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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text @@ -0,0 +1,1868 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Project Trinity 1945-1946, by Carl Maag and Steve Rohrer + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Project Trinity 1945-1946 + +Author: Carl Maag and Steve Rohrer + +Posting Date: July 30, 2008 [EBook #548] +Release Date: June, 1996 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROJECT TRINITY 1945-1946 *** + + + + + + + + + + + + + +PROJECT TRINITY + +1945-1946 + + +by + +Carl Maag and Steve Rohrer + + + + +United States Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests +Nuclear Test Personnel Review + +Prepared by the Defense Nuclear Agency as Executive Agency for the +Department of Defense + +Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. +Do not return to sender. + + +PLEASE NOITIFY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, +ATTN: STTI, WASINGTON D.C. 20305, IF +YOUR ADDRESS IS INCORRECT, IF YOU WISH TO +BE DELETED FROM THE DISTRIBUTION LIST, OR +IF THE ADDRESSEE IS NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY +YOUR ORGANIZATION. + + + + + +Since declassified + + + + + +CONTENTS: + + LIST OF FIGURES + LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS + REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE + FACT SHEET + PREFACE + + +CHAPTERS: + + 1 INTRODUCTION + 1.1 Historical Background of Project TRINITY + 1.2 The Project TRINITY Site + 1.3 The Project TRINITY Organization + 1.4 Military and Civilian Participants in Project TRINITY + + 2 THE ACTIVITIES AT PROJECT TRINITY + 2.1 Preshot Activities + 2.2 Detonation and Postshot Activities + 2.3 Activities after 16 July 1945 + + 3 RADIATION PROTECTION AT PROJECT TRINITY + 3.1 Organization + 3.2 Site Monitoring Group + 3.3 Offsite Monitoring Group + + 4 DOSIMETRY ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT TRINITY + 4.1 Film Badge Records + 4.2 Gamma Radiation Exposure + + REFERENCE LIST + + + +LIST OF FIGURES + + 1-1 Location of Alamogordo Bombing Range + 1-2 TRINITY Site and Major Installations + 1-3 Tent Used as Guard Post at Project TRINITY + 1-4 Truck Used as Guard Post at Project TRINITY + 1-5 Organization of Project TRINITY + 2-1 The TRINITY Shot-tower + 2-2 The TRINITY Detonation, 0530 Hours, 16 July 1945 + 2-3 The South Shelter (Control Point) + 2-4 Inside One of the Shelters + 2-5 The Base Camp, Headquarters for Project TRINITY + 2-5 The Base Camp, Headquarters for Project TRINITY + 2-6 Project TRINITY Personnel Wearing Protective Clothing + 2-7 "JUMBO" after the TRINITY Detonation + + + +LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS + +The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this volume: + + AEC Atomic Energy Commission + DOD Department of Defense + LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory + MAUD [Committee for the] Military Application of Uranium Detonation + MED Manhattan Engineer District + R/h roentgens per hour + UTM Universal Transverse Mercator + + + +REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE + + +SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered): +UNCLASSIFIED + + 1. REPORT NUMBER: DNA 6028F + 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.: + 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER: + 4. TITLE (and Subtitle): PROJECT TRINITY 1945-1946 + 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED: Final Report + 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER: JRB 2-816-03-423-00 + 7. AUTHOR(S): Carl Maag, Steve Rorer + 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S): DNA 001-79-C-0473 + 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS: + JRB Associates + 8400 Westpark Drive + McLean, Virginia 22102 + 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS: + Subtask U99QAXMK506-08 + 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS: + Director + Defense Nuclear Agency + Washington, D.C. 20305 + 12. REPORT DATE: 15 December 1982 + 13. NUMBER OF PAGES: 76 + 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling + Office): + 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report): UNCLASSIFIED + 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE: N/A Since UNCLASSIFIED + 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report): Approved for public + release; distribution unlimited. + 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, If + different from Report): + 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: This work was sponsored by the Defense + Nuclear Agency under RDT&E RMSS Code B350079464 U99QAXMK50608 H2590D. + For sale by National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA + 22161. + + The Defense Nuclear Agency Action Officer, Lt. Col. H. L. Reese, + USAF, under whom this work was done, wishes to acknowledge the + research and editing contribution of numerous reviewers in the + military services and other organizations in addition to those writers + listed in block 7. + + 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and Identify by + block number): + TRINITY + Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory + Alamogordo Bombing Range + Manhattan Engineer District + Manhattan Project + Personnel Dosimetry + Radiation Exposure + Nuclear Weapons Testing + 20. ABSTRACT: This report describes the activities of an estimated + 1,000 personnel, both military and civilian, in Project TRINITY, which + culminated in detonation of the first nuclear device, in New Mexico in + 1945. Scientific and diagnostic experiments to evaluate the effects + of the nuclear device were the primary activities engaging military + personnel. + + + +FACT SHEET + + +Defense Nuclear Agency +Public Affairs Office +Washington, D C. 20305 + +Subject: Project TRINITY + +Project TRINITY, conducted by the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), +was designed to test and assess the effects of a nuclear weapon. The +TRINITY nuclear device was detonated on a 100-foot tower on the +Alamogordo Bombing Range in south-central New Mexico at 0530 hours on +16 July 1945. The nuclear yield of the detonation was equivalent to +the energy released by detonating 19 kilotons of TNT. At shot-time, +the temperature was 21.8 degrees Celsius, and surface air pressure was +850 millibars. The winds were nearly calm at the surface; at 10,300 +feet above mean sea level, they were from the southwest at 10 knots. +The winds blew the cloud resulting from the detonation to the +northeast. From 16 July 1945 through 1946, about 1,000 military and +civilian personnel took part in Project TRINITY or visited the test +site. The location of the test site and its major installations are +shown in the accompanying figures. + + +Military and Scientific Activities + +All participants in Project TRINITY, both military and civilian, were +under the authority of the MED. No military exercises were conducted. +The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), which was staffed and +administered by the University of California (under contract to the +MED), conducted diagnostic experiments. Civilian and military +scientists and technicians, with assistance from other military +personnel, placed gauges, detectors, and other instruments around +ground zero before the detonation. Four offsite monitoring posts were +established in the towns of Nogal, Roswell, Socorro, and Fort Sumner, +New Mexico. An evacuation detachment consisting of 144 to 160 +enlisted men and officers was established in case protective measures +or evacuation of civilians living offsite became necessary. At least +94 of these personnel were from the Provisional Detachment Number 1, +Company "B," of the 9812th Technical Service Unit, Army Corps of +Engineers. Military police cleared the test area and recorded the +locations of all personnel before the detonation. + +A radiological monitor was assigned to each of the three shelters, +which were located to the north, west, and south of ground zero. Soon +after the detonation, the monitors surveyed the area immediately +around the shelters and then proceeded out the access road to its +intersection with the main road, Broadway. Personnel not essential to +postshot activities were transferred from the west and south shelters +to the Base Camp, about 16 kilometers southwest of ground zero. +Personnel at the north shelter were evacuated when a sudden rise in +radiation levels was detected; it was later learned that the +instrument had not been accurately calibrated and levels had not +increased as much as the instrument indicated. Specially designated +groups conducted onsite and offsite radiological surveys. + + +Safety Standards and Procedures + +The safety criteria established for Project TRINITY were based on +calculations of the anticipated dangers from blast pressure, thermal +radiation, and ionizing radiation. The TR-7 Group, also known as the +Medical Group, was responsible for radiological safety. A limit of 5 +roentgens of exposure during a two-month period was established. + +The Site and Offsite Monitoring Groups were both part of the Medical +Group. The Site Monitoring Group was responsible for equipping +personnel with protective clothing and instruments to measure +radiation exposure, monitoring and recording personnel exposure +according to film badge readings and time spent in the test area, and +providing for personnel decontamination. The Offsite Monitoring Group +surveyed areas surrounding the test site for radioactive fallout. In +addition to these two monitoring groups, a small group of medical +technicians provided radiation detection instruments and monitoring. + + +Radiation Exposures at Project TRINITY + +Dosimetry information is available for about 815 individuals who +either participated in Project TRINITY activities or visited the test +site between 16 July 1945 and 1 January 1947. The listing does not +indicate the precise military or unit affiliation of all personnel. +Less than six percent of the Project TRINITY participants received +exposures greater than 2 roentgens. Twenty-three of these +individuals received exposures greater than 2 but less than 4 +roentgens; another 22 individuals received between 4 and 15 roentgens. + + + +PREFACE + + +From 1945 to 1962, the U.S. Government, through the Manhattan Engineer +District (MED) and its successor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission +(AEC), conducted 235 tests of nuclear devices at sites in the United +States and in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In all, an estimated +220,000 Department of Defense (DOD)* participants, both military and +civilian, were present at the tests. Project TRINITY, the war-time +effort to test-fire a nuclear explosive device, was the first +atmospheric nuclear weapons test. + + * The MED, which was part of the Army Corps of Engineers, administered + the U.S. nuclear testing program until the AEC came into existence in + 1946. Before DOD was established in 1947, the Army Corps of Engineers + was under the War Department. + +In 1977, 15 years after the last above-ground nuclear weapons test, +the Centers for Disease Control** noted a possible leukemia cluster +among a small group of soldiers present at Shot SMOKY, a test of +Operation PLUMBBOB, the series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests +conducted in 1957. Since that initial report by the Centers for +Disease Control, the Veterans Administration has received a number of +claims for medical benefits from former military personnel who believe +their health may have been affected by their participation in the +weapons testing program. + + ** The Centers for Disease Control are part of the U.S. Department of + Health and Human Services (formerly the U.S. Department of Health, + Education, and Welfare). + +In late 1977, DOD began a study to provide data to both the Centers +for Disease Control and the Veterans Administration on potential +exposures to ionizing radiation among the military and civilian +participants in atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. DOD organized an +effort to: + +o Identify DOD personnel who had taken part in the atmospheric nuclear +weapons tests + +o Determine the extent of the participants' exposure to ionizing +radiation + +o Provide public disclosure of information concerning participation by +military personnel in Project TRINITY. + + +METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THIS VOLUME + +This report on Project TRINITY is based on historical and technical +documents associated with the detonation of the first nuclear device +on 16 July 1945. The Department of Defense compiled information for +this volume from documents that record the scientific activities +during Project TRINITY. These records, most of which were developed +by participants in TRINITY, are kept in several document repositories +throughout the United States. + +In compiling information for this report, historians, health +physicists, radiation specialists, and information analysts canvassed +document repositories known to contain materials on atmospheric +nuclear weapons tests conducted in the southwestern United States. +These repositories included armed services libraries, Government +agency archives and libraries, Federal repositories, and libraries of +scientific and technical laboratories. Researchers examined +classified and unclassified documents containing information on the +participation of personnel from the MED, which supervised Project +TRINITY, and from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), which +developed the TRINITY device. After this initial effort, researchers +recorded relevant information concerning the activities of MED and +LASL personnel and catalogued the data sources. Many of the documents +pertaining specifically to MED and LASL participation were found in +the Defense Nuclear Agency Technical Library and the LASL Records +Center. + +Information on the fallout pattern, meteorological conditions, and +nuclear cloud dimensions is taken from Volume 1 of the General +Electric Company-TEMPO's "Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test +Detonations 1945-1962, Extracted from DASA 1251," unless more specific +information is available elsewhere. + + +ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME + +The following chapters detail MED and LASL participation in Project +TRINITY. Chapter 1 provides background information, including a +description of the TRINITY test site. Chapter 2 describes the +activities of MED and LASL participants before, during, and after the +detonation. Chapter 3 discusses the radiological safety criteria and +procedures in effect for Project TRINITY, and chapter 4 presents the +results of the radiation monitoring program, including information on +film badge readings for participants in the project. + +The information in this report is supplemented by the Reference +Manual: Background Materials for the CONUS Volumes." The manual +summarizes information on radiation physics, radiation health +concepts, exposure criteria, and measurement techniques. It also +lists acronyms and includes a glossary of terms used in the DOD +reports addressing test events in the continental United States. + + + + + +CHAPTER 1 + +INTRODUCTION + + +Project TRINITY was the name given to the war-time effort to produce +the first nuclear detonation. A plutonium-fueled implosion device was +detonated on 16 July 1945 at the Alamogordo Bombing Range in +south-central New Mexico. + +Three weeks later, on 6 August, the first uranium-fueled nuclear bomb, +a gun-type weapon code-named LITTLE BOY, was detonated over the +Japanese city of Hiroshima. On 9 August, the FAT MAN nuclear bomb, a +plutonium-fueled implosion weapon identical to the TRINITY device, was +detonated over another Japanese city, Nagasaki. Two days later, the +Japanese Government informed the United States of its decision to end +the war. On 2 September 1945, the Japanese Empire officially +surrendered to the Allied Governments, bringing World War II to an +end. + +In the years devoted to the development and construction of a nuclear +weapon, scientists and technicians expanded their knowledge of nuclear +fission and developed both the gun-type and the implosion mechanisms +to release the energy of a nuclear chain reaction. Their knowledge, +however, was only theoretical. They could be certain neither of the +extent and effects of such a nuclear chain reaction, nor of the +hazards of the resulting blast and radiation. Protective measures +could be based only on estimates and calculations. Furthermore, +scientists were reasonably confident that the gun-type uranium-fueled +device could be successfully detonated, but they did not know if the +more complex firing technology required in an implosion device would +work. Successful detonation of the TRINITY device showed that +implosion would work, that a nuclear chain reaction would result in a +powerful detonation, and that effective means exist to guard against +the blast and radiation produced. + + +1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PROJECT TRINITY + +The development of a nuclear weapon was a low priority for the United +States before the outbreak of World War II. However, scientists +exiled from Germany had expressed concern that the Germans were +developing a nuclear weapon. Confirming these fears, in 1939 the +Germans stopped all sales of uranium ore from the mines of occupied +Czechoslovakia. In a letter sponsored by group of concerned +scientists, Albert Einstein informed President Roosevelt that German +experiments had shown that an induced nuclear chain reaction was +possible and could be used to construct extremely powerful bombs (7; +12)*. + + * All sources cited in the text are listed alphabetically in the + reference list at the end of this volume. The number given in the + text corresponds to the number of the source document in the reference + list. + +In