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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/6463.txt b/6463.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02bdc74 --- /dev/null +++ b/6463.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10650 @@ +Project Gutenberg's A Handbook of Ethical Theory, by George Stuart Fullerton + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: A Handbook of Ethical Theory + +Author: George Stuart Fullerton + +Release Date: September, 2004 [EBook #6463] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on December 17, 2002] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY *** + + + + +Produced by Scott Pfenninger, Charles Franks +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + + +A HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY + +BY GEORGE STUART FULLERTON + + + + + +To + +MY WIFE + + + + +PREFACE + + +We are all amply provided, with moral maxims, which we hold with more or +less confidence, but an insight into their significance is not attained +without reflection and some serious effort. Yet, surely, in a field in +which there are so many differences of opinion, clearness of insight and +breadth of view are eminently desirable. + +It is with a view to helping students of ethics in our universities and +outside of them to a clearer comprehension of the significance of morals +and the end of ethical endeavor, that this book has been written. + +I have, in the Notes appended to it, taken the liberty of making a few +suggestions to teachers, some of whom have fewer years of teaching behind +them than I have. I make no apology for writing in a clear and +untechnical style, nor for reducing to a minimum references to +literatures in other tongues than our own. These things are in accord +with the aim of the volume. + +I take this opportunity of thanking Professor Margaret F. Washburn, of +Vassar College, and Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge, of Columbia +University, for kind assistance, which I have found helpful. + +G. S. F. New York, 1921. + + + + +CONTENTS + +PART I + +_THE ACCEPTED CONTENT OF MORALS_ + +CHAPTER I. IS THERE AN ACCEPTED CONTENT? +1. The Point in Dispute. +2. What Constitutes Substantial Agreement? +3. Dogmatic Assumption. + +CHAPTER II. THE CODES OF COMMUNITIES +4. The Codes of Communities: Justice. +5. The Codes of Communities: Veracity. +6. The Codes of Communities: the Common Good. + +CHAPTER III. THE CODES OF THE MORALISTS +7. The Moralists. +8. Epicurean and Stoic. +9. Plato; Aristotle; the Church. +10. Later Lists of the Virtues. +11. The Stretching of Moral Concepts. +12. The Reflective Mind and the Moral Codes. + +PART II + +_ETHICS AS SCIENCE_ + +CHAPTER IV. THE AWAKENING TO REFLECTION +13. The Dogmatism of the Natural Man. +14. The Awakening. + +CHAPTER V. ETHICAL METHOD +15. Inductive and Deductive Method. +16 The Authority of the "Given." + +CHAPTER VI. THE MATERIALS OF ETHICS +17. How the Moralist should Proceed. +18. The Philosopher as Moralist. + +CHAPTER VII. THE AIM OF ETHICS AS SCIENCE +19. The Appeal to Reason. +20. The Appeal to Reason Justified. + +PART III + +_MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT_ + +CHAPTER VIII. MAN'S NATURE +21. The Background of Actions. +22. Man's Nature. +23. How Discover Man's Nature? + +CHAPTER IX. MAN'S MATERIAL ENVIRONMENT +24. The Struggle with Nature. +25. The Conquests of the Mind. +26. The Conquest of Nature and the Well-being of Man. + +CHAPTER X. MAN'S SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT +27. Man is Assigned his Place. +28. Varieties of the Social Order. +29. Social Organization. +30. Social Order and Human Will. + +PART IV + +_THE REALM OF ENDS_ + +CHAPTER XI. IMPULSE, DESIRE, AND WILL +31. Impulse. +32. Desire. +33. Desire of the Unattainable. +34. Will. +35. Desire and Will not Identical. +36. The Will and Deferred Action. + +CHAPTER XII. THE PERMANENT WILL +37. Consciously Chosen Ends. +38. Ends not Consciously Chosen. +39. The Choice of Ideals. + +CHAPTER XIII. THE OBJECT IN DESIRE AND WILL +40. The Object as End to be Realized. +41. Human Nature and the Objects Chosen. +42. The Instincts and Impulses of Man. +43. The Study of Man's Instincts Important. +44. The Bewildering Multiplicity of the Objects of Desire, and the Effort + to Find an Underlying Unity. + +CHAPTER XIV. INTENTION AND MOTIVE +45. Complex Ends. +46. Intention. +47. Motive. +48. Ethical Significance of Intention and Motive. + +CHAPTER XV. FEELING AS MOTIVE +49. Feeling. +50. Feeling and Action. +51. Feeling as Object. +52. Freedom as Object. + +CHAPTER XVI. RATIONALITY AND WILL +53. The Irrational Will. +54. One View of Reason. +55. Dominant and Subordinate Desires. +56. The Harmonization of Desires. +57. Varieties of Dominant Ends. +58. An Objection Answered. +59. This View of Reason Misconceived. +60. Another View of Reason. + +PART V + +_THE SOCIAL WILL_ + +CHAPTER XVII. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL WILL +61. What is the Social Will? +62. Social Will and Social Habits. +63. Social Will and Social Organization. +64. The Social Will and Ideal Ends. +65. The Permanent Social Will. + +CHAPTER XVIII. EXPRESSIONS OF THE SOCIAL WILL +66. Custom. +67. The Ground for the Authority of Custom. +68. The Origin and the Persistence of Customs. +69. Law. +70. Public Opinion. + +CHAPTER XIX. THE SHARERS IN THE SOCIAL WILL +71. The Community. +72. The Community and the Dead. +73. The Community and the Supernatural. +74. Religion and the Community. +75. The Spread of the Community. + +PART VI + +_THE REAL SOCIAL WILL_ + +CHAPTER XX. THE IMPERFECT SOCIAL WILL +76. The Apparent and the Real Social Will. +77. The Will of the Majority. +78. Ignorance and Error and the Social Will. +79. Heedlessness and the Social Will. +80. Rational Elements in the Irrational Will. +81. The Social Will and the Selfishness of the Individual. + +CHAPTER XXI. THE RATIONAL SOCIAL WILL +82. Reasonable Ends. +83. An Objection Answered. +84. Reasonable Social Ends. +85. The Ethics of Reason. +86. The Development of Civilization. + +CHAPTER XXII. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL WILL +87. Man's Multiple Allegiance. +88. The Appeal to Reason. +89. The Ethics of Reason and the Varying Moral Codes. + +PART VII + +_THE SCHOOLS OF THE MORALISTS_ + +CHAPTER XXIII. INTUITIONISM +90. What is it? +91. Varieties of Intuitionism. +92. Arguments for Intuitionism. +93. Arguments against Intuitionism. +94. The Value of Moral Intuitions. + +CHAPTER XXIV. EGOISM +95. What is Egoism? +96. Crass Egoisms. +97. Equivocal Egoism? +98. What is Meant by the Self? +99. Egoism and the Broader Self. +100. Egoism not Unavoidable. +101. Varieties of Egoism. +102. The Arguments for Egoism. +103. The Argument against Egoism. +104. The Moralist's Interest in Egoism. + +CHAPTER XXV. UTILITARIANISM +105. What is Utilitarianism? +106. Bentham's Doctrine. +107. The Doctrine of J. S. Mill. +108. The Argument for Utilitarianism. +109. The Distribution of Happiness. +110. The Calculus of Pleasures. +111. The Difficulties of Other Schools. +112. Summary of Arguments for Utilitarianism. +113. Arguments against Utilitarianism. +114. Transfigured Utilitarianism. + +CHAPTER XXVI. NATURE, PERFECTION, SELF-REALIZATION +I. _Nature_ +115. Human Nature as Accepted Standard. +116. Human Nature and the Law of Nature. +117. Vagueness of the Law of Nature. +118. The Appeal to Nature and Intuitionism. + +II. _Perfection_ +119. Perfection and Type. +120. More and Less Perfect Types. +121. Perfectionism and Intuitionism. + +III. _Self-realization_ +122. The Self-realization Doctrine. +123. The Doctrine Akin to that of Following Nature. +124. Is the Doctrine More Egoistic? +125. Why Aim to Realize Capacities? +126. The Problem of Self-sacrifice. +127. Self-satisfaction and Self-sacrifice. +128. Can Moral Self-sacrifice be a Duty? +129. Self-sacrifice and the Identity of Selves. +130. Questions which Seem to be Left Open. + +CHAPTER XXVII. THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION +131. The Significance of the Title. +132. Evolution and the Schools of the Moralists. +133. The Ethics of Individual Evolutionists. + +CHAPTER XXVIII. PESSIMISM +134. The Philosophy of the Pessimist. +135. Comment on the Ethics of Pessimism. + +CHAPTER XXIX. KANT, HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE +136. Kant. +137. Hegel. +138. Nietzsche. + +PART VIII + +_THE ETHICS OF THE SOCIAL WILL_ + +CHAPTER XXX. ASPECTS OF THE ETHICS OF REASON +139. The Doctrine Supported by the Other Schools. +140. Its Method of Approach to Problems. +141. Its Solution of Certain Difficulties. +142. The Cultivation of Our Capacities. + +CHAPTER XXXI. THE MORAL LAW AND MORAL IDEALS +143. Duties and Virtues. +144. The Negative Aspect of the Moral Law. +145. How Can One Know the Moral Law? + +CHAPTER XXXII. THE MORAL CONCEPTS +146. Good and Bad; Right and Wrong. +147. Duty and Obligation. +148. Reward and Punishment. +149. Virtues and Vices. +150. Conscience. + +CHAPTER XXXIII. THE ETHICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL. +151. What is Meant by the Term? +152. The Virtues of the Individual. +153. Conventional Morality. + +CHAPTER XXXIV. THE ETHICS OF THE STATE +154. The Aim of the State. +155. Its Origin and Authority. +156. Forms of Organization. +157. The Laws of the State. +158. The Rights and Duties of the State. + +CHAPTER XXXV. INTERNATIONAL ETHICS +159. What is Meant by the Term. +160. Our Method of Approach to the Subject. +161. Some Problems of International Ethics. +162. The Other Side of the Shield. +163. The Solution. +164. The Necessity for Caution. + +CHAPTER XXXVI. ETHICS AND OTHER DISCIPLINES +165. Sciences that Concern the Moralist. +166. Ethics and Philosophy. +167. Ethics and Religion. +168. Ethics and Belief. +169. The Last Word. + +NOTES + +INDEX + + + + + +PART I + +THE ACCEPTED CONTENT OF MORALS + + +CHAPTER I + +IS THERE AN ACCEPTED CONTENT? + + +1. THE POINT IN DISPUTE.--Is there an accepted content of morals? Can we +use the expression without going on to ask: Accepted where, when, and by +whom? + +To be sure, certain eminent moralists have inclined to maintain that men +are in substantial agreement in regard to their moral judgments. Joseph +Butler, writing in the first half of the eighteenth century, came to the +conclusion that, however men may dispute about particulars, there is an +universally acknowledged standard of virtue, professed in public in all +ages and all countries, made a show of by all men, enforced by the +primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions: namely, justice, +veracity, and regard to common good. [Footnote: _Dissertation on the +Nature of Virtue._] Sir Leslie Stephen, writing in the latter half of +the nineteenth, tells us that "in one sense moralists are almost +unanimous; in another they are hopelessly discordant. They are unanimous +in pronouncing certain classes of conduct to be right and the opposite +wrong. No moralist denies that cruelty, falsity and intemperance are +vicious, or that mercy, truth and temperance are virtuous." [Footnote: +_The Science of Ethics_, chapter i, Sec. 1.] + +In other words, these writers would teach us that men are, on the whole, +agreed in approving, explicitly or implicitly, some standard of conduct +sufficiently definite to serve as a code of morals. But that there is +such a substantial agreement among men has not impressed all observers to +the same degree. Locke, who wrote before Butler, based his arguments +against the existence of innate moral maxims upon the wide divergencies +found among various classes of men touching what is right and what is +wrong. [Footnote: _Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, Book I, +chapter iii.] The historian, the anthropologist and the sociologist +reinforce his reasonings with a wealth of illustration not open to the +men of an earlier time. They present us with codes, not a code; with +multitudinous standards, not a single standard; with what has been +accepted here or there, at this time or at that; and we may well ask +ourselves where, amid this profusion, we are to find the one and +acceptable code. + +2. WHAT CONSTITUTES SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT?--To be sure, we may be very +generous in our interpretation of what constitutes substantial agreement; +we may deny significance to all sorts of discrepancies by relegating them +to the unimpressive class of "disputes about particulars." Such an +impressionistic indifference to detail may leave us with something on our +hands as little serviceable as a composite photograph made from +individual objects which have little in common, a blur lacking all +definite outline and not recognizable as any object at all. No man can +guide his conduct by the common core of many or of all moral codes. Taken +in its bald abstraction, it is not a code or anything like a code. Who +can walk, without walking in some particular way, in some direction, at +some time? Who can mind his manners without being mannerly in accordance +with the usages of some race or people? + +Those who content themselves with enunciating very general moral +principles may, it is true, be of no little service to their fellow-men; +but that is only because their fellow-men are able to supply the details +that convert the blur into a picture. Some twenty-four hundred years ago +Heraclitus told his contemporaries "to act according to nature with +understanding"; we are often told today that the rule of our lives should +be "to do good." Had the ancient Greek not possessed his own notions of +what might properly be meant by nature and by understanding, did we not +ourselves have some rather definite conception of what actions may +properly fall under the caption of doing good, such admonitions could not +lead to the stirring of a finger. Who would appeal to his physician for +advice as to diet, if he expected from him no more than the counsel to +eat, at the proper hours, enough, but not too much, of suitable food? + +If, then, we confine our admonitions to the group of abstractions which +constitute the universally acknowledged standard of virtue when all the +individual differences which characterize different codes have been +ignored, we preach what, taken alone, no man can live by, and no +community of men has ever attempted to live by. If we leave it to our +hearers to drape our naked abstractions with concrete details, each will +set to work in a different way. The method of the composite photograph +seems unprofitable in attempting to solve the problem of morals. + +3. DOGMATIC ASSUMPTION.--There is, however, a second way by which the +variations which characterize different codes may come to be relegated to +a position of relative insignificance. We may assume that our own code is +the ultimate standard by which all others are to be judged, and we may +set down deviations from it to the account of the ignorance or the +perversity of our fellowmen. So regarded, they are aberrations from the +normal, and only true code of conduct; interesting, perhaps, but little +enlightening, for they can have little bearing upon our conception of +what we ought to do. + +A presumption against this arbitrary assumption that we have the one and +only desirable code is suggested the unthinking acceptance of the +traditional by those who are lacking in enlightenment and in the capacity +reflection. Is it not significant that a contact with new ways of +thinking has a tendency, at least, to make men broaden their horizon and +to revise some of their views? + +In other fields, we hope to attain to a capacity for self-criticism. We +expect to learn from other men. Why should we, in the sphere of morals, +lay claim to the possession of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing +but the truth? Why should we refuse to learn from anyone? Such a position +seems unreasoning. It puts moral judgments beyond the pale of argument +and intelligent discussion. It is an assumption of infallibility little +in harmony with the spirit of science. The fact that a given standard of +conduct is in harmony with our traditions, habits of thought, and +emotional responses, does not prove to other men that it is, not one of a +number of accepted codes, but in a quite peculiar sense acceptable, a +thing to put in a class by itself--the class into which each mother puts +her own child, as over against other children. + +Moreover, such an unreasoned assumption of superiority must make one +little sympathetic in one's attitude toward the moral life of other +peoples. Into the significance of their social organization, of their +customs, their laws, one can gain no insight. Their hopes, their fears, +their strivings, their successes and their failures, their approval and +disapproval of their fellows, their peace of conscience and their +remorse, must leave us cold and aloof. + +It is not profitable for us to assume at the outset that the differences +exhibited in the moral judgments of individuals or of peoples are of +minor significance. They are facts to be dealt with in the light of some +theory. An ethical theory which ignores them must rest upon a narrow and +insecure foundation. It is exposed to assault from many quarters. It may, +in default of better means of defence, be compelled to take refuge behind +the blind wall of dogmatic assertion. On the other hand, a theory which +gives them frank recognition, and strives to exhibit their real +significance in the life of the individual and of the race, may be able +to show lying among them the golden cord of reason which saves them from +the charge of being incoherent facts. It may even lead us back to a +conservatism no longer unreasoning, but rationally defensible and +conscious of its proper limits. The blindly conservative man seems to be +faced with the alternative of stagnation or revolution. The rationally +conservative may regard the development of the moral life as a Pilgrim's +Progress, not without its untoward accidents, but, in spite of them, a +gradual advance toward a desirable goal. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE CODES OF COMMUNITIES + + +4. THE CODES OF COMMUNITIES: JUSTICE.--In view of the existing tendency +in the average man, and even in some philosophers, to pass lightly over +the diversities exhibited by different codes, it is well to cast a brief +preliminary glance at the content of morals as accepted, both by +communities of men, and by their more reflective spokesmen, the +moralists. Let us first take a look at the codes of communities. + +We have seen that Butler viewed justice, veracity and regard to common +good as virtues accepted among men everywhere. But we may also see, if we +look into his pages, that he neglected to point out that there may be the +widest divergencies in men's notions of what constitutes justice, +veracity and common good. And men differ widely on the score of the +degree of emphasis to be laid upon their observance. + +Take justice. Where men possess a code, written or unwritten, that may +properly be called moral, we expect of them the judgment that guilt +should be punished. But what shall be accounted guilt? What shall be the +measure of retribution? Who shall be fixed upon as guilty? + +As to what constitutes guilt. We have only to remind ourselves that the +Dyak head-hunter is not condemned by his fellows, but is admired; +[Footnote: WESTERMARCK, _The Origin and Development of the Moral +Ideas_, London, 1906, I, chapter xiv.] that the fattening and eating +of a slave may, in a given primitive community, be accounted no crime; +[Footnote: WESTERMARCK, _op. cit._ II, chapter xlvi.] that +infanticide has been most widely approved, and that not merely in +primitive communities, for Greece and Rome, when they were far from +primitive, practiced certain forms of it with a view to the good of the +state; [Footnote: _Ibid._, I, chapter xvii.] that the holding of a +fellow-creature in bondage, and exploiting him for one's own advantage, +even under the lash, was, until recently, not a crime in the eye of the +law even in the most civilized states. On the other hand, it may be a +crime to eat a female opossum. [Footnote: _Ibid._, I, chapter iv, p. +124.] The impressive imperative: Thou shalt not! appears to bear +unmistakable reference to time and circumstance. + +And what is the natural and proper measure of punishment? The ancient and +primitive rule of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth suggests the +figure of the scales, the impartially meting out to each man of his due. +It is obviously a rule that cannot be applied in all cases. One cannot +take the tooth of a toothless man, or compel a thievish beggar to restore +fruit which he has eaten. We should be horrified were any serious attempt +made to make the rule the basis of legislation in any civilized state +today, but men have not always been so fastidious. Approximations to it +have been incorporated into the laws of various peoples. + +But all have modified it to some degree, and the modifications have taken +many forms--the punishment of someone not the criminal, compensation in +money or in goods, incarceration, and what not. Nor have the +modifications been made solely on account of the difficulty of applying +the rule baldly stated. Other influences have been at work. + +Thus, in the famous Babylonian code, the man who struck out the eye of a +patrician lost his own eye in return, and his tooth answered for the +tooth of an equal--but the rule was not made general. [Footnote: 5 +HOBHOUSE, _Morals in Evolution,_ I, chapter iii, Sec 3; New York, +1906.] In state after state it has been found just to treat differently +the patrician, the plebeian, the slave, the man, the woman, the priest. +In the very state to which Butler belonged, benefit of clergy could be +claimed, up to relatively recent times, by those who could read. The +educated criminal escaped hanging for offences for which his illiterate +neighbor had to swing. [Footnote: _Ibid.,_ Sec. 11.] + +Nor is there any clear concensus of opinion touching the question of who +shall be selected as the bearer of punishment. If a man has injured +another unintentionally, shall he be held to make amends? It has seemed +just to men that he should. [Footnote: WESTERMARCK, chapter ix.] That one +man should be made responsible for the misdeeds of another, under the +principle of collective responsibility, has commended itself as just to a +multitude of minds. Not merely the sins of the fathers, but those of the +most distant relations, those of neighbors, of fellow-tribesmen, of +fellow-citizens, have been visited upon those whose sole guilt lay in +such a connection with the directly guilty parties. This is not a +sporadic phenomenon. Among the ancient Hebrews, in Babylonia, in Greece, +in the later legislation of Rome, in medieval and even in modern Europe, +the principle of collective responsibility has been accepted and has +seemed acceptable. Asia, Africa and Oceania have cast votes for it. So +have the Americas. [Footnote: WESTERMARCK, I, chapter ii; DEWEY AND +TUFTS, _Ethics_, New York, 1919, Part I, chapter ii.] + +5. THE CODES OF COMMUNITES: VERACITY.--As to veracity: It has undoubtedly +been valued to some degree, and with certain limitations, by tribes and +nations the most diverse in their degrees of culture. Did men never speak +the truth they might well never speak at all. But to maintain that +absolute veracity has at all times been greatly valued would be an +exaggeration. The lie of courtesy, the clever lie, the lie to the +stranger, have been and still are, in many communities both uncivilized +and more advanced, not merely condoned, but approved. With the defence +which has been made of the doctrines of mental reservation and pious +fraud students of church history are familiar. In diplomacy and in war +today highly civilized nations find deceptions of many sorts profitable +to them, nor are such generally condemned. [Footnote: WESTERMARCK, II, +chapters xxx and xxxi.] + +What modern government does not employ secret service agents, and value +them in proportion to the degree of skill with which they manage to +deceive their fellows, while limiting the exercise of professional good +faith to their intercourse with their paymaster? The secret service agent +of transparent frankness, who could not bear to deceive his neighbor, +would not hold his post for a day. He would be a subject for Homeric +laughter. + +Moreover, if the question may be raised: what constitutes justice? may +one not equally well ask: what constitutes veracity or its opposite? +Where does the silence of indifference shade into purposed concealment, +and the latter into what is unequivocally deception? At what point does +deception blossom out into the unmistakable lie? One may take advantage +of an accidental misunderstanding of what one has said; one may use +ambiguous language; one may point instead of speaking. Between going +about with a head of glass, with all one's thoughts displayed as in a +show-case to every comer, and the settled purpose to deceive by the +direct verbal falsification, there is a long series of intermediate +positions. The commercial maxim that one is not bound to teach the man +with whom one is dealing how to conduct his business, and the lawyer's +dictum that the advocate is under no obligation to put himself in the +position of the judge, obviously, will bear much stretching. + +6. THE CODES OF COMMUNITIES: THE COMMON GOOD.--Nor are the facts which +confront us less perplexing when we turn to that "regard to the common +good" which Butler finds to be acknowledged and enforced by the primary +and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions. Whether we look at the +past or view the present, whether we study primitive communities or +confine ourselves to civilized nations, we see that common good is not, +apparently, conceived as the good of all men, however much the words +"justice" and "humanity" may be upon men's lips. + +Has any modern state as yet succeeded in incorporating in its civil +constitution such provisions as will ensure to all classes of its +subjects any considerable share in the common good? Slaves and animals, +said Aristotle, have no share in happiness, nor do they live after their +own choice. [Footnote: _Politics_, iii, 9.] The pervading unrest of +the modern economic community is due to the widespread conviction that +the existing organization of society does not sufficiently make for the +happiness of all. Some states with a high degree of culture have not even +made a pretence of having any such aim. They have deliberately legislated +for the few. [Footnote: The "citizens" of the ancient Greek state were a +privileged class who legislated in their own interest. Let the reader +look into Plato's _Laws_ and Aristotle's _Politics_ and see how +inconceivable the cultivated Greek found what is now the ideal of a +modern democracy. "Citizens" should own landed property, and work it by +slaves, barbarians and servants. They should not be "ignoble" mechanics +or petty traders. Compare the spirit of Froissart's _Chronicles_, in +the Middle Ages. See what Bryce (_South America_, New York, 1918, +chapters xi and xv) says about the position of the Negro in our Southern +states, and of the Indians in South American republics.] + +Even where the avowed aim is the common good of all, states have assumed +that some must be sacrificed for others. Certain individuals are selected +to die in the trenches in the face of the enemy, that others may be +guaranteed liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Grotius, the famous +jurist of the seventeenth century, has been criticized for holding that a +beleaguered town might justly deliver up to the enemy a small number of +its citizens in order to purchase immunity for the rest. How far do the +cases differ in principle? "Among persons variously endowed," wrote +Hegel, "inequality must occur, and equality would be wrong." [Footnote: +Hegel, _The Philosophy of Right_, translated by Dyde, London, 1896, +p. 56.] Commonwealths of many degrees of development have recognized +inequalities of many sorts, and have treated their subjects accordingly. + +"For diet," said Bentham with repellent frankness, "nothing but self- +regarding affection will serve." Benevolence he considered a valuable +addition "for a dessert." He had in mind the individual, and he did +injustice to individuals in certain of their relations. But how do things +look when we turn our attention to the relations between states? Does any +state actually make it a practice to treat its neighbor as itself? Would +its citizens approve of its doing so? + +The Roman was compelled to formulate a _jus gentium_, a law of +nations, to deal with those who held, to him, a place beyond the pale of +law as he knew it. [Footnote: See SIR HENRY MAINE, _Ancient Law_, +chapter iii.] Many centuries have elapsed since pagan philosophers taught +the brotherhood of man, and since Christian divines began to preach it +with passionate fervor. Yet civilized nations today are still seeking to +find a _modus vivendi_, which may put an end to strife and enable +them to live together. The _jus gentium_, or its modern equivalent, +is, alas! still in its rudiments. + +To obviate misunderstanding at this point, it is well to state that, in +adducing all the above facts, I do not mean to argue that it is abnormal +and an undesirable thing that the scales of justice should, at times, be +weighted in divers ways. I am not maintaining that the distribution of +common good should proceed upon the principle of strict impartiality. +What is possible and is desirable in this field is not something to be +decided off-hand. But the facts suffice to illustrate the truth that the +discrepancies to be found in the codes of different communities can +scarcely be dismissed as unimportant details. They are something far too +significant for that. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE CODES OF THE MORALISTS + + +7. THE MORALISTS.--If, from the codes, or the more or less vague bodies +of opinion, which have characterized different communities, we turn to +the moralists, we find similar food for thought. + +But who are the moralists? Can we put into one class those who preach a +short-sighted selfishness or a calculating egoism and those who urge upon +us the law of love? Those who recommend a contempt of mankind, and those +who inculcate a reverence for humanity? Those who incline to leave us to +our own devices, telling us to listen to conscience, and those who draw +up for us elaborate sets of rules to guide conduct? The histories of +ethics are rather tolerant in herding together sheep and goats. And not +without reason. Those whom they include have been in a sense the +spokesmen of their fellows. Their words have found an echo in the souls +of many. They are concerned with a rule of life, and their rule of life, +such as it is, rests upon some principle which has impressed men as being +not wholly unreasonable. + +In taking a glance at what they have to offer us, I shall not go far +afield, and shall exercise a brevity compatible with the purpose of mere +illustration. To the moralists of ancient Greece, and, to a lesser +degree, to those of the Roman Empire, to the Christian teachers who +succeeded to their heritage in the centuries which followed, and to the +more or less independent thinkers who made their appearance after the +Reformation, we can trace our ethical pedigree. For our purpose we need +seek no wider field. Here we may find sufficiently notable contrasts of +opinion to disturb the dogmatic slumber of even an inert mind. The most +cursory glance makes us inclined to accept with some reserve Stephen's +claim that "the difference between different systems is chiefly in the +details and special application of generally admitted principles." + +8. EPICUREAN AND STOIC.--Thus, Aristippus of Cyrene advised men to grasp +the pleasure of the moment rather than to await the more uncertain +pleasure of the future; but he also counselled, for prudential reasons, +the avoidance of a conflict with the laws. Such advice takes cognizance +of the self-love of the individual, and is not self-love reasonable? +Nevertheless, such advice might be given by a discouraged criminal of a +reflective turn of mind, on his release from prison, to a comrade not yet +chastened by incarceration. Epicurus praises temperance and fortitude, +but only as measures of prudence. He praises justice, but only in so far +as it enables us to escape harm, and frees us from that dread of +discovery that haunts the steps of the evil-doer. His more specific +maxims, do not fall in love with a woman, become the father of a family, +or, generally, go into politics, smack strongly of the rule of life +recommended to Feuillet's hero, Monsieur de Camors, by his worldly-wise +and cynical father. + +Contrast with these men the Stoics, whose rule of life was to follow +Nature, and to eschew the pursuit of pleasure. Man's nature, said +Epictetus, is social; wrongdoing is antisocial; affection is natural. +[Footnote: _Discourses_, Book I, chapter xxiii--a clever answer to +Epicurus.] Said Marcus Aurelius, it is characteristic of the rational +soul for a man to love his neighbor. The cautious bachelor imbued with +Epicurean principles would find strange and disconcerting the Stoic +position touching citizenship: "My nature is rational and social; and my +city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am +a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities +are alone useful to me." [Footnote: _Thoughts_, Book VI, 44; +translated by GEORGE LONG.] + +9. PLATO; ARISTOTLE; THE CHURCH.--No more famous classification of the +virtues--those qualities of character which it is desirable for a man to +have, and which determine his doing what it is desirable that he should +do--has ever been drawn up than that offered us by Plato: Wisdom, +Courage, Temperance and Justice. [Footnote: For PLATO's account of the +virtues see the _Republic_, Book IV, and the _Laws_, Book I.] +It is interesting to lay beside it the longer list drawn up by Aristotle, +and to compare both with that which commended itself to the mind of the +mediaeval churchman. + +With Aristotle, the virtues are made to include: [Footnote: +_Ethics_; I refer the reader to the admirable exposition and +criticism by SIDGWICK, _History of Ethics_, London, 1896, chapter +ii, Sec 10-12; compare ZELLER, _Aristotle and the Earlier +Peripatetics_, English translation London, 1897, Volume II, chapter +xii.] + + Wisdom + High-mindedness + Justice + Ambition + Courage + Gentleness + Temperance + Friendliness + Liberality + Truthfulness + Magnificence + Decorous Wit + +and it is suggested that, although scarcely a virtue, a sense of shame is +becoming in youth. + +We find the Christian teachers especially recommending: [Footnote: See +SIDGWICK'S sympathetic account of the Churchman's view of the virtues, +_loc_. _cit_., chapter iii.] + + Obedience + Patience + Benevolence + Purity + Humility + Alienation from the "World" + Alienation from the "Flesh" + +and their lists of the "deadly sins" they select from the following: + + Pride + Arrogance + Anger + Gluttony + Unchastity + Envy + Vain-Glory + Gloominess + Languid Indifference. + +Could there be a more striking contrast than that between the mediaeval +code and those of the great Greek thinkers? Plato recommended as virtues +certain general characteristics of character much admired by the Greek of +his day. Aristotle accepted them and added to them. He has painted much +more in detail the gifts and graces of a well-born and well-situated +Greek gentleman as he conceived him. The personage would cut a sorry +figure in the role of a mediaeval saint; the mediaeval saint would wear a +tarnished halo if endowed with the Aristotelian virtues. + +The one ideal, the Greek, breathes an air of self-assertion; the other +one of self-abnegation. Benevolence, Purity, Humility and Unworldliness +are not to be found in the former; Justice, Courage and Veracity appear +to be missing in the latter. Wisdom, insight, has given place to the +Obedience appropriate to a man clearly conscious of a Law, not man-made, +to which man feels himself to be subject. + +Indeed, the discrepancy between the ideals is such that Aristotle's +virtuously high-minded man would have been conceived by the mediaeval +churchman to be living in deadly sin, as the very embodiment of pride and +arrogance. We find him portrayed as neither seeking nor avoiding danger, +for there are few things about which he cares; as ashamed to accept +favors, since that implies inferiority; as sluggish and indifferent +except when stimulated by some great honor to be gained or some great +work to be performed; as frank, for this is characteristic of the man who +despises others; as admiring little, for nothing is great to him. His +pride prevents him from harboring resentment, from seeking praise, and +from praising others. This Nietzschean hero would attract attention upon +any stage: "The step of the high-minded man is slow, his voice deep, and +his language stately, for he who feels anxiety about few things is not +apt to be in a hurry; and he who thinks highly of nothing is not +vehement." [Footnote: _Ethics_, Book IV, chapter in, 19, translation +by R. W. BROWNE, London, 1865.] + +To be sure, virtues not on a given list may be found in, or read into, +some of the writings of the man who presents it. It would be absurd to +maintain that the mediaeval churchman had no regard for justice, courage +and veracity, as he would define them, or that Plato and Aristotle were +wholly deaf to the claims of benevolence. Nevertheless, the variations in +the emphasis laid on this virtue or on that, or in the conception of what +constitutes this virtue or that, may yield ideals of character and of +conduct which bear but a slight family resemblance. Imagine St. Francis +of Assisi lowering his voice, slowing his step, and cultivating "high- +mindedness," or striving to make himself a pattern of decorous wit. + +10. LATER LISTS OF THE VIRTUES.--The codes proposed by the moralists of a +later time are numerous and widely scattering. It is impossible to do +justice to them in any brief compass. A very few instances, selected from +among those most familiar to English readers, must suffice to indicate +the diversity of their nature. + +Hobbes [Footnote: _Leviathan_, chapter xv.], deeply concerned to +discover some _modus vivendi_ which should put a check upon strife +between man and his fellow-man, and save us from a life "solitary, poor, +nasty, brutish and short," recommends among other virtues: + + Justice + Equity + Requital of benefits + Sociability + A moderate degree of forgiveness + The avoidance of pride and arrogance. + +Locke [Footnote: _Essay_, Book IV, chapter iii, Sec. 18; _Of Civil +Government_, Book II, chapter ii.], who believes that moral principles +must be intuitively evident to one who contemplates the nature of God and +the relations of men to Him and to each other, thinks it worth while to +set down such random maxims as: + + No government allows absolute liberty. + Where there is no property there is no injustice. + All men are originally equal. + Men ought not to harm one another. + Parents have a right to control their children. + +Hume, [Footnote: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Sec 6, +Part I] whose two classes of virtues comprise the qualities immediately +agreeable or useful to ourselves and those immediately agreeable or +useful to others, offers us an extended list. He puts into the first +class: + + Discretion + Caution + Enterprise + Industry + Frugality + Economy + Good Sense, etc. + Temperance + Sobriety + Patience + Perseverance + Considerateness + Secrecy + Order, etc. + +In the second class he includes: + + Benevolence + Justice + Veracity + Fidelity + Politeness + Wit + Modesty + Cleanliness. + +Manifestly, the lists may be indefinitely prolonged. Why not add to the +first class the pachydermatous indifference to rebuffs which is of such +service to the social climber, and, to the second, taste in dress and the +habit of not repeating stories? + +Thomas Reid lays stress upon the deliverances of the individual +conscience, when consulted in a quiet hour. Nevertheless he proposes five +fundamental maxims: [Footnote: _On the Active Powers of Man_, Essay +V, chapter i.] + + We ought to exercise a rational self-love, and prefer a greater to a + lesser good. + We should follow nature, as revealed in the constitution of man. + We should exercise benevolence. + Right and wrong are the same for all in the same circumstances. + We should venerate and obey God. + +With such writers we may contrast the Utilitarians and the adherents of +the doctrine of Self-realization, [Footnote: These will be discussed +below, chapters xxv and xxvi.] who lay little stress upon lists of +virtues or duties, but aim, respectively, at the greatest happiness of +the greatest number, and at the harmonious development of the faculties +of man, regarding as virtues such qualities of character as make for the +attainment, in the long run, of the one or the other of these ends. + +11. THE STRETCHING OF MORAL CONCEPTS.--The instances given suffice to +show that the moralists speak with a variety of tongues. The code of one +age is apt to seem strange and foreign to the men of another. Even where +there is apparent agreement, a closer scrutiny often reveals that it has +been attained by a process of stretching conceptions. Take for example +the so-called "cardinal" virtues [Footnote: From _cardo_, a hinge. +These virtues were supposed to be fundamental. The name given to them was +first used by AMBROSE in the fourth century A.D. See SIDGWICK, _History +of Ethics_, chap, ii, p. 44.] dwelt upon by Plato. The Stoics, who +made use of his list, changed its spirit. Cicero stretches justice so as +to make it cover a watery benevolence. St. Augustine finds the cardinal +virtues to be different aspects of Love to God. The great scholastic +philosopher of the thirteenth century, St. Thomas, places in the first +rank the Christian graces of Faith, Hope and Charity, but still finds it +convenient to use the Platonic scheme in ordering a list of the self- +regarding virtues taken from Aristotle. Thus may the pillars of a pagan +temple be utilized as structural units in, or embellishments of, a +Christian church. + +Our own age reveals the same tendency. Thomas Hill Green, the Oxford +professor, follows Plato. But with him we find wisdom stretched to cover +artistic creation; we see that courage and temperance have taken on new +faces; and justice appears to be able to gather under its wings both +benevolence and veracity. [Footnote: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book +III, chapter iii, and Book IV, chapter v.] A still wider divergence from +the original understanding of the cardinal virtues is that of Dewey, who +conceives of them as "traits essential to all morality." He treats, under +temperance, of purity and reverence; he makes courage synonymous with +persistent vigor; he extends justice so as to include love and sympathy; +he transforms wisdom into conscientiousness. [Footnote: DEWEY AND TUFTS, +_Ethics_, pp. 404-423.] + +This variation in the content of moral concepts may be illustrated from +any quarter in the field of ethics. Cicero's circumspect "benevolence" +advances the doctrine that "whatever one can give without suffering loss +should be given even to an entire stranger." Among such obligations he +reckons: to prohibit no one from drinking at a stream of running water; +to permit anyone who wishes to light fire from fire; to give faithful +advice to one who is in doubt; which things, as he naively remarks, "are +useful to the receiver and do no harm to the giver." [Footnote: De +Officiis, Book I, chapter xvi.] + +Compare with this the admonition to love one's neighbor as oneself; +Sidgwick's "self-evident" proposition that "I ought not to prefer my own +lesser good to the greater good of another;" [Footnote: The Methods of +Ethics, Book III, chapter xiii, Sec 3.] Bentham's utilitarian formula, +"everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one." The +admonition, "be benevolent," may mean many things. + +12. THE REFLECTIVE MIND AND THE MORAL CODES.--Even the cursory glance we +have given above to the moral codes of different communities and those +proposed by individual moralists must suffice to bring any thoughtful man +to the consciousness that they differ widely among themselves, and that +the differences can scarcely be dismissed as insignificant. A little +reflection will suffice to convince him, furthermore, that to treat all +other codes as if they were mere pathological variations from his own is +indefensibly dogmatic. + +On the other hand, the differences between codes should not be unduly +emphasized. The core of identity is there, and, although in its bald +abstractness it is not enough to live by, it is vastly significant, +nevertheless. If there were not some congruity in the materials, they +would never be brought together as the subject of one science. Unless +"good," "right," "obligation," "approval," etc., or the rudimentary +conceptions which foreshadow them in the mind of the most primitive human +beings, had a core of identity which could be traced in societies the +most diverse, there would be no significance in speaking of the +enlightened morality of one people and the degraded and undeveloped +morality of another. There could be no history of the development of the +moral ideas. Collections of disparate and disconnected facts do not +constitute a science, nor are they the proper subject of a history. + +As a matter of fact, we all do speak of degraded moral conceptions, of a +perverted conscience, of a lofty morality, of a fine sense of duty; we do +not hesitate to compare, i. e., to treat as similar and yet dissimilar, +the customs, laws and ethical maxims of different ages and of different +races. This means that we have in our minds some standard, perhaps +consciously formulated, perhaps dimly apprehended, according to which we +rate them. The unreflective man is in danger of taking as this standard +his own actual code, such as it is; of accepting, together with such +elements of reason as it may contain, the whole mass of his inherited or +acquired prejudices; the more reflective man will strive to be more +rationally critical. + + + + +PART II + +ETHICS AS SCIENCE + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE AWAKENING TO REFLECTION + + + 13. THE DOGMATISM OF THE NATURAL MAN.--In morals and in politics it +seems natural for man to be dogmatic, to take a position without +hesitation, to defend it vehemently, to maintain that others are in the +wrong. + +This is not surprising. We are born into a moral environment as into an +all-embracing atmosphere. From the cradle to the grave, we walk with our +heads in a cloud of exhortations and prohibitions. From our earliest +years we have been urged to make decisions and to act, and we have been +furnished with general maxims to guide our action. When, therefore, we +approach the solution of a moral problem, we do not, as a rule, acutely +feel our fitness to solve it, even though we may be judged quite unfit by +others. + +This unruffled confidence in one's possession of an adequate supply of +indubitable moral truth may be found in men who differ widely in their +degree of intelligence and in the extent of their information. Some +individuals seem born to it. We may come upon it in the ethical +philosopher; we may meet it in the man of science, who knows that it has +taken him a quarter of a century to fit himself to be an authority in +matters chemical or physical, but who wanders in his hours of leisure +into the field of ethics and has no hesitation in proposing radical +reforms. But it is more natural to look for the unwavering confidence +which knows no questionings among persons of restricted outlook, who have +been brought into contact with but one set of opinions. It is +characteristic of the child, of the uncultivated classes in all +communities, of whole communities primitive in their culture and +relatively unenlightened. + +14. THE AWAKENING.--Manifestly, even the beginnings of ethical science +are an impossibility where such a spirit prevails. Where there are no +doubts, no questionings, there can be no attempt at rational +construction. + +Fortunately for the cause of human enlightenment there are forces at work +which tend to arouse men from this state of lethargy. Horizons are +broadened, new ideas make their appearance, there is a conflict of +authorities, the birth of a doubt, and, finally, a more or less +articulate appeal to Reason. + +Even a child is capable of seeing that paternal and maternal injunctions +and reactions are not wholly alike, and it sets them off against each +other. Nor have all the children in the home precisely the same nature. +One is temperamentally frank and open, but unsympathetic; another is +affectionate, and prone to lying as the sparks fly upward. The virtues +and vices are not spontaneously arranged in the same order of importance +by children, and differences of opinion may arise. Nor does it take the +child long to discover that the law of its own home is not identical with +that of the house next door. At school the experience is repeated on a +larger scale; many homes are represented, and, besides that, two codes of +law claim allegiance, the code of the schoolboy and that of the master. +They may be by no means in accord. + +And when, in college, the student for the first time seriously addresses +himself to the task of the study of ethics as science, he comes to it by +no means wholly unprepared. He has had rather a broad experience of the +contrasts which obtain between different codes. He is familiar with the +code of the home, of the school, of the social class, of the religious +community, of the civil community. There sit on the same benches with him +the sensitively conscientious student who doubts whether it is a +permissible deception of one's neighbor to apply a patch to an old +garment so skillfully that it will escape detection; the sporting +character who takes it to be the mutual understanding among men that +truth shall not be demanded of those who deal in horses and dogs; the +youth from Texas who claims that the French philosopher, Janet, cannot be +an authority on morals, since he asserts that he who cheats at cards must +feel a burning shame. With the ethics of the ancient Hebrews, of the +Greeks, of the Romans, our young moralist has had the opportunity to +acquire some familiarity, and he can compare them, if he will, with the +Christian ethics of his own day. He knows something of history and +biography; he has read books of travel, and has some acquaintance with +the manners and customs of other peoples. Were he given to reflection, it +ought not to surprise him to find a Portuguese sea-cook maintaining that +it is wrong to steal, except from the rich; or to learn that a Wahabee +saint rated the smoking of tobacco as the worst possible sin next to +idolatry, while maintaining that murder, robbery, and such like, were +peccadilloes which a merciful God might properly overlook. + +Material for reflection he has in abundance--and he often remains +relatively dogmatic and unplagued by doubt. But only relatively so; and +only so long as the claims of conflicting authorities are not forced upon +his attention, rendered importunate in the light of discussion, made so +familiar as to seem real and substantial. It is the tendency of the +widening of the horizon to arouse men to reflection, to stimulate to +criticism. From such criticism the science of ethics has its birth. + +What is true of the individual is true of men in the mass. The blind life +of social classes long laid in chains by custom and tradition may come to +be illuminated by new ideas, and passive acquiescence may give way to +active participation in social endeavor. Nor can primitive peoples remain +wholly primitive except in isolation. With the increased intercourse +between races and peoples, men are brought to a clear consciousness that +the accepted in morals is manifold and diverse; the next step is to +question whether it is, in any given instance, of unquestionable +authority; thus do men become ripe for the search for the +_acceptable_. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +ETHICAL METHOD + + +15. INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE METHOD.--Professor Henry Sidgwick has defined +a method of ethics as "any rational procedure by which we determine what +is right for individual human beings to do, or to seek to realize by +voluntary action." [Footnote: _The Methods of Ethics_, Book I, +chapter i, Sec I.] + +He points out that many methods are natural and are habitually used, but +claims that only one can be rational. By which he means that the several +methods of determining right conduct urged by the different schools of +the moralists must be reconciled, or all but one must be rejected. +[Footnote: _Ibid_., chapter i, Sec 3.] + +In this chapter I shall not discuss in detail the schools of the +moralists and the specific methods which characterize them. I am here +concerned only with the general distinction between the scientific +methods of deduction and induction, and its bearing upon ethical +investigations. + +How do we discover that, in an isosceles triangle, the sides which +subtend the equal angles are equal? We do not go about collecting the +opinions of individuals upon the subject, nor do we consult the records +of other peoples, past or present. We do not measure a great number of +triangles and arrive at our conclusion after a calculation of the +probable error of our measurements. The appeal to authorities does not +interest us; that measurements are always more or less inaccurate, and +that all actual triangles are more or less irregular, we freely admit, +but we do not regard such facts as significant. We use a single triangle +as an illustration, and from what is given in, or along with, that +individual instance, we deduce certain consequences in which we have the +highest confidence. Here we follow the method of deduction. We accept a +"given," with its validity we do not concern ourselves; our aim is the +discovery of what may be gotten out of it. + +In the inductive sciences the individual instance has an importance of +quite a different sort. It is not a mere illustration, unequivocally +embodying a general truth to which we may appeal directly, treating the +instance as a mere vehicle, in itself of little significance. Individual +instances are observed and compared; uniformities are searched for; it is +sought to establish general truths, not directly evident, but whose +authority rests upon the particular facts that have been observed and +classified. + +It is a commonplace of logic that both induction and deduction may be +employed in many fields of science. We may attain by inductive inquiry to +more or less general truths, which we no longer care to call in question, +and which we accept as a "given," to be exploited and carried out in its +consequences. Indeed, we need not betake ourselves to science to have an +illustration of this method of procedure. In everyday life men have +maxims by which they judge of the probable actions of their fellow-men +and in the light of which they direct their dealings with them. Such +maxims as that men may be counted upon to consult their own interests +have certainly not been adopted independently of an experience of what, +on particular occasions, men have shown themselves to be. But, once +adopted, they may be treated as, for practical purposes, unquestionable; +men are concerned to apply them, not to substantiate them. In so far, men +reason from them deductively and pass from the general rule to the +particular instance. + +16. THE AUTHORITY OF THE "GIVEN."--Obviously the "given," in the sense +indicated, may possess, in certain cases, a very high degree of +authority, and, in others, a very low degree. + +In the case of the mathematical truth referred to above, men do not, in +fact, find it necessary to call in question the "given," though they may +be divided in their notions touching the general nature of mathematical +evidence and whence it draws its apparently indisputable authority. In +certain of the inductive sciences, as in mechanics, physics and +chemistry, generalizations have been attained in which even the critical +repose much confidence. In other fields men are constantly making general +statements which are promptly contradicted by their fellows, and are +drawing from them inferences the justice of which is in many quarters +disallowed. There are axioms and axioms, maxims and maxims. The +confidence felt by a given individual in a particular "given" does not +guarantee its acceptance by all men of equal intelligence. Where, +however, the evidence upon which a disputed "given" is based is +forthcoming, there is, at least, ground for rational discussion. + +Not a few famous writers have treated moral truths as analogous to +mathematical. [Footnote: See the chapter on "Intuitionism," Sec 90, note.] +To take here a single instance. Sidgwick, in his truly admirable work on +"The Methods of Ethics," maintains [Footnote: Book III, chapter xiii, Sec +3.] that "the propositions, 'I ought not to prefer a present lesser good +to a future greater good,' and 'I ought not to prefer my own lesser good +to the greater good of another,' do present themselves as self-evident; +as much (_e.g._) as the mathematical axiom that 'if equals be added +to equals the wholes are equals.'" + +But it is one thing to claim that we are in possession of a "given" with +ultimate and indisputable authority; it is another to convince men that +we really do possess it. Locke's efforts at deduction fall lamentably +short of the model set by Euclid. "Professor Sidgwick's well-known moral +axiom, 'I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good of +another,' would," writes Westermarck, [Footnote: _Op_. _cit.,_ +Volume I, chapter i, p. 12.] "if explained to a Fuegian or a Hottentot, +be regarded by him, not as self-evident, but as simply absurd; nor can it +claim general acceptance even among ourselves. Who is that 'Another' to +whose greater good I ought not to prefer my own lesser good? A fellow- +countryman, a savage, a criminal, a bird, a fish--all without +distinction?" To Bentham's "everybody to count for one and nobody for +more than one" may be opposed Hartley's preference of benevolent and +religious persons to the rest of mankind. [Footnote: _Observations on +Man_, Part II, chapter iii, 6.] + +The fact that men eminent for their intellectual ability and for the +breadth of their information are, in morals, inclined to accept, as +ultimate, principles not identical, and thus to found different schools, +would seem to indicate that, to one who aims at treating ethics as a +science, principles, as well as the deductions from them, should be +objects of closest scrutiny. They should not be taken for granted. The +history of ethical theory appears to make it clear that the "given" of +the moralist is not of the same nature as that of the geometer. + +The ethical philosopher cannot, hence, confine himself to developing +deductively the implications of some principle or principles assumed +without critical examination. He must establish the validity even of his +principles. This we should bear in mind when we approach the study of the +different ethical schools. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE MATERIALS OF ETHICS + + +17. HOW THE MORALIST SHOULD PROCEED.--The above reflections on method +suggest the materials of which the moralist should avail himself in +rearing the edifice of his science. + +(1) Evidently he should reflect upon the moral judgments which he finds +in himself, the moral being with whom he is best acquainted. He should +endeavor to render consistent and luminous moral judgments which, as he +finds, have too often been inconsistent and more or less blind. + +(2) He should take cognizance of his own setting--of the social +conscience embodied in the community in which he lives. + +(3) And since, as we have seen, the significance, either of the +individual conscience, or of the social conscience revealed in custom, +law and public opinion, can hardly become apparent to one who does not +bring within his horizon many consciences individual and social, he +should enlarge his view so as to include such. The moralists, in our day, +show an increasing tendency to pay serious attention to this mass of +materials. They do not confine their attention to the moral standard +which this man or that has accepted as authoritative for him, nor to that +accepted as authoritative in a given community. They study _man_-- +man in all stages of his development and in material and social settings +the most diverse. + +(4) Nor should the student of ethics overlook the work which has been +done by those moralists who have gone before him. He who has studied +descriptive anatomy is aware of the immense service which has been done +him by the unwearied observations of his predecessors; observations which +have been put on record, and which draw his attention to numberless +details of structure that would, without such aid, certainly escape his +attention. Ethics is an ancient discipline. It has fixed the attention of +acute minds for many centuries. He who approaches the subject naively, +without an acquaintance with the many ethical theories which have been +advanced and the acute criticisms to which they have been subjected, will +almost certainly say what someone has said before, and said, perhaps, +much better. The valor of ignorance will involve him in ignominious +defeat. + +(5) It is evident that the moralist must make use of materials offered +him by workers in many other fields of science. The biologist may have +valuable suggestions to make touching the impulses and instincts of man. +The psychologist treats of the same, and exhibits the work of the +intellect in ordering and organizing the impulses. He studies the +phenomena of desire, will, habit, the formation of character. The +anthropologist and the sociologist are concerned with the codes of +communities and with the laws of social development. The fields of +economics, politics and comparative jurisprudence obviously march with +that cultivated by the student of ethics. + +18. THE PHILOSOPHER AS MORALIST.--In all these sciences at once it is not +possible for the moralist to be an adept. The mass of the material they +furnish is so vast that the ethical writer who starts out to master it in +all its details may well dread that he may be overcome by senility before +he is ready to undertake the formulation of an ethical theory. + +It does not follow, however, that he should leave to those who occupy +themselves professionally with any of these fields the task of framing a +theory of morals. He must have sufficient information to be able to +select with intelligence what has some important bearing upon the problem +of conduct, but there are many details into which he need not go. It is +well to note the following points: + +(1) A multitude of details may be illustrative of a comparatively small +number of general principles. It is with these general principles that +the moralist is concerned. The anthropologist may regard it as his duty +to spend much labor in the attempt to discover why this or that act, this +or that article of food, happens in a given community to be taboo to +certain persons. The student of ethics is not bound to take up the +detailed investigation of such matters. Human nature, in its general +constitution, is much the same in different races and peoples. The +influence of environment is everywhere apparent. There are significant +uniformities to be discovered even by one who has a limited amount of +detailed information. "Those who come after us will see nothing new," +said Antoninus, "nor have those before us seen anything more, but in a +manner he who is forty years old; if he has any understanding at all, has +seen by virtue of the uniformity which prevails all things which have +been and all that will be." [Footnote: _Thoughts_, XI, 1. London, +1891, translated by GEORGE LONG.] Which is, to be sure, an overstatement +of the case, but one containing a germ of truth. + +(2) We find, by looking into their books, that men most intimately +acquainted with the facts of the moral life as revealed in different +races and peoples may differ widely in the ethical doctrine which they +are inclined to base upon them. Not all men, even when endowed with no +little learning, are gifted with the clearness of vision which can detect +the significance of given facts; nor are all equally capable of weaving +relevant facts into a consistent and reasonable theory. The keenness and +the constructive genius of the individual count for much. And breadth of +view counts for much also. We have seen that ethics touches many fields +of investigation, and the philosopher is supposed, at least, to let his +vision range over a broad realm, and to grasp the relations of the +different sciences to each other. He is, moreover, supposed to be trained +in reflective analysis, and of this ethical theory appears to stand in no +little need. + +(3) Finally, the mere fact that ethics has for so many centuries been +regarded as one of the disciplines falling within the domain of the +philosopher is not without its significance. One may deplore the tendency +to base ethics upon this or that metaphysical doctrine, and desire to see +it made an independent science; and yet one may be compelled to admit +that it is not easy to comprehend and to estimate the value of many of +the ethical theories which have been evolved in the past, without having +rather an intimate acquaintance with the history of philosophy. The +ethical teachings of Plato, of Aristotle, of St. Thomas, of Kant, of +Hegel, of Green, lose much of their meaning when taken out of their +setting. The history of ethical theory is blind when divorced from the +history of philosophy, and with the history of ethical theory the +moralist should be acquainted. + +The philosopher has no prescriptive right to preempt the field of ethics. +Many men may cultivate it with profit. Nevertheless, he, too, should +cultivate it, not independently and with a disregard of what has been +done by others, but in a spirit of hearty cooperation, thankfully +accepting such help as is offered him by his neighbors. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE AIM OF ETHICS AS SCIENCE + + +19. THE APPEAL TO REASON.--The proper aim of the scientific study of +ethics appears to be suggested with sufficient clearness by what has been +said in the chapters on the accepted content of morals. + +Where individuals take up unreflectively the maxims which are to control +their conduct, human life can scarcely be said to be under the guidance +of reason. Where, moreover, the codes of individuals clash with each +other or with the social conscience of their community, and where the +codes of different communities are disconcertingly diverse, planful +concerted action with a view to the control of conduct appears to be +impracticable. Historical accident, blind impulse and caprice, cannot +serve as guides for a rational creature seeking to live, along with +others, a rational life. + +"The aim of ethics," says Sidgwick, [Footnote: _The Methods of +Ethics_, Book I, chapter vi, Sec 1.] "is to render scientific--i.e., +true, and as far as possible systematic--the apparent cognitions that +most men have of the rightness or reasonableness of conduct, whether the +conduct be considered as right in itself, or as the means to some end +conceived as ultimately reasonable." The use here of the word +"cognitions" calls our attention to the fact that, when men say, "this is +right, that is wrong," they mean no more than, "this I like, that I do +not like"; and the use of the word "apparent" indicates that the +judgments expressed may be approved by the man who makes them, and yet be +erroneous. The appeal is to an objective standard; there is a demand for +proof. + +That most men recognize, in some cases dimly, in some cases clearly and +explicitly, that the appeal to such a standard is justifiable, can +scarcely be denied. Between "I choose" and "I ought to choose," between +"the community demands," and "the community ought to demand," men +generally recognize a distinction when they have attained to a capacity +for reflection. + +It has, however, been denied that the appeal is justifiable, and denied +by no mean authority. "The presumed objectivity of moral judgments," +writes Westermarck, [Footnote: 2 _The Origin and Development of the +Moral Ideas_, chapter i, p. 17.] "being a chimera, there can be no +moral truth in the sense in which this term is generally understood. The +ultimate reason for this is, that the moral concepts are based upon +emotions, and that the contents of an emotion fall entirely outside the +category of truth. But it may be true or not that we have a certain +emotion, it may be true or not that a given mode of conduct has a +tendency to evoke in us moral indignation or moral approval. Hence a +moral judgment is true or false according as its subject has or has not +that tendency which the predicate attributes to it. If I say that it is +wrong to resist evil, and yet resistance to evil has no tendency whatever +to call forth in me an emotion of moral disapproval, then my judgment is +false." The conclusion drawn from this is that there are no general moral +truths, and that "the object of scientific ethics cannot be to fix rules +for human conduct"; it can only be "to study the moral consciousness as a +fact." + +20. THE APPEAL TO REASON JUSTIFIED.--The words of so high an authority +should not be passed over lightly. One is impelled to seek for their +proper appreciation and their reconciliation with the judgment of other +moralists. Such can be found, I think, by turning to two truths dwelt +upon in what has preceded: the truth that the moralist should not assume +that he is possessed of a "given" analogous to that of the geometer--a +standard in no need of criticism; and the equally important truth that +the moralist cannot hope to frame a code which will simply replace the +codes of individual communities and will prescribe the details of human +conduct while ignoring such codes altogether. + +But it does not seem to follow that, because the moralist may not set up +an arbitrary code of this sort, he is also forbidden to criticize and +compare moral judgments, to arrange existing codes in a certain order as +lower and higher, to frame some notion of what constitutes progress. He +may hold before himself, in outline, at least, an ideal of conduct, and +not one taken up arbitrarily but based upon the phenomena of the moral +consciousness as he has observed them. And in the light of this ideal he +may judge of conduct; his appeal is to an objective standard. + +Thus, he who says that it is false that it is right to reduce to slavery +prisoners taken in war may, if he be sufficiently unreflective, have no +better reason for his judgment than a feeling of repugnance to such +conduct. But, if he has risen to the point of taking broad views of men +and their moral codes, he may very well assert the falsity of the +statement even when he feels no personal repugnance to the holding of +certain persons as slaves. His appeal is, in fact, to such a standard as +is above indicated, and his condemnation of certain forms of conduct is +based upon their incompatibility with it. + +Hence, a man may significantly assert that certain conduct is objectively +desirable, although it may not be desired by himself or by his community. +He may judge a thing to be wrong without _feeling_ it to be wrong. +Whether anything would actually be judged to be wrong, if no one ever had +any emotions, is a different question. With it we may class the question +whether anything would be judged to be wrong if no one were possessed of +even a spark of reason. There is small choice between having nothing to +see and not being able to see anything. [Footnote: That, in the citation +above given, WESTERMARCK'S attention was concentrated upon the extreme +position taken by some moralists touching the function of the reason in +moral judgments seems to me evident. He is far too able an observer to +overlook the significance of the diversity of moral codes and the meaning +of progress. He writes: "Though rooted in the emotional side of our +nature, our moral opinions are in a large measure amenable to reason. Now +in every society the traditional notions as to what is good or bad, +obligatory or indifferent, are commonly accepted by the majority of +people without further reflection. By tracing them to their source it +will be found that not a few of these notions have their origin in +sentimental likings and antipathies, to which a scrutinizing and +enlightened judge can attach little importance; whilst, on the other +hand, he must account blamable many an act and omission which public +opinion, out of thoughtlessness, treats with indifference." Vol. I, pp. +2-3. See also his appeals to reason where it is a question of the +attitude of the community toward legal responsibility on the part of the +young, toward drunkenness, and toward the heedless production of +offspring doomed to misery and disease, pp. 269 and 310.] + +An appeal, thus, from the actual to the ideal appears to be possible. +And, since the natural man, unenlightened and unreflective, is not more +inclined to show himself to be a reasonable being in the sphere of morals +than elsewhere, it seems that there is no little need of ethical science. +Its aim is to bring about the needed enlightenment. Its value can only be +logically denied by those who maintain seriously that it is easy to know +what it is right to do. Do men really hold this, if they are thoughtful? + + + + +PART III + +MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT + + +CHAPTER VIII + +MAN'S NATURE + + +21. THE BACKGROUND OF ACTIONS.