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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Little Book of Stoicism, by St. George Stock
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
+other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
+whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
+the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
+www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
+to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
+
+Title: A Little Book of Stoicism
+
+Author: St. George Stock
+
+Posting Date: September 22, 2014 [EBook #7514]
+Release Date: February, 2005
+First Posted: May 13, 2003
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LITTLE BOOK OF STOICISM ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Charles Franks, Ted Garvin, S. R. Ellison and
+the Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+A GUIDE TO STOICISM
+
+by St. George Stock
+
+
+
+TEN CENT POCKET SERIES NO. 347
+
+Edited by E. Haldeman-Julius.
+
+
+
+FOREWORD
+
+If you strip Stoicism of its paradoxes and its wilful misuse of
+language, what is left is simply the moral philosophy of Socrates,
+Plato and Aristotle, dashed with the physics of Heraclitus. Stoicism
+was not so much a new doctrine as the form under which the old Greek
+philosophy finally presented itself to the world at large. It owed
+its popularity in some measure to its extravagance. A great deal
+might be said about Stoicism as a religion and about the part it
+played in the formation of Christianity but these subjects were
+excluded by the plan of this volume which was to present a sketch of
+the Stoic doctrine based on the original authorities.
+
+    ST GEORGE STOCK M A
+        _Pemb. Coll. Oxford_
+
+
+
+       A GUIDE TO STOICISM.
+
+         ST GEORGE STOCK
+
+
+PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE GREEKS AND ROMANS.
+
+Among the Greeks and Romans of the classical age philosophy occupied
+the place taken by religion among ourselves. Their appeal was to
+reason not to revelation. To what, asks Cicero in his Offices, are we
+to look for training in virtue, if not to philosophy? Now, if truth
+is believed to rest upon authority it is natural that it should be
+impressed upon the mind from the earliest age, since the essential
+thing is that it should be believed, but a truth which makes its
+appeal to reason must be content to wait till reason is developed. We
+are born into the Eastern, Western or Anglican communion or some
+other denomination, but it was of his own free choice that the
+serious minded young Greek or Roman embraced the tenets of one of the
+great sects which divided the world of philosophy. The motive which
+led him to do so in the first instance may have been merely the
+influence of a friend or a discourse from some eloquent speaker, but
+the choice once made was his own choice, and he adhered to it as
+such. Conversions from one sect to another were of quite rare
+occurrence. A certain Dionysius of Heraclea, who went over from the
+Stoics to the Cyrenaics, was ever afterward known as "the deserter."
+It was as difficult to be independent in philosophy as it is with us
+to be independent in politics. When a young man joined a school, he
+committed himself to all its opinions, not only as to the end of
+life, which was the main point of division, but as to all questions
+on all subjects. The Stoic did not differ merely in his ethics from
+the Epicurean; he differed also in his theology and his physics and
+his metaphysics. Aristotle, as Shakespeare knew, thought young men
+"unfit to hear moral philosophy". And yet it was a question--or
+rather the question--of moral philosophy, the answer to which decided
+the young man's opinions on all other points. The language which
+Cicero sometimes uses about the seriousness of the choice made in
+early life and how a young man gets entrammelled by a school before
+he is really able to judge, reminds us of what we hear said nowadays
+about the danger of a young man's taking orders before his opinions
+are formed. To this it was replied that a young man only exercised
+the right of private judgment in selecting the authority whom he
+should follow, and, having once done that, trusted to him for all the
+rest. With the analogue of this contention also we are familiar in
+modern times. Cicero allows that there would be something in it, if
+the selection of the true philosopher did not above all things
+require the philosophic mind. But in those days it was probably the
+case, as it is now, that, if a man did not form speculative opinions
+in youth, the pressure of affairs would not leave him leisure to do
+so later.
+
+The life span of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was from B.C. 347 to
+275. He did not begin teaching till 315, at the mature age of forty.
+Aristotle had passed away in 322, and with him closed the great
+constructive era of Greek thought. The Ionian philosophers had
+speculated on the physical constitution of the universe, the
+Pythagoreans on the mystical properties of numbers; Heraclitus had
+propounded his philosophy of fire, Democritus and Leucippus had
+struck out a rude form of the atomic theory, Socrates had raised
+questions relating to man, Plato had discussed them with all the
+freedom of the dialogue, while Aristotle had systematically worked
+them out. The later schools did not add much to the body of
+philosophy. What they did was to emphasize different sides of the
+doctrine of their predecessors and to drive views to their logical
+consequences. The great lesson of Greek philosophy is that it is
+worth while to do right irrespective of reward and punishment and
+regardless of the shortness of life. This lesson the Stoics so
+enforced by the earnestness of their lives and the influence of their
+moral teaching that it has become associated more particularly with
+them. Cicero, though he always classed himself as an Academic,
+exclaims in one place that he is afraid the Stoics are the only
+philosophers, and whenever he is combating Epicureanism his language
+is that of a Stoic. Some of Vergil's most eloquent passages seem to
+be inspired by Stoic speculation. Even Horace, despite his banter
+about the sage, in his serious moods borrows the language of the
+Stoics. It was they who inspired the highest flights of declamatory
+eloquence in Persius and Juvenal. Their moral philosophy affected the
+world through Roman law, the great masters of which were brought up
+under its influence. So all pervasive indeed was this moral
+philosophy of the Stoics that it was read by the Jews of Alexandria
+into Moses under the veil of allegory and was declared to be the
+inner meaning of the Hebrew Scriptures. If the Stoics then did not
+add much to the body of Philosophy, they did a great work in
+popularising it and bringing it to bear upon life.
+
+An intense practicality was a mark of the later Greek philosophy.
+This was common to Stoicism with its rival Epicureanism. Both
+regarded philosophy as 'the art of life,' though they differed in
+their conception of what that art should be. Widely as the two
+schools were opposed to one another, they had also other features in
+common. Both were children of an age in which the free city had given
+way to monarchies, and personal had taken the place of corporate
+life. The question of happiness is no longer, as with Aristotle, and
+still more with Plato, one for the state, but for the individual. In
+both schools the speculative interest was feeble from the first, and
+tended to become feebler as time went on. Both were new departures
+from pre-existent schools. Stoicism was bred out of Cynicism, as
+Epicureanism out of Cyrenaicism. Both were content to fall back for
+their physics upon the pre-Socratic schools, the one adopting the
+firm philosophy of Heraclitus, the other the atomic theory of
+Democritus. Both were in strong reaction against the abstractions of
+Plato and Aristotle, and would tolerate nothing but concrete reality.
+The Stoics were quite as materialistic in their own way as the
+Epicureans. With regard indeed to the nature of the highest god we
+may, with Senaca represent the difference between the two schools as
+a question of the senses against the intellect, but we shall see
+presently that the Stoics regarded the intellect itself as being a
+kind of body.
+
+The Greeks were all agreed that there was an end or aim of life, and
+that it was to be called 'happiness,' but at that point their
+agreement ended. As to the nature of happiness there was the utmost
+variety of opinion. Democritus had made it consist in mental
+serenity, Anaxagoras in speculation, Socrates in wisdom, Aristotle in
+the practise of virtue with some amount of favour from fortune,
+Aristippus simply in pleasure. These were opinions of the
+philosophers. But, besides these, there were the opinions of ordinary
+men, as shown by their lives rather than by their language. Zeno's
+contribution to thought on the subject does not at first sight appear
+illuminating. He said that the end was 'to live consistently,' the
+implication doubtless being that no life but the passionless life of
+reason could ultimately be consistent with itself. Cleanthes, his
+immediate successor in the school, is credited with having added the
+words 'with nature,' thus completing the well-known Stoic formula
+that the end is 'to live consistently with nature.'
+
+It was assumed by the Greeks that the ways of nature were 'the ways
+of pleasantness,' and that 'all her paths' were 'peace.' This may
+seem to us a startling assumption, but that is because we do not mean
+by 'nature' the same thing as they did. We connect the term with the
+origin of a thing, they connected it rather with the end; by the
+'natural state' we mean a state of savagery, they meant the highest
+civilization; we mean by a thing's nature what it is or has been,
+they meant what it ought to become under the most favourable
+conditions; not the sour crab, but the mellow glory of the Hesperides
+worthy to be guarded by a sleepless dragon, was to the Greeks the
+natural apple. Hence we find Aristotle maintaining that the State is
+a natural product, because it is evolved out of social relations
+which exist by nature. Nature indeed was a highly ambiguous term to
+the Greeks no less than to ourselves, but in the sense with which we
+are now concerned, the nature of anything was defined by the
+Peripatetics as 'the end of its becoming.' Another definition of
+theirs puts the matter still more clearly. 'What each thing is when
+its growth has been completed, that we declare to be the nature of
+each thing'.
+
+Following out this conception the Stoics identified a life in
+accordance with nature with a life in accordance with the highest
+perfection to which man could attain. Now, as man was essentially a
+rational animal, his work as man lay in living the rational life. And
+the perfection of reason was virtue. Hence the ways of nature were no
+other than the ways of virtue. And so it came about that the Stoic
+formula might be expressed in a number of different ways which yet
+all amounted to the same thing. The end was to live the virtuous
+life, or to live consistently, or to live in accordance with nature,
+or to live rationally.
+
+
+DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+Philosophy was defined by the Stoics as 'the knowledge of things
+divine and human'. It was divided into three departments; logic,
+ethic, and physic. This division indeed was in existence before their
+time, but they have got the credit of it as of some other things
+which they did not originate. Neither was it confined to them, but
+was part of the common stock of thought. Even the Epicureans, who are
+said to have rejected logic can hardly be counted as dissentients
+from this threefold division. For what they did was to substitute for
+the Stoic logic a logic of their own, dealing with the notions
+derived from sense, much in the same way as Bacon substituted his
+Novum Organum for the Organon of Aristotle. Cleanthes we are told
+recognised six parts of philosophy, namely, dialectic, rhetoric,
+ethic, politic, physic, and theology, but these are obviously the
+result of subdivision of the primary ones. Of the three departments
+we may say that logic deals with the form and expression of
+knowledge, physic with the matter of knowledge, and ethic with the
+use of knowledge. The division may also be justified in this way.
+Philosophy must study either nature (including the divine nature) or
+man; and, if it studies man, it must regard him either from the side
+of the intellect or of the feelings, that is either as a thinking
+(logic) or as an acting (ethic) being.
+
+As to the order in which the different departments should be studied,
+we have had preserved to us the actual words of Chrysippus in his
+fourth book on Lives. 'First of all then it seems to me that, as has
+been rightly said by the ancients, there are three heads under which
+the speculations of the philosopher fall, logic, ethic, physic; next,
+that of these the logical should come first, the ethical second, and
+the physical third, and that of the physical the treatment of the
+gods should come last, whence also they have given the name of
+"completions" to the instruction delivered on this subject'. That
+this order however might yield to convenience is plain from another
+book on the use of reason, where he says that 'the student who takes
+up logic first need not entirely abstain from the other branches of
+philosophy, but should study them also as occasion offers.'
+
+Plutarch twits Chrysippus with inconsistency, because in the face of
+this declaration as to the order of treatment, he nevertheless says
+that morals rest upon physics. But to this charge it may fairly be
+replied that the order of exposition need not coincide with the order
+of existence. Metaphysically speaking, morals may depend upon physics
+and the right conduct of man be deducible from the structure of the
+universe but for all that, it may be advisable to study physics
+later. Physics meant the nature of God and the Universe. Our nature
+may be deducible from that but it is better known to ourselves to
+start with, so that it may be well to begin from the end of the stick
+that we have in our hands. But that Chrysippus did teach the logical
+dependence of morals on physics is plain from his own words. In his
+third book on the Gods he says 'for it is not possible to find any
+other origin of justice or mode of its generation save that from Zeus
+and the nature of the universe for anything we have to say about good
+and evil must needs derive its origin therefrom', and again in his
+Physical Theses, 'for there is no other or more appropriate way of
+approaching the subject of good and evil on the virtues or happiness
+than from the nature of all things and the administration of the
+universe--for it is to these we must attach the treatment of good and
+evil inasmuch as there is no better origin to which we can refer them
+and inasmuch as physical speculation is taken in solely with a view
+to the distinction between good and evil.'
+
+The last words are worth noting as showing that even with Chrysippus
+who has been called the intellectual founder of Stoicism the whole
+stress of the philosophy of the Porch fell upon its moral teaching.
+It was a favourite metaphor with the school to compare philosophy to
+a fertile vineyard or orchard. Ethic was the good fruit, physic the
+tall plants, and logic the strong wall. The wall existed only to
+guard the trees, and the trees only to produce the fruit. Or again
+philosophy was likened to an egg of which ethic was the yolk
+containing the chick, physic the white which formed its nourishment
+while logic was the hard outside shell. Posidonius, a later member of
+the school, objected to the metaphor from the vineyard on the ground
+that the fruit and the trees and the wall were all separable whereas
+the parts of philosophy were inseparable. He preferred therefore to
+liken it to a living organism, logic being the bones and sinews,
+physic the flesh and blood, but ethic the soul.
+
+
+LOGIC
+
+The Stoics had a tremendous reputation for logic. In this department
+they were the successors or rather the supersessors of Aristotle. For
+after the death of Theophrastus the library of the Lyceum is said to
+have been buried underground at Scepsis until about a century before
+Christ, So that the Organon may actually have been lost to the world
+during that period. At all events under Strato the successor of
+Theophrastus who specialized in natural science the school had lost
+its comprehensiveness. Cicero even finds it consonant with dramatic
+propriety to make Cato charge the later Peripatetics with ignorance
+of logic! On the other hand Chrysippus became so famous for his logic
+as to create a general impression that if there were a logic among
+the gods it would be no other than the Chrysippean.
+
+But if the Stoics were strong in logic they were weak in rhetoric.
+This strength and weakness were characteristic of the school at all
+periods. Cato is the only Roman Stoic to whom Cicero accords the
+praise of real eloquence. In the dying accents of the school as we
+hear them in Marcus Aurelius the imperial sage counts it a thing to
+be thankful for that he had learnt to abstain from rhetoric, poetic,
+and elegance of diction. The reader however cannot help wishing that
+he had taken some means to diminish the crabbedness of his style. If
+a lesson were wanted in the importance of sacrificing to the Graces
+it might be found in the fact that the early Stoic writers despite
+their logical subtlety have all perished and that their remains have
+to be sought for so largely in the pages of Cicero. In speaking of
+logic as one of the three departments of philosophy we must bear in
+mind that the term was one of much wider meaning than it is with us.
+It included rhetoric, poetic, and grammar as well as dialectic or
+logic proper, to say nothing of disquisitions on the senses and the
+intellect which we should now refer to psychology.
+
+Logic as a whole being divided into rhetoric and dialectic: rhetoric
+was defined to be the knowledge of how to speak well in expository
+discourses and dialectic as the knowledge of how to argue rightly in
+matters of question and answer. Both rhetoric and dialectic were
+spoken of by the Stoics as virtues for they divided virtue in its
+most generic sense in the same way as they divided philosophy into
+physical, ethical, and logical. Rhetoric and dialectic were thus the
+two species of logical virtue. Zeno expressed their difference by
+comparing rhetoric to the palm and dialectic to the fist.
+
+Instead of throwing in poetic and grammar with rhetoric, the Stoics
+subdivided dialectic into the part which dealt with the meaning and
+the part which dealt with the sound, or as Chrysippus phrased it,
+concerning significants and significates. Under the former came the
+treatment of the alphabet, of the parts of speech, of solecism, of
+barbarism, of poems, of amphibolies, of metre and music--a list which
+seems at first sight a little mixed, but in which we can recognise
+the general features of grammar, with its departments of phonology,
+accidence, and prosody. The treatment of solecism and barbarism in
+grammar corresponded to that of fallacies in logic. With regard to
+the alphabet it is worth noting that the Stoics recognised seven
+vowels and six mutes. This is more correct than our way of talking of
+nine mutes, since the aspirate consonants are plainly not mute. There
+were, according to the Stoics, five parts of speech--name,
+appellative, verb, conjunction, article. 'Name' meant a proper name,
+and 'appellative' a common term.
+
+There were reckoned to be five virtues of speech--Hellenism,
+clearness, conciseness, propriety, distinction. By 'Hellenism' was
+meant speaking good Greek. 'Distinction' was defined to be 'a diction
+which avoided homeliness.' Over against these there were two
+comprehensive vices, barbarism and solecism, the one being an offence
+against accidence, the other against syntax.
+
+The famous comparison of the infant mind to a blank sheet of paper,
+which we connect so closely with the name of Locke, really comes from
+the Stoics. The earliest characters inscribed upon it were the
+impressions of sense, which the Greeks called "phantasies." A
+phantasy was defined by Zeno as "an impression in the soul."
+Cleanthes was content to take this definition in its literal sense,
+and believe that the soul was impressed by external objects as wax by
+a signet ring. Chrysippus, however, found a difficulty here, and
+preferred to interpret the Master's saying to mean an alteration or
+change in the soul. He figured to himself the soul as receiving a
+modification from every external object which acts upon it just as
+the air receives countless strokes when many people are speaking at
+once. Further, he declared that in receiving an impression the soul
+was purely passive and that the phantasy revealed not only its own
+existence, but that also of its cause, just as light displays itself
+and the things that are in it. Thus, when through sight we receive an
+impression of white, an affection takes place in the soul, in virtue
+whereof we are able to say that there exists a white object affecting
+us. The power to name the object resides in the understanding. First
+must come the phantasy, and the understanding, having the power of
+utterance, expresses in speech the affection it receives from the
+object. The cause of the phantasy was called the "phantast," _e.
+g._ the white or cold object. If there is no external cause, then
+the supposed object of the impression was a "phantasm," such as a
+figure in a dream, or the Furies whom Orestes sees in his frenzy.
+
+How then was the impression which had reality behind it to be
+distinguished from that which had not? "By the feel" is all that the
+Stoics really had to say in answer to this question. Just as Hume
+made the difference between sense-impressions and ideas to lie in the
+greater vividness of the former, so did they; only Hume saw no
+necessity to go beyond the impression, whereas the Stoics did.
+Certain impressions, they maintained, carried with them an
+irresistible conviction of their own reality, and this, not merely in
+the sense that they existed; but also that they were referable to an
+external cause. These were called "gripping phantasies." Such a
+phantasy did not need proof of its own existence, or of that of its
+object. It possessed self-evidence. Its occurrence was attended with
+yielding and assent on the part of the soul. For it is as natural for
+the soul to assent to the self-evident as it is for it to pursue its
+proper good. The assent to a griping phantasy was called
+"comprehension," as indicating the firm hold that the soul thus took
+of reality. A gripping phantasy was defined as one which was stamped
+and impressed from an existing object, in virtue of that object
+itself, in such a way as it could not be from a non-existent object.
+The clause "in virtue of that object itself" was put into the
+definition to provide against such a case as that of the mad Orestes,
+who takes his sister to be a Fury. There the impression was derived
+from an existing object, but not from that object as such, but as
+coloured by the imagination of the percipient.
+
+The criterion of truth then was no other than the gripping phantasy.
+Such at least was the doctrine of the earlier Stoics, but the later
+added a saving clause, "when there is no impediment." For they were
+pressed by their opponents with such imaginary cases as that of
+Admetus, seeing his wife before him in very deed, and yet not
+believing it to be her. But here there was an impediment. Admetus did
+not believe that the dead could rise. Again Menelaus did not believe
+in the real Helen when he found her on the island of Pharos. But here
+again there was an impediment. For Menelaus could not have been
+expected to know that he had been for ten years fighting for a
+phantom. When, however, there was no such impediment, then they said
+the gripping phantasy did indeed deserve its name, for it almost took
+men by the hair of the head and dragged them to assent.
