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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bd1546 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #65708 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65708) diff --git a/old/65708-0.txt b/old/65708-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a844aab..0000000 --- a/old/65708-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5211 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes, by -Averroes - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes - -Author: Averroes - -Translator: Mohammad Jamil-Ur-Rehman - -Release Date: June 27, 2021 [eBook #65708] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Wouter Franssen and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team - at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images - generously made available by The Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF -AVERROES *** - - - - -_The Gaekwad Studies -in -Religion and Philosophy: XI._ - - THE - PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY - OF AVERROES - - Printed by Manibhai Mathurbhai Gupta at the “Arya - Sudharak” Printing Press, Raopura, Baroda, and - Published by A. G. Widgery, the College, Baroda - 1-1-1921 - - - - - THE - PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY - OF AVERROES - - Tractata translated from the Arabic - - By - - MOHAMMAD JAMIL-UR-REHMAN M. A. - - Professor of Islamic History, Hyderabad - Formerly Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study - of Religions, Baroda. - - BARODA - - - - - DEDICATION - to - Dr. AZIMUDDIN AHMAD - - -SIR, - -It was at your feet that I first learned to appreciate historical and -literary research, and the following pages constitute the earliest -fruits of that literary labour of mine the impetus for which I am proud -to have received from you. I crave your indulgence for my taking the -liberty of dedicating the same to your revered name, with the hope that -it will not fail to attract the same generous sympathy from you as you -have always shown to your pupil. - - MOHAMMAD JAMIL UR REHMAN - - - - - PREFACE - - -It was as a Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study of -Religions at the College, Baroda, that the present work was begun. -The subject was taken up in the first place as a parallel study to -that contained in a paper in the Indian Philosophical Review, Volume -II, July 1918, pp. 24-32 entitled “Maimonides and the Attainment of -Religious Truth.” But as I proceeded with my investigation I thought -it might be best to let Averroes speak for himself. For this reason -I have here translated certain treatises of Averroes, as edited in -the Arabic text by D. H. Muller in “Philosophie und Theologie von -Averroes.” Munich 1859. I am confident that the book will prove an -interesting one and will explain itself to the reader without any -introduction on my part. Though owing to my appointment at Hyderabad I -resigned my position at Baroda soon after commencing this work I wish -here to express my thanks to Professor Alban G. Widgery of Baroda for -his constant sympathy with and encouragement for my work in and out of -the Seminar. He has also kindly accepted the book for inclusion in the -Gaekwad Studies in Religion and Philosophy. I am indebted to him for a -complete revision of the manuscript and for the onerous work of seeing -the book through the press. I am also indebted to my brother Mutazid -Wali ur Rehman, B.A. for valuable help in rendering many obscure -passages. - - MOHAMMAD JAMIL UR REHMAN - _Osmania University, - Hyderabad._ - - - - - CONTENTS - - - I. A Decisive Discourse on the Delineation of the Relation between - Religion and Philosophy. - - I a. Appendix: On the Problem of Eternal Knowledge which Averroes has - mentioned in his Decisive Discourse. - - II. An Exposition of the Methods of Argument concerning the Doctrines - of the Faith, and a Determination of Doubts and misleading Innovation - brought into the Faith through Interpretations. - - - - - I - A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION - OF THE - RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY - - - - - A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION - OF THE - RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.[1] - - -And after: Praise be to God for all His praiseworthy acts, and -blessings on Mohammad, His slave, the Pure, the Chosen One and His -Apostle. The purpose of the following treatise is to inquire through -sacred Law[2] whether the learning of philosophy and other sciences -appertaining thereto is permitted, or called dangerous, or commended -by the Law, and if commended, is it only approved or made obligatory. -We maintain that the business of philosophy is nothing other than to -look into creation and to ponder over it in order to be guided to the -Creator,--in other words, to look into the meaning of existence. For -the knowledge of creation leads to the cognisance of the Creator, -through the knowledge of the created. The more perfect becomes the -knowledge of creation, the more perfect becomes the knowledge of -the Creator. The Law encourages and exhorts us to observe creation. -Thus, it is clear that this is to be taken either as a religious -injunction or as something approved by the Law. But the Law urges -us to observe creation by means of reason and demands the knowledge -thereof through reason. This is evident from different verses of the -Quran. For example the Quran says: “Wherefore take example _from them_, -ye who have eyes.”[3] That is a clear indication of the necessity -of using the reasoning faculty, or rather both reason and religion, -in the interpretation of things. Again it says: “Or do they not -contemplate the kingdom of heaven and earth and the things which God -hath created.”[4] This is a plain exhortation to encourage the use of -observation of creation. And remember that one whom God especially -distinguishes in this respect, Abraham, the prophet. For He says: “And -this did we show unto Abraham: the kingdom of heaven and earth.”[5] -Further He says: “Do they not consider the camels, how they are -created; and the heaven, how it is raised.”[6] Or still again: “And -(who) meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord thou -hast not created this in vain.”[7] There are many other verses on this -subject: too numerous to be enumerated. - -Now, it being established that the Law makes the observation and -consideration of creation by reason obligatory--and consideration -is nothing but to make explicit the implicit--this can only be done -through reason. Thus we must look into creation with the reason. -Moreover, it is obvious that the observation which the Law approves -and encourages must be of the most perfect type, performed with the -most perfect kind of reasoning. As the Law emphasises the knowledge of -God and His creation by inference, it is incumbent on any who wish to -know God and His whole creation by inference, to learn the kinds of -inference, their conditions and that which distinguishes philosophy -from dialectic and exhortation from syllogism. This is impossible -unless one possesses knowledge beforehand of the various kinds of -reasoning and learns to distinguish between reasoning and what is not -reasoning. This cannot be done except one knows its different parts, -that is, the different kinds of premises. - -Hence, for a believer in the Law and a follower of it, it is necessary -to know these things before he begins to look into creation, for -they are like instruments for observation. For, just as a student -discovers by the study of the law, the necessity of knowledge of legal -reasoning with all its kinds and distinctions, a student will find out -by observing the creation the necessity of metaphysical reasoning. -Indeed, he has a greater claim on it than the jurist. For if a jurist -argues the necessity of legal reasoning from the saying of God: -“Wherefore take example _from them_ O ye who have eyes,”[8] a student -of divinity has a better right to establish the same from it on behalf -of metaphysical reasoning. - -One cannot maintain that this kind of reasoning is an innovation in -religion because it did not exist in the early days of Islam. For legal -reasoning and its kinds are things which were invented also in later -ages, and no one thinks they are innovations. Such should also be our -attitude towards philosophical reasoning. There is another reason why -it should be so, but this is not the proper place to mention it. A -large number of the followers of this religion confirm philosophical -reasoning, all except a small worthless minority, who argue from -religious ordinances. Now, as it is established that the Law makes the -consideration of philosophical reasoning and its kinds as necessary -as legal reasoning, if none of our predecessors has made an effort to -enquire into it, we should begin to do it, and so help them, until the -knowledge is complete. For if it is difficult or rather impossible for -one person to acquaint himself single-handed with all things which it -is necessary to know in legal matters, it is still more difficult in -the case of philosophical reasoning. And, if before us, somebody has -enquired into it, we should derive help from what he has said. It is -quite immaterial whether that man is our co-religionist or not; for the -instrument by which purification is perfected is not made uncertain -in its usefulness, by its being in the hands of one of our own party, -or of a foreigner, if it possesses the attributes of truth. By these -latter we mean those Ancients who investigated these things before the -advent of Islam. - -Now, such is the case. All that is wanted in an enquiry into -philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the -Ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to -their books and see what they have said in this connection. If all -that they say be true, we should accept it and if there be something -wrong, we should be warned by it. Thus, when we have finished this -kind of research we shall have acquired instruments by which we can -observe the universe, and consider its general character. For so long -as one does not know its general character one cannot know the created, -and so long as he does not know the created, he can have no knowledge -of the Creator. Thus we must begin an inquiry into the universe -systematically, such as we have learned from the trend of rational -inference. It is also evident that this aim is to be attained by the -investigation of one part of the universe after another, and that help -must be derived from predecessors, as is the case in other sciences. -Imagine that the science of geometry and astronomy had become extinct -in our day, and a single individual desired to find out by himself the -magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their forms, and their distances from -one another. Even though he were the most sagacious of men, it would be -as impossible for him as to ascertain the proportion of the sun and the -earth and the magnitude of the other stars. It would only be attainable -by aid of divine revelation, or something like it. If it be said to him -that the sun is a hundred and fifty or sixty times as big as the earth, -he would take it to be sheer madness on the part of the speaker, though -it is an established fact in the science of astronomy, so that no one -learned in that science will have any doubt about it. - -The science which needs most examples from other sciences is that of -Law. For the study of jurisprudence cannot be completed except in a -very long time. If a man today would himself learn of all the arguments -discovered by the different disputants of diverse sects, in problems -which have always excited contentions in all the big cities, except -those of Al-Maghrib, he would be a proper object to be laughed at on -account of the impossibility of the task, in spite of the existence of -every favourable circumstance. This is similar not only in the sciences -but also in the arts. For no one is capable of discovering by himself -alone everything which is required. And if this is so in other sciences -and arts, how is it possible in the art of arts--philosophy? - -This being so, it becomes us to go back to the Ancients, and to see -what observations and considerations they have made into the universe, -according to the tests of inference. We should consider what they have -said in this connection and proved in their books, so that whatever may -be true in them we may accept and, while thanking them, be glad to know -it, and whatever be wrong, we should be warned by it, be cautioned, and -hold them excused for their mistake. - -From what has been said, it may be taken that a search into the books -of the Ancients is enjoined by the Law, when their meaning and purpose -be the same as that to which the Law exhorts us. Anyone who prevents a -man from pondering over these things, that is, a man who has the double -quality of natural sagacity and rectitude in the Law, with the merit of -learning and disposition--turns away the people from the door by which -the Law invites them to enter into the knowledge of God, and that is -the door of observation which leads to the perfect knowledge of God. -Such an action is the extreme limit of ignorance and of remoteness from -God. - -If, by studying these books, a man has been led astray and gone wrong -on account of some natural defect, bad training of the mind, inordinate -passion, or the want of a teacher who might explain to him the true -significance of things, by all or some of these causes, we ought not on -this account to prevent one fit to study these things from doing so. -For such harm is not innate in man, but is only an accident of training. - -It is not right that a drug which is medically useful by its nature -should be discarded because it may prove harmful by accident. The -Prophet told a man whose brother was suffering with diarrhea to -treat him with honey. But this only increased the ailment. On his -complaining, the Prophet said: “God was right and thy brother’s stomach -was wrong.” We would even say that a man who prevents another fit for -it, from studying the books of philosophy, because certain worthless -people have been misled by them, is like a man who refused a thirsty -man cold and sweet water, till he died, because some people under the -same circumstances have been suffocated by it and have died. For death -by suffocation through drinking cold water is accidental, while by -thirst it is natural and inevitable. - -This state of things is not peculiar to this science only, but is -common to all. How many jurists there are in whom jurisprudence has -become the cause of worldliness and lack of piety? We should say that -a large majority of jurists are of this kind, although their science -should result in better action than other sciences which only lead to -better knowledge. - -So far, then, the position is established. Now, we Muslims firmly -believe that our Law is divine and true. This very Law urges us and -brings us to that blessing which is known as the knowledge of God, and -His creation. This is a fact to which every Muslim will bear testimony -by his very nature and temperament. We say this, because temperaments -differ in believing: one will believe through philosophy; while another -will believe through dogmatic discourse, just as firmly as the former, -as no other method appeals to his nature. There are others who believe -by exhortation alone, just as others believe through inferences. For -this reason our divine Law invites people by all the three methods, -which every man has to satisfy, except those who stubbornly refuse to -believe, or those, according to whom these divine methods have not been -established on account of the waywardness of their hearts. This is why -the mission of the Prophet has been declared common to the whole world, -for his Law comprises all the three methods leading men towards God. -What we say is quite clear from the following saying of God: “Invite -men unto the way of the Lord, by wisdom and mild exhortation, and -dispute with them in the most condescending manner.”[9] - -As this Law is true and leads to the consideration of the knowledge -of God, we Muslims should believe that rational investigation is not -contrary to Law, for truth cannot contradict truth, but verifies it and -bears testimony to it. And if that is so, and rational observation is -directed to the knowledge of any existent objects, then the Law may be -found to be silent about it, or concerned with it. In the former case -no dispute arises, as it would be equivalent to the absence of its -mention in the Law as injunctory, and hence the jurist derives it from -legal conjecture. But if the Law speaks of it, either it will agree -with that which has been proved by inference, or else it will disagree -with it. If it is in agreement it needs no comment, and if it is -opposed to the Law, an interpretation is to be sought. Interpretation -means to carry the meaning of a word from its original sense to a -metaphorical one. But this should be done in such a manner as will -not conflict with the custom of the Arabian tongue. It is to avoid -the naming of an object, by simply mentioning its like, its cause, -its attribute, or associate, etc. which are commonly quoted in the -definition of the different kinds of metaphorical utterances. And if -the jurist does so in many of the legal injunctions, how very befitting -would it be for a learned man to do the same with his arguments. For -the jurist has only his fanciful conjectures to depend upon, while a -learned man possesses positive ones. - -We hold it to be an established truth that if the Law is apparently -opposed to a truth proved by philosophy it admits of an interpretation -according to the canons of the Arabic language. This is a proposition -which a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer cannot mistrust. One who is -accustomed to these things divine can experience for himself what we -have said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together intellectual -and traditional science. Indeed, we would even say that no logical -conclusion will be found to be opposed to the Law, which when sifted -and investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or -almost so, with it. - - * * * * * - -That is why all Muslims are agreed that all the words of the Law are -not to be taken literally, nor all of them given an interpretation. -But they vary in verses, which are or are not to be interpreted. -For example, the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse -of Equalisation[10] and on the Tradition of Descent,[11] while -the Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides of -these--exoteric and esoteric--because of the differences of human -nature and minds in verifying a thing. The existence of an opposed -esoteric meaning is in order to call the attention of the learned to -find out a comprehensive interpretation. To this the following verse -of the Quran refers: “It is he who hath sent down unto thee the book, -wherein are some verses clear to be understood--they are the foundation -of the book--and others are parabolical. But they whose hearts are -perverse will follow that which is parabolical therein, out of love of -schism, and a desire of the interpretation thereof; yet none knoweth -the interpretation thereof except God. But they who are well grounded -in knowledge say: We believe therein, the whole is from our Lord, and -none will consider except the prudent.”[12] - -Here it may be objected that in the Law there are things which all -Muslims have agreed to take esoterically, while there are others on -which they have agreed to put an interpretation, while there are some -about which they disagree. Is it justifiable to use logic in the -interpretation of those which have been taken literally, or otherwise? -We would say that if the agreement is positive there is no need to -apply logic; but if it be conjectural there is. For this very reason -Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and Abu Ma’ali and other learned doctors have -ordained that a man does not become an unbeliever by forsaking the -common agreement and applying the principle of interpretation in such -things. It will certainly be agreed that complete consensus of opinion -is not possible in metaphysical questions, in the manner in which it is -possible to establish it in practical things. For it is not possible to -establish unanimity of opinion at any time, unless we confine ourselves -to a small period and know perfectly all the learned doctors living in -it, that is, their personalities, their number and their views about -any question to be quoted to us directly from them without a break in -the chain. With all this we should know for certain that the doctors -living at that time are agreed that there is no distinction of exoteric -and esoteric meanings in the Law, that the knowledge of no proposition -should be concealed from anybody, and that the method of teaching the -Law should be the same with all men. But we know that a large number -of people in the early days of Islam believed in exoteric and esoteric -meanings of the Law, and thought that the esoteric meanings should -not be disclosed to an ignorant person who cannot understand them. -For example, Bukhari has related on the authority of Ali that he said -“Talk to men what they can understand. Do you intend to give the lie -to God and His Apostle?” There are many Traditions to the same effect -related from other people. So, how is it possible to conceive of any -consensus of opinion coming down to us in metaphysical questions when -we definitely know that in every age there have been doctors who take -the Law to contain things the real significance of which should not be -disclosed to all men? But in practical affairs it is quite different. -For all persons are of opinion that they should be revealed to all men -alike. In these things unanimity of opinion can be easily obtained if -the proposition is published, and no disagreement is reported. That may -be sufficient to obtain unanimity of opinion in practical things as -distinct from the sciences. - -If it be maintained that one does not become an unbeliever by ignoring -consensus of opinion in interpretation, as no unanimity is possible -in it, what shall we say of such Muslim philosophers as Abu Nasr (Al -Farabi) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna)? For Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has -charged them with positive infidelity in his book: _The Refutation -of the Philosophers_, in regard to three things: The eternity of -the world; God’s ignorance of particulars; and the interpretation -concerning the resurrection of bodies and the state of the Day of -Judgment. To this we should reply that from what he has said it -is not clear that he has charged them positively with infidelity. -For in his book _Al Tafriqah bain’al Islami w’al Zindiqah_ he has -explained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the consensus of -opinion is doubtful. Moreover we have definitely pointed out that it -is not possible to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters, -especially when there are many people of the early times who have -held that there are interpretations which should not be disclosed to -all but only to those who are fit for them and those are men who are -“well grounded in knowledge”[13], a divine injunction which cannot -be overlooked. For if such people do not know the interpretation in -these matters they will have no special criterion of truth for their -faith, which the common people have not, while God has described -them as believing in Him. This kind of faith is always produced by -the acceptance of the arguments, and that is not possible without a -knowledge of interpretation. Otherwise, even the common people believe -in the words of God without any philosophy whatever. The faith which -the Quran has especially ascribed to the learned must be a faith -strengthened with full arguments, which cannot be without a knowledge -of the canons of interpretation. For God has said that the Law admits -of interpretation which is its real significance, and this is what is -established by arguments. Yet though this is so, it is impossible to -establish any well grounded consensus of opinion in the interpretations -which God has ascribed to the learned men. That is quite evident to -anyone with insight. But with this we see that Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) -has made a mistake in ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers the -opinion that God has no knowledge of particulars. They are only of -opinion that the knowledge of God about particulars is quite different -from ours. For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing. -Such knowledge is produced by the existence of a thing, and changes -with changes in the thing. On the other hand the knowledge of God is -the cause of an existent thing. Thus one who compares these two kinds -of knowledge ascribes the same characteristics to two quite different -things--and that is extreme ignorance. When applied both to eternal -and to transitory things the word _knowledge_ is used only in a formal -fashion, just as we use many other words for objects essentially -different. For instance the word _Jalal_ is applied both to great and -small; and _sarim_ to light and darkness. We have no definition which -can embrace both these kinds of knowledge, as some of the Mutakallimun -of our times have thought. We have treated this question separately at -the request of some of our friends. - -How can it be supposed that the Peripatetic Philosophers say that God -has no knowledge of particulars when they are of opinion that man is -sometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the future through -visions, and that he gets these admonitions in sleep, through a great -and powerful Director, who directs everything? These philosophers -are not only of opinion that God has no knowledge of details such as -we have but they also believe that He is ignorant of universals. For -all known universals with us are also the effect of the existence of -a thing, while God’s knowledge is quite other than this. From these -arguments it is concluded that God’s knowledge is far higher than that -it should be called universal or particular. There is therefore no -difference of opinion concerning the proposition, that is, whether they -are called infidel or not. - -As to the eternal or transitory nature of the world: I think that in -this matter the difference of opinion between the Asharite Mutakallimun -and the Ancient Philosophers is for the most part a verbal difference, -at least so far as the opinion of some of the Ancients is concerned. -For they are agreed on the fact that there are three kinds of -creation--the two extremes and a medial one. They again agree on the -nomenclature of the two extremes, but they disagree as to the medial -one. As to the one extreme, it has come into existence from something -other than itself, or from anything else--that is from a generative -cause or matter--while time existed before it. All those things whose -existence is perceived by the senses, as water, animals, vegetation, -etc., are included in this. All Ancient and Asharite philosophers are -agreed in denominating this creation _Originated_. - -The other extreme is that which came into existence from nothing, not -out of anything, and time did not precede it. The two parties are -agreed in calling this _Eternal_. This extreme can be reached by logic. -This is God, the Creator, Inventor, and Preserver of all. - -The medial kind of creation is that which has neither been made from -nothing, “matter,” nor has time preceded it, but it has been created -by some generative cause. In this is included the whole world. Again -they all agree on the existence of all the three categories of the -universe. The Mutakallimun admit, or they ought to admit, that -before the universe there was no time, for according to them time is -contemporaneous with motion and body. They are also agreed with the -Ancients that future time and creation have no end, but they differ as -to past time and its creation. The Mutakallimun are of opinion that it -had a beginning. - -This is the belief of Plato and his disciples, while Aristotle and -his followers are of opinion that it had no beginning, just as the -future has no end. It is clear that the last mentioned kind of creation -resembles both the _originated_ and the _eternal_ creation. So one who -thinks that in the past creation there are more characteristics of the -eternal than the originated takes it to be eternal and vice versa. -But in reality it is neither truly originated nor eternal. For the -originated creation is necessarily subject to destruction while the -eternal is without a cause. There are some, for example, Plato and his -followers, who have called it _infinitely originated_, for according -to them time has no end. There is not here so great a difference about -the universe, for it to be made the basis of a charge of infidelity. -In fact, they should not be so charged at all, for opinions which are -worthy of this are far removed from ours, those quite contrary to them, -as the Mutakallimun have thought them to be in this proposition. I mean -that they take the words _originated_ and _eternal_ to be contrary -expressions, which our investigation has shown not to be the case. - -The strange thing about all these opinions is that they are not in -agreement with the literal sense of the Law. For if we look closely -we shall find many verses which tell us of the creation of the -universe--that is, of its _originated_ nature. Creation and time are -said to be without end. For according to the verse: “It is He who hath -created the heavens and the earth in six days, but His Throne was above -the waters before the creation thereof”[14] it is clear that there was -a universe before this one, and that is the throne and the water, and -a time which existed before that water. Then again the verse “The day -will come when the earth shall be changed into another earth and the -heavens into other heavens”[15] shows equally when taken literally that -there will be a universe after this one. Again, the verse: “Then He set -his mind to the creation of heaven and it was smoke”[16] shows that the -heavens were created from something. - -Whatever the Mutakallimun say about the universe is not based on a -literal sense of the Law, but is an interpretation of it. For the Law -does not tell us that God was even before mere non-existence, and -moreover, this is not found as an ordinance in it. How can we suppose -that there could be any consensus of opinion about the interpretation -of verses by the Mutakallimun? In fact, there is much in the sayings -of some philosophers which supports what we have quoted from the Law, -taken literally. - -Those who differ concerning these obscure questions have either reached -the truth and have been rewarded; or have fallen into error and have -to be excused. For it is compulsory rather than voluntary to believe -a thing to be true, the proof of which has already been established; -that is, we cannot believe or disbelieve it as we like, as it depends -upon our will to stand or not to do so. So, if one of the conditions of -verification be freedom of choice, a learned man, and he alone, should -be held excused, if he makes a mistake on account of some doubt. Hence -the Prophet has said that if a magistrate judges rightly he receives -two rewards, and if he makes a mistake he deserves only one. But what -magistrate is greater than one who judges the universe, whether it -is so or not. These are the judges--the learned men--whom God has -distinguished with the knowledge of interpretation. - -It is this kind of mistake of insight which learned people are -quite apt to make when they look into those obscure questions the -investigation of which the Law has imposed upon them. But the mistake -the common people make in these matters is sin pure and simple, whether -in theoretical or in practical things. As a magistrate, ignorant of -Tradition, when he makes mistakes in judgment, cannot be held excused, -so likewise a judge of the universe when not having the qualities of a -judge is also not excusable, but is either a sinner or an unbeliever. -If it be a condition that a magistrate shall have capacity of -arbitration concerning the lawful and the forbidden, that is, knowledge -of the principles of Law and their application through analogy--how -much more befitting it is for an arbitrator of the universe to be armed -with fundamental knowledge of the mental sciences, and the way of -deducing results from them. - -Mistake in the interpretation of the Law is thus of two kinds--a -mistake which can be excused in one fit to look into the thing in which -it has been committed, just as an expert physician is excused if he -commits an error in the application of his science; or a magistrate -when he misjudges, and a mistake which is inexcusable in one not fit -to investigate a thing. But the error which cannot be excused for -anybody, and which, if it happens to show itself in relation to the -very principles of the Law, is infidelity, and if in universals is an -innovation, is that error which is committed in those things which have -been settled by all arguments and so the knowledge of them is possible -for everybody, for instance, the acknowledgement of the existence of -God, of Prophecy, and of the happiness or the misery of the next world. -This is so, because all these three principles are proved by those -three methods, the justification of which a man cannot deny by any -means, that is exhortative controversial and argumentative proofs. A -denier of such things, which are the very root of the principle of the -Law, is an unbeliever, a retrograde with his tongue and his heart, or -through negligence, on account of his denying them in spite of proofs. -For if he be a man believing in arguments, he can verify them through -these or if he believes in controversy, he can verify through that; -and if he believes in religions admonitions he can well justify them -through these. And hence the Prophet has said: “I have been commanded -to fight with men till they say: ‘There is no God but Allah’ and -believe in me” that is, by any of these three means of attaining the -Faith. - -But there are things which, on account of their obscurity, cannot be -understood by inference. So, God has favoured such of his creatures -as cannot understand logic, either on account of their nature, habit, -or lack of mental training, by quoting examples and parables of such -things and has urged them to testify as to their truth through them. -For everyone has mental capacity enough to understand them by the -help of dogmatic and exhortatory argument which are common to all -men. This is why the Law has been divided into two kinds: exoteric -and esoteric. The exoteric part consists of those examples which have -been coined to express certain meanings; while the esoteric is the -meanings themselves, which are not manifested except to the learned in -philosophy. - -These are the very four or five kinds of methods of knowing reality -mentioned by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book called _Al Tafriqah -bain al Islam wal Zindiqah_. If it so happens as we have said that -we can know of a thing by any of the above mentioned three methods, -then we do not stand in need of any examples for understanding them. -Such things should be taken literally and interpretation should find -no place with regard to them. If these things form a part of the -principles of the Law, one who puts an interpretation upon them is an -infidel. For instance, if a man believes that there is no happiness or -misery in the next world, and that the teaching is only an artifice to -safeguard the life and property of the people from one another and that -there is no goal for men other than this life, then he is certainly an -unbeliever. - -When this has once been established it will become clear to you that -interpretation is not lawful in the exoteric part of the Law. If the -canon of interpretation be used in the principles of the Law, it is -infidelity, and if used in general things it is an innovation. But -there is also a certain exoteric law which requires an interpretation -from learned men. It is not misbelief for them to take it exoterically, -but it is so or is at least an innovation in religion if ignorant men -try to interpret or explain it. - -Among these is the verse of Equalisation and the Tradition of Descent. -For the Prophet said of a Negro slave girl who told him that God was in -heaven: “Emancipate her, for she is a believer.” For there are persons -who cannot believe a thing except through their imagination, that is, -it is difficult for them to believe a thing which they cannot imagine. -Among these may be classed men who cannot understand a thing except -with a reference to space, and hence believe in God as though physical, -notwithstanding that these are the very persons who have dealt very -harshly with those mentioned above. They ought to be told that things -of his character are parabolical, and that we should pause and consider -the saying of God: “Yet none knoweth the interpretation thereof except -God.” Although learned men agree that these are to be interpreted, they -differ in the interpretation according to their knowledge of principles -of philosophy. There is a third part of the Law which occupies an -intermediate position, on account of some doubt about it. Some say that -it should be taken exoterically, and that no interpretation should -be allowed in it; while there are others who say that they have some -esoteric meaning, and should not be taken exoterically by the learned. -This is on account of the obscurity of their meaning. A learned man may -be excused if he makes a mistake about them. - -If the Law is divided into these three parts, it may be asked: to which -of these does the description of the state of the Day of Judgment -belong? We would reply that it is quite clear, on the very face of -the question, that it belongs to that part in which there is some -difference of opinion. For one group of men, who class themselves -among philosophers, say that these things should be taken literally. -For, according to them, there is not a single argument which makes -their literal sense absurd and unreasonable. This is the method of the -Asharites. But another group of philosophers interpret them; but they -differ very widely in the interpretation itself. Amongst these may be -mentioned Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and a large number of Sufis. There -are some who would amalgamate the two interpretations, as Abu Hamid has -done in some of his books. These questions are among those in which, if -the learned men err they are to be excused; otherwise, they are to be -thanked and rewarded. For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day -of Judgment, and then begins to apply the principles of interpretation -to the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny -it. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the -fundamentals of the Law, and it can be easily verified by any of the -three methods of argument common to all men. But one who is not learned -should take it exoterically, an interpretation in his case is unbelief, -for it leads to infidelity. We are thus of opinion that such people -should accept the literal sense, for interpretation will certainly -lead them to infidelity. A learned man who discloses the discussions -of these things to the common people helps them towards unbelief and -one who abets another in that direction is himself no better than an -unbeliever. It is therefore unsuitable that these interpretations -should be published in any other than learned books, for in this way -they will reach none but the learned. But it is a mistake both in -religion and philosophy if they are put in other books, with dogmatic -and exhortative arguments, as Abu Hamid has done. Although the author’s -intention was good, the idea thus to increase the number of learned -men, he caused a good deal of mischief through it. For, on account of -this method some people began to find fault with philosophy, and others -to blame religion, and still others began to think of reconciling the -two. It seems that this was the very aim which Abu Hamid had in view in -writing these books. He has tried to awaken the nature of men, for he -never attached himself to any particular way of thinking in his books. -He was an Asharite with the Asharites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a -philosopher with the philosophers, so much so that he was, as has been -said: “I am a Yeminite when I meet a Yeminite; if I meet a Ma’adi I am -one of Banu Adnan.” - -Hence, it is necessary for the doctors of Islam to prevent men, except -the learned, from reading his books; as it is incumbent upon them to -hinder them from reading controversial writings which should not be -studied except by those fit to do so. As a rule the reading of these -books is less harmful than those of the former. For the majority cannot -understand philosophical books, only those endowed with superior -natures. People are on the whole destitute of learning and are aimless -in their reading which they do without a teacher. Nevertheless they -succeed in leading others away from religion. It is an injustice to -the best kind of men and the best kind of creation; for in their case -justice consists in the knowledge of the best things by the best -people, fit to know it. It should be remembered that the greater the -thing is the higher will be the injustice done to it on account of -ignorance. Hence God says: “Polytheism is a great injustice.”[17] - -These things we have thought proper to mention here, that is, in a -discussion of the relation between philosophy and religion and the -canons of interpretation in Law. If these matters had not become -commonly known among men, we would not have said anything about them -and would not have entered in a plea on behalf of the interpreters. For -these things are suitable only for mention in philosophical books. - -You ought to be aware that the real purpose of the Law is to impart -the knowledge of truth and of right action. The knowledge of truth -consists in the cognisance of God and the whole universe with its -inner significance, especially that of religion, and the knowledge -of happiness or misery of the next world. Right action consists in -following those actions which are useful for happiness and avoiding -those which lead to misery. The knowledge of these actions has been -called practical knowledge. This is divided into two kinds: external -actions, the knowledge of which is called Fiqh, that is, Theology; and -actions pertaining to feelings, such as gratitude, patience, and other -points of character to which the Law has urged us or from which it has -prohibited us. This is called the knowledge of continence and of the -next world. Abu Hamid in his book _The Revivification of the Sciences -of Religion_ seems to be inclined to this kind, and as the people have -always turned away from the former kind of knowledge and have turned -themselves to the second which leads them easily to piety, the book -attained its name. But we have wandered from our own purpose and will -now return to it. - -If the purpose of the Law is to impart the knowledge of truth and -of right action, this cannot be attained except by one of the two -methods: _viz_, by conception or verification such as Mutakallimun have -maintained in their books. There are three methods of verification open -to people: philosophy, dogmatics and exhortation. There are two methods -of conception: either by the thing itself, or by its like. As all -people cannot by their nature understand and accept philosophical and -dogmatic arguments, together with the difficulty of learning the use of -inferences and the long time it takes to learn them, and the purpose -of the Law being to be quite common among men, it is necessary that it -should contain all kinds of verifications and conceptions. Among the -methods of verification there are some which are meant for the common -people: that is, exhortative and dogmatic, the exhortative being more -common than the other. There is one method which is meant solely for -the learned, and that is the method of rational inference. Now, it is -the primary aim of the Law to improve the condition of the many without -neglecting the few, and hence the method of conception and verification -adopted are common to the majority. - -These methods are of four kinds: the first is that which, while -in particulars the same in both, that is, both exhortatively and -dialectically, is still true by conception and verification. These -are syllogisms of which the minor and the major premise are certain, -besides being easily imagined and well known. These are set before the -deductions which are drawn from them, and not from their likes. To -this kind of religious injunction there is no interpretation, and one -who denies them or puts an interpretation upon them is an infidel. The -second kind is that the premises of which although well known or easily -imagined are also positively established. Their conclusions are drawn -by analogy. Upon these, that is, their conclusions, an interpretation -may be put. The third kind is just the reverse of the second, that is, -the conclusions are themselves intended and their premises are well -known or easily imagined without being positively established. Upon -these also--that is, upon the conclusions, no interpretation can be -put, but the premises may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth kind is -that the premises of which are well-known or conjectural without being -positively established. Their deductions are by analogy when that is -intended. It is the duty of the learned men to interpret them and of -the common people to take them exoterically. - -In short, all that should be interpreted can be grasped by philosophy -alone. So the duty of the learned person is to interpret, and of -the common people to take it literally, both in conception and in -verification. The reason for the latter is that they cannot understand -more. A student of law sometimes finds interpretations which have a -preference over others, in a general way by verification: that is, -the argument is more convincing with the interpretations than with -the literal meanings. These interpretations are common and it is -possible for them to be admitted by any whose speculative faculties -have been developed in controversy. Some of the interpretations of the -Asharites and the Mutazilites are of this type, though the arguments -of the Mutazilites are generally the more weighty. But it is the duty -of the common people who are not capable of understanding more than -exhortation to take them exoterically. Indeed, it is not proper for -them to know the interpretations at all. - -Thus there are three groups into which men have been divided: Those who -are not included amongst those who should know the interpretations. -These are common people who are guided by exhortation alone. They -form a vast majority: for there is not a single rational being who -cannot accept a result by this method. The second are dogmatic -interpreters. These are so, either by their nature only, or both by -nature and habit. The third are those who can be definitely called -interpreters. These are the philosophers, both by nature and by -philosophical training. This kind of interpretation should not be -discussed with the dogmatists, not to speak of the common people. If -any of these interpretations are disclosed to those not fit to receive -them--especially philosophical interpretations--these being far higher -than common knowledge, they may be led to infidelity. For he wishes to -nullify the exoteric meaning and to prove his interpretation. But if -the exoteric meaning is shown to be false without the interpretation -being established, he falls into infidelity, if this concerns the -principles of the Law. So, the interpretations should not be disclosed -to the common people, and ought not to be put into exhortative or -doctrinal books--that is, books written with an expository purpose in -view--as Abu Hamid has done. - -Hence, it is necessary that the common people should be told that those -things which are exoteric, and yet cannot be understood easily, the -interpretations of which it is impossible for them to understand, are -parabolical, and that no one knows the interpretation thereof except -God. We should stop at the following words of God: “None knoweth the -interpretation thereof except God.”[18] This is also the answer to the -question about some of those abstruse problems which the common people -cannot understand: “They will ask thee concerning the spirit: answer: -The spirit was created at the command of my Lord, but ye have no -knowledge given to you, except a little.”[19] Again, one who interprets -these to persons not fit to receive them is an infidel, because he -leads others to infidelity, which is quite in opposition to the purpose -of the Law. This is especially the case when corrupt interpretations -are put on the principles of the Law, as some men of our own times -do. We have known many people who think they are philosophers and -hence claim to find out strange things through philosophy, which are -in every way contrary to religion, and they do not admit of any other -interpretation. They think they must disclose these things to the -common people. But by the disclosure of wrong notions they lead them to -eternal destruction. - -The difference between their aim and that of the jurists can be made -clear by the following example. Since it is not possible to make every -one an expert physician a certain physician laid down some principles -for the preservation of health and the prevention of diseases, and he -allowed the use of some things but prohibited others. Now a man comes -and tells the people that the principles laid down by that physician -are not correct and declares them to be false, and they become -discredited in the eyes of the people; or says that they are capable -of interpretations which they cannot understand and cannot verify by -practice. Do you think that people in these circumstances will ever -act upon those things which are useful for their health and for the -prevention of diseases or that the man himself will ever be capable of -acting on them? No, he will be quite incapable of doing so and thus -will lead them all to destruction. - -This is the case when those interpretations which they cannot -understand are correct, to say nothing of those that are wrong. For -they will not believe in health to be preserved, nor disease to be -prevented, to say nothing of the things which preserve health or -prevent disease. This is the condition of that man who discloses -interpretations of the Law to the common people and those not fit to -receive them. And hence he is an unbeliever. - -The simile which we have described above is a real parallel, and not -merely fanciful (as some may think) as it is correct in every respect. -For the relation of the medicine to the body is the same as that of the -Law to the soul. A physician is one who seeks to preserve the health -when he finds it good and tries to restore it when it is missed. In the -same way a religious law-giver is one who takes care of the health of -souls, which is called piety. The Quran also makes clear its purpose, -through religious action, by many verses. For instance: “O true -believers, a fast is ordained unto you as it was ordained those before -you, that ye may fear God”[20] and “Their flesh is not accepted of -God, neither their blood; but your piety is accepted by Him”[21] and: -“For prayer preserveth a man from filthy crimes and from that which is -blameable.”[22] There are many other verses of the same nature in the -Quran. Thus, we see, a religious law-giver seeks to establish this kind -of health by religious knowledge and practice. This is the health upon -which depends happiness and in the case of its absence the misery of -the next world. - -This should have made it clear to you not merely that one should not -speak of the wrong interpretation. But also that it is not proper to -put even true ones in the books of the common people. These correct -interpretations are of the faith which man has and of which the whole -creation was afraid to bear the burden. By this we refer to the -following verse of the Quran: “We proposed the faith unto the heavens, -and the earth, and the mountains, and they refused to undertake the -same, and were afraid thereof, but man undertook it: verily he is -unjust to himself and foolish.”[23] These interpretations and the -idea that their discussion is necessary in the Law have given rise to -many sects in Islam, so much so that they have denounced one another -with infidelity and innovations. This is especially the effect of -wrong interpretations. The Mutazilites interpreted a large number -of verses and Traditions and disclosed them to the people. So also -did the Asharites, though their interpretations were less in number. -They only succeeded in creating hatred and wars among men, destroying -the Law, and disuniting the people completely. To add to this, the -method which they have adopted in proving these interpretations is -adapted neither to the common people nor to the learned. For if you -look closely into it, you will find that it is not correct according -to the norms of logic--this anyone who has had any training may see -for himself without the least effort. In fact, many of the principles -upon which the Asharites build their conclusions are sophistical in -their nature. They deny many fundamentals, like the proof of accidence, -the influence of one thing upon another, the necessity of cause and -effects, abstract figures and the processes leading to them. Indeed, -Asharite Mutakallimun have been in this respects unjust to Mohammadans, -for one of their sects has denounced as infidels all those who do not -recognise the existence of God by methods which they have devised for -the knowledge of Him: but in truth they themselves are in the wrong and -are unbelievers. - -It is upon this point that the difference of opinion arises. Some say -that the first principle is of reason, while others allege that it is -of faith. That is to say they have thought that faith, even before -knowing the methods common to all and to which the Law has made a -call on all, is the only method of arriving at truth. Thus they have -mistaken the real purpose of the Law-giver, and being themselves in the -wrong they have led others astray. - -If it be alleged that the method that the Asharites and other -Mutakallimun have devised are not those general methods in the purpose -of the Law-giver for the instruction of the common people, and that it -is not possible without some method being adopted, then the question -arises: What are those methods which are given in the Law? We maintain -that these methods are to be found in the Quran alone. For, if we -look closely we shall find that in the Quran all the three kinds of -methods are laid down, for the whole of mankind, both for the majority -and for the learned few. If we reflect we shall come to see that no -better methods can be discovered for the instruction of the common -people than those mentioned in the Quran. Anyone who changes them by -interpretations which are neither clear in themselves nor clearer than -others to the common people, makes null and void their philosophy and -their effect, the goal of which is the happiness of mankind. This is -quite evident from the early and the later condition of Islam, for in -the early days Muslims sought perfect excellence and piety by acting -on those principles without putting any interpretation upon them. And -those among them who knew any interpretation did not disclose it. In -the later days interpretations were used, and piety decreased, the love -for others was lost, and they became divided into schisms and parties. - -Hence one who cares to remove this innovation from the Law, should -turn to the Book, and should pick up from it the existing arguments -for things whose belief is inculcated upon us. Further he should -deeply think over the esoteric meanings, as far as possible, without -putting interpretations upon them, except when they are not quite -clear to all. The assertions of the Book for the instructions of the -people, when thought over are things, with whose help we can reach a -stage from which none but the learned in logic can differ about the -esoteric meaning of that which is not clear. This peculiarity cannot -be found in any other assertions but that of the Book. There are -three peculiarities in the assertions, which have been explained in -the Quran, for the common people. First, that nothing can be found -more convincing and true than these. Secondly, that they can be -accepted by every nature; and they are such that none can know their -interpretations, if there be any, except the learned in logic. Thirdly, -that they possess a call to the righteous, for correct interpretations. -This is neither to be found in the school of the Asharites nor in -that of the Mutazalites _i. e._ their interpretations are neither -generally acceptable, nor do they make any call to the righteous, nor -are they right in themselves. It is for this reason that innovation -has increased, and it is our desire to write about it, as far as it is -possible for us, provided that we get leisure for it, have power to do -it, and God gives us a respite in life. It is just possible that this -may be a beginning for the coming generation; because the breach of -Law, due to evil passions, and changed beliefs is simply aggrieving and -saddening. This is still enhanced by those, who ascribe themselves to -philosophy, because an injury from a friend is worse than the injury -from an enemy. Philosophy is a companion and a foster-sister to the -Law. Hence an injury from this source is the worst kind of injury, -even if we neglect the enmity, hatred, and animosity which is created -between the two, although they are companions by nature and friends -in reality. It has also been injured by many ignorant _friends_ who -ascribe themselves to it. These are the schisms which exist in Islam. -May God set all aright, help all to His love, and bring together their -hearts for piety, and erase enmity and hatred by his favour and grace. - -Indeed God has removed much of evil, ignorance and the misleading -ways through this strong government, and has led the many to good, -especially the people who have walked in the path of scholasticism, and -have a liking for the knowledge of the Truth. Because it has called -the people to the knowledge of God by mediate paths, which are higher -than the depressions of the blind followers: and lower than that of the -high-sounding Mutakallimun; and has called the learned to their duty of -considering fully the principles of Law. - - - FOOTNOTES - -[Footnote 1: A translation of Averroes’ Kitab Fasl a’l Maqal wa Taqrir -ma bain’a’l Shariata wa’l Hikmati mina’l Ittisal. Ed. by D. J. Muller, -Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes, Munich 1859.] - -[Footnote 2: _i. e._ Shariat. Compare Jewish Torah.] - -[Footnote 3: Quran lix, 2.] - -[Footnote 4: Quran vii, 184.] - -[Footnote 5: Quran vi, 75.] - -[Footnote 6: Quran lxxxviii, 17.] - -[Footnote 7: Quran iii, 176.] - -[Footnote 8: Quran lix, 2.] - -[Footnote 9: Quran xvi, 126.] - -[Footnote 10: “It is he who hath created you whatsoever is on -earth, and that set His mind to the creation of heaven and formed -it into seven heavens; he knoweth all thing.” Quran ii, 29. For an -interpretation of this see Raji’s _Tafsiri Kabir_ vol. I. p. 249 et -seq. Cairo. 1307. A. H. and Tabari’s _Commentary_ vol. I. p. 146 et -seq. Cairo. 1902 A. D.] - -[Footnote 11: “Verily God comes down every night to the earth” (Nibayah -fi Gharibil Hadith by Ibu Athir vol. IV. p. 138 Cairo 1311 A. H.) For -an interpretation see the above and Qustatain’s Commentary on Bukari, -vol. IX p. 178. Cairo. 1307 A. H.] - -[Footnote 12: Quran iii, 5.] - -[Footnote 13: Quran iii, 5.] - -[Footnote 14: Quran xi, 9.] - -[Footnote 15: Quran xiv, 19.] - -[Footnote 16: Quran xli, 10.] - -[Footnote 17: Quran xxxi, 12.] - -[Footnote 18: Quran iii, 5.] - -[Footnote 19: Quran xvii, 87.] - -[Footnote 20: Quran ii, 79.] - -[Footnote 21: Quran xxii, 38.] - -[Footnote 22: Quran xxix, 44.] - -[Footnote 23: Quran xxxiii, 67.] - - - - - Ia. - - APPENDIX. - - ON THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE, WHICH AVERROES HAS MENTIONED IN - HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE. - - -May God perpetuate your honour and bless you, and screen you always -from the eyes of misfortune. Through your excellent intelligence and -good understanding you have learned a great part of all these sciences, -till your insight informed you of the doubt which arises concerning the -eternal knowledge of God, with its being at the same time concerned -with created things. Thus, in the interests of truth, it is now -incumbent upon us to remove the doubt from your mind, after we have -stated it clearly. For one who does not know the problem adequately -cannot very well solve the doubt. - -The question may be stated thus: If all this universe was in the -knowledge of God before its creation, then, was it in His knowledge -after its creation as it was before it came into existence; or was it -in His knowledge before its creation quite different from that after -its coming into being? If we say that the knowledge of God about it -after its creation is quite different from that which it was before -its creation, it becomes necessary for us to admit that the eternal -knowledge is changeable; or that when the universe came into existence -out of non-existence, then there is an addition to the eternal -knowledge; which is impossible. Again, if we say that the knowledge of -it was the same in both the conditions, then it would be said: Was the -created universe the same before its coming into existence as it was -after its creation? To this objection it will have to be answered that -it was not the same before its creation as it was after it, otherwise -the existent and the non-existent thing would be the same. When the -opponent has admitted this much, he may be asked whether the real -knowledge does not consist in the cognizance of an existent thing as -it is. If he says: “Yes,” then accordingly it becomes necessary that -when a thing changes in itself the knowledge of it must also change, -otherwise it would be a knowledge of something other than the real -object. Thus it would then be necessary to admit one of two things: -either the eternal knowledge itself will change, or the created things -would be unknown to God. And both of these alternatives are impossible -with regard to God. This doubt is still further strengthened by the -apparent condition of man, that is, the relation of his knowledge -about non-existent things by the supposition of their existence and -its relation when the thing in question is found. It is self-evident -that both kinds of knowledge are different, otherwise God would have -been ignorant of its existence at the time he found it. The argument -which the Mutakallimun advance to meet this objection does not by any -means deliver us from the doubt. They say that God knows the things -before their coming into being, as they would be after they come into -existence. If they say that no change occurs, they fall into mistake. -If on the other hand they admit a change, they may be asked whether -this change was known in the eternal knowledge or not. Thus the first -doubt occurs again. On the whole it is difficult to imagine that the -knowledge of a thing before and after its existence can be one and the -same. - -This is the statement of the doubt in the briefest terms possible, as -we have put it for your sake. A solution of this doubt requires a very -long discussion, but here we intend to state a point which might easily -solve it. Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has also tried to solve this doubt in -his work: _The Refutation of the Philosophers_, but his method is by no -means satisfactory. For he says something to this effect: he thinks the -known and the knowledge are not connected with each other, so that when -a change takes place in the one the other does not change in itself. So -it is possible that it may happen in the case of Divine knowledge and -the things existent, that is, they may change in themselves while God’s -knowledge may remain the same. For instance a pillar may be on the -right hand of Zaid, it may be changed to his left without any change -taking place in Zaid himself. But the illustration is not at all a -correct one, for the relation has changed, that is, that which was on -the right side is now on the left. That in which no change has taken -place is the condition of that relation--Zaid. It being so, and the -knowledge is only the relation itself, it is necessary that it should -change with a change in the thing known, as the change in the relation -of the pillar to Zaid, for it is now on the left after being on the -right. - -The view which might solve this question is that it should be -maintained that the condition of eternal knowledge of existent things -is quite other than the created knowledge with regard to them. For -the existence of a thing is the cause and means of our knowledge of -it, while the eternal knowledge is itself the cause and means of the -existent thing. So if a change takes place in the eternal knowledge -after the coming into being of an existent thing, as it does in the -created knowledge then it is involved that the former cannot be -the cause but only the effect of the existent things. Thus it is -necessary that there should be no change in it, as there is in the -created knowledge. This mistake always occurs by our taking eternal -knowledge to be like the created one, by an analogy from the seen -to the unseen. The error in this analogy has already been exposed. -Just as no change takes place in any agent after the creation of his -act--that is, change of kind which was not found before--so no change -in the eternal knowledge of God after the creation of the thing which -was in His knowledge. So this doubt is removed. At the same time it -is not necessary for us to say that as there is no change in eternal -knowledge, therefore, He does not know an existent at the time of -its creation, as it is. But we must believe that He knows not by a -created but by His eternal knowledge. For a change in knowledge with -a change of the existent thing is a condition of the knowledge which -depends upon the existent thing, such a knowledge being created. Thus -the relation of the eternal knowledge with the existent things is not -the same as that of the created knowledge. It is not that there is -no connection between them at all as some philosophers are said to -maintain, who as the people think, say, at the time of doubt, that -God has no knowledge of particulars at all. But this is not as is -commonly supposed. They only say that He does not know particulars by -any created knowledge, one of the conditions of which is its being -created by them, by which it is an effect and not a cause. This is the -last of the things about it which must be remembered. For our reason -leads us to the fact that God is the Knower of things, all of them -emanating from Him. This is so because He is a knower, not because -of His existence, nor of His existence in any form, but only because -of His being a Knower. God has said, “Shall not He know all things -who hath created them, since He is the sagacious, the knowing.”[24] -The arguments also tell us that He knows by a knowledge which may be -akin to created knowledge. So it is necessary that there should be -some other knowledge for the existent things--and this is the eternal -of God. Moreover, how is it possible to suppose that the Peripatetic -Philosophers think that the eternal knowledge does not include -particulars, while they say that these are a cause of admonition to us -in our dreams, divine revelations, and other kinds of inspiration? - -That is what we think about the solution of the problem--a solution in -which there is no doubt or suspicion. God is the only helper to right -judgment, and leader to truth. Peace be upon you, and blessings of God -and His beatitude. God is the best knower of truth: and to Him is the -return and the refuge. - - - FOOTNOTES - -[Footnote 24: Quran lxvi, 14.] - - - - - II - - AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF - THE FAITH, AND A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS AND MISLEADING - INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS. - - - - - AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING - THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH - AND - A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS - AND - MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS.[25] - - -And after--Praise be to God, who sets apart anyone whom He will for His -knowledge, rendering him fit for understanding His Law and following -His path, informing him of the hidden recesses of His knowledge, the -real meaning of His inspiration, and the purpose of sending the Apostle -to creatures, in spite of what has become clear about the doubt of the -doubters among the Prophet’s own followers, and changes of meanings -introduced by the false among his own people. He has disclosed to him -that there are interpretations which God and His Apostle have not -ordered. May there be the most perfect blessings upon the Trusty of -His inspiration, and the Seal of His prophets, and upon his family and -relations. - -We have already described in the foregoing tractate the conformity of -philosophy with the Law, and its other relations. We have said there -that the Law is of two kinds: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the -common people is to follow the exoteric law; while the duty of learned -men is to follow the esoteric one. So the duty of the common people -is to follow the meanings of the Law in their literal sense, leaving -aside every interpretation of it. The learned men are not permitted -to expose their interpretations to the common people, as Ali, (upon -whom be peace) has said, “Tell the people what they can understand. Do -you wish to give the lie to God and His Apostle?” So I thought that -in the present book I should examine the exoteric meanings which the -Law intends the common people to follow, and in those, search the real -purpose of the Law-giver, (on whom be peace) according to my ability -and knowledge. For the people of His Law have been extremely disturbed, -so much so that many misguided sects and different divisions, have been -produced, every one of which thinks that it is following the best Law, -and that he who disagrees is either an innovator or an infidel whose -life and property is at stake. All this is directly opposed to the -purpose of the Law-giver. Its cause lies in the misleading things about -the Law which have been put forward. - -In our own times, there are four of these sects which are famous. In -the first place, there is the sect of the Asharites, and these are -the people who are commonly taken to be men of _Sunna_. Then there -are Mutazilites, the sects of the Batinites, (Esoteric), and the -sect of the Bombasts. Every one of these sects has its own peculiar -beliefs about God, and has turned many an exoteric word of the law -to interpretations, which they have applied to those beliefs. They -think that theirs was the original Law which all the people are asked -to follow, and he who deviates from it is either an innovator or an -infidel. But when you look into all their views and then examine the -purpose of the Law, it would appear that a great part of them are -recent opinions and innovating interpretations. Of them I will mention -here those indispensable beliefs in the Law, without which Faith does -not become complete, and will search, in every one of them, the real -purpose of the Law-giver, (peace be upon him,) beyond that which has -been made the basis of the Law, and its beliefs before the coming -into use of incorrect interpretations. I will begin by explaining the -intention of the Law-giver as to the beliefs which should be held by -the common people about God, and the methods which He adopted towards -them. All this is contained in the Divine Book. We will begin by an -exposition of the methods which leads to the knowledge of the existence -of the Creator, for this is the first thing which a student ought to -know. But before this, it is necessary that we should mention the -opinions of the well-known sects. - -The _Bombasts_ hold that the method of obtaining knowledge of the -existence of the Creator is by hearing and not by reason, that is, -the belief in His existence, the verification of which is incumbent -upon all men, is enough to be taught by the Law-giver, and believed -as an article of Faith, as is the case with his teachings about the -condition of the Day of Judgment, and others with which our reason has -no power to deal. This is obviously a misleading sect, for it falls -short of the purpose of the Law, as regards the method adopted towards -all the people, leading them to the knowledge of the existence of God, -and calling them to the confession of His belief. It is quite evident -from many verses of the Divine Book, that in it the people have been -called to verify the existence of the Creator by arguments of reason -which are mentioned in it. For instance, there are the following verses -of the Quran, “O men of Mecca, serve your Lord who has created you -and those before you,”[26] and “Is there any doubt concerning God, -the Creator of heaven and earth?”[27] and other verses on the subject -found therein. It is not fit for a man to say, that if these arguments -had been necessary for believing in God--that is, had his faith been -not completed without understanding them--the Prophet would not have -invited anybody to Islam without presenting to him all these arguments, -for the Arabs already knew the existence of the Creator, so that God -has said, “If thou asketh them who has created the heavens and the -earth, they will surely answer, God,”[28] and hence there was no use -giving arguments. It is impossible to find a man so stupid and dull, -that he cannot understand the arguments advanced by Law for the common -people, through the Prophet. This is to say the least. If there be -found such a man, then it is his duty to believe in God by hearing -alone. So much for the ideas of the _Bombasts_ about the exoterics of -the Law. - -The _Asharites_ are of opinion that the verification of the existence -of God cannot be attained but by reason. But about this they have -adopted a method, which is not among the methods adopted by Law, and -is not mentioned in the Quran, nor the people invited through it to -believe. Their well-known method is founded upon the fact that the -universe is a created thing, which is itself based upon the theory -of the composition of atoms, and that the atom is a created thing, -and that other bodies are created out of it. The method which they -adopt for the exposition of the creation of an atom, which they call -_al-Jauharat u’l Faridah_ (sole Essence), is a misleading one even for -many religious men in the business of controversy, not to speak of the -common people. And despite this it is a method devoid of philosophy, -and does not lead to a belief in the existence of the Creator. For if -we suppose the universe is a created thing, it becomes necessary, as -they say, that its Creator must also be a “Created” object. But a doubt -presents itself about the existence of this created thing, which is -not in the power of scholastic theology to solve. And that is this, -that we can take this thing to be neither eternal nor created. For if -we take it as created, then it must require another created thing, and -this another, and so on to infinity. This is impossible. On the other -hand, if we take Him as eternal, then it is necessary that his action -in connection with the result must also be eternal. In this way the -results also become eternal. It is necessary for a created thing that -its existence be dependent upon a created action. Their hypothesis can -only be proved if they admit that a created action can be performed by -an eternal agent. For the result of the action might be dependent on -the action of the agent. But they do not admit it, for according to -their principles what is coeval with created things is itself created. -Moreover, if the agent sometimes acts and at other times remains -inactive, it is necessary, that there be a condition better applicable -in one state of things than in the other. Then about this condition -the same question will rise, and so it will go on till infinity. And -what the Mutakallimun say in answer to this objection that the created -action is the result of eternal intention, does not relieve us of our -doubt or satisfy our mind. For intention without action is dependent -upon the act, and if the act is a created thing, then it is necessary -that the intention in connection with it must also be a created thing. -It makes no difference whether we take the intention as eternal or -created, rising before the action or with it. So we may take it as -we like. All the same it is necessary for them to admit either of -the three things about the universe--either a created action, with a -created intention or a created action and an eternal intention, or -an eternal action with an eternal intention. But a created thing is -impossible from an eternal action without any expedient, even if we -admit for their sake, that it comes into existence by eternal action; -and putting intention itself or the action, connected with the act is a -thing which cannot be understood. This is supposing an act without an -agent, with a result, without any intention. Intention is a condition -of the action and not the action itself. Also it is necessary that this -eternal intention, should be connected with non-existence of a created -thing, for a period of time which is indefinite. So if a created thing -be non-existence for an unknown period of time, then it does not become -connected with the intention at the time of its creation, except after -the completion of a time of which there is no limit, and that which has -no limit has no end. So it becomes necessary that the intention should -never take the form of action, or a time without limit should come to -an end, which is impossible. This is the argument of the Mutakallimun, -on which they rely in proving that the revolutions of the heavens are -created. Moreover, it is necessary that to the intention which precedes -the object, and is connected with it, at a certain time, there should -be created in it at the time of creation of the object a determination -for doing so. For the determination for the creation of an object -cannot be found before that time, because if at the time of action -there be found no additional quality in the agent, than that he had at -the time of intention, then action from him at that time would not be -quite as necessary from him as inactivity. We may go on in this way, -finding all the obscure and intricate doubts, from which, not to speak -of the common people, even clever men, learned in scholastic theology, -in philosophy, cannot escape. So if the common people be burdened with -a knowledge of these things, it would be an unbearable problem for them. - -Then again the methods adopted by the Asharites in proving the -creation of the universe are defective for all classes of men. The -common people, by their very nature, cannot understand them, and -they are at the same time in no way reasonable. So they are neither -fit for the learned, nor for the masses. We warn our readers of them -and say: The methods which they adopt are of two kinds. One of them, -the more famous of the two and upon which a majority of them relies, -is based upon three premises, from which they derive the proof for -the creation of the universe. They are: (1) that essences cannot be -separated from accidents, that is, they cannot be devoid of them; (2) -that the accidents are created things; (3) that that which cannot be -separated from a created thing is itself created, that is, that which -cannot be severed from the created thing is itself created. Now, if -by the first premise which says that the essences cannot be separated -from the accidents, they mean the bodies which stand by themselves, -then the premise is correct. But if by essence they mean the particle -which cannot be divided, which they call _Sole Essence_, then there is -doubt about it, which is not easy to solve. For the existence of an -indivisible essence is not well established in itself, and about it -there are many opposite and highly contradictory opinions, and it is -not in the power of scholastic theology to bring truth out of them. -That is the business of philosophers who are very few in number. - -The arguments which Asharites use are for the most part exhortative. -For their famous argument on this is that they say that our first -knowledge about a thing is, for instance, that an elephant is bigger -than an ant, for it is accepted that the former has more particles in -it than the latter. If it be so, then it is made up of particles and is -not a compact whole in itself. So when the body is destroyed it changes -into particles, and when composed it is composed of them. But this is -wrong. For they have taken a divisible quantity as a continuous one, -and then thought that that which is applicable to the divisible is also -applicable to the continuous. This is true about numbers, that is, we -say that a certain number is more than the other, by its containing -more particles in it, that is, more units. But it cannot be true of -a continuous quantity, of which we say that it is bigger or greater. -In this way everything may be enumerated without any reference to its -bulk at all. And the science of mathematics becomes the science of -number only. It is well-known that every bulk can be considered with -regard to line, surface and volume. Moreover, a continuous quantity -it is possible to cut in the middle and thus get two parts. But this -is impossible in the units of number, nay, it is opposed to it. Then, -again, the body and other particles of a continuous quantity are -capable of being divided. But everything divisible is either divided -into other divisible quantities, or into indivisible ones. If it is -divided into indivisible ones then we have found particles which cannot -be divided. And if it is divided into other divisible parts, then again -the question arises whether these can be divided into divisible or -indivisible parts. So if it can be divided a limitless number of times, -there would be limitless particles in a limited thing. But it is one of -the primary principles of knowledge that particles in a limited thing -are limited. - -Among the obscure doubts which can be attributed to the Asharites -is the question whether if an atom is brought into being, this is -different from creation itself, for it is one of the accidents? When -the created thing exists the act of creation is non-existent for -according to their principles, the accidents cannot be separated from -their essences. So this has compelled them to regard creation as -pertaining to the existent things and not for it. Then they may be -asked; if creation implies the non-existence of a thing, with what -is the act of the agent connected, for, according to them, there is -no mean between existence and non-existence. If this be so, and, -according to them, the action of the agent is connected neither with -non-existence, nor with that which is and nevertheless brings about an -existence, it must be connected with a middle substance. This doubt -has compelled the Mutazilites to say that there is a substance, even -in non-existence, which they call Matter or First Element. They should -admit that that which is non-existent can be made existent by action. -Both of these sects must also admit the existence of a void. These are -questions, which as you see, cannot be solved by dogmatics. Thus, it -is clear that such a method cannot be made a basis of the knowledge -of God, especially for the masses. We will shortly describe a clearer -method of knowing God. - -Now as to the second premise, according to which it is said that all -the accidents are created things:--This is a premise concerning which -there are doubts, and its meaning is as hidden as the soul in a body. -For we have observed many bodies to be created and such is also the -case with some accidents. So there is no difference in transferring -an observed object to the invisible, in both the cases. For if it is -necessary, with regard to accidents, to apply what applies of the -visible things to the invisible, that is, if we should suppose a thing -which we have not seen, so created, by the analogy of that which we -have observed, then we should also apply it to the essences. Thus we -can become quite careless of proving the creation of accidents, as -distinct from that of essences. The creation of the accidents of the -heavenly bodies is extremely doubtful to the observer just as there is -doubt in their essential creation. For the creation of their accidents -is never perceived. So it is necessary that we should clearly observe -them. This is the method which surely and certainly leads pious people -to the knowledge of God. This is the method of the chosen men, and that -with which God has particularly blessed the prophet Abraham. He says: -“And thus did We show unto Abraham the kingdom of heaven and earth, -that he might become of those who firmly believe.”