--In estimating human actions we take into +consideration both the doer and the circumstances under which the deed +was done. Actions may be desirable or undesirable, good or bad, according +to their setting. How shall we judge of the blow that takes away human +life? It may be the involuntary reaction of a man startled by a shock; it +may be a motion of justifiable self-defence; it may be one struck at the +command of a superior and in the defence of one's country; it may be the +horrid outcome of cruel rapacity or base malevolence. + +Nor are the emotions, torn out of their context, more significant than +actions without a background. They are mental phenomena to be observed +and described by the psychologist; to the moralist they are, taken alone, +as unmeaning as the letters of the alphabet, but, like them, capable in +combination of carrying many meanings. Anger, fear, wonder, and all the +rest are, as natural emotions, neither good nor bad; they are colors, +which may enter into a picture and in it acquire various values. + +In morals, when men have attained to the stage of enlightenment at which +moral estimation is a possible process, they always consider emotions, +intentions, and actions in the light of their background. We do not +demand a moral life of the brutes; we do not look for it in the +intellectually defective and the emotionally insane; nor do we expect a +savage caught in the bush to harbor the same emotions, or to have the +same ethical outlook, as the missionary with whom we may confront him. +The concepts of moral responsibility, of desert, of guilt, are emptied of +all significance, when we lose sight of the nature, inborn or acquired, +of the creature haled before the bar of our judgment, and of the +environment, which on the one hand, impels him to action, and, on the +other, furnishes the stage upon which the drama of his life must be +played out to the end. + +Hence, he who would not act as the creature of blind impulse or as the +unthinking slave of tradition, but would exercise a conscious and +intelligent control over his conduct, seems compelled to look at his life +and its setting in a broad way, to scrutinize with care both the nature +of man and the environment without which that nature could find no +expression. When he does this, he only does more intelligently what men +generally do instinctively and somewhat at haphazard. He seeks a rational +estimate of the significance of conduct, and a standard by which it may +be measured. + +22. MAN'S NATURE.--Moralists ancient and modern have had a good deal to +say about the nature of man. To some of them it has seemed rather a +simple thing to describe it. Its constitution, as they have conceived it, +has furnished them with certain principles which should guide human +action. Aristotle, who assumed that every man seeks his own good, +conceived of his good or "well-being" as largely identical with "well- +doing." This "well-doing" meant to him "fulfilling the proper functions +of man," or in other words acting as the nature of man prescribes. +[Footnote: _Politics_, i, 2. See, further, on _Man's Nature_, +chapter xxvi.] To the Stoic man's duty was action in accordance with his +nature. [Footnote: MARCUS AURELIUS, _Thoughts_, v, 1.] Butler, +[Footnote: _Sermons on Human Nature_, ii] many centuries later, +found in man's nature a certain "constitution," with conscience naturally +supreme and the passions in a position of subordination. This +"constitution" plainly indicated to him the conduct appropriate to a +human being. + +Such appeals to man's nature we are apt to listen to with a good deal of +sympathy. Manifestly, man differs from the brutes, and they differ, in +their kind, from each other. To each kind, a life of a certain sort seems +appropriate. The rational being is expected to act rationally, to some +degree, at least. In our dealings with creatures on a lower plane, we +pitch our expectations much lower. + +And the behavior we expect from each is that appropriate to its kind. The +bee and the ant follow unswervingly their own law, and live their own +complicated community life. However the behavior of the brute may vary in +the presence of varying conditions, the degree of the variation seems to +be determined by rather narrow limits. These we recognize as the limits +of the nature of the creature. It dictates to itself, unconsciously, its +own law of action, and it follows that law simply and without revolt. + +When we turn to man, "the crown and glory of the universe," as Darwin +calls him, we find him, too, endowed with a certain nature in an +analogous sense of the word. He has capacities for which we look in vain +elsewhere. The type of conduct we expect of him has its root in these +capacities. Human nature can definitely be expected to express itself in +a human life,--one lower or higher, but, in every case, distinguishable +from the life of the brute. It means something to speak of the physical +and mental constitution of man, that mysterious reservoir from which his +emotions and actions are supposed to flow. We feel that we have a right +to use the expression, even while admitting that the brain of man is, as +far as psychology is concerned, almost unexplored territory, and that the +relation of mind to brain is, and is long likely to remain, a subject of +dispute with philosophers and psychologists. + +23. HOW DISCOVER MAN'S NATURE?--Nevertheless, in speaking of the nature +of any living creature, we are forced to remind ourselves that the +original endowment of the creature studied can never be isolated and +subjected to inspection independently of the setting in which the subject +of our study is found. Who, by an examination of the brain of a bee or of +an ant, could foresee the intricate organized industry of the hive or the +anthill? The seven ages of man are not stored ready-made in the little +body of the infant. At any rate, they are beyond the reach of the most +penetrating vision. In the case of the simple mechanisms which can be +constructed by man a forecast of future function is possible on the basis +of a general knowledge of mechanics. But there is no living being of +whose internal constitution we have a similar knowledge. From the +behavior of the creature we gather a knowledge of its nature; we do not +start with its nature as directly revealed and infer its behavior. That +there are differences in the internal constitution of beings which react +to the same environment in different ways, we have every reason to +believe. What those differences are in detail we cannot know. And our +knowledge of the capacities inherent in this or that constitution will be +limited by what we can observe of its reaction to environment. + +Sometimes the reaction to environment is relatively simple and uniform. +In this case we feel that we can attain without great difficulty to what +may be regarded as a satisfactory knowledge of the nature of the creature +studied. The conception of that nature appears to be rather definite and +unequivocal. When it is once attained, we speak with some assurance of +the way in which the creature will act in this situation or in that. If, +however, the capacities are vastly more ample, and the environment to +which this creature is adjusted is greatly extended, the difficulty of +describing in any unequivocal way the nature of the creature becomes +indefinitely greater. + +Is it possible to contemplate man without being struck with the breadth +and depth of the gulf which separates the primitive human being from the +finished product of civilization? What a difference in range of emotion, +in reach of intellect, in stored information, in freedom of action, +between man at his lowest and man at his highest! Can we describe in the +same terms what is natural to man everywhere and always? + +For the filthy and ignorant savage, absorbed in satisfying his immediate +bodily needs, standing in the simplest of social relations, taking +literally no thought for the morrow, profoundly ignorant of the world in +which he finds himself, possessing over nature no control worthy of the +name, the sport and slave of his environment, it is natural to act in one +way. For enlightened humanity, acquainted with the past and forecasting +the future, developed in intellect and refined in feeling, rich in the +possession of arts and sciences, intelligently controlling and directing +the forces of nature, socially organized in highly complicated ways, it +is natural to act in another way. And to each of the intermediate stages +in the evolution of civilization some type of conduct appears to be +appropriate and natural. + +Whither, then, shall we turn for our conception of man's nature? Shall we +merely draw up a list of the instincts and impulses which may be +observable in all men? Shall we say no more than that man is gifted with +an intelligence superior to that of the brutes? To do this is, to be +sure, to give some vague indication of man's original endowment. But it +can give us little indication of what it is possible for man, with such +an endowment, and in such an environment as makes his setting, to become. +And what man becomes, that he is. + +If man's nature can be revealed only through the development of his +capacities, it is futile to seek it in a return to undeveloped man. The +nature of the chicken is not best revealed in the egg. And, as man can +develop only in interaction with his environment, we must, to understand +him, study his environment also. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +MAN'S MATERIAL ENVIRONMENT + + +24. THE STRUGGLE WITH NATURE.--It is not possible to disentangle from +each other and to consider quite separately the diverse elements which +enter into the environment of man and which influence his development. +His environment is two-fold, material and social; but his material +setting may affect his social relations, and it is social man, not the +individual as such, that achieves a conquest over nature. However, it is +possible, and it is convenient, to direct attention successively upon the +one and the other aspect of his environment. + +At every stage of his development, man must have food, shelter, some +means of defense. If they are not easily obtainable, he must strain every +nerve to attain them. Are his powers feeble and his intelligence +undeveloped, it may tax all his efforts to keep himself alive and to +continue the race in any fashion. The rules which determine his conduct +seem rather the dictates of a stern necessity than the products of +anything resembling free choice. + +He who is lashed by hunger and haunted by fear, who cannot provide for +the remote future, but must accept good or ill fortune as the accident of +the day precipitates his lot upon him, lives and must live a life at but +one remove from that of the brute. In such a life the instincts of man +attain to a certain expression, but intelligence plays a feeble part. The +man remains a slave, under dictation, and moved by the dread of immediate +disaster. For an interest in what is remote in time and place, for the +extension of knowledge for its own sake, for the development of +activities which have no direct bearing upon the problem of keeping him +alive and fed, there can be little place. One must be assured that one +can live, and live in reasonable security and physical well-being, before +the problem of enriching and embellishing life can fairly present itself +as an important problem. One must be set free before one can deliberately +set out to shape one's life after an ideal. + +Not that a severe struggle with physical nature is necessarily and of +itself a curse. It may call out man's powers, stimulate to action, and +result in growth and development. Where a prodigal nature amply provides +for man's bodily necessities without much effort on his part, the result +may be, in the absence of other stimulating influences giving rise to new +wants, a paralyzing slothfulness, an animal passivity and content. This +may be observed in whole peoples highly favored by soil and climate, and +protected by their situation from external dangers. It may be observed in +certain favored classes even in communities which, by long and strenuous +effort, have conquered nature and raised themselves high in the scale of +civilization. The idle sons of the rich, relieved from the spur of +necessity, may undergo the degeneration appropriate to parasitic life. In +the midst of a strenuous activity adapted to call out the best +intellectual and moral powers of man, they may remain unaffected by it, +incapable of effort, unintelligent, slothful, the weak and passive +recipients of what is brought to them by the labor of others. + +But the struggle with physical nature, sometimes a spur to progress and +issuing in triumph, may also issue in defeat. Nature may be too strong +for man, or, at least, for man at an early stage of his development. She +may thwart his efforts and dwarf his life. It was through no accident +that the Athenian state rose and flourished upon the shores of the +Aegean; no such efflorescence of civilization could be looked for among +the Esquimaux of the frozen North. + +25. THE CONQUESTS OF THE MIND.--Physical environment counts for much, but +the physical environment of man is the same as that of the creatures +below him who seem incapable of progress. It is as an intelligent being +that he succeeds in bringing about ever new and more complicated +adjustments to his environment. + +From the point of view of his animal life in many respects inferior to +other creatures--less strong, less swift, less adequately provided with +natural means of defense, less protected by nature against cold, heat and +the inclemencies of the weather, endowed with instincts less unerring, +less prolific, through a long period of infancy helpless and dependent-- +man nevertheless survives and prospers. + +He has conquered the strong, overtaken the swift, called upon his +ingenuity to furnish him with means of defence. He has defied cold and +heat, and we find him, with appliances of his own devising, successfully +combating the rigors of Arctic frosts and the torrid sun of the tropics. +Intelligence has supplemented instinct and has guaranteed the survival of +the individual and of the race. + +It has even protected man against himself, against the very dangers +arising out of his immunity from other dangers. A gregarious creature, +increasing and multiplying, he would be threatened with starvation did +not his intelligent control over nature furnish him with a food-supply +which makes it possible for vast numbers of human beings to live and +thrive on a territory of limited extent. Moreover, he has compassed those +complicated forms of social organization which reveal themselves in +cities and states, solving problems of production, transportation and +distribution before which undeveloped man would stand helpless. + +And from the problem of living at all he has passed to that of living +well. He has created new wants and has satisfied them. He has built up +for himself a rich and diversified life, many of the activities of which +appear to have the remotest of bearings upon the mere struggle for +existence, but the exercise of which gives him satisfaction. Thus, the +primitive instinct of curiosity, once relatively aimless and +insignificant, has developed into the passion for systematic knowledge +and the persistent search for truth; the rudimentary aesthetic feeling +which is revealed in primitive man, and traces of which are recognizable +in creatures far lower in the scale, has blossomed out in those elaborate +creations, which, at an enormous expense of labor and ingenuity, have +come to enrich the domains of literature, music, painting, sculpture, +architecture. Civilized man is to a great extent occupied with the +production of what he does not need, if need be measured by what his +wants are at a lower stage of his development. But these same things he +needs imperatively, if we measure his need by his desires when they have +been multiplied and their scope indefinitely widened. + +26. THE CONQUEST OF NATURE AND THE WELL-BEING OF MAN.--It is evident that +the successful exploitation of the resources of material nature is of +enormous significance to the life of man. It may bring emancipation; it +offers opportunity. One is tempted to affirm, without stopping to +reflect, that the development of the arts and sciences, the increase of +wealth and of knowledge, must in the nature of things increase human +happiness. + +One is tempted, further, to maintain that an advance in civilization must +imply an advance in moralization. Man has a moral nature which exhibits +itself to some degree at every stage of his development. What more +natural to conclude than that, with the progressive unfolding of his +intelligence, with increase in knowledge, with some relaxation of the +struggle for existence which pits man against his fellow-man, and +subordinates all other considerations to the inexorable law of self- +preservation, his moral nature would have the opportunity to show itself +in a fuller measure? + +When we compare man at his very lowest with man at his highest such +judgments appear to be justified. But man is to be found at all sorts of +intermediate stages. + +His knowledge may be limited, the development of the arts not far +advanced, his control over nature far from complete, and yet he may live +in comparative security and with such wants as he has reasonably well +satisfied. His competition with his fellows may not be bitter and +absorbing. The simple life is not necessarily an unhappy life, if the +simplicity which characterizes it be not too extreme. In judging broadly +of the significance for human life of the control over nature which is +implied in the advance of civilization, one must take into consideration +several points of capital importance: + +(1) The multiplication of man's wants results, not in happiness, but in +unhappiness, unless the satisfaction of those wants can be adequately +provided for. + +(2) The effort to satisfy the new wants which have been called into being +may be accompanied by an enormous expenditure of effort. Where the effort +is excessive man becomes again the slave of his environment. His task is +set for him, and he fulfills it under the lash of an imperious necessity. +The higher standard may become as inexorable a task-master as was the +lower. + +(3) It does not follow that, because a given community is set free from +the bondage of the daily anxiety touching the problem of living at all, +and may address itself deliberately to the problem of living well, it +will necessarily take up into its ideal of what constitutes living well +all those goods upon which developed man is apt to set a value. A +civilization may be a grossly material one, even when endowed with no +little wealth. With wealth comes the opportunity for the development of +the arts which embellish life, but that opportunity may not be embraced. +Man may be materially rich and spiritually poor; he may allow some of his +faculties to lie dormant, and may lose the enjoyments which would have +been his had they been developed. The Athenian citizen two millenniums +ago had no such mastery over the forces of nature as we possess today. +Nevertheless, he was enabled to live a many-sided life beside which the +life of the modern man may appear poor and bare. It is by no means self- +evident that the good of man consists in the multitude of the material +things which he can compel to his service. + +(4) Moreover, it does not follow that, because the sum of man's +activities, his behavior, broadly taken, is vastly altered, by an +increase in his control over his material environment, the result is an +advance in moralization. An advance in civilization--in knowledge, in the +control over nature's resources, in the evolution of the industrial and +even of the fine arts--does not necessarily imply a corresponding ethical +advance on the part of a given community. New conditions, brought about +by an increase of knowledge, of wealth, of power, may result in ethical +degeneration. + +What constitutes the moral in human behavior, what marks out right or +wrong conduct from conduct ethically indifferent, we have not yet +considered. But no man is wholly without information in the field of +morals, and we may here fall back upon such conceptions as men generally +possess before they have evolved a science of morals. In the light of +such conceptions a simple and comparatively undeveloped culture may +compare very favorably with one much higher in the scale of civilization. + +In the simplest groups of human beings, justice, veracity and a regard to +common good may be conspicuous; the claim of each man upon his fellow-man +may be generally acknowledged. In communities more advanced, the growth +of class distinctions and the inequalities due to the amassing of wealth +on the part of individuals may go far to nullify the advantage to the +individual of any advance made by the community as a whole. The social +bonds which have obtained between members of the same group may be +relaxed; the devotion to the common good may be replaced by the selfish +calculation of profit to the individual; the exploitation of man by his +fellow-man may be accepted as natural and normal. It is not without its +significance that the most highly civilized of states have, under the +pressure of economic advance, come to adopt the institution of slavery in +its most degraded forms; that the problem of property and poverty may +present itself as most pressing and most difficult of solution where +national wealth has grown to enormous proportions. The body politic may +be most prosperous from a material point of view, and at the same time, +considered from the point of view of the moralist, thoroughly rotten in +its constitution. + +It is well to remember that, even in the most advanced of modern +civilizations, whatever the degree of enlightenment and the power enjoyed +by the community as a whole, it is quite possible for the individual to +be condemned to a life little different in essentials from that of the +lowest savage. He whose feverish existence is devoted to the nerve- +racking occupation of gambling in stocks, who goes to his bed at night +scheming how he may with impunity exploit his fellow-man, and who rises +in the morning with a strained consciousness of possible fluctuations in +the market which may overwhelm him in irretrievable disaster, lives in +perils which easily bear comparison with those which threaten the +precarious existence of primitive man. To masses of men in civilized +communities the problem of the food supply is all-absorbing, and may +exclude all other and broader interests. The factory-worker, with a mind +stupefied by the mechanical repetition of some few simple physical +movements of no possible interest to him except as resulting in the wage +that keeps him alive, has no share in such light as may be scattered +about him. + +The control of the forces of nature brings about great changes in human +societies, but it may leave the individual, whether rich or poor, a prey +to dangers and anxieties, engaged in an unequal combat with his +environment, absorbed in the satisfaction of material needs, undeveloped, +unreflective and most restricted in his outlook. Of emancipation there +can here be no question. + +And a civilization in which the control of the forces of nature has been +carried to the highest pitch of development may furnish a background to +the darkest of passions. It may serve as a stage upon which callous +indifference, greed, rapacity, gross sensuality, play their parts naked +and unashamed. That some men sunk in ignorance and subject to such +passions live in huts and have their noses pierced, and others have taken +up from their environment the habit of dining in evening dress, is to the +moralist a relatively insignificant detail. He looks at the man, and he +finds him in each case essentially the same--a primitive and undeveloped +creature who has not come into his rightful heritage. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +MAN'S SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT + + +27. MAN IS ASSIGNED HIS PLACE.--The old fable of a social contract, by +virtue of which man becomes a member of a society, agreeing to renounce +certain rights he might exercise if wholly independent, and to receive in +exchange legal rights which guarantee to the individual the protection of +life and property and the manifold advantages to be derived from +cooperative effort, points a moral, like other fables. + +The contract in question never had an existence, but neither did the +conversation between the grasshopper and the ant. In each case, a truth +is illustrated by a play of the imagination. Contracts there have been in +plenty, between individuals, between families, between social classes, +between nations; but they have all been contracts between men already in +a social state of some sort, capable of choice and merely desirous of +modifying in some particular some aspect of that social state. The notion +of an original contract, lying at the base of all association of man with +man, is no more than a fiction which serves to illustrate the truth that +the desires and wills of men are a significant factor in determining the +particular forms under which that association reveals itself. + +No man enters into a contract to be born, or to be born a Kaffir, a +Malay, a Hindoo, an Englishman or an American. He enters the world +without his own consent, and without his own connivance he is assigned a +place in a social state of some sort. The reception which is accorded to +him is of the utmost moment to him. He may be rejected utterly by the +social forces presiding over his birth. In which case he does not start +life independently, but is snuffed out as is a candle-flame by the wind. +And if accepted, as he usually is in civilized communities, he takes his +place in the definite social order into which he is born, and becomes the +subject of education and training as a member of that particular +community. + +28. VARIETIES OF THE SOCIAL ORDER.--The social order into which he is +thus ushered may be most varied in character. He may find himself a +member of a small and primitive group of human beings, a family standing +in more or less loose relations to a limited number of other families; he +may belong to a clan in which family relationship still serves as a real +or fictive bond; his clan may have its place in a confederation; or the +body politic in which he is a unit may be a nation, or an empire +including many nationalities. + +His relations to his fellow-man will naturally present themselves to him +in a different light according to the different nature of the social +environment in which he finds himself. The community of feeling and of +interests which defines rights, determines expectations, and prescribes +duties, cannot be the same under differing conditions. Social life +implies cooperation, but the limits of possible cooperation are very +differently estimated by man at different stages of his development. To a +few human beings each man is bound closely at every stage of his +evolution. The family bond is everywhere recognized. But, beyond that, +there are wider and looser relationships recognized in very diverse +degrees, as intelligence expands, as economic advance and political +enlightenment make possible a community life on a larger scale, as +sympathy becomes less narrow and exclusive. + +It is not easy for a member of a community at a given stage of its +development even to conceive the possibility of such communities as may +come into existence under widely different conditions. The simple, +communistic savage, limited in his outlook, thinks in terms of small +numbers. A handful of individuals enjoy membership in his group; he +recognizes certain relations, more or less loose, to other groups, with +which his group comes into contact; beyond is the stranger, the natural +enemy, upon whom he has no claim and to whom he owes no duty. + +At a higher level there comes into being the state, including a greater +number of individuals and internally organized as the simpler society is +not. But even in a highly civilized state much the same attitude towards +different classes of human beings may seem natural and inevitable. To +Plato there remained the strongly marked distinctions between the +Athenian, the citizen of another Hellenic community, and the barbarian. +War, when waged against the last, might justifiably be merciless; not so, +when it was war between Greek states. [Footnote: Republic, Book V.] Into +such conceptions of rights and duties men are born; they take them up +with the very air that they breathe, and they may never feel impelled to +subject them to the test of criticism. + +It is instructive to remark that neither the speculative genius of a +Plato nor the acute intelligence of an Aristotle could rise to the +conception of an organized, self-governing community on a great scale. To +each it seemed evident that the group proper must remain a comparatively +small one. Plato finds it necessary to provide in his "Laws" that the +number of households in the State shall be limited to five thousand and +forty. Aristotle, less arbitrarily exact, allows a variation within +rather broad limits, holding that a political community should not +comprise a number of citizens smaller than ten, nor one greater than one +hundred thousand. [FOOTNOTE: PLATO, _Laws_, v. ARISTOTLE, +_Ethics_, ix, 10.] That a highly organized state, a state not +composed of a horde of subjects under autocratic control, but one in +which the citizens are, in theory, self-governing, should spread over +half a continent and include a hundred millions of souls, would have +seemed to these men of genius the wildest of dreams. Yet such a dream has +been realized. + +29. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.--The social body of which man becomes, by the +accident of birth, an involuntary member, may stand at any point in the +scale of economic evolution. It may be a primitive group living from hand +to mouth by the chase, by fishing or by gathering such food as nature +spontaneously produces. It may be a pastoral people, more or less +nomadic, occupied with the care of flocks and herds. It may be an +agricultural community, rooted to the soil, looking forward from seed- +time to harvest, capable of foresight in storing and distributing the +fruits of its labors. It may combine some of the above activities; and +may, in addition, have arrived at the stage at which the arts and crafts +have attained to a considerable development. In its life commerce may +have come to play an important role, bringing it into peaceful relations +with other communities and broadening the circle of its interests. That +human societies at such different stages of their development should +differ greatly in their internal organization, in their relations to +other communities, and in the demands which they make upon the +individuals who compose them, is to be expected. Some manner of life, +appropriate to the status of the community, comes to be prescribed. The +ideal of conduct, whether unconsciously admitted or consciously embraced +and inculcated, is not the same in different societies. The virtues which +come to be prized, the defects which are disapproved, vary with their +setting. + +Moreover, the process of inner development results in differentiation of +function. Clearly marked social classes come into existence, standing in +more or less sharply defined relations to other social classes, endowed +with special rights and called to the performance of peculiar duties. + +Man is not merely born into this or that community; he is born into a +place in the community. In very primitive societies that place may differ +little from other places, save as such are determined by age or sex. But +in more highly differentiated societies it may differ enormously, entail +the performance of widely different functions, and prescribe distinct +varieties of conduct. + +"What will be the manner of life," said Plato, [Footnote: Laws, vii.] +"among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided +for them in moderation, and who have entrusted the practice of the arts +to others, and whose husbandry, committed to slaves paying a part of the +produce, brings them a return sufficient for living temperately?" + +His ideal leisure class is patterned after what he saw before him in +Athens. He conceives those who belong to it to be set free from sordid +cares and physical labors, in order that they may devote themselves to +the perfecting of their own minds and bodies and to preparation for the +serious work of supervising and controlling the state. Their membership +in the class defined their duties and prescribed the course of education +which should fit them to fulfill them. It is not conceived that the +functions natural and proper to one human being are also natural and +proper to another in the same community. + +The flat monotony which obtains in those simplest human societies, +resembling extended families, where there is scarcely a demarcation of +classes, a distinction of occupations and a recognition of private +property in any developed sense, has given place in such a state to sharp +contrasts in the status of man and man. Such contrasts obtain in all +modern civilized communities. Man is not merely a subject or citizen; he +is a subject or citizen of this class or of that, and the environment +which molds him varies accordingly. + +30. SOCIAL ORDER AND HUMAN WILL.--We have seen that the material +environment of a man, the extent of his mastery over nature and of his +emancipation from the dictation of pressing bodily needs, is a factor of +enormous importance in determining what he shall become and what sort of +a life he shall lead. That his social setting is equally significant is +obvious. What he shall know, what habits he shall form, what emotions he +shall experience in this situation and in that, what tasks he shall find +set before him, and what ideals he shall strive to attain, are largely +determined for him independently of his choice. + +To be sure, it remains true that man is man, endowed with certain +instincts and impulses and gifted with human intelligence. Nor are all +men alike in their impulses or in the degree of their intelligence. +Within limits the individual may exercise choice, reacting upon and +modifying his environment and himself. But a moment's reflection reveals +to us that the new departure is but a step taken from a vantage-ground +which has not been won by independent effort. The information in the +light of which he chooses, the situation in the face of which he acts, +the emotional nature which impels him to effort, the habits of thought +and action which have become part of his being--these are largely due to +the larger whole of which he finds himself a part. He did not build the +stage upon which he is to act. His lines have been learned from others. +He may recite them imperfectly; he may modify them in this or in that +particular. But the drama from which, and from which alone, he gains his +significance, is not his own creation. + +The independence of the individual in the face of his material and social +environment makes itself more apparent with the progressive development +of man. But man attains his development as a member of society, and in +the course of a historical evolution. It was pointed out many centuries +ago that a hand cut off from the human body cannot properly be called a +hand, for it can perform none of the functions of one. And man, torn from +his setting, can no longer be considered man as the proper subject of +moral science. + +It is as a thinking and willing creature in a social setting that man +becomes a moral agent. To understand him we must make a study of the +individual and of the social will. + + + + +PART IV + +THE REALM OF ENDS + + +CHAPTER XI + +IMPULSE, DESIRE, AND WILL + + +31. IMPULSE.--Commands and prohibitions address themselves to man as a +voluntary agent. But it seems right to treat as willed by man much more +than falls under the head of conscious and deliberate volition. We do not +hesitate to make him responsible for vastly more; and yet common sense +does not, when enlightened, regard men as responsible for what is +recognized as falling wholly beyond the direct and indirect control of +their wills. + +Motions due to even the blindest of impulses are not to be confounded +with those brought about by external compulsion. They may have the +appearance of being vaguely purposive, although we would never attribute +purpose to the creature making them. The infant that cries and struggles, +when tormented by the intrusive pin, the worm writhing in the beak of a +bird,--these act blindly, but it does not appear meaningless to say that +they act. The impulse is from within. + +Some impulses result in actions very nicely adjusted to definite ends. +Such are winking, sneezing, swallowing. These reflexes may occur as the +mechanical response to a given stimulus. They may occur without our being +conscious of them and without our having willed them. + +Yet such responses to stimuli are not necessarily unconscious and cut off +from voluntary control. He who winks involuntarily when a hand is passed +before his eyes may become conscious that he has done so, and may, if he +chooses, even acquire some facility in controlling the reflex. One may +resist the tendency to swallow when the throat is dry, may hold back a +sneeze, or may keep rigid the hand that is pricked by a pin. That is to +say, actions in their origin mechanical and independent of choice may be +raised out of their low estate, made the objects of attention, and +brought within the domain of deliberate choice. + +Furthermore, many actions which, at the outset, claimed conscious +attention and were deliberately willed may become so habitual that the +doer lapses into unconsciousness or semi-unconsciousness of his deed. +They take on the nature of acquired reflexes. The habit of acting appears +to have been acquired by the mind and then turned over to the body, that +the mind may be free to occupy itself with other activities. The man has +become less the doer than the spectator of his acts; perhaps he is even +less than that, he is the stage upon which the action makes its +appearance, while the spectator is his neighbor. The complicated bodily +movements called into play when one bites one's nails had to be learned. +It requires no little ingenuity to accomplish the act when the nails are +short. Yet one may come to the stage of perfection at which one bites +one's nails when one is absorbed in thought about other things. And one +may learn to slander one's neighbor almost as mechanically and +unthinkingly as one swallows when the throat is dry. + +When we speak of man's impulses, we are using a vague word. There are +impulses which will never be anything more. There are impulses which may +become something more. There are impulses which are no longer anything +more. Impulses have their psychic aspect. At its lower limit, impulse may +appear very mechanical; at its upper, one may hesitate to say that desire +and will are wholly absent. It is not wise to regard impulse as lying +wholly beyond the sphere of will. + +32. DESIRE.--At its lower limit, desire is not distinguished by any sharp +line from mere impulse. Is the infant that stretches out its hands toward +a bright object conscious of a desire to possess it? Or does the motion +made follow the visual sensation as the wail follows the wound made by +the pin? At a certain stage of development the phenomena of desire become +unmistakable. The idea of something to be attained, the notion of means +to the attainment of an end, the consciousness of tension, may stand out +clearly. The analysis of the psychologist, which finds in desire a +consciousness of the present state of the self, an idea of a future +state, and a feeling of tension towards the realization of the latter, +may represent faithfully the elements present in desire in the higher +stages of its development, but it would be difficult to find those +elements clearly marked in desire which has just begun to differentiate +itself from impulse. There may be a desire where there can scarcely be +said to be a self as an object of consciousness; one may desire where +there is no clear consciousness of a future state as distinct from a +present one. + +Moreover, the consciousness of desire may be faint and fugitive, as it +may be intense and persistent. Desire is the step between the first +consciousness of the object and the voluntary release of energy which +works toward its attainment. This step may be passed over almost +unnoticed. The thought of shifting my position when I feel uncomfortable +may be followed by the act with no clear consciousness of a tension and +its voluntary release. The mere thought, itself but faintly and +momentarily in consciousness, appears to be followed at once by the act, +and desire and will to be eliminated. It does not follow that they are +actually eliminated; they may be present as fleeting shadows which fail +to attract attention. + +If, however, the desire fails to find its immediate fruition, if it is +frustrated, consciousness of it may become exceedingly intense. There is +the constant thought of the object, a vivid feeling of tension, of a +striving to attain the object. Desire may become an obsession, a torment +filling the horizon, and the volition in which it finds its fruition +stands forth as a marked relief. This condition of things may be brought +about by the inhibition occasioned by the physical impossibility of +attaining the object; but it may also be brought about by the struggle of +incompatible desires among themselves. The man is drawn in different +directions, he is subject to various tensions, and he becomes acutely +conscious that he is impelled to move in several ways and is moving in +none. + +I have used the word "tension" to describe the psychic fact present in +desire. I have done so for want of a better word. Of the physical basis +of desire, of what takes place in the brain, we know nothing. With the +psychic fact, the feeling of agitation and unrest, we are all familiar. +Of the tendency of desire to discharge itself in action we are aware. A +desire appears to be an inchoate volition--that which, if ripened +successfully and not nipped in the bud, would become a volition. It may +be looked upon as the first step toward action--a step which may or may +not be followed by others. It does not seem out of place to call it a +state of tension, of strain, of inclination. In speaking, thus, we use +physical metaphors, but they do not appear out of place. + +33. DESIRE OF THE UNATTAINABLE.--But if a desire may be regarded as an +unripe act of will, an inchoate volition, how is it that we can desire +the unattainable, a sufficiently common experience? I may bitterly regret +some act of my own in the past; I may earnestly wish that I had not +performed it. But the past is irrevocable. Hence, the desire for the +attainment of what is in this case the object, a different past, can +hardly be regarded as even a preparatory step toward attainment. + +In this case it can not, and were all desires directed upon what is in +the nature of the case wholly unattainable by effort, it would occur to +no one to speak of desire as a first step toward action. But normally and +usually desires are not of this nature. They usually do constitute a link +in the chain of occurrences which end in action. Did they not, they would +have little significance in the life-history of the creature desiring. +With the appearance of free ideas, with an extension of the range of +memory and imagination, objects may be held before the mind which are not +properly objects to be attained. Yet such objects are of the kind which +attract or repel, i.e., of the kind which men endeavor to realize in +action. They cannot be realized; we do not will to realize them; but we +should will to do so were they realizable. The psychic factor, the +strain, the tension, is unmistakably present. Real desire is revealed, +and common speech, as well as the language of science, recognizes the +fact. + +This general attraction or repulsion exercised by objects, in spite of +the fact that the objects may not appear to be realizable, is not without +significance. The hindrance to realization may be an accidental one; it +may not be wholly insuperable. The presence of a persistent desire may +result in persistent effort, which may ultimately be crowned by success. +Or it may show itself as a permanent readiness for effort. Were every +frustrated desire at once dismissed from consciousness, the result would +show itself in a passivity detrimental to action in general. Where the +object is intrinsically an impossible one, persistent desire is, of +course, futile. The dog baying at the cat in the tree is the prey of such +a desire, but he does not realize it, or he might discontinue his +inefficacious leaps. The man tormented by his unworthy act in the past is +quite aware of the futility of his longings. His condition is +psychologically explicable, but to a rational being, in so far as +rational, it is not normal. + +Normally, desire is the intermediate step between the recognition of an +object and the will to attain it. The most futile of desires may be +harbored. The imaginative mind may range over a limitless field, and give +itself up to desires the most extravagant. But indulgence in this habit +serves as a check to action serviceable to the individual and to the +race. As a matter of fact, desire is usually for what seems conceivably +within the limit of possible attainment. The man desires to catch a +train, to run that he may attain that end; his mind is little occupied +with the desire to fly, nor does his longing center upon the carpet of +Solomon. To the desirability of dismissing from the mind futile desires +current moral maxims bear witness. + +34. WILL.--The natural fruition of a desire is, then, an act of will; the +tension is normally followed by that release of energy which makes for +the attainment of the object or end of the desire. + +The question suggests itself, may there not be present, even in blindly +impulsive action, something faintly corresponding to desire and will? +That there should be an object in the sense of something aimed at, held +in view as an idea to be realized, appears to be out of the question. But +may there not be a more or less vague and evanescent sense of tension, +and some psychic fact which may be regarded as the shadowy forerunner of +the consciousness of the release of tension which, on a higher plane, +reveals itself as the consciousness of will? There may be: introspection +is not capable of answering the question, and one is forced to fall back +upon an argument from analogy. Blindly impulsive action and action in +which will indubitably and consciously plays a part are not wholly +unlike, but they differ by a very wide interval. The interval is not an +empty gap, however, for, as we have seen, all volitions do not stand out +upon the background of our consciousness with the same unmistakable +distinctness. There are volitions no one would hesitate to call such. And +there are phenomena resembling volition which we more and more doubtfully +include under that caption as we pass own on the descending scale. + +Naturally, in describing desire and volition we do not turn to the +twilight region where all outlines are blurred and indistinct. We fix our +attention upon those instances in which the phenomena are clearly and +strongly marked. They are most clearly marked where desire does not, at +once and unimpeded, discharge itself in action, but where action is +deferred, and a struggle takes place between desires. + +The man is subject to various tensions, he is impelled in divers +directions, he hesitates, deliberates, and he finally makes a decision. +During this period of deliberation he is apt to be vividly conscious of +desire as such--as a tension not yet relieved, as an alternation of +tensions as the attention occupies itself, first with one desirable +object, then with another. And the decision, which puts an end to the +strife, is clearly distinguished from the desires as such. + +In the reflective mind, which turns its attention upon itself and its own +processes, the distinction between desire and will seems to be a marked +one. But it is not merely the developed and reflective mind which is the +seat of deliberation. The child deliberates between satisfying its +appetite and avoiding possible punishment; it reaches for the forbidden +fruit, and withdraws its hand; it wavers, it is moved in one direction as +one desire becomes predominant, and its action is checked as the other +gains in ascendency. Deliberation this unmistakably is. And deliberation +we may observe in creatures below the level of man; in the sparrow, +hopping as close as it dares to the hand that sprinkles crumbs before it; +in the dog, ready to dart away in pursuance of his private desires, but +restrained by the warning voice of his master. This is deliberation. Such +deliberation as we find in the developed and enlightened human being it +is not. That, however, there is present even in these humble instances, +some psychic fact corresponding to what in the higher mind reveals itself +as desire and volition, we have no reason to doubt. + +35. DESIRE AND WILL NOT IDENTICAL.--I have had occasion to remark that +the modern psychologist draws no such sharp line between desire and +volition as the psychologist of an earlier time. That some distinction +should be drawn seems palpable. It is not without significance that +immemorial usage sanctions this distinction. The ancient Stoic's quarrel +was with the desires, not with the will. The will was treated as a master +endowed with rightful authority; the desires were subjects, often in +rebellion, but justly to be held in subjection. And from the days of the +Stoic down almost to our own, the will has been treated much as though it +were an especial and distinct faculty of man, not uninfluenced by desire, +but in no sense to be identified with it,--above it, its law-giver, +detached, independent, supreme. This tendency finds its culmination in +that impressive modern Stoic, Immanuel Kant, who desires to isolate the +will, and to emancipate it altogether from the influence of desire. + +Recently the pendulum has swung in the other direction. It has been +recognized that will is the natural outcome of desire, and that without +desire there would be no will at all. It has even been maintained that +will _is_ desire, the desire "with which the self identifies +itself." [Footnote: See, for example, GREEN, _Prolegomena to +Ethics_, Sec 144-149.] + +To this last form of expression objection may be made on the score of its +vagueness. What does it mean for the self to "identify" itself with a +desire? And if such an identification is necessary to will, can there be +volition or anything resembling volition where self-consciousness has not +yet been developed? It is very imperfectly developed in young children, +and in the lower animals still less developed, if at all; and yet we see +in them the struggle of desires and the resultant decision emerging in +action. If we call a volition in which consciousness of the self has +played its part "volition proper," it still remains to inquire how +volitions on a lower plane are to be distinguished from mere desires. + +What happens in a typical case of deliberation and decision? Two or more +objects are before the mind and the attention occupies itself with them +successively. Tensions alternate, wax strong and die away, only to +recover their strength again. Finally the attention fixes upon one object +to the exclusion of others, the strife of desires come to an end, and +there is an inception of action in the direction of the realization of +that particular desire. The desire itself is not to be confounded with +the decision; the tension, with its release. The psychic fact is in the +two cases different. The decision brings relief from the strain. It +cannot properly be called a desire, not even a triumphant desire, +although in it a desire attains a victory and its realization has begun. + +Such a victory not all desires, even when most intense and prolonged, are +able to attain. We have seen that the desire for the unattainable may +amount to an obsession, and yet it will not ripen into an act of +volition. The release of the tension in incipient action does not come. +The bent bow remains bent. From the sense of strain in such a case one +may be freed, as one is freed from the desires which succumb during the +process of deliberation, by the occupation of the attention with other +things. But the desire has been forgotten, not satisfied. It may at any +time recur in all its strength. + +We cannot more nearly describe the psychic fact called decision. Just as +we cannot more nearly describe the psychic fact to which we have given +the name "tension." Although the nervous basis of the phenomena of desire +and will are unknown, we can easily conceive that, during desire, and +before desire has resulted in the release of energy which is the +immediate forerunner of action, the cerebral occurrence should be +different from that which is present when that release takes place. Nor +should it be surprising that the psychical fact corresponding to each +should be different. + +The view here set forth does not confuse desire and will, making will +indistinguishable from desire, or, at least, from certain desires. On the +other hand, it does not separate them, as though they could not be +brought within the one series of occurrences which may properly be +regarded as a unit. It has the advantage of making comprehensible the +mutual relations of impulse, desire, and will. Blind impulse discharges +itself in action seemingly without the psychic accompaniments which +distinguish desire and will. But all impulse is not blind impulse, and +desiring and willing admit of many degrees of development. To deny will +to creatures lower than man, as some writers have done, is to misconceive +the nature of the process that issues in action. We are tempted to do it +only when we compare will in its highest manifestations with those +rudimentary foreshadowings of it which stand at the lower end of the +scale. But even in man we can discern blind impulse, dimly conscious +desires which ripen into as dimly recognized decisions, and, at the very +top of the scale, conscious decisions which follow deliberation, and are +the resultant of a struggle between many desires. + +For ethical science it is of no little importance to apprehend clearly +the relation of decision to desire. Moral rules aim to control human +conduct, and conduct is the expression of the whole man. If we have no +clear conception of the desires which struggle for the mastery within +him, and of the relation of his decisions to those desires, in vain will +we endeavor to influence him in the direction in which we wish him to +move. + +36. THE WILL AND DEFERRED ACTION.--It remains to speak briefly of one +point touching the nature of will. It has been suggested that the +decision is the psychic fact corresponding to the release of nervous +energy which relieves the tension of desire. It is the beginning of +action, of realization. But what shall we say of resolves which cannot at +once be carried out in action? Of decisions the realization of which is +deferred? I may long debate the matter and then determine to pay a bill +when it comes due next month. The decision is made; but, for a time, at +least, nothing happens. How can I here speak of the beginning of action? + +The action does not at once begin, yet it is, in a sense, initiated. The +struggle of conflicting considerations has ceased; the man is "set" for +action in a certain direction. For the time being the matter is settled, +and only an external circumstance prevents the resolve from being carried +out. The psychic factor is widely different from that of mere desire, and +is not recognized to be different from that present in volition which at +once issues in action. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE PERMANENT WILL + + +37. CONSCIOUSLY CHOSEN ENDS.--Our volitions, deliberate, less deliberate, +and those verging upon what scarcely deserves the name of volition, weave +themselves into complicated patterns, which find their expression in long +series of the most varied activities. The nature of the pattern as a +whole may be determined by the deliberate selection of an end, and to +that the other choices which enter into the complex may be subordinate. + +Thus, a man may decide that he can afford to give himself the pleasure of +a long walk through the country before taking the train at the next town. +During the course of the ramble he may make a number of more or less +conscious decisions not incompatible with the purpose he originally +embraced--to take this bit of road or that, to loiter in the shade, to +climb a hill that he may enjoy a view, to hasten lest he find himself too +late in arriving at his destination. These decisions may require little +deliberation; they spring into being at the call of the moment, are not +preceded by deliberation, and leave little trace in the memory. They may +be made semi-consciously, and while the mind is largely occupied with +other things, with thoughts of the past or the future, with other scenes +suggested by the landscape, or with the flowers which skirt the road. +Nevertheless, we would not hesitate to call them decisions. + +May we apply the word in speaking of the single steps made by the +traveler as he advances? His feet seem to move of themselves and to make +no demands at all upon his attention. + +Yet it is not strictly true to say that they move of themselves. They are +under control, and the successive steps follow upon each other not +without direction. They serve as expressions of the will to take the +walk, and they are adjusted to the end consciously held in view. That +attention is not fixed upon the individual steps does not remove them +from the sphere of the voluntary, in a proper sense of the words. They +are expressions of the man's will, even if they be not the result of a +conscious series of deliberations and decisions. Whether we shall use the +term decision in connection with the single step is rather a question of +verbal usage than of the determination of fact. We have seen that +decisions shade down gradually, from those quite unmistakable and +characteristic, to occurrences far less characteristic and more +disputable. The consciousness of deliberation and decision does not +disappear abruptly at some point in the series. It fades away, as the +light of day gradually passes, through twilight, into the shades of +night. And actions not directly recognizable as consciously voluntary may +be obviously under voluntary control. They weave themselves, with actions +more palpably voluntary and higher in the scale, into those complicated +patterns determined by the conscious selection of an end. As long as they +serve their purpose, and require no effort, they may remain inconspicuous +and unconsidered. But, as soon as a check is met with, attention is +directed upon them and they become the subject of conscious voluntary +control. + +38. ENDS NOT CONSCIOUSLY CHOSEN.--In the above illustration the end +which determines the character of a long chain of actions has been +deliberately chosen. It is a consciously selected end. When, however, we +contemplate critically the lives of our fellow-men, we seem to become +aware of the fact that many of them act in unconsciousness of the +ultimate end upon which their actions converge. The attention is taken up +with minor decisions, and takes no note of the permanent trend of the +will. + +Thus, the selfish man may be unaware of the significance of the whole +series of choices which he makes in a day; the malicious man may not +realize that he is animated by the settled purpose to injure his +neighbors; one may be law-abiding without ever having resolved to obey +the laws through the course of a life. If called upon to account for this +or that subordinate decision, each may exhaust his ingenuity in assigning +false causes, while ignoring the permanent attitude of the will revealed +in the series of decisions as a whole and giving them what consistency +they possess. + +Hence, the choice of ends, as well as the adoption of means to the +attainment of ends, may reveal itself either in conscious deliberate +decisions, or in the working of obscure impulses which do not emerge into +the light. Even in the latter case, we have not to do with what is wholly +beyond the sphere of intelligent voluntary control. The selfish man may +be made aware that he is selfish; the malicious man, that he is +malicious; and each may deliberately take steps to remedy the defect +revealed. + +When we understand the word "will" in the broad sense indicated in the +preceding pages, we see that a man's habits may justly be regarded as +expressions of the man's will. That, through repetition, his actions have +become almost automatic does not remove them from the sphere of the +volitional. That he does not clearly see, or that he misconceives, the +significance of his habits, and may acquiesce in them even though they be +injurious to him, does not make them the less willed, so long as he +follows them. It is only when he actively endeavors to control or modify +a habit that he may be said to will its opposite. + +39. THE CHOICE OF IDEALS.--Nor is it too much to bring under the head of +willing the attitudes of approval and disapproval taken by man in +contemplating certain occurrences, actual or possible, which lie beyond +the confines of the field within which he can exercise control. The field +of control, direct and indirect, is as we have seen a broad one, but it +has its limits, and many of the things he would like to see accomplished +or prevented lie without it. + +A man's will may be set upon the preservation of his health, he may +strive to attain that end, and circumstances may condemn him to a life of +invalidism. He would be healthy if he could, but his strivings are +overruled. Or he may earnestly pursue the attainment of wealth, and may +end in bankruptcy. He has the will to be rich, but that will is +frustrated. + +It is the same when we consider his attitude toward the decisions and +actions of other men. By mere willing he cannot condition another's +choice. But by willing he can often influence indirectly the volitions of +his fellows. He can enlighten or misinform, persuade or threaten, reward +or punish. In many ways he can weight the scale of his neighbor's mind. +But such influences are not all-powerful, and only within limits can we +bend other wills to follow a course prescribed for them by our own. + +Nevertheless, even beyond those limits, the attitude of a man's mind +toward the actions of his neighbor may be a volitional one. His will may +be for them or against them; he may approve or disapprove, command or +prohibit. We know quite well that commands and prohibitions laid upon +children and servants will not always be effective, yet we issue general +commands and prohibitions, as though assuming unlimited control. It is +quite in accordance with usage to speak of a man as willing an end, even +where it is clearly recognized that the will to attain does not guarantee +attainment. The man does what he can; could he do more he would do so; in +his helplessness the attitude of the will persists unchanged. + +It is obvious that, in this large sense of the word "will," we may speak +of a man as continuing to will or to approve a given end, even when he is +not willing or approving anything, in a narrower sense of the words, at +this or that moment. We speak of a man as inspired by the permanent will +to be rich, although at many times during the day, and certainly during +his hours of sleep, no act of volition with such an end in view has an +actual existence. + +No man always thinks of the permanent ends which he has selected as +controls to his actions. They are selected, they pass from his mind, and, +when they recur to it again, the selection is reaffirmed. But, whether he +is actually thinking about the ends in question or not, the settled trend +of his will is expressed in them. + +This settled trend of the will, even when scarcely recognized by the man +himself, may be vastly more significant than the passing individual +decision, although the latter be accompanied by clear consciousness. In +certain cases the latter is a true exponent of character, but not +infrequently it is not. It may be the result of a whim, of an irrational +impulse little congruous with a man's nature. It may be the outcome of +some misconception and in contradiction with what the man would will, if +enlightened. The individual volition appears only to disappear; it may +leave no apparent trace. The permanent will indicates a habit of mind, a +way of acting, which may be expected to make its influence felt with the +persistency of that which exerts a steady pressure. To refuse it the name +of will seems arbitrary and unjustifiable. + +In the permanent will is expressed the _character_ of the man. This +character is reflected in his _ideals_. Sometimes ideals are clearly +recognized and deliberately chosen. Sometimes a man is little aware of +the nature of the ideals which control his strivings. He may be said to +choose, but to choose more or less blindly. But, whether he chooses with +clear vision or without it, he may choose well or ill. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE OBJECT IN DESIRE AND WILL + + +40. THE OBJECT AS END TO BE REALIZED.--The expression "the object before +the mind in desiring and willing" is not free from ambiguity. It may be +used in referring to the idea, the psychic fact, which is present when +one desires or wills. Or it may be used to indicate the future fact which +is the realization of the idea, that which the idea points to as its end. + +The idea and the end are, of course, not identical, but they are related. +The idea mirrors the end, foreshadows it. In the attempt to explain a +voluntary act we may turn either to the one or to the other; we may +regard the idea as the efficient cause which has resulted in the act, or +we may account for the act by pointing out the end it was purposed to +attain. There is no reason why we should not recognize both the efficient +cause and the final cause, or end. + +The latter has been the subject of more or less mystification. How, it +has been asked, can an end, which does not, as yet, exist, be a cause +which sets in motion the apparatus that brings about its own existence? +[Footnote: See JANET, _Les Causes Finales_, Paris, 1901, p. 1, ff.] + +The difficulty is a gratuitous one. It lies in the confusion of the final +cause or end, with the efficient cause. When we realize that the +expression "final cause" means simply that which is purposed, or accepted +as an end, objections to it fall away. That, in desire and will, in all +their higher manifestations, at least, there is consciousness of an end, +there can be no question. + +If we attempt to give more than a vague physical explanation of actions +due to blind impulse, we are compelled to refer to the idea, the psychic +fact present, as efficient cause. Not so when we are concerned with +actions of a higher order. We constantly refer such actions to the ends +they have in view. We regard them as satisfactorily explained when we +have pointed out the end upon which they are directed. + +To the moralist it is of the utmost importance to know what ends men +actually choose, and what they may be induced to choose. He is concerned +with conduct, which is intelligent and purposive action. Conduct may be +studied without entering upon an investigation of the efficient causes, +whether physical or mental, which are the antecedents of action of any +kind. Such matters one may leave to the physiologist and the +psychologist. + +Accordingly, when I speak of "the object" in desiring and willing, I +shall use the word to indicate the end held in view, that toward which +the creature desiring or willing strives. + +41. HUMAN NATURE AND THE OBJECTS CHOSEN.--What objects do men actually +desire and will to attain? To give a detailed account of them appears to +be a hopeless and profitless task. + +I take up my pen, I write, I turn to a book; I look at my watch, change +my position, stretch, walk up and down, speak to some one who is present, +smile or give vent to irritation; I sit down to a meal, eat of this dish +rather than of that, go out to visit a place of amusement, respond to the +appeal of the beggar in the street--in short, I fill my day with a +thousand actions the most diverse, which follow each other without +intermission. + +Each of these actions may be the object of desire and will. No novel, +however realistic, however prolix in its descriptions, can give us more +than the barest outlines of the course of life followed by the personages +it attempts to portray. A touch here, a touch there, and a character is +indicated. No more, for more would be intolerable. + +It is significant, however, that the few points touched upon can serve to +give an idea of a character. Not-withstanding their diversity, volitions +fall into classes; it is quite possible to indicate in a general way the +kind of choices a given creature may be impelled to make. They are a +revelation of the nature of the creature choosing. That beings differing +in their nature should be impelled to different courses of action can +surprise no one. Cats have no temptation to wander in herds; the +exhibition of pugnacity in a sheep would strike us with wonder. + +To every kind of creature its nature: and, although individuals within a +kind differ more or less from one another, we look for approximation to a +type. So it is with man. The expression "human nature," so much in the +mouths of certain moralists ancient and modern, although somewhat vague, +is not without its significance. To it we refer in passing a judgment +upon individual human beings, and we regard as abnormal those who vary +widely from the type. + +42. THE INSTINCTS AND IMPULSES OF MAN.