+
+So far we have used "phantasy" only of real or imaginary impressions
+of sense. But the term was not thus restricted by the Stoics, who
+divided phantasies into sensible and not sensible. The latter came
+through the understanding and were of bodiless things which could
+only be grasped by reason. The ideas of Plato they declared existed
+only in our minds. Horse, man, and animal had no substantial
+existence but were phantasms of the soul. The Stoics were thus what
+we should call Conceptualists.
+
+Comprehension too was used in a wider sense than that in which we
+have so far employed it. There was comprehension by the senses as of
+white and black, of rough and smooth, but there was also
+comprehension by the reason of demonstrative conclusions such as that
+the gods exist and that they exercise providence. Here we are
+reminded of Locke's declaration: "'Tis as certain there's a God as
+that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight
+lines are equal." The Stoics indeed had great affinities with that
+thinker or rather he with them. The Stoic account of the manner in
+which the mind arrives at its ideas might almost be taken from the
+first book of Locke's _Essay_. As many as nine ways are
+enumerated of which the first corresponds to simple ideas--
+
+(1) by presentation, as objects of sense
+
+(2) by likeness, as the idea of Socrates from his picture
+
+(3) by analogy, that is, by increase or decrease, as ideas of giants
+and pigmies from men, or as the notion of the centre of the earth,
+which is reached by the consideration of smaller spheres.
+
+(4) by transposition, as the idea of men with eyes in their breasts.
+
+(5) by composition, as the idea of a Centaur.
+
+(6) by opposition, as the idea of death from that of life.
+
+(7) by a kind of transition, as the meaning of words and the idea of
+place.
+
+(8)by nature, as the notion of the just and the good
+
+(9)by privation, as handless
+
+The Stoics resembled Locke again in endeavoring to give such a
+definition of knowledge as should cover at once the reports of the
+senses and the relation between ideas. Knowledge was defined by them
+as a sure comprehension or a habit in the acceptance of phantasies
+which was not liable to be changed by reason. On a first hearing
+these definitions might seem limited to sense knowledge but if we
+bethink ourselves of the wider meanings of comprehension and of
+phantasy, we see that the definitions apply as they were meant to
+apply to the mind's grasp upon the force of a demonstration no less
+than upon the existence of a physical object.
+
+Zeno, with that touch of oriental symbolism which characterized him,
+used to illustrate to his disciples the steps to knowledge by means
+of gestures. Displaying his right hand with the fingers outstretched
+he would say, "That is a phantasy," then contracting the fingers a
+little, "That is assent," then having closed the fist, "That is
+comprehension," then clasping the fist closely with the left hand, he
+would add, "That is knowledge."
+
+A notion which corresponds to our word concept was defined as a
+phantasm of the understanding of a rational animal. For a notion was
+but a phantasm as it presented itself to a rational mind. In the same
+way so many shillings and sovereigns are in themselves but shillings
+and sovereigns, but when used as passage money they become fare.
+Notions were arrived at partly by nature, partly by teaching and
+study. The former kind of notions were called preconceptions; the
+latter went merely by the generic name.
+
+Out of the general ideas which nature imparts to us, reason was
+perfected about the age of fourteen, at the time when the voice--its
+outward and visible sign--attains its full development, and when the
+human animal is complete in other respects as being able to reproduce
+its kind. Thus reason which united us to the gods was not, according
+to the Stoics, a pre-existent principal, but a gradual development
+out of sense. It might truly be said that with them the senses were
+the intellect.
+
+Being was confined by the Stoics to body, a bold assertion of which
+we shall meet the consequences later. At present it is sufficient to
+notice what havoc it makes among the categories. Of Aristotle's ten
+categories it leaves only the first, Substance, and that only in its
+narrowest sense of Primary Substance. But a substance or body might
+be regarded in four ways--
+
+  (1) simply as a body
+  (2) as a body of a particular kind
+  (3) as a body in a particular state
+  (4) as a body in a particular relation.
+
+Hence result the four Stoic categories of--
+
+    substrates
+    suchlike
+    so disposed
+    so related
+
+But the bodiless would not be thus conjured out of existence. For
+what was to be made of such things as the meaning of words, time,
+place, and the infinite void? Even the Stoics did not assign body to
+these, and yet they had to be recognized and spoken of. The
+difficulty was got over by the invention of the higher category of
+somewhat, which should include both body and the bodiless. Time was a
+somewhat, and so was space, though neither of them possessed being.
+
+In the Stoic treatment of the proposition, grammar was very much
+mixed up with logic. They had a wide name which applied to any part
+of diction, whether a word or words, a sentence, or even a syllogism.
+This we shall render by "dict." A dict, then, was defined as "that
+which subsists in correspondence with a rational phantasy." A dict
+was one of the things which the Stoics admitted to be devoid of body.
+There were three things involved when anything was said--the sound,
+the sense, and the external object. Of these the first and the last
+were bodies, but the intermediate one was not a body. This we may
+illustrate after Seneca, as follows: "You see Cato walking. What your
+eyes see and your mind attends to is a body in motion. Then you say,
+'Cato is walking'." The mere sound indeed of these words is air in
+motion and therefore a body but the meaning of them is not a body but
+an enouncement about a body, which is quite a different thing.
+
+On examining such details as are left us of the Stoic logic, the
+first thing which strikes one is its extreme complexity as compared
+with the Aristotelian. It was a scholastic age, and the Stoics
+refined and distinguished to their hearts' content. As regards
+immediate inference, a subject which has been run into subtleties
+among ourselves, Chrysippus estimated that the changes which could be
+rung on ten propositions exceeded a million, but for this assertion
+he was taken to task by Hipparchus the mathematician, who proved that
+the affirmative proposition yielded exactly 103,049 forms and the
+negative 310,962. With us the affirmative proposition is more
+prolific in consequences than the negative. But then, the Stoics were
+not content with so simple a thing as mere negation, but had negative
+arnetic and privative, to say nothing of supernegative propositions.
+Another noticeable feature is the total absence of the three figures
+of Aristotle and the only moods spoken of are the moods of the
+complex syllogism, such as the _modus penens_ in a conjunctive.
+Their type of reasoning was--
+
+  If A, then B
+  But A
+  B
+
+The important part played by conjunctive propositions in their logic
+led the Stoics to formulate the following rule with regard to the
+material quality of such propositions: Truth can only be followed by
+truth, but falsehood may be followed by falsehood or truth.
+
+Thus if it be truly stated that it is day, any consequence of that
+statement, _e.g._ that it is light, must be true also. But a
+false statement may lead either way. For instance, if it be falsely
+stated that it is night then the consequence that it is dark is false
+also. But if we say, "The earth flies," which was regarded as not
+only false but impossible [Footnote: Here we may recall the warning
+of Arago to call nothing impossible outside the range of pure
+mathematics] this involves the true consequence that the earth is.
+Though the simple syllogism is not alluded to in the sketch which
+Diogenes Laertius gives of the Stoic logic, it is of frequent
+occurrence in the accounts left us of their arguments. Take for
+instance the syllogism wherewith Zeno advocated the cause of
+temperance--
+
+  One does not commit a secret to a man who is drunk.
+  One does commit a secret to a good man.
+  A good man will not get drunk.
+
+The chain argument which we wrongly call the Sorites was also a
+favorite resource with the Stoics. If a single syllogism did not
+suffice to argue men into virtue surely a condensed series must be
+effectual. And so they demonstrated the sufficiency of wisdom for
+happiness as follows----
+
+  The wise man is temperate
+  The temperate is constant
+  The constant is unperturbed
+  The unperturbed is free from sorrow
+  Whoso is free from sorrow is happy
+  The wise man is happy
+
+The delight which the early Stoics took in this pure play of the
+intellect led them to pounce with avidity upon the abundant stock of
+fallacies current among the Greeks of their time. These seem--most of
+them--to have been invented by the Megarians and especially by
+Eubulides of Miletus a disciple of Eucleides but they became
+associated with the Stoics both by friends and foes who either praise
+their subtlety or deride their solemnity in dealing with them.
+Chrysippus himself was not above propounding such sophisms as the
+following--
+
+  Whoever divulges the mysteries to the uninitiated commits impiety
+  The hierophant divulged the mysteries to the uninitiated
+  The hierophant commits impiety
+
+  Anything that you say passes through your mouth
+  You say a wagon
+  A wagon passes through your mouth
+
+He is said to have written eleven books on the No-one fallacy. But
+what seems to have exercised most of his ingenuity was the famous
+Liar, the invention of which is ascribed to Eubulides. This fallacy
+in its simplest form is as follows. If you say truly that you are
+telling a lie, are you lying or telling the truth? Chrysippus set
+this down as inexplicable. Nevertheless he was far from declining to
+discuss it. For we find in the list of his works a treatise in five
+books on the Inexplicables an Introduction to the Liar and Liars for
+Introduction, six books on the Liar itself, a work directed against
+those who thought that such propositions were both false and true,
+another against those who professed to solve the Liar by a process of
+division, three books on the solution of the Liar, and finally a
+polemic against those who asserted that the Liar had its premises
+false. It was well for poor Philetas of Cos that he ended his days
+before Chrysippus was born, though as it was he grew thin and died of
+the Liar, and his epitaph served as a solemn reminder to poets not to
+meddle with logic--
+
+    Philetas of Cos am I
+    'Twas the Liar who made me die
+    And the bad nights caused thereby.
+
+Perhaps we owe him an apology for the translation.
+
+
+ETHIC
+
+We have already had to touch upon the psychology of the Stoics in
+connection with the first principles of logic. It is no less
+necessary to do so now in dealing with the foundation of ethic.
+
+The Stoics we are told reckoned that there were eight parts of the
+soul. These were the five senses, the organ of sound, the intellect
+and the reproductive principle. The passions, it will be observed,
+are conspicuous by their absence. For the Stoic theory was that the
+passions were simply the intellect in a diseased state owing to the
+perversions of falsehood. This is why the Stoics would not parley
+with passion, conceiving that if once it were let into the citadel of
+the soul it would supplant the rightful ruler. Passion and reason
+were not two things which could be kept separate in which case it
+might be hoped that reason would control passion, but were two states
+of the same thing--a worse and a better.
+
+The unperturbed intellect was the legitimate monarch in the kingdom
+of man. Hence the Stoics commonly spoke of it as the leading
+principle. This was the part of the soul which received phantasies
+and it was also that in which impulses were generated with which we
+have now more particularly to do.
+
+Impulse or appetition was the principle in the soul which impelled to
+action. In an unperverted state it was directed only to things in
+accordance with nature. The negative form of this principle or the
+avoidance of things as being contrary to nature, we shall call
+repulsion.
+
+Notwithstanding the sublime heights to which Stoic morality rose. It
+was professedly based on self-love, wherein the Stoics were at one
+with the other schools of thought in the ancient world.
+
+The earliest impulse that appeared in a newly born animal was to
+protect itself and its own constitution which were conciliated to it
+by nature. What tended to its survival, it sought; what tended to its
+destruction, it shunned. Thus self-preservation was the first law of
+life.
+
+While man was still in the merely animal stage, and before reason was
+developed in him, the things that were in accordance with his nature
+were such as health, strength, good bodily condition, soundness of
+all the senses, beauty, swiftness--in short all the qualities that
+went to make up richness of physical life and that contributed to the
+vital harmony. These were called the first things in accordance with
+nature. Their opposites were all contrary to nature, such as
+sickness, weakness, mutilation. Under the first things in accordance
+with nature came also congenial advantages of soul such as quickness
+of intelligence, natural ability, industry, application, memory, and
+the like. It was a question whether pleasure was to be included among
+the number. Some members of the school evidently thought that it might
+be, but the orthodox opinion was that pleasure was a sort of
+aftergrowth and that the direct pursuit of it was deleterious to the
+organism. The after growths of virtue were joy, cheerfulness, and the
+like. These were the gambolings of the spirit like the frolicsomeness
+of an animal in the full flush of its vitality or like the blooming
+of a plant. For one and the same power manifested itself in all ranks
+of nature, only at each stage on a higher level. To the vegetative
+powers of the plant the animal added sense and Impulse. It was in
+accordance therefore with the nature of an animal to obey the
+Impulses of sense, but to sense and Impulse man superadded reason so
+that when he became conscious of himself as a rational being, it was
+in accordance with his nature to let all his Impulses be shaped by
+this new and master hand. Virtue was therefore pre-eminently in
+accordance with nature. What then we must now ask is the relation of
+reason to impulse as conceived by the Stoics? Is reason simply the
+guiding, and impulse the motive power? Seneca protests against this
+view, when impulse is identified with passion. One of his grounds for
+doing so is that reason would be put on a level with passion, if the
+two were equally necessary for action. But the question is begged by
+the use of the word 'passion,' which was defined by the Stoics as 'an
+excessive impulse.' Is it possible then, even on Stoic principles,
+for reason to work without something different from itself to help
+it? Or must we say that reason is itself a principle of action? Here
+Plutarch comes to our aid, who tells us on the authority of
+Chrysippus in his work on Law that impulse is 'the reason of man
+commanding him to act,' and similarly that repulsion is 'prohibitive
+reason.' This renders the Stoic position unmistakable, and we must
+accomodate our minds to it in spite of its difficulties. Just as we
+have seen already that reason is not something radically different
+from sense, so now it appears that reason is not different from
+impulse, but itself the perfected form of impulse. Whenever impulse
+is not identical with reason--at least in a rational being--it is not
+truly impulse, but passion.
+
+The Stoics, it will be observed, were Evolutionists in their
+psychology. But, like many Evolutionists at the present day, they did
+not believe in the origin of mind out of matter. In all living things
+there existed already what they called 'seminal reasons,' which
+accounted for the intelligence displayed by plants as well as by
+animals. As there were four cardinal virtues, so there were four
+primary passions. These were delight, grief, desire and fear. All of
+them were excited by the presence or the prospect of fancied good or
+ill. What prompted desire by its prospect caused delight by its
+presence, and what prompted fear by its prospect caused grief by its
+presence. Thus two of the primary passions had to do with good and
+two with evil. All were furies which infested the life of fools,
+rendering it bitter and grievous to them; and it was the business of
+philosophy to fight against them. Nor was this strife a hopeless one,
+since the passions were not grounded in nature, but were due to false
+opinion. They originated in voluntary judgements, and owed their
+birth to a lack of mental sobriety. If men wished to live the span of
+life that was allotted to them in quietness and peace, they must by
+all means keep clear of the passions.
+
+The four primary passions having been formulated, it became necessary
+to justify the division by arranging the specific forms of feeling
+under these four heads. In this task the Stoics displayed a subtlety
+which is of more interest to the lexicographer than to the student of
+philosophy. They laid great stress on the derivation of words as
+affording a clue to their meaning; and, as their etymology was bound
+by no principles, their ingenuity was free to indulge in the wildest
+freaks of fancy.
+
+Though all passion stood self-condemned, there were nevertheless
+certain 'eupathies,' or happy affections, which would be experienced
+by the ideally good and wise man. These were not perturbations of the
+soul, but rather 'constancies'; they were not opposed to reason, but
+were rather part of reason. Though the sage would never be
+transported with delight, he would still feel an abiding 'joy' in the
+presence of the true and only good; he would never indeed be agitated
+by desire, but still he would be animated by 'wish,' for that was
+directed only to the good; and though he would never feel fear still
+he would be actuated in danger by a proper caution.
+
+There was therefore something rational corresponding to three out of
+four primary passions--against delight was to be set joy; against
+grief there was nothing to be set, for that arose from the presence
+of ill which would rather never attach to the sage. Grief was the
+irrational conviction that one ought to afflict oneself where there
+was no occasion for it. The ideal of the Stoics was the unclouded
+serenity of Socrates of whom Xanthippe declared that he had always
+the same face whether on leaving the house In the morning or on
+returning to it at night.
+
+As the motley crowd of passions followed the banners of their four
+leaders so specific forms of feeling sanctioned by reason were
+severally assigned to the three eupathies.
+
+Things were divided by Zeno into good, bad, and indifferent. To good
+belonged virtue and what partook of virtue; to bad, vice and what
+partook of vice. All other things were indifferent.
+
+To the third class then belonged such things as life and death,
+health and sickness, pleasure and pain, beauty and ugliness, strength
+and weakness, honour and dishonour, wealth and poverty, victory and
+defeat, nobility and baseness of birth.
+
+Good was defined as that which benefits. To confer benefit was no
+less essential to good than to impart warmth was to heat. If one
+asked in what 'to benefit' lay one received the reply that it lay in
+producing an act or state in accordance with virtue, and similarly it
+was laid down that 'to hurt' lay in producing an act or state in
+accordance with vice.
+
+The indifference of things other than virtue and vice was apparent
+from the definition of good which made it essentially beneficial.
+Such things as health and wealth might be beneficial or not according
+to circumstances; they were therefore no more good than bad. Again,
+nothing could be really good of which the good or ill depended on the
+use made of it, but this was the case with things like health and
+wealth.
+
+The true and only good then was identical with what the Greeks called
+'the beautiful' and what we call 'the right'. To say that a thing was
+right was to say that it was good, and conversely to say that it was
+good was to say that it was right; this absolute identity between the
+good and the right and, on the other hand, between the bad and wrong,
+was the head and front of the Stoic ethics. The right contained in
+itself all that was necessary for the happy life, the wrong was the
+only evil, and made men miserable whether they knew it or not.
+
+As virtue was itself the end, it was of course choiceworthy in and
+for itself, apart from hope or fear with regard to its consequences.
+Moreover, as being the highest good, it could admit of no increase
+from the addition of things indifferent. It did not even admit of
+increase from the prolongation of its own existence, for the question
+was not one of quantity, but of quality. Virtue for an eternity was
+no more virtue, and therefore no more good, than virtue for a moment.
+Even so one circle was no more round than another, whatever you might
+choose to make its diameter, nor would it detract from the perfection
+of a circle if it were to be obliterated immediately in the same dust
+in which it had been drawn.
+
+To say that the good of men lay in virtue was another way of saying
+that it lay in reason, since virtue was the perfection of reason.
+
+As reason was the only thing whereby Nature had distinguished man
+from other creatures, to live the rational life was to follow Nature.
+
+Nature was at once the law of God and the law for man. For by the
+nature of anything was meant, not that which we actually find it to
+be, but that which in the eternal fitness of things it was obviously
+intended to become.
+
+To be happy then was to be virtuous, to be virtuous was to be
+rational, to be rational was to follow Nature, and to follow Nature
+was to obey God. Virtue imparted to life that even flow in which Zeno
+declared happiness to consist. This was attained when one's own
+genius was in harmony with the will that disposed of all things.
+
+Virtue having been purified from all the dross of the emotions, came
+out as something purely intellectual, so that the Stoics agreed with
+the Socratic conception that virtue is knowledge. They also took on
+from Plato the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Temperance, Courage,
+and Justice, and defined them as so many branches of knowledge.
+Against these were set four cardinal vices of Folly, Intemperance,
+Cowardice, and Injustice. Under both the virtues and vices there was
+an elaborate classification of specific qualities. But
+notwithstanding the care with which the Stoics divided and subdivided
+the virtues, virtue, according to their doctrine, was all the time
+one and indivisible. For virtue was simply reason and reason, if it
+were there, must control every department of conduct alike. 'He who
+has one virtue has all,' was a paradox with which the Greek thought
+was already familiar. But Chrysippus went beyond this, declaring that
+he who displayed one virtue did thereby display all. Neither was the
+man perfect who did not possess all the virtues, nor was the act
+perfect which did not involve them all. Where the virtues differed
+from one another was merely in the order in which they put things.