[29] For the whole -doubt concerns the heavenly bodies themselves. Many controversialists -have stopped here and believed that these are so many gods. - -Again, time is one of the accidents, the creation of which it is -impossible to imagine, for it is necessary that the non-existence of -a thing be preceded by time. But in this case it cannot be imagined -that the non-existence of a thing can be preceded by itself, except -by accepting time as existent. So also it is difficult to imagine the -creation of the space in which the universe is, for every existent -thing occupies a former space. For if it is a void, as is the opinion -of those who think that the void itself is space, its creation also, -if we suppose it to be created, must been have preceded by another -void. And if the space be a tangible body, as is the opinion of another -group, then it should be contained in another body, which would require -another, and so on without limit. These are all obscure problems -and the arguments which are brought to disprove the eternity of the -accidents, are necessary for one who believes in the eternity of those -accidents which can be perceived; that is, one who asserts that not all -the accidents are created. For they say that the accidents which can be -perceived by the senses are created things. If they are not created, -then they will move from one place to another, or will be latent in the -place in which they are to appear, before they make their appearance. -Then they disprove both of these arguments, and think that they have -established that all the accidents are created things. But it has -become apparent from what they have said, that the apparently created -portions of the accidents are created, not those whose creation is not -apparent, nor those in whose case there is doubt, such as the accidents -which are in the heavenly bodies, in their movement, in their shape, -etc., etc. So their arguments about the creation of all accidents, can -be interpreted by the analogy of the visible to the invisible. This -is an exhortative argument, except in the suggestion of reasonable -arguments which depend here on the certainty of the similarity of the -character of the visible and the invisible. - -The third premise which says, that that which cannot be separated -from a created thing is itself created, is equivocal, for it can be -understood in two ways: the thing which cannot be separated from the -class of created things, but can be removed from its units; and that -which cannot be separated from any one of the things in question, as if -one were to say, “That which cannot be separated from this blackness -in question.” The second meaning is the correct one, that is it cannot -be separated from a certain accident, which is created, for it is -absolutely necessary that it should also be a created thing. For if it -be eternal it becomes devoid of that accident, from which we suppose -that it cannot separate. This separation is impossible. The first -explanation, and that is which they mean, does not necessarily involve -the creation of place, that is, that which is not separated from the -class of created things. For it is possible to imagine a single place, -that is, a body upon which follow accidents without limit, either -opposed to one another or otherwise, as you were to say, movements -without limit. Such is the opinion of many ancient philosophers about -the universe, that it is made little by little. This is why, when -the Mutakallimun saw the weakness of this premise, they resolved to -make it strong and secure, by making it clear, that according to -them, limitless accidents cannot follow upon a single point. For they -maintain that on this occasion it is necessary that there cannot be -found any other accident, except that there be an unlimited number of -accidents before it at the place in question. This helps them to the -impossibility of their presence, for it is necessary that it should -not be there, except after the completion of an unlimited number. As -the limitless never ends, it follows that the thing which we have -supposed should not be there. For instance, consider the movement -of the heavenly bodies, as we know them today. If there were before -it limitless movements, then it is inevitable that this particular -movement should not occur. They give the example of a man, who said -to another, “I will not give you this dinar, till I have given you -before it a limitless number of dinars.” By this it is not possible -for him to give the dinar in question at all. But this example is not -a correct one. For in it there is a primary object, then a limit, and -then another object between them, which is without limit. For he has -said it in a limited time. So he has stipulated that he would give the -dinar between the time in which he is, and the time of which he speaks, -between which there is a time without limit. This is the period in -which he would give him the dinars without limit, which is impossible. -So it is quite clear that this example does not illustrate the object -for which it is given. Their opinion that the existence of a thing -which is found after limitless things, is impossible, is not correct -in all the cases. For the things which happen one after another are of -two kinds: those which come to pass in cycles, and those which occur in -order and arrangement. The things which occur in cycles are necessarily -unlimited, except that something may interfere to prevent them. For -instance if the sun rises there must be its setting; if there is a -setting then it must rise, and if it rise it must have risen before. -In the same way, if there are clouds there must be vapours rising from -the earth; if there rise vapours from the earth, then it must be wet, -if the earth is wet, there must have been rain, and if there was rain -there must have been clouds, and if thus there were clouds there must -similarly have been clouds before them. Again among those things which -happen by order, is, for instance, the creation of man from man, and of -that man from another. If this happens by essence then it can be taken -as limitless, for which the first link is not found, the last also -cannot be ascertained. If this is by accident, as for instance, if man -be really made by some one other than man, who must be his father, then -the position of his father would be the same as that of an instrument -in the hands of a maker. So it is not possible to find an agent doing -limitless actions, with countless different instruments. All these -views are not clear in this connection. We have mentioned them here, -that it may become known, that the arguments which these people advance -are no arguments at all, nor are they reasonings fit for the masses, -that is, open and clear arguments which God has imposed upon all his -creatures for the sake of belief. It must now have become clear to you -that this method is neither philosophical nor according to Law. - -The other method is that which Abul Maali has deduced and described -in one of his tractates known as _Nizamiyyah_. He has based it upon -two premises: in the first place, that the universe and all that it -contains may be conceived as other than what it really is. It may be -quite consistent, for instance, if it may be imagined smaller than it -is, or bigger, or of some other shape than it really has or having more -bodies in number than it really contains or the movements which are -made in it may go in the opposite direction from that which they take -now. This may be so much so that it may become possible that a stone -should go upwards, and fire downwards, or that the movement starting -in the east should start in the west, or the western from the eastern. -The second premise is that every transient thing is created, and for it -there is a creator; that is, an agent who made it in this way better -than in any other. - -The first premise is exhortative and very elementary. Its fallacy -is quite apparent with regard to some aspects of the universe--for -instance, the existence of man in some other form than he now -possesses; while in some others there is doubt--for instance, whether -the movement from the east might change to one from the west and _vice -versa_, for this is not known in itself. It is possible that for this -there may be a cause the existence of which is not evident, or it may -be one of those causes which are hidden from man. It is possible that -whatever of these things a man sees, is like one seeing for the first -time things of the manufacture of which he is ignorant. For such a -man may think that all or parts of the thing may possibly be made in -just the opposite fashion from that in which they really are made; and -still in spite of this idea the same work may be obtained from them -for which they were made. In this case there would be no art in them. -But its maker, and one who is associated with the maker in some of -his knowledge, know that the whole thing is just the opposite of what -that man has seen; and that there is nothing in it but that which is -absolutely necessary, or the existence of which makes it more perfect -and complete, though outwardly it may not seem quite necessary in it. -It is quite clear that this manufactured thing, may in this connection, -be taken as an illustration of God’s Creation--praised be its Great -Creator. - -This premise in being exhortative might be fit for all, but being -untrue and falsifying the wisdom of the Creator, is not fit for any. -It falsifies philosophy, because philosophy is nothing else but the -knowledge of the causes of things. If there be no necessary causes for -a thing, which make its existence necessary in the form in which it -exists, then there is no particular knowledge which may be attributed -to the wise Creator. Just as if there had not been some necessary -causes for the existence of any manufactured thing, there would have -been no art at all, and no wisdom by which its maker might be praised, -and which might not be found in any man other than the maker. Where -would be found any wisdom in a man, if he could perform all his actions -by any member of his body, or without any member at all, so much -so that he could see with his ears, as he could see with his eyes, -or smell with his eyes as he could with his nose. This is all only -falsifying philosophy, and the meaning for which God has called himself -Wise (_Hakim_)--High and Holy be his name from such imputations. We find -that Avicenna has also adopted this doctrine, for many reasons. He says -that everything, except the maker, when taken by itself, may either -be possible or allowable. Of the latter--that is, things allowable, -there are two kinds: One is allowable as regards its maker, the -other is necessary as regards the maker; and possible as regards its -essence. The only thing which is necessary, according to all reasons, -is the first maker. This opinion is extremely incorrect. Because that -which is possible in itself and its essence, will not possibly turn a -necessity beyond its maker, but by a change of the possible nature into -a necessary one. If it be said that by these words he means “Possible -with regard to itself”, that is, when the maker arises it will rise -also, then we would say that this rising is impossible. But this is -not the place to discuss the matter with this man. We ventured to talk -of him, because of the many views which he has invented. Now we would -return to our former theme. The second premise, which says that every -transient thing is created, is not in itself obvious. The philosophers -have differed about it. Plato allows that the apparently transient -thing may be eternal, while Aristotle denies it. It is a very intricate -matter, and cannot be made clear except to the philosophers, that is, -learned men, whom God has set apart for His knowledge, and has in His -Book, coupled their witness with that of Himself and His angels. - -Abul Maali has tried to make the premise clear by some other premises. -First, that there should be something unique in every transient thing, -which may make it more preferable by one of the two qualities. Second, -that this particular thing cannot be any other than that intended. -Third, that the thing which exists by intention is created. Then he -says that a transient thing comes into existence by our intention, -that is it is produced by previous volition. For all the actions are -performed either by nature or by intention. And nature is not one of -the passing things which are alike, that is, it not only creates the -dissimilar but does the both. For instance, sea-anemone will absorb -the yellow lob in the right side of the body and not in the left. -But intention is the thing which is particularly applicable to a -thing opposed to its like. Then he adds that the universe is like its -creation and exists in the position in the atmosphere where it was -made. By the void he means another void in which the world was made. So -he concluded that the universe was made by intention. The premise which -says that it is intention which fixes the shape of a thing, is correct, -but that universe is surrounded by a void is wrong, or at least not -clear. Then again according to their notions, his act of placing the -void is bad. That is, it must be eternal, otherwise it would require -another void for it. The premise saying that in this connection -intention is nothing but a created thing is not clear. For the -intention of an action is connected with the desired act itself, for it -is one of its adjuncts. And it is clear that when one adjunct is found -with the action the other must be there, for example the father and the -son. If one be found potentially the other must also be so. Hence if -the intention of the action is created, then necessarily the desired -act must also be created. If the intention of the action be eternal, -then the thing desired by that action must also be eternal. The -intention which precedes the intended object, is said to be a potential -intention only; that is, the intention which has not yet brought its -intended object into being. This is quite clear, for when the intended -object has appeared, then it becomes an existent thing, which it was -not before the appearance of the intended object in action. When this -becomes the cause of the creation of an intended thing, only by means -of action, then, if the Mutakallimun assert that intention is created, -it becomes clear that the intended object must also be created. From -the Law it is clear that there is no need to go so deeply into the -problem as far as the masses are concerned. So it has not mentioned any -eternal or created intention, but has only said that it exists and the -things are created. So God says:--“Verily, Our speech upon anything -when We will the same is, that We only say unto it, Be; and it is.”[30] -This has been so because the masses cannot understand the idea of -created things from an eternal intention. But the fact is that the Law -has not mentioned whether the intention is created or eternal, this -being a doubtful thing for many people. The Mutakallimun have also no -certain argument to advance for providing the possibility of a created -intention for creation. For the principle with which they maintain -their position for negating the existence of intention as eternal, is -the premise which we have already mentioned, that is, the thing which -cannot be separated from the created thing is itself created. We will -mention this again when talking of intention. - -From the foregoing it has become clear that the well-known methods -adopted by Asharites for the knowledge of God are certain neither -philosophical, nor by Law. This would be quite clear to anyone who -would look closely into the kind of arguments advanced in the Divine -Book about the knowledge of the existence of the Creator. For if you -look closely into this matter you will find that the arguments comprise -both qualities, those of being certain and at the same time clear, -without being complex, that is, they have few premises. - -As to the Sufis their method in theorising is not a philosophical -method--that is, made up of a number of premises, and syllogisms. -They maintain that the knowledge of God, or of anything existent, -is found in our own hearts, after its detachment from all physical -desires, and concentration of mind upon the desired object. In support -of their principle they bring many an argument from the exoteric side -of Law. For instance they quote the Divine words, “And fear God, and -God will instruct you,”[31] and, “Whoever do their best endeavour to -prompt our true religion, We will direct them unto Our ways;”[32] and -again, “If ye fear God, He will grant you a distinction,”[33] and -many other verses of this kind which are considered to be helpful for -their purpose. We say that this method, if we suppose it to be real, -is not meant for all people. Had this method been satisfactory for all -people then the philosophical method would have been quite futile, and -its existence among the people would have been useless, and with it -the existence of the Quran. For that always invites us to theorising, -judging, and admonishing by way of philosophy. We of course do not -deny that the control of physical desires is a condition for healthy -thinking, as physical health is one of its conditions. For the control -of desires is profitable in acquiring knowledge by itself, if it be -made a condition for it, just as health is a condition for education, -though it is not very useful for it. That is why our Law has invited -all of us to this method and has insisted upon it, that is, for work, -not that it is sufficient in itself, as these people think, but that -it is useful for thinking as we have already described. This would be -quite clear to any one who cares to ponder and think over it. - -As to the Mutazilites--their books have not reached us in sufficient -number in this Peninsula (Spain) that we may be able to form a fair -estimate of the method which they have adopted in this matter. But it -seems that their methods are like those of the Asharites. - -If now that it is clear that none of these methods are in accordance -with that by which the Law invites all the people, according to the -difference in their dispositions, to a confession of the existence -of God, it may be asked: What is that method which the Law has -laid down in the Divine Book, and upon which the Companions of the -Prophet depended? We would say that the method which the Divine Book -has adopted, and by which it has invited all to believe, is, when -thoroughly investigated from the Quran, dependent upon two principles. -The one is a knowledge of God’s solicitude for man, and the creation of -everything for his sake. We would call this the argument of solicitude. -The second is the creation of the essences of the existent things, as -for example, the creation of life in the minerals, and feeling and -intelligence. We would call this method the “argument of creation.” -The first method is founded upon two principles: first that all the -existent things suit man; secondly, that this suitability must have -existed in the mind of the Maker before He intended to make the object -in question, for it cannot be obtained by chance alone. Now their -suitability for the existence of man can be easily ascertained by the -suitability of day and night, sun and moon, for the existence of man. -Such is also the case with the suitability of the four seasons, and of -the place in which he lives, that is, the earth. It is also apparent -with respect to animals, vegetables, and minerals; and many other -things, such as rain, rivers, seas, the whole of the earth, water, -fire and air. It is also evident from the different members of his -body, on account of their suitability for the preservation of his life -and existence. On the whole, a knowledge of the benefit derived from -all the existent things may be included in it. So it is necessary for -a man who wants to know God perfectly, to investigate the benefits -derived from existent things. In the argument of creation is included -the existence of the animal world, the plant world, and the heavens. -This method is again based upon two principles, which can be found out -by every man by his very nature. The one is that all things have been -made and created. This is quite clear in itself, in the case of animals -and plants, as God has said, “Verily the idols which ye invoke, beside -God, can never create a single fly, though they may all assemble for -that purpose.”[34] We see an inorganic substance and then there is life -in it. So we know for certain, that there is an inventor and bestower -of life, and He is God. Of the heavens we know by their movements, -which never become slackened, that they work for our benefit by divine -solicitude, and are subordinate to our welfare. Such an appointed and -subordinate object is always created for some purpose. The second -principle is that for every created thing there is a creator. So it is -right to say from the two foregoing principles that for every existent -thing there is an inventor. There are many arguments, according to -the number of the created things, which can be advanced to prove this -premise. Thus it is necessary for one who wants to know God as He -ought to be known, to acquaint himself with the essence of things, so -that he may get information about the creation of all things. For who -cannot understand the real substance and purpose of a thing, cannot -understand the minor meaning of its creation. It is to this that God -refers in the following verse, “Or do they not contemplate the heaven -and the earth, and the things which God has created?”[35] And so a -man who would follow the purpose of philosophy in investigating the -existence of things, that is, would try to know the cause which led to -its creation, and the purpose of it would know the argument of kindness -most perfectly. These two arguments are those adopted by Law. - -The verses of the Quran leading to a knowledge of the existence of God -are dependent only on the two foregoing arguments. It will be quite -clear to anyone who will examine closely the verses, which occur in the -Divine Book in this connection. These, when investigated, will be found -to be of three kinds: either they are verses showing the “arguments of -kindness,” or those mentioning the “arguments of creation,” or those -which include both the kinds of arguments. The following verses may -be taken as illustrating the argument of kindness. “Have we not made -the earth for a bed, and the mountains for stakes to find the same? -And have we not created you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep -for rest; and made the night a garment to cover you; and destined the -day to the gaining of your livelihood and built over you seven solid -heavens; and placed therein a burning lamp? And do we not send down -from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down in abundance, -that we may thereby produce corn, and herbs, and gardens planted thick -with trees?”[36] and, “Blessed be He Who hath placed the twelve signs -in the heavens; hath placed therein a lamp by day, and the moon which -shineth by night;”[37] and again, “Let man consider his food.”[38] -The following verses refer to the argument of invention, “Let man -consider, therefore of what he is created. He is created of the seed -poured forth, issuing from the loins, and the breast bones;”[39] and, -“Do they not consider the camels, how they are created; the heaven, -how it is raised; the mountains, how they are fixed; the earth how it -is extended;”[40] and again, “O man, a parable is propounded unto you; -wherefore hearken unto it. Verily the idols which they invoke, besides -God, can never create a single fly, though they may all assemble for -the purpose.”[41] Then we may point to the story of Abraham, referred -to in the following verse, “I direct my face unto Him Who hath created -heaven and earth; I am orthodox, and not of the idolators.”[42] There -may be quoted many verses referring to this argument. The verses -comprising both the arguments are also many, for instance, “O men, -of Mecca, serve your Lord, Who has created you, and those who have -been before you: peradventure you will fear Him; Who hath spread the -earth as a bed for you, and the heaven as a covering, and hath caused -water to descend from heaven, and thereby produced fruits for your -sustenance. Set not up, therefore, any equals unto God, against your -own knowledge.”[43] His words, “Who hath created you, and those who -have been before you,” lead us to the argument of creation; while the -words, “who has spread the earth” refer to the argument of divine -solicitude for man. Of this kind also are the following verses of the -Quran, “One sign of the resurrection unto them is the dead earth; We -quicken the same by rain, and produce therefrom, various sorts of -grain, of which they eat;”[44] and, “Now in the creation of heaven and -earth, and the vicissitudes of night and day are signs unto those who -are endowed with understanding, who remember God standing, and sitting, -and lying on their sides; _and meditate on the creation of heaven and -earth, saying O Lord, Thou hast not created this in vain, far be it -from Thee, therefore deliver us from the torment of hell fire_.”[45] -Many verses of this kind comprise both the kinds of arguments. - -This method is the right path by which God has invited men to a -knowledge of His existence, and informed them of it through the -intelligence which He has implanted in their nature. The following -verse refers to this fixed and innate nature of man, “And when the -Lord drew forth their posterity from the loins of the sons of Adam, -and took them witness against themselves, Am I not your Lord? They -answered, Yea, we do bear witness.”[46] So it is incumbent for one who -intends to obey God, and follow the injunction of His Prophet, that -he should adopt this method, thus making himself one of those learned -men who bear witness to the divinity of God, with His own witness, and -that of His angels, as He says, “God hath borne witness, that there is -no God but He, and the angels, and those who are endowed with wisdom -profess the same; who executeth righteousness; there is no God but He; -the Mighty, the Wise.”[47] Among the arguments for both of themselves -is the praise which God refers to in the following verse, “Neither is -there any thing which doth not celebrate his praise; but ye understand -not their celebration thereof.”[48] - -It is evident from the above arguments for the existence of God that -they are dependent upon two categories of reasoning. It is also clear -that both of these methods are meant for particular people; that is, -the learned. Now as to the method for the masses. The difference -between the two lies only in details. The masses cannot understand the -two above mentioned arguments but only what they can grasp by their -senses; while the learned men can go further, and learn by reasoning -also, besides learning by sense. They have gone so far that a learned -man has said, that the benefits the learned men derive from the -knowledge of the members of human and animal body are a thousand and -one. If this be so, then this is the method which is taught both by -Law and by Nature. It is the method which was preached by the Prophet -and the divine books. The learned men do not mention these two lines -of reasonings to the masses, not because of their number, but because -of a want of depth of learning on their part about the knowledge of a -single thing only. The example of the common people, considering and -pondering over the universe, is like a man who looks into a thing, the -manufacture of which he does not know. For all that such a man can know -about it is that it has been made, and that there must be a maker of -it. But, on the other hand the learned look into the universe, just as -a man knowing the art would do; try to understand the real purpose of -it. So it is quite clear that their knowledge about the Maker, as the -maker of the universe, would be far better than that of the man who -only knows it as made. The atheists, who deny the Creator altogether, -are like men who can see and feel the created things, but would not -acknowledge any Creator for them, but would attribute all to chance -alone, and that they come into being by themselves. - - - OF THE UNITY OF GOD - -Now then if this is the method adopted by the Law, it may be asked: -What is the way of proving the unity of God by means of the Law; that -is, the knowledge of the religious formula that “there is no god, but -God.” The negation contained in it is an addition to the affirmative, -which the formula contains, while the affirmative has already been -proved. What is the purpose of this negation? We would say that the -method, adopted by the Law, of denying divinity to all but God is -according to the ordinance of God in the Quran, contained in the -following three verses. First, “If there were either in heaven or on -earth gods beside God, verily both would be corrupted.”[49] Secondly, -“God has not begotten issue; neither is there any other God with him; -otherwise every other God would surely take away that which he has -created; and some of them had enabled themselves over the others. Far -be it that from God, which they affirm of Him.”[50] Thirdly, “Say, -unto the idolators, if there were gods with Him, as ye say, they would -surely seek an occasion of making some attempt against the possessor of -the Throne.”[51] The argument contained in the first verse is implanted -in our dispositions by our very nature. For it is well-known that if -there be two kings, and the orders of the one be as effectual as those -of the other, it is not possible to have even a single city under their -guidance. It is impossible to have one action of a single kind from -two actors. So it is necessary that, if both of them begin work at the -same time, the city would be ruined, except in the case that one should -work and the other remain inactive. This is against our conception of -divinity. For when the two actions of the same kind are gathered upon -a single object, then that object must necessarily be destroyed. This -is the meaning of the verse, “If there were either in the heaven or on -earth gods besides God, both would be corrupted.” The verse, “Every god -has surely taken away that which he had created,” has been revealed in -refutation of the argument of those who believe in many gods, entrusted -with different works. For in this case it becomes incumbent that the -gods doing different works be independent of one another, and that they -should not be existent at one and the same time. But as the world is -one it is necessary that there be not in it gods with different duties. -The third verse, “Say unto the idolators if there were gods with him, -as ye say, they would surely seek an occasion of making some attempt -against the Possessor of the Throne,” is like the first, an argument -to prove the impossibility of the existence of two gods, whose duties -are the same. This verse means that had there been in the world any -other god, but the present one, able to create the world and those in -it, so that his relation to it be that of a creator, then he must live -with God on the Throne. Thus there would be found two existent things -of the same kind in a single place. But this is impossible. For when -the relation is one, the related must also be one, that is, they cannot -be gathered in a single place as they cannot live in it. The relation -of God to the Throne is just its opposite: the Throne exists for Him, -and not He for the Throne. That is what God has said, “His Throne is -extended over heaven and earth, and the preservation of them is no -burden unto him.”[52] This is the argument by nature or by Law for -proving the unity of God. The difference between the learned and the -masses is that the learned know more about the creation of the world, -and the purpose of its different parts, like a single body, than the -common people. It is to this that the latter part of the verse refers, -“God forbid! and far, very far, be that which they utter! The seven -heavens praise him, and the earth, and all who are therein: neither is -there anything which doth not celebrate His praise; but ye understand -not their celebration thereof: He is gracious and merciful.”[53] The -argument which the Asharites deduce from this verse, calling it the -“argument of impossibility,” is neither in accordance with natural nor -legal arguments. It is not in accordance with nature, because what -they say is without any proof at all; while it is insufficient by Law, -because the common people cannot understand it, not to speak of their -being satisfied with it. They say, that if there be two gods, then it -is more probable that they would differ. If this were to happen, then -there would be one of the following three cases, there being no fourth -alternative. Either the desire of both of them would be accomplished, -or the desire of neither would not. They say that it is impossible that -the desire of neither of them be accomplished, but if it be so then the -universe would neither be existent nor non-existent. If the desire of -both of them be accomplished, then the universe would be both existent -and non-existent at the same time. So there remains no alternative -but that the desire of one be accomplished, the other’s remaining -unfulfilled. So one whose desire remains unfulfilled is helpless, and -the helpless cannot be a God. The weakness of this argument is that -as it is possible to suppose that they differ, it is just as possible -to presume that they agree, a fact more becoming to the gods than -difference of opinion. If they agree about the creation of the world, -they would be like two craftsmen agreed upon making something. If it -be so then it must be said that their actions help them to work and -live in a single place, except that some one may say, that perhaps one -would do one thing and the other quite another thing, or perhaps they -would work by turns. But this is an objection which cannot be advanced -by the masses. But if any sceptic controversialist were to advance it, -he may be told that one who has power to create one thing has power -to create the whole. So now again it comes to the same thing, whether -they agree or not, and how can they help each other in work? As to -working by turn, it would be a defect in both of them. It is more -probable that if there be two gods, there must be two universes. But -as the universe is one, its Maker must also be one, for a single work -can only be done by one maker. So it is not necessary that we should -understand the verse of God, “and some of them had enabled themselves -over the other,” as pointing to disagreement alone, but it may be taken -as true even in the case of argument, for this also leads to the same -result as disagreement would do. Here lies the difference between us -and the Mutakallimun, about the meaning of this verse, though Abul -Maali has said something almost expressing our own views. By the -foregoing you would understand that the argument which the Mutakallimun -have deduced from this verse is not the one which it really contains. -The impossibility to which their argument leads is not one which -should be deduced from the verse in question. The impossibility which -is deduced from the argument which they think is contained in the -verse, is more than one impossibility, by their dividing it into -three parts, while there is no division in the verse itself. So the -argument which they use is the one which is known to the logicians as -disjunctive syllogism, and is known in their science as definition -and division. But the argument contained in the verse is one which is -known in logic as hypothetical syllogism, which is quite different -from disjunctive syllogism. Any one who would look most cursorily -into this science would know the difference between the two. Then, -again, the impossibility which their argument points out is not that -to which the argument of the Book leads. They say that universe will -either be neither existent nor non-existent, or it will be existent -and non-existent at the same time, or its god would be a helpless and -weak god. These are impossible for ever, because of the impossibility -of more than one. The impossibility which the verse refers to, is not -so for ever, for in it it depends upon a certain period of time, that -is when the universe is found corrupted at the time of its existence. -For he says “If there be any other god but God,” the universe would -be found corrupted. Then he has made an exception that it is not -corrupted, and hence there must not be more than one God. So now it has -become quite clear that this is the method by which God has invited the -people to believe in His existence, and negate the divinity of all but -Him. These are the two propositions which are contained in the article -of Faith, “There are no gods but He.” So one who thinks over these two -propositions, and believes in them by the method which we have pointed -out, is a Muslim in reality, with a belief which is truly Islamic. But -he whose belief is not based upon these arguments, though he confesses -the article, he is a Muslim with the other Muslims, only on account of -the similarity of names. - - - ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES - -The attributes which the Divine Book has assigned to the Creator and -Maker of the universe, are only the perfect forms of those which are -found in man, and these are seven in number: Knowledge, life, power, -volition, hearing, seeing and talking. - -Now as to knowledge, God in his Divine Book has said the following -“Shall he not know all things who has created them?”[54] The argument -contained in this verse is that a created thing always shows, by the -arrangement which it possesses,--its different parts being made for -the sake of one another for the benefit intended to be derived from -that thing,--that its maker is not nature only, but it must have been -made by one who has arranged all for the end in view. So he must have -a knowledge of it. For instance, when a man looks at a house he knows -that the foundation was laid for the sake of the walls, and the walls -have been raised for the roof. So it becomes clear to him that the -house must have been built by a man knowing the art of building. - -This quality is eternal, for it is not fitting that God should possess -it for a time only. But we should not go down deep into this matter, -and should not say, like the Mutakallimun, that He knows the created -things at the time of their creation, by His eternal knowledge, -for then it becomes necessary that the knowledge of the created -thing at the time of its non-existence be the same which is absurd, -when knowledge is said to be dependent upon the existent things. -As an existent thing is sometimes an action, and sometimes only a -potentiality, it is necessary that the knowledge of the two existence -be different, as its time of being in potentiality is quite different -from the time of its being in action. But this the Law does not -explain. On the other hand it maintains quite an opposite position: -that God knows the created thing at the time of its creation, as He -has said, “There falleth no leaf, but He knoweth it; neither is there -a single grain in the dark parts of the earth; neither a green thing, -nor a dry thing, but it is written in the perspicuous book.”[55] So -it is necessary that we should lay down in Law that He knows a thing -before it comes into being; knows a thing when it is, and not when -it should have been; and knows when a thing has been destroyed at -the time of its destruction. This is what the injunctions of the Law -establish. It has been so because the masses cannot understand the -universe through visible things, except in this way. The Mutakallimun -have no argument to advance against it, except that they say that the -knowledge which changes with a change in the existent thing is itself -created, while with God nothing created can be attached. They say so -because they think that that which cannot be separated from the created -thing is itself created. But we have already exposed the fallacy of -this argument. So it is established by the rules described, and it -should not be said that he knows the creation of the created, and the -corruption of the corrupted things, neither by created nor by eternal -knowledge. This is an innovation in Islam, “And is thy Lord forgetful -of thee?”[56] - -The attribute of life is quite evident from the attribute of Knowledge. -For our observation shows that one of the conditions of knowledge is -life. According to the Mutakallimun the conditions of an observed -object can be applied to the unseen. What they have said about this is -quite true. - -The attribute of volition needs no proof, because it is one of the -conditions of bringing forth a thing, that its maker must intend it. -Such is also the case with power: He must possess power. But to say -that He intended created things by eternal intention is innovation -in religion, which was not known to the learned in Law, and cannot -satisfy the masses who have reached the stage of dogmatics. We should -say that He intends making a thing at the time of its creation, but -does not intend at the time of its non-existence. So God says: “Verily -our speech unto anything when we will the same is that we say unto it, -Be; and it is.”[57] For, as we have said, the common people are never -compelled to advance the argument that He intends doing a thing by -eternal intention, but, as the Mutakallimun have said, that that by -which the created things exist, is itself created. - -Now if it be asked, how the attribute of Speech be assigned to and -proved in God, we would say that it can be ascribed to him on account -of the attributes of Knowledge and Power of creation. For speech -is nothing more than act on the part of the speaker to show to the -one addressed the knowledge which he has, or to disclose to him the -knowledge which is in him. This is one of the actions of the maker. And -when that created thing, which is really a creator, man, has power over -this faculty, because he knows and is powerful, how befitting it is -that it should be found in the real Creator. There is another condition -for this action, among the things which we can observe, and that is -that which must be the means of performing it: words. This being so, -it becomes necessary that that action should be performed by God in -the heart of somebody, His chosen servant. It is not necessary that -it should always be through the medium of words, and so created. But -it may happen either through an angel; or through divine inspiration, -that is without the medium of words which He may create, but through an -act to the hearer, which discloses to him the true nature of the thing -meant, or through words which He may create in the ears of him who has -been specialised to hear His words. It is to these three methods that -the verse of the Quran refers, “It is not fit for a man that God should -speak unto him otherwise than by private revelation, or from behind -a veil, or by sending a messenger to reveal, by His permission, that -which He pleaseth.”[58] So revelation is the disclosure of the intended -secrets to the inspired person without the medium of words which He -created, but through an action done on the mind of the one addressed. -So God says, “Afterwards He approached the Prophet and drew unto -him; until He was at the distance of two bows’ length from him or yet -nearer; and He revealed unto His servant that which He revealed.”[59] -The speech from behind the veil is one which is performed through the -medium of words. This is the real speech, and that is the one which God -specially bestowed upon Moses, and so He has said, “And God spake unto -Moses, discoursing with him.”[60] Now as to his words, “or by sending a -messenger to reveal,” this is the third kind mentioned above, that is, -through the medium of some angels. Sometimes God speaks to the learned -men, who are the successors of the prophets, by disclosing arguments -to them. On account of these causes it is true, when the learned men -say, that the Quran is the speech of God. It has now become clear to -you that the Quran, which is the speech of God, is eternal, but the -words expressing it are created by him, and are not human. From it are -excepted the Quranic words which we commonly use in our speech, that -is, these words are our own actions, by the command of God, while the -words of the Quran are those created by God. He who does not understand -these things by this method, cannot understand this argument and cannot -grasp as to how the Quran is the word of God. The alphabets used in the -Quran are our own invention, by the command of God. We have to respect -them, because of them are formed the words created by God, for the -purpose which is not itself created. He who thought of words and not -of meaning, that is, did not separate them, said that the Quran was -created; while he who thought of the meaning which these words express, -said the Quran was not created. But the truth lies in the middle of -these two extreme views. The Asharites deny that the speaker is the -maker of his own speech, for they think that if they admit it, they -must also admit that God is the maker of His speech. Again, when they -believe, that the speech can only exist with the speaker, they think, -they must also believe, taking in view the two foregoing principles, -that God is Himself the creator of His words. In this case He Himself -becomes the place of created things. So they assert that God is the -maker of speech, but it is an eternal attribute in him, like knowledge, -etc. This is the time of the speech in our mind, but not of the speech -which expresses what we have in our mind, that is, the words. As the -Mutazilites thought that speech is the action of the speaker, they said -that by speech is meant only the words uttered. So they believed that -the Quran is “Created.” Since according to them the word is an action -of the speaker, so it is not one of its conditions that it should exist -with the speaker. The Asharites on the other hand, insist that it is -one of its conditions that it should exist only with the speaker. -This is true in both the cases, that is in the case of ideas in our -minds, and the words which express them. But in the case of God, it -is the ideas which stand with Him, and not the words expressing them. -So when the Asharites laid it down as a condition, that the speech be -absolutely dependent upon the speaker, they deny that the speaker is -the maker of his speech; while on the other hand, the Mutazilites, when -they laid it down as a condition that the speaker is the maker of his -speech, ignored the existence of ideas in our minds. In this way there -is some truth, and some falsehood, in the opinions of both of these -sects, as must have become clear by what we have said. - -Now we come to the attributes of hearing and seeing. The Law has proved -them to be possessed by God by saying that hearing and seeing are the -two essential qualities for knowing the meaning of things, which cannot -be acquired by intellect. So a maker must know everything about the -object which he is making, it is necessary that he should possess the -two senses of hearing and seeing. So He must have these two faculties. -All this proves their existence in God, by means of the Law, through -the teaching of the knowledge which is found in him. Moreover, One -on whom the name of God and the Adorned is applied must necessarily -possess all the senses. For it is useless for man to worship him -who cannot know that he is being worshipped, as God has said, “O my -father, why dost thou worship that which heareth not, neither seeth, -nor profiteth thee at all;”[61] and, “Do you therefore worship, beside -God, that which cannot profit you at all, nor can it hurt you?”[62] -This is the power which has been ascribed to God, and which the Law has -commanded the common people to know and nothing else. - -Of the innovation which this question of attributes has given rise -to, one is whether they are the same as Divine Essence or something -added to it, that is, whether they are found in the essence itself -(_Nafsiyyah_), or are only applied to it, (_Maanawiyyah_). By -_Nafsiyyah_ we mean those attributes which are found in the thing -itself, and are not attached to it for the purpose of adding something -to the essence, for existence, we say one or eternal. By _Maanawiyyah_ -we mean the attributes which are applied to a thing for some purpose -which is found in it. The Asharites say that these attributes are only -_Maanawiyyah_, that is qualities which are only added to the Divine -Essence. So they say that he knows by a knowledge which has been added -to His essence, and lives by life attached to it and so on. This has -compelled them to admit that the Creator has a body, for there must be -the quality and the qualified, the bearer and the borne. This is the -condition of the body, so they must say that the essence is existent -by itself, and the qualities exist through it, or they must say that -these attributes are independent of each other, then there must be a -number of gods. This is the belief of the Christians, who say that the -three personifications are those of Existence, Life and Knowledge. God -has said about it the following, “They are certainly infidels, who -say, God is the third of the three.”[63] One of them stands by itself, -the others being dependent upon the former. So it becomes necessary -that there should be essence, existing in itself, and the accidents -depending on something else. The place in which the essence and the -accidents are found together must necessarily be a body. Such is also -the case with the Mutazilites about the question, that the essence and -the attributes are one and the same thing. This they think, is for -the primary principles of knowledge or may be opposed to them. For -they think that according to the primary principles knowledge must be -existent without the one knowing. But knowledge and the one knowing -cannot be the same, except that it may be possible that the two may be -very close to each other, just as the father and the son. This teaching -is very remote for the understanding of the masses, and to explain -it to them in detail is innovation, for it would more likely mislead -than guide them to the right path. The Mutazilites have no argument -to advance in proof of their proposition, for they have none. Such is -also the condition of the Mutakallimun in the case of denying a body -to God. For when they have established it, they are compelled to admit -the creation of the body, because it is a body. We have already said -that they have no argument for it. Those who have such are the learned -people, the philosophers. It is at this point that the Christians have -erred. They believe in the multiplicity of attributes that they are -essences existing not by the help of another, but by themselves, like -the self, (_Zat_). They also believe that the qualities with these -attributes are two in number--knowledge and life. So they say that -God is one from the three causes. That He is three they say because -He exists, lives and knows. They say that He is one, because He is a -collection of all the three qualities. And so there are three religious -opinions among them. One party believes that they are all the self -(_Zat_) alone without any number; the other only believes in numbers of -qualities. This is divided into two parties: one which thinks that they -exist by themselves, and the other which makes them exist by something -else. All this is in contrast with the purpose of the Law. - -It being so, it is necessary that one who wants to teach the knowledge -of these things to the common people should tell them as much as the -Law orders him to do--and that is only a confession of their existence -without entering into details. For it is not possible for the common -people to believe and understand them at all. By common people here I -mean all those who are unacquainted with the laws of reasoning, though -they may or may not know the science of scholastic theology. It is not -in the power of scholastic theology to know of these things even when -it is said that it is not a science of reasoning but of dogmatics, for -these things can never be clearly understood by dogmatics alone. So, -by now, the extent of these questions which should be disclosed to the -common people, and the method adopted for this purpose must have become -clear to you by what we have said. - - - OF DIVINE PERFECTION - -We have already described the way which the Law pursues in teaching -the common people the existence of God, the denial of His having any -associates, and thereby the knowledge of His attributes, and the -extent to which they have been explained in details in it, one after -another. It is really an addition to, and deduction from, and change -and interpretation of this very limit and extent which has not been -productive of good to any and all the people. Now it remains for us -to know the method which the Law has adopted in explaining to the -common people the perfection of God and freedom from all defects, and -the length to which it has gone in detailing it, and the cause of -restricting its knowledge to them. Then we should mention the methods -which it adopts in teaching the people the knowledge of His actions, -and the latitude which it has allowed in this respect. Having done so, -we shall have accomplished the purpose for which we began this book. - -So we say that the knowledge of things known as perfection and holiness -are found in many verses of the Quran, the most clear and definite of -them being the following, “There is nothing like Him, and it is He who -heareth and seeth;”[64] and, “Shall God, therefore, Who createth, be -as he who createth not.”[65] The second verse is an argument for the -verse “there is nothing like Him.” For it is one of the characteristics -of the dispositions of all the people to think that the Creator must -either be unlike the things which He has created, or having qualities -which may be different from these which He has given to the created; -otherwise he who is himself created cannot be a Creator. When we -have admitted that the created cannot be the creator then it becomes -incumbent upon us to say that the qualities of the created should -either be not found in the Creator, or found in Him in some different -way than they are in the created. We say, “in some different way,” -because we have proved the divine qualities to be those which are -found in the noblest of God’s creatures, man, as knowledge, life, -power, volition and so on. This is the meaning of the Tradition of -the Prophet, “God created Adam after His own image.” So it has been -established that the Law has denied the similarity between the Creator -and the created with fitting arguments. The denial of similarity is -of two kinds, first, that there may not be found in the Creator many -qualities of the created; and secondly; there may be found in him the -qualities of the created in so perfect and excellent a form as could -not be imagined. Of these two kinds it should be seen which one the Law -has explained, and about which it is reticent. We would also try to -find out the cause for this reticence. - -We would say that the qualities of the created which have been denied -by Law as pertaining to God are those which show some defects; for -example, death, as God says, “And do ye not trust in him who liveth, -and dieth not,”[66] or sleep and things which lead to negligence and -carelessness, as regards senses and the protection of the existent -things, as He says, “Neither slumber nor sleep seizeth Him.”[67] Of -such qualities are error and forgetfulness, as God has said, “The -knowledge thereof is with my Lord, in the book of His decrees: my -Lord erreth not, neither doth He forget.”[68] A knowledge of those -qualities the existence of which has been denied in God is one of the -necessary things of common education and is why the Law has been very -explicit about them. It only warns us not to meddle with those things -which are far from the primary principles of knowledge, because it -knows the small limits of human knowledge, as God has said in many -different verses of the Quran, “But the greater part of men do not -understand.” For example He says, “Verily the creation of heaven and -earth is more considerable, than the creation of man; but the greater -part of men do not understand,”[69] and “The institution of God to -which He has created mankind disposed; there is no change in what God -hath created. This is the right religion; but the greater part of men -know it not.”[70] Now it may be said, what is the proof--that is, the -proof advanced by the Law--of the fact that these defects are not found -in God. We would say that it is apparent from the universe itself. It -is quite safe. No confusion or corruption overtakes it. Had the Creator -been subject to negligence, carelessness, error or forgetfulness the -whole of the universe would have been destroyed. God has made this -clear in many verses of the Quran. He says, “Verily God sustaineth the -heaven and the earth, lest they fail: and if they should fail, none -could support the same besides him;”[71] and, “The preservation of both -is not burden unto him, He is the high, the mighty.”[72] - -If our opinion be asked about the anthropomorphic attributes of God, -whether the Law has denied them as attributes to the Creator or is -only silent about them, we would say, that it is evident that the Law -is quite silent about them, and their mention in it is quite near to -their denial altogether. It has come to be so because the Quran in -many verses speaks of His hands and face, and these verses are taken -as showing physical attributes which the Creator has bestowed upon the -created, just as He has given him the qualities of power, volition and -so on--qualities which are common between the Creator and created, -except that they are more perfect in the former. On account of this -many Muslims believed that the Creator has a body different from all -other bodies. Such is the case with the Hanbalites and their many -followers. But in my opinion we should follow the path of the Law; and -this should neither deny nor try to prove them, and whenever asked -by the common people to do so, we should answer with words of God, -“There is nothing like him; and it is He who heareth and seeth,”[73] -in this way preventing them from questioning. It is so because of -three reasons. It is neither near to the first, nor to the second, nor -to the third grade. This would be quite clear to you from the method -adopted by the Mutakallimun. They say that the proof of the fact that -He is not a body is that it has been proved that all bodies are created -things. If they are asked to point out the method of proving the latter -proposition, they adopt the method, which we have already pointed -out, concerning the creation of accidents, that that which cannot be -separated from created things is itself created. You have already seen, -from what we have said, that this method is not a philosophical one, -and had it been so, even then a majority of the common people would not -have grasped it. Moreover, whatever these people have said about God, -that He is a Self (_Zat_) and divine attributes added to it, proves -by itself that He has a body, on account of the denial of creation, -rather an argument denying anthropomorphism. This is the first reason -why the Law does not speak of these things in clear terms. The second -reason is that common people think that all that is existent they can -imagine and feel, all else being non-existent to them. So when they -are told that there exists One who has no body, their imagination does -not work and He becomes almost non-existent to them, particularly so -when they are told that He is neither outside our knowledge nor in -it, neither above nor below. That is why the sect which believes in -anthropomorphism thinks of those who deny it, that they also believe -in it; while, on the other hand, the party thinks its opponents to -be believing in a number of gods. The third reason is that had the -Law denied anthropomorphism altogether there would have arisen many a -misgiving about what has been said concerning the Day of Judgment, and -other beliefs. - -Of these one is the problem of Divine Vision which we find stated in -authentic Traditions. Those who have been very explicit in denying it -are the two sects of the Asharites and the Mutazilites. The belief -of the latter has driven them to deny the vision altogether; while -the Asharites have tried to make the two things agree, but this was -impossible for them to do. So they have taken refuge in many sophistic -arguments, the weakness of which we would show when talking of the -Divine Vision. Another problem which rises out of this is that it -evidently gives rise to a denial of the direction in which God is. For -if He has no body then the Law becomes an allegory. For the advent of -the prophets is founded upon the fact that Divine Revelation is sent -to them from the heaven. Upon this very principle is also based our -religion, for the Divine Book has come down from the heavens, as God -says, “Verily we have sent down the same (the Quran) on a blessed -night.”[74] The descending of the divine revelation from heaven is -based upon the fact of God’s being there. So also is the descending -and ascending of angels from heaven, as God says, “Unto him ascendeth -the good speech; and the righteous work will He exalt;”[75] and says -He, “The angels ascend up unto and the spirit.”[76] We would mention -all the things which the deniers of direction bring to prove their -proposition when we come to talk of this problem. - -Another difficulty which arises is that with the denial of -anthropomorphism we shall have to deny movement to God, after which -it would be difficult to explain with regard to the Day of Judgment, -that He would appear to the people at that moment, and would himself -superintend their judgment, as He says, “Thy Lord shall come and the -angels rank by rank.”[77] It would also be difficult to explain the -famous Tradition of Descent, though its explanation would be, on the -whole easier than that of the former in spite of all that has been said -about it in the Law. So it is necessary that there should be disclosed -to the common people nothing which might lead them to a disbelief in -the literal meanings of these things. This would be its effect upon the -mind of the people if taken exoterically. But when it is interpreted -it would come to either of two interpretations. Either interpretation -would overcome the exoteric side of it and of other things like it, -thus destroying the Law altogether, and falsifying their purpose; -or it will be said about all of them that they are only allegories, -which would destroy the Law, and efface it from the mind of the people, -while the man doing it would not know the sin he has committed with -regard to Law. With all this, if you were to look into the arguments -which the interpreters advance about these things, you would find -all of them unreasonable, while the exoteric meanings are much more -satisfactory, that is, verification through them is more common and -much better. This should become clearer to you when we begin to review -the arguments which they advance for a denial of anthropomorphism, and -discuss the question of direction, as we may shortly do. You should -also know that the Law never intended to disclose the question of the -denial of this attribute completely to the common people, since it can -be done by an explanation of the soul, and the Law has not explained -to the masses what the soul was. God says in the Quran, “They will -ask thee concerning the Soul; answer, The Soul was created at the -command of my Lord; but ye have no knowledge given unto you except a -little.”[78] This is so, because it is difficult to establish reasons -for the common people for the existence of a thing existing by itself, -without a body. Had the denial of this attribute been understood by the -masses then it would not have been enough for prophet Abraham to say in -his discussion with the infidel, “When Abraham said, My Lord is He who -giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and I kill.”[79] On -the other hand he would have said, “Thou art a body, and God has not -one, for every body is created,” as the Asharites would argue. So also -it would have sufficed for Moses in his discussion with Pharoah about -his divinity; and for the Holy Prophet in case of the anti-christ, -telling the Faithful of the falsehood of his claims for divinity, -because he would have a body while God has none. On the other hand -he told them that our God was not one-eyed. An argument proving the -physical defect in him was enough to falsify him. So you see that all -these are innovations in Islam, and have become the cause of its being -split up into sects, into which the Prophet tells us that his people -would be divided. - -Now some one may object that the Law has not made it clear to the -common people that God has or has not a body, then what should they -believe about him. This is a question which will naturally arise in the -mind of every man, and cannot be put away from him. So it would not -satisfy the common people to let them know of a thing, the existence -of which they should believe, that it is not made of matter. We should -say that they should be answered with the answer given by Law--That -He is the Light, for this is the quality which God has assigned to -himself in His Book, for describing himself, He says, “God is the -light of heaven and earth.”[80] The prophet has also assigned to him -the game quality in an authentic Tradition. It says that he was asked -whether he had seen God, and he answered, “He was Light, and I saw -him.” The Tradition of the Night Journey says that when the Prophet -neared the lote-tree,[81] it was completely covered with light, which -did not hide it from his sight. There is also a Tradition in the book -of Muslim which says that God is a curtain of light, which, if opened, -would burn the opener, and yet God would not be seen. In some other -readings of this very Tradition it is said that He is seventy curtains -of light. It should be known that this illustration is especially fit -for God, for it comprises the two things, that He can be felt, our -eyes and intellect being powerless to see or comprehend him, and in -spite of this He is not a body too. Now according to the common people -the existent thing is one which can be felt, while the non-existent -thing is that which they cannot feel. So light being the best of the -things felt, it is but fitting that the best existing thing should be -likened unto it. There is another cause for it which should be noticed. -The condition of His existence to the learned people, when they begin -to ponder over him, is like the condition of the eyes when they look -towards the sun. But such is not the condition of the eyes of the bat. -So this quality fittingly describes the condition of the two classes of -people. Moreover, God is the cause of the existence of things, and of -our knowledge of them. This is also the quality of the light in showing -colours, and of our seeing them. So God has very fittingly named -himself Light. When it is said that He is Light then there remains no -doubt as to His Vision on the Day of Judgment. From these it must have -become clear to you what the primary belief of the Law was about this -attribute, and what are the innovations which rose in it afterwards. -The Law is silent about it because there is not found in the universe -anything unseen without a body, except that which is found by arguments -among things seen as existent with this quality, and that is the soul. -As the belief of the soul was impossible for the masses, it was also -impossible for them to understand the existence of a Being who exists -without a body. Hence they cannot understand it about God. - - - OF DIRECTION - -This is a quality which all the people learned in Law have tried to -prove, until the Mutazilites denied it, and were followed by the -later Asharites, like Abul Maali and those who follow him. All the -exoterics of the Law go to prove it. For God says, “And eight shall -bear the Throne of thy Lord on that Day;”[82] and “He governeth all -the things from heaven even to the earth: hereafter shall they return -unto him, on the Day whose length shall be a thousand years, of those -which ye compute.”[83] Again, He says, “The angels ascend unto him -and the spirit;”[84] and, “Are Ye secure that He who dwelleth in -heaven will not cause the earth to swallow you up? and behold, it -shall shake.”[85] There are many other verses of this kind which, if -interpreted, would turn the whole of the Law into interpretation; and -if taken allegorically, would make it an allegory. All the religious -laws are based upon the principle that God is in heaven, from whence -he sends down angels to His Prophets with revelations, that from the -heaven, the religious books used to descend, and that towards it was -the Night Journey of the Prophet, till he reached near the lote-tree. -All the philosophers are, moreover, agreed that God and His Angels -are in heaven, as is the case with all the religions. The doubt which -led them to deny this idea of direction was that they thought that by -believing in direction it would be necessary to believe in space, which -in its turn leads to a belief in anthropomorphism. But we say that this -is not necessarily the case, for direction can exist without space. It -is nothing but the surfaces of the body surrounding it, which are six -in number. That is why we say that there is an above and a below, right -and left and before and behind for an animal. Or they are the surfaces -of a body surrounded by another body having the above-mentioned six -directions. So the directions, which are the surfaces of the body -itself, are not the spaces of the body in any respect. But the surfaces -of the surrounding bodies are space for it. The atmosphere surrounding -man, and the surfaces of the sky surrounding the surfaces of the -atmosphere, for they are the spaces for it. Such is also the case with -different surrounding and forming spaces for one another. As to the -last sky it is evident that beyond it there must be no body. For had it -been so, it would be necessary that beyond it be another body and so -on to infinity. So there is no space at all for the last body of the -universe, for it is not possible that in it be found any body, it being -necessary that there be found a body in every space. So when there -is an argument for the existence of a thing in that direction, it is -necessary that it be not a body. So one who denies His existence there -goes against his own ideas. He is existent, has a body, is not existent -without a body. They cannot say that beyond the universe is a void. -For the impossibility of a void has been made quite certain in the -philosophical sciences. For that upon which the name void is commonly -applied, are nothing but dimensions (_Abad_), in which there are no -bodies. For when these dimensions are once removed, there remains -nothing but non-existence. But if the void be supposed as existent, it -is necessary to admit the existence of accidents in something not a -body, for dimensions are accidents by their having a quality. But it is -said by the Ancients and established by past religions that that place -is the dwelling place of the spirits, God and angels. This place has no -space, and is not governed by time, because everything governed by time -and space can be corrupted. And it is necessary that the things there -be uncorrupted and uncreated. This has been made quite clear by what -I have said, for there cannot be found in that place anything but one -which is existent and at the same time can be felt, or is altogether -non-existent. It is self-evident that an existent object is always -referred to by its existence; that is, it is said that it exists, that -is, it has an existence. So if anything exists there, it must be the -noblest of all, and it is necessary that that existent thing should -be referred to by the best portion of the universe, which are the -heavens. God has said concerning the nobility of the heavens, “Verily -the creation of heaven and earth is more considerable than the creation -of man: but the greater part of men do not understand.”[86] All this is -perfectly clear to the learned men “Well grounded in knowledge.”[87] - -Now it has become clear to you that belief in direction is necessary -by religion and reason, and that it forms a part of the Law, which -is based upon it. A denial of the principles is a denial of all the -religions. The cause of the difficulty in their understanding this, and -in their denial of anthropomorphism is, that there cannot be found in -the visible world an illustration of such a thing. This was just the -reason why the Law did not expressly deny an anthropomorphism. For to -the common people verification of an invisible object can only come -when its existence be known in the visible world, as knowledge, which -being a condition for their own existence as visible, could to them -become a condition for the existence of an invisible Maker. Now as -the case of the visible was unknown in the visible on the part of the -many, and none knew it but those who were well-grounded in knowledge, -the Law-giver forbade an inquiry into it, as for example knowledge of -the Soul. If it be needful for the common people to know anything, -then the Law gives examples from the visible world. And if one example -did not suffice for the understanding of the problem in view, then -many examples are given, as in the case of an account of the Day of -Judgment. The doubt which arises out of a denial of direction, on the -part of those denying it, is that the common people cannot comprehend -it, particularly so, because they have not been given before hand to -understand that God has no body. So it is necessary to take the action -of the Law as our example, otherwise we will have to interpret that -which the Law itself has not expressly said. - -With regard to these problems of the Law, the people may be divided -into three classes. In the first place there are people who cannot -notice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the -Law has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest -in number, and may be described as the masses. Then the second group -of men is one which has doubts; but has not power to solve them. These -are above the masses and below the learned people. It is for them -that there are found in the Law allegorical sayings, and it is they -whom God has censured. For there is no allegory in the Law for the -learned or the common people, and it is in this light that all the -allegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood. Their example -as regards the Law is like the example of the bread of wheat which -though a useful cereal for the large number of human beings, may prove -harmful to some. Such is also the case with religious teaching: it -is useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some. The -following words of God point to the same thing. “He will not thereby -mislead any except the transgressors.”