exclaimed (and indeed it did exclaim by the mouth -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> its epigoni) to its adversaries and successors, in imitation of the -tone of Bonaparte on the 18th of Brumaire: "What have you done with the -history which I left to you so brilliant? Were these the new methods, -by means of which you promised to solve the problems which I had not -been able to solve? I see nothing in them but <i>revers et misère!</i>" But -we who have never met with absolute regressions during the secular -development of historiography shall not allow ourselves to be carried -away upon the polemical waves now beating against the positivistic and -naturalistic school which is our present or recent adversary, to the -point of losing sight of what it possessed that was substantially its -own, and owing to which it really did represent progress. We shall also -refrain from drawing comparisons between romanticism and positivism, -by measuring the merits of both, and concluding with the assertion -of the superiority of the former; because it is well known that such -examinations of degrees of merit, the field of professors, are not -permissible in history, where what follows ideally after is virtually -superior to that from which it is derived, notwithstanding appearances -to the contrary. And in the first place, it would be erroneous, -strictly speaking, to believe that what had been won by romanticism had -been lost in positivism, because when the histories of this period are -looked upon from other points of view and with greater attention, we -see how they were all preserved. Romanticism had abolished historical -dualism, for which there existed in reality positive and negative, -elect and outcast, facts. Positivism repeated that all facts are -facts and all have an equal right to enter history. Romanticism had -substituted the conception of development for the abysses and the -chasms that previous historiography had introduced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> into the course -of events, and positivism repeated that conception, calling it -<i>evolution.</i> Romanticism had established periods in development, either -in the form of a cycle of phases, like Vico, or as phases without -a circle and in linear order, like the German romantics, and had -exemplified the various phases as a series of the forms of the spirit -or of psychological forms, and positivism renewed these conceptions -(although owing to the lack of culture usual with its adherents it -often believed that it had made discoveries never made before), as can -be proved by a long series of examples. These range from the <i>three -ages</i> of mental development of Comte to the <i>eight phases</i> of social -development or <i>four political periods</i> which are respectively the -'novelties' of the contemporaries Lamprecht and Breysig. Romanticism, -judging that the explanation of events by means of the caprices, the -calculations, and the designs of individuals taken atomistically was -frivolous, took as the subject of history the universals, the Idea, -ideas, the spirit, nations and liberty and positivism; it also rejected -individualistic atomicism, talking of <i>masses, races, societies, -technique, economy, science, social tendencies</i>; of everything, in -fact, with the exception that the caprice of Tizius and Caius was -now no longer admitted. Romanticism had now not only reinforced the -histories of ideal values, but had conceived them as in organic -connexion; positivism in its turn insisted upon the <i>interdependence -of social factors</i> and upon the unity of the real, and attempted to -fill up the interstices of the various special histories by means of -the history of <i>civilization</i> and of <i>culture,</i> and so-called <i>social</i> -history, containing in itself politics, literature, philosophy, -religion, and every other class of facts. Romanticism had overthrown -heteronomous, instructive, moralizing, serviceable history, and -positivism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> in its turn boasted that its history was a <i>science,</i> an -end in itself, like every other science, although like every science -it afforded the basis for practice, and was therefore capable of -application. Romanticism had enhanced the esteem for erudition, and -had given an impetus to intercourse between it and history. But whence -did the erudition and philology of the positivistic period derive -that pride which made them believe that they were themselves history, -save from the consciousness that they had inherited from romanticism, -which they had preserved and exaggerated? Whence did they inherit the -substance of their method save (as Fueter well notes) from the romantic -search for the primitive, the genuine, the ingenuous, which manifested -itself in Wolf, who inaugurated the method? It is well to remember that -Wolf was a pre-romantic, an admirer of Ossian and of popular poetry. -And, finally, what is the meaning of the efforts of positivism to -seek out the <i>causes</i> of history, the series of historical facts, the -<i>unity</i> of the factors and their dependence upon a <i>supreme cause,</i> -save the speculations of the romantics themselves upon the manner, -the end, and the value of development? Whoever pays attention to all -these and other resemblances which we could enumerate must conclude -that positivism is to romanticism as was the enlightenment to the -Renaissance—that is to say, it is not so much its antithesis as it is -the logical prosecution and the exaggeration of its presuppositions. -Even its final conversion into theology corresponds to that of -romanticism. This is for the rest an obvious matter, for transcendency -is always transcendency, whether it be thought of as that of a God -or of reason, of nature or of matter. But thinking of it as Matter -or Nature, this naturalistic and materialistic travesty, which at -first seems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> odious or ridiculous, of the problems and conceptions of -romanticism, of the idea into cause, of development into evolution, -of the spirit into mass and the like, to which one would at first be -inclined to attribute the inferiority of positivistic historiography, -is, on the contrary, for the close observer the progress made by it -upon romanticism. That travesty contains the energetic negation of -history as moved by extramundane forces, by external finalities, -by transcendental laws, just both in its motive and in its general -tendency, and the correlative affirmation that its law must be sought -in reality, which is one and is called 'nature.' The positivism, -which on no account wished to hear anything of 'metaphysic,' had