+Each was primarily itself, secondarily all the rest. Wisdom had to
+determine what it was right to do, but this involved the other
+virtues. Temperance had to impart stability to the impulses, but how
+could the term 'temperate' be applied to a man who deserted his post
+through cowardice, or who failed to return a deposit through avarice,
+which is a form of injustice, or yet to one who misconducted affairs
+through rashness, which falls under folly? Courage had to face
+dangers and difficulties, but it was not courage unless its cause
+were just. Indeed one of the ways in which courage was defined was a
+virtue fighting on behalf of justice. Similarly justice put first the
+assigning to each man his due, but in the act of doing so had to
+bring in the other virtues. In short, it was the business of the man
+of virtue to know and to do what ought to be done, for what ought to
+be done implied wisdom in choice, courage in endurance, justice in
+assignment and temperance in abiding by ones conviction. One virtue
+never acted by itself, but always on the advice of a committee. The
+obverse to this paradox--He who has one vice has all vices--was a
+conclusion which the Stoics did not shrink from drawing. One might
+lose part of one's Corinthian ware and still retain the rest, but to
+lose one virtue--if virtue could be lost--would be to lose all along
+with it.
+
+We have now encountered the first paradox of Stoicism, and can
+discern its origin in the identification of virtue with pure reason.
+In getting forth the novelties in Zeno's teaching, Cicero mentions
+that, while his predecessors had recognized virtues due to nature and
+habit, he made all dependent upon reason. A natural consequence of
+this was the reassertion of the position which Plato held or wished
+to hold, namely, that virtue can be taught. But the part played by
+nature in virtue cannot be ignored. It was not in the power of Zeno
+to alter facts. All he could do was to legislate as to names. And
+this he did vigorously. Nothing was to be called virtue which was not
+of the nature of reason and knowledge, but still it had to be
+admitted that nature supplied the starting points for the four
+cardinal virtues--for the discovery of one's impulses, for right
+endurances and harmonious distributions.
+
+From things good and bad we now turn to things indifferent. Hitherto
+the Stoic doctrine has been stern and uncompromising. We have now to
+look at it under a different aspect, and to see how it tried to
+conciliate common sense.
+
+By things indifferent were meant such as did not necessarily
+contribute to virtue, for instance health, wealth, strength, and
+honor. It is possible to have all these and not be virtuous, it is
+possible also to be virtuous without them. But we have now to learn
+that though these things are neither good nor evil, and are therefore
+not matter for choice or avoidance, they are far from being
+indifferent in the sense of arousing neither impulse nor repulsion.
+There are things indeed that are indifferent in the latter sense,
+such as whether you put out your finger this way or that, whether you
+stoop to pick up a straw or not, whether the number of hairs on your
+head be odd or even. But things of this sort are exceptional. The
+bulk of things other than virtue and vice do arouse in us either
+impulse or repulsion. Let it be understood then that there are two
+senses of the word indifferent--
+
+   (1) neither good nor bad
+   (2) neither awaking impulse nor repulsion
+
+Among things indifferent in the former sense, some were in accordance
+with nature, some were contrary to nature and some were neither one
+nor the other. Health, strengths and soundness of the senses were in
+accordance with nature; sickness weakness and mutilation were
+contrary to nature, but such things as the fallibility of the soul
+and the vulnerability of the body were neither in accordance with
+nature nor yet contrary to nature, but just nature.
+
+All things that were in accordance with nature had 'value' and all
+things that were contrary to nature had what we must call 'disvalue'.
+In the highest sense indeed of the term 'value'--namely that of
+absolute value or worth--things indifferent did not possess any value
+at all. But still there might be assigned to them what Antipater
+expressed by the term 'a selective value' or what he expressed by its
+barbarous privative, 'a disselective disvalue'. If a thing possessed
+a selective value you took that thing rather than its contrary,
+supposing that circumstances allowed, for instance, health rather
+than sickness, wealth rather than poverty, life rather than death.
+Hence such things were called takeable and their contraries
+untakeable. Things that possessed a high degree of value were called
+preferred, those that possessed a high degree of disvalue were called
+rejected. Such as possessed no considerable degree of either were
+neither preferred nor rejected. Zeno, with whom these names
+originated, justified their use about things really indifferent on
+the ground that at court "preferment" could not be bestowed upon the
+king himself, but only on his ministers.
+
+Things preferred and rejected might belong to mind, body or estate.
+Among things preferred in the case of the mind were natural ability,
+art, moral progress, and the like, while their contraries were
+rejected. In the case of the body, life, health, strength, good
+condition, completeness, and beauty were preferred, while death,
+sickness, weakness, ill condition, mutilation and ugliness were
+rejected. Among things external to soul and body, wealth, reputation,
+and nobility were preferred, while poverty, ill repute, and baseness
+of birth were rejected.
+
+In this way all mundane and marketable goods, after having been
+solemnly refused admittance by the Stoics at the front door, were
+smuggled in at a kind of tradesman's entrance under the name of
+things indifferent. We must now see how they had, as it were, two
+moral codes, one for the sage and the other for the world in general.
+
+The sage alone could act rightly, but other people might perform "the
+proprieties." Any one might honor his parents, but the sage alone did
+it as the outcome of wisdom, because he alone possessed the art of
+life, the peculiar work of which was to do everything that was done
+as the result of the best disposition. All the acts of the sage were
+"perfect proprieties," which were called "rightnesses." All acts of
+all other men were sins or "wrongnesses." At their best they could
+only be "intermediate proprieties." The term "propriety," then, is a
+generic one. But, as often happens, the generic term got determined
+in use to a specific meaning, so that intermediate acts are commonly
+spoken of as "proprieties" in opposition to "rightnesses." Instances
+of "rightnesses" are displaying wisdom and dealing justly, instances
+of proprieties or intermediate acts are marrying, going on an
+embassy, and dialectic.
+
+The word "duty" is often employed to translate the Greek term which
+we are rendering by "propriety." Any translation is no more than a
+choice of evils, since we have no real equivalent for the term. It
+was applicable not merely to human conduct, but also to the acting of
+the lower animals, and even to the growth of plants. Now, apart from
+a craze of generalization we should hardly think of the "stern
+daughter of the voice of God" in connection with an amoeba
+corresponding successfully to stimulus, yet the creature in its
+inchoate way is exhibiting a dim analogy to duty. The term in
+question was first used by Zeno, and was explained by him, in
+accordance with its etymology, to mean what it came to one to do, so
+that as far as this goes, 'becomingness' would be the most
+appropriate translation.
+
+The sphere of propriety was confined to things indifferent, so that
+there were proprieties which were common to the sage and the fool. It
+had to do with taking the things which were in accordance with nature
+and rejecting those that were not. Even the propriety of living or
+dying was determined, not by reference to virtue or vice, but to the
+preponderance or deficiency of things in accordance with nature. It
+might thus be a propriety for the sage in spite of his happiness, to
+depart from life of his own accord, and for the fool notwithstanding
+his misery, to remain in it. Life, being in itself indifferent, the
+whole question was one of opportunism. Wisdom might prompt the
+leaving herself should occasion seem to call for it.
+
+We pass on now another instance of accommodation. According to the
+high Stoic doctrine, there was no mean between virtue and vice. All
+men indeed received from nature the starting-points for virtue, but
+until perfection had been attained they rested under the condemnation
+of vice. It was, to employ an illustration of the poet-philosopher
+Cleanthes, as though Nature had begun an iambic line and left men to
+finish it. Until that was done they were to wear the fool's cap. The
+Peripatetics, on the other hand, recognized an intermediate state
+between virtue and vice, to which they gave the name of progress and
+proficience. Yet so entirely had the Stoics, for practical purposes,
+to accept this lower level, that the word "proficience" has come to
+be spoken of as though it were of Stoic origin.
+
+Seneca is fond of contrasting the sage with the proficient. The sage
+is like a man in the enjoyment of perfect health. But the proficient
+is like a man recovering from a severe illness, with whom an
+abatement of the paroxysm is equivalent to health, and who is always
+in danger of a relapse. It is the business of philosophy to provide
+for the needs of these weaker brethren. The proficient is still
+called a fool, but it is pointed out that he is a very different kind
+of fool from the rest. Further, proficients are arranged into three
+classes, in a way that reminds one of the technicalities of
+Calvinistic theology. First of all, there are those who are near
+wisdom, but, however near they may be to the door of Heaven, they are
+still on the wrong side of it. According to some doctors, these were
+already safe from backsliding, differing from the sage only in not
+having yet realized that they had attained to knowledge; other
+authorities, however, refused to admit this, and regarded the first
+class as being exempt only from settled diseases of the soul, but not
+from passing attacks of passion. Thus did the Stoics differ among
+themselves as to the doctrine of "final assurance". The second class
+consisted of those who had laid aside the worst diseases and passions
+of the soul, but might at any moment relapse into them. The third
+class was of those who had escaped one mental malady but not another;
+who had conquered lust, let us say, but not ambition; who disregarded
+death, but dreaded pain, This third class, adds Seneca, is by no
+means to be despised.
+
+From these concessions to the weakness of humanity we now pass to the
+Stoic paradoxes, where we shall see their doctrine in its full rigor.
+It is perhaps these very paradoxes which account for the puzzled
+fascination with which Stoicism affected the mind of antiquity, just
+as obscurity in a poet may prove a surer passport to fame than more
+strictly poetical merits.
+
+The root of Stoicism being a paradox, it is not surprising that the
+offshoots should be so too. To say that "Virtue is the highest good"
+is a proposition to which every one who aspires to the spiritual life
+must yield assent with his lips, even if he has not yet learned to
+believe it in his heart. But alter it into "Virtue is the only good"
+and by that slight change it becomes at once the teeming mother of
+paradoxes. By a paradox is meant that which runs counter to general
+opinion. Now it is quite certain that men have regarded, do regard,
+and, we may safely add will regard things as good which are not
+virtue. But if we grant this initial paradox, a great many others
+will follow along with it--as for instance that "Virtue is sufficient
+of itself for happiness". The fifth book of Cicero's _Tusculan
+Disputations_ is an eloquent defense of this thesis, in which the
+orator combats the suggestion that a good man is not happy when he is
+being broken on the wheel.
+
+Another glaring paradox of the Stoics is that "All faults are equal".
+They took their stand upon a mathematical conception of rectitude. An
+angle must be either a right angle or not, a line must be either
+straight or crooked, so an act must be either right or wrong. There
+is no mean between the two and there are no degrees of either. To sin
+is to cross the line. When once that has been done it makes no
+difference to the offense how far you go. Trespassing at all is
+forbidden. This doctrine was defended by the Stoics on account of its
+bracing moral effect as showing the heinousness of sin. Horace gives
+the judgment of the world in saying that common sense and morality,
+to say nothing of utility, revolt against it.
+
+Here are some other specimens of the Stoic paradoxes. "Every fool is
+mad". "Only the sage is free and every fool is a slave". "The sage
+alone is wealthy". "Good men are always happy and bad men always
+miserable". "All goods are equal". "No one is wiser or happier than
+another". But may not one man we ask be more nearly wise or more
+nearly happy than another? "That may be", the Stoics would reply,
+"but the man who is only one stade from Canopus is as much not in
+Canopus as the man who is a hundred stades off; and the eight day old
+puppy is still as blind as on the day of its birth; nor can a man who
+is near the surface of the sea breathe any more than if he were full
+five hundred fathom down".
+
+It is only fair to the Stoics to add that paradoxes were quite the
+order of the day in Greece, though they greatly outdid other schools
+in producing them. Socrates himself was the father of paradox.
+Epicurus maintained as staunchly as any Stoic that "No wise man is
+unhappy", and, if he be not belied, went the length of declaring that
+the wise man, if put into the bull of Phalaris would exclaim: "How
+delightful! How little I mind this!"
+
+It is out of keeping with common sense to draw a hard and fast
+distinction between good and bad. Yet this was what the Stoics did.
+They insisted on effecting here and now that separation between the
+sheep and the goats, which Christ postponed to the Day of Judgment.
+Unfortunately, when it came to practice, all were found to be goats,
+so that the division was a merely formal one.
+
+The good man of the Stoics was variously known as 'the sage', or,
+'the serious man', the latter name being inherited from the
+Peripatetics. We used to hear it said among ourselves that a person
+had become serious, when he or she had taken to religion. Another
+appellation which the Stoics had for the sage was 'the urbane man',
+while the fool in contradistinction was called 'a boor'. Boorishness
+was defined as an inexperience of the customs and laws of the state.
+By the state was meant, not Athens or Sparta, as would have been the
+case in a former age, but the society of all rational beings into
+which the Stoics spiritualised the state. The sage alone had the
+freedom of this city and the fool was therefore not only a boor, but
+an alien or an exile. In this city, Justice was natural and not
+conventional, for the law by which it was governed was the law of
+right reason. The law then was spiritualised by the Stoics, just as
+the state was. It no longer meant the enactments of this or that
+community, but the mandates of the eternal reason which ruled the
+world and which would prevail in the ideal state. Law was defined as
+right reason commanding what was to be done and forbidding what was
+not to be done. As such, it in no way differed from the impulse of
+the sage himself.
+
+As a member of a state and by nature subject to law, man was
+essentially a social being. Between all the wise there existed
+"unanimity," which was "a knowledge of the common good," because
+their views of life were harmonious. Fools, on the other hand, whose
+views of life were discordant, were enemies to one another and bent
+on mutual injury.
+
+As a member of society the sage would play his part in public life.
+Theoretically this was always true, and practically he would do so,
+wherever the actual constitution made any tolerable approach to the
+ideal type. But, if the circumstances were such as to make it certain
+that his embarking on politics would be of no service to his country,
+and only a source of danger to himself, then he would refrain. The
+kind of constitution of which the Stoics most approved was a mixed
+government containing democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical
+elements. Where circumstances allowed the sage would act as
+legislator, and would educate mankind, one way of doing which was by
+writing books which would prove of profit to the reader.
+
+As a member of existing society the sage would marry and beget
+children, both for his own sake and for that of his country, on
+behalf of which, if it were good, he would be ready to suffer and
+die. Still he would look forward to a better time when, in Zeno's as
+in Plato's republic, the wise would have women and children in
+common, when the elders would love all the rising generation equally
+with parental fondness, and when marital jealousy would be no more.
+
+As being essentially a social being, the sage was endowed not only
+with the graver political virtues, but also with the graces of life.
+He was sociable, tactful and stimulating, using conversation as a
+means for promoting good will and friendship; so far as might be, he
+was all things to all men, which made him fascinating and charming,
+insinuating and even wily; he know how to hit the point and to choose
+the right moment, yet with it all he was plain and unostentatious and
+simple and unaffected; in particular he never delighted in irony much
+less in sarcasm.
+
+From the social characteristics of the sage we turn now to a side of
+his character which appears eminently anti-social. One of his most
+highly vaunted characteristics was his self-sufficingness. He was to
+be able to step out of a burning city, coming from the wreck not only
+of his fortunes, but of his friends and family, and to declare with a
+smile that he has lost nothing. All that he truly cared for was to be
+centered in himself. Only thus could he be sure that Fortune would
+not wrest it from him.
+
+The apathy or passionlessness of the sage is another of his most
+salient features. The passions being, on Zeno's showing, not natural,
+but forms of disease, the sage, as being the perfect man, would of
+course be wholly free from them. They were so many disturbances of
+the even flow in which his bliss lay. The sage therefore would never
+be moved by a feeling of favour towards any one; he would never
+pardon a fault; he would never feel pity; he would never be prevailed
+upon by entreaty; he would never be stirred to anger.
+
+As to the absence of pity in the sage, the Stoics themselves must
+have felt some difficulty there since we find Epictetus recommending
+his hearers to show grief out of sympathy for another, but to be
+careful not to feel it. The inexorability of the sage was a mere
+consequence of his calm reasonableness, which would lead him to take
+the right view from the first. Lastly, the sage would never be
+stirred to anger. For why should it stir his anger to see another in
+his ignorance injuring himself?
+
+One more touch has yet to be added to the apathy of the sage. He was
+impervious to wonder. No miracle of nature could excite his
+astonishment--no mephitic caverns, which men deemed the mouths of
+hell, no deep-drawn ebb tides--the standing marvel of the
+Mediterranean dweller, no hot springs, no spouting jets of fire.
+
+From the absence of passion it is but a step to the absence of error.
+So we pass now to the infallibility of the sage--a monstrous doctrine
+which was never broached in the schools before Zeno. The sage, it was
+maintained, held no opinions, he never repented of his conduct, he
+was never deceived in anything. Between the daylight of knowledge and
+darkness of nescience Plato had interposed the twilight of opinion
+wherein men walked for the most part. Not so however the Stoic sage.
+Of him it might be said, as Charles Lamb said of the Scotchman with
+whom he so imperfectly sympathized: "His understanding is always at
+its meridian--you never see the first dawn, the early streaks." He
+has no falterings of self suspicion. Surmises, guesses, misgivings,
+half intuitions, semiconsciousness, partial illuminations, dim
+instincts, embryo conceptions, have no place in his brain or
+vocabulary. The twilight of dubiety never falls upon him. Opinion,
+whether in the form of an ungripped assent, or a weak supposition,
+was alien from the mental disposition of the serious man. With him
+there was no hasty or premature assent of the understanding, no
+forgetfulness, no distrust. He never allowed himself to be
+overreached or deluded, never had need of an arbiter, never was out
+in his reckoning nor put out by another. No urbane man ever wandered
+from his way, or missed his mark, or saw wrong, or heard amiss, or
+erred in any of his senses; he never conjectured nor thought of a
+better thing, for the one was a form of imperfect assent, and the
+other a sign of previous precipitancy. There was with him no change,
+no retraction, and no tripping. These things were for those whose
+dogmas could alter. After this it is almost superfluous for us to be
+assured that the sage never got drunk. Drunkenness, as Zeno pointed
+out, involved babbling, and of that the sage would never be guilty.
+He would not, however, altogether eschew banquets. Indeed, the Stoics
+recognized a virtue under the name of 'conviviality,' which consisted
+in the proper conduct of them. It was said of Chrysippus that his
+demeanor was always quiet, even if his gait were unsteady, so that
+his housekeeper declared that only his legs were drunk.
+
+There were pleasantries even within the school on this subject of
+infallibility of the sage. Aristo of Chios, while seceding on some
+other matters, held fast to the dogma that the sage never opined.
+Whereupon Persaeus played a trick upon him. He made one of two twin
+brothers deposit a sum of money with him and the other call to
+reclaim it. The success of the trick however only went to establish
+that Aristo was not the sage, an admission which each of the Stoics
+seems to have been ready enough to make on his own part, as the
+responsibilities of the position were so fatiguing.
+
+There remains one more leading characteristic of the sage, the most
+striking of them all, and the most important from the ethical point
+of view. This was his innocence or harmlessness. He would not harm
+others and was not to be harmed by them. For the Stoics believed with
+Socrates that it was not permissible by the divine law for a better
+man to be harmed by a worse. You could not harm the sage any more
+than you could harm the sunlight; he was in our world, but not of it.
+There was no possibility of evil for him, save in his own will, and
+that you could not touch. And as the sage was beyond harm, so also
+was he above insult. Men might disgrace themselves by their insolent
+attitude towards his mild majesty, but it was not in their power to
+disgrace him.
+
+As the Stoics had their analogue to the tenet of final assurance, so
+had they also to that of sudden conversion. They held that a man
+might become a sage without being at first aware of it. The
+abruptness of the transition from folly to wisdom was in keeping with
+their principle that there was no medium between the two, but it was
+naturally a point which attracted the strictures of their opponents.
