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Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efbc258 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #63598 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/63598) diff --git a/old/63598-0.txt b/old/63598-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 3a989fc..0000000 --- a/old/63598-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5592 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Essentials of Logic, by Bernard Bosanquet - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Essentials of Logic - Being Ten Lectures on Judgment and Inference - -Author: Bernard Bosanquet - -Release Date: November 2, 2020 [EBook #63598] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ESSENTIALS OF LOGIC *** - - - - -Produced by Gdurb - - - - -THE ESSENTIALS OF LOGIC -being -TEN LECTURES ON JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE - -by - -BERNARD BOSANQUET -FORMERLY FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD - -MACMILLAN AND CO. -LONDON AND NEW YORK -1895 - -The right of Translation is reserved - -Richard Clay & Sons, Limited, -London & Bungay. - -Transcriber's Note: Footnotes have been placed under the paragraphs to -which they relate. A few added footnotes and additions to Bosanquet's -footnotes, giving the equivalents of Greek words in the text, are in -square brackets. Bosanquet's marginal notes have been used as -subheadings. Page numbers from the original are in braces {}. - - - - - -{v} - -PREFACE - -In this course of lectures I have attempted to carry out, under -the freer conditions of the University Extension system, a purpose -conceived many years ago at Oxford. It was suggested to me by the -answer of a friend, engaged like myself from time to time in teaching -elementary Logic, to the question which I put to him, “What do you aim -at in teaching Logic to beginners? What do you think can reasonably be -hoped for?” “If the men could learn what an Inference is, it would be -something,” was the reply. - -The course of lectures which I now publish was projected in the spirit -thus indicated. Though only the two last discourses deal explicitly -with Inference, yet those which precede them contribute, I hope, no -less essentially, to explain the nature of that single development -which in some stages we call Judgment, and in others Inference. So far -as I could see, the attempt to go to the heart of the subject, however -imperfectly executed, was appreciated by the students, and was rewarded -with a serious attention which would not have been commanded by the -trivialities of formal Logic, although more entertaining and less -abstruse. - -The details of traditional terminology may be found in Jevons’s -_Elementary Lessons in Logic_ (Macmillan). Those {vi} who desire to -pursue the study more in the sense of the present work, may be referred -above all to Bradley’s _Principles of Logic_, and also to Lotze’s -_Logic_ (E. Tr.), and to Sigwart’s great work on Logic, the English -translation of which, just completed, opens a storehouse of knowledge -and robust good sense to the English student. My own larger _Logic_ -expresses _in extenso_ the views which these lectures set out in a -shorter form. - -I hope it will be admitted by my critics that this experiment, whether -successful or unsuccessful, was worth making, and that except in the -University Extension system, it could not easily have been made. - -Bernard Bosanquet. -London, January 1895. - - - - -{vii} - -CONTENTS - -LECTURE I THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC - -1. Difficulty of the Science 1 - -2. The Problem stated 3 - -3. World as Idea 4 - -4. “World” 5 - -5. The Animal’s World 6 - -6. The World as “Objective” 7 - i. Common sense 8 - ii. Common-sense Theory 8 - iii. Philosophic Theory 11 - -7. Our separate “Worlds” 14 - -8. Subjective Idealism 19 - - -LECTURE II JUDGMENT AS THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF A WORLD - -1. Defect of Subjective Idealism 21 - -2. The World as Knowledge 22 - -3. Knowledge is in the form of Judgment 23 - a. Necessary 23 - b. Universal 26 - c. Constructive 27 - -4. The Continuous Affirmation of Waking - Consciousness 33 - -5. Comparison with World as Will 37 - -6. Distribution of Attention 40 - -{viii} - -LECTURE III THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO KNOWLEDGE - -1. Meaning of “Form” 42 - -2. Form of Knowledge dependent on Content 49 - -3. The Relation of Part and Whole as Form - determined by Content 54 - -4. Nature of Knowledge 58 - -5. Conclusion 59 - - -LECTURE IV TYPES OF JUDGMENT, AND THE GENERAL - CONDITIONS INVOLVED IN ASSERTION - -1. Correspondence between Types of Judgment - and Nature of Objects as Knowledge 61 - _a_. Impersonal Judgment 61 - _b_. Perceptive Judgment 62 - _c_. Proper Names in Judgment 64 - _d_. Abstract Judgment 65 - - -2. The General Definition of Judgment 66 - i. What is implied in claiming Truth 67 - ii. By what means the claim is made 69 - iii. The kind of Ideas which can claim Truth 74 - _a_. Idea as Psychical Presentation 74 - _b_. Idea as Identical Reference 74 - - -LECTURE V THE PROPOSITION AND THE NAME - -1. Judgment translated into Language 80 - -2. Proposition and Sentence 82 - -3. Difference between Proposition and Judgment 82 - -4. “Parts of Speech” 85 - -5. Denotation and Connotation 88 - -6. Have Proper Names Connotation? 91 - -7. Inverse Ratio of Connotation and Denotation 94 - -{ix} - -LECTURE VI PARTS OF THE JUDGMENT, AND ITS UNITY - -1. Parts of the Judgment 98 - -2. Copula 99 - -3. Are Subject and Predicate necessary? 100 - -4. Two Ideas or Things 101 - a. Two Ideas 102 - i. Mental Transition 102 - ii. Absence of Assertion 103 - b. Two Things 104 - -5. Distinction between Subject and Predicate 107 - - -LECTURE VII THE CATEGORICAL AND THE HYPOTHETICAL - JUDGMENTS - -1. Some Criticisms on the ordinary scheme of - Judgment 112 - a. Why we need a Scheme 112 - b. The Common Scheme 113 - -2. Which Judgments are Categorical? 116 - (1) The “Particular” Judgment 116 - a. Natural Meaning 116 - b. Limited Meaning 117 - (2) “Singular” Judgment 118 - (3) “Universal” Judgment 119 - (4) “Hypothetical” Judgment 121 - (5) “Disjunctive” Judgment 123 - - -LECTURE VIII NEGATION, AND OPPOSITION OF JUDGMENTS - -1. Distinction between Contrary and Contradictory - Opposition 126 - -2. Contrary Negation 128 - -3. Why use Negation? 130 - -4. Stage of Significant Negation; Combination - of Contrary and Contradictory 132 - -5. Negative Judgment expressing Fact 134 - -6. Operation of the Denied Idea 135 - -{x} - -LECTURE IX INFERENCE AND THE SYLLOGISTIC FORMS - -1. Inference in General 137 - -2. Conditions of the Possibility of Inference 139 - -3. System the ultimate condition of Inference 140 - -4. Immediate Inference 141 - -5. Number of Instances 142 - -6. Figures of Syllogism, illustrating Progress - from Guess-work to Demonstration 146 - - -LECTURE X INDUCTION, DEDUCTION, AND CAUSATION - -1. Induction 151 - a. By simple Enumeration 151 - b. Enumeration always has a Ground 152 - c. Perfect Induction 152 - d. System 153 - e. Analogy as Step towards System 155 - f. Negative Instance 158 - g. Classification and Generalisation 159 - h. Hypothesis 161 - -2. Deduction 162 - a. Subsumption 163 - b. Construction 163 - -3. Causation 164 - -4. The Postulate of Knowledge 165 - -5. Conclusion 166 - - - - -{1} - -LECTURE I THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC - -_Difficulty of the science_ - -1. There is no science more difficult than that on which we are -entering in these lectures. It is worth while to discuss the nature of -this difficulty. It is a question of interest rather than of intricacy. -All sciences have, perhaps, much the same possibilities of broad theory -and subtle analysis. But Logic stands alone in the difficulty with -which the student sustains his persuasion that its point of view is -worth applying. - -In most other sciences, even in the philosophical sciences, there -is a continual stimulus to sense-perception, to curiosity, to human -interest. The learner is called upon to dissect animals or plants, -to undertake delicate manipulations with beautifully contrived -instruments, to acquaint himself with the history of nations, with -the genesis of worlds, with strange and novel speculations upon the -nature of space, or with the industry and well-being of various classes -among mankind at the present day. And these elements of novelty, these -stimulations of sense-perception or of practical interest, carry us -forward imperceptibly, and sustain our {2} eagerness to analyse and -combine in theoretic completeness the novel matter thus constantly -impinging upon us. - -In Philosophy, and more especially in Logic, we can promise little -or nothing of this kind. The teacher of Philosophy, from Socrates -downwards, has talked about common things, things already familiar -to his hearers. And although he calls upon them to think of these -things in a peculiar way, and from an unaccustomed point of view, yet -it is likely to be felt that he is demanding a new effort, without -supplying a new interest. And it is a common experience, that after a -time the mind rebels against this artificial attitude, which fatigues -without instructing, if we have accustomed ourselves to understand by -instruction the accumulation of new sense-perceptions and the extension -of historical or scientific vision over a wider superficial area. - -Now this I cannot help, and I will not disguise. In Philosophy, and -in Logic above all, it must be so. The whole point and meaning of the -study is that in it we re-traverse familiar ground, and survey it by -unfamiliar processes. We do not, except accidentally, so much as widen -our mental horizon. For those who care to understand, to trace the -connecting principles and functions that permeate our intellectual -world, there is indeed an interest of a peculiar kind. But even -experienced students will occasionally feel the strain of attending to -difficult distinctions, entirely without the excitement of novelty in -sense-perception or of a practical bearing upon human life. It is this -that makes Logic probably the hardest of all the sciences. - -{3} _The problem stated_ - -2. We cannot hope to vanquish this difficulty unless we face it boldly -from the first. There are in the old-fashioned Logic-books tricks and -puzzles, fallacies and repartees, which can in some degree be made -amusing; but of these I do not intend to speak. The course by which -alone I can hope honestly to awaken a true logical interest among -any who may be quite unfamiliar with the subject, is to approach the -matter descriptively, and try to set before you fully and fairly what -the problem is which the process of knowledge has to meet. And then -it may be possible to claim a genuine theoretical curiosity--none the -less genuine that it may be tinged with a sympathy for man’s common -birthright of intelligence--for the detailed explanation of the means -by which this problem is solved from day to day. Such an explanation is -the science of Logic. - -The problem may be thus introduced. Several of those present have, -I believe, attended a previous course of lectures on Psychology. -They have learned, I presume, to think of the mind as the course of -consciousness, a continuous connected presentation, more or less -emphasising within it various images, and groups of images and ideas, -which may be roughly said to act and re-act upon each other, to cohere -in systems, and to give rise to the perception of self. This course -of consciousness, including certain latent elements, the existence -of which it is necessary to assume, is an individual mind, attached -to a particular body, and so far as we know, not separable from the -actions and affections of that body. What is the connection between -such a course of consciousness in any individual, and the world as -that individual knows and wills it? This is the point at {4} which -Psychology passes into Logic. Psychology treats of the course of ideas -and feelings; Logic of the mental construction of reality. How does the -course of my private ideas and feelings contain in it, for me, a world -of things and persons which are _not merely in my mind_? - -_World as Idea_ - -3. Schopenhauer called his great work, _The World as Will and -Idea_. [1] Leaving out Will for the moment, let us consider the world -“as Idea.” - - “‘The world is my idea;’ [2] this is a truth which holds - good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone - can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If - he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. - It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows - is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, - a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds - him is there only as an idea, _i.e._ only in relation to - something else, the consciousness which is himself. If any - truth can be asserted _a priori_, it is this; for it is the - expression of the most general form of all possible and - thinkable experience: a form which is more general than - time, space, or causality, for they all pre-suppose it. - - ..... - - “No truth, therefore, is more certain, more independent of - all others, and less in need of proof than this, that all that - exists for knowledge, and, therefore, this whole world, is - only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, - in a word, idea. This is obviously true of the past and the - future, as well as of the present, of what is farthest off, as - of {5} what is near; for it is true of time and space - themselves, in which alone these distinctions arise. All that - in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably - thus conditioned through the subject and exists only for the - subject. The world is idea.” - -[1] E. Tr. (Trubner, 1883). - -[2] Schopenhauer, _op. cit._ beginning. - -The world, then, for each of us, exists in the medium of our mind. -It is a sort of building, of which the materials are our ideas and -perceptions. - -_The “world”_ - -4. So much for “idea.” What do we mean by “world”? A succession of -images passing before us, or rather making up our consciousness, like a -dream, is not a world. The term is very expressive; it is a favourite -word in Shakespeare. When the courtier says — - - “Hereafter, in a better world than this, - I shall desire more love and knowledge of you,” - -he does not mean, as I used to think, “in heaven”; he means in a -better condition of social affairs. In “mad world, mad kings, mad -composition,” the term means more especially the set of political and -family connections within which extraordinary reversals of behaviour -have just taken place. Often we use the expression, with a qualifying -epithet, to indicate some particular sphere of connected action, “the -ecclesiastical world,” “the political world,” and so forth. Always -there seems to be implied the notion of a set of things or persons -bound together by some common quality which enables them to act upon -each other, and to constitute what is technically termed a “whole.” -_The_ “world” _par excellence_, then, ought to mean the one connected -set of things and persons which we all recognise {6} and refer to as -the same, and as including ourselves along with all who use the word in -the same sense. - -Then the “world as idea” means no less than this, that the system of -things and persons which surrounds all of us, and which each of us -speaks of and refers to as the same for every one, exists for each of -us as something built up in his own mind--the mind attached to his own -body--and out of the material of his own mind. - -_The animal’s world_ - -5. Let us illustrate this building up by thinking of the world, our -surroundings, as an animal must be aware of it. The lowest beginnings -of sight, for example, give no colour and no shape. An animal in this -stage can, probably, only just take warning if a dark object comes -between him and the light. Therefore he cannot have the ordered visual -image of space definitely stretching away all round him, which is the -primary basis of our idea of a world. He can move, no doubt, but there -is nothing to make us suppose that he records and co-ordinates the -results of his movements into anything like that permanent order of -objects which must be constructed in some way by a human being even -though born blind. Succession, we might say, is much more powerful -with animals than co-existence; but we should have to guard ourselves -against supposing that this was what we mean by succession, that is, -a process definitely recognised as in time, with a connection of some -reasonable kind between its phases. For the most part with animals -out of sight is out of mind; if so, the present is not interpreted, -enlarged, and arranged with reference to what is not present in time -or space by them as it is by us. And therefore the consciousness of a -single system of things, {7} permanent, and distinct from the momentary -presentations of the senses, cannot, in all probability, grow up for -them. If so, they have no real world, but only a dream world, [1] -_i.e._ a world not contrasted with the stream of presentation, nor -taken as the common theatre of all actions and events. This difference -between the world of an animal and that of a human being, is a rough -measure of what man does by mental or intellectual construction in -making his world. - -[1] The character of the sensory powers, which are strongest in -many animals, contributes to this conclusion. Mr. F.H. Bradley -is sure that his dog’s system of logic, if he had one, would -run, “What exists smells; what does not smell is nothing.” The -sense of smell can scarcely give rise to the idea of a world of -objects. It has hardly any capacity of structural discernment. - -_The world as objective_ - -6. We have now got the idea of a “world,” as a system of things and -persons connected together, taken to be the same for oneself at -different times and for different minds at the same time, yet existing, -for oneself, in the medium of one’s individual consciousness. - -We see at once that we cannot stop here. We have really got a -contradiction. If the parts of our world are connected with each other, -they are not merely dependent upon us, that is, upon the changes of our -consciousness. And we all take them to be independent of us, in the -sense that we do not suppose the presence or absence of our perception -to make any difference to the world except by the continuance or -cessation of our perception of it or of its parts. This is the state -of mind in which we practically live, philosophers and all. I do not -really take notice of any difference in mode of existence between the -wall in front of me, which I see, and the wall behind me, which I {8} -do not see. While you are in this lecture-hall, if you think of your -rooms at home, you think of them as they look, that is, as they would -look if you were there to see them. How else, indeed, could you think -of them? This is practically necessary, and therefore, for practical -purposes, true. - -But if you take it as a theory, omitting the hypothetical factor, -“if I was there to see,” you go wrong. You then treat your world -as being, outside your consciousness, the same that it is inside -your consciousness, without allowing for the withdrawal of your -consciousness. You are then on the way to think that the world, _as -you see, hear, and feel it_, is outside your mind, and that the sight, -hearing, feeling, and the ideas born of them, are inside your mind as -a sort of faint and imperfect _copy_ of the world which you then call -“external,” _in the sense of outside the mind_. - -_Common sense_ - -i. The first position was that of common sense. The second is that -of common-sense theory. Common sense is quite justified. It says, -“Things affect each other, but the mere presence and absence of our -perception does not affect them.” For practical purposes we must -treat them as being, when unapprehended by our minds, just the same -as when apprehended by our minds. This is the first idea or rather -postulate--for it is not a theoretical idea--of objectivity. Objective -= “independent of our consciousness for practical purposes.” - -_Common-sense theory_ - -ii. In describing the second position as that of common-sense theory -I do not refer to the doctrine of any regular school of philosophers. -There was a Scotch school of philosophy--the school of Reid in the -eighteenth century--commonly called the common-sense school. I will say -{9} below how I think this school was related to the position which -I am now describing. But my present purpose is to hit off the simple -theory of reality which common-sense people make for themselves when -they reflect. Now this theory, in which we all live except when we make -a special effort, accepts the distinction between things and the mind. -For example, it defines truth as the conformity of ideas to objects. -That means something of this kind: the ideas are inside our heads, -and the objects are outside our heads. If we are to have knowledge, -the objects have to be represented inside our heads, and they get in -through the senses. And then you have two similar forms of the world, -one outside our heads, which is real, and another like it but less -perfect and without solidity or causal power, inside our heads, which -is ideal or mental. This is what I call the common-sense theory of the -Objective. Like common sense, it assumes that there is a world which -the withdrawal of our individual consciousness does not affect, but -which persists and acts all the same. Unlike common sense, it lays down -an assertion as to the nature of this world, viz. that it is, apart -from our consciousness, the same as it is for our consciousness. The -world in consciousness, it assumes, is subjective, the world out of -consciousness is objective, and the former is an imperfect copy of the -latter in a feebler material. - -The schools of common-sense philosophy, such as are represented by -Locke and Reid, are not quite so simple-minded as the reflection of -ordinary common sense, because every systematic thinker sees at once -that the question stares him in the face, “If the world outside the -mind is copied {10} by the world inside the mind, how can we ever know -whether the copy conforms to the original?” We are by the hypothesis -inside the mind; whatever has passed through the senses is inside the -mind. We cannot as at present advised get at anything outside the -senses or outside the mind. In face of this question, the common-sense -philosophies have two courses open. They may start from the idea of -things outside the mind, but admit that in passing through the senses -the things are in some partial respects transformed--as for instance, -that they acquire colour, sound, and smell in passing through the -senses--this is what Locke says. Or again, still starting from the idea -of things outside the mind, they may simply assert that perception -is of such a nature that it gives us things as they really are. The -former was the view of Locke, the latter that of Reid. This latter -view obviously might pass into the most extreme idealism, and its -interpretation, if it does not so pass, is exceedingly difficult. - -But whatever may have been the view of the historical “common-sense -school,” [1] the common-sense theory which we all make for ourselves -involves a separation between the mind and reality. The objective world -is the world as independent of mind, and independent of mind means -existing and acting outside mind, exactly, or almost exactly, as it -seems to exist and act before the mind. - -[1] See Seth, _Scottish Philosophy_ (Blackwood, 1885). - -Now this is an absolute _cul-de-sac_. If the objective is that which is -outside perception, the objective is out of our reach, and the world of -our perception can never be objective. This is the pass to which we are -brought by taking {11} common sense as the guide of theory and not as -its material. - -_Philosophical theory._ - -iii. There is no way out but by retracing our steps, and avoiding a -false turn which we took in passing from common sense to common-sense -theory. It was quite true that the world is unaffected by the -withdrawal of my individual perception and consciousness (except in so -far as I acted _qua_ bodily thing in the world); but it does not follow -from this that _if_ it becomes the object of a consciousness in me, -it can be so otherwise than as presented within that consciousness. -We must distinguish between the idea that the objective is outside -consciousness and therefore not in consciousness, and the idea that -the objective can be in the individual consciousness, but identified -with something beyond the individual consciousness. It may be that -consciousness is capable of containing a world, not as a copy of a -ready-made original, but as something which it makes for itself by a -necessary process, and which refers beyond this finite and momentary -consciousness. - -According to these ideas, the objective is, shortly stated, whatever -we are obliged to think. This, though it is _in_ our thought, is not -considered merely _as_ our thought, or as a train of images or whole -of presentation in our minds. That is an artificial point of view, the -point of view of psychology, and we must carefully avoid starting from -it. But knowledge refers beyond its mental self, and has no limitation -in time or in kind except its own necessity. Thus, I am forced to -think, by a certain context of ideas and perceptions, that there is -now a fire burning in my study at home. This judgment is not barred -by the fact that my mind, as a {12} function attached to my body, is -here three miles away. The thought is objective for me, so long as I am -obliged to think it. My presence in or absence from the room where the -fire is burning has no effect on the question, except as it furnishes -me with evidence one way or the other. Not only absence in space is no -obstacle, but succession in time is no obstacle. My thought, which _is_ -here and now, refers confidently to what has happened in long intervals -of time, if the necessity of consistency obliges it to do so. Thus if -I go back to my room and find the fire out and the room very cold, I -infer without hesitation to certain acts and events which are needed -to explain this state of things. And interpretations or explanations -of this kind make up my world, which is for me in my thought, but is -presented as more than my thought, and cannot be a world at all unless -it is more than in my thought. It is in as far as my thought constructs -and presents a world which is more than my momentary psychical state, -that my thought, and the world as presented to me in it, is objective. -The world is not a set of my ideas, but it is a set of objects and -relations of which I frame an idea, and the existence of which has no -meaning for me except as presented in the idea which 1 frame. We are -not to think of (i) Ideas, and (ii) Things which they represent; the -ideas, taken as parts of a world, _are_ the things. - -We begin to see, then, how the nature of knowledge meets the puzzle -which I stated above. How, I asked, can a connected “world,” whose -parts act on one another quite independently of my perception, be in -my individual mind? I answer that it does not follow, because the -world _is for me_ {13} only in my presentation, that my presentation -is the only thing which goes on in the world. “What I am obliged to -think” may represent a real development depending on laws and a system -which is not confined to my individual course of consciousness. The -“objective” in this sense is for Logic an assumption, or rather a fact -to be analysed. We do not attempt to prove its existence, except in the -sense of calling attention to its nature in detail. It will be seen -that “outside the mind” ceases, on this view of objectivity, to have -meaning as regards anything that can be related to us. “Outside” is a -relation of bodies to one another; but everything, about which we can -so much as ask a question, is so far inside the mind, _i.e._ given in -its continuum of presentation or idea. - -I will recapitulate the three conceptions of the “objective.” - -(1) According to practical “common sense” the objective is independent -of our consciousness in the sense that the presence or absence of our -consciousness makes no difference to the operation of things upon each -other. - -(2) According to “common-sense theory” the objective is independent -of our consciousness in the sense that the presence or absence of our -consciousness makes no difference in the mode of being of things (viz. -that the world in consciousness approaches objectivity by resembling or -reproducing a similar and quite objective world outside consciousness). - -(3) According to philosophical theory the objective is independent of -our consciousness in the sense that it is what we are constrained to -think in order to make our consciousness consistent with itself. “What -we are constrained to {14} think” is not confined, in its _reference_ -to our thought, or to thought at all. - -_Our separate worlds._ - -7. Thus, for the purposes of Logic, we must turn our usual ideas upside -down. We must try to imagine something of this kind. We have all seen -a circular panorama. Each one of us, we must think, is shut up alone -inside such a panorama, which is movable and flexible, and follows him -wherever he goes. The things and persons depicted in it move and act -upon one another; but all this is in the panorama, and not beyond it. -The individual cannot get outside this encircling scenery, and no one -else can get inside it. Apart from it, prior to it, we have no self; it -is indeed the stuff of which oneself is made. Is every one’s panorama -exactly the same? No, they are not exactly the same. They are formed -round different centres, each person differing from all the others -by individual qualities, and by his position towards the points and -processes which determine his picture. For--and here is the remarkable -point--every one of us has painted for himself the picture within -which he is shut up, and he is perpetually painting and re-painting -it, not by copying from some original, but by arranging and completing -confused images and tints that are always appearing magically on his -canvas. Now this magical panorama, from which the individual cannot -escape, and the laws of which are the laws of his experience, is simply -his own mind regarded as a content or a world. His own body and mind, -regarded as things, are within the panorama, just as other people’s -bodies and minds are. The whole world, for each of us, _is_ our course -of consciousness, in so far as this is regarded as a system of objects -which we are obliged to {15} think. Not, in so far as it really _is_ -a system, for an onlooker, say for a psychologist. For no doubt -every child’s mind, and every animal’s mind, _is_ a working system -of presentations, which a psychologist may study and analyse from -without. Consciousness is consciousness of a world only in so far as -it _presents_ a system, a whole of objects, acting on one another, and -therefore independent of the presence or absence of the consciousness -which presents them. - -I take another very rough metaphor to explain this curious contrast -between my mind as a working system, observable from without, and -belonging to my individual body--distinguishable from the thirty or -forty quite different minds belonging to the thirty or forty persons in -this room--and my mind as a continuum of presentations which includes, -as objects, itself, and all the other minds in the room, and the whole -world so far as I have any conscious relation to it whatever. - -All of us are familiar with the appearance of a microscope ready -adjusted for use, with its little lamp, its mirror and illuminating -apparatus under the stage, with a specimen on the stage under the -object-glass, its object-glass and its eye-piece. Any one who -understands the working of a microscope finds this a most suggestive -spectacle. He follows in his imagination the light as it comes from -the lamp to the mirror, through the illuminating lenses, through the -transparent specimen, through perhaps a dozen lenses arranged as an -object-glass within an inch of distance, through the eye-piece and -into the observer’s eye. Give him the parts, lenses, prisms, and -mirrors into his hands, and he will test them all, and tell you exactly -how they work. This {16} scientific onlooker may be compared to the -psychologist looking at another man’s mind. He sees it as a thing among -other things, a working system of parts. - -But there is one thing that the mere onlooker cannot see. He cannot -see the object. That can only be seen by looking through the tube. -And every one has felt, I should think, the magical transformation, -suggestive of looking through another man’s eye and mind, which occurs -when you put your eye to the eye-piece of an optical instrument. The -outside world of other objects, the tube, the stage, the mirror, the -bystanders, the external light, all disappear, and you see nothing but -the field of vision and whatever distinctly pictured structure may -be displayed within it. The observer who looks through the tube may -be compared with each one of us as he contemplates his own world of -knowledge and perception. This is a thing that no one else can ever do. - -The metaphor, indeed, breaks down, in so far as each of us is able to -observe the history and character of his own mind as an object within -the field of presentation which is before his mind. Of course such a -metaphor must break down at some point. But it remains true that the -mind, while directly observing its field of objects, cannot observe its -own peculiarities, and when turned, as we say, upon itself, is still -observing only a part of itself. It remains true that my mind contains -the whole presented world for me and is merely one among thousands of -similar mind-things for you. - -Thus, I repeat, the world for each of us is our course of -consciousness, looked at in that way in which it presents a {17} -systematic, organised picture of inter-acting objects, not in that way -in which it is a stream of ideas and feelings, taking place in our -several heads. In the former point of view it is the world as our idea; -in the latter point of view it is simply the consciousness attached to -our body. We might soon puzzle ourselves with the contradictions which -arise if we fail to distinguish these points of view. In one sense my -mind is in my head, in the other sense my head is in my mind. In the -one sense I am in space, in the other sense space is in me. Just so, -however rough the metaphor, from one point of view the microscope is -one among a host of things seen from the outside; from the other point -of view all that we see is in the microscope, which is itself not seen -at all. - -It is in this latter sense that our mental equipment is looked at, when -it is regarded as knowledge; and it is in this sense that it forms a -panorama which absolutely shuts in every one of us into his own circle -of ideas. (It is not implied, we should carefully observe, that his -ideas or experience are in any way secondary to his self, or separable -from it, or an adjective of it.) Then how does it happen that our -separate worlds, the panoramas which we construct, do not contradict -one another? - -The answer is, that they _correspond_. It is this conception from -which we must start in Logic. We must learn to regard our separate -worlds of knowledge; as something constructed by definite