--In sketching for us the outlines +of this distinctively human nature, the psychologist proceeds to an +enumeration of the fundamental instincts and general innate tendencies of +man, and he draws up a list of the emotions which correspond to them. He +mentions the instincts of flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self- +abasement, self-assertion, the parental instinct, the instinct of sex, +the instinct for food, that for acquisition, etc. He points out that man +is by nature open to sympathy, is suggestible, and has the impulse to +play. In such instincts and inborn general tendencies, blending and +reinforcing or opposing and inhibiting one another, he sees the forces +which give their direction to desire and will; which select, out of all +possible objects, those which are to become objects for man. + +It is not necessary here to discuss the nature of instinct, to +distinguish between an instinct and a more general inborn tendency, or to +attempt a complete list of the instincts and inborn tendencies of man. +Nor need I ask whether every choice made by a human being can be traced, +directly or indirectly, to one or more of the instincts and other +tendencies given in the above or in any similar list. In explaining the +individual choices which men make, or the desires to which they are +subject, there is much scope for the ingenuity of the psychologist. + +But of the significance for human life of the impulses mentioned there +can be no question. What would the life of a man be if he could feel no +fear or repulsion? Could there be a development of knowledge in the +absence of curiosity? How long would the race endure if the parental +instinct were wholly lacking? What would become of a man who never +desired food? Could a human society of any sort exist if there were no +sympathy or tender feeling, no impulse to seek the company of other men? +It is men, such as they are, endowed with the qualities which distinguish +man, who associate themselves into communities, and the customs and laws +of such reflect the fundamental impulses in which they had their origin. + +43. THE STUDY OF MAN'S INSTINCTS IMPORTANT.--That a careful study of +human nature is of the utmost importance to the moralist is palpable. He +must not prescribe for man a rule of conduct which it is not in man to +follow. He must not set before him, as inducements to actions, objects +which it is impossible for him to desire and, hence, to choose. + +To be sure, the main traits of human nature were pretty well recognized +many centuries before the modern science of psychology had its birth. Had +they not been, man could not have had rational dealings with his fellow- +man; could not effectively have persuaded and threatened, rewarded and +punished, and, in short, set in motion all the machinery which is at the +service of one man when he wants to influence the conduct of another. But +moralists ancient and modern have made serious blunders through an +imperfect understanding of the impulses natural to man; and the modern +psychologist, without claiming to be a wholly original or an infallible +guide, may be of no little service in helping us to detect them. + +Thus, it was possible for as shrewd an observer of man as Aristotle to +explain the affection of a man for his child by regarding it as an +extension of self-love, the child being, in a sense, a part of the +parent. [Footnote: _Ethics_, Book VIII, chapter xii.] Aristotle's +quaint explanation of the fact that maternal affection is apt to be +stronger than paternal is an error of a kindred nature. [Footnote: +_Ibid_., Book IX, chapter vii.] And the ancient egoists, [Footnote: +See the answer to Epicurus in the _Discourses of Epictetus_, +translated by LONG, London, 1890, pp. 69-70.] in setting before man their +selfish and anti-social ideal of human conduct, made their appeal, not to +the whole man, but only to a part of him. The normal man, whether savage +or civilized, whether ancient or modern, cannot desire a life filled only +with the objects which they set before him. Nor is the modern moralist, +or as he prefers to style himself, "immoralist," Nietzsche, [Footnote: A +sketch of Nietzsche's doctrine is given later, see chapter xxix.] guilty +of less gross a blunder. He rails at morality as commonly understood, +calling it "the morality of the herd," and he recommends isolation, the +repression of sympathy, and a contempt for one's fellows. To be sure, the +"herd" is a scornful, rhetorical expression,--what Bentham would have +called a "question-begging epithet,"--for men do not, properly speaking, +live in herds; but they do normally live in human societies of some sort, +and they have the instincts and impulses which fit them to do so. The +repression of such instincts and impulses does violence to their nature, +and he who advocates other than a social morality should advocate it for +some creature other than man. Man is a social creature, and, among the +objects of his desire and will, he must give a prominent place to some +which are distinctively social. + +44. THE BEWILDERING MULTIPLICITY OF THE OBJECTS OF DESIRE, AND THE EFFORT +TO FIND AN UNDERLYING UNITY.--The mere enumeration of the characteristics +which have been adduced as instincts or fundamental innate tendencies of +man is enough to reveal the truth that man is not merely the subject of +_desire_, but of _desires_; that is to say, his impulses are +directed upon objects widely different from each other. + +And when we call to mind that the concepts of the instincts and +fundamental tendencies of human nature, as thus enumerated, are products +of abstraction and generalization--are general notions gathered from the +numberless concrete instances of desire and will furnished by our +observation--we are forced to realize that the objects which individual +men set before themselves in desiring and willing are really endlessly +varied. + +All men are not equally moved by fear, anger, repulsion, tender emotion, +or sympathy. Nor do all men find the same things the objects of their +fear, anger, repulsion, and the rest. The desire for food is an +abstraction; in the concrete, this man eagerly accepts an oyster, and +that one turns from it in disgust. In order to deal successfully with our +fellow-man, we must not merely know man. We must know men. + +Furthermore, not only do individuals set their affections upon different +objects, but the same person at different stages of his development +desires widely different things. What is a temptation to the boy has no +attraction for the man. What fills the savage with longings may inspire +in the product of a high civilization no other feeling than repulsion. + +And what is true of the individual is true of men in the mass. The +objects of desire and of endeavor are not the same in communities of all +orders. Each kind of man has its own nature, which differs in some +respects from that of each other kind, and dictates what shall be, for +this or that man, an object of desire and will. No two men desire +precisely the same thing in all particulars. Yet each is a man, and is +endowed with the usual complement of human instincts. + +The process of abstraction and generalization which resulted in the +above-mentioned list of the elements which enter into the constitution of +human nature is, nevertheless, not without its uses. It serves to order, +to some extent, at least, the bewildering variety of the phenomena +presented to us when we view the broad field of the desires and volitions +of all sorts and conditions of men. Men's choices fall into _kinds_; +there is similiarity in difference. We do not approach an unknown man +with the feeling that he is a wholly unknown quantity. He is, at least, a +man, and we know something of men. We have _some_ notion how to go +at him. + +But the ordering of the motley multiplicity of men's desires by a +reference to the fundamental instincts of man stops far short of a +complete unification. We are left with a number of distinct and +apparently irreducible impulses and tendencies on our hands. If it is +useful to go so far, may it not be much more useful to go still farther? + +Aristotle divided things eligible into those eligible in themselves and +those eligible for the sake of something else. How it would illuminate +the field of action, if it were discovered that men ultimately desire but +one thing, and choose all other things on account of it! Would the +discovery not facilitate immensely our dealings with our fellows, +suggesting new possibilities of control? A notorious instance of the +attempt to conjure away the bewildering diversity in men's desires and +choices lies in the selection of pleasure as the one thing eligible in +itself, the unique ultimate object of human action. Of this object we +have, so far, taken no account. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +INTENTION AND MOTIVE + + +45. COMPLEX ENDS.--I may desire to clear my throat and may do so. The +action is a trivial one, is over in a moment, and is forgotten. On the +other hand, I may desire to spend my summer on the sea-coast, to grow +rich in business, to attain to high social position, or to satisfy +political ambition. + +When the object is of this complicated description, there may easily be +elements in it which, considered alone, I should not desire at all. + +The summer on the New Jersey coast may make for health. But it may entail +mosquitoes, uncomfortable rooms, unaccustomed food, the lack of wonted +occupations, and a distasteful association at close quarters with +neighbors not of one's choosing. The road to wealth is an arduous one. +The envied social station may imply the swallowing of many rebuffs. The +way of the politician is hard. + +One may desire, _on the whole_, one of these objects, or a thousand +like them; but there are, obviously, many things comprised in the whole, +or unavoidably bound up with it, that cannot attract, and are not +eligible for their own sake. + +46. INTENTION.--An object chosen and realized may bring in its train an +indefinite series of consequences foreseen or unforeseen. + +The striking of a match to light a candle may result in an unforeseen and +disastrous conflagration. The overmastering desire to grow rich may have +its fruit in an excessive application to business, the neglect of the +family and of the duties of citizenship, and in hard and, perhaps, +unscrupulous dealings. These things may be foreseen and accepted as +natural accompaniments of the end chosen. But there may also be entailed +shattered health, overwhelming anxieties, and the distress of seeing +one's sons, brought up in luxury and without incentive to effort, victims +to the dangers which menace the idle rich. + +Whether such consequences might have been foreseen and provided against +or not, it is true that they are frequently not foreseen with clearness. +They certainly form no part of the intention of the man who bends his +energies to the attainment of wealth. He does not deliberately intend to +injure his health, to lose the affection of his family, to leave behind +him degenerate children. He does intend to get rich, if he can. + +How many of the elements contained in the object chosen, or so bound up +with it that they must be accepted along with it, may fairly be said to +fall within the intention of the chooser? There may easily be dispute +touching the latitude with which the word intention may be used. Some +things a man sees clearly to be inseparably connected with the object of +his choice; some he is less conscious of; some he overlooks altogether. +It does not seem unwarranted to maintain that the first of the three +classes of things, at least, may be said to be intended. When Dr. +Katzenberger, in his desire to get across the road without sinking in the +mire, used as a stepping-stone his old servant Flex, who had fallen down, +his complete intention was not simply to cross the road unmuddied. It was +to cross the road unmuddied by stepping on Flex. + +Evidently the intention--the whole object--gives some revelation of the +character of a man. Many men may will to avoid the mud; but not all of +these can will to avoid it by stepping upon a fellow-man. + +47. MOTIVE.--The stepping upon a fellow-man with whom one is on good +terms can scarcely be regarded as a thing desirable in itself. If it is +desired, it is because of the complex in which it is an element. Some +other element or elements may exert the whole attractive force which +moves desire and will. In other words, some things are chosen for the +sake of others. + +When we have discovered that for the sake of which any object is chosen, +we have come upon the _Motive_. The intention may be said to embrace +the whole object as foreseen. The motive embraces only a part of it, but +the vital part, the part without which the object would not be desired +and willed. + +48. ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INTENTION AND MOTIVE.--There has been much +dispute among moralists as to the ethical significance of intention and +motive. Bentham maintains that "from one and the same motive, and from +every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are +bad, and others that are indifferent." He gives the following +illustration: [Footnote: _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, +chapter x, Sec 3.] + +"1. A boy, in order to divert himself, reads an inspiring book; the +motive is accounted, perhaps, a good one; at any rate, not a bad one. 2. +He sets his top a-spinning: the motive is deemed at any rate not a bad +one. 3. He sets loose a mad ox among a crowd: his motive is now, perhaps, +termed an abominable one. Yet in all three cases the motive may be the +very same: it may be neither more nor less than curiosity." + +In criticizing this citation I must point out that curiosity is not, +properly speaking, an object of choice at all. I have used the word +"object" to indicate what is chosen, not to indicate the psychic fact +present at the time of the choice. And I have said that the motive is the +vital part of the object. + +Hence curiosity should not be called the motive. No man chooses curiosity +as an object, either in the abstract or in the concrete. Curiosity is a +fundamental impulse of human nature; we may elect to satisfy the impulse +in any given instance; in other words, we may choose the appropriate +object. + +In the case of the boy letting loose the bull in the crowd, the object is +to see what will happen under the given circumstances. This is what +appeals to the boy. Something else might have appealed to him in +performing the action. He might have had the deliberate wish to injure +certain persons present against whom he harbored resentment. Or his +sympathies might have been with the bull, which had been the victim of +bad treatment, and to which he wished to grant its liberty. Were the +crowd in question a band of ruffians intent upon lynching, he might have +been moved by the desire to assist, in a somewhat irregular way, in the +re-establishment of law and order. But even if his real object is only to +see what will happen, there is no reason to put it on a par with the +object in view when a boy spins a top. "To see what will happen" is the +vaguest of phrases, and covers a multitude of disparate objects. He who +does things to see what will happen has, at least, a very general +knowledge of the kind of thing likely to happen, if a given experiment is +made. A boy does not hold his finger in the candle-flame to see what will +happen. He who does things to see what will happen, in really complete +ignorance of what is likely to happen, may be set down as too much of a +fool to be the subject of moral judgments. + +It is obvious that an act may be done with many different objects in +view--I mean real objects, motives. I give money to a beggar whose case +is one to inspire pity. My motive, my "vital" object, may be to relieve +the man. But it may equally well be to get rid of him, to gratify my +self-feeling by becoming the dispenser of bounty, or to inspire +admiration in the onlooker. The intention, as I have used the word above, +is to relieve the beggar, with such consequences of the act as may be +foreseen at the time. Within the limits of this intention, the motive may +vary widely, and may, in a given instance, be either admirable or +contemptible. + +It may be claimed, in answer to this, that the real intention is, in +every case, what I have called the motive; that, in the first case, it +was to relieve suffering; in the second, to get rid of an annoyance; in +the third to satisfy vanity; in the fourth, to be admired. + +The word "intention," thus used, is equivalent to "motive." Popular usage +gives some sanction to this confusion of the words. We say of a man who +has done a questionable act: "His intentions were good," or, "His motives +were good." Still, popular usage does not always regard the two +expressions as equivalent. To revert to the case of the unhappy Flex. It +does not seem inappropriate to say that the use of a man as a stepping- +stone was a part of his master's intention. It does appear inappropriate +to call it the motive or a part of the motive of the whole transaction. + +Intention and motive are convenient words to designate the whole object +chosen and the part of the object which accounts for the choice of the +whole. That it is important to distinguish between the two is palpable. + +The intention gives some indication of character. We know something about +a man when we know what kinds of objects he will probably set before +himself as aims. But we know more when we know why he chooses these +objects rather than others; when we can analyze the complex and can +discover just what elements in it attract him. + +With an increase of our knowledge comes an increased power of control. +Until we know a man's motives, we do not really know the man; and until +we know the man, our efforts to influence him must be rather blind. + +The search for motives appears to carry us in the direction of the +systematization and simplification of the embarrassing wealth of objects +which are actually the goal of human desires and volitions. Man may +desire a boundless variety of objects. His motives in desiring them may, +conceivably, be comparatively few. + +It should be apparent that both intention and motive have ethical +significance. We have our opinion of men capable of harboring certain +intentions. But we recognize that some men may harbor them with better +motives than others. And we can see that a man's intention may be bad, +and yet his motive, considered in itself, be good. How we are to rate the +man, morally, becomes rather a nice question. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +FEELING AS MOTIVE + + +49. FEELING. [Footnote: See the notes on this chapter at the end of this +volume.]--Two men may recognize with equal clearness the presence of a +danger. That recognition may evoke in the one a violent emotion of fear, +and in the other little or no emotion. Two men may be treated with +indignity. The one fumes with rage; the other remains calm. It is well +recognized that men may be susceptible to emotion in general, or to +certain specific emotions, in varying degrees. Knowledge is not always +accompanied by a marked manifestation of emotion. Thoughts may be clear, +but cold. There are, however, natures whose intellectual processes are +steeped in emotion. Such men live in an atmosphere of agitation. + +Lists of the emotions which correspond to the instincts and fundamental +impulses of man have been drawn up. In them we find mentioned fear, +disgust, wonder, anger, elation, tender feeling, and so forth; phenomena +which, by earlier writers, were classified as "passions," and to which we +may conveniently give the name "feeling." We constantly speak of our +emotions as our "feelings," and we contrast the man of feeling with the +coldly intellectual mind in which emotion is at a minimum. + +But it is not alone to such specific emotions as those above-mentioned +that we apply the term feeling. Thoughts are agreeable or disagreeable, +pleasurable or painful. So are emotions. The agreeableness or +disagreeableness, pleasantness or painfulness, which are the +accompaniments of thoughts and emotions, have been called by modern +psychologists their feeling-tone. It is not out of harmony with common +usage to give them the name of feelings. In so doing we contrast them +with knowledge and assimilate them to emotion. + +Whether every sensation and every thought gives rise to an emotion of +some sort is matter for dispute, as is also the question whether every +sensation, thought and emotion is tinged with some degree of pleasurable +or painful feeling. In the absence of conclusive evidence, it is open to +us to assume that some feeling is always present where there is mental +activity of any kind. The feeling may be so faint and evanescent as to +escape detection, but this does not prove that it is absent. + +50. FEELING AND ACTION.--Emotions and feelings of pleasure and pain are +the normal accompaniments of the exercise of the instincts and impulses +of creatures that desire and will. Within limits, we appear to be able to +take them as an index of the strength of the desire and the vigor of the +effort at attainment. + +An act of cruelty is perpetrated. I see it, and it leaves me, perhaps, +cold and unmoved. In such case, it is hardly expected of me that I should +take energetic measures to have the evil-doer punished. The man whose +face flushes, whose brows descend, whose teeth come together, whose fists +clench, whose heart beats thickly, at the recognition of an insult, is, +as a rule, the man from whom we look for vigorous efforts at retaliation. +The apathetic creature who _feels_ no resentment is usually expected +to swallow the indignity. The child who jumps for joy at the sight of a +new doll is supposed to desire it eagerly, and to be ready to make +efforts to obtain it. + +But it is only within limits that this relation between feeling and +action holds. Men of little emotion may be resolute and prompt to action. +Their desires, as evinced by their actions, may be persistent and +effective. Nor need the individual fix his choice upon the particular +object that arouses in him the most feeling. A man may see his fellow- +creature destitute, and may shed tears over his pitiable lot. But he will +not bequeath his money to him. He will leave it to his son, for whom, +perhaps, he has no respect and has come to have little affection. And he +may leave it to him with regret, knowing that it will be dissipated in +ways which he cannot approve. It has been pointed out with justice that +the exercise of many instincts may be accompanied with little feeling; +and we are all aware of the fact that, as action becomes habitual, +emotion tends to evaporate and the pleasure of effort and attainment is +apt to be reduced to a minimum. + +51. FEELING AS OBJECT.--It is well to keep in mind the distinction +between feeling as a psychic fact present in the mind of the creature +desiring and willing, and feeling as the object of desire and will. A man +in a rage is the victim of a storm of feeling. The thought of the injury +he has received and the desire for retaliation by no means exhaust the +contents of his mind. But the passion which shakes him is not his +_object_; that object is revengeful action. + +Nevertheless, feeling may be made the object of desire and will. One may +attend a religious or political meeting with the deliberate view of +arousing in one's self certain complex emotions. Poe's gruesome tales are +read for the sake of the thrill which is produced by the perusal. +Probably the desire for excitement, for the experiencing of certain vivid +emotions, has no little to do with the attraction exercised by certain +criminal professions. The burglar desires the booty, but he may desire +something more. + +Emotions have, as we have seen, their "tone" of pleasure or pain. They +are agreeable or the reverse, and it is palpable that men do not, as a +rule, deliberately make them the object of desire and will in +indifference to the fact that they are pleasant or are painful. We do not +normally wish to attain to states of mind in which remorse plays a +prominent part; we do not aim to revel in shame; we do not seek to be +haunted with fear. Pleasurable emotions are desired, where desire is set +on emotions at all; and painful emotions are regarded by the mind as +unwelcome guests. At any rate, this appears to be the rule, and to +characterize the man whom we regard as normal. + +This being the case, it seems natural to ask whether, when we embrace the +_intention_ of producing in ourselves a given emotion, our +_motive_ may not be narrower in scope, namely, the attainment of +pleasure? and, when we wish to rid the mind of any emotion, our +_motive_ may not be the avoidance of pain? + +The adoption of this view would give to the feelings of pleasure and pain +a unique importance. They would be accepted as the only ultimate objects +of desire and will. By many they have been thus accepted. It has been +insisted that objects of every description are chosen only as they arouse +some feeling; and that those which promise pleasant feeling are sought +and those which entail pain are avoided. The general recognition of the +primacy of pleasure and pain over our other feelings, over the specific +emotions mentioned above, is indicated by the fact that ethical writers +of eminence sometimes make pleasure and pain synonymous with feeling in +general, passing over other feelings, as though it were not important for +the moralist to take them into consideration. The dispute whether the +proper course for human action to take is prescribed by reason or is +dictated by feeling often resolves itself into the problem whether we +should be guided by reason, or by a consideration of pleasure to be +attained or pain to be avoided. + +52. FREEDOM AS OBJECT.--The acceptance of pleasure and pain as the +ultimate motives of human action seems, at first sight, to be of +inestimable assistance to us in threading our way through the labyrinth +of diverse choices made by creatures that desire and will. + +But only at first sight. Even if it be true that every creature seeks +only to attain pleasure and to avoid pain, and uses the means it finds to +hand in the attainment of these ends, the endless diversity of the means +remains as a thing to reckon with. The knowledge that all men desire +pleasure does not help us a whit in dealing with men, unless we know what +things will give pleasure to this man or to that. All men may desire +pleasure; but it remains true that what gives pleasure to the spendthrift +gives pain to the miser; what appeals to the glutton disgusts a man of +refined tastes. If all men were alike and precisely alike, and if their +natures were very simple and remained unchanged, the problem of the +distribution of pleasures would be vastly simplified. + +Whether the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain may be regarded +as the only ultimate ends proper to man will be discussed later. +[Footnote: See chapter xxv.] Here, it is important to insist that so +general a formula gives us little useful information touching the set of +the will either of classes of men or of individuals. This we can attain +to only as a result of the study of the complex nature of man as revealed +in the choices which he actually makes. The ends of man are many and +various; some of these ends are accidental, palpably means for the +attainment of other ends more fundamental, and for them other means of +attaining the same ends may be substituted. But other ends, and they are +by no means to be reduced to a single class, appear to belong to the very +nature of man. In seeking them he is giving expression to the impulses +which make him what he is. + +In so far as these impulses find an unimpeded expression the man is free; +otherwise he is under restraint. Without rendering here a final decision +upon the importance of the role played in human life by pleasure and +pain, one feels impelled to ask the question whether the goal of a man's +endeavors may not best be described as _freedom_? Not freedom in the +abstract, freedom to do anything and everything, but freedom to live the +life appropriate to him as man, and as a man of a given type. That this +freedom is limited in a variety of ways, by his material environment, by +the clashing of impulses within himself, by the conflict of his desires +with the will of the social organism in which he finds his place, is +sufficiently palpable. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +RATIONALITY AND WILL + + +53. THE IRRATIONAL WILL.--As dreams do not consist of an insignificant +medley of elements drawn from the experiences of waking life, but, in +spite of their fantastic character, bear some semblance of ordered +reality, so the impulses of even the most unintelligent and inconsequent +of human beings are not wholly chaotic, but differ only in the degree of +their organization from those of the most rational and far-seeing. + +Where there is even a glimmer of intelligence, ends are recognized and +means to their attainment are chosen. Ends are compared, and the +preference is given to some over others. But, with all this, there may be +much incoherence and planlessness. Men can live somehow without looking +far into the future, or keeping well in mind the lessons to be learned +from the past. They can manage to exist in the face of no little short- +sighted impulsiveness and inconsistency. But it is palpable that they +cannot, under such circumstances, live as they might live were they more +truly rational. + +The individual deficient in foresight and control may, it is true, be +carried along and defended from disaster by the presence of these +qualities in the greater organism of which he is a part. The infant is a +parasite upon society; it is provided for independently of its own +efforts. The child would soon come to grief were its ends not chosen by +others and its conduct kept under control. And a vast number of persons +not children are in much the same position. There is foresight and +rational purpose somewhere; they profit by it; but of foresight and +rational purpose they themselves possess but a modicum. + +Where breadth of view is lacking, where the future is unforeseen or +ignored and the past is forgotten, where desires arise and impel to +action in relative independence of one another, the man seeks today what +tomorrow he rejects. We can scarcely say that the man chooses. He is the +scene of independent choices, varied and inconsistent. He is the victim +of caprice, and appears to us largely the creature of accident, a prey to +the impulse which happens to be in his mind at the moment. From such a +man we cannot look for an adherence to distant aims, and the marshalling +of the proper means to their attainment. He cannot count upon himself, +and he cannot be counted upon. That he can play no significant role in +such stable organizations as the state and church is obvious. His desires +may be many and varied, but they converge upon no one end. We set him +down as irrational. + +54. ONE VIEW OF REASON.--Concerning the part played by reason or +intelligence in the active life of man there has been no little dispute. + +It has been maintained, on the one hand, that reason or intelligence +serves its whole purpose in holding before the mind all its impulses and +desires, revealing their interrelations, and making possible an +enlightened and deliberate choice from among them. Where the horizon is +thus extended and mental clarity reigns, the attention can roam unimpeded +over the whole field, consider the objects of desire in their true +relations and compare them with one another. Congruous desires can +reinforce each other; conflicting desires can be brought face to face, +and the one or the other can deliberately be dismissed; fundamental and +dominant desires may assert their supremacy, and give their stamp to far- +reaching decisions which exercise a control over minor decisions and +favor or repress a multitude of desires and volitions. + +The attainment of perfect rationality in this sense is an ideal never +completely realized. No man can hold before his mind all his impulses and +desires, see them in their true relations to each other, and come to a +decision which will do complete justice to all. But the ideal may be +approached. + +The reason, in this case, resembles the presiding officer of a +deliberative assembly, who insists that all the members shall be heard +from, all proposals seriously considered, and that the ultimate decision +shall justly represent the true will of the deliberative body as a whole. +The specious but fallacious argument is, in the debate, revealed in its +true nature; the obstinate insistence of the individual is not allowed to +prevail; the loud voice is recognized to be a loud voice and nothing +more; fugitive gusts of passion exhaust themselves; the permanent and +fundamental will of the assembly is revealed in the final vote. It is +claimed that, in such a mind, the result is a harmonization and +unification of the multiplicity of the desires and purposes which, in a +mind less rational, jostle one another without control, and refuse to +fall into an ordered system. That the decisions of a rational mind reveal +both a unity and a harmony not evinced by a mind short-sighted and +impulsive cannot be denied. But it is well to understand clearly what is +meant by such unity and harmony. + +55. DOMINANT AND SUBORDINATE DESIRES.--Wherever a group of desires fall +into a system and work together toward a common end, we have unity. Such +a system may be short-lived, comparatively poor in content, and of no +great significance for a man's life as a whole. It may come into +competition with another similar system, and be displaced by it. An +interest that has dominated our minds for a time, and controlled our +desires and volitions, may readily give place to different choices. I may +successively bend all my energies upon the winning of a game, the doing +of a successful stroke of business, the defeat of a social rival, the +success of a philanthropic undertaking. There is no normal human being +who does not exhibit such limited volitional units. The most idle and +purposeless of vagrants, the most scatter-brained school-boy, the most +volatile coquette, may, for a time, be dominated by some desire which +calls into its service other desires and thus realizes some chosen end. + +Such volitional units do not, however, go far toward unifying the efforts +of a life. It is only when some dominant and deep-seated desire, oft +recurring, not easily displaced by others, sweeps into its train the +other desires of a man, establishing a sovereignty and exacting +subservience, that such an effect is accomplished. Then the lesser units +fall into a significant relation to each other as constituent elements in +the greater unit. The life, as such, may be said to have a purpose; it +strives toward a single goal. + +Whatever bears upon the attainment of such a dominant purpose may, +however trivial in itself, acquire a vital importance and be eagerly +desired. To a man of mature mind there can be little interest in hitting +a small ball with a stick, abstractly considered. Nor is the dropping of +a bit of paper into a box with a slit in it an action in itself +calculated to stir profound emotion. But if the hitting of the ball in +the right way marks the critical point in winning an eagerly contested +game of golf, the interest in it may be absorbing. And if the bit of +paper is an offer of marriage committed to the post, the hand may tremble +and the heart leap in the breast. A dominant desire may create or +reinforce other desires to a degree to which it is not easy to set +limits. + +56. THE HARMONIZATION OF DESIRES.--And it may actively repress other +desires or cause them to dwindle and disappear. A man possessed by a +devouring ambition may resolutely scorn delights to which he would +otherwise be keenly susceptible, or he may simply ignore them without +effort. The attention, fixed upon some chosen end, and busied with the +means to its attainment, may leave them unheeded. Finding no place in the +volitional pattern that occupies the mind, they are cast aside and soon +forgotten. + +In so far, hence, as the desires of a man tend to fall thus into groups +converging upon a single end, we find not merely unity but harmony. The +volitional pattern is of a given kind, and the colors which enter into it +are selected. + +When, however, we speak of the desires of a rational mind as harmonized, +we do not mean that incompatible desires are reconciled. One cannot laugh +and drink at the same time, nor can the desire for luxurious ease be made +to fall upon the neck of the desire for attainment through strenuous +effort. The final harmony attained resembles in some respects the peace +enforced by the violent character depicted by Mark Twain, who would have +peace at any price, and was willing to sacrifice to it the life and limb +of the opposing party. The cessation of strife does not imply the +satisfaction of all parties to a contest; nor does the fact that a life +is controlled by a ruling motive, which reinforces or calls into being +certain desires and robs others of their insistence, imply that by any +device all the desires which man has, still less all that he, as a human +being, might have, can find their satisfaction. Harmony is obtained at +the price of the suppression of many desires; but, where a mind is +strongly dominated by a comprehensive volitional unit, the price may be +paid without much regret. + +57. VARIETIES OF DOMINANT ENDS.--Obviously, the comprehensive and +harmonious volitional complexes which may come to characterize different +minds may be of very different complexion. Peace of mind, the bubble +reputation, the amassing of a fortune, a happy domestic life, +humanitarian effort, the perfecting of one's character--each may become +the controlling end which furthers or inhibits individual desires and +emotions. Or the ends may be such as to appear to most men far more +insignificant. To the collection of first editions or the heaping +together of bric-a-brac a man may sacrifice his financial security and +the welfare of his family. Naturally, the moralist cannot put all such +ends upon the same level; but, from the point of view of the +psychologist, the processes which take place in the minds thus unified +and harmonized are essentially the same. + +58. AN OBJECTION ANSWERED.--To the position that it is reason or +intelligence that brings about this unity and harmony an objection may be +brought. It may be claimed that breadth of information and clarity of +vision are quite compatible with highly inconsistent action revealing the +temporary dominance of a succession of incongruous desires. + +_Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor_, confessed the Latin +poet. Have we not seen men of the highest intelligence, gifted with +foresight, quite capable of grasping the relation of means to ends, +nevertheless subject to the baleful influence of momentary desires which +drive them hither and thither like a rudderless bark at the mercy of the +wind and tide? How does it happen that their intelligence does not help +them? + +To this we may answer that it is not the same thing to possess +intelligence and to use it. One may be supplied with information and +quite capable of taking long views and embracing inclusive ends--and the +attention may be so preoccupied with the desire of the moment, that the +voices of others are stifled. In so far as this is the case, the man can +not, at the time, be said to be reasonable or intelligent. He has +information, and acts as if he were ignorant; his choices do not issue as +a resultant of his desires as a whole; there is no resultant; the single +desires make their influence felt separately. + +To be sure, an insistent and oft-recurring desire may introduce a good +deal of unity and harmony into life, even where long views are not taken +and there is little intelligence. The stupid egoist may become rather a +consistent egoist, and increasingly so as he grows older. His desires and +volitions may converge upon an end of which he is very imperfectly +conscious; incompatible desires may come to be repressed. But this does +not refute the position that, when reason or intelligence is supreme, the +attention is directed upon a wide range of desires, they are weighed in +the light of each other, and the ultimate decision is no longer blind, +but fairly expresses the permanent push of the man's nature. Even where a +desire or group of desires, unilluminated by intelligence, seems so +insistent as to take on something of this character, complete unity and +harmony of action may be lacking, due to the short-sightedness of the +methods employed to attain to the chosen goal. Blind desires may easily +defeat their own ends; wealth does not necessarily accumulate in +proportion to a man's miserliness; the ardent but unenlightened +philanthropist may do his fellow-man more harm than good. Long views are +of no little service in weeding out inconsistent actions and introducing +order and unity into life. + +59. THIS VIEW OF REASON MISCONCEIVED.--In the above view of the function +of reason or intelligence it has not been represented as issuing commands +to perform certain actions rather than others, nor as furnishing motives +not in some way related to the impulses and desires of man. It has been +treated, literally, as the presiding officer of a public assembly, who +insists that every voice shall be heard; that all proposals shall be +weighed and compared with one another; that the consequences of all shall +be clearly foreseen. Its function is enlightenment; the driving force +which impels to action of any sort has been found in the impulses and the +desires. + +It is possible to set this view forth in terms which make it highly +unpalatable. + +Thus Hume, who has a weakness for shocking the susceptibilities of the +conservative and the sober-minded, startles us with the remark that +"Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." [Footnote: +A Treatise of Human Nature, iv, Sec 3.] This doctrine, taken as the average +reader is almost inevitably impelled to take it, seems worthy of instant +reprobation. It appears to degrade the rational in man and to exalt the +blind and irrational. + +But it is not fair to the doctrine to set it forth in such terms. There +is no small difference between random and fugitive desires and those more +fundamental desires that express truly the nature of a man. Desires +organized and harmonized gain great strength, and are enabled to overcome +and expel from the mind erratic impulses, the obedience to which may +easily be followed by regret. Action taken without a clear foresight of +consequences, with an imperfect conception of the relation of means to +ends, is blind and irrational action. Reason, as bringing enlightenment, +as making possible deliberation, as turning the incoherent clamors of a +mob of inconsistent desires into the authoritative voice of an orderly +deliberative assembly, is not a faculty to be lightly regarded. + +Nor should it be forgotten that, neither to the plain man, nor to the +moralist, do desires all stand upon the same level. He who bends his +intellectual energies to the satisfaction of his greed, his avarice, his +longing for revenge, may fairly be said to be prostituting his mind to +the service of passion. But is it a proper use of language to describe as +the slave of his passions the man whose thought is set upon the +enlightenment of mankind, the alleviation of suffering, the service of a +state, the attainment of a noble character? Were Socrates, St. Francis, +Abraham Lincoln, Wilberforce, Thomas Hill Green, the slaves of their +passions? Yet these men were moved by certain dominant desires, and their +unswerving pursuit of their goal was made possible only by the reason +that harmonized their lives and substituted deliberate purpose for random +impulse. + +The doctrine, then, that the reason is to be likened rather to the +presiding officer of a deliberative assembly, concerned only to give +every voice a fair hearing, than to a legislator issuing commands +independently, may be so stated as not to shock the sober-minded. + +And the doctrine recommends itself in showing that reason and inclination +or desire are not enemies. The possession of reason must lead to the +suppression of some desires--those incompatible with a comprehensive +purpose deliberately embraced; but the desires and the reason or +intelligence work together to a common end. On this view, it is not the +rational man who is divided against himself; it is the short-sighted, the +impulsive, the inconsistent, the irrational man. He is the prey of +warring desires whose strife leads to no permanent peace under the +guidance of reason. + +60. ANOTHER VIEW OF REASON.--To certain minds this view of reason as the +arbiter and reconciler of man's impulses and desires does not appeal. + +Thus, Kant, whose doctrine will be more fully considered later, +[Footnote: Chapter xxix.] holds that man's reason promulgates a law which +takes no account of the impulses and desires of man. Thus, also, Henry +Sidgwick, who differs from Kant in making the attainment of happiness the +goal of human endeavor, and who, consequently, is not tempted to +disregard the desires of man, yet refers to the reason independently +certain maxims, which he regards as self-evident, touching our own good +and the good of our neighbor. [Footnote: _The Methods of Ethics_, +chapter iii.] + +There are certain considerations which appear to favor the view that the +reason is a faculty which may be regarded as an independent law-giver. A +man may be possessed of great intelligence; he may be well-informed, +acute in his reasonings, and consistent in his strivings to attain some +comprehensive end, which, on the whole, appears congruous to his nature, +such as it is. Yet we may regard him as highly unreasonable. Judged by +some higher standard which we look upon as approved by reason, he is +found to fall short. Is reason, then, synonymous with intelligence? Or is +it something more--the source of an ultimate standard of action, +intuitively known, and by which all man's actions must be judged? Upon +this question light will be thrown in the pages following. + + + + +PART V + +THE SOCIAL WILL + + +CHAPTER XVII + +CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL WILL + + +61. WHAT IS THE SOCIAL WILL?--The social will is not a mysterious entity, +separate and distinct from all individual wills. It is their resultant. +The resultant of two or more physical forces is a force; it has a +character and may be described. The resultant of individual wills in +interaction is a will with a given character which it is of no small +importance for the moralist to comprehend. This will presents aspects +closely analogous to those presented by the will of the individual. + +Thus, to begin with, a community of men may be said to will a vast number +of things which have never been made by the members of the community the +object of conscious reflection. It may unthinkingly move along the groove +made for it by tradition. It may be intellectually upon so low a plane +that even the possibility of acting in other ways does not occur to it. +Nevertheless, ways of action thus unthinkingly pursued cannot properly be +said to be beyond the voluntary control of the community. A new situation +may draw attention to the fact that they are unsatisfactory, lead to +critical examination, to inhibition, to deliberate change. Between the +passive acceptance of actions prescribed by tradition and deliberate +conscious choice in the presence of recognized alternatives there is no +clear line of demarcation. + +Under the pressure of circumstances or with the gradual increase of +information and intelligence the traditional may undergo slight +modifications which scarcely rank as conscious departures from what has +been passively accepted. The algebraic sum of such departures may, with +the lapse of time, come to be by no means insignificant, yet no +individual may have exercised in any considerable degree conscious +reflection or shown in any large measure freedom of choice. + +On the other hand, the social will may, at times, reveal itself in +deliberate decisions, preceded by much conscious deliberation, and +initiating wide departures from established usage. The presence of new +enemies or a diminution of the food-supply may awake a primitive +community from its lethargy, leading it to modify its habits and adjust +itself to new conditions. A barbarous horde may set out upon a career of +conquest, and may introduce revolutionary changes into its manner of +life. A civilized nation may come to the conclusion that, in the course +of human events, it has become necessary for it to dissolve the bands +which have held it to another nation; it may frame for itself an +independent constitution, embodying new ideals and prescribing a new form +of corporate life. + +But, as in the case of the individual, so in that of the community, the +tendency to fall again into a rut is always apparent. Laws, once enacted, +lend a passive resistance to change, even when they no longer serve well +the ends they were intended to serve. The independence of thought and +action revealed in the adoption of new constitutions are not conspicuous +in their maintenance. Man collective, as well as man individual, falls +into habits, and he commits to his unthinking self what was wrought out +by himself as thinking and consciously choosing. Passive acceptance of +the traditional again wins the day and becomes a ruling factor in action. +[Footnote: "It is indisputable that much the greatest part of mankind has +never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be +improved since the moment when external completeness was first given to +them by their embodiment in some permanent record." MAINE, _Ancient +Law_, chapter ii.] + +This tendency to mechanization should not surprise us, for we meet with +the phenomenon everywhere. The man who says, "Good-by" today does not +mean "God be with thee," and the "Gruss Dich Gott" of the Bavarian +peasant is very properly translated by the American child as "Hallo." The +traditional tends to lose or to alter its meaning, but it continues to +serve a purpose. A community without traditions, without settled ways of +acting, followed, for the most part, without much reflection, would be in +the position of a man without habits either good or bad. Human life as we +know it could not go on upon such a basis. The rule has, at times, its +inconveniences; but it leads somewhere, at least; whereas he who plunges +into the unexplored forest may find every step a problem, and may come +even to doubt whether any step is a step in advance. + +62. SOCIAL WILL AND SOCIAL HABITS.--Within the province of the social +will fall what may not inaptly be called the habits of a community--ways +of acting acquired largely without premeditation and followed to a great +extent through mere inertia. The province of the social will is a broad +one. Deliberate choices; those half-conscious choices analogous to the +unheeded expressions of preference which fill the days of the individual; +impulses and tendencies which scarcely emerge into the light--all are +expressions of the social will. + +In the next chapter I shall distinguish between customs proper and social +habits in a broader sense. But, in discussing the general problem of the +relation of habit to will, it is not necessary to mark the distinction. + +Some habits rest upon us lightly; some are inveterate. Of some we are +well aware; others have to be pointed out to us before we recognize that +we have them. Some we approve, some we disapprove, to some we are +indulgent or indifferent. All these peculiarities are found in the +relation of the social will to social habits. It may recognize them, +approve of them, encourage them. It may pay them little attention. It may +disapprove them and strive to repress them. Will has brought them into +being; it is will that maintains them; it is will that must modify or +suppress them. + +As a matter of fact, all communities do tend to change their habits, some +more slowly, some more rapidly. And for its habits we hold a community +responsible. Common sense refers them to its will, and exercises approval +or disapproval. This it would not do were the practices upon which +judgment is passed recognized as beyond the control of will altogether. + +63. SOCIAL WILL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.--Under the general heading of +the habits of a society it is not out of place to discuss its social and +political organization. + +The fact that there never was an original social contract, made with each +other by men solitary and unrelated, with the deliberate intent of +putting an end to the war of all against all, does not signify that the +social state in which men find themselves is a something with which the +human will has had, and has, nothing to do. + +Social and political organization are the result of a secular process, +but behind that process, as moving and directing forces, stand the will +and the intelligence of man. The social and political organization of a +community is not the creation of any single generation of men. Each +generation is born into a given social setting, as the individual is born +into the setting furnished by the community. This social setting, the +heritage of the community from the past, may be compared to a great +estate brought together by the efforts of a man's ancestors, and +transmitted to him to hold intact, to add to, to squander, as he may be +inclined. It is a product attained by man's nature in its struggle with +environment, and that product may be modified by the same forces that +made it what it is. + +Into this heritage the generation of men who compose a community at any +given time may enter with little thought of its significance, with no +information, or with false information, touching the manner of its coming +into being, and with small inclination to do anything save to leave +unchanged the institutions of which it finds itself possessed. +Nevertheless, the forms under which societies are organized are subject +to the social will, and, if disapproved, are modified or abolished. Some +change is taking place even where there is apparent immobility, as +becomes evident when the history of institutions is followed through long +periods of time. The utmost that can be said is that, where intelligence +is little developed and energy at a low ebb, the social will may bear the +stamp of passive acceptance of the inherited, rather than exhibit a +tendency to innovation. _Will_ it remains, but we may hesitate to +describe it as a _free will_. + +It is at times forced upon our attention with unmistakable emphasis that +the forms of social and political organization are under voluntary +control. Momentous changes may be made deliberately, and with full +consciousness of their significance. Among the more progressive nations +in our day the duty of introducing innovations appears to be generally +recognized: constitutions are amended; the status of social classes is +made the object of legislation; even the domain of the family is invaded, +as in legislation touching marriage and divorce. Men appear to feel +themselves free to will deliberately the end that shall be served by the +mechanism of the state, and to adapt that mechanism to the attainment of +the end chosen. + +64. THE SOCIAL WILL AND IDEAL ENDS.--The social will, like the wall of +the individual, may manifest itself in decisions which it is obviously +impossible to carry out to a completely successful issue. A community has +a power of control over its members, but that control has its limits. +Even a man's actions cannot be completely controlled by the community of +which he is a part. There are always individuals who violate rules, and +to whom, as it would seem, no motive can be presented which is adequate +to keep them in the rut prescribed by society. + +Still less can the social will exercise full control over men's thoughts +and feelings. Influenced to some degree they may be. A man may be kept in +ignorance, or furnished with information calculated to determine his +thought in a given direction. His emotions may be played upon; he may be +exhorted, rewarded, punished. But thoughts and feelings are not open to +direct inspection; they may be concealed or simulated. Much more readily +than actions can they withdraw themselves from control. + +Nevertheless, the social will may, and does, ignore all such limitations +to its powers. Laws are not passed to regulate the changes of the +weather, which palpably fall outside the province of the law; but they +are passed to regulate the actions of men, which normally fall within it; +that is, which can, to a very significant degree, be influenced by the +attitude of the social will. For the same reason laws may even take +cognizance of men's thoughts. Of the accidental limitations of its power +of control within the general sphere in which it has a meaning to speak +of control, the social will is not compelled to take cognizance. It may +set itself to encourage or repress certain types of character and +conduct, and take measures to attain the end it has selected. That the +measures taken should sometimes prove inadequate does not alter the fact +of the choice of an end, nor does it obscure the revelation of the trend +of the social will. + +Thus, a community may be said to will that its members shall not be +guilty of violence; it may will to live at peace with other communities; +it may will to conquer and subjugate. Whether, in each case, the will +shall be completely realized or not, may not be determined by the mere +fact of its willing. Nevertheless, the permanent volitional attitude may +be unmistakably present, and may reveal itself in strivings toward the +chosen goal. To describe this attitude as no more than wishing is +manifestly to do it an injustice. + +65. THE PERMANENT SOCIAL WILL.--The social will may be regarded as +something permanent. Its existence is not confined to those moments in +which collective decisions are being made. The will to be one which +constitutes a group of human beings a nation is not at all times actively +exercised, but the settled disposition to action looking toward that end +may be always present and ready to be called into action. An autocracy +remains such when its irresponsible head is making no decisions; and a +democracy is not such only while elections are being held or the +legislature is sitting. The organization of a society, the whole body of +the usages which it accepts and approves, are revelations of the social +will. That will does, it is true, give expression to itself in a series +of actual decisions more or less conscious and deliberate, but it is far +more than any such series of decisions. It is a disposition, rooted in +the past and reaching into the future. It is a guarantee of decisions to +come, of whose nature we may make some forecast. + +The permanent social will constitutes the _character_ of a +community. Our study of the will of the individual prepares us for the +recognition of the fact that communities may be but dimly aware of their +own character, and may be quite unable to give an unbiased account of the +ideals which animate them. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +EXPRESSIONS OF THE SOCIAL WILL + + +66. CUSTOM.--We have seen above that even the forms of political and +social organization may justly be regarded as an expression of the social +will. Such forms are the result of past choices, and their acceptance in +the present is evidence of present choice. + +Between the organization of a society and its customs proper we may +distinguish by comparing the former to structure and the latter to +function in the case of any organism. But we must bear in mind that, +here, structure has been built up by, and is in process of modification +by, the same forces that exhibit themselves in function. It would not be +wholly out of place to describe a people as having the custom of being +ruled by hereditary chiefs, of choosing their monarchs, or of governing +themselves through elected representatives. Forms of organization are +handed down to successive generations by the same social tradition that +transmits customs of every description. + +Customs are public habits which are, on the whole, approved by a +community. They are ways of acting which are regarded as normal and +proper. Where the authority of custom is evoked, pressure is brought to +bear upon the individual to adjust himself to the will of the community. + +A community, like an individual, may have habits which it does not +approve. Such may be tolerated, although disapproved; or active efforts +may be made to set them aside. Some habits may be regarded with +comparative indifference, although professedly held in condemnation. The +individual, in following such habits, may claim that they are not +unequivocally condemned by the community, and he is not conscious of the +weight of displeasure which visits the violation of the will of the +community when unequivocally expressed. + +In simple and primitive societies custom prescribes to the individual his +course of life in the minutest detail. It possesses the authority of the +dictator. In societies upon a higher level it may leave to him some +discretion in deciding upon the details of his daily life, while still +exercising a paramount control over the general trend of his actions. + +Thus the will of the community, expressed in custom, determines what the +members of the community _ought_ to do, and it takes measures to +enforce obedience to its decisions. Is it surprising that the names which +have been given to the science which treats of man's rights and duties, +_morals, ethics_ (_mores, ethica, Sitten_), should reflect this +truth? It would be an inadequate statement to maintain that the science +of morals is no more than a systematic exposition of the customary in +human societies. It is not an inadequate statement to assert that, in +many societies, custom has, in fact, furnished the ultimate and complete +standard of obligation, and that in all societies it is of enormous +significance in moulding men's notions of right and wrong. + +67. THE GROUND FOR THE AUTHORITY OF CUSTOM.--Habits are as essential to a +society as they are to an individual human being. Without them, society +could not live. In any social state--and no man can live except in a +social state--there must be cooperation. How can there be cooperation if +there are no social habits upon which men may count in their dealings +with one another? + +Try to conceive all the tacit mutual conventions, the unconscious +adaptations to custom, which guide our daily lives, suspended for twenty- +four hours. When should one rise in the morning? How should one dress? +What and how should one eat? Of business there could be no question, nor +could there be cooperation in pleasures. Public order there could not be, +for there would be no public worthy of the name. Protection of life and +limb would be the creature of accident. Between civility and insult there +would be no recognizable distinction. In short, men could not behave +either well or ill, for there would be no rule to follow or to violate, +nothing to expect, and, hence, no ground for disappointment. + +In such a chaotic condition no society of men has ever lived. No actual +state of anarchy has ever been complete, nor could it be, and endure. A +"reign of terror" is a reign of law in comparison with such a dissolution +of all the bonds which knit man to man. When we pass from one community +to another, we find one set of public habits exchanged for another. Some +sets impress us as better, some as worse. But there is no set which is +not better than none. It makes it possible for men to live, if not to +live well. + +Customs are, then, a necessity. It is equally necessary that they should, +in general, have binding force for the individual. But there are customs +good and bad. The individual may fall into habits which he, upon +reflection, concludes to be injurious to him, and which others see +clearly to be injurious. A community sufficiently enlightened to +criticize itself at all, may come to disapprove some of its customs and +may endeavor to abolish them. + +This means that a new act of the social will may set itself in opposition +to the social will already crystallized into custom. In a given instance, +and where there are differences of opinion, it may be a nice question +whether the new or the old should be regarded as the authoritative +expression of the social will. + +68. THE ORIGIN AND THE PERSISTENCE OF CUSTOMS.--From the fact that +customs are, in general, to be regarded as expressions of the social +will, it might be assumed that their purposive character and social +utility should be a sufficient explanation of their coming into being. +But the matter is not so simple. A man may fall into habits which are no +indication of what he regards as useful to him. Such habits have not been +formed independently of his will, and yet they may appear to be +purposeless, or even detrimental. Who wishes to have the inveterate habit +of cracking the joints of his fingers or of biting his finger-nails? What +purpose do such habits serve? + +Although the social utility of customs, taken generally, is easily +apparent, yet there are many customs which seem inexplicable upon such a +principle. Why, for example, should the king of a primitive community be +prohibited from sleeping lying down? or why should it be forbidden that +he gaze upon the sea? [Footnote: _Encyclopedia Britannica_, Eleventh +edition, article "Taboo."] The origin of such customs is hidden in +obscurity. That their adoption was not without its reason, we may assume. +That the reason was a reasonable one cannot be maintained. It seems +probable, however, that it at some time seemed reasonable to some one. +The persistence of habit, social as well as individual, would account for +the perpetuation of the custom long after the occasion which gave rise to +it had been forgotten. + +69. LAW.--Between custom and law, taken generally, it is by no means easy +to draw a sharp distinction, although, in some instances, the +distinction, may be clearly marked. In primitive communities, laws +reduced to writing, and administered by persons deliberately chosen for +that end, may be wholly lacking; and yet who would say that such +communities do not live under the reign of law in a broad sense of the +term? A course of life is prescribed to the individual; failure to come +up to the standard meets with punishment. + +Nevertheless, as social life rises in the scale and as communities become +developed, custom and law become differentiated. The latter stands out +upon the background of the former as something more sharply defined. +Penalties and the method of their infliction are more exactly fixed. Not +all violations of what is customary are taken up into the legal code as +punishable offences, although they meet with that indefinite measure of +punishment entailed by social disapproval. + +Those public habits which it seems to a community it is of especial +importance to preserve and enforce come to be embodied in laws. The +selection is a matter of more or less deliberate choice, and is an +expression of will. The choice is not, normally, an arbitrary one. The +laws of a people are, unless accident has intervened, the outcome and +expression of its corporate life. For their ultimate authority they rest +upon the acquiescence of the social will. Laws contrary to deep-seated +and widely accepted custom are not apt to be regarded as of binding +force. They are felt to be tyrannous, and are obeyed, if at all, +unwillingly, and because of pressure from without. + +In a later chapter [Footnote: Chapter XX.] I shall dwell upon the fact +that the accidental may play a very significant role in law. In given +instances the laws of a community may be, not the outcome of its will in +any sense, but something imposed upon it. Such laws cannot but be felt to +be oppressive and a restriction of freedom. + +Laws, like customs, may cease to have a significance, and they may be +modified or allowed to fall into desuetude. There is, however, much +conservatism, as all who are familiar with legal usage know. And laws may +fail of their purpose. They may aim to diminish crime, and their +undiscriminating severity may foster crime. So may the individual select +an end, fall into error in his choice of means, and, as a result of +experience, resolve to substitute for such means others which are better +adapted to carry out his purpose. + +70. PUBLIC OPINION.--Public opinion is manifestly a force broader and +more vague than established custom, and still broader than law. Public +opinion may approve or condemn what no law touches, and it makes its +influence felt beyond the sphere of what is customary. + +Where customs and laws come to be imperfect expressions of the social +will, they may stand condemned by public opinion. In such a case their +authority is undermined and violations of them are condoned. Where public +opinion is strongly against a law; the law becomes ineffective. The +conservatism of law is such that a law may be allowed to stand unchanged, +and yet may fail to be carried into effect. Juries may refuse to convict, +or the unpalatable infliction of punishment may be avoided by granting to +the judge a wide discretion in pronouncing sentence. + +The gradual development of a strong public sentiment may lead to the +passage of new laws, not based upon previously established customs, but +deliberately framed with a view to the public weal. Old customs may be +modified and new customs may be introduced. That the recommendations of +public opinion extend beyond the sphere of the customary is manifest. It +is not the custom of most men to leave any large part of their estate to +public charity. Except in the case of the very rich, the failure to do so +is not, as a rule, expressly condemned. Yet such bequests are approved, +the testators are praised, and the attitude of public opinion has no +small influence upon the conduct of individuals. Again, extreme self- +sacrifice is not customary; it is exceptional; and yet shining examples +of unselfishness excite a warm sympathy. The expression of this sympathy +is not without its influence. + +Public opinion is more palpably an expression of the actual social will +than are custom and law. We have seen that the last two may represent, in +given instances, rather the inherited will of the past than the living +will of the present. But when we call public opinion an expression of the +social will we cannot mean that it necessarily reflects the sentiment of +all the members of a given community. + +In primitive communities custom may be a public habit which embraces all, +or nearly all, individuals. Public opinion may scarcely have a separate +existence. In communities more developed, some individuals may disapprove +and refuse to follow many customs which are characteristic of the society +to which they belong. Laws are not approved by all, and, in progressive +states, there is usually some agitation which has as its object the +repeal of old laws or the passage of new ones. In communities where there +is independence of thought, public opinion is usually divided. + +Furthermore, the communities to which civilized men belong are not +homogeneous aggregations of units. There is the public opinion which +obtains within single groups within the state. The adherents of a +religious sect may have notions peculiar to themselves of the conduct +proper to the individual, and such notions may extend far beyond what is +actually prescribed by the tenets of the sect. The several trades and +professions, the social classes, neighborhoods, even lesser voluntary +associations of men, such as clubs, may be pervaded by a public sentiment +which varies with each group. When we speak of public opinion generally +we have in mind something broader, a resultant. But the public sentiment +of the lesser groups cannot be ignored. The individual feels himself +especially influenced by the opinions of those most nearly associated +with him. + +Under the head of public opinion it is convenient to speak of the +opinions of moral teachers who have influenced the race. Such a thinker +may enunciate truths far in advance of the opinions of his fellows. His +teachings are not, hence, fairly representative of the social will as it +reveals itself in his time. But the sentiments of the more enlightened +never are completely in accord with those of the mass of their fellows. +They are not mere aberrations from the social will; they are its +forerunners. The moralist and the religious teacher initiate new choices, +which may become the choices of large bodies of men. From them proceed +influences which have their issue in new expressions of the social will, +characterizing whole societies, and giving birth to new customs, new +laws, and a new form of public opinion. One can scarcely imagine what +China would be without her Confucius; or the Arabic world, with Mahomet +abstracted. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +THE SHARERS IN THE SOCIAL WILL + + +71. THE COMMUNITY.--It is difficult to state with absolute exactness what +constitutes a community. + +We may define it as a group of human beings associated in a common life, +depending upon and cooperating with each other. This definition will +apply, to be sure, to lesser groups within a tribe or state; and even to +a collection of tribes or states in so far as such enter into alliances +and cooperate to their mutual advantage. As, however, the bond of union +is, in the former case, subordinate to the higher authority of a larger +group (for the family is subject to the tribe or state); and as, in the +latter case, the bond of union is a relatively loose one, and evidently +subordinate to that which binds the citizens of individual states, the +community proper may be regarded as that group which is characterized by +a relatively great degree of inner coherence and by relative external +independence. + +The type of such communities is, among the more primitive peoples, the +tribe, and among the more developed, the state. The authority of such +groups over their own members is, theoretically, paramount, although it +may be suspended or abolished by the exertion of force from without. + +Such a community may be said to be inspired by a social will expressed in +its customs, its laws and the public opinion prevalent in it. Its members +may be said to be sharers in the social will of the community. Their +participation in it is marked by their being endowed with rights and +charged with duties. + +It has not been characteristic of communities generally that all who find +their place in them should be like sharers in the social will. The +distinction has been made between the citizen, who enjoys the fullest +rights and may, perhaps, directly take part in the government of the +state, and those who, while _in_ the state, are not _of_ it, as +they do not enjoy citizenship. Where slavery, in any of its forms, has +prevailed, the distinction between those who are significant factors in +determining the social will, and those who have not this prerogative, has +been very marked. Social classes have often enjoyed, even before the law, +privileges of great moment. Women have, as a rule, not been treated as +citizens, and have been refused a share in the government of the +community. Children are cared for and are protected, but political rights +are denied them. Their status before the law is a peculiar one. The +mentally defective, both in primitive communities and in developed ones, +stand in a relation to the community peculiar to themselves. They are not +excluded from it; they are accorded rights; but they are assigned in the +community a place of their own. Wherever we look, we find inequality. The +sharers in the social will do not share equally, nor do they share in the +same way. This is true of communities of every description, but the +differences are more marked in some than in others. + +72. THE COMMUNITY AND THE DEAD.--It is not merely of the living human +beings which compose a community that the social will takes cognizance. +Other wills are made participants in the body of rights and duties +peculiar to the community. + +In many communities the dead are still counted among its members. They +are conceived as affecting its welfare, and as demanding services from +the living. Duties towards the dead are a well-recognized division of the +sum of a man's obligations in communities the most diverse in their +character. In some, they occupy a very prominent place; in no community +are they wholly overlooked. A striking illustration of the recognition by +the social will of the rights of the dead is to be found in the whole +modern law of testamentary succession. The will expressed by a man while +he is alive is given effect as though he were still in the flesh and +insisted upon the fulfillment of his desire. It appears to work as a +permanent factor in the community life, making its influence felt for +generations. Witness its influence in charitable foundations, in the law +of entail, and the like. + +73. THE COMMUNITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL.--Nor is it merely in recognizing +the wills of the dead that the social will extends its sphere beyond the +community of living human beings. To primitive man, and to man far from +primitive, his social environment has not seemed to be limited to the +living and the dead who have, or who have had, an undeniable and +unequivocal place in the community. + +The part played in the life of man by supernatural beings of various +orders has been a most significant one. Demons and gods, spirits of a +lower or of a higher order, have occupied his mind and have influenced +his actions. Such beings have been conceived to be, sometimes, malevolent +and needing to be placated, sometimes, benevolent and fit objects of +gratitude. Their wills man has regarded as forces to be taken into +account, a something to which the individual and the community must +adjust themselves. + +Man's relation, or supposed relation, to such beings has been a source of +classes of duties upon which great stress has been laid. The influence of +this admission of supernatural beings into the circle of those directly +concerned in the community life has found its expression in the +organization of the state, in custom, in law, in public opinion. We know +little of a community when we overlook this factor. + +Between magic and religion it is not easy to draw a sharp line, +especially when we view religion in the lower stages of its development. +In both we have to do with what may be called the supernatural. Magic has +been defined as the employment of mechanical means to attain the desired +end. In religion, when it so far develops that its specific character +seems clearly revealed, we have left the sphere of the mechanical. + +The distinction between the mechanical and the spiritual is familiar to +us in our dealings with our fellow-men. In such dealings we may employ +physical force. On the other hand, we may appeal to their intelligence +and their emotions, and thus influence their action. In so far as we do +not make such an appeal, we deal with our fellows, not as though they +belonged to our social environment, but to our physical. + +At the lowest stages of his development, man does not distinguish clearly +between persons and things. This means that he cannot distinguish clearly +between his material environment and his social. But the distinction +becomes gradually clearer, and it is, in the end, a marked one. Religion +becomes differentiated from magic. To confound religion, in its higher +developments, with magic is an inexcusable confusion. + +74. RELIGION AND THE COMMUNITY.--The denotation of the term religion is a +broad one, and there will probably always be dispute as to the justice of +its extension to this or to that particular form of faith. But it seems +clear that it is typical of religion to extend what may not unjustly be +called the social environment of man. + +Will is recognized other than the wills of the human beings constituting +the community. To the part played by such wills a very great prominence +may be given. + +States may be theocratic, as among the ancient Hebrews; or church and +state may share the dominion, or struggle between themselves for the +supremacy, as in Europe in the Middle Ages; or the state may be +theoretically supreme in authority and yet maintain and lend authority to +a church. Even where church and state are, in theory, quite divorced--a +modern conception--the church with its ordinances and prescriptions, its +sacred days, its ceremonial, its educational institutions, remains a very +significant factor in the social environment of man. Religious duties +have at all times and in all sorts of societies been regarded as +constituting an important aspect of conduct. They color strongly the +_mores_ of the community. Whole codes of morals may be referred to +the teachings of certain religious leaders. They claim their authority on +religious grounds. + +The great significance of the role played by religion in the sphere of +morals is impressed upon one who glances over the works of those writers +who have approached the subject of ethics from the side of anthropology +or sociology. A review of the facts has even tempted one of the most +learned to seek the origin of morals almost wholly in religion. +[Footnote: WUNDT, _Ethics_, Vol. I. "The Facts of the Moral Life"; +see chapters ii and iii. English Translation, London, 1897.] + +That religion should play an important part in giving birth to or +modifying moral codes is not surprising. Man adjusts himself to his +social environment as he conceives it. If the community of wills which he +recognizes includes the wills of supernatural beings, it is natural that +the social will which finds its expression in the organization of the +state, in custom, in law and in public opinion, should be modified by +such inclusion. + +Nor is it surprising that the supernatural element should, at times, +dwarf and render insignificant the other elements which enter into the +social will. It may seem to man the all-important factor in his life. + +Within the human community some individuals count for much more than do +others. There are those who scarcely seem to have any voice in +contributing to the character and direction of the social will. Others +are influential; and, in extreme cases, the wills of the few, or even +that of a single individual, may be the source of law for the many. If +men come to the conclusion that the weal and woe of the community are +dependent upon the will of the gods, or of God, they will unavoidably +give frank recognition to that will above others, and such recognition +will dictate conduct. The gods of Epicurus, leading a lazy existence in +the interstellar spaces, indifferent to man and in no wise affecting his +life, could scarcely become the objects of a cult. But the God of the +Mahometan, of the Jew, or of the Christian, is a ruler to be feared, +loved, obeyed. His will is law, and is determinative of conduct. + +75. THE SPREAD OF THE COMMUNITY.--So far I have been speaking of the +community properly so called, of the single group of human beings living +its corporate life. But such groups do not normally remain in isolation. +As the isolation of the group diminishes, as contacts between it and +others become more numerous and more important, the necessity of +conventions controlling the relations of groups becomes more pressing. + +This implies the development of a broader social will, inclusive of the +social wills of the several communities. This social will may be very +feeble, and the bond between men belonging to different communities may +be a weak one; or it may be vigorous, and furnish an intimate bond. The +savage, to whom those beyond the pale of his tribe or small confederation +are mere strangers, and probably enemies, stands at the lower limit of +the scale; the trader, to whom the stranger is co-partner in a mutually +profitable transaction, stands higher; the Stoic philosopher, +cosmopolitan in thought and feeling, rating the claims of kindred and +country as less significant than the bonds which unite all men in virtue +of their common humanity, marks the other extreme. The spread of the +social will grows marked as man rises in the scale of civilization. +Barriers are broken down and limits are transcended. + +This broader social will, like the narrower, reveals itself in the +organization of society. We find confederations of tribes or states; +alliances temporary or relatively permanent. And the broader social will +modifies customs, gives birth to systems of law, and encourages the +development of an inclusive humanitarian sentiment. + +It does not necessarily obliterate old distinctions. The family, +neighborhood, kindred, have their claims even under the most firmly +organized of states; but those claims are limited and controlled. Even +so, the broader social will may come to regard states as answerable for +their decisions. International law remains to the present day what has +aptly been called a pious wish. But public opinion prepares the way for +law; and all states, whatever be their real aims, now attempt to justify +their actions by an appeal to the more or less nebulous tribunal of +international public opinion. In this they recognize its claim to act as +arbiter. Within the jurisdiction of a state, the motto, "my family, right +or wrong," would not be a maxim approved in a court of justice. +International law is made a mock of by the frank enunciation of the +maxim, "my country, right or wrong." Hence, such frankness is, in +international relations, not encouraged. + +The more or less skillfully made appeal to the moral sense of mankind--to +the broader social will as public opinion--implies a certain recognition +of its authority, or, at least, of its influence. Whether this is a +definite step toward the granting of a real authority to the broader +social will, an authority which will curb impartially the selfishness of +individual states, it remains for the future to decide. + + + + +PART VI + +THE REAL SOCIAL WILL + + +CHAPTER XX + +THE IMPERFECT SOCIAL WILL + + +76. THE APPARENT AND THE REAL SOCIAL WILL.--It is important to +distinguish between the apparent and the real social will. We may begin +by pointing out that the question "apparent to whom?" is a pertinent one. + +The social will is brought to bear upon the individual through a variety +of agencies. The family, the neighborhood, the church, the trade or +profession, the political party, the social class--all these have their +habits and maxims. They tend to mold to their type those whom they count +among their members. The pressure which they bring to bear is felt as a +sense of moral obligation. Naturally, individuals with different +affiliations will be sensible of the pressure in different ways, and may +differ widely in their conceptions of the obligations actually laid upon +the individual by the will of the greater organism of which he is a part. + +But even he who rises above minor distinctions and takes a broad view of +society is forced to recognize that the distinction between the apparent +and the real social will may be a most significant one. + +We have found the expression of the social will in custom, law and public +opinion. This is just; but the statement must be accepted with +reservations. + +There are instances in which neither the organization of the state, nor +the laws according to which it is governed, can be considered as in any +sense an expression of the social will. An autocracy, established by +force, and ruling without the free consent of the governed, is an +external and overruling power. It may be obeyed, but it is not consented +to. Nor is any body of law or system of government imposed upon a subject +people by an alien and dominant race a fair exponent of the social will +of the people thus governed. Custom and public opinion are at variance +with law. However just and enlightened the government, as judged from the +standpoint of some other race or nation, its control must be felt as +oppressive by those upon whom it is imposed. Traditions felt to be the +most sacred may be violated; moral laws, as understood by those thus +under dictation, may be transgressed by obedience to the law of the land. + +Where custom, law and public opinion are more nearly the spontaneous +outcome of the life of a community, they may with more justice be taken +as expressions of the social will of that community as it is at the time. +Yet, even here, we must make reservations. + +The organization of a state represents rather the crystallized will of +the past than the free choice of the present. To be sure, it is accepted +in the present; but this is little more than the acquiescence of inertia. +And public opinion may be at variance both with custom and with law long +before it succeeds in modifying either. What is the actual social will of +a community during the interval? + +The past may be felt as exercising a certain tyranny over the present. +That the present cannot be cut wholly loose from it is manifest, but how +far should its dependence be accepted? In the past there have been +historical causes for the rise of dictatorships, of oligarchies, of +dominant social classes. The men of a later time inherit such social +institutions, may accept them as desirable, or may feel them as +instruments of tyranny. Shall we say that they represent the actual +social will of the community until such time as they are done away with +by a successful revolution? Or shall we say that they are in harmony with +the apparent social will only, and really stand condemned? + +77. THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY.--Our own democratic institutions rest upon +the theory that the social will is to be determined by the majority vote. +To be sure, we seem to find it necessary to limit the application of this +doctrine, and to seek stability of government by fixing, in certain cases +rather arbitrarily, the size of the majority that shall count. [Footnote: +See the Constitution of the United States, Article V.] But the doctrine, +taken generally, does seem in harmony with the test of rationality +developed above. [Footnote: Chapter xvi.] It aims at the satisfaction of +many desires--at what may be termed satisfaction _on the whole_. + +Nevertheless, it is possible to question whether the vote of the majority +represents, in a given instance, the actual will of the community. + +No one knows better than the practical politician how the votes of the +majority are obtained. No one knows better than he that, in the most +democratic of communities, it is the wills of the few that count. The +organization of a party, clever leadership, the command of the press, the +catching phrases of the popular orator, the street procession, the brass +band, the possession of the ability to cajole and to threaten--these play +no mean role in the outcome, which may be the adoption of a state policy +of which a large proportion of the majority voting may be quite unable to +comprehend the significance. Shall we say, in such a case, that the will +of the majority was for the ultimate end? Or shall we say that the vote +was in pursuance of a multitude of minor ends, many of which had but an +accidental connection with the ultimate end? + +78. IGNORANCE AND ERROR AND THE SOCIAL WILL.--The apparent will of the +community appears to be, in large measure, an accidental thing. That is +to say, men will what they would not will were they not hampered by +ignorance and error, and were they not incapable of taking long views of +their own interests. + +The decisions of the social will may be the outcome of ignorance and +superstition. + +Where it is thought necessary to punish the accidental homicide in order +to appease the ghost of the dead man, which might otherwise become a +cause of harm, the course of justice, if one may call it such, deviates +from what the enlightened man must regard as normal. The belief that sin +is an infection, communicable by heredity or even by contact, must lead +to similar aberrations of primitive justice. Animals, and even material +things, have, and not by peoples the most primitive, been treated as +rational, responsible and amenable to law. This seems to do the brutes +more than justice. On the other hand, the philosophical tenet of the +Cartesians, which denied a mind to the brutes, resulted in no little +cruelty. The treatment of drunkards, and of the mentally defective, has, +at times, been based upon the notion that they are possessed by god or +demon, and, hence, have a right to peculiar consideration, or may be +treated with extreme rigor. + +It is worth while to follow up the above reference to the Cartesians by a +reference to St. Augustine. Trains of reasoning based upon theological or +philosophical tenets have more than once given rise to aberrations of the +moral judgment. + +The intellectual subtlety of Augustine betrays him into magnifying to +enormous proportions the guilt of the boyish prank of stealing green +pears from the garden of a neighbor, inspired by the agreeable thought of +the irritation which would be caused by the theft. The pears were not +edible, and were thrown to the pigs, which circumstance seduces this +father of the Church into the reflection that the sin must have been +committed for no other end than for the sake of sinning. A greater crime +than this he cannot conceive. + +Many years after the event, in writing his Confessions, he expresses in +unmeasured terms his horror of the deed, filling seven chapters +[Footnote: _Confessions_, chapters iv-x.] with his reflections and +lamentations: "Behold my heart, O God, behold my heart, upon which thou +hadst mercy when in the depths of this bottomless pit." "O corruption! O +monster of life and depth of death! Is it possible that I liked to do +what I might not, simply and for no other reason than because I might +not?" + +Saint as he was, Augustine would have made a sorry schoolmaster. It is +evident that the enlightened mind cannot regard schoolboys as unique +monsters of iniquity for making a raid on an orchard. + +The community whose decisions are made under the influence of erroneous +preconceptions undoubtedly wills, but its will is determined by the +accident of ignorance. It is to be likened to the man who, in unfamiliar +surroundings, takes the wrong road in his desire to get home. He chooses, +but he does not choose what he would if he knew what he was about. + +79. HEEDLESSNESS AND THE SOCIAL WILL.--Numberless illustrations might be +given of the fact that, not merely ignorance and error, but also a short- +sighted heedlessness plays no small part in introducing elements of the +accidental and irrational into the social will. The man who spends freely +with no thought for the morrow is not more irrational than the state that +permits a squandering of its resources, and wakes up too late only to +discover that it has lost what cannot easily be replaced. + +The life of the community is a long one, and calls for long views of the +interests of the community. These are too often lacking. Heedlessness and +indifference are a fertile source of abuses. In which case, the will of +the community resembles that of the impulsive and erratic man, who has +too little foresight and self-control to consult consistently his own +interests. We may say that he desires his own good on the whole, but we +cannot say that he desires it at all times. Future goods disappear from +his view. His choices clash. His actual will at any given moment appears +to be the creature of accident. So it may be with the community. + +80. RATIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE IRRATIONAL WILL.--The actual social will, as +revealed in custom, law and public opinion, often appears, thus, highly +irrational, and we may be justified in distinguishing between it and the +real will which we conceive of as struggling to get itself expressed. +Nevertheless, in justice to custom, law and public opinion, we must look +below the surface of things. Even where the decisions of the community +seem most irrational, and where there appears to be little consciousness +of the ends pursued by the real will, the discriminating observer may see +that pure irrationality does not prevail. The individual may show by his +actions that he has comprehensive ends, and may yet not be distinctly +aware of them. So may a community of men. + +"The true meaning of ethical obligations," says Hobhouse, [Footnote: +_Morals in Evolution_, New York, 1906, p. 30.] "--their bearing on +human purposes, their function in social life--only emerges by slow +degrees. The onlooker, investigating a primitive custom, can see that +moral elements have helped to build it up, so that it embodies something +of moral truth. Yet these elements of moral truth were perhaps never +present to the minds of those who built it. Instead thereof we are likely +to find some obscure reference to magic or to the world of spirits. The +custom which we can see, perhaps, to be excellently devised in the +interests of social order or for the promotion of mutual aid is by those +who practice it based on some taboo, or preserved from violation from +fear of the resentment of somebody's ghost." It is not wholly irrational +that, in the laws of various peoples, an allowance should be made for the +sudden resentment which flames up when wrong has been suffered, and that +an offence grown cold should be treated more leniently than one which is +fresh and the smart caused by which has not had time to suffer +diminution. Society has to do with men as they are. It is its task to +bend the will of the individual into conformity with the social will. +That resentment for wrongs suffered is an important element in the +establishment of order in the community can scarcely be denied, nor is it +wholly unreasonable, men being what they are, for the community to make +some concessions to the natural feeling of the individual. Moreover, the +offender caught in the act is indubitably the real offender; and settled +animosities are more injurious to the social order than are fugitive +gusts of passion. + +And if it is true that the arbitrary laws of hospitality, as recognized +by some primitive and half-civilized communities, are reinforced by the +superstitious fear of the stranger's curse, it is none the less true that +they serve certain social needs. The fact that hospitality tends to +decline when it becomes superfluous is sufficient to indicate its social +significance. + +Again, collective responsibility--the making of a man responsible for the +delinquencies of those connected with him, even when he could in no way +have prevented the evils in question--appears to modern civilized man, in +most instances, [Footnote: Only under normal conditions. We have recently +had abundant opportunity to see that in time of war civilized nations +have no scruples in making the innocent suffer with the guilty, or even +for the guilty.] an irrational thing. Yet men are actually knit into +groups with common interests and accustomed to cooperation. To treat them +as wholly independent units, responsible only to some higher organization +such as the state, is to overlook actual relationships which have no +small influence in determining the course of their lives. Within each +lesser group the members can and do encourage or repress given types of +action beneficial or the reverse. Is it irrational for the larger group +to set such influences to work by holding the lesser group responsible in +its collective capacity? In China the principle has worked with some +measure of success as an instrument of order for many centuries. In an +enlightened society some better method of attaining order may obtain, but +it would be a mistake to assume that there is nothing behind the +principle of collective responsibility save the unintelligent attempt to +satisfy resentment by striking indirectly at the offender through those +connected with him, or the mental confusion that identifies the culprit, +through mere association of ideas, with other members of the group to +which he belongs. + +81. THE SOCIAL WILL AND THE SELFISHNESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL.--There is, +then, often some reason to be discovered even in what appears at first +sight to be wholly irrational. But no small part of the irrationality of +the actual social will must be set down, in the last instance, to that +peculiar form of irrationality in the individual or in groups of +individuals which we call selfishness. + +That some degree of inequality should be necessary in communities of men, +in view of the differentiation of function implied in cooperative effort, +may be admitted. How far the inherited organization or the existing +environment of a given community may make it necessary, in the interests +of all, to grant a large measure of power or prerogative to a single +individual, or to the few, is fair matter for investigation. But the most +cursory glance at the pages of history, the most superficial survey of +the present condition of mankind, must make it evident that a far-seeing +and enlightened social will has not been the determining factor in +bringing into existence many of the institutions which are accepted by +the actual social will of a given epoch. + +Neither Alexander the Great nor Napoleon can be regarded as true +exponents of the social will. The rule of the oligarchy is based upon +selfish considerations. The institution of slavery overrides the will of +the bondsman in the interests of his possessor. The perennial struggle +between the "haves" and the "have nots"--the rich and the poor--is, +unfortunately, carried on by those engaged in it with a view to their own +interests and not with a view to the good of society as a whole. + +That those to whom especial opportunities are, by the accident of their +position, open, or by whom special rights are inherited, should accept +the situation as right and proper is not to be wondered at. All rights +and duties have their roots in the past, and conceptions of what is +feasible and desirable are always influenced by tradition. While from the +standpoint of the real social will anomalous and accidental it is +nevertheless psychologically explicable and natural that the mediaeval +knight should be bound by the rules of chivalry only in his dealings with +those of his own rank; that the murder of a priest should be regarded as +a crime of a special class; that benefit of clergy should be extended to +a limited number of those guilty of the same offence; that the lists of +the deadly sins should, in an age dominated by the monastic idea, smack +so strongly of the cloister. + +Natural it is, and, perhaps, inevitable, that such expressions of the +social will should make their appearance. They have their place in the +historic evolution of society. But they betray the fact that man is +imperfectly rational. They cannot be regarded as expressions of the +permanent rational will which belongs to man as man. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI + +THE RATIONAL SOCIAL WILL + + +82. REASONABLE ENDS.--We have seen in the chapter on "Rationality and +Will," that we cannot consider a man rational unless his choices are +harmonized and converge upon some comprehensive end. It has been hinted, +furthermore, that not all comprehensive ends can be described as +reasonable or rational. + +A child may be consistently disobedient to its parents, and, given +parents of a certain kind, it may find its life highly satisfactory. A +man may consistently be a bad neighbor, and may harbor the conviction +that, on the whole, he gains by it. A miser may be consistent; he may +come to joy in denying himself luxuries and even comforts, repaid in the +consciousness of an increasing store. The philosophical egoist may reason +with admirable consistency, and may habitually act in accordance with his +convictions, leading, for him, a very endurable life. + +All these may be intelligent, even acutely intelligent, and may reason +clearly and well. Nevertheless, men generally refuse to consider their +behavior reasonable. There are ends which we regard as rational, and +others which we condemn as irrational. + +It is not enough, hence, that a man's volitions should be intelligently +harmonized and unified. His will must be adjusted to ends which +themselves can be judged rational. + +And in deciding whether the ends he chooses are rational or not, we +proceed just as we do in judging the rationality of his individual +choices. If the latter are made in the light of information, if their +significance is realized, if they converge upon some comprehensive end +and do not merely clash and defeat one another, we have seen that they +are made under the guidance of reason or intelligence. The individual +volitions are congruous with the permanent set of the man's will. They +are judged by their background, by their harmony with the "pattern" which +is revealed in the man's volitional life. + +Even so, each such volitional pattern, the harmonized and unified will of +the individual as directed upon some comprehensive end, is judged to be +rational or not according as it does or does not accord with the ends +pursued by the social will. Individuals, whose wills are thoroughly +unified and harmonized by the dominant influence of given chosen ends, +may be thoroughly out of harmony with the chosen ends of the larger +organism of which they are a part. They may be out of harmony with each +other. Considered alone, each may display an internal order and unity. +Taken together they may be seen to be in open strife. + +We have found the social will to be something relatively permanent and +moving with more or less consistency toward certain comprehensive ends. +That the ends chosen by given individuals may be very much out of harmony +with these is palpable. The deliberate idler, the whole-hearted epicure, +the habitually untruthful man, the miser, the cold egoist--these and such +as these are condemned in enlightened communities. Their lives do not +help to further, but serve to frustrate, the ends approved by the social +will. In so far they may be regarded as consistently irrational. + +83. AN OBJECTION ANSWERED.--Consistently irrational! it may be exclaimed; +how can that be? is not a far-sighted consistency the very mark of +rational choice? + +The difficulty is only an apparent one. Many forms of consistency may +indicate a certain degree of rationality, and yet too slight a degree to +win approval. There is such a thing as a narrow consistency. He who +devotes his life to the purpose of revenge, may live consistently, but he +loses much. A bitter and angry life is not a desirable thing, even from +the standpoint of the individual. + +But why should we limit ourselves to the standpoint of the individual, in +judging of the rationality of ends? There are those to whom it appears +self-evident that this should be done; those to whom it does not seem +reasonable for a man to do anything by which he, on the whole, loses; +those who deny the reasonableness of self-sacrifice in any form. This +doctrine will be examined later. [Footnote: See Sec 102 and 128.] + +Here it is enough to point out that men do not actually limit the notion +of rationality in this way. In every, even moderately, rational life some +desires must be suppressed. All desires cannot be satisfied. Why should +it not be regarded as rational and reasonable that, to attain the +comprehensive ends of the social will, certain ends consistently chosen +by certain kinds of individuals should deliberately be denied? + +As a matter of fact, men generally do so regard it. They employ the terms +rational and irrational, reasonable and unreasonable, to indicate the +harmony or lack of harmony between the individual and the social will. We +call the man unreasonable who insists upon having his own way regardless +of his fellows; and this, even in instances in which his fellows cannot +punish him for his selfish attitude. + +It is not a matter of accident that this should be so. The analogy +between the relation of separate volitions to the dominant ends which +control action on the part of the individual, and the relation of the +ultimate choices of individuals to the ends pursued by the social will, +is a close one. In the well-ordered mind the clash of conflicting desires +is reduced to a minimum. In a well-ordered community the conflict of +individual wills is also reduced to a minimum. In each case, we are +concerned with the work of reason, and judgments as to rationality and +irrationality are equally in place. + +84. REASONABLE SOCIAL ENDS.--The will of the individual, when affirmed to +be rational or irrational, is, therefore, referred to the background of +the social will. But the social will is more or less different in +different communities, and in the one community at different stages of +its development. Is there any measure of the degree of rationality of the +social will itself? is there any standard to which its different +expressions may be referred? + +We may criticise a community as we criticise an individual man even when +he is taken as abstracted from his social setting. The man's choices may +be blind, conflicting, wayward, and ill-adapted to serve his interests +taken as a whole. In the last chapter we saw that a community may +resemble such a man. It may be ignorant, superstitious, short-sighted, +and in conflict with itself. The social will as actually revealed may be +an imperfect and inconsistent thing. Here enlightenment and inner +harmonization are called for, to set the social will free. + +But even where the will of a community is something more definite and +consistent than this, it may be condemned by the moral judgment of the +enlightened. An appeal may be made from the will of the community in the +narrower sense to that of the larger community. The limits of nation, +race and religion may be transcended, and we may appeal to humanity as +such, refusing to recognize the will of any lesser unit as really +ultimate. He who occupies the one standpoint is apt to speak of defending +his legitimate rights, or of extending to subject races the blessings of +civilization. He who takes his stand upon the other may talk of lust of +dominion, or desire for economic advantage. The one may use the term +righteous indignation; the other, the word anger. The moral judgment +passed upon an act depends upon the concept under which men manage to +bring it. What is approved by the tribal ethics may be abhorrent to the +ethics of humanity. + +But the larger social will, so far as it has gotten itself expressed at +all, seems to remain something vague and indefinite. It is appealed to as +rational; but how indicate clearly the end which it sets before itself +and the obligations which it lays upon mankind? + +The difficulty of describing in detail the ultimate ends of the real +social will has led some writers to speak in terms of exaggerated +vagueness. The mere idea in a man "of something, he knows not what, which +he may and should become" can give little guidance to action; nor can one +aim with much confidence at a goal of which "we can only speak or think +in negatives." [Footnote: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec Sec 192, 172, +180. But GREEN is not always so indefinite. He is on the right track. He +reverences the social will and the historical development of the social +order.] + +But it is not necessary to speak in this way. We may form some conception +of the real, rational social will, without being compelled to know all +that man is capable of becoming and without being able to forecast the +details of his environment in the distant future. + +We may attain to our conception by determining clearly the nature of the +aims man sets before himself in proportion to his growing rationality. We +can see in what direction man moves as he develops and becomes +enlightened. From this standpoint, the aims of the rational social will +appear to be as follows: + +(1) The harmonious satisfaction of the impulses and desires of man. + +(2) Such an unfolding of his powers as will increase their range and +variety, broaden man's horizon, and give him an increased control over +erratic impulses. + +(3) The bringing about of a social state in which the will of each +individual within a community counts for something, and not merely the +will of a chosen few. + +(4) The broadening of the conception of what constitutes a community, so +that ever increasing numbers are regarded as having claims that must be +recognized. + +(5) The taking into consideration of the whole of life; the whole life of +individuals and of communities, so that the insistent present shall not +be given undue weight, as against the future. + +85. THE ETHICS OF REASON.--The doctrine of the Rational Social Will might +very properly be called the Ethics of Reason. It is not to be confounded +with the so-called "tribal" or "group" ethics. To be sure, it has to do +with man as a social being; but this is characteristic of ethical systems +generally. Man is a social being; he is one essentially, and not +accidentally. That he should be a member of a tribe, or of any lesser +group than the whole body of sentient and reasonable beings, may not +unjustly be regarded as an historical accident, as a function of his +position in the scale of development. + +In judging the doctrine of the rational social will, bear in mind the +following: + +(1) It rests upon the basis of the impulsive and volitional nature of +man. + +(2) It recognizes reason in the individual, and declares that only so far +as he is rational is he the proper subject of ethics at all. Erratic and +uncontrolled impulse knows no moral law. + +(3) It sees reason in the customs, laws and public opinion of the tribe +or the state, while recognizing a higher tribunal before the bar of which +all these are summoned. + +(4) It appeals to the reason of the race--the reason appropriate to the +race as enlightened and freed from the shackles of local prejudice and +restricted sympathy. + +(5) It recognizes that man can give expression to his nature, can satisfy +his desires and exercise his reason, only as aided by his physical and +social environment. It emphasizes the necessity of a certain reverence +for the actual historical development of human societies, with their +institutions. Such institutions are the embodiment of reason--not pure +reason, but reason struggling to get itself expressed as it can. He who +would legislate for man independently of such institutions has left the +solid earth and man far behind. He is suspended in the void. + +86. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATION.--Civilizations differ; some are more +material, laying stress upon man's conquest of his material environment. +Others exhibit a greater appreciation of idealistic elements, the pursuit +of knowledge for its own sake, the cultivation of the fine arts, the +development of humanitarian sentiment. For civilization in general it is +not necessary to advance an argument. But there are elements in many +civilizations which the thoughtful man may feel called upon to defend. + +Civilization, taken generally, scarcely needs a labored justification +because it is only in a civilization of some kind or other that we can +look for a guarantee of the broad social will, for the reign of reason. +Undeveloped man is at the mercy of nature; he is the sport of history. +Where developed man can raise his voice, man possessed of power and +capable of taking broad views of things, the rule of reason may be set +up. A deliberate attempt may be made to recognize many wills, harmonize +discords. Order may be brought out of chaos, and the limits of the realm +within the borders of which order reigns may be indefinitely extended. + +Such is the general ethical justification for the rise of a civilization. +It is an expression of, and an instrument for the realization of, the +broader social will. That a given civilization may be imperfect in both +respects has been made clear in the last chapter. In the light of the +general justification for civilization many questions may be raised +touching this or that element in civilizations as we observe them. + +Thus, it may be pointed out that as man progresses in civilization he +calls into being a multitude of new wants, many of which may have to +remain unsatisfied. [Footnote: Compare chapter xxx, Sec 142.] It may be +asserted that literature, art and science are, in fact, cherished as +though they were ends in themselves, and not means called into existence +to serve the interests of man. Absorbing as it may be to him, how can the +philologist prove that his science is useful to humanity either present +or prospective? How shall the astronomer, who may frankly admit that he +cannot conceive that nine tenths of the work with which he occupies +himself can ever be of any actual use to anyone, justify himself in +devoting his life to it? Shall a curiosity, which seems to lead nowhere, +be satisfied? And if so, on what ground? + +Moreover, every civilization recognizes that some wills are to be given a +more unequivocal recognition than others. Inequality is the rule. A man +does not put his own children upon a level with those of his neighbor. +Even in the most democratic of states men do not stand upon the same +level. In dealing with our own fellows we do not employ the same weights +and measures as in dealing with foreigners. Who loses his appetite for +his breakfast when he reads that there have been inundations in China or +that an African tribe has come under the "protection" of a race of +another color? The white man has added to his burden--the burden of +economic advantage present or prospective--and we find it as it should +be. Finally, when we bring within our horizon the "interests" of humbler +sentient creatures, we see that they are unhesitatingly subordinated to +our own. Some attention is paid to them in civilized communities. They +are recognized, not merely by custom and public opinion, but, to some +degree, even by law. Men are punished for treating certain animals in +certain ways. But why? Have the animals rights? There is no topic within +the sphere of morals upon which moralists speak with more wavering and +uncertain accents. [Footnote: See chapter XXX, Sec 141.] + +I know of no way in which such problems as the above can be approached +other than by the appeal to reason, as reason has been understood in the +pages preceding. The reign of reason implies the recognition of all +wills, _so far as such a recognition is within the bounds of +possibility_. The escape from chaos lies in the evolution of the +enlightened social will. Man must be raised in the scale, in order that +he may have control; control over himself, over other men, over the +brutes. And he cannot rise except through the historical evolution of a +social order. This implies the development of the capacities latent in +man. + +To decide that any of his capacities shall be allowed to remain dormant +may threaten future development. To cut off certain arts and sciences as +not palpably serving the interests of man is a dangerous thing. To ignore +the actual history of man's efforts to become a rational being, and to +place, hence, all wills upon the one level, is to frustrate the desired +end. It is not thus that the reign of reason can be established. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII + +THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL WILL + + +87. MAN'S MULTIPLE ALLEGIANCE.--We have seen that each man has his place +in a social order. This order is the expression and the embodiment of the +social will, which accepts him, protects him, gives him a share in the +goods the community has so far attained, recognizes his individual will +in that it accords to him rights, and prescribes his course of conduct, +that is, defines his duties or obligations. + +The social will is authoritative; it issues commands and enforces +obedience. With its commands the individual may be in sympathy or he may +not. But upon obedience the social will insists, and it compasses its +ends by the bestowal of rewards or the infliction of punishment. The +moral law to which man thus finds himself subject is something not wholly +foreign to the nature of the individual. It has come into being as an +expression of the nature of man. That nature the individual shares with +his fellows. + +Obedience to the social will would be a relatively simple matter were +that will always unequivocally and unmistakably expressed, and did all +the members of a community feel the pressure of the social will in the +same manner and to the same degree. But the whole matter is indefinitely +complicated by what may be called man's multiple allegiance. + +Organized societies do not consist of undifferentiated units. They are +not mere aggregates, both are highly complex in their internal +constitution. A conscientious man may feel that he owes duties to +himself, to his immediate family, to his kindred, to his neighborhood, to +his social class, to his political party, to his church, to his country, +to its allies, to humanity. The social will does not bring its pressure +to bear upon the man who holds one place in the social order just as it +does upon him who holds another. + +Nor are the injunctions laid upon a man always in harmony. The demands of +family may seem to conflict with those of neighborhood or of profession; +duties to the church may seem to conflict with duties to the state; +patriotism may appear to be more or less in conflict with an interest in +humanity taken broadly. That the individual should often approach in +doubt and hesitation the decision as to what it is, on the whole, his +duty to do, is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that individuals the +most conscientious should find it impossible to be at one on the subject +of rights and duties. Two men may agree perfectly that it is right to "do +good," and be quite unable to agree just what good it is right to do now, +or with whom one should make a beginning. + +88. THE APPEAL TO REASON.--Were there no appeal save to the social will +as it happens to make its pressure felt upon this person or that, in this +situation or that, there could be no issue to dispute. Dispute would be +useless and sheer dogmatism would prevail. But there is such an appeal +and men do make it, where they are in any degree enlightened. It is the +appeal to Reason. + +He who says: "I have especial rights, just because I am Smith, and so has +my father, because he is my father," has no ground of argument with +Jones, who says: "I have especial rights because I am Jones, and so has +my father, because he is my father." Upon such a basis, or lack of basis, +all discussion becomes fatuous. But if Smith and Jones agree that duties +to self should only within limits be recognized, and that duties to +family have their place upon the larger background of the will of the +state, they may, at least, begin to talk. + +The multiple allegiance of the individual does not mean that a man is +subject to a multitude of independent masters whose several claims have +no relation to one another. An appeal may be made from lower to higher. + +We have seen that, in the organization of a given society, the social +will may be imperfectly expressed. It may come about that the place in +the social order assigned to a man cramps and pains him, or forces him to +exertions which seem intolerable. He may passively accept it, or he may +set himself in opposition to the social will as it is, appealing to a +better social will. The fact that an individual finds himself out of +harmony with given aspects of the social will characteristic of his age +and country is no proof that he desires to set himself up in opposition +to the social will in general. + +In a given instance, he may be, from the standpoint of existing law, a +criminal. Yet he may reverence the law above his fellows. His aberrations +need not be arbitrary wanderings, prompted by selfish impulses. He may +leave the beaten track because he does not approve of it, which is a very +different thing from disliking it. Some will judge him to be a pestilent +fellow; some will rate him as a reformer, a prophet, perhaps a martyr. +Neither judgment is of the least value so long as it reflects merely the +tastes or prejudices of the individual. Each must justify itself before +the bar of reason, if it would have a respectful hearing. A reason must +be given for conservatism and a reason must be given for reform. + +89. THE ETHICS OF REASON AND THE VARYING MORAL CODES.--Several +advantages may be claimed for the ethical doctrine I have been +advocating: + +(1) It gives a relative justification to the varying moral codes of +communities of men in the past and in the present. A code may, even when +imperfect from some higher point of view, fit well a community at a given +stage of its development. It may be a man's duty to obey its injunctions, +even where they are not seen to be the wisest possible. One reason for +bowing to custom is that it _is_ custom; one reason for obeying laws +is that they _are_ laws. They embody the permanence and stability of +the social will, and have a _prima facie_ claim to our reverence. + +(2) In recognizing the social will as something deeper and broader than +the will of the individual, as having its roots in the remote past and as +reaching into the distant future, it admits the futility of devising +utopian schemes which would bless humanity in defiance of the actual +expressions of the social will revealed in the development of human +societies. The whim of the individual cannot well be substituted for the +settled purpose of the community--a purpose ripened by generations of +experience, and adjusted to what is possible under existing conditions. + +(3) On the other hand, it distinguishes between lower and higher ethical +codes, or codes lower or higher in certain of their aspects. It sets a +standard of comparison; it recognizes progress towards a goal. + +(4) And, in all this, it does not appear to decide _arbitrarily_ +either what is the goal of man's moral efforts or what means must be +adopted to attain to it. It rests upon a study of man; man as he has +been, man as he is, in all the manifold relations in which he stands to +his environment, physical and social. + +There are other ethical theories in the field, of course. Some of them +are advocated by men of original genius and of no little learning. Some +deserve more attention than others, but all should have a hearing, at +least. A close scrutiny will often reveal that advocates of different +theories are by no means so far apart as a hasty reading of their works +would suggest. Writers the most diverse may assist one to a comprehension +of one's own theory. Its implications may be developed, objections to it +may be suggested, its strong points may stand revealed. By no means the +least important part of a work on ethics is its treatment of the schools +of the moralists. If it be written with any degree of fairness, it may +contain what will serve the reader with an antidote to erroneous opinions +on the part of the writer. To a study of the most important schools of +the moralists I shall now turn. + + + + +PART VII + +THE SCHOOLS OF THE MORALISTS + + +CHAPTER XXIII + +INTUITIONISM + + +90. WHAT IS IT?--"We come into the world," said Epictetus, "with no +natural notion of a right-angled triangle, or of a quarter-tone, or of a +half-tone; but we learn each of these things by a certain transmission +according to art; and for this reason those who do not know them do not +think that they know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and +ugly, and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and +proper and improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, +who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them?" +[Footnote: _Discourses_, Book II, chapter xi, translation by GEORGE +LONG.] Seneca adds his testimony to the self-luminous character of moral +truth: "Whatever things tend to make us better or happier are either +obvious or easily discovered." [Footnote: _On Benefits_, Book VII, +chapter i.] + +With the general spirit of these utterances the typical intuitionist is +in sympathy, although he need not assent to the doctrine of innate ideas, +nor need he hold that all moral truths are equally self-evident. There +are intuitionists of various classes, and there are sufficiently notable +differences of opinion. Still, all intuitionists believe that some moral +truth, at least, is revealed to the individual by direct inspection +(_intueor_), and that we must be content with such evidence and must +not seek for proof. It may be maintained that our moral judgments--or +some of them--are the result of "an immediate discernment of the natures +of things by the understanding." and appeal may be made to the analogy +furnished by mathematical truths. [Footnote: This appeal has been made by +famous intuitionists from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth-- +Cudworth, More, Locke, Clarke, Price, Whewell.] + +91. VARIETIES OF INTUITIONISM.--Forms of intuitionism have been +conveniently classified as Perceptional, Dogmatic and Philosophical. +[Footnote: SIDGWICK, The Methods of Ethics, Book I, chapter viii, Sec 4.] +To this nomenclature it may be objected that the term "dogmatic" carries +with it a certain flavor of disapprobation, and predisposes one to the +assumption of a critical attitude, while the term "philosophical" has the +reverse suggestion, and smacks of special pleading. While admitting that +there is something in the objection, I retain the convenient terms, +merely warning the reader to be on his guard. + +(1) Perceptional Intuitionism falls back upon the analogy of perception +in general. I seem to perceive by direct inspection that my blotter is +green, and that my penholder is longer than my pencil. I do not seek for +evidence; I do not have recourse to any chain of reasonings to establish +the fact. And I am concerned here with facts, not with some general +proposition applicable to many facts. Even so, I may maintain that, in +specific situations, the rightness or wrongness of given courses of +action may be perceived immediately. + +He who accepts the spontaneous deliverances of his conscience, when +confronted with the necessity of making a decision, as revelations of +moral truth, may be called a perceptional intuitionist. The deliverances +must, however, be spontaneous and immediate, not the result of reasoning. +If a man reasons, if he falls back upon general considerations, if he +looks into the future and weighs the consequences of his act, and, as a +result, decides what he ought to do, he is no longer a perceptional +intuitionist. + +The perceptional intuitionist, consistently and unreservedly such, is +rather an ideal construction than an actually existing person. Most men, +on certain occasions, are inclined to say, "I feel this to be right, and +will do it, although I cannot support my decision by giving reasons." +Many men are, at times, tempted to maintain that a given course of action +is evidently right and should be followed irrespective of consequences. +But this is not the habitual attitude even of men very little gifted with +reflection, and it is highly unsatisfactory to those who have the habit +of thinking. + +Primitive man supports his decisions by an appeal to custom. Civilized +man turns to custom, to law, or to general principles of some sort, which +he accepts as authoritative, and which he regards as having a bearing +upon the particular instance in question. That individual decisions +should be capable of some sort of justification by the adduction of a +reason or reasons is generally admitted. No sane man would maintain the +general proposition that the consequences of acts should be wholly +disregarded in determining whether they are or are not desirable. + +(2) Thus, Perceptional Intuitionism gives place to what has been called +Dogmatic Intuitionism--to the doctrine that certain general moral rules +can be immediately perceived to be valid. The application of such general +rules to particular instances implies discrimination and the use of +reason. + +Here decisions are not wholly unsupported. Reasons may be asked for and +given. In answer to the question: Why should I say this or that? it may +be said: Because the law of veracity demands it. In answer to the +question: Why should I act thus? it may be said: Because it is just, or +is in accordance with the dictates of benevolence. The general rule is +accepted as intuitively evident, but it is incumbent upon the individual +to use his judgment in determining what may properly fall under the +general rule. + +But there are rules and rules. It is not easy to draw a sharp line +between Perceptional Intuitionism and Dogmatic, just as it is not easy in +other fields to distinguish sharply between knowledge given directly in +perception, and knowledge in which more or less conscious processes of +inference play a part. Do I perceive the man whom I see, when I look into +a mirror, to be behind the mirror or in front of it? Do I perceive the +whereabouts of the coach which I hear rattling by my window, or does +reasoning play its part in giving me information? And if I follow my +conscience in not withholding from the cabman the small customary fee in +addition to his fare, am I prompted by an unreasoned perception of the +rightness of my act, or am I influenced by general considerations--the +thought of what is customary, the belief that gratuities should not be +withheld where services of a certain kind are rendered, etc.? + +Even so, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between Dogmatic +Intuitionists and Philosophical, or to regard Dogmatic Intuitionists as a +clearly defined class of any sort. A man may accept it as self-evident +that a waiter should receive ten per cent of the amount of his bill; a +woman may find it obviously proper that an old lady should wear purple. +Those little given to reflection may accept such maxims as these without +attempting to justify them by falling back upon any more general rule. We +all find about us human beings who have their minds stored with a +multitude of maxims not greatly different from those adduced, and who +find them serviceable in guiding their actions. But thoughtful men can +scarcely be content with such a modicum of reason, and they distinguish +between ultimate principles and minor maxims which stand in need of +justification by their reference to principles. + +The intuitional moralists by profession draw this distinction. We find +them setting forth as ultimate a limited number of ethical principles of +a high degree of generality. It is obvious that, the more general the +principle, the more room for conscious reasoning in its interpretation +and application. The man to whom it appears as in the nature of things +suitable that the waiter should receive his ten per cent is relieved from +many perplexities which may beset the man who feels assured only of the +general truth that it is right to be benevolent. + +A glance at a few of the moralists who are treated in the history of +ethics as representative intuitionists reveals that they are little in +harmony as touching the particular moral intuitions which they urge as +the foundation of ethics. + +Thus, John Locke maintains that from the idea of God, and of ourselves as +rational beings, a science of morality may be deduced demonstratively; a +science: "wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by +necessary consequences, as incontestible as those in mathematics, the +measures of right and wrong might be made out to anyone that will apply +himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one, as he does +to the other of those sciences." [Footnote: _Essay Concerning Human +Understanding_, Book IV, chapter iii, Sec 18.] + +Among Locke's self-evident propositions or moral axioms we find: where +there is no property there is no injustice; no government allows absolute +liberty; all men are originally free and equal; parents have the power to +control their children till they come of age; the right of property is +based upon work, but is limited by the supply of property left for others +to enjoy. [Footnote: See above, chapter iii, Sec 10.] + +These axioms cannot be identified with Samuel Clarke's four chief rules +of righteousness, which inculcate: piety toward God, equity in our +dealings with men, benevolence, and sobriety. [Footnote: _A Discourse +concerning the Unalterable Relations of Natural Religion_, Prop. I.] +Richard Price gives us still another choice, in dwelling upon our +obligation as regards piety, prudence, beneficence, gratitude, veracity, +the fulfillment of promises, and justice. [Footnote: _A Review of the +Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals_, chapter vii.] And +Whewell, emulating the performance of Euclid, tried to build up a system +of morals upon axioms embodying the seven principles of benevolence, +justice, truth, purity, order, earnestness, and moral purpose. [Footnote: +_The Elements of Morality_, Book III, chapter iv.] + +These moralists press the analogy of mathematical truth. It must be +confessed, however, that a row of text-books on geometry, with so +scattering and indefinite a collection of axioms, would do little to +support one another; and little to convince us that they represented a +coherent and consistent body of truth in which we might have +unquestioning faith. + +(3) It is not unnatural that some thoughtful intuitionists, dissatisfied +with a considerable number of independent moral principles, should aim at +a further simplification. Such a simplification Kant finds in the +Categorical Imperative, or unconditional command of the Practical Reason: +"Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it +should become a universal law." [Footnote: _Fundamental Principles of +the Metaphysic of Morals_, Sec 2.] And Henry Sidgwick, refusing to +regard all intuitions as of equal authority, selects two only as +ultimately and independently valid--that which recommends a far-seeing +prudence, and that which urges a rational benevolence. [Footnote: _The +Methods of Ethics_, Book III, chapter xiii, Sec 3.] Those who make their +ultimate moral rules so broad and inclusive base upon them the multitude +of minor maxims to which men are apt to have recourse in justifying their +actions. Whether their doctrine may be called philosophical in a sense +implying commendation is matter for discussion. + +92. ARGUMENTS FOR INTUITIONISM.--What may be said in favor of +intuitionism? + +(1) It may be urged that it is the doctrine which appeals most directly +to common sense, and that it is found reasonably satisfactory in practice +by men generally. + +Intuition appears to be, in fact, man's guide in an overwhelming majority +of the situations in which he is called upon to act. In the face of the +concrete situation he _feels_ that he should say a kind word, help a +neighbor, stand his ground courageously, speak the truth, and a thousand +other things which a moralist might, upon reflection, approve. + +That he "feels" this does not mean merely that he is influenced by an +emotion. We constantly employ the word to indicate the presence of a +judgment which presents itself spontaneously and for which men cannot or +do not seek support by having recourse to reasons. + +He who, without reflection, affirms, "this action is right," has framed a +moral judgment. He has in a given instance distinguished between right +and wrong, although he has not raised the general problem of what +constitutes right and wrong. He has exercised the prerogative of a moral +being, though not of a very thoughtful one. + +We have seen above, that perceptional intuitionism tends to pass over +into dogmatic intuitionism of some sort, even in the case of minds little +developed. The egoistic rustic may defend his selfishness by citing the +proverb, "my shirt is closer to me than my coat." If he does so, it means +that a doubt has been suggested, a conflict of some sort called into +being. Were such conflicts, causing hesitation and deliberation, of very +frequent occurrence, life could scarcely go on at all. Conversation would +be impossible were no word placed and no inflection chosen without +conscious reference to the rules of grammar. No man could conduct himself +properly in a drawing-room or at a table, were his mind harking back at +every moment to the instructions contained in some volume on etiquette. +He who must justify every act by reflection is condemned to the jerkiest +and most hesitant of moral lives. Perceptional moral intuition must stand +our friend, if there is to be a flow of conduct worthy of the name. + +There are, however, occasions for checking the flow by reflection. Then +men are forced to think, and we find them appealing to custom, citing +proverbs, quoting maxims, taking their stand upon principles. Recourse +may be had to generalizations of a very low or of a very high degree of +generality. + +But low or high, it is upon intuitions that men actually fall back in +justifying their actions. Benevolence, justice, honesty, truthfulness, +purity, honor, modesty, courtesy, and what not, are intuitively perceived +to be right, and an effort is made to bring the individual act under some +one of these headings. The mass of men, even in enlightened communities, +do not feel impelled to justify these general moral maxims, to reduce +them to a harmonious system, or to reconcile with each other the +different lists of them which have been drawn up. They find it possible +in practice to resolve most of their doubts by an appeal to this maxim or +to that. From such doubts as refuse to be resolved they are apt to turn +away their attention. But the moral life goes on, and to intuitions it +owes its guidance. + +As to the few who reduce the moral intuitions to a minimum, and, like +Kant and Sidgwick, end with one or two ultimate intuitional moral +principles, we may say that they, like other men, are compelled, in the +actual conduct of life, to turn to intuitions of lower orders. All sorts +of moral intuitions are actually found helpful by all sorts of men. + +(2) To the minds of men differing in their education and traditions, and +at different stages of intellectual and moral development, very different +moral judgments spontaneously present themselves. It is not a matter of +accident that this man may "feel" an action to be right, and that man may +"feel" it to be wrong. There is evident adaptation of the judgments to +history and environment. They spring into being because the men are what +they are and are situated as they are. + +It is this adaptation that renders the moral intuitions serviceable in +carrying on the actual business of life. It is more complete, the less +abstract the moral intuitions which come into play. Plato, who in his +"Laws" enters very minutely into the question of the permissible and the +forbidden in the life of the citizens of his ideal state, finds it +necessary to leave some things to the judgment of the individual. Thus, +he finds it impossible to determine exhaustively what things are, and +what things are not, worthy of a freeman. He leaves it to the virtuous to +give judgments "in accordance with their feelings of right and wrong." +[Footnote: Book XI; see the account of the occupations permissible to the +landed proprietor.] The intuitions of the mediaeval saint, of the upright +modern European, of the virtuous Chinaman, would have impressed him as +without rhyme or reason. He appealed to the Greek gentleman, whose sense +of propriety was Greek, and might be expected to be adjusted to the +situation. + +(3) The intuitive judgment of a sensitive moral nature may often be more +nearly right than moral judgments based upon the most subtle of +reasonings. + +It is not hard to find, with a little ingenuity, apparent justification +for actions which the consciences of the enlightened condemn at first +sight. Scarcely any action may not be brought under some moral rule, if +one deliberately sets out to do so. A narrow selfishness is defended as +caring for one's own; a refusal of aid to the needy is justified by a +reference to the evils of pauperization; patriotism becomes the excuse +for hatred, wilful blindness and untruthful vilification. To the +sophistries of those who would thus make the worse appear the better, the +intuitive judgment of the moral man opposes its unreasoned conviction. +That the conviction is not supported by arguments does not prove that it +is not a just one. + +93. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTUITIONISM.--What may be urged against +Intuitionism? + +(1) It may be pointed out that such considerations as the above +constitute an argument to prove the value of moral intuitions, and not +one to prove the value of intuitionism as an ethical theory. That moral +intuitions are indispensable may be freely admitted even by one who +demurs to the doctrine that intuitionism in some one of its forms may be +accepted as a satisfactory theory of morals. + +(2) Perceptional Intuitionism, at least, cannot be regarded as embodying +a rational theory or furnishing a science of any sort. Its one and only +dogma must be that whatever actions reveal themselves to this man or that +as right, are right, and there is no going behind the judgment of the +individual. + +Shall we say to men: "In order to know what is right and what is wrong in +human conduct, we need only to listen to the dictates of conscience when +the mind is calm and unruffled"? [Footnote: THOMAS REID, _Essays on the +Active Powers of Man_, v, Sec 4.] As well say: "The right time is the +time indicated by your watch, when you are not shaking it." If men are to +keep appointments with each other, they must have some other standard of +time than that carried by each man in his vest-pocket. + +Perceptional Intuitionism ignores the fact that consciences may sometimes +disagree, and that there may be a choice in consciences. The consistent +perceptional intuitionist is, however, scarcely to be found, as has been +said above; and we actually find those, some of whose utterances read as +though the authors ought to be adherents of such a school, dwelling upon +the desirability of the education of the conscience, i.e., upon the +desirability of acquiring a capacity for having the right intuitions. In +other words, they tell us to follow our noses--but to make sure that they +point in the right direction. [Footnote: See THOMAS REID, _Essays on +the Active Powers of Man_, iii, Part 3, Sec 8] In which case the +determination of the right direction is not left to perceptional +intuition. + +(3) The Dogmatic Intuitionist has difficulties of his own with which to +cope. It is not enough to possess a collection of valid and authoritative +rules. The rules must be applied; there is room for the exercise of +judgment and for the possibility of error. Error is not excluded even +when the rule appears to be at only one or two removes from the +individual instance; where the rule is one of great generality the +problem of its application becomes correspondingly difficult. The +interpretation of the rule is not given intuitively with the rule. This +means that the rule must, in practice, be supplemented. + +Always and everywhere, a straight line appears to be the shortest +distance between two points. What is meant by shortness hardly seems to +be legitimate matter for dispute. But the man convinced that he ought to +pay his workman a fair wage, and that he ought to do his duty by his son, +may be in no little perplexity when he attempts to define that fair wage +or that parental duty. If he turns for advice to others, he will find +that history and tradition, time, place and circumstance, very +perceptibly color the advice they offer. + +The application of the general rule is, hence, quite as important as the +rule. There is no such thing as conduct in the abstract. Let us admit +that benevolence is morally obligatory. How shall we be benevolent? Shall +we follow Cicero, and give only that which costs us nothing? or shall we +emulate St. Francis? The general rule may be a faultless skeleton, but it +is, after all, only a skeleton, and it cannot walk of itself. + +Again. The dogmatic intuitionist has quite a collection of rules by which +he must judge of his actions. They are severally independent and +authoritative. Suppose an act appears to be commanded by one rule and +forbidden by another? Who shall decide between them? Prudence and +benevolence may urge him in opposite directions. Benevolence and justice +may not obviously be in harmony. The rule of veracity may seem, at times, +to prescribe conduct which will entail much suffering on the part of the +innocent. To what court of appeal can we refer the conflicts which may +arise when ultimate authorities disagree? He who, in war time, can +conscientiously shoot a sentry, but cannot conscientiously lie to him, +may, later, have his misgivings, when the Golden Rule knocks at the gate +of his mind. + +(4) Nor does he leave all difficulties behind him, who abandons Dogmatic +Intuitionism and takes refuge in Philosophical. + +Kant's maxim needs a vast amount of interpretation. As it stands, it is +little more than an empty formula. What I can wish to be the law of the +universe must depend very much upon what I am. The lion and the lamb do +not thirst for the same law. To the quarrelsome heroes of Walhalla a +world of perpetual fighting and feasting must seem a very good world, in +spite of knocks received as well as given. Kant's fundamental maxim +scarcely appears to be a moral rule at all, unless we make it read: "Act +on a maxim which a _wise and good man_ can will to be a universal +law." But how decide who is the wise and good man? + +The philosophical intuitionist who accepts more than one ultimate moral +rule must face the possibility that he will meet with a conflict of the +higher intuitions to which he has had recourse. Shall his intuitions be +those recommending a rational self-interest and a rational benevolence? +Can he be sure that the two are necessarily in accord? Can there be a +rational adjustment of the claims of each? Not if there be no court of +appeal to which both intuitions are subject. [Footnote: With his usual +candor, SIDGWICK admits this difficulty. He leaves it unresolved. See, +_The Methods of Ethics_, in the concluding chapter.] + +Furthermore, between the philosophical and the dogmatic intuitionist +serious differences of opinion may be expected to arise. He who makes, +let us say, benevolence the supreme law naturally allows to other +intuitions, such as justice and veracity, but a derivative authority. It +appears, then, that there may be occasions on which they are not valid. +To some famous intuitionists this has seemed to be a pernicious doctrine. + +"We are," writes Bishop Butler, "constituted so as to condemn falsehood, +unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some +preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration, which conduct is +likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery." [Footnote: +Dissertations appended to the "Analogy," II, _Of the Nature of +Virtue_. Cf. DUGALD STEWART, _Outlines of Moral Philosophy_, Part +2, Sec 348.] + +Butler thought that justice should be done though the heavens fall; the +philosophical intuitionist must maintain that the danger of bringing down +the heavens is never to be lost sight of. But this doctrine that there +are intuitions and intuitions, some ultimately authoritative and others +not so, raises the whole question of the validity of intuitions. How are +we to distinguish those that are always valid from others? By intuition? +Intuition appears to be discredited. And if it is proper to demand proof +that justice should be done and the truth spoken, why may one not demand +proof that men should be prudent and benevolent? One may talk of "an +immediate discernment of the nature of things by the understanding" in +the one case as in the other. If error is possible there, why not here? + +94. THE VALUE OF MORAL INTUITIONS.--It would not be fair to close this +chapter on intuitionism, an ethical theory competing with others for our +approval, without emphasizing the value of the role played by the moral +intuitions. + +They are the very guide of life, and without them our reasonings would be +of little service. They should be treated gently, gratefully, with +reverence. To them human societies owe their stability, their capacity +for an orderly development, the smooth working of the machinery of daily +life. Their presence does not exclude the employment of reasoning, but +they furnish a basis upon which the reason can occupy itself with profit. +They are a safeguard against those utopian schemes which would shatter +our world and try experiments in creation out of nothing. + +Nevertheless, he who busies himself with ethics as science must study +them critically and strive to estimate justly their true significance. He +may come to regard them, not as something fixed and changeless, but as +living and developing, coming into being, and modifying themselves, in +the service of life. Does he dishonor them who so views them? + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV + +EGOISM + + +95. WHAT IS EGOISM?--Egoism has been defined as "any ethical system in +which the happiness or good of the individual is made the main criterion +of moral action," [Footnote: _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 11th +edition.] or as "the doing or seeking of that which affords pleasure or +advantage to oneself, in distinction to that which affords pleasure or +advantage to others." [Footnote: _Century Dictionary_.] + +It may strike the average reader as odd to be told that such definitions +bristle with ambiguities, and that it is by no means easy to draw a sharp +line between doctrines which everyone would admit to be egoistic, and +others which seem more doubtfully to fall under that head. "Happiness," +"good," "advantage," "self," all are terms which call for scrutiny, and +which set pitfalls for the unwary. + +96. CRASS EGOISMS.--We may best approach the subject of what may properly +be regarded as constituting egoism, by turning first to one or two +"terrible examples." + +No one would hesitate to call egoistic the doctrine of Aristippus, the +Cyrenaic, the errant disciple of Socrates. He made pleasure the end of +life, and taught that it might be sought without a greater regard to +customary morality than was made prudent by the penalties to be feared as +a consequence of its violation. Where the centre of gravity of the system +of the Cyrenaics falls is evident from their holding that "corporeal +pleasures are superior to mental ones," and that "a friend is desirable +for the use which we can make of him." [Footnote: Diogenes Laertius, +_Lives of the Philosophers,_ "Aristippus," viii.] + +The doctrine of the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, is as +unequivocally egoistic. + +"Of the voluntary acts of every man," he writes, [Footnote: +_Leviathan,_ Part I, xiv.] "the object is some good to himself;" and +again, [Footnote _Ibid_. xv.] "no man giveth, but with intention of +good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts the +object is to every man his own good." + +He leaves us in no doubt as to the sort of good which he conceives men to +seek when they practice what has the appearance of generosity. Contract +he calls a mutual transference of rights, and he distinguishes gift from +contract as follows: + +"When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties +transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from +another, or from his friends, or in hope to gain the reputation of +charity or magnanimity, _or to deliver his mind from the pain of +compassion_, or in hope of reward in heaven, this is not contract but +gift, free gift, grace, which words signify the same thing." [Footnote: +_Ibid_. I, xiv. The italics are mine. It was thus that Hobbes +accounted for his giving a sixpence to a beggar: "I was in pain to +consider the miserable condition of the old man; and now my alms, giving +him some relief, doth also ease me." _Hobbes_, by G. C. ROBERTSON, +Edinburgh, 1886, p. 206.] + +There is a passage from the pen of the British divine, Paley, which +appears to merit a place alongside of the citations from Hobbes, widely +as the men differ in many of their views. It reads: + +"We can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose +something by; for nothing else can be a 'violent motion' to us. As we +should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards +or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended upon our +obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to +do what is right, to practice virtue, or to obey the commandments of +God." [Footnote: _Moral Philosophy,_ Book II, chapter ii.] + +97. EQUIVOCAL EGOISM?--The above is unquestionably egoism. The man who +accepts such a doctrine and consistently walks in the light must be set +down as self-seeking. But self-seeking, as understood by different men, +appears to take on different aspects. Shall we class all those who +frankly accept it as man's only ultimate motive with Aristippus and +Epicurus and Hobbes? + +Thomas Hill Green writes: "Anything conceived as good in such a way that +the agent acts for the sake of it, must be conceived as his own good." +[Footnote: _Prolegomena to Ethics,_ Sec 92.] The motive to action is, +he maintains, always "some idea of the man's personal good." [Footnote: Sec +Sec 95, 97.] He does not hesitate to say that a man necessarily lives for +himself; [Footnote: Sec 138.] and he calls "the human self or the man" +[Footnote: Sec 99.] a self-seeking ego, a self-seeking subject, and a self- +seeking person. [Footnote: Sec Sec 98, 100, 145.] + +Were Green's book a lost work, only preserved to the memories of men by +such citations as the above, the author would certainly be relegated to a +class of moralists with which he had, in fact, little sympathy. + +But the book is not lost, and by turning to it we find Green continuing +the first of the above citations with the words: "Though he may conceive +it as his own good only on account of his interest in others, and in +spite of any amount of suffering on his own part incidental to its +attainment." He is willing to grant the self-seeking ego an eye single to +its own interests, but he is careful to explain that: "These are not +merely interests dependent on other persons for the means to their +gratification, but interests in the good of those other persons, +interests which cannot be satisfied without the consciousness that those +other persons are satisfied." [Footnote: Sec 199.] + +When Hobbes gave an account of "the passions that incline men to peace," +[Footnote: _Leviathan,_ I, xiii.] he made no mention of the social +nature of man. That nature Green conceives to be so essentially social +that the individual cannot disentangle his own good from the good of his +fellows. To live "for himself," since that self is a social self, means +to live for others. May this fairly be called egoistic doctrine? + +98. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE SELF?--It is sufficiently clear that the +happiness, or good, or advantage, or interests of the individual or self +may mean many things. It is equally clear that in our interpretation of +all such terms our notions of the nature of the self will play no +inconsiderable role. What is the self? + +In his famous chapter on the Consciousness of Self, [Footnote: +_Psychology,_ New York, 1890, I, chapter x.] William James +enumerates four senses of the word. With three of these we may profitably +occupy ourselves here. He calls them the Material Self, the Social Self +and the Spiritual Self. + +The innermost part of the material self he makes our body, and next to +it, in their order, he places our clothes, our family, our home, and our +property. They contribute to our being what we are in our own eyes, we +identify ourselves with them, and we experience "a sense of the shrinkage +of our personality" when even the more outlying elements, such as our +possessions, are lost. "Our immediate family," he writes, "is a part of +ourselves. Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our +bone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is +gone. If they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are insulted, +our anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in their place." + +It is obvious that the limits of the material self, as above understood, +may be indefinitely extended. There are men who feel about their country +as the average normal man feels about his home; and doubtless the +suffering of a stray beggar tugged at the heart of St. Francis as the +misfortune of wife or child does in the case of other men. How far abroad +our "interests" are to be found, and just what "interests" we shall +regard as intimately and peculiarly our own, depends upon what we are. + +The Social Self James describes as the recognition a man gets from his +mates: "We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in the sight of +our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, +and noticed favorably, by our kind." Men certainly regard their fame or +honor as to be included among their interests, and they may value and +seek to obtain the good opinion of a very little clique or of a much +wider circle. + +By the Spiritual Self is meant our qualities of mind and character--"the +most enduring and intimate part of the Self, that which we most verily +seem to be." Our interest in these it is impossible to overlook, and +their cultivation and development may become a ruling passion. + +James's illuminating pages make clear that he who speaks of the advantage +or interest of the individual may have in mind predominantly any one of +these aspects of the Self, or all of them conjointly. The Self as he +conceives it may be a narrow one, or it may be a very broad one. + +99. EGOISM AND THE BROADER SELF.--It may with some plausibility be +maintained that he who lives for himself may not properly be regarded as +an egoist and called selfish, if his Self is sufficiently expanded. May +it not, theoretically, include as much of the universe as is known to +man? And where can a man seek ends of any sort beyond this broad field? +On this view, all men are, in a sense, self-seeking, but only those are +reprehensibly self-seeking who have narrow and scanty selves. + +But common sense and the common usage of speech do not sanction such +statements as that a man necessarily lives for himself and that all men +are self-seeking. It is justly recognized that some men with broad +interests--of a sort--are self-seeking, and that some others with great +limitations are not. + +He who has property scattered over four continents and watches with +absorbing interest all movements upon the political and economic stage +may nevertheless be a thorough-going egoist. The breadth of his horizon +will not redeem him. One may look far afield and live laborious days in +the pursuit of fame, and be egoistic to the back-bone, although one's +interests, in this case, include even the contents of the minds of +generations yet unborn. One may forego many pleasures and concentrate all +one's efforts upon the attainment of intellectual eminence or of a +virtuous character, and yet seem to have a claim to the name of egoist. + +That even the pursuit of virtue may take an egoistic turn has frequently +been recognized: "Woe betides that man," writes Dewey, "who having +entered upon a course of reflection which leads to a clearer conception +of his own moral capacities and weaknesses, maintains that thought as a +distinct mental end, and thereby makes his subsequent acts simply means +to improving or perfecting his moral nature." [Footnote: _Ethics_, +chapter xviii, Sec 3, p. 384.] He characterizes this as one of the worst +kinds of selfishness. The task set himself by the egoist who aims at +outshining his fellows in an unselfish self-forgetfulness would seem to +be a particularly difficult one; yet we have all met persons who appear +to be animated by some such desire. + +100. Egoism not Unavoidable.--On such cases as the above the common +judgment can hardly be in doubt. But there are cases more questionable. +Was Hobbes really self-seeking when he gave the sixpence to the old +beggar? Is it egoism that leads the young mother to give herself the +exquisite pleasure of feeding and caring for her babes? or that induces +the patriot to die for his country? To be sure, both the babes and the +fatherland may fall within the limits of the self, as the psychologist +has broadly defined it. + +But they fall within it only in a sense. No doctrine of the mutual +inclusion of selves can obliterate the distinction between self and +neighbor, and make my neighbor _merely_ a part of myself. The common +opinion of mankind is not at fault in basing upon the distinction between +selves the further distinction between egoism and altruism. Whatever +interests the egoist may have, his ultimate motive to action +_cannot_ be the recognition of the desire or will of another. Such +can be the motive of the altruist. + +Human motives are of many sorts, and just what they are it is not always +easy to discover. Cornelia, in exhibiting her "jewels," may have been +puffed up with pride. When Cyrano de Bergerac threw, with a noble +gesture, his purse to the players, his "Mais quel geste!" reveals that he +was a player himself and was "showing off." There may be spectacular +patriots, who are willing to suffer the extreme penalty for the sake of a +place in history. But all maternal affection is not identical with pride; +all generous impulses cannot be traced to vanity; all patriotism is not +spectacular; nor is the motive to the relief of suffering necessarily the +removal of one's own pain. It is one thing to hire Lazarus not to exhibit +himself in his shocking plight on our front porch, and it is a distinctly +different thing to be concerned about the needs of Lazarus _per se_. + +It is obvious, then, that it is only by a straining of language that one +can say that man necessarily lives for himself, or is unavoidably self- +seeking. He who makes such statements overlooks the fact that, even if is +true that, in a sense, a man's self may be regarded as coextensive with +all that interests him, it is equally true that different selves are +mutually exclusive and that the good of one may serve as the ultimate +motive in determining the action of another. The ethnologist is compelled +to recognize altruistic impulses in men primitive and in men civilized: +"Of the doctrine of self-interest as the primary and only genuine human +motive, it is sufficient to say that it bears no relation to the facts of +human nature, and implies an incorrect view of the origin of instinct." +[Footnote: HOBHOUSE, _Morals in Evolution_, p. 16] + +101. Varieties of Egoism.--The egoist may set his affections upon +pleasure, and become a representative of Egoistic Hedonism, the variety +of egoism normally treated as typical and made the subject of criticism +in ethical treatises. But there is nothing to prevent him from making his +aim, not so much pleasure, as self-preservation; or from taking as his +goal wealth, power, reputation, intellectual or moral attainment, or what +not. [Footnote: Thus, Hobbes made his end self-preservation; Spinoza +takes much the same position; Nietzsche makes that which is aimed at, +power.] + +So long as the motives which impel him to get, to avoid, to be, or to do, +something, do not include, except as means to some ulterior end, the +desire or will of his fellow-man, there appears no reason to deny him the +title of "Egoist." Nor need we deny him the title because he may be +unconscious of his egoism. There are unconscious egoists who are wholly +absorbed in the individual objects which are the end of their strivings. +They may be quite unaware that they are ruled by self-interest, when it +is clear to the spectator that such is the case. [Footnote: James, +_Psychology_, Vol. I, chapter x, pp. 319-321; a baby is +characterized as "the completest egoist."] But the philosophical egoist +must rise to a higher plane of reflection. + +There are, thus, egoisms of many sorts, and they may urge men to very +different courses of conduct. Some of them may pass over more naturally +than others into forms of doctrine which are not egoistic at all. He who +aims at a maximum of pleasure for himself is likely to remain an egoist; +he whose ambition is to be a patron of science or a philanthropist, may, +it is true, remain within the circle of the self, but it is quite +possible that his ulterior aim may come to be forgotten and his real +interest be transferred to the enlightenment of mankind or to the relief +of suffering. + +It is especially worthy of remark that in judging a system of doctrine we +must take it as a whole, and not confine ourselves to a few utterances of +the man who urges it, however unequivocal they may appear when taken in +isolation. He whose motive to action is always some idea of his own +personal good is an egoist. But a philosopher may hold that human motives +are always of this sort, and yet reveal unmistakably, both in his life +and in his writings, that he is not really an egoist at all. In which +case, we may tax him with more or less inconsistency, but we should not +misconceive him. + +102. THE ARGUMENTS FOR EGOISM.--So much for the forms of egoism. It +remains to enquire what may be urged in favor of the doctrine, and what +may be said against it. + +(1) It has been urged that egoism is inevitable. This, to be sure, can +scarcely be regarded as an argument that a man _ought_ to be an +egoist, for there seems little sense in telling a man that he ought to do +what he cannot possibly help doing. But the argument may be used to deter +us from advocating some other ethical doctrine. + +"On the occasion of every act that he exercises," says Bentham, "every +human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his +view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest +degree contributory to his own greatest happiness." [Footnote: _The +Constitutional Code_. Introduction, Sec 2.] + +From this we might conclude, not only that every man is an egoist, but +also that every man is at all times a prudent and calculating egoist-- +which seems to flatter grossly the drunkard and the excited man laying +about him in blind fury. But one may hold that egoism is inevitable +without going so far. [Footnote: Psychological Hedonism, the doctrine +that "volition is always determined by pleasures or pains actual or +prospective," need not be thus exaggerated. See SIDGWICK's _Methods of +Ethics_, I, iv, Sec 1.] + +(2) The egoistic ideal may be urged upon us on the ground that it +addresses itself to man as natural and reasonable. + +Thus, the Cyrenaics saw in the fact that we are from our childhood +attracted to pleasure, and, when we have attained it, seek no further, a +proof that pleasure is the chief good. [Footnote: _Diogenes +Laertius_, II, "Aristippus," Sec 8.] Paley maintains that, when it has +been pointed out that private happiness has been the motive of an act, +"no further question can reasonably be asked." [Footnote: _Moral +Philosophy_, II, Sec 3.] Our citations from Hobbes and Bentham and Green +reveal that these writers never think of giving reasons why a man should +seek his own good. + +And various moralists, who do not make self-interest the one fundamental +principle which should rule human conduct, are evidently loath to make of +it a principle subordinate to some other. Bishop Butler, who maintains +that virtue consists in the pursuit of right and good as such, yet holds +that: "When we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to +ourselves this nor any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will +be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." [Footnote: +_Sermon_ XI.] Clarke, who dwells upon the eternal and immutable +obligations of morality "incumbent on men from the very nature and reason +of things themselves" teaches that it is not reasonable for men to adhere +to virtue if they receive no advantage from it. [Footnote: _Boyle +Lectures_, 1705, Prop. I.] + +The moral here seems to be that, whatever else a man ought to do, he +ought to seek his own advantage--real self-sacrifice cannot be his duty. +This conviction of the unreasonableness of self-sacrifice reveals itself +in another form in the doctrine that morality cannot be made completely +rational unless a reconciliation between prudence and benevolence can be +found; [Footnote: SIDGWICK, _The Methods of Ethics_, concluding +chapter, Sec 5.] and in the labored attempts to show that the good of the +individual must actually coincide with that of the community. [Footnote: +_E. g._ GREEN, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec Sec 244-245. Aristotle +tries to prove that he who dies for his country is impelled by self-love. +He does what is honorable, and thus "gives the greater good to himself." +_Ethics_, Book IX, chapter viii.] It may be questioned whether the +same conviction did not lurk in the back of the mind of that sternest of +moralists, Kant, who denied that happiness ought to be sought at all, and +yet found so irrational the divorce of virtue and happiness that he +postulated a God to guarantee their union. [Footnote: _The Critique of +the Practical Reason_, chapter ii.] + +Thus, moralists of widely different schools agree in recognizing that +self-interest is a principle that should not be placed second to any +other. The confessed egoist only goes a step further in recognizing it as +a principle that has no rival. And that men generally are inclined to +regard egoism as not unnatural seems evinced by the fact that for +apparently altruistic actions they are very apt to seek ulterior egoistic +motives, while, if the action seems plainly egoistic, they seek no +further. + +Does, then, anything seem more natural than egoism? and, if natural, may +it not be assumed to be proper and right? + +(3) Finally, it may be urged that he who serves his own interests at all +intelligently has, at least, a comprehensive aim, and does not live at +random. In so far, egoism appears to be rational in a sense dwelt on +above; [Footnote: Sec Sec 55-56] it harmonizes and unifies the impulses and +desires of the man. + +103. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST EGOISM.--What may be said against egoism? + +(1) Enough has been said above to show that egoism is not inevitable, but +that men actually are influenced by motives which cannot be regarded as +egoistic. It is, hence, not necessary to dwell upon this point. + +(2) As to the naturalness of egoism. Both the professional moralist and +the man in the street may hesitate to admit that a man should neglect his +own interests, and may find it natural that he should cultivate them +assiduously. But it is only the exceptional man who maintains that he +should have nothing else in view. + +There are individuals so constituted that self-interest makes to them a +peculiarly strong appeal. Others, more social by nature, may be misled by +psychological theory to maintain that a man's chief and only end is his +own "satisfaction." [Footnote: See below, chapter xxvi, 3.] Still others, +realizing that both one's own interests and the interests of one's +neighbor are natural and seemingly legitimate objects of regard, are +perplexed as to the method of reconciling their apparently conflicting +claims, and are betrayed into inconsistent utterances. + +But it is too much to say that the professional moralist and the plain +man normally regard pure egoism with favor and find it natural. In spite +of our cynical maxims and our inclination to seek for ulterior motives +for apparently altruistic acts, we abhor the thorough-going egoist, and +we are not inclined to look upon the phenomena, let us say, of the family +life, as manifestations of self-seeking. + +It is worth while to remark that, even if the approach to the Cyrenaic +ideal were so common as not to seem wholly unnatural, that would not +prove that it ought to be embraced; it is natural for men to err, but +that does not make error our duty. + +(3) By the moral conviction of organized humanity, as expressed in +custom, law, and public opinion, egoism stands condemned. Neither in +savage life nor among civilized peoples, neither in the dawn of human +history nor in its latest chapters, do we find these agencies encouraging +every man to live exclusively for himself. Egoistic impulses are +recognized, in that reward and punishment are allotted, but the end urged +upon the attention of the individual is the common good, not his own +particular good. + +The social conscience has always demanded of the individual self- +sacrifice, even to the extent of laying down his life, on occasion, for +the public weal. And the enlightened social conscience does not regard a +man as truly moral whose outward conformity to moral laws rests solely +upon a basis of egoistic calculation. The very existence of the family, +the tribe, the state, is a protest against pure egoism. Were all men as +egoistic as Aristippus seems to have professed to be, a stable community +life of any sort would be impossible. + +(4) The argument that egoism is rational at least in so far as it +introduces consistency into actions and unifies and harmonizes desires +and impulses deserves little consideration. Any comprehensive end will do +the same, and many comprehensive ends may be very trivial. One may make +it the aim of one's life to remain slender, or may devote all one's +energies to the amelioration of the social position of bald-headed men. +He who counsels deliberate egoism does not recommend it merely on the +score that it leads to consistent action. He does it on the ground that +the end itself appeals to him as one that ought to be selected and will +be selected if a man is wise. That the interest of the individual is in +this sense a matter of obligation, is something to be proved, not +assumed. + +104. THE MORALIST'S INTEREST IN EGOISM--It has been worth while to treat +at length of egoism because the doctrine takes on more or less subtle +forms, and its fundamental principle, self-interest, has a significance +for various ethical schools which are not, or are not considered, +egoistic. Men have been vastly puzzled by the moral claims of the +principle of self-interest, both plain men and professional moralists. + +That prudence is not the only fundamental virtue, most men would be ready +enough to admit; but is it properly speaking, a virtue at all? +_Ought_ I, for example, to try to make myself happy? Suppose I do +not want to be happy, what is the source of the obligation? + +Butler tells me that interest, one's own happiness, is a manifest +obligation; [Footnote: _Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue_, Sec 8; +_Sermons_ III and XI.] Bentham, a writer of a widely different +school, informs me that "the constantly proper end of action on the part +of any individual at the moment of action is his real greatest happiness +from that moment to the end of his life." [Footnote: BENTHAM, +_Memoirs_, Vol. X of Bowring's Edition, Edinburgh, 1843, p. 560.] On +the other hand, Hutcheson teaches me that I am under no obligation to be +good to myself, although I am under obligation to be good to others: +"Actions which flow solely from self-love, and yet evidence no want of +benevolence, having no hurtful effects upon others, seem perfectly +indifferent in a moral sense." [Footnote: _An Enquiry concerning Moral +Good and Evil_, Sec 3, 5.] Which means that intemperance is blameworthy +only so far as it is against the public interest. + +May I, should I, on occasion, sacrifice myself? Thoughtful men generally +recognize self-sacrifice, not only as possible, but as actual, and +believe it to be at times a duty. But the moralist gives forth here an +uncertain sound. + +Self-interest and benevolence have been left to fight out their quarrel +in a court without a judge to decide upon their conflicting claims; +[Footnote: See Sec 102, the citations from Butler and Clarke.] self- +sacrifice has been enjoined; [Footnote: KANT, see, later, chapter xxix.] +it has been declared impossible; [Footnote: See, above, the position of +Green, Sec 97; cf., below, Sec 126.] it has been denied that it can ever +be a duty; [Footnote: FITE, _An Introductory Study of Ethics_, chapter +vii, Sec 5.] the kind of self-sacrifice in question has been regarded as +significant. [Footnote: SIDGWICK, _The Methods of Ethics_, +Introduction, Sec 4.] + +He who has rejected as unworthy of serious consideration the naive egoism +of an Aristippus or an Epicurus is not on that account done with egoism, +by any means. [Footnote: The question of self-sacrifice recurs again in +chapter xxvi, 3.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXV + +UTILITARIANISM + + +105. WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM?--The division of things desirable into those +desirable in themselves, and those desirable for the sake of something +else, is two thousand years old. Those things which we recognize as +desirable for the sake of something else, we call useful. + +What we shall regard as useful depends in each case upon the nature of +the end at which we aim. If our aim is the attainment of pleasure, the +preservation of life, the harmonious development of our faculties, or any +other, we may term useful whatever makes for the realization of that end. + +Hence, we can, by stretching the application of the word, call +utilitarian any ethical doctrine which sets an ultimate end to human +endeavor and judges actions as moral or the reverse, according to their +tendency to realize that end, or to frustrate its realization. As the +ends thus chosen may be very diverse, it is obvious that widely different +forms of utilitarian doctrine may come into being. + +It is, however, inconvenient to stretch the term, "utilitarianism" in +this fashion. Certain forms of doctrine which, in its wider sense, it +would include, have come to be known under names of their own; and, +besides, the especial type of utilitarianism advocated by Bentham and +John Stuart Mill appears to have a claim upon the appellation which they +set in circulation. Common usage has thus limited the significance of the +word, and we naturally think of the doctrine of these men when we hear it +uttered. It is in this sense that I shall use it. + +"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the +Greatest Happiness Principle," writes Mill, "holds that actions are right +in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to +produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and +the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." +This means, he adds, "that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only +things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things ... are desirable +either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the +promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." [Footnote: +_Utilitarianism_, chapter ii. In the pages following, when I leave +out a reference to pain in discussing the utilitarian doctrine, it will +be for convenience and for the sake of brevity. The intelligent reader +can supply the omissions. ] + +The pleasure here intended is not the selfish pleasure of the individual. +Utilitarianism is not Cyrenaicism. The goal of the utilitarian's +endeavors is the general happiness, in which many individuals +participate. The moral rules which control and direct the strivings of +the individual derive their authority from their tendency to serve this +end. + +106. BENTHAM'S DOCTRINE.--Most uncompromising is the utilitarianism set +forth in the writings of Mill's master, that most benevolent and +philanthropic of men, Jeremy Bentham. He is true to his principles and he +makes no concessions. + +He regards that as in the interest of the individual which tends to add +to the sum total of his pleasures or to diminish the sum total of his +pains. And he understands in the same sense the interest of the +community. [Footnote: _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, +chapter i, Sec 5.] That which serves that interest he sets down as +"conformable to the principle of utility." What is thus conformable he +declares ought to be done, what is not conformable ought not to be done. +Right and wrong he distinguishes in the same manner. "When thus +interpreted," he insists, "the words _ought_, and _right_ and +_wrong_, and others of that stamp, have a meaning; when otherwise, +they have none" [Footnote: _Ibid_., i, 10.] + +Of differences in quality between pleasures Bentham takes no account. In +his curious and interesting chapter entitled "Value of a Lot of Pleasure +or Pain, how to be Measured," he enumerates the circumstances which +should determine the value of a pleasure or a pain. They are as follows: +[Footnote: _Ibid_., chapter iv.] + +1. Its intensity. 2. Its duration. 3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. +Its propinquity or remoteness. 5. Its fecundity. 6. Its purity. 7. Its +extent. + +The first four of these characteristics call for no comment. By the +fecundity of a pleasure Bentham understands its likelihood of being +followed by other pleasures; by its purity, the likelihood that it will +not be followed by pains. The characteristic "extent" marks off +utilitarianism from egoism, for it has reference to the number of persons +affected by the pleasure or the pain. The greater the number, the higher +the value in question. The greatest number of pleasures of the highest +value, as free as possible from admixture with pains, is the goal of the +endeavors of the utilitarian. Naturally, when the interests of many +persons are taken into account, the question of the principle according +to which "lots" of pleasure are to be distributed becomes a pressing one. +Bentham decides it as follows: "Everybody to count for one, and nobody +for more than one." [Footnote: See the discussion of Bentham's dictum in +its bearings on justice, J. S. Mill, _Utilitarianism_, chapter v.] +In other words, the distribution should be an impartial one. + +At first sight, this account of the relative desirability of pleasures +and undesirability of pains seems sensible enough. Men do desire +pleasure, and they undoubtedly approve the preference given to pleasures +more intense, enduring, certain, immediate, fruitful in further +pleasures, free from painful consequences, and shared by many, over those +which have not these characteristics: + + "_Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure_-- + Such marks in _pleasures_ and in _pains_ endure. + Such pleasures seek, if _private_ be thy end: + If it be _public_, wide let them _extend_. + Such _pains_ avoid, whichever be thy view; + If pains _must_ come, let them _extend_ to few." + +[Footnote: _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, chapter iv, i, +Note.] + +These mnemonic lines may well strike many readers as embodying a very +good working rule of common-sense morality; as paying a proper regard to +prudence and to benevolence as well. But there are passages in Bentham +calculated to shake such acquiescence. He writes: + +"Now pleasure is in _itself_ a good; nay, even setting aside +immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil, and, indeed +without exception, the only evil; or else the words good and evil have no +meaning. And this is alike true of every sort of pain, and of every sort +of pleasure." [Footnote: _Ibid_., chapter x, 10.] + +"Let a man's motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it +is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at +the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary +undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good: it +may be faint; it may be short; it must at any rate be impure: yet, while +it lasts, and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any +other that is not more intense." [Footnote: _Ibid_, note.] + +Reflection upon such passages may well lead a man to ask himself: + +(1) Is it, after all, the consensus of human opinion that pleasure is the +only good and pain the only evil? + +(2) Are some pleasures actually regarded as more desirable than others, +solely through the application of the standard given above? + +(3) Can the pleasure of a malignant act properly be called _morally_ +good at all? + +107. THE DOCTRINE OF JOHN STUART MILL.--Bentham's purely quantitative +estimate of the value of pleasures has aroused in many minds the feeling +that he puts morality upon a low level. [Footnote: In justice to Bentham +it must be borne in mind that his prime interest was not in ethical +theory, but in legislative reform. His doctrine, such as it was, and +applied as he applied it, was a tool of no mean efficacy. Bentham must +count among the real benefactors of mankind.] Mill attempts an +improvement upon his doctrine. "It is quite compatible with the principle +of utility," he writes, "to recognize the fact that some _kinds_ of +pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be +absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered +as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to +depend on quantity alone." [Footnote: _Utilitarianism_, chapter i.] + +Thus, Mill distinguishes between higher pleasures and lower, and he gives +a criterion for distinguishing the former from the latter: "Of two +pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience +of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral +obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure." He refers +the whole matter to the judgment of the "competent;" and, in accordance +with that judgment, decides that: "It is better to be a human being +dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied +than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different +opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The +other party to the comparison knows both sides." [Footnote: _Ibid_.] + +That some pleasures may properly be called higher than others moralists +of many schools will be ready to admit, but to Mill's criterion of what +proves them to be higher they may demur. Of the delight that a fool takes +in his folly a wise man may be as incapable as a fool is of the enjoyment +of wisdom. With mature years men cease to be competent judges of the +pleasures of boyhood. To each nature, its appropriate choice of +pleasures. That human beings at a given level of intellectual and +emotional development actually desire certain things rather than certain +others does not prove that those things are desirable in any general +sense. It does not prove that men _ought_ to desire them. For that +proof we must look in some other direction; and a critical scrutiny of +the pleasures which moralists ancient and modern have generally accepted +as "higher" reveals a common characteristic which explains their being +thus classed together much better than the appeal to Mill's criterion. +[Footnote: See chapter xxx, Sec 142.] + +As has often been pointed out, Mill, while defending Utilitarianism, +really passes beyond it, and his doctrine tends to merge in one widely +different from that of Bentham. For the "Greatest Happiness Principle" he +virtually substitutes the "Highest Happiness Principle." But he scarcely +realizes the significance of his substitution, and he gives an inadequate +account of the significance of higher and lower. + +108. THE ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM.--We have seen above that Bentham +maintains that such words as "ought," "right" and "wrong" have no meaning +unless interpreted after the fashion of the utilitarian. He admits that +his "principle of utility" is not susceptible of direct proof, but claims +that such a proof is needless. [Footnote: Principles of Morals and +Legislation, chapter i, 11.] + +Accepting it as a fact revealed by observation that the actual end of +action on the part of every individual is his own happiness as he +conceives it, he appears to have passed on without question to the +further positions, that the _proper_ end of action of the individual +is his own greatest happiness, and, yet, his _proper_ end of action, +as a member of a community, is the greatest happiness of the community. +[Footnote: See the paper entitled "Logical Arrangements, Employed as +Instruments in Legislation" etc., _Memoirs_, Bowring's Edition, +Volume X, page 560.] + +The second of these positions cannot be deduced from the first, nor can +the third be inferred from the other two. Bentham appears to have taken +the "principle of utility" for granted; but one coming after him and +scrutinizing his work can scarcely avoid raising the question of the +justice of his assumption. That happiness is the only thing desirable, +and that the happiness of all should be the object aimed at by each, are +propositions which seem to stand in need of proof. + +Such proof Mill attempted to furnish. [Footnote: He does not regard his +doctrine as provable in the usual sense; but he adduces what he regards +as "equivalent to proof." _Utilitarianism_, chapter i. ] He argues +as follows: + +"The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that +people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that +people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like +manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that +anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end +which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and +practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any +person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness +is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be +attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we +have not only all the proof the case admits of, but all which it is +possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's +happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, +a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title +as _one_ of the ends of conduct, and, consequently one of the ends +of morality." [Footnote: _Utilitarianism_, chapter iv.] + +That happiness is the _only ultimate_ end, Mill regards as +established by the argument that other things, for example, virtue, +though they come to be valued for themselves, do so only through the fact +that, originally valued as means to the attainment of happiness, they +become, through association, valued even out of this relation, and thus +treated as a part of happiness. [Footnote: _Ibid._] + +The defects in Mill's argument have made themselves apparent, not merely +to the opponents of utilitarianism, but even to its advocates. [Footnote: +SIDGWICK, _The Methods of Ethics_, Book III, chapter xiii, Sec 5] We +cannot say that things are desirable in any moral sense, simply because +they are desired. In a loose sense of the word, everything that is or has +been desired by anyone is desirable--it evidently can be desired. When we +say no more than this, we say nothing. But when we call a course of +action desirable we mean more than this; and we are compelled to admit +that a multitude of desirable things are not generally desired. This is +the burden of the lament of every reformer. + +Furthermore, it does not appear to follow that, because his own happiness +is a good to each member of a community, the happiness of all must +likewise be a good to each severally. A community in which every man +studies his own interest may conceivably be a community in which no man +regards it as desirable to consult the public weal. That the general +happiness is desirable, in a loose sense of the word, is palpable fact; +it is obvious that it can be desired, for some persons do actually desire +it. But that it is desirable in any sense cannot be inferred from the +fact that all men desire something else, namely, their own individual +happiness. + +We must, then, look further for the proof of the utilitarian principle. +Henry Sidgwick, that admirable scholar and most judicial mind, falls back +upon certain intuitions which, he conceives, present themselves as +ultimate and unassailable. He writes: + +"Let us reflect upon the clearest and most certain of our moral +intuitions. I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and +certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic or Geometry, that it is +'right' and 'reasonable' for me to treat others as I should think that I +myself ought to be treated under similar conditions, and to do what I +believe to be ultimately conducive to universal Good or Happiness." + +And again: "The propositions, 'I ought not to prefer a present lesser +good to a future greater good,' and 'I ought not to prefer my own lesser +good to the greater good of another,' do present themselves as self- +evident; as much (e. g.) as the mathematical axiom that 'if equals be +added to equals the wholes are equal.'" [Footnote: _The Methods of +Ethics_, concluding chapter, Sec 5, and Book III, chapter xiii, Sec 3.] + +Whether these intuitions will be accepted as furnishing an indisputably +sound basis for utilitarianism will depend upon one's attitude toward +intuitions in general and the list of intuitions one is inclined to +accept. It is significant that Sidgwick does not accept as self-evident +such subordinate propositions as, "I ought to speak the truth." He +regards their authority as derived from the Greatest Happiness Principle. + +109. THE DISTRIBUTION OF HAPPINESS.--The man who accepts the Greatest +Happiness Principle as the sole basis of his ethical doctrine is faced +with the problem of its application in detail. The "greatest good of the +greatest number" is a vague expression. What is properly understood by +"the greatest number"? and upon what principle shall "lots" of happiness +be assigned to each? Very puzzling questions arise when we approach the +problem of the distribution of pleasures and the calculation of their +values. Let us look at them. + +I. Who should be considered in the Distribution? + +(1) Shall we aim directly at the happiness of all men now living? or +shall we content ourselves with a smaller number? Certainly, with +increasing intelligence and broadening sympathies, men tend toward a more +embracing benevolence. + +(2) Shall we admit to the circle generations yet unborn? and, if so, how +far into the future should we look? + +(3) Should we make a deliberate attempt to increase the number of those +who may share the common fund of happiness, by striving for an increase +in the number of births? This end has been consciously sought for divers +reasons. The ancestor-worship of China has made the Chinaman eagerly +desirous of leaving behind him those who would devote themselves to him +after he has departed this life. Nations ancient and modern have +endeavored to strengthen the state by providing for an increase in its +population. Shall a similar end be pursued for the ethical purpose of +widening the circle of those who shall live and be happy? Most ethical +teachers do not appear to have regarded this as a corollary to the +doctrine of benevolence. + +(4) Shall we enlarge the circle so as to include the lower animals? As +Bentham expressed it: The question is not, "Can they _reason_? nor, +Can they _talk_? but, Can they _suffer_?" [Footnote: _Principles of Morals +and Legislation_, chapter xvii, Sec 4.] + +II. How should the "lots" of happiness be measured? + +(1) Should everybody count as one, and nobody as more than one? in other +words, should strict impartiality be aimed at? + +Dr. Westermarck's striking reply to the argument for impartiality as +urged by Professor Sidgwick has already been quoted. [Footnote: See +chapter v, Sec 16.] Let the reader glance at it again. + +It must be confessed that to put one's parents, one's children, one's +neighbors, strangers, foreigners, the brutes, all upon the same level, is +contrary to the moral judgment of savage and civilized alike. It would +seem contrary to the sentiments which lie at the root of the family, the +community, and the state. Nor have we reason to look forward to any +future state of human society in which such lesser groups within the +broad circle of humanity will be done away with, though they tend to +become less exclusive in their demands upon human sympathy. + +(2) Suppose that the greatest sum of happiness on the whole could be best +attained by an unequal distribution--by making a limited number very +happy at the expense of the rest. Would this be justifiable? It would be +in harmony with the Greatest Happiness Principle, though not with the +principle of the greatest happiness equally shared. + +III. The question of the distribution of happiness in the life of the +individual is not one to be ignored. If we are concerned only with the +quantity of happiness, may we not take as the ethical precept "a short +life and a merry one"--provided the brief span of years be merry enough, +and there be no objection to the choice on the score of harm to others? + +This problem is closely analogous to that of the distribution of +pleasures to those who compose the "greatest number" taken into account. +There we were concerned with the shares allotted to individuals; here we +are concerned with the shares assigned to the different parts of a single +life. In the attempt to solve the problem, Bentham's criteria of +intensity, certainty, purity, etc., might naturally be appealed to. + +110. THE CALCULUS OF PLEASURES.--Nor are the problems which meet us less +perplexing when we pass from questions of the distribution of pleasures +to that of the calculus of pleasures. How are delights and miseries to be +weighed, and reasonably balanced? + +(1) Men desire pleasure, and they desire to avoid pain. The two seem to +be opposed. But men constantly accept pleasures which entail some +suffering, and they avoid pains even at the expense of some pleasure. +Are, however, pleasures and pains strictly commensurable? How much +admixture of pain is called for to reduce the value of a pleasure to +zero? and how much pleasure, added to a pain, will make the whole +emotional state predominantly a pleasurable one? A disagreeable taste and +an agreeable odor may be experienced together, but they cannot be treated +as an algebraic sum. If we do so treat them, we seem to fall back upon +the assumption that the mere fact that the heterogeneous complex is +accepted or rejected is evidence that its ingredients have been measured +and compared. This is an ungrounded assumption. + +(2) Undoubtedly men prefer intense pleasures to mild ones, and those +long-continued to those which are fleeting. But what degree of intensity +will overbalance what period of duration? Here, again, we appear to be +without a unit of measure, both in the case of pleasures and of pains. + +(3) Obviously, he who would distribute pleasures with impartiality must +take into consideration the natures and capacities of the recipients. All +are not susceptible of pleasure in the same degree, nor are all capable +of enjoying the same pleasures. It is small kindness to a cat to offer it +hay; nor will the miser thank us for the opportunity to enjoy the +pleasures of liberality. The gift which arouses deep emotion in one man, +will leave another cold. The diversity of natures would make the calculus +of pleasures, in any accurate sense of the expression, a most difficult +problem, even if such a calculus were admissible in the case of a single +individual. [Footnote: This difficulty has not been overlooked by the +Utilitarian, see BENTHAM, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, +chapter vi.] + +III. THE DIFFICULTIES OF OTHER SCHOOLS.--It would be unjust to the +utilitarian not to point out that those who advocate other doctrines must +find some way of coping with the difficulties which embarrass him. + +Thus, the egoist may ignore duties to others, but he cannot free himself +from the problems of the distribution of happiness in his own life and of +the calculus of pleasures. The intuitionist, who, among other precepts, +accepts as ultimate those enjoining upon him justice and benevolence, may +well ask himself toward whom these virtues are to be exercised, and +whether the claims of all who belong to the class in question are +identical in kind and degree. If they are not, he must find some rule for +estimating their relative importance. He who makes it his moral ideal to +Follow Nature, to Strive for Perfection, or to Realize his Capacities, +must determine in detail what conduct, self-regarding and other- +regarding, the acceptance of such aims entails. Only the unreflective can +regard the utilitarian as having a monopoly of the difficulties which +face the moralist. The vague general statement that we should strive to +render others happy--a duty recognized by men of very different schools-- +never frees us from the perplexities which arise when it is asked: What +others? With what degree of impartiality? When? By what means? But that +such questions can be approached by a path more satisfactory than that +followed by the utilitarian, there is good reason to maintain. [Footnote: +See, below, chapter xxx, Sec Sec 140-142.] + +112. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR UTILITARIANISM.--It is worth while to +summarize what may be said for utilitarianism, and what may be said +against it. It may be argued in its favor: + +(1) That it appears to set as the aim of human endeavor, an intelligible +end, and a fairly definite one. Everyone has some notion of what +happiness means, and is not without ideas touching the way to seek his +own happiness, or to contribute to that of others. + +(2) The end is one actually desired by men at all stages of intellectual +and moral development. Men are impelled to seek their own happiness, and +there are few who do not feel impelled to take into consideration, to +some degree, at least, the happiness of some others. + +(3) The general happiness is not merely desired by some men, but it is +felt to be _desirable;_ that is, it is an end not out of harmony +with the moral judgments of mankind. It makes its appeal to the social +nature of man; it seems to furnish a basis for the exercise of +benevolence and justice. + +(4) The utilitarian's clear recognition of the general happiness as the +ultimate end of human endeavor, and his insistence that institutions, +laws and moral maxims must be judged solely by their fitness to serve as +means to that end, have made him an energetic apostle of reform, and +intolerant of old and passively accepted abuses. His insistence upon the +principle of impartiality in the distribution of happiness has made him a +champion of the inarticulate and the oppressed. Whatever one may think of +his abstract principles, the general character of the specific measures +he has advocated must meet with the approval of enlightened moralists of +very different schools. + +113. ARGUMENTS AGAINST UTILITARIANISM.--Against utilitarianism as an +ethical theory various objections have been brought or may be brought. + +(1) Objection may be taken to the utilitarian assumption that the only +ultimate object of desire is pleasure or happiness. + +It was pointed out forcibly by Bishop Butler in the eighteenth century +that men desire many things besides pleasure. Man's desires are an +outcome of his nature, and that results in "particular movements towards +particular external objects"--honor, power, the harm or good of another. +[Footnote: _Sermons_, Preface, Sec 29; cf. Sermon XI.] To be sure, "no +one can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own," but +this is no evidence that what he seeks in acting is always pleasure. +Particular passions or appetites are, Butler ingeniously argues, +"necessarily presupposed by the very idea of an interested pursuit; since +the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite +or affection enjoys its object." + +Here we find our attention called to a very important truth, the +significance of which there is danger of our overlooking. Pleasure or +happiness is not something that can be parcelled up and handed about +independently of the nature of the recipient. It is not everyone who can +desire everything and feel pleasure in its attainment. That the objects +of desire and will are many, and that the strivings of conscious +creatures have in view many ends, and vary according to the impulsive and +instinctive endowments of the creatures in question, has been well +brought out in the admirable studies of instinct which we now have at our +disposal. The most ardent devotee of pleasure must recognize, that only +certain pleasures are open to him; that, such as they are, they are a +revelation of his nature and capacities; that pleasures, if sought at +all, cannot be secured directly, but only as the result of a successful +striving for objects not pleasures, which bring pleasure as their +accompaniment. He who would have the pleasure of eating must desire food; +and neither food, nor the eating of food, can be regarded as, _per +se_, pleasure. The pleasure of the brooding hen is beyond the reach of +man, who, however pleasure-loving, cannot desire to sit upon eggs, and so +must forego the pleasure which, in the case of the bird, crowns that +exercise. + +Such considerations as the above have led some moralists to define, as +the end of desire, not pleasure, but self-satisfaction. Every desire, it +is pointed out, strives to satisfy itself in the attainment of its +appropriate object. With the attainment of the object, the desire has +produced its proper fruit and ceases to be. It is admitted that the +satisfaction of desire is accompanied by pleasure, but it is denied that +the pleasure may be properly called the object of the desire, or regarded +as calling it into being: "The appetite of hunger must precede and +condition the pleasure which consists in its satisfaction. It cannot +therefore have that pleasure for its exciting object." [Footnote: GREEN, +_Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book III, chapter i, Sec 161. See also Book +II, chapter ii, Sec 131; Book III, chapter i, Sec Sec 154-160.] + +At the same time it is conceded that the idea of a pleasure to be +attained may "reinforce" the desire for an object, may "intensify the +putting forth of energy," and may tend "to sustain and prolong any mode +of action." [Footnote: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec 161; DEWEY, +_Ethics_, chapter xiv, Sec 1, p. 271; MCDOUGALL, _Social +Psychology_, London, 1916, p. 43.] It is further conceded that +pleasures may be consciously aimed at, but it is urged that this does not +result in true self-satisfaction, and is evidence of the existence of +unhealthy desires. [Footnote: _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec 158; DEWEY, +_Ethics_ p. 270.] + +The utilitarian is not wholly helpless in the face of such objections. He +may argue that, if it is difficult to see how a pleasure which is the +result of a desire may cause the desire, it is equally difficult to see +how it may prolong, reinforce or intensify it. And he may maintain that, +although the pursuit of pleasure, in certain forms, is calculated to +defeat its own aim and is undoubtedly unhealthy, this need not be the +case if one's aim be the true utilitarian one--the happiness of all. The +direct attack upon his Greatest Happiness Principle which consists in the +objection that, if pleasure is the only object of desire, a sum of +pleasures, as not being a pleasure, cannot be desired, [Footnote: +_Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec 221.] he can put aside with the remark +that no far-reaching and comprehensive aim can be realized at one stroke. +I can desire a long and useful life; this cannot be had all at once. I +can desire a long life full of pleasures; this cannot be enjoyed all at +once either. But each can certainly be the object of desire. + +But, when all is said, it remains true that the contention of those, who +distinguish sharply between the satisfaction of desire and the attainment +of pleasure, is of no little importance. It calls our attention to the +following truths: + +(a) We have definite instincts and impulses which tend to satisfy +themselves with their appropriate objects. + +(b) At their first exercise, our aim could not have been the pleasure +resulting from their satisfaction, for that could not have been foreseen. + +(c) Although, after experience, the attainment of pleasure may come to be +our aim in the exercise of many activities, and may often, as far as we +can see, be a natural and not unwholesome aim; it is by no means evident +that, even when we are experienced and reflective, the exercise of our +faculties comes to be regarded _only_ as a means to the attainment +of pleasure. + +(d) The hedonist, in maintaining that pleasure is the only ultimate +object of desire, appears, thus, to be committed to the doctrine that the +satisfaction of all other desires is subordinated to the satisfaction of +the desire for pleasure. For this position he can furnish no adequate +proof. Self-evident the doctrine is not. + +(e) It is incumbent upon him, as a moralist, to prove, not merely that +all other satisfactions are, but also that they _ought_ to be +subordinated to the satisfaction of the desire for pleasure. This he +appears to assume without proof. + +(2) We have seen above [Footnote: See Sec 108.] that the fundamental +principle of utilitarian hedonism, as against egoistic, namely, the +making the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number the object of the +endeavors of each individual, has not been satisfactorily established by +leading utilitarians. Bentham assumes the principle; Mill advances a +doubtful argument; Sidgwick falls back upon intuitions which all will not +admit to be indubitable. To his assertion: "Reason shows me that if my +happiness is desirable and a good, the equal happiness of any other +person must be equally desirable," [Footnote: _The Methods of +Ethics_, Book III, chapter xiv, Sec 5.] the doubter may reply: Desirable +to whom? to him or to me? + +(3) Finally, it may be objected that the consistent utilitarian, in +making pleasure, abstractly taken, the only ultimate good, and in +regarding as the sole criterion of right actions their tendency to +produce pleasure, really tears pleasure out of its moral setting +altogether. + +Thus Bentham's contention [Footnote: Sec 106, above.] that the pleasure a +man may derive from the exercise of malice or cruelty is, "taken by +itself," good--while it lasts, and before any bad consequences have set +in, as good as any other that is not more intense--derives what +plausibility it has, from an ambiguity in the word "good." Pleasure, +taken by itself, is undoubtedly pleasure, whatever be its source. To +affirm this is mere tautology. And, if we chose to make "good" but a +synonym for pleasure, we remain in the same tautology when we affirm that +every pleasure is a good. But Bentham assumed that good in this sense and +moral good are the same thing. + +His assumption is not borne out by the moral judgments of mankind. Even a +cursory view of those moral judgments as revealed in customs, laws and +public opinion makes it evident that, under certain circumstances, +pleasure is regarded as, from a moral standpoint, a good, and, under +other circumstances, an evil. Torn out of its setting, it is simply +pleasure, a psychological phenomenon like any other, with no ethical +significance. + +Take the case of the pleasure enjoyed by the malignant man. It may be +intense, if he be peculiarly susceptible to such pleasure. The pain +suffered by his victim may conceivably be less intense. Both may die +before the "bad consequences," that is to say, other pains, arrive. There +may be no spectators. Is, in such a case, the pleasure one to be called a +"good"? Can it _be approved?_ No reflective moralist would maintain +that it can. Which means that the moralists, in all ages, have meant by +"good" something more than pleasure, taken abstractly, and that Bentham's +assumption may be regarded as an aberration. + +114. TRANSFIGURED UTILITARIANISM.