+That a man should be at one moment stupid and ignorant and unjust and
+intemperate, a slave and poor, and destitute, at the next a king,
+rich, and prosperous, temperate, and just, secure in his judgements
+and exempt from error, was a transformation, they declared, which
+smacked more of the fairy tales of the nursery than of the doctrines
+of a sober philosophy.
+
+
+PHYSIC
+
+We have now before us the main facts with regard to the Stoic view of
+man's nature, but we have yet to see in what setting they were put.
+What was the Stoic outlook upon the universe? The answer to this
+question is supplied by their Physic.
+
+There were, according to the Stoics, two first principles of all
+things, the active and the passive. The passive was that unqualified
+being which is known as Matter. The active was the Logos, or reason
+in it, which is God. This, it was held, eternally pervades matter and
+creates all things. This dogma, laid down by Zeno, was repeated after
+him by the subsequent heads of the school.
+
+There were then two first principles, but there were not two causes
+of things. The active principle alone was cause, the other was mere
+material for it to work on--inert, senseless, destitute in itself of
+all shape and qualities, but ready to assume any qualities or shape.
+
+Matter was defined as that out of which anything is produced. The
+Prime Matter, or unqualified being, was eternal and did not admit of
+increase or decrease, but only of change. It was the substance or
+being of all things that are.
+
+The Stoics, it will be observed, used the term "matter" with the same
+confusing ambiguity with which we use it ourselves, now for sensible
+objects which have shape and other qualities, now for the abstract
+conception of matter, which is devoid of all qualities.
+
+Both these first principles, it must be understood, were conceived of
+as bodies, though without form, the one everywhere interpenetrating
+the other. To say that the passive principle, or matter, is a body
+comes easy to us, because of the familiar confusion adverted to
+above. But how could the active principle, or God, be conceived of as
+a body? The answer to this question may sound paradoxical. It is
+because God is a spirit. A spirit in its original sense meant air in
+motion. Now the active principle was not air, but it was something
+which bore an analogy to it--namely aether. Aether in motion might be
+called a 'spirit' as well as air in motion. It was in this sense that
+Chrysippus defined the thing that is, to be a spirit moving itself
+into and out of itself, or spirit moving itself to and fro.
+
+From the two first principles which are ungenerated and
+indestructible must be distinguished the four elements which, though
+ultimate for us, yet were produced in the beginning by God and are
+destined some day to be reabsorbed into the divine nature. These with
+the Stoics were the same which had been accepted since
+Empedocles--namely earth, air, fire and water. The elements, like the
+two first principles were bodies; unlike them, they were declared to
+have shape as well as extension.
+
+An element was defined as that out of which things at first come into
+being and into which they are at last resolved. In this relation did
+the four elements stand to all the compound bodies which the universe
+contained. The terms earth, air, fire and water had to be taken in a
+wide sense: earth meaning all that was of the nature of earth, air
+all that was of the nature of air and so on. Thus, in the human
+frame, the bones and sinews pertained to earth.
+
+The four qualities of matter--hot, cold, moist and dry--were
+indicative of the presence of the four elements. Fire was the source
+of heat, air of cold, water of moisture, and earth of dryness.
+Between them, the four elements made up the unqualified being called
+Matter. All animals and other compound natures on earth had in them
+representatives of the four great physical constituents of the
+universe, but the moon, according to Chrysippus, consisted only of
+fire and air, while the sun was pure fire.
+
+While all compound bodies were resolvable into the four elements,
+there were important differences among the elements, themselves. Two
+of them, fire and air, were light; the other two, water and earth,
+were heavy. By 'light' was meant that which tends away from its own
+centre, by 'heavy,' that which, tends towards it. The two light
+elements stood to the two heavy ones in much the same relation as the
+active to the passive principle generally. But further, fire had such
+a primary as entitles it, if the definition of element were pressed,
+to be considered alone worthy of the name. For the three other
+elements arose out of it and were to be again resolved into it.
+
+We should obtain a wholly wrong impression of what Bishop Berkeley
+calls 'the philosophy of fire' if we set before our minds in this
+connection, the raging element whose strength is in destruction. Let
+us rather picture to ourselves as the type of fire the benign and
+beatific solar heat, the quickener and fosterer of all terrestrial
+life. For according to Zeno, there were two kinds of fire, the one
+destructive, the other what we may call 'constructive,' and which he
+called 'artistic'. This latter kind of fire, which was known as
+aether, was the substance of the heavenly bodies, as it was also of
+the soul of animals and of the 'nature' of plants. Chrysippus,
+following Heraclitus, taught that the elements passed into one
+another by a process of condensation and rarefaction. Fire first
+became solidified into air, then air into water and lastly water into
+earth. The process of dissolution took place in the reverse order,
+earth being rarefied into water, water into air, and air into fire.
+It is allowable to see in this old world doctrine an anticipation of
+the modern idea of different states of matter--the solid, the liquid,
+and the gaseous, with a fourth beyond the gaseous which science can
+still only guess at, and in which matter seems almost to merge into
+spirit.
+
+Each of the four elements had its own abode in the universe.
+Outermost of all was the ethereal 'fire' which was divided into two
+spheres: first that of the fixed stars and next that of the planets.
+Below this lay the sphere of 'air', below this again that of 'water',
+and lowest or in other words, most central of all was the sphere of
+'earth', the solid foundation of the whole structure. Water might be
+said to be above earth because nowhere was there water to be found
+without earth beneath it, but the surface of water was always
+equidistant from the centre, whereas earth had prominences which rose
+above water.
+
+When we say that the Stoics regarded the universe as a plenum, the
+reader must understand by 'the universe' the Cosmos or ordered whole.
+Within this there was no emptiness owing to the pressure of the
+celestial upon the terrestrial sphere. But outside of this lay the
+infinite void without beginning, middle, or end. This occupied a very
+ambiguous position In their scheme. It was not being, for being was
+confined to body and yet it was there. It was in fact nothing, and
+that was why it was infinite. For as nothing cannot be bound to any
+thing, so neither can there be any bound to nothing. But while
+bodiless itself, it had the capacity to contain body, a fact which
+enabled it, despite its non-entity, to serve, as we shall see, a
+useful purpose.
+
+Did the Stoics then regard the universe as finite or as infinite? In
+answering this question we must distinguish our terms, as they did.
+The All, they said, was infinite, but the Whole was finite. For the
+'All' was the cosmos and the void, whereas the 'Whole' was the cosmos
+only. This distinction we may suppose to have originated with the
+later members of the school. For Appolodorus noted the ambiguity of
+the word 'All' as meaning,
+
+   (1) the cosmos only,
+   (2) cosmos + void
+
+If then by the term "universe" we understand the cosmos, or ordered
+whole, we must say that the Stoics regarded the universe as finite.
+All being and all body, which was the same thing with being, had
+necessarily bounds, it was only not being, which was boundless.
+
+Another distinction, due this time to Chrysippus himself, which the
+Stoics found it convenient to draw, was between the three words
+'void,' 'place' and 'space'. Void was defined as 'the absence of
+body', place was that which was occupied by body, the term 'space'
+was reserved for that which was partly occupied and partly
+unoccupied. As there was no corner of the cosmos unfilled by body,
+space, it will be seen, was another name for the All. Place was
+compared to a vessel that was full, void to one that was empty, and
+space to the vast wine-cask, such as that in which Diogenes made his
+home, which was kept partly fully, but in which there was always room
+for more. The last comparison must of course not be pressed. For if
+space be a cask, it is one without top, bottom or sides.
+
+But while the Stoics regarded our universe as an island of being in
+an ocean of void, they did not admit the possibility that other such
+islands might exist beyond our ken. The spectacle of the starry
+heavens, which presented itself nightly to their gaze in all the
+brilliancy of a southern sky--that was all there was of being, beyond
+that lay nothingness. Democritus or the Epicureans might dream of
+other worlds, but the Stoics contended for the unity of the cosmos as
+staunchly as the Mahometans for the unity of God, for with them the
+cosmos was God.
+
+In shape they conceived of it as spherical, on the ground that the
+sphere was the perfect figure and was also the best adapted for
+motion. Not that the universe as a whole moved. The earth lay in its
+centre, spherical and motionless, and round it coursed the sun, moon,
+and planets, fixed each in its respective sphere as in so many
+concentric rings, while the outermost ring of all, which contained
+the fixed stars, wheeled round the rest with an inconceivable
+velocity.
+
+The tendency of all things in the universe to the centre kept the
+earth fixed in the middle as being subject to an equal pressure on
+every side. The same cause also, according to Zeno, kept the universe
+itself at rest in the void. But in an infinite void, it could make no
+difference whether the whole were at rest or in motion. It may have
+been a desire to escape the notion of a migratory whole which led
+Zeno to broach the curious doctrine that the universe has no weight,
+as being composed of elements whereof two are heavy and two are
+light. Air and fire did indeed tend to the centre like everything
+else in the cosmos, but not till they had reached their natural home.
+Till then they were of an upward-growing nature. It appears then that
+the upward and downward tendencies of the elements were held to
+neutralise one another and to leave the universe devoid of weight.
+
+The universe was the only thing which was perfect in itself, the one
+thing which was an end in itself. All other things were perfect
+indeed as parts, when considered with reference to the whole, but
+were none of them ends in themselves, unless man could be deemed so
+who was born to contemplate the universe and imitate its perfections.
+Thus, then, did the Stoics envisage the universe on its physical
+side--as one, finite, fixed in space, but revolving round its own
+centre, earth, beautiful beyond all things, and perfect as a whole.
+
+But it was impossible for this order and beauty to exist without
+mind. The universe was pervaded by intelligence as man's body is
+pervaded by his soul. But as the human soul though everywhere present
+in the body is not present everywhere in the same degree, so it was
+with the world-soul. The human soul presents itself not only as
+intellect, but also in the lower manifestations of sense, growth, and
+cohesion. It is the soul which is the cause of the plant life, which
+displays itself more particularly in the nails and hair; it is the
+soul also which causes cohesion among the parts of the solid
+substances such as bones and sinews, that make up our frame. In the
+same way the world-soul displayed itself in rational beings as
+intellect, in the lower animals as mere souls, in plants as nature or
+growth, and in inorganic substances as 'holding' or cohesion. To this
+lowest stage add change, and you have growth or plant nature;
+super-add to this phantasy and impulse and you rise to the soul of
+irrational animals; at a yet higher stage you reach the rational and
+discursive intellect, which is peculiar to man among mortal natures.
+
+We have spoken of soul as the cause of the plant life in our bodies,
+but plants were not admitted by the Stoics to be possessed of soul in
+the strict sense. What animated them was 'nature' or, as we have
+called it above, 'growth'. Nature, in this sense of the principle of
+growth, was defined by the Stoics as 'a constructive fire, proceeding
+in a regular way to production,' or 'a fiery spirit endowed with
+artistic skill'. That Nature was an artist needed no proof, since it
+was her handiwork that human art essayed to copy. But she was an
+artist who combined the useful with the pleasant, aiming at once at
+beauty and convenience. In the widest sense, Nature was another name
+for Providence, or the principle which held the universe together,
+but, as the term is now being employed, it stood for that degree of
+existence which is above cohesion and below soul. From this point of
+view, it was defined as "a cohesion subject to self originated change
+in accordance with seminal reasons effecting and maintaining its
+results in definite times, and reproducing in the offspring the
+characteristics of the parent". This sounds about as abstract as
+Herbert Spencer's definition of life, but it must be borne in mind
+that nature was all the time a 'spirit', and as such a body. It was a
+body of a less subtle essence than soul. Similarly, when the Stoics
+spoke of cohesion, they are not to be taken as referring to some
+abstract principle like attraction. 'Cohesions,' said Chrysippus,
+'are nothing else than airs, for it is by these that bodies are held
+together, and of the individual qualities of things which are held
+together by cohesion, it is the air which is the compressing cause
+which in iron is called "hardness", in stone "thickness" and in
+solver "whiteness"'. Not only solidarity then, but also colours,
+which Zeno called 'the first schematisms' of matter were regarded as
+due to the mysterious agency of air. In fact, qualities in general
+were but blasts and tensions of the air, which gave form and figure
+to the inert matter underlying them.
+
+As the man is in one sense the soul, in another the body, and in a
+third the union of both, so it was with the cosmos. The word was used
+in three senses--
+
+  (1) God
+  (2) the arrangement of the stars, etc.
+  (3) the combination of both.
+
+The cosmos as identical with God was described as an individual made
+up of all being who is incorruptible and ungenerated, the fashioner
+of the ordered frame of the universe, who at certain periods of time
+absorbs all being into himself and again generates it from himself.
+Thus the cosmos on its external side was doomed to perish and the
+mode of its destruction was to be by fire, a doctrine which has been
+stamped upon the world's belief down to the present day. What was to
+bring about this consummation was the soul of the universe becoming
+too big for its body, which it would eventually swallow up
+altogether. In the efflagration, when everything went back to the
+primeval aether, the universe would be pure soul and alive equally
+through and through. In this subtle and attenuated state, it would
+require more room than before and so expand into the void,
+contracting again when another period of cosmic generation had set
+in. Hence the Stoic definition of the Void or Infinite as that into
+which the cosmos is resolved at the efflagration.
+
+In this theory of the contraction of the universe out of an ethereal
+state and ultimate return to the same condition one sees a
+resemblance to the modern scientific hypothesis of the origin of our
+planetary system out of the solar nebula, and its predestined end in
+the same. Especially is this the case with the form in which the
+theory was held by Cleanthes, who pictured the heavenly bodies as
+hastening to their own destruction by dashing themselves, like so
+many gigantic moths, into the sun. Cleanthes however did not conceive
+mere mechanical force to be at work in this matter. The grand
+apotheosis of suicide which he foresaw was a voluntary act; for the
+heavenly bodies were Gods and were willing to lose their own in a
+larger life.
+
+Thus all the deities except Zeus were mortal, or at all events,
+perishable. Gods, like men, were destined to have an end some day.
+They would melt in the great furnace of being as though they were
+made of wax or tin. Zeus then would be left alone with his own
+thoughts, or as the Stoics sometimes put it, Zeus would fall back
+upon Providence. For by Providence they meant the leading principle
+or mind of the whole, and by Zeus, as distinguished from Providence,
+this mind together with the cosmos, which was to it as body. In the
+efflagration the two would be fused into one in the single substance
+of aether. And then in the fulness of time there would be a
+restitution of all things. Everything would come round regularly
+again exactly as it had been before.
+
+To us who have been taught to pant for progress, this seems a dreary
+prospect. But the Stoics were consistent Optimists, and did not ask
+for a change in what was best. They were content that the one drama
+of existence should enjoy a perpetual run without perhaps too nice a
+consideration for the actors. Death intermitted life, but did not end
+it. For the candle of life, which was extinguished now, would be
+kindled again hereafter. Being and not being came round in endless
+succession for all save him, into whom all being was resolved, and
+out of whom it emerged again, as from the vortex of some aeonian
+Maelstrom.
+
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+When Socrates declared before his judges that "there is no evil to a
+good man either in life or after death, nor are his affairs neglected
+by the gods", he sounded the keynote of Stoicism, with its two main
+doctrines of virtue as the only good, and the government of the world
+by Providence. Let us weigh his words, lest we interpret them by the
+light of a comfortable modern piety. A great many things that are
+commonly called evil may and do happen to a good man in this life,
+and therefore presumably misfortunes may also overtake him in any
+other life that there may be. The only evil that can never befall him
+is vice, because that would be a contradiction in terms. Unless
+therefore Socrates was uttering idle words on the most solemn
+occasion of his life, he must be taken to have meant that there is no
+evil but vice, which implies that there is no good but virtue. Thus
+we are landed at once in the heart of the Stoic morality. To the
+question why, if there be a providence, so many evils happen to good
+men, Seneca unflinchingly replies: "No evil can happen to a good man,
+contraries do not mix." God has removed from the good all evil:
+because he has taken from them crimes and sins, bad thoughts and
+selfish designs and blind lust and grasping avarice. He has attended
+well to themselves, but he cannot be expected to look after their
+luggage: they relieve him of that care by being indifferent about it.
+This is the only form in which the doctrine of divine providence can
+be held consistently with the facts of life Again, when Socrates on
+the same occasion expressed his belief that it was not "permitted by
+the divine law for a better man to be harmed by a worse", he was
+asserting by implication the Stoic position. Neither Meletus nor
+Anytus could harm him, though they might have him killed or banished,
+or disfranchised. This passage of the Apology, in a condensed form,
+is adopted by Epictetus as one of the watchwords of Stoicism.
+
+There is nothing more distinctive of Socrates than the doctrine that
+virtue is knowledge. Here too the Stoics followed him, ignoring all
+that Aristotle had done in showing the part played by the emotions
+and the will in virtue. Reason was with them a principle of action;
+with Aristotle it was a principle that guided action, but the motive
+power had to come from elsewhere. Socrates must even be held
+responsible for the Stoic paradox of the madness of all ordinary
+folk.
+
+The Stoics did not owe much to the Peripatetics. There was too much
+balance about the master mind of Aristotle for their narrow
+intensity. His recognition of the value of the passions was to them
+an advocacy of disease in moderation: his admission of other elements
+besides virtue into the conception of happiness seemed to them to be
+a betrayal of the citadel, to say as he did that the exercise of
+virtue was the highest good was no merit in their eyes, unless it
+were added to the confession that there was none beside it. The
+Stoics tried to treat man as a being of pure reason. The Peripatetics
+would not shut their eyes to his mixed nature, and contended that the
+good of such a being must also be mixed, containing in it elements
+which had reference to the body and its environment. The goods of the
+soul indeed, they said, far outweighed those of body and estate, but
+still the latter had a right to be considered.
+
+Though the Stoics were religious to the point of superstition, yet
+they did not invoke the terrors of theology to enforce the lesson of
+virtue. Plato does this even in the very work, the professed object
+of which is to prove the _intrinsic_ superiority of justice to
+injustice. But Chrysippus protested against Plato's procedure on this
+point, declaring that the talk about punishment by the gods was mere
+'bugaboo'. By the Stoics indeed, no less than by the Epicureans, fear
+of the gods was discarded from philosophy. The Epicurean gods took no
+part in the affairs of men; the Stoic God was incapable of anger.
+
+The absence of any appeal to rewards and punishments was a natural
+consequence of the central tenet of the Stoic morality: that virtue
+is in itself the most desirable of all things. Another corollary that
+flows with equal directness from the same principle is that is better
+to be than to seem virtuous. Those who are sincerely convinced that
+happiness is to be found in wealth or pleasure or power prefer the
+reality to the appearance of these goods; it must be the same with
+him who is sincerely convinced that happiness lies in virtue.
+
+Despite the want of feeling in which the Stoics gloried, it is yet
+true to say that the humanity of their system constitutes one of its
+most just claims on our admiration. They were the first fully to
+recognise the worth of man as man; they heralded the reign of peace
+for which we are yet waiting; they proclaimed to the world the
+fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man; they were convinced of
+the solidarity of mankind, and laid down that the interest of one
+must be subordinated to that of all. The word "philanthrop," though
+not unheard before their time, was brought into prominence by them as
+a name for a virtue among the virtues.
+
+Aristotle's ideal state, like the Republic of Plato, is still an
+Hellenic city; Zeno was the first to dream of a republic which should
+embrace all mankind. In Plato's Republic all the material goods are
+contemptuously thrown to the lower classes, all the mental and
+spiritual reserved for the higher. In Aristotle's ideal the bulk of
+the population are mere conditions, not integral parts of the state.