processes, -and corresponding to each other in consequence of the common nature -of these processes. We know that we begin apart. We begin in fact, -though not conscious of our limits, with feelings and fancies and -unorganised experiences which give us little or no {18} common ground -and power of co-operation with other people. But as the constructive -process advances, the correspondence between our worlds is widened -and deepened, and the greater proportion of what we are obliged to -think is in harmony with what other people are obliged to think. Now -of course this would not be so unless reality, the whole actual system -in which we find ourselves, were self-consistent. But more than that, -it would not be so unless the nature of intelligence were the same in -every mind. It is this common nature of intelligence, together with its -differentiated adaptations to reality, that we have to deal with in -Logic. - -Thus the separate worlds, in which we are all shut up, must be -considered as corresponding so far as they are objective, that is, so -far as they approach what we are ultimately obliged to think. I say -“corresponding,” because that is the term which expresses the relation -between systems which represent the same thing by the same rules, -but with different starting-points. Drawings in perspective of the -same building from different points of view are such corresponding -systems; the parts represented answer each to each, but the same part -is near or large in one drawing, and distant and small in another; not, -however, by chance, but as a definite consequence of the same laws. -Our separate worlds may be compared to such drawings: the things in -them are identified by their relations and functions, so that we can -understand each other, _i.e._ make identical references, though my -drawing be taken from the east, and yours from the west. The things do -not look quite the same in our different worlds; besides being taken -from different standpoints, both drawings are imperfect and incorrect. -But so {19} long as we can make out the correspondence, we have a basis -for co-operation and for discussion. Logic shows us the principles and -processes by which, under the given influences, these drawings are -constructed. - -_Subjective Idealism_ - -8. If we merely hold to the doctrine of separate worlds, without -insisting upon their correspondence with each other and with reality, -we fall back into the position of subjective idealism, which is a -natural completion of common-sense theory, when, instead of turning -round to retrace its path, it runs deeper into the _cul-de-sac_. It -is a very obvious reflection, that each of us is shut up within his -own mind, and much easier to grasp than the reason for assuming a -real system which appears differently, though correspondingly, in the -centres of consciousness which are ourselves. We cannot get at anything -but in terms of consciousness; how can we justify the assumption that -our consciousness of a world of objects is rooted in reality, _e.g._, -that objects may rightly be treated as persisting and inter-acting -when our personal consciousness is withdrawn? And if we once doubt -this, then why should we assume that our ideas need be or tend to -be consistent with themselves and each other, as for the time they -apparently are? - -Subjective Idealism necessarily arises if the common-sense theory of -two worlds, the real outside the mind, and the ideal, copying it, -within the mind, is pushed to its conclusion. The real, outside the -mind, being inaccessible, falls away. The arguments of this Idealism, -as Hume said, “admit of no answer and produce no conviction.” [1] -But I {20} mention the idea, because I do not think that any one -can really understand the problem of Logic, or indeed of science in -general, without having thoroughly thought himself into the difficulty -of Subjective Idealism. It is necessary to be wholly dissatisfied with -common-sense theory, and with the notion of a ready-made world set up -for us to copy in the mind, before the logical analysis of intellectual -construction can have interest or meaning for us. And to produce this -dissatisfaction is the value of Subjective Idealism. - -[1] Vol. iv. p. 176 (ed. of 1854), _Inquiry concerning Human -Understanding_, sect. 12. - - - - -{21} - -LECTURE II “JUDGMENT” AS THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF A WORLD - -_Defect of Subjective Idealism_ - -1. The last lecture was devoted to explaining the distinction between -the stream of presentations and the world as it is for knowledge. -I ended by calling attention to the theory known as “Subjective -Idealism.” This, I said, has the merit of forcing upon us the question, -“How do we get from mind to reality? How do we get from subjective to -objective?” For we have always to remember that our knowledge _is_ -within consciousness, though it may _refer_ outside it. - -On the other hand, Subjective Idealism has the _defect_ of confounding -the very distinction which we took so much trouble to make plain. Its -essence lies in ascribing to the world of knowledge properties which -are only true of the stream of presentation. It is quite true that the -actual presentations of this room, which each of us has in his head -at this moment, are all different from each other, and different from -any which we have had before, and shall ever have again. Every minute, -every second, they differ; they are perishing existences, wholly -mental, and each of them when past is irrecoverably gone. That is the -property of a presentation within the course of consciousness. It is a -particular perishing existence. - -{22} But Subjective Idealism says, “Because these mental existences are -particular perishing existences, and all knowledge consists in them as -its medium, therefore the object of knowledge is nothing beyond these -mental facts, and is not rooted in a permanent system [1] independent -of our mental connections.” Here we must check the inference, and -reply, “No, it does not follow. The presentations which themselves come -and go may refer to something in common, and through them all we may -become aware of something that is not wholly in any of them.” In other -words, there is in Knowledge no passage _from_ subjective to objective, -but only a development of the objective. - -[1] Our estimate of Berkeley’s view must depend on the degree -in which we judge him to have identified the Deity with, or -separated Him from, a permanent and universal system. The -statement in the text applies fairly to Hume. - -_The world as_ Knowledge - -2. Therefore we say, coming closer to our subject, that “_Knowledge_ -is the medium in which our world, _as an interrelated whole_, [1] -exists for us.” This is more than saying that it exists in mind or -presentation, because the mere course of consciousness need not -amount to Knowledge. A world, that is, a system of things acting -on one another, could not exist merely in the course of our ideas. -But _Knowledge_, we said, is the mental construction of reality. It -consists of what we are obliged to assert in thought, and because we -are all obliged to think assertorily according to the same methods, -the results of our thinking form corresponding systems--systems that -correspond alike to each other and to reality. (I may be asked, does -not this agreement of {23} our knowledge depend on the agreement of -the physical stimuli supplied to us by nature, as well as on the -homogeneousness of our intelligences? The answer is, that these -stimuli, or nature, have no priority in Knowledge. Their identity is -merely a case or consequence of the identity of our experience as a -whole. We are regarding nature as a system developed in experience, not -as an unknown somewhat behind it. To suppose that solid or extended -existence somehow comes before and accounts for everything else, is a -form of the common-sense theory we have dismissed. Knowledge and Truth -have their limitations as forms of Reality, but an appeal to solidity -or extension will not furnish the required supplementation.) - -[1] The words italicised make a reservation in favour of -feeling, which has its own form of reality, but is not -relational. - -_Knowledge is in the form of Judgement_ - -3. All that we have been saying about Knowledge is summed up in the -sentence, “Knowledge is a judgment, an affirmation.” We need not -trouble ourselves yet about negation. We all know what affirmative -assertion is, and it is near enough for the present to say that all -knowledge is judgment in the sense of affirmative assertion. - -I will explain how we sum up all we have said of knowledge by calling -it a judgment. - -Judgment or affirmation always implies three properties, though they -are not always recognised. - -It is (a) necessary, (b) universal, and (c) constructive. - -_Judgment necessary_ - -(a) Judgment is necessary. In saying this, we express all that we said -about the objectivity of the world in knowledge. “Objective” meant, we -concluded, what we are obliged to think. And judgment is necessary, -because it expresses what we are obliged to think; obliged, that is, -not as we are obliged to feel pain, as an unexplained and {24} isolated -fact, but obliged by a necessity operative within the movement of our -consciousness, though not, of course, theoretically recognised as -necessity in common thinking. Thus, in the simplest phases of Judgment, -necessity does begin to approach the kind of necessity by which we feel -pain or are visited by persistent irrational associations. - -We can trace an explicit sense of necessity in any scientific matter, -or in any doubtful and complex matters in which we are aware of our own -reflections. We constantly hear and read such phrases as, “I am unable -to resist the conclusion”; “I am forced to believe”; “I am driven to -think”; “I have no alternative but to suppose.” These are every-day -phrases in controversy and in theoretical discussion. And what they all -mean is just what was insisted on in the last lecture; the objective or -real for us is what we are obliged to think. Given our perceptive state -and our mental equipment, the judgment follows. - -In trivial or simple judgments this necessity is harder to observe -within consciousness, and approaches more and more to the mere -constraint exercised upon us by physical reality. In a judgment of -mere sensuous comparison, such as a “colour-match,” the necessity is -not that of an intellectual system, but almost that of a feeling which -we cannot dispel. The chief intellectual labour is here negative, and -consists in precautions to remove all disturbing influences, both -mental and material, so as to let the perception operate freely on the -mind. But yet here _is_ necessity; we never for a moment think that we -can modify the result; our aim is simply to distinguish from all others -the particular strand of necessity by which we desire to be guided. - -{25} It is easy for an observer to detect intellectual necessity in -judgment, even where the judging subject is wholly unreflective. If -you contradict an obvious judgment made by an uneducated man, he will -no doubt be quite unable to point out the intellectual necessity -which constrains him to it, _i.e._ to argue in support of it; but he -will be bewildered and probably indignant, which shows that, unknown -to himself, his whole intellectual existence is really impeached by -impeachment of a necessary conclusion from it. Many people cannot see -the difference between impeaching their argument and impeaching their -veracity; and this confusion arises, I presume, from a just feeling -that their whole mind is on its trial in the one case as in the other, -although they do not distinguish between the forms of its action which -are concerned. We are told, indeed, in formal logic, that ordinary -statements of fact do not claim necessity; but this merely arises -from confining necessity to explicit necessity expressed in a special -grammatical form. - -But, it may be objected, we do not always feel that every trivial -judgment emanates from and so implicates our whole mental constitution -and equipment. If I say to a friend, “I saw you at Charing Cross -yesterday,” and he says, “No, you could not, for I was out of town,” -then, unless I was very certain indeed, I should admit having made a -mistake, and think no more about the matter. That only means, (1) that -the unity of the mind is not thoroughly complete--there are many more -or less detached systems in the mind, and one of them may not be very -deeply inwrought in the whole intellectual frame; and (2) the necessity -of thought may itself modify the certainty of the fact, _e.g._ I know -that {26} a mistake of identity is quite a common thing, and this -knowledge co-operates with my friend’s denial. - -But in any perceptive judgment, however unimportant its immediate -content, if it is clear and persistent, a contradiction is a most -serious thing. There is a well-known form of bewilderment connected -with the judgment of direction; if you forget or do not know of a turn -that you have taken, and come out, for example, on familiar ground from -the North when you think you are coming on it from the South, so that -objects have the reverse position of what you expected, then, supposing -that you cannot explain the contradiction, the result is sometimes -a very grave perplexity; some men are quite unhinged by it for the -moment, and a psychologist in France [1] has given it a new name, -“Vertigo of Direction.” This again shows how your whole intellectual -nature is staked upon the most trifling perception, and if you seem to -be forced to a flat contradiction even in the simplest judgment you are -almost “beside yourself.” - -[1] M. Binet. See _Mind_, x. 156. - -_Judgment universal_ - -(b) Judgment is universal. There are different senses of “universal” as -of “necessary.” We are now speaking only in the widest sense, in which -universality is a property of all judgment whatever. If we assume that -all our intellectual natures are the same, then to be universal is a -mere consequence of being necessary. I not only feel that my judgment -is inevitable for me, but I never think of doubting that, given the -same materials, it is obligatory for every other intelligent being. -If some one disagrees with a judgment of mine, I try to put the case -before him as it is in my mind. And I am absolutely sure that if I -could do so, he {27} would be obliged to judge as I do. If it were not -so, we should never think of arguing. We should simply say, “Perhaps -his mind is differently constituted from mine,” as, in fact, with -reference to special sets of dominant ideas, and to special provinces -of experience, we often do say. But these we regard as hindrances, -imperfections, accidents. We do not doubt that the system of reason is -active in him as in us. - -And thus, as reason is essentially a system, the universality of -judgment involves something more. We not only think that our judgment -is obligatory upon every one else, in as far as they have the same -materials, but we think that it must be _consistent with_ the -judgments of all other persons, just as much as with our own. If it -is inconsistent with any other judgment, we think that one of the two -must be wrong; that is, we will not admit the possibility that the real -world, as others construct it, is out of harmony with the real world as -we construct it. - -Thus knowledge, being judgment, is necessary and universal, and in the -widest sense this is true of all judgments. - -_Judgment is constructive_ - -(c) These are two properties of the Judgment, but they do not tell us -what it is. We shall of course examine its nature more fully in the -later lectures. At present we need only think of it as affirmation. -This may be simply described as “pronouncing the interpretation of our -perceptions to form one system with the data of our perceptions.” We -may at once admit the distinction between _data_ and interpretation to -be only relative. Its relativity is the consequence of the constructed -or so to speak artificial {28} character of our real world. We can get -at no data unqualified by judgment. - -We may take as an example our perception of things in space. How -much of what we see is given in present sense-perception? This is a -question to which there is no definite answer. We do not know what -the presentations of vision were like before we had learnt to see as -a fully conscious human being sees. We have no right to assume, that -after we have learned to see in this way the actual sense-presentation -remains the same as it was in a different stage of our visual -education. We can give no precise meaning in the way of a time-limit -to the _presentness_ of perception. But we know this much, that it -takes a long time and many kinds of experience to learn to see as an -educated human being sees, and that this acquired capacity is never at -a stand-still, but is always being extended or diminished according to -the vitality, growth, or atrophy of our apperceptive masses. There is -always a certain element of amplification or interpretation, which by -experience, or attentive introspection we can eliminate from the data, -apparently forced upon us by reality, although these data themselves -are modified through and through both by habitual interpretation, -and by the very defining attention which aims at eliminating all -amplification from them. - -But yet the whole of sense-perception has a peculiar quality in being -_present_. Artificial though it is, it yet, relatively speaking, -contains an irreducible datum. It is distinguishable from everything -which is not present. It is pervaded by something which we cannot -reduce to {29} intellectual relation, though if we withdrew from it all -that is relation, the apparent datum would be gone. - -Now Knowledge is the affirmation or judgment which identifies the -constructive interpretation of our present perception with the reality -which present perception forces upon us. This is clear enough to begin -with, but will have to be modified below to suit the more circuitous or -mediate types of Judgment. - -I take two examples, one from sight and one from sound. - -Here is a table. In common language we should all say, “We see that -is a table.” The expression is quite correct, because human seeing -is a judgment. But yet, if you were asked to reduce your perception -to terms of sight pure and simple--I mean of visual sensation--why, -unless you were an analytic psychologist or a very skilful artist, -you would not be able to do it. To speak of one point only, you would -have to eliminate the attribute of depth and distance. That is all, so -far as mere vision is concerned, your theory and your interpretation. -The problem for an artist is to get back, at his high plane of -perceptive power, to what in theory would be the lower plane. He has to -re-translate his perception of a thing in space into a flat coloured -surface. The difference between his flat picture and a real object in -space is a rough measure of the difference made by interpretation or -implication in the datum of sense-perception when we say, judging by -sight only, “That is a table.” All the experiences of touch and motion, -from which we have learned to perceive the solidity of the object, are, -theoretically speaking, put into the judgment by us. They are not given -by the eye alone, although we cannot now {30} separate them from that -which is given by the eye alone. For the artist’s flat picture, which -I used as an illustration, is not a stage in our visual education. -Our visual education has proceeded _pari passu_ with our education by -touch and motion; and we saw objects in space as solids, long before -we reflected that for the eye alone a coloured surface would naturally -appear as flat. [1] - -[1] The view that depth is a visual datum in the same sense as -breadth seems to me in flagrant contradiction with experience. -But for our present purpose the question is only one of degree, -as no one maintains, that either depth or breadth are seen -without education as an adult sees them. - -But this impossibility of getting at an original datum only shows -how entirely we are right in saying that our world is constructed -by judgment. For the process of interpretative amplification passes -quite continuously from the unconscious to the conscious; and every -definitely expressed judgment, though perfectly homogeneous with the -processes which have qualified its datum, and though it may fall -wholly within the maximum of what in ordinary parlance we should call -a simple given perception, contains an identification of some ideal -element, enlargement, or interpretation, with that relatively given -element which reveals itself through a peculiar quality of presentness -pervading the “given” perception. - -In the example “That is a table,” the unity of judgment is so well -shown that the identification becomes almost unreal. In fact, we never -judge except to satisfy an interest and so simple a judgment used as an -example, apart from any context which could explain the need for it, -has an air of unreality. You may hear a child make such a judgment {31} -constantly in the sheer pleasure of recognition. An adult would never -make it explicitly unless in some particular context; but it is made, -as I shall maintain below, by the mere glance of his eye which takes in -the table as a real object in a real world of space. Its appearance to -the eye is in this case the datum, while the interpretation consists in -construing this appearance as a solid individual existence in space. - -We will look at an example in which the discrimination of elements is -easier. Take the affirmation, “That is a cab,” assuming it to be made -from merely hearing a sound. In this we can much more nearly separate -the datum or minimum of sense from our enlargement or interpretation -of it, and we know that our interpretation is liable to be wrong; -that is to say, the reality into which we ought to construe the sound -may be some other kind of vehicle, and not a cab. Now compare this -with the affirmation, “That (which I see) is a cab.” This judgment of -sight-perception, though its terms are more inextricably interwoven, -has just the same elements in it as the judgment of sound-perception, -“That (which I hear) is a cab.” In the sound-perception the structure -is quite plain. A particular complex quality in the sound suggests as -its objective explanation, what is perfectly distinguishable from it in -thought, the movement of a cab on a particular kind of pavement. The -quality of the sound, its roughness, loudness, increase and decrease, -all form points of connection with the sound of a cab as we know it, -and with the speed, weight, etc. of such a vehicle. But it is quite -easy to consider the sound in itself apart from its interpretation, and -we sometimes feel the {32} interpretation to be more immediate, and -sometimes more inferential. We sometimes say, “I hear a cab,” just as -we say, “I see one,” but in case of sound we more often perhaps say, -“That sounds like--” such and such a thing, which indicates a doubt, -and the beginning of conscious inference. - -Thus we see how continuous is the mental construction of reality. -From our unreflective education in seeing, hearing, and touching, to -the explicit judgment of the trained observer, which in its turn -passes readily into inference, there is no definite break. Once the -idea of reality, or of a world, is applied in practice (I do not say -reflectively grasped), there is no further difficulty in principle -throughout the whole process of its construction. - -We may then sum up so far: our knowledge, or our world in knowledge, -exists for us as a judgment, that is, as an affirmation in which our -present perception is amplified by an ideal interpretation which is -identified with it. This interpretation or enlargement claims necessity -or universality, and is therefore objective as our world, _i.e._ is -what we are _obliged_ to think, and what we are _all_ obliged to -think. The whole system in process of construction, viz. our present -perception as extended by interpretation, is what we mean by reality, -only with a reservation in favour of forms of experience which are -not intellectual at all. Every judgment then affirms something to be -real, and therefore affirms reality to be defined, in part, by that -something. Knowledge exists in the form of affirmations about reality. -And our world as existing for us in the medium of knowledge consists, -for us, of a standing affirmation about reality. - -{33} _Continuous affirmation of waking consciousness_ - -4. This standing affirmation about reality may be described in -other words as “the continuous affirmative judgment of the waking -consciousness.” In the common logic-books you will find judgment -treated only as the “proposition,” that is, as an assertion made in -language. That is a very convenient way of treating the judgment, -and is not false, if you remember that the proposition, that is, the -assertory sentence, is rather a translation of the judgment than the -judgment itself. But the judgment expressed in a proposition is always -some one definite assertion, with a limited subject and predicate. We -shall speak of the judgment in this sense--the usual sense--later. But -to-day I want to describe the judgment in a more extended sense, that -is, as co-extensive with the waking human consciousness, so far as -aware of a world. - -If Judgment consists in the extension of our perceptions by an -interpretation considered as equally real with their content, it -clearly is not confined to the particular facts and truths which from -time to time we utter in language. And more than this, everything that -we do definitely utter, implies a great deal which is not definitely -uttered. If I say, “I have to catch the train at Sloane Square to go -down to Essex Hall,” I only mention the reality of one train, one -square, and one building. But my assertion shades off into innumerable -facts, the equal reality of which as elements in my world is necessary -to make this judgment intelligible and true. It implies the real -existence of the underground railway, which implies that of London, and -therefore that of the surface of our globe in a certain definite order, -and of the civilised world. It implies the reality of this building and -of the meetings which we hold in it, of the University {34} Extension -system, and of my own life and habits as enabling me to take part in -the work of that system. Only a part of this is in the focus of my -attention as I judge; but the whole is a continuous context, the parts -of which are inseparable; and although I do not affirm the whole of it -in so many words, when I say that I am coming down here by train this -evening, yet if any part of it was not affirmed the rest would, so to -speak, fall to pieces, _i.e._ would lose relations in the absence of -which its meaning would be destroyed. Other detached parts of one’s -life and knowledge may seem to be separable from the content of such -a judgment; but on looking closely we see that this is not the case. -So long as we are awake, our whole world is conceived as real, and -forms for us a single immense affirmation, which hangs from present -perception, and shares its constraining power. My present perception -is the illuminated spot, and shades off gradually into the rest which -forms the background, receiving from this background its organised -systematic individuality, while impressing upon it a relation to -its own sensuous presentness. We have only to reflect, in order to -illustrate this connection, on the way in which the idea of London -forms a determining background for the present perception of this -room, while on the other hand it is perceived by us as real in our -presentation of this room. - -And indeed the simplest example of what I am pointing out is the -arrangement of objects and places in space. The visual picture which -each of us forms of this room is certainly an affirmative judgment. It -is a judgment because it consists of ideas affirmed as true of reality. -As we look round, all the distances of the objects and the walls from -{35} each other, and their shapes and position, seem to be imprinted on -our minds without an effort. But really they are conclusions from long -education in the art of seeing and from the experience of the other -senses. They are an enlargement or interpretation of sense-perception, -taken as real, _i.e._ as forming a system which is one with the -content of sense-perception, and touches us through sense-perception, -and therefore they exist for us in the form of Judgment. And, as I -described before, our whole world, both of things in space and of our -own history and circumstances, is also affirmed as the background -implied in this picture. That is to say, it is all connected together, -it is all taken as equally real, and it is all vouched for by its -connection with what is given to us in perception. What do we mean by -saying that the Antipodes are real, and implied in my perception of -this room? We mean that they are an element, necessary to educated -thought, in the same system with which I am in contact at this moment -by sight, touch, and hearing, the system of reality. And though I may -not have explicitly thoughts of them since entering the room till now, -yet, if they were no part of my affirmed system of ideas, my perception -of anything in space would be quite different from what it is. - -This sense of necessary connection is confined, I think, to our -_waking_ consciousness. Of course there are degrees between waking and -dreaming; but I should be inclined to set up the presence or absence -of judgment as a very fair test of those degrees. We say that a man -is _awake_ in as far as he is aware (i) of a reality which is not his -mere course of consciousness, and (ii.) of the same reality of which -other {36} people are aware; _i.e._ in as far as he identifies his -present perception with a reality, and that the real reality. It is -said that surprise, _i.e._ the sense of conflict between expectation -and the reality, is absent In dreams, and in a very remarkable passage -Aeschylus identifies the life of the savage in his (imaginary) -primitive state with a dream-life, considered as a life of sensuous -presentation, in which the interpretative judgment of perception was -absent. With extraordinary profoundness, in portraying this all but -animal existence, he strikes out all those relations to the objective -world by which man forms for himself a system that goes beyond the -present, so as to leave the stream of presentation without any -background of organised reality. [1] - -[1] I quote from Mrs. Browning’s Translation of the _Prometheus -Bound_, which seems close enough for the present purpose. - - “And let me tell you, not as taunting men, - But teaching you the intention of my gifts, - How first, _beholding, they beheld in vain. - And hearing, heard not, but, like shapes in dreams_, - Mixed all things wildly down the tedious time, - Nor knew to build a house against the sun - With wicketed sides, nor any woodwork knew, - But lived, like silly ants, beneath the ground, - In hollow caves unsunned. There came to them - No steadfast sign of winter, nor of spring - Flower-perfumed, nor of summer full of fruit. - But blindly and lawlessly they did all things, - Until I taught them how the stars do rise - And set in mystery, and devised for them - Number, the inducer of philosophies. - The synthesis of letters, and besides, - The artificer of all things, Memory, - That sweet muse-mother.” _Pr_., v. 445, ff. - -The expression “seeing saw not, and hearing heard not” appears to -suggest the contrast of presentation and objective perception. - -{37} It may be asked, “Why should not a man form for himself a system -which interprets his own perception, but is discrepant from the system -of every one else? Should we in that case count him as awake?” Yes, he -would be awake, but he would be mad. Suppose, being a common man, he -interprets all his perceptions into a system which makes him out to -be King of England; in such a case he cannot be set down as dreaming, -because he is alleging a connection which goes beyond his present -perception, and has, ostensibly, been propounded as an interpretation -of it into a systematic order of things. He has in short _a_ world, but -he has broken away from _the_ world, and therefore we pronounce him -mad. A completely new vision of life may cause a man to be thought mad. -[1] - -[1] See Browning’s _Epistle of Karshish_. - -The whole world, then, of our waking [1] consciousness may be treated -as a single connected predicate affirmed as an enlargement of present -perception. All that we take to be real is by the mere fact of being so -taken, brought within an affirmative judgment. - -[1] I do not mean to say that judgment and consciousness of -a world can be wholly absent in dreams, and often no doubt -they are distinctly present. But in those dreams, in my own -experience the normal ones, which leave behind a mere impression -that unrecognisable images have passed before the mind, judgment -and the sense of reality must surely have all but disappeared. I -am inclined to think that dreams are very much rationalised in -recollection and description. - -_Comparison with world as Will_ - -5. To further illustrate the relation of what, in our permanent -judgment, is distinctly thought, what is dimly thought, and what is -implied, let us look for a moment at what we may call “the world -as will.” This is _not_ the doctrine of Schopenhauer in his work, -_The World as Will and Idea_, {38} although the two conceptions have -something in common. His is a metaphysical doctrine, in which he says -that the fundamental reality of the Universe must be conceived as -Will. We have nothing to do with that. We are speaking merely of what -the world is for us, and for us it is not only a system of reality -but a system of purposes. Our world of will is a permanent factor of -our waking consciousness, just as much as our world of knowledge. -Now our will is made up of a great number of purposes, more or less -connected together, just as our knowledge is made up of a great number -of provinces and regions more or less connected together. And just as -in our knowledge at any moment much is clear, much is dim, much is -implied, and the whole forms a continuous context, so it is with our -purposes. - -When, for example, one stands looking at a picture, one’s immediate -conscious purpose is to study the picture. One also entertains dimly or -by force of habit the purpose to remain standing, which is a curious -though common instance of will. We do not attend to the purpose of -walking or standing, yet we only walk or stand (in normal conditions -of mind) as long as we will to do so. If we go to sleep or faint, we -shall fall down. Purpose, like judgment, is confined to the waking -consciousness. - -But further; the purpose which one entertains in standing to look at a -picture is not really an isolated pin-point of will. It is uppermost -in the mind at the moment in which we carry it out, but it is only the -uppermost stratum, or perhaps rather the present point attained upon a -definite road, within an intricate formation or network of purposes, -which taken together constitute the world of will. The purpose of -looking {39} at a picture shades off into the more general purpose of -learning to take pleasure in what is good of its kind, which is again -set in a certain place within the conception of our life and the way -in which we desire to spend it, and