response to the potential threat of a German nuclear weapon, the +United States sought a source of uranium to use in determining the +feasibility of a nuclear chain reaction. After Germany occupied +Belgium in May 1940, the Belgians turned over uranium ore from their +holdings in the Belgian Congo to the United States. Then, in March +1941, the element plutonium was isolated, and the plutonium-239 +isotope was found to fission as readily as the scarce uranium isotope, +uranium-235. The plutonium, produced in a uranium-fueled nuclear +reactor, provided the United States with an additional source of +material for nuclear weapons (7; 12). + +In the summer of 1941, the British Government published a report +written by the Committee for Military Application of Uranium +Detonation (MAUD). This report stated that a nuclear weapon was +possible and concluded that its construction should begin immediately. +The MAUD report, and to a lesser degree the discovery of plutonium, +encouraged American leaders to think more seriously about developing a +nuclear weapon. On 6 December 1941, President Roosevelt appointed the +S-1 Committee to determine if the United States could construct a +nuclear weapon. Six months later, the S-1 Committee gave the +President its report, recommending a fast-paced program that would +cost up to $100 million and that might produce the weapon by July 1944 +(12). + +The President accepted the S-1 Committee's recommendations. The +effort to construct the weapon was turned over to the War Department, +which assigned the task to the Army Corps of Engineers. In September +1942, the Corps of Engineers established the Manhattan Engineer +District to oversee the development of a nuclear weapon. This effort +was code-named the "Manhattan Project" (12). + +Within the next two years, the MED built laboratories and production +plants throughout the United States. The three principal centers of +the Manhattan Project were the Hanford, Washington, Plutonium +Production Plant; the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, U-235 Production Plant; +and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in northern New Mexico. At +LASL, Manhattan Project scientists and technicians, directed by Dr. J. +Robert Oppenheimer,* investigated the theoretical problems that had to +be solved before a nuclear weapon could be developed (12). + + * This report identifies by name only those LASL and MED personnel who + are well-known historical figures. + +During the first two years of the Manhattan Project, work proceeded at +a slow but steady pace. Significant technical problems had to be +solved, and difficulties in the production of plutonium, particularly +the inability to process large amounts, often frustrated the +scientists. Nonetheless, by 1944 sufficient progress had been made to +persuade the scientists that their efforts might succeed. A test of +the plutonium implosion device was necessary to determine if it would +work and what its effects would be. In addition, the scientists were +concerned about the possible effects if the conventional explosives in +a nuclear device, particularly the more complex implosion-type device, +failed to trigger the nuclear reaction when detonated over enemy +territory. Not only would the psychological impact of the weapon be +lost, but the enemy might recover large amounts of fissionable +material. + +In March 1944, planning began to test-fire a plutonium-fueled +implosion device. At LASL, an organization designated the X-2 Group +was formed within the Explosives Division. Its duties were "to make +preparations for a field test in which blast, earth shock, neutron and +gamma radiation would be studied and complete photographic records +made of the explosion and any atmospheric phenomena connected with the +explosion" (13). Dr. Oppenheimer chose the name TRINITY for the +project in September 1944 (12). + + +1.2 THE PROJECT TRINITY SITE + +The TRINITY site was chosen by Manhattan Project scientists after +thorough study of eight different sites. The site selected was an +area measuring 29 by 39 kilometers* in the northwest corner of the +Alamogordo Bombing Range. The Alamogordo Bombing Range was located in +a desert in south-central New Mexico called the Jornada del Muerto +("Journey of Death"). Figure 1-1 shows the location of the bombing +range. The site was chosen for its remote location and good weather +and because it was already owned by the Government. MED obtained +permission to use the site from the Commanding General of the Second +Air Force (Army Air Forces) on 7 September 1944 (12). Figure 1-2 +shows the TRINITY site with its major installations. + + * Throughout this report, surface distances are given in metric units. + The metric conversion factors include: 1 meter = 3.28 feet; 1 meter = + 1.09 yards; and 1 kilometer = 0.62 miles. Vertical distances are + given in feet; altitudes are measured from mean sea level, while + heights are measured from surface level, unless otherwise noted. + +Ground zero for the TRINITY detonation was at UTM coordinates +630266.** Three shelters, located approximately 9,150 meters (10,000 +yards) north, west, and south of ground zero, were built for the +protection of test personnel and instruments. The shelters had walls +of reinforced concrete and were buried under a few feet of earth. The +south shelter was the Control Point for the test (12). The Base Camp, +which was the headquarters for Project TRINITY, was located +approximately 16 kilometers southwest of ground zero. The principal +buildings of the abandoned McDonald Ranch, where the active parts of +the TRINITY device were assembled, stood 3,660 meters southeast of +ground zero. Seven guard posts, which were simply small tents or +parked trucks like the ones shown in figures 1-3 and 1-4, dotted the +test site (9). + + ** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates are used in this + report. The first three digits refer to a point on an east- west + axis, and the second three digits refer to a point on a north-south + axis. The point so designated is the southwest corner of an area 100 + meters square. + + +1.3 THE PROJECT TRINITY ORGANIZATION + +The organization that planned and conducted Project TRINITY grew out +of the X-2 Group. LASL, though administered by the University of +California, was part of the Manhattan Project, supervised by the Army +Corps of Engineers Manhattan Engineer District. The chief of MED was +Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves of the Army Corps of Engineers. Major General +Groves reported to both the Chief of Engineers and the Army Chief of +Staff. The Army Chief of Staff reported to the Secretary of War, a +Cabinet officer directly responsible to the President. Figure 1-5 +outlines the organization of Project TRINITY. + +The director of the Project TRINITY organization was Dr. Kenneth +Bainbridge. Dr. Bainbridge reported to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the +director of LASL. A team of nine research consultants advised Dr. +Bainbridge on scientific and technical matters (3). + +The Project TRINITY organization was divided into the following +groups (3): + +o The TRINITY Assembly Group, responsible for assembling and arming +the nuclear device + +o The TR-1 (Services) Group, responsible for construction, utilities, +procurement, transportation, and communications + +o The TR-2 Group, responsible for air-blast and earth-shock measurements + +o The TR-3 (Physics) Group, responsible for experiments concerning +measurements of ionizing radiation + +o The TR-4 Group, responsible for meteorology + +o The TR-5 Group, responsible for spectrographic and photographic +measurements + +o The TR-6 Group, responsible for the airblast-airborne condenser +gauges + +o The TR-7 (Medical) Group, responsible for the radiological safety +and general health of the Project TRINITY participants. + +Each of these groups was divided into several units. Individuals were +also assigned special tasks outside their groups, such as +communications and tracking the TRINITY cloud with a searchlight (3). + + +1.4 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT TRINITY + +From March 1944 until the beginning of 1946, several thousand people +participated in Project TRINITY. These included not only the LASL +scientists, but also scientists, technicians, and workmen employed at +MED installations throughout the United States. According to entrance +logs, film badge data, and other records, about 1,000 people either +worked at or visited the TRINITY site from 16 July 1945 through 1946 +(1; 3; 8; 15; 16). + +Although supervised by Major General Groves and the Army Corps of +Engineers, many Manhattan Project personnel were civilians. Military +personnel were assigned principally to support services, such as +security and logistics, although soldiers with special skills worked +with the civilians (7; 12). Most of the military personnel were part +of the Army Corps of Engineers, although Navy and other Army personnel +were also assigned to the project (4; 12). + + + +CHAPTER 2 + +THE ACTIVITIES AT PROJECT TRINITY + + +The TRINITY nuclear device was detonated on a 100-foot tower (shown in +figure 2-1) at UTM coordinates 630266 on the Alamogordo Bombing Range, +New Mexico, at 0530 Mountain War Time, on 16 July 1945. The +detonation had a yield of 19 kilotons and left an impression 2.9 +meters deep and 335 meters wide. The cloud resulting from the +detonation rose to an altitude of 35,000 feet (5). The TRINITY +detonation is shown in figure 2-2. + +At shot-time, the temperature was 21.8 degrees Celsius, and the +surface air pressure was 850 millibars. Winds at shot-time were +nearly calm at the surface but attained a speed of 10 knots from the +southwest at 10,300 feet. At 34,600 feet, the wind speed was 23 knots +from the southwest. The winds blew the cloud to the northeast (5). + + +2.1 PRESHOT ACTIVITIES + +Construction of test site facilities on the Alamogordo Bombing Range +began in December 1944. The first contingent of personnel, 12 +military policemen, arrived just before Christmas. The number of +personnel at the test site gradually increased until the peak level of +about 325 was reached the week before the detonation (2; 12). + +On 7 May 1945 at 0437 hours, 200 LASL scientists and technicians +exploded 100 tons of conventional high explosives at the test site. +The explosives were stacked on top of a 20-foot tower and contained +tubes of radioactive solution to simulate, at a low level of activity, +the radioactive products expected from a nuclear explosion. The test +produced a bright sphere which spread out in an oval form. A column +of smoke and debris rose as high as 15,000 feet before drifting +eastward. The explosion left a shallow crater 1.5 meters deep and 9 +meters wide. Monitoring in the area revealed a level of radioactivity +low enough to allow workers to spend several hours in the area (3; +12). + +The planned firing date for the TRINITY device was 4 July 1945. On 14 +June 1945, Dr. Oppenheimer changed the test date to no earlier than 13 +July and no later than 23 July. On 30 June, the earliest firing date +was moved to 16 July, even though better weather was forecast for 18 +and 19 July. Because the Allied conference in Potsdam, Germany, was +about to begin and the President needed the results of the test as +soon as possible, the TRINITY test organization adjusted its schedules +accordingly and set shot-time at 0400 hours on 16 July (3; 12; 14). + +The final preparations for the detonation started at 2200 on 15 July. +To prevent unnecessary danger, all personnel not essential to the +firing activities were ordered to leave the test site. During the +night of 15 July, these people left for viewing positions on Compania +Hill,* 32 kilometers northwest of ground zero. They were joined by +several spectators from LASL (3; 12). + + * "Compania" also appears as "Compana," "Campagne," or "Compagna" in + various sources. + +Project personnel not required to check instruments within the ground +zero area stationed themselves in the three shelters or at other +assigned locations. The military police at Guard Posts 1, 2, and 4 +blocked off all roads leading into the test site, and the men at Guard +Post 8, the only access to the ground zero area from the Base Camp, +ensured that no unauthorized individuals entered the area (9; 12). + +At 0100 hours on 16 July, military policemen from Guard Posts 3, 5, 6, +and 7 met to compare their logs of personnel authorized to be in the +ground zero area. The guards then traveled along the access roads to +clear out all project personnel. As individuals left for their +assigned shelters or stations, their departures from the test area +were recorded in the military police logs. By 0200 the area sweep was +completed, and the military police went to their shelters and +stations. A final check of personnel was made in each shelter (3; 9; +12). + +At the time of detonation, 99 project personnel were in the three +shelters: 29 in the north shelter, 37 in the west shelter, and 33 in +the south shelter. Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Bainbridge, and other key +personnel awaited the firing at the south shelter, which served as the +Control Point. Figure 2-3 shows the exterior of the south shelter; +figure 2-4 gives an interior view of one of the shelters, most likely +the south. Although most of the shelter occupants were civilians, at +least 23 military participants were spread among the three shelters +(1; 12). + +The remainder of the test site personnel were positioned at the Base +Camp 16 kilometers south-southwest of ground zero, or on Compania +Hill, or at the guard posts. Important Government officials, such as +General Groves and Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the U.S. Office of +Scientific Research and Development, viewed the detonation from a +trench at the Base Camp. The Base Camp is depicted in figure 2-5. + +The military police of Guard Posts 1 and 2 were instructed to be in +foxholes approximately five kilometers west and north, respectively, +from their posts. The military police of Guard Posts 3 and 4 were +instructed to be in foxholes south of Mockingbird Gap. A radiological +safety monitor was assigned to the group from Guard Post 4. Guard Post +5 personnel were to be in the south shelter, Guard Post 6 personnel in +the west shelter, and Guard Post 7 personnel in the north shelter. +The military police of Guard Post 8 remained at that post, 400 meters +east of the Base Camp (9). + +An evacuation detachment of between 144 and 160 officers and enlisted +men was stationed near Guard Post 2, about 14 kilometers northwest of +ground zero. These men were on standby in case ranches and towns +beyond the test site had to be evacuated. Five radiological safety +monitors were assigned to this detachment. Ninety-four men of the +evacuation detachment belonged to Provisional Detachment Number 1, +Company "B," of the 9812th Technical Service Unit, Army Corps of +Engineers, from LASL. The identity of the remaining evacuation +personnel has not been documented (3; 4; 8; 10; 15). + +With the exception of the shelter occupants (99 personnel) and +evacuation detachment (between 144 and 160 men), the number of +personnel at the test site at the time of detonation has not been +documented. Film badge records show that approximately 355 people +were at the test site at some time during 16 July. The shelter +occupants and 44 men of the evacuation detachment are on this list. +It has not been possible to pinpoint the location of many of the +remaining personnel. Some were at the Base Camp or on Compania Hill. +Since many of these people returned to the test site after shot-time +to work on experiments, their film badges registered exposures from +residual radioactivity on 16 July. Based on the documented personnel +totals, at least the following 263 individuals were at the test site +when the device was detonated (1; 4; 8-10; 13; 15): + +o 99 shelter occupants at shelters 9,150 meters north, south, and west +of ground zero + +o 144 to 160 officers and enlisted men of the evacuation detachment, +located 14 kilometers northwest of ground zero near Guard Post 2 + +o Five radiological safety monitors assigned to the evacuation +detachment to perform offsite monitoring of nearby towns and +residences + +o One radiological safety monitor assigned to Guard Post 4 + +o Two military policemen at each of the seven guard posts (indicated +by photographs such as figures 1-3 and 1-4). + + +2.2 DETONATION AND POSTSHOT ACTIVITIES + +Because of bad weather, the Project TRINITY director (Dr. Bainbridge) +delayed the detonation, which had been scheduled for 0400 hours. By +0445, however, the forecast was better, and shot-time was set for +0530. This gave the scientists 45 minutes to arm the device and +prepare the instruments in the shelters. The final countdown began at +0510, and the device was detonated at 0529:45 Mountain War Time from +the Control Point in the south shelter (3; 12). + +No one was closer than 9,150 meters to ground zero at the time of the +detonation. With the exception of a few men holding the ropes of +barrage balloons or guiding cameras to follow the fireball as it +ascended, all shelter personnel were in or behind the shelters. Some +left the shelters after the initial flash to view the fireball. As a +precautionary measure, they had been advised to lie on the ground +before the blast wave arrived. Project personnel located beyond the +shelters, such as at the Base Camp and on Compania Hill, were also +instructed to lie on the ground or in a depression until the blast +wave had passed (1). However, the blast wave at these locations was +not as strong as had been expected. + +In order to prevent eye damage, Dr. Bainbridge ordered the +distribution of welder's filter glass. Because it was not known +exactly how the flash might affect eyesight, it was suggested that +direct