+Aristotle's callous acceptance of the existing fact of slavery
+blinded his eyes to the wider outlook, which already in his time was
+beginning to be taken. His theories of the natural slave and of the
+natural nobility of the Greeks are mere attempts to justify practice.
+In the Ethics there is indeed a recognition of the rights of man, but
+it is faint and grudging. Aristotle there tells us that a slave, as a
+man, admits of justice, and therefore of friendship, but
+unfortunately it is not this concession which is dominant in his
+system, but rather the reduction of a slave to a living tool by which
+it is immediately preceded. In another passage Aristotle points out
+that men, like other animals, have a natural affection for the
+members of their own species, a fact, he adds, which is best seen in
+travelling. This incipient humanitarianism seems to have been
+developed in a much more marked way by Aristotle's followers, but it
+is the Stoics who have won the glory of having initiated humanitarian
+sentiment.
+
+Virtue, with the earlier Greek philosophers, was aristocratic and
+exclusive. Stoicism, like Christianity, threw it open to the meanest
+of mankind. In the kingdom of wisdom, as in the kingdom of Christ,
+there was neither barbarian, Scythian, bond, nor free. The only true
+freedom was to serve philosophy, or, which was the same thing, to
+serve God; and that could be done in any station in life. The sole
+condition of communion with gods and good men was the possession of a
+certain frame of mind, which might belong equally to a gentleman, to
+a freedman, or to a slave. In place of the arrogant assertion of the
+natural nobility of the Greeks, we now hear that a good mind is the
+true nobility. Birth is of no importance; all are sprung from the
+gods. "The door of virtue is shut to no man; it is open to all,
+admits all, invites all--free men, freedmen, slaves, kings and
+exiles. Its election is not of family or fortune; it is content with
+the bare man." Wherever there was a human being, there Stoicism saw a
+field for well doing. Its followers were always to have in their
+mouths and hearts the well-known line--
+
+ Homo sum humani nihil a me allenum puto
+
+Closely connected with the humanitarianism of the Greeks is their
+cosmopolitanism.
+
+Cosmopolitanism is a word which has contracted rather than expanded
+in meaning with the advance of time. We mean by it freedom from the
+shackles of nationality. The Stoics meant this and more. The city of
+which they claimed to be citizens was not merely this round world on
+which we dwell, but the universe at large with all the mighty life
+therein contained. In this city, the greatest of earth's
+cities--Rome, Ephesus or Alexandria, were but houses. To be exiled
+from one of them was only like changing your lodgings, and death but
+a removal from one quarter to another. The freemen of this city were
+all rational beings--sages on earth and the stars in heaven. Such an
+idea was thoroughly in keeping with the soaring genius of Stoicism.
+It was proclaimed by Zeno in his Republic, and after him by
+Chrysippus and his followers. It caught the imagination of alien
+writers as of the author of the Peripatetic _De Mundo_ who was
+possibly of Jewish origin and of Philo and St Paul who were certainly
+so. Cicero does not fail to make of it on behalf of the Stoics;
+Seneca revels in it; Epictetus employs it for edification and Maucus
+Aurelius finds solace in his heavenly citizenship for the cares of an
+earthly ruler--as Antoninus indeed his city is Rome, but as a man it
+is the universe.
+
+The philosophy of an age cannot perhaps be inferred from its
+political conditions with that certainty which some writers assume;
+still there are cases in which the connection is obvious. On a wide
+view of the matter we may say that the opening up of the East by the
+arms of Alexander was the cause of the shifting of the philosophic
+standpoint from Hellenism to cosmopolitanism. If we reflect that the
+Cynic and Stoic teachers were mostly foreigners in Greece we shall
+find a very tangible reason for the change of view. Greece had done
+her work in educating the world and the world was beginning to make
+payment in kind. Those who had been branded as natural slaves were
+now giving laws to philosophy. The kingdom of wisdom was suffering
+violence at the hands of barbarians.
+
+
+
+DATES AND AUTHORITIES
+                                             BC
+Death of Socrates                              399
+Death of Plato                                 347
+Zeno                                       347 275
+  Studied under Crates                         325
+  Studied under Stilpo and Xenocrates      325 315
+  Began teaching                               315
+Epicurus                                   341 270
+Death of Aristotle                             322
+Death of Xenocrates                            315
+Cleanthes succeeded Zeno                       275
+Chrysippus died                                207
+Zeno of Tarsus succeeded Chrysippus            ---
+Decree of the Senate forbidding the
+           teaching of philosophy at Rome      161
+Diogenes of Babylon
+Embassy of the philosophers to Rome            155
+Antipater of Tarsus
+Panaetius Accompanied Africanus on
+  his mission to the East                      143
+  His treatise on Propriety was the
+  basis of Cicero's De Officiis.
+The Scipionic Circle at Rome
+  The coterie was deeply tinctured with
+    Stoicism. Its chief members were--
+    The younger Africanus
+    the younger Laelius
+    L. Furius Philus
+    Manilius
+    Spurius Mummius
+    P. Rutillus Rufus
+    Q. Aelius,
+    Tubero
+    Polybius and
+    Panaetius
+Suicide of Blossius of Cumae, the adviser
+  of Tiberius Gracchus and a disciple
+  of Antipater of Tarsus                       130
+Mnesarchus, a disciple of Panaetius, was
+  teaching at Athens when the orator
+  Crassus visited that city                    111
+Hecaton of Rhodes
+  A great Stoic writer, a disciple of
+  Panaetius and a friend of Tubero
+Posidonius                            About 128-44
+  Born at Apameia in Syria
+  Became a citizen of Rhodes
+  Represented the Rhodians at Rome              86
+  Cicero studied under him at Rhodes            78
+  Came to Rome again at an advanced age         51
+Cicero's philosophical works                 54-44
+  These are a main authority for our
+  knowledge of the Stoics.
+                                               A.D.
+Philo of Alexandria came on an embassy to Rome  39
+  The works of Philo are saturated with Stoic
+  ideas and he displays an exact acquaintance
+  with their terminology
+Seneca
+  Exiled to Corsica                             41
+  Recalled from exile                           49
+  Forced by Nero to commit suicide              65
+  His Moral Epistles and philosophical
+    works generally are written from
+    the Stoic standpoint though somewhat
+    affected by Eclecticism
+Plutarch                                  Flor. 80
+  The Philosophical works of Plutarch
+    which have most bearing upon the
+    Stoics are--
+      De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute,
+      De Virtute Morali,
+      De Placitis Philosophorum,
+      De Stoicorum Repugnantiis,
+      Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere,
+      De Communibus Notitiis.
+Epictetus                                 Flor. 90
+  A freedman of Epaphroditus,
+  Disciple of C Musonius Rufus,
+  Lived and taught at Rome until A. D. 90
+    when the philosophers were expelled by
+    Domitian. Then retired to Nicopolis in
+    Epirus, where he spent the rest of his life.
+  Epictetus wrote nothing himself, but his
+    Dissertations, as preserved by Arrian,
+    from which the Encheiridion is excerpted,
+    contain the most pleasing presentation that
+    we have of the moral philosophy of the Stoics.
+C Musonius Rufus
+  Banished to Gyaros ...                        65
+  Returned to Rome ...                          68
+  Tried to intervene between the armies
+    of Vitellius and Vespasian ...              69
+  Procured the condemnation of Publius Celer
+   (Tac H iv 10, Juv Sat iii 116) ...           --
+Q Junius Rusticus ...                      Cos 162
+  Teacher of M Aurelius who learnt
+    from him to appreciate Epictetus
+
+M Aurelius Antoninus Emperor ...           161-180
+  Wrote the book commonly called his
+    "Meditations" under the title of
+    "to himself"
+  He may be considered the last of the
+    Stoics
+
+Three later authorities for the Stoic teaching are--
+  Diogenes Laertius ...                        200?
+  Sextus Empiricus ...                         225?
+  Stobaeus ...                                 500?
+
+Modern works--
+  Von Arnim's edition of the "Fragmenta Stoicorum Veterum"
+  Pearson's "Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes" Pitt Press
+  Remains of C Musonius Rufus in the Teubner series
+  Zeller's "Stoics and Epicureans."
+  Sir Alexander Grant, "Ethics of Aristotle"
+  Essay VI on the Ancient Stoics
+  Lightfoot on the Philippians, Dissertation II,
+  "St. Paul and Seneca."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's A Little Book of Stoicism, by St. George Stock
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+Title: A Little Book of Stoicism
+
+Author: St George Stock
+
+Release Date: February, 2005 [EBook #7514]
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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LITTLE BOOK OF STOICISM ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Charles Franks, Ted Garvin, S.R.Ellison
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+A GUIDE TO STOICISM
+
+by St. George Stock
+
+
+
+TEN CENT POCKET SERIES NO. 347
+
+Edited by E. Haldeman-Julius.
+
+
+
+FOREWORD
+
+If you strip Stoicism of its paradoxes and its wilful misuse of
+language, what is left is simply the moral philosophy of Socrates,
+Plato and Aristotle, dashed with the physics of Heraclitus. Stoicism
+was not so much a new doctrine as the form under which the old Greek
+philosophy finally presented itself to the world at large. It owed
+its popularity in some measure to its extravagance. A great deal
+might be said about Stoicism as a religion and about the part it
+played in the formation of Christianity but these subjects were
+excluded by the plan of this volume which was to present a sketch of
+the Stoic doctrine based on the original authorities.
+
+    ST GEORGE STOCK M A
+        _Pemb. Coll. Oxford_
+
+
+
+       A GUIDE TO STOICISM.
+
+         ST GEORGE STOCK
+
+
+PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE GREEKS AND ROMANS.
+
+Among the Greeks and Romans of the classical age philosophy occupied
+the place taken by religion among ourselves. Their appeal was to
+reason not to revelation. To what, asks Cicero in his Offices, are we
+to look for training in virtue, if not to philosophy? Now, if truth
+is believed to rest upon authority it is natural that it should be
+impressed upon the mind from the earliest age, since the essential
+thing is that it should be believed, but a truth which makes its
+appeal to reason must be content to wait till reason is developed. We
+are born into the Eastern, Western or Anglican communion or some
+other denomination, but it was of his own free choice that the
+serious minded young Greek or Roman embraced the tenets of one of the
+great sects which divided the world of philosophy. The motive which
+led him to do so in the first instance may have been merely the
+influence of a friend or a discourse from some eloquent speaker, but
+the choice once made was his own choice, and he adhered to it as
+such. Conversions from one sect to another were of quite rare
+occurrence. A certain Dionysius of Heraclea, who went over from the
+Stoics to the Cyrenaics, was ever afterward known as "the deserter."
+It was as difficult to be independent in philosophy as it is with us
+to be independent in politics. When a young man joined a school, he
+committed himself to all its opinions, not only as to the end of
+life, which was the main point of division, but as to all questions
+on all subjects. The Stoic did not differ merely in his ethics from
+the Epicurean; he differed also in his theology and his physics and
+his metaphysics. Aristotle, as Shakespeare knew, thought young men
+"unfit to hear moral philosophy". And yet it was a question--or
+rather the question--of moral philosophy, the answer to which decided
+the young man's opinions on all other points. The language which
+Cicero sometimes uses about the seriousness of the choice made in
+early life and how a young man gets entrammelled by a school before
+he is really able to judge, reminds us of what we hear said nowadays
+about the danger of a young man's taking orders before his opinions
+are formed. To this it was replied that a young man only exercised
+the right of private judgment in selecting the authority whom he
+should follow, and, having once done that, trusted to him for all the
+rest. With the analogue of this contention also we are familiar in
+modern times. Cicero allows that there would be something in it, if
+the selection of the true philosopher did not above all things
+require the philosophic mind. But in those days it was probably the
+case, as it is now, that, if a man did not form speculative opinions
+in youth, the pressure of affairs would not leave him leisure to do
+so later.
+
+The life span of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was from B.C. 347 to
+275. He did not begin teaching till 315, at the mature age of forty.
+Aristotle had passed away in 322, and with him closed the great
+constructive era of Greek thought. The Ionian philosophers had
+speculated on the physical constitution of the universe, the
+Pythagoreans on the mystical properties of numbers; Heraclitus had
+propounded his philosophy of fire, Democritus and Leucippus had
+struck out a rude form of the atomic theory, Socrates had raised
+questions relating to man, Plato had discussed them with all the
+freedom of the dialogue, while Aristotle had systematically worked
+them out. The later schools did not add much to the body of
+philosophy. What they did was to emphasize different sides of the
+doctrine of their predecessors and to drive views to their logical
+consequences. The great lesson of Greek philosophy is that it is
+worth while to do right irrespective of reward and punishment and
+regardless of the shortness of life. This lesson the Stoics so
+enforced by the earnestness of their lives and the influence of their
+moral teaching that it has become associated more particularly with
+them. Cicero, though he always classed himself as an Academic,
+exclaims in one place that he is afraid the Stoics are the only
+philosophers, and whenever he is combating Epicureanism his language
+is that of a Stoic. Some of Vergil's most eloquent passages seem to
+be inspired by Stoic speculation. Even Horace, despite his banter
+about the sage, in his serious moods borrows the language of the
+Stoics. It was they who inspired the highest flights of declamatory
+eloquence in Persius and Juvenal. Their moral philosophy affected the
+world through Roman law, the great masters of which were brought up
+under its influence. So all pervasive indeed was this moral
+philosophy of the Stoics that it was read by the Jews of Alexandria
+into Moses under the veil of allegory and was declared to be the
+inner meaning of the Hebrew Scriptures. If the Stoics then did not
+add much to the body of Philosophy, they did a great work in
+popularising it and bringing it to bear upon life.
+
+An intense practicality was a mark of the later Greek philosophy.
+This was common to Stoicism with its rival Epicureanism. Both
+regarded philosophy as 'the art of life,' though they differed in
+their conception of what that art should be. Widely as the two
+schools were opposed to one another, they had also other features in
+common. Both were children of an age in which the free city had given
+way to monarchies, and personal had taken the place of corporate
+life. The question of happiness is no longer, as with Aristotle, and
+still more with Plato, one for the state, but for the individual. In
+both schools the speculative interest was feeble from the first, and
+tended to become feebler as time went on. Both were new departures
+from pre-existent schools. Stoicism was bred out of Cynicism, as
+Epicureanism out of Cyrenaicism. Both were content to fall back for
+their physics upon the pre-Socratic schools, the one adopting the
+firm philosophy of Heraclitus, the other the atomic theory of
+Democritus. Both were in strong reaction against the abstractions of
+Plato and Aristotle, and would tolerate nothing but concrete reality.
+The Stoics were quite as materialistic in their own way as the
+Epicureans. With regard indeed to the nature of the highest god we
+may, with Senaca represent the difference between the two schools as
+a question of the senses against the intellect, but we shall see
+presently that the Stoics regarded the intellect itself as being a
+kind of body.
+
+The Greeks were all agreed that there was an end or aim of life, and
+that it was to be called 'happiness,' but at that point their
+agreement ended. As to the nature of happiness there was the utmost
+variety of opinion. Democritus had made it consist in mental
+serenity, Anaxagoras in speculation, Socrates in wisdom, Aristotle in
+the practise of virtue with some amount of favour from fortune,
+Aristippus simply in pleasure. These were opinions of the
+philosophers. But, besides these, there were the opinions of ordinary
+men, as shown by their lives rather than by their language. Zeno's
+contribution to thought on the subject does not at first sight appear
+illuminating. He said that the end was 'to live consistently,' the
+implication doubtless being that no life but the passionless life of
+reason could ultimately be consistent with itself. Cleanthes, his
+immediate successor in the school, is credited with having added the
+words 'with nature,' thus completing the well-known Stoic formula
+that the end is 'to live consistently with nature.'
+
+It was assumed by the Greeks that the ways of nature were 'the ways
+of pleasantness,' and that 'all her paths' were 'peace.' This may
+seem to us a startling assumption, but that is because we do not mean
+by 'nature' the same thing as they did. We connect the term with the
+origin of a thing, they connected it rather with the end; by the
+'natural state' we mean a state of savagery, they meant the highest
+civilization; we mean by a thing's nature what it is or has been,
+they meant what it ought to become under the most favourable
+conditions; not the sour crab, but the mellow glory of the Hesperides
+worthy to be guarded by a sleepless dragon, was to the Greeks the
+natural apple. Hence we find Aristotle maintaining that the State is
+a natural product, because it is evolved out of social relations
+which exist by nature. Nature indeed was a highly ambiguous term to
+the Greeks no less than to ourselves, but in the sense with which we
+are now concerned, the nature of anything was defined by the
+Peripatetics as 'the end of its becoming.' Another definition of
+theirs puts the matter still more clearly. 'What each thing is when
+its growth has been completed, that we declare to be the nature of
+each thing'.
+
+Following out this conception the Stoics identified a life in
+accordance with nature with a life in accordance with the highest
+perfection to which man could attain. Now, as man was essentially a
+rational animal, his work as man lay in living the rational life. And
+the perfection of reason was virtue. Hence the ways of nature were no
+other than the ways of virtue. And so it came about that the Stoic
+formula might be expressed in a number of different ways which yet
+all amounted to the same thing. The end was to live the virtuous
+life, or to live consistently, or to live in accordance with nature,
+or to live rationally.
+
+
+DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY.
+
+Philosophy was defined by the Stoics as 'the knowledge of things
+divine and human'. It was divided into three departments; logic,
+ethic, and physic. This division indeed was in existence before their
+time, but they have got the credit of it as of some other things
+which they did not originate. Neither was it confined to them, but
+was part of the common stock of thought. Even the Epicureans, who are
+said to have rejected logic can hardly be counted as dissentients
+from this threefold division. For what they did was to substitute for
+the Stoic logic a logic of their own, dealing with the notions
+derived from sense, much in the same way as Bacon substituted his
+Novum Organum for the Organon of Aristotle. Cleanthes we are told
+recognised six parts of philosophy, namely, dialectic, rhetoric,
+ethic, politic, physic, and theology, but these are obviously the
+result of subdivision of the primary ones. Of the three departments
+we may say that logic deals with the form and expression of
+knowledge, physic with the matter of knowledge, and ethic with the
+use of knowledge. The division may also be justified in this way.
+Philosophy must study either nature (including the divine nature) or
+man; and, if it studies man, it must regard him either from the side
+of the intellect or of the feelings, that is either as a thinking
+(logic) or as an acting (ethic) being.
+
+As to the order in which the different departments should he studied,
+we have had preserved to us the actual words of Chrysippus in his
+fourth book on Lives. 'First of all then it seems to me that, as has
+been rightly said by the ancients, there are three heads under which
+the speculations of the philosopher fall, logic, ethic, physic; next,
+that of these the logical should come first, the ethical second, and
+the physical third, and that of the physical the treatment of the
+gods should come last, whence also they have given the name of
+"completions" to the instruction delivered on this subject'. That
+this order however might yield to convenience is plain from another
+book on the use of reason, where he says that 'the student who takes
+up logic first need not entirely abstain from the other branches of
+philosophy, but should study them also as occasion offers.'
+
+Plutarch twits Chrysippus with inconsistency, because in the face of
+this declaration as to the order of treatment, he nevertheless says
+that morals rest upon physics. But to this charge it may fairly be
+replied that the order of exposition need not coincide with the order
+of existence. Metaphysically speaking, morals may depend upon physics
+and the right conduct of man be deducible from the structure of the
+universe but for all that, it may be advisable to study physics
+later. Physics meant the nature of God and the Universe. Our nature
+may be deducible from that but it is better known to ourselves to
+start with, so that it may be well to begin from the end of the stick
+that we have in our hands. But that Chrysippus did teach the logical
+dependence of morals on physics is plain from his own words. In his
+third book on the Gods he says 'for it is not possible to find any
+other origin of justice or mode of its generation save that from Zeus
+and the nature of the universe for anything we have to say about good
+and evil must needs derive its origin therefrom', and again in his
+Physical Theses, 'for there is no other or more appropriate way of
+approaching the subject of good and evil on the virtues or happiness
+than from the nature of all things and the administration of the
+universe--for it is to these we must attach the treatment of good and
+evil inasmuch as there is no better origin to which we can refer them
+and inasmuch as physical speculation is taken in solely with a view
+to the distinction between good and evil.'