our purposes throughout every -particular day are fitted into one another, and give a particular -setting and colour to each other, and to each particular day, and week, -and year. - -Now less or more of all this may be clearly in the mind when we are -carrying out a particular momentary aim. But it is quite certain that -in a human life the particular momentary aim derives its significance -from this background of other purposes; and, if they were to fall away, -the distinct momentary purpose would change its character and become -quite a feeble and empty thing. - -Thus we have, in our world of will, a parallel case which illustrates -the nature of our world of knowledge. There is the clear will to look -at the picture, the dim will to continue standing, and the implied will -to carry out certain general aims, and follow a certain routine or -course of life, which gives the momentary purpose its entire setting -and background. - -I have spoken of the will in order to illustrate the judgment, because -the dim and implied elements are perhaps more easy to observe in the -case of the will. Almost all our common waking life is carried on by -actions such as walking and sitting, which we hardly know that we -will, but which we could not do if we did not will them. And also the -greater part of our life is rather within a sphere of will which has -become objective for us in our profession, interests, and ideals, than -a perpetual active choice between {40} alternatives such as brings the -act of volition before us in the most striking way. Just so it is with -judgment. Our speaking and writing is a very small part of our judging, -just as our conscious choice between alternatives [1] is a very small -part of our willing. - -[1] I do not for a moment suggest that our “conscious choice” is -ultimately different in kind from our habitual persistence in a -course of life. I only take it as an instance in which we fully -attend to our volition. - -_Distribution of Attention_ - -6. Thus the world of knowledge and the world of will must each of them -be regarded as a _continuum_ for the waking consciousness. Whenever -we are awake, we are judging; whenever we are awake we are willing. -The distribution of attention in these two worlds is very closely -analogous. In both, it is impossible to attend to our whole world at -the same moment. But in both, our world is taken as being a single -connected system; and therefore (i.) attention shades off gradually -from the momentary focus of illumination into less and less intensity -over the other parts of the continuous judgment or purpose; but (ii.) -that which is _in_ the focus of attention depends for its quality upon -that which is less distinctly or not at all in the focus of attention. -And as attention diminishes in intensity, the implication of reality -does not diminish with it. In other words, in spite of the inequality -of attention, the reality of our whole world is implied in the reality -of which at any moment we are distinctly aware. But being distinctly -aware of reality is another name for judgment. - -Now the common logical judgments which we shall have to analyse -and classify are simply those parts of this continuous affirmation -of consciousness which are from time {41} to time separately made -distinct. Each of them therefore must be regarded as a partial -expression of the nature of reality, and the subject will always be -Reality in one form, and the predicate reality in another form. The -ultimate and complete judgment would be the whole of Reality predicated -of itself. All our logical judgments are such portions and fragments -of this judgment as we can grasp at the moment. Some of these gather -up in a system whole provinces of reality, others merely enlarge, -interpret, or analyse the content of a very simple sense-perception. -We shall not go far wrong in practice if we start from this judgment -of Perception as the fundamental kind of Judgment. The real subject in -Judgment is always Reality in some particular datum or qualification, -and the tendency of Judgment is always to be a definition of Reality. -We see the parts of Judgment most clearly in such thoughts as “This is -blue”; “This is a flower”; “That light is the rising sun”; “That sound -is the surf on a sandy shore.” In these we can plainly distinguish the -element of presentation and the interpretative construction or analytic -synthesis which is by the judgment identified with it. - - - - -{42} - -LECTURE III THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO KNOWLEDGE - -_Meaning of “Form”_ - -1. I spoke of the whole world, which we take to be real, as presented -to us in the shape of a continuous judgment. It is the task of Logic -to analyse the structure of this Judgment, the parts of which are -Judgments. - -The first thing is then to consider what sort of properties of -Judgments we attend to in Logic. It is commonly said that Logic is a -formal science; that is, that it deals with the form, and not with the -content or matter of knowledge. - -This word “form” is always meeting us in philosophy. “Species” is Latin -for form, as εἶδος and ἰδεα [1] are Greek for form. The form of any -object primarily means its appearance, that which the mind can carry -away, while the object as a physical reality, as material, remains -where it was. It need not mean shape as opposed to colour; that is a -narrower usage. The Greek opinion was no doubt rooted in some such -notion as that in knowing or remembering a thing the mind possessed -its form or image without its matter. Thus the form came to stand for -the knowable shape or structure which makes a thing what it is, and by -which we recognise it when we see it. This was its species or its idea, -the “image,” as it is used in the phrase, “Let us make man in our own -image.” So in any work of the hands {43} of man, the form was the shape -given by the workman, and came out of his mind, while the matter was -the stuff or material out of which the thing was made. - -[1] [= “eidos” and “idea”. Tr.] - -The moment we contemplate a classification of the sciences, we see -that this is a purely relative distinction. There is no matter without -form. If it was in this deep sense without form, it would be without -properties, and so incapable of acting or being acted upon. In a -knife the matter is steel, the form is the shape of the blade. But -the qualities of steel again depend, we must suppose, upon a certain -character and arrangement in its particles, and this is, as Bacon would -have called it, the _form_ of steel. But taken as purely relative, -the distinction is good _prima facie_. Steel has its own form, but -the knife has its form, and the matter steel can take many other -forms besides that of a knife. Marble has its own form, its definable -properties as marble (chemical and mechanical), but in a statue, marble -is the matter, and the form is the shape given by the sculptor. - -Now applying this distinction to knowledge in general, we see that -all science is formal, and therefore it is no distinction to say that -Logic is a formal science. Geometry is a formal science; even molecular -physics is a formal science. All science is formal, because all science -consists in tracing out the universal characteristics of things, the -structure that makes them what they are. - -The particular “form,” then, with which a science deals is simply the -kind of properties that come under the point of view from which that -science in particular looks at things. But a very general science is -more emphatically formal than {44} a very special science. That is to -say, it deals with properties which are presented in some degree by -everything; and so in every object a great multitude of properties -are disregarded by it, are treated by it as matter and not as form. -In this sense Logic is emphatically “formal,” though not nearly so -formal as it is often supposed to be. The subject-matter of Logic, -then, is Knowledge _qua_ Knowledge, or the form of knowledge; that is, -the properties which are possessed by objects or ideas _in so far as -they are members of the world of knowledge_. And it is quite essential -to distinguish the form of knowledge in this sense from its matter or -content. The “matter” of knowledge is the whole region of facts dealt -with by science and perception. If Logic dealt with this in the way in -which knowledge deals with it, _i.e._ simply as a process of acquiring -and organising experience, then Logic would simply be another name for -the whole range of science, history, and perception. Then there would -be no distinction between logic and science or common sense, and in -trying to ascertain, say, the wave-length of red light, or the cab-fare -from Chelsea to Essex Hall, we should be investigating a logical -problem. But we see at once that this is not what we mean by studying -knowledge as knowledge. Science or common sense aims at a particular -answer to each problem of this kind. Logic aims at understanding -the type and principles both of the problem and of its answer. The -details of the particular answer are the “_matter_ of fact.” The type -and principles which are found in all such particular answers may be -regarded as the form of fact, _i.e._ that which makes the fact a fact -in knowledge. - -Jevons appears to me to make a terrible blunder at this {45} point. He -says [1]--“One name which has been given to Logic, namely the Science -of Sciences, very aptly describes the all-extensive power of logical -principles. The cultivators of special branches of knowledge appear -to have been fully aware of the allegiance they owe to the highest -of the sciences, for they have usually given names implying this -allegiance. The very name of Logic occurs as part of nearly all the -names adopted for the sciences, which are often vulgarly called the -‘ologies,’ but are really the ‘logics,’ the ‘o’ being only a connecting -vowel or part of the previous word. Thus geology is logic applied to -explain the formation of the earth’s crust; biology is logic applied -to the phenomena of life; psychology is logic applied to the nature -of the mind; and the same is the case with physiology, entomology, -zoology, teratology, morphology, anthropology, theology, ecclesiology, -thalattology, and the rest. Each science is thus distinctly confessed -to be a special logic. The name of Logic itself is derived from the -common Greek word λόγος, which usually means _word_, or the sign and -outward manifestation of any inward thought. But the same word was -also used to denote the inward thought or reasoning of which words are -the expression, and it is thus probably that later Greek writers on -reasoning were led to call their science ἐπιστήμη λογική, or logical -science, also τέχνη λογική or logical art. [2] The adjective λογική, -being used alone, soon came to be the name of the science, just as -Mathematic, Rhetoric, and other names ending in ‘ic’ were originally -adjectives, but have been converted into substantives.” - -[1] _Elementary Lessons_, p. 6. - -[2] [= “logos”, “episteme logike”, “techne logike” and “logike”. Tr.] - -{46} This account of the connection between the name “Logic” and the -terminations of the names of the sciences appears precisely wrong. -Whatever may have been the exact meaning of the expression “Logic,” -or “Logical curriculum,” [1] or “art,” or “science” when first -employed, there can be no doubt that the word logical had a substantive -reference to that about which the science or teaching in question -was to treat. The term “logic,” therefore, corresponds not to the -syllables “logy” in such a word as “Zoology,” but to the syllables -“Zoo,” which indicate the province of the special science, and not -its character as a science. Zoology means connected discourse (λόγος) -about living creatures. Logic meant a curriculum, or science or art -dealing with connected discourse. The phrase “Science of Sciences,” -rightly interpreted, has the same meaning. It does not mean that Logic -is a Science which comprises all the special sciences, but that Logic -is a Science dealing with those general properties and relations which -all sciences _qua_ sciences have in common, but omitting, as from its -point of view matter and not form, the particular details of content by -which every science answers the particular questions which it asks. It -is wild, and most mischievous, to say that “every science is a special -logic,” or that “biology is Logic applied to the phenomena of life.” -This confusion destroys the whole disinterestedness which is necessary -to true scientific Logic, and causes the logical student always to have -his eye on puzzles, and special methods, and interferences by which he -may teach the student of science how to perform the concrete labour -of research. We quite admit that {47} a looker-on may _sometimes_ see -more of the game, and no wise investigator would contemn _a priori_ -the suggestions of a student like Goethe, or Mill, or Lotze, because -their author was not exclusively engaged in the observation of -nature. But all this is secondary. The idea that Logic is a judge of -scientific results, able to pass sentence, in virtue of some general -criterion, upon their validity and invalidity, arises from a deep-lying -misconception of the nature of truth which naturally allies itself with -the above confusion between Logic and the special sciences. - -[1] πραγμάτεια [= pragmateia Tr.]. See Prantl, i. 545. - -Therefore the relation between content or matter of knowledge, and -the form which is its general characteristic as knowledge, is of -this kind. We can either study the objects of knowledge directly as -we perceive them, or indirectly, as examples of the way in which we -know. As studied for their own sake, they are regarded as the matter -or content in which the general form of knowledge finds individual -realisation. In botany, for instance, we have a large number of actual -plants classified and explained in their relation to one another. -A botanist is interested directly in the affinities and evolution -of these plants, and in the principles of biology which underlie -their history. He pushes his researches further and further into -the individual matters that come to light, without, as a rule, more -than a passing reflection upon the abstract nature of the methods -which he is creating as his work proceeds. He classifies, explains, -observes, experiments, theorises, generalises, to the best of his -power, solely in order to grasp and render intelligible the region of -concrete fact that lies before him. Now while his particular results -and discoveries {48} constitute the “form” or knowable properties of -the plant-world _as the object of botanical science_, the science -which inquires into the general nature of knowledge must treat these -particular results as “mere matter”--as something with which it is -not directly concerned, any more than the art which makes a statue -is primarily and directly concerned with the chemical and mechanical -properties of marble. The “form” or knowable properties with which the -general science of knowledge is directly concerned, consists in those -methods and processes which the man of science, developing the modes -in which common sense naturally works, constructs unconsciously as he -goes along. Thus, not the nature and affinities of the plant-world, -but classification, explanation, observation, experiment, theory, are -the phenomena in virtue of which the organised structure of botanical -science participates in the form of knowledge, and its objects become, -in these respects, objects of logical theory. - -Hence some properties and relations of objects, being the form or -knowable structure of the concrete objects as a special department of -nature, correspond to the mere matter, stuff, or content of Knowledge -in general, while other properties and relations of objects, being -their form or knowable structure as entering into a world of reality -displayed to our intelligence, correspond to the form of Knowledge as -treated of by a general inquiry into its characteristics, which we -call Logic. It is just as the qualities or “forms” of the different -metals of which knives can be made are mere matter or irrelevant detail -when we are discussing the general “form” or quality of a good knife, -{49} whatever its material. A reservation on this head appears in the -following section. - -_Form of Knowledge dependent on Content_ - -2. For the form of Knowledge depends in some degree upon its matter. -It is very important to realise this truth; for if Logic is swamped -by being identified with the whole range of special sciences, it is -killed by being emptied of all adaptation to living intelligence. What -is called Formal Logic _par excellence_ in all its shapes, whether -antiquated as in Hamilton’s or Thomson’s Formal Laws of Thought, -or freshly worked out on a symbolic basis as by Boole and others, -has, it appears to me, this initial defect, _when considered as a -general theory of Logic_. As a contribution to such a theory, every -method which will work undoubtedly has its place, and indicates and -depends upon some characteristic of real thought. But in the central -theory itself, and especially in so short an account of it as must -be attempted in these lectures, I should be inclined to condemn all -attempts to employ symbols for anything more than the most passing -illustration of points in logical processes. All such attempts, I must -maintain, share with the old-fashioned laws of Identity, Contradiction, -and Excluded Middle the initial fallacy of representing a judgment -by something which is not and cannot be in any way an adequate -symbol of one. If, in order to get at the pure form of Knowledge, -we restrict ourselves to very abstract characteristics in which all -knowledge appears, very roughly speaking, to agree, and which can be -symbolized for working purposes by combinations of signs which have -not the essential properties of ideal contents, then we have _ab -initio_ substituted for the judgment something which is a very {50} -abstract corollary from the nature of judgment, and may or not for -certain purposes and within certain limits be a fair representative -of it. We cannot and must not exclude from the form of Knowledge its -modifications according to “matter,” and its nature as existing only in -“matter.” - -In fact, the peculiar “form” of _everything_ depends in some degree -on its “matter.” A statue in marble is a little differently treated -if it is copied in bronze. A knife is properly made of steel; you -can only make a bad one of iron, or copper, or flint, and you cannot -make one at all of wax. Different matters will more or less take the -same form, but only within certain limits. So it is in Knowledge. The -_nature of objects as Knowledge_--for we _must_ remember that “form” -in our sense is not something put into the “matter,” something alien -or indifferent to it, but is simply its own inmost character revealed -by the structural relations in which it is found capable of standing -[1]--depends on the way in which their parts are connected together. - -[1] The example of the marble statue may seem to contradict -this idea; and no doubt the indifference of matter to form is -a question of degree. But the feeling for material is a most -important element in fine art; and in knowledge there is only a -relative distinction between formal and material relations. - -Let us compare, for example, the use of number in understanding objects -of different kinds. - -Suppose there are four books in a heap on the table. This heap of -books is the object. We desire to conceive it as a whole consisting -of parts. In order to do so we simply _count_ them “one, two, three, -_four_ books.” If one is taken away, there is one less to count; if -one is added, there is one more. But the books themselves, as books, -are not {51} altered by taking away one from them or adding one to -them. They are parts indifferent to each other, forming a heap which is -sufficiently analysed or synthesised by counting its parts. - -But now instead of four books in a heap, let us think of the four -sides of a square. Of course we _can_ count them, as we counted the -books; but we have not conceived the nature of the square by counting -its sides. That does not distinguish it from four straight lines drawn -anyhow in space. In order to appreciate what a square is, we must -consider that the sides are _equal_ straight lines, put together in a -particular way so as to make a figure with four right angles; we must -distinguish it from a figure with four equal sides, but its angles not -right angles, and from a four-sided figure with right angles, but with -only its opposite sides equal; and note that if we shorten up one side -into nothing, the square becomes a triangle, with altogether different -properties from those of a square; if we put in another side it becomes -a pentagon, and so on. - -These two things, the heap of books and the square, are _prima -facie_ objects of perception. We commonly speak of a diagram on a -blackboard or in a book as “a square” if we have reason to take it -as approximately exact, and as intended for a square. But on looking -closer, we soon see that the “matter,” or individual attributes, of -each of these objects of our apprehension demands a different form of -knowledge from that necessary to the other. The judgment “_This_ heap -of books has four books in it” is a judgment of enumerative perception. -The judgment “_The_ square has four sides” is a judgment of systematic -necessity. - -{52} Why did we not keep the two judgments in the same logical shape? -Why did we say “_This_ heap” and “_The_ square”? Why did we not say -“this” in both propositions, or “the” in both propositions? Because -the different “matter” demands this difference of form. Let us try. -“The heap of books has four books in it.” Probably we interpret this -proposition to mean just the same as if we had said “This heap.” That -is owing to the fact that the judgment naturally occurs to us in its -right form. But if we interpret “The heap” on the analogy of our -interpretation of “The square,” our judgment will have become false. - -It will have come to mean “Every heap of books has four books in it,” -and a judgment of perception will not bear this enlargement. The -subject is composite, and one, the most essential of its elements, is -destroyed by the change from “this” to “the.” - -Let us try again. Let us say “This square has four sides.” That is -not exactly false, but it is ridiculous. Every square must have four -sides, and by saying “this square” we strongly imply that foursidedness -is a relation of which we are aware chiefly, if not exclusively, in -the object attended to in the moment of judging, simply through the -apprehension of that moment. By this implication the form of the -judgment abandons and all but denies the character of systematic -necessity which its content naturally demands. It is like saying, “It -appears to me that in the present instance two and two make four.” The -number of sides in a square, then, is not a mere fact of perception, -while the number of books in a heap is such a fact. - -But you may answer by suggesting the case that an {53} uninstructed -person--say a child, with a square figure before him, and having heard -the name square applied to figures generally resembling that figure, -may simply observe the number of sides, without knowing any of the -geometrical properties connected with it; will he not then be right in -saying, “This square has four sides”? - -Certainly not. In that case he has no right to call it a square. -It would only be a name he had picked up without knowing what it -meant. All he has the right to say would be, “This object” or “This -figure has four sides.” That would be a consistent judgment of mere -perception, true as far as it went. It is always possible to apprehend -the more complex objects of knowledge in the simpler forms; but then -they are not apprehended adequately, not _as_ complex objects. It is -also possible to apply very complex forms of knowledge to very simple -objects. Most truths that can be laid down quite in the abstract about -a human mind could also be applied in some sense or other to any speck -of protoplasm, or to any pebble on the seashore. And every simple -form of knowledge is always being pushed on, by its own defects and -inconsistencies, in the direction of more complex forms. - -So far I have been trying to show that objects are capable of being -different in their nature as knowledge as well as in their individual -properties; and that their different natures as knowledge depend on the -way in which their parts are connected together. We took two objects -of knowledge, and found that the mode of connection between the parts -required two quite different kinds of judgment to express them. Let us -look at the reason of this. - -{54} _The relation of Part and Whole_ - -3. The relation of Part and Whole is a form of the relation of Identity -and Difference. Every Judgment expresses the unity of some parts in a -whole, or of some differences in an Identity. This is the meaning of -“construction” in knowledge. We saw that knowledge exists in judgment -as a construction (taking this to include maintenance) of reality. - -The expression whole and parts may be used in a strict or in a lax -sense. - -In a strict sense it means a whole of quantity, that is, a whole -considered as made up by the addition of parts of the same kind, as a -foot is made up of twelve inches. In this sense the whole is the sum of -the parts. And even in this sense the whole is represented within every -part by an identity of quality that runs through them all. Otherwise -there would be nothing to earmark them as belonging to the particular -whole or kind of whole in question. Parts of length make up a whole -of length, parts of weight a whole of weight, parts of intensity a -whole of intensity, in so far as a whole of intensity is quantitative, -which is not a perfectly easy question. Wholes like these are “_Sums_” -or “_Totals_”. The relation of whole to part in this sense is a very -simple case of the relation of differences in an identity, but for -that very reason is not the easiest case to appreciate. The relation -is so simple that it is apt to pass unnoticed, and in dealing with -numerical computation we are apt to forget that in application to any -concrete problem the numbers must be numbers of something having a -common quality, and that the nature of this something may affect the -result as related to real fact, though not as a conclusion from pure -{55} numerical premisses. In a whole of pure number the indifference -of parts to whole reaches its maximum. The unit remains absolutely the -same, into whatever total of addition it may enter. - -In a whole of differentiated members, such as a square, all this begins -to be different. A side in a square possesses, by the fact of being a -side, very different relations and properties from those of a straight -line conceived in isolation. In this case the whole is not made up -merely by adding the parts together. It is a geometrical whole, and its -parts are combined according to a special form of necessity which is -rooted in the nature of space. Speaking generally, the point is that -parts must occupy certain perfectly definite places as regards each -other. You cannot make a square by merely adding three right angles to -one, nor by taking a given straight line and adding three more equal -straight lines to its length. You must construct in a definite way so -as to fulfil definite conditions. The identity shows itself in the -different elements which make it up, not as a mere repeated quality, -but as a property of contributing, each part in a distinctive way, to -the nature of the whole. Such an identity is not a mere total or sum, -though I imagine that its relations can be fully expressed in terms of -quantity, certain differentiated objects or conceptions being given -(_e.g._ line and angle). - -I take a further instance to put a sharp point upon this distinction. -The relation of whole and parts is nowhere more perfect, short of -a living mind, than in a work of art. There is a very fine Turner -landscape now [1] in the “Old {56} Masters” Exhibition at Burlington -House--the picture of the two bridges at Walton-on-Thames. The picture -is full of detail--figures, animals, trees, and a curving river-bed. -But I am told that if one attempts to cut out the smallest appreciable -fragment of all this detail, one will find that it cannot be done -without ruining the whole effect of the picture. That means that the -individual totality is so welded together by the master’s selective -composition, that, according to Aristotle’s definition of a true -“whole,” if any part is modified or removed the total is entirely -altered, “for that of which the presence or absence makes no difference -is no true part of the whole.” [2] - -[1] February 1892. [2] _Poetics_, 8 - -Of course, in saying that the part is thus essential to the whole, it -is implied that the whole reacts upon and transfigures the part. It is -in and by this transformation that its pervading identity makes itself -felt throughout all the elements by which it is constituted. As the -picture would be ruined if a little patch of colour were removed, so -the little patch of colour might be such as to be devoid of all value -if seen on a piece of paper by itself. I will give an extreme instance, -almost amounting to a _tour de force_, from the art of poetry, in -illustration of this principle. We constantly hear and use in daily -life the phrase, “It all comes to the same thing in the end.” Perhaps -in the very commonest speech we use it less fully, omitting the word -“thing”; but the sentence as written above is a perfectly familiar -platitude, with no special import, nor grace of sound or rhythm. Now, -in one of the closing stanzas of Browning’s poem _Any Wife to Any -Husband_, this sentence, only modified {57} by the substitution of “at” -for “in,” forms an entire line. [1] And I think it will generally be -felt that there are few more stately and pathetic passages than this -in modern poetry. Both the rhythm and sonorousness of the whole poem, -and also its burden of ideal feeling, are communicated to the line -in question by the context in which it is framed. Through the rhythm -thus prescribed to it, and through the characteristic emotion which it -contributes to reveal, the “whole” of the poem re-acts upon this part, -and confers upon it a quality which, apart from such a setting, we -should never have dreamed that it was capable of possessing. - -[1] In order to remind the reader of the effect of this passage -it is necessary to quote a few lines before and after-- - - “Re-issue words and looks from the old mint, - Pass them afresh, no matter whose the print, - Image and superscription once they bore! - Re-coin thyself and give it them to spend,-- - It all comes to the same thing at the end, - Since mine thou wast, mine art and mine shalt be, - Faithful or faithless, sealing up the sum - Or lavish of my treasure, thou must come - Back to the heart’s place here I keep for thee!” - -We are not here concerned with the peculiar “aesthetic” nature of -works of art, which makes them, although rational, nevertheless unique -individuals. I only adduced the above examples to show, in unmistakable -cases, what is actually meant when we speak of “a whole” as constituted -by a pervading identity which exhibits itself in the congruous or -co-operating nature of all the constituent parts. In wholes of a higher -kind than the whole of mere quantity the parts no longer repeat each -other. They are not merely distinct, {58} but different. Yet the common -or continuous nature shows itself within each of them. - -The parts of a sum-total, taking them for convenience of summation -as equal parts, may be called units; [1] the parts of an abstract -system, such as a geometrical figure, may be called elements (I cannot -answer for mathematical usage), and the parts of a concrete system, an -aesthetic product, a mind, or a society, might be called members. - -[1] A unit of measurement implies in addition that it has been -equated with some accepted standard. If I divide the length of -my room into thirty equal parts, each part is a “unit” in the -sum-total; but I have not measured the room till I have equated -one such part with a known standard, and thus made it into a -unit in the general system of length equations. - -But every kind of whole is an identity, and its parts are always -differences within it. - -_Nature of Knowledge_ - -4. It will be well to sum up here what we have learnt of the nature -of knowledge in general, before passing to the definition and -classification of Judgment. - -Knowledge is always Judgment. Judgment is constructive, for us, of -the real world. Constructing the real world means interpreting or -amplifying our present perception by what we are obliged to think, -which we take as all belonging to a single system one with itself, -and with what constrains us in sense-perception, and objective in the -sense that its parts act on each other independently of our individual -apprehension, and that we are obliged to think them thus. The process -of construction is always that of exhibiting a whole in its parts, -_i.e._ an identity in its differences; that is to say, it is always -both analytic and synthetic. The objects of knowledge differ in the -mode of relation between their {59} parts and the whole, and thus give -rise to different types of judgment and inference; and this difference -in the form of knowledge is a difference in the content of Logic, which -deals with the objects of experience only from the point of view of -their properties as objects in an intellectual world. - -_Conclusion_ - -5. I hope that these general lectures, which, as I am quite aware, have -anticipated the treatment of many difficult questions which they have -not attempted to solve, have been successful in putting the problem of -Logic before us with some degree of vividness. If this problem were -thoroughly impressed upon our minds, I should say that we had already -gained something definite from this course of study. The points which I -desire to emphasise are two. - -(1) I hope that we have learned to realise the world of our knowledge -as a living growth, sustained by the energy of our intelligence; and to -understand that we do not start with a ready-made world in common, but -can only enter upon the inheritance of science and civilisation as the -result of courage, labour, and reasonable perseverance; and further, -that we retain this inheritance just as long as our endurance and -capacity hold out, and no longer. - -And (2) I have attempted to make clear that this living growth, our -knowledge, is like the vegetable or animal world in being composed -of infinite minor systems, each and all of which are at bottom the -same function with corresponding parts or elements, modified by -adaption to the environment. So that the task of analysing the form of -judgment bears a certain resemblance to that of analysing the forms -of plants. Just as from the single cell of the undifferentiated Alga, -to {60} the most highly organised flower or tree, we have the same -formation, with its characteristic functions and operations, so from -the undifferentiated judgment, which in linguistic form resembles -an ejaculation or interjection, to the reasonable systems of exact -or philosophical science, we find the same systematic function with -corresponding elements. - -But the world of knowledge has a unity which the