in -mind the dogmatic and transcendental metaphysic, which had filtered -into the thought of Kant and of his successors; and the target of its -contempt was a good one, although it ended by confusing metaphysic -with philosophy in general, or dogmatic with critical metaphysic, -the metaphysic of being with that of the mind, and was not itself -altogether free from that which it undertook to combat. But this does -not prevent its repugnance to 'metaphysic' and, restricting ourselves -to what is our more immediate interest, to the 'philosophy of history' -from having produced durable results. Thanks to positivism historical -works became less naïve and richer in facts, especially in that class -of facts which romanticism had neglected, such as the dispositions -that are called natural, the processes that are called degenerative or -pathological, the spiritual complications that are called psychological -illusions, the interests that are called material, the production and -the distribution of wealth, or economic activity, the facts of force -and violence, or of political and revolutionary power. Positivism, -intent upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> negation of transcendency and upon the observation of -what appertained to it, felt itself to be, and was in that respect, in -the right. And each one of us who pays due attention to that order of -things and renews that negation is gathering the fruit of positivism, -and in that respect is a positivist. Its very contradictions had the -merit of making more evident the contradictions latent in romantic -historiography. This merit must be admitted to the most extravagant -doctrines of the positivists, such as that of Taine, that knowledge -is a true hallucination and that human wisdom is an accident (<i>une -rencontre</i>), which presumed irrationality to be the normal condition, -much as Lombroso believed that genius is madness. Another instance -of this is the attempt to discover in what way heterogeneity and -historical diversity come into existence, if homogeneity is posited; -and again the methodical canon that the explanation of history is to -be found in causality, but is to stop at genius and virtue, which are -without it, because they refuse to accept of causal explanation, or -the frightful Unknowable, which was placed at the head of histories -of the real, after so great a fuss being made about that Titan -science which was ready to scale the skies. But since romanticism -had left spirit and nature without fusion, the one facing the other, -it was just that if in the first place spirit swallowed up nature -without being able to digest it (because, as had been laid down, it -was indigestible), now nature was engaged in doing the same thing to -spirit, and with the same result. So just and logical was this that -not a few of the old idealists went over to the crassest materialism -and positivism, and that confession of not being able to see their way -in the confusion was at once instructive and suggestive, as was also -the perplexity decorated with the name of 'agnosticism.'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> And as the -precise affirmation of the positivity of history represented an advance -in thought, so the antithesis of materialism, pushed to an extreme, was -an advance in the preparation of the new problem and in the new way of -solving the relation between spirit and nature. <i>Oportet ut scandala, -eveniant,</i> and this means that even scandal, the scandal of the absurd, -and of offensive false criticisms of human conscience, is an advance.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>VIII</h4> - - -<h4>THE NEW HISTORIOGRAPHY CONCLUSION</h4> - - -<p>The romantic current not only maintained itself in its excesses during -the dominion of positivism, and, as we have shown, insinuated itself -even into its naturalistic antithesis, but it also persisted in its -genuine form. And although we have not spoken of pedantic imitators -and conservatives—whose significance is slight in the history of -thought, that is to say, confined to the narrow sphere in which they -were compelled to think for themselves—we have nevertheless recorded -the preservation of romanticism in the eclecticism of Ranke, who -adhered to the theories of Humboldt (another 'diplomatist'). Idealistic -and romantic motives continued to illuminate the intellect and soul -among the philosophers, from Humboldt to Lotze and from Hartmann to -Wundt and those who corresponded to them in other countries. The like -occurred in historiography properly so called, and could not but -happen, because, if the formulas of agnosticism and of positivism had -been followed to the letter, all light of thought would have been -extinguished in blind mechanicism—that is to say, in nothing—and no -historical representation would have been possible. Thus political, -social, philosophical, literary, and artistic history continued to -make acquisitions, if not equally important with those of the romantic -period (the surroundings were far more favourable to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> the natural -sciences and to mathematics than to history), yet noteworthy. This is -set forth in a copious volume upon historiography (I refer to the work -of Fueter already several times mentioned in this connexion). There -due honour will be found accorded to the great work accomplished by -Ranke, which the rapidity of my course of exposition has induced me to -illustrate rather in its negative aspects, causing me, for instance, -to allude solely to the contradictions in the <i>History of the Popes,</i> -which is notwithstanding a masterpiece. The cogent quality of the -romantic spirit at its best is revealed in the typical instance of -Taine, who is so ingenuously naturalistic in his propositions and in -the directive principles of his work, yet so unrestrainedly romantic -in particular instances, as, for example, in his characterization of -the French poets or of the Dutch and Italian painters. All this led to -his ending in the exaggerated anti-Jacobin romanticism of his <i>Origines -de la France contemporaine,</i> in the same way that Zola and the other -verists, those verbal enemies of romanticism, were lyrical in all -their fiction, and the leader of the school was induced to conclude -his works with the abstract lyricism of the <i>Quatre évangiles.