viewing of the fireball not be attempted even with this +protection. The recommended procedure was to face away from ground +zero and watch the hills or sky until the fireball illuminated the +area. Then, after the initial flash had passed, one could turn around +and view the fireball through the filter glass. Despite these +well-publicized instructions, two participants did not take +precautions. They were temporarily blinded by the intense flash but +experienced no permanent vision impairment (1; 17). + +People as far away as Santa Fe and El Paso saw the brilliant light of +the detonation. Windows rattled in the areas immediately surrounding +the test site, waking sleeping ranchers and townspeople. To dispel +any rumors that might compromise the security of Project TRINITY, the +Government announced that an Army munitions dump had exploded. +However, immediately after the destruction of Hiroshima, the +Government revealed to the public what had actually occurred in the +New Mexico desert (12; 13). + +Immediately after the shot, Medical Group personnel began the +radiological monitoring activities described in section 3.1.2. At +0815, when most of the monitoring activities were completed, +preparations began for entrance into the ground zero area. To +regulate entry into the area, a "Going-in Board" was established, +consisting of Dr. Bainbridge, the Chief of the Medical Group, and a +special scientific consultant. Its purpose was to determine whether a +party had a valid reason for entering the ground zero area. The board +functioned for three days. + +Military police at Guard Post 4 and at three roadblocks set up along +Broadway controlled entry into the area. Guard Posts 3, 5, 6, and 7 +were within 3,000 meters of ground zero and thus remained unmanned. +At the south shelter, the Medical Group set up a "going-in" station +where personnel were required to stop to put on protective clothing +(coveralls, booties, caps, and cotton gloves) and pick up monitoring +equipment before entering the ground zero area. Since it was not +known how much radioactive material might be suspended in the air, all +personnel entering the ground zero area wore complete protective +covering and respirators for the first three days after the +detonation. Figure 2-6 shows two Project TRINITY personnel wearing +protective clothing (1). + +On the day of the shot, five parties entered the ground zero area. +One party consisted of eight members of the earth-sampling group. +They obtained samples by driving to within 460 meters of ground zero +in a tank specially fitted with rockets to which retrievable +collectors were fastened in order to gather soil samples from a +distance. This group made several sampling excursions on 16 and 17 +July. The tank carried two personnel (a driver and a passenger) each +trip. No member of this party received a radiation exposure of more +than 1 roentgen (1). + +Five other men from the earth-sampling group entered the ground zero +area in a second tank, lined with lead for radiation protection. The +tank, carrying the driver and one passenger, made five trips into the +ground zero area to retrieve soil samples on 16 and 17 July. On two +trips, the tank passed over ground zero; on the others, it approached +to within about 90 meters of ground zero. The men scooped up soil +samples through a trap door in the bottom of the tank. One driver who +made three trips into the ground zero area received the highest +exposure, 15 roentgens (1). + +This lead-lined tank was also used by ten men to observe the radiation +area. These men, traveling two at a time, made five trips into the +area on shot-day but never approached closer than 1,370 meters to +ground zero. The highest exposure among these ten men was 0.3 +roentgens (1). + +The next party to approach ground zero consisted of a photographer and +a radiological safety monitor. Wearing protective clothing and +respirators, the two men were about 730 meters northwest of ground +zero photographing "JUMBO" from 1100 to 1200 hours. "JUMBO," shown in +figure 2-7, was a massive container built to contain the +high-explosive detonation of the TRINITY device and to allow recovery +of the fissionable material if the device failed to produce a nuclear +detonation. The plan to use "JUMBO," however, was abandoned when the +scientists concluded that a fairly large nuclear explosion was +certain. The container remained on the ground near the shot-tower +during the detonation. Both the photographer and the monitor received +an estimated radiation exposure between 0.5 and 1 roentgen (1; 7). + +The last party to "go in" on shot-day consisted of six men retrieving +neutron detectors. They entered the test area at 1430 hours. Three +of the men went to a point 730 meters south of ground zero to pull out +cables carrying neutron detectors located 550 meters south of ground +zero. The group wore protective clothing and respirators and spent +about 30 minutes in the area. The remaining three men drove as close +as 320 meters southwest of ground zero to retrieve neutron detectors. +They got out of their vehicle only once, at about 460 meters from +ground zero, and spent a total of about ten minutes making this trip +through the area. Each man's radiation exposure measured less than 1 +roentgen (1). + +Most of the soldiers of the evacuation detachment remained in their +bivouac area near Guard Post 2. According to a report written by the +detachment commander, a reinforced platoon was sent to the town of +Bingham, about 29 kilometers northeast of the test site, while offsite +radiological safety monitors surveyed the area. The evacuation +detachment was dismissed at 1300 hours on shot-day when it became +evident from offsite monitoring that evacuations would not be +undertaken. The detachment returned to LASL at 0400 on 17 July (15). + +Two B-29 aircraft from Kirtland Field, Albuquerque, New Mexico, +participated in post-shot events. Their planned mission was to pass +over the test area shortly before the explosion to simulate a bomb +drop. After the TRINITY device had been detonated, the aircraft would +circle near ground zero, while the men onboard would measure the +atmospheric effects of the nuclear explosion. This would enable them +to determine whether a delivery aircraft would be endangered. +However, because of bad weather on shot-day, Dr. Oppenheimer canceled +the aircraft's flight in the ground zero area. Instead, the two +B-29s, each with 12 men onboard, flew along the perimeter of the +bombing range and observed the shot from a distance of 19 to 29 +kilometers. Among those observers was a Navy captain who was also the +MED Chief of Ordnance (6; 12; 13). + + +2.3 ACTIVITIES AFTER 16 JULY 1945 + +On 17, 18, and 19 July, all personnel and visitors had to receive +permission to approach ground zero from the "Going-in Board." On +these three days, 21 groups were authorized to go beyond the Broadway +roadblocks. Most of those who sought this authorization were +scientists and military support personnel whose job required that they +work near ground zero. Except for a group of two military men and +three civilians who went to ground zero on 16 and 17 July and a group +of two civilians who approached as close as 90 meters on 18 July, the +reentry personnel came no closer than 180 meters to ground zero. Of +these personnel, the individual who received the highest exposure +during the three days was an Army sergeant who received 15 roentgens. +During the same period, two civilians received 10 roentgens and 7.5 +roentgens, respectively. All other personnel received exposures of 5 +roentgens or less (1; 3). + +After the "Going-In Board" was disbanded on 19 July, permission to +enter the ground zero area had to be obtained from Dr. Bainbridge or +one of his deputies. Many scientists entered the ground zero area +after 19 July to retrieve instruments or to perform experiments. The +population of the TRINITY test site was diminishing, however, as the +emphasis shifted to preparing the devices that were to be dropped on +Japan (1). + +On 23 July, a week after the shot, chain barricades with prominent +signs warning against trespassing were placed 910 meters north, south, +and west of ground zero. These barricades were supplemented with two +concentric circles of red flags 1,830 and 2,740 meters from ground +zero. Except during bad weather, the entire ground zero area was +visible from the roadblocks. No unauthorized person was ever detected +entering the ground zero area (1). + +On 10 August, the Broadway roadblocks were removed, and mounted +military policemen began patrolling around ground zero at a distance +of 730 meters. Each guard was assigned to a daily six-hour shift for +a period of two weeks; in the third week, the guard was assigned tasks +away from the ground zero area. The mounted guards and their horses +wore film badges. No exposure greater than 0.1 roentgen was +registered. On 1 September, the mounted patrol moved to a distance of +460 meters from ground zero, just outside a fence installed a week +earlier to seal off the area. The same rotating patrol schedule was +used. The guards' film badge readings showed an average daily +exposure of 0.02 roentgens. The mounted patrol at the fence continued +until early 1947 (1). + +Between 20 July 1945 and 21 November 1945, 67 groups entered the +ground zero area. Most of these parties entered in the month after +shot-day. These were the scientists and technicians conducting +experiments or retrieving data. By the beginning of September, most +of those who entered the ground zero area were invited guests (1). + +Also during the period 20 July through 21 November, at least 71 +soldiers were at the TRINITY test site. Twenty-five of these men were +support personnel who never went within 460 meters of ground zero. +The remaining 46 men were technical personnel, laborers who erected +the 460-meter fence, or military policemen who served as guides. +Eleven of these men, probably members of the fence detail, spent +several days at about 460 meters from ground zero. Working three to +five hours per day between 9 August and 25 August, they would have +been the only group to stay longer than one hour in the ground zero +area. Of the remaining personnel who approached within 460 meters +from ground zero, 25 spent 15 minutes and ten spent between 30 minutes +and one hour in the ground zero area. Only 11 people received +exposures of 3 to 5 roentgens between 20 July and 21 November. Most +received less than 1 roentgen. After 21 November 1945, no one +approached closer than the fence which was 460 meters from ground +zero, although about 200 civilian and military personnel worked at or +visited the TRINITY site through 1946 (1; 16). + +According to dosimetry data, entrance logs, and other records, about +1,000 individuals were at the test site at some time between 16 July +1945 and the end of 1946. This number includes not only the +scientists, technicians, and military personnel who were part of +Project TRINITY but also many visitors. Some of the scientists took +their wives and children on a tour of the area near ground zero, +particularly to view the green glass called "trinitite," which covered +the crater floor. Trinitite was the product of the detonation's +extreme beat, which melted and mixed desert sand, tower steel, and +other debris (1; 8; 9; 16). + + + +CHAPTER 3 + +RADIATION PROTECTION AT PROJECT TRINITY + + +The TR-7 or Medical Group, shown in the figure 1-5 organizational +chart, was responsible for radiological safety at Project TRINITY. +Many of the physicians and scientists in the Medical Group had worked +with radioactive materials before and were trained in radiological +safety procedures. The Chief of the Medical Group supervised the +radiological safety operations and reported to the TRINITY director. +In addition to providing medical care to TRINITY personnel, this group +established radiological safety programs to: + +o Minimize radiation exposure of personnel on the test site and in +offsite areas + +o Provide monitors to conduct radiological surveys onsite and offsite + +o Provide and maintain radiation detection instruments + +o Provide protective clothing and equipment. + +An exposure limit of 5 roentgens during a two-month period was +established. Personnel were provided with radiation detection +instruments to determine their exposures (1). + + +3.1 ORGANIZATION + +The Medical Group consisted of physicians, scientists, and +administrators, as well as radiological monitors. Many of these +personnel were nonmilitary, but all worked on the Manhattan Project +under the administration of the Army Corps of Engineers Manhattan +Engineer District. + +The Medical Group was divided into two monitoring groups, the Site +Monitoring Group, which was responsible for onsite monitoring, and the +Offsite Monitoring Group. Each reported to the Chief of the Medical +Group, and each communicated with the other during the monitoring +activities. In addition to these two groups, a small group of medical +technicians provided radiation detection instruments to Medical Group +personnel (1; 10). + + +3.2 SITE MONITORING GROUP + +The Site Monitoring Group consisted of a chief monitor, three other +monitors, and several medical doctors. This group had the following +functions (1; 10): + +o Conduct ground surveys of the test area and mark areas of +radioactivity + +o Conduct surveys of the Base Camp and roads leading into the test +area + +o Provide protective clothing and equipment, including film badges and +pocket dosimeters, to personnel + +o Monitor all personnel for radioactive contamination and provide for +their decontamination + +o Maintain a record of radiation exposures received by personnel. + +The Site Monitoring Group monitored the radiation exposures of +personnel in the test area. The time spent by personnel in radiation +areas was limited, and radiation detection instruments were provided +to permit continuous monitoring of exposure rates. In many cases, a +monitor from the Site Monitoring Group accompanied project personnel +into the test area to monitor exposure rates (1; 10). + +Two members of the Site Monitoring Group, a monitor and a physician +with radiological safety training, were assigned to each shelter. The +supervising monitor was stationed at the Base Camp and was in radio +and telephone communication with all three shelters and the offsite +ground and aerial survey teams. Before any personnel were allowed to +leave the shelter areas, a radiological safety monitor and a military +policeman from each shelter advanced along the roads to Broadway to +check radiation levels. They wore respirators to prevent them from +inhaling radioactive material (1; 10). + +Since it was expected that any dust from the cloud would fall on one +of the shelter areas within 30 minutes of the shot, plans had been +made to evacuate personnel as soon as the monitors completed their +initial survey. Because the cloud moved to the northeast, the south +shelter (the Control Point) was not completely evacuated, although +nonessential personnel were sent to the Base Camp. The west shelter +was emptied of all personnel except a searchlight crew spotlighting +the cloud as it moved away (1; 10). + +Only at the north shelter did an emergency evacuation occur. About 12 +minutes after the shot, a detection instrument indicated a rapid rise +in the radiation levels within the shelter. At the same time, a +remote ionization monitoring device detected a rapid increase in +radiation. Because of these two readings, all north shelter personnel +were immediately evacuated to the Base Camp, 25 kilometers to the +south. Film badges worn by personnel stationed at the north shelter, +however, showed no radiation exposure above the detectable level. It +was later discovered that the meter of the detector in the north +shelter had not retained its zero calibration setting, and radiation +at the north shelter had not reached levels high enough to result in +measurable exposures of the personnel who had been positioned there. +However, fallout activity was later detected in the north shelter +area, proof that part of the cloud did head in that direction. This +also explains why the monitoring device detected rising radiation +levels (1; 12). + +After ascertaining that radiation levels along the roads leading from +the shelters to Broadway were within acceptable limits, the +radiological safety monitors and military police established +roadblocks at important intersections leading to ground zero. The +north shelter monitor and military police set up a post where the +North Shelter Road ran into Broadway. The west shelter monitor and a +military policeman blocked Vatican Road where it intersected Broadway. +The south shelter monitor and military police set up a roadblock where +Broadway intersected Pennsylvania Avenue (1). + +The monitor assigned to Guard Post 4 surveyed the Mockingbird Gap area +to ensure that it was safe for the guards to return to their post. +This position controlled access to the McDonald Ranch Road, which led +directly to ground zero (1). + +At 0540 hours, the chief monitor departed from the Base Camp with a +military policeman to monitor the entire length of Broadway. They +first checked the roadblock at Pennsylvania Avenue and Broadway. Next +they drove to the roadblock at Vatican Road and Broadway. Upon the +chief monitor's arrival, the west shelter monitor traveled about nine +kilometers west on Vatican Road to monitor Guard Post 1 so that the +military police could reoccupy the post. The monitoring excursion to +Guard Post 1 continued until the chief monitor had returned from Guard +Post 2, located 17 kilometers northwest of the Vatican Road roadblock +on Broadway (1; 18). + +The chief monitor arrived at Guard Post 2 at about 0550 hours and +found the post empty. He then continued five kilometers north along +Broadway to the foxholes from which the military police had watched +the detonation. There he found the guards, the five radiological +safety monitors assigned to the evacuation detachment, and the +Commanding Officer of the evacuation detachment (1; 18). + +The military policemen refused to return to Guard Post 2, insisting +that they had received orders over their two-way radio from the Base +Commander to evacuate their post and head for San Antonio, New Mexico, +a town 28 kilometers northwest of the Guard Post. The Base Commander +had noted that portions of the cloud were heading northwestward and, +fearing that fallout from the cloud would contaminate Guard Post 2, +had ordered the military police to evacuate. The chief monitor, +however, had found no significant radiation levels anywhere along the +northern part of Broadway nor around Guard Post 2. The Base Commander, +after being contacted by the chief monitor, drove to the foxholes and +ordered the guards to return to their post. This was the only +unplanned incident during the onsite monitoring (1). + +After Guard Post 2 was reoccupied, the chief monitor returned to the +roadblock at the intersection of Broadway and the North Shelter Road. +The north shelter monitor informed the chief monitor of the sudden +evacuation of the north shelter, whereupon the chief monitor surveyed +the north shelter area and found intensities of only 0.01 and 0.02 +roentgens per hour (R/h). The chief monitor then contacted the south +shelter and informed Dr. Bainbridge that the north shelter region was +safe for those who needed to return, that Broadway was safe from the +Base Camp to Guard Post 2, and that Guard Post 2 was now manned so +that personnel leaving for LASL could be checked out (1). + +The chief monitor then returned to the south shelter and assembled the +monitors from the three roadblocks and Guard Post 4 to prepare for +entrance into the ground zero area. The time was about 0815 hours. +The military police at the roadblocks were given radiation meters to +survey the adjoining area. Broadway from the south shelter to Guard +Post 2 was remonitored occasionally to reassure the military police +that there was no radiation problem. Monitors also surveyed the Base +Camp for 24 hours after the detonation. No radiation above background +levels was detected there (1). + +The following brief description of the radiological environment in the +TRINITY test area is based primarily on the results of the remote +gamma recorders situated in the test area and on results of the road +surveys conducted after the detonation (1). + +Within about 1,400 meters of ground zero (except to the north), +radiation intensities between 0.2 and 1.3 R/h were detected during the +first few minutes after the detonation. These readings decreased to +less than 0.1 R/h within a few hours. At greater distances to the +east, south, and west, radiation levels above background were not +detected (1). + +The cloud drifted to the northeast, and higher gamma readings due to +fallout were encountered in this direction. About five minutes after +the detonation, a reading of 3 R/h was recorded 1,400 meters north of +ground zero. Several minutes later, the intensity there had increased +to greater than 7 R/h, and it continued to increase for several more +minutes. Gamma detectors 9,150 meters north of ground zero, however, +recorded no radiation above background levels. This indicated that +the cloud had passed over or near the 1,400-meter area and only +partially over the 9,150-meter area where the north shelter was +located. Subsequent ground surveys of this area found no gamma +intensities higher than 0.02 R/h (1). + +Gamma radiation levels at and around ground zero were much higher than +in other onsite areas because of induced activity in the soil. +Twenty-four hours after the detonation, the gamma intensity at ground +zero was estimated to be 600 to 700 R/h. This estimate was based on +data provided by the tank crew that drove to ground zero to obtain +soil samples. The intensity decreased to about 2 R/h at 725 meters +from ground zero. Gamma intensities of 0.1 R/h or more were confined +within a circular area extending about 1,100 meters from ground zero +(except in areas of fallout). One week after the shot, the gamma +intensity at ground zero was about 45 R/h. After 30 days, intensities +at ground zero had decreased to 15 R/h, and intensities of 0.1 R/h or +more were not encountered beyond about 365 meters from ground zero. +Gamma intensities of 3 to 10 R/h were found at ground zero three +months after the detonation (1; 19). + + +3.3 OFFSITE MONITORING GROUP + +Four two-man teams and one five-man team supervised by the chief +offsite monitor constituted the Offsite Monitoring Group. Before the +detonation, the four two-man teams established monitoring posts in +towns outside the test area. These towns were Nogal, Roswell, Fort +Sumner, and Socorro, all in New Mexico. The five-man team remained at +Guard Post 2 to assist in evacuation of nearby residences if the +TRINITY cloud drifted in that direction. These residences, the Fite +house and the homes in the town of Tokay, were 24 and 32 kilometers +northwest of ground zero, respectively. Since the cloud drifted to +the northeast, evacuation was not required. All offsite monitoring +teams were in radio or telephone contact with personnel at the Base +Camp (11). + +Offsite monitoring teams in areas northeast of ground zero encountered +gamma readings ranging from 1.5 to 15 R/h two to four hours after the +detonation. Three hours after the detonation, surveys taken in +Bingham, New Mexico (located 30 kilometers northeast of ground zero) +found gamma intensities of about 1.5 R/h. Radiation readings at the +town of White, nine kilometers southeast of Bingham, were 6.5 R/h +three hours after the detonation and 2.5 R/h two hours later. Another +team monitoring in a canyon 11 kilometers east of Bingham found a +gamma intensity of about 15 R/h. Five hours later, the intensity had +decreased to 3.8 R/h. It was estimated that peak intensities of gamma +radiation from fallout on shot-day were about 7 R/h at an occupied +ranch house in this canyon area (1; 11; 19). + +Monitoring teams resurveyed these towns about one month after the +TRINITY detonation. At Bingham, gamma readings of 0.003 R/h and +0.0001 R/h were found at ground level outdoors and at waist level +inside a building, respectively. At the town of White, the highest +outdoor gamma reading was 0.008 R/h. Inside a building, the highest +reading was 0.0005 R/h (11). + +Surveys taken in the canyon area one month after the detonation +indicated that gamma intensities at ground level had decreased to +0.032 R/h. The occupied ranch house was also surveyed, both inside +and outside. The highest reading outdoors was 0.028 R/h, and the +highest reading indoors was 0.004 R/h (11; 19). + +Monitoring was also conducted in offsite areas other than those to the +north and northeast of ground zero. Monitors found no radiation +readings above background levels (11). + +Significant fallout from the TRINITY cloud did not reach the ground +within about 20 kilometers northeast of ground zero. From this point, +the fallout pattern extended out 160 kilometers and was 48 kilometers +wide. Gamma intensities up to 15 R/h were measured in this region +several hours after the detonation. One month later, intensities had +declined to 0.032 R/h or less (11). + + + +CHAPTER 4 + +DOSIMETRY ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT TRINITY + + +This chapter summarizes the radiation doses received by participants +in various activities during Project TRINITY. The sources of this +dosimetry information are the safety and monitoring report for +personnel at TRINITY, which includes a compilation of film badge +readings for all participants up to 1 January 1946, and film badge +data from the records of the Reynolds Electrical and Engineering +Company, which contain readings through 1946 (1; 16). These sources +list individual participants with their cumulative gamma radiation +exposures. + + +4.1 FILM BADGE RECORDS + +During TRINITY, the film badge was the primary device used to measure +the radiation dose received by individual participants. The site +monitoring plan indicates that film badges were to be issued to +participants. The film badge was normally worn at chest level on the +outside of clothing and was designed to measure the wearer's exposure +to gamma radiation from external sources. These film badges were +insensitive to neutron radiation and did not measure the amount of +radioactive material that might have been inhaled or ingested (1). + +Personnel from the Medical Group had responsibility for issuing, +receiving, processing, and interpreting film badges for Project +TRINITY. The Site Monitoring Group compiled the film badge records +for both onsite and offsite personnel. Radiological safety personnel +and military police recorded the names and identification numbers of +individuals as they entered the test area. This information was +recorded in an entry logbook and on a personal exposure data card. +Upon leaving the test area, individuals returned their film badges to +the check station. When the film badges were processed and +interpreted, the reading was entered on the individuals exposure data +card. In this manner, the number of times an individual entered the +test area and his cumulative exposure history were recorded and +maintained (1). + + +4.2 GAMMA RADIATION EXPOSURE + +The safety and monitoring report lists film badge readings for about +700 individuals who participated in Project TRINITY from 16 July 1945 +to 1 January 1946 (1). This list includes both military and +nonmilitary personnel who were involved with the TRINITY operation and +postshot activities. However, records are available for only 44 of +the 144 to 160 members of the evacuation detachment (1). In addition, +some of these film badge listings may be for personnel who were only +peripherally involved with TRINITY activities, such as family members +and official guests who visited the site. + +According to the safety and monitoring report, by 1 January 1946, 23 +individuals had received cumulative gamma exposures greater than 2 but +less than 4 roentgens. An additional 22 individuals received gamma +exposures between 4 and 15 roentgens. Personnel who received gamma +exposures exceeding 2 roentgens represent less than six percent of the +Project TRINITY participants with recorded exposures. As described +below, these exposures generally resulted when personnel approached +ground zero several times (1). + +Information is available regarding the activities of some of these +personnel. One of the drivers of the earth-sampling group's +lead-lined tank, an Army sergeant who traveled three times to ground +zero, received an exposure of 15 roentgens. A second tank driver, +also an Army sergeant, received an exposure of 3.3 roentgens. Three +members of the earth-sampling group, all of whom traveled in the tank +to ground zero, received exposures of 10, 7.5, and 5 roentgens. An +Army photographer who entered the test area six times between 23 July +and 20 October received 12.2 roentgens (1). + +Four individuals involved with excavating the buried supports of the +TRINITY tower from 8 October to 10 October 1945 received gamma +exposures ranging from 3.4 to 4.7 roentgens. Film badge readings for +this three-day period indicate that the two individuals who operated +mechanical shovels received 3.4 and 4.3 roentgens, while the two who +supervised and monitored the excavation received exposures of 4.2 and +4.7 roentgens. The individual receiving 4.7 roentgens during the +excavation operation had received 1.3 roentgens from a previous +exposure, making his total exposure 6 roentgens (1). + +An Army captain who accompanied all test and observer parties into the +ground zero area between 1 September and 11 October 1945 received a +total gamma exposure of 2.6 roentgens (1). The activities and times +of exposure are not known for other personnel with exposures over 2 +roentgens. + +According to the dosimetry records for 1946, about 115 people visited +the test site that year. No one ventured inside the fence surrounding +ground zero, and no one received an exposure greater than 1 roentgen +(1; 16). + + + +REFERENCE LIST + + +The following list of references represents the documents consulted in +preparation of the Project TRINITY volume. + + +AVAILABILITY INFORMATION + +An availability statement has been included at the end of the +reference citation for those readers who wish to read or obtain copies +of source documents. Availability statements were correct at the time +the bibliography was prepared. It is anticipated that many of the +documents marked unavailable may become available during the +declassification review process. The Coordination and Information +Center (CIC) and the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) +will be provided future DNA-WT documents bearing an EX after the +report number. + +Source documents bearing an availability statement of CIC may be +reviewed at the following address: + + Department of Energy + Coordination and Information Center + (Operated by Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.) + ATTN: Mr. Richard V. Nutley + 2753 S. Highland + P.O. Box 14100 + Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 + + Phone: (702) 734-3194 + FTS: 598-3194 + + +Source documents bearing an availability statement of NTIS may be +purchased from the National Technical Information Service. When +ordering by mail or phone, please include both the price code and the +NTIS number. The price code appears in parentheses before the NTIS +order number. + + National Technical Information Service + 5285 Port Royal Road + Springfield, Virginia 22161 + Phone: (703) 487-4650 + (Sales Office) + +Additional ordering information or assistance may be obtained by +writing to the NTIS, Attention: Customer Service, or by calling (703) +487-4660. + + +PROJECT TRINITY REFERENCES + + *Available from NTIS; order number appears before the asterisk. + **Available at CIC. + ***Not available, see Availability Information page. + ****Requests subject to Privacy Act restrictions. + +1. Aebersold, Paul. July 16th Nuclear Explosion-Safety and +Monitoring of Personnel (U). Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Atomic +Energy Commission. Los Alamos, NM.: LASL. LA-616. January 9, 1947. +170 Pages.*** + +2. Bainbridge, K. T. Memorandum to All Concerned, Subject: TR +Circular No. 18--Total Personnel at TR. [Base Camp, Trinity Site: +NM.] July 3, 1945. 1 Page.** + +3. Bainbridge, K. T. TRINITY. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. +Los Alamos, NM.: LASL, LA-6300-H and Washington, D. C.: GPO. May +1976. 82 Pages.** + +4. Bramlet, Walt. Memorandum for Thomas J. Hirons, Subject: DOD +Participants in Atmospheric Tests, wo/encl. Los Alamos Scientific +Laboratory. Los Alamos, NM. ISD-5. February 20, 1979. 4 Pages.** + +5. General Electric Company--TEMPO. Compilation of Local Fallout +Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962. Vol. 1: "Continental US Tests." +Washington, D. C.: Defense Nuclear Agency. DNA 1251-1(EX.). 1979. +619 Pages. (A99) AD/AO79 309.* + +6. Groves, Leslie R., LTG, USA. Memorandum for Secretary of War, +[Subject: TRINITY]. [Washington, D.C.] 18 July 1945. 13 Pages.** + +7. Groves, Leslie R., LTG, USA (Ret.). Now It Can Be Told: The Story +of the Manhattan Project. New York, NY.: Harper and Row. 1962. 444 +Pages. + +8. Headquarters, 9812th Technical Service Unit, Provisional +Detachment No. I (Company "B"). [Extract from: Daily Diary, +Provisional Detachment No. 1 (Company "B"), 9812th Technical Service +Unit.] Army Corps of Engineers, Department of War. [Santa Fe, NM.] +14 July 1945. 2 Pages.** + +9. Headquarters, Special Service Detachment. Supplemental Special +Guard Orders, with Appendix. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, +Manhattan Engineer District. [Alamogordo, NM.] 14 July 1945. 4 +Pages.** + +10. Hempelmann, L. H., M.D. [Extracts from: "Preparation and +Operational Plan of Medical Group (TR-7) for Nuclear Explosion 16 July +1945."] Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Atomic Energy Commission. +Los Alamos, NM.: LASL. LA-631(Deleted). June 13, 1947. 32 Pages.*** + +11. Hoffman, J. G. [Extracts from "Health Physics Report on +Radioactive Contamination throughout New Mexico Following the Nuclear +Explosion, Part A--Physics."] Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, +Manhattan Engineer District. [Los Alamos, NM.] [1945.] 31 Pages.** + +12. Lamont, Lansing. Day of TRINITY. New York, NY.: Atheneum. +1965. 331 Pages. + +13. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Public Relations Office. "Los +Alamos: Beginning of an Era, 1943-1945." Atomic Energy Commission. +Los Alamos, NM.: LASL. 1967. 65 Pages.** + +14. Oppenheimer, J. R. Memorandum for Group Leaders, Subject: +TRINITY Test. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Los Alamos, NM. +June 14, 1945. 2 Pages.** + +15. Palmer, T. O., Maj., USA. Evacuation Detachment at TRINITY. +[Manhattan Engineer District, Army Corps of Engineers.] [Los Alamos, +NM.] [18 July 1945.] 2 Pages.** + +16. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc. [Personnel +Radiation Exposures, 1945, 1946] Las Vegas, NV. Microfilm.**** + +17. Warren, S. L., COL., USA. Directions for Personnel at Base Camp +at Time of Shot. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Manhattan Engineer +District. [Alamogordo, NM.] 15 July 1945. 1 Page.** + +18. Warren, S. L., COL, USA; Hempelmann, L. H., M.D. Extracts from: +Personal Notes, Subject: Events in Camp Immediately Following +Shot--July 16, 1945. 1945. 2 Pages.** + +19. Weisskopf, V.; Hoffman, J.; Aebersold, Paul; Hempelmann, L. H. +Memorandum for George Kistiakowsky, Subject: Measurement of Blast, +Radiation, Heat and Light and Radioactivity at Trinity. [Los Alamos, +NM.] 5 September 1945. 2 Pages.** + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Project Trinity 1945-1946, by +Carl Maag and Steve Rohrer + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROJECT TRINITY 1945-1946 *** + +***** This file should be named 548.txt or 548.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/548/ + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +PROJECT TRINITY +1945-1946 + +by Carl Maag and Steve Rohrer + + + + +United States Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests +Nuclear Test Personnel Review + +Prepared by the Defense Nuclear Agency as Executive Agency for the +Department of Defense + +Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. +Do not return to sender. + + +PLEASE NOITIfY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGANCY, +ATTN: STTI, WASINGTON D.C. 20305, IF +YOUR ADDRESS IS INCORRECT, IF YOU WISH TO +BE DELETED FROM THE DISTRIBUTION LIST, OR +IF THE ADDRESSEE IS NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY +YOUR ORGANIZATION. + + + + + +Since declassified + + + + + +CONTENTS: + + LIST OF FIGURES + LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS + REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE + FACT SHEET + PREFACE + +CHAPTERS: + 1 INTRODUCTION + 1.1 Historical Background of Project TRINITY + 1.2 The Project TRINITY Site + 1.3 The Project TRINITY Organization + 1.4 Military and Civilian Participants in Project TRINITY + + 2 THE ACTIVITIES AT PROJECT TRINITY + 2.1 Preshot Activities + 2.2 Detonation and Postshot Activities + 2.3 Activities after 16 July 1945 + + 3 RADIATION PROTECTION AT PROJECT TRINITY + 3.1 Organization + 3.2 Site Monitoring Group + 3.3 Offsite Monitoring Group + + 4 DOSIMETRY ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT TRINITY + 4.1 Film Badge Records + 4.2 Gamma Radiation Exposure + + REFERENCE LIST + + + +LIST OF FIGURES + + 1-1 Location of Alamogordo Bombing Range + 1-2 TRINITY Site and Major Installations + 1-3 Tent Used as Guard Post at Project TRINITY + 1-4 Truck Used as Guard Post at Project TRINITY + 1-5 Organization of Project TRINITY + 2-1 The TRINITY Shot-tower + 2-2 The TRINITY Detonation, 0530 Hours, 16 July 1945 + 2-3 The South Shelter (Control Point) + 2-4 Inside One of the Shelters + 2-5 The Base Camp, Headquarters for Project TRINITY + 2-5 The Base Camp, Headquarters for Project TRINITY + 2-6 Project TRINITY Personnel Wearing Protective Clothing + 2-7 "JUMBO" after the TRINITY Detonation + + + +LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS + +The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this volume: + + AEC Atomic Energy Commission + DOD Department of Defense + LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory + MAUD [Committee for the] Military Application of Uranium Detonation + MED Manhattan Engineer District + R/h roentgens per hour + UTM Universal Transverse Mercator + + + +REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE + + + SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered): +UNCLASSIFIED + + 1. REPORT NUMBER: DNA 6028F + 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.: + 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER: + 4. TITLE (and Subtitle): PROJECT TRINITY 1945-1946 + 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED: Final Report + 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER: JRB 2-816-03-423-00 + 7. AUTHOR(S): Carl Maag, Steve Rorer + 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S): DNA 001-79-C-0473 + 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS: + JRB Associates + 8400 Westpark Drive + McLean, Virginia 22102 + 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS: + Subtask U99QAXMK506-08 + 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS: + Director + Defense Nuclear Agency + Washington, D.C. 20305 + 12. REPORT DATE: 15 December 1982 + 13. NUMBER OF PAGES: 76 + 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling + Office): + 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report): UNCLASSIFIED + 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE: N/A Since UNCLASSIFIED + 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report): Approved for public + release; distribution unlimited. + 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, If + different from Report): + 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: This work was sponsored by the Defense + Nuclear Agency under RDT&E RMSS Code B350079464 U99QAXMK50608 H2590D. + For sale by National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA + 22161. + + The Defense Nuclear Agency Action Officer, Lt. Col. H. L. Reese, + USAF, under whom this work was done, wishes to acknowledge the + research and editing contribution of numerous reviewers in the + military services and other organizations in addition to those writers + listed in block 7. + + 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and Identify by + block number): + TRINITY + Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory + Alamogordo Bombing Range + Manhattan Engineer District + Manhattan Project + Personnel Dosimetry + Radiation Exposure + Nuclear Weapons Testing + 20. ABSTRACT: This report describes the activities of an estimated + 1,000 personnel, both military and civilian, in Project TRINITY, which + culminated in detonation of the first nuclear device, in New Mexico in + 1945. Scientific and diagnostic experiments to evaluate the effects + of the nuclear device were the primary activities engaging military + personnel. + + + +FACT SHEET + + +Defense Nuclear Agency +Public Affairs Office +Washington, D C. 20305 + +Subject: Project TRINITY + +Project TRINITY, conducted by the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), +was designed to test and assess the effects of a nuclear weapon. The +TRINITY nuclear device was detonated on a 100-foot tower on the +Alamogordo Bombing Range in south-central New Mexico at 0530 hours on +16 July 1945. The nuclear yield of the detonation was equivalent to +the energy released by detonating 19 kilotons of TNT. At shot-time, +the temperature was 21.8 degrees Celsius, and surface air pressure was +850 millibars. The winds were nearly calm at the surface; at 10,300 +feet above mean sea level, they were from the southwest at 10 knots. +The winds blew the cloud resulting from the detonation to the +northeast. From 16 July 1945 through 1946, about 1,000 military and +civilian personnel took part in Project TRINITY or visited the test +site. The location of the test site and its major installations are +shown in the accompanying figures. + + +Military and Scientific Activities + +All participants in Project TRINITY, both military and civilian, were +under the authority of the MED. No military exercises were conducted. +The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), which was staffed and +administered by the University of California (under contract to the +MED), conducted diagnostic experiments. Civilian and military +scientists and technicians, with assistance from other military +personnel, placed gauges, detectors, and other instruments around +ground zero before the detonation. Four offsite monitoring posts were +established in the towns of Nogal, Roswell, Socorro, and Fort Sumner, +New Mexico. An evacuation detachment consisting of 144 to 160 +enlisted men and officers was established in case protective measures +or evacuation of civilians living offsite became necessary. At least +94 of these personnel were from the Provisional Detachment Number 1, +Company "B," of the 9812th Technical Service Unit, Army Corps of +Engineers. Military police cleared the test area and recorded the +locations of all personnel before the detonation. + +A radiological monitor was assigned to each of the three shelters, +which were located to the north, west, and south of ground zero. Soon +after the detonation, the monitors surveyed the area immediately +around the shelters and then proceeded out the access road to its +intersection with the main road, Broadway. Personnel not essential to +postshot activities were transferred from the west and south shelters +to the Base Camp, about 16 kilometers southwest of ground zero. +Personnel at the north shelter were evacuated when a sudden rise in +radiation levels was detected; it was later learned that the +instrument had not been accurately calibrated and levels had not +increased as much as the instrument indicated. Specially designated +groups conducted onsite and offsite radiological surveys. + + +Safety Standards and Procedures + +The safety criteria established for Project TRINITY were based on +calculations of the anticipated dangers from blast pressure, thermal +radiation, and ionizing radiation. The TR-7 Group, also known as the +Medical Group, was responsible for radiological safety. A limit of 5 +roentgens of exposure during a two-month period was established. + +The Site and Offsite Monitoring Groups were both part of the Medical +Group. The Site Monitoring Group was responsible for equipping +personnel with protective clothing and instruments to measure +radiation exposure, monitoring and recording personnel exposure +according to film badge readings and time spent in the test area, and +providing for personnel decontamination. The Offsite Monitoring Group +surveyed areas surrounding the test site for radioactive fallout. In +addition to these two monitoring groups, a small group of medical +technicians provided radiation detection instruments and monitoring. + + +Radiation Exposures at Project TRINITY + +Dosimetry information is available for about 815 individuals who +either participated in Project TRINITY activities or visited the test +site between 16 July 1945 and 1 January 1947. The listing does not +indicate the precise military or unit affiliation of all personnel. +Less than six percent of the Project TRINITY participants received +exposures greater than 2 roentgens. Twenty-three of these +individuals received exposures greater than 2 but less than 4 +roentgens; another 22 individuals received between 4 and 15 roentgens. + + + +PREFACE + + +From 1945 to 1962, the U.S. Government, through the Manhattan Engineer +District (MED) and its successor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission +(AEC), conducted 235 tests of nuclear devices at sites in the United +States and in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In all, an estimated +220,000 Department of Defense (DOD)* participants, both military and +civilian, were present at the tests. Project TRINITY, the war-time +effort to test-fire a nuclear explosive device, was the first +atmospheric nuclear weapons test. + + * The MED, which was part of the Army Corps of Engineers, administered + the U.S. nuclear testing program until the AEC came into existence in + 1946. Before DOD was established in 1947, the Army Corps of Engineers + was under the War Department. + +In 1977, 15 years after the last above-ground nuclear weapons test, +the Centers for Disease Control** noted a possible leukemia cluster +among a small group of soldiers present at Shot SMOKY, a test of +Operation PLUMBBOB, the series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests +conducted in 1957. Since that initial report by the Centers for +Disease Control, the Veterans Administration has received a number of +claims for medical benefits from former military personnel who believe +their health may have been affected by their participation in the +weapons testing program. + + ** The Centers for Disease Control are part of the U.S. Department of + Health and Human Services (formerly the U.S. Department of Health, + Education, and Welfare). + +In late 1977, DOD began a study to provide data to both the Centers +for Disease Control and the Veterans Administration on potential +exposures to ionizing radiation among the military and civilian +participants in atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. DOD organized an +effort to: + +o Identify DOD personnel who had taken part in the atmospheric nuclear +weapons tests + +o Determine the extent of the participants' exposure to ionizing +radiation + +o Provide public disclosure of information concerning participation by +military personnel in Project TRINITY. + + +METHODS AND SOURCES USED TO PREPARE THIS VOLUME + +This report on Project TRINITY is based on historical and technical +documents associated with the detonation of the first nuclear device +on 16 July 1945. The Department of Defense compiled information for +this volume from documents that record the scientific activities +during Project TRINITY. These records, most of which were developed +by participants in TRINITY, are kept in several document repositories +throughout the United States. + +In compiling information for this report, historians, health +physicists, radiation specialists, and information analysts canvassed +document repositories known to contain materials on atmospheric +nuclear weapons tests conducted in the southwestern United States. +These repositories included armed services libraries, Government +agency archives and libraries, Federal repositories, and libraries of +scientific and technical laboratories. Researchers examined +classified and unclassified documents containing information on the +participation of personnel from the MED, which supervised Project +TRINITY, and from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), which +developed the TRINITY device. After this initial effort, researchers +recorded relevant information concerning the activities of MED and +LASL personnel and catalogued the data sources. Many of the documents +pertaining specifically to MED and LASL participation were found in +the Defense Nuclear Agency Technical Library and the LASL Records +Center. + +Information on the fallout pattern, meteorological conditions, and +nuclear cloud dimensions is taken from Volume 1 of the General +Electric Company-TEMPO's "Compilation of Local Fallout Data from Test +Detonations 1945-1962, Extracted from DASA 1251," unless more specific +information is available elsewhere. + + +ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME + +The following chapters detail MED and LASL participation in Project +TRINITY. Chapter 1 provides background information, including a +description of the TRINITY test site. Chapter 2 describes the +activities of MED and LASL participants before, during, and after the +detonation. Chapter 3 discusses the radiological safety criteria and +procedures in effect for Project TRINITY, and chapter 4 presents the +results of the radiation monitoring program, including information on +film badge readings for participants in the project. + +The information in this report is supplemented by the Reference +Manual: Background Materials for the CONUS Volumes." The manual +summarizes information on radiation physics, radiation health +concepts, exposure criteria, and measurement techniques. It also +lists acronyms and includes a glossary of terms used in the DOD +reports addressing test events in the continental United States. + + + + + +CHAPTER 1 + +INTRODUCTION + + +Project TRINITY was the name given to the war-time effort to produce +the first nuclear detonation. A plutonium-fueled implosion device was +detonated on 16 July 1945 at the Alamogordo Bombing Range in +south-central New Mexico. + +Three weeks later, on 6 August, the first uranium-fueled nuclear bomb, +a gun-type weapon code-named LITTLE BOY, was detonated over the +Japanese city of Hiroshima. On 9 August, the FAT MAN nuclear bomb, a +plutonium-fueled implosion weapon identical to the TRINITY device, was +detonated over another Japanese city, Nagasaki. Two days later, the +Japanese Government informed the United States of its decision to end +the war. On 2 September 1945, the Japanese Empire officially +surrendered to the Allied Governments, bringing World War II to an +end. + +In the years devoted to the development and construction of a nuclear +weapon, scientists and technicians expanded their knowledge of nuclear +fission and developed both the gun-type and the implosion mechanisms +to release the energy of a nuclear chain reaction. Their knowledge, +however, was only theoretical. They could be certain neither of the +extent and effects of such a nuclear chain reaction, nor of the +hazards of the resulting blast and radiation. Protective measures +could be based only on estimates and calculations. Furthermore, +scientists were reasonably confident that the gun-type uranium-fueled +device could be successfully detonated, but they did not know if the +more complex firing technology required in an implosion device would +work. Successful detonation of the TRINITY device showed that +implosion would work, that a nuclear chain reaction would result in a +powerful detonation, and that effective means exist to guard against +the blast and radiation produced. + + +1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PROJECT TRINITY + +The development of a nuclear weapon was a low priority for the United +States before the outbreak of World War II. However, scientists +exiled from Germany had expressed concern that the Germans were +developing a nuclear weapon. Confirming these fears, in 1939 the +Germans stopped all sales of uranium ore from the mines of occupied +Czechoslovakia. In a letter sponsored by group of concerned +scientists, Albert Einstein informed President Roosevelt that German +experiments had shown that an induced nuclear chain reaction was +possible and could be used to construct extremely powerful bombs (7; +12)*. + + * All sources cited in the text are listed alphabetically in the + reference list at the end of this volume. The number given in the + text corresponds to the number of the source document in the reference + list. + +In response to the potential threat of a German nuclear weapon, the +United States sought a source of uranium to use in determining the +feasibility of a nuclear chain reaction. After Germany occupied +Belgium in May 1940, the Belgians