--It is possible to hold to a +utilitarianism more circumspect and less startling than Bentham's. It is +possible, while maintaining that pleasure is the only thing that an +experienced and reasonable being can regard as ultimately desirable, to +maintain at the same time that it is rash for any man to attempt to seek +his own happiness, or to strive to promote the general happiness, without +taking into very careful consideration the instincts and impulses of man +and the nature of the social organization which has resulted from man's +being what he is. One may argue that the experience of the race is, as a +rule, a safer guide than the independent judgment of the individual; and +that, in the secular endeavor to compass the general happiness, it has +discovered the paths to that goal which may most successfully be +followed. Thus, one may distrust Utopian schemes, recognizing the +significance of custom, law, traditional moral maxims, and public +opinion, and yet remain a utilitarian. + +But he who does this must still answer the preceding objections. He must +prove: (1) That pleasure is the only thing ultimately desirable; (2) that +each is under obligation to promote the pleasure of all; (3) that its +mere conduciveness to the production of a preponderance of pleasure makes +an action right, even though the pleasure be a malicious one, as in the +illustration above given. + +Still, his doctrine has become less startling, and he has moved in the +direction of a greater harmony with the moral judgments of men generally. +The conduct he recommends need not, as a rule, differ greatly from that +recognized as right by moralists of quite different schools. + +Such a utilitarian may easily pass over to a form of doctrine which is +not utilitarian at all. Thus, Sidgwick asks whether there is a measurable +quality of feeling expressed by the word "pleasure," which is independent +of its relation to volition, and strictly undefinable from its +simplicity--"like the quality of feeling expressed by 'sweet,' of which +also we are conscious in varying degrees of intensity;" and he answers: +"For my own part, when the term (pleasure) is used in the more extended +sense which I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle +intellectual and emotional gratifications, no less than the coarser and +more definite sensual enjoyments, I can find no common quality in the +feelings so designated except some relation to desire or volition." +[Footnote: _The Methods of Ethics_, Book II, chapter ii, Sec 2, 4th +Edition. SIDGWICK never appreciably modified this opinion, which is most +clearly expressed in the Edition quoted.] + +When we seek, then, to "give pleasure," are we doing nothing else than +giving recognition to the desire and will of our neighbor? What has +become of the Greatest Happiness Principle? Has it not dissolved into the +doctrine of the Real Social Will? + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI + +NATURE, PERFECTION, SELF-REALIZATION + + +I. NATURE + +115. HUMAN NATURE AS ACCEPTED STANDARD.--The three doctrines, that the +norm of moral action is to follow nature, that it is to aim at the +attainment of perfection, and that it is the realization of one's +capabilities, have much in common. They may conveniently be treated in +the same chapter. + +Early in the history of the ethics we find the moralist preaching that it +is the duty of man to follow nature, and branding vice as unnatural and, +hence, to be abhorred. + +The word "nature," thus used, has had a fluctuating meaning. Sometimes +the thought has been predominantly of human nature, and sometimes the +appeal has been to nature in a wider sense. + +Aristotle, who finds the "good" of man in happiness or "well-being," +points out that this is something relative to man's nature. The well- +being of a man he conceives as, in large part, "well-doing," and well- +doing he defines as performing the proper functions of a man. [Footnote: +_Nichomachean Ethics_, Book I, chapters iv, vii, viii.] If we ask +him what is proper or natural to man, he refers us to what man, when +fully developed, becomes: "What every being is in its completed state, +that certainly is the nature of that thing, whether it be a man, a house, +or a horse." [Footnote: _Politics_, i, 2.] He conceives man's +nature, thus, as that which it is in man to become. Toward this end man +strives; and it is this which furnishes him with the law of his action. + +But, it may be asked, how shall this end be defined in detail? Individual +men, who arrive at mature years, are by no means alike. Some we approve; +some we disapprove. We evidently appeal to a standard by which the +individual is judged. The appeal to the nature of man helps us little +unless we can agree upon what we may accept as a just revelation of that +nature--a pattern of some sort, divergence from which may be called +unnatural, and is to be reprobated. + +Neither Aristotle, nor those who, after him, took human nature as the +moral norm, were without some conception of such a pattern. They kept in +view certain things that men may become rather than certain others. They +accepted as their standard a type of human nature which tends, on the +whole, to realize itself more and more in the course of development of +human communities. But as different human societies differ more or less +in the characteristics which they tend to transmit to their members, in +the kind of man whom they tend to form, we find the ideal of human +nature, with which we are presented, somewhat vague and fluctuating. +Different traits are dwelt upon by different moralists. Still, the +appeals to human nature have a good deal in common; upon man's rational +and social qualities especial stress is apt to be laid. + +116. HUMAN NATURE AND THE LAW OF NATURE.--"Every nature," said Marcus +Aurelius, [Footnote: _Thoughts_, translated by George Long, viii, +7.] "is contented with itself when it goes on its way well; and a +rational nature goes on its way well, when in its thoughts it assents to +nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements to social +acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions to the things +which are in its power, and when it is satisfied with everything that is +assigned to it by the common Nature." + +In the last clause the Stoic turns from the contemplation of man's +nature, taken by itself, and dwells upon the nature of the universe, +which he conceives to be controlled by reason. He thus gains an added +argument for the obligations laid upon man by his own nature. He writes: + +"Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been +made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things +which are held together by Nature there is within and there abides in +them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit to reverence +this power, and to think that, if thou dost live and act according to its +will, everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence." [Footnote: +_Ibid_ vi, 40.] + +The law of man's nature is, thus, regarded as a part of the law of +Nature--"We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and +design, and others without knowing what they do." [Footnote: _Ibid_, +vi, 42.] And, this being the case, man may take pattern, when he is +inclined to fall below the standard of duty appropriate to him, by +considering humbler creatures: "Dost thou not see the little plants, the +little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in +order their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do +the work of a human being? And dost thou not make haste to do that which +is according to thy nature?" [Footnote: Ibid, v, 1. ] The delinquent is, +hence, judged guilty, not merely of derogation from his high estate, but +also of impiety. [Footnote: Ibid, ix, 1. ] + +117. VAGUENESS OF THE LAW OF NATURE.--The question of the influence of +religious belief upon a theory of morals I shall discuss elsewhere. +[Footnote: See chapter xxxvi.] Here it is only necessary to point out +that, if there is vagueness in the appeal to human nature, it can +scarcely be dissipated satisfactorily by simply turning to Nature in a +broader sense. Shall we, when in doubt as to human behavior, copy that of +the brutes? The industry of some humble creatures it seems edifying to +dwell upon; but from the fact that bees are stung to death by their +sisters in the hive, or that the spider is given to devouring her mate, +we can hardly draw a moral lesson for man. + +The appeal to a Law of Nature so often made in the history of ethical +speculation has furnished but a vague and elusive norm. He who makes it +is apt to fall back upon the moral intuitions with which he is furnished, +and to pack a greater or less number of them into his notion of Natural +Law. [Footnote: See SIR HENRY MAINE'S fascinating chapters on the "Law of +Nature," Ancient Law, chapters in and iv. The innumerable appeals to the +Law of Nature contained in Grotius's famous work on the "Law of War and +Peace" are very illuminating. ] + +In Cicero, Nature becomes fairly garrulous to man on all matters of +deportment: "Let us follow Nature, and refrain from whatever lacks the +approval of eye and ear. Let attitude, gait, mode of sitting, posture at +table, countenance, eyes, movement of the hands, preserve the +becomingness of which I speak." [Footnote: _De Officiis_, i, 35, +translated by Peabody,] + +118. THE APPEAL TO NATURE AND INTUITIONISM.--The moralists who urge us +to follow nature, whether human nature or Nature in a wider sense, we +may, hence, regard as intuitionists of a sort. Those who emphasize human +nature evidently depend upon their moral intuitions to give them +information as to its characteristics. It is intuition that paints for +them their pattern. They do not take man as they actually find him; they +call for the suppression of some traits, and the exaggeration of others. + +Nor are those who appeal to Nature in a wider sense less guided by moral +intuitions. The appeal is never made without restrictions and +limitations. No one dreams that the bird, the ant, the spider, the bee, +can be regarded as satisfactory teachers of morals to human beings. Each +may be occupied in putting in order its corner of the universe; but the +order attained is not a human order, and there is in it much that is +revolting to the moral judgments of mankind. Man must have a standard of +his own. He listens to Nature only when she tells him what he already +approves. + +As a form of intuitionism the doctrine of following.. nature may be +criticised in much the same way as other forms. One great merit it has. +It calls attention to the fact that ethics is a discipline which has no +significance abstracted from the nature of man. It appears absurd to say +that man ought to do what it is not in man, under any conceivable +circumstances, to do. And, like other forms of intuitionism, it has the +merit of avoiding that short-circuiting which may easily prove seductive +to the egoist or the utilitarian. He who accepts as his end either his +own happiness or that of men generally may easily be induced to take +short cuts to that end, and pay little attention to moral maxims as such. +He may treat lightly that great system of rules and observances by which +men are guided in their relations with one another, and which prevent +human societies from relapsing into a chaos. + +On the other hand, the follower of nature, like other intuitionists, may +easily be thrown into perplexity by the fact that what seems to him +natural, and, hence, right, may not be approved by other men. He cannot +_prove_ that he is right and they are wrong. He appears condemned to +take refuge in subjective conviction, that is, in mere dogmatism. + + +II. PERFECTION + +119. PERFECTION AND TYPE.--When we speak of a thing as more or less +perfect, we commonly mean that it is more or less perfect in its kind. A +good saw makes a poor razor; a good chair, a more than indifferent bed. A +bee crushed by a blow, a bird with a broken wing, we regard as imperfect. +But it scarcely occurs to us to ask ourselves whether the bee is more or +less perfect than the bird, or the bird than the spider. Swift's +Houyhnhnms at their best could not be either perfect horses or perfect +men. They were creatures with a perfection of their own, and one +appropriate to their hybrid nature. + +To every creature its own perfection. This principle men seem to assume +tacitly in their judgments. They set up a standard for each kind, and +they conceive the individual to attain or to fall short, according to the +degree of its approach to, or of its divergence from, the allotted +standard. + +If we take perfection in this sense--and we usually have no other sense +in mind in our judgments of perfection--the doctrine that it is the +whole duty of man to strive to attain to perfection is none other than +the doctrine that it is his duty to follow nature, his proper nature as +man. And any difficulties which may legitimately be urged upon the +attention of the moralist who recommends the following of nature may with +equal justice be urged upon the attention of him who exhorts us to aim at +perfection. + +Thus, if it is doubtful just what nature demands of us, it seems no less +doubtful what obligations are laid upon us when we make perfection our +goal. That goal cannot mean for each man simply the developing to the +utmost of all the capacities which he possesses. There are men rich in +the possibilities of sloth, of indifference to future good, of egoism, +even of malignant feeling. Nor does the average man furnish the pattern +of perfection. The perfectionist does not regard the average man as the +embodiment of his ideal. He seeks to better him. + +That, in striving to attain perfection, a man should remain a man, with +essentially human characteristics, seems evident. But what sort of a man +he should be is not as clear. Until we are in a position to give some +reasoned account of what we mean by perfection as an ideal, and to show +that it is a desirable goal for man, we appear to be setting up but a +vague end for human endeavor, and to be assuming intuitively that it is a +desirable end. + +120. MORE AND LESS PERFECT TYPES.--So much for perfection as synonymous +with the ideal human nature of which ancient and modern moralists have +treated. It appears, however, possible to use the word "perfection" in a +somewhat different sense. + +Man is not merely man; he is a living being, and there are living beings +of many orders. The plants, the simpler forms of animal life, the brutes +which we recognize as standing nearer to us, and man may, from this point +of view, be referred to the one series. Some members of this series we +characterize as lower, and others we speak of as higher in the scale. + +Now, such designations as higher and lower cannot be applied +indiscriminately. There is little sense in the assertion that a bit of +string is higher than a straight line, or a hat than a handkerchief. Some +significant basis of comparison must be present. Things must be +recognized as approximating to or diverging from an accepted standard in +varying degrees. + +Such a basis of comparison is present when some objects possess the same +qualities in a more marked degree than do others. But this is not the +only possible basis of comparison. We may assume that the possession of +certain qualities marks a creature as higher, and that the creature which +has them not, or has them imperfectly developed, thereby stamps itself as +being of a lower order. + +Something like this appears to determine our judgments when we assign to +various creatures their place in the scale of living beings. We do not +mean that the higher possess to a greater degree all the capacities +possessed by the lower. Many things which the plant does man cannot do at +all; and, among the animals, those which we recognize as higher may be +lacking in many capacities present in a marked degree in the lower. In +ranking one living creature as higher, and, thus, as more perfect, than +another, we assume that the "nature" of the one, with its various +capacities and lacks of capacity, is, on the whole, of more _worth_ +than the "nature" of another. + +It might be maintained that, in his estimate of the worth of different +kinds of beings man is influenced by his partiality for the distinctively +human, rating creatures as lower or higher in proportion to their +divergence from or approximation to his own type. Undoubtedly this plays +a part in men's judgments. We are partial to ourselves. And yet judgments +of perfection and imperfection cannot wholly be explained on this +principle. + +"I think we must admit without proof," writes Professor Janet, [Footnote: +The Theory of Morals, Book I, chapter iii, English translation, New York, +1883, p. 48.] a brilliant apostle of the doctrine of perfection, "that +things are good, even independently of the pleasure which they give us, +in themselves and by themselves, because of their intrinsic excellence. +If anyone were to demand that I should prove that thought is worth more +than digestion, a tree more than a heap of stones, liberty than slavery, +maternal love than luxury, I could only reply by asking him to +demonstrate that the whole is greater than one of its parts. No sensible +person denies that, in passing from the mineral kingdom to the vegetable +kingdom, from this to the animal kingdom, from the animal to man, from +the savage to the enlightened citizen of a free country, Nature has made +a continual advance; that is to say, at each step has gained in +excellence and perfection." + +One is naturally impelled to ask from what point of view things so +disparate as the mineral, the plant, the brute, man, thought and +digestion, liberty and slavery, can be compared with one another at all, +and referred to any sort of a series. What is, in its essence, this +excellence or perfection of which we have more shining evidence as we go +up in the scale? Janet identifies it with intensity of being, with +activity. The greater the activity, the greater the perfection. + +To the identification of perfection and activity we may hesitate to +assent. It does not seem clear that there is greater activity manifested +in a snail than in a burning house, in maternal love than in furious +hate, in quiet thought than in passion. Yet it seems significant that +judgments of worth do not appear out of place in comparing such things. + +121. PERFECTIONISM AND INTUITIONISM.--Taking into consideration all that +is said above, it seems not unreasonable to conclude: + +(1) That in speaking of the perfection of any creature we very often +judge it only by the standard set by its own type. We regard it as a good +specimen of its kind. + +(2) But when we use perfection in a wider sense, we judge different types +after the standard furnished by the distinctively human. + +(3) And we take as our standard of the human the "pattern" man held in +view by those who urge us to follow nature. + +But why should this pattern man be assumed to be better or worthier than +a man of a different sort? He who finds in him a greater exhibition of +activity may with equal justice address to himself the question: Why is +activity, in itself, of value? The one question, like the other, looks +for its answer in the dictum of some intuition. What may be said for, and +what against, intuitions, we have already considered. [Footnote: See +chapter xxiii] + + +III. SELF-REALIZATION + +122. THE SELF-REALIZATION DOCTRINE.--The ethical school which makes the +realization of the capacities of the self the aim of moral action has for +a generation, especially in England and America, had the support of many +acute and scholarly minds. The doctrine, often spoken of as the Neo- +Kantian or the Neo-Hegelian, may be said to be influenced by Kant, so far +as concerns metaphysical theory, but its ethical character is more +properly Hegelian and suggests in many particulars that great German +philosopher's "Philosophy of Right." + +We may conveniently take as the protagonist of the school the Oxford +scholar, Thomas Hill Green, whose "Prolegomena to Ethics" has had, +directly and indirectly, a powerful influence upon the minds of the men +of our generation. + +We find the doctrine of self-realization, as set forth by Green, to be as +follows: + +(1) In all desire some object is presented to the mind as not yet real, +and there is a striving to make it real, and thus to satisfy, or +extinguish, the desire. [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec 131.] + +(2) Self-consciousness knits the desires into a system, and thus attains +to the conception of "well-being," which implies the satisfaction of +desire in general, and not merely of this or that desire. [Footnote: +Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec 128.] + +(3) "Good" is that which satisfies some desire. Any good at which an +agent aims must be his own good; and "true good" is nothing else than +"permanent well-being." [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec Sec 190, 92, +203.] + +(4) A desire is determined by the nature of the creature desiring; man +can attain satisfaction only in the realization of his capacities. His +true good lies only in their complete realization--in his becoming all +that it is in him to become. [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec +Sec 171-2, 180.] + +(5) But man is a social being, and has an interest in other persons than +himself. Hence his complete self-satisfaction implies the satisfaction of +his social as well as of his other impulses. That is, his true good +includes the good of others. [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec Sec 199- +205.] + +(6) We can only discover what our "capacities" are by observing them as +so far realized, and thus gaining the idea of future progress. The +ultimate end is unknown to us. [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec 172.] + +(7) But we see enough to recognize that man's capacities can be realized, +his self-satisfaction intelligently sought, only in a social state based +upon the notion of the common good. The right reveals itself in the +actual evolution of society. [Footnote: Ibid., Sec Sec 172-76, 205.] + +123. THE DOCTRINE AKIN TO THAT OF FOLLOWING NATURE.--The self- +realization doctrine has much in common with the doctrine of following +nature. Thus: + +1. It evidently does not recommend the realization of all the capacities +of the individual as such, but holds in view a "pattern" man. + +2. This is social man, the true representative of human nature as +conceived by the ancient Stoic. Green holds before himself "the ideal of +a society in which everyone shall treat everyone else as his neighbor, in +which to every rational agent the well-being or perfection of every other +such agent shall be included in that perfection for which he lives." +[Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec 205.] The same thought was more +pithily expressed by Marcus Aurelius in the aphorism that "what is good +for the hive is good for the bee." + +3. We find, too, the analogue of that wider appeal to nature which +suffused the Stoic doctrine with religious feeling. In the above brief +recapitulation of the steps in the self-realization doctrine I have +omitted this aspect, as I wished to confine myself to the ethical +doctrine pure and simple. But Green conceives of the Divine Consciousness +as already having before it the consummation toward which man strives in +his efforts at self-realization; he regards man as working toward the +attainment of a Divine Purpose. The self-realizationist may prefer, +sometimes, to use language more abstract. He may say: "Man's +consciousness of himself as a member of society involves a reference to a +cosmic order." [Footnote: MUIRHEAD, The Elements of Ethics, Book I, +chapter in, Sec 10.] But the difference of language scarcely carries with +it a substantial difference of thought. [Footnote: "Though the +philosopher as such may shun the term 'God' on account of its +anthropomorphic associations, and may prefer to speak of the 'conscious +principle,' or of the 'universal self,' yet the latter has in substance +the same meaning as the former." FITE, _An Introductory Study of +Ethics_, chapter xiii, Sec 4.] + +4. As the appeal to human nature, or to nature in a broader sense, left +the norm for the guidance of human actions somewhat vague, so the appeal +to the principle of self-realization seems to leave one without very +definite guidance. There may easily arise disputes touching what +capacities are to be realized, and in what degree. + +124. IS THE DOCTRINE MORE EGOISTIC?--One difference between the +principles of following nature, striving to attain to perfection, and +aiming at self-realization seems to force itself upon our notice. On the +surface, at least, the last doctrine appears to stand out as more +distinctly egoistic. The very name has an egoistic flavor; the doctrine +bases itself upon the satisfaction of desire; nor do its advocates +hesitate to emphasize that the satisfaction sought is the satisfaction of +the agent desiring. In the chapter on Egoism [Footnote: Chapter xxiv.] I +have cited some utterances which sound egoistic, and such citations might +be multiplied. + +Nevertheless, from this egoistic root springs a flower which disseminates +the perfume of a saintly self-abnegation. How is this seeming miracle +accomplished? + +The transition is brought about through a chain of reasoning which is +subtle and ingenious in the extreme. Must we not admit that in all +purposive action--the only action with which the moralist need concern +himself--there is a striving to realize or satisfy desire in the +attainment of some object? And if the desires of a mind or self converge +upon some object, does not its realization imply the satisfaction or +realization of the desires of that mind or self? Furthermore, if our +desires have as their root our capacities--for we can desire nothing that +it is not in us to desire--is not the realization of desire the +realization of capacity? Does it not follow, hence, that every mind or +self, in all purposive action, is striving, either blunderingly or with +far-sighted intelligence, to attain to self-satisfaction, which means, to +the realization of its capacities? Finally, as men are by nature social +creatures, how can a man fully realize his capacities without becoming a +truly unselfish being? Unselfishness appears to be the inevitable goal of +the strivings for self-satisfaction of an unselfish self. + +125. WHY AIM TO REALIZE CAPACITIES?--This reasoning appears highly +satisfactory in two very different ways. It seems, on the one hand, to +stop the mouth of the egoist, who insists that his own advantage is his +only proper aim. It assures him that he is throughout seeking his own +advantage, when he aims at self-realization. On the other hand, it +assures the man to whom egoism appears repellant and immoral, that self- +realization implies that one must love one's neighbor as oneself. The +immemorial quarrel between self-love and benevolence appears to be +adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. + +Is the reasoning unassailable? There are two steps in it which appear to +demand a closer scrutiny. One is the transition from desire to capacity; +the other, the assumption that he who follows an unselfish impulse may +properly be said to aim at self-satisfaction, and to exercise no self- +denial. + +As to the first. Our desires may have their roots in our capacities, but +desires and capacities are, nevertheless, not the same thing. + +Men do actually strive to realize their desires--a desire is nothing else +than such a striving for realization or satisfaction. But it cannot be +said that men generally strive to realize their capacities, except to the +limited degree in which their capacities may happen to be expressed in +actual desires. Capacities may lie dormant, and the man in whom they lie +dormant need not on that account feel dissatisfied, as does the man whose +desires are not realized. Self-realization, as understood by the school +of thinkers which advocates it, implies much more than the satisfaction +of desire. It implies the multiplication of desires and their +satisfaction. On what ground shall we persuade the contented egoist, who +has but a handful of commonplace desires and finds it possible to satisfy +most of them, that it is better to call into being a multitude of wants +many of which will probably remain unrealized? He may point out that the +divine discontent is apt to leave the idealist and the reformer as lean +as Cassius. All of which does not prove that the self-realizationist is +not right in exhorting men to develop their capacities in the direction +of the pattern which he holds in view; but it does seem to prove that the +path to self-realization, in this sense, is not necessarily the path to +self-satisfaction. "The good" has come to mean more than that which +satisfies desire. How shall we persuade men that it is their duty to make +this good their end? + +126. THE PROBLEM OF SELF-SACRIFICE.--As for the second point. He who +makes his moral aim self-satisfaction can scarcely be expected to +advocate self-sacrifice. + +Accordingly, we find among self-realizationists, a tendency to repudiate +altogether what may properly be called self-denial. "Anything conceived +as good in such a way that the agent acts for the sake of it," said +Green, [Footnote: Prolegomena, Sec 92.] "must be conceived as his own +good." "A moment's consideration will show," writes Professor Fite, in +his clear and attractive book, [Footnote: An Introductory Study of +Ethics, chapter viii, Sec 5.] "that, for self-sacrifice in any absolute +sense, no ground of obligation is conceivable. Unless I am in some way +interested in the object [Footnote: I.e., unless I desire the object.] +whose attainment is set before me as a duty, it seems to be +psychologically impossible that I should ever strive for it." + +Now we do seem compelled to concede that, unless a man desires an end, he +cannot will that end. Anything that is selected as an end, and striven +for, must be desired. And the attainment of the end implies, of course, +the satisfaction of that particular desire. But, admitting all this, is +not the question left open whether some desires may not be sacrificed to +others; and whether, indeed, a whole extensive system of desires may not, +on occasion, be sacrificed to a single desire? In this case, may not the +transaction properly be called self-sacrifice? Suppose the desire to +serve one's neighbor, if satisfied, prevents the realization of a +multitude of other desires of the same agent. Is it certain that its +satisfaction does not imply self-denial? + +127. SELF-SATISFACTION AND SELF-SACRIFICE.--The argument to prove that it +is not really self-sacrifice may follow divers paths. + +Thus, it may be argued that, since the proper end of a rational being is +his own permanent good, the sacrifice of such goods as do not conduce to +this end is not self-sacrifice. Sensual pleasures, the satisfaction of +vanity or ambition, the accomplishment of a vengeful purpose, an +excessive preoccupation with one's own interests as contrasted with those +of others--such things as these, it is claimed, do not permanently +satisfy. That the so-called man of pleasure is a man upon whom pleasures +pall, and that he who seeks too earnestly to save his own life is apt to +lose it, has been reiterated by a long line of professional and lay +moralists from Buddha to Tolstoi. The refuge from the discontent arising +out of the attempt to quench one's thirst by sipping at transient +delights has always been found in altruism under some guise. The self- +realizationists may claim that certain things are given up in order that +other things more permanently satisfying to the self may be attained, and +may deny that this is any renunciation of self-satisfaction. [Footnote: +GREEN, op. cit., Sec 176.] + +Again. It may be argued that men's interests do not conflict as widely as +is commonly supposed. To be sure, two men may have to struggle with each +other for the pleasure of eating a given apple, of making a pecuniary +profit, of obtaining a coveted post, of being the first authority in a +given science or art, of securing the affections of a particular woman. +Here one man's loss seems to be another man's gain. But two men may enjoy +seeing a child eat an apple, or a deserving man profit, or their common +candidate win the election, or their favorite artist honored, or their +beloved nephew accepted by the lady of his choice. If one desires certain +things, and certain things only, there seems no reason why one's desires +should not be in harmony with those of others. + +The things best worth having, it is claimed, do not admit of being +competed for. [Footnote: GREEN, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec Sec 244- +245.] If my aim is unselfish devotion to humanity, how can I lose if my +neighbor attains in the same running? Do virtuous men, in so far as they +are virtuous, stand in each other's light? Are there not as many prizes +as there are competitors? As long as I remain in this field I may seek +self-satisfaction without scruple. I satisfy another's desire in +satisfying my own. By benevolence I lose nothing. + +The list of things which one may forego without self-sacrifice has been +made a long one. Even the realization of capacities highly valued by +cultivated men has been brought into it: + +"No conflict," writes Professor Seth, [Footnote: _A Study of Ethical +Principles_, Part II, chapter ii, Sec 4, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 286.] "is +possible between the ends of the individual and those of society. The +individual may be called upon to sacrifice, for example, his opportunity +of esthetic or intellectual culture; but in that very sacrifice lies his +opportunity of moral culture, of true self-realization." + +128. CAN MORAL SELF-SACRIFICE BE A DUTY?--To this position one is tempted +to demur until two questions have found a satisfactory answer: + +1. Is it true that there is no sacrifice of self-realization or self- +satisfaction, properly so called, where all other desires and impulses +are sacrificed to the one desire to do right? + +2. Is it not conceivable, at least, that obedience to an unselfish +impulse may result even in the sacrifice of the opportunities of moral +culture in general? Can it, then, be called self-realization? + +Touching the first question it may plausibly be maintained that the +desires of the self are many and various, and that the satisfaction of an +altruistic impulse may imply the sacrifice of so many of them that the +self may very doubtfully be said to attain to permanent satisfaction when +the impulse is realized. Aristotle's hero, who, in dying for his country, +chooses the more "honorable" for himself, [Footnote: _Ethics_, Book +IX, chapter viii, Sec 12.] can hardly be said in that one act to have +accomplished a state of permanent satisfaction or well-being for the self +whose being was, in that act, brought to an abrupt termination. Certain +Stoics seem to have taught that virtue is its own adequate reward and +that nothing else matters; but this has not been the verdict of moralists +generally. Paley, who writes like an unblushing egoist, [Footnote: See Sec +96.] we may pass over; but even Kant, a thinker of a very different +complexion, appears to regard the mere doing of a right act as not a +sufficient reward for the doer. He looks for the act to be crowned with +happiness in a life to come, thus saving it from being mere self- +sacrifice. + +The second question one approaches with some hesitation. "No moralist," +writes Professor Sidgwick, [Footnote: _The Methods of Ethics_, +Introduction.] "has ever directed an individual to promote the virtue of +others except in so far as this promotion is compatible with, or rather +involved in, the complete realization of virtue in himself." It appears +rash to admit to be a duty that which as high an authority as Sidgwick +maintains no moralist has ever ventured to advise. Still, it is +permissible to adduce an illustration taken from actual life, and to ask +the reader to form his opinion independently. + +A girl, anxious to provide her younger sister with a better lot, enters a +factory and gives up her life to labor of a monotonous and mind- +destroying character, amid sordid and more or less degrading +surroundings. The act is a heroic one, but is it clear that it conduces +to the self-realization, not of the sister, but of the agent herself? The +influence of surroundings counts for much. High impulses may, under such +pressure, come to be repressed. + +"Capacity for the nobler feelings," writes Mill, [Footnote: +_Utilitarianism_, chapter iii] "is in most natures a very tender +plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of +sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if +the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the +society into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that +higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose +their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for +indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not +because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the +only ones to which they have access, or the only ones they are any longer +capable of enjoying." + +In other words, one may put oneself into a situation in which self- +realization appears to be made a most difficult and problematic goal. Nor +does it seem inconceivable that one should do this for the sake of +another's good. Hence, even if we restrict the meaning of the word "self- +sacrifice" to the sacrifice of the "real" or moral self, the +impossibility of self-sacrifice scarcely appears to have been proved; the +impossibility of a conflict between the ends of the individual and of +society does not appear to be indubitably established. + +129. SELF-SACRIFICE AND THE IDENTITY OF SELVES.--Can it be maintained +upon any other grounds than those adduced above? One line of argument +remains open to us. We may maintain that, while two bodies are two +because they occupy two portions of space, two minds, as not in space, +cannot thus be held apart, and we may conclude that "the many individuals +composing the race are not really many, but one." [Footnote: Fite, _An +Introductory Study of Ethics_, chapter xii.] I suppose that he who can +take this position will find it natural to argue that any act which +serves the interests of any self must be regarded as serving the +interests of every self, and thus cannot be considered as sacrificing the +interests of any self. + +To these transcendental heights, however, comparatively few will be able +to climb. To men generally it will still appear that Peter's love to Paul +is not identical with Peter's love to Peter; and that Peter may act in +such a way that, on the whole, he loses, while Paul gains. That the +interests of Peter and Paul, as developed social beings and members of a +civilized community, are less likely to be in conflict than those of +their primitive cave-dwelling forerunners may be freely conceded. But +from such relative harmony to a complete identity of interests seems a +far cry. + +130. QUESTIONS WHICH SEEM TO BE LEFT OPEN.--Evidently, the self- +realization doctrine is a great advance upon the doctrine of following +nature. The self-realizationist realizes that man's nature is in the +making, and he is not blind to the difficulty of the task of determining +just what the real demands of human nature are. + +This leads to his laying much stress upon the gradual development of +systems of rights and duties as they emerge under the actual conditions +to which human societies are subjected in the course of their evolution. +He reads history with comprehending eyes, and reverences the human reason +as crystallized in social institutions. Hence, the divergence of the +moral standards which obtain in different ages and among different +peoples does not seem to him a baffling mystery. He can find a relative +justification for each, and yet hold to an ideal in the light of which +each must be judged. + +It may be questioned, however, whether the edifice which he erects can be +based wholly upon the appeal to the self which ostensibly furnishes the +groundwork of the doctrine. We may ask whether such an appeal can: + +(1) Prescribe to the individual in what measure his various capacities +should be realized. + +(2) Show that it is reasonable to awaken dormant capacities, and thus +multiply desires. + +(3) Justify social acts which certainly appear to be self-sacrificing, +and which the moral judgments of men generally do not hesitate to +approve. + + + +CHAPTER XXVII + +THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION + + +131. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TITLE.--The title, "The Ethics of +Evolution," seems to assume that the evolutionist, frankly accepting +himself as such, must be prepared to join some school of the moralists +different from other schools, and basing itself upon evolutionary +doctrine. + +That the ethical views of individuals and of communities of men may +undergo a process of evolution or development is palpable. The ethical +notions of the child are not those of the man, nor are the moral ideas of +primitive races identical with those of races more advanced +intellectually and morally. + +But it is one thing to maintain that morals may be in evolution in +individuals and in communities, and quite another to hold that the +acceptance of the doctrine of evolution, broadly taken, forces upon one +some new norm by which human actions may be judged. It was possible for +as ardent an evolutionist as Huxley to hold that evolution and ethics are +not merely independent, but are actually at war with one another, the +competitive struggle for existence characteristic of the one giving place +in the other to a new principle in which the rights of the weak and the +helpless attain express recognition. [Footnote: HUXLEY, _Evolution and +Ethics_, New York, 1894. See, especially, the _Prolegomena_.] And +Sidgwick, that clearest of thinkers, maintains [Footnote: _The Methods +of Ethics_, Book I, chapter vi, Sec 2.] that we have no reason to assume +that it is our duty as moral beings simply to accelerate the pace in the +direction already marked out by evolution. + +It should be remembered that the word evolution may be used equivocally. +It is not evident that all evolution is in the direction of a life, brute +or human, that we commonly recognize as higher. There is retrogression, +as well as progress, where such retrogression is favored by environment. +We may call this, if we please, _devolution_. Were the conditions of +his life very unfavorable, man could not live as he now lives; and, +indeed, were they sufficiently unfavorable--for example, if the earth +cooled off to a certain point--he could not live at all, but would have +to give place to a lowlier creature better fitted to the conditions. Must +the man who foresees this end approaching strive to hasten its arrival, +or should he oppose it? In a decadent society, to come nearer to the +problems which concern us in ethics, must a man strive to realize the +social will expressed in progressive decadence? Should he hasten the +decline of the community? + +That those who study man as a moral being, like those who study man in +any of his other aspects, will be more or less influenced in their +outlook by the broadening of the horizon which results from a study of +what the students of the evolutionary process have to tell us, may be +conceded. But when we admit this, we do not necessarily have to look for +a new norm by which to judge conduct. We seem, rather, forced to ask +ourselves how this broadening of the horizon affects the norms which have +heretofore appealed to men as reasonable. To be sure, any evolutionist +has, in the capacity of a moralist, the right to suggest a new norm. But, +in that case, he must, like any other moralist, convince us that it is a +reasonable one. + +132. EVOLUTION AND THE SCHOOLS OF THE MORALISTS.--Those who have +suggested the norms discussed above, no one would think of as greatly +influenced in their ethical teaching by the doctrine of evolution. Locke, +Price, Butler and Sidgwick; Aristippus and Epicurus; Paley and Hobbes; +Bentham and Mill; Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius; Janet, Green, and the +rest, no one would be inclined to class simply as evolutionary moralists. +Some of them never thought of evolution at all. How would it affect their +standards of right and wrong were evolution expressly taken into account? +Would the standards have to be abandoned? Or would the men, as broader +men, merely have to revise some of their moral judgments? + +(1) It might be supposed that the acceptance of evolutionary doctrine +would bring into being a grave problem for the intuitionist, at least. If +the body and mind of man are products of evolution, must we not admit as +much of man's moral intuitions? Then why not admit that these may be +replaced some day by other moral intuitions to be evolved in an unknown +future? + +He who reasons thus should bear in mind that Sidgwick, who by no means +repudiated the doctrine of evolution, was an intuitionist, and placed his +ultimate moral intuitions on a par with such mathematical intuitions as +that two and two make four. If all intuitions are a product of evolution, +Sidgwick might claim that the moral intuitions he accepts fare no worse +than those elementary mathematical truths which we accept without +question and without reflection. And he might maintain that an appeal to +evolution need cast no greater doubt upon ultimate moral truth than upon +mathematical. If intuitionism in all its forms is to be rejected, it +seems as though it must be done upon some other ground than an appeal to +evolution. + +(2) As to the egoist. It is not easy to see how the appeal to evolution +need disconcert him. Should he be so foolish as to maintain that egoism +is always, in fact, necessary and unavoidable on the part of every living +creature, he might easily be refuted by a reference to the actual life of +the brutes, where altruism can be shown to play no insignificant role. +But if he simply maintains that the only _reasonable_ principle for +a man to adopt is egoism, he may continue to do so. He makes the self and +its satisfactions his end. How can it concern him to learn how the self +came to be what it is, or what it will be in the distant future? He +panders to the present self; he may assume that it will be reasonable to +pander at the appropriate time to the self that is to be, whatever its +nature. + +(3) The utilitarian remains such whether he makes the greatest good of +the greatest number to consist in pleasure or in some other end, such as +self-preservation. Some utilitarians, who have been inclined to emphasize +the good of man, rather than to extend even to the brutes the goods to be +distributed, may be influenced to extend the sphere of duties, if they +will listen to the evolutionist, who cannot well leave out of view +humbler creatures. [Footnote: "Thus we shall not go wrong in attributing +to the higher animals in their simple social life, not only the +elementary feelings, the loves and hates, sympathies and jealousies which +underlie all forms of society, but also in a rudimentary stage the +intelligence which enables those feelings to direct the operations of the +animal so as best to gratify them." HOBHOUSE, _Ethics in Evolution_, +chapter i, Sec 4.] + +He may broaden his sympathies. But this need not compel him to abandon +his fundamental doctrine. + +(4) A very similar conclusion may be drawn, when we consider the +influence of an acceptance of the doctrine of evolution upon those who +would turn to man's nature, to perfection, or to self-realization, as +furnishing the norm of human conduct. + +A Marcus Aurelius could, with little reference to evolution, accept man's +nature, or Nature in the wider sense, as marking out for man the round of +his duties. A modern Darwinian might fall back upon much the same +standard, while clearly conscious of the fact that man's nature is not +something unchangeable, and while inclined to view Nature in general with +different eyes from those of the Roman Stoic. No sensible evolutionist +would maintain that a creature of a given species should act in defiance +of all the instincts of creatures of that type, merely on the ground that +species may be involved in a process of progressive development. + +Nor need the perfectionist abandon his perfectionism in view of any such +consideration. He who measures perfection by the degree of activity +exercised in action, may admit that the coming man will be more perfect +than it is possible for any man to be now; but that need not prevent him +from holding that it is man's present duty to aim at the only perfection +possible to him, he being what he is. Similar reasoning will apply to any +other conception of perfection likely to be adopted, consciously or +unconsciously, by any adherent of the school in question. + +As for the self-realizationist, a very little reflection seems sufficient +to reveal that the maxim that it is man's duty to become all that it is +in him to become is in no wise refuted by the claim that man may, in the +indefinitely distant future, become much more than many people have +supposed or now suppose. + +(5) There remains the doctrine of the Rational Social Will as furnishing +the norm of conduct. I have tried to show that this doctrine must rest +upon broad views of man and of man's environment. It is the very essence +of the rational will to take broad views, to consider the past, the +present, and the future. Surely the adherent of this school may let the +evolutionist work in peace, may thank him for any helpful suggestions he +has to offer, and may develop his own doctrine with little cause for +uneasiness at the thought that information given him may refute his +fundamental principle. + +However, it is not out of place for him to point out, if revolutionary +measures of any sort are suggested by this or that evolutionist, that +ethics is a discipline which is concerned with what men have to do, here +and now. It must take into consideration what is advisable and feasible. +Utopian schemes which break violently with the actual order of things and +the normal development of human societies may be suggested by +evolutionists, as they have been suggested by men who were not +evolutionists at all. They are not to be taken much more seriously in the +one case than in the other. + +133. THE ETHICS OF INDIVIDUAL EVOLUTIONISTS.--Such considerations seem to +make it evident that the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution should +have no other influence upon us as moralists than that of making us take +broad views of man and of his environment. It still remains to find a +norm of conduct, and evolutionists, like other men, may develop ethical +systems which are not identical. It is worth while here to touch very +briefly upon the suggestions of one or two individual evolutionists. +Those who speak of the ethics of evolution are very apt to have such in +mind. + +Thus, Darwin, whose study of the lower animals led him to believe that +the social instincts have been developed for the general good rather than +for the general happiness of the species, defines the "good" as "the +rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, +with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they have +been subjected." The "greatest happiness principle" he regards as an +important secondary guide to conduct, while making social instinct and +sympathy primary guides. [Footnote: _The Descent of Man_, chapter +iv, concluding remarks. ] + +Spencer maintains that the evolution of conduct becomes the highest +possible when the conduct "simultaneously achieves the greatest totality +of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men." "The conduct called +good," he writes, "rises to the conduct conceived as best, when it +fulfills all three classes of ends at the same time." But life he does +not regard as necessarily a good. He judges it to be good or bad +"according as it has or has not a surplus of agreeable feeling." Hence, +"conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or +painful." [Footnote: _The Data of Ethics,_ chapter in, Sec Sec 8 and 10. +] + +To be sure, Spencer criticises the utilitarians, and thinks little of the +Benthamic calculus of pleasures. He believes that we should substitute +for it something more scientific, a study of the processes of life. In +his earlier writings he appears to be largely in accord with the +intuitionists in judging of conduct, regarding intuitions as having their +origin in the experiences of the race. Nor does he ever seem inclined to +break with intuitionism completely. But, as we have seen above (Sec 108), +there appears to be nothing to prevent a utilitarian from being an +intuitionist of some sort, as well. + +Stephen, in his clear and beautifully written work on morals, also +accepts the general happiness as the ultimate end of reasonable conduct; +and he, too, criticizes the current utilitarianism. He writes: "This, as +it seems to me, represents the real difference between the utilitarian +and the evolutionist criterion. The one lays down as a criterion the +happiness, the other the health of society." [Footnote: _The Science of +Ethics_, London, 1882, chapter ix, 12.] By which, of course, he does +not mean merely physical health, but such a condition of vigor and +efficiency as carries with it a promise of continued existence and well- +being in the future. + +It is not necessary to multiply instances. It can readily be seen that +all three of the writers cited are utilitarians, and the last two are +what have been characterized as hedonistic utilitarians. That they +suggest this or that means of best attaining to the desired goal does not +put them outside of a school which embraces men of many shades of +opinion. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVIII + +PESSIMISM + + +134. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PESSIMIST.--With philosophy in general this +volume has little to do; but as pessimism is not the doctrine of normal +men generally, but is apt to be identified in our minds with the +teachings of certain of its leading exponents, it may be well to give, in +briefest outline, the type of reasonings upon which the pessimist may +take his stand. + +Schopenhauer held that the one World-Will, which manifests itself in all +nature, inorganic and organic, and is identical with the will of which +each man is conscious in himself, is a "will to live." When the World- +Will becomes conscious, as it does in man, the will to live is +consciously asserted. But the will to live is essentially blind and +unreasoning, or it would not do anything so stupid as to will life of any +sort. He writes: + +"Only a blind will, no seeing will, could place itself in the position in +which we behold ourselves. A seeing will would rather have soon made the +calculation that the business did not cover the cost; for such a mighty +effort and struggle, with the straining of all the powers, under constant +care, anxiety and want, and with the inevitable destruction of every +individual life, finds no compensation in the ephemeral existence itself, +which is so obtained, and which passes into nothing in our hands." +[Footnote: _The World as Will and Idea_, translated by HALDANE and +KEMP, London, 1896. _On the Vanity and Suffering of Life_. Volume +III, p. 390.] + +The basis of all will, says Schopenhauer, is need, deficiency, and, +hence, pain. He dwells at length upon the misery of life, and the +desirability of a release from life. The refuge of suicide at once +suggests itself, but is rejected by Schopenhauer on the ground that the +destruction of the individual cannot prevent the One Will from +manifesting itself in other individuals. Curiously enough he appears to +approve of suicide by starvation, as indicating a renunciation of the +will to live. But his general recommendation is asceticism, renunciation +of the striving for pleasure, the voluntary acceptance of pain. Through +this the Will is to be taught to apprehend its own nature, and, thus, to +deny itself. How a general asceticism on our part will rob the one +universal Will, revealed in the mineral, vegetable and animal worlds, of +its nature, and still its strivings, the great pessimist does not +indicate. + +At this point, von Hartmann, who may fairly be called Schopenhauer's +pupil, takes up the tale. He suggests that it is conceivable that a +universal negation of the will may be obtained, if the preponderating +part of the actual World-Will should come to be contained in the +conscious minds that resolve to will no more. This he thinks may +neutralize the whole, and put an end to existence, which is unavoidably +an evil, and implies a preponderance of pain. [Footnote: _Philosophy of +the Unconscious_, "Metaphysic of the Unconscious," chapter xiv.] + +135. COMMENT ON THE ETHICS OF PESSIMISM.--On the metaphysics of the +pessimists I shall make no comment save that there appears to be here +sufficient vagueness to satisfy the most poetical of minds. But the +following points in the ethics of pessimism should be noted: + +(1) Pleasure and pain are made the measure of the desirability or +undesirability of existence. + +(2) It is assumed that pleasure and pain are measurable; and that they +may be quantitatively balanced against one another in such a way that +this or that mixture of them may be declared by an enlightened man to be, +on the whole, desirable or the reverse. + +(3) It is claimed that the balance must necessarily incline to the side +of pain, and hence, that life is not worth living. + +(4) It follows from all this that it is our duty to aim, not necessarily +directly, but in some manner, at least, at the destruction of life +everywhere. + +(5) I beg the reader to observe that the above doctrine rests upon +assumptions which seem to be made without due consideration. Thus: + +(a) It is by no means to be assumed without question that pleasure and +pain alone are the measure of the desirable. They are not the only things +actually desired; and, if we assert that they alone are desirable, we +fall back upon a dubious intuition. + +(6) The quantitative relations of pleasures and pains are legitimate +subjects of dispute, as we have seen in earlier chapters in this volume. +When is one pleasure twice as great as another? How can we know that +three pleasures counterbalance a pain? Is it by the mere fact that we +_will_ as we do, in a given instance? Then how prove that we will as +we do, because of the equivalence of the pleasure to the pain? + +(c) Who shall decide for us whether life is--not desired, it is +admittedly that, as a rule,--but, also, _desirable_? + +May the man who denies it rest his assertion upon such general +considerations as that satisfaction presupposes desire, and that desire +implies a lack, and, hence, pain? The famous author of "Utopia" pointed +out long ago that the pains of hunger begin before the pleasure of +eating, and only die when it does. Shall we, then, regard a hearty +appetite as a curse, to be mitigated but not wholly neutralized by a +series of good dinners? + +To be sure, the pessimists do not depend wholly upon such general +arguments, but point out in great detail that there is much suffering in +the world, and that the fulfillment of desire, when it is attained, often +results in disillusionment. But the fact remains that life, such as it +is, is desired by men and other creatures generally; desired not as an +exception, and under a misapprehension, but, as a rule, even by the +enlightened and the far-seeing. + +Is not the desirable what is desired by the rational will? We have seen +that the rational social will does not aim at the suppression of desires +generally, but only at the suppression of such desires as interfere with +broader satisfactions. Viewed from this stand-point, the pessimist's +"denial of the will to live" appears as an expression of the accidental +or irrational will. It is not an expression of the nature of man, but of +the nature of the pessimist. + +(6) It is, perhaps, worth while to point out that there is nothing to +prevent a given pessimist from being an intuitionist, an egoist, a +utilitarian (of a sort), or an adherent of one of the other schools above +discussed. He may assume intuitively that life is undesirable; in view of +its undesirability he may act, either taking himself alone into +consideration, or including his neighbor; he may invoke the doctrine of +evolution; he may even, if he chooses, call it self-realization to +annihilate himself, for he may argue that a will that comes to clear +consciousness must see that it must be its own undoing. It is hardly +necessary to point out, however, that the pessimist, as such, should not +be in any wise confounded with the moralists discussed in the five +chapters preceding. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIX + +KANT, HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE + + +136. KANT.---It is impossible, in any brief compass, to treat of the many +individual moralists, some of them men of genius and well worthy of our +study, who offer us ethical systems characterized by differences of more +or less importance. When we refer a man to this or that school and do no +more, we say comparatively little about him, as has become evident in the +preceding chapters. As we have seen, it has been necessary to class +together those who differ rather widely in many of their opinions. Here, +I shall devote a few pages to three men only, partly because of their +prominence, and partly because it is instructive to call attention to the +contrast between them in their fundamental positions. I shall begin with +Kant. + +Kant held that the human reason issues "categorial imperatives," that is +to say, unconditional commands to act in certain ways. The motive for +moral action must not be the desire for pleasure, but solely the desire +to do right. + +He makes his fundamental rule abstract and formal: "So act that you could +wish your maxim to be universal law." As no man could wish to be himself +neglected when in distress, this law compels him to be benevolent, and a +new form of the fundamental rule is developed: "Treat humanity, in +yourself or any other, as an end always, and never as a means." [Footnote: +_Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals_, Sec 2.] + +Now Kant, although he maintains that it is not a man's duty to seek his +own happiness--a thing which natural inclination would prompt him to do-- +by no means overlooks happiness altogether. He thinks that virtue and +happiness together constitute the whole and perfect good desired by +rational beings. The attainment of this good must be the supreme end of a +will morally determined. [Footnote: _Dialectic of the Pure Practical +Reason_, chapter ii.] We are morally bound to strive to be virtuous +ourselves and to make others happy. + +Still, each man's happiness means much to him; and Kant, convinced that +virtue _ought_ to be rewarded with happiness, holds that our world +is a moral world, where God will reward the virtuous. If we do not assume +such a world, he claims, moral laws are reduced to idle dreams. +[Footnote: Ibid.] + +Such utterances as the last may well lead the utilitarian to question +whether Kant was quite whole-hearted in his doctrine of the unconditional +commands of the practical reason of man. They appear to be not +independent of all consideration of human happiness. + +I shall not ask whether Kant was consistent. Great men, like lesser men, +seldom are. But, in order that the contrast between his doctrine and +those of the two writers whom I shall next discuss may be brought out +clearly, I shall ask that the following points be kept well in mind: + +(1) Kant was an out-and-out intuitionist. He goes directly to the +practical reason of man for an enunciation of the moral law. + +(2) Moral rules of lesser generality, such as those touching benevolence, +justice and veracity, he traces to the practical reason, making them +independent of all considerations of expediency. Thus he defends the body +of moral truth accepted by so many of his fellow-moralists. + +(3) His "practical reason" speaks directly to the individual. Kant looked +within, not without. We may call him an ethical individualist. Socrates, +when on trial for his life, listened for the voice of the divinity within +him. He needed no other. + +137. HEGEL.--In strongest contrast to the individualism of Kant stands +the doctrine of Hegel. To the latter, duty consists in the realization of +the free reasonable will--but this will is identical in all individuals, +[Footnote: _The Philosophy of Right_, Sec 209] and its realization +reveals itself in the customs, laws and institutions of the state. From +this point of view the individual is an accidental thing; the ethical +order revealed in society is permanent, and has absolute authority. It is +true, however, that it is not something foreign to the individual; he is +conscious of it as his own being. In duty he finds his liberation. +[Footnote: _Ibid_., Sec Sec 145-149] + +But what is a man's duty? "What a man ought to do," says Hegel, +[Footnote: _Ibid_., Sec 150] "what duties he should fulfill in order +to be virtuous, is in an ethical community easy to say--the man has only +to do what is presented, expressed and recognized in the established +relations in which he finds himself." + +In other words, he ought to do just what his community prescribes! This +seems, taken quite literally, a startling doctrine. + +It would be a wrong to Hegel to take him quite literally, for he +elsewhere [Footnote: _Ibid_., Introduction.] makes it plain that he +by no means approves of all the laws and customs that have obtained in +various societies. Still, he exalts the law of the state and regards any +opposition to it on the authority of private conviction as "stupendous +presumption." [Footnote: Op. _cit_., Sec 138.] This is a serious +rebuke to the reformer. The individual must, according to Hegel, look for +the moral law outside of himself--of himself as an individual, at least. +He must find it in the State. + +138. NIETZSCHE.--Again a startling contrast: after Hegel, Nietzsche--the +voice of one crying in the wilderness, exquisitely, passionately, but +scarcely with articulate scientific utterance. A prophet of revolt and +emancipation; a cave-dweller, who would flee organized society and the +refinements of civilization; the rabid individualist, to whom the +community is the "herd," and common notions of right and wrong are +absurdities to be visited with scorn and denunciation. He makes a strong +appeal to young men, even after the years during which the carrying of +one's own latch-key is a source of elation. He appeals also to those +perennially young persons who never attain to the stature which befits +those who are to take a responsible share in the organized efforts of +communities of men. + +With Nietzsche the man, his suffering life, and the melancholy eclipse of +his brilliant intellect, ethics as science is little concerned. In +Nietzsche the marvellous literary artist it can have no interest. These +things are the affair of literature and biography. + +Here we are concerned only with his contribution to ethics. Just what +that has been it is more difficult to determine than would be the case in +a writer more systematic and scientific. But he makes it very clear that +he repudiates the morals which have been accepted heretofore by moralists +and communities of men generally. + +He confesses himself an "immoralist." He despises man as he is, and hails +the "Superman," a creature inspired by the "will to have power" and free +from all moral prejudices, including that of sympathy with the weak and +the helpless. + +"Full is the world of the superfluous," he sings in his famous dithyramb, +[Footnote: _Thus Spake Zarathustra, I, xi_. It is a pity to read +NIETZSCHE in any translation. His diction is exquisite. But those who can +only read him in English may be referred to the translations of his works +edited by LEVY. New York, 1911.] "marred is life by the many-too- +many."... "Many too many are born; for the superfluous ones was the State +devised."..."There, where the State ceaseth--there only commenceth the +man who is not superfluous." + +Man, says Nietzsche, should regard himself as a "bridge" over which he +can pass to something higher. [Footnote: _Ibid._, Prologue, and I, +IV, XI, _et passim_.] Upon the fact that the Superman may have the +same reason for regarding himself as a "bridge" as the most commonplace +of mortals, and may begin anew with loathing and self-contempt, he does +not dwell. Yet, as long as progress is possible, man may always be +regarded as a "bridge." The reader of Nietzsche is tempted to believe +that hatred and contempt must always be the predominant emotions in the +mind of the "superior" man. Darwin, who knew much more about man and +nature than did our passionate poet, was still able to regard man as "the +crown and glory of the universe." Not so, Nietzsche. + +Those who have read little in ethics are inclined to attribute to +Nietzsche a greater measure of originality than he can reasonably claim. +More than two milleniums before him, Plato conceived an ideal Republic in +which moral laws, as commonly accepted, were to be set aside. Marriage +was to be done away with; births were to be scientifically regulated; +children were to be taken from their mothers; sickly infants were to be +destroyed. In Sparta the committee of the elders did not permit the +promptings of sympathy and the cries of wounded maternal love to +influence the decision touching the life or death of the new-born. + +Here was an attempt at bridge-building, but it was conceived as a +scientific matter, to be taken in hand by the State, and for the good of +the State. But Nietzsche would destroy the State. His Superman appears as +individualistic as a "rogue" elephant, a few passages to the contrary +notwithstanding. Are we to regard him as a mere lawless egoist, or as +something more? We are left in the dark. [Footnote: See the volume, +_Beyond Good and Evil,_ "What is Noble?" Sec 265.] But we note that +Nietzsche disagrees with most moralists, in that he refuses to regard +Caesar Borgia as a morbid growth. [Footnote: _Ibid., The Natural +History of Morals,_ Sec 197. DOSTOIEVSKY'S genius has portrayed for us +an admirable Superman in the person of the Russian convict Orloff. See +his _House of the Dead_, chapter v.] + +The Superman has always been with us, in somewhat varying types. From +Alexander the Great to Napoleon, and before and after, he adorns the +pages of history. Attila, among others, may enter his claim to +consideration. It remains for the serious student of ethics to estimate +scientifically his value as an ethical ideal, and to judge how far this +type of character may profitably be taken as a pattern. Nietzsche stands +at the farthest possible remove from Hegel. Does he, as an individualist, +stand within hail of Kant? It scarcely seems so. When we examine Kant's +"practical reason," in other words, the moral law as it revealed itself +to Kant, we find that it had taken up into itself the moral development +of the ages preceding. Kant's practical reason, his conscience, to speak +plain English, was not the practical reason of, for example, Aristotle. +The latter could speak of a slave as an "animated tool," and could +believe there were men intended by nature for slavery. Kant could not. In +theory an individualist, the Sage of Konigsberg stands, in reality, not +far from Hegel. He does not break with the past. But Nietzsche is revolt +incarnate. + + +PART VIII + +THE ETHICS OF THE SOCIAL WILL + + +CHAPTER XXX + +ASPECTS OF THE ETHICS OF REASON + + +139. THE DOCTRINE SUPPORTED BY THE OTHER SCHOOLS.