</i> What -has been observed of Taine is to be applied to Buckle and to the -other naturalists and positivists, obliged to be historical against -their will, and to the positivists who became followers of historical -materialism, and found the dialectic established in their house without -being able to explain what it was or whence it came. Not all theorists -of historiography showed themselves to be so resolutely and madly -naturalistic as Bourdeau and one or two others; indeed these were few -in number and of inferior reputation. Eclecticism prevailed among -the majority of them, a combination of necessity and of liberty, of -masses<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> and individuals, of cause and end, of nature and spirit: even -the philosophy of history was admitted, if in no other form, then as a -<i>desideratum</i> or a problem to be discussed at a convenient time (even -though that were the Greek Kalends). Eclecticism, too, presented the -greatest variety, from the low level of a trivial arranging of concepts -in an artificial manner to the lofty heights of interior labour, from -which it seemed at every moment that a new gospel, no longer eclectic, -must issue.</p> - -<p>This last form of eclecticism and the open attempts to renew romantic -idealism more or less completely, as well as romantic methods of -historiography, have become more frequent since modern consciousness -has withdrawn itself from positivism and has declared its bankruptcy. -But all this is of importance rather as a symptom of a real advance in -thought. And the new modern philosophies of intuition and philosophy -of values must be looked upon rather as symptoms than as representing -progress in thought (I mean in general, and not in the particular -thoughts and theories which often form a real contribution). The former -of these, however, while it correctly criticizes science as an economic -construction useless for true knowledge, then proceeds to shut itself -up in immediate consciousness, a sort of mysticism, where historical -dialectic finds itself submerged and suffocated; and the latter, -placing the conception of value as guardian of the spirit in opposition -to the conceptions of science like "a philosophical <i>cave canem</i>" (as -our imaginative Tari would have said), leaves open a dualism, which -stands in the way of the unity of history and of thought as history. -When we look around us, therefore, we do not discover that <i>new -philosophy</i> which shall lay the foundations and at the same time afford -justification for the new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> historiography by solving the antithesis -between imaginative romanticism and materialistic positivism. And it -is clear that we are not even able to discuss such a philosophy as a -<i>demand,</i> because the demand for a particular philosophy is itself the -thinking of that particular philosophy, and therefore is not a demand -but an actuality. Hence the dilemma either of saying nothing about it, -and in this case of not speaking even of positivism as a period that -has been closed and superseded, or of speaking of the new philosophy as -of something that lives and exists, precisely because it does live and -exist. And since to renounce talking of it has been rendered impossible -by the very criticism chat we have devoted to it, nothing remains save -to recognize that philosophy as something that exists, not as something -to be invoked. Only we must not <i>look around us</i> in order to see where -it is, but return to <i>ourselves</i> and have recourse to the thought -that has animated this historical sketch of historiography and to all -the historical explanations that have preceded it. In the philosophy -that we have delineated, reality is affirmed to be spirit, not such -that it is above the world or wanders about the world, but such as -coincides with the world; and nature has been shown as a moment and a -product of this spirit itself, and therefore the dualism (at least that -which has troubled thought from Thales to Spencer) is superseded, and -transcendency of all sorts, whether materialistic or theological in its -origin, has also been superseded with it. Spirit, which is the world, -is the spirit which develops, and is therefore both one and diverse, an -eternal solution and an eternal problem, and its self-consciousness is -philosophy, which is its history, or history, which is its philosophy, -each substantially identical with the other; and consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> is -identical with self-consciousness—that is to say, distinct and one -with it at the same time, as life and thought. This philosophy, which -is in us and is ours, enables us to recognize it—that is to say, to -recognize ourselves outside of us—in the thought of other men which is -also our thought, and to discover it more or less clearly and perfectly -in the other forms of contemporary philosophy, and more or less clearly -in contemporary historiography. We have frequent opportunities of -effecting this recognition, which is productive of much spiritual -comfort. Quite lately, for instance, while I was writing these pages, -the historical work of a historian, a pure historian, came into my -hands (I select this instance among many) where I read words at the -very beginning which seemed to be my very own: "My book is based upon -the conviction that German historical inquiry must elevate itself to -freer movement and contact with the great forces of political life and -culture, without renouncing the precious tradition of its method, and -that it must plunge into philosophy and politics, without experiencing -injury in its end or essence, for thus alone can it develop its -intimate essence and be both universal and national."<a name="FNanchor_1_20" id="FNanchor_1_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_20" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> This is the -philosophy of our time, which is the initiator of a new philosophical -and historiographical period. But it is not possible to write the -history of this philosophy and of this historiography, which is subject -and not <i>object</i>, not for the reason generally adopted, which we -have found to be false, since it separates the fact of consciousness -from the fact, but for the other reason that the history which we -are constructing is a history of 'epochs' or of 'great periods,' and -the new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> period is new, just because it is not a period—that is -to say, something closed. Not only are we not able to describe its -chronological and geographical outline, because we are ignorant as to -what measure of time it will fill (will it develop rapidly in thirty -or forty years, or will it encounter obstacles, yet nevertheless -continue its course for centuries?), what extent of countries it -will include (will it remain for long Italian or German, confined to -certain Italian or German circles, or will it diffuse itself rapidly -in all countries, both in general culture and in public instruction?), -but we are unable to limit <i>logically</i> what may be its value outside -these considerations. The reason for this is that in order to be able -to describe its limitations, it must necessarily have developed its -antitheses—that is to say, the new problems that will infallibly arise -from its solutions, and this has not happened: we are ourselves on -the waves and we have not furled our sails in port preparatory to a -new voyage. <i>Bis hierher ist das Bewusstsein gekommen</i> (Knowledge has -reached this point in its development), said Hegel, at the end of his -lectures upon the philosophy of history; and yet he had not the right -to say so, because his development, which went from the unconsciousness -of liberty to the full consciousness of it in the German world and in -the system of absolute idealism, did not admit of prosecution. But -we are well able to say so, for we have overcome the abstractness of -Hegelianism.