[88] But this is found only in -a few verses of the Quran about a few people. Most of the verses are, -however, those which speak of things invisible for which there is no -example in the visible world. So they are expressed by the things -nearest to them in the visible world, on account of their similarity. -Some people take the illustration as the thing illustrated, and hence -they fall into confusion and doubt. This is what is called allegorical -in the Law, and is not meant for the learned or the common people, -which in reality form two groups of men. For these are the people who -are really healthy, and delicate food is only fit for them. The other -group is a group of sick men who are always few in number. So God has -said, “But they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is -parabolical therein, out of love of schism.”[89] These are the dogmatic -and the scholastic theologians. The worst which these people have -done in respect to the Law is that they have interpreted much which -they thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their -interpretation was the thing intended, and that God had mentioned it -parabolically only to test and try His creatures. God forbid that -we should ever have such an idea about Him. The Divine Book is a -miracle of clearness and lucidity. So it is far from the real purpose -of the Law for one to say about a thing which is not parabolical, -that it is so, and then set about interpreting it according to his -own ideas, telling the people that their duty lies in believing -his interpretations. They have done so in the case of the verse of -Equalisation on the Throne, and others, saying that their exoteric -meaning is only parabolical. On the whole many interpretations, which -these people maintain to be the real purpose of the Law, when intently -looked into and deciphered, are found wanting in arguments, and not -serving the purpose which the exoteric meaning would have with regard -to the common people. The primary purpose of knowledge for the common -people is action, so that which is most useful in action is most -suitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge -is both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the -Law, thinking that his interpretation is the real purpose of it, and -then discloses it to the common people, is like a man, who finds a -medicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the -health of all, or of a majority of the people; then there came a man -with whom that medicine did not agree on account of the coarseness -of his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought -that by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as -composing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug -commonly known by that name--but another which he really meant, but -used this name for it by a far-fetched metaphor. So he took out the -first drug from the compound, and placed another in its stead, which -he thought to be the one intended by the first physician. Then he -told the people that this was the medicine intended. The people began -to use that “improved” medicine, and many of them got injured by it. -Then there came another group of men, who, seeing the people sick on -account of that medicine, thought of curing them. So they changed some -of its drugs with some other than the first one, then presented it to -the people for quite another disease than that intended by the first -physician. Then there appeared another group which interpreted the -medicine in quite another way than the two preceding groups had done. -The fourth group gave a new interpretation to the drug and prescribed -it for a fourth kind of disease. So as time went on with that great -medicine, the interpretations of it took hold of the people instead of -the drugs, and they changed and transformed it altogether. As a result -the people were attacked by many different kinds of diseases, till the -usefulness of the medicine was altogether lost. Such is the condition -of those sects which have risen in Islam. For every one of them has -made interpretations quite different from the others, and maintained -that its interpretation shows the real purpose of the Law, which was -at last rent to piece, and lost its primary purpose altogether. The -Prophet, knowing that a thing like this would necessarily happen among -his people, said, “My people will shortly be divided into seventytwo -sects. All of them will be in hell, except one.” By this one he meant -the sect which followed the exoteric meanings of the Law, without -making any interpretations which may be disclosed to the people. If you -were to look into the Law and see the corruption which it has suffered -up to this time, through interpretations, the truth of this example -would become clear to you. - -The first to make a change in the religion--the great medicine--were -the Kharijites, who were followed by the Mutazilites. They were -succeeded by the Asharites, after whom came the Sufis. Last of all came -Al-Ghazzali, who went to the extreme and corrupted everything. He it is -who explained philosophy to the common people, and disclosed to them -the opinions of the philosophers as he understood them to be. This he -did in a book called _Al-Maqasid_, in which he thought he was refuting -them. He planned his _Refutation of the Philosophers_, and charged -them with infidelity in respect to three questions, tearing them to -pieces, as he thought, in regard to consensus of opinion; and calling -them innovators as regards other opinions. In this book he has advanced -many specious arguments and confused reasonings, which have led astray -many people both from religion and philosophy. Then he said in his -book _Jawahir al-Quran_ that the arguments which he had mentioned in -his _Refutation_ were controversial in their nature, while in fact -they were mentioned in his _Al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi_. Then in his -_Mishkat ul Anwar_ he mentions grades of men really knowing God. He -says that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the -first heaven, and that it is not He from whom this movement originates, -are precluded from it. This is an explanation from him of men learned -in divine science. He has said in many places that divine science -exists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science. In -his book _Munqidh min al Dalal_ he has gone against the philosophers -and maintained that knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and -meditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the -rank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his _Kimiya -i Saadat_. Men have become divided into parties on account of this -confusion. One party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other -agreed to interpret the Law, and make it conform to philosophy. All -this is wrong. The Law should be taken literally; and the conformity of -religion to philosophy should not be told to the common people. For by -an exposition of it we should be exposing the results of philosophy to -them, without their having intelligence enough to understand them. It -is neither permitted nor desirable to expose anything of the result of -philosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no -arguments either with the learned people who have a mastery over both -the subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the -Law. So his action brought disorder in respect to both of these things, -religion and philosophy, in the mind of the common people, while he -saved them for the others. The disorder in religion came through his -exposing those interpretations which should not be exposed; and so -also the disorder in philosophy was the result of his mentioning those -things in his books which should not be put in the works on philosophy. -Now it was the result of his treatment of the subjects that many people -do not know the difference between the two, because of his bringing -both of them together. He has also insisted upon the fact that he knew -the cause of doing so, as he did in his _Al Tafriqa bain al Islami -wa-z Zindiqah_. In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations -and has decided that their interpreters were not infidels though they -may go against the consensus of opinion. Since he has done so, he is -dangerous to the Law for some reasons, to philosophy for others, and to -both for some other reasons. So this man, by disclosing them, has shown -that he is dangerous for both the things in reality and profitable to -them only by accident. For teaching philosophy to one who is not fit -for it, will either falsify philosophy or religion absolutely or will -show conformity between them by accident only. The right thing would -have been not to disclose philosophy to the common people at all. But -if teaching of it was absolutely necessary, then only that section of -the people should have been taught who saw that religion was opposed -to philosophy, in order to show them that it was not so. And also it -might have been taught to those people who thought that philosophy -is opposed to religion. This may have been shown to either of these -sections, that in reality they did not possess a knowledge of their -substance and truth, that is, of religion and philosophy. Moreover, -they would know that the opinion about religion, that it was opposed to -philosophy was one which was either about some innovation in religion, -and not about its principles, or is an error in understanding that is, -a wrong interpretation of it, as was shown in the case of knowledge -about particulars and other things. That is why we were compelled in -this book to explain the principles of religion. These principles, -when intently looked into will be found in perfect agreement with -philosophy. Such is also the case with the opinion which says this -philosophy is opposed to religion. It only shows that the man has not -had a sufficient training in either philosophy or religion. This is the -reason that we were compelled to explain it in our tractate entitled -_Fasl al Maqal fi Muwafiqat il Hikmat lil Sharia_. - -Now that this has become clear we would return to our former theme. -The only problem which remains for us to solve, out of those which we -proposed is that of Divine Vision. It is thought for some reasons, -that it forms a part of the problem which we have just discussed, on -account of the words of God, “The sight comprehendeth him not, but He -comprehendeth the sight.”[90] And hence the Mutazilites have denied -it, setting aside the arguments found in the Law, in spite of their -greatness in number and fame, a very shameful act on their part. The -cause of this doubt of the Law that since the Mutazilites denied -physical attributes, and believed in exposing their ideas to every one, -it became necessary for them to deny direction also. And having once -denied direction they must also deny the Vision, for the thing seen -must be in some direction to one who sees it. To prove their point they -are constrained to set aside the traditional religion. They neglected -the Traditions because they were only isolated things which should not -be believed, if found opposed to the teachings of the Quran, that is, -opposed to the verse, “The sight comprehendeth Him not.” The Asharites -tried to mix together the two beliefs, that is, the denial of physical -attributes, and the possibility of vision of One having no body, by -means of our senses. It became difficult for them to prove it, and -they took refuge in many sophistical and conjectural arguments, that -is arguments which are thought to be correct but are in reality wrong. -It is so because it is possible to have the same grades in arguments -as there are among men. Just as there may be found men with perfect -excellence and those below them, till we may have a man who thinks -himself learned and yet he is not, being only a pedant, so there are -arguments which are extremely certain, and those below them, then, -there are specious arguments, and those which though really false seem -to be true. The statements of the Asharites in regard to this question -are of two kinds: those refuting the arguments of the Mutazilites, and -those proving the possibility of the Vision of One having no body, and -that there is no difficulty in our believing it. The statements by -which they have opposed the Mutazilites in their argument, that the -thing seen must have a direction for one who sees it, is that some -of them say that it is applied only to the visible, and not to the -invisible, world; and that it is not one of those cases in which the -condition of the one can be applied to the other. According to them -it is possible for a man to see an object having no direction, for he -sees by his power of sight only that which comes before his eyes. In -this they have mixed together the senses of sight with intelligence, -for the latter can perceive that which has no direction, that is, no -space; but for the perception of the eye there is a condition, that the -thing to be perceived be in a direction, not only that but a particular -direction too. So if we take the eye to be endowed with the power of -seeing, then it is not possible except under very limited conditions. -These are three in number-light, the intervention of a transparent body -between the eye and the object seen, and the possession of necessary -colours by the object. A refutation of these conditions in the eyes is -also a refutation of those primary principles of knowledge which are -known to all. It would be a refutation of the sciences of philosophy -and mathematics. The Asharites also maintain that one of the conditions -as we have said, for example, is that every rational being has a life, -it being apparent in the visible world as a condition for knowledge. -Hence we say to them that these are also conditions for seeing things -in the visible world. So according to their own principle is the -case of the visible and the invisible. In his book _Al Maqasid_ Abu -Hamid (Al Ghazzali) intended to oppose the premise that every object -perceivable must be in some direction to the one seeing it. He says -that a man sees himself reflected in a mirror and sees himself not in -any other direction but the opposite one. Hence he can see his self in -an opposite direction too. But this is a mistake, because what he sees -is not his self but only an image of it. This image is in the opposite -direction, being in the mirror, placed there. - -Of the arguments which they advance to prove the vision of an object -having no body, two are famous ones. Of these the more famous is one -which says that an object seen is either because it has some colour, or -because it has a body, or it is a colour, or because it is existent. -Sometimes they mention many other causes than really do exist. They -say that it is wrong to suppose that it must be a body, otherwise, no -colour would be visible, it being also incorrect to suppose the space -to be the colour. Now when all the kinds of suppositions in the premise -have been refuted we shall have to believe that only an existent object -will be seen. The mistake in this statement is quite clear. For an -object is visible because of itself. This is the case with the colour -and the body: the colour being visible by itself, and the body through -the colour. That is why a thing which has no colour cannot be seen. -Had the existence of a thing been the only condition of visibility, it -would have been possible to see the sound and the senses. In that case -seeing, hearing, in fact all the five senses would have been only one, -which is quite contrary to our reason. This problem and others like it -have obliged the Mutakallimun to admit that it is possible to _hear_ -the colour, and _see_ the sounds. But this is against nature, as man -has understood it to be. For it is absolutely evident that the sense of -seeing is quite different from that of hearing. Their actions are quite -distinct from one another, and the organ of the one cannot work as the -organ of the other. It is just as impossible to turn hearing as to turn -colour into sound. Those who say that sometimes sound can be seen, -should be asked to define the sense of seeing. They would necessarily -answer that it is a faculty which perceives those things which can be -seen, such as colour and so on. Then they should be asked to define the -sense of hearing. They would surely say that it is one sense by which -sounds can be heard. Then they should be asked whether at the time of -sound it is the sense of hearing only or seeing too. If they say that -it is hearing only, they admit that it cannot perceive colours. If -they say that it is seeing only, then it cannot hear sounds. If it is -neither alone, for it perceives colours, then it is seeing and hearing -both. But in this way everything can be proved to be one, even in the -case of contradictory things. This is a thing which our Mutakallimun -admit or they are compelled to do so. But it is clear that it is a -philosophical opinion which is only fit for those ancient people famous -for it. - -Now the second method which Mutakallimun have adopted for proving the -possibility of Divine Vision is that which has been mentioned by Abul -Maali in his book, _Al Irshad_. It says that the senses can only feel -the substance (_Zat_) of things, but that which separates the existent -thing from one another is not to be found in the substance only. So -the senses cannot perceive the substance, which is common to all the -existent things. They can only perceive a thing because it exists. -But all this is absurd, which is quite clear from the fact that if -sight were only able to perceive things then it would not have been -possible for it to differentiate between white and black, for there is -no difference between things about those qualities which are common -to all. This also becomes impossible as regards all the other senses. -The sense of seeing could not perceive different kinds of colours; -the sense of hearing cannot differentiate between tastes. It would be -necessary that the objects perceived by the senses be all of a kind, -and there should be no difference between objects perceived by seeing -and apprehended by hearing. This is contrary to that which man commonly -understands. In reality the senses perceive the substance of things by -the power which is vouchsafed to them. The cause of this mistake lies -in the fact that that which perceives a substance, is thought to be the -thing perceived. Had there not been said so much about these things, -and so much respect for those who said it, it would not have satisfied -anybody with a strong common sense. - -The cause of such a perplexing situation in the Law, which has -compelled its votaries to take refuge in such worthless arguments, -as would bring a smile to the lips of anybody who has made the least -effort to distinguish between different kinds of arguments, is the -exposition of anthropomorphic qualities of God to the common people, -a fact which has been prohibited by God and His Prophet. It is so -because it is very difficult for a man to believe at the same time that -there exists One without a body, who can be seen with our eyes. For -the things which the senses comprehend are in the bodies or the bodies -themselves. Hence the Mutakallimun have tried to prove that the Divine -Vision will be an addition to our existing qualities at that moment. -This also should not have been disclosed to the common people. For -since their intellect cannot go beyond their imagination that which -they cannot imagine is non-existent for them. To imagine a thing which -has no body is not possible, and hence a belief in the existence of -an object which they cannot imagine, is impossible for them. It was -for this reason that the Law refused to disclose this secret to them, -and described God, for their sake, in terms which they can imagine, -ascribing to him the attributes of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c. -&c., at the same time telling them that He is not like anything which -can be imagined. Had the intention of the Law been to make clear to -the masses the fact of His having no body, it would not have mentioned -these things in detail. But as light was the highest of imaginable -things, it was given to them as an illustration of God, for it is the -best known of the things both to the senses and to the imagination. - -Such is also the case in respect to the possibility of their -understanding the things of the Day of Judgment. These have also -been mentioned in terms which they can imagine. So now when the Law -has adopted this course about the apparent description of God, there -arises no doubt about him. For when it is said that He is Light or that -there is a curtain of light upon Him, as is mentioned in the Quran and -authentic Traditions, and when it is said that the Faithful will see -Him on the Day of Judgement as they see the sun, there arises no doubt -or suspicion out of it for the common or the learned people. It is so -because to the learned it is quite clear that that condition will be -an addition to our former knowledge. But when this is disclosed to -the common people, they cannot understand it, and hence they either -disbelieve the whole of the Law, or consider its exponent to be an -infidel. So one who adopts a method other than that laid down by the -Law in this respect, certainly goes astray. If you look a little -intently it will become clear to you, that in spite of the fact that -the Law has not given illustration of those things for the common -people, beyond which their imagination cannot go, it has also informed -the learned men of the underlying meanings of those illustrations. So -it is necessary to bear in mind the limits which the Law has set about -the instruction of every class of men, and not to mix them together. -For in this manner the purpose of the Law is multiplied. Hence it is -that the Prophet has said, “We, the prophets, have been commanded to -adapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them -according to their intelligence.” He who tries to instruct all the -people in the matter of religion, in one and the same way, is like a -man who wants to make them alike in actions too, which is quite against -apparent laws and reason. - -From the foregoing it must have become clear to you that the divine -vision has an exoteric meaning in which there is no doubt, if we take -the words of the Quran about God as they stand, that is, without -proving or disproving the anthropomorphic attribute of God. Now since -the first part of the Law has been made quite clear as to God’s purity, -and the quantity of the teaching fit for the common people, it is time -to begin the discussion about the actions of God, after which our -purpose in writing this tractate will be over. - - - OF THE ACTIONS OF GOD - -In this section we will take up five questions, around which all others -in this connection revolve. In the first place a proof of the creation -of the universe; secondly, the advent of the prophets; thirdly, -predestination and fate; fourthly, Divine justice and injustice; and -fifthly, the Day of Judgment. - -First Problem: the Creation of the Universe:--The Law teaches that the -universe was invented and created by God, and that it did not come -into being by chance or by itself. The method adopted by the Law for -proving this is not the one upon which the Asharites have depended. -For we have already shown that those methods are not specially certain -for the learned, nor common enough to satisfy all the classes of men. -The methods which are really serviceable are those which have a very -few premises, and the results of which fall very near to the commonly -known ideas. But in instructing the common people the Law does not -favour statements composed of long and complete reasonings, based -upon different problems, So everyone who, in teaching them, adopts a -different course, and interprets the Law according to it, has lost -sight of its purpose and gone astray from the true path. And so also, -the Law in giving illustrations for its reasonings uses only those -which are present before us. Whatever has been thought necessary for -the common people to know, has been explained to them by the nearest -available examples, as in the case of the Day of Judgment. But whatever -was unnecessary for them to know, they have been told that it was -beyond their knowledge, as the words of God about the Soul.[91] Now -that we have established this, it is necessary that the method adopted -by the Law for teaching the creation of the universe to the common -people be such as would be acknowledged by all. It is also necessary -that since there cannot be found anything present to illustrate the -creation of the universe the Law must have used the examples of the -creation of things in the visible world. - -So the method adopted by Law is that the universe was made by God. If -we look intently into the verse pertaining to this subject we shall -see that the method adopted is that of divine solicitude, which we -know to be one of those which prove the existence of God. When a man -sees a thing made in a certain shape, proportion and fashion, for a -particular advantage is derived from it, and purpose which is to be -attained, so that it becomes clear to him, that had it not been found -in that shape, and proportion, then that advantage would have been -wanting in it, he comes to know for certain that there is a maker of -that thing, and that he had made it in that shape and proportion, for -a set purpose. For it is not possible that all those qualities serving -that purpose be collected in that thing by chance alone. For instance, -if a man sees a stone on the ground in a shape fit for sitting, and -finds its proportions and fashion of the same kind, then he would -come to know that it was made by a maker, and that he had made it and -placed it there. But when he sees nothing in it, which may have made -it fit for sitting then he becomes certain that its existence in the -place was by chance only, without its being fashioned by any maker. -Such is also the case with the whole of the universe. For when a man -sees the sun, the moon, and all the stars, which are the cause of the -four seasons, of days and nights, of rain, water and winds, of the -inhabitation of the parts of the earth, of the existence of man, and -of the being of all the animals and the plants and of the earth being -fit for the habitation of a man, and other animals living on it; and -the water fit for the animals living in it; and the air fit for birds, -and if there be anything amiss in this creation and edifice, the whole -world would come to confusion and disorder, then he would come to know -with certainty that it is not possible that this harmony in it for the -different members of the universe--man, animals, and plants--be found -by chance only. He will know that there is one who determined it, and -so one who made it by intention, and that is God, exalted and magnified -may He be. He would know with certainty that the universe is a created -thing, for he would necessarily think that it is not possible that in -it should be found all this harmony, if it be not made by some one, -and had come into existence by chance alone. This kind of argument is -quite definite and at the same time clear, and some have mentioned it -here. It is based upon two principles which are acknowledged by all. -One of them being, that the universe, with all its component parts, is -found fit for the existence of man and things; secondly, that which is -found suitable in all its parts, for a single purpose, leading to a -single goal, is necessarily a created thing. So those two principles -lead us naturally to admit that the universe is a created thing, and -that there is a maker of it. Hence “the argument of analogy” leads to -two things at one and the same time, and that is why it is the best -argument for proving the existence of God. This kind of reasoning is -also found in the Quran in many verses in which the creation of the -universe is mentioned. For instance, “Have We not made the earth a -bed, and the mountains for shelter to fix the same? And have We not -created you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep for rest and made -the night a garment to cover you, and destined the day to a gaining of -a livelihood; and built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a -burning lamp? And do We not send down from the clouds pressing forth -rain, water pouring down in abundance, that We may hereby produce corn -and herbs, and gardens planted thick with trees.”[92] If we ponder over -this verse it would be found that our attention has been called to the -suitability of the different parts of the universe for the existence -of man. In the very beginning we are informed of a fact well-known to -all--and that is that the earth has been created in a way which has -made it suitable for our existence. Had it been unstable, or of any -other shape, or in any other place, or not of the present proportion, -it would not have been possible to be here, or at all created on it. -All this is included in the words, “Have We not made the earth a -bed for you?” for in a bed are collected together all the qualities -of shape, tranquility, and peace, to which may be added those of -smoothness and softness. So how strange is this wonderful work and -how excellent this blessedness, and how wonderful this collection of -all the qualities! This is so because in the word _mihad_ (bed) are -brought together all those qualities, which are found in the earth, -rendering it suitable for the existence of man. It is a thing which -becomes clear to the learned after much learning and a long time, “But -God will appropriate His mercy unto whom He pleaseth.”[93] Then as to -the divine words, “And the mountains for stakes,”--they tell us of the -advantage to be found in the tranquility of the earth on account of -the mountains. For had the earth been created smaller than it is now, -that is, without mountains it would have been quivered by the motion -of other elements, the water and the air, and would have been shaken -and thus displaced. This would naturally have been the cause of the -destruction of the animal world. So when its tranquility is in harmony -with those living on it, it did not come into being by chance alone, -but was made by some one’s intention, and determination. Certainly it -was made by One who intended it, and determined it, for the sake of -those living on it. Then He calls our attention to the suitability of -the existence of night and day for animals. He says, “And made the -night a garment to cover you; and destined the day to a gaining of your -livelihood.” He means to say that He has made the night like a covering -and clothing for all the things, from the heat of the sun. For had -there been no setting of the sun at night, all the things, whose life -has been made dependent upon the sun, would have perished--that is, the -animals and the plants. As clothing protects the people from the heat -of the sun, in addition to its being a covering, so God likened the -night to it. This is one of the most beautiful of the metaphors. There -is also another advantage in the night for the animals: their sleep in -it is very deep, after the setting of the sun, which keeps faculties in -motion, that is, wide awake. So God has said, “And appointed your sleep -for rest,” on account of the darkness of the night. Then He says, “And -built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp.” Here -by the word building He means their creation, and their harmony with -the created things, and their arrangement and system. By strength He -means that power of revolution and motion which is never slackened, and -never overtaken by fatigue; and they never fall like other roofs and -high edifices. To this refer the words of God, “And made the heaven a -roof well-supported.”[94] By all this He shows their fitness in number, -shape, fashion, and movement, for the existence of those who live on -the earth round it. Were one of the heavenly bodies, not to speak of -all, to stop for a moment all would be chaos on the face of the earth. -Some people think the blast of the last trumpet, which will be the -cause of the thunderbolt, will be nothing but a stop in the revolution -of the heavenly bodies. Then He tells us of the advantage of the sun -for those living on the earth and says, “And placed therein a burning -lamp.” He calls it a lamp because in reality it is all darkness, and -light covers the darkness of the night, and if there be no lamp, man -can get no advantage out of his sense of sight at night time; and in -the same way if there were no sun the animals can have no benefit of -their sense of seeing. He calls our attention to this advantage of the -sun, ignoring others because it is the noblest of all the advantages -and the most apparent of all. Then He tells us of His kindness in -sending down rain, for the sake of the plants and the animals. The -coming down of rain in an appointed proportion, and at an appointed -season, for the cultivated fields cannot be by chance alone, but is -the result of divine solicitude for us all. So He says, “And do We -not send down from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down -in abundance that We may hereby produce corn and herbs, and gardens -planted thick with trees.” There are many verses of the Quran on this -subject. For instance, He says, “Do ye not see how God hath created the -seven heavens, one above another, and hath placed the moon therein for -a light, and hath appointed the sun for a taper? God hath also provided -and caused you to bring forth corn from the earth.”[95] If we were to -count all such verses and comment upon them showing the kindness of -the Creator for the created, it would take too many volumes. We do not -intend to do it in this book. If God should grant us life and leisure -we shall write a book to show the kindness of God to which He has -called our attention. - -It should be known that this kind of argument is just contrary to that -which the Asharites think leads to the knowledge of God. They think -that the creation does not lead us to the knowledge of God through any -of His goodness, but through possibility, that is, the possibility -which is found in all things, which we can understand to be of his -shape or of quite a contrary one. But if this possibility be found -alike in both the cases, then there is no wisdom in the creation of the -universe, and there is found no harmony between man and the parts of -it. For, as they think, if it is possible for the things to have any -other form than they have now, then there can exist no harmony between -man and other existent things by the creation of which God has obliged -man and commanded him to be thankful to Him. This opinion, by which the -creation of man, as a part of the universe, is just as possible, for -instance, as his creation in the void, is like the opinion of those who -say that man exists but he could have been created in quite a different -shape, and yet could perform actions like a man. According to them it -is also possible that he may have formed the part of another universe -quite different from the existing one. In that case the blessing of the -universe can have no obligation for man, for they are not necessary for -his purpose. Hence man is quite careless of them and they of him. So -their existence is no blessing to him. This is all against the nature -of man. - -On the whole, a man who denies the existence of the effects arranged -according to the causes in the question of arts, or whose wisdom -cannot understand it, then he has no knowledge of the art of its -Maker. So also a man who denies the existence of an order of effects -in accordance with causes in this universe, denies the existence of -the Creator altogether. Their saying that God is above these causes, -and that they cannot have any bearing on the effects by His command, -is very far from the true nature of philosophy, nay, it is a destroyer -of it. For if it is possible to have the same effects with other than -the prescribed causes just in the same degree as by them, then where -is the greatness in producing the effects from the known Causes? It is -so because the effects from the causes have one of the following three -reasons. Either the existence of the causes will be in place of the -effects by compulsion, as a man’s taking his food; or their being more -perfect that is, the effect becoming better and more perfect through -them, as a man’s having two eyes, or they may have neither a better nor -a more compulsive effect. In this case the existence of the effect and -the cause would be by chance, without any intention at all; and hence, -there would be no greatness found in it. For instance, if the shape -of human hand, the number of the fingers, and their length be neither -necessary nor adding any perfection in its work in seizing things of -different kind, then the actions of the hand from this shape, and -number of parts, would be by chance alone. If it be so, then it makes -no difference whether a man is given a hand or a hoof, or something -else, like the different animals, for their particular actions. On the -whole, if we ignore the causes and their effects, then there remains -nothing to refute the arguments of those who believe in the creation of -the universe by chance alone, that is, those who say that there is no -Creator at all, and that which has come into being in this universe is -the result of material causes. For taking one of the two alternatives -it is not more possible that it may have happened by chance, than done -by an independent Actor. So when the Asharites say that the existence -of one or more possibilities shows that there is a particular Maker of -these things, they can answer and say that the existence of things by -one of these possibilities was by chance alone, for intention works as -one of the causes, and that which happens without any means or cause -is by chance. We see that many things come into being in this way. -For example, the elements mix together by chance, and then by this -unintentional mixing there is produced a new thing. They mix again, -and this quite unintentionally produces quite a new thing. In this -way every kind of creation may be said to have come into existence by -chance. - -We say that it is necessary that there be found order and arrangement, -the more perfect and finished than what can be imagined. This mixing -together of elements is limited and prearranged, and things produced -by them are sure to happen, and no disorder has ever happened in them. -But all this could not happen by chance alone, for that which happens -in this way by chance is of the least value. It is to this that God -refers, “It is the work of the Lord, who has rightly disposed all -things.”[96] I would like to know what completeness can be found in -things made by chance, for such things are by no means better than -their opposites. To this God refers in the following words, “Thou -canst not see in the Creation of the most Merciful any unfitness or -disproportion. Lift thy eyes again to heaven, and _look whether thou -seest any flaw_.”[97] But what defect can be greater than that all the -things can be found with any other quality than they really possess. -For the non-existent quality may be better than the existing one. -In this way, if one thinks that were the Eastern movement to become -Western and vice versa, there would be no difference in the universe, -then he has destroyed philosophy altogether. He is like a man who -thinks that were the right side of the animals to become left, and -vice versa, there would be no difference at all for one of the two -alternatives is there. For as it is possible to say that it is made -according to one alternative by an independent Maker, so it is possible -to assert that it was all made by chance alone. For we see so many -things coming into being by themselves. - -It is quite clear to you that all the people see that lower kinds of -creation could have been made in a different way from that in which -they really are and as they see this lower degree in many things they -think that they must have been made by chance. But in the higher -creation they know that it is impossible to have been made in a more -perfect and excellent form than that given to it by the Creator. So -this opinion, which is one of the opinions of the Mutakallimun is both -against the Law and philosophy. What we say is that the opinion of -possibility in creation is closer to a complete denial of God, than -leading us nearer to Him. At the same time it falsifies philosophy. For -if we do not understand that there is a mean between the beginnings -and ends of the creation, upon which is based the ends of things, then -there can neither be any order nor any method in it. And if they be -wanting then there can be no proof of the existence of an intelligent -and knowing Maker; for taking them together with cause and effect -we are led to the fact that they must have been created by wisdom -and knowledge. But on the other hand the existence of either of two -possibilities shows that they may have been performed by a not-knowing -Maker and by chance alone. Just as a stone falling on the earth may -fall in any place, on any side, and in any form. It will show the want -of the existence either of a creator at all or at least of a wise and -knowing Creator. The thing which has compelled the Mutakallimun of the -Asharites to adopt this opinion is a denial of the action of those -natural forces which God has put in all things, as He has endowed them -with life, power and so forth. They avoided the opinion that there was -any other creator but God, and God forbid that there be any other, for -he is the only creator of the causes and they are made effective by -His command only. We will talk of this in detail when discoursing on -Fate and Predestination. They were also afraid that by admitting the -natural causes they might be accused of saying that the universe came -into being by chance only. They would have known that a denial of it -means a denial of a great part of the arguments, which can be advanced -for a proof of the existence of God. One who denies any part of God’s -creation denies His work which falls very near to a denial of a part -of His attributes. On the whole as their opinion is based upon hasty -conclusions, which come to the mind of a man by superficial thought -and as apparently it appears that the word “intention” can be applied -to one who has power to do bad or otherwise, they saw that if they did -not admit that all the creation is possible, they would not be able to -say that it came into existence by the action of an intending creator. -So they say that all the creation is possible so that they may prove -that the creator is an intelligent one. They never thought of the order -which is necessary in things made, and with that their coming from an -intelligent creator. These people have also ignored the blame they will -have to bear in thus denying wisdom to the creator; or maintaining that -chance should be found governing creation. They know, as we have said, -that it is necessary, on account of the order existent in nature, that -it must have been brought into being by some knowing creator, otherwise -the order found in it would be by chance. When they were compelled to -deny the natural forces, they had to deny with them a large number of -those forces which God has made subservient to His command for the -creation and preservation of things. For God has created some things -from causes which He has produced from outside, these are the heavenly -bodies; there are other things which He has made by causes placed in -the things themselves, that is, the soul, and other natural forces, -by which he preserves those things. So how wicked is the man who -destroyeth philosophy, and “inventeth a lie about God.”[98] - -This is only a part of the change which has taken place in the Law, -in this and other respects, which we have already mentioned, and will -mention hereafter. From all this it must have become clear to you -that the method which God had adopted for teaching His creatures that -the universe is made and created by Him is the method of kindness -and wisdom, towards all His creatures and especially towards man. -It is a method which bears the same relation to our intellect, as -the sun bears to our senses. The method which it has adopted towards -the common people about this problem, is that of illustration from -things observed. But as there was nothing which could be given as an -illustration, and as the common people cannot understand a thing, an -illustration of which they cannot see, God tells us that the universe -was created in a certain time out of a certain thing, which He made. -He tells us His condition before the creation of the universe, “His -throne was above the waters.”[99] He also says, “Verily your Lord is -God who created the heavens and the earth in six days,”[100] and “Then -He set His mind to the creation of the heavens, and it was smoke.”[101] -In addition to these there are other verses of the Book, pertaining to -this subject. So it is incumbent that nothing out of them should be -interpreted for the common people, and nothing should be presented to -them in explaining it but this illustration. For one who changes it, -makes the wisdom of the Law useless. If it be said that the Law teaches -about the universe that it is created, and made out of nothing and in -no time, then it is a thing which even the learned cannot understand, -not to speak of the common people. So we should not deviate in this -matter of the Law, from the method laid down in it for instructing -the common people, and should not tell them except this regarding the -creation of the universe, which is found alike in the Quran, the Bible, -and other revealed books. The wonder is that the example in the Quran -is quite in accordance with the creation of the things in the visible -world. But the Law does not say so, which is a warning to the learned -people that the creation of the universe is not like the creation of -all other things. He has used the words _creation_ and _flaw_, because -they connote two things,--Conception of the things that can be seen, -and the creation of the things which the learned prove in the invisible -world. So the use of the words _creation_ (Huduth) and _eternal_ is an -innovation in religion, and the cause of great doubt and corruption of -the belief of the common people, especially of the argumentative among -them. This has greatly perplexed the Mutakallimun of the Asharites, -and has proved them in great doubt. For if they explain that God -intends doing things by an eternal intention--which, as we said, is an -innovation--they have put it down that the universe is _created_. Then -they are asked how can a created thing come from an eternal intention. -They answer that the eternal intention became connected with the action -at the time of the creation especially, and that is the time in which -the universe was made. Then they may be asked, that if the relation -of the intending Creator towards the created thing at the time of its -non-existence be the same as at the time of its creation, then that -created thing is by no means better than the other thing, when at the -time of its making, the action which was not found in its non-existence -is not connected with it. If the relation be different then there must -necessarily be a created intention otherwise the created result of an -action would come from an eternal action, for what is necessary of it -in action, is necessary also in intention. If it be said that when the -time of its making comes it is found done; it may be asked: is it so -by an eternal or a created action? If they say by an eternal action, -they admit the existence of a created thing by an eternal action; and -if they say by a created action, then there must be a created intention -also. They may say that intention is the action itself, but this is -impossible. For intention is the only cause of the action in the -intender. If an intender, intending to do an act in a certain time, -finds that act quite another than that which he intended, then that -act would have come into being without any intender at all. At the -same time, if it is thought that from a created intention there can -only be a created thing, then as a rule an eternal intention should -give an eternal thing, otherwise the result of a created or eternal -intention would be the same, which is impossible. All these doubts -are found in Islam only through the Mutakallimun, by their explaining -things in Law, which God had forbidden them to do. For in the Quran it -is not said whether intention is created or eternal. So they neither -adhere to the exoteric meanings of the Law, which may have given them -beatitude and salvation, nor did they attain the degree of certain and -exact knowledge, so that they may have had this blessing. Hence they -are neither to be counted among the learned nor among the masses, who -believe and have strong faith. They are the people “whose hearts are -perverse”[102] and “whose hearts are diseased.”[103] They say things by -their tongues which are quite contrary to those which they believe in -their hearts, a cause of which is their tenacity, and love of upholding -their opinions at any cost. By a repetition of attitudes like these -they become quite devoid of all philosophy, as we see the case of -those who are completely accustomed to the Asharite school of thought, -and are well pleased with it, even to the degree of love. They are -certainly veiled on account of their habit and environment. - -What we have said about this question is enough for our purpose. Now we -would take up the second problem. - -Problem Second: Prophetic Mission:--There are two points which are to -be discussed in this problem. First, the proof of the coming of the -prophets; and secondly an explanation of the fact that the man claiming -to be a prophet is really so and does not lie. Many people are desirous -of proving the existence of the prophets by analogy--and such are the -Mutakallimun. They say that it is proved that God speaks and intends, -and is the master of His creatures. It is quite consistent for such a -being in the visible world to send a messenger to his dependent people. -Hence such a thing is also possible in the unseen world. They have -thought of making this valid for proving the advent of the prophets, by -absurd and far-fetched arguments which only Brahmins should use. They -say that it is possible both in the observed and unseen world. In the -observed world it is quite evident, that when a man stands up before a -king and says, “O ye men, I am the messenger of the king towards you” -and produces credentials for his claim, it is necessary to acknowledge -him to be true. They say that in the case of the prophets, the -credentials are the miracles which they perform. For certain reasons -this method is quite fit and satisfactory for the common people, -but when investigated there appear many flaws in the principle. Our -acknowledgement of a man who claims to be the messenger of a king is -not true unless we know that the symbols which he has are those of the -royal messenger, which can only happen, if a king tells his subjects -that whenever they happen to see such and such symbols with a man, -which are particularly his, they should take him as his messenger. When -this is so, one can object, from where does it appear that performance -of miracles is the special sign of the prophets? This can be proved -neither by law nor by reason. To prove it by religion is still more -impossible; it does not admit it. Reason alone cannot affirm that they -are the special symbols of prophecy, except that in many cases they -were found in people who claimed to be prophets and in none other. So -in this case a proof of anyone’s prophecy is based upon two premises. -First, the man who claims to be a prophet has performed a miracle, and -secondly, everyone who performs a miracle is a prophet. - -Now as to the premise that the claimant for prophecy has performed -miracles we can say that it pertains to our senses after we have -admitted that there are actions performed by men, which can neither -be made by wondrous workmanship or by some particular forces, but are -beyond our conception. The second premise can only be true when we -admit the existence of the prophets, and that the miracles are only -performed by those who are the true claimants for prophetic mission. -We would say that this premise is not true but for those who believe -the existence of the prophets and the miracles. For instance if it has -become clear to man, that the universe is created, then he certainly -knows that the world exists and the Creator too. This being so, a man -can object and say how can we say that one who performs the miracles -is a prophet, when the prophetic mission itself remains unproved? Even -after we admit the existence of miracle in the manner in which it -may seem quite impossible, it is necessary that the two sides of the -premise be admitted first and then the one can be applied to the other. -One cannot say that the existence of the prophets can be proved by -reason, because of its possibility. For the possibility to which they -refer is in fact really ignorance, and is not found in the nature of -things. For instance, if we say that it is possible that it will rain -or not, then the possibility is found in the nature of things, that -is, it is felt that a thing may sometimes be, and at others not be, as -in the case of rain. Here, reason can exactly decide the possibility -of a thing by its nature. The necessary (_wajib_) is quite contrary to -it; that is, it is a thing the existence of which is always found. -In this case reason can always decide without a mistake, because its -nature cannot be changed or transformed. So when one party admits the -existence of a prophet, at a certain time it appears that the prophetic -mission is a thing whose existence is possible and the other party says -that it cannot feel it, then that possibility becomes mere ignorance in -its case. Now we believe in the existence of this possibility because -we have known the prophets. We say that a knowledge of the messengers -from man, leads us to a belief in the existence of messengers from God, -as the existence of a messenger from Anir, leads us to the conclusion -of there being a messenger from Zaid also. This requires a similarity -in the natural dispositions of both men and it is here where the -difficulty lies. If we suppose this possibility by itself even in the -future, it will only be by the means of the known fact and not by our -knowledge and reason. Now one of the premises of this possibility has -come into existence. For the possibility is in our knowledge, and the -fact in itself is an established one, by one of the two alternatives, -that is, whether he sent a messenger or did not. So we have nothing -in this case but sheer ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir sent -any messengers in the past or did not, which is quite different from -our doubting, whether or not he will send any in future. So when we do -not know about Zaid, for instance, whether he has or has not sent any -messenger in the past, it is not correct for us to suppose anybody to -be his messenger, if he happens to have his symbols upon him. We can -admit his claim only after we know that Zaid did send a messenger. So -when we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, and the miracles, -then how can it be correct for us to say that one who performs the -miracles is a prophet. We cannot believe in this by hearing only, for -this faculty is not the thing by which such things can be proved. At -the same time we cannot claim this premise to be true by experience -and habit, except that the miracles performed by the prophets can be -seen by one who believes in their mission, and has never seen them to -have been performed by anybody else, so that they may be taken as a -convincing sign for distinguishing a prophet of God, from one who is -not, that is a distinction between one whose claim is right, and one -whose claim is wrong. - -By these things it is seen that the Mutakallimun have missed the -whole purpose of the argument from miracles because they have put -possibility in the place of real existence, possibility which is in -reality ignorance. Then they have believed in the premise that every -one who performs miracles is a prophet, which cannot be true except -when the miracles prove the prophetic mission itself, and the sender of -messengers. It is not by reason that we can believe in these marvelous -things, which happen again and again, and are divine, as a conclusive -proof of the existence of prophetic mission, except that one who can do -such things is an excellent person, and that such persons cannot lie. -But it can prove the prophetic mission of a person only when we admit -that the mission does exist, and that such marvelous things cannot be -performed by any person, however good he may be, except by one who is a -a prophet. The miracles cannot prove the prophetic mission of a person, -because there is no connection between them and reason, except that -we admit that the miracles are one of the works of the prophets, just -as curing is the work of the physicians, so that one who can cure is -certainly a physician. This is one of the fallacies of the argument. -Moreover, if we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, by -putting the idea of possibility, which is in fact ignorance, in place -of certainty, and make miracles a proof of the truth of man who claims -to be a prophet it becomes necessary that they should not be used by a -person, who says that they can be performed by others than prophets, -as the Mutakallimun do. They think that the miracles can be performed -by the magicians and saints. The condition which they attach with them -is that miracles prove a man to be a prophet, when he at the same time -claims to be so, for the true prophet can perform them as opposed to -the false ones. This is an argument without any proof, for it can be -understood either by hearing or reason. That is, it is said that one -whose claims to prophecy are wrong, cannot perform miracles, but as -we have already said, when they cannot be performed by a liar, then -they can only be done by the good people, whom God has meant for this -purpose. These people, if they speak a lie, are not good, and hence -cannot perform the miracles. But this does not satisfy the people who -think miracles to be possible from the magicians, for they certainly -are not good men. It is here that the weakness of the argument lies. -Hence some people have thought that the best thing is to believe that -they cannot be performed but by the prophets and hence magic is only -imagination, and not a change of essence. Among these are also men who -deny all sorts of marvelous things from the saints. - -It is clear to you from the life of the prophet, peace be upon him, -that he never invited any man or community to believe in his prophecy, -and that which he has brought with him from God, by means of the -performance of any miracles, in support of his claim, such as changing -one element into another. Whatever miracles did appear from him were -only performed in the natural course of things, without on his part -any intention of contention or competition. The following words of -the Quran will make this clear; “And they say: We will by no means -believe in thee, until thou cause a spring of water to gush forth -for us out of the earth, and thou have a garden of palm-trees and -vines, and thou cause rivers to spring forth from the midst thereof in -abundance; or thou cause the heaven to fall down in pieces upon us, as -thou hast given out, or thou bring down God and the angels to vouch -for thee; or thou have a house of gold, or thou ascend by a ladder to -heaven; neither will we believe thy ascending thither alone, until -thou cause a book to descend unto us, bearing witness of thee which we -may read. Answer: My Lord be praised, Am I other than a man sent as -an apostle?”[104] Then again, “Nothing hindered us from sending thee -with miracles, except that the former nations have charged them with -imposture.”[105] The thing by which we invited the people to believe in -him, and with which he vied with them is the Quran. For says God, “Say, -verily, if men and genii were purposely assembled, that they might -produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like unto -it, although the one of them assigned the other.”[106] Then further he -says, “will they say, He hath forged the Quran? Answer, bring therefore -ten chapters like unto it forged by yourself.”[107] This being the case -the miracle of the Prophet with which he vied with the people and which -he advanced as an argument for the truth of his claim to the prophetic -mission, was the Quran. If it be said, that this is quite clear, but -how does it appear that the Quran is a miracle, and that it proves his -prophecy, while just now we have proved the weakness of the proof of -prophecy by means of miracles without any exceptions in the case of -any prophet. Besides the people have differed in taking the Quran to -be a miracle at all. For in their opinion one of the conditions of a -miracle is that it should be quite different from any act which may -have become habitual. But the Quran is of this sort, because it is only -word, though it excels all created words. So it becomes a miracle by -its superiority only, that is, the impossibility for people bringing -anything like it, on account of its being highly eloquent. This being -the case it differs from the habitual, not in genus but in details -only, and that which differs in this way is of the same genus. Some -people say that it is a miracle by itself, and not by its superiority. -They do not lay it down as a condition for miracles that they should -be quite different from the habitual, but think that it should be -such a habitual act, as men may fall short of accomplishing. We would -reply that it is as the objectors say, but the thing about it is not -as they have thought. That the Quran is an evidence of his prophecy, -is based, we believe, upon two principles, which are found in the Book -itself. The first being that the existence of the class of men called -prophets and apostles is well-known. They are the men who lay down -laws for the people by divine revelation, and not by human education. -Their existence can be denied only by the people who deny repeated -action, as the existence of all things which we have not seen--the -lives of the famous thinkers and so forth. All the philosophers, and -other men are agreed, except those who pay no regard to their words, -(and they are the Materialists), that there are men to whom have been -revealed many commandments for the people, to perform certain good -actions, by which their beatitude may be perfected; and to make them -give up certain wrong beliefs and vicious actions. This is the business -of divine apostles. The second principle is, that everyone who does -this work, that is, lays down laws by revelation, is a prophet. This -principle is also quite in accordance with human nature. For as it -is known that the business of medicine is to cure a disease, and one -who can cure is a physician, so it is also known that the business of -the prophets is to give law to the people by divine revelation, and -one who does so is a prophet. The Book mentions the first principle -in the following:--“Verily We have revealed Our will unto thee, as We -have revealed it unto Noah, and the prophets who succeeded him, and -We have revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac and Jacob, -and the tribes, and unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron and -Solomon; and we have given thee the Quran as We gave the Psalms unto -David; some apostles have We sent, whom We have mentioned unto thee, -and God spake unto Moses discoursing with him,”[108] and again: “Say, -I am not alone among the apostles.”[109] The second principle is that -Mohammed, peace be upon him, has done the work of a prophet, that is, -has given Law to the people by divine revelation. This also can be -known from the Quran, where God mentions it. He says, “O men, now is -an evident proof come unto you from your Lord, and We have sent down -unto you manifest light.”[110] By _manifest light_ is meant the Quran. -Again He says, “O men, now is the apostle come unto you from your Lord; -believe, therefore, it will be better for you,”[111] and again, “But -those among them who are well-grounded in knowledge, and faithful, who -believe in that which hath been sent down unto thee, and that which -hath been sent down unto the prophets before thee;”[112] and again “God -is the witness of the revelation which He hath sent down unto thee; He -sent it down with his special knowledge; the angels are also witness -thereof; but God is a sufficient witness.”[113] If it be said, how can -the first principle be known, that is, that there is a class of men -who give the Law to the people by divine revelation; and so also, how -to know the second principle, that is, that which the Quran contains, -about beliefs and actions, is of divine origin? We would answer that -the first principle can be known by the information which these men -give about the existence of things, which were not found before, but -come into existence after they have informed the people about them, and -in a specified time; and by their command for doing certain things, and -teaching certain precepts which do not resemble the common things and -actions, which can be taught by human agency. This is so because if the -miracles be of the kind of laying down Laws, proving that they cannot -be laid down by human education, but only through divine revelation, -then it is prophecy. But the miracles which do not take the form of -laws, as the dividing of the sea, etc., do not necessarily prove the -prophecy of anyone. But they can only be used as supplements to the -former, if they fall very near to it. But standing alone they cannot -prove it, and so by themselves alone they do not lead to a cognizance -of the prophets, if the other kind of miracles, which are its -conclusive proofs, be not found in them. So according to this principle -must be understood the proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles, that -is, the miracles of knowledge and deeds are its conclusive proofs -while others only make it strong, and can be used as witnesses. So -now it has become clear to you that men of this kind do exist, and -how can men be sure of them, except by their repeated appearance; as -is the case with physicians and other kinds of men. If it be asked: -How can it be proved that the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a -miracle which is the business of the prophets to perform, as curing is -the business of a physician, we would say that this can be known in -many ways:--First, the precepts which it contains about knowledge and -deeds, cannot be acquired by learning, but only by divine revelation; -secondly, by the information which it gives about hidden things; and -thirdly, by its poetry, which is quite different from that which can -be achieved by imagination or repetition of verses, that is, it is -known that it is of quite a different kind from the poetry of Arabic -speaking people, whether the language be acquired and learned, as is -the case with non-Arabs, or it be the mother-tongue, as it is with the -Arabs themselves. The first reason is the most weighty one. If it be -asked how can it be known that the laws which contain both knowledge -and precepts about deeds are of divine origin, so much so that they -deserve the name of the word of God, we would say also that this also -can be known in many ways. First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be -acquired except after a knowledge of God, and of human happiness and -misery; and the acts by which this happiness can be acquired, as -charity and goodness and the works which divert men from happiness -and produce eternal misery, such as evil and wickedness. Again the -knowledge of human happiness and misery requires a knowledge of the -soul and its substance, and whether it has eternal happiness or not. -If it be so, then what is the quantity of this happiness, or misery; -and also what amount of good would be the cause of happiness. For the -case of goodness and evil is just the same as with food, which does -not give health, if taken in any quantity and at any time; but must be -used in a specified quantity and at an appointed time. For this reason -we find these limited in the religious laws. All this, or a greater -part of it, cannot be known but by divine revelation, or at least a -knowledge through it would be better. Again a perfect knowledge of God -requires a knowledge of existent things. Then a law-giver must know the -quantity of this knowledge which would be good to be imparted to the -common people, and the method to be adopted in teaching them. All this, -or at least a greater part of it, cannot be acquired by education, -learning or philosophy. This can be clearly known from imparting -learning, and especially the giving of laws, making regulations, and -giving information about the conditions of the Day of Judgment. When -all this is found in the Quran in the most perfect form, there can be -no doubt that it is a divine revelation and His word, given through -the agency of His prophet. So God has said, informing the people about -it, “Say, verily if man and genii were purposely assembled, that they -might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like -it.” This idea is further strengthened, nay, comes near exact surety -and certainty, when it is known that the prophet was an unlettered -man, and lived among a people, uneducated, wild, and nomadic by habit, -who had never tried to investigate the universe, as was the case with -the Greeks, and other nations, among whom philosophy was perfected in -long periods of time. To this very fact refer the words of God, “Thou -couldst not read any book before this; neither couldst thou write -it with thy right hand, then had gainsayers justly doubted of the -divine origin thereof.”[114] Hence God has repeatedly told the people -this quality of His prophet. “It is He who hath raised up among the -illiterate Arabians an apostle from among themselves,”[115] and, “Those -who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate Prophet.”[116] This matter -can also be known by another method--that of comparison of this Law -with the others. For, if the business of the prophets be the giving -of laws by divine revelation, as has been acknowledged by all who -believe in the existence of the prophets, then if you look into the -teachings of useful knowledge and actions leading to happiness, which -are contained in the Quran, and compare them with other divine books -and religious systems, you will find it excelling all the others in an -unlimited degree. On the whole, if there are books worthy to be called -the words of God, on account of their wondrous nature, and separation -from the genius of human words and their peculiarity by what they -contain in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it is clear that the -Quran is much more worth thy, and many times fitter, than they are to -be called the words of God. This would be still clearer to you if you -could know the past books--the Old and New Testaments. But that is not -possible because they have been changed to a great extent. Were we to -describe the superiority of one Law over another, and the superiority -of the teachings given to us about the knowledge of God, and the Day -of Judgment to the laws given to the Jews and the Christians, it would -require many volumes with a confession of our own short-comings in -dealing with the subject. For this very reason, the Law of ours has -been called the last of the divine dispensations. The Prophet, peace be -on him, has said, “Had Moses lived in my time, he could not have helped -following me,” and the Prophet was right, on account of the universal -nature of the teachings of the Quran, and its regulations. That is it -is able to satisfy the needs of all, being meant for the whole of the -human race. So God has said, “say, O men, Verily I am the messenger of -God unto you all.”[117] The Prophet has said, “I have been sent both to -the white and the black nations.” - -The case of religions is just the same as that of God. There are some -foods which agree with all, or most of the people. Such is the case -with religions also. So the dispensations before our own were meant -for some particular peoples, ignoring all others, but our religion was -meant for the whole of the human race. This being the case, our Prophet -excels all the other Prophets, to him comes the divine revelation, -which makes a man fit to be called a prophet. So the Prophet has said -informing us of his superiority over other prophets, “There is no -prophet to whom has not been given a sign by which all the men would -have believed. I have been given divine revelation, and I hope that my -followers would be in the majority on the Day of Judgment.” All that we -have said must have made it clear to you that the proof of the prophecy -of the prophet from the Quran is not of the same kind as that of -turning a staff into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy of Moses, -or of giving life to the dead, and curing the blind and leprous for the -prophecy of Jesus. For these, although never performed by any but the -prophets, and sufficient to satisfy the common people, are not by any -means conclusive proofs of prophecy, when taken by themselves,--they -not being acts which make a prophet. - -Now as to the Quran, its case is just like curing by medicine. For -instance, suppose two men were to claim to be physicians, and one were -to say that he could walk on water, and the other were to assert that -he could cure a disease, and so one walked on the water, and the other -cured a sick man. In this case, our verification for medicine would be -only for one who has cured a sick man, but in the case of the other, it -would be outward satisfaction alone. The first is far better. The only -reason by which the common people can be satisfied in this respect is -that one who can walk on water, which is against the nature of men, can -certainly cure a disease, which is what men can do. This also is one of -the reasons of the connection between miracle, which is not one of the -conditions of prophecy, and the sign which makes a man deserve the name -of a prophet: divine revelation. Of this quality is also the fact, that -there comes nothing to the mind of such a man except that which God has -ordained for this unique work, and specialised him for it, among all -his fellow-men. So it is not inconsistent if he were to claim that God -distinguished him with his revelations. - -On the whole, when once it is laid down that the prophets do exist, -and that the miracles cannot be performed except by them, they can -become a prophecy, that is the miracles which are not in any way fit -to be received as a proof for it. This is the method to be adopted -with regard to the common people. For the doubts and objections which -we have described about unnatural miracles are not perceived by the -masses. But if you look intently you will find that the Law depends -upon suitable and natural miracles, and not upon unnatural ones. What -we have said about this problem is enough for our purpose and for the -sake of truth. - -Problem Third: Of Fate and Predestination. This is one of the most -intricate problems of religion. For if you look into the traditional -arguments about this problem you will find them contradictory; such -also being the case with arguments of reason. The contradiction in the -arguments of the first kind is found in the Quran and the Traditions. -There are many verses of the Quran, which by their universal nature, -teach that all the things are predestined, and that man is compelled -to do his acts; then there are verses which say that man is free in -his acts and not compelled in performing them. The following verses -tell us that all the things are by compulsion, and are predestined, -“Everything have We created bound by a fixed degree;”[118] again, “With -Him everything is regulated according to a determined measure.”[119] -Further, He says, “No accident happeneth in the earth, nor in your -persons, but the same was entered in the Book verily it is easy with -God.”[120] There may be quoted many other verses on this subject. Now, -as to the verses which say that man can acquire deeds by free will, -and that things are only possible and not necessary, the following may -be quoted: “Or He destroyeth them (by ship-wreck), because of that -which their crew have merited; though He pardoneth many things.”[121] -And again, “Whatever misfortune befalleth you is sent you by God, -for that which your hands have deserved.”[122] Further, He says, -“But they who commit evil, equal thereunto.”[123] Again, He says, -“It shall have the good which it gaineth, and it shall have the evil -which it gaineth.”[124] and, “And as to Thamud, We directed them, -but they loved blindness better than the true directions.”[125] -Sometimes contradiction appears even in a single verse of the Quran. -For instance, He says, “After a misfortune hath befallen you (you had -already attained two equal advantages), do you say, whence cometh -this? Answer, This is from yourselves.”[126] In the next verse, He -says, “And what happenth unto you, on the day whereon the two armies -met, was certainly by permission of the Lord.”[127] Of this kind also -is the verse, “Whatever good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God; -and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself;”[128] while the -preceding verse says, “All is from God.”