turned over uranium ore from their +holdings in the Belgian Congo to the United States. Then, in March +1941, the element plutonium was isolated, and the plutonium-239 +isotope was found to fission as readily as the scarce uranium isotope, +uranium-235. The plutonium, produced in a uranium-fueled nuclear +reactor, provided the United States with an additional source of +material for nuclear weapons (7; 12). + +In the summer of 1941, the British Government published a report +written by the Committee for Military Application of Uranium +Detonation (MAUD). This report stated that a nuclear weapon was +possible and concluded that its construction should begin immediately. +The MAUD report, and to a lesser degree the discovery of plutonium, +encouraged American leaders to think more seriously about developing a +nuclear weapon. On 6 December 1941, President Roosevelt appointed the +S-1 Committee to determine if the United States could construct a +nuclear weapon. Six months later, the S-1 Committee gave the +President its report, recommending a fast-paced program that would +cost up to $100 million and that might produce the weapon by July 1944 +(12). + +The President accepted the S-1 Committee's recommendations. The +effort to construct the weapon was turned over to the War Department, +which assigned the task to the Army Corps of Engineers. In September +1942, the Corps of Engineers established the Manhattan Engineer +District to oversee the development of a nuclear weapon. This effort +was code-named the "Manhattan Project" (12). + +Within the next two years, the MED built laboratories and production +plants throughout the United States. The three principal centers of +the Manhattan Project were the Hanford, Washington, Plutonium +Production Plant; the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, U-235 Production Plant; +and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in northern New Mexico. At +LASL, Manhattan Project scientists and technicians, directed by Dr. J. +Robert Oppenheimer,* investigated the theoretical problems that had to +be solved before a nuclear weapon could be developed (12). + + * This report identifies by name only those LASL and MED personnel who + are well-known historical figures. + +During the first two years of the Manhattan Project, work proceeded at +a slow but steady pace. Significant technical problems had to be +solved, and difficulties in the production of plutonium, particularly +the inability to process large amounts, often frustrated the +scientists. Nonetheless, by 1944 sufficient progress had been made to +persuade the scientists that their efforts might succeed. A test of +the plutonium implosion device was necessary to determine if it would +work and what its effects would be. In addition, the scientists were +concerned about the possible effects if the conventional explosives in +a nuclear device, particularly the more complex implosion-type device, +failed to trigger the nuclear reaction when detonated over enemy +territory. Not only would the psychological impact of the weapon be +lost, but the enemy might recover large amounts of fissionable +material. + +In March 1944, planning began to test-fire a plutonium-fueled +implosion device. At LASL, an organization designated the X-2 Group +was formed within the Explosives Division. Its duties were "to make +preparations for a field test in which blast, earth shock, neutron and +gamma radiation would be studied and complete photographic records +made of the explosion and any atmospheric phenomena connected with the +explosion" (13). Dr. Oppenheimer chose the name TRINITY for the +project in September 1944 (12). + + +1.2 THE PROJECT TRINITY SITE + +The TRINITY site was chosen by Manhattan Project scientists after +thorough study of eight different sites. The site selected was an +area measuring 29 by 39 kilometers* in the northwest corner of the +Alamogordo Bombing Range. The Alamogordo Bombing Range was located in +a desert in south-central New Mexico called the Jornada del Muerto +("Journey of Death"). Figure 1-1 shows the location of the bombing +range. The site was chosen for its remote location and good weather +and because it was already owned by the Government. MED obtained +permission to use the site from the Commanding General of the Second +Air Force (Army Air Forces) on 7 September 1944 (12). Figure 1-2 +shows the TRINITY site with its major installations. + + * Throughout this report, surface distances are given in metric units. + The metric conversion factors include: 1 meter = 3.28 feet; 1 meter = + 1.09 yards; and 1 kilometer = 0.62 miles. Vertical distances are + given in feet; altitudes are measured from mean sea level, while + heights are measured from surface level, unless otherwise noted. + +Ground zero for the TRINITY detonation was at UTM coordinates +630266.** Three shelters, located approximately 9,150 meters (10,000 +yards) north, west, and south of ground zero, were built for the +protection of test personnel and instruments. The shelters had walls +of reinforced concrete and were buried under a few feet of earth. The +south shelter was the Control Point for the test (12). The Base Camp, +which was the headquarters for Project TRINITY, was located +approximately 16 kilometers southwest of ground zero. The principal +buildings of the abandoned McDonald Ranch, where the active parts of +the TRINITY device were assembled, stood 3,660 meters southeast of +ground zero. Seven guard posts, which were simply small tents or +parked trucks like the ones shown in figures 1-3 and 1-4, dotted the +test site (9). + + ** Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates are used in this + report. The first three digits refer to a point on an east- west + axis, and the second three digits refer to a point on a north-south + axis. The point so designated is the southwest corner of an area 100 + meters square. + + +1.3 THE PROJECT TRINITY ORGANIZATION + +The organization that planned and conducted Project TRINITY grew out +of the X-2 Group. LASL, though administered by the University of +California, was part of the Manhattan Project, supervised by the Army +Corps of Engineers Manhattan Engineer District. The chief of MED was +Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves of the Army Corps of Engineers. Major General +Groves reported to both the Chief of Engineers and the Army Chief of +Staff. The Army Chief of Staff reported to the Secretary of War, a +Cabinet officer directly responsible to the President. Figure 1-5 +outlines the organization of Project TRINITY. + +The director of the Project TRINITY organization was Dr. Kenneth +Bainbridge. Dr. Bainbridge reported to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the +director of LASL. A team of nine research consultants advised Dr. +Bainbridge on scientific and technical matters (3). + +The Project TRINITY organization was divided into the following +groups (3): + +o The TRINITY Assembly Group, responsible for assembling and arming +the nuclear device + +o The TR-1 (Services) Group, responsible for construction, utilities, +procurement, transportation, and communications + +o The TR-2 Group, responsible for air-blast and earth-shock measurements + +o The TR-3 (Physics) Group, responsible for experiments concerning +measurements of ionizing radiation + +o The TR-4 Group, responsible for meteorology + +o The TR-5 Group, responsible for spectrographic and photographic +measurements + +o The TR-6 Group, responsible for the airblast-airborne condenser +gauges + +o The TR-7 (Medical) Group, responsible for the radiological safety +and general health of the Project TRINITY participants. + +Each of these groups was divided into several units. Individuals were +also assigned special tasks outside their groups, such as +communications and tracking the TRINITY cloud with a searchlight (3). + + +1.4 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT TRINITY + +From March 1944 until the beginning of 1946, several thousand people +participated in Project TRINITY. These included not only the LASL +scientists, but also scientists, technicians, and workmen employed at +MED installations throughout the United States. According to entrance +logs, film badge data, and other records, about 1,000 people either +worked at or visited the TRINITY site from 16 July 1945 through 1946 +(1; 3; 8; 15; 16). + +Although supervised by Major General Groves and the Army Corps of +Engineers, many Manhattan Project personnel were civilians. Military +personnel were assigned principally to support services, such as +security and logistics, although soldiers with special skills worked +with the civilians (7; 12). Most of the military personnel were part +of the Army Corps of Engineers, although Navy and other Army personnel +were also assigned to the project (4; 12). + + + +CHAPTER 2 + +THE ACTIVITIES AT PROJECT TRINITY + + +The TRINITY nuclear device was detonated on a 100-foot tower (shown in +figure 2-1) at UTM coordinates 630266 on the Alamogordo Bombing Range, +New Mexico, at 0530 Mountain War Time, on 16 July 1945. The +detonation had a yield of 19 kilotons and left an impression 2.9 +meters deep and 335 meters wide. The cloud resulting from the +detonation rose to an altitude of 35,000 feet (5). The TRINITY +detonation is shown in figure 2-2. + +At shot-time, the temperature was 21.8 degrees Celsius, and the +surface air pressure was 850 millibars. Winds at shot-time were +nearly calm at the surface but attained a speed of 10 knots from the +southwest at 10,300 feet. At 34,600 feet, the wind speed was 23 knots +from the southwest. The winds blew the cloud to the northeast (5). + + +2.1 PRESHOT ACTIVITIES + +Construction of test site facilities on the Alamogordo Bombing Range +began in December 1944. The first contingent of personnel, 12 +military policemen, arrived just before Christmas. The number of +personnel at the test site gradually increased until the peak level of +about 325 was reached the week before the detonation (2; 12). + +On 7 May 1945 at 0437 hours, 200 LASL scientists and technicians +exploded 100 tons of conventional high explosives at the test site. +The explosives were stacked on top of a 20-foot tower and contained +tubes of radioactive solution to simulate, at a low level of activity, +the radioactive products expected from a nuclear explosion. The test +produced a bright sphere which spread out in an oval form. A column +of smoke and debris rose as high as 15,000 feet before drifting +eastward. The explosion left a shallow crater 1.5 meters deep and 9 +meters wide. Monitoring in the area revealed a level of radioactivity +low enough to allow workers to spend several hours in the area (3; +12). + +The planned firing date for the TRINITY device was 4 July 1945. On 14 +June 1945, Dr. Oppenheimer changed the test date to no earlier than 13 +July and no later than 23 July. On 30 June, the earliest firing date +was moved to 16 July, even though better weather was forecast for 18 +and 19 July. Because the Allied conference in Potsdam, Germany, was +about to begin and the President needed the results of the test as +soon as possible, the TRINITY test organization adjusted its schedules +accordingly and set shot-time at 0400 hours on 16 July (3; 12; 14). + +The final preparations for the detonation started at 2200 on 15 July. +To prevent unnecessary danger, all personnel not essential to the +firing activities were ordered to leave the test site. During the +night of 15 July, these people left for viewing positions on Compania +Hill,* 32 kilometers northwest of ground zero. They were joined by +several spectators from LASL (3; 12). + + * "Compania" also appears as "Compana," "Campagne," or "Compagna" in + various sources. + +Project personnel not required to check instruments within the ground +zero area stationed themselves in the three shelters or at other +assigned locations. The military police at Guard Posts 1, 2, and 4 +blocked off all roads leading into the test site, and the men at Guard +Post 8, the only access to the ground zero area from the Base Camp, +ensured that no unauthorized individuals entered the area (9; 12). + +At 0100 hours on 16 July, military policemen from Guard Posts 3, 5, 6, +and 7 met to compare their logs of personnel authorized to be in the +ground zero area. The guards then traveled along the access roads to +clear out all project personnel. As individuals left for their +assigned shelters or stations, their departures from the test area +were recorded in the military police logs. By 0200 the area sweep was +completed, and the military police went to their shelters and +stations. A final check of personnel was made in each shelter (3; 9; +12). + +At the time of detonation, 99 project personnel were in the three +shelters: 29 in the north shelter, 37 in the west shelter, and 33 in +the south shelter. Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Bainbridge, and other key +personnel awaited the firing at the south shelter, which served as the +Control Point. Figure 2-3 shows the exterior of the south shelter; +figure 2-4 gives an interior view of one of the shelters, most likely +the south. Although most of the shelter occupants were civilians, at +least 23 military participants were spread among the three shelters +(1; 12). + +The remainder of the test site personnel were positioned at the Base +Camp 16 kilometers south-southwest of ground zero, or on Compania +Hill, or at the guard posts. Important Government officials, such as +General Groves and Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the U.S. Office of +Scientific Research and Development, viewed the detonation from a +trench at the Base Camp. The Base Camp is depicted in figure 2-5. + +The military police of Guard Posts 1 and 2 were instructed to be in +foxholes approximately five kilometers west and north, respectively, +from their posts. The military police of Guard Posts 3 and 4 were +instructed to be in foxholes south of Mockingbird Gap. A radiological +safety monitor was assigned to the group from Guard Post 4. Guard Post +5 personnel were to be in the south shelter, Guard Post 6 personnel in +the west shelter, and Guard Post 7 personnel in the north shelter. +The military police of Guard Post 8 remained at that post, 400 meters +east of the Base Camp (9). + +An evacuation detachment of between 144 and 160 officers and enlisted +men was stationed near Guard Post 2, about 14 kilometers northwest of +ground zero. These men were on standby in case ranches and towns +beyond the test site had to be evacuated. Five radiological safety +monitors were assigned to this detachment. Ninety-four men of the +evacuation detachment belonged to Provisional Detachment Number 1, +Company "B," of the 9812th Technical Service Unit, Army Corps of +Engineers, from LASL. The identity of the remaining evacuation +personnel has not been documented (3; 4; 8; 10; 15). + +With the exception of the shelter occupants (99 personnel) and +evacuation detachment (between 144 and 160 men), the number of +personnel at the test site at the time of detonation has not been +documented. Film badge records show that approximately 355 people +were at the test site at some time during 16 July. The shelter +occupants and 44 men of the evacuation detachment are on this list. +It has not been possible to pinpoint the location of many of the +remaining personnel. Some were at the Base Camp or on Compania Hill. +Since many of these people returned to the test site after shot-time +to work on experiments, their film badges registered exposures from +residual radioactivity on 16 July. Based on the documented personnel +totals, at least the following 263 individuals were at the test site +when the device was detonated (1; 4; 8-10; 13; 15): + +o 99 shelter occupants at shelters 9,150 meters north, south, and west +of ground zero + +o 144 to 160 officers and enlisted men of the evacuation detachment, +located 14 kilometers northwest of ground zero near Guard Post 2 + +o Five radiological safety monitors assigned to the evacuation +detachment to perform offsite monitoring of nearby towns and +residences + +o One radiological safety monitor assigned to Guard Post 4 + +o Two military policemen at each of the seven guard posts (indicated +by photographs such as figures 1-3 and 1-4). + + +2.2 DETONATION AND POSTSHOT ACTIVITIES + +Because of bad weather, the Project TRINITY director (Dr. Bainbridge) +delayed the detonation, which had been scheduled for 0400 hours. By +0445, however, the forecast was better, and shot-time was set for +0530. This gave the scientists 45 minutes to arm the device and +prepare the instruments in the shelters. The final countdown began at +0510, and the device was detonated at 0529:45 Mountain War Time from +the Control Point in the south shelter (3; 12). + +No one was closer than 9,150 meters to ground zero at the time of the +detonation. With the exception of a few men holding the ropes of +barrage balloons or guiding cameras to follow the fireball as it +ascended, all shelter personnel were in or behind the shelters. Some +left the shelters after the initial flash to view the fireball. As a +precautionary measure, they had been advised to lie on the ground +before the blast wave arrived. Project personnel located beyond the +shelters, such as at the Base Camp and on Compania Hill, were also +instructed to lie on the ground or in a depression until the blast +wave had passed (1). However, the blast wave at these locations was +not as strong as had been expected. + +In order to prevent eye damage, Dr. Bainbridge ordered the +distribution of welder's filter glass. Because it was not known +exactly how the flash might affect eyesight, it was suggested that +direct viewing of the fireball not be attempted even with this +protection. The recommended procedure was to face away from ground +zero and watch the hills or sky until the fireball illuminated the +area. Then, after the initial flash had