--- I urge the more +confidently the Ethics of Reason, or the Ethics of the Rational Social +Will, because there is so little in it that is really new. It only makes +articulate what we all know already, and strives to get rid of certain +exaggerations into which many men who reason, and who reason well, have +unwittingly fallen. + +The fundamentals of the doctrine have been exhibited in Parts V and VI of +this volume, and the exaggerations alluded to have been treated in Part +VII. Hence, I may speak very briefly in indicating how the Ethics of +Reason finds a many-sided support in schools which appear, on the +surface, to be in the opposition. + +It is evident, to begin with, that the Ethics of the Social Will cannot +dispense with Moral Intuitions, but must regard them as indispensable; +as, indeed, the very foundation of the moral life. That the individual +may, and if he is properly equipped for the task, ought, to examine +critically his own moral intuitions and those of the community in which +he finds himself, and should, with becoming modesty and hesitation, now +and then suggest an innovation, means no more than that he and the +community are not dead, but are living, and that progress is a +possibility, at least. + +As for the Egoist, unless he is an absurd extremist, we must admit that +he says much that is worth listening to. Was not Bentham quite right in +maintaining that if all A's interests were committed to B, and all B's to +A, the world would get on very badly? A charity that begins at the planet +Mars would arrive nowhere. The Ethics of Reason has room for a very +careful consideration of the interests of the self. But it may object to +the position that the moral mathematician may regard as the only +important number the number One. + +With the Utilitarian our doctrine need have, as we have seen, no quarrel. +Did not that learned, enlightened, and most fair-minded of utilitarians, +Sidgwick, ultimately resolve the happiness which men seek into anything +which may be the object of the mind in willing? Did not a critical +utilitarianism resolve itself into the doctrine of the Rational Social +Will? Why take less critical utilitarians as the only exponents of the +school? Besides, is there any reason why the social will should be blind +to the fact that men generally do desire to gain pleasure and to avoid +pain? It is only the exaggeration of this truth that we need to combat. + +To Nature, properly understood, we can enter no objection. Who objects to +Perfection as a "counsel of perfection?" Can the Social Will object to a +man's striving to Realize his Capacities--under proper control, and with +a regard to others? The Pessimist is an unhealthy creature, and the +Social Will represents normal and healthy humanity. Here we have +disparity. But to Evolution our doctrine offers no opposition. It is only +by a process of development that the Actual Social Will has come to be +what it is; and the Rational Social Will looks to a further development +under the guidance of reason. + +The fact is that thoughtful men belonging to different schools tend to +introduce into their statement of their doctrines modifying clauses; and +in the end we find them not as far apart as they seemed at the beginning. +The tendency is, I think, in the direction of the recognition of the +Rational Social Will. This doctrine belongs to nobody in particular; it +is the. common property of us all. It contains little that is startling. + +140. ITS METHOD OF APPROACH TO PROBLEMS.---He who looks to the Rational +Social Will for guidance is given a compass which may be of no small +service to him. For example: + +(1) He will see that moral phenomena are not to be isolated. He will +accept the historic order of society and judge man and his emotions and +actions in the light of it. He will never feel tempted to say, with +Bentham, that the pleasure which has its roots in malice, envy, cruelty, +"taken by itself, is good." [Footnote: _Principles of Morals and +Legislation,_ chapter x, Sec 10, note.] + +He will simply say, it is pleasure. That it is, of course; but he will +maintain that nothing "taken by itself" is either good or bad, from the +moralist's point of view. The cruel man may will to see suffering, and +may enjoy it. The moral man may hold that the cruel man, his act of will, +and his pleasure, should all be snuffed out, in the interest of humanity, +as an unmitigated evil. + +(2) The advocate of the Rational Social Will recognizes, as do many +adherents of other schools, that the social will, as expressed at any +given time, is only relatively rational; that men must live in their own +day and generation, although they can, to some degree, reach beyond them; +and that some differences of opinion as to the relative values of +virtues, and the goodness of characters, are to be expected. + +(3) Furthermore, he is in a position to explain how a man may be +"subjectively" right and yet "objectively" wrong. The man's character may +be such that it is, on the whole, to be approved by the Rational Social +Will. He may be animated by the desire to adjust himself to that will. +And yet, the accident of ignorance, the accident of prejudice not +recognized by himself as such, may lead him to do what he thinks right +and what those more enlightened recognize to be wrong. + +141. ITS SOLUTION OF CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES.--Perhaps it would be better +for me to give this section a heading more nearly like the last. I aim +only to give the reader a point of view from which he can approach the +problem of a solution. + +Take the problem which has come up before in the form of the distribution +of pleasures. [Footnote: See Sec 109.] He who dwells, not so much upon +pleasure, as upon the satisfaction of desire and will, must state it +differently, but the problem is much the same. What degree of recognition +should be given to the will of each individual, or to the separate +volitions and desires in the life of the individual? Should everybody +count for one? Should every desire or group of desires receive +recognition? Is no distinction to be made in the intensity of desires? +And how many individuals shall we include in our reckoning? + +Light seems to be shed upon this complicated problem or set of problems +when we hold clearly before ourselves what the task of reason is in +regulating the life of man individually and collectively. Its function is +to bring order out of chaos and strife; to substitute harmony and +planfulness for accident; to introduce long views in the place of +momentary impulses; to prevent the barter of permanent good for a mess of +pottage. + +Reason must accept the impulses and instincts of man as it finds them, +and do what it can with them. It cannot ignore them. Slowly, +civilizations, to some degree rational, have come into being. In so far +as they are rational, they are justified. Keeping all this in view we may +say, tentatively: + +(a) The principle, "everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than +one," must be interpreted as an expression of the conviction that no will +should be _needlessly_ sacrificed. + +Reason is bodiless, except as incorporated in human societies, and these +must have their historic development. Can we do away with the special +claims of family, of neighborhood, of the state? They have their place in +the historic rational order. But the whispered "everybody to count for +one" may help us to realize that such special claims cannot take the +place of all others. + +(b) Shall a deliberate attempt be made to enlarge the circle of those who +are to share in the social will, not merely by diminishing the number of +deaths, but by promoting the number of births? States have attempted it +often enough. I can only say that, if this be attempted, it should not be +attempted in ways that ignore the historical development of society, with +its social and moral traditions. + +(c) Why not justify our attitude toward the brutes by maintaining that +they have, theoretically, rights to recognition, in so far as such +recognition does not interfere with the rights of man in the rational +social order? The brutes outnumber us, to be sure. We are in a hopeless +minority. But were this minority sacrificed, there would be no rational +social order at all--no right, no wrong; nothing but the clash of wills +or impulses which reason now strives to harmonize as it can. [Footnote: +See chapter xxi] + +(d) When we turn to the problem of the distribution of satisfactions in +the life of the individual, we find ready to hand a variety of unwise +saws--"A short life and a merry one," and the like. + +How should the individual choose his satisfactions? Merely from the +standpoint of the individual? What is _desirable_? Not _desired_, +by this man or by that, but _desirable, reasonable_? + +It is an open secret that the house of mirth lacks every convenience +demanded of a permanent residence, and that those who breathlessly pursue +pleasure are seldom pleased. Nor do men, when they stop to think, want +their lives to be very short. + +And, in any case, this question of the distribution of satisfactions in +the life of the individual does not concern the individual alone. Is the +man who wants a short life and a merry one an "undesirable" from the +standpoint of the Rational Social Will? Then he should be suppressed. The +manner of distribution of even his own personal satisfactions is not his +affair exclusively. Every ordered society has its notions touching the +type of man which suits its ends. + +(e) But shall we, in making up our minds about the "satisfaction on the +whole" which busies the rational individual or the rational community, +take no account at all of the intensity of pleasures and of pains, the +eagerness with which some things are desired and the feebleness of the +impulsion toward others? May not the intense thrill of a moment more than +counterbalance "four lukewarm hours?" Are we not, if we take such things +into consideration, back again face to face with something very like the +calculus of pleasures--that bugbear of the egoist and of the utilitarian? + +It would be foolish to maintain that man, either individually or +collectively, places all desires upon the same level. No man of sense +holds that every desire should count as one. On the other hand, no man of +sense pretends to have any accurate unit of measurement by which he can +make unerring estimates of desirability. + +Fortunately, he is not compelled to fall back upon such a unit. Even if +he was born yesterday, the race was not. He is born into a system of +values expressed in social organization and social institutions. It is +the resultant of innumerable expressions of preference on the part of +innumerable men. It is a general guide to what, on the whole, man wants. + +It is, then, foolish for him to raise such questions as, whether it is +not better to aim at intense happiness on the part of the few, to the +utter ignoring of the mass of mankind. Such questions the Rational Social +Will has already answered in the negative. + +142. THE CULTIVATION OF OUR CAPACITIES.--Finally, we may approach the +question whether it is reasonable to awake dormant desires, to call into +being new needs; which, satisfied, may be recognized as a good, but +which, unsatisfied, may result in unhappiness. [Footnote: Compare chapter +xxi, Sec 86.] + +A little cup may be filled with what leaves a big one half empty. It is +easy to find grounds upon which to congratulate the "average" man. All +the world caters to him--ready-made clothing is measured to fit his +figure, and it is sold cheap; the average restaurant consults his taste +and his pocket; the average woman just suits him as a help-mate; he is +much at home with his neighbors, most of whom diverge little from the +average. Why strive to rise above the average--and fall into a divine +discontent? + +May one not say much the same of a community? Why should it strive to +attain to new conquests, to awaken in its members new wants and strain to +satisfy them? Does it seem self-evident that it is reasonable, in +general, to multiply desires with no guarantee of their satisfaction? + +I know no way of approaching the solution of this problem save from the +standpoint of the Rational Social Will. We are confronted with the +general problem of the desirability of civilization, with all that that +implies. The life of man in some rather primitive societies has seemed in +certain respects rather idyllic. The eating of the fruit of the tree, and +the consequent opening of the eyes, has, time and again, seemed to result +in disaster. + +But was the idyllic life not an accidental thing, due to a fortuitous +combination of circumstances, rather than to man's intelligent control of +a larger environment? Civilization of some sort seems inevitable. Have we +any other guarantee that we can make it, in the long run, rational, than +a many-sided development of man's capacities? And must we not exercise a +broad faith in the value of enlightenment, increase of knowledge, +farsightedness, the cultivation of complex emotions, even at the risk of +some waste of effort and some suffering to certain individuals? + +Perhaps this is as good a place as any to say a word about the +significance of the terms "higher" and "lower," when used in a moral +sense. We have seen that John Stuart Mill made much of the distinction in +his utilitarianism. Bentham appears to sin against the enlightened moral +judgment in holding that, quantities of pleasure being the same, "push- +pin is as good as poetry." + +When we realize that the worth of things may be determined from the +standpoint of the Rational Social Will, we can easily understand that +some occupations and their accompanying pleasures should be rated higher +than others, however satisfactory the latter may seem to certain +individuals. It is not unreasonable to rate the pleasure of scientific +discovery as higher than the pleasure of swallowing an oyster; and that, +without following Bentham in falling back upon a quantitative standard, +or following Mill in maintaining that pleasures, as pleasures, differ in +kind. [Footnote: See chapter xxv, Sec 107.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXXI + +THE MORAL LAW AND MORAL IDEALS + + +143. DUTIES AND VIRTUES.--We saw, at the very beginning of this volume +[Footnote: Chapter i, Sec 2.] that a single moral law, so abstractly stated +as to cover the whole sphere of conduct, must be something so vague and +indeterminate as to be practically useless as a guide to action. The +admonition, "do right," does not mean anything in particular to the man +who is not already well instructed as to what, in detail, constitutes +right action. Nor do we make ourselves more intelligible, when we say to +him "be good." + +It seems to mean something more when we say "act justly" or "be just"; +"speak the truth," or "be truthful." And the more we particularize, the +more we help the individual confronted with concrete problems--the only +problems with which life actually confronts us. + +This is as it should be. Duties and virtues are expressions of the +Rational Social Will, and that will is a mere abstraction except as it is +incorporated, with a wealth of detail, in human societies. It would be +hard for the small boy to classify, under any ten commandments, the +innumerable company of the "don'ts" which he hears from his mother during +the course of a week. He can leave such work to the moralist. But he is +receiving an education in the moral law, as an expression of the social +will, through the whole seven days. + +If we wish, we can emphasize the _moral law_, and dwell upon the +_duties_ of man. On the other hand, we may lay stress upon the +_virtues_, and point to _ideals_. The Greek made much of the +virtues; the Christian moralist had more to say of man's duties. In the +end, there need be little discrepancy in the results. I make the same +recommendation, whether I say to a man, Speak the truth! or whether I say +to him, Be truthful! + +It may be claimed that shades of difference make themselves apparent, +where one emphasizes the law and another points to an ideal. Perhaps they +do, in most minds. It certainly sounds more conceited to say: "I am +trying to be virtuous," than to say: "I am trying to do my duty." On the +other hand, the admonition, "Be truthful," appears to leave one a little +latitude. We take the truthful man, so to speak, in the lump. If he has a +strong bias toward truth-speaking, and is felt to be reliable, on the +whole, it is not certain that we should rob him of his title on the +ground of one or two lapses for which weighty reasons could be urged. The +admonition: "Speak the truth!" seems more uncompromising; and yet he who +prefers this legal form may maintain that it is a general admonition +addressed to men of sense who are supposed to be able to exercise reason. + +144. THE NEGATIVE ASPECT OF THE MORAL LAW.--Why does the Moral Law, on +the surface at least, appear to be so largely negative? As we look back +upon our early youth, our days appear to be punctuated with punishments. +When we attain to years of discretion, this is not the case, with most of +us, at least. + +But when we turn to the law, in our own society or in others, we find +prohibitions and penalties everywhere. Of rewards little is said. Is the +social will meant to be chiefly inhibitory? Is it a check to the action +of the individual? + +(1) The negative aspect of the moral law is, to a considerable degree, an +illusion. The social will takes us up into itself and forms us. In our +early youth we are acutely conscious of the process. A vast number of the +things a boy wants to do are things that do not suit the social will at +all. He wants to break windows; he wants to fight other boys; he wants to +be idle; his delight is in adventures not normally within the reach of, +or suited to the taste of, the citizens of an ordered state. It is little +wonder that the boy regards the moral law as a nuisance and the state as +a suitable refuge for those suffering from senile decay. + +There are individuals who scarcely get beyond this stage. They remain, +even in their later years, at war with the state. From time to time, we +seize them and incarcerate them. That the law _forbids_ and +_punishes_, they never forget. It is chiefly for such that the +criminal law exists. They are in the state, but they are not of it. They +have small share in the heritage of the civilized man. + +For most of us there comes a time when most prohibitions are little +thought of. It has been maintained, that the law is negative partly for +the reason that positive duties are too numerous to be formulated. But +how numerous are the things that ought not to be done which normal men +never think of doing! At this moment, I could swallow a pen, taste the +ink in the ink-well, throw my papers from the window, hurl the porcelain +jar on the chimney-piece at the cat next door, swing on the chandelier. I +am conscious of no constraint in not doing these things. Why? I have +become to some degree adjusted to the type which the social will strives +to produce. + +(2) And, having become so far adjusted, I recognize that the social will +is distributing rewards most lavishly. The whole organism of society is +its instrument. Work is found for me, and I am paid for it. If I am +industrious and dependable, I am recompensed. If I am truthful, I am +believed, which is no little convenience. If I am energetic and +persevering, I may grow rich or be elected to office. If I am courteous, +I am liked and am treated with courtesy. + +Every day I am paid, in the ordinary course of things, according to my +deserts. Why should society work out an extraordinary system of rewards +for those whom it is already rewarding automatically? + +In some cases, recourse is had to extraordinary rewards. We give prizes +to children in the schools; we give medals to soldiers for distinguished +service; we confer honorary degrees upon men for a variety of reasons. In +monarchical countries and in their colonies, the man who earns an +extraordinary reward may even pass it on, in the shape of a title, to his +descendants, as though it were original sin. But the giving of +extraordinary rewards to all ordinary, normal persons would be too much. + +The man who markedly offends against the moral law is not an ordinary, +normal person. He is not adjusted to the social will. It is natural that +he should attract especial attention. Thus the "Thou shalt not!" is given +prominence. To this I might add, that punishments are cheaper and easier +than extraordinary rewards. Pains are sharper than pleasures, and are +easily inflicted. + +(3) It is worthy of remark that, with the evolution of morality, it tends +to become positive. The enlightened moral man recognizes, not merely the +actual social will, but also the Rational Social Will. He may feel it his +duty to do much more than society formally demands of him. + +145. HOW CAN ONE KNOW THE MORAL LAW?--This question has already been +answered in chapters preceding. Every man has three counsellors: (1) The +"objective" morality of his community--custom, law, and public opinion, +which certainly deserve to be taken very seriously; (2) his moral +intuitions, which may be of the finest; and (3) his reason, which +prevents him from making decisions without reflection. + +Can a man who listens to these three counsellors be sure that he is right +in a given decision? The sooner a man learns that he is not infallible +and impeccable, the better it will be for him, for his neighbor, and for +the world at large. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXII + +THE MORAL CONCEPTS + + +146. GOOD AND BAD; RIGHT AND WRONG.--As a rule, men reflect little +touching the moral terms which are on their lips every day. It is well +worth while to take some of them up and to turn them over for +examination. + +We may use the terms "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," in a very +broad sense. A "good" trick may be a contemptible action; the "right" way +to crack a bank-safe may be the means to the successful commission of a +crime. Evidently, the words, thus used, are not employed in a moral +sense. + +When we pass judgments from the moral point of view, we concern ourselves +with men and with their actions, and measure them by the standard of the +social will. Men and actions are "good," when they can meet the test. +Actions are "right" or "wrong," when they are in accordance with the +dictates of the moral law, or are at variance with them. That an act may +be both right and wrong, when viewed from different standpoints, even on +moral ground, we have seen in Chapter XXX. A man may mean to do right, +and may, through ignorance or error, be guilty of an act that we condemn. +To the intelligent, confusions are here unnecessary. But the history of +ethics is full of confusions in just this field. + +147. DUTY AND OBLIGATION.--Verbal usage sometimes justifies the use of +one of these words, and sometimes that of the other. We say: I did my +duty; we do not say: I did my obligation. But this is a mere matter of +verbal expression, and we are really concerned with two names for the +same thing. + +(1) There has been much dispute as to whether the sense of duty or moral +obligation can or cannot be analyzed. It has been declared unanalyzable +and unique. Some think this a point of much importance which imparts a +peculiar sacredness to the sense of duty. + +There appears no reason why this position should be taken. No one has +been able to analyze into its ultimate sensational elements the peculiar +feeling one has when one is tickled. But this does not make the feeling +sacred or awe-inspiring. The authority of the sense of duty must be +looked for in another direction--and authority it has. + +(2) I have spoken of the "sense" of duty. We all recognize that, when we +are faced with a duty, a feeling is normally present. But the whole +argument of this volume has maintained that man is not to be treated only +as the subject of emotions. He is a rational being. In some persons +feeling is very prominent; in others it is less so. It is quite +conceivable that, in a given case, a man capable of reflection should +recognize that he is confronted with a duty, and yet that he should feel +no impulse to perform it. Did no one ever feel any such impulse, the +whole system of duties, the whole rational order of society itself, would +dissolve and disappear. + +Fortunately, the normal man does feel an impulse to perform duties +recognized as such. And in the case of those exceptional persons who do +not, society strives to supply surrogates, extraordinary impulses based +upon a system of rewards and punishments. This is a mere supplement, and +could never keep alive a society from which the sense of duty had +disappeared. + +Duty _is_ sacred. It is the very foundation of every rational +society. It does not greatly concern ethics whether the impulse, which +makes itself felt in men who want to do their duty, can or cannot be +analyzed. But it is all-important that they should feel the impulse. + +(3) Can a man do more than his duty? Is it the duty of everyone to be, +not merely a good, average, honest, faithful, law-abiding citizen, but to +go far beyond this and be conspicuously a saint? + +It should be remembered that we are concerned with the connotation +properly to be given to a word in common use. + +A certain amount of goodness the social will appears to demand of men +rather peremptorily. Its demands seem to vary somewhat with the +exigencies of the times--for example, in peace and in war. It does not +make the same demands of all men. From those to whom much has been given-- +wealth, education, social or political influence,--much is required. +From certain persons it appears to be glad to get anything. If they keep +out of the police-court, it is agreeably surprised. + +I have no desire to dissuade anyone from the arduous pursuit of +sainthood; but I submit that the word "duty," as sanctioned by usage, +implies but a limited demand, and takes cognizance of character and +environment. He who comes up to this moderate standard is not condemned; +but he is free to go farther and to become as great a saint as he +pleases. In which case, we admire him. Those who, in the past, have +spoken of "counsels of perfection," have drawn upon a profound knowledge +of human nature and of human societies. + +148. REWARD AND PUNISHMENT.--We saw in the last chapter (Sec 144) that it +is something of a criticism upon man and upon societies of men that +extraordinary rewards have to be given and that punishments must be +inflicted. + +More attention has been paid to punishments than to rewards, and the +question touching the proper aim of punishment in a civilized state has +received much discussion. The study of the history of the infliction of +punishment is suggestive, but it does not shed a clear light. The social +will has not always been a rational social will, and some of its +decisions may be placed among the curiosities of literature. Still, they +may serve the purpose of the traditional "terrible example." + +Should we, in punishing, aim at the prevention of crime? Are punishments +to be "deterrent"? Under this head we must consider, not merely the +criminal himself, but also those who are in more or less danger of +becoming criminals, though they have, as yet, committed no known crime. + +Should the aim of punishment be the reformation of the criminal? + +Should we punish merely that "justice" be done? He who steals and eats +fruit is visited with punishment, in the course of nature, if the fruit +is unripe. But he suffers equally if he eats his own fruit, under like +conditions. This seems a blind punishment. Should we visit pain upon him +for the theft, merely because it is a theft, and without looking abroad +for any other reason? + +Light appears to be thrown upon these problems when we reflect that +punishment is an instrument, employed by the Rational Social Will, in +pursuance of its ends. + +(1) It is desirable that men should be deterred from committing crime. If +this cannot be done save by the infliction of punishment, then let men be +punished. But be it remembered that punishment is a regrettable +necessity, and that the occasions for the infliction of penalties may +greatly be diminished by the amelioration of the organism of society. +There is the born criminal, as there is the born inmate of an asylum for +the insane. But there is also the manufactured criminal; the product of +the slum, the victim of ignorance, the prey of the walking-delegate, the +sufferer from over-work and undernourishment, the inhabitant of the +filthy and overcrowded tenement, the man robbed of his self-respect, who +has no share in the sweetness and light of civilization. A society that +first manufactures criminals and then expends great sums in punishing +them is, in so far, not rational. + +(2) It is desirable that the criminal should be reformed and returned to +society as a normal man. But this is not the one and only aim of the +social will. The whole flock should not be sacrificed to the one black +sheep, as some sentimental persons appear to believe. There is room here +for the exercise of judgment and of some cool calculation. + +(3) As for the demand that a given pain shall be inflicted for a given +wrong done, irrespective of any gain to anybody, and irrespective of +consequences,--it appears to carry one back to ancient and primitive law. + +Undoubtedly many punishments have been inflicted in the past to satisfy +the sense of resentment. [Footnote: It may be objected that we are not +concerned here with resentment but with the satisfaction of "justice." +Men's notions of the "justice" of punishments have been touched upon in +chapter ii, Sec 4. Plato suggests, in his Laws, that the slave who steals a +bunch of grapes should receive a blow for every grape in the bunch. This +has an agreeably mathematical flavor of exactitude. But what shall be +done to the man who steals half of a ham or a third of a watermelon?] +Undoubtedly the same is true of the present. Can anything be said in +favor of this impulse? It plays no small part in the life of humanity. + +We feel that a bad man _ought_ to be punished. We harbor a certain +resentment against him. The resentment of the individual for personal +injuries we recognize to be wrong. It is not impartial, and it is apt to +be excessive and unreasoning. Public order demands that it be refused +expression. + +But is the--we must admit, somewhat more disinterested--resentment of the +community a rational thing? Have men, collectively, no whims, no +prejudices? When a trial is deferred, and public indignation has cooled +off, how do the chances of the prisoner compare with those he enjoyed +just after the commission of the crime? And yet something may be said for +public resentment. It has a certain driving-power. It may be questioned +whether either our desire to deter men from crime, or our benevolent +interest in the criminal, would be quite sufficient to enforce law, if +all sense of resentment against the law-breaker were lacking. Its +usefulness as an instrument of the social will appears to give it a +certain justification. But it also suggests that even public resentment +should not be given free rein. + +Before leaving the subject of reward and punishment, it may be well to +say a word touching our use of the terms _credit_ and _discredit_, _merit_ +and _demerit_. + +We do not give a man credit for an action, we do not think of him as +meritorious, merely because he has done right. Who thinks of praising the +young mother for feeding and washing her first-born? Who shakes the hand +of the Sunday-school teacher and congratulates him upon having stolen +nothing for a week? But the waif from the gutter who wanders through a +department-store and resolutely takes nothing, emerging exhausted with +the struggle, we slap upon the back and call a little man. + +Our notions of credit and merit are bound up with our notions of +extraordinary rewards. The creditable action, the meritorious man, have a +certain claim upon us, if only the claim of special recognition. Any man +who makes a notable step forward deserves credit, whatever his actual +position upon the moral scale. He who only "marks time" upon a relatively +high level may be a good man, but we do not give him credit for the act +normally to be expected of him. The recognition of merit is a part of the +machinery of moralization. + +149. VIRTUES AND VICES.--One swallow, said Aristotle, does not make a +spring, nor does one happy day make a happy life. Elsewhere he draws our +attention to the fact that one good action does not constitute a virtue. + +We may define the virtues as those relatively permanent qualities of +character which it is desirable, from the moral point of view, that a man +should have. The vices are the corresponding defects. I shall not attempt +to draw up a list of the virtues. For a variety of lists, exhibiting +curious and interesting diversities, I refer the reader back to Chapter +III, Sec Sec 9-11. + +The Rational Social Will aims to build up a social order which shall do +justice to the fundamental impulses and desires of man, a social and +rational creature. The stones which it must build into its edifice are +human beings. If the human beings are mere lumps of soft clay, incapable +of holding their shape or of bearing any weight, the walls cannot rise. +And a human being may be satisfactory in one respect, and far from +satisfactory in another. No one of us is wholly ignorant of the qualities +desirable in our building-material. Custom, law and public opinion are +there to indicate what qualities have, in fact, proved, on the whole, not +detrimental. Our intuitions help us in forming a judgment. Rational +reflection is of service. + +But one thing is very evident. Nowhere is it made clearer than in the +study of the virtues and vices, that the moralist cannot consider the +phenomena, with which he occupies himself, in a state of isolation. + +Is courage a virtue? Is, then, the man who is willing to take the risk of +breaking a bank, or holding up a stage-coach, in so far virtuous? Is +perseverance a virtue? Is, then, the woman, who holds out to the bitter +end in her desire to have the last word, in so far virtuous? Is justice a +virtue? Then why not be virtuous in demanding the pound of flesh, if it +is the law--as it once was? + +Certain qualities of character have been recognized as, _on the +whole_, and _generally_, serviceable to the social will. But a +man is not a quality of character, and qualities of character are +sometimes gathered into strange bundles. It is of men that the state is +composed; of thinking, feeling men. We cannot isolate qualities of +character, and assess their value in their isolation. + +150. CONSCIENCE.--We are all forced to recognize that conscience has its +dual aspect. It is characterized by _feeling_; and the feeling is +seldom blind, or, at least, wholly blind; conscience implies a +_judgment_ that something is right or wrong. + +(1) The feeling is, to be sure, very often in the foreground. Those who +say, "My conscience tells me that this is wrong," often mean little more +than, "I feel that it is wrong." + +But the word "feeling" is an ambiguous one. It is used to cover all sorts +of intuitive judgments as well as mere emotions. The man who takes the +time to reflect upon his feeling of the rightness or wrongness of an +action can often discover some, perhaps rather vague, reason for his +feeling proper. + +(2) In other words, he may come upon an intuitive judgment. And the +thoughtful man who talks about his conscience is rarely satisfied with a +blind intuition; he wants to be sure he is right, and he thinks the whole +matter over. + +(3) The feeling and the judgment are not necessarily in accord. The +feeling may lag behind an enlightened judgment. On the other hand, the +feeling of repugnance to acting in certain ways may be a justifiable +protest against a bit of intellectual sophistry. + +(4) So much ought to be admitted by everyone who holds that conscience +may be blunted or may be enlightened. Consciences vary indefinitely. Some +we set down as hopelessly below the average; others we reverence as +refined and enlightened. The social worker makes it his aim to "awaken" +conscience, to cultivate it, to bring it up to a high standard. No +practical moralist regards the conscience of the individual as something +which must simply be left to itself and treated as sacred, no matter what +its character. + +(5) The above sufficiently explains some of the puzzles which confront +the man who reverences conscience and yet studies the consciences of his +fellow-men. He finds that the individual conscience is not an infallible +guide-post pointing to right action; that it is not a perfect time- +keeper, in complete accord with the watches of other men. + +"It's a turrible thing to have killed the wrong man," said the +conscience-stricken illicit distiller in his mountain fastness. "I never +seen good come o' goodness yet; him as strikes first is my fancy," said +the dying pirate in "Treasure Island." Augustine, passing over much worse +offences, exhausts himself in agonies of remorse over a boyish prank. +[Footnote: See chapter xx, Sec 78.] Seneca draws up a list of the most +horrifying crimes, and decides that ingratitude exceeds them all in +enormity. [Footnote: _On Benefits_, i, 10.] + +(6) It appears to be quite evident that consciences ought to be +standardized, and that the standard should be made a high one. The true +standard is the one set by the Rational Social Will. It is as much a duty +to have a good conscience as it is to obey the conscience one has. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIII + +THE ETHICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL + + +151. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM?--Men collected into groups and organized +in various ways we call states, and we treat a state as a unit. We look +upon it as having rights and as owing duties both to individuals and to +other states. There are individuals whom we are apt to regard as +representatives of the state; as instruments, rather than as men-- +executive officers, legislators, official interpreters of its laws, +whether good or bad. For states and their representatives we often have +especial moral standards, differing more or less from those by which we +judge human beings merely as human beings. It is with the morality of the +latter that I am here concerned. + +To be sure, all human beings are to be found in states, or in that +rudimentary social something which foreshadows the state. To talk of the +morality of the isolated individual is nonsense. Morality is the +expression of the social will; and if we think of even Robinson Crusoe as +a good man, it means that we apply to him social standards. Had he not +been moralized, he would have killed and eaten Friday, when the latter +made his appearance. + +We must, then, take the individual as we find him in the state, but it is +convenient to consider his morality separately from the ethics of the +state, its institutions and its instruments. + +152. THE VIRTUES OF THE INDIVIDUAL.--What moral traits have we a right to +look for in the individual man? What sort of a man is it his duty to be? + +Evidently, men's duties must vary somewhat according to the type of the +society to which they belong, and to their definite place in that +society. Still, certain general desirable traits of character unavoidably +suggest themselves. To attempt a complete list seems futile, but the most +salient have been dwelt upon by the moralists of many schools, and for +centuries past. + +Does it not appear self-evident that a man should be law-abiding, honest, +industrious, truthful, and capable of unselfishness? Should he not have a +regard for his health and efficiency? Should he not aim to develop his +capacities, and in so far to diminish the dead mass of ignorance and bad +taste which weighs down society? + +Of marital fidelity, with all that that implies--personal purity, the +good of one's children, a fine sense of loyalty--it is scarcely necessary +to speak. No man, betrothed or married, can be sure that he will not meet +tomorrow some woman whom the unprejudiced would judge to be more +attractive than the one to whom he has bound himself. Shall he remain +unprejudiced--a floating mine, ready to explode at any accidental +contact? Away with him! He has, in the eyes of the scientific moralist, +"too much ego in his cosmos." Those babble of "affinities" who know +little, and care less, about the long and arduous ascent up which mankind +has toiled, in the effort to attain to civilization. + +And what shall we say of such things as religious duties, of +cheerfulness, of good manners, of personal cleanliness? Of religious +duties I shall speak elsewhere. [Footnote: Chapter xxxvi.] As to +cheerfulness and good manners, it is only necessary to reflect upon the +baleful influence exercised upon the young--who have here my entire +sympathy--by a bilious and depressing piety, or by those who are rudely +and superciliously moral. + +Cleanliness deserves some special attention, on account of the fact that +it has perplexed even thoughtful scholars to discover why society has +come to regard it as a duty at all. [Footnote: The chapter on cleanliness +by Epictetus is a homily, and not a philosophic argument. See, +_Discourses_, Book IV, chapter xi.] That, if society does regard +cleanliness as important, it should be the duty of the individual to keep +himself and his house clean presents no problem. He has no right to make +himself gratuitously offensive, and gratuitously offensive he will be, if +he is a dirty fellow. But why does anyone object to his being a dirty +fellow? The prejudice in favor of cleanliness does not appear to be +universal--witness the Eskimo and various other peoples. + +We have learned that the social will has its foundation in the +fundamental impulses and instincts of man. An admirable scholar has +suggested that the ultimate root of the regard for cleanliness which more +or less characterizes civilized societies may be traced to some such +primitive and inexplicable impulse to cleanliness as we observe, for +example, in the cat. [Footnote: WESTERMARCK, _Origin and Development of +the Moral Ideas_, chapter xxxix.] It must be admitted that it is far +more marked in the cat than in the human being. A kitten is much more +fastidious than is a baby, and a grown cat would tolerate no powder or +rouge. + +But, assuming that such an instinct exists, even in weak measure, it +might easily develop with the development of society. And, as man is a +rational being, capable of discovering a connection between cleanliness +and hygiene, the duty of cleanliness would acquire a new authority. Dirt +becomes no longer merely distasteful; it is recognized as a danger. + +153. CONVENTIONAL MORALITY.--There are virtues--taking the traits of +character indicated by the names broadly and loosely, and making +allowance for all sorts of variations within wide limits--which appear to +be recognized as such very generally. Bishop Butler regarded justice, +veracity and regard to common good as valued in all societies. Certainly +they have served as expressions of the social will in many societies, +ancient and modern, primitive and highly civilized. + +We have seen that the forms under which they appear are not independent +of the degree and kind of the development of the society we may happen to +be contemplating. [Footnote: See chapter ii.] And we have realized that +man is born into a world of ready-made duties which are literally forced +upon his attention. He finds himself a member of a family, somebody's +neighbor, a resident in a town or village, allotted to a social class, an +employer or an employee, a citizen of a state. Justice, veracity and a +regard for common good appear to have their value in all these relations; +but the manner of their interpretation is not independent of the +relations, and the relations with their appropriate demands are +relatively independent of the individual will. One cannot ignore these +demands and fall back, independently, upon metaphysical theory. +Aristotle's claim that a man cannot be unjust to his own child, because +the child is a part of himself, and a man cannot be unjust to himself, +[Footnote: _Ethics_, Book V, chapter vi, Sec 7.] excites our +curiosity. It does not elicit our approval. + +It is because the vast majority of our duties are so unequivocally thrust +upon us that I have been able to touch so lightly, in the last section, +upon the duties of the individual. Why dilate upon what everybody knows? +Is it not enough to set him thinking about it? + +And, in helping him to think, the reference to the virtue of cleanliness +has its value. Cleanliness is prized by those who know little of hygiene. +If a society cannot be happy without cleanliness, for whatever reason, is +it not the duty of the individual to be clean? But _how_ clean +should he be? + +There are virtues--I use the word here broadly to cover approved habits-- +which seem to have a very direct reference to chronology and geography. +They are _conventional virtues_; they suit a given society, and +satisfy its actual social will. A Vermont housekeeper in an _igloo_ +would be an intolerable nuisance. Imagine an unbroken succession of New +England house-cleanings with the inhabitants of the house sitting in +despair in the snow outside. + +Those who live north of the Alps are sometimes criticized for dipping +Zwieback into their tea. Those who live south of the Alps eat macaroni in +ways revolting to other nations. A very pretty Frenchwoman, devouring +snails after the approved fashion of the locality, has driven me out of +an excellent restaurant. And the world opens its eyes in wonder when it +sees the well-bred Anglo-Saxon dispose of his asparagus. + +There is a little-recognized virtue called toleration. St. Ambrose was a +wise man when he advised St. Augustine to do, when in Rome, as the Romans +do. Of course, he did not mean this to apply to robbery or to murder. He +was giving an involuntary recognition to the doctrine that there are +conventional virtues, worthy of our notice, as well as virtues of heavier +caliber and wider range. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIV + +THE ETHICS OF THE STATE + + +154. THE AIM OF THE STATE.--He who has resolved to devote but a single +chapter to the Ethics of the State must deliberately sacrifice nine- +tenths, at least, of the material--some of it very good material, and +some of it most curious and interesting--which has heaped itself together +on his hands in the course of his reading and thinking. I have resolved +to write only the one chapter. The State is the background of the +individual, the scaffold which supports his moral life. Without it, he +may be a being; but he is scarcely recognizable as a _human_ being. +It has made the individual what he is, and it is the medium in which he +can give expression to the nature which he now possesses. + +Plato maintains that the object of the constitution of the state is the +happiness of the whole, not of any part. [Footnote: _Republic_, II. +It must be borne in mind that both Plato and Aristotle had the Greek +prejudice touching citizenship. Their "citizenship" was enjoyed by a +strictly limited class.] Aristotle, in his "Politics," maintains that it +is the aim of the state to enable men to live well. Sidgwick defines +politics as "the theory of what ought to be (in human affairs) as far as +this depends on the common action of societies of men." [Footnote: _The +Methods of Ethics_, chapter ii.] We may agree with all three, and yet +leave ourselves much latitude in determining the nature of the +organization of, and the limits properly to be set to the activities of, +the State as such. Shall the State only strive to repress grave +disorders? or shall it take a paternal interest in its citizens, making +them virtuous and happy in spite of themselves? + +155. ITS ORIGIN AND AUTHORITY.--In Parts III to VI we have seen how and +upon what basis the State has grown up. It is an organism, something that +lives and grows. It is not a machine, deliberately put together at a +definite time by some man or some group of men. The "social contract" +fanatic may have read history, but he has not understood it. Of +psychology he has no comprehension at all. + +Herodotus, at some of whose stories we smile, was a wiser man. He writes: +"It appears certain to me, by a great variety of proofs, that Cambyses +was raving mad; he would not else have set himself to make a mock of holy +rites and long-established usages. For, if one were to offer men to +choose out of all the customs in the world such as seemed to them the +best, they would examine the whole number, and end by preferring their +own; so convinced are they that their own usages far surpass those of all +others." [Footnote: _The History of Herodotus_, Book III, chapter +xxxviii, translated by GEORGE RAWLINSON, London, 1910.] + +This may be something of an over-statement, for men in one state have +shown themselves to be, within limits, capable of learning from men in +another. But only within limits. Those things which give a state +stability--and without stability we are tossed upon the waves of mere +anarchy--have their roots in the remote past. Strip a man of his past, +and he is little better than an idiot; strip men within the State of +their corporate institutions and ideals, of their loyalties and emotional +leanings, and we have on our hands a mob of savages, something much below +the tribe proper, knit into unity of purpose by custom and tribal law. + +The State has its origin in man as a creature desiring and willing, and +at the same time endowed with reason. Its authority is the authority of +reason. Not reason in the abstract, with no ground to stand upon, and no +material for its exercise; but reason as incorporate in institutions and +social usages; reason which takes cognizance of the nature of man, and +recognizes what man has already succeeded in doing. + +Where shall we look for a limit to the authority of the State? Surely, +only in the Reason which makes it possible for the State to be. The State +must not defeat its own object. + +156. FORMS OF ORGANIZATION.--The special science of politics enters in +detail into the forms of organization of the State. The ethical +philosopher must content himself with certain general reflections. +Everyone knows that States have been organized in divers ways; and that +their citizens, under much the same form of political organization, have +been here happy and contented, and there in a state of ferment. The form +of government counts for something; but its suitability to the population +governed, and the degree of enlightenment and discipline characteristic +of the population, count for much more. It is not every shoe that fits +every foot, and there are feet that are little at home in shoes of any +description. + +Monarchies of many sorts, aristocracies, oligarchies, democracies, even +communisms, have been tried; and all, save the last, have managed to hold +their own with some degree of success. + +It is easy to bring objections against each form of government, just as +it is easy to say something specious in its favor. + +Are the eldest sons of a few families peculiarly fitted by nature to be +governors of the State? Look at history, and wake up to common sense. Of +the divine right of kings I shall not speak, for the adherents of the +doctrine are in our day relegated to museums of antiquities. And have the +members of aristocracies been carefully bred with a view to their +intellectual and moral superiority, as we breed fine varieties of horses +and dogs? Have those who have had their share in oligarchies been +peculiarly wise and peculiarly devoted to the common good? The communist +makes two fatal mistakes. He shuts his eyes to history, and he overlooks +the fact that there is such a thing as human nature. + +There remains democracy. Of this, Herodotus, already quoted as a man of +sense, has his opinion. He makes a shrewd Persian, in a political crisis, +thus address his fellow-conspirators: + +"There is nothing so void of understanding, nothing so full of +wantonness, as the unwieldy rabble. It were folly not to be borne, for +men, while seeking to escape the wantonness of a tyrant, to give +themselves up to the wantonness of a rude unbridled mob. The tyrant, in +all his doings, at least knows what he is about, but a mob is altogether +devoid of knowledge; for how should there be any knowledge in a rabble, +untaught, and with no natural sense of what is right and fit? It rushes +wildly into state affairs with all the fury of a stream swollen in the +winter, and confuses everything. Let the enemies of the Persians be ruled +by democracies; but let us choose out from the citizens a certain number +of the worthiest, and put the government into their hands." [Footnote: +_Op. cit._ Book III, chapter lxxxi.] + +To be sure, we, who belong to a modern, enlightened democracy, would +resent being called "a rude unbridled mob," and being likened to the +populace of ancient Persia. But those of us who reflect recognize the +dangers that lurk in the "psychology of the crowd"; and we are all aware +that, after a popular vote, it is quite possible to discover that few, +except a handful of office-holders, have gotten anything that they really +want. Democracy is not a panacea for all political evils, and there are +democracies of many kinds. + +Still, when all is said, it seems as though the Rational Social Will, the +ultimate arbiter of every moral State, should give its authority to a +democratic form of government, rather than to another form. Every +individual will has a _prima facie_ claim to recognition. + +But the Rational Social Will can never forget that human nature is in +process of development, and that each nation, at a given time, is a +historical phenomenon. The Rational Social Will is too enlightened to +drape an infant in the raiment appropriate to a college graduate. It is +only an intemperate enthusiasm that is capable of that. + +157. THE LAWS OF THE STATE.--The State allots to individuals, and to the +lesser groups of human beings, of which it is composed, _rights_, +and it prescribes to them _duties_. Upon its activities in this +sphere I can touch only by way of illustration, and for the sake of +making clear the nature of the functions of the State. + +(1) To whom shall the State grant a share in the formulation and +execution of its laws? Once, in communities very enlightened, in their +own peculiar way, women, children, slaves, mechanics, petty traders, and +hired servants were deemed quite unfit to be entrusted with such +responsibilities. [Footnote: See ARISTOTLE'S _Politics_.] + +With us, the position of woman has changed. Slavery, in a technical +sense, has been abolished. The mechanic and the petty trader are much in +evidence at "primaries." Hired servants are by some accused of being +tyrants. Children, and defectives who are grossly and palpably defective, +we bar from elections, and we also reject some criminals. + +The times have changed, and our notions of the right of the individual to +an active share in the State have changed with them. The expression of +the social will has undergone modification, and I think we can say that +it is, on the whole, modification in the right direction. + +To be sure, the court of last resort is the _Rational_ Social Will. +What is best for the State, and, hence, for those who compose it? What is +practicable in the actual condition in which a given state finds itself +at a given time? It seems too easy a solution of our problems to seek +dogmatic answers to our questionings by having recourse to the "natural +light," that ready oracle of the philosopher, Descartes. + +(2) There are certain classes of rights which civilized states generally +guarantee to their citizens with varying degrees of success. They make it +the duty of their citizens to respect these rights in others. + +(a) The laws protect life and limb. Much progress has been made in this +respect in the last centuries past. I own no coat of mail; and, when I +walk abroad, I neither carry a sword nor surround myself with armed +retainers. + +(b) They protect private property. To be sure, the "promoter" may prey +upon my simplicity; and the state itself does not recognize that I have +any absolute right to my property, any more than it recognizes that I +have an absolute right to my life. + +It may send me into the trenches. It may take from me what it will in the +form of taxes. It may even forbid me to increase my income by using my +property in ways which will make me insupportable to my neighbors. But it +will not allow my neighbor, who is stronger than I, to take possession of +my house without form of law. It will even allow me to dispose of my +property by will, after my death. + +I suggest that those, to whom this right appears to be rooted in the very +nature of things, and not to be a creation of the State, called into +being at the behest of the social will in a certain stage of its +development, should read and re-read what Sir Henry Maine has to say +about testamentary succession, in his wonderful little book on "Ancient +Law." [Footnote: See chapters vi and vii.] + +The State has not always treated a man as an individual, directly and +personally responsible to the state. It has treated him as a member of a +family or some other group; a being endowed, by virtue of his position, +with certain rights, and burdened with certain duties. A being who, when +he drops out of being, is automatically replaced by someone else who is +clothed upon with both his rights and his responsibilities. + +Our conceptions have changed. The lesser groups within the State have to +some degree lost their cohesion, and the bond between the individual, as +such, and the state has been correspondingly strengthened. But many +traces of the old conception make themselves apparent. The law compels me +to provide for my wife and children; and, if I die intestate, the law by +no means assumes that my property is left without a claimant. + +Have we been moving in the right direction, as judged by the standard of +the Rational Social Will? We think so. But it is well to bear in mind +what Herodotus said about the madness of Cambyses, and the prejudice men +have in favor of their own customs. No state is a mere aggregate of +unrelated individuals. Men are set in families, and the State seems to be +composed of groups within groups. How far the State should recognize the +will of the individual, as over against the claims of the lesser groups +to which he may belong, is a nice question for the Rational Social Will +to settle. + +(c) The law must regulate marriage and divorce. Matters so vital to the +interests of society cannot be left at the mercy of the egoistic whims of +the individual. But to what law shall we have recourse? It seems highly +irrational to have forty-eight independent authorities upon this subject +within the limits of a single nation. And, if we turn the matter over to +the churches, we discover that we have committed it to the care of one +hundred and eighty, or more, sects. Add to this, that a state of any sort +cannot be set upon its feet without some difficulty, while any +enterprising man or woman can call a sect into existence any day. There +is a new adherent for sectarian eccentricities born every minute. Surely, +here is a field for the activities of the Rational Social Will. + +(d) To paternalism of some sort the modern State, as law-giver, seems +hopelessly pledged. If we ignore this we are simply closing our eyes. The +State seems to be justified in educating its citizens, in protecting +children and women against exploitation, in protecting the working +classes, in stamping out infectious diseases. We are not even allowed to +expectorate when and where we will, a privilege enjoyed by the merest +savage. + +(e) In one respect the paternalism of our own State has lagged behind +that of certain others. We do little to secure to a man a decent privacy, +or to safeguard his personal dignity. The newspaper reporter is allowed +to rage unchecked, to unearth scandals in private families, and to cause +great pain by printing the names of individuals. + +I have known, in Europe, a man, after a difference of opinion touching +the ventilation of a railway carriage, to break a window with his elbow +and to apply to his fellow-passenger an offensive epithet. The court made +him pay a dollar and a half for breaking the window and six dollars for +giving himself the pleasure of being insulting. + +Which was the greater offense? Herodotus would expect this question to be +answered in accordance with the prejudices of the person giving the +answer. + +158. THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE STATE.--The State evidently has rights +over its citizens, and may enforce these rights through the infliction of +punishment. It as evidently has duties. A given state may not be +answerable to any actual given power. Our own State is in such a position +at the present time--there is no other state strong enough to call it to +account. + +But this does not free it from duties. No state is anything more than a +brute force, except as it incorporates, in some measure, the Rational +Social Will. And states that fall far short, as judged by this standard, +may overstep their rights and ignore their duties, whether they are +dealing with individuals or with other states. + +In punishing, the State should punish rationally. [Footnote: See chapter +xxxii, Sec 148.] And it should not demand of its subjects what will degrade +them as moral beings. "We all recognize," said a pure and candid soul, +"that a rightful sovereign may command his subjects to do what is wrong, +and that it is then their duty to disobey him." [Footnote: Sidgwick, +_Methods of Ethics_, III, vi.] + +But how discover what demands are just? It is the whole argument of this +volume that no man should venture an opinion upon this subject without +having come to some appreciation of what is meant by the Rational Social +Will. Man, his instincts, the degree of his intelligence and self- +control, the history of the development of human societies, cannot be +ignored. It is the weakness of good men, endowed with a high degree of +speculative intelligence, to construct Utopias, and to tabulate the +"rights of man," or, as Bentham well expressed it, to make lists of +"anarchical fallacies." [Footnote: See _Works_, Bowring's Edition, +Volume II.] Thus, some may, with Plato and Aristotle, advocate +infanticide. The Greek city-state was a crowded little affair, and in +danger of over-population. Some may propose radical measures to increase +the population. To France and Argentina, in our day, such an increase +appears highly desirable. May any and every method be embraced which +seems adapted to avert a given evil or to attain to a desired end? It is +instructive to note that Francis Galton, the father of "eugenics," +proposed to leave morals out of the question as "involving too many +hopeless difficulties." [Footnote: Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition, +article, "Sociology."] But do men live well who leave morals out of the +question? + +The man who falls back upon intuition alone, in his advocacy of the +abolition of capital punishment, may be expected to maintain next that a +state, in going to war, should stop short at the point where the lives of +its citizens are put in jeopardy. Why kill a good man, when it is wrong +to kill a bad one? + +It must be admitted that the State and its representatives enjoy some +rights and duties not accorded to individuals. The State may condemn men +to death or to imprisonment; it may take over property; it may make +itself a compulsory arbiter between individuals. On the other hand, its +representatives are not always as free as are private persons. The +individual, if he is a generous soul, may freely forego some of his +advantages and may seek only a fair fight with an opponent. It is +doubtful whether the duty the State owes to its citizens permits of +chivalry. Certainly strong states do not hesitate to attack weak ones; +nor do many hesitate to combine against one, on the score of fair play. +And a private man may temper justice with mercy in ways forbidden to a +judge. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXV + +INTERNATIONAL ETHICS + + +159. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM.--I am almost tempted to avoid the +discussion of this thorny subject by simply referring the reader to what +has been said already on "The Spread of the Community," and developed in +the chapters on "The Rational Social Will" and "The Individual and the +Social Will." [Footnote: See Sec 75 and chapters xxi-xxii.] + +He who confines himself to generalities avoids many difficulties and can +assure himself of the approval of many. Who, condemns justice and +humanity in the abstract? Who can wax eloquent in his condemnation of +freedom? Who finds the Christian Church on his side, when he advocates +rapacity and the oppression of the helpless, without entering into +details? + +On the other hand, who wishes to view his country with a cold +impartiality, and to place its interests exactly on a par with the +interests of other lands? Who, save the Chinaman himself, thinks it as +important that a Chinaman should have enough to eat as that an American +or an Englishman should? Was not the turpitude, that excluded the +Chinaman from Australia, traced to the two deadly sins of undue diligence +and sobriety? [Footnote: Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition, article, +"Australia."] As for freedom, men of certain nations regard it as the +highest virtue to be willing to die for it--their own freedom, be it +understood,--while they regard the same desire for freedom on the part of +their colonists as a moral obliquity to be extirpated, root and branch. + +That the historian and the sociologist should find much to say touching +the relation of nations to each other and to subject peoples goes without +saying. But the cynic may maintain with some plausibility that the +moralist's chapter on International Ethics must be as void of content as +the traditional chapter on "Snakes in Ireland." In this the cynic is +wrong, as usual; but it is instructive to listen to him, if only that we +may intelligently refute him. + +It is not always easy for an individual to determine just what he owes to +his family, to his neighbors, or to his country. Is it surprising that it +should be difficult for men to determine just what one country, or what +one race, owes to another? This is the subject of international ethics. +He who treads upon this ground should walk gingerly, and not feel too +sure of himself. But there is no reason why the moralist should not put +upon paper such reflections as occur to him. He cannot say anything more +devoid of reason than much that is said by others. + +The great Grotius, in writing on international law, in the seventeenth +century, drew his illustrations chiefly from Greeks and Romans long dead. +He had much more recent material ready to hand. But he well knew that he, +who would induce another to give him calm and dispassionate attention, +must not begin by treading on the toes of his listener. I shall strive to +profit by his example. It is best to say only what each man can apply to +his neighbor. We are all sensitive in this field. + +160. OUR METHOD OF APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT--We have seen (Sec 80) that +rational elements are to be found even in the irrational will, if one +will look below the surface. + +Is it rational for the mother to place before all else the interests of +the hairless, toothless and, apparently, mindless little creature that +she clasps to her breast? The very existence of society depends upon her +having the feeling that prompts her to do it. Is it rational to favor +one's neighbor, to be proud of one's native town, which may be a poor +sort of a town? Is it rational to be patriotic, even when one's state is +not much of a state? + +We have seen that the Rational Social Will incorporates itself in +societies very gradually, and that it draws into its service lesser +groups of many descriptions. He who detaches himself from these lesser +groups is not a man. He is the mere outline of a man--the "featherless +biped" of the philosopher. It is not of such that a state can be made. + +It is the duty of the state to prevent a man from shrinking into being +the mere member of some lesser group, but it is not its duty to +obliterate what is human in him. And the Rational Social Will must see to +it that he does not, on the other hand, forget, in a blind and irrational +patriotism, that he is a human being with a capacity for human +sympathies--sympathies extending far beyond the limits of any state. +Except when they are under the influence of strong passion, I think we +may say that men in civilized states, at least, have already shown +themselves amenable to the influence of the Rational Social Will in this +direction. It must be confessed that that influence has, as yet, been +limited. + +The approach to the subject of international ethics must lie in the +recognition that men are set in families, in neighborhoods, in towns or +cities, in states; and are yet human beings with a capacity for +respecting and loving those who belong to none of these particular +organizations. My advice to the man who wishes to abuse his fellow-man is +to do it quickly, and before he is acquainted with him. If he gets to +know him well, he will probably find something lovable in him, and he +will lose the pleasure of being malicious. + +161. SOME PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS.--The man who reads history +finds, sometimes, things to inspire him; and sometimes, things that are +depressing. He sees that the family must expand into the clan, that the +clan must come into contact with others, that the state must rise, and +that some interrelation of states is an inevitable necessity. He sees +that man's increase in insight, in diligence, in enterprise, must make +him reach out and trade with his fellow-man. + +He sees also conquest, with the subjugation of peoples; he sees trade +extended by force, and under the smoke of cannon; he sees a peaceful +economic penetration, which ends in protectorates and annexations, in +defiance of the will of those who do not want to be either protected or +annexed. + +What is rational is real, and what is real is rational, said Hegel. +[Footnote: _The Philosophy of Right_, Preface, and see Sec Sec 351 and +347.] He further maintained that civilized nations may treat as +barbarians peoples who are behind them in the "essential elements of the +state"; and also that, in a given epoch, a given nation is dominant, and +"other existing nations are void of right." + +Hegel has long been dead, and is turned to dust. He always was as dry as +dust, even when he was alive, but he was a great man. But the famous +Englishman, Sir Thomas More, wrote more engagingly; and does he not tell +us, in his "Utopia," that any nation's holding unused a piece of ground +needed for the nourishment of other people is a just cause of war? + +Such doctrines should be most comforting to us Americans. They appear to +teach us that we are, at present, the chosen people; that the rights of +other peoples are as the rights of the Hivites, the Hittites, and all the +rest; that we are justified in taking what we please, for who is there to +withstand us? + +Yet ethical Americans shake their heads over such philosophies, and some +of them even speak slightingly of philosophers. This, in spite of the +fact that great men seldom talk pure nonsense, except when carried away +by excitement, as all men may be, at times. If what they say sounds to us +wholly unmeaning, it is probable that we have not fully understood the +voice that speaks within them. What can be said in their defense? and +what can be said in, at least, partial defence of the actual historical +procedure of the nations? They have not been wholly composed of +criminals, and they must possess at least the rudiments of a moral sense. + +(1) We have seen that the state maintains its right as against those who +belong to it by controlling, not by destroying, the lesser groups which +exist within the state. Such a control appears to be demanded by the +Rational Social Will, but it often frustrates the will of the individual. + +(2) We have seen that the spread of the community is inevitable, and +that, in the interests of rationality, it is desirable. + +(3) We have seen that, even in the family, all the members are not +equally free agents. The small boy is not consulted touching the amount +of his punishment, nor can he dictate where it shall be laid on. And the +state does not give to all the individuals in it equal political rights, +nor guarantee to them an equal share of influence. This is desirable, on +the whole, in the interests of the whole, but grave abuses may easily +come into being. + +(4) We have seen that the greater whole guarantees to individuals rights, +and assigns to them duties. In so far as it is rational, it cannot do +this arbitrarily. To have recourse to metaphysical abstractions is +futile. Shall we say, without hedging, that a man has a right to the +fruits of his labor, or that first occupation gives a right to the soil? +Then, shall the man who is too weak to work be refused a right to the +ownership of a coat? Or must the discoverer of a continent prove a real +occupancy, by performing the ridiculous task of the abnormal center of +the mythical mathematical infinite circle, by being everywhere at the +same time? + +(5) We have seen that the human community, taking the words in a broad +sense, will spread, and already has spread, beyond the limits of several +nationalities. It is in the interest of human society that it should do +so. It is rational, in the sense of the word everywhere used in this +book. But the nations continue to exist, and they often cultivate +selfishly national interests. So do families cultivate selfishly family +interests. So does the egoist selfishly dig about and fertilize the +number One. + +(6) It requires little acuteness to see that some communities of men are +miserable exponents of the social will. They are deplorably governed. +Read Slatin's fascinating book, "Fire and Sword in the Soudan,"--it is +better than any novel,--and ask yourself what becomes of the social will +or of rationality of any sort under the rule of a Mahdi. Is it not the +duty of the nations to combine and to relieve suffering humanity? + +(7) There are theorists who maintain that, in the nature of things, the +soil belongs to nobody. We find, in the actual state of things, it +usually belongs to somebody, unless it is so poor that it is not worth +owning at all. But it may belong to somebody who can make little more use +of it than an infant can of a gold watch. A handful of Indians, wandering +over a great tract of country in which they chase game in the intervals +of time during which they chase and scalp one another, may have an +immemorial, although unrecorded, title to the land. + +Shall they be permitted to keep back settlers from more or less civilized +and densely populated countries? Settlers eager to cultivate the land and +to make it support many, where before it supported few, and supported +those few miserably? + +And shall the natural resources of great regions of the earth be +permitted to lie fallow merely because the actual inhabitants are too +ignorant and too indolent to want to produce anything and to trade? He +who finds his happiness in idleness, bananas, and black wives who can be +beaten with impunity, has little interest in international traffic, with +such blessings as it is supposed to bring. + +The world is filling up. The losses due to war and pestilence, said no +less an authority than Darwin, are soon made up. There is something +terrifying in what the very modern science of geography has to tell us +about the rapidity with which the remaining part of the earth's surface, +available for the nourishment of man, is being exhausted. What problems +will face the Rational Social Will in the none too distant future? + +162. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SHIELD.--We have seen that something can be +said for the philosopher. The Rational Social Will does not appear to +give carte blanche to the man who wishes to remain ignorant, idle, cut +off from the family of the nations, the possessor of great tracts of land +which he will not develop, the cruel oppressor of such as he finds within +his power. It tends to deal with him, wherever it finds him, as an +enlightened nation treats the idle, the vicious and the irresponsible +within its own borders. + +Undoubtedly civilization has made some advance in the course of the +centuries. When the world is at peace, the stranger is not normally an +outlaw. I have sojourned in the cities of many of the nations of Europe +and have made excursions into Africa and Asia. Nowhere have I been +compelled to ask for the protection of an American consul. It has been +recognized that I had rights, although an American. And the ability to +sign my name has procured me a supply of money. + +Notwithstanding all this, it is depressing to read of the dealings of the +nations with each other, and with backward peoples--who have been well +defined as peoples who possess gold-mines, but no efficient navy. Is it +not generally taken for granted that it is the duty of more powerful and +more enlightened nations to take the backward nations in hand, to exploit +their resources, and, incidentally, to exploit _them_? + +Not that international law has not counted for something. To be sure +Hegel reduced it to the level of "a good intention," [Footnote: _The +Philosophy of Right_, Sec Sec 330-333.] but it has counted for something. +Descartes and Spinoza could, with impunity, be heretics in little +Holland. Switzerland has for centuries been the refuge of the oppressed. +But we cannot forget that our highest authority, Captain Mahan, declared, +in 1889, that certain rights of neutrals were "forever secured," +[Footnote: _The Influence of Sea Power upon History_, Boston, 1908, +chapter ii, p. 84.] and he has since stood revealed as a false prophet, a +mere man making a guess. International law is a capital thing--when it is +not put under a strain, and when no nation is too powerful. + +The depressing thing is that rapacity and oppression become glorified, +when the cloak of patriotism is thrown over their shoulders. I drew my +illustrations in the last section from wild Indians and from African +savages. But there are nations in all stages of their development. How +"backward" must a nation be to give us the right to rule over it by +force? No people were more ingenious than the ancient Romans in finding +plausible reasons for the wars which it pleased them to wage. This has +never been a lost art. Men's enemies are, like the absent, always in the +wrong; and those are apt to become enemies, in whose defeat some +substantial advantage is to be looked for. + +163. THE SOLUTION.--The very title seems a presumption. Who may dogmatize +in matters so involved? I make no pretentions to giving a clear vision of +"yonder shining light," but I venture to hint at the general direction in +which one is to seek the little wicket gate. + +The only ethical solution of our problem appears to lie in the frank +recognition of the fact that the groups of men, called nations, may be as +brutal egoists as are individual persons, and in the earnest attempt to +avoid the baleful influence of such egoism. + +Man _is_ his brother's keeper. But that does not give him the right +to keep his brother in chains, nor to use him for selfish ends. This is +as true of nations as it is of individuals, of families, of religious +orders, or of unions, whether of employers or of employees. + +It is certainly true of nations. It is only as having a place in, and as +being an instrument of, the great organism of humanity aimed at by the +Rational Social Will, that the individual, the family, the tribe, the +nation, have any ethical justification for being at all. Sometimes it is +very profitable for the individual, or for some group of human beings, to +disallow this obligation to be moral. We treat the individual as a +robber; why not admit that there are robber nations? + +I feel like reiterating that it is a great thing to be young; to live in +that Golden Age in which one still believes what one sees in print, and +still is moved by the honeyed words of statesmen. When one is old, and +has enjoyed some breadth of culture, one has read the newspapers of many +lands, and has met a certain number of statesmen, usually with a start of +surprise. + +It is borne in upon one--a matter touched upon in the last chapter--that +it appears to be generally accepted that the state and its +representatives may adopt a peculiar variety of ethics. Certainly +statesmen feel justified in doing for their country what they, as +gentlemen, would never dream of doing for themselves. They talk of +justice, when they would scoff at such justice within the borders of +their own states; they talk of humanity, and they have in mind the +economic advantage of their own peoples; they speak of protection and +Christianization, when they mean economic exploitation or strategic +superiority. As for truth, the less said about that subject the better. + +I know of only one way in which the determination of a nation to aid in +the general realization of the Rational Social Will can be tested. Does +it, in dealing with other nations, civilized or backward, propose what is +palpably to its own advantage, or is it evidently disinterested? It is +thus that we judge a man, when we wish to fix his ethical status; it is +thus that the Rational Social Will judges a nation. The language in which +the proposals are made is a matter of no moment. It may fairly be called +professional slang, and can quickly be acquired, even by men of mediocre +intelligence, in any diplomatic circle. + +164. THE NECESSITY FOR CAUTION.--Shall a man, then, eschew patriotism, +and become a citizen of the world, as though he were a Stoic philosopher? +By no means. As well eschew the family or the neighborhood. But let him +not, in his patriotism, forget that he is a man. Here, as everywhere, he +is called upon to exercise judgment. This is a burden which he can never +throw off. He must pay the penalty of being a rational human being. As an +instrument of the Rational Social Will the state must be kept up. It is +his duty to see that it is done. His cat has an easier task; she may +sleep her life away in peace. + +We hear much of the brotherhood of man and of artificial barriers. The +barriers are not all artificial, and they cannot be swept away with a +gesture. + +Races and peoples are formed upon the model of their own immemorial past. +They have their institutions, their traditions, their loyalties, their +standards of living. What is tolerable to one man is wholly intolerable +to another. To compel men to live together in intimacy, when centuries of +training have made them antipathetic, is sheer cruelty. + +Men may be brothers, but there are big brothers and little brothers. I do +not refer to physical bulk. I refer to the development of intelligence, +to the degree and kind of culture, which has been attained. There are +little brothers still at the stage of development at which it is natural +for human beings to drool. Shall we have them sit up to the table and +serve them with the complete dinner, enlivening it with intellectual +conversation? + +Between incontinently doing this, and relegating the little brothers to a +nursery where they will be treated with cruelty and starved in our +interests, some persons seem to think there is no middle course. In their +enthusiasm for humanity, they forget that the brotherhood of man may be +made as ridiculous as the eight-hour day. Between eight hours of the +creative work of a Milton and eight hours of the dawdling done by a lazy +housemaid, there is no relation save that both may be measured by a +clock. + +These enthusiasts forget much. Men are not alike; they do not want to be +alike; they do not want to live together in close intimacy, when they +have little in common; they reverence different things; as a rule, they +would rather be somewhat unhappy after their own fashion, than be happy +under compulsion, after the fashion of someone else. + +We have, thus, on the one hand, the enthusiasts who would at once sound +the trump and announce the millenium, feeding the lion and the sucking +calf out of the same dish and on the same meat. We have, on the other, +those who are eager to take on their shoulders the white man's burden--to +enclose in a coop, as if they were chickens, the greater part of the +human race, allaying the discontent of the imprisoned by pointing out to +them that, although their freedom of movement is limited, they are +growing fat, and that they should show their gratitude by laying eggs. + +Surely, there must be some middle course. Patience and caution are +virtues. Surely, it is possible to accept the existing organism of +society, to love one's country, and yet to strive to respect the freedom +of others. It is not easy for a true patriot to do this, but it seems to +be what the Rational Social Will demands of him. + +The moralist who reads history carefully is not wholly discouraged. He +may look forward to some time, in the more or less distant future, when +there may be a union of the nations in the interests of all men; when the +gross egoism of the hypertrophied patriot may be curbed; when the +mellifluous language of the statesman may mean more than did the pious +letter which Nero wrote to the Roman Senate, after he had murdered his +mother. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXVI + +ETHICS AND OTHER DISCIPLINES + + +165. SCIENCES THAT CONCERN THE MORALIST.--There are certain sciences that +the Moralist must lay under contribution very directly, and yet he seems +to be able to make little return to those who cultivate them, at least in +their professional capacity. + +He must ask aid from the biologist, the psychologist, the anthropologist. +They help him to a comprehension of what man is; and, hence, of what it +is desirable that man should strive to do. But these men seldom come to +the moralist for advice. They appear to be able to work without his help. + +There are, however, other sciences in which the moralist feels that he +has more of a right to meddle, however independent they may regard +themselves. + +Take, for example, politics or economics, or the very modern and +rudimentary science of eugenics. The man who cultivates political science +may know much more than do most moralists about states and their forms of +organization; about legislative, executive and judicial functions; about +the probable effects of the centralization or decentralization of +authority; about what may be expected, in a given case, from a +restriction or extension of the franchise; about the creation and +maintenance of a military establishment and the building up of an +efficient civil service. The economist may be a monster of learning and a +master in ingenuity on all problems touching the creation and +distribution of wealth. + +But the political scientist and the economist, however able, share our +common humanity. A man's outlook is more or less apt to be bounded by the +limits of the science of his predilection. The several sciences, broader +or more specialized, rest, in the minds of most men, upon foundations +which are taken for granted. It is too much to expect that every sermon +should begin as far back as the Garden of Eden. "Practical" politics and +economics do not, as a rule, go so far back. + +The transition from practical politics and economics to ethical problems +may be made at any time. No man was shrewder than Machiavelli, and the +moral sense of mankind has rebelled against him and made him a byword. A +state, desirous of maintaining itself, may palpably violate in its +institutions, inherited from the past, a social will grown more rational, +more conscious of its rights and more articulate. Then the appeal is made +to right and justice in other than the traditional forms. It may, in a +given instance, be wrong to create wealth; existing forms of its +distribution may be iniquitous. The ultimate arbiter in all such matters +must be the Ethical Man. + +Human society is indefinitely complex. Many specialists must occupy +themselves with its problems. A technical question in this field may +always be carried over to moral ground. He who undertakes to make this +transition without having made a fairly thorough study of ethics appears +to be working in the dark. His assumptions have been questioned, or have +been abandoned. Who shall furnish him with a new basis for his special +science? + +Ethics is a basal science. It justifies, or it refuses to justify, those +specialists who concern themselves with men in societies. It is a very +old science and has interested men vastly. I have spoken above of +eugenics as a new science. Only in its modern form is it new. Plato +cultivated it intemperately when he wrote his "Republic"--but he saw that +his "Republic" would not do, and he wrote his "Laws." He stood condemned +by Ethics. + +Usually men who occupy themselves seriously, and in a broad way, with man +in society, have adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some ethical +doctrine. But this is often done without due consideration, and without a +sufficient knowledge of what has been said by the great thinkers of the +past. It is for this reason that I have treated at such length in this +volume of the schools of the moralists. + +166. ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY.--It should be observed that in developing the +Ethics of the Rational Social Will, or the Ethics of Reason--the doctrine +advocated in this volume--I have not depended upon a particular +philosophy. + +I see no reason why a Realist or an Idealist, a Monist or a Dualist, one +who holds to an immediate perception of an external world or one who +regards our acquaintance with it as a matter of inference, should refuse +to go with me so far. Nor do I see any reason why a believer in God, one +who bows at the shrine of Mind-Stuff, or one who refuses to commit +himself at all upon such matters, should enter a demurrer. The +Parallelist and the Interactionist, however widely they differ touching +the relation of mind and body, may here fall upon one another's necks and +shed tears of brotherly affection. + +That it is proper for the philosopher to interest himself in ethics, I +have maintained. [Footnote: See chapter vi, Sec 18.] He is supposed to be a +critical and reflective man, and to take broad views of human affairs. +Such views are needed when one comes to the study of ethics. + +I am forced to admit that some philosophers, when they have written on +ethical subjects, have said certain things to which the critical moralist +cannot readily assent. He who maintains that certain human intuitions-- +which it may even appear impossible to reconcile with each other--are +inexplicably and infallibly authoritative, seems to leave us without so +much as the hope of ever attaining to ultimate rationality. [Footnote: +See chapter xxiii.] + +And there are philosophers who would persuade us that, unless we accept +all the religious or theological doctrines which have appeared to them +acceptable, we rob man of every incentive for being moral at all. If God +is not going to repay him with interest for the pains which he gives +himself, does he not play the part of a dupe in being good? We have seen +that this was palpably the position of Paley. [Footnote: Chapter xxiv, Sec +96.] If God will not reconcile, ultimately, benevolence and self- +interest, proclaimed Reid, man "is reduced to this miserable dilemma, +whether it is best to be a fool or a knave." [Footnote: _Essays on the +Active Powers of Man_, Essay III, Part III, chapter viii. It would be +absurd to believe that either Paley or Reid lived down to the level of +his doctrine. Both were very decent men, and capable of +disinterestedness.] Some of the utterances of Kant and of Green seem to +point in the same direction, but both have made it abundantly plain that +they, personally, and whatever their intellectual perplexities, were +moved by something much higher than egoism. [Footnote: See chapters xxiv, +Sec 97; xxvi, 3; and xxix.] + +I mean to say very little about philosophy in this volume. I wish to keep +to ethics, a science old enough and strong enough to stand upon its own +feet. But it would be wrong not to underline one or two points in this +connection, if only to obviate misunderstanding: + +(1) There is nothing wrong in a man's wishing to earn the heaven in which +he believes. It is not wrong for him to wish to be happy on earth and in +the body. But if the desire for his own happiness, either here or +hereafter, is the _only_ motive that can move him, he is not a good +man. Prudence may be a virtue, generally speaking; but it is no +substitute for benevolence. The man who is _only_ prudent is no fit +member of any society of rational beings anywhere. + +(2) Men are often better than their words would indicate. Paley talks as +if he were a cad; Reid flounders; Kant, noble as are many of his +utterances, sometimes gives forth an uncertain sound. Yet no one of these +men was personally selfish. + +And yet all of these men assumed that morality is endangered unless there +is a God to repay men for being good. Why did they insist so strenuously +upon this, and incorporate it into their philosophy? We must, I think, go +beneath the surface to find the real reason; and when we have discovered +it, we cannot regard them in an unfavorable light. + +They felt, I believe, that good men _ought_ to be made happy; that +this is rational, if anything is. So far, they are quite in accord with +the doctrine of the Rational Social Will. And they saw no other way of +guaranteeing a complete rationality than in holding to a theistic +philosophy. + +(3) This means that their real motives were not selfish and personal. +This is admirably brought out when we turn to Green. It is too much to +expect that many of my readers have read his "Prolegomena to Ethics," +which is repetitious, tedious, and rather vague, though it is inspired by +a fine spirit and has the great merit of having influenced, directly or +indirectly, a number of able writers to produce excellent works on +ethics. [Footnote: I need only to refer to the text-books by Muirhead, +Mackenzie, Dewey and Fite.] + +Green dwells, with infinite repetition, upon the presence in man "of a +principle not natural," which is identical in all men, and which, in +some way that he does not explain, holds the world of our experiences +together, being itself not in time or in space. The disciple of Paley or +Reid or Kant will search his pages in vain for any indication that this +"principle" performs or can perform any of the functions of the God +believed in by the above-mentioned philosophers. Nevertheless, it is the +source of an ardent inspiration to Green, who relieves the baldness of +the appellation "principle," by calling it, sometimes, "self- +consciousness," sometimes, "reason." It does not appear to promise Green +anything, so his devotion to it may be regarded as disinterested. +However, he owes to it inspiration. + +Philosophers find their inspiration in very different directions. The +philosopher, as such, sometimes rather objects to the word, "God." +[Footnote: See chapter xxvi, Sec 123, note.] But he may feel much as men +generally feel toward God, when he contemplates his "Conscious +Principle," or his "Idea," or the "Substance" which he conceives as the +identity of thought and extension, or, for that matter, "Mind-Stuff" or +the "Unknowable." That other men may not see that he has anything in +particular to be inspired about, or that he can hope for anything in +particular for himself or for other men, does not rob him of his +inspiration, and that may affect his life deeply. + +It is, hence, not a matter of no importance to ethics what manner of +philosophy it pleases a man to elect. One's outlook upon the great world +may repress or may stimulate ethical strivings, may narrow or may broaden +the ethical horizon. It is something to feel, even rather blindly, that +one has a Cause. For myself, I think it is better to have a Cause that +seems worth while, even when rather impartially looked at. But, of this, +more in the next section. + +(4) Whatever one thinks of such matters, it is well to come back to the +fact that, nevertheless, ethics stands upon its own feet. Even if Paley, +and Reid, and Kant, and Green, and many others, are in the wrong, the +doctrine of the Rational Social Will stands sure. It is wrong to be +selfish; it is wrong to be untruthful; it is wrong to be unjust. It is +wrong for individuals, and it is wrong for nations. The man, or the group +of men, that does wrong, is irrational. It stands condemned. + +167. ETHICS AND RELIGION.--I regret having to speak, in this book, about +religion at all, just as I regret having to refer to the philosophers. +But it would be folly to omit all reference to religious duties. They +have played quite too important a part in the life of the family, of the +tribe, of the state; and that not merely here and there, but everywhere, +in societies of all degrees of development, in recent centuries and in +times of a hoary antiquity. Those interested in the classics have read +the remarkable little book, "The Ancient City," by Fustel de Coulanges. +As schoolboys we were brought up on the pious Aeneas. All Christians have +some knowledge of the theocratic state of the Hebrews, and we know +something of the history of Christian Europe. The anthropologist gives us +masses of information touching the religious duties of all sorts and +conditions of men. + +There are those who rid themselves easily of the problem of religious +duties. They simply deny that there are any. And there are those--the +classes overlap--who easily shuffle off duties to the family and to the +state. They regard it as their function to ignore and to destroy. + +(1) I cannot think the matter is so simple. There always have been +religious duties generally recognized, as a matter of fact. The boldest +and most gifted of thinkers, who have not hesitated to call into being +Utopian schemes for an ideal state, such men as Plato and More, have +thought that the ideal state must have a religion. And the modern +scientist has gravely raised the question whether the state can maintain +itself, if all religious beliefs, with their inspirations and their +restraints, die out. [Footnote: McDougall, _Social Psychology_, +chapter xiii.] + +The moralist, who accepts religious duties, has a difficult task. It is +not enough for him to say that men have religious duties "in general," +just as it is not enough for him to say that they have political duties +"in general." On the other hand it would be the height of presumption for +him to endeavor to tell every man what he should do in detail. He does +not feel it his duty to tell every man whom he should marry, or for whom +he should vote at each election. Still, it does seem as though the +moralist ought to do more than tell a man vaguely that he has religious +duties. + +(2) Why not follow the analogy suggested by duties to the family, the +neighborhood, the state? + +States have their religions, sometimes unequivocally and unmistakably, +and sometimes not so palpably. The religion of a people has, as a rule, +its roots far back in the history of that people. Its religion has +influenced in many subtle ways its institutions, its emotions, its +habits, its whole outlook upon life. + +Even where, as with us, state and church have been, in theory, wholly +sundered, there has been no question, up to the present, of the +disappearance of a religion. The United States has been regarded as a +Christian nation, inspired by ideals and addicted to customs only +explicable by a Christian past. + +The fact that it is so is somewhat obscured to us. For this there are two +causes. The first is, that the American, who is a freeman, possesses and +exercises a fatal ingenuity in the creation of a multitude of sects out +of practically nothing. Still, most of these sects have more in common +than some of their adherents suppose. They spring, as a rule, from a +Christian root. The second is, that our land has been the goal of the +greatest migration ever recorded in human history. Most of those who have +come to us have, so far, come from nations in some sense Christian, but +they have brought with them very diverse traditions, and some appear to +object to traditions altogether. + +Nevertheless, I think we may be called a Christian nation, and if we +follow the analogy above suggested--that of the relations of men to the +state and to lesser organisms within the state--it would appear that it +is the duty of an American to recognize himself as a Christian rather +than as a Mahometan or a Pagan. If he does recognize this, he will feel +himself under certain obligations which are independent of his personal +tastes and proclivities. + +(3) For one thing, he will recognize that a religion is not a thing to be +stripped off and drawn on as one changes a suit of clothes. + +A woman may regret that her infant has red hair. She will not, on that +account, as a rule, exchange him surreptitiously for another. Men do not +commonly repudiate their fathers because they are not rich or are growing +old. A good citizen may regret that his country has seen fit to enter +into a given war, but he will not, therefore, give aid or comfort to the +enemy. + +He who is capable of lightly repudiating his religion resembles the man +who is capable of discarding his wife, when he sees the first grey hair. +Those who do such things are apt to be men who fill their whole field of +vision with their rights, and can find no place there for their duties. +Nor should it be overlooked that the man, who is capable of lightly +discarding his wife, is the man as capable of supplying her place with a +worse. Even so, he who easily throws off his religion is usually the man +who easily replaces it with some superstition, scientific or merely +whimsical, at which other men wonder. + +Men lament sometimes over the fact that the task of the foreign +missionary is a hard one. Were it really an easy one, there would be no +stability in human societies, for there would be no stability in human +nature. The man of light credulity is the man who easily takes on new +faiths; not the man to whom tradition and loyalty mean something. + +(4) It seems to follow, as a corollary, that the religion in which a man +has been brought up has the first claim upon him. I accept this without +hesitation. + +But this does not mean that the claim is in all cases final and valid. + +There may be cases in which it seems to be the duty of a man to leave his +wife, to disinherit a child, to transfer his allegiance from one state to +another. Such cases are recognized as justifiable by men who are +thoughtful and disinterested. But the same men also recognize that, were +such disruptions of the bonds which unite men in communities the rule and +not the exception, it would mean the destruction of the community. +Similarly, it may become the duty of a man to transfer his allegiance +from one church to another. + +Are not religions, rationally compared, of different values? Have there +not been religions indisputably on a moral level lower than that of the +community which they represent? Undoubtedly. + +And there have been governments so bad that the only refuge has seemed to +lie in revolution. It should be remembered, however, that revolutions can +be resorted to too lightly; and that evolution, where possible, is +preferable to revolution, whether in things secular or in things +religious. It is always easier to tear down than it is to build up. Nor +does anyone, save the anarchist, tear down through wanton love of +destruction. Even he is apt to feel called upon to give some sort of a +vague excuse for his violence. + +It will be observed that I have all along spoken, not merely of religion, +but of the Church. I have done this because religion is a social +phenomenon. It has its institutions, and cannot live without them. + +It cannot be denied that individual philosophers have evolved religious +philosophies; it cannot be denied that solitary individuals, as such, +have felt religious emotions. How much of this is due to the fact that +there have been religions and churches, I do not believe that they +themselves have realized. + +But, if religion is to be a vital force of any sort in a state, holding +up ideals and stimulating the emotion that helps to realize them, it must +be incorporated in an institution or in institutions. You cannot remove +the rose and keep the perfume. Even the memory of it tends to vanish. A +religious man without a church is like a citizen without a state. A +citizen without a state is a man who makes the effort to keep step, and +to walk in single file, all alone. + +(5) Having said so much for Religion and for the Church, it is right that +I should refer to some things that may be said on the other side. + +It may be claimed that men of science have a tendency to turn away from +religion and to grow indifferent to or to deny religious duties. In this +there is some truth, although notable exceptions to the rule may be +cited. + +But I have known many men of learning in two hemispheres, in some cases +rather intimately. With the utmost respect for their learning and for +their mental ability, I am still bound to say that I have found them +quite human. Some of them--among the greatest of them--have been so +absorbed in their special fields of investigation, that they have not +merely given scant attention to religion and to religious duties, but +have done scant justice even to their own family life or to the state. +And all have not been equally broad men, capable of seeing clearly the +part which religion has played in the life of humanity. + +To this I must add that the impartial objectivity with which the scholar +is supposed by the layman to view things is something of a chimera. In +saying this I criticize no one more severely than I criticize myself. +This may be taken as my apology for the utterance. Have we not seen, not +many years since, that, in the feeling aroused by an international +conflict, some scores of great scholars on the one side found it possible +to write and to sign a series of statements diametrically opposed to a +series drawn up and signed by some scores of equally famous scholars on +the other? Was either group walled in hopelessly by sheer ignorance? It +is easy to take lightly matters about which one does not particularly +care. + +There is another objection brought against religion and the church which +seems to be more significant. Is there not a danger that an interest in +these may hamper freedom of thought and encourage an undue conservatism? + +It should be borne in mind that religion and the church are not the only +forces that make for conservatism. Family affection is conservative; the +law is conservatism itself, and men feel that it should not be lightly +tampered with. How impartial and how ready to introduce innovations +should men be in any field? Changes of certain kinds, though they may +have no little bearing upon our comfort, do not threaten the existence of +either state or church. Could someone devise a scheme by which the +periodical visits of the plumber could be avoided, we should all welcome +it, and have no fear of the consequences. + +Other innovations may bring in their train consequences more momentous. +What men deeply care about, they cling to, and the question which +confronts us is a very broad one. Does humanity, on the whole, gain or +lose by a given degree of conservatism? An increase of knowledge is by no +means the only thing that makes for civilization. Men may be highly +enlightened, and yet rotten to the very core. How much of the ballast of +conservatism and of loyalty to tradition is it well to throw overboard in +the interest of accelerated motion? Those who, in our judgment, throw +overboard much too much we have taken to deporting. + +(6) Here it will very likely be objected: In all this you are advocating +sheer Pragmatism! Are we to accept God and look for a life to come, +extending the spread of the community after the fashion suggested in +Chapter XIX, and broadening the outlook for a future and more perfect +rationality, for no better reason than that it is our whim? Shall we +_believe_ and join ourselves with other _believers_, for no +better reason than that something happens to tempt our will? + +I beg the reader, if he will be just to my thought, to follow me here +with close attention. + +168. ETHICS AND BELIEF.--Under this heading I must call attention to +several points. + +(1) I deny that I advocate Pragmatism at all. The views which I advocate +are so many thousand years older than Pragmatism, that it seems unjust to +them, at this late date, to compel them to take on a new name, and to be +carried about in swaddling clothes in the arms of the philosophers, after +they have been functioning as adults in human communities from time +immemorial. + +(a) That abounding genius and most lovable man, William James, realizing, +as many lesser men did not realize, that the truth contained in such +views was in danger of being lost sight of by many, wrote, with +characteristic vivacity and unerring dramatic instinct, the little volume +called "Pragmatism." It is with no lack of appreciation of the services +he has rendered, that I venture to call attention to the fact that he +has, in certain respects, failed to do justice to those views. + +(b) Pragmatism has received attention partly on account of the +exaggerations of which it has been guilty. These have repelled some men +of sober mind. It appears to be maintained that we can play fast and +loose with the world, and make it what we will. I have criticized this +elsewhere,9 and shall not do so now. I shall only say here that I do not +believe that so able a man of science as William James meant all that he +said to be taken quite literally. He was gifted with a sense of humor. +This, some lack. + +(c) Men of genius are apt to be strongly individualistic and impatient of +restraints. We have seen that there is such a thing as a public +conscience and a private conscience. The latter is only too often a +whimsical thing. Pragmatism appears to teach that any individual, as +such, has a moral right to adopt any hypothesis live enough to appeal to +his individual will. One has only to call to mind the extraordinary +assortment of guests collected by Signer Papini in his novel pragmatic +"hotel." [Footnote: _Ibid_.] Can such, by any human ingenuity, be +moulded into anything resembling an orderly community? + +(d) In a later work, Professor James, realizing that religion and +theology are not identical, and strongly desirous of promoting religion, +deals severely with theology and the theologians. [Footnote: _Varieties +of Religious Experience_, Lecture xviii.] + +One truth has been seen, but has not another been treated with some +injustice? Is it not inevitable that reflective men, who cherish beliefs, +should endeavor to give a more or less clear and reasoned account of +them? What degree of success is to be looked for, and what emphasis +should be laid upon such attempts, are questions which will probably +divide men for a long time to come. + +(2) Hence, I do not advocate Pragmatism at all, but I agree with it in so +far, at least, as to recognize that belief is a phenomenon which concerns +the will. That it is so is a commonplace of psychology; and it was +recognized dimly long before the psychologist, as such, came into being. + +That it is so is rather readily overlooked where the evidence for certain +beliefs is undeniable and overpowering. I seem forced to believe that I +am now writing. I do not seem forced in a similar manner to accept a +particular metaphysical doctrine or a given system of theological dogma. +Intelligent men appear to be able to discuss such matters with each other +and to agree to disagree. If they are tolerant, they can do this good- +temperedly. It is worth while to keep several points clearly in mind: + +(a) Beliefs are not a matter of indifference. Some evidently lead to +palpable and speedy disaster. If I elect to believe that I can fly, and +leave my window-sill as lightly as does the sparrow I now see there, it +is time for my friends to provide me with an attendant. + +Other beliefs are not of this character. And that they will lead to +ultimate disaster of any sort to myself or to others seems highly +disputable. + +(b) What may be called scientific evidence may be adduced for different +beliefs with varying degrees of cogency. Hegel tries to distinguish +between the authority of the state and that of the church by attributing +to the former something like infallibility. He maintains that religion +"believes," but that the state "knows." [Footnote: The Philosophy of +Right, Sec 270.] + +We have had abundant reason to see that the state does not _know_, +but _believes_, and that it is very often mistaken in its beliefs. +Nevertheless, it does its best to keep order, to be as rational as it +can, and to look a little way ahead. I think it ought to be admitted that +it concerns itself with matters more _terre-a-terre_ than does the +church; and that it ought not to be taken as a general truth that the +state should take its orders from the church. It has to do with matters +which, like our daily bread, must be assured, if certain other matters +are to be considered at all. In so far Hegel was right. There are those +who forget this, and talk as if metaphysical systems and religious +beliefs should be forced upon men in spite of themselves, either by sheer +force of windpower or with the aid of the police. + +To this it may be added that beliefs range from an unshakable and +unthinking conviction to that degree of acquiescence which can scarcely +be distinguished from mere loyalty. It remains to be proved that the +latter may not come under the head of belief, and is something to be +condemned. [Footnote: More than thirty years ago, while I was the guest +of Henry Sidgwick at Cambridge, England, I asked him how it was that he, +the President of the British Society for Psychical Research, had never, +in his presidential addresses, expressed a belief in the phenomena +investigated. He answered that if the word "belief" were taken broadly +enough to express a willingness to look into things, he might be said to +believe. No more candid soul ever breathed.] + +(c) Beliefs, being phenomena which concern the will, are at the mercy of +many influences. Is there any scientific evidence open to the parallelist +in psychology which is not also open to the interactionist? Is the +conviction that one's country is in the right a mere matter of scientific +evidence? Are the enlightened adherents of a given sect wholly ignorant +of the tenets and of the arguments of another? + +I maintain that tradition and loyalty have their claims. They are not the +only claims that can be made, but they are worthy of serious +consideration. Man is man, whether he is dealing with things secular or +with things religious. + +To see that such claims are recognized everywhere we have only to open +our eyes. It is absurd to believe that all the adherents of a political +party are influenced only by the logical arguments published in the +newspapers. A newspaper that lived on logic alone would starve to death. +It is ridiculous to believe that all the members of a church are induced +to become such only by the arguments of the theologians, many of which +arguments the mass of the members are not in a position to comprehend at +all. + +And learned men are men, too. The philosopher who really kept himself +free from all prepossessions would, if he did much serious reading, +probably epitomize in his own person a large part of the history of +philosophy, falling out of one system and into another, like an acrobat. +But he is usually caught young and influenced by some teacher, or he is +carried away by some book or by the spirit of the times. As he is not an +abnormal creature, he acts like other men, becoming an adherent of a +school, or, if he is ambitious, starting one. + +(d) We have seen that the individual has duties toward the state. We have +also seen that the state has duties toward the individual. The state +should not make it practically impossible for him to be a loyal citizen. +A somewhat similar duty appears to be incumbent upon the church. + +A church that forces upon all of its members, as a condition of +membership, intricate and abstract systems of metaphysics; a church that +does not teach good-will toward men, but makes walls of separation out of +slight differences of opinion; a church that lags behind the moral sense +of the community in which it finds itself; a church that starves the +religious life; these, and such as these, must expect to lose adherents. +It is not that men reject them; it is that they reject men. + +Those who read history have no reason to think that men, except here and +there and under exceptional circumstances, will cease to regard religious +duties as duties. I have not ventured to offer any detailed solution of +the problem of loyalty to the church. But neither have I ventured to +offer any detailed solution of the problem of loyalty to the state. In +the one case, as in the other, I suggest as guides tradition, intuition +and reflective reasoning. I can only counsel good sense and some degree +of patience. It may be said: You do not solve the difficulty for the +individual. I admit it. Such difficulties every thinking man must meet +and solve for himself. + +169. THE LAST WORD.--Those persons, whether students, or teachers, who +dislike this final chapter, may omit it, without detriment to the rest of +the book. The doctrine of the Rational Social Will is not founded upon +this chapter. The latter is a mere appendix. + +I regret that, in a work in which I have wished to avoid disputation, I +have felt compelled to touch upon religious duties at all. But they have +played, and still play, so significant a role in the history of mankind, +that the omission could scarcely have been made. You are free to take +them or leave them; but you are not free to take or leave the Rational +Social Will as the Moral Arbiter of the Destinies of Man. + + + + +NOTES + + +1. CHAPTERS I TO III.--The notes in a book of any sort are rarely read, +except by a few specialists, and by them not seldom with a view to +refuting the author. I shall make the following as brief as I may. But I +do wish to give some of my readers--all will not be equally learned--an +opportunity to get acquainted with a few books better than this one. This +first note is not addressed to the learned, and some will find it +superfluous. + +I intend to mention here a handful of books which any cultivated man may +read with profit, and re-read with profit, if he has already read them. +They can be collected gradually at a relatively slight expense, and it is +a pleasure to have them in one's library. The list may easily be +bettered, and may be indefinitely lengthened. I mention only books for +those who are accustomed to do their reading in English. + +It is hardly necessary to say that I do not advise all this reading in +connection with the first three chapters of this book. But, as those +chapters are concerned with the accepted content of morals as recognized +by individuals and communities, I have a good excuse for bringing the +list in here. Many other good books, not in the list, are referred to +later in the volume, in other chapters. + +It is very convenient to have within one's reach some such book as +Sidgwick's _History of Ethics_. The only fault to find with Sidgwick +is that he has made his book too short, and has not given enough +references. But he is admirably fair and sympathetic, as well as clear +and interesting. + +He, who would dip more deeply into the Greek moralists, can read the +accounts of the ancient egoists, Aristippus and Epicurus, in the _Lives +of the Philosophers_ by that entertaining old gossip, Diogenes +Laertius. The translation in Bohn's edition will serve the purpose. + +As for the greatest of the Greeks--a keen pleasure, intellectual and +aesthetic, awaits the man who turns to Plato's _Republic_ and his +_Laws_. Jowett's great translation is in every public library. And +we must read Aristotle's _Nichomachean Ethics_ and his _Politics_. +Here little attention is given to artistic form; but the preternatural +acuteness of the man is overpowering. If we would understand some +of the reasons which induced Plato and Aristotle to write of the state +as they did, we can turn to chapter xiv of Grote's _Aristotle_. + +With certain later classical moralists most of us are more or less +familiar. Seneca, in his work _On Benefits_, gives a good picture of +the moral emotions and judgments of an enlightened man of his time. He +was a great favorite with Christian writers later. Cicero's work, _De +Officiis--On Duties_--it is best known under the Latin title, is very +clear and very clever. It is, in its last half, full of "cases of +conscience." I venture to suggest to the teacher of undergraduates who +find ethics a dry subject, that he give them a handful of Cicero's +"cases" to quarrel over. Doing just this has brought about something +resembling civil war in certain classes of my undergraduates. It has done +them good, and it has vastly entertained me. But each teacher must follow +his own methods. We can none of us dictate. + +How many of us have drawn inspiration from the noble reflections +contained in the _Thoughts_ of Marcus Aurelius and in the +_Discourses_ of Epictetus, those great Stoics! The unadorned +translations of George Long will serve to introduce us to these. + +To get a good idea of how the moral world revealed itself to a Father of +the Church in the fifth century, we have only to turn to that most +fascinating of autobiographies, the _Confessions_ of St. Augustine. +His _City of God_ is too long, though interesting. Augustine's +thought influenced the world for centuries. Then we may take a long jump +and come down to St. Thomas, the great Scholastic of the thirteenth +century. To get acquainted with him, we may turn to the English versions +by Rickaby, _Aquinas Ethicus_. Those of us who are smugly satisfied +at belonging to the twentieth century must remind ourselves that there +were great men in the thirteenth, and that many among our contemporaries +are still listening to them. We Protestant teachers of philosophy are +sometimes in danger of forgetting this. A strictly fresh century and a +strictly fresh egg cannot claim to be precisely on a par. + +I do not think that I shall add the modern moralists to this list. There +are a great many of them, and many of them are very good. But they are +discussed at length in Part VII, which deals with the schools of the +moralists. Citations and references are there given. I think, however, +that I ought to add here that I should regard an ethical collection +incomplete that did not include at least one of the comprehensive works +on morals lately offered us by certain sociologists. Westermarck's +wonderful book--a mine of information--on _The Origin and Development +of the Moral Ideas_, or the admirable book by Hobhouse, _Morals in +Evolution_, will serve to fill the gap. + +Information regarding editions of all the books I have mentioned can be +had in most public libraries, or from any good publisher and book-seller. + +As for the reading to accompany these Chapters, I-III, I suggest looking +over the chapters by Westermarck and Hobhouse, indicated in foot-notes. +He who would realize how men have differed in their moral outlook on life +might read the lives of Aristippus, Epicurus and Zeno, in Diogenes +Laertius; or follow the account, in Sidgwick's _History of Ethics_, +of Aristotle's teaching, as compared with the ethics of the Church. + +2. Chapters IV to VII.--These chapters on ethics as science and on +ethical method do not appear to me to call for extensive notes. Several +foot-notes are given which might be followed up. I think it would be a +very good thing for the student to read chapters i and vi in Sidgwick's +admirable work, The _Methods of Ethics_. + +3. Chapters VIII to X.--To undertake to give any adequate list of +references on the chapters which treat of man's nature and of his +material and social environment would take us quite too far afield. I +merely suggest looking up the articles on "Anthropology" and "Sociology" +in the _Encyclopedia Britannica._ References are given there. And +one should not overlook Darwin's great book on _The Descent of Man_. +It will never be rendered superfluous, although the men of our day +criticize it in detail. A recent work of value is "Heredity and +Environment in the Development of Men," by Professor Edwin Grant Conklin, +1918. + +4. Chapters XI to XVI.--Here my notes must be somewhat more detailed, for +we are on quite debatable ground. At any rate, there is much dispute, +between men of unquestionable ability, on the one side and on the other. +I may be pardoned for thinking that the general argument of these +chapters is reasonable and sound. + +In commenting upon Chapter XI, I suggest that the reader look up what +Hobhouse has to say on impulse, desire and will, in his volume, _Morals +in Evolution_; also that he consult the same topics in James' +_Psychology_. McDougall's _Social Psychology_ might be read +with much profit. + +Some admirable writers have a repugnance to using the word "volition" in +speaking of the brutes. I cannot help thinking that this is a dispute +touching the proper use of a word, rather than that any important +distinction in _kind_ is marked. Some human volitions stand out very +clearly as such. There are free ideas present, there is the tension of +desires, there is deliberation, and there is clearly conscious choice, or +the final release of tension. But how many of the decisions--I see no +objection to the word,--which we make during the course of a day, are of +this character! It would be difficult to set a lower limit to volition. + +Muirhead, who writes, in his _Elements of Ethics_, clearly and well +of desires, emphasizing the presence of "tensions," follows the Neo- +Hegelian tradition in speaking of will. He describes it as the act by +which the attention is concentrated upon one object of desire, and he +calls the act of choice the _identifying of oneself_ with one object +or line of action. + +Naturally, it is not easy to think of the bee or the ant or the spider, +perhaps not even of the cat or dog, as "identifying itself" with some +object of desire. I suggest that the reader, after a perusal of Muirhead, +reflect upon what Hobhouse has to say of the lower animals; or that he +look up Miss Washburn's book on _The Animal Mind_, (second edition, +1918), where a really serious study of the brute is undertaken. + +On Chapter XII, I find no comment necessary. As to Chapter XIII, I +recommend to the reader a reading or re-reading of the fascinating pages +in which James treats of instinct in his _Psychology_. And let him +look up the same subject in McDougall's _Social Psychology_. At the +same time, I enter a note of warning against reading even such good +writers uncritically. There is no little dispute in this field. Dr. H. R. +Marshall's volume _Mind and Conduct_ gives an unusually thoughtful +account of instinct (N. Y., 1919). + +Comment on Chapter XIV is not imperatively necessary. But I must speak +with detail of Chapter XV, for the best of men quarrel when they come +upon this ground: + +Sec 49. The psychologist takes into his mouth no word more ambiguous than +"feeling." It may be used to indicate any mental content whatever--John +Stuart Mill could speak of consciousness as composed of a string of +feelings. Herbert Spencer divided conscious processes into "feelings" and +"relations between feelings." James obliterates the distinction, and +finds it possible to speak of "a feeling of _and_, a feeling of +_if_, a feeling of _but_," etc. (_Psychology_ I, p. 154, +ff.). + +Some writers do not distinguish between emotions and feelings. Thus, +Darwin, in his _Descent of Man_, calls pleasure and pain "emotions." +Marshall (_op. cit._, chapter ii) makes emotions, and even +intuitions, "instinct-feelings." Dewey, in his _Ethics_ (p. 251), +appears to treat emotions as synonymous with feelings. Gardiner, in his +interesting and careful study, _Affective Psychology in Ancient Writers +after Aristotle_ (_Psychological Review_. May, 1919), treats of +"what are popularly called the feelings, including emotions." + +On the other hand, in ethical writings the word, "feelings," very often +means no more than pleasure and pain. Thus, _Seth_ (_A Study of +Ethical Principles_, p. 63), makes feelings synonymous with pleasure +and pain. Muirhead (_Elements of Ethics_, p. 46), says, "by feeling +is meant simply pleasure and pain"; and to have "interest" in, he defines +as to have pleasure in (p. 46). + +This narrowing of the meaning of the word on the part of ethical writers +is, perhaps, natural. The hedonistic moralists made pleasure and pain the +only ultimate reasonable stimulants to action. Many moralists opposed +them (see, later, Chapters XXIV and XXV). So pleasure and pain became +"the feelings," _par excellence_. Both Dewey and Alexander sometimes +speak as if, by the word "feeling," we meant no more than pleasure and +pain. So does Kant. + +The modern psychologist sometimes distinguishes pleasure and pain from +"agreeableness" and "disagreeableness." Marshall, a high authority on +pleasure and pain, refuses to draw the distinction (_op. cit._, Part +III. chapter vi). But he also refuses to call pleasure and pain +sensations, regarding them as "qualifications of our sensations," like +intensity, duration, and the like. + +Are pleasures, as pleasures, alike? and are pains, as pains, alike? +Jeremy Bentham refused to distinguish between kinds of pleasures. On the +other hand, John Stuart Mill did so (see Chapter XXV in this volume); and +S. Alexander, in his work entitled _Moral Order and Progress_, +maintains that pleasures differ in kind, and cannot be compared merely in +their intensity (see page 202). + +The whole matter is complicated enough, and there is occupation for the +most disputatious. But I do not think that these disputes very directly +affect the argument of my chapter. + +Sec 50. That there is a relation between feeling and action, but that the +two are by no means nicely adjusted to each other, has been recognized in +many quarters. + +Darwin, discussing the mental and moral qualities of man, points out that +the satisfaction of some fundamental instincts gives little pleasure, +although uneasiness is suffered if they are not satisfied. Seth (_op. +cit._, p. 64) says that feelings "guide" action; and he claims that +the energy of a moving idea lies in the feeling which it arouses (p. 70). +On the quantity of emotion, and its relation to action, see Stephen, The +Science of Ethics, ii, iii, 25. + +Sec 51. It appears to be repugnant to Green to admit that feeling-- +pleasure--can be the direct object of action; and he denies roundly that +a sum of pleasures can be made an object of desire and will at all +(_Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec 221; see Sec 113 of this book). Moreover, +he maintains, and in this Dewey follows him, that the making of pleasure +an object is evidence of the existence of unhealthy desires. I cannot but +think this, taken generally, an exaggeration. Of course, what is called +"a man of pleasure" is a pretty poor sort of a thing. + +Sec 52. In this section I do not touch at all upon the immemorial dispute +concerning what has been called "the 'freedom' of the will." + +Indeed, I leave it out of this book altogether. The moralist must, I +think, assume that man has natural impulses and is a rational creature. +Those who are interested in the problem above mentioned, may turn to my +_Introduction to Philosophy_, chapter xi, Sec 46, where the matter is +discussed, and references (in the corresponding note) are given. + +Chapter XVI.--The matter of this chapter appears, clear enough, but it +may be well to give a few references touching the two conceptions of the +functions of Reason. + +Men of quite varying views have inclined to the doctrine which appeals to +me. I think it is to be gotten out of Hegel. Green, who is much +influenced by him, takes, as the rational end of conduct, a "satisfaction +on the whole," which implies a harmonization and unification of the +desires (see, in this book, Chapter XXVI, Sec 122). Spencer, in his +_Study of Sociology_, defines the rational as the consistent. +Stephen, in his _Science of Ethics_, chapter ii, Sec 3, says: "Reason, +in short, whatever its nature, is the faculty which enables us to act +with a view to the distant and the future." He claims that rationality +tends to bring about a certain unity or harmony. Hobhouse, _Morals in +Evolution_, (pp. 572-581), says that reason harmonizes the impulses. + +The champions of the opposite view are the intuitionists proper--such men +as Kant, Reid, Price, even Sidgwick. To judge of their doctrine--they +were great men, be it remembered, and worthy of all respect--I suggest +that the reader wait until he has read the chapter on _Intuitionism_ +in this volume, Chapter XXIII. + +5. CHAPTERS XVII TO XIX.--What is said in Chapter XVII seems too +obviously true to need comment. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the +chapter is not full of platitudes. But even platitudes are overlooked by +some; and there is some merit in arranging them systematically. Besides, +they may serve as a spring-board. + +As to Chapter XVIII, I suggest reading chapter vii, of Westermarck's book +on _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_. It is entitled +_Customs and Laws as Expressions of Moral Ideas_. + +For Chapter XIX, one may read Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, Part +I, chapter vi, where he shows how the mere "group morality" gradually +gives place to a wider morality in which the concept of humanity plays a +part. In the same work, Part II, chapters i and ii, the author treats of +religious or sub-religious ideas as affecting conduct. Compare +Westermarck, _op. cit._, chapter xl. See, also, _The Ancient +City_, by Fustel de Coulanges. + +6. CHAPTERS XX TO XXII.--What is said in Chapter XX may be well +reinforced by turning to Hobhouse (_op. cit._), Part I, chapter iii, +where he traces the gradual evolution of rational morality in the field +of justice. See, also, Westermarck, (_op. cit._) chapters ix and x, +i. e., "The Will as the Subject of Moral Judgment and the Influence of +External Events," and "Agents under Intellectual Disability." In the last +chapter referred to, animals, drunkards, idiots, the insane, etc., come +on the stage. The chapter is full of curious information. + +In Chapter XXI (Sec 86), I have spoken of the hesitating utterances of +moralists touching any duties we may owe to the brutes. I suggest that +before anyone dogmatize in detail on this subject he read with some care +such a comprehensive work as Miss Washburn's _The Animal Mind_. The +book is admirable. Chapters x and xliv of Westermarck's work are +instructive and entertaining on this subject. Hegel disposes of the +animals rather summarily. See his _Philosophy of Right_, Sec 47. +Sidgwick, _The Methods of Ethics_, Book III, chapter iv, 2, is well +worth consulting. See in my own volume, Chapter XXX, Sec 141. + +For Chapter XXII, I give no references. I appeal only to the common sense +of my reader. + +7. Chapters XXIII to XXIX.--For the chapters on the Schools of the +Moralists, XXIII to XXIX, I shall give briefer notes than I should have +given, were the chapters not already so well provided with foot-notes. + +So far as the first four of these chapters are concerned, I shall assume +that enough has been said, drawing attention only to two points which +concern Chapter XXIII. + +It is very interesting to note that one of our best critics of +intuitionism, Hemy Sidgwick, was himself an intuitionist. His _Methods +of Ethics_ deserves very close attention. Again Intuitions are often +spoken of as if they had been shot out of a pistol, and had neither +father nor mother. To understand them better it is only necessary to read +chapter viii of Dr. H. R. Marshall's little book, _Mind and +Conduct_, which shows how difficult it is to mark intuitions off +sharply, and to treat them as if they had nothing in common with reason. + +Those interested in the ethics of evolution, treated in Chapter XXVII, +should not miss reading the fourth chapter of Darwin's _Descent of +Man_. Huxley's essay, _Evolution and Ethics_, might be read. The +"Prolegomena" to the essay is, however, much more valuable than the essay +itself. Spencer's general theory of conduct is best gathered from his +_Data of Ethics_, which was reprinted as Part I of his _Principles +of Ethics_. The volume by C. M. Williams, entitled, _A Review of +Evolutionary Ethics_, gives a convenient account of a dozen or more +writers who have treated of ethics from the evolutionary standpoint. It +is well not to overlook what Sidgwick has to say of evolution and ethics; +see _The Methods of Ethics_, Book I, chapter ii, Sec 2. + +As for Chapter XXVIII, on "Pessimism," it is enough, I think, to refer +the reader to Book IV, in Schopenhauer's work on _The World as Will and +Idea_. The Book is entitled _The Assertion and Denial of the Will to +Live, where Self-consciousness has been Attained_. See also his +supplementary chapters, xlvi, on "The Vanity and Suffering of Life," and +xlviii, "On the Doctrine of the Denial of the Will to Live." For the +doctrine of von Hartmann, see chapters xiii to xv, in the part of his +work entitled, _The Metaphysic of the Unconscious_. + +For the chapter on Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, I shall give but a few +references, though the literature on these writers is enormous. The +English reader will find T. K. Abbott's translation of Kant's ethical +writings a very convenient volume (third edition, London, 1883). The +translation of Hegel's _Philosophy of Right_, by S. W. Dyde (1896), +I have found good, where I have compared it with the original. The word +"Right" in the title is unavoidably ambiguous, for the German word means +both "right" and "law." Hegel is dealing, in a sense, with both. I have +indicated, in a foot-note, that Nietzsche ought to be read in the +original. He is a marvellous artist. + +Perhaps I should add that Nietzsche will be read with most pleasure by +those who do not attempt to find in his works a system of ethics. I +recommend to the reader, especially, his three volumes: _The Genealogy +of Morals_; _Beyond Good and Evil_; and _Thus Spake Zarathustra_; +(New York, 1911). + +8. CHAPTERS XXX TO XXXVI.--I shall not comment on Chapter XXX. It is +sufficiently interpreted by what has been said earlier in this book. Nor +do I think that Chapter XXXI needs to be discussed here. I need only say +that many moralists have commented upon the negative aspect of the moral +law. It will be remembered that the "demon" of Socrates--a dreadful +translation--was a negative sign. I do not think that those who have +dwelt upon the negative aspect of morality have reflected sufficiently +upon the moral organization of society. We are put to school unavoidably +as soon as we are born. + +I shall not dwell upon Chapters XXXII and XXXIII. Here I appeal merely to +the good sense of the reader. + +But Chapter XXXIV demands more attention. He who is ignorant of history, +and has come into no close contact with the organization and functioning +of any state other than his own, is as unfit to pass judgment upon states +generally, as is the man who has never been away from his native village +to pass judgment upon towns generally--towns inhabited by various peoples +and situated in different quarters of the globe. His lot may, it is true, +happen to be cast in a good village; but how he is to tell that it is +good, I cannot conceive. He has no standard of comparison. + +Fortunately, his ignorance is not as harmful as it might be. The Rational +Social Will, which is penetrated through and through with traditions +wiser than the whims of the individual, carries him along upon its broad +bosom, and makes decisions for him. + +The sociologist and the political philosopher should be consulted, as +well as the historian, by one who would make a satisfactory list of books +touching the subject of this chapter. But the moralist may be allowed to +suggest a few titles, some of them very old ones. Plato's _Republic_ +is fascinating, and Aristotle's _Politics_ is the shrewdest of +books. But compare the state as conceived by these men with our notions +of a modern democracy! More's _Utopia_ is a delight. To get back to +earth and see what _history_ means to a state, and to its +constitution and laws, read Sir Henry Maine's _Ancient Law_. States +are not made in a day, although, under abnormal conditions, governments +may be upset, and new ones set up, within twenty-four hours. After such +unhistorical proceedings, one can scarcely expect "fast colors." One or +two washings will suffice to show what was there before. + +He who has a weakness for the operatic can peruse Rousseau's _Social +Contract_ and the _Declaration of the Rights of Man_ published in +the great French Revolution. As an antidote, I suggest Bentham's essay on +_Anarchical Fallacies_. + +But reading will do little good--even historical reading--unless one +also thinks. It is wonderful how much knowledge a man may escape, if he +is born under the proper star. I once knew an undergraduate in an +American university, who attended compulsory chapel for more than three +years, and who still thought that the Old Testament was a history of the +Ancient Romans. + +There is quite too much to say about Chapters XXXV and XXXVI. The only +thing to do is to say nothing. I shall touch upon just one point in each +chapter. I venture to beg the teacher, when he treats of International +Ethics, to read in class, with his students, those pages in which Sir +Thomas More describes the principles upon which the Utopians conducted +their wars. Remember that Sir Thomas was not merely a statesman, but, by +common consent, a learned, a great, and a good man. Mark the reaction of +the undergraduate mind. + +The one matter upon which I shall comment in Chapter XXXVI, is the +question of belief as an object of approval or of censure. Westermarck +states (_The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_, Volume I, +chapter viii, p. 216), that neither the Catholic nor the Protestant +Church regarded _belief, as such_, as an object of censure. Yet each +was willing to punish heresy. The point is most interesting, and I hazard +an explanation. The churches were organizations with a definite object. +They made use of reward and punishment. This was reasonable enough, +abstractly considered. However, doctrine was the affair of the +theologian. Now the theologian, like the philosopher, is a man who +assumes that he is concerned with _proofs_, and with proofs only. If +a thing is _proved_, how can a man _help_ believing it? Only if +he _will_ not, which is sheer obstinacy or perversity. Let him, +then, be punished on account of his defective character (see Westermarck, +I, chapter xi, p. 283). + +I think the apparent quibbling here can be gotten rid of by recognizing +the truth emphasized in Sec Sec 167-168, namely, that logical proofs play +but a subordinate part in the adoption or rejection of beliefs touching a +vast number of matters both secular and religious. If we can influence +men's emotions, we can influence their beliefs. Both State and Church +have this power. It is a power that can be abused. But it is, on the +whole, a good thing that men's beliefs can thus be influenced. There +would be no stability in human society could they not. Every ignorant +man--and many men are ignorant--would be at the mercy of every clever +talker; and he would change his beliefs every day. As men act on beliefs, +this means that he would zig-zag through life to the detriment of all +orderly development. I beg the reader, learned or unlearned, to put aside +prepossessions, and to look at things as they are in this field. + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Handbook of Ethical Theory +by George Stuart Fullerton + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY *** + +This file should be named 6463.txt or 6463.zip + +Produced by Scott Pfenninger, Charles Franks +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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