+
+The last words are worth noting as showing that even with Chrysippus
+who has been called the intellectual founder of Stoicism the whole
+stress of the philosophy of the Porch fell upon its moral teaching.
+It was a favourite metaphor with the school to compare philosophy to
+a fertile vineyard or orchard. Ethic was the good fruit, physic the
+tall plants, and logic the strong wall. The wall existed only to
+guard the trees, and the trees only to produce the fruit. Or again
+philosophy was likened to an egg of which ethic was the yolk
+containing the chick, physic the white which formed its nourishment
+while logic was the hard outside shell. Posidonius, a later member of
+the school, objected to the metaphor from the vineyard on the ground
+that the fruit and the trees and the wall were all separable whereas
+the parts of philosophy were inseparable. He preferred therefore to
+liken it to a living organism, logic being the bones and sinews,
+physic the flesh and blood, but ethic the soul.
+
+
+LOGIC
+
+The Stoics had a tremendous reputation for logic. In this department
+they were the successors or rather the supersessors of Aristotle. For
+after the death of Theophrastus the library of the Lyceum is said to
+have been buried underground at Scepsis until about a century before
+Christ, So that the Organon may actually have been lost to the world
+during that period. At all events under Strato the successor of
+Theophrastus who specialized in natural science the school had lost
+its comprehensiveness. Cicero even finds it consonant with dramatic
+propriety to make Cato charge the later Peripatetics with ignorance
+of logic! On the other hand Chrysippus became so famous for his logic
+as to create a general impression that if there were a logic among
+the gods it would be no other than the Chrysippean.
+
+But if the Stoics were strong in logic they were weak in rhetoric.
+This strength and weakness were characteristic of the school at all
+periods. Cato is the only Roman Stoic to whom Cicero accords the
+praise of real eloquence. In the dying accents of the school as we
+hear them in Marcus Aurelius the imperial sage counts it a thing to
+be thankful for that he had learnt to abstain from rhetoric, poetic,
+and elegance of diction. The reader however cannot help wishing that
+he had taken some means to diminish the crabbedness of his style. If
+a lesson were wanted in the importance of sacrificing to the Graces
+it might be found in the fact that the early Stoic writers despite
+their logical subtlety have all perished and that their remains have
+to be sought for so largely in the pages of Cicero. In speaking of
+logic as one of the three departments of philosophy we must bear in
+mind that the term was one of much wider meaning than it is with us.
+It included rhetoric, poetic, and grammar as well as dialectic or
+logic proper, to say nothing of disquisitions on the senses and the
+intellect which we should now refer to psychology.
+
+Logic as a whole being divided into rhetoric and dialectic: rhetoric
+was defined to be the knowledge of how to speak well in expository
+discourses and dialectic as the knowledge of how to argue rightly in
+matters of question and answer. Both rhetoric and dialectic were
+spoken of by the Stoics as virtues for they divided virtue in its
+most generic sense in the same way as they divided philosophy into
+physical, ethical, and logical. Rhetoric and dialectic were thus the
+two species of logical virtue. Zeno expressed their difference by
+comparing rhetoric to the palm and dialectic to the fist.
+
+Instead of throwing in poetic and grammar with rhetoric, the Stoics
+subdivided dialectic into the part which dealt with the meaning and
+the part which dealt with the sound, or as Chrysippus phrased it,
+concerning significants and significates. Under the former came the
+treatment of the alphabet, of the parts of speech, of solecism, of
+barbarism, of poems, of amphibolies, of metre and music--a list which
+seems at first sight a little mixed, but in which we can recognise
+the general features of grammar, with its departments of phonology,
+accidence, and prosody. The treatment of solecism and barbarism in
+grammar corresponded to that of fallacies in logic. With regard to
+the alphabet it is worth noting that the Stoics recognised seven
+vowels and six mutes. This is more correct than our way of talking of
+nine mutes, since the aspirate consonants are plainly not mute. There
+were, according to the Stoics, five parts of speech--name,
+appellative, verb, conjunction, article. 'Name' meant a proper name,
+and 'appellative' a common term.
+
+There were reckoned to be five virtues of speech--Hellenism,
+clearness, conciseness, propriety, distinction. By 'Hellenism' was
+meant speaking good Greek. 'Distinction' was defined to be 'a diction
+which avoided homeliness.' Over against these there were two
+comprehensive vices, barbarism and solecism, the one being an offence
+against accidence, the other against syntax.
+
+The famous comparison of the infant mind to a blank sheet of paper,
+which we connect so closely with the name of Locke, really comes from
+the Stoics. The earliest characters inscribed upon it were the
+impressions of sense, which the Greeks called "phantasies." A
+phantasy was defined by Zeno as "an impression in the soul."
+Cleanthes was content to take this definition in its literal sense,
+and believe that the soul was impressed by external objects as wax by
+a signet ring. Chrysippus, however, found a difficulty here, and
+preferred to interpret the Master's saying to mean an alteration or
+change in the soul. He figured to himself the soul as receiving a
+modification from every external object which acts upon it just as
+the air receives countless strokes when many people are speaking at
+once. Further, he declared that in receiving an impression the soul
+was purely passive and that the phantasy revealed not only its own
+existence, but that also of its cause, just as light displays itself
+and the things that are in it. Thus, when through sight we receive an
+impression of white, an affection takes place in the soul, in virtue
+whereof we are able to say that there exists a white object affecting
+us. The power to name the object resides in the understanding. First
+must come the phantasy, and the understanding, having the power of
+utterance, expresses in speech the affection it receives from the
+object. The cause of the phantasy was called the "phantast," _e.
+g._ the white or cold object. If there is no external cause, then
+the supposed object of the impression was a "phantasm," such as a
+figure in a dream, or the Furies whom Orestes sees in his frenzy.
+
+How then was the impression which had reality behind it to be
+distinguished from that which had not? "By the feel" is all that the
+Stoics really had to say in answer to this question. Just as Hume
+made the difference between sense-impressions and ideas to lie in the
+greater vividness of the former, so did they; only Hume saw no
+necessity to go beyond the impression, whereas the Stoics did.
+Certain impressions, they maintained, carried with them an
+irresistible conviction of their own reality, and this, not merely in
+the sense that they existed; but also that they were referable to an
+external cause. These were called "gripping phantasies." Such a
+phantasy did not need proof of its own existence, or of that of its
+object. It possessed self-evidence. Its occurrence was attended with
+yielding and assent on the part of the soul. For it is as natural for
+the soul to assent to the self-evident as it is for it to pursue its
+proper good. The assent to a griping phantasy was called
+"comprehension," as indicating the firm hold that the soul thus took
+of reality. A gripping phantasy was defined as one which was stamped
+and impressed from an existing object, in virtue of that object
+itself, in such a way as it could not be from a non-existent object.
+The clause "in virtue of that object itself" was put into the
+definition to provide against such a case as that of the mad Orestes,
+who takes his sister to be a Fury. There the impression was derived
+from an existing object, but not from that object as such, but as
+coloured by the imagination of the percipient.
+
+The criterion of truth then was no other than the gripping phantasy.
+Such at least was the doctrine of the earlier Stoics, but the later
+added a saving clause, "when there is no impediment." For they were
+pressed by their opponents with such imaginary cases as that of
+Admetus, seeing his wife before him in very deed, and yet not
+believing it to be her. But here there was an impediment. Admetus did
+not believe that the dead could rise. Again Menelaus did not believe
+in the real Helen when he found her on the island of Pharos. But here
+again there was an impediment. For Menelaus could not have been
+expected to know that he had been for ten years fighting for a
+phantom. When, however, there was no such impediment, then they said
+the gripping phantasy did indeed deserve its name, for it almost took
+men by the hair of the head and dragged them to assent.
+
+So far we have used "phantasy" only of real or imaginary impressions
+of sense. But the term was not thus restricted by the Stoics, who
+divided phantasies into sensible and not sensible. The latter came
+through the understanding and were of bodiless things which could
+only be grasped by reason. The ideas of Plato they declared existed
+only in our minds. Horse, man, and animal had no substantial
+existence but were phantasms of the soul. The Stoics were thus what
+we should call Conceptualists.
+
+Comprehension too was used in a wider sense than that in which we
+have so far employed it. There was comprehension by the senses as of
+white and black, of rough and smooth, but there was also
+comprehension by the reason of demonstrative conclusions such as that
+the gods exist and that they exercise providence. Here we are
+reminded of Locke's declaration: "'Tis as certain there's a God as
+that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight
+lines are equal." The Stoics indeed had great affinities with that
+thinker or rather he with them. The Stoic account of the manner in
+which the mind arrives at its ideas might almost be taken from the
+first book of Locke's _Essay_. As many as nine ways are
+enumerated of which the first corresponds to simple ideas--
+
+(1) by presentation, as objects of sense
+
+(2) by likeness, as the idea of Socrates from his picture
+
+(3) by analogy, that is, by increase or decrease, as ideas of giants
+and pigmies from men, or as the notion of the centre of the earth,
+which is reached by the consideration of smaller spheres.
+
+(4) by transposition, as the idea of men with eyes in their breasts.
+
+(5) by composition, as the idea of a Centaur.
+
+(6) by opposition, as the idea of death from that of life.
+
+(7) by a kind of transition, as the meaning of words and the idea of
+place.
+
+(8)by nature, as the notion of the just and the good
+
+(9)by privation, as handless
+
+The Stoics resembled Locke again in endeavoring to give such a
+definition of knowledge as should cover at once the reports of the
+senses and the relation between ideas. Knowledge was defined by them
+as a sure comprehension or a habit in the acceptance of phantasies
+which was not liable to be changed by reason. On a first hearing
+these definitions might seem limited to sense knowledge but if we
+bethink ourselves of the wider meanings of comprehension and of
+phantasy, we see that the definitions apply as they were meant to
+apply to the mind's grasp upon the force of a demonstration no less
+than upon the existence of a physical object.
+
+Zeno, with that touch of oriental symbolism which characterized him,
+used to illustrate to his disciples the steps to knowledge by means
+of gestures. Displaying his right hand with the fingers outstretched
+he would say, "That is a phantasy," then contracting the fingers a
+little, "That is assent," then having closed the fist, "That is
+comprehension," then clasping the fist closely with the left hand, he
+would add, "That is knowledge."
+
+A notion which corresponds to our word concept was defined as a
+phantasm of the understanding of a rational animal. For a notion was
+but a phantasm as it presented itself to a rational mind. In the same
+way so many shillings and sovereigns are in themselves but shillings
+and sovereigns, but when used as passage money they become fare.
+Notions were arrived at partly by nature, partly by teaching and
+study. The former kind of notions were called preconceptions; the
+latter went merely by the generic name.
+
+Out of the general ideas which nature imparts to us, reason was
+perfected about the age of fourteen, at the time when the voice--its
+outward and visible sign--attains its full development, and when the
+human animal is complete in other respects as being able to reproduce
+its kind. Thus reason which united us to the gods was not, according
+to the Stoics, a pre-existent principal, but a gradual development
+out of sense. It might truly be said that with them the senses were
+the intellect.
+
+Being was confined by the Stoics to body, a bold assertion of which
+we shall meet the consequences later. At present it is sufficient to
+notice what havoc it makes among the categories. Of Aristotle's ten
+categories it leaves only the first, Substance, and that only in its
+narrowest sense of Primary Substance. But a substance or body might
+be regarded in four ways--
+  (1) simply as a body
+  (2) as a body of a particular kind
+  (3) as a body in a particular state
+  (4) as a body in a particular relation.
+
+Hence result the four Stoic categories of--
+    substrates
+    suchlike
+    so disposed
+    so related
+
+But the bodiless would not be thus conjured out of existence. For
+what was to be made of such things as the meaning of words, time,
+place, and the infinite void? Even the Stoics did not assign body to
+these, and yet they had to be recognized and spoken of. The
+difficulty was got over by the invention of the higher category of
+somewhat, which should include both body and the bodiless. Time was a
+somewhat, and so was space, though neither of them possessed being.
+
+In the Stoic treatment of the proposition, grammar was very much
+mixed up with logic. They had a wide name which applied to any part
+of diction, whether a word or words, a sentence, or even a syllogism.
+This we shall render by "dict." A dict, then, was defined as "that
+which subsists in correspondence with a rational phantasy." A dict
+was one of the things which the Stoics admitted to be devoid of body.
+There were three things involved when anything was said--the sound,
+the sense, and the external object. Of these the first and the last
+were bodies, but the intermediate one was not a body. This we may
+illustrate after Seneca, as follows: "You see Cato walking. What your
+eyes see and your mind attends to is a body in motion. Then you say,
+'Cato is walking'." The mere sound indeed of these words is air in
+motion and therefore a body but the meaning of them is not a body but
+an enouncement about a body, which is quite a different thing.
+
+On examining such details as are left us of the Stoic logic, the
+first thing which strikes one is its extreme complexity as compared
+with the Aristotelian. It was a scholastic age, and the Stoics
+refined and distinguished to their hearts' content. As regards
+immediate inference, a subject which has been run into subtleties
+among ourselves, Chrysippus estimated that the changes which could be
+rung on ten propositions exceeded a million, but for this assertion
+he was taken to task by Hipparchus the mathematician, who proved that
+the affirmative proposition yielded exactly 103,049 forms and the
+negative 310,962. With us the affirmative proposition is more
+prolific in consequences than the negative. But then, the Stoics were
+not content with so simple a thing as mere negation, but had negative
+arnetic and privative, to say nothing of supernegative propositions.
+Another noticeable feature is the total absence of the three figures
+of Aristotle and the only moods spoken of are the moods of the
+complex syllogism, such as the _modus penens_ in a conjunctive.
+Their type of reasoning was--
+  If A, then B
+  But A
+  B
+
+The important part played by conjunctive propositions in their logic
+led the Stoics to formulate the following rule with regard to the
+material quality of such propositions: Truth can only be followed by
+truth, but falsehood may be followed by falsehood or truth.
+
+Thus if it be truly stated that it is day, any consequence of that
+statement, _e.g._ that it is light, must be true also. But a
+false statement may lead either way. For instance, if it be falsely
+stated that it is night then the consequence that it is dark is false
+also. But if we say, "The earth flies," which was regarded as not
+only false but impossible [Footnote: Here we may recall the warning
+of Arago to call nothing impossible outside the range of pure
+mathematics] this involves the true consequence that the earth is.
+Though the simple syllogism is not alluded to in the sketch which
+Diogenes Laertius gives of the Stoic logic, it is of frequent
+occurrence in the accounts left us of their arguments. Take for
+instance the syllogism wherewith Zeno advocated the cause of
+temperance--
+  One does not commit a secret to a man who is drunk.
+  One does commit a secret to a good man.
+  A good man will not get drunk.
+
+The chain argument which we wrongly call the Sorites was also a
+favorite resource with the Stoics. If a single syllogism did not
+suffice to argue men into virtue surely a condensed series must be
+effectual. And so they demonstrated the sufficiency of wisdom for
+happiness as follows----
+  The wise man is temperate
+  The temperate is constant
+  The constant is unperturbed
+  The unperturbed is free from sorrow
+  Whoso is free from sorrow is happy
+  The wise man is happy
+
+The delight which the early Stoics took in this pure play of the
+intellect led them to pounce with avidity upon the abundant stock of
+fallacies current among the Greeks of their time. These seem--most of
+them--to have been invented by the Megarians and especially by
+Eubulides of Miletus a disciple of Eucleides but they became
+associated with the Stoics both by friends and foes who either praise
+their subtlety or deride their solemnity in dealing with them.
+Chrysippus himself was not above propounding such sophisms as the
+following--
+
+  Whoever divulges the mysteries to the uninitiated commits impiety
+  The hierophant divulged the mysteries to the uninitiated
+  The hierophant commits impiety
+
+  Anything that you say passes through your mouth
+  You say a wagon
+  A wagon passes through your mouth
+
+He is said to have written eleven books on the No-one fallacy. But
+what seems to have exercised most of his ingenuity was the famous
+Liar, the invention of which is ascribed to Eubulides. This fallacy
+in its simplest form is as follows. If you say truly that you are
+telling a lie, are you lying or telling the truth? Chrysippus set
+this down as inexplicable. Nevertheless he was far from declining to
+discuss it. For we find in the list of his works a treatise in five
+books on the Inexplicables an Introduction to the Liar and Liars for
+Introduction, six books on the Liar itself, a work directed against
+those who thought that such propositions were both false and true,
+another against those who professed to solve the Liar by a process of
+division, three books on the solution of the Liar, and finally a
+polemic against those who asserted that the Liar had its premises
+false. It was well for poor Philetas of Cos that he ended his days
+before Chrysippus was born, though as it was he grew thin and died of
+the Liar, and his epitaph served as a solemn reminder to poets not to
+meddle with logic--
+
+    Philetas of Cos am I
+    'Twas the Liar who made me die
+    And the bad nights caused thereby.
+
+Perhaps we owe him an apology for the translation.
+
+
+ETHIC
+
+We have already had to touch upon the psychology of the Stoics in
+connection with the first principles of logic. It is no less
+necessary to do so now in dealing with the foundation of ethic.
+
+The Stoics we are told reckoned that there were eight parts of the
+soul. These were the five senses, the organ of sound, the intellect
+and the reproductive principle. The passions, it will be observed,
+are conspicuous by their absence. For the Stoic theory was that the
+passions were simply the intellect in a diseased state owing to the
+perversions of falsehood. This is why the Stoics would not parley
+with passion, conceiving that if once it were let into the citadel of
+the soul it would supplant the rightful ruler. Passion and reason
+were not two things which could be kept separate in which case it
+might be hoped that reason would control passion, but were two states
+of the same thing--a worse and a better.
+
+The unperturbed intellect was the legitimate monarch in the kingdom
+of man. Hence the Stoics commonly spoke of it as the leading
+principle. This was the part of the soul which received phantasies
+and it was also that in which impulses were generated with which we
+have now more particularly to do.
+
+Impulse or appetition was the principle in the soul which impelled to
+action. In an unperverted state it was directed only to things in
+accordance with nature. The negative form of this principle or the
+avoidance of things as being contrary to nature, we shall call
+repulsion.
+
+Notwithstanding the sublime heights to which Stoic morality rose. It
+was professedly based on self-love, wherein the Stoics were at one
+with the other schools of thought in the ancient world.
+
+The earliest impulse that appeared in a newly born animal was to
+protect itself and its own constitution which were conciliated to it
+by nature. What tended to its survival, it sought; what tended to its
+destruction, it shunned. Thus self-preservation was the first law of
+life.