world of organic -individuals cannot claim; and this whole system of functions is itself, -for our intelligence, approximately a single function or system, -corresponding in structure to each of its individual parts, as though -the plant world or animal world were itself in turn a plant or animal. -We cannot hope to exhaust the shapes taken by the pervading fundamental -function of intelligence. We shall only attempt to understand the -analogies and differences between some few of its leading types. - - - - -{61} - -LECTURE IV TYPES OF JUDGMENT AND THE GENERAL CONDITIONS - INVOLVED IN ASSERTION - -_Correspondence between types of Judgment and nature of objects as -Knowledge_ - -1. The question of correspondence between the types of Judgment and the -orders of Knowledge was really anticipated in discussing the relation -between the content and the form of knowledge. We saw that the content -or matter and nature known determines on the whole the form or method -of knowledge by which it can be known. - -I give a few cases of this correspondence, not professing to complete -the list. We should accustom ourselves to think of these forms as -constituting a progression in the sense that each of them betrays a -reference to an ideal of knowledge which in itself it is unable to -fulfil, and therefore inevitably suggests some further or divergent -form. And the defect by which the forms contradict the ideal, is felt -by us as a defect in their grasp of reality, in their presentation of -real connections. - -_“Impersonal” Judgment_ - -_a_. We think of the judgment as predicating an ideal content of a -subject indicated in present perception. But there are judgments -which scarcely have an immediate subject at all, such as “How hot!” -“Bad!” “It hurts!” In the judgments thus represented the true subject -is some {62} undefined aspect of the given complex presentation. Of -course the words which we use are not an absolutely safe guide to the -judgment--they may be merely an abbreviation. But there are typical -judgments of this kind in which we merely mean to connect some namable -content with that which can only be defined as the focus of attention -at the moment. Such judgments might be called predications of mere -quality. The only link by which they bind their parts into a whole is -a feeling referred to our momentary surroundings. A _mere_ quality, if -not defined or analysed, or a feeling of pleasure or pain, is the sort -of object which can be expressed in such a judgment. - -_Perceptive Judgment_ - -_b_. Then we have the very wide sphere of perceptive judgment, which -we may most conveniently confine to judgments which have in the -subject elements analogous to “This,” “Here,” “Now.” Such particles as -these indicate an effort to distinguish elements within the complex -presented. They have no content beyond the reference to presentation, -and, in “here” and “now,” an implication that the present is taken in -a particular kind of _continuum_. Otherwise they mean nothing more or -other than is meant by pointing with the finger. We may or may not -help out a “subject” of this kind by definite ideas attached to it as -conditions of the judgment. If we do, we are already on the road to a -new form of knowledge, incompatible with the judgment of perception. -For so long as we keep a demonstrative, spatial or temporal, reference -in the thought, the subject of judgment is not cut loose from our -personal focus of presentation. And as the existence of such a focus is -undeniable, we are secure against criticism so far as the {63} content -of the subject is concerned. But if we begin to specify it, we do so at -our peril. - -Such judgments as these have been called “Analytic judgments of -sense.” [1] The term is not generally accepted in this meaning, but -is conveniently illustrative of the nature of these judgments. It -is intended to imply that they are a breaking up and reconstruction -of what, in our usual loose way of talking, is said to be given in -sense-perception. They remain on the whole within the complex of “that -which” is presented. - -[1] Mr. F.H. Bradley, _Principles of Logic_, p. 48. - -From the point of view which we have taken, such judgments are not -confined to what we think it worth while to _say_, but are the essence -of every orderly and objective perception of the world around us. In a -waking human consciousness nothing is unaffirmed. - -We have no other term than perception to express the process which is -employed in scientific observation and experiment. But it is plain that -so soon as the judgment that refers to “This” is modified through the -inevitable demand for qualification by exact ideas--“_This_ hurts me,” -“_What_ hurts you?” “This old sprain, at the pace we are walking”--a -conflict of elements has arisen within the judgment. And as commonplace -perception passes into scientific observation, the qualifying ideas, on -which truth and relevancy depend, dwarf the importance of the “this,” -and ultimately oust it altogether. That is a simple case in which -the ideal of knowledge and the nature of reality operate within the -judgment to split asunder its primitive form. The subject as expressed -by a pure demonstrative refuses to {64} take account either of truth, -_i.e._ consistency with knowledge as a whole, or of relevancy, _i.e._ -consistency with the relation involved in the particular predication -that may be in question. Our commonplace perception halts between -these two extremes. It deals with the world of individual objects and -persons, which, being already systematised according to our current -observations and interests, has, so long as we keep to its order, a -sufficient degree of truth and relevancy for the needs of daily life. -Thus if I say, “This book will do as a desk to write upon,” the truth -of the qualification “book” (_i.e._ the reality of the subject) is -assumed on the ground of the facility of recognising a well-known -“thing,” while the relevancy of the qualification “book” is not -questioned, because we accept an individual thing as an object of -habitual interest _qua_ individual, and do not demand that whenever it -is named those properties alone should be indicated which are relevant -to the purpose for which it is named. The “thing” is a current coin of -popular thought, and makes common perception workable without straining -after a special relevancy in the subject of every predication. Such -special relevancy leads ultimately to the ideal of _definition_, in -which subject and predicate are adequate to each other and necessarily -connected. A definitory judgment drops the demonstrative and relies -on qualifying ideas alone. It is therefore an abstract universal -Judgment, while the Judgment of Perception, so long as it retains the -demonstrative, is a Singular Judgment. - -_Proper names in Judgment_ - -_c_. But a very curious example of a divergence or half-way house in -Knowledge is that form of the singular Judgment in which the subject is -a proper name. A proper name is {65} designative and not definitory. -It may be described as a generalised demonstrative pronoun--a -demonstrative pronoun which has the same particular reference in the -mouth of every one who uses, it, and beyond the given present of time. - -So the reference of a proper name is a good example of what we called -a universal or an identity. That which is referred to by such a name -is a person or thing whose existence is extended in time and its parts -bound together by some continuous quality--an _individual_ person or -thing and the whole of this individuality is referred to in whatever -is affirmed about it. Thus the reference of such a name is universal, -not as including more than one individual, but as including in the -identity of the individual numberless differences--the acts, events, -and relations that make up its history and situation. - -What kinds of things are called by Proper Names, and why? This question -is akin to the doctrine of Connotation and Denotation, which will be -discussed in the next lecture. It is a very good problem to think over -beforehand, noting especially the limiting cases, in which either some -_people_ give proper names to things to which other people do not give -them, or some _things_ are given proper names while other things of the -same general kind are not. These judgments, which are both Singular and -Universal, may perhaps be called for distinction’s sake “Individual” -Judgments. - -_Abstract Judgment_ - -_d_. The demonstrative perception may also be replaced by a more or -less complete analysis or definition. - -Within this province Definition of a concrete whole is one extreme, -_e.g_. “Human Society is a system of wills”; {66} that of an abstract -whole the other extreme, “12 = 7 + 5.” There are all degrees, between -these two, in the amount of modification which the parts undergo -by belonging to the whole. There are also all sorts of incomplete -definitions, expressing merely the effects of single conditions out of -those which go to make up a whole. These form the abstract universal -judgments of the exact sciences, such as, “If water is heated to 212° -Fahr. under one atmosphere it boils.” In all these cases some idea, -“abstract” as being cut loose from the focus of present perception, -whether abstract or concrete in its content, replaces the demonstrative -of the judgment which is a perception. These are the judgments which in -the ordinary logical classification rank as universal. - -_The general definition of Judgment_ - -2. It was quite right of us to consider some types of judgment -before trying to define it generally. It is hopeless to understand a -definition unless the object to be defined is tolerably familiar. We -have said a great deal about knowledge and about judgment as the organ -or medium of knowledge. Now we want to study particular judgments in -their parts and working, and observe how they perform their function of -constructing reality. - -Now, for our purpose, we may take the clearest cases of judgment, viz. -the meanings of propositions. - -The distinctive character of Judgment as contrasted with every other -act of mind is that it claims to be true, _i.e._ pre-supposes the -distinction between truth and falsity. - -First, we have to consider what is implied in claiming truth. - -Secondly, by what means truth is claimed in Judgment. - -{67} Thirdly, the nature of the ideas for which alone truth can be -claimed. - -_What is implied in claiming truth_ - -(i.) Claiming truth implies the distinction between truth and falsity. -I do not say, “between truth and falsehood,” because falsehood -includes a lie, and a lie is not _prima facie_, an error or falsity of -knowledge. It is, as may be said of a question, altogether addressed -to another person, and has no existence as a distinct species within -knowledge. Thus a lie is called by Plato “falsehood in words”; the term -“falsehood in the mind” he reserves for ignorance or error, which he -treats as the worst of the two, which from an intellectual point of -view it plainly is. - -No distinction between truth and falsity can exist unless, in the act -or state which claims truth, there is a reference to something outside -psychical occurrence in the course of ideas. Falsity or error are -relations that imply existences which, having reality of one kind, -claim in addition to this another kind of reality which they have not. -In fact, all things that are called false, are called so because they -claim a place or property which they do not possess. They must exist, -in order to be false. It is in the non-fulfilment, by their existence, -of some claim or pretension which it suggests, that falsity consists. -And so it is in the fulfilment of such a claim that truth has a -meaning. A false coin exists as a piece of metal; it is false because -it pretends to a place in the monetary system which its properties or -history [1] contradict. - -[1] For it is, I suppose, technically false, even if over value, -if not coined by those who have the exclusive legal right to -coin. - -As the claim to be true is made by every judgment in its {68} form, -there can be no judgment without some recognition of a difference -between psychical occurrences and the system of reality. That is to -say, there is no judgment unless the judging mind is more or less aware -that it is possible to have an idea which is not in accordance with -reality. - -Thus, _if_ an animal has no real world distinct from his train of -mental images, if, that is, and just because, these are his world -directly, and without discord, he cannot judge. The question is, _e.g._ -when he seems disappointed, whether the pleasant image [1] simply -disappears and a less pleasant image takes its place, or whether the -erroneous image was distinguished as an element in “a mere idea,” which -could be retained and compared with the systematised perceptions which -force it out, _as_ an idea with reality. - -[1] It will be observed that we are not treating the mental -images as being taken for such by the primitive mind. It is just -in as far as they are _not_ yet _taken for such_ that they _are -merely such_. Mr. James says that the first sensation is for the -child the universe (_Psychology_ II. 7). But it is a universe -in which all is equally mere fact, and there is no distinction -of truth and falsehood, or reality and unreality. That can only -come when an existent is found to be a fraud. - -We must all of us have seen a dog show signs of pleasure when he -notices preparations for a walk, and then express the extreme of -unhappiness when the walk is not taken at all, or he is left at home. -People interpret these phenomena very carelessly. They say “he thought -that he was going to be taken out.” If he did “_think that_, etc,” then -he made a judgment. This would imply that he distinguishes between the -images suggested to his mind, and the reality of their content as the -future event of going out, and knew that he might have the one without -the other following. But of {69} course it is quite possible that the -dog has no distinct expectation of something different from his present -images, but merely derives pleasure from them, which he expresses, and -suffers and expresses pain when they are replaced by something else. It -is here, no doubt, in the conflict of suggestion and perception, that -judgment originates. - -On the other hand, animals, especially domestic animals, do seem to use -the imperative, which perhaps implies that they know what they want, -and have it definitely contrasted with their present ideas as something -to be realised. - -However this may be, the claim of truth marks the minimum of Judgment. -There can be no judgment until we distinguish psychical fact from the -reference to Reality. A mere mental fact as such is not true or false. -In other words, there is no judgment unless there is something that, -formally speaking, is capable of being denied. When your dog sees -you go to the front door, he may have an image of hunting a rabbit -suggested to his mind, but so far there is nothing that can be denied. -If he has the image, of course he has. There is nothing that can be -denied until the meaning of this image is treated as a further fact -beyond the image itself, in a system independent of the momentary -consciousness in his mind. _Then_ it is possible to say, “No, the -fact does not correspond to your idea,” _i.e._ what we are ultimately -obliged to think as a system is inconsistent with the idea as you -affirmed it of the same system. - -_By what means the claim to truth is made_ - -(ii.) The first thing then in Judgment is that we must have a world of -reality distinguished from the course of our ideas. Thereupon the claim -to truth is actually made by attaching the meaning of an idea to some -point in the real {70} world. This can only be done where an identity -is recognised between reality and our meaning. - -Thus (keeping to the Judgment of Perception) I say, “This table is -made of oak.” This table is given in perception already qualified by -numberless judgments; it is a point in the continuous system or tissue -which we take as reality. Among its qualities it has a certain grain -and colour in the wood. I know the colour and grain of oak-wood, and if -they are the same as those of the table, then the meaning or content -“made of oak” coalesces with this point in reality, and instead of -merely saying, “This table is made of wood that has such and such a -grain and colour,” I am able to say “This table is made of oak-wood.” - -This example shows the true distinction between the Logical Subject and -Predicate. The fact is, that the ultimate subject in Judgment is always -Reality. Of course the logical subject may be quite different from -the grammatical subject. Some kinds of words cannot in strict grammar -be made subjects of a sentence, though they can represent a logical -subject quite well: _e.g._ “_Now_ is the time.” “_Here_ is the right -place_.” Adverbs, I suppose, cannot be grammatical subjects. But in -these sentences they stand for the logical subjects, certain points in -the perceptive series. - -The true logical subject then is always reality, however much disguised -by qualifications or conditions. The logical predicate is always -the meaning of an idea; and the claim to be true consists in the -affirmation of the meaning as belonging to the tissue of reality at -the point indicated by the subject. The connection is always made by -identity of {71} content at the point where the idea joins the reality, -so that _the judgment always appears as a revelation of something which -is in reality_. It simply develops, accents, or gives accuracy to a -recognised quality of the real. This is easily seen in cases of simple -quality--_e.g._ “This colour is sky-blue.” The colour is given, and the -judgment merely identifies it with sky-blue, and so reveals another -element belonging to its identity, the element of being seen in the sky -on a clear day. - -The analysis is not quite so easy when there is a concrete subject like -a person; for how can there be an identity between a person and a fact? -“A.B. passed me in the street this afternoon.” Between what elements is -the identity in this case? It is between him, as an individual whom I -know by sight in other places, and him as he appeared this afternoon in -particular surroundings. His identity already extends through a great -many different particulars of time and place, and this judgment merely -recognises one more particular as included in the same continuous -history. “He in this context belongs to him in a former context.” In -this simple case the operative identity is probably that of my friend’s -personal appearance; but the judgment is not merely about that but -about his whole personality, of which his personal appearance is merely -taken as a sign. - -Any assertion which is incredible because the identical quality is -wanting will illustrate the required structure. There is a story -commented on by Thackeray in one of his occasional papers, which -implied that the Duke of Wellington took home note-paper from a club to -which he did not {72} belong. (Thackeray gives the true explanation of -the fact on which the suggestion was founded.) The identity concerned -in this case would be that of character. Can we find an identity -between the character involved in a piece of meanness like that -suggested and the character of the Duke of Wellington? No; and _prima -facie_ therefore the judgment is false. The identity which should bind -it together breaks it in two. But yet, again: supposing the external -evidence to be strong enough, we may have to accept a fact which -conflicts with a man’s character as we conceive it. That is so: in such -a case one kind of identity appears to contradict the other. I may -think that I saw a man with my own eyes, doing something which wholly -contradicts his character as I judge it. Then there is a conflict -between identity in personal appearance and identity in character, -and we have to criticise the two estimates of identity--_i.e._ to -refer them both to our general system of knowledge, and to accept the -connection which can be best adapted to that system. - -We have got, then, as the active elements in Judgment a Subject in -Reality, the meaning of an idea, and an identity between them. - -Is this enough? Have we the peculiar act of affirmation wherever we -have these conditions? - -This is not the question by what elements of language the judgment is -rendered. We shall speak of that in the next lecture. The question is -now, simply, “Is a significant idea, referred to reality, always an -assertion?” - -The first answer seems to be that such an idea is always _in_ an -assertion, but need not constitute the whole of an {73} assertion. If -we think of a subject in judgment which is represented by a relative -sentence, it seems clear that any idea which can stand a predicate can -also form a part of a subject. “The exhibition which it is proposed -to hold at Chicago in 1893”--has in effect just the same elements of -meaning, and just the same reference to a point in our world of reality -as if the sentence ran, “It is proposed to hold an exhibition at -Chicago in 1893.” In common parlance we should say, that in the former -case we entertain an idea--or conceive or represent it--while in the -latter case we affirm it. - -But if we go on to say that the former kind of sentence as truly -represents the nature of thought as the latter, then it seems that we -are mistaken. Even language does not admit such a clause to the rank of -an independent sentence. - -If we insist on considering it in its isolation, we probably eke it -out in thought by an unarticulated affirmation such as that which -constitutes an impersonal judgment; in other words, we affirm it to -belong to reality under some condition which remains unspecified. -Thus the linguistic form of the relative clause, as also the separate -existence of the spoken or written word, produces an illusion which -has governed the greater part of logical theory so far as concerns the -separation between concept and judgment, _i.e._ between entertaining -ideas and affirming them in reality. In our waking life, all thought is -judgment, every idea is referred to reality, and in being so referred, -is ultimately affirmed of reality. The separation of elements in the -texture of Judgment into Subjects and Predicates which, as separated, -are conceived as _possible_ Subjects and Predicates, is therefore -{74} theoretical and ideal, an analysis of a living tissue, not an -enumeration of loose bricks out of which something is about to be built -up. - -_The kind of ideas which can claim truth_ - -(iii.) “Idea” has two principal meanings. - - (_a_) A psychical presentation and - - (_b_) An identical reference. - -This distinction is the same as that between our course of ideas and -our world of knowledge. We must try now to define it more accurately. - -(_a_) An idea as a psychical presentation is strictly a particular. -Every moment of consciousness is full of a given complex of -presentation which passes away and can never be repeated without some -difference. For this purpose a representation is just the same as a -presentation; is, in fact, a presentation. Its detail at any given -moment is filled in by the influence of the moment, and it can never -occur again with precisely the same elements of detail as before. -If we use the term “idea” in this sense, as a momentary particular -mental state, it is nonsense to speak of having the same idea twice, -or of referring it to a reality other than our mental life. The idea -in this sense is a psychical image. We cannot illustrate this usage -by any recognisable part of our mental furniture, for every such part -which can be described and indicated by a general name, is something -more than a psychical image. We can only say that that which at any -moment we have in consciousness, when our waking perception encounters -reality, is such an idea, and so too is the image supplied by memory, -when considered simply as a datum, a fact, in our mental history. - -(_b_) To get at the other sense of “idea” we should think {75} of the -meaning of a word; a very simple case is that of a proper name. What -is the meaning of “St. Paul’s Cathedral in London”? No two people who -have seen it have carried away precisely the same image of it in their -minds, nor does memory, when it represents the Cathedral to each of -them, supply the same image in every detail and association twice over -to the same person, nor do we for a moment think that such an image -_is_ the Cathedral. [1] Yet we neither doubt that the name _means_ -something, and that the same to all those who employ it, nor that it -means the same to each of them at one time that it did at every other -time. The psychical images which formed the first vision of it are dead -and gone for ever, and so, after every occasion on which it has been -remembered, are those in which that memory was evoked. The essence of -the idea does not lie in the peculiarities of any one of their varying -presentations, but in the identical reference that runs through them -all, and to which they all serve as material, and the content of this -reference _is_ the object of our thought. - -[1] When we are actually looking at the Cathedral, we say, -“_That is_ the Cathedral.” Does not this mean that we take our -momentary image, to which we point, to be the reality of the -Cathedral? Not precisely so. It is the “that,” not our definite -predication about it, which makes us so confident. The “that” is -identified by our judgment, but goes beyond it. - -In order to distinguish and employ this reference it is necessary that -there should be a symbol for it, and so long as it brings us to the -object which is the centre of the entire system, this symbol may vary -within considerable limits. - -The commonest and most secure means of reference is {76} the word or -name. [1] So confident are we in the “conventional” or artificially -adapted character of this mark or sign of reference, that we are -inclined to treat it as absolutely unvarying on every occasion of -utterance. But of course it is not unvarying. It differs in sound every -time it is spoken, and in context and appearance every time we see -it in a written shape. Our reliance upon it as identical throughout -depends on the fact that it has a recognisable character to which -its variations are irrelevant, and which practically crushes out -these variations from our attention. Unless we are on the look-out -for mispronunciations or misprints, they do not interfere at all -with our attention to the main reference of words. We know that it -is almost impossible to detect misprints so long as one reads a book -with attention to its meaning. This then is a fair parallel to the -distinction which we are considering between two kinds of ideas. If the -momentary sound or look of a word is analogous to idea as psychical -presentation, “the word” as a permanent possession of our knowledge is -analogous to the idea as a reference to an object in our systematic -world, and is the normal instrument of such a reference. - -[1] “A name is a sound which has significance according to -convention,” _i.e._ according to rational agreement.--_Ar. de -Interp_. 16a 19. - -But either with the word or without it there may be a symbol of another -kind. Any psychical image that falls within certain limits may appear -as the momentary vehicle of the constant reference to an object. Just -as in recognising the reference of a word we omit to notice the accent -and loudness with which it is pronounced, or the quality of the paper -on which it is printed, just so in recognising the {77} reference of -a psychical image our attention fails to note its momentary context, -colouring, and detail. If it includes something that definitely belongs -to a systematic object in our world of objects, that is enough, unless -counteracted by cross references, to effect the suggestion we require, -and that, and nothing else, arrests our attention for the moment. When -I think of St. Paul’s Cathedral, it may be the west front, or the -dome seen from the outside, or the gallery seen from the inside, that -happens to occur to my mind; and further, that which does occur to me -occurs in a particular form or colouring, dictated by the condition -of my memory and attention at the moment. But these peculiarities are -dwarfed by the meaning, and unless I consider them for psychological -purposes, I do not know that they are there. It is the typical -element only, the element which points to the common reference in -which my interest centres, that forms the content of the idea in this -sense, taken not as a transient feature of the mental complex, but -as definitely suggesting a constant object in our constructed world. -And it suggests this object because it, the typical element, is a -common point that links together the various cases and the various -presentations in which the object is given to us. In this sense it is a -universal or an identity. - -How can this conception of a logical idea be applied to a perfectly -simple presentation? It would be impossible so to apply it, but there -does not seem to be such a thing as a simple presentation in the sense -of a presentation that has no connection as a universal with anything -else. In the image of a particular blue colour, we cannot indeed -separate out what makes it blue from what makes it the particular {78} -shade of blue that it is. But nevertheless its blueness makes it a -symbol to us of blue in general, and when so thought of, crushes out of -sight all the visible peculiarities that attend every spatial surface. -We understand perfectly well that the colour is blue, and that in -saying this we have gone beyond the limits of the momentary image, and -have referred something in it as a universal quality to our world of -objects. An idea, in this sense, is both less and more than a psychical -image. It contains less, but stands for more. It includes only what is -central and characteristic in the detail of each mental presentation, -and therefore omits much. But it is not taken as a mental presentation -at all, but as a content belonging to a systematic world of objects -independent of my thought, and therefore stands for something which is -not mere psychical image. - -If therefore we are asked to display it as an image, as something -fixed in a permanent outline, however pale or meagre, we cannot do -so. It is not an abstract image, but a concrete habit or tendency. It -can only be displayed in the judgment, that is, in a concrete case -of reference to reality. Apart from this, it is a mere abstraction -of analysis, a tendency to operate in a certain way upon certain -psychical presentations. Psychically speaking, it is when realised in -judgment a process more or less systematic, extending through time, and -dealing with momentary presentations as its material. In other words, -we may describe it as a selective rule, shown by its workings but not -consciously before the mind--for if it were, it would no longer be an -idea, but an idea of an idea. - -Every judgment, whether made with language or without, {79} is an -instance of such an idea, which may be called a symbolic idea as -distinct from a psychical image; “symbolic” because the mental units -or images involved are not as such taken as the whole of the object -for which they stand, but are in a secondary sense, as the word in a -primary sense, symbols or vehicles only. - -Such ideas can have truth claimed for them, because they have a -reference beyond their mental existence. They point to an object in -a system of permanent objects, and that to which they point may or -may not suit the relation which they claim for it. Therefore the -judgment can only be made by help of symbolic ideas. Mere mental -facts, occurrences in my mental history, taken as such, cannot enter -into judgment. When we judge about them, as in the last sentence, -they are not themselves subject or predicate, but are referred to, -like any other facts, by help of a selective process dealing with our -current mental images of them. We shall not be far wrong then, if in -every judgment, under whatever disguises it may assume, we look for -elements analogous to those which are manifest in the simple perceptive -judgment, “This is green,” or “That is a horse.” The relation between -these and more elaborate forms of affirmation, such as the abstract -judgment of science, has partly been indicated in the earlier portion -of this lecture. The general definition of judgment has therefore -been sufficiently suggested on p. 72. Judgment is the reference of a -significant idea to a subject in reality, by means of an identity of -content between them. - - - - -{80} - -LECTURE V THE PROPOSITION AND THE NAME - -_Judgment translated into language._ - -1. Judgment expressed in words is a Proposition. _Must_ Judgment be -expressed in words? We have assumed that this need not be so. Mill [1] -says of Inference that “it is an operation which usually takes place -by means of words, and in complicated cases can take place in no other -way.” The same is true of Judgment. - -[1] _Logic_ vol. I. c. i., init. - -We may say in general that words are not needed, when thinking about -objects by help of pictorial images will do the work demanded of the -mind, _i.e._ when perfectly individualised connections in space and -time are in question. Mr. Stout [1] gives chess-playing as an example. -With the board before him, even an ordinary player does not need words -to describe to himself the move which he is about to make. - -[1] In _Mind_, no. 62. - -Words are needed when we have to attend to the general plan of any -system, as in thinking about organisms with reference to their type, -or about political relations--about anything, that is, which is not -of such a nature that the members of the idea can be symbolised in -pictorial form. It would be difficult, for example, to comprehend the -respiration of plants under a symbolic picture-idea drawn {81} from the -respiration of the higher animals. The relations which constitute a -common element between the two processes do not include the movements, -feelings, and visible changes in the circulatory fluid from which our -image of animal respiration is chiefly drawn; and we could hardly -frame a pictorial idea that would duly insist on the chemical and -organic conditions on which the common element of the process depends. -In a case of this kind the word is the symbol which enables us to -hold together in a coherent system, though not in a single image, the -relations which make up the content of our thought. - -“Words” may be of many different kinds--spoken, written, indicated -by deaf and dumb signs; all of these are derived from the word as -it is in speech, although writing and printing become practically -independent of sound, and we read, like the deaf and dumb alphabet, -directly by the eye. Then there may be any kind of conventional signals -either for letters, words, or sentences, and any kind of cipher or -_memoria technica_ either for private or for general use--in these the -“conventional” nature of language reaches its climax, and the relation -to a natural growth of speech has disappeared. And finally there are -all forms of picture-writing, which need not, so far as its intrinsic -nature goes, have any connection with speech at all, and which seems to -form a direct transition between picture-thinking and thinking through -the written sign. - -All these must be considered under the head of language, as a fixed -system or signs for meanings, before we can ultimately pronounce