passed, one could turn around +and view the fireball through the filter glass. Despite these +well-publicized instructions, two participants did not take +precautions. They were temporarily blinded by the intense flash but +experienced no permanent vision impairment (1; 17). + +People as far away as Santa Fe and El Paso saw the brilliant light of +the detonation. Windows rattled in the areas immediately surrounding +the test site, waking sleeping ranchers and townspeople. To dispel +any rumors that might compromise the security of Project TRINITY, the +Government announced that an Army munitions dump had exploded. +However, immediately after the destruction of Hiroshima, the +Government revealed to the public what had actually occurred in the +New Mexico desert (12; 13). + +Immediately after the shot, Medical Group personnel began the +radiological monitoring activities described in section 3.1.2. At +0815, when most of the monitoring activities were completed, +preparations began for entrance into the ground zero area. To +regulate entry into the area, a "Going-in Board" was established, +consisting of Dr. Bainbridge, the Chief of the Medical Group, and a +special scientific consultant. Its purpose was to determine whether a +party had a valid reason for entering the ground zero area. The board +functioned for three days. + +Military police at Guard Post 4 and at three roadblocks set up along +Broadway controlled entry into the area. Guard Posts 3, 5, 6, and 7 +were within 3,000 meters of ground zero and thus remained unmanned. +At the south shelter, the Medical Group set up a "going-in" station +where personnel were required to stop to put on protective clothing +(coveralls, booties, caps, and cotton gloves) and pick up monitoring +equipment before entering the ground zero area. Since it was not +known how much radioactive material might be suspended in the air, all +personnel entering the ground zero area wore complete protective +covering and respirators for the first three days after the +detonation. Figure 2-6 shows two Project TRINITY personnel wearing +protective clothing (1). + +On the day of the shot, five parties entered the ground zero area. +One party consisted of eight members of the earth-sampling group. +They obtained samples by driving to within 460 meters of ground zero +in a tank specially fitted with rockets to which retrievable +collectors were fastened in order to gather soil samples from a +distance. This group made several sampling excursions on 16 and 17 +July. The tank carried two personnel (a driver and a passenger) each +trip. No member of this party received a radiation exposure of more +than 1 roentgen (1). + +Five other men from the earth-sampling group entered the ground zero +area in a second tank, lined with lead for radiation protection. The +tank, carrying the driver and one passenger, made five trips into the +ground zero area to retrieve soil samples on 16 and 17 July. On two +trips, the tank passed over ground zero; on the others, it approached +to within about 90 meters of ground zero. The men scooped up soil +samples through a trap door in the bottom of the tank. One driver who +made three trips into the ground zero area received the highest +exposure, 15 roentgens (1). + +This lead-lined tank was also used by ten men to observe the radiation +area. These men, traveling two at a time, made five trips into the +area on shot-day but never approached closer than 1,370 meters to +ground zero. The highest exposure among these ten men was 0.3 +roentgens (1). + +The next party to approach ground zero consisted of a photographer and +a radiological safety monitor. Wearing protective clothing and +respirators, the two men were about 730 meters northwest of ground +zero photographing "JUMBO" from 1100 to 1200 hours. "JUMBO," shown in +figure 2-7, was a massive container built to contain the +high-explosive detonation of the TRINITY device and to allow recovery +of the fissionable material if the device failed to produce a nuclear +detonation. The plan to use "JUMBO," however, was abandoned when the +scientists concluded that a fairly large nuclear explosion was +certain. The container remained on the ground near the shot-tower +during the detonation. Both the photographer and the monitor received +an estimated radiation exposure between 0.5 and 1 roentgen (1; 7). + +The last party to "go in" on shot-day consisted of six men retrieving +neutron detectors. They entered the test area at 1430 hours. Three +of the men went to a point 730 meters south of ground zero to pull out +cables carrying neutron detectors located 550 meters south of ground +zero. The group wore protective clothing and respirators and spent +about 30 minutes in the area. The remaining three men drove as close +as 320 meters southwest of ground zero to retrieve neutron detectors. +They got out of their vehicle only once, at about 460 meters from +ground zero, and spent a total of about ten minutes making this trip +through the area. Each man's radiation exposure measured less than 1 +roentgen (1). + +Most of the soldiers of the evacuation detachment remained in their +bivouac area near Guard Post 2. According to a report written by the +detachment commander, a reinforced platoon was sent to the town of +Bingham, about 29 kilometers northeast of the test site, while offsite +radiological safety monitors surveyed the area. The evacuation +detachment was dismissed at 1300 hours on shot-day when it became +evident from offsite monitoring that evacuations would not be +undertaken. The detachment returned to LASL at 0400 on 17 July (15). + +Two B-29 aircraft from Kirtland Field, Albuquerque, New Mexico, +participated in post-shot events. Their planned mission was to pass +over the test area shortly before the explosion to simulate a bomb +drop. After the TRINITY device had been detonated, the aircraft would +circle near ground zero, while the men onboard would measure the +atmospheric effects of the nuclear explosion. This would enable them +to determine whether a delivery aircraft would be endangered. +However, because of bad weather on shot-day, Dr. Oppenheimer canceled +the aircraft's flight in the ground zero area. Instead, the two +B-29s, each with 12 men onboard, flew along the perimeter of the +bombing range and observed the shot from a distance of 19 to 29 +kilometers. Among those observers was a Navy captain who was also the +MED Chief of Ordnance (6; 12; 13). + + +2.3 ACTIVITIES AFTER 16 JULY 1945 + +On 17, 18, and 19 July, all personnel and visitors had to receive +permission to approach ground zero from the "Going-in Board." On +these three days, 21 groups were authorized to go beyond the Broadway +roadblocks. Most of those who sought this authorization were +scientists and military support personnel whose job required that they +work near ground zero. Except for a group of two military men and +three civilians who went to ground zero on 16 and 17 July and a group +of two civilians who approached as close as 90 meters on 18 July, the +reentry personnel came no closer than 180 meters to ground zero. Of +these personnel, the individual who received the highest exposure +during the three days was an Army sergeant who received 15 roentgens. +During the same period, two civilians received 10 roentgens and 7.5 +roentgens, respectively. All other personnel received exposures of 5 +roentgens or less (1; 3). + +After the "Going-In Board" was disbanded on 19 July, permission to +enter the ground zero area had to be obtained from Dr. Bainbridge or +one of his deputies. Many scientists entered the ground zero area +after 19 July to retrieve instruments or to perform experiments. The +population of the TRINITY test site was diminishing, however, as the +emphasis shifted to preparing the devices that were to be dropped on +Japan (1). + +On 23 July, a week after the shot, chain barricades with prominent +signs warning against trespassing were placed 910 meters north, south, +and west of ground zero. These barricades were supplemented with two +concentric circles of red flags 1,830 and 2,740 meters from ground +zero. Except during bad weather, the entire ground zero area was +visible from the roadblocks. No unauthorized person was ever detected +entering the ground zero area (1). + +On 10 August, the Broadway roadblocks were removed, and mounted +military policemen began patrolling around ground zero at a distance +of 730 meters. Each guard was assigned to a daily six-hour shift for +a period of two weeks; in the third week, the guard was assigned tasks +away from the ground zero area. The mounted guards and their horses +wore film badges. No exposure greater than 0.1 roentgen was +registered. On 1 September, the mounted patrol moved to a distance of +460 meters from ground zero, just outside a fence installed a week +earlier to seal off the area. The same rotating patrol schedule was +used. The guards' film badge readings showed an average daily +exposure of 0.02 roentgens. The mounted patrol at the fence continued +until early 1947 (1). + +Between 20 July 1945 and 21 November 1945, 67 groups entered the +ground zero area. Most of these parties entered in the month after +shot-day. These were the scientists and technicians conducting +experiments or retrieving data. By the beginning of September, most +of those who entered the ground zero area were invited guests (1). + +Also during the period 20 July through 21 November, at least 71 +soldiers were at the TRINITY test site. Twenty-five of these men were +support personnel who never went within 460 meters of ground zero. +The remaining 46 men were technical personnel, laborers who erected +the 460-meter fence, or military policemen who served as guides. +Eleven of these men, probably members of the fence detail, spent +several days at about 460 meters from ground zero. Working three to +five hours per day between 9 August and 25 August, they would have +been the only group to stay longer than one hour in the ground zero +area. Of the remaining personnel who approached within 460 meters +from ground zero, 25 spent 15 minutes and ten spent between 30 minutes +and one hour in the ground zero area. Only 11 people received +exposures of 3 to 5 roentgens between 20 July and 21 November. Most +received less than 1 roentgen. After 21 November 1945, no one +approached closer than the fence which was 460 meters from ground +zero, although about 200 civilian and military personnel worked at or +visited the TRINITY site through 1946 (1; 16). + +According to dosimetry data, entrance logs, and other records, about +1,000 individuals were at the test site at some time between 16 July +1945 and the end of 1946. This number includes not only the +scientists, technicians, and military personnel who were part of +Project TRINITY but also many visitors. Some of the scientists took +their wives and children on a tour of the area near ground zero, +particularly to view the green glass called "trinitite," which covered +the crater floor. Trinitite was the product of the detonation's +extreme beat, which melted and mixed desert sand, tower steel, and +other debris (1; 8; 9; 16). + + + +CHAPTER 3 + +RADIATION PROTECTION AT PROJECT TRINITY + + +The TR-7 or Medical Group, shown in the figure 1-5 organizational +chart, was responsible for radiological safety at Project TRINITY. +Many of the physicians and scientists in the Medical Group had worked +with radioactive materials before and were trained in radiological +safety procedures. The Chief of the Medical Group supervised the +radiological safety operations and reported to the TRINITY director. +In addition to providing medical care to TRINITY personnel, this group +established radiological safety programs to: + +o Minimize radiation exposure of personnel on the test site and in +offsite areas + +o Provide monitors to conduct radiological surveys onsite and offsite + +o Provide and maintain radiation detection instruments + +o Provide protective clothing and equipment. + +An exposure limit of 5 roentgens during a two-month period was +established. Personnel were provided with radiation detection +instruments to determine their exposures (1). + + +3.1 ORGANIZATION + +The Medical Group consisted of physicians, scientists, and +administrators, as well as radiological monitors. Many of these +personnel were nonmilitary, but all worked on the Manhattan Project +under the administration of the Army Corps of Engineers Manhattan +Engineer District. + +The Medical Group was divided into two monitoring groups, the Site +Monitoring Group, which was responsible for onsite monitoring, and the +Offsite Monitoring Group. Each reported to the Chief of the Medical +Group, and each communicated with the other during the monitoring +activities. In addition to these two groups, a small group of medical +technicians provided radiation detection instruments to Medical Group +personnel (1; 10). + + +3.2 SITE MONITORING GROUP + +The Site Monitoring Group consisted of a chief monitor, three other +monitors, and several medical doctors. This group had the following +functions (1; 10): + +o Conduct ground surveys of the test area and mark areas of +radioactivity + +o Conduct surveys of the Base Camp and roads leading into the test +area + +o Provide protective clothing and equipment, including film badges and +pocket dosimeters, to personnel + +o Monitor all personnel for radioactive contamination and provide for +their decontamination + +o Maintain a record of radiation exposures received by personnel. + +The Site Monitoring Group monitored the radiation exposures of +personnel in the test area. The time spent by personnel in radiation +areas was limited, and radiation detection instruments were provided +to permit continuous monitoring of exposure rates. In many cases, a +monitor from the Site Monitoring Group accompanied project personnel +into the test area to monitor exposure rates (1; 10). + +Two members of the Site Monitoring Group, a monitor and a physician +with radiological safety training, were assigned to each shelter. The +supervising monitor was stationed at the Base Camp and was in radio +and telephone communication with all three shelters and the offsite +ground and aerial survey teams. Before any personnel were allowed to +leave the shelter areas, a radiological safety monitor and a military +policeman from each shelter advanced along the roads to Broadway to +check radiation levels. They wore respirators to prevent them from +inhaling radioactive material (1; 10). + +Since it was expected that any dust from the cloud would fall on one +of the shelter areas within 30 minutes of the shot, plans had been +made to evacuate personnel as soon as the monitors completed their +initial survey. Because the cloud moved to the northeast, the south +shelter (the Control Point) was not completely evacuated, although +nonessential personnel were sent to the Base Camp. The west shelter +was emptied of all personnel except a searchlight crew spotlighting +the cloud as it moved away (1; 10). + +Only at the north shelter did an emergency evacuation occur. About 12 +minutes after the shot, a detection instrument indicated a rapid rise +in the radiation levels within the shelter. At the same time, a +remote ionization monitoring device detected a rapid increase in +radiation. Because of these two readings, all north shelter personnel +were immediately evacuated to the Base Camp, 25 kilometers to the +south. Film badges worn by personnel stationed at the north shelter, +however, showed no radiation exposure above the detectable level. It +was later discovered that the meter of the detector in the north +shelter had not retained its zero calibration setting, and radiation +at the north shelter had not reached levels high enough to result in +measurable exposures of the personnel who had been positioned there. +However, fallout activity was later detected in the north shelter +area, proof that part of the cloud did head in that direction. This +also explains why the monitoring device detected rising radiation +levels (1; 12). + +After ascertaining that radiation levels along the roads leading from +the shelters to Broadway were within acceptable limits, the +radiological safety monitors and military police established +roadblocks at important intersections leading to ground zero. The +north shelter monitor and military police set up a post where the +North Shelter Road ran into Broadway. The west shelter monitor and a +military policeman blocked Vatican Road where it intersected Broadway. +The south shelter monitor and military police set up a roadblock where +Broadway intersected Pennsylvania Avenue (1). + +The monitor assigned to Guard Post 4 surveyed the Mockingbird Gap area +to ensure that it was safe for the guards to return to their post. +This position controlled access to the McDonald Ranch Road, which led +directly to ground zero (1). + +At 0540 hours, the chief monitor departed from the Base Camp with a +military policeman to monitor the entire length of Broadway. They +first checked the roadblock at Pennsylvania Avenue and Broadway. Next +they drove to the roadblock at Vatican Road and Broadway. Upon the +chief monitor's arrival, the west shelter monitor traveled about nine +kilometers west on Vatican Road to monitor Guard Post 1 so that the +military police could reoccupy the post. The monitoring excursion to +Guard Post 1 continued until the chief monitor had returned from Guard +Post 2, located 17 kilometers northwest of the Vatican Road roadblock +on Broadway (1; 18). + +The chief monitor arrived at Guard Post 2 at about 0550 hours and +found the post empty. He then continued five kilometers north along +Broadway to the foxholes from which the military police had watched +the detonation. There he found the guards, the five radiological +safety monitors assigned to the evacuation detachment, and the +Commanding Officer of the evacuation detachment (1; 18). + +The military policemen refused to return to