+
+While man was still in the merely animal stage, and before reason was
+developed in him, the things that were in accordance with his nature
+were such as health, strength, good bodily condition, soundness of
+all the senses, beauty, swiftness--in short all the qualities that
+went to make up richness of physical life and that contributed to the
+vital harmony. These were called the first things in accordance with
+nature. Their opposites were all contrary to nature, such as
+sickness, weakness, mutilation. Under the first things in accordance
+with nature came also congenial advantages of soul such as quickness
+of intelligence, natural ability, industry, application, memory, and
+the like. It was a question whether pleasure was to be included among
+the number. Some members of the school evidently though that it might
+be, but the orthodox opinion was that pleasure was a sort of
+aftergrowth and that the direct pursuit of it was deleterious to the
+organism. The after growths of virtue were joy, cheerfulness, and the
+like. These were the gambolings of the spirit like the frolicsomeness
+of an animal in the full flush of its vitality or like the blooming
+of a plant. For one and the same power manifested itself in all ranks
+of nature, only at each stage on a higher level. To the vegetative
+powers of the plant the animal added sense and Impulse. It was in
+accordance therefore with the nature of an animal to obey the
+Impulses of sense, but to sense and Impulse man superadded reason so
+that when he became conscious of himself as a rational being, it was
+in accordance with his nature to let all his Impulses be shaped by
+this new and master hand. Virtue was therefore pre-eminently in
+accordance with nature. What then we must now ask is the relation of
+reason to impulse as conceived by the Stoics? Is reason simply the
+guiding, and impulse the motive power? Seneca protests against this
+view, when impulse is identified with passion. One of his grounds for
+doing so is that reason would be put on a level with passion, if the
+two were equally necessary for action. But the question is begged by
+the use of the word 'passion,' which was defined by the Stoics as 'an
+excessive impulse.' Is it possible then, even on Stoic principles,
+for reason to work without something different from itself to help
+it? Or must we say that reason is itself a principle of action? Here
+Plutarch comes to our aid, who tells us on the authority of
+Chrysippus in his work on Law that impulse is 'the reason of man
+commanding him to act,' and similarly that repulsion is 'prohibitive
+reason.' This renders the Stoic position unmistakable, and we must
+accomodate our minds to it in spite of its difficulties. Just as we
+have seen already that reason is not something radically different
+from sense, so now it appears that reason is not different from
+impulse, but itself the perfected form of impulse. Whenever impulse
+is not identical with reason--at least in a rational being--it is not
+truly impulse, but passion.
+
+The Stoics, it will be observed, were Evolutionists in their
+psychology. But, like many Evolutionists at the present day, they did
+not believe in the origin of mind out of matter. In all living things
+there existed already what they called 'seminal reasons,' which
+accounted for the intelligence displayed by plants as well as by
+animals. As there were four cardinal virtues, so there were four
+primary passions. These were delight, grief, desire and fear. All of
+them were excited by the presence or the prospect of fancied good or
+ill. What prompted desire by its prospect caused delight by its
+presence, and what prompted fear by its prospect caused grief by its
+presence. Thus two of the primary passions had to do with good and
+two with evil. All were furies which infested the life of fools,
+rendering it bitter and grievous to them; and it was the business of
+philosophy to fight against them. Nor was this strife a hopeless one,
+since the passions were not grounded in nature, but were due to false
+opinion. They originated in voluntary judgements, and owed their
+birth to a lack of mental sobriety. If men wished to live the span of
+life that was allotted to them in quietness and peace, they must by
+all means keep clear of the passions.
+
+The four primary passions having been formulated, it became necessary
+to justify the division by arranging the specific forms of feeling
+under these four heads. In this task the Stoics displayed a subtlety
+which is of more interest to the lexicographer than to the student of
+philosophy. They laid great stress on the derivation of words as
+affording a clue to their meaning; and, as their etymology was bound
+by no principles, their ingenuity was free to indulge in the wildest
+freaks of fancy.
+
+Though all passion stood self-condemned, there were nevertheless
+certain 'eupathies,' or happy affections, which would be experienced
+by the ideally good and wise man. These were not perturbations of the
+soul, but rather 'constancies'; they were not opposed to reason, but
+were rather part of reason. Though the sage would never be
+transported with delight, he would still feel an abiding 'joy' in the
+presence of the true and only good; he would never indeed be agitated
+by desire, but still he would be animated by 'wish,' for that was
+directed only to the good; and though he would never feel fear still
+he would be actuated in danger by a proper caution.
+
+There was therefore something rational corresponding to three out of
+four primary passions--against delight was to be set joy; against
+grief there was nothing to be set, for that arose from the presence
+of ill which would rather never attach to the sage. Grief was the
+irrational conviction that one ought to afflict oneself where there
+was no occasion for it. The ideal of the Stoics was the unclouded
+serenity of Socrates of whom Xanthippe declared that he had always
+the same face whether on leaving the house In the morning or on
+returning to it at night.
+
+As the motley crowd of passions followed the banners of their four
+leaders so specific forms of feeling sanctioned by reason were
+severally assigned to the three eupathies.
+
+Things were divided by Zeno into good, bad, and indifferent. To good
+belonged virtue and what partook of virtue; to bad, vice and what
+partook of vice. All other things were indifferent.
+
+To the third class then belonged such things as life and death,
+health and sickness, pleasure and pain, beauty and ugliness, strength
+and weakness, honour and dishonour, wealth and poverty, victory and
+defeat, nobility and baseness of birth.
+
+Good was defined as that which benefits. To confer benefit was no
+less essential to good than to impart warmth was to heat. If one
+asked in what 'to benefit' lay one received the reply that it lay in
+producing an act or state in accordance with virtue, and similarly it
+was laid down that 'to hurt' lay in producing an act or state in
+accordance with vice.
+
+The indifference of things other than virtue and vice was apparent
+from the definition of good which made it essentially beneficial.
+Such things as health and wealth might be beneficial or not according
+to circumstances; they were therefore no more good than bad. Again,
+nothing could be really good of which the good or ill depended on the
+use made of it, but this was the case with things like health and
+wealth.
+
+The true and only good then was identical with what the Greeks called
+'the beautiful' and what we call 'the right'. To say that a thing was
+right was to say that it was good, and conversely to say that it was
+good was to say that it was right; this absolute identity between the
+good and the right and, on the other hand, between the bad and wrong,
+was the head and front of the Stoic ethics. The right contained in
+itself all that was necessary for the happy life, the wrong was the
+only evil, and made men miserable whether they knew it or not.
+
+As virtue was itself the end, it was of course choiceworthy in and
+for itself, apart from hope or fear with regard to its consequences.
+Moreover, as being the highest good, it could admit of no increase
+from the addition of things indifferent. It did not even admit of
+increase from the prolongation of its own existence, for the question
+was not one of quantity, but of quality. Virtue for an eternity was
+no more virtue, and therefore no more good, than virtue for a moment.
+Even so one circle was no more round than another, whatever you might
+choose to make its diameter, nor would it detract from the perfection
+of a circle if it were to be obliterated immediately in the same dust
+in which it had been drawn.
+
+To say that the good of men lay in virtue was another way of saying
+that it lay in reason, since virtue was the perfection of reason.
+
+As reason was the only thing whereby Nature had distinguished man
+from other creatures, to live the rational life was to follow Nature.
+
+Nature was at once the law of God and the law for man. For by the
+nature of anything was meant, not that which we actually find it to
+be, but that which in the eternal fitness of things it was obviously
+intended to become.
+
+To be happy then was to be virtuous, to be virtuous was to be
+rational, to be rational was to follow Nature, and to follow Nature
+was to obey God. Virtue imparted to life that even flow in which Zeno
+declared happiness to consist. This was attained when one's own
+genius was in harmony with the will that disposed of all things.
+
+Virtue having been purified from all the dross of the emotions, came
+out as something purely intellectual, so that the Stoics agreed with
+the Socratic conception that virtue is knowledge. They also took on
+from Plato the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Temperance, Courage,
+and Justice, and defined them as so many branches of knowledge.
+Against these were set four cardinal vices of Folly, Intemperance,
+Cowardice, and Injustice. Under both the virtues and vices there was
+an elaborate classification of specific qualities. But
+notwithstanding the care with which the Stoics divided and subdivided
+the virtues, virtue, according to their doctrine, was all the time
+one and indivisible. For virtue was simply reason and reason, if it
+were there, must control every department of conduct alike. 'He who
+has one virtue has all,' was a paradox with which the Greek thought
+was already familiar. But Chrysippus went beyond this, declaring that
+he who displayed one virtue did thereby display all. Neither was the
+man perfect who did not possess all the virtues, nor was the act
+perfect which did not involve them all. Where the virtues differed
+from one another was merely in the order in which they put things.
+Each was primarily itself, secondarily all the rest. Wisdom had to
+determine what it was right to do, but this involved the other
+virtues. Temperance had to impart stability to the impulses, but how
+could the term 'temperate' be applied to a man who deserted his post
+through cowardice, or who failed to return a deposit through avarice,
+which is a form of injustice, or yet to one who misconducted affairs
+through rashness, which falls under folly? Courage had to face
+dangers and difficulties, but it was not courage unless its cause
+were just. Indeed one of the ways in which courage was defined was a
+virtue fighting on behalf of justice. Similarly justice put first the
+assigning to each man his due, but in the act of doing so had to
+bring in the other virtues. In short, it was the business of the man
+of virtue to know and to do what ought to be done, for what ought to
+be done implied wisdom in choice, courage in endurance, justice in
+assignment and temperance in abiding by ones conviction. One virtue
+never acted by itself, but always on the advice of a committee. The
+obverse to this paradox--He who has one vice has all vices--was a
+conclusion which the Stoics did not shrink from drawing. One might
+lose part of one's Corinthian ware and still retain the rest, but to
+lose one virtue--if virtue could be lost--would be to lose all along
+with it.
+
+We have now encountered the first paradox of Stoicism, and can
+discern its origin in the identification of virtue with pure reason.
+In getting forth the novelties in Zeno's teaching, Cicero mentions
+that, while his predecessors had recognized virtues due to nature and
+habit, he made all dependent upon reason. A natural consequence of
+this was the reassertion of the position which Plato held or wished
+to hold, namely, that virtue can be taught. But the part played by
+nature in virtue cannot be ignored. It was not in the power of Zeno
+to alter facts. All he could do was to legislate as to names. And
+this he did vigorously. Nothing was to be called virtue which was not
+of the nature of reason and knowledge, but still it had to be
+admitted that nature supplied the starting points for the four
+cardinal virtues--for the discovery of one's impulses, for right
+endurances and harmonious distributions.
+
+From things good and bad we now turn to things indifferent. Hitherto
+the Stoic doctrine has been stern and uncompromising. We have now to
+look at it under a different aspect, and to see how it tried to
+conciliate common sense.
+
+By things indifferent were meant such as did not necessarily
+contribute to virtue, for instance health, wealth, strength, and
+honor. It is possible to have all these and not be virtuous, it is
+possible also to be virtuous without them. But we have now to learn
+that though these things are neither good nor evil, and are therefore
+not matter for choice or avoidance, they are far from being
+indifferent in the sense of arousing neither impulse nor repulsion.
+There are things indeed that are indifferent in the latter sense,
+such as whether you put out your finger this way or that, whether you
+stoop to pick up a straw or not, whether the number of hairs on your
+head be odd or even. But things of this sort are exceptional. The
+bulk of things other than virtue and vice do arouse in us either
+impulse or repulsion. Let it be understood then that there are two
+senses of the word indifferent--
+   (1) neither good nor bad
+   (2) neither awaking impulse nor repulsion
+
+Among things indifferent in the former sense, some were in accordance
+with nature, some were contrary to nature and some were neither one
+nor the other. Health, strengths and soundness of the senses were in
+accordance with nature; sickness weakness and mutilation were
+contrary to nature, but such things as the fallibility of the soul
+and the vulnerability of the body were neither in accordance with
+nature nor yet contrary to nature, but just nature.
+
+All things that were in accordance with nature had 'value' and all
+things that were contrary to nature had what we must call 'disvalue'.
+In the highest sense indeed of the term 'value'--namely that of
+absolute value or worth--things indifferent did not possess any value
+at all. But still there might be assigned to them what Antipater
+expressed by the term 'a selective value' or what he expressed by its
+barbarous privative, 'a disselective disvalue'. If a thing possessed
+a selective value you took that thing rather than its contrary,
+supposing that circumstances allowed, for instance, health rather
+than sickness, wealth rather than poverty, life rather than death.
+Hence such things were called takeable and their contraries
+untakeable. Things that possessed a high degree of value were called
+preferred, those that possessed a high degree of disvalue were called
+rejected. Such as possessed no considerable degree of either were
+neither preferred nor rejected. Zeno, with whom these names
+originated, justified their use about things really indifferent on
+the ground that at court "preferment" could not be bestowed upon the
+king himself, but only on his ministers.
+
+Things preferred and rejected might belong to mind, body or estate.
+Among things preferred in the case of the mind were natural ability,
+art, moral progress, and the like, while their contraries were
+rejected. In the case of the body, life, health, strength, good
+condition, completeness, and beauty were preferred, while death,
+sickness, weakness, ill condition, mutilation and ugliness were
+rejected. Among things external to soul and body, wealth, reputation,
+and nobility were preferred, while poverty, ill repute, and baseness
+of birth were rejected.
+
+In this way all mundane and marketable goods, after having been
+solemnly refused admittance by the Stoics at the front door, were
+smuggled in at a kind of tradesman's entrance under the name of
+things indifferent. We must now see how they had, as it were, two
+moral codes, one for the sage and the other for the world in general.
+
+The sage alone could act rightly, but other people might perform "the
+proprieties." Any one might honor his parents, but the sage alone did
+it as the outcome of wisdom, because he alone possessed the art of
+life, the peculiar work of which was to do everything that was done
+as the result of the best disposition. All the acts of the sage were
+"perfect proprieties," which were called "rightnesses." All acts of
+all other men were sins or "wrongnesses." At their best they could
+only be "intermediate proprieties." The term "propriety," then, is a
+generic one. But, as often happens, the generic term got determined
+in use to a specific meaning, so that intermediate acts are commonly
+spoken of as "proprieties" in opposition to "rightnesses." Instances
+of "rightnesses" are displaying wisdom and dealing justly, instances
+of proprieties or intermediate acts are marrying, going on an
+embassy, and dialectic.
+
+The word "duty" is often employed to translate the Greek term which
+we are rendering by "propriety." Any translation is no more than a
+choice of evils, since we have no real equivalent for the term. It
+was applicable not merely to human conduct, but also to the acting of
+the lower animals, and even to the growth of plants. Now, apart from
+a craze of generalization we should hardly think of the "stern
+daughter of the voice of God" in connection with an amoeba
+corresponding successfully to stimulus, yet the creature in its
+inchoate way is exhibiting a dim analogy to duty. The term in
+question was first used by Zeno, and was explained by him, in
+accordance with its etymology, to mean what it came to one to do, so
+that as far as this goes, 'becomingness' would be the most
+appropriate translation.
+
+The sphere of propriety was confined to things indifferent, so that
+there were proprieties which were common to the sage and the fool. It
+had to do with taking the things which were in accordance with nature
+and rejecting those that were not. Even the propriety of living or
+dying was determined, not by reference to virtue or vice, but to the
+preponderance or deficiency of things in accordance with nature. It
+might thus be a propriety for the sage in spite of his happiness, to
+depart from life of his own accord, and for the fool notwithstanding
+his misery, to remain in it. Life, being in itself indifferent, the
+whole question was one of opportunism. Wisdom might prompt the
+leaving herself should occasion seem to call for it.
+
+We pass on now another instance of accommodation. According to the
+high Stoic doctrine, there was no mean between virtue and vice. All
+men indeed received from nature the starting-points for virtue, but
+until perfection had been attained they rested under the condemnation
+of vice. It was, to employ an illustration of the poet-philosopher
+Cleanthes, as though Nature had begun an iambic line and left men to
+finish it. Until that was done they were to wear the fool's cap. The
+Peripatetics, on the other hand, recognized an intermediate state
+between virtue and vice, to which they gave the name of progress and
+proficience. Yet so entirely had the Stoics, for practical purposes,
+to accept this lower level, that the word "proficience" has come to
+be spoken of as though it were of Stoic origin.
+
+Seneca is fond of contrasting the sage with the proficient. The sage
+is like a man in the enjoyment of perfect health. But the proficient
+is like a man recovering from a severe illness, with whom an
+abatement of the paroxysm is equivalent to health, and who is always
+in danger of a relapse. It is the business of philosophy to provide
+for the needs of these weaker brethren. The proficient is still
+called a fool, but it is pointed out that he is a very different kind
+of fool from the rest. Further, proficients are arranged into three
+classes, in a way that reminds one of the technicalities of
+Calvinistic theology. First of all, there are those who are near
+wisdom, but, however near they may be to the door of Heaven, they are
+still on the wrong side of it. According to some doctors, these were
+already safe from backsliding, differing from the sage only in not
+having yet realized that they had attained to knowledge; other
+authorities, however, refused to admit this, and regarded the first
+class as being exempt only from settled diseases of the soul, but not
+from passing attacks of passion. Thus did the Stoics differ among
+themselves as to the doctrine of "final assurance". The second class
+consisted of those who had laid aside the worst diseases and passions
+of the soul, but might at any moment relapse into them. The third
+class was of those who had escaped one mental malady but not another;
+who had conquered lust, let us say, but not ambition; who disregarded
+death, but dreaded pain, This third class, adds Seneca, is by no
+means to be despised.
+
+From these concessions to the weakness of humanity we now pass to the
+Stoic paradoxes, where we shall see their doctrine in its full rigor.
+It is perhaps these very paradoxes which account for the puzzled
+fascination with which Stoicism affected the mind of antiquity, just
+as obscurity in a poet may prove a surer passport to fame than more
+strictly poetical merits.
+
+The root of Stoicism being a paradox, it is not surprising that the
+offshoots should be so too. To say that "Virtue is the highest good"
+is a proposition to which every one who aspires to the spiritual life
+must yield assent with his lips, even if he has not yet learned to
+believe it in his heart. But alter it into "Virtue is the only good"
+and by that slight change it becomes at once the teeming mother of
+paradoxes. By a paradox is meant that which runs counter to general
+opinion. Now it is quite certain that men have regarded, do regard,
+and, we may safely add will regard things as good which are not
+virtue. But if we grant this initial paradox, a great many others
+will follow along with it--as for instance that "Virtue is sufficient
+of itself for happiness". The fifth book of Cicero's _Tusculan
+Disputations_ is an eloquent defense of this thesis, in which the
+orator combats the suggestion that a good man is not happy when he is
+being broken on the wheel.
+
+Another glaring paradox of the Stoics is that "All faults are equal".
+They took their stand upon a mathematical conception of rectitude. An
+angle must be either a right angle or not, a line must be either
+straight or crooked, so an act must be either right or wrong. There
+is no mean between the two and there are no degrees of either. To sin
+is to cross the line. When once that has been done it makes no
+difference to the offense how far you go. Trespassing at all is
+forbidden. This doctrine was defended by the Stoics on account of its
+bracing moral effect as showing the heinousness of sin. Horace gives
+the judgment of the world in saying that common sense and morality,
+to say nothing of utility, revolt against it.
+
+Here are some other specimens of the Stoic paradoxes. "Every fool is
+mad". "Only the sage is free and every fool is a slave". "The sage
+alone is wealthy". "Good men are always happy and bad men always
+miserable". "All goods are equal". "No one is wiser or happier than
+another". But may not one man we ask be more nearly wise or more
+nearly happy than another? "That may be", the Stoics would reply,
+"but the man who is only one stade from Canopus is as much not in
+Canopus as the man who is a hundred stades off; and the eight day old
+puppy is still as blind as on the day of its birth; nor can a man who
+is near the surface of the sea breathe any more than if he were full
+five hundred fathom down".
+
+It is only fair to the Stoics to add that paradoxes were quite the
+order of the day in Greece, though they greatly outdid other schools
+in producing them. Socrates himself was the father of paradox.
+Epicurus maintained as staunchly as any Stoic that "No wise man is
+unhappy", and, if he be not belied, went the length of declaring that
+the wise man, if put into the bull of Phalaris would exclaim: "How
+delightful! How little I mind this!"