that -we think without words. - -Every Judgment, however, can be expressed in words, {82} though not -every Judgment need be so expressed or can readily be so. - -_Proposition and sentence._ - -2. A Judgment expressed in words is a Proposition, which is one kind -of sentence. A command question or wish is a sentence but not a -proposition. A detached relative clause [1] is not even a complete -sentence. The meaning of the imperative and the question seems to -include some act of _will_; the meaning of a proposition is always -given out simply for fact or truth. We need not consider any sentence -that has no meaning at all. - -[1] See above, Lect. IV. - -_Difference between Proposition and Judgment_ - -3. Almost all English logicians speak of the Proposition and not of the -Judgment. [1] This does not matter, so long as we are agreed about what -they mean. They must mean the proposition _as understood_, and this is -what we call the judgment. - -[1] So Mill, Venn, Jevons, Bain (see his note, p. 80). - -In order to make this distinction clear, let us consider the -proposition as it reaches us from without, that is to say, either as -spoken or as written. The words, the parts of such a proposition, as we -hear or read them, are separate and successive either in time alone, or -in time and space. Further, the mere sounds or signs can be mastered -apart from the meaning. You can repeat them or copy them without -understanding them in the least, as _e.g._ in the case of a proposition -in an unknown language. So far, the proposition has not become a -judgment, and I do not suppose that any logician would admit that it -deserved the name even of a proposition. But if not, then we must not -confuse the attributes which it has before it becomes a proposition -with those which it has after. - -{83} Further, in understanding a proposition, or in construing a -sentence into a proposition (if the sentence only becomes a proposition -when understood), there are many degrees. I read upon a postcard, -“A meeting will be held on Saturday next by the Women’s Liberal -Association, to discuss the taxation of ground-rents.” The meaning of -such a sentence takes time to grasp, and if the words are read aloud -to us, must of necessity be apprehended by degrees. We understand very -quickly that a meeting is to be held next Saturday. This understanding -is already a judgment. It is something quite different from merely -repeating the words which we read. It consists in realising them as -meanings, and bringing these meanings together into a connected idea, -and affirming this idea to belong to our real world. The meanings are -not separate, outside one another, as the words are when we first -hear or read them. They enter into each other, modify each other, and -become parts of an ideal whole. This gradual apprehension of a sentence -recalls to one the boyish amusement of melting down bits of lead in a -ladle. At first the pieces all lie about, rigid and out of contact; but -as they begin to be fused a fluid system is formed in which they give -up their rigidity and independence, and enter into the closest possible -contact, so that their movements and position determine each other. But -still some parts, like words not yet grasped, remain hard and separate, -and it is only when the melting is complete that this isolation is -destroyed, and there are no longer detached fragments, but a fluid body -such that all its parts are in the closest connection with one another. - -Thus then in understanding a sentence we have a judgment {84} from the -first. The rest of the process of understanding consists in completing -the content of this judgment by fusing with it the meanings of the -words not yet apprehended; and in the completeness with which this -is effected there will always be great differences of degree between -different minds, and also between the same mind at different times. -Some of us attach a complete and distinct meaning to the words “Women’s -Liberal Association”; some of us do not know, or have forgotten, -exactly what it is, and what are its aims and history. All of us have -some conception of the purpose described as “taxation of ground rents,” -but the phrase conveys a perfectly definite scheme hardly to one in -a thousand readers. Nevertheless, in so far as we have some symbolic -idea which refers to this place or context in the world of objects, -the content of this idea enters into and modifies the total meaning -which in apprehending the sentence before us we affirm of reality. The -heard or written proposition (or sentence, if it is not a proposition -till understood) serves as an instrument by which we build up in our -intellectual world a sort of plan or scheme of connected meanings, and -also, not subsequently but concurrently with this work of building, -affirm the whole content thus being put together to be true of reality. -Then we have what I call a Judgment. It is not that the words are -necessarily forgotten; they, or at least the principal significant -terms, are probably still in the mind as guides and symbols; but yet a -constructive work has been done; a complex experience has been called -up and analysed, and its parts fitted together in a certain definite -order by the operation of universal ideas or meanings, each of which is -a system playing {85} into other systems; and the whole thus realised -has been added as an extension to the significance of the continuous -judgment which forms our waking consciousness. The inconvenience of the -term “proposition” is that it tends to confuse the heard or written -sentence in its separate words with the proposition as apprehended and -intellectually affirmed. And these two things have quite different -characteristics. - -_Parts of Speech_ - -4. Thus we must be very careful how we apply the conception of -“parts of speech.” The grammatical analysis which classifies words -as substantives, adjectives, adverbs, verbs, and the like, is not to -be taken as telling us what words are by themselves, but just the -opposite, viz. what they do when employed in a significant sentence. -They are studied separately for convenience in attending to them, as -we may study the wheels and pistons of an engine; but the work which -gives them their names can only be done when they are together. This -truth is often expressed by saying that “the sentence is the unit -of language,” _i.e._ a word taken by itself cannot have a complete -meaning--unless it is a verb, or used with verbal force, for a verb -is an unanalysed sentence. If any one uses a substantive or adverb by -itself, we think that he has not finished his sentence, and no meaning -is conveyed to our minds. We ask him, “Well, what about it?” The same -is true, as we saw, of a relative clause. If we read in a newspaper -such a clause as this, “The epidemic of influenza, which has appeared -in England for three successive seasons,” followed by a full stop, we -should infer, without hesitation, that some words had dropped out by -accident. Of course such a {86} combination of words would make us -think something, but the meaning which we might ascribe to it would be -conjectural; we should necessarily complete the thought for ourselves -by some affirmation--some relation to reality--while recognising that -no such relation was given in the clause as we read it. Nothing less -than a sentence, or, omitting the wish and the command, nothing less -than a proposition, conveys a meaning in which the mind can acquiesce -as not requiring to be supplemented conjecturally. There are traces in -language that indicate the sentence to have been historically prior to -the word. I question whether the word could be certainly distinguished -within the sentence in early languages that have not been reduced -to writing. The tendency of reflective analysis, as in grammar and -dictionaries, is to give it a more and more, artificial isolation. The -Greeks did not separate their words in writing, and they wrote down -the change in a terminal consonant produced by the initial letter of -the next word, just as if it was within a compound word. Nor had they -really any current term co-extensive with our “word.” Where we should -say “the word ‘horse’” they most commonly use the neuter article -“the” followed by the word in question as if in quotation-marks (”the -‘horse’“). In defining noun and verb, Aristotle has no simple class -name like ”word“ to employ as a common element of the definition, but -uses the curious description ”a portion of discourse, of which no part -has a meaning by itself.“ - -Of course, single words often stand as signs for propositions. It -is interesting to note the pregnant meaning of a single word in the -mouth of a child. Thus “stool” was {87} used to mean “(1) Where is my -stool? (2) My stool is broken; (3) Lift me on to the stool; (4) Here -is a stool.” [1] There is in this an interesting conflict of form and -meaning, owing to the child of European race having at command only -“parts of speech.” In a less analytical language he might have at -command a sound corresponding to a sentence rather than to a “noun -substantive.” - -[1] Preyer, quoted in _Höffding, Psych_., 176. - -The verb of inflected languages, [1] such as Greek or Latin, in which -the “nominative case” need not be supplied even by a pronoun, is the -type for us of a sentence not yet broken up. - -[1] In German and English, though the verb is inflected, custom -forbids it to stand without the pronoun. - -The bearing of this truth on Logic is to make us treat it in two parts -and not in three. We do not treat of Name, Proposition, Syllogism, or -of Concept, Judgment, Inference, but only of the two latter parts. The -name or concept has no reality in living language or living thought, -except when referred to its place in a proposition or judgment. We -ought not to think of propositions as built up by putting words or -names together, but of words or names as distinguished though not -separable elements in propositions. Aristotle takes the simple and -straightforward view. “A term is the element into which a proposition -is broken up, such as subject and predicate.” [1] Of course different -languages separate the parts of the proposition very differently, -{88} and uneducated people hardly separate them at all. Formal Logic -breaks down the grammatical meaning of “name,” so far as to treat as a -“logical name” any complex words that can stand as Subject or Predicate -in a Proposition (_e.g._ a relative clause). - -[1] _Anal. prior_., 24b, 16. The opposite view seems to be -expressed in the beginning of the περὶ Ἑρμενείας [= peri -Hermeneias, _de Interpretatione_], that the separate word -corresponds to the separate idea. I have attempted to explain -this as an illusion, p. 73, above. - -_Denotation and Connotation_ - -5. The doctrine of the meaning of names has suffered from their -relation to propositions not being borne in mind. Mill’s discussion [1] -is very sensible, but, as always, very careless of strict system. More -especially it seems a pity to state the question as if it concerned -a division of names into Connotative and Non-connotative; because in -this way we from the first let go of the idea that the meaning of a -name has necessarily two aspects, [2] and we almost bind ourselves to -make out that there are some non-connotative names. It is better to -consider this latter subject on its merits. Mill says that an ordinary -significant name such as “man” “signifies the subjects directly, the -attributes indirectly; it _denotes_ the subjects, and implies or -involves or indicates, or, as we shall say henceforth, _connotes_, the -attributes.” In short, the denotation of a name consists of the things -_to which_ it _ap_plies, the connotation consists of the properties -which it _im_plies. The denotation is made up of individuals and -the connotation of attributes. Denotation is also called Extension, -especially if we are speaking of Concepts rather than of names. -Connotation is then called Intension. In the German writers it is -more usual to say that the Extension or Area (_Umfang_) consists not -of the individuals, but of the species that are contained in {89} -the meaning of a general name. They oppose it to Content (_Inhalt_) -corresponding to our “Connotation.” Thus the “Area” of “rose” would -not be the individual roses in the world, but rather all the species -of rose in the world (_Rosa Canina, Rosa Rubiginosa_, etc.). This -raises a difficulty as to the denotation of a specific name, but -perhaps represents the actual process of thought, in the case of a -generic name, better than that which Mill adopts. The difference is not -important. - -[1] _Logic_, Bk. I. c. ii. § 5. Cf. Venn, 174 and 183, and Bain, 48. - -[2] See Bradley, p. 155. - -Well, then, according to Mill, when we say, “The Marshal Niel is a -yellow rose,” we refer directly to a group of real or possible objects, -and we mean that all these individual objects are yellow roses. The -attributes are only mentioned by the way, or implied. So Dr. Venn says -that the denotation is real, and the connotation is notional. - -But there is another side to this question. The objects may be _what -you mean_ but the attributes seem to be _the meaning_, for how can you -(especially on Mill’s theory of the proposition) refer to any objects -except through these attributes, unless indeed you can point to them -with your finger? And so again it seems, especially if we consider -Mill’s account of predication, as if the Connotation were the primary -meaning and the Denotation the secondary meaning. The Connotation -determines the Denotation; and if we “define” the meaning of the name -it is the Connotation that we state. And so Mill tells us two or -three pages further on, that whenever the names given to objects have -properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they denote, but -in what they connote. In short, {90} the denotation of a general name -is simply the meaning of its plural, or of its singular, in that sense -in which it implies a plural, while the connotation is the meaning _per -se_, not considered in its instances. - -It is clear then that every name has these two kinds of meaning--first, -a content, and then instances, whether possible or actual, of the -content; and the two are obviously inseparable, although they are -distinguishable. Ultimately, indeed, the denotation itself is an -attribute, and so part of the connotation. It is one of the attributes -of man to be a unit in the plurality men, _i.e._ to be “a man.” It -may be said that some names have no plural. If so, these would be -non-denotative rather than non-connotative, but in fact this is not -true. The content of a significant name can always, unless hindered -by a special convention (see below on proper names), be _prima facie_ -regarded, in respect of its actual embodiment, as a unit against -other possible units. Granting that there may be an object, which -according to our knowledge can only be real as an isolated case, the -very consideration of it as such a case is enough to distinguish its -existence, whether real or possible, from its content. Thus, as a real -or possible existence, the object is _ipso facto_ considered in the -light of a particular, and as capable of entering into a plurality. -But its nature or content, the meaning of its name, cannot enter -into a plurality. Two _meanings_, two connotations, are alternative -and irreconcilable. Denotation and connotation are thus simply the -particular, or particulars, which embody or are thought of as embodying -a content, and the single or universal content itself. - -{91} _Have Proper Names Connotation?_ - -6. Therefore I think that Mill is wrong, when he goes on, “The only -names of objects which connote nothing are Proper Names, and these -have, strictly speaking, no signification.” [1] If the name has no -signification, for what reason, or by what means, is it attached to a -person or a place? You may say that it is only a conventional mark. But -a mark which has power to select from all objects in the world, and -bring to our minds, a particular absent object, is surely a significant -mark. Granted that it is conventional, yet by what mechanism, and for -what purpose, does the convention operate? - -[1] Cf. Venn, 183 ff, and Bradley, 156. - -Mill’s point, however, is quite clear. To be told the name of a person -or object does not inform us of his or its attributes. Directly, -it only warns us by what sign the same person or object will be -recognisable in language again. [1] If a name is changed, the new name -tells us nothing different from the old, [2] whereas if an object that -was called vegetable is now called animal, our conception of it is -radically transformed. A name expresses the continued identity of an -object, and this implies only a historical continuity of attributes and -relations, and no constant attribute whatever. - -[1] We cannot make it a distinctive mark of proper names that -they recur in different and quite disconnected meanings, because -the words which are used as general names have this same -property. Nor can we say that a proper name is not used in the -same sense of more than one object. Family names and national -names make this plainly untrue. Through these, and names -typically employed, there is a clear gradation from proper to -general names. - -[2] The case of marriage may be urged. But a lady’s change of -name does not by itself indicate marriage. It is a mere fact, -which may have various explanations. The change of title (from -“Miss” to “Mrs.”) is more significant, but it is not a change of -name. - -{92} Thus a _proper_ name is a contradiction in terms. [1] A name -should have a meaning. But a meaning cannot be proper--that is, -particular. The name-word is therefore like a demonstrative pronoun, -if this were attached, by a special convention, to one identifiable -object only. It acquires meaning, but its meaning is an ever-growing -contradiction with its usage. The meaning is necessarily general, the -usage is _ex hypothesi_ particular. - -[1] So, from the complementary point of view, is a _general_ -name. A name, it may be urged, _is_ meant to designate a -particular thing or things. And this a name with a true -“meaning” cannot do. - -This convention of usage, which prevents a proper name from becoming -general, _i.e._ from being cut loose and used simply for its meaning, -is always on the point of breaking down. [1] Christian names usually -indicate sex; family names, though now with little certainty, descent -and relationship. There are germs of a general meaning within the -several usages of names; while a Solon, a Croesus, a Christian, a -Mahometan, have become purely general names cut loose from all unique -reference. Still in a proper name, as such, we have no right to build -on any general meaning. Recognition is its only purpose; and the law -permits, it has been said, that a man should have one name for Mondays, -Wednesdays, and Fridays, and another for Tuesdays, Thursdays, and -Saturdays. The essence of a name is a reference to unique identity; it -employs meaning only to establish identity. - -[1] See note on last page. - -What kinds of things have proper names given, then? Always things -_individually_ known to the people who give {93} the name, and -interesting to them for some reason beyond generic or specific -qualities. Pet animals have names, when other animals of the same kind -have not. The peasants throughout England use names, it is said, for -all the fields, although strangers are not usually acquainted with them. - -A Proper Name, then, has a connotation, but not a fixed general -connotation. It is attached to a unique individual, and connotes -whatever may be involved in his identity, or is instrumental in -bringing it before the mind. - -When we think of history, the importance of proper names becomes -very great. This is the characteristic logical difference between -history and science. “England” and “France” are proper names, names -of individual existences in contact with our world of perception, not -scientific abstractions. Even the words, “1892 A.D.,” are partly of the -nature of a proper name. They say nothing merely general or abstract -about this year; they assign the year a name by counting forwards from -a unique point in the series of years, itself designated by the name -of a historical personage. Everything that is simply distinguished by -its place in the series of events in space and time is in some degree a -proper name. Thus we could not identify the French Revolution by mere -scientific definition. It is known by its proper name, as a unique -event, in a particular place and time. When thus identified it may have -all kinds of general ideas attached to it. It would be hard to show -that “Our earth,” “Our solar system” are not proper names, in virtue of -their uniqueness. - -{94} _Inverse ratio of Connotation and Denotation_ - -7. It has sometimes been said that Connotation is in inverse ratio [1] -to Denotation. Mill explains the fact upon which any such idea -rests. [2] If we arrange things in classes, such that the one class -includes the other--_e.g. Species_ “Buttercup,” _Genus_ “Ranunculus,” -_Order_ “Ranunculaceae,”--of course the genus will contain many species -besides the one mentioned, and the order many genera besides the one -mentioned. The object of the arrangement is that they should do so, and -thus bring out the graduated natural affinities which prevail in the -world. Thus the denotation of the genus-name is larger than that [3] of -the species, and the denotation of the order-name is larger than that -of the genus-name. - -[1] See Venn, p. 174, for reference to Hamilton. Venn points out -the fallacy. - -[2] _Logic_, Bk. I. ch. vii. § 5. - -[3] Or “than the species,” if we take the denotation as made up -of species. - -But further, in such an arrangement the genus can contain only the -attributes which are common to all the species, and the order can -contain only the attributes which are common to all the genera; so the -genus-name implies fewer attributes (less connotation) than any one -species-name under it, and the order-name implies fewer attributes -(less connotation) than any one genus-name under it. - -That is the fact which suggests the conception of Denotation and -Connotation as varying inversely. - -But in any case it would not be right to speak thus mathematically of -an inverse ratio, because there is no meaning in a numerical comparison -of attributes and {95} individuals, and the addition of one attribute -will exclude sometimes more and sometimes fewer individuals. [1] - -[1] See Jevons, p. 40. - -And there are more important objections to the whole idea of a -corresponding gradation in these two kinds of meaning. The idea -of abstraction thus implied is altogether wrong. The meaning of a -genus-name does not _omit_ the properties in which the species differ. -If it did, it would omit nearly all properties. What happens is that -the genus-idea represents the general plan on which the species are -built, but provides for each of the parts that constitute the whole, -varying in the specific cases within certain limits. Thus in the -Ranunculaceae some species have no petals. But we do not omit the -character “petals” from the genus-idea. We state the general plan -so far as this element is concerned as “Petals five or more; rarely -none.” This is read by a botanist to mean that in some groups the -petals tend to be aborted, and sometimes are actually missing. In a -symbolic representation of the genus-idea such a property may stand as -A, and its various specific forms as A1, A2, A3, etc. There is nothing -to prevent these specific phases approaching and sometimes reaching -zero. No doubt if the classification is pursued in the direction of -“universals” containing fewer and fewer properties, it is possible -to arrive at concepts which appear to have a larger denotation and -a smaller connotation than those “below” them. “Ranunculaceae,” -“Dicotyledons,” “Plants,” “Organisms.” - -But this is only because we choose to form our system by that -process of abstraction which consists in leaving out properties. -_E.g._ comparing Frenchmen with men in general, {96} we assume that -“Frenchman” indicates (_a_) all the qualities of humanity as such, -and (_b_) the qualities of French humanity in addition to these. But -is this so in fact? Humanity, considered as a wider, and therefore -as a deeper, idea, may have more content, as well as more area, than -Frenchmanity. We do not really, in thinking of humanity, omit from our -schematic thought all references to qualities of Greek, Jew, English, -and German, and their bearing and interaction upon one another. It is -only that we have been drilled to assume a certain neatness in the -pyramidal arrangement by which we vainly try to reduce the meaning of -a great idea to something that has no system and no inter-relation of -parts, but approaches as near as possible in fixity to the character -of a definite image, though far removed from such a character in the -impossibility of bringing it before the mind. - -So we can only say, “the greater the denotation the less the -connotation,” and “_vice versâ_”, in as far as we arrange ideas by -progressive abstraction in the sense of progressive omission. But -it is not the only way of regarding them. Things may develop new -inter-relations as their number increases. Has the community, as Mr. -Bradley asks, less meaning than the individual person? But we must not -consider the community, would be the answer; we must simply consider -the relation of an idea of one individual to any idea that applies -to many individuals. This is simply to rule out those relations that -arise within progressively larger wholes. We can do so, if we think the -exclusion necessary in the interests of logical purity, but it is only -by doing so that we can maintain the traditional view of connotation -and denotation. It is worth while to think out the {97} matter for -ourselves in relation to such familiar ideas as those of man and -animal. It is plain that the idea of “animal” cannot omit all reference -to intelligence, but must in some way allow for the different phases -of this property which run throughout the animal kingdom, and only -find a climax in man. And it is plain also, that even if intelligence -were wholly omitted, this would not leave behind, as in a simple -stratification, properties in which the whole animal kingdom was the -same. Man’s animality is modified throughout in a way corresponding -to his rationality, so that no general idea could be framed including -him and other animals, simply by collecting properties which are -the same and omitting those which are different. The idea of “man” -really becomes richer when considered in the light of a comparison -[1] with the rest of the animal world. Our great systems of natural -classification, representing affinities graduated by descent, are what -give the view which we have criticised a certain objective importance. -But they do not establish it as an exclusive logical doctrine. - -[1] If we insist on throwing the whole of this comparison, in -explicit shape, into the complete idea of man, then the progress -to the idea “animal” can add nothing; even so, however, it loses -nothing, but simply becomes the same set of relations, looked -at, so to speak, from the other end. - - - - -{98} - -LECTURE VI PARTS OF THE JUDGMENT, AND ITS UNITY - -_Parts of the Judgment_ - -1. The result of taking the Judgment as one with the Proposition -has been to assume that its parts were the same as those of the -Proposition; [1] and moreover the same as those of the Proposition in a -very artificial form, viz. as analysed into three separable elements, -“Subject,” “Predicate,” “Copula,” commonly represented in the examples -of the text-books by Substantive, Adjective or Substantive, and the -Verb “is.” - -[1] This assumption involves (see Lecture V.) a confusion -between the Proposition as thoroughly understood, and the -Proposition as a series of partially significant sounds or -signs. For obvious reasons, this confusion is very readily made. - -For the operation of Formal Logic it is almost necessary to have -these parts, because it is requisite to transpose the terms (as in -Conversion) without changing their meaning, [1] and to get rid of -_tenses_, which do not belong to Scientific Judgment, and are very -troublesome in Formal Inference. - -[1] If the “predicate” is a Substantive, this presents no -difficulty; and if it is an Adjective, it can be done by a -little straining of grammar, or the insertion of “thing” or -“things.” With a verb it is more clumsy. - -Thus in Formal Logic we prefer the shape of sentence “Gold is lustrous” -to “Gold glitters,” and “The bridge is {99} cracked” to “There is -a crack in the bridge.” And practically all propositions can be -thrown into this shape, which is convenient for comparing them. The -educational value of elementary formal logic consists chiefly, I am -convinced, in the exercise of paraphrasing poetical or rhetorical -assertions into this typical shape, with the least possible sacrifice -of meaning. The commonest mistakes in the work of beginners, within my -experience as a teacher, consist in failures to interpret rightly the -sentence given for analysis. - -But this type is not really ultimate. The judgment can be conveyed -without a grammatical subject, and without the verb “is”--indeed -without any grammatical verb at all. On the whole this agrees with -Mill’s view in the chapter “Of Propositions.” [1] He points out (§ 1) -that we really need nothing but the Subject and Predicate, and that the -copula is a mere sign of their connection _as_ Subject and Predicate. -He does not, however, discuss the case in which the grammatical Subject -is absent. - -[1] Mill’s _Logic_, Bk. I. ch. iv. - -_Copula_ - -2. In analysing the Judgment as an act of thought we may begin by -dismissing the separate Copula. It has no separate existence in thought -corresponding to its separate place in the typical proposition of -Formal Logic. It has come to be considered separately, because the -abstract verb “is” is used in our languages as a sign of the complete -enunciation. But there is not in the Judgment any separate significant -idea--any third idea--coming in between the Subject and Predicate of -Judgment. We should try to think of the Copula not as a link, separable -and always {100} intrinsically the same, [1] connecting two distinct -things. We should think of it rather as the grip with which the parts -of a single complex whole cohere with one another, differing according -to the nature of the whole and the inter-dependence of its parts. Benno -Erdmann [2] has strikingly expressed this point of view by saying, -that in the Judgment, “The dead ride fast,” the Subject is “the dead,” -the Predicate “fast riding,” _and the Copula “the fast riding of the -dead_.” In other words, the Copula is simply the Judgment considered -exclusively as a cohesion between parts of a complex idea, the -individual connection between which can only be indicated by supplying -the idea of those parts themselves. - -[1] In a comic Logic, with pictures, meant to stimulate dull -minds at a University, I have seen the Copula represented as -the coupling-link between two railway carriages. This is an -excellent type of the way in which we should _not_ think of it. - -[2] _Logik_, p. 189. - -_Are Subject and Predicate necessary?_ - -3. The explicit Predicate is more necessary than the explicit Subject. - -We have spoken of Judgments expressed by one word, “Fire!” “Thieves!” -etc., and also of impersonal Propositions, “It is raining,” “It -is thawing.” These two classes of Judgments show hardly any -explicit Subject at all. But we could not assert anything without -a Predicate--that would be to assert without asserting anything in -particular. - -As these Judgments have, roughly speaking, a Predicate and no -Subject, I do not think it convenient to call them, with Dr. Venn, -existential judgments. It is true that they refer to reality, but their -_peculiarity_ is in not referring to a distinct subject. And when used -for definite and complex assertions they become very artificial, _e.g._ -“There is a {101} British Constitution by which our liberties are -guaranteed.” Instead of organising the content of the Judgment, such a -form of assertion simply tosses the whole of it into the Predicate in a -single mass. - -The question is only one of words; but it appears to me more convenient -to reserve the term Existential judgments for those highly artificial -assertions which actually employ the Predicate “exist” or “existence,” -_e.g._ “Matter exists.” These are at the opposite end of the scale -from those last-mentioned, and are the nearest approach to Judgment -with Subject and no Predicate. That is to say, their Predicate is -the generalised abstract form of predication [1] without any special -content--the kind and degree of existence asserted being understood -from the context. - -[1] Expressed in Greek by the word corresponding to “is,” used -with an accent, which does not belong to it in its ordinary use. -He is good = ἄγαθός ἐστι [= agathos esti]; He exists = ἔστι [= -esti Tr.]