Guard Post 2, insisting +that they had received orders over their two-way radio from the Base +Commander to evacuate their post and head for San Antonio, New Mexico, +a town 28 kilometers northwest of the Guard Post. The Base Commander +had noted that portions of the cloud were heading northwestward and, +fearing that fallout from the cloud would contaminate Guard Post 2, +had ordered the military police to evacuate. The chief monitor, +however, had found no significant radiation levels anywhere along the +northern part of Broadway nor around Guard Post 2. The Base Commander, +after being contacted by the chief monitor, drove to the foxholes and +ordered the guards to return to their post. This was the only +unplanned incident during the onsite monitoring (1). + +After Guard Post 2 was reoccupied, the chief monitor returned to the +roadblock at the intersection of Broadway and the North Shelter Road. +The north shelter monitor informed the chief monitor of the sudden +evacuation of the north shelter, whereupon the chief monitor surveyed +the north shelter area and found intensities of only 0.01 and 0.02 +roentgens per hour (R/h). The chief monitor then contacted the south +shelter and informed Dr. Bainbridge that the north shelter region was +safe for those who needed to return, that Broadway was safe from the +Base Camp to Guard Post 2, and that Guard Post 2 was now manned so +that personnel leaving for LASL could be checked out (1). + +The chief monitor then returned to the south shelter and assembled the +monitors from the three roadblocks and Guard Post 4 to prepare for +entrance into the ground zero area. The time was about 0815 hours. +The military police at the roadblocks were given radiation meters to +survey the adjoining area. Broadway from the south shelter to Guard +Post 2 was remonitored occasionally to reassure the military police +that there was no radiation problem. Monitors also surveyed the Base +Camp for 24 hours after the detonation. No radiation above background +levels was detected there (1). + +The following brief description of the radiological environment in the +TRINITY test area is based primarily on the results of the remote +gamma recorders situated in the test area and on results of the road +surveys conducted after the detonation (1). + +Within about 1,400 meters of ground zero (except to the north), +radiation intensities between 0.2 and 1.3 R/h were detected during the +first few minutes after the detonation. These readings decreased to +less than 0.1 R/h within a few hours. At greater distances to the +east, south, and west, radiation levels above background were not +detected (1). + +The cloud drifted to the northeast, and higher gamma readings due to +fallout were encountered in this direction. About five minutes after +the detonation, a reading of 3 R/h was recorded 1,400 meters north of +ground zero. Several minutes later, the intensity there had increased +to greater than 7 R/h, and it continued to increase for several more +minutes. Gamma detectors 9,150 meters north of ground zero, however, +recorded no radiation above background levels. This indicated that +the cloud had passed over or near the 1,400-meter area and only +partially over the 9,150-meter area where the north shelter was +located. Subsequent ground surveys of this area found no gamma +intensities higher than 0.02 R/h (1). + +Gamma radiation levels at and around ground zero were much higher than +in other onsite areas because of induced activity in the soil. +Twenty-four hours after the detonation, the gamma intensity at ground +zero was estimated to be 600 to 700 R/h. This estimate was based on +data provided by the tank crew that drove to ground zero to obtain +soil samples. The intensity decreased to about 2 R/h at 725 meters +from ground zero. Gamma intensities of 0.1 R/h or more were confined +within a circular area extending about 1,100 meters from ground zero +(except in areas of fallout). One week after the shot, the gamma +intensity at ground zero was about 45 R/h. After 30 days, intensities +at ground zero had decreased to 15 R/h, and intensities of 0.1 R/h or +more were not encountered beyond about 365 meters from ground zero. +Gamma intensities of 3 to 10 R/h were found at ground zero three +months after the detonation (1; 19). + + +3.3 OFFSITE MONITORING GROUP + +Four two-man teams and one five-man team supervised by the chief +offsite monitor constituted the Offsite Monitoring Group. Before the +detonation, the four two-man teams established monitoring posts in +towns outside the test area. These towns were Nogal, Roswell, Fort +Sumner, and Socorro, all in New Mexico. The five-man team remained at +Guard Post 2 to assist in evacuation of nearby residences if the +TRINITY cloud drifted in that direction. These residences, the Fite +house and the homes in the town of Tokay, were 24 and 32 kilometers +northwest of ground zero, respectively. Since the cloud drifted to +the northeast, evacuation was not required. All offsite monitoring +teams were in radio or telephone contact with personnel at the Base +Camp (11). + +Offsite monitoring teams in areas northeast of ground zero encountered +gamma readings ranging from 1.5 to 15 R/h two to four hours after the +detonation. Three hours after the detonation, surveys taken in +Bingham, New Mexico (located 30 kilometers northeast of ground zero) +found gamma intensities of about 1.5 R/h. Radiation readings at the +town of White, nine kilometers southeast of Bingham, were 6.5 R/h +three hours after the detonation and 2.5 R/h two hours later. Another +team monitoring in a canyon 11 kilometers east of Bingham found a +gamma intensity of about 15 R/h. Five hours later, the intensity had +decreased to 3.8 R/h. It was estimated that peak intensities of gamma +radiation from fallout on shot-day were about 7 R/h at an occupied +ranch house in this canyon area (1; 11; 19). + +Monitoring teams resurveyed these towns about one month after the +TRINITY detonation. At Bingham, gamma readings of 0.003 R/h and +0.0001 R/h were found at ground level outdoors and at waist level +inside a building, respectively. At the town of White, the highest +outdoor gamma reading was 0.008 R/h. Inside a building, the highest +reading was 0.0005 R/h (11). + +Surveys taken in the canyon area one month after the detonation +indicated that gamma intensities at ground level had decreased to +0.032 R/h. The occupied ranch house was also surveyed, both inside +and outside. The highest reading outdoors was 0.028 R/h, and the +highest reading indoors was 0.004 R/h (11; 19). + +Monitoring was also conducted in offsite areas other than those to the +north and northeast of ground zero. Monitors found no radiation +readings above background levels (11). + +Significant fallout from the TRINITY cloud did not reach the ground +within about 20 kilometers northeast of ground zero. From this point, +the fallout pattern extended out 160 kilometers and was 48 kilometers +wide. Gamma intensities up to 15 R/h were measured in this region +several hours after the detonation. One month later, intensities had +declined to 0.032 R/h or less (11). + + + +CHAPTER 4 + +DOSIMETRY ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT TRINITY + + +This chapter summarizes the radiation doses received by participants +in various activities during Project TRINITY. The sources of this +dosimetry information are the safety and monitoring report for +personnel at TRINITY, which includes a compilation of film badge +readings for all participants up to 1 January 1946, and film badge +data from the records of the Reynolds Electrical and Engineering +Company, which contain readings through 1946 (1; 16). These sources +list individual participants with their cumulative gamma radiation +exposures. + + +4.1 FILM BADGE RECORDS + +During TRINITY, the film badge was the primary device used to measure +the radiation dose received by individual participants. The site +monitoring plan indicates that film badges were to be issued to +participants. The film badge was normally worn at chest level on the +outside of clothing and was designed to measure the wearer's exposure +to gamma radiation from external sources. These film badges were +insensitive to neutron radiation and did not measure the amount of +radioactive material that might have been inhaled or ingested (1). + +Personnel from the Medical Group had responsibility for issuing, +receiving, processing, and interpreting film badges for Project +TRINITY. The Site Monitoring Group compiled the film badge records +for both onsite and offsite personnel. Radiological safety personnel +and military police recorded the names and identification numbers of +individuals as they entered the test area. This information was +recorded in an entry logbook and on a personal exposure data card. +Upon leaving the test area, individuals returned their film badges to +the check station. When the film badges were processed and +interpreted, the reading was entered on the individuals exposure data +card. In this manner, the number of times an individual entered the +test area and his cumulative exposure history were recorded and +maintained (1). + + +4.2 GAMMA RADIATION EXPOSURE + +The safety and monitoring report lists film badge readings for about +700 individuals who participated in Project TRINITY from 16 July 1945 +to 1 January 1946 (1). This list includes both military and +nonmilitary personnel who were involved with the TRINITY operation and +postshot activities. However, records are available for only 44 of +the 144 to 160 members of the evacuation detachment (1). In addition, +some of these film badge listings may be for personnel who were only +peripherally involved with TRINITY activities, such as family members +and official guests who visited the site. + +According to the safety and monitoring report, by 1 January 1946, 23 +individuals had received cumulative gamma exposures greater than 2 but +less than 4 roentgens. An additional 22 individuals received gamma +exposures between 4 and 15 roentgens. Personnel who received gamma +exposures exceeding 2 roentgens represent less than six percent of the +Project TRINITY participants with recorded exposures. As described +below, these exposures generally resulted when personnel approached +ground zero several times (1). + +Information is available regarding the activities of some of these +personnel. One of the drivers of the earth-sampling group's +lead-lined tank, an Army sergeant who traveled three times to ground +zero, received an exposure of 15 roentgens. A second tank driver, +also an Army sergeant, received an exposure of 3.3 roentgens. Three +members of the earth-sampling group, all of whom traveled in the tank +to ground zero, received exposures of 10, 7.5, and 5 roentgens. An +Army photographer who entered the test area six times between 23 July +and 20 October received 12.2 roentgens (1). + +Four individuals involved with excavating the buried supports of the +TRINITY tower from 8 October to 10 October 1945 received gamma +exposures ranging from 3.4 to 4.7 roentgens. Film badge readings for +this three-day period indicate that the two individuals who operated +mechanical shovels received 3.4 and 4.3 roentgens, while the two who +supervised and monitored the excavation received exposures of 4.2 and +4.7 roentgens. The individual receiving 4.7 roentgens during the +excavation operation had received 1.3 roentgens from a previous +exposure, making his total exposure 6 roentgens (1). + +An Army captain who accompanied all test and observer parties into the +ground zero area between 1 September and 11 October 1945 received a +total gamma exposure of 2.6 roentgens (1). The activities and times +of exposure are not known for other personnel with exposures over 2 +roentgens. + +According to the dosimetry records for 1946, about 115 people visited +the test site that year. No one ventured inside the fence surrounding +ground zero, and no one received an exposure greater than 1 roentgen +(1; 16). + + + +REFERENCE LIST + + +The following list of references represents the documents consulted in +preparation of the Project TRINITY volume. + + +AVAILABILITY INFORMATION + +An availability statement has been included at the end of the +reference citation for those readers who wish to read or obtain copies +of source documents. Availability statements were correct at the time +the bibliography was prepared. It is anticipated that many of the +documents marked unavailable may become available during the +declassification review process. The Coordination and Information +Center (CIC) and the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) +will be provided future DNA-WT documents bearing an EX after the +report number. + +Source documents bearing an availability statement of CIC may be +reviewed at the following address: + + Department of Energy + Coordination and Information Center + (Operated by Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.) + ATTN: Mr. Richard V. Nutley + 2753 S. Highland + P.O. Box 14100 + Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 + + Phone: (702) 734-3194 + FTS: 598-3194 + + +Source documents bearing an availability statement of NTIS may be +purchased from the National Technical Information Service. When +ordering by mail or phone, please include both the price code and the +NTIS number. The price code appears in parentheses before the NTIS +order number. + + National Technical Information Service + 5285 Port Royal Road + Springfield, Virginia 22161 + Phone: (703) 487-4650 + (Sales Office) + +Additional ordering information or assistance may be obtained by +writing to the NTIS, Attention: Customer Service, or by calling (703) +487-4660. + + +PROJECT TRINITY REFERENCES + + *Available from NTIS; order number appears before the asterisk. + **Available at CIC. + ***Not available, see Availability Information page. + ****Requests subject to Privacy Act restrictions. + +1. Aebersold, Paul. July 16th Nuclear Explosion-Safety and +Monitoring of Personnel (U). Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Atomic +Energy Commission. Los Alamos, NM.: LASL. LA-616. January 9, 1947. +170 Pages.*** + +2. Bainbridge, K. T. Memorandum to All Concerned, Subject: TR +Circular No. 18--Total Personnel at TR. [Base Camp, Trinity Site: +NM.] July 3, 1945. 1 Page.** + +3. Bainbridge, K. T. TRINITY. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. +Los Alamos, NM.: LASL, LA-6300-H and Washington, D. C.: GPO. May +1976. 82 Pages.** + +4. Bramlet, Walt. Memorandum for Thomas J. Hirons, Subject: DOD +Participants in Atmospheric Tests, wo/encl. Los Alamos Scientific +Laboratory. Los Alamos, NM. ISD-5. February 20, 1979. 4 Pages.** + +5. General Electric Company--TEMPO. Compilation of Local Fallout +Data from Test Detonations 1945-1962. Vol. 1: "Continental US Tests." +Washington, D. C.: Defense Nuclear Agency. DNA 1251-1(EX.). 1979. +619 Pages. (A99) AD/AO79 309.* + +6. Groves, Leslie R., LTG, USA. Memorandum for Secretary of War, +[Subject: TRINITY]. [Washington, D.C.] 18 July 1945. 13 Pages.** + +7. Groves, Leslie R., LTG, USA (Ret.). Now It Can Be Told: The Story +of the Manhattan Project. New York, NY.: Harper and Row. 1962. 444 +Pages. + +8. Headquarters, 9812th Technical Service Unit, Provisional +Detachment No. I (Company "B"). [Extract from: Daily Diary, +Provisional Detachment No. 1 (Company "B"), 9812th Technical Service +Unit.] Army Corps of Engineers, Department of War. [Santa Fe, NM.] +14 July 1945. 2 Pages.** + +9. Headquarters, Special Service Detachment. Supplemental Special +Guard Orders, with Appendix. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, +Manhattan Engineer District. [Alamogordo, NM.] 14 July 1945. 4 +Pages.** + +10. Hempelmann, L. H., M.D. [Extracts from: "Preparation and +Operational Plan of Medical Group (TR-7) for Nuclear Explosion 16 July +1945."] Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Atomic Energy Commission. +Los Alamos, NM.: LASL. LA-631(Deleted). June 13, 1947. 32 Pages.*** + +11. Hoffman, J. G. [Extracts from "Health Physics Report on +Radioactive Contamination throughout New Mexico Following the Nuclear +Explosion, Part A--Physics."] Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, +Manhattan Engineer District. [Los Alamos, NM.] [1945.] 31 Pages.** + +12. Lamont, Lansing. Day of TRINITY. New York, NY.: Atheneum. +1965. 331 Pages. + +13. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Public Relations Office. "Los +Alamos: Beginning of an Era, 1943-1945." Atomic Energy Commission. +Los Alamos, NM.: LASL. 1967. 65 Pages.** + +14. Oppenheimer, J. R. Memorandum for Group Leaders, Subject: +TRINITY Test. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Los Alamos, NM. +June 14, 1945. 2 Pages.** + +15. Palmer, T. O., Maj., USA. Evacuation Detachment at TRINITY. +[Manhattan Engineer District, Army Corps of Engineers.] [Los Alamos, +NM.] [18 July 1945.] 2 Pages.** + +16. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company, Inc. [Personnel +Radiation Exposures, 1945, 1946] Las Vegas, NV. Microfilm.**** + +17. Warren, S. L., COL., USA. Directions for Personnel at Base Camp +at Time of Shot. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Manhattan Engineer +District. [Alamogordo, NM.] 15 July 1945. 1 Page.** + +18. Warren, S. L., COL, USA; Hempelmann, L. H., M.D. Extracts from: +Personal Notes, Subject: Events in Camp Immediately Following +Shot--July 16, 1945. 1945. 2 Pages.** + +19. Weisskopf, V.; Hoffman, J.; Aebersold, Paul; Hempelmann, L. H. +Memorandum for George Kistiakowsky, Subject: Measurement of Blast, +Radiation, Heat and Light and Radioactivity at Trinity. [Los Alamos, +NM.] 5 September 1945. 2 Pages.** + + + + +End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of U. S. Project Trinity Report + diff --git a/old/prjtr10.zip b/old/prjtr10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..81fcd27 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/prjtr10.zip |