[129] - -Such is also the case with the Traditions. The Prophet says, “Every -child is born in the true religion; his parents afterwards turn him -into a Jew or a Christian.” On another occasion he said, “The following -people have been created for hell, and do the deeds of those who are -fit for it. These have been created for heaven, and do deeds fit for -it.” The first Tradition says that the cause of disbelief is one’s own -environments; while faith and belief are natural to man. The other -Tradition says that wickedness and disbelief are created by God, and -man is compelled to follow them. - -This condition of things has led Muslims to be divided into two -groups. The one believed that man’s wickedness or virtue is his own -acquirement, and that according to these he will be either punished -or rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. The belief of the other party -is quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his -deeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to adopt a mean -between these two extreme views. They say that man can do action, but -the deeds done, and the power of doing it, are both created by God. -But this is quite meaningless. For if the deed and the power of doing -it be both created by God, then man is necessarily compelled to do the -act. This is one of the reasons of the difference of opinion about this -problem. - -As we have said there is another cause of difference of opinion -about this problem, than the traditional one. This consists of the -contradictory arguments advanced. For if we say that man is the creator -of his own deeds, it would be necessary to admit that there are things -which are not done according to the will of God, or His authority. -So there would be another creator besides God, while the Muslims are -agreed that there is no creator but He. If, on the other hand, we were -to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he is compelled -to do certain acts, for there is no mean between compulsion and -freedom. Again, if man is compelled to do certain deeds, then on him -has been imposed a task which he cannot bear; and when he is made to -bear a burden, there is no difference between his work and the work -of inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has no power, neither has -the man the power for that which he cannot bear. Hence all people have -made capability one of the conditions for the imposition of a task, -such as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in his _Nizamiyyah_, that -man is free in his own deeds and has the capability of doing them. He -has established it upon the impossibility of imposing a task which one -cannot bear, in order to avoid the principle formerly disproved by the -Mutazilites, on account of its being unfit by reason. The succeeding -Asharites have opposed them. Moreover if man had no power in doing a -deed, then it will be only by chance that he may escape from evil, -and that is meaningless. Such also would be the case with acquiring -goodness. In this way all those arts which lead to happiness, as -agriculture etc., would become useless. So also would become useless -all those arts the purpose of which is protection from, and repulsion -of danger as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine etc. such a -condition is quite contrary to all that is intelligible to man. - -Now it may be asked that if the case is so, how is this contradiction -which is to be found both in tradition and reason to be reconciled we -would say, that apparently the purpose of religion in this problem is -not to divide it into two separate beliefs, but to reconcile them by -means of a middle course, which is the right method. It is evident that -God has created in us power by which we can perform deeds which are -contradictory in their nature. But as this cannot be complete except -by the cause which God has furnished for us, from outside, and the -removal of difficulties from them, the deeds done are only completed -by the conjunction of both these things at the same time. This being -so the deeds attributed to us are done by our intention, and by the -fitness of the causes which are called the _Predestination_ of God, -which He has furnished for us from outside. They neither complete the -works which we intend nor hinder them, but certainly become the cause -of our intending them--one of the two things. For intention is produced -in us by our imagination, or for the verification of a thing, which in -itself is not in our power, but comes into being by causes outside us. -For instance, if we see a good thing, we like it, without intention, -and move towards acquiring it. So also, if we happen to come to a thing -which it is better to shun, we leave it without intention. Hence our -intentions are bound and attached to causes lying outside ourselves. -To this the following words of God, refer “Each of them hath angels, -mutually succeeding each other, before him and behind him; they watch -him by the command of God.”[130] As these outside causes take this -course according to a well defined order and arrangement, and never -go astray from the path which their Creator hath appointed for them, -and our own intentions can neither be compelled, nor ever found, on -the whole, but by _their_ fitness, so it is necessary that actions -too should also be within well-defined limits, that is, they be found -in a given period of time and in a given quantity. This is necessary -because our deeds are only the effects of causes, lying outside us; -and all the effects which result from limited and prearranged causes, -are themselves limited, and are found in a given quantity only. This -relation does not exist only between our actions and outside causes, -but also between them and the causes which God has created in our -body, and the well-defined order existing between the inner and outer -causes. This is what is meant by Fate and predestination, which is -found mentioned in the Quran and is incumbent upon man. This is also -the “Preserved Tablet.”[131] God’s knowledge of these causes, and that -which pertains to them, is the cause of their existence. So no one -can have a full knowledge of these things except God, and hence He -is the only Knower of secrets, which is quite true; as God has said, -“Say, None either in heaven or earth, knoweth that which is hidden -besides God.”[132] A knowledge of causes is a knowledge of secret -things, because the secret is a knowledge of the existence of a thing, -before it comes into being. And as the arrangement and order of causes -bring a thing into existence or not at a certain time, there must be -a knowledge of the existence or non-existence of a thing at a certain -time. A knowledge of the causes as a whole, is the knowledge of what -things would be found or not found at a certain moment of time. Praised -be He, Who has a complete knowledge of creation and all of its causes. -This is what is meant by the “keys of the secret,” in the following -words of God, “with Him are the keys of secret things; none knoweth -them besides Himself.”[133] - -All that we have said being true, it must have become evident how we -can acquire our deeds, and how far they are governed by predestination -and fate. This very reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by -those verses and Traditions which are apparently contradictory. When -their universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions -should vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised -before, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear. The -existent things from our volition are completed by two things: our -intention and the other causes. But when the deeds are referred to -only by one of these agencies, doubts would rise. It may be said is a -good answer, and here reason is in perfect agreement with religion, -but it is based upon the principles that these are agreed that there -are creative causes bringing into existence other things; while the -Muslims are agreed that there is no Creator but God. We would say that -whatever they have agreed upon is quite right, but the objection can -be answered in two ways. One of them is that this objection itself can -be understood in two ways; one of them being that there is no Creator -but God, and all those causes which He has created, cannot be called -creators, except speaking figuratively. Their existence also depends -upon Him. He alone has made them to be causes, nay, He only preserves -their existence as creative agents, and protects their effects after -their actions. He again, produces their essences at the moment when -causes come together. He alone preserves them as a whole. Had there -been no divine protection they could not have existed for the least -moment of time. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that a man who makes -any of the causes to be co-existent with God is like a man who makes -the pen share the work of a scribe in writing; that is, he says -that the pen is a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He means that -_writing_ is a word which may be applied to both, but in reality they -have no resemblance in anything but word, for otherwise there is no -difference between them. Such is also the case with the word _Creator_, -when applied to God and the Causes. We say that in this illustration -there are doubts. It should have been clearly shown, whether the scribe -was the Creator of the essence (_Jawhar_) of pen, a preserver of it, as -long as it remains a pen, and again a preserver of the writing after -it is written, a Creator of it after it has come in touch with the -pen, as we have just explained that God is the Creator of the essences -(_Jawahir_) of everything which come into contact with its causes, which -are so called only by the usage. This is the reason why there is no -creator but God--a reason which agrees with our feelings, reason and -religion. Our feelings and reason see that there are things which -produce others. The order found in the universe is of two kinds: that -which God has put in the nature and disposition of things; and that -which surround the universe from outside. This is quite clear in the -movement of the heavenly bodies. For it is evident that the sun and the -moon, the day and night, and all other stars are obedient to us; and it -is on this arrangement and order which God has put in their movements -that our existence and that of all other things depends. So even if we -imagine the least possible confusion in them, with them in any other -position, size and rapidity of movement which God has made for them, -all the existent things upon the earth would be destroyed. This is so -because of the nature in which God has made them and the nature of the -things which are effected by them. This is very clear in the effects -of the sun and the moon upon things of this world; such also being the -case with the rains, winds, seas and other tangible things. But the -greater effect is produced upon plants, and upon a greater number, -or all, on the animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had there not -been those faculties which God has put in our bodies, as regulating -them that could not exist even for a single moment after birth. But -we say, had there not been the faculties found in all the bodies of -the animals, and plants and those found in the world by the movement -of the heavenly bodies, then they would not have existed at all, not -even for a twinkling of the eye. So praised be the “Sagacious, the -Knowing.”[134] God has called our attention to this fact in His book, -“And He hath subjected the night and the day to your service; and the -sun and the moon and the stars, which are compelled to serve by His -Command;”[135] again, “Say, what think ye, if God should cover you with -perpetual night, until the day of Resurrection;”[136] and again, “Of -His mercy, He hath made you night and the day, that ye may rest in the -one, and may seek to obtain provision for yourselves of His abundance, -by your industry; in the other;”[137] and, “And He obligeth whatever is -in heaven or on earth to serve you.”[138] Further He says, “He likewise -compelleth the sun and the moon, which diligently perform their -courses, to serve you; and hath subjected the day and night to your -service,”[139] There may be quoted many other verses on the subject. -Had there been any wisdom in their existence by which God has favoured -us, and there would not have been those blessings for which we are to -be grateful to Him. - -The second answer to the objection is, that we say that the things -produced out of it are of two kinds: essences and substances; and -movements, hardness, coldness and all other accidents. The essences -and substances are not created by any but God. Their causes effect -the accidents of those essences, and not the essences themselves. For -instance, man and woman are only the agents, while God is the real -creator of the child, and the life in it. Such is also the case with -agriculture. The earth is prepared and made ready for it, and the seed -scattered in it. But it is God who produces the ear of the corn. So -there is no creator but God, while created things are but essences. To -this refer the words of God. “O men, a parable is propounded unto you, -therefore, hearken unto it. Verily the idols which ye invoke, besides -God, can never create a single fly, although they may all assemble for -the purpose; and if the fly snatch anything from them they cannot turn -the same from it. Weak is the petitioner and the petitioned.”[140] -This is where the unbeliever wanted to mislead Abraham, when he said, -“I give life and kill.”[141] When Abraham saw that he could understand -it, he at once turned to the conclusive argument and said, “Verily, God -bringeth the sun from the east; do thou bring it from the west.” - -On the whole, if the matter about the creator and the doer be -understood on this wise, there would be no contradiction, either in -Tradition or in reason. So we say that the word Creator does not -apply to the created things by any near or far-fetched metaphor, for -the meaning of the creator is the inventor of the essences. So God -has said, “God created you, and that which ye know.” It should be -known that one who denies the effect of the causes on the results of -them, also denies philosophy and all the sciences. For science is -the knowledge of the things by their causes, and philosophy is the -knowledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes altogether is a thing -which is unintelligible to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, not -seen by us. For the unseen in this matter must always be understood by -a reference to the seen. - -So those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for -every action there is an actor. It being so, the agreement of the -Muslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect, -if we understand by it the denial of the existence of an agent in the -visible world. For from the existence of the agent in it, we have -brought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we -have once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world, -it becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His -command and will. It is also evident that we can perform our own deeds, -and that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is -the case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the -middle Course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot -find it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling -and the movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their -admitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if -they are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are -compelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling -of hand and voluntary movement, which they would call acquired. So -there is no difference between them, except in their names, which never -effect the things themselves. This is all clear by itself. - -Fourth Problem:--Divine Justice and Injustice. The Asharites have -expressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and -religion; about this problem. They have explained it in a way in which -religion has not, but have adopted quite an opposite method. They -say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite -opposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within -the limits of religious actions, so when a man’s action is just with -regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls -it to be unjust; He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been -imposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within -the four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His -actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there -is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say -that there is nothing which may in itself be called good or bad is -simply intolerable. Justice is known as good, and injustice as bad. -So according to them, polytheism is in itself neither injustice nor -evil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it -would have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with -any kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and -reason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied -injustice to himself. He says “God hath borne witness that there is -no God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom -profess the same, who executeth righteousness;”[142] and “Thy God is -not unjust towards His servants;”[143] and again, “Verily God will not -deal unjustly with men in any respect; but men deal unjustly with their -own souls.”[144] It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading -the people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many -a verse of the Quran, “That He leads as well as misleads the people?” -He says, “God causeth to err whom He pleaseth, and directeth whom -He pleaseth;”[145] and, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given -every soul its direction.”[146] We would say that these verses cannot -be taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently -contradict them--the verses in which God denies injustice to himself. -For instance, He says, “He liketh not ingratitude (_Kufr_) in His -servant.”[147] So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even -from them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement -of the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like, -and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding -such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity. That God has not -misled the people and has not caused them to err will be clear to you -from the following verses: “Wherefore be thou orthodox and set thy -face towards true religion, the institution of God, to which He hath -created man kindly disposed;”[148] and, “when thy Lord drew forth -their posterity from the lions of the sons of Adam.”[149] A Tradition -of the Prophet says, “Every child is born according to the divine -constitution.” - -These being contradictions in this problem we should try to reconcile -them so that they may agree with reason. The verse, “Verily God will -cause to err whom He pleaseth, and will direct whom He pleaseth” -refers to the prearranged divine will, with which all things have -been endowed. They have been created erring, that is, prepared to go -astray by their very nature, and led to it by inner and outer causes. -The meaning of the verse, “If we had pleased, we have given unto every -soul its direction,” is that He thought of not creating people ready to -err, by their nature, or by the outer causes or by both, He could have -done so. But as the dispositions of men are different the words may -mislead the one and direct the other. For these are the verses which -speak of misleading the people. For instance, “He will thereby mislead -many, and will direct many thereby: but He will not mislead any thereby -except the transgressors”[150]; and, “We have appointed the vision -which we showed thee, and also the tree cursed in the Quran,”[151] and -the verses about the number of angels of hell. “Thus doth God cause -to err whom He pleaseth and He directeth whom He pleaseth.”[152] It -means that for evil natures, these verses are misleading, as for the -sick bodies even good drugs are injurious. But some one may object and -ask, what was the need of creating a class of men already prepared -to err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? We would say that -divine wisdom designated it so. The injustice would have consisted in -its being otherwise. For the nature and constitution of men, in His -very creation, are such that they require some men, though very few, -to be wicked and evil by their nature. Such is also the case with the -outer causes, made for directing the people to the right path, which -requires that some men must be bad. If many had been good then the -divine law would not have been fulfilled, because either there had not -been created things in which there is little evil and much good, for -the good would have disappeared on account of that little evil; or -there had been created things with much good and little evil. Now it is -well known that the existence of many good ones with a few evil ones, -is better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of little -evil. This very evil was the thing which remained hidden to the angels -when God informed them that He was going to create upon the earth, a -vicegerent, that is, a man. “When God said to the angels, I am going -to place a substitute on earth, they said, wilt thou place there one -who will do evil therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate thy praise, -and sanctify Thee. God answered, Verily I know that which ye know -not.”[153] He means that the thing which is hidden from them is that -when there is found both good and evil in a thing, and good overpowers -the evil, reason requires the creation of the one for the destruction -of the other. So from all these it is clear how misleading can be -attributed to Him, in spite of His justice, and injustice disproved. -The causes of misleading are created, because from them appear the -causes of direction to good. For some people have not been given causes -of direction to good in which there is found nothing which may lead to -erring. Such is the condition of the angels. So also the causes of good -have those evil, though in their nature much evil be not found; this -applies to man. It may be asked: What is the use of these contradictory -verses, thus compelling the people to take refuge in interpretations, -which you have absolutely forbidden? We would say that to explain this -problem to the common people, they have been compelled to adopt this -method. For they should know that God is just, and that He is the -Creator of all good and evil, instead of believing, as many nations -have done, that there are two Gods, the creator of good, and the -creator of evil. So now they know that He is the Creator of both. As -misleading is evil, and as there is no Creator but He, it was necessary -that it should be attributed to Him, like the creation of evil. But -this should be done without qualifying it, that is, that He created -good for its own sake, and evil for the sake of good--on account of -their connection with one another. In this way His creation of evil -would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has been made because of its -necessity for the existence of things, and without it they could not -have existed at all. It also destroys things by its very nature. But -if you think of the destruction and evil which it causes, and compare -it to the advantages which we derive out of it, you will find that its -existence is better than non-existence, that is,--good. Now the verse -of the Quran “No account shall be demanded of him for what He shall do; -but an account shall be demanded of them,” means that He does nothing -because it is incumbent upon him for it is degrading to him, to need -doing a thing. If it be so, God needs that thing for His own existence, -because of necessity or to be more perfect in His Being--and God is -free from such imperfections. Man is just because he gains something -good by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that -He may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection -requires him to be just. When we understand it in this way it would be -evident, that He is not just in the same way as man is just. But it is -not right to say that He is not just at all, and that all His actions -are neither just nor unjust, as the Mutakallimuns have thought. For -it cannot be understood by human intellect, and is at the same time -falsifying religion. These people knew the meaning but were misled. For -if we say that He is not at all just, we falsify the principle that -there are things which are just and good in themselves and others which -are evil and unjust. Again, if we suppose that He is just in the same -way as man is, it becomes necessary to admit there is some defect in -him. For one who is just, his existence is for the sake of things for -which he is just, and so he is dependent upon another. - -It should now be known that it is not necessary for all the people to -be told this interpretation in its entirety. Only those should be told -it who have some doubts about this problem. For not every one among the -common people is confronted by these contradictions in the universal -verses, and Tradition. Such people must believe in the exoteric -meanings of them. There is another reason for these verses. The common -people cannot differentiate between possible and impossible, while to -God is not ascribed power over the impossible. If they be told what is -impossible (_Mustahil_) and they think that God has power over it, and -then told that God has no power, they begin to think that there is some -defect in God, because He cannot do a certain thing and hence He is -weak. As the existence of things free from evil was possible according -to the masses, God has said, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given -every soul its direction; but the word which hath proceeded from Me -must necessarily be fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the hell -with genii and men, altogether.”[154] This verse means one thing to -the common people, and the other to the learned. The former take it to -mean that it is not incumbent upon him that He should create a class of -men to whom evil may be attached. But it really means: Had we thought -we could create men with whom evil could not be attached, but would -have been good in all and all, and hence every one had been given his -guidance. This much is enough for this problem. Now we would deal with -the fifth question. - -Problem fifth: Of the Conditions of the Day of Judgment:--The Day of -Judgment is a thing in which all the religions are agreed, and all the -learned men have proved it by arguments. The religions differ about -the conditions of its existence; nay, in reality they do not differ -about its condition, but about the visible things by which they should -explain to the common people the conditions of the unseen. There are -some religions which have made it only spiritual, that is, meant only -for the souls; while others have thought it to be both physical and -spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter depends upon the testimony -of divine revelation, and the necessary arguments of all the learned -men, that is, that for a man there are two blessings: of the present -world, and of the world to come, which is itself established upon -principles, admitted by all to be true. One of them is that when it is -clear that all the existent things have not been created in vain, but -for some particular work assigned to them, which is the sum total of -their life, then man is far fitter to be placed under this category. -God himself has warned us of the existence of this purpose in all the -created things. He says in the Quran, “We have created the heavens and -the earth, and whatever is between them, in vain. This is the opinion -of the unbelievers.”[155] Again, He says, describing and praising -the learned men, who have understood, the real and inner purpose of -this existence, “Who remember God standing, and sitting, and lying -on their sides; and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, -saying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee -therefore, deliver us from the torment of hell fire.”[156] The ultimate -purpose in the creation of man is still more evident in him, than in -other things. God has informed us of it in many a verses of the Quran. -He says, “Did ye think that we had created you in sport; and that ye -should not be brought again before us,”[157] and, “Doth man think, that -he shall be left at full liberty, without control?”[158] and further -on He says, “I have not created genii and men for any other end, but -that they should serve me.”[159] That is the genius out of all creation -which could know him. Again, He says, informing us of the importance -of knowing God, “What reason have I that I should not worship him who -hath created me? for unto him shall ye return.”[160] Now it being clear -that man has been created for a certain work, it is evident that the -work should be of a particular kind. For we see that everything has -been created for a certain work, which is found in it, and in none -other; that is, it is specialised in it. This being so, it is necessary -that the real purpose of man’s creation be those deeds which are found -in him, and in no other animal. These deeds pertain to his rational -powers. As there are two portions of the rational powers,--practical -and theoretical--it is evident that the first kind of thing is demanded -of him. That is, that his faculties of knowledge and science should be -found in their perfection. The deed by which soul acquires perfection -in those two faculties are goodness and virtue, and those that retard -it are evil and wicked. And as these actions are most of them fixed by -divine revelation, religions appeared to fix them. With that there also -appears a knowledge of those qualities, exhorting the people towards -them. They ordered men to act upon goodness, and shew evil. They taught -them the quantity of the deeds which will be good for all the people, -both in practice and in knowledge taken together. They also taught -them the theoretical knowledge of things, which all the people should -know, such as the knowledge of God, angels, of higher creation, and of -goodness. In this way they also taught them the quantity of the acts -which would be necessary to make the souls excel in virtue. This is -especially the case with our religion, Islam, for when compared with -other religions, it is found that it is absolutely _the_ best religion. -Hence it was the last of divine dispensations. - -Now divine revelation has informed us in all the religions that the -soul will live, and all the argument of the learned people have -established the same. The souls are freed from physical desires after -death. If they be pure, their purity is doubled by this freedom from -desires. If they be evil this separation increases their depravity, -for they are troubled by the evil which they have already earned, and -their regret increases about the opportunities which they lost before -their separation from the body, for this purification is not possible -without it. It is to this that following verse refers:--A soul would -say, “Alas, for that I have been negligent in my duties towards God: -Verily I have been one of the scorners.”[161] All the religions agree -about this condition of man, and call it his last goodness or misery. -This being so, there could not be found in the visible world anything -which may be given as an illustration, so there is a difference in its -description in the revelations given to different prophets. We mean -to say, that there is a difference in illustrating the condition of -the good and bad soul on that occasion. There are some which have not -given any illustrations of that happiness or misery which the good and -bad souls will have there. They have only said that the conditions -there would be only spiritual, and pleasures angelic. Others have -given instances from the visible world; that is, they have given the -examples of the pleasures here for the pleasures of the next world, -after deducting the trouble borne in acquiring them, and in the same -way, they have illustrated the misery there, by the example of misery -here, after deducting the pleasure which we derive from it. Either the -people of these religions received from God revelations which those did -not receive who made the next world purely spiritual, or they saw, that -illustrations from things visible are best understood by the common -people and that they are best led so or checked from an action through -them. So they said that God will put back the good souls in their -respective bodies, and the best possible ease--in paradise. The bad -souls will also return to their bodies, where they will be in the worst -possible misery, which they call hell-fire. - -This is true of our religion, Islam, in illustrating the conditions -of the next world. There are many verses of the Quran which contain -arguments as to the possibilities of the conditions of that world, -which can be understood and verified by all. For our reason cannot -apprehend these things more than the possibility of knowing which is -common to all, and which is of the kind of analogy of the existence -of the like from the being of the like, that is of its coming into -being. It is an analogy of the coming into being of the small from the -existence of the big and the great. For instance, God says, “And He -propoundeth unto us a comparison and forgetteth His Creation.”[162] -In these verses the argument used is the analogy of the return of the -beginning, when both are equal. In the following verse the argument of -those is refuted who differentiate between the real and _return_ of the -same thing. He says, “He giveth you fire out of a green tree.”[163] -The doubt is that the birth was from heat and moisture, while the -return will be from cold and dryness. So this doubt is met by the fact -that God can create the contrary from the contrary, as He can create -the like from the like. The analogy is drawn from the existence of -the little from the great. For example, God says, “Is not He who has -created the Heavens and the earth able to create new creatures like -unto them! yea, certainly; for He is the wise Creator.”[164] These -verses have two arguments for proving the resurrection and at the same -time refuting the arguments of those denying it. Were we to quote the -verses which give this proof our discourse would be lengthened. But all -of them are of the kind we have mentioned. - -So, as we have already said, all the religions are agreed that there -is a blessing or misery for the human soul after death, but differ in -illustrating the conditions of that moment and in explaining it to -the common people. It seems that the illustration in our religion is -the most perfect of all for the understanding of the people, and at -the same time most inciting of them all to gain for their souls the -advantages of that day. And it is the many with whom lies the primary -purpose of religion. The spiritual illustration would be least inciting -to the common people for desiring the things of hereafter. So they -would have little liking for it, while they would fear the physical -illustration. So it seems that the physical illustration would be most -exciting to them, than the spiritual, while the latter would appeal -only to the controversialists among the scholastic theologians, who are -always very few in number. Hence we find that the Muslims have been -divided into three parties about the meaning of the conditions of the -Day of Judgment. One party says that that existence would be just like -our present one, as regards pleasures and enjoyments, that is, they -think that both are of the same genius, but differ in perpetuity and -termination: the one is for ever and the others come to an end. The -other party thinks that the two existences are different. But this is -again subdivided into two parties. The one thinks that that existence -with our present faculties is spiritual, but has been described as -physical. For this there are many religious arguments which it would -be useless to repeat here. The other party says that that existence is -physical only; but they at the same time believe, that the body will -be different from our present body. This is only transient, that will -be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. It seems that -even Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is related of him that he -said, “There is nought in this world of the hereafter, but names.” It -seems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its -possibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement -according to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the -second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look -so impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because -the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one -body to another, i. e.; one and the same matter is found in many people -and in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for -their matter is the same. For instance a man dies and his body becomes -dissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into -vegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another -man comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then -our aforesaid view cannot be true. - -The truth about this question is that man should follow that which he -himself has thought out but anyhow it should not be the view which -may deny the fundamental principle altogether. For this would be -denying its existence. Such a belief leads to infidelity, on account -of a distinct knowledge of this condition being given to man, both -by religion and by human reason, which is all based upon the eternal -nature of the soul. If it be said whether there is any argument or -information in the Law about this eternal nature of the soul, we would -say that it is found in the Quran itself. God says, “God taketh unto -himself the souls of men at the time of their death; and those which -die not He also taketh in their sleep.”[165] In this verse sleep and -death have been placed upon the same level, on account of the change -in its instrument, and in sleep on account of a change in itself. For -had it not been so it would not have come to its former condition -after awakening. By this means we know that this cession does not -effect its essence, but was only attached to it on account of change -in its instrument. So it does not follow that with a cessation of the -work of the instrument, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is only -a cessation of work, so it is clear that its condition should be like -that of sleep. As someone has said that if an old man were to get the -eyes of the young, he would begin to see like him. - -This is all that we thought of in an exposition of the beliefs of our -religion, Islam. What remains for us is to look into things of religion -in which interpretation is allowed and not allowed. And if allowed, -then who are the people to take advantage of it? With this thing we -would finish our discourse. - -The things found in the Law can be divided into five kinds. But in the -first place, there are only two kinds of things: indivisible and the -divisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind -which is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The -second is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant -but is only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds. -First, the meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that -they can only be known by the far-fetched and compound analogies, -which cannot be understood, but after a long time and much labour. -None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot -be known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by -this far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former: -they can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is -just what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is -merely an illustration, but what it is the example of is difficult to -comprehend. The fourth kind is quite opposite to the former. The thing -of which it is an example, is easily understood; while it is difficult -to know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first -kind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are -far-fetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are -well-grounded in knowledge; and an exposition of it is not fit for any -but the learned. The interpretation of its opposite--that which can be -understood on both the sides--is just what is wanted, and an exposition -of it is necessary. The case of the third kind is like the case of the -above. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the -difficulty for the common people to understand it: it only incites the -people to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet; -“The black stone is God’s action on Earth,” etc. etc. That which can -be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know of which it -is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular -persons and learned men. Those who understand that it is only an -illustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it -illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be -understood by the well-established learned men; or the illustration -should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding. -This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds. - -The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid -(Al Ghazzali) in his book, _Al Tafriga bainal Islam wal Zindiga_. It -should be understood that one thing has five existences which he calls -by the name of _essential_ (_Zati_); sensual (_Hissi_); rational (_Agli_); -imaginative (_Khayali_) and doubtful (_Shilbhi_). So at the time of doubt -it should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy -the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called _essential_ -then an illustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also -included the following traditions of the Prophet, “Whatever the -earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven -and hell.” “Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a -garden of paradise;” and “The earth will eat up the whole of a man -except the extremity of the tail.” All these, it can easily be known -are but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate, -it is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary in this case to -give an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This -kind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but -when used irrelevantly it is wrong. Abu Hamid has not decided about -the occasion when both the sides of the question--the illustration -and the illustrated--be both far-fetched and difficult to understand. -In this case there would apparently be a doubt, but a doubt without -any foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no -basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many -places in our present book against the Mutakallimun, Asharites and the -Mutazalites. - -The fourth kind of occasion is quite opposite to the former. In this -it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when -once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated. -In the interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: about -those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such -and such a thing; but they doubt whether it is an illustration at -all. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them -is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of -the views which they hold about its being an illustration at all. It -is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant -from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the -illustrated. For these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is -given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when -disclosed are denied by the common people, Such has been the case with -the Sufis, and those learned men who have followed them. When this work -of interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between -these occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom -the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion, -at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with -unbelief. All this is pure ignorance of the purpose of the Law. - -From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by -interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire -our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and -when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult -portions of the Law and Traditions are to be explained or not. These -are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated. - -The purpose of our writing this book is now completed. We took -it up because we thought that it was the most important of all -purposes--connected with God and the Law. - - - FOOTNOTES - -[Footnote 25: A translation of _Al-Kashf’an Manhij i’l Adillah fi -Aqaid il Millah, we Tarif ma Waqa fiha bi Hasb i’l Ta’wil min Shubhi’l -Muzighah wa Bid’ill Mudillah_.] - -[Footnote 26: Quran ii, 19.] - -[Footnote 27: Quran xiv, 11.] - -[Footnote 28: Quran xxxix, 39.] - -[Footnote 29: Quran vi, 75.] - -[Footnote 30: Quran xvi, 42.] - -[Footnote 31: Quran ii, 282.] - -[Footnote 32: Quran xxix, 69.] - -[Footnote 33: Quran viii, 29.] - -[Footnote 34: Quran xxii, 72.] - -[Footnote 35: Quran vii, 184.] - -[Footnote 36: Quran lxxvii, 6-16.] - -[Footnote 37: Quran xxv, 62.] - -[Footnote 38: Quran lxxx, 24.] - -[Footnote 39: Quran lxxxvi, 6.] - -[Footnote 40: Quran lxxxviii, 17.] - -[Footnote 41: Quran xxii, 72.] - -[Footnote 42: Quran vi, 79. The story referred to will be found in the -preceding verses.] - -[Footnote 43: Quran ii, 19.] - -[Footnote 44: Quran xxxvi, 33.] - -[Footnote 45: Quran iii, 188.] - -[Footnote 46: Quran vii, 171.] - -[Footnote 47: Quran iii, 16.] - -[Footnote 48: Quran xvii, 46.] - -[Footnote 49: Quran xxi, 22.] - -[Footnote 50: Quran xxiii, 93.] - -[Footnote 51: Quran xvii, 44.] - -[Footnote 52: Quran ii, 256.] - -[Footnote 53: Quran xvii, 45, 46.] - -[Footnote 54: Quran lxxvii, 14.] - -[Footnote 55: Quran vi, 59.] - -[Footnote 56: Quran xix, 65.] - -[Footnote 57: Quran xvi, 42.] - -[Footnote 58: Quran xlii, 50.] - -[Footnote 59: Quran liii, 8, 10.] - -[Footnote 60: Quran iv, 162.] - -[Footnote 61: Quran xix, 43.] - -[Footnote 62: Quran xxi, 67.] - -[Footnote 63: Quran v, 77.] - -[Footnote 64: Quran xlii, 9.] - -[Footnote 65: Quran xvi, 17.] - -[Footnote 66: Quran xxv, 60.] - -[Footnote 67: Quran ii, 256.] - -[Footnote 68: Quran xx, 54.] - -[Footnote 69: Quran xxxv, 39.] - -[Footnote 70: Quran xxx, 29.] - -[Footnote 71: Quran xxxv, 41.] - -[Footnote 72: Quran ii, 256.] - -[Footnote 73: Quran xlii, 9.] - -[Footnote 74: Quran xliv, 2.] - -[Footnote 75: Quran xxxv, 10.] - -[Footnote 76: Quran lxx, 4.] - -[Footnote 77: Quran lxxxix, 23.] - -[Footnote 78: Quran xvii, 87.] - -[Footnote 79: Quran ii, 260.] - -[Footnote 80: Quran xxiv, 35.] - -[Footnote 81: He also saw him another time, by the lote-tree, beyond -which there is no passing: near it is the garden of eternal abode. -_When the lote-tree covered that which it covered_, his eye-sight -turned not aside, nor did it wander: and he really beheld some of the -greater signs of his Lord. (Quran lii, 16, 18.) The lote-tree is the -limit beyond which neither angel nor man can pass. It stands in the -seventh heaven, on the right hand of the Throne of God.] - -[Footnote 82: Quran lxix, 17.] - -[Footnote 83: Quran xxxii, 2.] - -[Footnote 84: Quran lxx, 4.] - -[Footnote 85: Quran lxvii, 16.] - -[Footnote 86: Quran xl, 59.] - -[Footnote 87: Quran iii, 5.] - -[Footnote 88: Quran ii, 24.] - -[Footnote 89: Quran iii, 5.] - -[Footnote 90: Quran vi, 103.] - -[Footnote 91: They will ask the concerning the Soul: answer, The Soul -was created at the command of my Lord: but ye have no knowledge given -unto you, except a little.--(Quran xxii, 85.)] - -[Footnote 92: Quran lxxvii, 3, et. seq.] - -[Footnote 93: Quran ii, 99.] - -[Footnote 94: Quran xxi, 33.] - -[Footnote 95: Quran lxxi, 14-16.] - -[Footnote 96: Quran xxvii, 90.] - -[Footnote 97: Quran lxvii, 3.] - -[Footnote 98: Quran iii, 88.] - -[Footnote 99: Quran xi, 9.] - -[Footnote 100: Quran vii, 52.] - -[Footnote 101: Quran xli, 10.] - -[Footnote 102: Quran iii, 5.] - -[Footnote 103: Quran ii, 8.] - -[Footnote 104: Quran xvii, 92-95.] - -[Footnote 105: Quran, xvii, 61.] - -[Footnote 106: Quran xvii, 90.] - -[Footnote 107: Quran xi, 16.] - -[Footnote 108: Quran iv, 161, 162.] - -[Footnote 109: Quran xlvi, 8.] - -[Footnote 110: Quran iv, 173.] - -[Footnote 111: Quran iv, 168.] - -[Footnote 112: Quran iv, 160.] - -[Footnote 113: Quran iv, 164.] - -[Footnote 114: Quran xxix, 47.] - -[Footnote 115: Quran lxii, 2.] - -[Footnote 116: Quran vii, 156.] - -[Footnote 117: Quran vii, 156.] - -[Footnote 118: Quran liv, 49.] - -[Footnote 119: Quran xiii, 9.] - -[Footnote 120: Quran lvii, 22.] - -[Footnote 121: Quran xlii, 32.] - -[Footnote 122: Quran xlii, 32.] - -[Footnote 123: Quran x, 28.] - -[Footnote 124: Quran ii, 278.] - -[Footnote 125: Quran xli, 16.] - -[Footnote 126: Quran iii, 159.] - -[Footnote 127: Quran iii, 160.] - -[Footnote 128: Quran iv, 81.] - -[Footnote 129: Quran iv, 80.] - -[Footnote 130: Quran xiii, 12.] - -[Footnote 131: Quran lxxxv, 22.] - -[Footnote 132: Quran xxvii, 67.] - -[Footnote 133: Quran vi, 59.] - -[Footnote 134: Quran lxvii, 14.] - -[Footnote 135: Quran xvi, 12.] - -[Footnote 136: Quran xxviii, 71.] - -[Footnote 137: Quran xviii, 73.] - -[Footnote 138: Quran xlv, 12.] - -[Footnote 139: Quran xiv, 37.] - -[Footnote 140: Quran xxii, 72.] - -[Footnote 141: “Hast thou not considered him who disputed with Abraham -concerning his Lord, because God had given him the Kingdom? When -Abraham Said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered, -I give life and kill, Abraham said, verily God bringeth the sun from -the east do thou bring it from the west; whereupon the infidel was -confounded; for God directeth not the ungodly people.” Quran ii, 260.] - -[Footnote 142: Quran iii, 16.] - -[Footnote 143: Quran xli, 46.] - -[Footnote 144: Quran x, 45.] - -[Footnote 145: Quran xiv, 4.] - -[Footnote 146: Quran xxxii, 11.] - -[Footnote 147: Quran xxxix, 9.] - -[Footnote 148: Quran xxx, 29.] - -[Footnote 149: Quran vii, 171.] - -[Footnote 150: Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a -parable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for they who -believe will know it to be true from their Lord; but the unbelievers -will say, what meaneth by this parable? He will thereby mislead etc. -(Quran ii, 24).] - -[Footnote 151: Quran xvii, 62. By the _vision_ may be meant the -Prophet’s night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at -Hudaibiyyah, seeing himself entering Mecca or his vision about the -Omayyeds.] - -[Footnote 152: Quran lxxiv, 34.] - -[Footnote 153: Quran ii, 28.] - -[Footnote 154: Quran xxxii, 14.] - -[Footnote 155: Quran xxxviii, 26.] - -[Footnote 156: Quran iii, 188.] - -[Footnote 157: Quran xxiii, 117.] - -[Footnote 158: Quran lxxv, 36.] - -[Footnote 159: Quran li, 56.] - -[Footnote 160: Quran xxxvi, 21.] - -[Footnote 161: Quran xxxix, 57.] - -[Footnote 162: Quran xxxvi, 78.] - -[Footnote 163: Quran xxxvi, 80.] - -[Footnote 164: Quran xxxxvi, 81.] - -[Footnote 165: Quran xxxix, 43.] - - - Transcriber’s Notes - -The cover image was created by the transcriber, and is placed in the -Public Domain. Obvious typographical errors and variable spelling -were corrected. Quran reference formatting has been made uniform to -e.g. “Quran xxv, 60.” The following corrections have been made to the -text: - - Page Original New - ---------------------------------------------------------------- - 14 cogniscance cognisance - 28 heavena heavens - 30 concensus consensus - 53 cogniscance cognisance - 60 necessarry necessary - 60 shonld should - 60 interpretes interprets - 64 Qnran Quran - 67 tbe the - 69 Mutazalites Mutazilites - 71 Mutakallimum Mutakallimun - 76 he be - 91 upo upon - 97 nevertheles nevertheless - 98 nonexistent non-existent - 129 no not - 135 s is - 137 controvertialist controversialist - 143 Mutakalimun Mutakallimun - 147 bows bows’ - 161 Quran Quran xxx, 28. [Footnote 46] - 162 Quran Quran xxxv, 41. [Footnote 47] - 166 ii 10 [Footnote 51] - 174 Maati Maali - 186 by be - 193 Quran Quran vi, 103. [Footnote 66] - 194 th the - 198 imposible impossible - 207 excep except [Footnote 67] - 219 beeause because - 222 pre-arranged prearranged - 244 there-of thereof - 251 repeatsd repeated - 251 appearence appearance - 257 Qnran Quran [Footnote 93] - 259 distingished distinguished - 261 Quran LIVI Quran liv, - 262 Quarn Quran [Footnote 102] - 265 Mutazlites Mutazilites - 265 intellegible intelligible - 266 perfom perform - 266 use us - 269 YXVII XXVII [Footnote 108] - 270 things things: - 274 [Removed duplicate footnote 111. Numbers - of the subsequent footnotes corrected.] - 276 [118] [Removed second, unused footnote anchor] - 277 alsays always - 277 in an - 278 thay they - 278 their there - 278 there their - 279 Injusitce Injustice - 280 [Added footnote anchors, - footnotes on next page] - 282 [Added footnote anchors] - 282 Quran, XXXV, 9 [Removed footnote, as no matching - quran quote was found in the text] - 283 [Added footnote anchors] - 285 in-spite in spite - 285 [Added footnote anchor] - 286 contradictary contradictory - 286 Crertor Creator - 286 attributd attributed - 289 131 Quran, XXX, 14. 131 Quran, XXXII, 14. - 292 that That - 293 theoratical theoretical - 295 that is, ... world; [Removed duplicate part] - 296 mirsery misery - 296 possiblities possibilities - 299 divded divided - 300 enternal eternal - 300 reilgious religious - 304 farfetched far-fetched - 305 than then - 306 occassion occasion - 306 irrelevently irrelevantly - 306 Mutazalites Mutazilites - 307 man men - 308 interperetation interpretation - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF -AVERROES *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/old/65708-0.zip b/old/65708-0.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index ac1f187..0000000 --- a/old/65708-0.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/65708-h.zip b/old/65708-h.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index c8ec616..0000000 --- a/old/65708-h.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/65708-h/65708-h.htm b/old/65708-h/65708-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index 7279427..0000000 --- a/old/65708-h/65708-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9570 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" - "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> - <head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> - <title> - The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes—A Project Gutenberg eBook - </title> - <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> - <style type="text/css"> - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - - h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { - text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ - clear: both; -} - -h2 { -font-size: 125%; -} - -p { - margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em; - text-indent: 1.5em; -} - - -.p1 {margin-top: 1em;} -.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} -.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} -.p6 {margin-top: 6em;} -.p8 {margin-top: 8em;} - -.b2 {margin-bottom: 2em;} - -.wi {text-indent: 3em;} - -hr { - width: 33%; - margin-top: 2em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - margin-left: 33.5%; - margin-right: 33.5%; - clear: both; -} - -hr.tb {width: 45%; margin-left: 27.5%; margin-right: 27.5%;} -hr.chap {width: 65%; margin-left: 17.5%; margin-right: 17.5%;} - -div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} -h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} - -table { - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; -} - - -.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - text-indent: 0em; - left: 92%; - font-size: smaller; - text-align: right; - font-style: normal; - font-weight: normal; - font-variant: normal; - color: silver -} /* page numbers */ - - -.center {text-align: center;} - -.right {text-align: right;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} - -.allsmcap {font-variant: small-caps; text-transform: lowercase;} - -.large {font-size: 150%} - -.mlarge {font-size: 125%} - -.medium {font-size: 85%} - -.small {font-size: 60%} - -.lh {line-height: 1.5;} - - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} - -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: - none; -} - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:5em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; } - - </style> - </head> -<body> - -<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes, by Averroes</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes</p> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Averroes</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Mohammad Jamil-Ur-Rehman</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: June 27, 2021 [eBook #65708]</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Wouter Franssen and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</div> - -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF AVERROES ***</div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3"></a>[3]</span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div><i>The Gaekwad Studies<br /> -in<br /> -Religion and Philosophy: XI.</i></div> - -<h1 class="p4 b2 large">THE<br /> -PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY<br /> -OF AVERROES</h1> - -<div class="center p8">Printed by Manibhai Mathurbhai Gupta at the “Arya -Sudharak” Printing Press, Raopura, Baroda, and -Published by A. G. Widgery, the College, Baroda<br /> -1-1-1921</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5"></a>[5]</span> -</p> -<div class="center large"> -<b>THE<br /> -PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY<br /> -OF AVERROES</b></div> - -<div class="center p2">Tractata translated from the Arabic</div> - -<div class="center mlarge p4">By</div> - -<p class="center">MOHAMMAD JAMIL-UR-REHMAN <span class="allsmcap">M. A.</span></p> - -<div class="center">Professor of Islamic History, Hyderabad<br /> -Formerly Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study -of Religions, Baroda.</div> - -<div class="center p6 large"><b>BARODA</b> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7"></a>[7]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="center">DEDICATION<br /> -to<br /> -<span class="smcap">Dr.</span> AZIMUDDIN AHMAD</h2> -</div> - - -<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,</p> - -<p class="wi">It was at your feet that I first -learned to appreciate historical and literary -research, and the following pages -constitute the earliest fruits of that -literary labour of mine the impetus for -which I am proud to have received from -you. I crave your indulgence for my -taking the liberty of dedicating the same -to your revered name, with the hope -that it will not fail to attract the same -generous sympathy from you as you -have always shown to your pupil.</p> - -<div class="right"> -<span class="smcap">Mohammad Jamil ur Rehman</span> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9"></a>[9]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2>PREFACE</h2> -</div> - - -<p>It was as a Fellow of the Seminar -for the Comparative Study of Religions -at the College, Baroda, that the present -work was begun. The subject was taken -up in the first place as a parallel study -to that contained in a paper in the -Indian Philosophical Review, Volume II, -July 1918, pp. 24-32 entitled “Maimonides -and the Attainment of Religious -Truth.” But as I proceeded with my -investigation I thought it might be best -to let Averroes speak for himself. For -this reason I have here translated certain -treatises of Averroes, as edited in the -Arabic text by D. H. Muller in “Philosophie -und Theologie von Averroes.” -Munich 1859. I am confident that the -book will prove an interesting one and -will explain itself to the reader without -any introduction on my part.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10"></a>[10]</span> -Though owing to my appointment -at Hyderabad I resigned my position at -Baroda soon after commencing this work -I wish here to express my thanks to -Professor Alban G. Widgery of Baroda -for his constant sympathy with and -encouragement for my work in and -out of the Seminar. He has also kindly -accepted the book for inclusion in the -Gaekwad Studies in Religion and Philosophy. -I am indebted to him for a -complete revision of the manuscript and -for the onerous work of seeing the book -through the press. I am also indebted -to my brother Mutazid Wali ur Rehman, -<span class="allsmcap">B.A.</span> for valuable help in rendering many -obscure passages.</p> - -<div class="right"> -<span class="smcap">Mohammad Jamil ur Rehman</span><br /> -</div> -<div> -<i>Osmania University,<br /> -Hyderabad.</i><br /> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11"></a>[11]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - - -<div> -<table summary="Table of Contents"> -<tr> -<td><a href="#I">I. A Decisive Discourse on the Delineation of -the Relation between Religion and -Philosophy.</a></td> -<td class="right"><a href="#Page_13">13</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href="#Ia">Ia. Appendix: On the Problem of -Eternal Knowledge which Averroes -has mentioned in his Decisive -Discourse.</a></td> -<td class="right"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href="#II">II. An Exposition of the Methods of Argument -concerning the Doctrines of the -Faith, and a Determination of Doubts -and misleading Innovation brought -into the Faith through Interpretations.</a></td> -<td class="right"><a href="#Page_83">83</a></td> -</tr> -</table> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12"></a>[12]</span></p> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="I">I<br /> -A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION<br /> -OF THE<br /> -RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY</h2> -<hr class="chap" /> -</div> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">[13]</a></span> -</p> - -<div class="center mlarge"> -<b>A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION<br /> -<span class="small">OF THE</span><br /> -RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.</b><a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a><br /> -</div> - - -<p class="p1">And after: Praise be to God for all -His praiseworthy acts, and blessings on -Mohammad, His slave, the Pure, the -Chosen One and His Apostle. The -purpose of the following treatise is to -inquire through sacred Law<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> whether the -learning of philosophy and other sciences -appertaining thereto is permitted, or -called dangerous, or commended by the -Law, and if commended, is it only -approved or made obligatory.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14"></a>[14]</span> -We maintain that the business of -philosophy is nothing other than to look -into creation and to ponder over it in -order to be guided to the Creator,—in -other words, to look into the meaning -of existence. For the knowledge of -creation leads to the cognisance of the -Creator, through the knowledge of the -created. The more perfect becomes the -knowledge of creation, the more perfect -becomes the knowledge of the Creator. -The Law encourages and exhorts us to -observe creation. Thus, it is clear that -this is to be taken either as a religious -injunction or as something approved by -the Law. But the Law urges us to -observe creation by means of reason and -demands the knowledge thereof through -reason. This is evident from different -verses of the Quran. For example the -Quran says: “Wherefore take example -<i>from them</i>, ye who have eyes.”<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> That is -a clear indication of the necessity of -using the reasoning faculty, or rather<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15"></a>[15]</span> -both reason and religion, in the interpretation -of things. Again it says: -“Or do they not contemplate the kingdom -of heaven and earth and the things -which God hath created.”<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> This is a -plain exhortation to encourage the use -of observation of creation. And remember -that one whom God especially distinguishes -in this respect, Abraham, the -prophet. For He says: “And this did -we show unto Abraham: the kingdom -of heaven and earth.”<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Further He says: -“Do they not consider the camels, how -they are created; and the heaven, how -it is raised.”<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Or still again: “And (who) -meditate on the creation of heaven and -earth, saying, O Lord thou hast not -created this in vain.”<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> There are many -other verses on this subject: too numerous -to be enumerated.</p> - -<p>Now, it being established that the -Law makes the observation and consideration -of creation by reason obligatory—and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16"></a>[16]</span> -consideration is nothing but to make -explicit the implicit—this can only be -done through reason. Thus we must -look into creation with the reason. -Moreover, it is obvious that the observation -which the Law approves and encourages -must be of the most perfect -type, performed with the most perfect -kind of reasoning. As the Law emphasises -the knowledge of God and His -creation by inference, it is incumbent -on any who wish to know God and His -whole creation by inference, to learn the -kinds of inference, their conditions and -that which distinguishes philosophy from -dialectic and exhortation from syllogism. -This is impossible unless one -possesses knowledge beforehand of the -various kinds of reasoning and learns to -distinguish between reasoning and what -is not reasoning. This cannot be done -except one knows its different parts, -that is, the different kinds of premises.</p> - -<p>Hence, for a believer in the Law and -a follower of it, it is necessary to know<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17"></a>[17]</span> -these things before he begins to look into -creation, for they are like instruments -for observation. For, just as a student -discovers by the study of the law, the -necessity of knowledge of legal reasoning -with all its kinds and distinctions, a -student will find out by observing the -creation the necessity of metaphysical -reasoning. Indeed, he has a greater -claim on it than the jurist. For if -a jurist argues the necessity of legal -reasoning from the saying of God: -“Wherefore take example <i>from them</i> O -ye who have eyes,”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> a student of divinity -has a better right to establish the same -from it on behalf of metaphysical -reasoning.</p> - -<p>One cannot maintain that this kind -of reasoning is an innovation in religion -because it did not exist in the early -days of Islam. For legal reasoning and -its kinds are things which were invented -also in later ages, and no one thinks -they are innovations. Such should also<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18"></a>[18]</span> -be our attitude towards philosophical -reasoning. There is another reason why -it should be so, but this is not the -proper place to mention it. A large -number of the followers of this religion -confirm philosophical reasoning, all except -a small worthless minority, who argue -from religious ordinances. Now, as it is -established that the Law makes the -consideration of philosophical reasoning -and its kinds as necessary as legal -reasoning, if none of our predecessors -has made an effort to enquire into it, -we should begin to do it, and so help -them, until the knowledge is complete. -For if it is difficult or rather impossible -for one person to acquaint himself single-handed -with all things which it is -necessary to know in legal matters, it is -still more difficult in the case of philosophical -reasoning. And, if before us, -somebody has enquired into it, we should -derive help from what he has said. It is -quite immaterial whether that man is -our co-religionist or not; for the instrument<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19"></a>[19]</span> -by which purification is perfected -is not made uncertain in its usefulness, -by its being in the hands of one of our -own party, or of a foreigner, if it -possesses the attributes of truth. By -these latter we mean those Ancients -who investigated these things before the -advent of Islam.</p> - -<p>Now, such is the case. All that is -wanted in an enquiry into philosophical -reasoning has already been perfectly -examined by the Ancients. All that is -required of us is that we should go back -to their books and see what they have -said in this connection. If all that they -say be true, we should accept it and if -there be something wrong, we should -be warned by it. Thus, when we have -finished this kind of research we shall -have acquired instruments by which we -can observe the universe, and consider -its general character. For so long as -one does not know its general character -one cannot know the created, and so long -as he does not know the created, he can<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20"></a>[20]</span> -have no knowledge of the Creator. Thus -we must begin an inquiry into the -universe systematically, such as we have -learned from the trend of rational inference. -It is also evident that this aim -is to be attained by the investigation of -one part of the universe after another, -and that help must be derived from -predecessors, as is the case in other -sciences. Imagine that the science of -geometry and astronomy had become -extinct in our day, and a single individual -desired to find out by himself the -magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their -forms, and their distances from one -another. Even though he were the most -sagacious of men, it would be as impossible -for him as to ascertain the proportion -of the sun and the earth and the -magnitude of the other stars. It would -only be attainable by aid of divine -revelation, or something like it. If it be -said to him that the sun is a hundred -and fifty or sixty times as big as the -earth, he would take it to be sheer madness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21"></a>[21]</span> -on the part of the speaker, though -it is an established fact in the science of -astronomy, so that no one learned in -that science will have any doubt about it.</p> - -<p>The science which needs most examples -from other sciences is that of Law. For -the study of jurisprudence cannot be -completed except in a very long time. -If a man today would himself learn of -all the arguments discovered by the -different disputants of diverse sects, in -problems which have always excited -contentions in all the big cities, except -those of Al-Maghrib, he would be a -proper object to be laughed at on account -of the impossibility of the task, in spite -of the existence of every favourable circumstance. -This is similar not only in -the sciences but also in the arts. For -no one is capable of discovering by himself -alone everything which is required. -And if this is so in other sciences and -arts, how is it possible in the art of -arts—philosophy?</p> - -<p>This being so, it becomes us to go<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22"></a>[22]</span> -back to the Ancients, and to see what -observations and considerations they have -made into the universe, according to the -tests of inference. We should consider -what they have said in this connection -and proved in their books, so that whatever -may be true in them we may accept -and, while thanking them, be glad to know -it, and whatever be wrong, we should -be warned by it, be cautioned, and hold -them excused for their mistake.</p> - -<p>From what has been said, it may be -taken that a search into the books of -the Ancients is enjoined by the Law, -when their meaning and purpose be the -same as that to which the Law exhorts -us. Anyone who prevents a man from -pondering over these things, that is, a -man who has the double quality of -natural sagacity and rectitude in the -Law, with the merit of learning and -disposition—turns away the people from -the door by which the Law invites -them to enter into the knowledge of -God, and that is the door of observation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23"></a>[23]</span> -which leads to the perfect knowledge of -God. Such an action is the extreme -limit of ignorance and of remoteness -from God.</p> - -<p>If, by studying these books, a man -has been led astray and gone wrong on -account of some natural defect, bad -training of the mind, inordinate passion, -or the want of a teacher who might -explain to him the true significance of -things, by all or some of these causes, -we ought not on this account to prevent -one fit to study these things from doing -so. For such harm is not innate in man, -but is only an accident of training.</p> - -<p>It is not right that a drug which is -medically useful by its nature should be -discarded because it may prove harmful -by accident. The Prophet told a man -whose brother was suffering with diarrhea -to treat him with honey. But this only -increased the ailment. On his complaining, -the Prophet said: “God was right -and thy brother’s stomach was wrong.” -We would even say that a man who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24"></a>[24]</span> -prevents another fit for it, from studying -the books of philosophy, because -certain worthless people have been misled -by them, is like a man who refused -a thirsty man cold and sweet water, -till he died, because some people under -the same circumstances have been -suffocated by it and have died. For -death by suffocation through drinking -cold water is accidental, while by thirst -it is natural and inevitable.</p> - -<p>This state of things is not peculiar -to this science only, but is common to -all. How many jurists there are in -whom jurisprudence has become the cause -of worldliness and lack of piety? We -should say that a large majority of jurists -are of this kind, although their science -should result in better action than other -sciences which only lead to better -knowledge.</p> - -<p>So far, then, the position is established. -Now, we Muslims firmly believe -that our Law is divine and true. This -very Law urges us and brings us to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25"></a>[25]</span> -that blessing which is known as the -knowledge of God, and His creation. -This is a fact to which every Muslim -will bear testimony by his very nature -and temperament. We say this, because -temperaments differ in believing: one will -believe through philosophy; while another -will believe through dogmatic discourse, -just as firmly as the former, as -no other method appeals to his nature. -There are others who believe by exhortation -alone, just as others believe through -inferences. For this reason our divine -Law invites people by all the three -methods, which every man has to satisfy, -except those who stubbornly refuse to -believe, or those, according to whom -these divine methods have not been -established on account of the waywardness -of their hearts. This is why the -mission of the Prophet has been declared -common to the whole world, for his Law -comprises all the three methods leading -men towards God. What we say is quite -clear from the following saying of God:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26"></a>[26]</span> -“Invite men unto the way of the Lord, -by wisdom and mild exhortation, and -dispute with them in the most condescending -manner.”<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<p>As this Law is true and leads to the -consideration of the knowledge of God, -we Muslims should believe that rational -investigation is not contrary to Law, for -truth cannot contradict truth, but verifies -it and bears testimony to it. And -if that is so, and rational observation is -directed to the knowledge of any existent -objects, then the Law may be found -to be silent about it, or concerned with -it. In the former case no dispute arises, -as it would be equivalent to the absence -of its mention in the Law as injunctory, -and hence the jurist derives it from legal -conjecture. But if the Law speaks of it, -either it will agree with that which has -been proved by inference, or else it will -disagree with it. If it is in agreement -it needs no comment, and if it is opposed -to the Law, an interpretation is to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27"></a>[27]</span> -sought. Interpretation means to carry -the meaning of a word from its original -sense to a metaphorical one. But this -should be done in such a manner as will -not conflict with the custom of the -Arabian tongue. It is to avoid the -naming of an object, by simply mentioning -its like, its cause, its attribute, or -associate, etc. which are commonly quoted -in the definition of the different kinds of -metaphorical utterances. And if the -jurist does so in many of the legal -injunctions, how very befitting would it -be for a learned man to do the same -with his arguments. For the jurist has -only his fanciful conjectures to depend -upon, while a learned man possesses -positive ones.</p> - -<p>We hold it to be an established -truth that if the Law is apparently -opposed to a truth proved by philosophy -it admits of an interpretation -according to the canons of the Arabic -language. This is a proposition which -a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28"></a>[28]</span> -cannot mistrust. One who is accustomed -to these things divine can experience -for himself what we have said. The -aim of this discourse is to bring together -intellectual and traditional science. -Indeed, we would even say that no -logical conclusion will be found to be -opposed to the Law, which when sifted -and investigated in its different parts -will be found in accordance, or almost -so, with it.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>That is why all Muslims are agreed -that all the words of the Law are not -to be taken literally, nor all of them -given an interpretation. But they vary -in verses, which are or are not to be -interpreted. For example, the Asharites -put an interpretation upon the verse of -Equalisation<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> and on the Tradition of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29"></a>[29]</span> -Descent,<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> while the Hanbalites take them -literally. The Law has made two sides -of these—exoteric and esoteric—because of -the differences of human nature and -minds in verifying a thing. The existence -of an opposed esoteric meaning is in -order to call the attention of the learned -to find out a comprehensive interpretation. -To this the following verse of the -Quran refers: “It is he who hath sent -down unto thee the book, wherein are -some verses clear to be understood—they -are the foundation of the book—and -others are parabolical. But they -whose hearts are perverse will follow -that which is parabolical therein, out of -love of schism, and a desire of the -interpretation thereof; yet none knoweth -the interpretation thereof except God. -But they who are well grounded in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30"></a>[30]</span> -knowledge say: We believe therein, the -whole is from our Lord, and none will -consider except the prudent.”