. - -Except, however, in the case of these peculiarly abstract and -reflective assertions, it must be laid down that a predicated content -is necessary to judgment, while an _explicit_ subject of predication is -unnecessary. - -_Two Ideas of Things_ - -4. If it is possible, in some cases, to throw the whole content of -judgment into the predicate, this rather disposes us to criticise the -notion that there must be two distinct matters, objects, ideas, or -contents, in every judgment. The notion in question has two forms. - -It is thought that the Judgment consists in putting two _ideas_ -together, [1] or, -{102} That the Judgment consists in comparing two or -more things. [2] - -[1] For this conception, see Hamilton’s _Lectures on Logic_, i. -227, and for a criticism on it. Mill’s _Logic_, Bk. I. ch. v., -_init_, Dr. Venn seems to incline to Hamilton’s view, but I do -not feel sure that he intends to discuss the question in the -form in which it is referred to in the text. See his _Empirical -Logic_, pp. 210 and 211. - -[2] See Jevons, pp. 61-2; and Mill, Bk. I. ch. iii., _init_.; -and ch. iv., _init_. - -_Two Ideas_ - -(_a_) The notion of “two ideas” has two principal difficulties. - -_Notion of mental transition pure and simple_ - -(i.) In its simplest shape the notion of “two ideas” involves the -great blunder which I explained in Lecture IV. It suggests that the -parts of Judgment are separate and successive psychical states, and -that the Judgment consists in a change from the one to the other. -Herbert Spencer, as I understand him, considers every relation to be -apprehended as a mental change or passage from one idea to another. -This view would degrade logical connection into mere psychical -transition. I do not say that there is no psychical transition in -Judgment. I do say that psychical transition is not enough to make a -Judgment. The parts of Judgment, as we saw in the last lecture, do -not succeed one another separately like the parts of a sentence. The -relation between Subject and Predicate is not a relation between mental -states, but is itself the content of a single though continuous mental -state. Mill has rightly touched on this point. “When I say that fire -causes heat, do I mean that my idea of fire causes my idea of heat?” -[1] and so on. The fact is that “Fire-causing-heat” is itself the -single content or meaning represented in my symbolic idea; it is not a -succession of psychical states in my mind, or a passage from the idea -of fire to the idea of causing heat. - -[1] _Logic_, Bk. I. ch. V. § I. - -{103} _Absence of assertion_ - -(ii.) But further, understanding now that the Judgment is composed of -a single ideal content, and is not a transition from one mental state -to another, there is still a difficulty in the conception that its -component elements are nothing but ideas. If the Subject in Judgment is -no more than an ideal content, how, by what means, does the Judgment -claim to be true of Reality? “The Subject cannot belong to the content -or fall within it, for in that case it would be the idea attributed to -itself.” [1] If the Subject were only a part of an ideal content it -would not claim to be true of Reality, and where it _appears_ to be -only an ideal content there is much dispute in what sense the Judgment -does claim to be true of Reality. “Violations of a law of nature are -impossible.” “The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right -angles.” “All trespassers will be prosecuted.” In these Judgments we -should find it hard to make out that the Subjects are real things -corresponding to our ideas. And yet, if they are not, how can the -Judgment attach itself to Reality? This is the difficult question of -the distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical Judgment, -and we shall have to return to it. In the meantime, we must adhere to -our judgment of perception as the true underlying type. The Subject -is here not an idea, but is the given reality, _this_ or _that_, and -the Judgment is not a conjunction of two ideas, but is present reality -qualified by an idea. We say, “It is very hot,” meaning that heat, the -general quality embodied for us in an ideal content, is true of--forms -one tissue with--the surroundings which here and now press upon our -attention. Or again, “This is red,” {104} _i.e._ the content of the -idea red is what my attention selects and emphasises within the mass -of detail presented to it in its own unique focus which the pronoun -“this” simply points out as though with the finger. We shall find such -a structure underlying all the more artificial forms of Judgment. - -[1] _Bradley’s Principles of Logic_, p. 14. - -_Two Things_ - -(_b_) Thus it would seem that Jevons and Mill are much nearer the real -point when they say that the proposition has to do with two Things, -or with a Thing and a group of Things. But we must notice in passing -that Mill, [1] after fighting hard against calling them Ideas, takes -our breath away by saying that they are states of consciousness. There -is, of course, a difficulty, which I will not try to deal with now, in -the fact that however much we _refer_ to things, we have nothing to -_work with intellectually_ but our ideas of them, and in some types -of Judgment the reference to real things is difficult to trace. Mill -further emphasises this by showing, that what we assert in ordinary -_general_ Judgment is co-existence of attributes. [2] “Now when we -say, Man is mortal, we mean that wherever these various mental and -physical phenomena (the attributes of man) are all found, then we have -assurance that the other physical and mental phenomenon called death, -will not fail to take place.” That is, no doubt, a very indirect way of -referring to the real things which we call men. Moreover, he treats all -conclusions in geometry and mechanics as hypothetical. [3] All this we -shall have to return to, in order to reconcile it with our doctrine; -which is apparently coincident with {105} Mill’s view in the place -first alluded to, that the subject in Judgment is always reality. - -[1] _Logic_, Bk. I. ch. V. § 5. [2] _Ibid_., § 4. - -[3] _Ibid_., Bk. II. ch. vi. §§ 3, 4. - -But our point at present is only the duality ascribed to the Judgment -by saying that it essentially deals with _two_ things or groups of -things. Jevons even says [1] that every Judgment is a comparison of -two things--though these “things” are really, it would seem, groups -of things. [2] We thus have it impressed upon our minds that there -is one “thing” corresponding to the Subject-word (or clause) of the -Propositional sentence, and another “thing” corresponding to the -Predicate-word (or clause), and that these are somehow separate, like -two railway carriages, till we bring them together by the coupling-link -of the copula. This is a very inconvenient way of looking at the -matter. It is not true that all Judgment is comparison, in the proper -and usual sense of the word. It is not true that Judgment involves two -things; two or more things may be mentioned in a Judgment, but they -cannot correspond respectively to the Subject and Predicate. It is a -real Comparison if you say, “A.B. is taller than C.D.,” but C.D. is -here not a term in the Judgment. The one person, A.B., is qualified by -the ideal content “taller than C.D.,” and the idea of A.B. so qualified -is referred to, or discriminated within, perceptive reality. Comparison -is a rather complex process, and consists in a cross-reference by which -each of two objects is judged according to a standard furnished by the -other; but this complex process is not necessary to all Judgment, and -cannot be expressed with complete convenience in a single Judgment. And -in {106} any case the two objects that enter into the comparison do not -correspond to two essential parts of Judgment. - -[1] _Elementary Lessons in Logic_, p. 61. [2] _Ibid_. p. 62. - -It is far more simple and true to say that Judgment is always the -analysis _and_ synthesis of elements in some one thing or ideal -content. “Gold is yellow” has not within it, as Jevons says it has, [1] -any direct comparison of gold with other yellow substances. It simply -drags to light the property “yellow” as distinct within the complex of -attributes belonging to gold, while at the same time insisting that -this property--this meaning of an idea--belongs to, is of one piece -with, perceived reality in so far as gold is given in such reality. -The Judgment exhibits the content in its parts. It breaks it up, and -pronounces it to be all of one tissue, by one and the same indivisible -act. We should practically have a much fairer chance of seeing clearly -what Judgment is if we began by considering it as not two things or -two terms — but as one thing or one term drawn out into elements by -discriminating selection. Even if the paradox that every “Thing” is -a Judgment neglects some necessary distinctions, I am convinced that -we shall understand Judgment much more clearly if we do our best to -approach it from this point of view. Whenever we look or listen, and -_notice_ features and qualities in the perceptions that arrest the -eye and ear, we are rapidly and continuously judging. “The fire is -crackling,” “The daylight is waning,” “That bookshelf is not full,” -“The window-curtain is twisted.” In none of these cases is there -any separation other than an intellectual distinction between the -predicated content and the perceived reality. The Judgment is simply -a distinct {107} insistence on a quality within a certain focus of -reality as belonging to that reality. This is the fundamental nature of -Judgment. - -[1] _Loc. cit_. - -Therefore, to draw our conclusion as to the Unity of the Judgment, it -is not a transition from one mental state to another; the relation of -which it consists is not between ideas in it, but is the content of the -idea which forms it. Judgment is not primarily comparison between two -things; it is a thing or content displayed as possessing some definite -relation or quality within its identity. Every Judgment is the content -of one idea, but you may of course distinguish relations between ideal -elements within this idea. “Fire causes heat” is a single content or -idea, the nature of fire, expanded into one of its properties. - -_Distinction between Subject and Predicate_ - -5. But then, if the whole Judgment is a single content, what is the -difference between Subject and Predicate, and is it necessary to -distinguish Subject from Predicate at all? If _some_ Judgments can be -made without explicit Subjects, cannot _all_ be made in that way? - -This suggestion is very useful as carrying on the simplest type of -Judgment throughout the whole theory of Judgment. By a little torture -of expression any Judgment can be thrown into a form in which undefined -Reality is the general subject, and the whole mass of the Judgment -is the Predicate. “William Pitt was a great statesman” = “There was -a great statesman named William Pitt”; “The three angles of every -triangle are equal to two right angles” = “There are figures known as -triangles with their three angles equal to two right angles”; “All -citizens are members of a moral order” = “There is a moral order, -including the {108} relations of citizenship”; “All trespassers will -be prosecuted” = “Here are conditions which ensure the prosecution of -possible trespassers.” Or you might always put a subject, “Reality is -such that”--“Reality is characterised by.” - -Thus we see that, as we have said before, in every Judgment the -ultimate subject is Reality, the world in contact with us as we have -already qualified it by previous Judgment. It is a less mistake to -reject the Subject and Predicate in the Judgment altogether, than to -think that they are separate things or ideas, and that in judging you -pass or change from one to the other. Always bear in mind that it is -possible to mass the whole Judgment as a single Predicate directly or -indirectly true of Reality. - -Having said this much, to make the Unity of the Judgment unmistakable, -we may now safely distinguish between the Subject and Predicate -in the Judgment. And we shall find the safest clue to be that the -explicit Subject, when there is one, marks the place at which, or the -conditions under which, Reality accepts the Predicate. The natural -Subject is concrete, and the Predicate abstract; the Subject real, and -the Predicate ideal, but pronounced to be real. The reason of this is -that every Judgment is the connection of parts in a whole, and to be -a whole is the characteristic of reality. In other words, the natural -course of thought is to define further what is already in great part -defined, and our real world is that which we have so far defined. The -isolated judgments of the text-books make it very hard to grasp this, -because you seem to begin anywhere for no connected reason at all. But -if we reflect on actual thought, {109} we find that, as Mr. Stout very -cleverly says, we are always developing a “subject” which is in our -minds (in the ordinary sense of a “subject of conversation”), and this -subject is some region or province of the world of reality. - -Now the explicit Subject in Judgment or the grammatical Subject in -Proposition does not always set out the full nature of this, but -merely some mark or point in it which we wish to insist upon. So -that we may find in Judgment almost anything serving as explicit -Subject. Thus, as Aristotle said quite plainly and sensibly, it is -natural to say “The horse is white,” but we _may_ have occasion to say -“This white is a horse”; it depends on the way in which the Subject -comes into our minds. [1] Usually the Subject will be what Dr. Venn -calls the heavier term, _i.e._ the term with more connotation. When -there is no difference of concreteness between parts and whole, the -Judgment becomes reversible as in the equation 7 + 5 = 12. There is no -distinction here between Subject and Predicate. The real underlying -unity or Subject is the numerical system. - -[1] See Prof. Bain, p. 56, upon the Universe, and Universe of -Discourse, _i.e._ the general subject which you have in your -mind. - -Therefore by recognising Subject and Predicate we represent the -organisation of knowledge, and the connection of inherence or -consequence within the content of our knowledge. If we do not -recognise this distinction we throw the whole of Judgment into an -undifferentiated mass of fact, running all assertion into the same -mould, “It is the case that,” etc. One difficulty still remains. If -the relation between Subject and Predicate is within an idea, and -not between ideas--that is, if the whole explicit content, Subject -and {110} Predicate together, can be regarded as predicated of -reality,--why is the act of predication expressed by a verb, _i.e._ -a sign of activity within this content? Why is a verb often if not -always the form of predication which connotes Subject and Predicate? -Not because it is a time-word. On the contrary, we want to get rid -of the tense in Logic. The time of a Judgment ought to be determined -only by the special connection between Subject and Predicate, not by -tense, because tense is always subjective, merely relative to the time -of speaking, and is accidental to the content of Judgment. Action -seems nearer to what we want; the _verb_ expresses both action and -predicate. But the _idea_ of action again does not make a predication, -and the verb “is” does not _really indicate_ action. Perhaps it is the -demonstrative element in a finite verb that makes it the vehicle of -predication, _i.e._ in a finite verb you have a meaning referred by a -demonstrative element to something else. Originally the meaning was -always an action; “is” of course meant “breathes.” But now the verb has -lost vitality by wear and tear, and only refers something to something -else. The puzzle is that the Judgment is not referred to us who make -it, but is expressed as if it was accomplished by something outside us. -That puzzle points to the essential feature which we insisted on, viz. -its objectivity; in predication we refer what is mentally our act to a -subject that represents the real world, not to ourselves at all. When -I say “Gladstone comes to London this week,” the verb which expresses -Gladstone’s action also expresses that my real world in his person -accepts the qualification “coming to London this week.” Because of this -objectivity of thought, I attribute to {111} the real world and not to -myself the connection which is presented to my mind, and so it takes -its place as an act of the real world. But I might throw the whole -content into the Predicate by saying, “The ideal content ‘Gladstone -coming to London this week’ is a predication true of Reality.” Thus -though the distinction between Subject and Predicate best exhibits the -living structure of knowledge, we must beware of the notion that two -ideas or two things are needed for Judgment. - - - - -{112} - -LECTURE VII THE CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL CHARACTERS IN - JUDGMENT - -_Some criticism on the ordinary scheme_ [1] - -1. We will first consider why we want to examine the types of Judgment, -and then what arrangement of them best fulfils our want. - -[1] Read Mill, ch. iv. (Bk. I.), on Propositions; Venn, -_Empirical Logic_, ch. ix., x. Cf. _Knowledge and Reality_ pp. -57-8; and Venn, p. 264. Ordinary statement, Jevons, p. 60, ff.; -cf. p. 163. - -_Why we need an arrangement_ - -(_a_) If we attended purely to the propositions in common use, we -should get an unmanageable variety of forms, though the reality of -thought would be fairly represented. We cannot quite do this; we must -try to select the forms which for some reason are the most fundamental -and constant. - -On the other hand, it is possible to think simply of what is convenient -in logical combination; and then for working with syllogistic Logic we -get the well-known scheme of four propositions, each with Subject and -Predicate; and for working with symbolic Logic we get the existential -scheme in which Subject and Predicate disappear, and “All S. are P.” -turns into “There exists no S. which is not P.”; or we get Jevons’ -Equational Logic, in which “All A is B” stands as A = AB. Now every -Judgment has a great many aspects, {113} being really a very complex -systematic act of mind, and a logical method can be founded on any of -these aspects which is sufficiently constant to stand for the Judgment. -You can take “All men are mortal” to mean “There are no not-mortal -men,” or “Men = some mortals,” or two or three more meanings. The two -former are artificial or formal corollaries from the natural Judgment, -representing it for some purposes but omitting a great part of its -natural meaning. They tell you nothing about a relation of causality -between the content of man and the property mortal, and they destroy -all implication of existence in the Subject man. - -What we want is neither to follow _mere_ everyday language, nor be -guided by mere convenience of logical combination. We want to look at -the Judgment on its merits with reference to its power of expressing -the principal kinds of our experience, which in fact are constructed in -the medium of Judgment. The great kingdoms of intellectual experience -are Perception, History, and Science, and of these three, Science, -including Philosophy, is the form towards which all knowledge presses -on, and its judgment must therefore be considered as the most complete -type. - -_The common scheme_ - -(_b_) With this purpose in mind, let us look at the traditional scheme, -omitting the negative Judgments of which we have not yet spoken. We may -dismiss the Indefinite Judgment “Men are mortal” as imperfect by not -being “quantified,” and we have left, as Categorical Judgments, the -Particular Affirmative “Some men are mortal,” the Universal Affirmative -“All men are mortal,” and the Singular Affirmative “Socrates is -mortal.” The Singular Affirmative, however, is not treated of any -further under the old scheme, {114} because in it the Subject is taken -in its full extent, and therefore the Singular Affirmative Judgment is -ranked with the Universal Affirmative. So as Categorical Judgments we -have left the Particular Affirmative and the Universal Affirmative. - -Outside the account of the Categorical Judgment we find the -Hypothetical and Disjunctive Judgments touched on as a sort of -Appendix, standing as “Conditional.” The historical reason of this -is, that they were not recognised by Aristotle, and have never been -incorporated in the diagram of judgments employed in traditional Logic. -Then on the ordinary scheme we have-- - - Categorical. Conditional. - -Particular Universal Hypothetical Disjunctive -Judgments. Judgments, Judgments. - including - Singular - Judgments. - -The defects of this scheme from our point of view are— - -(i.) Our Impersonal and Demonstrative Judgments are omitted. They -_might_ be classed under the particular, which also has an undefined -element in the subject. - -(ii.) The Singular Judgment (of which the chief instance is the -judgment with proper name) is rightly classed as Universal, but yet is -wrongly absorbed in the abstract universal, from which it ought to be -distinguished. - -(iii.) In the treatment of the Universal Judgment there are two -defects— - - (1) The Collective Judgment, resulting from enumeration, {115} direct -or indirect, is not distinguished from the Generic Judgment, resting -on a connection of content or presumption of causality. “All the [1] -papers have been looked over” should be distinguished from “All -triangles have their three angles equal to two right angles.” - -[1] “The” as here used indeed practically = “these,” so -that, by our analysis, such a judgment has no claim to rank -as a universal judgment It is difficult to find a plainly -collective judgment which has not some affinity to judgment with -demonstrative pronoun or proper name. A judgment in which “All -M.P.’s” stands as subject, has affinity with the latter. - - (2) The nature of the Universal Judgment is not examined with a view -to the distinction between Categorical and Hypothetical. The common -Logic does not go behind the grammatical form, which on this point is -not decisive. - -(iv.) The Hypothetical Judgment [1] is said to consist of two -categorical propositions, or to be “_complex_” But of course it is a -simple judgment, _prima facie_ expressing a relation of reason and -consequent. Its parts are not Judgments, for they are not such as to -stand alone. - -[1] Bain, p. 85; Jevons, p. 160. - -(v.) The Disjunctive Judgment is often (_e.g._ by Mill and Bain) said -to be equivalent to two Hypothetical Judgments. The strange thing -is that both of these writers take the wrong two. [1] If we allow -conversion of a Hypothetical Judgment two are enough, but of course -they must be the two which cannot be got from each other by conversion, -viz. the two beginning, “If A is B ...” and “If A is not B ...” -respectively. If we do not admit conversion we must have all four. -Let the disjunction be, “This signal light is either red or green.” -In order to know this we must know not {116} only that, “If it is -red it is not green” (with its equivalent, “If it is green it is not -red”), but that, “If it is not red it is green” (with its equivalent, -“If it is not green it is red”). The former by itself leaves open the -possibility that it may be not red or green, but blue or yellow; the -latter by itself the possibility that when it is red it may also at -the same time be green. The former secures that the two terms exclude -each other; the latter, that, taken together, they exclude all other -predicates. - -[1] Mill, ch. iv.; Bain, p. 86. - -In any case, the disjunctive is more than any combination of -Hypotheticals, and really tends to be Categorical, and ought not to be -claimed as Conditional. - -_Which are Categorical?_ - -2. We will now look at these Judgments in order, consider their real -meaning, and also ascertain the limits of the Categorical Judgment, -viz. that which affirms the existence of its Subject, or in other -words, asserts a fact. - -_The Particular Judgment_ - -(i) The Particular Judgment of common Logic, “Some S. is P.,” has -different meanings according as it is understood naturally, or tied -down to be a result of enumeration. - -In any case it is an imperfect, unscientific Judgment, in which the -mind cannot rest, because it has an undefined limitation imposed upon -the Subject. - -_Its natural meaning_ - -(_a_) For the natural meaning, take the example, “Some engines can -drag a train at a mile a minute for a long distance.” [1] This does -not _mean_ a certain number of engines, though of course they _are_ a -certain number. It {117} means certain engines of a particular make, -not specified in the Judgment. The Judgment is Categorical, because -the undefined reservation implies a reference to something unanalysed, -but merely touched or presented in experience. If it was a mere idea -it would have to be clear; and if the full description or definition -were inserted, the Judgment would cease to affirm the existence of -the engines in question. _And the Judgment itself challenges this -completion._ - -[1] To be accurate, the Judgment would demand the insertion of -precise details about train, distance, and other matters. But -this illustrates the point of the text, because the assignment -of such details would naturally extend to the Subject, and then -the “Some” would be displaced. - -_A narrower meaning_ - -(_b_) A more artificial meaning is to take the Judgment as not formed -by imperfect description, but by imperfect enumeration (understanding -it almost wholly in denotation). “Some Conservatives are in favour -of women’s suffrage.” This means or may mean that we have counted a -certain number, large or small, who are so, and we may or may not know -about the others. _Thus understood, the Judgment challenges complete -enumeration_; it contains of course the elements of a fraction--half, -most, nine-tenths of, and so on. - -This again is Categorical; not merely because it implies counting, but -because it implies counting units separately given to experience. - -The Particular Judgment does not include our Impersonal and -Demonstrative Judgments; they are not classed in the common text-books. -But as referring to perception they too are categorical and assert -facts, whether they have ideas to help out the perceptive reference or -not. And there is no reason against including them under the Particular -Judgment. The assertion, “This engine can drag a train a mile a -minute,” is much the same kind of Judgment as, “Some engines can, etc.” -Either of these would be false {118} if no such engines existed. _These -Judgments are of the essence of perception_. They have the connection -of content and the undefined complex of presentation struggling -together in them. They assert fact. - -_Singular Judgment_ - -(2) The Singular Judgment of the common Logic is pretty much our -Judgment with a proper name, which I call Individual, and which, as we -saw, is in part rightly called universal--because the Subject extends -beyond perception, and the Predicate follows the Subject. But it is -a concrete or individual Universal, not an abstract Universal, and -therefore asserts the existence of its Subject. The reason why it is -taken to assert the reality of its Subject must be, I suppose, that -it _can_ assert this, its Subject being a name for an existence that -has limited reality within the temporal series, and _cannot_ assert -anything else, not having any general fixed content or connotation -which could imply a _general_ connection of Subject and Predicate. The -general connection of content which is so fatal to the asserting of -fact does not exist in this case. We see this in Mill’s instance. “The -summit of Chimborazo is white,” When the Subject is a unique name with -precise connotation, “The centre of gravity of the material universe -is variable,” then we are passing into the abstract Universal, and I -think we may take such a Judgment perhaps as one of the best examples -of a conjunction of categorical and hypothetical meaning, _i.e._ of -a connection of content ascribed to a Subject affirmed to exist. But -usually one meaning or the other is uppermost. - -These Judgments, called Singular or Individual, correspond to the -region of history or narrative. The realities {119} with which they -deal have their definite position in a single system of time and space, -and this is often made emphatic by the use of tenses. But these change -with the date relative to the speaker, so that a Judgment with real -tense must once have been false, or must become false by lapse of -time. Thus the Judgment of fact may be not absolutely true. Nothing is -genuinely true which a change of date can make false. The permanently -true time-relations between Subject and Predicate are determined by -their content, and the copula is not a tense, but a mere sign of -affirmation. The Singular as Categorical is sharply distinguished from -the Abstract Universal, with which common Logic classes it. - -_Universal Judgment_ - -(3) Down to this point the judgment states a _fact_. When we come to -the ordinary universal affirmative, we see at once that it may express -very different meanings. In its natural meaning it strongly _implies_ -that its Subject has a particular existence within the series of time -and space, but hardly asserts it. - -_Import of Propositions_ - -Mill, for example, says “the objects are no longer individually -designated, they are pointed out only by their attributes;” “most of -them not known individually at all.” That means that the explicit -Subject is not made of individuals. The natural meaning is disputed; I -incline to think with Venn, that the Subject is naturally taken _more_ -in Denotation (not solely, which is unmeaning), and the Predicate -_more_ in connotation. But clearly in literal form the Subject is -simply a significant idea, and its existence in things or events is -not affirmed though it may be strongly implied. Hamilton [1] {120} -says quite calmly--“‘Rainy weather is wet weather’ is a Categorical -Proposition; ‘If it rains it will be wet’ is Hypothetical.” Between -the two I can see no distinction of meaning at all. [2] If indeed we -take the Universal Affirmative in the pure sense of aggregate formed -by enumeration, and therefore finite, it _may_ be said that we assert -the existence of the individuals composing it; but this is a very -unreal view of the meaning of the Judgment (though suggested by its -customary form), and even then it would be hard to prove that we -continue to think of the Subject as individuals. This reference to -a finite aggregate makes the _Collective Judgment_ or _Judgment of -Allness_. It cannot really exist in the case of a class like man, of -unknown extension, and is confined, at its widest, to such cases as -“All present Members of Parliament have to take a line on the Irish -question.” This _might_ be Categorical, but need not be so. - -[1] _Lectures_, vol, iii. p. 327. - -[2] Contrast Jevons, _Elementary Logic_, p. 163. - -Otherwise, the Universal Affirmative of common Logic is literally -Hypothetical, though in some cases it may strongly imply the assertion -of reality. Dr. Venn has discussed this question. [1] He says the -implication of existence is much stronger with a single-word Subject -than with a many-worded Subject; _i.e._ perhaps with a natural than -with an artificial conception. But in any case, the expressed bond with -perception is lost, and in pure form the Subject is a mere abstract -idea, so that the relations of content entirely predominate over the -implication of existence. - -[1] _Empirical Logic_, pp. 258-9. - -Thus the Universal Affirmative in its full meaning fairly {121} -represents the sciences of classification, combining a subordinate -meaning of Allness or numerical totality with a primary meaning of -connotation of attributes or presumed causality. When we say “All the -Buttercup family have an inferior corolla,” of course we mean that -there is a reason for this. Often we omit the term all, as in “Heat -is a mode of motion.” In doing this we wipe out the last trace of a -reference to individual objects, and we pass to the pure hypothetical -form which absolutely neglects the existence of objects. - -_“Hypothetical” Judgment_ - -(4) The simplest type of this Judgment is, if A is B it is C. This -Judgment corresponds to abstract science, but it is only making -explicit what was implied in the Universal Affirmative. That -expressed a presumption of causality, this expresses a clear Reason -and Consequent or scientific necessity. The point of this form is -(i.) that it drops all reference to individual objects, (ii.) that -it challenges you to explain how the Subject-content is tied to the -Predicate-content. “Water boils at 212°,” is a statement we should -generally pass in so-called Categorical form, because it does not -challenge any great accuracy of connection. But “If water boils, it -is at a temperature of 212°,” puts us upon asking, “Is the condition -adequate?” and we see at once that we must at least say, “If water -boils _under pressure of one atmosphere_, it is at a temperature of -212°,” or else the judgment is untrue. Of course we may apply the form -rightly or wrongly, as you may fill up your census paper rightly or -wrongly. We can only say that it calls upon you to put in an adequate -condition. Therefore I rather object to the form “If A is, B is,” -because it adds very little to the so-called Categorical shape. - -{122} We have now to ask how the Hypothetical Judgment connects its -content with reality, _i.e._ how it is a Judgment at all? And the same -explanation must apply to so-called Categorical Judgments, which can be -thrown into this form without change of meaning. - -The point from which the explanation starts is taking hypothesis as -supposition. This is much more true, I think, than connecting it with -_doubt_. In Dr. Venn’s _Empirical Logic_ the connection of Hypothetical -Judgment and doubt to my mind disfigures the whole treatment of the -Scientific Judgment. Supposition is distinct from affirmation--that -is true--but just because it is distinct from affirmation, it cannot -indicate doubt. It probably arose out of doubt, but as a method of -science it does not imply doubt, but only the accurate limitation of -attention. What doubt is there when we judge “If equals be added to -equals, the wholes are equal”? We are attending to one particular -thread of the nexus. - -Hypothetical Judgment, then, is Judgment that starts from a -supposition. Every supposition is made upon a certain basis of -Reality. Take as an extreme case, “If you ask permission of A.B., he -will refuse it.” This is a supposition and its result, on the basis -of the known character of A.B. And the full judgment is “A.B. is of -such a character, that, supposing you ask him for permission, etc.” -The Hypothetical Judgment may be true, as an assertion about A.B.’s -character, though you may never ask. - -Here, then, is the clue to the analysis of _all Abstract Judgments_, -Like Perceptive Judgment, they affirm something of Reality, but they -do this indirectly and not directly. {123} Underlying them there is -the implied Categorical Judgment, “Reality has a character, such -that, supposing so and so, the consequence will be so and so.” And -if this implied assertion is true, then the Hypothetical Judgment is -true, although its terms may be not only unreal, but impossible. “If -a microscopic object-lens with a focal length of 1/100 in. were used, -its magnifying power with an A eye-piece would be so many diameters.” -This is a mere matter of calculation, and is unquestionably true, -depending upon the effects of refraction upon the optical image. But I -do not suppose that such an object-lens could be made, or used. Does -such a Judgment, although true, express a _fact_? No, I should say not, -although common usage varies. I remember a _Pall Mall_ leading article -which said, “It is an absolute fact, that, if Mr. Gladstone had not -done something--the Government would have committed--some iniquity -or other.” Is this what we call a fact? We observe that the content -actually mentioned was never real at all. The implied connection -with reality is “There existed in reality a condition of things -(unspecified) in which _if_ Mr. Gladstone, etc., etc.” Are mathematical -truths facts, and in what sense? Abstract truth need not, and perhaps -cannot express fact, but implies fact indirectly. - -_Disjunctive Judgment_ - -(5) The Disjunctive Judgment “A is either B or C,” is again not -a judgment of doubt but a mode of Knowledge, It may be taken as -numerical; then it gives rise to the statement of Chances. But in its -perfect form it is appropriate to the exposition of a content as a -system, and it may be taken as returning to the Categorical Judgment, -and combining it with the Hypothetical, because its {124} content is -naturally taken as an individual, being necessarily concrete. - -The peculiar point of the Disjunctive is that it makes negation -positively significant. - -“This signal light shows either red or green.” Here we have the -categorical element, “This signal light shows some colour,” and on the -top of this the two Hypothetical Judgments, “If it shows red it does -not show green,” “If it does not show red it does show green.” You -cannot make it up out of the two Hypothetical Judgments alone; they do -not give you the assertion that “it shows some colour.” [1] - -[1] The example in the text, chosen for its simplicity, may -be objected to as involving perceptive concreteness by the -pronoun “this.” You can have a disjunction, it may be said, -dealing with “the triangle” as such; and why should this be -more “Categorical” than the assertion that the triangle has -its angles = three right angles? Still, it might be replied, -the development of a single nature into a number of precise -and necessary alternatives, always gives it an implication of -self-completeness. - -Does this state a fact? I think it implies