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_20" id="Footnote_1_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_20"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Friedrich Meinecke, <i>Weltbürgerthum und Nationalstaat: -Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates,</i> second edition, -preface, p. vii. (München u. Berlin, Oldenburg, 1911.)</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span></p></div> - -<hr class="full" /> - - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -INDEX OF NAMES<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Agnello of Ravenna, <a href="#Page_212">212</a><br /> -Alcmæon of Crete, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -Aristotle, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br /> -Asellio, <a href="#Page_186">186</a><br /> -Augustine, St, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_248">248</a>-249, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></span><br /> -Avito, <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -<br /> -Bacon, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -Balbo, C, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -Bandello, M., <a href="#Page_233">233</a><br /> -Barante, De, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a><br /> -Baronio, C, <a href="#Page_233">233</a><br /> -Bartoli, A., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>-<a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Baur, C., <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Beato Renano, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Bede, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -Benedictines, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Bernheim, E., <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br /> -Bettinelli, S., <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Biondo, F., <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -Bodin, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Bolingbroke, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>-<a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> -Bonafede, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Boscoli, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -Bossuet, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-<a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a><br /> -Bourdeau, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -Bracciolini, P., <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -Breysig, C, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a><br /> -Brucker, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Bruni, L., <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -Bruno, G., <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a><br /> -Buckle, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -Buhle, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -Burckhardt, J., <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Burke, E., <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> -<br /> -Calchi, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Campanella, T., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a><br /> -Casanova, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>-<a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> -Cellario, <a href="#Page_240">240</a><br /> -Chateaubriand, <a href="#Page_265">265</a><br /> -Châtelet, Marquise du, <a href="#Page_245">245</a><br /> -Cicero, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -Ciezkowski, A., <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Colletta, P., <a href="#Page_45">45</a><br /> -Comines, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -Comte, A., <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a><br /> -Condorcet, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Cousin, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -<br /> -Dahlmann, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Daniel, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a><br /> -Dante, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -Davidsohn, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Democritus, <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br /> -Descartes, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></span><br /> -Diodorus Siculus, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a><br /> -Diogenes of Halicarnassus, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a><br /> -Droysen, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Dubos, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -Eichhorn, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Erchempertus, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a><br /> -Erdmann, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Eusebius of Cæsarea, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -<br /> -Ferrari, G., <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -Fichte, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> -Ficker, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Fischer, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Flint, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Florus, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Fredegarius, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Frederick II of Prussia, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -Fueter, E., <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>-<a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>-<a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></span><br /> -Fustel de Coulanges, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -<br /> -Galiani, F., <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Gans, E., <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Gervinus, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Giannone, P., <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Gibbon, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Giesebrecht, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Gioacchino di Flora, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> -Gioberti, V., <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Goncourts, <a href="#Page_36">36</a><br /> -Gotti, <a href="#Page_128">128</a><br /> -Gracian, B., <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -Gregory of Tours, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>-<a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -Grote, <a href="#Page_36">36</a><br /> -Guicciardini, F., <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>-<a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></span><br /> -Guizot, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -<br /> -Hamann, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Hartmann, E., <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Hase, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Hecolampadius, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Heeren, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -Hegel, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>-<a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></span><br /> -Heimholtz, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Helvétius, <a href="#Page_267">267</a><br /> -Herbart, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Herder, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a><br /> -Herodotus, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>-<a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></span><br /> -Hesiod, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -Hirth, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Holbach, d', <a href="#Page_267">267</a><br /> -Homer, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -Hugo Falcando, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -Humboldt, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Hume, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -<br /> -Jamsilla (pseudo), <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -Jerome, St, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -<br /> -Kant, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>-<a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></span><br /> -Kluger, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Krause, <a href="#Page_282">282</a><br /> -<br /> -Labriola, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br /> -Lamprecht, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a><br /> -Lanzi, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Lassalle, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Laurent, <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> -Leibnitz, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Leo, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Lessing, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Liutprand of Cremona, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br /> -Livy, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -Locke, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -Lombroso, C, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Lorenz, O., <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a><br /> -Lotze, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Lucian, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br /> -Luther, <a href="#Page_242">242</a><br /> -<br /> -Machiavelli, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>-<a href="#Page_170">170</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>-<a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>-<a href="#Page_232">232</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br /> -Magdeburg group of reformed divines, <a href="#Page_233">233</a><br /> -Malaterra, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -Malebranche, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br /> -Manzoni, A., <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>-<a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -Marheinecke, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Marineo, L., <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -Mario Vittorino, <a href="#Page_20">20</a><br /> -Marsilio of Padua, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -Martial, <a href="#Page_231">231</a><br /> -Martin Polonus, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -Marx, K., <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a><br /> -Maurini, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Meinecke, F., <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br /> -Meo, A. De, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Meyer, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Michelet, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Mommsen, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -Montesquieu, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Möser, J., <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -Mosheim, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Müller, G., <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Müller, K. O., <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Muratori, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -<br /> -Napoli Signorelli, P., <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Navagero, A., <a href="#Page_231">231</a><br /> -Neander, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Niebuhr, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -<br /> -Ossian, <a href="#Page_305">305</a><br /> -Otto of Frisia, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -<br /> -Pais, H., <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Paolo Emilio, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -Pascal, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -Paterculus, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Patrizzi, F., <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br /> -Paulus Diaconus, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -Paulus Orosius, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Perizonius, <a href="#Page_182">182</a><br /> -Pietro da Eboli, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -Planck, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Plato, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -Plutarch, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a><br /> -Polybius, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_186">186</a>-<a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></span><br /> -Polydore Virgil, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -Pontanus, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -Popelinière, de la, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Quintilian, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a><br /> -Quintus Curtius, <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -<br /> -Ranke, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>-<a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>-<a href="#Page_301">301</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></span><br /> -Raumer, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Renan, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br /> -Riccardo da San Germano, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -Rickert, <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br /> -Ricobaldo of Ferrara, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -Robbia, L. Della, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -Robertson, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -Rollin, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Romualdo Guarna, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -Rotteck, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Rousseau, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Rumohr, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Ruskin, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -<br /> -Saba Malaspina, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -Sabellicus, M. A., <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -Sainte-Beuve, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Sainte-Palaye, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Sallust, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a><br /> -Salvemini, G., <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Sanctis, F. de, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>-<a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Sanctis, G. de, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Sarpi, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Savigny, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Schelling, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a><br /> -Schlegel, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a><br /> -Schlosser, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>-<a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -Schnaase, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Scipio, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Seneca, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -Sextus Empiricus, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -Shakespeare, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -Sigonio, C, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Simmel, <a href="#Page_70">70</a><br /> -Sismondi, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Socrates, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a><br /> -Spaventa, B., <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Spencer, <a href="#Page_312">312</a><br /> -Spinoza, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br /> -Spittler, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Strauss, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -<br /> -Tacitus, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></span><br /> -Taine, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>-<a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -Tari, A., <a href="#Page_311">311</a><br /> -Telesino, Abbot, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -Thales, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a><br /> -Thierry, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -Thomas Aquinas, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -Thucydides, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></span><br /> -Tiedemann, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -Tiraboschi, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -Tocqueville, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Tolstoi, <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br /> -Tosti, L., <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -Treitschke, <a href="#Page_266">266</a><br /> -Troya, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -Turgot, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>-<a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -<br /> -Ulrici, <a href="#Page_167">167</a><br /> -<br /> -Valla, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Vasari, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>-<a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Vega, Lope de, <a href="#Page_172">172</a><br /> -Vico, G. B., <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>-<a href="#Page_103">103</a>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_269">269</a>-<a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>-<a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-<a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></span><br /> -Villani, G., <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -Villari, P., <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -Villemain, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Voltaire, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>-<a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-<a href="#Page_263">263</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></span><br /> -Vossius, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>-<a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Wachler, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>-<a href="#Page_169">169</a><br /> -Widekind, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -Winckelmann, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>-<a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Wolf, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a><br /> -Wundt, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -<br /> -Xenophon, <a href="#Page_185">185</a><br /> -<br /> -Zeller, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Zeno, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -Zola, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -Zwingli, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -</p> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Theory & History of Historiography, by -Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORY & HISTORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY *** - -***** This file should be named 54642-h.htm or 54642-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/6/4/54642/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... 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