<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>Here it may be objected that in the -Law there are things which all Muslims -have agreed to take esoterically, while -there are others on which they have -agreed to put an interpretation, while -there are some about which they disagree. -Is it justifiable to use logic in -the interpretation of those which have -been taken literally, or otherwise? We -would say that if the agreement is positive -there is no need to apply logic; -but if it be conjectural there is. For -this very reason Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) -and Abu Ma’ali and other learned -doctors have ordained that a man does -not become an unbeliever by forsaking -the common agreement and applying the -principle of interpretation in such things. -It will certainly be agreed that complete -consensus of opinion is not possible in -metaphysical questions, in the manner in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31"></a>[31]</span> -which it is possible to establish it in -practical things. For it is not possible -to establish unanimity of opinion at any -time, unless we confine ourselves to a -small period and know perfectly all the -learned doctors living in it, that is, their -personalities, their number and their -views about any question to be quoted -to us directly from them without a break -in the chain. With all this we should -know for certain that the doctors living -at that time are agreed that there is no -distinction of exoteric and esoteric meanings -in the Law, that the knowledge of -no proposition should be concealed -from anybody, and that the method of -teaching the Law should be the same -with all men. But we know that a -large number of people in the early days -of Islam believed in exoteric and esoteric -meanings of the Law, and thought that -the esoteric meanings should not be disclosed -to an ignorant person who cannot -understand them. For example, Bukhari -has related on the authority of Ali that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32"></a>[32]</span> -he said “Talk to men what they can -understand. Do you intend to give the -lie to God and His Apostle?” There -are many Traditions to the same effect -related from other people. So, how is -it possible to conceive of any consensus -of opinion coming down to us in metaphysical -questions when we definitely -know that in every age there have been -doctors who take the Law to contain -things the real significance of which -should not be disclosed to all men? But -in practical affairs it is quite different. -For all persons are of opinion that they -should be revealed to all men alike. In -these things unanimity of opinion can -be easily obtained if the proposition is -published, and no disagreement is reported. -That may be sufficient to obtain -unanimity of opinion in practical things -as distinct from the sciences.</p> - -<p>If it be maintained that one does -not become an unbeliever by ignoring -consensus of opinion in interpretation, as -no unanimity is possible in it, what shall<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33"></a>[33]</span> -we say of such Muslim philosophers as -Abu Nasr (Al Farabi) and Ibn Sina -(Avicenna)? For Abu Hamid (Al -Ghazzali) has charged them with positive -infidelity in his book: <i>The Refutation -of the Philosophers</i>, in regard to -three things: The eternity of the -world; God’s ignorance of particulars; -and the interpretation concerning the -resurrection of bodies and the state of -the Day of Judgment. To this we should -reply that from what he has said it is -not clear that he has charged them -positively with infidelity. For in his -book <i>Al Tafriqah bain’al Islami w’al -Zindiqah</i> he has explained that the -infidelity of a man who ignores the -consensus of opinion is doubtful. Moreover -we have definitely pointed out that -it is not possible to establish a consensus -of opinion in such matters, especially -when there are many people of the early -times who have held that there are interpretations -which should not be disclosed -to all but only to those who are fit for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34"></a>[34]</span> -them and those are men who are “well -grounded in knowledge”<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>, a divine injunction -which cannot be overlooked. -For if such people do not know the -interpretation in these matters they will -have no special criterion of truth for -their faith, which the common people -have not, while God has described them -as believing in Him. This kind of faith -is always produced by the acceptance of -the arguments, and that is not possible -without a knowledge of interpretation. -Otherwise, even the common people -believe in the words of God without -any philosophy whatever. The faith -which the Quran has especially ascribed -to the learned must be a faith strengthened -with full arguments, which cannot -be without a knowledge of the canons -of interpretation. For God has said that -the Law admits of interpretation which -is its real significance, and this is what -is established by arguments. Yet though -this is so, it is impossible to establish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35"></a>[35]</span> -any well grounded consensus of opinion -in the interpretations which God has -ascribed to the learned men. That is -quite evident to anyone with insight. -But with this we see that Abu Hamid -(Al Ghazzali) has made a mistake in -ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers -the opinion that God has no knowledge -of particulars. They are only of opinion -that the knowledge of God about particulars -is quite different from ours. For our -knowledge is the effect of the existence -of a thing. Such knowledge is produced -by the existence of a thing, and changes -with changes in the thing. On the -other hand the knowledge of God is the -cause of an existent thing. Thus one -who compares these two kinds of knowledge -ascribes the same characteristics -to two quite different things—and that -is extreme ignorance. When applied both -to eternal and to transitory things the -word <i>knowledge</i> is used only in a formal -fashion, just as we use many other words -for objects essentially different. For<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36"></a>[36]</span> -instance the word <i>Jalal</i> is applied both -to great and small; and <i>sarim</i> to light -and darkness. We have no definition -which can embrace both these kinds of -knowledge, as some of the Mutakallimun -of our times have thought. We have -treated this question separately at the -request of some of our friends.</p> - -<p>How can it be supposed that the -Peripatetic Philosophers say that God -has no knowledge of particulars when they -are of opinion that man is sometimes -warned of the coming vicissitudes of the -future through visions, and that he gets -these admonitions in sleep, through a -great and powerful Director, who directs -everything? These philosophers are not -only of opinion that God has no knowledge -of details such as we have but -they also believe that He is ignorant -of universals. For all known universals -with us are also the effect of the existence -of a thing, while God’s knowledge -is quite other than this. From these -arguments it is concluded that God’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37"></a>[37]</span> -knowledge is far higher than that it -should be called universal or particular. -There is therefore no difference of opinion -concerning the proposition, that is, -whether they are called infidel or not.</p> - -<p>As to the eternal or transitory nature -of the world: I think that in this -matter the difference of opinion between -the Asharite Mutakallimun and the -Ancient Philosophers is for the most -part a verbal difference, at least so far -as the opinion of some of the Ancients -is concerned. For they are agreed on -the fact that there are three kinds of -creation—the two extremes and a medial -one. They again agree on the nomenclature -of the two extremes, but they -disagree as to the medial one. As to -the one extreme, it has come into existence -from something other than itself, -or from anything else—that is from a -generative cause or matter—while time -existed before it. All those things whose -existence is perceived by the senses, as -water, animals, vegetation, etc., are included<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38"></a>[38]</span> -in this. All Ancient and Asharite -philosophers are agreed in denominating -this creation <i>Originated</i>.</p> - -<p>The other extreme is that which -came into existence from nothing, not -out of anything, and time did not precede -it. The two parties are agreed in calling -this <i>Eternal</i>. This extreme can be -reached by logic. This is God, the -Creator, Inventor, and Preserver of all.</p> - -<p>The medial kind of creation is that -which has neither been made from -nothing, “matter,” nor has time preceded -it, but it has been created by some -generative cause. In this is included -the whole world. Again they all agree -on the existence of all the three categories -of the universe. The Mutakallimun -admit, or they ought to admit, -that before the universe there was -no time, for according to them time is -contemporaneous with motion and body. -They are also agreed with the Ancients -that future time and creation have no -end, but they differ as to past time and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39"></a>[39]</span> -its creation. The Mutakallimun are of -opinion that it had a beginning.</p> - -<p>This is the belief of Plato and his -disciples, while Aristotle and his followers -are of opinion that it had no -beginning, just as the future has no end. -It is clear that the last mentioned kind -of creation resembles both the <i>originated</i> -and the <i>eternal</i> creation. So one who -thinks that in the past creation there -are more characteristics of the eternal -than the originated takes it to be eternal -and vice versa. But in reality it is -neither truly originated nor eternal. For -the originated creation is necessarily -subject to destruction while the eternal -is without a cause. There are some, for -example, Plato and his followers, who -have called it <i>infinitely originated</i>, for -according to them time has no end. -There is not here so great a difference -about the universe, for it to be made -the basis of a charge of infidelity. In -fact, they should not be so charged at -all, for opinions which are worthy of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40"></a>[40]</span> -this are far removed from ours, those -quite contrary to them, as the Mutakallimun -have thought them to be in this -proposition. I mean that they take the -words <i>originated</i> and <i>eternal</i> to be contrary -expressions, which our investigation has -shown not to be the case.</p> - -<p>The strange thing about all these -opinions is that they are not in agreement -with the literal sense of the Law. -For if we look closely we shall find many -verses which tell us of the creation of -the universe—that is, of its <i>originated</i> -nature. Creation and time are said to -be without end. For according to the -verse: “It is He who hath created the -heavens and the earth in six days, but -His Throne was above the waters before -the creation thereof”<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> it is clear that -there was a universe before this one, -and that is the throne and the water, -and a time which existed before that -water. Then again the verse “The day -will come when the earth shall be changed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41"></a>[41]</span> -into another earth and the heavens into -other heavens”<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> shows equally when -taken literally that there will be a -universe after this one. Again, the -verse: “Then He set his mind to the -creation of heaven and it was smoke”<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> -shows that the heavens were created -from something.</p> - -<p>Whatever the Mutakallimun say about -the universe is not based on a literal -sense of the Law, but is an interpretation -of it. For the Law does not tell -us that God was even before mere non-existence, -and moreover, this is not found -as an ordinance in it. How can we -suppose that there could be any consensus -of opinion about the interpretation -of verses by the Mutakallimun? In fact, -there is much in the sayings of some -philosophers which supports what we -have quoted from the Law, taken literally.</p> - -<p>Those who differ concerning these -obscure questions have either reached the -truth and have been rewarded; or have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42"></a>[42]</span> -fallen into error and have to be excused. -For it is compulsory rather than voluntary -to believe a thing to be true, the -proof of which has already been established; -that is, we cannot believe or -disbelieve it as we like, as it depends -upon our will to stand or not to do so. -So, if one of the conditions of verification -be freedom of choice, a learned man, -and he alone, should be held excused, if -he makes a mistake on account of some -doubt. Hence the Prophet has said that -if a magistrate judges rightly he receives -two rewards, and if he makes a mistake -he deserves only one. But what magistrate -is greater than one who judges -the universe, whether it is so or not. -These are the judges—the learned -men—whom God has distinguished with -the knowledge of interpretation.</p> - -<p>It is this kind of mistake of insight -which learned people are quite apt to -make when they look into those obscure -questions the investigation of which the -Law has imposed upon them. But the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43"></a>[43]</span> -mistake the common people make in -these matters is sin pure and simple, -whether in theoretical or in practical -things. As a magistrate, ignorant of -Tradition, when he makes mistakes in -judgment, cannot be held excused, so -likewise a judge of the universe when -not having the qualities of a judge is -also not excusable, but is either a sinner -or an unbeliever. If it be a condition -that a magistrate shall have capacity of -arbitration concerning the lawful and -the forbidden, that is, knowledge of the -principles of Law and their application -through analogy—how much more -befitting it is for an arbitrator of the -universe to be armed with fundamental -knowledge of the mental sciences, and the -way of deducing results from them.</p> - -<p>Mistake in the interpretation of the -Law is thus of two kinds—a mistake -which can be excused in one fit to look -into the thing in which it has been -committed, just as an expert physician -is excused if he commits an error in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44"></a>[44]</span> -application of his science; or a magistrate -when he misjudges, and a mistake -which is inexcusable in one not fit to -investigate a thing. But the error which -cannot be excused for anybody, and -which, if it happens to show itself in -relation to the very principles of the -Law, is infidelity, and if in universals -is an innovation, is that error which is -committed in those things which have -been settled by all arguments and so the -knowledge of them is possible for everybody, -for instance, the acknowledgement -of the existence of God, of Prophecy, -and of the happiness or the misery of -the next world. This is so, because all -these three principles are proved by -those three methods, the justification of -which a man cannot deny by any means, -that is exhortative controversial and -argumentative proofs. A denier of such -things, which are the very root of the -principle of the Law, is an unbeliever, -a retrograde with his tongue and his -heart, or through negligence, on account<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45"></a>[45]</span> -of his denying them in spite of proofs. -For if he be a man believing in arguments, -he can verify them through these -or if he believes in controversy, he can -verify through that; and if he believes -in religions admonitions he can well -justify them through these. And hence -the Prophet has said: “I have been -commanded to fight with men till they -say: ‘There is no God but Allah’ and -believe in me” that is, by any of these -three means of attaining the Faith.</p> - -<p>But there are things which, on account -of their obscurity, cannot be understood -by inference. So, God has favoured such -of his creatures as cannot understand -logic, either on account of their nature, -habit, or lack of mental training, by -quoting examples and parables of such -things and has urged them to testify as -to their truth through them. For everyone -has mental capacity enough to understand -them by the help of dogmatic and -exhortatory argument which are common -to all men. This is why the Law has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46"></a>[46]</span> -been divided into two kinds: exoteric -and esoteric. The exoteric part consists -of those examples which have been coined -to express certain meanings; while the -esoteric is the meanings themselves, -which are not manifested except to the -learned in philosophy.</p> - -<p>These are the very four or five kinds -of methods of knowing reality mentioned -by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his -book called <i>Al Tafriqah bain al Islam -wal Zindiqah</i>. If it so happens as we -have said that we can know of a thing -by any of the above mentioned three -methods, then we do not stand in need -of any examples for understanding them. -Such things should be taken literally -and interpretation should find no place -with regard to them. If these things -form a part of the principles of the Law, -one who puts an interpretation upon -them is an infidel. For instance, if a -man believes that there is no happiness -or misery in the next world, and that -the teaching is only an artifice to safeguard<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47"></a>[47]</span> -the life and property of the -people from one another and that there -is no goal for men other than this life, -then he is certainly an unbeliever.</p> - -<p>When this has once been established -it will become clear to you that interpretation -is not lawful in the exoteric -part of the Law. If the canon of interpretation -be used in the principles of the -Law, it is infidelity, and if used in -general things it is an innovation. But -there is also a certain exoteric law -which requires an interpretation from -learned men. It is not misbelief for -them to take it exoterically, but it is so -or is at least an innovation in religion if -ignorant men try to interpret or explain it.</p> - -<p>Among these is the verse of Equalisation -and the Tradition of Descent. For -the Prophet said of a Negro slave girl -who told him that God was in heaven: -“Emancipate her, for she is a believer.” -For there are persons who cannot believe -a thing except through their imagination, -that is, it is difficult for them to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48"></a>[48]</span> -believe a thing which they cannot imagine. -Among these may be classed men -who cannot understand a thing except -with a reference to space, and hence -believe in God as though physical, notwithstanding -that these are the very -persons who have dealt very harshly -with those mentioned above. They -ought to be told that things of his -character are parabolical, and that we -should pause and consider the saying of -God: “Yet none knoweth the interpretation -thereof except God.” Although -learned men agree that these are to be -interpreted, they differ in the interpretation -according to their knowledge of -principles of philosophy. There is a third -part of the Law which occupies an intermediate -position, on account of some -doubt about it. Some say that it should -be taken exoterically, and that no interpretation -should be allowed in it; while -there are others who say that they have -some esoteric meaning, and should not -be taken exoterically by the learned.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49"></a>[49]</span> -This is on account of the obscurity of -their meaning. A learned man may be -excused if he makes a mistake about -them.</p> - -<p>If the Law is divided into these -three parts, it may be asked: to which -of these does the description of the state -of the Day of Judgment belong? We -would reply that it is quite clear, on the -very face of the question, that it belongs -to that part in which there is some -difference of opinion. For one group of -men, who class themselves among philosophers, -say that these things should -be taken literally. For, according to -them, there is not a single argument -which makes their literal sense absurd -and unreasonable. This is the method -of the Asharites. But another group of -philosophers interpret them; but they -differ very widely in the interpretation -itself. Amongst these may be mentioned -Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and a large -number of Sufis. There are some who -would amalgamate the two interpretations,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50"></a>[50]</span> -as Abu Hamid has done in some -of his books. These questions are among -those in which, if the learned men err -they are to be excused; otherwise, they -are to be thanked and rewarded. For, -if one acknowledges the reality of the -Day of Judgment, and then begins to -apply the principles of interpretation to -the description, and not its reality, he -does not in any way deny it. A denial -of its reality is infidelity, for it is one -of the fundamentals of the Law, and it -can be easily verified by any of the -three methods of argument common to -all men. But one who is not learned -should take it exoterically, an interpretation -in his case is unbelief, for it leads -to infidelity. We are thus of opinion -that such people should accept the literal -sense, for interpretation will certainly -lead them to infidelity. A learned man -who discloses the discussions of these -things to the common people helps them -towards unbelief and one who abets -another in that direction is himself no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51"></a>[51]</span> -better than an unbeliever. It is therefore -unsuitable that these interpretations -should be published in any other than -learned books, for in this way they will -reach none but the learned. But it is a -mistake both in religion and philosophy -if they are put in other books, with -dogmatic and exhortative arguments, -as Abu Hamid has done. Although the -author’s intention was good, the idea -thus to increase the number of learned -men, he caused a good deal of mischief -through it. For, on account of this -method some people began to find fault -with philosophy, and others to blame -religion, and still others began to think -of reconciling the two. It seems that -this was the very aim which Abu Hamid -had in view in writing these books. He -has tried to awaken the nature of men, -for he never attached himself to any -particular way of thinking in his books. -He was an Asharite with the Asharites, -a Sufi with the Sufis and a philosopher -with the philosophers, so much so that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52"></a>[52]</span> -he was, as has been said: “I am a -Yeminite when I meet a Yeminite; if -I meet a Ma’adi I am one of Banu -Adnan.”</p> - -<p>Hence, it is necessary for the doctors -of Islam to prevent men, except the -learned, from reading his books; as it is -incumbent upon them to hinder them -from reading controversial writings which -should not be studied except by those -fit to do so. As a rule the reading of -these books is less harmful than those -of the former. For the majority cannot -understand philosophical books, only -those endowed with superior natures. -People are on the whole destitute of -learning and are aimless in their reading -which they do without a teacher. -Nevertheless they succeed in leading -others away from religion. It is an -injustice to the best kind of men and -the best kind of creation; for in their -case justice consists in the knowledge -of the best things by the best people, -fit to know it. It should be remembered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53"></a>[53]</span> -that the greater the thing is the higher -will be the injustice done to it on account -of ignorance. Hence God says: “Polytheism -is a great injustice.”<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p>These things we have thought proper -to mention here, that is, in a discussion -of the relation between philosophy and -religion and the canons of interpretation -in Law. If these matters had not become -commonly known among men, we -would not have said anything about -them and would not have entered in a -plea on behalf of the interpreters. For -these things are suitable only for mention -in philosophical books.</p> - -<p>You ought to be aware that the real -purpose of the Law is to impart the -knowledge of truth and of right action. -The knowledge of truth consists in the -cognisance of God and the whole universe -with its inner significance, especially -that of religion, and the knowledge -of happiness or misery of the next -world. Right action consists in following<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54"></a>[54]</span> -those actions which are useful for -happiness and avoiding those which lead -to misery. The knowledge of these -actions has been called practical knowledge. -This is divided into two kinds: -external actions, the knowledge of which -is called Fiqh, that is, Theology; and -actions pertaining to feelings, such as -gratitude, patience, and other points of -character to which the Law has urged -us or from which it has prohibited us. -This is called the knowledge of continence -and of the next world. Abu Hamid -in his book <i>The Revivification of the -Sciences of Religion</i> seems to be inclined -to this kind, and as the people have -always turned away from the former -kind of knowledge and have turned -themselves to the second which leads -them easily to piety, the book attained -its name. But we have wandered from -our own purpose and will now return -to it.</p> - -<p>If the purpose of the Law is to impart -the knowledge of truth and of right<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55"></a>[55]</span> -action, this cannot be attained except by -one of the two methods: <i>viz</i>, by conception -or verification such as Mutakallimun -have maintained in their books. -There are three methods of verification -open to people: philosophy, dogmatics -and exhortation. There are two methods -of conception: either by the thing itself, -or by its like. As all people cannot by -their nature understand and accept philosophical -and dogmatic arguments, together -with the difficulty of learning -the use of inferences and the long time -it takes to learn them, and the purpose -of the Law being to be quite common -among men, it is necessary that it should -contain all kinds of verifications and -conceptions. Among the methods of -verification there are some which are -meant for the common people: that is, -exhortative and dogmatic, the exhortative -being more common than the other. -There is one method which is meant -solely for the learned, and that is the -method of rational inference. Now, it is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56"></a>[56]</span> -the primary aim of the Law to improve -the condition of the many without neglecting -the few, and hence the method -of conception and verification adopted -are common to the majority.</p> - -<p>These methods are of four kinds: the -first is that which, while in particulars -the same in both, that is, both exhortatively -and dialectically, is still true by -conception and verification. These are -syllogisms of which the minor and the -major premise are certain, besides being -easily imagined and well known. These -are set before the deductions which are -drawn from them, and not from their -likes. To this kind of religious injunction -there is no interpretation, and one who -denies them or puts an interpretation -upon them is an infidel. The second -kind is that the premises of which -although well known or easily imagined -are also positively established. -Their conclusions are drawn by analogy. -Upon these, that is, their conclusions, -an interpretation may be put. The third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57"></a>[57]</span> -kind is just the reverse of the second, -that is, the conclusions are themselves -intended and their premises are well -known or easily imagined without being -positively established. Upon these also—that -is, upon the conclusions, no interpretation -can be put, but the premises -may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth -kind is that the premises of which are -well-known or conjectural without being -positively established. Their deductions -are by analogy when that is intended. -It is the duty of the learned men to -interpret them and of the common people -to take them exoterically.</p> - -<p>In short, all that should be interpreted -can be grasped by philosophy alone. So -the duty of the learned person is to -interpret, and of the common people to -take it literally, both in conception and -in verification. The reason for the latter -is that they cannot understand more. -A student of law sometimes finds interpretations -which have a preference over -others, in a general way by verification:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58"></a>[58]</span> -that is, the argument is more convincing -with the interpretations than with the -literal meanings. These interpretations -are common and it is possible for them -to be admitted by any whose speculative -faculties have been developed in controversy. -Some of the interpretations -of the Asharites and the Mutazilites are -of this type, though the arguments of -the Mutazilites are generally the more -weighty. But it is the duty of the common -people who are not capable of understanding -more than exhortation to take -them exoterically. Indeed, it is not proper -for them to know the interpretations -at all.</p> - -<p>Thus there are three groups into -which men have been divided: Those -who are not included amongst those who -should know the interpretations. These -are common people who are guided by -exhortation alone. They form a vast -majority: for there is not a single rational -being who cannot accept a result by -this method. The second are dogmatic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59"></a>[59]</span> -interpreters. These are so, either by -their nature only, or both by nature and -habit. The third are those who can be -definitely called interpreters. These are -the philosophers, both by nature and by -philosophical training. This kind of interpretation -should not be discussed with -the dogmatists, not to speak of the common -people. If any of these interpretations -are disclosed to those not fit to -receive them—especially philosophical interpretations—these -being far higher than -common knowledge, they may be led to -infidelity. For he wishes to nullify the -exoteric meaning and to prove his interpretation. -But if the exoteric meaning -is shown to be false without the interpretation -being established, he falls into -infidelity, if this concerns the principles -of the Law. So, the interpretations -should not be disclosed to the common -people, and ought not to be put into -exhortative or doctrinal books—that is, -books written with an expository purpose -in view—as Abu Hamid has done.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60"></a>[60]</span></p> - -<p>Hence, it is necessary that the common -people should be told that those -things which are exoteric, and yet cannot -be understood easily, the interpretations -of which it is impossible for them -to understand, are parabolical, and that -no one knows the interpretation thereof -except God. We should stop at the -following words of God: “None knoweth -the interpretation thereof except God.”<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> -This is also the answer to the question -about some of those abstruse problems -which the common people cannot understand: -“They will ask thee concerning -the spirit: answer: The spirit was created -at the command of my Lord, but ye have -no knowledge given to you, except a -little.”<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Again, one who interprets these -to persons not fit to receive them is an -infidel, because he leads others to infidelity, -which is quite in opposition to the -purpose of the Law. This is especially -the case when corrupt interpretations -are put on the principles of the Law, as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61"></a>[61]</span> -some men of our own times do. We -have known many people who think they -are philosophers and hence claim to find -out strange things through philosophy, -which are in every way contrary to -religion, and they do not admit of any -other interpretation. They think they -must disclose these things to the common -people. But by the disclosure of wrong -notions they lead them to eternal -destruction.</p> - -<p>The difference between their aim and -that of the jurists can be made clear -by the following example. Since it is -not possible to make every one an expert -physician a certain physician laid -down some principles for the preservation -of health and the prevention of -diseases, and he allowed the use of some -things but prohibited others. Now a -man comes and tells the people that the -principles laid down by that physician -are not correct and declares them to be -false, and they become discredited in the -eyes of the people; or says that they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62"></a>[62]</span> -are capable of interpretations which -they cannot understand and cannot -verify by practice. Do you think that -people in these circumstances will ever -act upon those things which are useful -for their health and for the prevention -of diseases or that the man himself will -ever be capable of acting on them? No, -he will be quite incapable of doing so -and thus will lead them all to destruction.</p> - -<p>This is the case when those interpretations -which they cannot understand -are correct, to say nothing of those that -are wrong. For they will not believe -in health to be preserved, nor disease -to be prevented, to say nothing of the -things which preserve health or prevent -disease. This is the condition of that man -who discloses interpretations of the Law -to the common people and those not fit -to receive them. And hence he is an -unbeliever.</p> - -<p>The simile which we have described -above is a real parallel, and not merely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63"></a>[63]</span> -fanciful (as some may think) as it is -correct in every respect. For the relation -of the medicine to the body is the -same as that of the Law to the soul. -A physician is one who seeks to preserve -the health when he finds it good -and tries to restore it when it is missed. -In the same way a religious law-giver -is one who takes care of the health of -souls, which is called piety. The Quran -also makes clear its purpose, through -religious action, by many verses. For -instance: “O true believers, a fast is -ordained unto you as it was ordained -those before you, that ye may fear God”<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> -and “Their flesh is not accepted of God, -neither their blood; but your piety is -accepted by Him”<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> and: “For prayer -preserveth a man from filthy crimes and -from that which is blameable.”<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> There -are many other verses of the same -nature in the Quran. Thus, we see, a -religious law-giver seeks to establish -this kind of health by religious knowledge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64"></a>[64]</span> -and practice. This is the health -upon which depends happiness and in -the case of its absence the misery of -the next world.</p> - -<p>This should have made it clear to -you not merely that one should not speak -of the wrong interpretation. But also -that it is not proper to put even true -ones in the books of the common people. -These correct interpretations are of the -faith which man has and of which the -whole creation was afraid to bear the -burden. By this we refer to the following -verse of the Quran: “We proposed -the faith unto the heavens, and -the earth, and the mountains, and they -refused to undertake the same, and were -afraid thereof, but man undertook it: -verily he is unjust to himself and foolish.”<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> -These interpretations and the idea that -their discussion is necessary in the Law -have given rise to many sects in Islam, -so much so that they have denounced -one another with infidelity and innovations.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65"></a>[65]</span> -This is especially the effect of -wrong interpretations. The Mutazilites -interpreted a large number of verses and -Traditions and disclosed them to the -people. So also did the Asharites, -though their interpretations were less in -number. They only succeeded in creating -hatred and wars among men, destroying -the Law, and disuniting the people -completely. To add to this, the method -which they have adopted in proving -these interpretations is adapted neither -to the common people nor to the learned. -For if you look closely into it, you will -find that it is not correct according to -the norms of logic—this anyone who -has had any training may see for himself -without the least effort. In fact, -many of the principles upon which the -Asharites build their conclusions are -sophistical in their nature. They deny -many fundamentals, like the proof of -accidence, the influence of one thing upon -another, the necessity of cause and effects, -abstract figures and the processes leading<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66"></a>[66]</span> -to them. Indeed, Asharite Mutakallimun -have been in this respects unjust -to Mohammadans, for one of their sects -has denounced as infidels all those who -do not recognise the existence of God -by methods which they have devised for -the knowledge of Him: but in truth they -themselves are in the wrong and are -unbelievers.</p> - -<p>It is upon this point that the difference -of opinion arises. Some say that -the first principle is of reason, while -others allege that it is of faith. That -is to say they have thought that faith, -even before knowing the methods common -to all and to which the Law has made -a call on all, is the only method of arriving -at truth. Thus they have mistaken -the real purpose of the Law-giver, -and being themselves in the wrong they -have led others astray.</p> - -<p>If it be alleged that the method that -the Asharites and other Mutakallimun -have devised are not those general methods -in the purpose of the Law-giver<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67"></a>[67]</span> -for the instruction of the common people, -and that it is not possible without some -method being adopted, then the question -arises: What are those methods which -are given in the Law? We maintain -that these methods are to be found in -the Quran alone. For, if we look closely -we shall find that in the Quran all the -three kinds of methods are laid down, -for the whole of mankind, both for the -majority and for the learned few. If we -reflect we shall come to see that no better -methods can be discovered for the -instruction of the common people than -those mentioned in the Quran. Anyone -who changes them by interpretations -which are neither clear in themselves nor -clearer than others to the common people, -makes null and void their philosophy -and their effect, the goal of which is the -happiness of mankind. This is quite -evident from the early and the later -condition of Islam, for in the early days -Muslims sought perfect excellence and -piety by acting on those principles without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68"></a>[68]</span> -putting any interpretation upon them. -And those among them who knew any -interpretation did not disclose it. In the -later days interpretations were used, and -piety decreased, the love for others was -lost, and they became divided into -schisms and parties.</p> - -<p>Hence one who cares to remove this -innovation from the Law, should turn -to the Book, and should pick up from -it the existing arguments for things -whose belief is inculcated upon us. -Further he should deeply think over the -esoteric meanings, as far as possible, -without putting interpretations upon -them, except when they are not quite -clear to all. The assertions of the Book for -the instructions of the people, when -thought over are things, with whose -help we can reach a stage from which -none but the learned in logic can differ -about the esoteric meaning of that which -is not clear. This peculiarity cannot be -found in any other assertions but that -of the Book. There are three peculiarities<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69"></a>[69]</span> -in the assertions, which have been -explained in the Quran, for the common -people. First, that nothing can be found -more convincing and true than these. -Secondly, that they can be accepted by -every nature; and they are such that -none can know their interpretations, if -there be any, except the learned in logic. -Thirdly, that they possess a call to the -righteous, for correct interpretations. -This is neither to be found in the school -of the Asharites nor in that of the -Mutazilites <i>i. e.</i> their interpretations are -neither generally acceptable, nor do they -make any call to the righteous, nor are -they right in themselves. It is for this -reason that innovation has increased, -and it is our desire to write about it, -as far as it is possible for us, provided -that we get leisure for it, have power -to do it, and God gives us a respite in -life. It is just possible that this may be -a beginning for the coming generation; -because the breach of Law, due to evil -passions, and changed beliefs is simply<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70"></a>[70]</span> -aggrieving and saddening. This is still -enhanced by those, who ascribe themselves -to philosophy, because an injury -from a friend is worse than the injury -from an enemy. Philosophy is a companion -and a foster-sister to the Law. -Hence an injury from this source is the -worst kind of injury, even if we neglect -the enmity, hatred, and animosity which -is created between the two, although -they are companions by nature and -friends in reality. It has also been -injured by many ignorant <i>friends</i> who -ascribe themselves to it. These are the -schisms which exist in Islam. May -God set all aright, help all to His love, -and bring together their hearts for -piety, and erase enmity and hatred by -his favour and grace.</p> - -<p>Indeed God has removed much of -evil, ignorance and the misleading ways -through this strong government, and has -led the many to good, especially the -people who have walked in the path of -scholasticism, and have a liking for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71"></a>[71]</span> -knowledge of the Truth. Because it has -called the people to the knowledge of -God by mediate paths, which are higher -than the depressions of the blind followers: -and lower than that of the high-sounding -Mutakallimun; and has called -the learned to their duty of considering -fully the principles of Law.</p> - - - -<h3>FOOTNOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> A translation of Averroes’ Kitab Fasl a’l Maqal wa -Taqrir ma bain’a’l Shariata wa’l Hikmati mina’l Ittisal. -Ed. by D. J. Muller, Philosophie und Theologie von -Averroes, Munich 1859.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> <i>i. e.</i> Shariat. Compare Jewish Torah.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> Quran lix, 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> Quran vii, 184.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Quran vi, 75.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> Quran lxxxviii, 17.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Quran iii, 176.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> Quran lix, 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> Quran xvi, 126.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> “It is he who hath created you whatsoever is on -earth, and that set His mind to the creation of heaven and -formed it into seven heavens; he knoweth all thing.” Quran -ii, 29. For an interpretation of this see Raji’s <i>Tafsiri Kabir</i> -vol. I. p. 249 et seq. Cairo. 1307. A. H. and Tabari’s <i>Commentary</i> -vol. I. p. 146 et seq. Cairo. 1902 A. D.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> “Verily God comes down every night to the earth” -(Nibayah fi Gharibil Hadith by Ibu Athir vol. IV. p. 138 -Cairo 1311 A. H.) For an interpretation see the above and -Qustatain’s Commentary on Bukari, vol. IX p. 178. Cairo. 1307 -A. H.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> Quran iii, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> Quran iii, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[14]</a> Quran xi, 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[15]</a> Quran xiv, 19.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[16]</a> Quran xli, 10.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[17]</a> Quran xxxi, 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[18]</a> Quran iii, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[19]</a> Quran xvii, 87.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[20]</a> Quran ii, 79.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[21]</a> Quran xxii, 38.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[22]</a> Quran xxix, 44.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[23]</a> Quran xxxiii, 67.</p> - -</div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72"></a>[72]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="Ia">Ia.<br /><br /> -APPENDIX.<br /><br /> -ON THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE, -WHICH AVERROES HAS MENTIONED IN -HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE. -</h2> -</div> - -<p>May God perpetuate your honour -and bless you, and screen you always -from the eyes of misfortune. Through -your excellent intelligence and good -understanding you have learned a great -part of all these sciences, till your insight -informed you of the doubt which arises -concerning the eternal knowledge of -God, with its being at the same time -concerned with created things. Thus, -in the interests of truth, it is now incumbent -upon us to remove the doubt -from your mind, after we have stated -it clearly. For one who does not know -the problem adequately cannot very well -solve the doubt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73"></a>[73]</span></p> - -<p>The question may be stated thus: If -all this universe was in the knowledge -of God before its creation, then, was it -in His knowledge after its creation as -it was before it came into existence; -or was it in His knowledge before its -creation quite different from that after -its coming into being? If we say that -the knowledge of God about it after its -creation is quite different from that -which it was before its creation, it becomes -necessary for us to admit that -the eternal knowledge is changeable; or -that when the universe came into existence -out of non-existence, then there is -an addition to the eternal knowledge; -which is impossible. Again, if we say -that the knowledge of it was the same -in both the conditions, then it would be -said: Was the created universe the same -before its coming into existence as it -was after its creation? To this objection -it will have to be answered that it was -not the same before its creation as it -was after it, otherwise the existent and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74"></a>[74]</span> -the non-existent thing would be the -same. When the opponent has admitted -this much, he may be asked whether the -real knowledge does not consist in the -cognizance of an existent thing as it is. -If he says: “Yes,” then accordingly it -becomes necessary that when a thing -changes in itself the knowledge of it -must also change, otherwise it would be -a knowledge of something other than the -real object. Thus it would then be -necessary to admit one of two things: -either the eternal knowledge itself will -change, or the created things would be -unknown to God. And both of these -alternatives are impossible with regard -to God. This doubt is still further -strengthened by the apparent condition -of man, that is, the relation of his -knowledge about non-existent things by -the supposition of their existence and -its relation when the thing in question -is found. It is self-evident that both -kinds of knowledge are different, otherwise -God would have been ignorant of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75"></a>[75]</span> -its existence at the time he found it. -The argument which the Mutakallimun -advance to meet this objection does not -by any means deliver us from the doubt. -They say that God knows the things -before their coming into being, as they -would be after they come into existence. -If they say that no change occurs, they -fall into mistake. If on the other hand -they admit a change, they may be asked -whether this change was known in the -eternal knowledge or not. Thus the first -doubt occurs again. On the whole it is -difficult to imagine that the knowledge -of a thing before and after its existence -can be one and the same.</p> - -<p>This is the statement of the doubt in -the briefest terms possible, as we have -put it for your sake. A solution of this -doubt requires a very long discussion, -but here we intend to state a point -which might easily solve it. Abu Hamid -(Al Ghazzali) has also tried to solve -this doubt in his work: <i>The Refutation -of the Philosophers</i>, but his method is by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76"></a>[76]</span> -no means satisfactory. For he says something -to this effect: he thinks the -known and the knowledge are not connected -with each other, so that when a -change takes place in the one the other -does not change in itself. So it is possible -that it may happen in the case of -Divine knowledge and the things existent, -that is, they may change in themselves -while God’s knowledge may remain the -same. For instance a pillar may be on -the right hand of Zaid, it may be changed -to his left without any change taking -place in Zaid himself. But the illustration -is not at all a correct one, for the -relation has changed, that is, that which -was on the right side is now on the left. -That in which no change has taken place -is the condition of that relation—Zaid. -It being so, and the knowledge is only -the relation itself, it is necessary that -it should change with a change in the -thing known, as the change in the relation -of the pillar to Zaid, for it is now -on the left after being on the right.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77"></a>[77]</span></p> - -<p>The view which might solve this question -is that it should be maintained that -the condition of eternal knowledge of -existent things is quite other than the -created knowledge with regard to them. -For the existence of a thing is the cause -and means of our knowledge of it, while -the eternal knowledge is itself the cause -and means of the existent thing. So if -a change takes place in the eternal -knowledge after the coming into being -of an existent thing, as it does in the -created knowledge then it is involved -that the former cannot be the cause but -only the effect of the existent things. -Thus it is necessary that there should -be no change in it, as there is in the -created knowledge. This mistake always -occurs by our taking eternal knowledge -to be like the created one, by an analogy -from the seen to the unseen. The error -in this analogy has already been exposed. -Just as no change takes place in any -agent after the creation of his act—that -is, change of kind which was not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78"></a>[78]</span> -found before—so no change in the eternal -knowledge of God after the creation -of the thing which was in His knowledge. -So this doubt is removed. At the same -time it is not necessary for us to say -that as there is no change in eternal -knowledge, therefore, He does not know -an existent at the time of its creation, -as it is. But we must believe that He -knows not by a created but by His -eternal knowledge. For a change in -knowledge with a change of the existent -thing is a condition of the knowledge -which depends upon the existent thing, -such a knowledge being created. Thus -the relation of the eternal knowledge -with the existent things is not the same -as that of the created knowledge. It is -not that there is no connection between -them at all as some philosophers are -said to maintain, who as the people -think, say, at the time of doubt, that -God has no knowledge of particulars at -all. But this is not as is commonly supposed. -They only say that He does not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79"></a>[79]</span> -know particulars by any created knowledge, -one of the conditions of which is -its being created by them, by which it -is an effect and not a cause. This is -the last of the things about it which -must be remembered. For our reason -leads us to the fact that God is the -Knower of things, all of them emanating -from Him. This is so because He is a -knower, not because of His existence, -nor of His existence in any form, but -only because of His being a Knower. -God has said, “Shall not He know all -things who hath created them, since He -is the sagacious, the knowing.”<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> The -arguments also tell us that He knows -by a knowledge which may be akin to -created knowledge. So it is necessary -that there should be some other knowledge -for the existent things—and this -is the eternal of God. Moreover, how -is it possible to suppose that the Peripatetic -Philosophers think that the eternal -knowledge does not include particulars,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80"></a>[80]</span> -while they say that these are a -cause of admonition to us in our dreams, -divine revelations, and other kinds of -inspiration?</p> - -<p>That is what we think about the -solution of the problem—a solution in -which there is no doubt or suspicion. -God is the only helper to right judgment, -and leader to truth. Peace be -upon you, and blessings of God and His -beatitude. God is the best knower of -truth: and to Him is the return and -the refuge.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81"></a>[81]</span></p> - - -<h3>FOOTNOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[24]</a> Quran lxvi, 14.</p> - -</div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="mlarge center" id="II"><b>II<br /><br /> -AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS -CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH, AND -A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS -AND MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN -INTERPRETATIONS.</b></h2> -</div> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83"></a>[83]</span></p> - - - - -<div class="center mlarge lh"> -<b><span class="medium">AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING</span><br /> -THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH<br /> -<span class="small">AND</span><br /> -<span class="medium">A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS</span><br /> -<span class="small">AND</span><br /> -<span class="medium">MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS.</span></b><a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> -</div> - - -<p class="p1">And after—Praise be to God, who -sets apart anyone whom He will for -His knowledge, rendering him fit for -understanding His Law and following -His path, informing him of the hidden -recesses of His knowledge, the real meaning -of His inspiration, and the purpose -of sending the Apostle to creatures, in -spite of what has become clear about -the doubt of the doubters among the -Prophet’s own followers, and changes of -meanings introduced by the false among<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84"></a>[84]</span> -his own people. He has disclosed to -him that there are interpretations which -God and His Apostle have not ordered. -May there be the most perfect blessings -upon the Trusty of His inspiration, and -the Seal of His prophets, and upon his -family and relations.</p> - -<p>We have already described in the -foregoing tractate the conformity of -philosophy with the Law, and its -other relations. We have said there -that the Law is of two kinds: -exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the -common people is to follow the exoteric -law; while the duty of learned men is to -follow the esoteric one. So the duty of -the common people is to follow the -meanings of the Law in their literal -sense, leaving aside every interpretation -of it. The learned men are not permitted -to expose their interpretations to the -common people, as Ali, (upon whom be -peace) has said, “Tell the people what -they can understand. Do you wish to -give the lie to God and His Apostle?”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85"></a>[85]</span> -So I thought that in the present book -I should examine the exoteric meanings -which the Law intends the common people -to follow, and in those, search the -real purpose of the Law-giver, (on -whom be peace) according to my ability -and knowledge. For the people of His -Law have been extremely disturbed, so -much so that many misguided sects and -different divisions, have been produced, -every one of which thinks that it is following -the best Law, and that he who -disagrees is either an innovator or an -infidel whose life and property is at stake. -All this is directly opposed to the purpose -of the Law-giver. Its cause lies -in the misleading things about the Law -which have been put forward.</p> - -<p>In our own times, there are four of -these sects which are famous. In the -first place, there is the sect of the Asharites, -and these are the people who are -commonly taken to be men of <i>Sunna</i>. -Then there are Mutazilites, the sects of -the Batinites, (Esoteric), and the sect<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86"></a>[86]</span> -of the Bombasts. Every one of these -sects has its own peculiar beliefs about -God, and has turned many an exoteric -word of the law to interpretations, -which they have applied to those beliefs. -They think that theirs was the original -Law which all the people are asked to -follow, and he who deviates from it is -either an innovator or an infidel. But -when you look into all their views and -then examine the purpose of the Law, -it would appear that a great part of -them are recent opinions and innovating -interpretations. Of them I will mention -here those indispensable beliefs in the Law, -without which Faith does not become -complete, and will search, in every one -of them, the real purpose of the Law-giver, -(peace be upon him,) beyond -that which has been made the basis of the -Law, and its beliefs before the coming -into use of incorrect interpretations. I -will begin by explaining the intention -of the Law-giver as to the beliefs -which should be held by the common<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87"></a>[87]</span> -people about God, and the methods -which He adopted towards them. All -this is contained in the Divine Book. -We will begin by an exposition of the -methods which leads to the knowledge -of the existence of the Creator, for this -is the first thing which a student ought -to know. But before this, it is necessary -that we should mention the opinions of -the well-known sects.</p> - -<p>The <i>Bombasts</i> hold that the method -of obtaining knowledge of the existence -of the Creator is by hearing and not by -reason, that is, the belief in His existence, -the verification of which is incumbent -upon all men, is enough to be -taught by the Law-giver, and believed -as an article of Faith, as is the case -with his teachings about the condition -of the Day of Judgment, and others -with which our reason has no power to -deal. This is obviously a misleading -sect, for it falls short of the purpose of -the Law, as regards the method adopted -towards all the people, leading them to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88"></a>[88]</span> -the knowledge of the existence of God, -and calling them to the confession of -His belief. It is quite evident from -many verses of the Divine Book, that -in it the people have been called to -verify the existence of the Creator by -arguments of reason which are mentioned -in it. For instance, there are the following -verses of the Quran, “O men of -Mecca, serve your Lord who has created -you and those before you,”<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> and “Is -there any doubt concerning God, the -Creator of heaven and earth?”<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> and -other verses on the subject found therein. -It is not fit for a man to say, that -if these arguments had been necessary -for believing in God—that is, had his -faith been not completed without understanding -them—the Prophet would not -have invited anybody to Islam without -presenting to him all these arguments, -for the Arabs already knew the existence -of the Creator, so that God has -said, “If thou asketh them who has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89"></a>[89]</span> -created the heavens and the earth, they -will surely answer, God,”<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> and hence -there was no use giving arguments. It -is impossible to find a man so stupid -and dull, that he cannot understand the -arguments advanced by Law for the -common people, through the Prophet. -This is to say the least. If there be -found such a man, then it is his duty -to believe in God by hearing alone. So -much for the ideas of the <i>Bombasts</i> -about the exoterics of the Law.</p> - -<p>The <i>Asharites</i> are of opinion that the -verification of the existence of God -cannot be attained but by reason. But -about this they have adopted a method, -which is not among the methods adopted -by Law, and is not mentioned in the -Quran, nor the people invited through -it to believe. Their well-known method -is founded upon the fact that the universe -is a created thing, which is itself -based upon the theory of the composition -of atoms, and that the atom is a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90"></a>[90]</span> -created thing, and that other bodies are -created out of it. The method which -they adopt for the exposition of the -creation of an atom, which they call -<i>al-Jauharat u’l Faridah</i> (sole Essence), -is a misleading one even for many religious -men in the business of controversy, not -to speak of the common people. And -despite this it is a method devoid of -philosophy, and does not lead to a belief -in the existence of the Creator. For if -we suppose the universe is a created -thing, it becomes necessary, as they say, -that its Creator must also be a “Created” -object. But a doubt presents itself -about the existence of this created thing, -which is not in the power of scholastic -theology to solve. And that is this, -that we can take this thing to be neither -eternal nor created. For if we take it -as created, then it must require another -created thing, and this another, and so -on to infinity. This is impossible. On -the other hand, if we take Him as -eternal, then it is necessary that his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91"></a>[91]</span> -action in connection with the result must -also be eternal. In this way the results -also become eternal. It is necessary for -a created thing that its existence be -dependent upon a created action. Their -hypothesis can only be proved if they -admit that a created action can be performed -by an eternal agent. For the -result of the action might be dependent -on the action of the agent. But they -do not admit it, for according to their -principles what is coeval with created -things is itself created. Moreover, if the -agent sometimes acts and at other times -remains inactive, it is necessary, that -there be a condition better applicable in -one state of things than in the other. -Then about this condition the same -question will rise, and so it will go on -till infinity. And what the Mutakallimun -say in answer to this objection that the -created action is the result of eternal -intention, does not relieve us of our -doubt or satisfy our mind. For intention -without action is dependent upon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92"></a>[92]</span> -the act, and if the act is a created -thing, then it is necessary that the intention -in connection with it must also be a -created thing. It makes no difference -whether we take the intention as eternal -or created, rising before the action or -with it. So we may take it as we like. -All the same it is necessary for them -to admit either of the three things about -the universe—either a created action, -with a created intention or a created -action and an eternal intention, or an -eternal action with an eternal intention. -But a created thing is impossible from -an eternal action without any expedient, -even if we admit for their sake, that it -comes into existence by eternal action; -and putting intention itself or the action, -connected with the act is a thing which -cannot be understood. This is supposing -an act without an agent, with a result, -without any intention. Intention is a -condition of the action and not the -action itself. Also it is necessary that -this eternal intention, should be connected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93"></a>[93]</span> -with non-existence of a created thing, -for a period of time which is -indefinite. So if a created thing be non-existence -for an unknown period of time, -then it does not become connected with -the intention at the time of its creation, -except after the completion of a time -of which there is no limit, and that -which has no limit has no end. So it becomes -necessary that the intention should -never take the form of action, or a time -without limit should come to an end, -which is impossible. This is the argument -of the Mutakallimun, on which -they rely in proving that the revolutions -of the heavens are created. Moreover, -it is necessary that to the intention which -precedes the object, and is connected -with it, at a certain time, there should -be created in it at the time of creation -of the object a determination for doing -so. For the determination for the creation -of an object cannot be found before -that time, because if at the time of -action there be found no additional<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94"></a>[94]</span> -quality in the agent, than that he had -at the time of intention, then action -from him at that time would not be -quite as necessary from him as inactivity. -We may go on in this way, finding -all the obscure and intricate doubts, -from which, not to speak of the common -people, even clever men, learned in -scholastic theology, in philosophy, cannot -escape. So if the common people be -burdened with a knowledge of these -things, it would be an unbearable problem -for them.</p> - -<p>Then again the methods adopted -by the Asharites in proving the -creation of the universe are defective -for all classes of men. The common -people, by their very nature, cannot -understand them, and they are at the -same time in no way reasonable. So -they are neither fit for the learned, nor -for the masses. We warn our readers of -them and say: The methods which they -adopt are of two kinds. One of them, the -more famous of the two and upon which a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95"></a>[95]</span> -majority of them relies, is based upon three -premises, from which they derive the -proof for the creation of the universe. -They are: (1) that essences cannot -be separated from accidents, that is, -they cannot be devoid of them; (2) -that the accidents are created things; -(3) that that which cannot be separated -from a created thing is itself created, -that is, that which cannot be severed -from the created thing is itself created. -Now, if by the first premise which says -that the essences cannot be separated from -the accidents, they mean the bodies -which stand by themselves, then the -premise is correct. But if by essence -they mean the particle which cannot be -divided, which they call <i>Sole Essence</i>, -then there is doubt about it, which is -not easy to solve. For the existence of -an indivisible essence is not well established -in itself, and about it there are -many opposite and highly contradictory -opinions, and it is not in the power of -scholastic theology to bring truth out<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96"></a>[96]</span> -of them. That is the business of philosophers -who are very few in number.</p> - -<p>The arguments which Asharites use -are for the most part exhortative. For -their famous argument on this is that -they say that our first knowledge about -a thing is, for instance, that an elephant -is bigger than an ant, for it is accepted -that the former has more particles -in it than the latter. If it be -so, then it is made up of particles -and is not a compact whole in itself. -So when the body is destroyed it -changes into particles, and when -composed it is composed of them. But -this is wrong. For they have taken a -divisible quantity as a continuous one, -and then thought that that which is -applicable to the divisible is also applicable -to the continuous. This is -true about numbers, that is, we say -that a certain number is more than -the other, by its containing more -particles in it, that is, more units. But -it cannot be true of a continuous quantity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97"></a>[97]</span> -of which we say that it is bigger or -greater. In this way everything may be -enumerated without any reference to -its bulk at all. And the science of -mathematics becomes the science of -number only. It is well-known that -every bulk can be considered with regard -to line, surface and volume. Moreover, -a continuous quantity it is possible -to cut in the middle and thus -get two parts. But this is impossible in the -units of number, nay, it is opposed to -it. Then, again, the body and other -particles of a continuous quantity are -capable of being divided. But everything -divisible is either divided into -other divisible quantities, or into indivisible -ones. If it is divided into indivisible -ones then we have found particles -which cannot be divided. And if -it is divided into other divisible parts, -then again the question arises whether -these can be divided into divisible or -indivisible parts. So if it can be divided -a limitless number of times, there<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98"></a>[98]</span> -would be limitless particles in a limited -thing. But it is one of the primary -principles of knowledge that particles in -a limited thing are limited.</p> - -<p>Among the obscure doubts which -can be attributed to the Asharites is -the question whether if an atom is -brought into being, this is different -from creation itself, for it is one of -the accidents? When the created thing -exists the act of creation is non-existent -for according to their principles, -the accidents cannot be separated from -their essences. So this has compelled -them to regard creation as pertaining -to the existent things and not for it. -Then they may be asked; if creation -implies the non-existence of a thing, -with what is the act of the agent connected, -for, according to them, there is -no mean between existence and non-existence. -If this be so, and, according -to them, the action of the agent is -connected neither with non-existence, nor -with that which is and nevertheless<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99"></a>[99]</span> -brings about an existence, it must be -connected with a middle substance. -This doubt has compelled the Mutazilites -to say that there is a substance, -even in non-existence, which they call -Matter or First Element. They should -admit that that which is non-existent -can be made existent by action. Both -of these sects must also admit the -existence of a void. These are questions, -which as you see, cannot be solved by -dogmatics. Thus, it is clear that such a -method cannot be made a basis of the -knowledge of God, especially for the -masses. We will shortly describe a -clearer method of knowing God.</p> - -<p>Now as to the second premise, -according to which it is said that all the -accidents are created things:—This is a -premise concerning which there are -doubts, and its meaning is as hidden as -the soul in a body. For we have -observed many bodies to be created and -such is also the case with some accidents. -So there is no difference in transferring<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100"></a>[100]</span> -an observed object to the invisible, in -both the cases. For if it is necessary, -with regard to accidents, to apply what -applies of the visible things to the -invisible, that is, if we should suppose a -thing which we have not seen, so -created, by the analogy of that which -we have observed, then we should also -apply it to the essences. Thus we can -become quite careless of proving the -creation of accidents, as distinct from -that of essences. The creation of the -accidents of the heavenly bodies is -extremely doubtful to the observer just -as there is doubt in their essential -creation. For the creation of their accidents -is never perceived. So it is necessary -that we should clearly observe them. -This is the method which surely and -certainly leads pious people to the knowledge -of God. This is the method of -the chosen men, and that with which -God has particularly blessed the prophet -Abraham. He says: “And thus did -We show unto Abraham the kingdom<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101"></a>[101]</span> -of heaven and earth, that he might become -of those who firmly believe.”<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> For -the whole doubt concerns the heavenly -bodies themselves. Many controversialists -have stopped here and believed that -these are so many gods.</p> - -<p>Again, time is one of the accidents, -the creation of which it is impossible -to imagine, for it is necessary that the -non-existence of a thing be preceded by -time. But in this case it cannot be imagined -that the non-existence of a thing can be -preceded by itself, except by accepting time -as existent. So also it is difficult to imagine -the creation of the space in which -the universe is, for every existent thing -occupies a former space. For if it is a -void, as is the opinion of those who -think that the void itself is space, its -creation also, if we suppose it to be created, -must been have preceded by another -void. And if the space be a tangible -body, as is the opinion of another group, -then it should be contained in another<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102"></a>[102]</span> -body, which would require another, and -so on without limit. These are all -obscure problems and the arguments -which are brought to disprove the eternity -of the accidents, are necessary for -one who believes in the eternity of -those accidents which can be perceived; -that is, one who asserts that not all -the accidents are created. For they say -that the accidents which can be perceived -by the senses are created things. If -they are not created, then they will -move from one place to another, or will -be latent in the place in which they are -to appear, before they make their -appearance. Then they disprove both -of these arguments, and think that they -have established that all the accidents -are created things. But it has become -apparent from what they have said, that -the apparently created portions of the -accidents are created, not those whose -creation is not apparent, nor those in -whose case there is doubt, such as the -accidents which are in the heavenly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103"></a>[103]</span> -bodies, in their movement, in their shape, -etc., etc. So their arguments about the -creation of all accidents, can be interpreted -by the analogy of the visible to -the invisible. This is an exhortative -argument, except in the suggestion of -reasonable arguments which depend -here on the certainty of the similarity -of the character of the visible and the -invisible.</p> - -<p>The third premise which says, that -that which cannot be separated from a -created thing is itself created, is equivocal, -for it can be understood in two -ways: the thing which cannot be separated -from the class of created things, -but can be removed from its units; and -that which cannot be separated from -any one of the things in question, as if -one were to say, “That which cannot -be separated from this blackness in question.” -The second meaning is the correct -one, that is it cannot be separated -from a certain accident, which is created, -for it is absolutely necessary that it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104"></a>[104]</span> -should also be a created thing. For if -it be eternal it becomes devoid of that -accident, from which we suppose that -it cannot separate. This separation is -impossible. The first explanation, and -that is which they mean, does not necessarily -involve the creation of place, -that is, that which is not separated from -the class of created things. For it is -possible to imagine a single place, that -is, a body upon which follow accidents -without limit, either opposed to one -another or otherwise, as you were to -say, movements without limit. Such is -the opinion of many ancient philosophers -about the universe, that it is made little -by little. This is why, when the Mutakallimun -saw the weakness of this premise, -they resolved to make it strong -and secure, by making it clear, that according -to them, limitless accidents cannot -follow upon a single point. For -they maintain that on this occasion it -is necessary that there cannot be found -any other accident, except that there be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105"></a>[105]</span> -an unlimited number of accidents before -it at the place in question. This helps -them to the impossibility of their presence, -for it is necessary that it should -not be there, except after the completion -of an unlimited number. As the limitless -never ends, it follows that the -thing which we have supposed should -not be there. For instance, consider the -movement of the heavenly bodies, as we -know them today. If there were -before it limitless movements, then it is -inevitable that this particular movement -should not occur. They give the example -of a man, who said to another, “I -will not give you this dinar, till I have -given you before it a limitless number -of dinars.” By this it is not possible -for him to give the dinar in question at -all. But this example is not a correct -one. For in it there is a primary object, -then a limit, and then another object -between them, which is without limit. -For he has said it in a limited time. -So he has stipulated that he would give<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106"></a>[106]</span> -the dinar between the time in which he -is, and the time of which he speaks, -between which there is a time without -limit. This is the period in which he -would give him the dinars without limit, -which is impossible. So it is quite -clear that this example does not illustrate -the object for which it is given. Their -opinion that the existence of a thing -which is found after limitless things, is -impossible, is not correct in all the cases. -For the things which happen one after -another are of two kinds: those which -come to pass in cycles, and those which -occur in order and arrangement. The -things which occur in cycles are necessarily -unlimited, except that something -may interfere to prevent them. For -instance if the sun rises there must be -its setting; if there is a setting then it -must rise, and if it rise it must have -risen before. In the same way, if there -are clouds there must be vapours rising -from the earth; if there rise vapours -from the earth, then it must be wet, if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107"></a>[107]</span> -the earth is wet, there must have been -rain, and if there was rain there must -have been clouds, and if thus there were -clouds there must similarly have been -clouds before them. Again among those -things which happen by order, is, for -instance, the creation of man from man, -and of that man from another. If this -happens by essence then it can be taken -as limitless, for which the first link is -not found, the last also cannot be ascertained. -If this is by accident, as for -instance, if man be really made by some -one other than man, who must be his -father, then the position of his father -would be the same as that of an instrument -in the hands of a maker. So it -is not possible to find an agent doing -limitless actions, with countless different -instruments. All these views are not clear -in this connection. We have mentioned -them here, that it may become known, -that the arguments which these people -advance are no arguments at all, nor are -they reasonings fit for the masses, that is,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108"></a>[108]</span> -open and clear arguments which God -has imposed upon all his creatures for -the sake of belief. It must now have -become clear to you that this method -is neither philosophical nor according -to Law.