a fact much more distinctly -than the hypothetical does, but of course it is a question whether an -alternative can be called a fact. It seems a precise expression of -some kinds of reality, but it is not a solid single momentary fact. -It is very appropriate to the objects of philosophy as the higher -concrete science, which are conceived as systems of facts bearing -definite relations to each other; _e.g._ “Society is a structure of -individual characters, having positions which are not interchangeable.” -Taken all as a mass, they are conjunctively connected, but taken in -distinguishable relations they are disjunctively related. A human -being as such has some position and no other, and this is ultimately -determined by {125} the nature of the social whole to which he -belongs. He is if this, nothing else, and if nothing else, then this. -A more artificial example, which illustrates the degree in which -actual abstract knowledge and purpose can be embodied by man in -machinery, is the interlocking system of points and signals at a great -railway station. I suppose that the essence of such a system lies in -arrangements for necessarily closing every track to all but one at a -time of any tracks which cross it or converge into it. The track X -receives trains from A, B, C, D; if the entrance for those from A is -open, B, C, and D are _ipso facto_ closed; if A, B, and C are closed, -D is open, and so on. This is a disjunction consciously and purposely -incorporated in material fact, and differs from a Disjunctive Judgment -only in so far as existence necessarily differs from discursive thought. - -The disjunction seems to complete the system of judgments, including -all the others in itself, and it is wrong in principle to distinguish, -_e.g._ between a hypothetical and categorical disjunction, or to -consider how a disjunction can be denied. For disjunction in itself -implies a kind of individuality which is beyond mere fact and mere -abstract truth, though allied to both; and all intelligible negation -is under, not of, a disjunction. Negation of a disjunction would -mean throwing aside the whole of some definite group of thoughts as -fallacious, and going back to begin again with a judgment of the -simplest kind. It amounts to saying, “None of your distinctions touch -the point; you must begin afresh.” - - - - -{126} - -LECTURE VIII NEGATION, AND OPPOSITION OF JUDGMENTS - -_Distinction between Contrary and Contradictory opposition_ [1] - -1. The only important point in the traditional diagram of opposition -of Judgments is the distinction between contrary and contradictory -opposition, the opposition, that is, between A and E, and the -opposition between A and O, or E and I. - -[1] Read Bain, pp. 55-6, on “Negative Names and the Universe -of the Proposition,” also on “Negative Propositions,” p. 83 -ff.; Venn, _Empirical Logic_, pp. 214--217; Jevons, _Elementary -Logic_, ix., on “Opposition of Propositions”; Mill, ch. iv. § 2. - -In _Contrary_ Opposition the one Judgment not only denies the other, -but goes on to deny or assert something more besides. The mere -grammatical shape “No man is mortal” conceals this, but we easily see -that it says more than is necessary to deny the other, “All men are -mortal.” - -In _Contradictory_ Opposition, the one Judgment does absolutely nothing -more than is involved in destroying the other. - -The _Contrary_ Negation has the advantage in positive, or at least in -definite import. - -The _Contradictory_ or pure Negation has the advantage in the -exhaustive disjunction which it involves. - -This is plain if we reflect that Contrary Negation only {127} rests on -the Law of Contradiction, “X is not both A and not A.” - -_Ordinary Diagram of Opposition of Judgments_. - -[The diagram has diagonal lines, not represented here, from corner A to -corner O, and from corner E to corner I, each labelled “Contradictory -Opposition”. Tr.] - - - A E - Contrary Opposition. - - - - - - Sub-contrary Opposition. - I O - - A = Universal Affirmative. All men are mortal. - E = Universal Negative. No men are mortal. - I = Particular Affirmative. Some men are mortal. - O = Particular Negative. Some men are not mortal. - -Sub-contrary Opposition has no real meaning; the judgments so opposed -are compatible. - -It is not _true_ both that “All M.P.’s are wise,” _and_ that “No -M.P.’s are wise,” but both may be false; while Contradictory Negation -implies the Law of Excluded Third or excluded Middle, “X is either -A or not A,” the principle of disjunction, or rather, the simplest -case of it. It is not {128} _false_ both that “All M.P.’s are wise” -and that “Some M.P.’s are not wise.” The point is, then, on the one -hand, that in Contradiction you can go from falsehood to truth, [1] -while in Contrariety you can only go from truth to falsehood; but also -that in Contradiction the Affirmative and Negative are not at all on -a level in meaning, while in Contrariety they are much more nearly -so. Then if we leave out the relations of mere plurality, of All and -Some, which enable you to get contrary negation in pure negative form -in the common Logic, we may say generally that in contrary negation -something is asserted, and in contradictory negation taken quite -literally nothing is asserted, but we have a “bare denial,” a predicate -is merely removed. In actual thought this cannot be quite realised, -because a bare denial is really meaningless, and we always have in our -mind some subject or universe of discourse within which the denial is -construed definitely. But this definite construing is not justified by -the bare form of contradiction, which consists simply in destroying a -predication and not replacing it by another. In as far as you replace -it by another, defined or undefined, you are going forward towards -contrary negation. - -[1] _I.e._ Contradictory alternatives are exhaustive. - -_Contrary Negation_ - -2. Thus, Contrary Negation in its essence is affirmation with a -negative intention, and we may take as a type of it in this wider -sense the affirmation of a positive character with the intention of -denying another positive character. _E.g._ when you deny “This is a -right-angled triangle” by asserting “This is an equilateral triangle,” -you have typical contrary negation. It is not really safe to speak of -contraries except with reference to _judgments_, intended to deny each -{129} other; but it is common to speak of species of the same genus as -contraries or opposites, because the same thing cannot be both. [1] - -[1] Bain, p. 55 ff. - -We must therefore distinguish _contrary_ from _different_. Of course -the same thing or content has many different qualities, and even -combines qualities that we are apt to call contrary or opposite. But -as Plato was fond of pointing out, a thing cannot have different or -opposing qualities in the same relation, that is to say, belonging to -the same subject under the same condition. The same thing may be blue -in one part of it and green in another, and the same part of it may be -blue by daylight and green by candlelight. But the same surface cannot -be blue and green at once by the same light to the same eye looking in -the same direction. _Different_ qualities become _contrary_ when they -claim to stand in the same relation to the same subject. Right-angled -triangles and equilateral triangles do not deny each other if we leave -them in peace side by side. They are then merely different species of -the same genus, or different combinations of the same angular space. -But if you say, “This triangle is right-angled,” and I say “It is -equilateral,” then they deny each other, and become true contraries. - -Then the _meaning_ of denial is always of the nature of _contrary_ -denial. As we always speak and think within a general subject or -universe of discourse, it follows that every denial substitutes some -affirmation for the judgment which it denies. The only judgments in -which this is not the case are those called by an unmeaning tradition -Infinite Judgments, _i.e._ judgments in which the negative predicate -{130} includes every determination which has applicability to the -Subject. This is because the attribute denied has no applicability -to the Subject, and therefore all that has applicability is -undiscriminatingly affirmed, in other words, the judgment has no -meaning. “Virtue is not-square.” This suggests no definite positive -quality applicable to virtue, and therefore is idle. You may safely -analyse a significant negative judgment, “A is not B” as = “A is not B -but C,” or as = “A is X, which excludes B.” For X may be undetermined, -“a colour not red.” But then if the meaning is always affirmative or -positive, why do we ever use the negative form? - -_Why use Negation?_ - -3. In the first place, we use it because it indicates exclusion, -and without it we cannot distinguish between mere differents on the -one hand and contraries on the other. If you ask me, “Are you going -to Victoria, London Chatham and Dover station?” and I answer, “I am -going to Victoria, London Brighton and South Coast,” that will not be -satisfactory to you, unless you happen to know beforehand that these -stations are so arranged that if you are at one you are not at the -other. They might be a single station used by different companies, and -called indifferently by the name of either. To make it clear that the -suggestion and the answer are incompatible, I must say, “I am _not_ -going to Victoria, London Chatham and Dover,” and I may add or not add, -“I _am_ going to Victoria, London Brighton and South Coast.” That tells -you that the one predicate excludes the other, and that is the first -reason why we use the generalised form of exclusion, _i.e._ negation. - -But in the second place, it can give us more, and something absolutely -necessary to our knowledge, and that is not {131} merely exclusion, but -exhaustion. In literal form negation is absolutely exhaustive, that is -to say, contradictory. The Judgment “A is not B” forms an exhaustive -alternative to the Judgment “A is B,” so that no third case beyond -these two is possible, and therefore you can argue from the falsehood -of either to the truth of the other. Now this form is potentially of -immense value for knowledge, and all disjunction consists in applying -it; but as it stands in the abstract it is worthless, because it is -an empty form. “A is red or not-red.” If either of these is false the -other is true. But what do you gain by this? You are not entitled to -put any positive meaning upon not-red; if you do so you slide into mere -contrary negation, and the inference from falsehood becomes a fallacy. -Make an argument, “The soul is red or not-red.” “It is not-red ∴ it is -some other colour than red.” The argument is futile. We have construed -“not-red” as a positive contrary, and that being so, the disjunction is -no longer exhaustive. We had no right to say that the soul is either -red or some other colour; the law of Excluded Middle does not warrant -that. - -I pause to say that the proof of the exhaustiveness of negation, _i.e._ -that two negatives make an affirmative--that if A is not not-B, it -follows that A is B--is a disputed problem, the problem known as double -negation. How do you know that what is not not-red must be red? I take -the law of Excluded Middle simply as a definition of the bare form -of denial, or the distinction between this and not-this; “not-this” -being the bare abstraction of the other than this. Others say that -every negation presupposes an affirmation; so “A is not-B” presupposes -the affirmation “A is B,” and {132} if you knock down the negative, -the original affirmative is left standing. Sigwart and B. Erdmann say -this. I think it monstrous. I do not believe that you must find an -affirmative standing before you can deny. - -_Stage of Significant Negation. Combination of Contrary and -Contradictory_ - -4. Well, then, the point we have reached is this. What we mean in -denial is always the contrary, something positive. What we say -in denial--in other words, the literal form which we use--always -approaches the contradictory, _i.e._ is pure exclusion. The Contrary -of the diagram denies more than it need, but still its form is that -of exclusion. Now we have seen that in denial, as used in common -speech, we get the benefit of _both affirmation and exclusion_, but in -accurate thought we want to do much more than this; we want to get the -whole benefit of the negative form--that is, to get a positive meaning -together with not only exclusion, but exhaustion. - -I will put the three cases in one example, beginning with mere -affirmations of different facts. - -_Different Affirmations_ - -(1) “He goes by this train to-day.” “He goes by that train to-morrow.” -This conjunction, as simply stated, gives no inference from the truth -or falsehood of either statement to the truth or falsehood of the other. - -_Contrary Opposition, exclusive_ - -(2) “He goes by this train,” and “He goes by that train,” with a -meaning equivalent to “No, he goes by that.” If it is true that in -the sense suggested by the context he goes by this train, then it is -not true that he goes by the other, and if it is true, in the sense -explained, that he goes by the other, then he does not go by this. Each -excludes the other, but both may be excluded by a third alternative. -If it is _not_ true that he goes by this {133} train--nothing follows. -There may be any number of trains he might go by, or he might give up -going; _i.e._ your Universe of discourse, your implicit meaning is -not expressly limited. If it is _not_ true to say, “No, he goes by -that”--taking the whole meaning together, and not separating its parts, -for this combination is essential to the “contrary”--nothing follows as -to the truth of the other statement. He may not be going at all, or may -be going by some third train, or by road. - -_Combined Contrary and Contradictory Negation_ - -But if you limit your Universe, or general subject, then you can -combine the value of contrary and contradictory negation. Then you say, - -(3) “He goes either by this train or by that.” Then you can infer not -only from “He goes by this train,” that “He does not go by that,” but -from “He does not go by this train” to “He does go by that.” - -The alternative between “A is B” and “A is not-B” remains exhaustive, -but not-B has been given a positive value, _because we have limited -the possibilities by definite knowledge_. The processes of accurate -thinking and observation aim almost entirely at giving a positive value -C to not-B, and a positive value B to not-C, under a disjunction, -because it is then that you define exactly where and within what -conditions C which is not B passes into B which is not C. Take the -disjunction, “Sound is either musical or noise.” If the successive -vibrations are of a uniform period it is musical sound; if they are of -irregular periods it is noise. This is a disjunction which assumes the -form, - -A is either B or C. That is to say, If it is B it is not C. If it is -not B it is C. - -{134} Therefore I think that all “determination is negation”--of -course, however, not bare negation, but significant negation; the -essence of it consists in correcting and confirming our judgment of -the nature of a positive phenomenon by showing that _just when_ its -condition ceases, _just then_ something else begins, and when you have -exhausted the whole operation of the system of conditions in question, -so that from any one phase of their effects you can read off what _it_ -is not but the _others_ are, then you have almost all the knowledge -we can get. The “_Just-not_” is the important point, and this is only -given by a positive negation within a definite system. You want to -explain or define the case in which A becomes B. You want observation -of not-B; but almost the whole world is formally or barely not-B, so -that you are lost in chaos. What you must do is to find the point -within A, where A1 which is B passes into A2 which is C, and that will -give you the _just-not-B_ which is the valuable negative instance. - -_Negative judgment expressing fact_ - -5. You will find it said that a Negative Judgment cannot express fact; -_e.g._ that a Judgment of Perception cannot be negative. This is worth -reflecting upon; I hope that what has been said makes clear how far it -is true. The bare form of Negation is not adequate to fact; it contains -mere emptiness or ignorance; we nowhere in our perception come upon a -mere “not-something.” No doubt negation is in this way more subjective -than affirmation. But then as it fills up in meaning, the denial -becomes more and more on a level with the affirmation, till at last -in systematic knowledge both become double-edged--every affirmative -denies, and every negative affirms. When a man who is both a {135} -musician and a physicist says, “this compound tone A is a discord Y,” -he knows exactly how much of a discord, what ratio of vibration makes -it so much of a discord, how much it would have to change to become a -concord (X which is not Y), and what change in the vibration ratio from -a1 to a2 would be needed to make it a concord. To such knowledge as -this, the accurate negation is just as expressive as the affirmation, -and it does not matter whether he says “A is Y,” or “A is by so much -not X.” It becomes, as Venn says, all but impossible to distinguish the -affirmation from the negation. No doubt affirmative terms come in at -this stage, though the meaning is negative. Observe in this connection -how we sometimes use the nearest word we can think of, knowing that the -negative gives the positive indirectly--“He was, I won’t say insolent,” -meaning _just not_ or “_all but_” insolent; or again, “That was not -right,” rather than saying bluntly “wrong.” - -_Operation of the denied idea_ - -6. Every significant negation “A is not B” can be analysed as “A is X -which excludes B.” Of course X may not be a distinct C; _e.g._ we may -be able to see that A is not red, but we may not be able to make out -for certain what colour it is; then the colour X is “an unknown colour -which excludes red.” - -How does the rejected idea operate in Judgment? I suppose it operates -by suggesting a Judgment which as you make it destroys some of its -own characteristics. It is really an expression of the confirmatory -negative instance or “just-not.” _Just_ when two parallel straight -lines swing so that they can meet, _just_ then the two interior angles -begin to be less than two right angles, which tells us that the {136} -straight lines are ceasing to be parallel. Just in as much as two -straight lines begin to enclose a space we become aware that one or -other of them is not straight, so that A in turning from Y to X turns -_pari passu_ from A1 to A2, and we are therefore justified in saying -that A, when it is Y, cannot be X. - -This lecture may pave the way for Induction, by giving some idea of the -importance of the negative instance which Bacon preached so assiduously. - -In a real system of science the conceptions are negative towards each -other merely as defining each other. One of them is not in itself -more negative than another. Such a conception, _e.g._, is that of a -triangle compared with two parallel straight lines which are cut by -a third line. If the parallels are swung so as to meet, they become -a triangle which gains in its third angle what the parallels lose on -the two interior angles, and the total of two right angles remains -the same. Thus in saying that parallels cut by a third straight line -cannot form a triangle, and that the three angles of a triangle are -equal to two right angles, we are expressing the frontier which is at -once the demarcation between two sets of geometrical relations, and the -positive grasp or connection of the one with the other. The negation is -no bar to a positive continuity in the organism of the science, but is -essential to defining its nature and constituent elements. This is the -bearing of significant negation when fully developed. - - - - -{137} - -LECTURE IX INFERENCE AND THE SYLLOGISTIC FORMS - -_Inference in general_ [1] - -1. The Problem of Inference is something of a paradox. Inference -consists in asserting as fact or truth, on the ground of certain given -facts or truths, something which is not included in those data. We -have not got inference unless the conclusion, (i.) is necessary from -the premisses, and (ii.) goes beyond the premisses. To put the paradox -quite roughly--we have not got inference unless the conclusion is (i.) -in the premisses, and (ii.) outside the premisses. This is the problem -which exercises Mill so much in the chapter, “Function and Value of the -Syllogism.” We should notice especially his § 7, “the universal type -of the reasoning process.” The point of it is to make the justice of -inference depend upon relations of content, which are judged of by what -he calls induction. That is quite right, but the question still returns -upon us, “What kind of relations of content must we have, in order to -realise the paradox of Inference?” This the “type of inference” rather -shirks. See Mill’s remarks when he is brought face to face with {138} -Induction, Bk. III. ch. f. § 2. An Inference, as he there recognises, -either does not hold at all, or it holds “in all cases of a certain -description,” _i.e._, it depends on universals. - -[1] Read for Lectures IX. and X., Mill, Bk. II ch. i., ii., -iii.; Bk. III. ch. i. and ii. at least; Venn, ch. xiv., xv.; -Jevons, _Lessons_ xv. and xxiv.; De Morgan’s _Budget of -Paradoxes_. - -I ought to warn you at once that though we may have novelty in the -conclusion of Inference (as in multiplication of large numbers), -the necessity is more essential than the novelty. In fact, much of -Inference consists in demonstrating the _connection_ of matters that -as _facts_ are pretty familiar. Of course, however, they are always -modified in the process, and in that sense there is always novelty. You -obtain the most vital idea of Inference by starting from the conclusion -as a suggestion, or even as an observation, and asking yourself how it -is proved, or explained, and treating the whole process as a single -mediate judgment, _i.e._ a reasoned affirmation. Take the observation, -“The tide at new and full moon is exceptionally high.” In scientific -inference this is filled out by a middle term. We may profitably think -of the “middle term,” as the copula or grip which holds the conclusion -together, made explicit and definitely stated. Thus the judgment pulls -out like a telescope, exhibiting fresh parts within it, as it passes -into inference. “The tide at new and full moon, _being at these times -the lunar tide plus the solar tide_, is exceptionally high.” This is -the sort of inference which is really commonest in science. Such an -inference would no doubt give us the conclusion if we did not know it -by observation, but it happens in many cases that we do know it by -observation, and what the inference gives us is the connection, which -of course may enable us to correct the observation. - -{139} _Conditions of the possibility of Inference_ - -2. In the strictest formal sense there can be no inference from -particulars to particulars. When there seems to be such inference, it -is merely that the ground of inference is not mentioned, sometimes -because it is obvious, sometimes because it is not clearly specified -in the mind. Suppose we say, “Morley and Harcourt will go for -Disestablishment, and I think, therefore, that Gladstone will.” I do -not _express_ any connecting link, merely because every one sees at -once that I am inferring from the intentions of some Liberal leaders to -those of another. If the terms are really particulars, “X is A, Y is B, -Z is C,” one is helpless; they do not point to anything further at all; -there is no bridge from one to the other. - -Inference cannot possibly take place except through the medium of an -identity or universal which acts as a bridge from one case or relation -to another. If each particular was shut up within itself as in the -letters taken as an instance just now, you could never get from one -which is given to another which is not given, or to a connection not -given between two which are given. - -Take the simplest conceivable case, which hardly amounts to Inference, -that of producing a given straight line. How is it that this is -possible? Because the direction of the straight line is universal and -self-identical as against possible directions in space, and it acts as -a rule which carries you beyond the given portion of it. This might -fairly be called an “immediate inference.” So I presume that any curve -can be constructed out of a sufficient portion of the curve, although, -except with a circle, this is more than repeating the same line over -again. The content has a nature which {140} is capable of prescribing -its own continuation. A curve is not a direction; a truth which is a -puzzle to the non-mathematician--it is a law of continuous change of -direction. - -_System the ultimate condition of Inference_ - -3. _Ultimately_ the condition of inference is always a system. And -it will help us in getting a vital notion of inference if we think, -to begin with, of the interdependence of relations in space--in -geometrical figures, or, to take a commonplace example, in the -adjustment of a Chinese puzzle or a dissected map. Or any of the -propositions about the properties of triangles are a good example. -How can one property or attribute determine another, so that you can -say, “Given this, there must be that”? This can only be answered by -pointing to the nature of a whole with parts, or a system, which just -means this, a group of relations or properties or things so held -together by a common nature that you can judge from some of them what -the others must be. Not all systems admit of precise calculation and -demonstration, but wherever there is inference at all there is at -least an identity of content which may be more or less developed into -a precise relation between parts. For example, we cannot construct -geometrically the life and character of an individual man; we can argue -from his character to some extent, but the connection of facts in his -personal identity is all that we can infer for certain; and even this -involves a certain context of facts, as in circumstantial evidence. -Yet this simplest linking together of occurrences by personal identity -is enough to give very startling inferences. Thackeray’s story of the -priest is a good instance of inference from mere identity. “An old -abbé, talking among a party of intimate friends, happened {141} to say, -‘A priest has strange experiences; why, ladies, my first penitent was -a murderer.’ Upon this, the principal nobleman of the neighbourhood -enters the room. ‘Ah, Abbé, here you are; do you know, ladies, I was -the Abbé’s first penitent, and I promise you my confession astonished -him!’” Here the inference depends solely on individual identity, which -is, as we saw, a kind of universal. - -But in this case was there really an inference? Does not the conclusion -fall inside the premisses? It must in one sense fall inside the -premisses, or it is not true. But it does not fall inside them until we -have brought them into contact by their point of identity and melted -them down into the same judgment. I admit that these inferences from -individual identity, assuming the terms not to be ambiguous, are only -just within the line of rational inference, but, as we see in this -case, they bring together the parts of a very extended universal. What -_is_ the lower limit of inference? - -_Immediate Inference_ - -4. In the doctrine of _immediate Inference_ common Logic treats of -Conversion and the Opposition of judgments. - -Is a mere transposition of Subject and Predicate, where the truth -of the new judgment follows from that of the old, an inference? It -is a matter of degree. [1] Does it give anything new? “The Queen -is a woman.” “A woman is the Queen.” If we make a real difference -between the implications of a Subject and a Predicate, we seem to get -something new; but it is a point of little interest. {142} Comparison -or Recognition are more like immediate inferences. Comparison means -that we do not let ourselves perceive freely, but take a particular -content as the means of apperception of another content, _i.e._ as -the medium through which we look at it. I do not merely look at the -second, but I look at it with the first in my mind. And so far I may -be said to infer, without the form of proof, from data of perception -to a relation between them. “You are taller than me,” is a result -obtained by considering your height from the point of view of mine, or -_vice versâ_. Recognition is somewhat similar. It is more than a mere -perception, because it implies reproduction of elements not given, -and an identification with them. I recognise this man _as_ so-and-so, -_i.e._ I see he is identical with the person who did so-and-so. It is -a judgment, but it goes beyond the primary judgment, “He is such and -such,” and is really inferred from it. It is a matter of degree. Almost -every Judgment can be broken up into elements, and recognition fades -gradually into cognition--we “recognise” an example of a law, a right, -a duty, an authority; not that we knew _it_, the special case, before, -but that in analysing it we find a principle which commands our assent, -and with which we identify the particular instance before us. - -[1] The collective or general judgment, as commonly explained, -cannot be converted “simply,” because the predicate is “wider” -than the subject, and the same rule is accepted for the relation -of consequent to antecedent. The aim of science, it might almost -be said, is to get beyond the kind of judgment to which this -rule applies. - -_Number of Instances_ - -5. The difference between guess-work and demonstration rests on the -difference between a detached quality or relation striking enough to -suggest something to us, and a system thoroughly known in its parts as -depending on one another. This is so even in recognising an individual -person; it is necessary to know that the quality by which you recognise -him is one that no one else possesses, or else {143} it is guess-work. -Still more is this the case in attempting a scientific connection. -All scientific connection is really by system as between the parts -of the content. A quality is often forced on our attention by being -repeated a great many times in some particular kind of occurrence, but -as long as we do not know its _causal_ connection with the properties -and relations involved in the occurrence it is only guess-work to -treat them as essentially connected. This is a matter very easy to -confuse, and very important. It is easy to confuse, because a number -of instances does help us really in inference, as it always insensibly -gives us an immense command of content; that is to say, without knowing -it we correct and enlarge our idea of the probable connection a little -with every instance. So the connection between the properties that -strike us becomes much larger and also more correct than it is to -people who have only seen a few instances. But this is because the -instances are all a little different, and so correct each other, and -show transitions from more obvious forms to less obvious forms of the -properties in question which lead us up to a true understanding of -them. If the instances were all exactly the same they would not help -us in this way, but our guess would still be a guess, however many -instances might have suggested it. - -I remember that a great many years ago I hardly believed in the -stone-age tools being really tools made by men. I had only seen a few -bad specimens, one or two of which I still think were just accidentally -broken flints which an old country clergyman took for stone-age tools. -This was to me then a mere guess, viz. that the cutting shape proved -{144} the flints to have been made by men. And obviously, if I had seen -hundreds of specimens no better than these, I should have treated it as -a mere guess all the same. But I happened to go to Salisbury, and there -I saw the famous Blackmore Museum, where there are not only hundreds -of specimens, but specimens arranged in series from the most beautiful -knives and arrow-heads to the rudest. There one’s eye caught the common -look of them at once, the better specimens helping one to interpret the -worse, and the guess was almost turned into a demonstration, because -one’s eyes were opened to the sort of handwork which these things -exhibit, and to the way in which they are chipped and flaked. - -Now this very important operation of number of examples, in helping the -mind to an explanation, is always being confused with the effect of -mere repetition of examples, which does not help you to an explanation, -_i.e._ a repetition in which one tells you no more than another. -But these mere repetitions operate _prima facie_ in a different -way, viz. by making you think there is an _unknown_ cause in favour -of the combination of properties which recurs, and lead up to the -old-fashioned perfect Induction and the doctrine of chances, and not to -demonstration. [1] - -[1] Ultimately the calculus of chances may be said to rest on -the same principle as Induction, in so far as the repetition of -examples derives its force from the (unspecified) variety of -contexts through which this repetition shows a certain result -to be persistent. But in such a calculus the presumption from -recurrence in such a variety of contexts is only estimated, and -not analysed. - -On the road from guess-work to demonstration, and generally assisted -by great experience, we have _skilful_ {145} guess-work, the first -stage of discovery. This depends on the capacity for hitting upon -qualities which _are_ connected by causation, though the connection -remains to be proved. So a countryman or a sailor gets to judge of -the weather; it is not merely that he has seen so many instances, but -he has been taught by a great variety of instances to recognise the -essential points, and has formed probably a much more complex judgment -than he can put into words. So again a doctor or a nurse can see how -ill a patient is, though it does not follow that they could always say -why this appearance goes with this degree of illness. In proportion -as you merely _presume_ a causal connection, it is guess-work or pure -discovery. In as far as you can _analyse_ a causal connection it is -demonstration or proof; and for Logic, discovery cannot be treated -apart from proof, except as skilful guess-work. _In as far as_ there -is ground for the guess, so far it approaches to proof; _in as far as_ -there is no ground, it gives nothing for Logic to get hold of--is mere -caprice. A good scientific guess really depends on a shrewd eye for the -essential points. I am not mathematician enough to give the history -of the discovery of Neptune by Leverrier and Adams, “calculating a -planet into existence by enormous heaps of algebra,” [1] but it must -have begun as a guess, I should suppose it was suggested before Adams -and Leverrier took it up, on the ground of the anomalous movements of -Uranus indicating an attraction unaccounted for by the known solar -system. And I suppose that this guess would gradually grow into -demonstration as it became clear that nothing but a new planet would -explain the anomalies of {146} the orbit of Uranus. And at last the -calculators were able to tell the telescopist almost exactly where -to look for the unknown planet. The proof in this case preceded the -observation or discovery by