</p> - -<p>The other method is that which Abul -Maali has deduced and described in one -of his tractates known as <i>Nizamiyyah</i>. -He has based it upon two premises: in -the first place, that the universe and all -that it contains may be conceived as -other than what it really is. It may be -quite consistent, for instance, if it may -be imagined smaller than it is, or bigger, -or of some other shape than it really -has or having more bodies in number -than it really contains or the movements -which are made in it may go in the -opposite direction from that which they -take now. This may be so much so -that it may become possible that a stone -should go upwards, and fire downwards, -or that the movement starting in the -east should start in the west, or the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109"></a>[109]</span> -western from the eastern. The second -premise is that every transient thing is -created, and for it there is a creator; -that is, an agent who made it in this -way better than in any other.</p> - -<p>The first premise is exhortative and -very elementary. Its fallacy is quite -apparent with regard to some aspects of -the universe—for instance, the existence -of man in some other form than he -now possesses; while in some others there -is doubt—for instance, whether the -movement from the east might change -to one from the west and <i>vice versa</i>, for -this is not known in itself. It is possible -that for this there may be a cause -the existence of which is not evident, or -it may be one of those causes which are -hidden from man. It is possible that -whatever of these things a man sees, is -like one seeing for the first time things -of the manufacture of which he is ignorant. -For such a man may think that -all or parts of the thing may possibly -be made in just the opposite fashion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110"></a>[110]</span> -from that in which they really are made; -and still in spite of this idea the same -work may be obtained from them for -which they were made. In this case -there would be no art in them. But its -maker, and one who is associated with -the maker in some of his knowledge, -know that the whole thing is just the -opposite of what that man has seen; -and that there is nothing in it but -that which is absolutely necessary, or -the existence of which makes it more -perfect and complete, though outwardly -it may not seem quite necessary in it. -It is quite clear that this manufactured -thing, may in this connection, be taken -as an illustration of God’s Creation—praised -be its Great Creator.</p> - -<p>This premise in being exhortative -might be fit for all, but being untrue -and falsifying the wisdom of the Creator, -is not fit for any. It falsifies philosophy, -because philosophy is nothing else but -the knowledge of the causes of things. -If there be no necessary causes for a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111"></a>[111]</span> -thing, which make its existence necessary -in the form in which it exists, then -there is no particular knowledge which -may be attributed to the wise Creator. -Just as if there had not been some -necessary causes for the existence of -any manufactured thing, there would -have been no art at all, and no wisdom -by which its maker might be praised, -and which might not be found in any -man other than the maker. Where -would be found any wisdom in a man, -if he could perform all his actions by -any member of his body, or without any -member at all, so much so that he could -see with his ears, as he could see with -his eyes, or smell with his eyes as he -could with his nose. This is all only -falsifying philosophy, and the meaning -for which God has called himself Wise -(<i>Hakim</i>)—High and Holy be his name -from such imputations. We find that -Avicenna has also adopted this doctrine, -for many reasons. He says that everything, -except the maker, when taken<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112"></a>[112]</span> -by itself, may either be possible or -allowable. Of the latter—that is, things -allowable, there are two kinds: One -is allowable as regards its maker, the -other is necessary as regards the -maker; and possible as regards its -essence. The only thing which is necessary, -according to all reasons, is the -first maker. This opinion is extremely -incorrect. Because that which is possible -in itself and its essence, will not -possibly turn a necessity beyond its -maker, but by a change of the possible -nature into a necessary one. If it be -said that by these words he means -“Possible with regard to itself”, that -is, when the maker arises it will rise -also, then we would say that this rising -is impossible. But this is not the place -to discuss the matter with this man. -We ventured to talk of him, because of -the many views which he has invented. -Now we would return to our former -theme. The second premise, which says -that every transient thing is created, is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113"></a>[113]</span> -not in itself obvious. The philosophers -have differed about it. Plato allows -that the apparently transient thing -may be eternal, while Aristotle denies -it. It is a very intricate matter, and -cannot be made clear except to the -philosophers, that is, learned men, whom -God has set apart for His knowledge, -and has in His Book, coupled their -witness with that of Himself and His -angels.</p> - -<p>Abul Maali has tried to make the -premise clear by some other premises. -First, that there should be something -unique in every transient thing, which -may make it more preferable by one of -the two qualities. Second, that this -particular thing cannot be any other -than that intended. Third, that the -thing which exists by intention is created. -Then he says that a transient thing comes -into existence by our intention, that is -it is produced by previous volition. For -all the actions are performed either by -nature or by intention. And nature is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114"></a>[114]</span> -not one of the passing things which are -alike, that is, it not only creates the -dissimilar but does the both. For instance, -sea-anemone will absorb the yellow -lob in the right side of the body and -not in the left. But intention is the -thing which is particularly applicable to -a thing opposed to its like. Then he -adds that the universe is like its creation -and exists in the position in the -atmosphere where it was made. By the -void he means another void in which -the world was made. So he concluded -that the universe was made by intention. -The premise which says that it is intention -which fixes the shape of a thing, -is correct, but that universe is surrounded -by a void is wrong, or at least not clear. -Then again according to their notions, -his act of placing the void is bad. That -is, it must be eternal, otherwise it would -require another void for it. The premise -saying that in this connection intention -is nothing but a created thing is not -clear. For the intention of an action is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115"></a>[115]</span> -connected with the desired act itself, for -it is one of its adjuncts. And it is clear -that when one adjunct is found with -the action the other must be there, for -example the father and the son. If one -be found potentially the other must also -be so. Hence if the intention of the -action is created, then necessarily the -desired act must also be created. If the -intention of the action be eternal, then -the thing desired by that action must -also be eternal. The intention which -precedes the intended object, is said to -be a potential intention only; that is, -the intention which has not yet brought -its intended object into being. This is -quite clear, for when the intended object -has appeared, then it becomes an existent -thing, which it was not before the -appearance of the intended object in -action. When this becomes the cause -of the creation of an intended thing, -only by means of action, then, if the -Mutakallimun assert that intention is -created, it becomes clear that the intended<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116"></a>[116]</span> -object must also be created. From -the Law it is clear that there is no need -to go so deeply into the problem as -far as the masses are concerned. So it -has not mentioned any eternal or created -intention, but has only said that it -exists and the things are created. So -God says:—“Verily, Our speech upon -anything when We will the same is, that -We only say unto it, Be; and it is.”<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> -This has been so because the masses -cannot understand the idea of created -things from an eternal intention. But -the fact is that the Law has not mentioned -whether the intention is created -or eternal, this being a doubtful thing -for many people. The Mutakallimun -have also no certain argument to advance -for providing the possibility of a created -intention for creation. For the principle -with which they maintain their position -for negating the existence of intention -as eternal, is the premise which we have -already mentioned, that is, the thing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117"></a>[117]</span> -which cannot be separated from the -created thing is itself created. We will -mention this again when talking of -intention.</p> - -<p>From the foregoing it has become -clear that the well-known methods -adopted by Asharites for the knowledge -of God are certain neither philosophical, -nor by Law. This would be quite -clear to anyone who would look closely -into the kind of arguments advanced in -the Divine Book about the knowledge of -the existence of the Creator. For if -you look closely into this matter you -will find that the arguments comprise -both qualities, those of being certain -and at the same time clear, without -being complex, that is, they have few -premises.</p> - -<p>As to the Sufis their method in -theorising is not a philosophical method—that -is, made up of a number of premises, -and syllogisms. They maintain -that the knowledge of God, or of anything -existent, is found in our own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118"></a>[118]</span> -hearts, after its detachment from all -physical desires, and concentration of -mind upon the desired object. In support -of their principle they bring many an -argument from the exoteric side of Law. -For instance they quote the Divine -words, “And fear God, and God will -instruct you,”<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> and, “Whoever do their -best endeavour to prompt our true -religion, We will direct them unto Our -ways;”<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> and again, “If ye fear God, He -will grant you a distinction,”<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> and many -other verses of this kind which are -considered to be helpful for their purpose. -We say that this method, if we -suppose it to be real, is not meant for -all people. Had this method been -satisfactory for all people then the philosophical -method would have been quite -futile, and its existence among the -people would have been useless, and with -it the existence of the Quran. For that -always invites us to theorising, judging, -and admonishing by way of philosophy.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119"></a>[119]</span> -We of course do not deny that the -control of physical desires is a condition -for healthy thinking, as physical health -is one of its conditions. For the control -of desires is profitable in acquiring knowledge -by itself, if it be made a condition -for it, just as health is a condition for -education, though it is not very useful -for it. That is why our Law has invited -all of us to this method and has insisted -upon it, that is, for work, not that it is -sufficient in itself, as these people think, -but that it is useful for thinking as we -have already described. This would be -quite clear to any one who cares to -ponder and think over it.</p> - -<p>As to the Mutazilites—their books -have not reached us in sufficient number -in this Peninsula (Spain) that we may -be able to form a fair estimate of the -method which they have adopted in this -matter. But it seems that their methods -are like those of the Asharites.</p> - -<p>If now that it is clear that none of -these methods are in accordance with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120"></a>[120]</span> -that by which the Law invites all the -people, according to the difference in -their dispositions, to a confession of the -existence of God, it may be asked: -What is that method which the Law -has laid down in the Divine Book, and -upon which the Companions of the -Prophet depended? We would say that -the method which the Divine Book has -adopted, and by which it has invited all -to believe, is, when thoroughly investigated -from the Quran, dependent upon -two principles. The one is a knowledge -of God’s solicitude for man, and the -creation of everything for his sake. We -would call this the argument of solicitude. -The second is the creation of the -essences of the existent things, as for -example, the creation of life in the -minerals, and feeling and intelligence. -We would call this method the “argument -of creation.” The first method is -founded upon two principles: first that -all the existent things suit man; secondly, -that this suitability must have existed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121"></a>[121]</span> -in the mind of the Maker before He -intended to make the object in question, -for it cannot be obtained by chance -alone. Now their suitability for the -existence of man can be easily ascertained -by the suitability of day and night, -sun and moon, for the existence of man. -Such is also the case with the suitability -of the four seasons, and of the place in -which he lives, that is, the earth. It is -also apparent with respect to animals, -vegetables, and minerals; and many -other things, such as rain, rivers, seas, -the whole of the earth, water, fire and -air. It is also evident from the different -members of his body, on account of their -suitability for the preservation of his -life and existence. On the whole, a -knowledge of the benefit derived from -all the existent things may be included -in it. So it is necessary for a man who -wants to know God perfectly, to investigate -the benefits derived from existent -things. In the argument of creation is -included the existence of the animal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122"></a>[122]</span> -world, the plant world, and the heavens. -This method is again based upon two -principles, which can be found out by -every man by his very nature. The one -is that all things have been made and -created. This is quite clear in itself, -in the case of animals and plants, as -God has said, “Verily the idols which -ye invoke, beside God, can never create -a single fly, though they may all assemble -for that purpose.”<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> We see an -inorganic substance and then there is -life in it. So we know for certain, that -there is an inventor and bestower of -life, and He is God. Of the heavens we -know by their movements, which never -become slackened, that they work for -our benefit by divine solicitude, and are -subordinate to our welfare. Such an -appointed and subordinate object is -always created for some purpose. The -second principle is that for every created -thing there is a creator. So it is right -to say from the two foregoing principles<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123"></a>[123]</span> -that for every existent thing there is an -inventor. There are many arguments, -according to the number of the created -things, which can be advanced to prove -this premise. Thus it is necessary for -one who wants to know God as He -ought to be known, to acquaint himself -with the essence of things, so that he -may get information about the creation -of all things. For who cannot understand -the real substance and purpose of -a thing, cannot understand the minor -meaning of its creation. It is to this -that God refers in the following verse, -“Or do they not contemplate the heaven -and the earth, and the things which -God has created?”<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> And so a man who -would follow the purpose of philosophy -in investigating the existence of things, -that is, would try to know the cause -which led to its creation, and the purpose -of it would know the argument of kindness -most perfectly. These two arguments -are those adopted by Law.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124"></a>[124]</span></p> - -<p>The verses of the Quran leading to -a knowledge of the existence of God -are dependent only on the two foregoing -arguments. It will be quite clear to -anyone who will examine closely the -verses, which occur in the Divine Book -in this connection. These, when investigated, -will be found to be of three -kinds: either they are verses showing -the “arguments of kindness,” or those -mentioning the “arguments of creation,” -or those which include both the kinds -of arguments. The following verses may -be taken as illustrating the argument of -kindness. “Have we not made the earth -for a bed, and the mountains for stakes -to find the same? And have we not -created you of two sexes; and appointed -your sleep for rest; and made the night -a garment to cover you; and destined -the day to the gaining of your livelihood -and built over you seven solid heavens; -and placed therein a burning lamp? -And do we not send down from the -clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125"></a>[125]</span> -down in abundance, that we may thereby -produce corn, and herbs, and gardens -planted thick with trees?”<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> and, “Blessed -be He Who hath placed the twelve signs -in the heavens; hath placed therein a -lamp by day, and the moon which shineth -by night;”<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> and again, “Let man -consider his food.”<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The following -verses refer to the argument of invention, -“Let man consider, therefore of what -he is created. He is created of the seed -poured forth, issuing from the loins, -and the breast bones;”<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> and, “Do they -not consider the camels, how they are -created; the heaven, how it is raised; -the mountains, how they are fixed; the -earth how it is extended;”<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> and again, -“O man, a parable is propounded unto -you; wherefore hearken unto it. Verily -the idols which they invoke, besides God, -can never create a single fly, though -they may all assemble for the purpose.”<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126"></a>[126]</span> -Then we may point to the story -of Abraham, referred to in the following -verse, “I direct my face unto Him Who -hath created heaven and earth; I am -orthodox, and not of the idolators.”<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> -There may be quoted many verses referring -to this argument. The verses comprising -both the arguments are also -many, for instance, “O men, of Mecca, -serve your Lord, Who has created you, -and those who have been before you: -peradventure you will fear Him; Who -hath spread the earth as a bed for you, -and the heaven as a covering, and hath -caused water to descend from heaven, -and thereby produced fruits for your -sustenance. Set not up, therefore, any -equals unto God, against your own knowledge.”<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> -His words, “Who hath created -you, and those who have been before -you,” lead us to the argument of creation; -while the words, “who has spread<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127"></a>[127]</span> -the earth” refer to the argument of -divine solicitude for man. Of this kind -also are the following verses of the -Quran, “One sign of the resurrection -unto them is the dead earth; We quicken -the same by rain, and produce therefrom, -various sorts of grain, of which -they eat;”<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> and, “Now in the creation -of heaven and earth, and the vicissitudes -of night and day are signs unto those -who are endowed with understanding, -who remember God standing, and sitting, -and lying on their sides; <i>and meditate -on the creation of heaven and earth, -saying O Lord, Thou hast not created this -in vain, far be it from Thee, therefore -deliver us from the torment of hell fire</i>.”<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> -Many verses of this kind comprise both -the kinds of arguments.</p> - -<p>This method is the right path by -which God has invited men to a knowledge -of His existence, and informed -them of it through the intelligence which -He has implanted in their nature. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128"></a>[128]</span> -following verse refers to this fixed and -innate nature of man, “And when the -Lord drew forth their posterity from the -loins of the sons of Adam, and took -them witness against themselves, Am -I not your Lord? They answered, Yea, -we do bear witness.”<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> So it is incumbent -for one who intends to obey God, -and follow the injunction of His Prophet, -that he should adopt this method, -thus making himself one of those -learned men who bear witness to the -divinity of God, with His own witness, -and that of His angels, as He says, -“God hath borne witness, that there -is no God but He, and the angels, and -those who are endowed with wisdom -profess the same; who executeth righteousness; -there is no God but He; the -Mighty, the Wise.”<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> Among the arguments -for both of themselves is the -praise which God refers to in the following -verse, “Neither is there any thing -which doth not celebrate his praise; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129"></a>[129]</span> -ye understand not their celebration -thereof.”<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></p> - -<p>It is evident from the above arguments -for the existence of God that -they are dependent upon two categories -of reasoning. It is also clear that both -of these methods are meant for particular -people; that is, the learned. Now -as to the method for the masses. The -difference between the two lies only in -details. The masses cannot understand -the two above mentioned arguments but -only what they can grasp by their -senses; while the learned men can go -further, and learn by reasoning also, -besides learning by sense. They have -gone so far that a learned man has said, -that the benefits the learned men derive -from the knowledge of the members of -human and animal body are a thousand -and one. If this be so, then this is the -method which is taught both by Law -and by Nature. It is the method which -was preached by the Prophet and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130"></a>[130]</span> -divine books. The learned men do not -mention these two lines of reasonings to -the masses, not because of their number, -but because of a want of depth of learning -on their part about the knowledge -of a single thing only. The example -of the common people, considering and -pondering over the universe, is like a man -who looks into a thing, the manufacture -of which he does not know. For all -that such a man can know about it is -that it has been made, and that there -must be a maker of it. But, on the -other hand the learned look into the -universe, just as a man knowing the art -would do; try to understand the real -purpose of it. So it is quite clear that -their knowledge about the Maker, as -the maker of the universe, would be far -better than that of the man who only -knows it as made. The atheists, who -deny the Creator altogether, are like -men who can see and feel the created -things, but would not acknowledge any -Creator for them, but would attribute<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131"></a>[131]</span> -all to chance alone, and that they come -into being by themselves.</p> - - -<h3>OF THE UNITY OF GOD</h3> - -<p>Now then if this is the method adopted -by the Law, it may be asked: What -is the way of proving the unity of God -by means of the Law; that is, the -knowledge of the religious formula that -“there is no god, but God.” The -negation contained in it is an addition -to the affirmative, which the formula -contains, while the affirmative has -already been proved. What is the purpose -of this negation? We would say -that the method, adopted by the Law, -of denying divinity to all but God is -according to the ordinance of God in -the Quran, contained in the following -three verses. First, “If there were -either in heaven or on earth gods beside -God, verily both would be corrupted.”<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> -Secondly, “God has not begotten -issue; neither is there any other<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132"></a>[132]</span> -God with him; otherwise every other -God would surely take away that which -he has created; and some of them had -enabled themselves over the others. Far -be it that from God, which they affirm -of Him.”<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> Thirdly, “Say, unto the -idolators, if there were gods with Him, -as ye say, they would surely seek an -occasion of making some attempt against -the possessor of the Throne.”<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> The -argument contained in the first verse -is implanted in our dispositions by our -very nature. For it is well-known that -if there be two kings, and the orders of -the one be as effectual as those of the -other, it is not possible to have even a -single city under their guidance. It is -impossible to have one action of a single -kind from two actors. So it is necessary -that, if both of them begin work at the -same time, the city would be ruined, -except in the case that one should work -and the other remain inactive. This is -against our conception of divinity. For<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133"></a>[133]</span> -when the two actions of the same kind -are gathered upon a single object, then -that object must necessarily be destroyed. -This is the meaning of the verse, “If -there were either in the heaven or -on earth gods besides God, both would -be corrupted.” The verse, “Every god -has surely taken away that which he -had created,” has been revealed in -refutation of the argument of those who -believe in many gods, entrusted with -different works. For in this case it becomes -incumbent that the gods doing different -works be independent of one another, -and that they should not be existent at -one and the same time. But as the -world is one it is necessary that there -be not in it gods with different duties. -The third verse, “Say unto the idolators -if there were gods with him, as ye say, -they would surely seek an occasion -of making some attempt against the -Possessor of the Throne,” is like the -first, an argument to prove the impossibility -of the existence of two gods,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134"></a>[134]</span> -whose duties are the same. This verse -means that had there been in the world -any other god, but the present one, able -to create the world and those in it, so -that his relation to it be that of a creator, -then he must live with God on the -Throne. Thus there would be found -two existent things of the same kind in -a single place. But this is impossible. -For when the relation is one, the related -must also be one, that is, they cannot -be gathered in a single place as they -cannot live in it. The relation of God -to the Throne is just its opposite: the -Throne exists for Him, and not He for -the Throne. That is what God has said, -“His Throne is extended over heaven -and earth, and the preservation of them -is no burden unto him.”<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> This is the -argument by nature or by Law for proving -the unity of God. The difference -between the learned and the masses is -that the learned know more about the -creation of the world, and the purpose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135"></a>[135]</span> -of its different parts, like a single body, -than the common people. It is to this -that the latter part of the verse refers, -“God forbid! and far, very far, be that -which they utter! The seven heavens -praise him, and the earth, and all who -are therein: neither is there anything -which doth not celebrate His praise; but -ye understand not their celebration thereof: -He is gracious and merciful.”<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> -The argument which the Asharites deduce -from this verse, calling it the “argument -of impossibility,” is neither in -accordance with natural nor legal arguments. -It is not in accordance with -nature, because what they say is without -any proof at all; while it is insufficient -by Law, because the common people -cannot understand it, not to speak of -their being satisfied with it. They say, -that if there be two gods, then it is -more probable that they would differ. -If this were to happen, then there -would be one of the following three<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136"></a>[136]</span> -cases, there being no fourth alternative. -Either the desire of both of them would -be accomplished, or the desire of neither -would not. They say that it is impossible -that the desire of neither of them -be accomplished, but if it be so then -the universe would neither be existent -nor non-existent. If the desire of both -of them be accomplished, then the universe -would be both existent and non-existent -at the same time. So there -remains no alternative but that the -desire of one be accomplished, the other’s -remaining unfulfilled. So one whose -desire remains unfulfilled is helpless, and -the helpless cannot be a God. The -weakness of this argument is that as it -is possible to suppose that they differ, -it is just as possible to presume that -they agree, a fact more becoming to the -gods than difference of opinion. If they -agree about the creation of the world, -they would be like two craftsmen agreed -upon making something. If it be so -then it must be said that their actions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137"></a>[137]</span> -help them to work and live in a single -place, except that some one may say, -that perhaps one would do one thing and -the other quite another thing, or perhaps -they would work by turns. But -this is an objection which cannot be -advanced by the masses. But if any -sceptic controversialist were to advance -it, he may be told that one who has -power to create one thing has power to -create the whole. So now again it -comes to the same thing, whether they -agree or not, and how can they help -each other in work? As to working by -turn, it would be a defect in both -of them. It is more probable that if -there be two gods, there must be two -universes. But as the universe is one, -its Maker must also be one, for a single -work can only be done by one maker. -So it is not necessary that we should -understand the verse of God, “and some -of them had enabled themselves over the -other,” as pointing to disagreement -alone, but it may be taken as true even<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138"></a>[138]</span> -in the case of argument, for this also -leads to the same result as disagreement -would do. Here lies the difference between -us and the Mutakallimun, about -the meaning of this verse, though Abul -Maali has said something almost expressing -our own views. By the foregoing you -would understand that the argument -which the Mutakallimun have deduced -from this verse is not the one which it -really contains. The impossibility to -which their argument leads is not one -which should be deduced from the verse -in question. The impossibility which is -deduced from the argument which they -think is contained in the verse, is more -than one impossibility, by their dividing -it into three parts, while there is no -division in the verse itself. So the -argument which they use is the one which -is known to the logicians as disjunctive -syllogism, and is known in their science -as definition and division. But the -argument contained in the verse is one -which is known in logic as hypothetical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139"></a>[139]</span> -syllogism, which is quite different from disjunctive -syllogism. Any one who would look -most cursorily into this science would -know the difference between the two. -Then, again, the impossibility which -their argument points out is not that to -which the argument of the Book leads. -They say that universe will either be -neither existent nor non-existent, or it -will be existent and non-existent at the -same time, or its god would be a helpless -and weak god. These are impossible -for ever, because of the impossibility -of more than one. The impossibility -which the verse refers to, is not so for -ever, for in it it depends upon a certain -period of time, that is when the universe -is found corrupted at the time of -its existence. For he says “If there -be any other god but God,” the universe -would be found corrupted. Then he -has made an exception that it is not -corrupted, and hence there must not be -more than one God. So now it has -become quite clear that this is the method<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140"></a>[140]</span> -by which God has invited the -people to believe in His existence, and -negate the divinity of all but Him. -These are the two propositions which -are contained in the article of Faith, -“There are no gods but He.” So -one who thinks over these two propositions, -and believes in them by the method -which we have pointed out, is a -Muslim in reality, with a belief which -is truly Islamic. But he whose belief -is not based upon these arguments, -though he confesses the article, he is a -Muslim with the other Muslims, only -on account of the similarity of names.</p> - - -<h3>ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES</h3> - -<p>The attributes which the Divine Book -has assigned to the Creator and Maker -of the universe, are only the perfect -forms of those which are found in man, -and these are seven in number: Knowledge, -life, power, volition, hearing, seeing -and talking.</p> - -<p>Now as to knowledge, God in his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141"></a>[141]</span> -Divine Book has said the following -“Shall he not know all things who has -created them?”<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> The argument contained -in this verse is that a created -thing always shows, by the arrangement -which it possesses,—its different parts -being made for the sake of one another -for the benefit intended to be derived -from that thing,—that its maker is not -nature only, but it must have been made -by one who has arranged all for the end -in view. So he must have a knowledge -of it. For instance, when a man looks -at a house he knows that the foundation -was laid for the sake of the walls, -and the walls have been raised for the -roof. So it becomes clear to him that -the house must have been built by a -man knowing the art of building.</p> - -<p>This quality is eternal, for it is not -fitting that God should possess it for -a time only. But we should not go -down deep into this matter, and should -not say, like the Mutakallimun, that He<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142"></a>[142]</span> -knows the created things at the time of -their creation, by His eternal knowledge, -for then it becomes necessary that the -knowledge of the created thing at the -time of its non-existence be the same -which is absurd, when knowledge is said -to be dependent upon the existent things. -As an existent thing is sometimes an -action, and sometimes only a potentiality, -it is necessary that the knowledge of -the two existence be different, as -its time of being in potentiality is quite -different from the time of its being in -action. But this the Law does not -explain. On the other hand it maintains -quite an opposite position: that -God knows the created thing at the -time of its creation, as He has said, -“There falleth no leaf, but He knoweth -it; neither is there a single grain in the -dark parts of the earth; neither a green -thing, nor a dry thing, but it is written -in the perspicuous book.”<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> So it is -necessary that we should lay down in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143"></a>[143]</span> -Law that He knows a thing before it -comes into being; knows a thing when -it is, and not when it should have been; -and knows when a thing has been destroyed -at the time of its destruction. -This is what the injunctions of the Law -establish. It has been so because the -masses cannot understand the universe -through visible things, except in this -way. The Mutakallimun have no argument -to advance against it, except that -they say that the knowledge which -changes with a change in the existent -thing is itself created, while with God -nothing created can be attached. They -say so because they think that that -which cannot be separated from the -created thing is itself created. But we -have already exposed the fallacy of this -argument. So it is established by the -rules described, and it should not be -said that he knows the creation of the -created, and the corruption of the corrupted -things, neither by created nor -by eternal knowledge. This is an innovation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144"></a>[144]</span> -in Islam, “And is thy Lord -forgetful of thee?”<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> - -<p>The attribute of life is quite evident -from the attribute of Knowledge. For -our observation shows that one of the -conditions of knowledge is life. According -to the Mutakallimun the conditions -of an observed object can be applied to -the unseen. What they have said about -this is quite true.</p> - -<p>The attribute of volition needs no -proof, because it is one of the conditions -of bringing forth a thing, that its maker -must intend it. Such is also the case -with power: He must possess power. -But to say that He intended created -things by eternal intention is innovation -in religion, which was not known to the -learned in Law, and cannot satisfy the -masses who have reached the stage of -dogmatics. We should say that He -intends making a thing at the time of -its creation, but does not intend at the -time of its non-existence. So God<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145"></a>[145]</span> -says: “Verily our speech unto anything -when we will the same is that we say unto -it, Be; and it is.”<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> For, as we have said, -the common people are never compelled to -advance the argument that He intends -doing a thing by eternal intention, but, -as the Mutakallimun have said, that -that by which the created things exist, -is itself created.</p> - -<p>Now if it be asked, how the attribute -of Speech be assigned to and proved in -God, we would say that it can be ascribed -to him on account of the attributes -of Knowledge and Power of creation. -For speech is nothing more than act -on the part of the speaker to show to -the one addressed the knowledge which -he has, or to disclose to him the knowledge -which is in him. This is one of -the actions of the maker. And when -that created thing, which is really a -creator, man, has power over this faculty, -because he knows and is powerful, how -befitting it is that it should be found<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146"></a>[146]</span> -in the real Creator. There is another -condition for this action, among the -things which we can observe, and that -is that which must be the means of performing -it: words. This being so, it becomes -necessary that that action should be performed -by God in the heart of somebody, -His chosen servant. It is not necessary -that it should always be through -the medium of words, and so created. -But it may happen either through an -angel; or through divine inspiration, -that is without the medium of words -which He may create, but through an -act to the hearer, which discloses to him -the true nature of the thing meant, or -through words which He may create in -the ears of him who has been specialised -to hear His words. It is to these three -methods that the verse of the Quran -refers, “It is not fit for a man that -God should speak unto him otherwise -than by private revelation, or from -behind a veil, or by sending a messenger -to reveal, by His permission, that which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147"></a>[147]</span> -He pleaseth.”<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> So revelation is the -disclosure of the intended secrets to the -inspired person without the medium of -words which He created, but through -an action done on the mind of the one -addressed. So God says, “Afterwards He -approached the Prophet and drew unto -him; until He was at the distance of -two bows’ length from him or yet nearer; -and He revealed unto His servant that -which He revealed.”<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> The speech from -behind the veil is one which is performed -through the medium of words. This is -the real speech, and that is the one -which God specially bestowed upon -Moses, and so He has said, “And God -spake unto Moses, discoursing with him.”<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> -Now as to his words, “or by sending -a messenger to reveal,” this is the -third kind mentioned above, that is, -through the medium of some angels. -Sometimes God speaks to the learned -men, who are the successors of the -prophets, by disclosing arguments to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148"></a>[148]</span> -them. On account of these causes it is -true, when the learned men say, that -the Quran is the speech of God. It -has now become clear to you that the -Quran, which is the speech of God, is -eternal, but the words expressing it are -created by him, and are not human. -From it are excepted the Quranic words -which we commonly use in our speech, -that is, these words are our own actions, -by the command of God, while the words -of the Quran are those created by God. -He who does not understand these -things by this method, cannot understand -this argument and cannot grasp as to -how the Quran is the word of God. -The alphabets used in the Quran are -our own invention, by the command of -God. We have to respect them, because -of them are formed the words created -by God, for the purpose which is not -itself created. He who thought of words -and not of meaning, that is, did not -separate them, said that the Quran was -created; while he who thought of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149"></a>[149]</span> -meaning which these words express, said -the Quran was not created. But the -truth lies in the middle of these two -extreme views. The Asharites deny -that the speaker is the maker of his -own speech, for they think that if they -admit it, they must also admit that God -is the maker of His speech. Again, -when they believe, that the speech can -only exist with the speaker, they think, -they must also believe, taking in view -the two foregoing principles, that God -is Himself the creator of His words. In -this case He Himself becomes the place -of created things. So they assert that -God is the maker of speech, but it is -an eternal attribute in him, like knowledge, -etc. This is the time of the -speech in our mind, but not of the -speech which expresses what we have in -our mind, that is, the words. As the -Mutazilites thought that speech is the -action of the speaker, they said that by -speech is meant only the words uttered. -So they believed that the Quran is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150"></a>[150]</span> -“Created.” Since according to them -the word is an action of the speaker, so -it is not one of its conditions that it -should exist with the speaker. The -Asharites on the other hand, insist that -it is one of its conditions that it should -exist only with the speaker. This is -true in both the cases, that is in the -case of ideas in our minds, and the -words which express them. But in the -case of God, it is the ideas which stand -with Him, and not the words expressing -them. So when the Asharites laid it -down as a condition, that the speech be -absolutely dependent upon the speaker, -they deny that the speaker is the maker -of his speech; while on the other hand, -the Mutazilites, when they laid it down -as a condition that the speaker is the -maker of his speech, ignored the existence -of ideas in our minds. In this way there -is some truth, and some falsehood, in -the opinions of both of these sects, as -must have become clear by what we -have said.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151"></a>[151]</span></p> - -<p>Now we come to the attributes of -hearing and seeing. The Law has proved -them to be possessed by God by -saying that hearing and seeing are the -two essential qualities for knowing the -meaning of things, which cannot be acquired -by intellect. So a maker must -know everything about the object which -he is making, it is necessary that he -should possess the two senses of hearing -and seeing. So He must have these -two faculties. All this proves their -existence in God, by means of the Law, -through the teaching of the knowledge -which is found in him. Moreover, One -on whom the name of God and the -Adorned is applied must necessarily -possess all the senses. For it is useless -for man to worship him who cannot -know that he is being worshipped, as -God has said, “O my father, why dost -thou worship that which heareth not, -neither seeth, nor profiteth thee at all;”<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> -and, “Do you therefore worship, beside<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152"></a>[152]</span> -God, that which cannot profit you at -all, nor can it hurt you?”<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> This is the -power which has been ascribed to God, -and which the Law has commanded the -common people to know and nothing else.</p> - -<p>Of the innovation which this question -of attributes has given rise to, one is -whether they are the same as Divine -Essence or something added to it, that -is, whether they are found in the essence -itself (<i>Nafsiyyah</i>), or are only applied -to it, (<i>Maanawiyyah</i>). By <i>Nafsiyyah</i> -we mean those attributes which are -found in the thing itself, and are not -attached to it for the purpose of adding -something to the essence, for existence, -we say one or eternal. By <i>Maanawiyyah</i> -we mean the attributes which are applied -to a thing for some purpose -which is found in it. The Asharites say -that these attributes are only <i>Maanawiyyah</i>, -that is qualities which are only -added to the Divine Essence. So they -say that he knows by a knowledge which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153"></a>[153]</span> -has been added to His essence, and lives -by life attached to it and so on. This -has compelled them to admit that the -Creator has a body, for there must be -the quality and the qualified, the bearer -and the borne. This is the condition of the -body, so they must say that the essence -is existent by itself, and the qualities -exist through it, or they must say that -these attributes are independent of each -other, then there must be a number -of gods. This is the belief of the -Christians, who say that the three -personifications are those of Existence, -Life and Knowledge. God has said -about it the following, “They are certainly -infidels, who say, God is the third -of the three.”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> One of them stands -by itself, the others being dependent -upon the former. So it becomes necessary -that there should be essence, existing -in itself, and the accidents depending on -something else. The place in which the -essence and the accidents are found together<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154"></a>[154]</span> -must necessarily be a body. Such -is also the case with the Mutazilites -about the question, that the essence and -the attributes are one and the same -thing. This they think, is for the primary -principles of knowledge or may be -opposed to them. For they think that -according to the primary principles knowledge -must be existent without the one -knowing. But knowledge and the one knowing -cannot be the same, except that it may -be possible that the two may be very close -to each other, just as the father and -the son. This teaching is very remote -for the understanding of the masses, and -to explain it to them in detail is innovation, -for it would more likely mislead -than guide them to the right path. The -Mutazilites have no argument to advance -in proof of their proposition, for they -have none. Such is also the condition -of the Mutakallimun in the case -of denying a body to God. For when -they have established it, they are compelled -to admit the creation of the body,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155"></a>[155]</span> -because it is a body. We have already -said that they have no argument for it. -Those who have such are the learned -people, the philosophers. It is at this -point that the Christians have erred. -They believe in the multiplicity of attributes -that they are essences existing -not by the help of another, but by -themselves, like the self, (<i>Zat</i>). They -also believe that the qualities with these -attributes are two in number—knowledge -and life. So they say that God is one -from the three causes. That He is three -they say because He exists, lives -and knows. They say that He is one, -because He is a collection of all the -three qualities. And so there are three -religious opinions among them. One -party believes that they are all the self -(<i>Zat</i>) alone without any number; the -other only believes in numbers of qualities. -This is divided into two parties: -one which thinks that they exist by -themselves, and the other which makes -them exist by something else. All this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156"></a>[156]</span> -is in contrast with the purpose of the -Law.</p> - -<p>It being so, it is necessary that one -who wants to teach the knowledge of -these things to the common people -should tell them as much as the Law -orders him to do—and that is only a -confession of their existence without -entering into details. For it is not -possible for the common people to believe -and understand them at all. By common -people here I mean all those who are -unacquainted with the laws of reasoning, -though they may or may not know the -science of scholastic theology. It is not -in the power of scholastic theology to know -of these things even when it is said -that it is not a science of reasoning but -of dogmatics, for these things can -never be clearly understood by dogmatics -alone. So, by now, the extent of -these questions which should be disclosed -to the common people, and the method -adopted for this purpose must have become -clear to you by what we have said.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157"></a>[157]</span></p> - - -<h3>OF DIVINE PERFECTION</h3> - -<p>We have already described the way -which the Law pursues in teaching the -common people the existence of God, -the denial of His having any associates, -and thereby the knowledge of His -attributes, and the extent to which they -have been explained in details in it, -one after another. It is really an addition -to, and deduction from, and change -and interpretation of this very limit and -extent which has not been productive of -good to any and all the people. Now -it remains for us to know the method -which the Law has adopted in explaining -to the common people the perfection -of God and freedom from all defects, -and the length to which it has gone in -detailing it, and the cause of restricting -its knowledge to them. Then we should -mention the methods which it adopts in -teaching the people the knowledge of -His actions, and the latitude which it -has allowed in this respect. Having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158"></a>[158]</span> -done so, we shall have accomplished the -purpose for which we began this book.</p> - -<p>So we say that the knowledge of -things known as perfection and holiness -are found in many verses of the Quran, -the most clear and definite of them -being the following, “There is nothing -like Him, and it is He who heareth and -seeth;”<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> and, “Shall God, therefore, -Who createth, be as he who createth -not.”<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> The second verse is an argument -for the verse “there is nothing like -Him.” For it is one of the characteristics -of the dispositions of all the people -to think that the Creator must either -be unlike the things which He has -created, or having qualities which may -be different from these which He has -given to the created; otherwise he who -is himself created cannot be a Creator. -When we have admitted that the -created cannot be the creator then it -becomes incumbent upon us to say that -the qualities of the created should either<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159"></a>[159]</span> -be not found in the Creator, or found -in Him in some different way than they -are in the created. We say, “in some -different way,” because we have proved -the divine qualities to be those which -are found in the noblest of God’s -creatures, man, as knowledge, life, power, -volition and so on. This is the meaning -of the Tradition of the Prophet, “God -created Adam after His own image.” -So it has been established that the Law -has denied the similarity between the -Creator and the created with fitting -arguments. The denial of similarity is -of two kinds, first, that there may not -be found in the Creator many qualities -of the created; and secondly; there may -be found in him the qualities of the -created in so perfect and excellent a -form as could not be imagined. Of -these two kinds it should be seen which -one the Law has explained, and about -which it is reticent. We would also try -to find out the cause for this reticence.</p> - -<p>We would say that the qualities of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160"></a>[160]</span> -the created which have been denied by -Law as pertaining to God are those -which show some defects; for example, -death, as God says, “And do ye not -trust in him who liveth, and dieth -not,”<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> or sleep and things which lead -to negligence and carelessness, as regards -senses and the protection of the existent -things, as He says, “Neither slumber -nor sleep seizeth Him.”<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> Of such -qualities are error and forgetfulness, as -God has said, “The knowledge thereof -is with my Lord, in the book of His -decrees: my Lord erreth not, neither -doth He forget.”<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> A knowledge of -those qualities the existence of which -has been denied in God is one of the -necessary things of common education -and is why the Law has been very -explicit about them. It only warns us -not to meddle with those things which -are far from the primary principles of -knowledge, because it knows the small -limits of human knowledge, as God has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161"></a>[161]</span> -said in many different verses of the -Quran, “But the greater part of men -do not understand.” For example He -says, “Verily the creation of heaven -and earth is more considerable, than the -creation of man; but the greater part -of men do not understand,”<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> and “The -institution of God to which He has -created mankind disposed; there is no -change in what God hath created. This -is the right religion; but the greater -part of men know it not.”<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Now it -may be said, what is the proof—that -is, the proof advanced by the Law—of -the fact that these defects are not found -in God. We would say that it is -apparent from the universe itself. It is -quite safe. No confusion or corruption -overtakes it. Had the Creator been -subject to negligence, carelessness, error -or forgetfulness the whole of the universe -would have been destroyed. God -has made this clear in many verses of -the Quran. He says, “Verily God<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162"></a>[162]</span> -sustaineth the heaven and the earth, -lest they fail: and if they should fail, -none could support the same besides -him;”<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> and, “The preservation of both -is not burden unto him, He is the -high, the mighty.”<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> - -<p>If our opinion be asked about the -anthropomorphic attributes of God, -whether the Law has denied them as -attributes to the Creator or is only -silent about them, we would say, that -it is evident that the Law is quite -silent about them, and their mention in -it is quite near to their denial altogether. -It has come to be so because the Quran -in many verses speaks of His hands -and face, and these verses are taken as -showing physical attributes which the -Creator has bestowed upon the created, -just as He has given him the qualities -of power, volition and so on—qualities -which are common between the Creator -and created, except that they are more -perfect in the former. On account of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163"></a>[163]</span> -this many Muslims believed that the -Creator has a body different from all -other bodies. Such is the case with the -Hanbalites and their many followers. -But in my opinion we should follow the -path of the Law; and this should neither -deny nor try to prove them, and whenever -asked by the common people to do -so, we should answer with words of -God, “There is nothing like him; and -it is He who heareth and seeth,”<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> in -this way preventing them from questioning. -It is so because of three reasons. -It is neither near to the first, nor to -the second, nor to the third grade. This -would be quite clear to you from the -method adopted by the Mutakallimun. -They say that the proof of the fact that -He is not a body is that it has been -proved that all bodies are created things. -If they are asked to point out the method -of proving the latter proposition, -they adopt the method, which we have -already pointed out, concerning the creation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164"></a>[164]</span> -of accidents, that that which cannot -be separated from created things is itself -created. You have already seen, from -what we have said, that this method is -not a philosophical one, and had it been -so, even then a majority of the common -people would not have grasped it. Moreover, -whatever these people have said -about God, that He is a Self (<i>Zat</i>) and -divine attributes added to it, proves by -itself that He has a body, on account -of the denial of creation, rather an -argument denying anthropomorphism. -This is the first reason why the Law -does not speak of these things in clear -terms. The second reason is that common -people think that all that is existent -they can imagine and feel, all else -being non-existent to them. So when -they are told that there exists One who -has no body, their imagination does not -work and He becomes almost non-existent -to them, particularly so when they -are told that He is neither outside our -knowledge nor in it, neither above nor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165"></a>[165]</span> -below. That is why the sect which -believes in anthropomorphism thinks of -those who deny it, that they also believe -in it; while, on the other hand, the party -thinks its opponents to be believing in a -number of gods. The third reason is that -had the Law denied anthropomorphism -altogether there would have arisen many -a misgiving about what has been said -concerning the Day of Judgment, and -other beliefs.</p> - -<p>Of these one is the problem of -Divine Vision which we find stated in -authentic Traditions. Those who have -been very explicit in denying it are -the two sects of the Asharites and -the Mutazilites. The belief of the -latter has driven them to deny the -vision altogether; while the Asharites -have tried to make the two things agree, -but this was impossible for them to do. -So they have taken refuge in many -sophistic arguments, the weakness of -which we would show when talking of -the Divine Vision. Another problem<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166"></a>[166]</span> -which rises out of this is that it evidently -gives rise to a denial of the -direction in which God is. For if He -has no body then the Law becomes an -allegory. For the advent of the prophets -is founded upon the fact that Divine -Revelation is sent to them from the -heaven. Upon this very principle is -also based our religion, for the Divine -Book has come down from the heavens, -as God says, “Verily we have sent -down the same (the Quran) on a blessed -night.”<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> The descending of the -divine revelation from heaven is based -upon the fact of God’s being there. So -also is the descending and ascending of -angels from heaven, as God says, “Unto -him ascendeth the good speech; and the -righteous work will He exalt;”<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> and -says He, “The angels ascend up unto -and the spirit.”<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> We would mention -all the things which the deniers of -direction bring to prove their proposition -when we come to talk of this problem.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167"></a>[167]</span></p> - -<p>Another difficulty which arises is that -with the denial of anthropomorphism -we shall have to deny movement to -God, after which it would be difficult to -explain with regard to the Day of Judgment, -that He would appear to the -people at that moment, and would himself -superintend their judgment, as He -says, “Thy Lord shall come and the -angels rank by rank.”<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> It would also -be difficult to explain the famous Tradition -of Descent, though its explanation -would be, on the whole easier than that -of the former in spite of all that has -been said about it in the Law. So it -is necessary that there should be disclosed -to the common people nothing which -might lead them to a disbelief in the -literal meanings of these things. This -would be its effect upon the mind of -the people if taken exoterically. But -when it is interpreted it would come to -either of two interpretations. Either interpretation -would overcome the exoteric<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168"></a>[168]</span> -side of it and of other things like it, -thus destroying the Law altogether, -and falsifying their purpose; or it will -be said about all of them that they are -only allegories, which would destroy the -Law, and efface it from the mind of the -people, while the man doing it would -not know the sin he has committed with -regard to Law. With all this, if you -were to look into the arguments which -the interpreters advance about these -things, you would find all of them unreasonable, -while the exoteric meanings are -much more satisfactory, that is, verification -through them is more common and -much better. This should become clearer -to you when we begin to review the -arguments which they advance for a -denial of anthropomorphism, and discuss -the question of direction, as we may -shortly do. You should also know that -the Law never intended to disclose the -question of the denial of this attribute -completely to the common people, since -it can be done by an explanation of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169"></a>[169]</span> -soul, and the Law has not explained to -the masses what the soul was. God -says in the Quran, “They will ask thee -concerning the Soul; answer, The Soul -was created at the command of my Lord; -but ye have no knowledge given unto -you except a little.”<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> This is so, -because it is difficult to establish reasons -for the common people for the existence -of a thing existing by itself, without a -body. Had the denial of this attribute -been understood by the masses then it -would not have been enough for prophet -Abraham to say in his discussion with -the infidel, “When Abraham said, My -Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: -he answered, I give life and I kill.”<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> -On the other hand he would have said, -“Thou art a body, and God has not -one, for every body is created,” as the -Asharites would argue. So also it would -have sufficed for Moses in his discussion -with Pharoah about his divinity; and -for the Holy Prophet in case of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170"></a>[170]</span> -anti-christ, telling the Faithful of the -falsehood of his claims for divinity, -because he would have a body while -God has none. On the other hand he -told them that our God was not one-eyed. -An argument proving the -physical defect in him was enough to -falsify him. So you see that all these -are innovations in Islam, and have -become the cause of its being split up -into sects, into which the Prophet tells -us that his people would be divided.</p> - -<p>Now some one may object that the -Law has not made it clear to the -common people that God has or has not -a body, then what should they believe -about him. This is a question which -will naturally arise in the mind of every -man, and cannot be put away from him. -So it would not satisfy the common -people to let them know of a thing, the -existence of which they should believe, -that it is not made of matter. We -should say that they should be answered -with the answer given by Law—That<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171"></a>[171]</span> -He is the Light, for this is the quality -which God has assigned to himself in -His Book, for describing himself, He -says, “God is the light of heaven and -earth.”<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> The prophet has also assigned -to him the game quality in an authentic -Tradition. It says that he was asked -whether he had seen God, and he -answered, “He was Light, and I saw -him.” The Tradition of the Night -Journey says that when the Prophet -neared the lote-tree,<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> it was completely -covered with light, which did not hide -it from his sight. There is also a -Tradition in the book of Muslim which -says that God is a curtain of light, -which, if opened, would burn the opener, -and yet God would not be seen. In<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172"></a>[172]</span> -some other readings of this very Tradition -it is said that He is seventy curtains -of light. It should be known that -this illustration is especially fit for God, -for it comprises the two things, that He -can be felt, our eyes and intellect being -powerless to see or comprehend him, and -in spite of this He is not a body too. -Now according to the common people -the existent thing is one which can be -felt, while the non-existent thing is that -which they cannot feel. So light being -the best of the things felt, it is but -fitting that the best existing thing should -be likened unto it. There is another -cause for it which should be noticed. -The condition of His existence to the -learned people, when they begin to -ponder over him, is like the condition of -the eyes when they look towards the -sun. But such is not the condition of -the eyes of the bat. So this quality -fittingly describes the condition of the -two classes of people. Moreover, God -is the cause of the existence of things,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173"></a>[173]</span> -and of our knowledge of them. This is -also the quality of the light in showing -colours, and of our seeing them. So -God has very fittingly named himself -Light. When it is said that He is Light -then there remains no doubt as to His -Vision on the Day of Judgment. From -these it must have become clear to you -what the primary belief of the Law -was about this attribute, and what are -the innovations which rose in it afterwards. -The Law is silent about it -because there is not found in the universe -anything unseen without a body, -except that which is found by arguments -among things seen as existent with this -quality, and that is the soul. As the -belief of the soul was impossible for the -masses, it was also impossible for them -to understand the existence of a Being -who exists without a body. Hence they -cannot understand it about God.</p> - - -<h3>OF DIRECTION</h3> - -<p>This is a quality which all the people -learned in Law have tried to prove,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174"></a>[174]</span> -until the Mutazilites denied it, and were -followed by the later Asharites, like -Abul Maali and those who follow him. -All the exoterics of the Law go to -prove it. For God says, “And eight -shall bear the Throne of thy Lord on -that Day;”<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> and “He governeth all -the things from heaven even to the -earth: hereafter shall they return unto -him, on the Day whose length shall be -a thousand years, of those which ye -compute.”<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> Again, He says, “The -angels ascend unto him and the spirit;”<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> -and, “Are Ye secure that He who -dwelleth in heaven will not cause the -earth to swallow you up? and behold, -it shall shake.”<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> There are many -other verses of this kind which, if interpreted, -would turn the whole of the Law -into interpretation; and if taken allegorically, -would make it an allegory. All -the religious laws are based upon the -principle that God is in heaven, from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175"></a>[175]</span> -whence he sends down angels to His -Prophets with revelations, that from the -heaven, the religious books used to -descend, and that towards it was the -Night Journey of the Prophet, till he -reached near the lote-tree. All the -philosophers are, moreover, agreed that -God and His Angels are in heaven, as -is the case with all the religions. The -doubt which led them to deny this idea -of direction was that they thought that -by believing in direction it would be -necessary to believe in space, which in -its turn leads to a belief in anthropomorphism. -But we say that this is not -necessarily the case, for direction can -exist without space. It is nothing but -the surfaces of the body surrounding it, -which are six in number. That is why -we say that there is an above and a below, -right and left and before and behind for -an animal. Or they are the surfaces of -a body surrounded by another body -having the above-mentioned six directions. -So the directions, which are the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176"></a>[176]</span> -surfaces of the body itself, are not the -spaces of the body in any respect. But -the surfaces of the surrounding bodies are -space for it. The atmosphere surrounding -man, and the surfaces of the sky -surrounding the surfaces of the atmosphere, -for they are the spaces for it. -Such is also the case with different -surrounding and forming spaces for one -another. As to the last sky it is evident -that beyond it there must be no body. -For had it been so, it would be necessary -that beyond it be another body and -so on to infinity. So there is no space -at all for the last body of the universe, -for it is not possible that in it be found -any body, it being necessary that there -be found a body in every space. So -when there is an argument for the existence -of a thing in that direction, it is -necessary that it be not a body. So -one who denies His existence there goes -against his own ideas. He is existent, -has a body, is not existent without a -body. They cannot say that beyond the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177"></a>[177]</span> -universe is a void. For the impossibility -of a void has been made quite certain -in the philosophical sciences. For that -upon which the name void is commonly -applied, are nothing but dimensions -(<i>Abad</i>), in which there are no bodies. -For when these dimensions are once -removed, there remains nothing but -non-existence. But if the void be supposed -as existent, it is necessary to admit -the existence of accidents in something -not a body, for dimensions are -accidents by their having a quality. -But it is said by the Ancients and -established by past religions that that -place is the dwelling place of the spirits, -God and angels. This place has no -space, and is not governed by time, -because everything governed by time -and space can be corrupted. And it is -necessary that the things there be -uncorrupted and uncreated. This has -been made quite clear by what I have -said, for there cannot be found in that -place anything but one which is existent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178"></a>[178]</span> -and at the same time can be felt, or is -altogether non-existent. It is self-evident -that an existent object is always -referred to by its existence; that is, it -is said that it exists, that is, it has an -existence. So if anything exists there, -it must be the noblest of all, and it is -necessary that that existent thing should -be referred to by the best portion of -the universe, which are the heavens. -God has said concerning the nobility of -the heavens, “Verily the creation of -heaven and earth is more considerable -than the creation of man: but the -greater part of men do not understand.”<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> -All this is perfectly clear to the learned -men “Well grounded in knowledge.”<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a></p> - -<p>Now it has become clear to you that -belief in direction is necessary by religion -and reason, and that it forms a part of -the Law, which is based upon it. A -denial of the principles is a denial of all -the religions. The cause of the difficulty -in their understanding this, and in their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179"></a>[179]</span> -denial of anthropomorphism is, that there -cannot be found in the visible world an -illustration of such a thing. This was -just the reason why the Law did not -expressly deny an anthropomorphism. -For to the common people verification -of an invisible object can only come -when its existence be known in the -visible world, as knowledge, which being -a condition for their own existence as -visible, could to them become a condition -for the existence of an invisible Maker. -Now as the case of the visible was unknown -in the visible on the part of the -many, and none knew it but those who -were well-grounded in knowledge, the -Law-giver forbade an inquiry into it, as -for example knowledge of the Soul. If -it be needful for the common people to -know anything, then the Law gives -examples from the visible world. And -if one example did not suffice for the -understanding of the problem in view, -then many examples are given, as in the -case of an account of the Day of Judgment.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180"></a>[180]</span> -The doubt which arises out of a -denial of direction, on the part of those -denying it, is that the common people -cannot comprehend it, particularly so, -because they have not been given before -hand to understand that God has no -body. So it is necessary to take the -action of the Law as our example, -otherwise we will have to interpret that -which the Law itself has not expressly -said.</p> - -<p>With regard to these problems of -the Law, the people may be divided -into three classes. In the first place -there are people who cannot notice any -doubt arising out of them, especially in -things which the Law has left to be -taken exoterically. These people are -the greatest in number, and may be -described as the masses. Then the -second group of men is one which has -doubts; but has not power to solve -them. These are above the masses and -below the learned people. It is for -them that there are found in the Law<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181"></a>[181]</span> -allegorical sayings, and it is they whom -God has censured. For there is no -allegory in the Law for the learned or -the common people, and it is in this -light that all the allegorical sayings of -the Quran should be understood. Their -example as regards the Law is like the -example of the bread of wheat which -though a useful cereal for the large -number of human beings, may prove -harmful to some. Such is also the -case with religious teaching: it is useful -for the many but sometimes becomes -harmful to some. The following words -of God point to the same thing. “He -will not thereby mislead any except the -transgressors.”<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> But this is found only -in a few verses of the Quran about a -few people. Most of the verses are, -however, those which speak of things -invisible for which there is no example -in the visible world. So they are expressed -by the things nearest to them -in the visible world, on account of their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182"></a>[182]</span> -similarity. Some people take the illustration -as the thing illustrated, and -hence they fall into confusion and doubt. -This is what is called allegorical in the -Law, and is not meant for the learned -or the common people, which in reality -form two groups of men. For these -are the people who are really healthy, -and delicate food is only fit for them. -The other group is a group of sick men -who are always few in number. So God -has said, “But they whose hearts are -perverse will follow that which is -parabolical therein, out of love of -schism.”<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> These are the dogmatic and -the scholastic theologians. The worst -which these people have done in respect -to the Law is that they have interpreted -much which they thought was not -to be taken literally, and then said that -their interpretation was the thing -intended, and that God had mentioned -it parabolically only to test and try -His creatures. God forbid that we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183"></a>[183]</span> -should ever have such an idea about -Him. The Divine Book is a miracle of -clearness and lucidity. So it is far from -the real purpose of the Law for one to -say about a thing which is not parabolical, -that it is so, and then set -about interpreting it according to his -own ideas, telling the people that their -duty lies in believing his interpretations. -They have done so in the case of the -verse of Equalisation on the Throne, -and others, saying that their exoteric -meaning is only parabolical. On the -whole many interpretations, which these -people maintain to be the real purpose -of the Law, when intently looked into -and deciphered, are found wanting in -arguments, and not serving the purpose -which the exoteric meaning would have -with regard to the common people. The -primary purpose of knowledge for the -common people is action, so that which -is most useful in action is most suitable -for them. But for the learned men, the -purpose of knowledge is both knowledge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184"></a>[184]</span> -and action. The man who interprets -anything of the Law, thinking that his -interpretation is the real purpose of it, -and then discloses it to the common -people, is like a man, who finds a medicine -which an expert physician had -compounded to preserve the health of -all, or of a majority of the people; then -there came a man with whom that -medicine did not agree on account of the -coarseness of his disposition. He presented -it to some people, and then thought -that by some drug, which the first -physician had clearly specified, as composing -that universally useful medicine, -he did not mean the drug commonly -known by that name—but another -which he really meant, but used this -name for it by a far-fetched metaphor. -So he took out the first drug from the -compound, and placed another in its -stead, which he thought to be the one -intended by the first physician. Then -he told the people that this was the -medicine intended. The people began<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185"></a>[185]</span> -to use that “improved” medicine, and -many of them got injured by it. Then -there came another group of men, who, -seeing the people sick on account of -that medicine, thought of curing them. -So they changed some of its drugs with -some other than the first one, then -presented it to the people for quite -another disease than that intended by -the first physician. Then there appeared -another group which interpreted the -medicine in quite another way than the -two preceding groups had done. The -fourth group gave a new interpretation -to the drug and prescribed it for a -fourth kind of disease. So as time went -on with that great medicine, the interpretations -of it took hold of the people -instead of the drugs, and they changed -and transformed it altogether. As a -result the people were attacked by many -different kinds of diseases, till the usefulness -of the medicine was altogether -lost. Such is the condition of those -sects which have risen in Islam. For<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186"></a>[186]</span> -every one of them has made interpretations -quite different from the others, and -maintained that its interpretation shows -the real purpose of the Law, which was -at last rent to piece, and lost its primary -purpose altogether. The Prophet, -knowing that a thing like this would -necessarily happen among his people, -said, “My people will shortly be divided -into seventytwo sects. All of them will -be in hell, except one.” By this one -he meant the sect which followed the -exoteric meanings of the Law, without -making any interpretations which may -be disclosed to the people. If you were -to look into the Law and see the corruption -which it has suffered up to this -time, through interpretations, the truth -of this example would become clear -to you.</p> - -<p>The first to make a change in the -religion—the great medicine—were the -Kharijites, who were followed by the -Mutazilites. They were succeeded by -the Asharites, after whom came the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187"></a>[187]</span> -Sufis. Last of all came Al-Ghazzali, -who went to the extreme and corrupted -everything. He it is who explained -philosophy to the common people, and -disclosed to them the opinions of the -philosophers as he understood them to -be. This he did in a book called -<i>Al-Maqasid</i>, in which he thought -he was refuting them. He planned his -<i>Refutation of the Philosophers</i>, and charged -them with infidelity in respect to three -questions, tearing them to pieces, as he -thought, in regard to consensus of opinion; -and calling them innovators as -regards other opinions. In this book he -has advanced many specious arguments -and confused reasonings, which have led -astray many people both from religion -and philosophy. Then he said in his -book <i>Jawahir al-Quran</i> that the arguments -which he had mentioned in his -<i>Refutation</i> were controversial in their -nature, while in fact they were mentioned -in his <i>Al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi</i>. -Then in his <i>Mishkat ul Anwar</i> he mentions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188"></a>[188]</span> -grades of men really knowing God. -He says that all but those who believe -that God is not the mover of the first -heaven, and that it is not He from -whom this movement originates, are -precluded from it. This is an explanation -from him of men learned in divine -science. He has said in many places -that divine science exists only by guesses, -as opposed to certainties in other science. -In his book <i>Munqidh min al Dalal</i> he -has gone against the philosophers and -maintained that knowledge can only be -acquired by privacy and meditation, and -that those in this rank are all very near to -the rank of the prophets. He has mentioned -this very fact in his <i>Kimiya i Saadat</i>. -Men have become divided into parties -on account of this confusion. One -party chose to censure the philosophers, -while the other agreed to interpret the -Law, and make it conform to philosophy. -All this is wrong. The Law should be -taken literally; and the conformity of -religion to philosophy should not be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189"></a>[189]</span> -told to the common people. For by an -exposition of it we should be exposing -the results of philosophy to them, without -their having intelligence enough to -understand them. It is neither permitted -nor desirable to expose anything of -the result of philosophy to a man who -has no arguments to advance, for there -are no arguments either with the learned -people who have a mastery over both -the subjects, or with the common people -who follow the exoteric of the Law. -So his action brought disorder in respect -to both of these things, religion -and philosophy, in the mind of the -common people, while he saved them -for the others. The disorder in religion -came through his exposing those interpretations -which should not be exposed; -and so also the disorder in philosophy -was the result of his mentioning those -things in his books which should not -be put in the works on philosophy. Now -it was the result of his treatment of -the subjects that many people do not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190"></a>[190]</span> -know the difference between the two, -because of his bringing both of them -together. He has also insisted upon -the fact that he knew the cause of -doing so, as he did in his <i>Al Tafriqa -bain al Islami wa-z Zindiqah</i>. In it he -has noted down many kinds of interpretations -and has decided that their -interpreters were not infidels though -they may go against the consensus of -opinion. Since he has done so, he is -dangerous to the Law for some reasons, -to philosophy for others, and to both -for some other reasons. So this man, -by disclosing them, has shown that he -is dangerous for both the things in -reality and profitable to them only by -accident. For teaching philosophy to -one who is not fit for it, will either -falsify philosophy or religion absolutely -or will show conformity between them -by accident only. The right thing would -have been not to disclose philosophy to -the common people at all. But if teaching -of it was absolutely necessary, then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191"></a>[191]</span> -only that section of the people should -have been taught who saw that religion -was opposed to philosophy, in order to -show them that it was not so. And also -it might have been taught to those -people who thought that philosophy is -opposed to religion. This may have -been shown to either of these sections, -that in reality they did not possess a -knowledge of their substance and truth, -that is, of religion and philosophy. -Moreover, they would know that the -opinion about religion, that it was opposed -to philosophy was one which was -either about some innovation in religion, -and not about its principles, or is -an error in understanding that is, a -wrong interpretation of it, as was -shown in the case of knowledge about -particulars and other things. That -is why we were compelled in this book -to explain the principles of religion. -These principles, when intently looked -into will be found in perfect agreement -with philosophy. Such is also the case<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192"></a>[192]</span> -with the opinion which says this philosophy -is opposed to religion. It only -shows that the man has not had a -sufficient training in either philosophy -or religion. This is the reason that we -were compelled to explain it in our -tractate entitled <i>Fasl al Maqal fi -Muwafiqat il Hikmat lil Sharia</i>.</p> - -<p>Now that this has become clear we -would return to our former theme. The -only problem which remains for us to -solve, out of those which we proposed -is that of Divine Vision. It is thought -for some reasons, that it forms a part -of the problem which we have just -discussed, on account of the words of -God, “The sight comprehendeth him -not, but He comprehendeth the sight.”<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> -And hence the Mutazilites have denied -it, setting aside the arguments found in -the Law, in spite of their greatness in -number and fame, a very shameful act -on their part. The cause of this doubt -of the Law that since the Mutazilites<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193"></a>[193]</span> -denied physical attributes, and believed -in exposing their ideas to every one, it -became necessary for them to deny direction -also. And having once denied -direction they must also deny the -Vision, for the thing seen must be in -some direction to one who sees it. To -prove their point they are constrained -to set aside the traditional religion. -They neglected the Traditions because -they were only isolated things which -should not be believed, if found opposed -to the teachings of the Quran, that is, -opposed to the verse, “The sight comprehendeth -Him not.” The Asharites -tried to mix together the two beliefs, -that is, the denial of physical attributes, -and the possibility of vision of One -having no body, by means of our -senses. It became difficult for them to -prove it, and they took refuge in many -sophistical and conjectural arguments, -that is arguments which are thought to -be correct but are in reality wrong. It -is so because it is possible to have the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194"></a>[194]</span> -same grades in arguments as there are -among men. Just as there may be -found men with perfect excellence and -those below them, till we may have a -man who thinks himself learned and -yet he is not, being only a pedant, so -there are arguments which are extremely -certain, and those below them, then, -there are specious arguments, and -those which though really false seem -to be true. The statements of the -Asharites in regard to this question -are of two kinds: those refuting the -arguments of the Mutazilites, and those -proving the possibility of the Vision of -One having no body, and that there is -no difficulty in our believing it. The -statements by which they have opposed -the Mutazilites in their argument, that -the thing seen must have a direction -for one who sees it, is that some of -them say that it is applied only to the -visible, and not to the invisible, world; -and that it is not one of those cases in -which the condition of the one can be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195"></a>[195]</span> -applied to the other. According to them -it is possible for a man to see an object -having no direction, for he sees by his -power of sight only that which comes -before his eyes. In this they have -mixed together the senses of sight with -intelligence, for the latter can perceive -that which has no direction, that is, no -space; but for the perception of the eye -there is a condition, that the thing to -be perceived be in a direction, not only -that but a particular direction too. So -if we take the eye to be endowed with -the power of seeing, then it is not possible -except under very limited conditions. -These are three in number-light, -the intervention of a transparent body -between the eye and the object seen, -and the possession of necessary colours -by the object. A refutation of these -conditions in the eyes is also a refutation -of those primary principles of -knowledge which are known to all. It -would be a refutation of the sciences of -philosophy and mathematics. The Asharites<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196"></a>[196]</span> -also maintain that one of the conditions -as we have said, for example, is -that every rational being has a life, it -being apparent in the visible world as a -condition for knowledge. Hence we say -to them that these are also conditions -for seeing things in the visible -world. So according to their own principle -is the case of the visible and the -invisible. In his book <i>Al Maqasid</i> Abu -Hamid (Al Ghazzali) intended to oppose -the premise that every object perceivable -must be in some direction to -the one seeing it. He says that a man -sees himself reflected in a mirror and -sees himself not in any other direction -but the opposite one. Hence he can see -his self in an opposite direction too. -But this is a mistake, because what he -sees is not his self but only an image -of it. This image is in the opposite -direction, being in the mirror, placed -there.</p> - -<p>Of the arguments which they advance -to prove the vision of an object having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197"></a>[197]</span> -no body, two are famous ones. Of -these the more famous is one which -says that an object seen is either because -it has some colour, or because it has a -body, or it is a colour, or because it is -existent. Sometimes they mention many -other causes than really do exist. They -say that it is wrong to suppose that it -must be a body, otherwise, no colour -would be visible, it being also incorrect -to suppose the space to be the -colour. Now when all the kinds of suppositions -in the premise have been refuted -we shall have to believe that only -an existent object will be seen. The -mistake in this statement is quite clear. -For an object is visible because of itself. -This is the case with the colour -and the body: the colour being visible -by itself, and the body through the -colour. That is why a thing which has -no colour cannot be seen. Had the -existence of a thing been the only condition -of visibility, it would have been -possible to see the sound and the senses.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198"></a>[198]</span> -In that case seeing, hearing, in fact all -the five senses would have been only -one, which is quite contrary to our -reason. This problem and others like it -have obliged the Mutakallimun to admit -that it is possible to <i>hear</i> the colour, -and <i>see</i> the sounds. But this is against -nature, as man has understood it to be. -For it is absolutely evident that the -sense of seeing is quite different from -that of hearing. Their actions are quite -distinct from one another, and the organ -of the one cannot work as the organ of -the other. It is just as impossible to -turn hearing as to turn colour into -sound. Those who say that sometimes -sound can be seen, should be asked to -define the sense of seeing. They would -necessarily answer that it is a faculty -which perceives those things which can -be seen, such as colour and so on. -Then they should be asked to define the -sense of hearing. They would surely -say that it is one sense by which sounds -can be heard. Then they should be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199"></a>[199]</span> -asked whether at the time of sound it is -the sense of hearing only or seeing too. -If they say that it is hearing only, they -admit that it cannot perceive colours. -If they say that it is seeing only, then -it cannot hear sounds. If it is neither -alone, for it perceives colours, then -it is seeing and hearing both. But -in this way everything can be proved -to be one, even in the case of contradictory -things. This is a thing which our -Mutakallimun admit or they are compelled -to do so. But it is clear that it -is a philosophical opinion which is only -fit for those ancient people famous for it.</p> - -<p>Now the second method which Mutakallimun -have adopted for proving -the possibility of Divine Vision is that -which has been mentioned by Abul -Maali in his book, <i>Al Irshad</i>. It says -that the senses can only feel the substance -(<i>Zat</i>) of things, but that which -separates the existent thing from one -another is not to be found in the substance -only. So the senses cannot perceive<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200"></a>[200]</span> -the substance, which is common -to all the existent things. They can -only perceive a thing because it exists. -But all this is absurd, which is quite -clear from the fact that if sight were -only able to perceive things then it -would not have been possible for it to -differentiate between white and black, -for there is no difference between things -about those qualities which are common -to all. This also becomes impossible as -regards all the other senses. The sense -of seeing could not perceive different kinds -of colours; the sense of hearing cannot -differentiate between tastes. It would -be necessary that the objects perceived -by the senses be all of a kind, and -there should be no difference between -objects perceived by seeing and apprehended -by hearing. This is contrary to -that which man commonly understands. -In reality the senses perceive the substance -of things by the power which is -vouchsafed to them. The cause of this -mistake lies in the fact that that which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201"></a>[201]</span> -perceives a substance, is thought to be -the thing perceived. Had there not -been said so much about these things, -and so much respect for those who said -it, it would not have satisfied anybody -with a strong common sense.</p> - -<p>The cause of such a perplexing situation -in the Law, which has compelled -its votaries to take refuge in such -worthless arguments, as would bring a -smile to the lips of anybody who has -made the least effort to distinguish -between different kinds of arguments, is -the exposition of anthropomorphic qualities -of God to the common people, a fact -which has been prohibited by God and -His Prophet. It is so because it is -very difficult for a man to believe at -the same time that there exists One -without a body, who can be seen with -our eyes. For the things which the -senses comprehend are in the bodies or -the bodies themselves. Hence the -Mutakallimun have tried to prove that -the Divine Vision will be an addition to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202"></a>[202]</span> -our existing qualities at that moment. -This also should not have been disclosed -to the common people. For since their -intellect cannot go beyond their imagination -that which they cannot imagine -is non-existent for them. To imagine a -thing which has no body is not possible, -and hence a belief in the existence of -an object which they cannot imagine, is -impossible for them. It was for this -reason that the Law refused to disclose -this secret to them, and described God, -for their sake, in terms which they can -imagine, ascribing to him the attributes -of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c. &c., -at the same time telling them that He -is not like anything which can be -imagined. Had the intention of the -Law been to make clear to the masses -the fact of His having no body, it -would not have mentioned these things -in detail. But as light was the highest -of imaginable things, it was given to -them as an illustration of God, for it is -the best known of the things both to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203"></a>[203]</span> -the senses and to the imagination.</p> - -<p>Such is also the case in respect to the -possibility of their understanding the -things of the Day of Judgment. These -have also been mentioned in terms which -they can imagine. So now when the Law -has adopted this course about the apparent -description of God, there arises no -doubt about him. For when it is said -that He is Light or that there is a -curtain of light upon Him, as is mentioned -in the Quran and authentic -Traditions, and when it is said that the -Faithful will see Him on the Day of -Judgement as they see the sun, there -arises no doubt or suspicion out of it -for the common or the learned people. -It is so because to the learned it is -quite clear that that condition will be -an addition to our former knowledge. -But when this is disclosed to the common -people, they cannot understand it, -and hence they either disbelieve the -whole of the Law, or consider its exponent -to be an infidel. So one who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204"></a>[204]</span> -adopts a method other than that laid -down by the Law in this respect, certainly -goes astray. If you look a little -intently it will become clear to you, -that in spite of the fact that the Law -has not given illustration of those things -for the common people, beyond which -their imagination cannot go, it has also -informed the learned men of the underlying -meanings of those illustrations. -So it is necessary to bear in mind the -limits which the Law has set about the -instruction of every class of men, and -not to mix them together. For in this -manner the purpose of the Law is -multiplied. Hence it is that the Prophet -has said, “We, the prophets, have -been commanded to adapt ourselves to -the conditions of the people, and address -them according to their intelligence.” -He who tries to instruct all the people -in the matter of religion, in one and -the same way, is like a man who wants -to make them alike in actions too, which -is quite against apparent laws and reason.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205"></a>[205]</span></p> - -<p>From the foregoing it must have -become clear to you that the divine -vision has an exoteric meaning in which -there is no doubt, if we take the words -of the Quran about God as they stand, -that is, without proving or disproving -the anthropomorphic attribute of God. -Now since the first part of the Law -has been made quite clear as to God’s -purity, and the quantity of the teaching -fit for the common people, it is time to -begin the discussion about the actions -of God, after which our purpose in -writing this tractate will be over.</p> - - -<h3>OF THE ACTIONS OF GOD</h3> - -<p>In this section we will take up five -questions, around which all others in -this connection revolve. In the first -place a proof of the creation of the -universe; secondly, the advent of the -prophets; thirdly, predestination and fate; -fourthly, Divine justice and injustice; -and fifthly, the Day of Judgment.</p> - -<p>First Problem: the Creation of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206"></a>[206]</span> -Universe:—The Law teaches that the -universe was invented and created by -God, and that it did not come into -being by chance or by itself. The method -adopted by the Law for proving -this is not the one upon which the -Asharites have depended. For we have -already shown that those methods are -not specially certain for the learned, nor -common enough to satisfy all the classes -of men. The methods which are really -serviceable are those which have a very -few premises, and the results of which -fall very near to the commonly known -ideas. But in instructing the common -people the Law does not favour statements -composed of long and complete -reasonings, based upon different problems, -So everyone who, in teaching them, -adopts a different course, and interprets -the Law according to it, has lost sight -of its purpose and gone astray from the -true path. And so also, the Law in -giving illustrations for its reasonings uses -only those which are present before us.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207"></a>[207]</span> -Whatever has been thought necessary -for the common people to know, has -been explained to them by the nearest -available examples, as in the case of the -Day of Judgment. But whatever was -unnecessary for them to know, they have -been told that it was beyond their knowledge, -as the words of God about the -Soul.<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> Now that we have established -this, it is necessary that the method -adopted by the Law for teaching the -creation of the universe to the common -people be such as would be acknowledged -by all. It is also necessary that since -there cannot be found anything present -to illustrate the creation of the universe -the Law must have used the examples -of the creation of things in the visible -world.</p> - -<p>So the method adopted by Law is -that the universe was made by God. -If we look intently into the verse pertaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208"></a>[208]</span> -to this subject we shall see that -the method adopted is that of divine solicitude, -which we know to be one of those -which prove the existence of God. When -a man sees a thing made in a certain -shape, proportion and fashion, for a -particular advantage is derived from it, -and purpose which is to be attained, so -that it becomes clear to him, that had -it not been found in that shape, and -proportion, then that advantage would -have been wanting in it, he comes to -know for certain that there is a maker of -that thing, and that he had made it in -that shape and proportion, for a set -purpose. For it is not possible that all -those qualities serving that purpose be -collected in that thing by chance alone. -For instance, if a man sees a stone on -the ground in a shape fit for sitting, -and finds its proportions and fashion of -the same kind, then he would come to -know that it was made by a maker, -and that he had made it and placed it -there. But when he sees nothing in it,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209"></a>[209]</span> -which may have made it fit for sitting -then he becomes certain that its existence -in the place was by chance only, -without its being fashioned by any -maker. Such is also the case with the -whole of the universe. For when a man -sees the sun, the moon, and all the stars, -which are the cause of the four seasons, -of days and nights, of rain, water and -winds, of the inhabitation of the parts -of the earth, of the existence of -man, and of the being of all the -animals and the plants and of the -earth being fit for the habitation of a -man, and other animals living on it; -and the water fit for the animals living -in it; and the air fit for birds, and if -there be anything amiss in this creation -and edifice, the whole world would -come to confusion and disorder, then he -would come to know with certainty that -it is not possible that this harmony in -it for the different members of the -universe—man, animals, and plants—be -found by chance only. He will<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210"></a>[210]</span> -know that there is one who determined -it, and so one who made it by intention, -and that is God, exalted and magnified -may He be. He would know with -certainty that the universe is a created -thing, for he would necessarily think -that it is not possible that in it should -be found all this harmony, if it be not -made by some one, and had come into -existence by chance alone. This kind of -argument is quite definite and at the -same time clear, and some have mentioned -it here. It is based upon two -principles which are acknowledged by -all. One of them being, that the universe, -with all its component parts, is -found fit for the existence of man and -things; secondly, that which is found -suitable in all its parts, for a single -purpose, leading to a single goal, is -necessarily a created thing. So those -two principles lead us naturally to admit -that the universe is a created thing, and -that there is a maker of it. Hence “the -argument of analogy” leads to two<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211"></a>[211]</span> -things at one and the same time, and -that is why it is the best argument for -proving the existence of God. This -kind of reasoning is also found in the -Quran in many verses in which the -creation of the universe is mentioned. -For instance, “Have We not made the -earth a bed, and the mountains for -shelter to fix the same? And have We -not created you of two sexes; and -appointed your sleep for rest and made -the night a garment to cover you, and -destined the day to a gaining of a livelihood; -and built over you seven heavens, -and placed therein a burning lamp? -And do We not send down from the -clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring -down in abundance, that We may hereby -produce corn and herbs, and gardens -planted thick with trees.”<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> If we ponder -over this verse it would be found that -our attention has been called to the -suitability of the different parts of the -universe for the existence of man. In<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212"></a>[212]</span> -the very beginning we are informed of -a fact well-known to all—and that is -that the earth has been created in a -way which has made it suitable for our -existence. Had it been unstable, or of -any other shape, or in any other place, -or not of the present proportion, it -would not have been possible to be here, -or at all created on it. All this is -included in the words, “Have We not -made the earth a bed for you?” for in -a bed are collected together all the -qualities of shape, tranquility, and peace, -to which may be added those of smoothness -and softness. So how strange is -this wonderful work and how excellent -this blessedness, and how wonderful this -collection of all the qualities! This is -so because in the word <i>mihad</i> (bed) are -brought together all those qualities, -which are found in the earth, rendering -it suitable for the existence of man. It -is a thing which becomes clear to the -learned after much learning and a long -time, “But God will appropriate His<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213"></a>[213]</span> -mercy unto whom He pleaseth.”<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> Then -as to the divine words, “And the -mountains for stakes,”—they tell us of -the advantage to be found in the tranquility -of the earth on account of the -mountains. For had the earth been -created smaller than it is now, that is, -without mountains it would have been -quivered by the motion of other elements, -the water and the air, and -would have been shaken and thus displaced. -This would naturally have been -the cause of the destruction of the -animal world. So when its tranquility -is in harmony with those living on it, -it did not come into being by chance -alone, but was made by some one’s -intention, and determination. Certainly -it was made by One who intended it, -and determined it, for the sake of those -living on it. Then He calls our attention -to the suitability of the existence -of night and day for animals. -He says, “And made the night<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214"></a>[214]</span> -a garment to cover you; and destined -the day to a gaining of your livelihood.” -He means to say that He has made -the night like a covering and clothing -for all the things, from the heat of the -sun. For had there been no setting of -the sun at night, all the things, whose -life has been made dependent upon the -sun, would have perished—that is, the -animals and the plants. As clothing -protects the people from the heat of -the sun, in addition to its being a covering, -so God likened the night to it. -This is one of the most beautiful of the -metaphors. There is also another advantage -in the night for the animals: their -sleep in it is very deep, after the setting -of the sun, which keeps faculties in -motion, that is, wide awake. So God -has said, “And appointed your sleep -for rest,” on account of the darkness -of the night. Then He says, “And -built over you seven heavens, and placed -therein a burning lamp.” Here by the -word building He means their creation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215"></a>[215]</span> -and their harmony with the created -things, and their arrangement and -system. By strength He means that -power of revolution and motion which -is never slackened, and never overtaken -by fatigue; and they never fall like -other roofs and high edifices. To this -refer the words of God, “And made -the heaven a roof well-supported.”<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> -By all this He shows their fitness in -number, shape, fashion, and movement, -for the existence of those who live on -the earth round it. Were one of the -heavenly bodies, not to speak of all, to -stop for a moment all would be chaos -on the face of the earth. Some people -think the blast of the last trumpet, -which will be the cause of the thunderbolt, -will be nothing but a stop in the -revolution of the heavenly bodies. Then -He tells us of the advantage of the sun -for those living on the earth and says, -“And placed therein a burning lamp.” -He calls it a lamp because in reality it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216"></a>[216]</span> -is all darkness, and light covers the -darkness of the night, and if there be -no lamp, man can get no advantage out -of his sense of sight at night time; and -in the same way if there were no sun -the animals can have no benefit of their -sense of seeing. He calls our attention -to this advantage of the sun, ignoring -others because it is the noblest of all -the advantages and the most apparent -of all. Then He tells us of His kindness -in sending down rain, for the sake -of the plants and the animals. The -coming down of rain in an appointed -proportion, and at an appointed season, -for the cultivated fields cannot be by -chance alone, but is the result of divine -solicitude for us all. So He says, “And -do We not send down from the clouds -pressing forth rain, water pouring down -in abundance that We may hereby produce -corn and herbs, and gardens planted -thick with trees.” There are many -verses of the Quran on this subject. -For instance, He says, “Do ye not see<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217"></a>[217]</span> -how God hath created the seven heavens, -one above another, and hath placed the -moon therein for a light, and hath appointed -the sun for a taper? God hath -also provided and caused you to bring -forth corn from the earth.”<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> If we -were to count all such verses and comment -upon them showing the kindness -of the Creator for the created, it would -take too many volumes. We do not intend -to do it in this book. If God -should grant us life and leisure we shall -write a book to show the kindness of -God to which He has called our attention.</p> - -<p>It should be known that this kind -of argument is just contrary to that -which the Asharites think leads to the -knowledge of God. They think that the -creation does not lead us to the knowledge -of God through any of His goodness, -but through possibility, that is, the -possibility which is found in all things, -which we can understand to be of his -shape or of quite a contrary one. But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218"></a>[218]</span> -if this possibility be found alike in both -the cases, then there is no wisdom in -the creation of the universe, and there -is found no harmony between man and -the parts of it. For, as they think, if -it is possible for the things to have any -other form than they have now, then -there can exist no harmony between -man and other existent things by the -creation of which God has obliged man -and commanded him to be thankful to -Him. This opinion, by which the creation -of man, as a part of the universe, -is just as possible, for instance, as his -creation in the void, is like the opinion -of those who say that man exists but -he could have been created in quite a -different shape, and yet could perform -actions like a man. According to them -it is also possible that he may have -formed the part of another universe -quite different from the existing one. -In that case the blessing of the universe -can have no obligation for man, for they -are not necessary for his purpose.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219"></a>[219]</span> -Hence man is quite careless of them and -they of him. So their existence is no -blessing to him. This is all against the -nature of man.</p> - -<p>On the whole, a man who denies the -existence of the effects arranged according -to the causes in the question of arts, -or whose wisdom cannot understand it, -then he has no knowledge of the art of -its Maker. So also a man who denies -the existence of an order of effects in -accordance with causes in this universe, -denies the existence of the Creator -altogether. Their saying that God is -above these causes, and that they cannot -have any bearing on the effects by His -command, is very far from the true -nature of philosophy, nay, it is a -destroyer of it. For if it is possible to -have the same effects with other than -the prescribed causes just in the same -degree as by them, then where is the -greatness in producing the effects from -the known Causes? It is so because -the effects from the causes have one of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220"></a>[220]</span> -the following three reasons. Either the -existence of the causes will be in place -of the effects by compulsion, as a man’s -taking his food; or their being more -perfect that is, the effect becoming better -and more perfect through them, as a -man’s having two eyes, or they may -have neither a better nor a more compulsive -effect. In this case the existence -of the effect and the cause would be by -chance, without any intention at all; -and hence, there would be no greatness -found in it. For instance, if the shape -of human hand, the number of the -fingers, and their length be neither -necessary nor adding any perfection in -its work in seizing things of different -kind, then the actions of the hand from -this shape, and number of parts, would -be by chance alone. If it be so, then it -makes no difference whether a man is -given a hand or a hoof, or something -else, like the different animals, for their -particular actions. On the whole, if we -ignore the causes and their effects, then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221"></a>[221]</span> -there remains nothing to refute the -arguments of those who believe in the -creation of the universe by chance alone, -that is, those who say that there is no -Creator at all, and that which has come -into being in this universe is the result -of material causes. For taking one of -the two alternatives it is not more -possible that it may have happened by -chance, than done by an independent -Actor. So when the Asharites say that -the existence of one or more possibilities -shows that there is a particular Maker of -these things, they can answer and say -that the existence of things by one of -these possibilities was by chance alone, -for intention works as one of the causes, -and that which happens without any -means or cause is by chance. We see -that many things come into being in -this way. For example, the elements -mix together by chance, and then by -this unintentional mixing there is produced -a new thing. They mix again, -and this quite unintentionally produces<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222"></a>[222]</span> -quite a new thing. In this way every -kind of creation may be said to have -come into existence by chance.</p> - -<p>We say that it is necessary that -there be found order and arrangement, -the more perfect and finished than what -can be imagined. This mixing together -of elements is limited and prearranged, -and things produced by them are sure -to happen, and no disorder has ever -happened in them. But all this could -not happen by chance alone, for that -which happens in this way by chance -is of the least value. It is to this that -God refers, “It is the work of the -Lord, who has rightly disposed all -things.”<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> I would like to know what -completeness can be found in things -made by chance, for such things are by -no means better than their opposites. -To this God refers in the following -words, “Thou canst not see in the -Creation of the most Merciful any unfitness -or disproportion. Lift thy eyes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223"></a>[223]</span> -again to heaven, and <i>look whether thou -seest any flaw</i>.”<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> But what defect can -be greater than that all the things can -be found with any other quality than -they really possess. For the non-existent -quality may be better than the -existing one. In this way, if one thinks -that were the Eastern movement to -become Western and vice versa, there -would be no difference in the universe, -then he has destroyed philosophy altogether. -He is like a man who thinks -that were the right side of the animals -to become left, and vice versa, there -would be no difference at all for one of -the two alternatives is there. For as it -is possible to say that it is made according -to one alternative by an independent -Maker, so it is possible to assert that -it was all made by chance alone. For -we see so many things coming into -being by themselves.</p> - -<p>It is quite clear to you that all the -people see that lower kinds of creation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224"></a>[224]</span> -could have been made in a different -way from that in which they really are -and as they see this lower degree in -many things they think that they must -have been made by chance. But in the -higher creation they know that it is -impossible to have been made in a more -perfect and excellent form than that -given to it by the Creator. So this -opinion, which is one of the opinions of -the Mutakallimun is both against the -Law and philosophy. What we say is -that the opinion of possibility in creation -is closer to a complete denial of -God, than leading us nearer to Him. -At the same time it falsifies philosophy. -For if we do not understand that there -is a mean between the beginnings and -ends of the creation, upon which is -based the ends of things, then there -can neither be any order nor any method -in it. And if they be wanting then -there can be no proof of the existence -of an intelligent and knowing Maker; -for taking them together with cause and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225"></a>[225]</span> -effect we are led to the fact that they -must have been created by wisdom and -knowledge. But on the other hand -the existence of either of two possibilities -shows that they may have been -performed by a not-knowing Maker and -by chance alone. Just as a stone falling -on the earth may fall in any place, on -any side, and in any form. It will show -the want of the existence either of a -creator at all or at least of a wise and -knowing Creator. The thing which has -compelled the Mutakallimun of the Asharites -to adopt this opinion is a denial -of the action of those natural forces -which God has put in all things, as He -has endowed them with life, power and -so forth. They avoided the opinion that -there was any other creator but God, -and God forbid that there be any other, -for he is the only creator of the causes -and they are made effective by His -command only. We will talk of this in -detail when discoursing on Fate and -Predestination. They were also afraid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226"></a>[226]</span> -that by admitting the natural causes -they might be accused of saying that -the universe came into being by chance -only. They would have known that a denial -of it means a denial of a great part of the -arguments, which can be advanced for a -proof of the existence of God. One -who denies any part of God’s creation -denies His work which falls very near -to a denial of a part of His attributes. -On the whole as their opinion is based -upon hasty conclusions, which come to -the mind of a man by superficial thought -and as apparently it appears that the -word “intention” can be applied to one -who has power to do bad or otherwise, -they saw that if they did not admit -that all the creation is possible, they -would not be able to say that it came -into existence by the action of an intending -creator. So they say that all the -creation is possible so that they may -prove that the creator is an intelligent -one. They never thought of the order -which is necessary in things made, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227"></a>[227]</span> -with that their coming from an intelligent -creator. These people have also -ignored the blame they will have to bear -in thus denying wisdom to the creator; -or maintaining that chance should be -found governing creation. They know, -as we have said, that it is necessary, -on account of the order existent in -nature, that it must have been brought -into being by some knowing creator, -otherwise the order found in it would -be by chance. When they were compelled -to deny the natural forces, they had -to deny with them a large number of -those forces which God has made subservient -to His command for the creation -and preservation of things. For God has -created some things from causes which -He has produced from outside, these -are the heavenly bodies; there are other -things which He has made by causes -placed in the things themselves, that is, -the soul, and other natural forces, by -which he preserves those things. So -how wicked is the man who destroyeth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228"></a>[228]</span> -philosophy, and “inventeth a lie about -God.”<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a></p> - -<p>This is only a part of the change -which has taken place in the Law, in -this and other respects, which we have -already mentioned, and will mention -hereafter. From all this it must have -become clear to you that the method -which God had adopted for teaching His -creatures that the universe is made and -created by Him is the method of kindness -and wisdom, towards all His creatures -and especially towards man. It is -a method which bears the same relation -to our intellect, as the sun bears to our -senses. The method which it has adopted -towards the common people about -this problem, is that of illustration from -things observed. But as there was -nothing which could be given as an -illustration, and as the common people -cannot understand a thing, an illustration -of which they cannot see, God tells -us that the universe was created in a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229"></a>[229]</span> -certain time out of a certain thing, -which He made. He tells us His condition -before the creation of the universe, -“His throne was above the waters.”<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> -He also says, “Verily your Lord is God -who created the heavens and the earth -in six days,”<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> and “Then He set His -mind to the creation of the heavens, and -it was smoke.”<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> In addition to these there -are other verses of the Book, pertaining -to this subject. So it is incumbent that -nothing out of them should be interpreted -for the common people, and nothing -should be presented to them in explaining -it but this illustration. For one who -changes it, makes the wisdom of the -Law useless. If it be said that the -Law teaches about the universe that it -is created, and made out of nothing and -in no time, then it is a thing which even -the learned cannot understand, not to -speak of the common people. So we -should not deviate in this matter of the -Law, from the method laid down in it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230"></a>[230]</span> -for instructing the common people, and -should not tell them except this regarding -the creation of the universe, which -is found alike in the Quran, the Bible, -and other revealed books. The wonder -is that the example in the Quran is -quite in accordance with the creation of -the things in the visible world. But the -Law does not say so, which is a warning -to the learned people that the -creation of the universe is not like the -creation of all other things. He has -used the words <i>creation</i> and <i>flaw</i>, because -they connote two things,—Conception -of the things that can be seen, and the -creation of the things which the learned -prove in the invisible world. So the -use of the words <i>creation</i> (Huduth) and -<i>eternal</i> is an innovation in religion, and -the cause of great doubt and corruption -of the belief of the common people, -especially of the argumentative among -them. This has greatly perplexed the -Mutakallimun of the Asharites, and has -proved them in great doubt. For if they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231"></a>[231]</span> -explain that God intends doing things -by an eternal intention—which, as we -said, is an innovation—they have put -it down that the universe is <i>created</i>. -Then they are asked how can a created -thing come from an eternal intention. -They answer that the eternal intention -became connected with the action at the -time of the creation especially, and that -is the time in which the universe was -made. Then they may be asked, that if the -relation of the intending Creator towards -the created thing at the time of its non-existence -be the same as at the time of -its creation, then that created thing is -by no means better than the other -thing, when at the time of its making, -the action which was not found in its -non-existence is not connected with it. -If the relation be different then there -must necessarily be a created intention -otherwise the created result of an action -would come from an eternal action, for -what is necessary of it in action, is -necessary also in intention. If it be said<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232"></a>[232]</span> -that when the time of its making comes -it is found done; it may be asked: is it -so by an eternal or a created action? -If they say by an eternal action, they -admit the existence of a created thing -by an eternal action; and if they say by -a created action, then there must be a -created intention also. They may say -that intention is the action itself, but -this is impossible. For intention is the -only cause of the action in the intender. If -an intender, intending to do an act in a -certain time, finds that act quite another -than that which he intended, then that -act would have come into being without -any intender at all. At the same time, -if it is thought that from a created intention -there can only be a created thing, -then as a rule an eternal intention should -give an eternal thing, otherwise the -result of a created or eternal intention -would be the same, which is impossible. -All these doubts are found in Islam -only through the Mutakallimun, by -their explaining things in Law, which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233"></a>[233]</span> -God had forbidden them to do. For -in the Quran it is not said whether -intention is created or eternal. So they -neither adhere to the exoteric meanings -of the Law, which may have given them -beatitude and salvation, nor did they -attain the degree of certain and exact -knowledge, so that they may have had -this blessing. Hence they are neither -to be counted among the learned nor -among the masses, who believe and -have strong faith. They are the people -“whose hearts are perverse”<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> and “whose -hearts are diseased.”<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> They say things -by their tongues which are quite contrary -to those which they believe in their -hearts, a cause of which is their tenacity, -and love of upholding their opinions -at any cost. By a repetition of -attitudes like these they become quite -devoid of all philosophy, as we see the -case of those who are completely accustomed -to the Asharite school of thought, -and are well pleased with it, even to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234"></a>[234]</span> -the degree of love. They are certainly -veiled on account of their habit and -environment.</p> - -<p>What we have said about this question -is enough for our purpose. Now -we would take up the second problem.</p> - -<p>Problem Second: Prophetic Mission:—There -are two points which are to be -discussed in this problem. First, the -proof of the coming of the prophets; -and secondly an explanation of the fact -that the man claiming to be a prophet -is really so and does not lie. Many -people are desirous of proving the existence -of the prophets by analogy—and -such are the Mutakallimun. They say -that it is proved that God speaks and -intends, and is the master of His creatures. -It is quite consistent for such a -being in the visible world to send a -messenger to his dependent people. -Hence such a thing is also possible in -the unseen world. They have thought -of making this valid for proving the -advent of the prophets, by absurd and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235"></a>[235]</span> -far-fetched arguments which only Brahmins -should use. They say that it is -possible both in the observed and unseen -world. In the observed world it is quite -evident, that when a man stands up -before a king and says, “O ye men, I -am the messenger of the king towards -you” and produces credentials for his -claim, it is necessary to acknowledge -him to be true. They say that in the -case of the prophets, the credentials are -the miracles which they perform. For -certain reasons this method is quite fit -and satisfactory for the common people, -but when investigated there appear -many flaws in the principle. Our acknowledgement -of a man who claims to -be the messenger of a king is not true -unless we know that the symbols which -he has are those of the royal messenger, -which can only happen, if a king tells -his subjects that whenever they happen -to see such and such symbols with a -man, which are particularly his, they -should take him as his messenger.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236"></a>[236]</span> -When this is so, one can object, -from where does it appear that performance -of miracles is the special -sign of the prophets? This can -be proved neither by law nor by -reason. To prove it by religion is still -more impossible; it does not admit it. -Reason alone cannot affirm that they -are the special symbols of prophecy, -except that in many cases they were -found in people who claimed to be prophets -and in none other. So in this -case a proof of anyone’s prophecy is -based upon two premises. First, the -man who claims to be a prophet has -performed a miracle, and secondly, everyone -who performs a miracle is a prophet.</p> - -<p>Now as to the premise that the claimant -for prophecy has performed miracles -we can say that it pertains to our senses -after we have admitted that there are -actions performed by men, which can -neither be made by wondrous workmanship -or by some particular forces, but -are beyond our conception. The second<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237"></a>[237]</span> -premise can only be true when we admit -the existence of the prophets, and that -the miracles are only performed by -those who are the true claimants for -prophetic mission. We would say that -this premise is not true but for those -who believe the existence of the prophets -and the miracles. For instance if it has -become clear to man, that the universe -is created, then he certainly knows that -the world exists and the Creator too. -This being so, a man can object and say -how can we say that one who performs -the miracles is a prophet, when the -prophetic mission itself remains unproved? -Even after we admit the existence -of miracle in the manner in which -it may seem quite impossible, it is necessary -that the two sides of the premise -be admitted first and then the one can -be applied to the other. One cannot -say that the existence of the prophets -can be proved by reason, because of its -possibility. For the possibility to which -they refer is in fact really ignorance,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238"></a>[238]</span> -and is not found in the nature of things. -For instance, if we say that it is possible -that it will rain or not, then the -possibility is found in the nature of things, -that is, it is felt that a thing may -sometimes be, and at others not be, as -in the case of rain. Here, reason can -exactly decide the possibility of a thing -by its nature. The necessary (<i>wajib</i>) -is quite contrary to it; that is, it is a -thing the existence of which is always -found. In this case reason can always -decide without a mistake, because its -nature cannot be changed or transformed. -So when one party admits the existence -of a prophet, at a certain time it appears -that the prophetic mission is a thing -whose existence is possible and the other -party says that it cannot feel it, then -that possibility becomes mere ignorance -in its case. Now we believe in the existence -of this possibility because we have -known the prophets. We say that a -knowledge of the messengers from man, -leads us to a belief in the existence of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239"></a>[239]</span> -messengers from God, as the existence -of a messenger from Anir, leads us to -the conclusion of there being a messenger -from Zaid also. This requires a similarity -in the natural dispositions of both -men and it is here where the difficulty -lies. If we suppose this possibility by -itself even in the future, it will only be -by the means of the known fact and -not by our knowledge and reason. Now -one of the premises of this possibility -has come into existence. For the possibility -is in our knowledge, and the fact -in itself is an established one, by one of -the two alternatives, that is, whether he -sent a messenger or did not. So we -have nothing in this case but sheer -ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir -sent any messengers in the past or did -not, which is quite different from our -doubting, whether or not he will send -any in future. So when we do not know -about Zaid, for instance, whether he has -or has not sent any messenger in the -past, it is not correct for us to suppose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240"></a>[240]</span> -anybody to be his messenger, if he happens -to have his symbols upon him. -We can admit his claim only after we -know that Zaid did send a messenger. -So when we admit the existence of -the prophetic mission, and the miracles, -then how can it be correct for us -to say that one who performs the -miracles is a prophet. We cannot believe -in this by hearing only, for this faculty is -not the thing by which such things can -be proved. At the same time we cannot -claim this premise to be true by experience -and habit, except that the miracles -performed by the prophets can be seen -by one who believes in their mission, -and has never seen them to have been -performed by anybody else, so that they -may be taken as a convincing sign for -distinguishing a prophet of God, from -one who is not, that is a distinction -between one whose claim is right, and -one whose claim is wrong.</p> - -<p>By these things it is seen that the -Mutakallimun have missed the whole<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241"></a>[241]</span> -purpose of the argument from miracles -because they have put possibility in the -place of real existence, possibility which -is in reality ignorance. Then they have -believed in the premise that every one -who performs miracles is a prophet, -which cannot be true except when the -miracles prove the prophetic mission -itself, and the sender of messengers. It -is not by reason that we can believe in -these marvelous things, which happen again -and again, and are divine, as a conclusive -proof of the existence of prophetic -mission, except that one who can do such -things is an excellent person, and that such -persons cannot lie. But it can prove the -prophetic mission of a person only when -we admit that the mission does exist, and -that such marvelous things cannot be performed -by any person, however good he -may be, except by one who is a a prophet. -The miracles cannot prove the prophetic -mission of a person, because there is no -connection between them and reason, except -that we admit that the miracles are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242"></a>[242]</span> -one of the works of the prophets, just as -curing is the work of the physicians, so -that one who can cure is certainly a physician. -This is one of the fallacies of the -argument. Moreover, if we admit the -existence of the prophetic mission, by putting -the idea of possibility, which is in fact -ignorance, in place of certainty, and make -miracles a proof of the truth of man who -claims to be a prophet it becomes necessary -that they should not be used by a person, -who says that they can be performed -by others than prophets, as the Mutakallimun -do. They think that the miracles -can be performed by the magicians and -saints. The condition which they attach -with them is that miracles prove a man -to be a prophet, when he at the same time -claims to be so, for the true prophet can -perform them as opposed to the false ones. -This is an argument without any proof, -for it can be understood either by hearing -or reason. That is, it is said that one -whose claims to prophecy are wrong, cannot -perform miracles, but as we have already<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243"></a>[243]</span> -said, when they cannot be performed -by a liar, then they can only be done -by the good people, whom God has meant -for this purpose. These people, if they -speak a lie, are not good, and hence cannot -perform the miracles. But this does not satisfy -the people who think miracles to be -possible from the magicians, for they certainly -are not good men. It is here that the -weakness of the argument lies. Hence -some people have thought that the best -thing is to believe that they cannot be performed -but by the prophets and hence -magic is only imagination, and not a change -of essence. Among these are also men who -deny all sorts of marvelous things from -the saints.</p> - -<p>It is clear to you from the life of the -prophet, peace be upon him, that he never -invited any man or community to believe -in his prophecy, and that which he has -brought with him from God, by means of -the performance of any miracles, in support -of his claim, such as changing one -element into another. Whatever miracles<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244"></a>[244]</span> -did appear from him were only performed -in the natural course of things, without -on his part any intention of contention or -competition. The following words of the -Quran will make this clear; “And they -say: We will by no means believe in thee, -until thou cause a spring of water to gush -forth for us out of the earth, and thou -have a garden of palm-trees and vines, -and thou cause rivers to spring forth from -the midst thereof in abundance; or thou -cause the heaven to fall down in pieces -upon us, as thou hast given out, or thou -bring down God and the angels to vouch -for thee; or thou have a house of gold, -or thou ascend by a ladder to heaven; -neither will we believe thy ascending thither -alone, until thou cause a book to descend -unto us, bearing witness of thee -which we may read. Answer: My Lord -be praised, Am I other than a man sent -as an apostle?”<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Then again, “Nothing -hindered us from sending thee with miracles, -except that the former nations have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245"></a>[245]</span> -charged them with imposture.”<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> The -thing by which we invited the people to -believe in him, and with which he vied -with them is the Quran. For says God, -“Say, verily, if men and genii were purposely -assembled, that they might produce -a book like this Quran, they could not -produce one like unto it, although the -one of them assigned the other.”<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> Then -further he says, “will they say, He hath -forged the Quran? Answer, bring therefore -ten chapters like unto it forged by -yourself.”<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> This being the case the miracle -of the Prophet with which he vied with -the people and which he advanced as an -argument for the truth of his claim to the -prophetic mission, was the Quran. If it -be said, that this is quite clear, but how -does it appear that the Quran is a miracle, -and that it proves his prophecy, while -just now we have proved the weakness of -the proof of prophecy by means of miracles -without any exceptions in the case of any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246"></a>[246]</span> -prophet. Besides the people have differed -in taking the Quran to be a miracle at all. -For in their opinion one of the conditions -of a miracle is that it should be quite different -from any act which may have become -habitual. But the Quran is of this -sort, because it is only word, though it -excels all created words. So it becomes a -miracle by its superiority only, that is, the -impossibility for people bringing anything -like it, on account of its being highly -eloquent. This being the case it differs -from the habitual, not in genus but in details -only, and that which differs in this -way is of the same genus. Some people -say that it is a miracle by itself, and not -by its superiority. They do not lay it -down as a condition for miracles that they -should be quite different from the habitual, -but think that it should be such a habitual -act, as men may fall short of accomplishing. -We would reply that it is as the objectors -say, but the thing about it is not as they -have thought. That the Quran is an evidence -of his prophecy, is based, we believe,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247"></a>[247]</span> -upon two principles, which are found in -the Book itself. The first being that the -existence of the class of men called prophets -and apostles is well-known. They -are the men who lay down laws for the -people by divine revelation, and not by -human education. Their existence can be -denied only by the people who deny repeated -action, as the existence of all things -which we have not seen—the lives of the -famous thinkers and so forth. All the -philosophers, and other men are agreed, -except those who pay no regard to their -words, (and they are the Materialists), -that there are men to whom have been revealed -many commandments for the people, -to perform certain good actions, by which -their beatitude may be perfected; and to -make them give up certain wrong beliefs -and vicious actions. This is the business -of divine apostles. The second principle -is, that everyone who does this work, that -is, lays down laws by revelation, is a prophet. -This principle is also quite in accordance -with human nature. For as it is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248"></a>[248]</span> -known that the business of medicine is to -cure a disease, and one who can cure is a -physician, so it is also known that the business -of the prophets is to give law to the -people by divine revelation, and one who does -so is a prophet. The Book mentions the -first principle in the following:—“Verily We -have revealed Our will unto thee, as We -have revealed it unto Noah, and the prophets -who succeeded him, and We have -revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael, -and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and -unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron -and Solomon; and we have given thee the -Quran as We gave the Psalms unto David; -some apostles have We sent, whom We -have mentioned unto thee, and God spake -unto Moses discoursing with him,”<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> and -again: “Say, I am not alone among -the apostles.”<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> The second principle is -that Mohammed, peace be upon him, has -done the work of a prophet, that is, has -given Law to the people by divine revelation. -This also can be known from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249"></a>[249]</span> -Quran, where God mentions it. He says, -“O men, now is an evident proof come -unto you from your Lord, and We have -sent down unto you manifest light.”<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> By -<i>manifest light</i> is meant the Quran. Again -He says, “O men, now is the apostle come -unto you from your Lord; believe, therefore, -it will be better for you,”<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> and again, -“But those among them who are well-grounded -in knowledge, and faithful, who -believe in that which hath been sent down -unto thee, and that which hath been sent -down unto the prophets before thee;”<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> -and again “God is the witness of the -revelation which He hath sent down unto -thee; He sent it down with his special knowledge; -the angels are also witness thereof; -but God is a sufficient witness.”<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> If -it be said, how can the first principle be -known, that is, that there is a class of men -who give the Law to the people by divine -revelation; and so also, how to know the -second principle, that is, that which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250"></a>[250]</span> -Quran contains, about beliefs and actions, -is of divine origin? We would answer -that the first principle can be known by -the information which these men give -about the existence of things, which were -not found before, but come into existence -after they have informed the people about -them, and in a specified time; and by their -command for doing certain things, and -teaching certain precepts which do not resemble -the common things and actions, -which can be taught by human agency. -This is so because if the miracles be of the -kind of laying down Laws, proving that -they cannot be laid down by human education, -but only through divine revelation, -then it is prophecy. But the miracles -which do not take the form of laws, as the -dividing of the sea, etc., do not necessarily -prove the prophecy of anyone. But they -can only be used as supplements to the -former, if they fall very near to it. But -standing alone they cannot prove it, and -so by themselves alone they do not lead to -a cognizance of the prophets, if the other<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251"></a>[251]</span> -kind of miracles, which are its conclusive -proofs, be not found in them. So according -to this principle must be understood the -proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles, -that is, the miracles of knowledge and deeds -are its conclusive proofs while others only -make it strong, and can be used as witnesses. -So now it has become clear to you -that men of this kind do exist, and how -can men be sure of them, except by their -repeated appearance; as is the case with -physicians and other kinds of men. If it -be asked: How can it be proved that -the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a -miracle which is the business of the -prophets to perform, as curing is -the business of a physician, we would -say that this can be known in many ways:—First, -the precepts which it contains -about knowledge and deeds, cannot be -acquired by learning, but only by divine -revelation; secondly, by the information -which it gives about hidden things; and -thirdly, by its poetry, which is quite -different from that which can be achieved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252"></a>[252]</span> -by imagination or repetition of verses, -that is, it is known that it is of quite a -different kind from the poetry of Arabic -speaking people, whether the language be -acquired and learned, as is the case with -non-Arabs, or it be the mother-tongue, as -it is with the Arabs themselves. The -first reason is the most weighty one. If -it be asked how can it be known that the -laws which contain both knowledge and -precepts about deeds are of divine origin, -so much so that they deserve the name of -the word of God, we would say also that -this also can be known in many ways. -First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be -acquired except after a knowledge of God, -and of human happiness and misery; and -the acts by which this happiness can be -acquired, as charity and goodness and the -works which divert men from happiness -and produce eternal misery, such as evil -and wickedness. Again the knowledge of -human happiness and misery requires a -knowledge of the soul and its substance, -and whether it has eternal happiness or not.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253"></a>[253]</span> -If it be so, then what is the quantity of -this happiness, or misery; and also what -amount of good would be the cause of -happiness. For the case of goodness -and evil is just the same as with -food, which does not give health, -if taken in any quantity and at any -time; but must be used in a -specified quantity and at an appointed -time. For this reason we find these limited -in the religious laws. All this, or a greater -part of it, cannot be known but by divine -revelation, or at least a knowledge -through it would be better. Again a perfect -knowledge of God requires a knowledge -of existent things. Then a law-giver must -know the quantity of this knowledge which -would be good to be imparted to the common -people, and the method to be adopted -in teaching them. All this, or at least a -greater part of it, cannot be acquired by -education, learning or philosophy. This -can be clearly known from imparting learning, -and especially the giving of laws, -making regulations, and giving information<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254"></a>[254]</span> -about the conditions of the Day of Judgment. -When all this is found in the Quran -in the most perfect form, there can be no -doubt that it is a divine revelation and His -word, given through the agency of His -prophet. So God has said, informing the -people about it, “Say, verily if man and -genii were purposely assembled, that they -might produce a book like this Quran, -they could not produce one like it.” This -idea is further strengthened, nay, comes -near exact surety and certainty, when it is -known that the prophet was an unlettered -man, and lived among a people, uneducated, -wild, and nomadic by habit, who had -never tried to investigate the universe, as -was the case with the Greeks, and other -nations, among whom philosophy was perfected -in long periods of time. To this very -fact refer the words of God, “Thou couldst -not read any book before this; neither -couldst thou write it with thy right hand, -then had gainsayers justly doubted of the -divine origin thereof.”<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> Hence God<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255"></a>[255]</span> -has repeatedly told the people this quality -of His prophet. “It is He who hath raised -up among the illiterate Arabians an apostle -from among themselves,”<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> and, “Those -who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate -Prophet.”<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> This matter can also be known -by another method—that of comparison of -this Law with the others. For, if the -business of the prophets be the giving of -laws by divine revelation, as has been -acknowledged by all who believe in the -existence of the prophets, then if you look -into the teachings of useful knowledge and -actions leading to happiness, which are -contained in the Quran, and compare them -with other divine books and religious -systems, you will find it excelling all the -others in an unlimited degree. On the -whole, if there are books worthy to be -called the words of God, on account of -their wondrous nature, and separation -from the genius of human words and -their peculiarity by what they contain -in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256"></a>[256]</span> -is clear that the Quran is much more worth -thy, and many times fitter, than they are -to be called the words of God. This would -be still clearer to you if you could know -the past books—the Old and New Testaments. -But that is not possible because -they have been changed to a great extent. -Were we to describe the superiority of -one Law over another, and the superiority -of the teachings given to us about the -knowledge of God, and the Day of Judgment -to the laws given to the Jews and the -Christians, it would require many volumes -with a confession of our own short-comings -in dealing with the subject. For this -very reason, the Law of ours has been -called the last of the divine dispensations. -The Prophet, peace be on him, has said, -“Had Moses lived in my time, he could not -have helped following me,” and the Prophet -was right, on account of the universal -nature of the teachings of the Quran, and -its regulations. That is it is able to satisfy -the needs of all, being meant for the whole -of the human race. So God has said, “say,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257"></a>[257]</span> -O men, Verily I am the messenger of God -unto you all.”<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> The Prophet has said, -“I have been sent both to the white and -the black nations.”