perception, and this makes it a very -dramatic example; but if the observation had come earlier, it would not -I suppose have dispensed with the precise proof of Neptune’s effect on -Uranus, though it might have made it easier. - -[1] De Morgan, _Budget of Paradoxes_, p. 53. - -_Figures of Syllogism_ - -6. In illustration of this progress from guess-work to science, [1] -I will give an example of the three Aristotelian figures of the -Syllogism. I omit the fourth. I assume that the heavier term, or the -term most like a “thing,” is fitted to be the Subject, and the term -more like an attribute to be the Predicate. The syllogistic rules -depend practically on the fact that common Logic, following common -speech and thought, treats the Predicate as wider than the Subject, -which corresponds to Mill’s view (also the common scientific view), -that the same effect may have several alternative causes (not a -compound cause, but different possible causes), and that consequent -is wider than antecedent. [2] It is this assumption that prevents -affirmative propositions from being simply convertible, _i.e._ prevents -“All men are mortal” from being identical with “All mortals are men,” -and but for it there would be no difference of figure at all, as there -is not for inference by equation. - -[1] Cf. Plato’s _Republic_, Bk. VI., end. [2] See p. 141, note. - -This progression is here merely meant to illustrate the universal or -systematic connection of particulars in process of disengaging itself. -But I do _not_ say that the first {147} figure with a major premise is -a natural form for all arguments. - -I take the scheme of the first three figures from Jevons, and suggest -their meaning as follows:-- - - X denotes the major term. - Y denotes the middle term. - Z denotes the minor term. - - 1st Fig. 2nd Fig. 3rd Fig. - Major Premise YX XY YX - Minor Premise ZY ZY YZ - Conclusion ZX ZX ZX - -Fig. 3. _An observation and a guess._ - - Yesterday it rained in the evening. - All yesterday the smoke tended to sink. - ∴ The smoke sinking ( may be ) a sign of rain. - ( is sometimes ) - -The conclusion cannot be general in this figure, because nothing -general has been said in the premisses about the subject of the -conclusion. So it is very suitable for a mere suggested connection -given in a single content--that of the time “yesterday,” implying -moreover that both the points in question have something to do with the -state of the atmosphere on that single day. - -Fig. 2. _A tentative justification_. - - Smoke that goes downwards is heavier than air - Particles of moisture are heavier than air. - ∴ Particles of moisture may be in the descending smoke. - -A universal conclusion in this figure would be formally bad. But we -do not care for that, because we only mean it to be tentative, and we -do not draw a universal affirmative {148} conclusion. We express its -badness by querying it, or by saying “may be.” The reason why it is -formally bad is that nothing general has been said in the premisses -about the middle term or reason, so that it is possible that the two -Subjects do not touch each other within it, _i.e._ that the suggested -special cause, moisture, is not connected with the special effect, the -sinking of the smoke. The general reason “heavier than air” may include -both special suggested cause and special suggested effect without their -touching. Smoke and moisture may both sink in air, but for different -and unconnected reasons. Still, when a special cause is suggested which -is probably present in part, and which would act in the way required -by the general character of the effect, there is a certain probability -that it _is_ the operative cause, subject to further analysis; and -the argument has substantive value, though bad in form. The only good -arguments in this figure have negative conclusions, _e.g._-- - - Smoke that is heavier than air goes downwards. - Smoke on dry days does not go downwards. - ∴ Smoke on dry days is not heavier than air. - -This conclusion _is_ formal, because the negative throws the second -Subject altogether outside the Predicate, and so outside the first -Subject. The one content always has a characteristic which can never -attach to the other, and consequently it is clear that some genuine -underlying difference keeps them apart. Such an inference would -corroborate the suggestion previously obtained that the presence of -moisture was the active cause of the descending smoke on days when rain -was coming. - -Fig. 1. _A completely reasoned judgment_. -{149} - All particles that sink in the air in damp weather more - than in dry, are loaded with moisture when they sink. - - Smoke that descends before rain is an example of particles - that sink in the air in damp weather more than in dry. - - ∴ Smoke that descends before rain is loaded with moisture - when it descends (and therefore its sinking is not - accidentally a sign of rain, but is really connected with - the cause of rain). - -The major premise belongs only to this figure. In the other it is mere -tradition to call it so, and their two premisses are the same in kind, -and contribute equally to the conclusion, and for that reason the -affirmative conclusion was not general or not formal. If your general -conclusion is to follow by mere form, you must show your principle -as explicitly covering your conclusion. But if you do this, then of -course you are charged with begging the question. And, in a sense, -that is what you mean to do, when you set out to make your argument -complete by its mere form. If you have _bonâ fide_ to construct a -combination of your data, you cannot predict whether the conclusion -will take this form or that form. Using a major premise meant, “We -have got a principle that covers the conclusion, and so explains the -case before us.” Granting that the major premise involves the minor -premise and conclusion, that is just the reason why it is imperative -to express them. The meaning of the Syllogism is that it analyses the -whole actual thought; the fault is to suppose that novelty is the -point of inference. The Syllogism shows you how you must understand -either premise in order that it may cover {150} the conclusion. Or, -starting from the conclusion as a current popular belief, or as an -isolated observation or suggestion by an individual observer (and this -is practically the way in which our science on any subject as a rule -takes its rise), the characteristic process through the three stages -described above consists in first noting the given circumstances under -which, according to the _prima facie_ belief or observation, the -conjunction in question takes place (“yesterday,” _i.e._ “in the state -of the atmosphere yesterday”); secondly in analysing or considering -those given circumstances, to find within them something which looks -like a general property, a law, or causal operation, which may attach -the conjunction in question to the systematic whole of our experience -(the presence of something heavier than air in the atmosphere); and -thirdly, in the exhibition of this ground or reason as a principle, in -the light of which the primary belief or observation (probably a good -deal modified) becomes a part of our systematic intelligible world. - - - - -{151} - -LECTURE X INDUCTION, DEDUCTION, AND CAUSATION - -_Induction_ [1] - -1. Induction has always meant some process that starts from instances; -the Greek word for it is used by Aristotle both in his own Logic and -in describing the method of Socrates. It meant either “bringing up -instance after instance,” or “carrying the hearer on by instances.” And -still in speaking of Induction we think of some process that consists -in doing something with a number of instances. But we find that this -notion really breaks down, and the contradiction between Mill and other -writers (Jevons, ch. i.) shows exactly how it breaks down. The question -is whether one experiment will establish an inductive truth. We will -review the meanings of the term, and show how they change. - -[1] Read N. Lockyer’s _Elements of Astronomy_; Abney’s _Colour -Measurement_; Introduction to _Bain on Induction_; Jevons’s -_Elementary Lessons on “Observation and Experiment”_ p. 228, and -on _Induction_, p. 214 (about Mill). - -_Induction by simple Enumeration_ - -(_a_) Induction by simple enumeration was what Bacon was always -attacking, and saying, quite rightly, that it was not scientific. It is -the method which I stated in the Third Figure of the syllogism, almost -a conversational method; the mere beginning of observation. “I am sure -the influenza is a serious illness; all my friends who have had it have -been dreadfully pulled down.” -{152} - - A B C have been seriously ill. - ABC have had influenza. - ∴ Influenza is a serious illness. - -Now this popular kind of inference, as Bacon says, “Precarie concludit, -et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria.” Suppose you come -across one slight case of influenza, the conclusion is upset. This -type of reasoning really appeals to two quite opposite principles; -one the principle of counting, which leads up to statistics and the -old-fashioned perfect Induction or the theory of chance, the other the -principle of scientific system. - -_Enumeration always has a ground_ - -(_b_) In counting, we do not think of the reason why we count, but -there always is a reason, which is given in the nature of the whole -whose parts we are counting. If I count the members of this audience, -it is because I want to know how many units the whole audience consists -of. I do not ask why each unit is there; counting is different from -scientific analysis; but yet the connection between whole and part is -present in _my reason for counting_. So really, though I only say, -“One, two, three, four, etc.,” each unit demands a judgment, “This is -one member--that makes two members, that makes three members,” etc. -Counting is the construction of a total of units sharing a common -nature; measurement is a form of counting in which the units are also -referred to some other standard besides the whole in question, _e.g._ -the standard pound or inch. - -_Perfect Induction_ - -(_c_) _Mere_ counting or “enumeration” only helps you in induction by -comparison with some other numerical result, and, if imperfect, only to -the extent of suggesting that there {153} is a common cause or there is -not a common cause. _E.g._ if you throw a six with one die fifty times -running, you infer that the die is probably loaded. This is because -you compare the result with that which you expect if the die is fair, -viz. a six once in every six throws. You infer that there is a special -cause favouring one side. The principle is that ignorance is impartial. -If you know no reason for one case more than another, you take them -as equal fractions of reality; if results are not equal fractions -of reality, you infer a special reason favouring one case. [1] Pure -counting cannot help you in Induction in any way but this. _Perfect -Induction_ simply means that the total is limited and the limit is -reached; you have counted 100 per cent, of the possible cases, and the -chance becomes certainty. The result is a mere collective judgment. - -[1] See Lecture IX, p. 144, note. - -_System_ - -(_d_) The principle of scientific system is quite a different thing. -Essentially, it has nothing to do with number or with a generalised -conclusion. It is merely this, “What is once true is always true, and -what is not true never was true.” The aim of scientific induction is -to find out “What _is_ true,” _i.e._ what is consistent with the given -system. We never doubt this principle; if we did we could have no -science. If observation contradicts our best-established scientific -laws, and we cannot suppose an error in the observation, we must -infer that the law was wrongly, _i.e._ untruly stated. Therefore, as -Mill says, one case is enough, _if_ you can find the truth about it. -People object that you cannot make a whole science out of one case, -and therefore you must have a number of instances. That is a {154} -_practical_ point to be borne in mind, but it has no real scientific -meaning. “Instance” cannot be defined except as one observation, which -is a purely accidental limitation. The point is, that you use your -instances not by counting cases of given terms, but by ascertaining -what the terms really are (_i.e._ modifying them), and what is their -real connection. This is the simple secret of Mill’s struggle to base -scientific Induction, on Induction by simple Enumeration; the latter is -not the evidence, but the beginning of eliciting the evidence--so that -the Scientific Induction is far more certain than that on which Mill -bases it. Aristotle’s statement is the clearest and profoundest that -has ever been made. [1] - -“Nor is it possible to obtain scientific knowledge by way -sense-perception. For even if sense-perception reveals a certain -character in its object, yet we necessarily perceive _this_, _here_, -and _now_. The universal, which is throughout all, it is impossible to -perceive; for it is not a this-now; if it had been it would not have -been universal, for what is always and everywhere we call universal. -Since then demonstration (science) is universal, and such elements it -is impossible to perceive by sense, it is plain that we cannot obtain -scientific knowledge by way of sense. But it is clear that even if we -had been able to perceive by sense [_e.g._ by measurement] that the -three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, we should -still have had to search for a demonstration, and should not, as some -say, have known it scientifically (without one); for we necessarily -perceive in particular cases only, but science comes by knowing the -universal. Wherefore if we could have been on the moon, and seen the -earth coming between it and the {155} sun, we should not (by that mere -perception) have _known_ the cause of the eclipse. Not but what by -seeing this frequently happen we should have grasped the universal, -and obtained a demonstration; for the universal becomes evident out -of a plurality of particulars, and the universal is valuable because -it reveals the cause;” and again, [2] “And that the search of science -is for the middle term is made plain in those cases in which the -middle term is perceptible to sense. For we search where we have had -no perception,--as for the reason (or middle term) of an eclipse,--to -know if there is a reason or not. But if we had been upon the moon, we -should not have had to inquire if the process (of an eclipse as such, -and not some other kind of darkness) takes place, or for what reason, -but both would have been plain at once. The perception would have been, -‘The earth is now coming between,’ carrying with it the obvious fact, -‘The moon is now suffering an eclipse,’ and _out of this_ the universal -(connection) would have arisen.” - -[1] Aristotle, _An. Post._ 87, b. 28. [2] _Ibid._ 90, a. 24. - -_Analogy_ - -(_e_) I showed you a method on the way to this in the shape of -Aristotle’s second figure, which we may call _analogy_. The plain sign -of it is, that you give up counting the instances and begin to weigh -them, so that the attributes which are predicates fall into the middle -term or reason. In the former inference about influenza we did not -suppose that you had any idea _why_ influenza was a serious illness; -but in analogy there is some suggestion of this kind, so that the -connection is examined into. Here at once you begin to get suggested -explanations and confirmation from the {156} system of knowledge. You -cannot have analogy by merely counting attributes. - -I begin from _Enumerative Suggestion_ drawn from observation of -Butterflies. - -1. Three species of genus _x_ closely resemble three species of _y_. - -2. The species of _x_ would be protected by resembling _y_ (because _y_ -is distasteful to birds). - -∴ The resemblance may be a “protective resemblance,” _i.e._ a -resemblance brought about by survival of those thus protected. - -On this there naturally follows _Analogy_. - -1. Protective resemblances naturally increase through series of species -from slighter to closer resemblances. - -2. The resemblances in question increase in genus _x_ through series of -species from slighter to closer resemblance to _y_. - -∴ The resemblances in question show important signs of being protective -resemblances. - -When we get thus far, a single syllogism will not really represent -the argument. It can only analyse with convenience a single step in -inference. But now we have connected the reason of the resemblances -with the whole doctrine of natural selection, the gradual approximation -of the species is most striking, and we could set up a corroborative -analogy on the basis of every feature and detail of these resemblances, -the tendency of which would be to show that no cause or combination of -causes other than that suggested is likely to account for the observed -resemblances. - -{157} I give a confirmatory negative analogy. - -1. No protective resemblance can grow up where there is no initial -tendency to resemblance. - -2. The non-resembling species in the genus _x_ show no initial tendency -towards _y_. - -∴ The non-resemblances observed are such as could not produce -protective resemblances. This is a formally bad argument from two -negative premisses justified by its positive meaning, which implies -that _just where_ the alleged effect ceases, the alleged cause ceases -too. - -If you look at the case in the Natural History Museum [1] you see the -normal Pierinae down one side, not approaching Euploinae. They are the -positive examples, negatively confirming the explanation of those which -do approach Euploinae. These latter all start from some form which -varied slightly, by accident we presume, towards Euploinae, and then -this partially resembling series splits into three sets, each leading -up to a different and complete protective resemblance. - -[1] These cases in the entrance-hall of the Natural History -Museum at South Kensington afford excellent practical -illustrations of Inductive Method. I strongly urge the London -student to try his hand at formulating them. - -I said _mere_ number was no help in scientific Induction. But do not -these three sets of resemblances make a stronger proof than any one -would? Yes, because we need a presumption against accident. You would -not want this if you could unveil what really happens in one case, -but as infinite conditions are operative in such matters, and it is -impossible to experiment accurately, [1] this cannot be done; {158} -and it might be said that _one_ such resemblance was an accident, -_i.e._ that it was owing to causes independent of the protection. But -as the cases become more numerous it becomes more improbable that -different circumstances produce the same effect, which would then be -a mere coincidence, in so many different cases. If, however, we knew -by positive and negative analysis what circumstance did produce the -effect, this confirmation would be useless. - -[1] Ultimately, no experiments are absolutely accurate. There is -always an unexhausted background in which unsuspected causes of -error may be latent. - -_Negative Instance_ - -(_f_) In order to show _exactly_ what circumstance produces a given -effect, a system must be brought to bear on the phenomenon through -negation. The only test of truth is that it is that which enables you -to organise your thought and perception. - -The first means of doing this is Observation, then Experiment, then -Classification and Hypothesis, which takes us into Deduction. - -Observation is inaccurate, until you begin to distinguish what is -connected from what is not connected. When you do this, you are very -near experiment, the use of which is to introduce perfectly definite -and measurable changes into what you are observing. [1] There is no -absolute distinction between observation and experiment. Looking at a -tissue through a microscope is observation; putting on a polariscope, -though it changes the _image_ altogether, is observation; if you -warm the stage, or put an acid on the object, that, I suppose, is -experiment, because you interfere with the object {159} itself. What -should we say, for example, as to spectroscopic analysis of the Sun’s -corona? - -[1] Jevons, _loc. cit_., esp. quot. from Herschel (p. 234). - -The moment you begin accurate observation you get a negative with -positive value, which is really the converse by negation of your -positive observation, a1 is b1; b2 (which is _just_ not-b1) is a2 -(which is _just_ not-a1). Thus the two may be represented as the same -judgment in positive and negative forms, which confirm one another. -“Yellow is a compound of red and green”--in Experiment, “if, and as far -as you take away the red or the green you destroy the yellow.” That -describes an experiment with the colour-box. I have inverted the order -in the conversions in compliance with the rule of common Logic, that -Predicate is wider than Subject; but in accurate matter it is a false -rule, and very inconvenient. The common rule means that a man who is -drowned is dead, but a man who is dead need not have been drowned; but -of course if he has the signs of death by drowning then he has been -drowned. - -_Classification and Generalisation_ - -(_g_) _Classification_ is a consequence of all systematic theory; it -is not a separate method of science. It is merely the arrangement -of positive contents negatively related. No doubt where we have a -kind of family relations between individuals classification is more -prominent, and in the theory of continuous matter or operation, where -individualities are not remarkable--_e.g._ in geometry--it is less -prominent. But both are always there--classification and theory. -Classification which expresses no theory is worthless, except that -intended for convenient reference, such as alphabetical classification. - -Under classification I may say a word on generalisation. {160} The -common idea of inference from many cases, because they are many, to -all cases of the same kind, is quite without justification. The only -genuine and fundamental law of generalisation is “Once true always -true.” But this might fail to suffice for our practical purposes, -because it might save its truth by abstraction. Let us take the -example, “Water is made of oxygen and hydrogen.” If that is true once, -it is always true _in the same sense_. If you find some fluid of a -different composition which you are inclined to call water, then you -must identify or distinguish the two, and this is a mere question of -classification. _Practically_, however, we could not get on unless our -knowledge had some degree of _exhaustiveness_, _i.e._ unless we knew -roughly that most of _what we take for water_ will have the alleged -properties. But no Induction or analysis, however accurate, can assure -us against confusion and error, viz. assure us that everything we take -to be water will be made of oxygen and hydrogen, nor that water will -always be found on the earth. I call this accurate analysis, which -_may_ be made in a single instance only, and is the only perfectly -scientific generalisation, generalisation by mere determination. Its -classification is hypothetical, _i.e._ in it the individuals are merely -possible individuals. - -But this passes into another kind of generalisation, which may be -called generalisation by concrete system, as when we attach scientific -analysis to some extensive individual reality, _e.g._ to the solar -system or the race of man. Then our judgments have a place in the -real world, and our classification is categorical classification. The -generalisation in this case does not follow from the judgment being -extended {161} over a great plurality of possible similar subjects, but -from the subject to which it applies having as an organised totality -a large place in the world; _e.g._ “The human race alone gives moral -interest to the history of bur planet.” These judgments come by making -explicit the reality which underlies such hypothetical judgments as -“all men are capable of morality.” It means that we actually venture to -assign a place in the universe to the system we are speaking of. Then, -though it is an individual, and unique, its name has a meaning, and is -not a mere proper name. The solar system is good instance. Judgments -about it or parts of it are universal but not purely hypothetical, -and as our knowledge of this kind increases it becomes even a little -exhaustive. - -_Generalisation by mere likeness or analogy_, on the other hand, is -precarious. It is what popular theory has in its mind in speaking of -Induction, viz. a conclusion from a truth to judgments concerning all -similar cases, _e.g._ from “Water is made of Oxygen and Hydrogen” to -“All liquids which we choose to take for water are made of Oxygen and -Hydrogen.” No scientific method can possibly give us this result. In as -far as it has value it depends upon our guessing rightly by analogy. -It may be replied, “that the signs of recognition are set down in -the law or truth.” Well, if they are certain, generalisation by mere -determination is enough; if they are doubtful, no induction can warrant -your judgment of them in particular cases. Practically, of course, we -get them right pretty often, although wrong very often. - -_Hypothesis_ - -(_h_) Hypothesis is merely supposition; it consists in suggesting a -fact as if it were real, when it is the only way of {162} completing -given facts into a consistent system. If the hypothesis is proved that -is a demonstration. It has been said that “Facts are only familiar -theories.” If a bell rings in the house, I say unhesitatingly, “Some -one rang that bell.” Once in ten years it may be rung, not by a person, -but by some mechanical accident, in which case the “some one” is a -hypothesis, but one always treats it as a fact. The only proof of a -hypothesis is its being the only one that will fit the facts, _i.e._ -make our system of reality relatively self-consistent. We believe many -things we can never verify by perception, _e.g._ the existence of the -centre of the earth, or that you have an idea in your minds; and if we -go to ultimate analysis, perception itself involves hypothesis, and -_a fortiori_ all experiment involves hypothesis. Every experimental -interference with nature involves some supposition as to a possible -connection which it is intended to confirm or disprove. - -_Deduction_ - -2. Classification and hypothesis bring us into Deduction, which is not -really a separate kind of inference from Induction, but is a name given -to science when it becomes systematic, so that it goes from the whole -to the parts, and not from the parts to the whole. In Induction you are -finding out the system piecemeal, in Deduction you already have the -clue; but the system, and the system only, is the ground of inference -in both. Induction is tentative because we do not know the system -completely. Their relation may be fairly represented by the relation -of the first figure of the Syllogism to the second and third. The -difference is merely that in deduction we are sure of having knowledge -which covers the whole system. If a man observed, “The difference -{163} between the dark blood in the veins and the bright blood in the -arteries calls for explanation,” that is the beginning of Induction. If -a man states the circulation of the blood as an explanation, that is -Deduction. Really Induction is only a popular name for such Inference -as deals with numbers of instances. Mill’s experimental methods do -not depend upon number of instances, but only upon content; they -presuppose the instances already broken up into conditions A, B, C, and -consequents a, b, c. - -I must distinguish subsumption and construction as two forms of -deduction. Only the former _properly_ employs Syllogism in the first -figure. - -_Subsumption_ - -(_a_) Subsumption is argument by subject and attribute; _i.e._ when -we do not know the system so as to construct the detail,--_e.g._ a -man’s character,--and can only state _in_ what individual system the -details occur. Then we _really want_ the major premise to lay down the -properties of the system, and all deduction _can_ therefore be employed -with a major premise, _e.g._ a mathematical argument might ultimately -take the form, “_space is such that_ two parallels cannot meet.” - -_Construction_ - -But (_b_) when the nature of the subject is very obvious, and -the combinations in it very definite, then the major premise is -superfluous, and adds nothing to the elements of the combination. - - “A to right of B, B to right of C. - ∴ A to right of C.” - -This is clear, but it is not formal; as a syllogism it has four terms. -It is simply a construction in a series of which the nature is obvious. -And if you insert a major premise it would be, “What is to the right -of anything is to the right {164} of that which the former is to the -right of,” and that is simply the nature of the series implied in the -inference stated in an abstract form. “Inference is a construction -followed by an intuition.” [1] The construction, I think, however, -must be a stage of the intuition. I am therefore inclined to suggest -that a factor of general insight into principle is neglected in this -definition, from which much may undoubtedly be learned. - -[1] Bradley, _Principles of Logic_, p. 235. - -_Causation_ - -3. I have said very little about causation. The fact is, that in -Logic the cause necessarily fades away into the reason, that is, the -explanation. If we follow Mill’s account, we see how this takes place. -I will put the stages very briefly. - -_Cause_ - -(_a_) We start, no doubt, by thinking of a cause as a real event in -time, the priority of which is the condition of another event, the -effect. Pull the trigger--cause--and the gun goes off--effect. - -_Complete conditions_ - -(_b_) The moment we look closer at it, we see that this will not -do, and we begin to say with Mill, that the cause is the antecedent -which includes _all_ the conditions of the effect. The plurality of -alternative causes breaks down, through the conditions defining the -effect. Pull the trigger?--yes, but the cartridge must be in its place, -the striker must be straight, the cap must be in order, the powder must -be dry and chemically fit, and so on, and so on, till it becomes pretty -clear that the cause is a system of circumstances which include the -effect. - -_Law_ - -(_c_) But then our troubles are not ended. Only the essential and -invariable conditions enter into the cause, if the {165} cause is -invariable. This begins to cut away the particular circumstances of -the case. You need not use the trigger, nor even the cap; you may -ignite powder in many ways. You may have many kinds of explosives. All -that is essential is to have an explosion of a certain force and not -too great rapidity. Then you will get this paradox. What is merely -essential to the effect, is always something less than any combination -of real “things” which will produce the effect, because every real -thing has many properties irrelevant to this particular effect. So, -_if the cause means something real_, as a material object is real, it -cannot be invariable and essential. If it is not something real, and -is essential, it fines down into a reason or law--the antecedent in a -hypothetical judgment. - -_Ground, or real system with known laws_ - -(_d_) We can only escape this by identifying both cause and reason -with the complete ground; that is, the nature of a system of reality -within which the cause and effect both lie. But even then, though the -ground is _real_, it is not antecedent in time. We see, indeed, that -the conditions of an effect must be continuous through the effect. If -the process were taken as cut in two at any point, its connection would -be destroyed. If _a_ cause and _b_ effect were really detached events, -what difference could it make if, instead of _a_, _c_ preceded _b_? - -_Postulate of Knowledge_ - -4. The postulate of Knowledge, then, is very badly stated as -Uniformity of Nature. That was due to the vulgar notion of Inductive -“generalisation.” It must be stated in two parts: first, “Once true -always true;” and secondly, “Our truth is enough for us,” that is, it -covers enough of the universe for our practical and theoretical needs. -The {166} two parts may be put together by saying, “The universe is a -rational system,” taking rational to mean not only of such a nature -that it can be known by intelligence, but further of such a nature that -it can be known and handled by our intelligence. - -_Conclusion_ - -5. These lectures have been unavoidably descriptive rather than -thorough, and yet, as I warned you, descriptive of properties which -are in a sense not at all new, but quite familiar, and even trite. You -will not feel, at first, that the full interest which I claimed for -the science of knowledge, really attaches to these dry relations of -abstract thought. You will get no permanent good unless you carry the -study forward for yourselves, and use these ideas as a clue to find -your bearings in the great world of knowledge. - -And I would give you one hint about this. _I_ do not suggest that you -should neglect philosophy but yet you should remember that philosophy -can tell you no new facts, and can make no discoveries. All that it -can tell you is the significant connection of what you already know. -And if you know little or nothing, philosophy has little or nothing to -tell you. Plato says, “The synoptical man, the man who has a conspectus -of knowledge, is the philosopher; and the man who is not synoptical, -who cannot see two subjects in their relation, is no philosopher.” -By all means read good logical books; but also and more especially -read good and thorough systematic books on science, or history, or -politics, or fine art--I do not mean on all of these subjects, but on -some, wherever your interest leads you. You cannot learn the nature of -inference, of systematic necessity, of the construction of reality, -by reading logic exclusively; you must {167} feel it and possess it -by working in the world of concrete knowledge. I give one example in -passing. If you study social questions, test for yourselves the value -of statistics--_i.e._ sets of enumerative judgments. Consider what the -causal analysis of any problem demands; remember that all enumeration -implies a ground or whole, on which its value depends; and contrast -the exhaustive examination of an instance thoroughly known, with the -enumeration of thousands of cases lumped under a general predicate. -Determine always to know the truth; welcome all information and all -suggestion, but remember that truth is always systematic, and that -every judgment, when you scrutinise it, demands a fuller and fuller -connection with the structure of life. It is not cleverness or learning -that makes the philosopher; it is a certain spirit; openness of mind, -thoroughness of work, and hatred of superficiality. Each of us, -whatever his opportunities, can become in a true sense, if he has the -real philosophic spirit, in Plato’s magnificent words, “The spectator -of all time and of all existence.” - -THE END - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Essentials of Logic, by Bernard Bosanquet - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ESSENTIALS OF LOGIC *** - -***** This file should be named 63598-0.txt or 63598-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/6/3/5/9/63598/ - -Produced by Gdurb -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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