</p> - -<p>The case of religions is just the same -as that of God. There are some foods -which agree with all, or most of the people. -Such is the case with religions also. -So the dispensations before our own were -meant for some particular peoples, ignoring -all others, but our religion was meant for -the whole of the human race. This being -the case, our Prophet excels all the other -Prophets, to him comes the divine revelation, -which makes a man fit to be called -a prophet. So the Prophet has said informing -us of his superiority over other prophets, -“There is no prophet to whom -has not been given a sign by which all -the men would have believed. I -have been given divine revelation, and I -hope that my followers would be -in the majority on the Day of Judgment.” -All that we have said must have made it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258"></a>[258]</span> -clear to you that the proof of the prophecy -of the prophet from the Quran is not of -the same kind as that of turning a staff -into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy -of Moses, or of giving life to the dead, and -curing the blind and leprous for the -prophecy of Jesus. For these, although -never performed by any but the prophets, -and sufficient to satisfy the common people, -are not by any means conclusive proofs of -prophecy, when taken by themselves,—they -not being acts which make a -prophet.</p> - -<p>Now as to the Quran, its case is just -like curing by medicine. For instance, -suppose two men were to claim to be -physicians, and one were to say that he -could walk on water, and the other were -to assert that he could cure a disease, and -so one walked on the water, and the other -cured a sick man. In this case, our -verification for medicine would be only for -one who has cured a sick man, but in the -case of the other, it would be outward -satisfaction alone. The first is far better.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259"></a>[259]</span> -The only reason by which the common -people can be satisfied in this respect is -that one who can walk on water, which is -against the nature of men, can certainly -cure a disease, which is what men can -do. This also is one of the reasons of the -connection between miracle, which is not -one of the conditions of prophecy, and the -sign which makes a man deserve the name -of a prophet: divine revelation. Of this -quality is also the fact, that there comes -nothing to the mind of such a man except -that which God has ordained for this -unique work, and specialised him for it, -among all his fellow-men. So it is not -inconsistent if he were to claim that God -distinguished him with his revelations.</p> - -<p>On the whole, when once it is laid down -that the prophets do exist, and that the -miracles cannot be performed except by -them, they can become a prophecy, that is -the miracles which are not in any way fit -to be received as a proof for it. This is -the method to be adopted with regard to -the common people. For the doubts and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260"></a>[260]</span> -objections which we have described about -unnatural miracles are not perceived by the -masses. But if you look intently you will -find that the Law depends upon suitable -and natural miracles, and not upon unnatural -ones. What we have said about this -problem is enough for our purpose and for -the sake of truth.</p> - -<p>Problem Third: Of Fate and Predestination. -This is one of the most intricate problems -of religion. For if you look into the -traditional arguments about this problem -you will find them contradictory; such also -being the case with arguments of reason. -The contradiction in the arguments of -the first kind is found in the Quran and -the Traditions. There are many verses -of the Quran, which by their universal -nature, teach that all the things are predestined, -and that man is compelled to -do his acts; then there are verses which say -that man is free in his acts and not compelled -in performing them. The following -verses tell us that all the things are by -compulsion, and are predestined, “Everything<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261"></a>[261]</span> -have We created bound by a fixed -degree;”<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> again, “With Him everything -is regulated according to a determined -measure.”<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> Further, He says, “No accident -happeneth in the earth, nor in your -persons, but the same was entered in the -Book verily it is easy with God.”<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> There -may be quoted many other verses on this subject. -Now, as to the verses which say that -man can acquire deeds by free will, and -that things are only possible and not necessary, -the following may be quoted: “Or -He destroyeth them (by ship-wreck), -because of that which their crew have merited; -though He pardoneth many things.”<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> -And again, “Whatever misfortune befalleth -you is sent you by God, for that -which your hands have deserved.”<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> Further, -He says, “But they who commit evil, -equal thereunto.”<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> Again, He says, “It -shall have the good which it gaineth, and it -shall have the evil which it gaineth.”<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> and,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262"></a>[262]</span> -“And as to Thamud, We directed them, but -they loved blindness better than the true -directions.”<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> Sometimes contradiction -appears even in a single verse of the Quran. -For instance, He says, “After a misfortune -hath befallen you (you had already -attained two equal advantages), do you -say, whence cometh this? Answer, This is -from yourselves.”<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> In the next verse, He -says, “And what happenth unto you, on -the day whereon the two armies met, was -certainly by permission of the Lord.”<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> -Of this kind also is the verse, “Whatever -good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God; -and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from -thyself;”<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> while the preceding verse -says, “All is from God.”<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> - -<p>Such is also the case with the Traditions. -The Prophet says, “Every child is -born in the true religion; his parents afterwards -turn him into a Jew or a Christian.” -On another occasion he said, “The following<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263"></a>[263]</span> -people have been created for hell, and -do the deeds of those who are fit for it. -These have been created for heaven, and -do deeds fit for it.” The first Tradition -says that the cause of disbelief is one’s own -environments; while faith and belief are -natural to man. The other Tradition says -that wickedness and disbelief are created -by God, and man is compelled to follow -them.</p> - -<p>This condition of things has led Muslims -to be divided into two groups. The -one believed that man’s wickedness or -virtue is his own acquirement, and that -according to these he will be either punished -or rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. -The belief of the other party is quite -opposed to this. They say that man is -compelled to do his deeds. They are the -Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to -adopt a mean between these two extreme -views. They say that man can do action, -but the deeds done, and the power of doing -it, are both created by God. But this -is quite meaningless. For if the deed and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264"></a>[264]</span> -the power of doing it be both created by -God, then man is necessarily compelled to -do the act. This is one of the reasons of -the difference of opinion about this problem.</p> - -<p>As we have said there is another cause -of difference of opinion about this problem, -than the traditional one. This consists of -the contradictory arguments advanced. -For if we say that man is the creator of -his own deeds, it would be necessary to -admit that there are things which are not -done according to the will of God, or His -authority. So there would be another -creator besides God, while the Muslims -are agreed that there is no creator but He. -If, on the other hand, we were to suppose -that man cannot act freely, we admit that -he is compelled to do certain acts, for there -is no mean between compulsion and freedom. -Again, if man is compelled to do -certain deeds, then on him has been imposed -a task which he cannot bear; and when -he is made to bear a burden, there is no difference -between his work and the work of -inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265"></a>[265]</span> -no power, neither has the man the power -for that which he cannot bear. Hence all -people have made capability one of the -conditions for the imposition of a task, such -as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in -his <i>Nizamiyyah</i>, that man is free in his own -deeds and has the capability of doing them. -He has established it upon the impossibility -of imposing a task which one cannot -bear, in order to avoid the principle formerly -disproved by the Mutazilites, on account -of its being unfit by reason. The succeeding -Asharites have opposed them. Moreover -if man had no power in doing a deed, then -it will be only by chance that he may escape -from evil, and that is meaningless. Such -also would be the case with acquiring -goodness. In this way all those arts which -lead to happiness, as agriculture etc., would -become useless. So also would become -useless all those arts the purpose of which -is protection from, and repulsion of danger -as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine -etc. such a condition is quite contrary to -all that is intelligible to man.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266"></a>[266]</span></p> - -<p>Now it may be asked that if the case -is so, how is this contradiction which is to -be found both in tradition and reason to -be reconciled we would say, that apparently -the purpose of religion in this problem is -not to divide it into two separate beliefs, -but to reconcile them by means of a middle -course, which is the right method. It is evident -that God has created in us power by -which we can perform deeds which are contradictory -in their nature. But as this cannot -be complete except by the cause which God -has furnished for us, from outside, and the -removal of difficulties from them, the deeds -done are only completed by the conjunction -of both these things at the same time. -This being so the deeds attributed to us -are done by our intention, and by the fitness -of the causes which are called the -<i>Predestination</i> of God, which He has furnished -for us from outside. They neither -complete the works which we intend nor -hinder them, but certainly become the -cause of our intending them—one of the -two things. For intention is produced in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267"></a>[267]</span> -us by our imagination, or for the verification -of a thing, which in itself is not in our -power, but comes into being by causes -outside us. For instance, if we see a good -thing, we like it, without intention, and -move towards acquiring it. So also, if we -happen to come to a thing which it is -better to shun, we leave it without intention. -Hence our intentions are bound and -attached to causes lying outside ourselves. -To this the following words of God, refer -“Each of them hath angels, mutually succeeding -each other, before him and behind -him; they watch him by the command -of God.”<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> As these outside causes -take this course according to a well -defined order and arrangement, and -never go astray from the path which -their Creator hath appointed for them, -and our own intentions can neither be -compelled, nor ever found, on the whole, -but by <i>their</i> fitness, so it is necessary that -actions too should also be within well-defined -limits, that is, they be found in a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268"></a>[268]</span> -given period of time and in a given -quantity. This is necessary because our -deeds are only the effects of causes, lying -outside us; and all the effects which -result from limited and prearranged causes, -are themselves limited, and are found in a -given quantity only. This relation does -not exist only between our actions and -outside causes, but also between them and -the causes which God has created in our -body, and the well-defined order existing -between the inner and outer causes. This -is what is meant by Fate and predestination, -which is found mentioned in the -Quran and is incumbent upon man. This -is also the “Preserved Tablet.”<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> God’s -knowledge of these causes, and that which -pertains to them, is the cause of their -existence. So no one can have a full knowledge -of these things except God, and -hence He is the only Knower of secrets, -which is quite true; as God has said, -“Say, None either in heaven or earth, -knoweth that which is hidden besides<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269"></a>[269]</span> -God.”<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> A knowledge of causes is -a knowledge of secret things, because the -secret is a knowledge of the existence of a -thing, before it comes into being. And as -the arrangement and order of causes bring -a thing into existence or not at a certain -time, there must be a knowledge of the -existence or non-existence of a thing at -a certain time. A knowledge of the causes -as a whole, is the knowledge of what -things would be found or not found at a -certain moment of time. Praised be He, -Who has a complete knowledge of creation -and all of its causes. This is what is meant -by the “keys of the secret,” in the following -words of God, “with Him are the -keys of secret things; none knoweth them -besides Himself.”<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a></p> - -<p>All that we have said being true, it -must have become evident how we can -acquire our deeds, and how far they are -governed by predestination and fate. This -very reconciliation is the real purpose of -religion by those verses and Traditions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270"></a>[270]</span> -which are apparently contradictory. When -their universal nature be limited in this -manner, those contradictions should vanish -by themselves, and all the doubts which -were raised before, about the contradictory -nature of reason, would disappear. The existent -things from our volition are completed -by two things: our intention and the -other causes. But when the deeds are referred -to only by one of these agencies, doubts -would rise. It may be said is a good answer, -and here reason is in perfect agreement -with religion, but it is based upon -the principles that these are agreed that -there are creative causes bringing into -existence other things; while the Muslims -are agreed that there is no Creator but -God. We would say that whatever -they have agreed upon is quite right, -but the objection can be answered in -two ways. One of them is that this -objection itself can be understood in -two ways; one of them being that -there is no Creator but God, and all -those causes which He has created, cannot<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271"></a>[271]</span> -be called creators, except speaking figuratively. -Their existence also depends -upon Him. He alone has made them to -be causes, nay, He only preserves their -existence as creative agents, and protects -their effects after their actions. He again, -produces their essences at the moment -when causes come together. He alone -preserves them as a whole. Had there -been no divine protection they could not -have existed for the least moment of time. -Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that -a man who makes any of the causes to be -co-existent with God is like a man who -makes the pen share the work of a scribe -in writing; that is, he says that the pen is -a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He -means that <i>writing</i> is a word which may -be applied to both, but in reality they -have no resemblance in anything but word, -for otherwise there is no difference between -them. Such is also the case with the word -<i>Creator</i>, when applied to God and the -Causes. We say that in this illustration -there are doubts. It should have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272"></a>[272]</span> -clearly shown, whether the scribe was the -Creator of the essence (<i>Jawhar</i>) of pen, -a preserver of it, as long as it remains a -pen, and again a preserver of the writing -after it is written, a Creator of it after it -has come in touch with the pen, as we -have just explained that God is the Creator -of the essences (<i>Jawahir</i>) of everything -which come into contact with its causes, -which are so called only by the usage. This -is the reason why there is no creator but -God—a reason which agrees with our feelings, -reason and religion. Our feelings -and reason see that there are things which -produce others. The order found in the -universe is of two kinds: that which God -has put in the nature and disposition of -things; and that which surround the universe -from outside. This is quite clear in -the movement of the heavenly bodies. For -it is evident that the sun and the moon, -the day and night, and all other stars are -obedient to us; and it is on this arrangement -and order which God has put in their -movements that our existence and that of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273"></a>[273]</span> -all other things depends. So even if we -imagine the least possible confusion in -them, with them in any other position, -size and rapidity of movement which God -has made for them, all the existent things -upon the earth would be destroyed. This -is so because of the nature in which God -has made them and the nature of the -things which are effected by them. This -is very clear in the effects of the sun and -the moon upon things of this world; such -also being the case with the rains, winds, -seas and other tangible things. But the -greater effect is produced upon plants, and -upon a greater number, or all, on the -animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had -there not been those faculties which God -has put in our bodies, as regulating them -that could not exist even for a single -moment after birth. But we say, had -there not been the faculties found in all -the bodies of the animals, and plants and -those found in the world by the movement -of the heavenly bodies, then they would -not have existed at all, not even for a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274"></a>[274]</span> -twinkling of the eye. So praised be the -“Sagacious, the Knowing.”<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> God has -called our attention to this fact in His -book, “And He hath subjected the night -and the day to your service; and the sun -and the moon and the stars, which are -compelled to serve by His Command;”<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> -again, “Say, what think ye, if God -should cover you with perpetual night, -until the day of Resurrection;”<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> and -again, “Of His mercy, He hath made you -night and the day, that ye may rest in -the one, and may seek to obtain provision -for yourselves of His abundance, by your -industry; in the other;”<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a> and, “And He -obligeth whatever is in heaven or on earth -to serve you.”<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> Further He says, “He -likewise compelleth the sun and the moon, -which diligently perform their courses, to -serve you; and hath subjected the day and -night to your service,”<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> There may be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275"></a>[275]</span> -quoted many other verses on the subject. -Had there been any wisdom in their existence -by which God has favoured us, and -there would not have been those blessings -for which we are to be grateful to Him.</p> - -<p>The second answer to the objection is, -that we say that the things produced out -of it are of two kinds: essences and substances; -and movements, hardness, coldness -and all other accidents. The essences and -substances are not created by any but God. -Their causes effect the accidents of those -essences, and not the essences themselves. -For instance, man and woman are only -the agents, while God is the real creator -of the child, and the life in it. Such is -also the case with agriculture. The earth -is prepared and made ready for it, and the -seed scattered in it. But it is God who -produces the ear of the corn. So there is -no creator but God, while created things -are but essences. To this refer the words -of God. “O men, a parable is propounded -unto you, therefore, hearken unto it. Verily -the idols which ye invoke, besides God,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276"></a>[276]</span> -can never create a single fly, although they -may all assemble for the purpose; and if -the fly snatch anything from them they -cannot turn the same from it. Weak is -the petitioner and the petitioned.”<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> This -is where the unbeliever wanted to mislead -Abraham, when he said, “I give life and -kill.”<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> When Abraham saw that he -could understand it, he at once turned to -the conclusive argument and said, “Verily, -God bringeth the sun from the east; do -thou bring it from the west.”</p> - -<p>On the whole, if the matter about the -creator and the doer be understood on this -wise, there would be no contradiction, either -in Tradition or in reason. So we say -that the word Creator does not apply to -the created things by any near or far-fetched -metaphor, for the meaning of the -creator is the inventor of the essences. So -God has said, “God created you, and that -which ye know.” It should be known<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277"></a>[277]</span> -that one who denies the effect of the -causes on the results of them, also denies -philosophy and all the sciences. For -science is the knowledge of the things by -their causes, and philosophy is the knowledge -of hidden causes. To deny the causes -altogether is a thing which is unintelligible -to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, -not seen by us. For the unseen in this -matter must always be understood by a -reference to the seen.</p> - -<p>So those men can have no knowledge of -God, when they admit that for every -action there is an actor. It being so, the -agreement of the Muslims on the fact that -there is no Creator but God cannot be -perfect, if we understand by it the denial -of the existence of an agent in the visible -world. For from the existence of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278"></a>[278]</span> -agent in it, we have brought an argument -for the Creator in the invisible world. But -when we have once admitted the existence -of the Creator in the invisible world, it -becomes clear that there is no Creative -agent except one by His command and -will. It is also evident that we can perform -our own deeds, and that one who -takes up only one side of the question is -wrong, as is the case with the Mutazilites -and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the -middle Course, like the Asharites, for -discovering the truth, cannot find it. For -they make no difference for a man between -the trembling and the movement of his -hand by intention. There is no meaning in -their admitting that both the movements -are not by ourselves. Because if they -are not by ourselves we have no power to -check them, so we are compelled to do -them. Hence there is no difference -between trembling of hand and voluntary -movement, which they would call acquired. -So there is no difference between them, -except in their names, which never effect<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279"></a>[279]</span> -the things themselves. This is all clear -by itself.</p> - -<p>Fourth Problem:—Divine Justice and Injustice. -The Asharites have expressed a very -peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason -and religion; about this problem. They -have explained it in a way in which religion -has not, but have adopted quite an opposite -method. They say that in this problem -the case of the invisible world is quite -opposed to the visible. They think that -God is just or unjust within the limits of -religious actions, so when a man’s action -is just with regard to religion, he also is -just; and whatever religion calls it to be -unjust; He is unjust. They say that -whatever has not been imposed as a divinely -ordained duty upon men, does not -come within the four walls of religion. He -is neither just or unjust, but all His actions -about such things are just. They have -laid down that there is nothing in itself -which may be called just or unjust. But -to say that there is nothing which may in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280"></a>[280]</span> -itself be called good or bad is simply intolerable. -Justice is known as good, and injustice -as bad. So according to them, polytheism -is in itself neither injustice nor -evil, but with regard to religion, and had -religion ordained it, it would have been just -and true. Such also would have been the -case with any kind of sin. But all this is quite -contrary to our traditions and reason. As to -tradition God has described himself as just, -and denied injustice to himself. He says -“God hath borne witness that there is no -God but He; and the angels and those -who are endowed with wisdom profess the -same, who executeth righteousness;”<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> and -“Thy God is not unjust towards His servants;”<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> -and again, “Verily God will not -deal unjustly with men in any respect; but -men deal unjustly with their own souls.”<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> -It may be asked, What is your opinion -about misleading the people, whether it is -just or unjust, for God has mentioned in -many a verse of the Quran, “That He -leads as well as misleads the people?” He -says, “God causeth to err whom He<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281"></a>[281]</span> -pleaseth, and directeth whom He -pleaseth;”<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> and, “If we had pleased, we -had certainly given every soul its -direction.”<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> We would say that these -verses cannot be taken exoterically, for -there are many verses which apparently -contradict them—the verses in which God -denies injustice to himself. For instance, -He says, “He liketh not ingratitude (<i>Kufr</i>) -in His servant.”<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> So it is clear that as He -does not like ingratitude even from -them, He certainly cannot cause -them to err. As to the statement of the -Asharites that God sometimes does things -which He does not like, and orders others -which He does not want, God forbid us from -holding such a view about him, for it is -pure infidelity. That God has not misled -the people and has not caused them to err -will be clear to you from the following -verses: “Wherefore be thou orthodox and -set thy face towards true religion, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282"></a>[282]</span> -institution of God, to which He hath -created man kindly disposed;”<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> and, “when -thy Lord drew forth their posterity from -the lions of the sons of Adam.”<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> A Tradition -of the Prophet says, “Every child is -born according to the divine constitution.”</p> - -<p>These being contradictions in this -problem we should try to reconcile them -so that they may agree with reason. The -verse, “Verily God will cause to err whom -He pleaseth, and will direct whom He -pleaseth” refers to the prearranged divine -will, with which all things have been -endowed. They have been created erring, -that is, prepared to go astray by their very -nature, and led to it by inner and outer -causes. The meaning of the verse, -“If we had pleased, we have given unto -every soul its direction,” is that He -thought of not creating people ready to -err, by their nature, or by the outer causes -or by both, He could have done so. But -as the dispositions of men are different<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283"></a>[283]</span> -the words may mislead the one and direct -the other. For these are the verses which -speak of misleading the people. For instance, -“He will thereby mislead many, and -will direct many thereby: but He will not -mislead any thereby except the transgressors”<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a>; -and, “We have appointed the vision -which we showed thee, and also the tree -cursed in the Quran,”<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> and the verses about -the number of angels of hell. “Thus -doth God cause to err whom He pleaseth -and He directeth whom He pleaseth.”<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> -It means that for evil natures, these verses -are misleading, as for the sick bodies even -good drugs are injurious. But some one<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284"></a>[284]</span> -may object and ask, what was the need of -creating a class of men already prepared -to err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? -We would say that divine wisdom -designated it so. The injustice would have -consisted in its being otherwise. For the -nature and constitution of men, in His -very creation, are such that they require -some men, though very few, to be wicked -and evil by their nature. Such is also the -case with the outer causes, made for directing -the people to the right path, which -requires that some men must be bad. If -many had been good then the divine law -would not have been fulfilled, because -either there had not been created things -in which there is little evil and much good, -for the good would have disappeared on -account of that little evil; or there had -been created things with much good and -little evil. Now it is well known that the -existence of many good ones with a few -evil ones, is better than the non-existence -of much good for the sake of little evil. -This very evil was the thing which remained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285"></a>[285]</span> -hidden to the angels when God informed -them that He was going to create -upon the earth, a vicegerent, that is, a man. -“When God said to the angels, I am going -to place a substitute on earth, they said, -wilt thou place there one who will do evil -therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate -thy praise, and sanctify Thee. God answered, -Verily I know that which ye know -not.”<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> He means that the thing which is -hidden from them is that when there is -found both good and evil in a thing, and -good overpowers the evil, reason requires -the creation of the one for the destruction -of the other. So from all these it is clear -how misleading can be attributed to Him, -in spite of His justice, and injustice disproved. -The causes of misleading are -created, because from them appear the -causes of direction to good. For some people -have not been given causes of direction -to good in which there is found nothing -which may lead to erring. Such is the -condition of the angels. So also the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286"></a>[286]</span> -causes of good have those evil, though in -their nature much evil be not found; this -applies to man. It may be asked: What -is the use of these contradictory verses, -thus compelling the people to take refuge -in interpretations, which you have absolutely -forbidden? We would say that to -explain this problem to the common people, -they have been compelled to adopt -this method. For they should know that -God is just, and that He is the Creator -of all good and evil, instead of believing, -as many nations have done, that there are -two Gods, the creator of good, and the -creator of evil. So now they know that -He is the Creator of both. As misleading -is evil, and as there is no Creator -but He, it was necessary that it should be -attributed to Him, like the creation of evil. -But this should be done without qualifying -it, that is, that He created good for -its own sake, and evil for the sake of good—on -account of their connection with one -another. In this way His creation of evil<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287"></a>[287]</span> -would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has -been made because of its necessity for the -existence of things, and without it they -could not have existed at all. It also destroys -things by its very nature. But if you -think of the destruction and evil which it -causes, and compare it to the advantages -which we derive out of it, you will find that -its existence is better than non-existence, -that is,—good. Now the verse of the Quran -“No account shall be demanded of him -for what He shall do; but an account shall -be demanded of them,” means that He does -nothing because it is incumbent upon him -for it is degrading to him, to need doing a -thing. If it be so, God needs that thing -for His own existence, because of necessity -or to be more perfect in His Being—and -God is free from such imperfections. Man -is just because he gains something good by -being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. -God is just, not that He may become more -perfect by His justice, but because His -perfection requires him to be just. When -we understand it in this way it would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288"></a>[288]</span> -be evident, that He is not just in the same -way as man is just. But it is not right -to say that He is not just at all, and that -all His actions are neither just nor unjust, -as the Mutakallimuns have thought. -For it cannot be understood by human -intellect, and is at the same time falsifying -religion. These people knew the -meaning but were misled. For if we say -that He is not at all just, we falsify the -principle that there are things which are -just and good in themselves and others -which are evil and unjust. Again, if we -suppose that He is just in the same way -as man is, it becomes necessary to admit -there is some defect in him. For one who -is just, his existence is for the sake of -things for which he is just, and so he is -dependent upon another.</p> - -<p>It should now be known that it is not -necessary for all the people to be told this -interpretation in its entirety. Only those -should be told it who have some doubts -about this problem. For not every one -among the common people is confronted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289"></a>[289]</span> -by these contradictions in the universal -verses, and Tradition. Such people must -believe in the exoteric meanings of them. -There is another reason for these verses. -The common people cannot differentiate -between possible and impossible, while -to God is not ascribed power over -the impossible. If they be told what is -impossible (<i>Mustahil</i>) and they think that -God has power over it, and then told that -God has no power, they begin to think -that there is some defect in God, because -He cannot do a certain thing and hence -He is weak. As the existence of things -free from evil was possible according to -the masses, God has said, “If we had -pleased, we had certainly given every soul -its direction; but the word which hath -proceeded from Me must necessarily be -fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the -hell with genii and men, altogether.”<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> This -verse means one thing to the common -people, and the other to the learned. -The former take it to mean that it is not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290"></a>[290]</span> -incumbent upon him that He should create -a class of men to whom evil may be attached. -But it really means: Had we thought -we could create men with whom evil could -not be attached, but would have been -good in all and all, and hence every one -had been given his guidance. This much -is enough for this problem. Now we -would deal with the fifth question.</p> - -<p>Problem fifth: Of the Conditions -of the Day of Judgment:—The Day -of Judgment is a thing in which all -the religions are agreed, and all the -learned men have proved it by arguments. -The religions differ about the conditions -of its existence; nay, in reality they -do not differ about its condition, but about -the visible things by which they should -explain to the common people the conditions -of the unseen. There are some religions -which have made it only spiritual, that -is, meant only for the souls; while others -have thought it to be both physical and -spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter -depends upon the testimony of divine revelation, -and the necessary arguments of all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291"></a>[291]</span> -the learned men, that is, that for a man there -are two blessings: of the present world, and -of the world to come, which is itself established -upon principles, admitted by all to be -true. One of them is that when it is clear -that all the existent things have not been -created in vain, but for some particular -work assigned to them, which is the sum -total of their life, then man is far fitter to -be placed under this category. God himself -has warned us of the existence of this purpose -in all the created things. He says -in the Quran, “We have created the heavens -and the earth, and whatever is between -them, in vain. This is the opinion of the -unbelievers.”<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> Again, He says, describing -and praising the learned men, who have -understood, the real and inner purpose of -this existence, “Who remember God standing, -and sitting, and lying on their sides; -and meditate on the creation of heaven -and earth, saying, O Lord, thou hast not -created this in vain; far be it from thee -therefore, deliver us from the torment of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292"></a>[292]</span> -hell fire.”<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> The ultimate purpose in the -creation of man is still more evident -in him, than in other things. God has -informed us of it in many a verses of the -Quran. He says, “Did ye think that we -had created you in sport; and that ye -should not be brought again before -us,”<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> and, “Doth man think, that he -shall be left at full liberty, without control?”<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> -and further on He says, “I have not -created genii and men for any other end, -but that they should serve me.”<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> That is -the genius out of all creation which could -know him. Again, He says, informing us -of the importance of knowing God, “What -reason have I that I should not worship -him who hath created me? for unto him -shall ye return.”<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> Now it being clear that -man has been created for a certain work, it -is evident that the work should be of a -particular kind. For we see that everything -has been created for a certain work, -which is found in it, and in none other; that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293"></a>[293]</span> -is, it is specialised in it. This being so, it is -necessary that the real purpose of man’s -creation be those deeds which are found in -him, and in no other animal. These deeds -pertain to his rational powers. As there -are two portions of the rational powers,—practical -and theoretical—it is evident that -the first kind of thing is demanded of him. -That is, that his faculties of knowledge and -science should be found in their perfection. -The deed by which soul acquires perfection -in those two faculties are goodness and -virtue, and those that retard it are evil -and wicked. And as these actions are -most of them fixed by divine revelation, -religions appeared to fix them. With that -there also appears a knowledge of those -qualities, exhorting the people towards -them. They ordered men to act upon goodness, -and shew evil. They taught them -the quantity of the deeds which will be -good for all the people, both in practice -and in knowledge taken together. They -also taught them the theoretical knowledge -of things, which all the people should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294"></a>[294]</span> -know, such as the knowledge of God, -angels, of higher creation, and of goodness. -In this way they also taught them the -quantity of the acts which would be necessary -to make the souls excel in virtue. -This is especially the case with our religion, -Islam, for when compared with other -religions, it is found that it is absolutely -<i>the</i> best religion. Hence it was the last of -divine dispensations.</p> - -<p>Now divine revelation has informed us -in all the religions that the soul will live, -and all the argument of the learned people -have established the same. The souls are -freed from physical desires after death. If -they be pure, their purity is doubled by -this freedom from desires. If they be evil -this separation increases their depravity, -for they are troubled by the evil which they -have already earned, and their regret increases -about the opportunities which they -lost before their separation from the body, -for this purification is not possible without -it. It is to this that following verse refers:—A -soul would say, “Alas, for that I<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295"></a>[295]</span> -have been negligent in my duties towards -God: Verily I have been one of the scorners.”<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> -All the religions agree about this -condition of man, and call it his last goodness -or misery. This being so, there could -not be found in the visible world anything -which may be given as an illustration, so -there is a difference in its description in the -revelations given to different prophets. -We mean to say, that there is a difference -in illustrating the condition of the good -and bad soul on that occasion. There are -some which have not given any illustrations -of that happiness or misery which the good -and bad souls will have there. They have only -said that the conditions there would be only -spiritual, and pleasures angelic. Others have -given instances from the visible world; -that is, they have given the examples -of the pleasures here for the pleasures of -the next world, after deducting the trouble -borne in acquiring them, and in the same -way, they have illustrated the misery there,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296"></a>[296]</span> -by the example of misery here, after -deducting the pleasure which we derive -from it. Either the people of these -religions received from God revelations -which those did not receive who made -the next world purely spiritual, or they -saw, that illustrations from things visible -are best understood by the common people -and that they are best led so or checked -from an action through them. So they said -that God will put back the good souls in -their respective bodies, and the best possible -ease—in paradise. The bad souls will also -return to their bodies, where they will be -in the worst possible misery, which they -call hell-fire.</p> - -<p>This is true of our religion, Islam, in -illustrating the conditions of the next -world. There are many verses of the -Quran which contain arguments as -to the possibilities of the conditions -of that world, which can be understood -and verified by all. For our reason -cannot apprehend these things more than -the possibility of knowing which is common<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297"></a>[297]</span> -to all, and which is of the kind of analogy -of the existence of the like from the being -of the like, that is of its coming into being. -It is an analogy of the coming into being of -the small from the existence of the big -and the great. For instance, God says, -“And He propoundeth unto us a comparison -and forgetteth His Creation.”<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> In these -verses the argument used is the analogy of -the return of the beginning, when both -are equal. In the following verse the -argument of those is refuted who differentiate -between the real and <i>return</i> of the -same thing. He says, “He giveth you -fire out of a green tree.”<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> The doubt is -that the birth was from heat and moisture, -while the return will be from cold and -dryness. So this doubt is met by the fact -that God can create the contrary from the -contrary, as He can create the like from the -like. The analogy is drawn from the existence -of the little from the great. For -example, God says, “Is not He who has -created the Heavens and the earth able to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298"></a>[298]</span> -create new creatures like unto them! yea, -certainly; for He is the wise Creator.”<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> -These verses have two arguments for proving -the resurrection and at the same time -refuting the arguments of those denying -it. Were we to quote the verses which give -this proof our discourse would be lengthened. -But all of them are of the kind we -have mentioned.</p> - -<p>So, as we have already said, all the -religions are agreed that there is a blessing -or misery for the human soul after death, -but differ in illustrating the conditions -of that moment and in explaining it to the -common people. It seems that the illustration -in our religion is the most perfect -of all for the understanding of the people, -and at the same time most inciting of them -all to gain for their souls the advantages of -that day. And it is the many with whom -lies the primary purpose of religion. The -spiritual illustration would be least inciting -to the common people for desiring the -things of hereafter. So they would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299"></a>[299]</span> -little liking for it, while they would fear -the physical illustration. So it seems that -the physical illustration would be most -exciting to them, than the spiritual, while -the latter would appeal only to the controversialists -among the scholastic theologians, -who are always very few in number. -Hence we find that the Muslims have been -divided into three parties about the meaning -of the conditions of the Day of Judgment. -One party says that that existence would be -just like our present one, as regards pleasures -and enjoyments, that is, they think -that both are of the same genius, but differ -in perpetuity and termination: the one is -for ever and the others come to an end. -The other party thinks that the two existences -are different. But this is again subdivided -into two parties. The one thinks that -that existence with our present faculties is -spiritual, but has been described as physical. -For this there are many religious arguments -which it would be useless to repeat here. -The other party says that that existence is -physical only; but they at the same time<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300"></a>[300]</span> -believe, that the body will be different from -our present body. This is only transient, that -will be eternal. For this also there are religious -arguments. It seems that even -Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is -related of him that he said, “There is nought -in this world of the hereafter, but names.” -It seems that this view is better suited -to the learned men because its possibility -is based upon principles, in which there is -no disagreement according to all men: the -one being that the soul is immortal, and -the second is that the return of the souls -into other bodies does not look so impossible -as the return of the bodies themselves. -It is so because the material of the bodies -here is found following and passing from -one body to another, i. e.; one and the same -matter is found in many people and in -many different times. The example of -bodies cannot be found, for their matter is -the same. For instance a man dies and -his body becomes dissolved into earth. -The earth ultimately becomes dissolved -into vegetable, which is eaten by quite a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301"></a>[301]</span> -different man from whom another man -comes into being. If we suppose them -to be different bodies, then our aforesaid -view cannot be true.</p> - -<p>The truth about this question is that -man should follow that which he himself -has thought out but anyhow it should not -be the view which may deny the fundamental -principle altogether. For this would -be denying its existence. Such a belief -leads to infidelity, on account of a distinct -knowledge of this condition being given to -man, both by religion and by human reason, -which is all based upon the eternal nature -of the soul. If it be said whether there is -any argument or information in the Law -about this eternal nature of the soul, we -would say that it is found in the Quran -itself. God says, “God taketh unto himself -the souls of men at the time of their -death; and those which die not He also -taketh in their sleep.”<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> In this verse sleep -and death have been placed upon the same -level, on account of the change in its instrument,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302"></a>[302]</span> -and in sleep on account of a change -in itself. For had it not been so it would -not have come to its former condition after -awakening. By this means we know that -this cession does not effect its essence, but -was only attached to it on account of change -in its instrument. So it does not follow that -with a cessation of the work of the instrument, -the soul also ceases to exist. Death is -only a cessation of work, so it is clear that -its condition should be like that of sleep. -As someone has said that if an old man -were to get the eyes of the young, he -would begin to see like him.</p> - -<p>This is all that we thought of in an -exposition of the beliefs of our religion, -Islam. What remains for us is to look -into things of religion in which interpretation -is allowed and not allowed. And if -allowed, then who are the people to take -advantage of it? With this thing we would -finish our discourse.</p> - -<p>The things found in the Law can be divided -into five kinds. But in the first place, -there are only two kinds of things: indivisible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303"></a>[303]</span> -and the divisible. The second one is -divided into four kinds. The first kind which -is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in -its meanings. The second is that in which -the thing mentioned is not the thing meant -but is only an example of it. This is -again divided into four kinds. First, the -meanings which it mentions are only illustrations -such that they can only be known -by the far-fetched and compound analogies, -which cannot be understood, but after a -long time and much labour. None can -accept them but perfect and excellent -natures; and it cannot be known that the -illustration given is not the real thing; -except by this far-fetched way. The second -is just the opposite of the former: they -can be understood easily, and it can be -known that the example is just what is -meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily -known that it is merely an illustration, -but what it is the example of is difficult -to comprehend. The fourth kind is quite -opposite to the former. The thing of -which it is an example, is easily understood;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304"></a>[304]</span> -while it is difficult to know that it -is an example at all. The interpretation -of the first kind is wrong without doubt. -The kind in which both the things are -far-fetched: its interpretation particularly -lies with those who are well-grounded in -knowledge; and an exposition of it is not -fit for any but the learned. The interpretation -of its opposite—that which can be -understood on both the sides—is just what -is wanted, and an exposition of it is necessary. -The case of the third kind is like -the case of the above. For in it illustration -has not been mentioned because of -the difficulty for the common people to -understand it: it only incites the people -to action. Such is the case with the tradition -of the prophet; “The black stone is -God’s action on Earth,” etc. etc. That -which can be easily known that is an -example, but difficult to know of which it -is example, should not be interpreted but -for the sake of particular persons and -learned men. Those who understand that -it is only an illustration, but are not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305"></a>[305]</span> -learned enough to know the thing which -it illustrates, should be told either that it -is allegorical and can be understood by the -well-established learned men; or the -illustration should be changed in a way -which might be near to their understanding. -This would be the best plan to dispel -doubts from their minds.</p> - -<p>The law about this should be that which -has been laid down by Abu Hamid (Al -Ghazzali) in his book, <i>Al Tafriga bainal -Islam wal Zindiga</i>. It should be understood -that one thing has five existences -which he calls by the name of <i>essential</i> -(<i>Zati</i>); sensual (<i>Hissi</i>); rational (<i>Agli</i>); -imaginative (<i>Khayali</i>) and doubtful -(<i>Shilbhi</i>). So at the time of doubt it -should be considered which of these five -kinds would better satisfy the man who -has doubts. If it be that which he has -called <i>essential</i> then an illustration would -best satisfy their minds. In it is also -included the following traditions of the -Prophet, “Whatever the earlier prophets -saw I have seen it from my place here,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_306"></a>[306]</span> -even heaven and hell.” “Between my -cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a -garden of paradise;” and “The earth will -eat up the whole of a man except the -extremity of the tail.” All these, it can -easily be known are but illustrations, but -what is the thing which they illustrate, it -is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary -in this case to give an instance to the -people which they may easily understand. -This kind of illustration, when used on -such an occasion is allowable; but when -used irrelevantly it is wrong. Abu Hamid -has not decided about the occasion when -both the sides of the question—the illustration -and the illustrated—be both far-fetched -and difficult to understand. In this case -there would apparently be a doubt, but a -doubt without any foundation. What should -be done is to prove that the doubt has no -basis, but no interpretation should be made, -as we have shown in many places in our -present book against the Mutakallimun, -Asharites and the Mutazilites.</p> - -<p>The fourth kind of occasion is quite<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307"></a>[307]</span> -opposite to the former. In this it is very -difficult to understand that it is an example, -but when once understood, you can easily -comprehend the thing illustrated. In the -interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: -about those people who know -that if it is an example, it illustrates such -and such a thing; but they doubt whether -it is an illustration at all. If they are -not learned people, the best thing -to do with them is not to make -any interpretation, but only to prove -the fallacy of the views which they hold -about its being an illustration at all. It is -also possible that an interpretation may -make them still distant from the truth, on -account of the nature of the illustration -and the illustrated. For these two kinds -of occasions if an interpretation is given, -they give rise to strange beliefs, far from -the law which when disclosed are denied -by the common people, Such has been the -case with the Sufis, and those learned men -who have followed them. When this work -of interpretation was done by people who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308"></a>[308]</span> -could not distinguish between these occasions, -and made no distinction between the -people for whom the interpretation is to -be made, there arose differences of opinion, -at last forming into sects, which ended in -accusing one another with unbelief. All -this is pure ignorance of the purpose of -the Law.</p> - -<p>From what we have already said the -amount of mischief done by interpretation -must have become clear to you. We always -try to acquire our purpose by knowing -what should be interpreted, and what not, -and when interpreted, how it should be -done; and whether all the difficult portions -of the Law and Traditions are to be -explained or not. These are all included in -the four kinds which have already been -enumerated.</p> - -<p>The purpose of our writing this book -is now completed. We took it up because -we thought that it was the most important -of all purposes—connected with God -and the Law.</p> - - -<h3>FOOTNOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[25]</a> A translation of <i>Al-Kashf’an Manhij i’l Adillah fi -Aqaid il Millah, we Tarif ma Waqa fiha bi Hasb i’l Ta’wil -min Shubhi’l Muzighah wa Bid’ill Mudillah</i>.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[26]</a> Quran ii, 19.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[27]</a> Quran xiv, 11.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[28]</a> Quran xxxix, 39.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[29]</a> Quran vi, 75.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[30]</a> Quran xvi, 42.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[31]</a> Quran ii, 282.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[32]</a> Quran xxix, 69.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[33]</a> Quran viii, 29.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[34]</a> Quran xxii, 72.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[35]</a> Quran vii, 184.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[36]</a> Quran lxxvii, 6-16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[37]</a> Quran xxv, 62.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[38]</a> Quran lxxx, 24.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[39]</a> Quran lxxxvi, 6.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[40]</a> Quran lxxxviii, 17.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[41]</a> Quran xxii, 72.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[42]</a> Quran vi, 79. The story -referred to will be found in the preceding verses.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[43]</a> Quran ii, 19.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[44]</a> Quran xxxvi, 33.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[45]</a> Quran iii, 188.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[46]</a> Quran vii, 171.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[47]</a> Quran iii, 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[48]</a> Quran xvii, 46.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[49]</a> Quran xxi, 22.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[50]</a> Quran xxiii, 93.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[51]</a> Quran xvii, 44.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[52]</a> Quran ii, 256.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[53]</a> Quran xvii, 45, 46.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[54]</a> Quran lxxvii, 14.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[55]</a> Quran vi, 59.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[56]</a> Quran xix, 65.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[57]</a> Quran xvi, 42.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[58]</a> Quran xlii, 50.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="label">[59]</a> Quran liii, 8, 10.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="label">[60]</a> Quran iv, 162.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="label">[61]</a> Quran xix, 43.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="label">[62]</a> Quran xxi, 67.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="label">[63]</a> Quran v, 77.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="label">[64]</a> Quran xlii, 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="label">[65]</a> Quran xvi, 17.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="label">[66]</a> Quran xxv, 60.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="label">[67]</a> Quran ii, 256.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="label">[68]</a> Quran xx, 54.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="label">[69]</a> Quran xxxv, 39.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="label">[70]</a> Quran xxx, 29.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="label">[71]</a> Quran xxxv, 41.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="label">[72]</a> Quran ii, 256.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="label">[73]</a> Quran xlii, 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="label">[74]</a> Quran xliv, 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="label">[75]</a> Quran xxxv, 10.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="label">[76]</a> Quran lxx, 4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="label">[77]</a> Quran lxxxix, 23.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="label">[78]</a> Quran xvii, 87.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="label">[79]</a> Quran ii, 260.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="label">[80]</a> Quran xxiv, 35.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="label">[81]</a> He also saw him another time, by the lote-tree, -beyond which there is no passing: near it is the garden -of eternal abode. <i>When the lote-tree covered that which -it covered</i>, his eye-sight turned not aside, nor did it wander: -and he really beheld some of the greater signs of his Lord. -(Quran lii, 16, 18.) The lote-tree is the limit beyond -which neither angel nor man can pass. It stands in the -seventh heaven, on the right hand of the Throne of God.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="label">[82]</a> Quran lxix, 17.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="label">[83]</a> Quran xxxii, 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="label">[84]</a> Quran lxx, 4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="label">[85]</a> Quran lxvii, 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="label">[86]</a> Quran xl, 59.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="label">[87]</a> Quran iii, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="label">[88]</a> Quran ii, 24.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="label">[89]</a> Quran iii, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="label">[90]</a> Quran vi, 103.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="label">[91]</a> They will ask the concerning the Soul: answer, The -Soul was created at the command of my Lord: but ye have -no knowledge given unto you, except a little.—(Quran -xxii, 85.)</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="label">[92]</a> Quran lxxvii, 3, et. seq.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="label">[93]</a> Quran ii, 99.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="label">[94]</a> Quran xxi, 33.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="label">[95]</a> Quran lxxi, 14-16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="label">[96]</a> Quran xxvii, 90.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="label">[97]</a> Quran lxvii, 3.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="label">[98]</a> Quran iii, 88.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="label">[99]</a> Quran xi, 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="label">[100]</a> Quran vii, 52.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="label">[101]</a> Quran xli, 10.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="label">[102]</a> Quran iii, 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="label">[103]</a> Quran ii, 8.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="label">[104]</a> Quran xvii, 92-95.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="label">[105]</a> Quran, xvii, 61.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="label">[106]</a> Quran xvii, 90.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="label">[107]</a> Quran xi, 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="label">[108]</a> Quran iv, 161, 162.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="label">[109]</a> Quran xlvi, 8.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="label">[110]</a> Quran iv, 173.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="label">[111]</a> Quran iv, 168.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="label">[112]</a> Quran iv, 160.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="label">[113]</a> Quran iv, 164.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="label">[114]</a> Quran xxix, 47.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="label">[115]</a> Quran lxii, 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="label">[116]</a> Quran vii, 156.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="label">[117]</a> Quran vii, 156.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="label">[118]</a> Quran liv, 49.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="label">[119]</a> Quran xiii, 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="label">[120]</a> Quran lvii, 22.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="label">[121]</a> Quran xlii, 32.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="label">[122]</a> Quran xlii, 32.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="label">[123]</a> Quran x, 28.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="label">[124]</a> Quran ii, 278.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="label">[125]</a> Quran xli, 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="label">[126]</a> Quran iii, 159.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="label">[127]</a> Quran iii, 160.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="label">[128]</a> Quran iv, 81.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="label">[129]</a> Quran iv, 80.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="label">[130]</a> Quran xiii, 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="label">[131]</a> Quran lxxxv, 22.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="label">[132]</a> Quran xxvii, 67.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="label">[133]</a> Quran vi, 59.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="label">[134]</a> Quran lxvii, 14.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="label">[135]</a> Quran xvi, 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="label">[136]</a> Quran xxviii, 71.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="label">[137]</a> Quran xviii, 73.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="label">[138]</a> Quran xlv, 12.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="label">[139]</a> Quran xiv, 37.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="label">[140]</a> Quran xxii, 72.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="label">[141]</a> “Hast thou not considered him who disputed with -Abraham concerning his Lord, because God had given him -the Kingdom? When Abraham Said, My Lord is He who -giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and kill, Abraham -said, verily God bringeth the sun from the east do thou -bring it from the west; whereupon the infidel was confounded; -for God directeth not the ungodly people.” Quran -ii, 260.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="label">[142]</a> Quran iii, 16.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="label">[143]</a> Quran xli, 46.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="label">[144]</a> Quran x, 45.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="label">[145]</a> Quran xiv, 4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="label">[146]</a> Quran xxxii, 11.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="label">[147]</a> Quran xxxix, 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="label">[148]</a> Quran xxx, 29.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="label">[149]</a> Quran vii, 171.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="label">[150]</a> Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a -parable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for -they who believe will know it to be true from their -Lord; but the unbelievers will say, what meaneth by this -parable? He will thereby mislead etc. (Quran ii, 24).</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="label">[151]</a> Quran xvii, 62. By the <i>vision</i> may be meant the Prophet’s -night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at -Hudaibiyyah, seeing himself entering Mecca or his vision -about the Omayyeds.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="label">[152]</a> Quran lxxiv, 34.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="label">[153]</a> Quran ii, 28.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="label">[154]</a> Quran xxxii, 14.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="label">[155]</a> Quran xxxviii, 26.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="label">[156]</a> Quran iii, 188.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="label">[157]</a> Quran xxiii, 117.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="label">[158]</a> Quran lxxv, 36.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="label">[159]</a> Quran li, 56.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="label">[160]</a> Quran xxxvi, 21.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="label">[161]</a> Quran xxxix, 57.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="label">[162]</a> Quran xxxvi, 78.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="label">[163]</a> Quran xxxvi, 80.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="label">[164]</a> Quran xxxxvi, 81.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="label">[165]</a> Quran xxxix, 43.</p> - -</div> - - - -<div class="transnote p2"> -<div class="center large">Transcriber’s Notes</div> -<div class="p1">The cover image was created by the transcriber, and is placed in the Public Domain. -Obvious typographical errors and variable spelling were corrected. -Quran reference formatting has been made uniform to e.g. “Quran xxv, 60.” -The following corrections -have been made to the text: <br /> -<br /> -<table style="width:75%" summary="Transcriber edits"> -<tr style="text-align:left"> -<th>Page</th> -<th>Original</th> -<th>New</th> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_14'>14</a></td> -<td>cogniscance</td> -<td>cognisance</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_28'>28</a></td> -<td>heavena</td> -<td>heavens</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_30'>30</a></td> -<td>concensus</td> -<td>consensus</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_53'>53</a></td> -<td>cogniscance</td> -<td>cognisance</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_60'>60</a></td> -<td>necessarry</td> -<td>necessary</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_60'>60</a></td> -<td>shonld</td> -<td>should</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_60'>60</a></td> -<td>interpretes</td> -<td>interprets</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_64'>64</a></td> -<td>Qnran</td> -<td>Quran</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_67'>67</a></td> -<td>tbe</td> -<td>the</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_69'>69</a></td> -<td>Mutazalites</td> -<td>Mutazilites</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_71'>71</a></td> -<td>Mutakallimum</td> -<td>Mutakallimun</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_76'>76</a></td> -<td>he</td> -<td>be</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_91'>91</a></td> -<td>upo</td> -<td>upon</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_97'>97</a></td> -<td>nevertheles</td> -<td>nevertheless</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_98'>98</a></td> -<td>nonexistent</td> -<td>non-existent</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_129'>129</a></td> -<td>no</td> -<td>not</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_135'>135</a></td> -<td>s</td> -<td>is</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_137'>137</a></td> -<td>controvertialist</td> -<td>controversialist</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_143'>143</a></td> -<td>Mutakalimun</td> -<td>Mutakallimun</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_147'>147</a></td> -<td>bows</td> -<td>bows’</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_161'>161</a></td> -<td>Quran</td> -<td>Quran xxx, 28. [Footnote 46]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_162'>162</a></td> -<td>Quran</td> -<td>Quran xxxv, 41. [Footnote 47]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_166'>166</a></td> -<td>ii</td> -<td>10 [Footnote 51]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_174'>174</a></td> -<td>Maati</td> -<td>Maali</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_186'>186</a></td> -<td>by</td> -<td>be</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_193'>193</a></td> -<td>Quran</td> -<td>Quran vi, 103. [Footnote 66]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_194'>194</a></td> -<td>th</td> -<td>the</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_198'>198</a></td> -<td>imposible</td> -<td>impossible</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_207'>207</a></td> -<td>excep</td> -<td>except [Footnote 67]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_219'>219</a></td> -<td>beeause</td> -<td>because</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_222'>222</a></td> -<td>pre-arranged</td> -<td>prearranged</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_244'>244</a></td> -<td>there-of</td> -<td>thereof</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_251'>251</a></td> -<td>repeatsd</td> -<td>repeated</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_251'>251</a></td> -<td>appearence</td> -<td>appearance</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_257'>257</a></td> -<td>Qnran</td> -<td>Quran [Footnote 93]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_259'>259</a></td> -<td>distingished</td> -<td>distinguished</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_261'>261</a></td> -<td>Quran LIVI</td> -<td>Quran liv,</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_262'>262</a></td> -<td>Quarn</td> -<td>Quran [Footnote 102]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_265'>265</a></td> -<td>Mutazlites</td> -<td>Mutazilites</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_265'>265</a></td> -<td>intellegible</td> -<td>intelligible</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_266'>266</a></td> -<td>perfom</td> -<td>perform</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_266'>266</a></td> -<td>use</td> -<td>us</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_269'>269</a></td> -<td>YXVII</td> -<td>XXVII [Footnote 108]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_270'>270</a></td> -<td>things</td> -<td>things:</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_274'>274</a></td> -<td></td> -<td>[Removed duplicate footnote 111. Numbers of the subsequent footnotes corrected.]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_276'>276</a></td> -<td>[118]</td> -<td>[Removed second, unused footnote anchor]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_277'>277</a></td> -<td>alsays</td> -<td>always</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_277'>277</a></td> -<td>in</td> -<td>an</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_278'>278</a></td> -<td>thay</td> -<td>they</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_278'>278</a></td> -<td>their</td> -<td>there</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_278'>278</a></td> -<td>there</td> -<td>their</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_279'>279</a></td> -<td>Injusitce</td> -<td>Injustice</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_280'>280</a></td> -<td></td> -<td>[Added footnote anchors, footnotes on next page]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_282'>282</a></td> -<td></td> -<td>[Added footnote anchors]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_282'>282</a></td> -<td>Quran, XXXV, 9</td> -<td>[Removed footnote, as no matching quran quote was found in the text]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_283'>283</a></td> -<td></td> -<td> [Added footnote anchors]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_285'>285</a></td> -<td>in-spite</td> -<td>in spite</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_285'>285</a></td> -<td></td> -<td> [Added footnote anchor]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_286'>286</a></td> -<td>contradictary</td> -<td>contradictory</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_286'>286</a></td> -<td>Crertor</td> -<td>Creator</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_286'>286</a></td> -<td>attributd</td> -<td>attributed</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_289'>289</a></td> -<td>131 Quran, XXX, 14.</td> -<td>131 Quran, XXXII, 14.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_292'>292</a></td> -<td>that</td> -<td>That</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_293'>293</a></td> -<td>theoratical</td> -<td>theoretical</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_295'>295</a></td> -<td>that is, ... world;</td> -<td>[Removed duplicate part]</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_296'>296</a></td> -<td>mirsery</td> -<td>misery</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_296'>296</a></td> -<td>possiblities</td> -<td>possibilities</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_299'>299</a></td> -<td>divded</td> -<td>divided</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_300'>300</a></td> -<td>enternal</td> -<td>eternal</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_300'>300</a></td> -<td>reilgious</td> -<td>religious</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_304'>304</a></td> -<td>farfetched</td> -<td>far-fetched</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_305'>305</a></td> -<td>than</td> -<td>then</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_306'>306</a></td> -<td>occassion</td> -<td>occasion</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_306'>306</a></td> -<td>irrelevently</td> -<td>irrelevantly</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_306'>306</a></td> -<td>Mutazalites</td> -<td>Mutazilites</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_307'>307</a></td> -<td>man</td> -<td>men</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><a href='#Page_308'>308</a></td> -<td>interperetation</td> -<td>interpretation</td> -</tr> -</table> -</div> -</div> -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF AVERROES ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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