+
+It is out of keeping with common sense to draw a hard and fast
+distinction between good and bad. Yet this was what the Stoics did.
+They insisted on effecting here and now that separation between the
+sheep and the goats, which Christ postponed to the Day of Judgment.
+Unfortunately, when it came to practice, all were found to be goats,
+so that the division was a merely formal one.
+
+The good man of the Stoics was variously known as 'the sage', or,
+'the serious man', the latter name being inherited from the
+Peripatetics. We used to hear it said among ourselves that a person
+had become serious, when he or she had taken to religion. Another
+appellation which the Stoics had for the sage was 'the urbane man',
+while the fool in contradistinction was called 'a boor'. Boorishness
+was defined as an inexperience of the customs and laws of the state.
+By the state was meant, not Athens or Sparta, as would have been the
+case in a former age, but the society of all rational beings into
+which the Stoics spiritualised the state. The sage alone had the
+freedom of this city and the fool was therefore not only a boor, but
+an alien or an exile. In this city, Justice was natural and not
+conventional, for the law by which it was governed was the law of
+right reason. The law then was spiritualised by the Stoics, just as
+the state was. It no longer meant the enactments of this or that
+community, but the mandates of the eternal reason which ruled the
+world and which would prevail in the ideal state. Law was defined as
+right reason commanding what was to be done and forbidding what was
+not to be done. As such, it in no way differed from the impulse of
+the sage himself.
+
+As a member of a state and by nature subject to law, man was
+essentially a social being. Between all the wise there existed
+"unanimity," which was "a knowledge of the common good," because
+their views of life were harmonious. Fools, on the other hand, whose
+views of life were discordant, were enemies to one another and bent
+on mutual injury.
+
+As a member of society the sage would play his part in public life.
+Theoretically this was always true, and practically he would do so,
+wherever the actual constitution made any tolerable approach to the
+ideal type. But, if the circumstances were such as to make it certain
+that his embarking on politics would be of no service to his country,
+and only a source of danger to himself, then he would refrain. The
+kind of constitution of which the Stoics most approved was a mixed
+government containing democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical
+elements. Where circumstances allowed the sage would act as
+legislator, and would educate mankind, one way of doing which was by
+writing books which would prove of profit to the reader.
+
+As a member of existing society the sage would marry and beget
+children, both for his own sake and for that of his country, on
+behalf of which, if it were good, he would be ready to suffer and
+die. Still he would look forward to a better time when, in Zeno's as
+in Plato's republic, the wise would have women and children in
+common, when the elders would love all the rising generation equally
+with parental fondness, and when marital jealousy would be no more.
+
+As being essentially a social being, the sage was endowed not only
+with the graver political virtues, but also with the graces of life.
+He was sociable, tactful and stimulating, using conversation as a
+means for promoting good will and friendship; so far as might be, he
+was all things to all men, which made him fascinating and charming,
+insinuating and even wily; he know how to hit the point and to choose
+the right moment, yet with it all he was plain and unostentatious and
+simple and unaffected; in particular he never delighted in irony much
+less in sarcasm.
+
+From the social characteristics of the sage we turn now to a side of
+his character which appears eminently anti-social. One of his most
+highly vaunted characteristics was his self-sufficingness. He was to
+be able to step out of a burning city, coming from the wreck not only
+of his fortunes, but of his friends and family, and to declare with a
+smile that he has lost nothing. All that he truly cared for was to be
+centered in himself. Only thus could he be sure that Fortune would
+not wrest it from him.
+
+The apathy or passionlessness of the sage is another of his most
+salient features. The passions being, on Zeno's showing, not natural,
+but forms of disease, the sage, as being the perfect man, would of
+course be wholly free from them. They were so many disturbances of
+the even flow in which his bliss lay. The sage therefore would never
+be moved by a feeling of favour towards any one; he would never
+pardon a fault; he would never feel pity; he would never be prevailed
+upon by entreaty; he would never be stirred to anger.
+
+As to the absence of pity in the sage, the Stoics themselves must
+have felt some difficulty there since we find Epictetus recommending
+his hearers to show grief out of sympathy for another, but to be
+careful not to feel it. The inexorability of the sage was a mere
+consequence of his calm reasonableness, which would lead him to take
+the right view from the first. Lastly, the sage would never be
+stirred to anger. For why should it stir his anger to see another in
+his ignorance injuring himself?
+
+One more touch has yet to be added to the apathy of the sage. He was
+impervious to wonder. No miracle of nature could excite his
+astonishment--no mephitic caverns, which men deemed the mouths of
+hell, no deep-drawn ebb tides--the standing marvel of the
+Mediterranean dweller, no hot springs, no spouting jets of fire.
+
+From the absence of passion it is but a step to the absence of error.
+So we pass now to the infallibility of the sage--a monstrous doctrine
+which was never broached in the schools before Zeno. The sage, it was
+maintained, held no opinions, he never repented of his conduct, he
+was never deceived in anything. Between the daylight of knowledge and
+darkness of nescience Plato had interposed the twilight of opinion
+wherein men walked for the most part. Not so however the Stoic sage.
+Of him it might be said, as Charles Lamb said of the Scotchman with
+whom he so imperfectly sympathized: "His understanding is always at
+its meridian--you never see the first dawn, the early streaks." He
+has no falterings of self suspicion. Surmises, guesses, misgivings,
+half intuitions, semiconsciousness, partial illuminations, dim
+instincts, embryo conceptions, have no place in his brain or
+vocabulary. The twilight of dubiety never falls upon him. Opinion,
+whether in the form of an ungripped assent, or a weak supposition,
+was alien from the mental disposition of the serious man. With him
+there was no hasty or premature assent of the understanding, no
+forgetfulness, no distrust. He never allowed himself to be
+overreached or deluded, never had need of an arbiter, never was out
+in his reckoning nor put out by another. No urbane man ever wandered
+from his way, or missed his mark, or saw wrong, or heard amiss, or
+erred in any of his senses; he never conjectured nor thought of a
+better thing, for the one was a form of imperfect assent, and the
+other a sign of previous precipitancy. There was with him no change,
+no retraction, and no tripping. These things were for those whose
+dogmas could alter. After this it is almost superfluous for us to be
+assured that the sage never got drunk. Drunkenness, as Zeno pointed
+out, involved babbling, and of that the sage would never be guilty.
+He would not, however, altogether eschew banquets. Indeed, the Stoics
+recognized a virtue under the name of 'conviviality,' which consisted
+in the proper conduct of them. It was said of Chrysippus that his
+demeanor was always quiet, even if his gait were unsteady, so that
+his housekeeper declared that only his legs were drunk.
+
+There were pleasantries even within the school on this subject of
+infallibility of the sage. Aristo of Chios, while seceding on some
+other matters, held fast to the dogma that the sage never opined.
+Whereupon Persaeus played a trick upon him. He made one of two twin
+brothers deposit a sum of money with him and the other call to
+reclaim it. The success of the trick however only went to establish
+that Aristo was not the sage, an admission which each of the Stoics
+seems to have been ready enough to make on his own part, as the
+responsibilities of the position were so fatiguing.
+
+There remains one more leading characteristic of the sage, the most
+striking of them all, and the most important from the ethical point
+of view. This was his innocence or harmlessness. He would not harm
+others and was not to be harmed by them. For the Stoics believed with
+Socrates that it was not permissible by the divine law for a better
+man to be harmed by a worse. You could not harm the sage any more
+than you could harm the sunlight; he was in our world, but not of it.
+There was no possibility of evil for him, save in his own will, and
+that you could not touch. And as the sage was beyond harm, so also
+was he above insult. Men might disgrace themselves by their insolent
+attitude towards his mild majesty, but it was not in their power to
+disgrace him.
+
+As the Stoics had their analogue to the tenet of final assurance, so
+had they also to that of sudden conversion. They held that a man
+might become a sage without being at first aware of it. The
+abruptness of the transition from folly to wisdom was in keeping with
+their principle that there was no medium between the two, but it was
+naturally a point which attracted the strictures of their opponents.
+That a man should be at one moment stupid and ignorant and unjust and
+intemperate, a slave and poor, and destitute, at the next a king,
+rich, and prosperous, temperate, and just, secure in his judgements
+and exempt from error, was a transformation, they declared, which
+smacked more of the fairy tales of the nursery than of the doctrines
+of a sober philosophy.
+
+
+PHYSIC
+
+We have now before us the main facts with regard to the Stoic view of
+man's nature, but we have yet to see in what setting they were put.
+What was the Stoic outlook upon the universe? The answer to this
+question is supplied by their Physic.
+
+There were, according to the Stoics, two first principles of all
+things, the active and the passive. The passive was that unqualified
+being which is known as Matter. The active was the Logos, or reason
+in it, which is God. This, it was held, eternally pervades matter and
+creates all things. This dogma, laid down by Zeno, was repeated after
+him by the subsequent heads of the school.
+
+There were then two first principles, but there were not two causes
+of things. The active principle alone was cause, the other was mere
+material for it to work on--inert, senseless, destitute in itself of
+all shape and qualities, but ready to assume any qualities or shape.
+
+Matter was defined as that out of which anything is produced. The
+Prime Matter, or unqualified being, was eternal and did not admit of
+increase or decrease, but only of change. It was the substance or
+being of all things that are.
+
+The Stoics, it will be observed, used the term "matter" with the same
+confusing ambiguity with which we use it ourselves, now for sensible
+objects which have shape and other qualities, now for the abstract
+conception of matter, which is devoid of all qualities.
+
+Both these first principles, it must be understood, were conceived of
+as bodies, though without form, the one everywhere interpenetrating
+the other. To say that the passive principle, or matter, is a body
+comes easy to us, because of the familiar confusion adverted to
+above. But how could the active principle, or God, be conceived of as
+a body? The answer to this question may sound paradoxical. It is
+because God is a spirit. A spirit in its original sense meant air in
+motion. Now the active principle was not air, but it was something
+which bore an analogy to it--namely aether. Aether in motion might be
+called a 'spirit' as well as air in motion. It was in this sense that
+Chrysippus defined the thing that is, to be a spirit moving itself
+into and out of itself, or spirit moving itself to and fro.
+
+From the two first principles which are ungenerated and
+indestructible must be distinguished the four elements which, though
+ultimate for us, yet were produced in the beginning by God and are
+destined some day to be reabsorbed into the divine nature. These with
+the Stoics were the same which had been accepted since
+Empedocles--namely earth, air, fire and water. The elements, like the
+two first principles were bodies; unlike them, they were declared to
+have shape as well as extension.
+
+An element was defined as that out of which things at first come into
+being and into which they are at last resolved. In this relation did
+the four elements stand to all the compound bodies which the universe
+contained. The terms earth, air, fire and water had to be taken in a
+wide sense: earth meaning all that was of the nature of earth, air
+all that was of the nature of air and so on. Thus, in the human
+frame, the bones and sinews pertained to earth.
+
+The four qualities of matter--hot, cold, moist and dry--were
+indicative of the presence of the four elements. Fire was the source
+of heat, air of cold, water of moisture, and earth of dryness.
+Between them, the four elements made up the unqualified being called
+Matter. All animals and other compound natures on earth had in them
+representatives of the four great physical constituents of the
+universe, but the moon, according to Chrysippus, consisted only of
+fire and air, while the sun was pure fire.
+
+While all compound bodies were resolvable into the four elements,
+there were important differences among the elements, themselves. Two
+of them, fire and air, were light; the other two, water and earth,
+were heavy. By 'light' was meant that which tends away from its own
+centre, by 'heavy,' that which, tends towards it. The two light
+elements stood to the two heavy ones in much the same relation as the
+active to the passive principle generally. But further, fire had such
+a primary as entitles it, if the definition of element were pressed,
+to be considered alone worthy of the name. For the three other
+elements arose out of it and were to be again resolved into it.
+
+We should obtain a wholly wrong impression of what Bishop Berkeley
+calls 'the philosophy of fire' if we set before our minds in this
+connection, the raging element whose strength is in destruction. Let
+us rather picture to ourselves as the type of fire the benign and
+beatific solar heat, the quickener and fosterer of all terrestrial
+life. For according to Zeno, there were two kinds of fire, the one
+destructive, the other what we may call 'constructive,' and which he
+called 'artistic'. This latter kind of fire, which was known as
+aether, was the substance of the heavenly bodies, as it was also of
+the soul of animals and of the 'nature' of plants. Chrysippus,
+following Heraclitus, taught that the elements passed into one
+another by a process of condensation and rarefaction. Fire first
+became solidified into air, then air into water and lastly water into
+earth. The process of dissolution took place in the reverse order,
+earth being rarefied into water, water into air, and air into fire.
+It is allowable to see in this old world doctrine an anticipation of
+the modern idea of different states of matter--the solid, the liquid,
+and the gaseous, with a fourth beyond the gaseous which science can
+still only guess at, and in which matter seems almost to merge into
+spirit.
+
+Each of the four elements had its own abode in the universe.
+Outermost of all was the ethereal 'fire' which was divided into two
+spheres: first that of the fixed stars and next that of the planets.
+Below this lay the sphere of 'air', below this again that of 'water',
+and lowest or in other words, most central of all was the sphere of
+'earth', the solid foundation of the whole structure. Water might be
+said to be above earth because nowhere was there water to be found
+without earth beneath it, but the surface of water was always
+equidistant from the centre, whereas earth had prominences which rose
+above water.
+
+When we say that the Stoics regarded the universe as a plenum, the
+reader must understand by 'the universe' the Cosmos or ordered whole.
+Within this there was no emptiness owing to the pressure of the
+celestial upon the terrestrial sphere. But outside of this lay the
+infinite void without beginning, middle, or end. This occupied a very
+ambiguous position In their scheme. It was not being, for being was
+confined to body and yet it was there. It was in fact nothing, and
+that was why it was infinite. For as nothing cannot be bound to any
+thing, so neither can there be any bound to nothing. But while
+bodiless itself, it had the capacity to contain body, a fact which
+enabled it, despite its non-entity, to serve, as we shall see, a
+useful purpose.
+
+Did the Stoics then regard the universe as finite or as infinite? In
+answering this question we must distinguish our terms, as they did.
+The All, they said, was infinite, but the Whole was finite. For the
+'All' was the cosmos and the void, whereas the 'Whole' was the cosmos
+only. This distinction we may suppose to have originated with the
+later members of the school. For Appolodorus noted the ambiguity of
+the word 'All' as meaning,
+   (1) the cosmos only,
+   (2) cosmos + void
+
+If then by the term "universe" we understand the cosmos, or ordered
+whole, we must say that the Stoics regarded the universe as finite.
+All being and all body, which was the same thing with being, had
+necessarily bounds, it was only not being, which was boundless.
+
+Another distinction, due this time to Chrysippus himself, which the
+Stoics found it convenient to draw, was between the three words
+'void,' 'place' and 'space'. Void was defined as 'the absence of
+body', place was that which was occupied by body, the term 'space'
+was reserved for that which was partly occupied and partly
+unoccupied. As there was no corner of the cosmos unfilled by body,
+space, it will be seen, was another name for the All. Place was
+compared to a vessel that was full, void to one that was empty, and
+space to the vast wine-cask, such as that in which Diogenes made his
+home, which was kept partly fully, but in which there was always room
+for more. The last comparison must of course not be pressed. For if
+space be a cask, it is one without top, bottom or sides.
+
+But while the Stoics regarded our universe as an island of being in
+an ocean of void, they did not admit the possibility that other such
+islands might exist beyond our ken. The spectacle of the starry
+heavens, which presented itself nightly to their gaze in all the
+brilliancy of a southern sky--that was all there was of being, beyond
+that lay nothingness. Democritus or the Epicureans might dream of
+other worlds, but the Stoics contended for the unity of the cosmos as
+staunchly as the Mahometans for the unity of God, for with them the
+cosmos was God.
+
+In shape they conceived of it as spherical, on the ground that the
+sphere was the perfect figure and was also the best adapted for
+motion. Not that the universe as a whole moved. The earth lay in its
+centre, spherical and motionless, and round it coursed the sun, moon,
+and planets, fixed each in its respective sphere as in so many
+concentric rings, while the outermost ring of all, which contained
+the fixed stars, wheeled round the rest with an inconceivable
+velocity.
+
+The tendency of all things in the universe to the centre kept the
+earth fixed in the middle as being subject to an equal pressure on
+every side. The same cause also, according to Zeno, kept the universe
+itself at rest in the void. But in an infinite void, it could make no
+difference whether the whole were at rest or in motion. It may have
+been a desire to escape the notion of a migratory whole which led
+Zeno to broach the curious doctrine that the universe has no weight,
+as being composed of elements whereof two are heavy and two are
+light. Air and fire did indeed tend to the centre like everything
+else in the cosmos, but not till they had reached their natural home.
+Till then they were of an upward-growing nature. It appears then that
+the upward and downward tendencies of the elements were held to
+neutralise one another and to leave the universe devoid of weight.
+
+The universe was the only thing which was perfect in itself, the one
+thing which was an end in itself. All other things were perfect
+indeed as parts, when considered with reference to the whole, but
+were none of them ends in themselves, unless man could be deemed so
+who was born to contemplate the universe and imitate its perfections.
+Thus, then, did the Stoics envisage the universe on its physical
+side--as one, finite, fixed in space, but revolving round its own
+centre, earth, beautiful beyond all things, and perfect as a whole.
+
+But it was impossible for this order and beauty to exist without
+mind. The universe was pervaded by intelligence as man's body is
+pervaded by his soul. But as the human soul though everywhere present
+in the body is not present everywhere in the same degree, so it was
+with the world-soul. The human soul presents itself not only as
+intellect, but also in the lower manifestations of sense, growth, and
+cohesion. It is the soul which is the cause of the plant life, which
+displays itself more particularly in the nails and hair; it is the
+soul also which causes cohesion among the parts of the solid
+substances such as bones and sinews, that make up our frame. In the
+same way the world-soul displayed itself in rational beings as
+intellect, in the lower animals as mere souls, in plants as nature or
+growth, and in inorganic substances as 'holding' or cohesion. To this
+lowest stage add change, and you have growth or plant nature;
+super-add to this phantasy and impulse and you rise to the soul of
+irrational animals; at a yet higher stage you reach the rational and
+discursive intellect, which is peculiar to man among mortal natures.
+
+We have spoken of soul as the cause of the plant life in our bodies,
+but plants were not admitted by the Stoics to be possessed of soul in
+the strict sense. What animated them was 'nature' or, as we have
+called it above, 'growth'. Nature, in this sense of the principle of
+growth, was defined by the Stoics as 'a constructive fire, proceeding
+in a regular way to production,' or 'a fiery spirit endowed with
+artistic skill'. That Nature was an artist needed no proof, since it
+was her handiwork that human art essayed to copy. But she was an
+artist who combined the useful with the pleasant, aiming at once at
+beauty and convenience. In the widest sense, Nature was another name
+for Providence, or the principle which held the universe together,
+but, as the term is now being employed, it stood for that degree of
+existence which is above cohesion and below soul. From this point of
+view, it was defined as "a cohesion subject to self originated change
+in accordance with seminal reasons effecting and maintaining its
+results in definite times, and reproducing in the offspring the
+characteristics of the parent". This sounds about as abstract as
+Herbert Spencer's definition of life, but it must be borne in mind
+that nature was all the time a 'spirit', and as such a body. It was a
+body of a less subtle essence than soul. Similarly, when the Stoics
+spoke of cohesion, they are not to be taken as referring to some
+abstract principle like attraction. 'Cohesions,' said Chrysippus,
+'are nothing else than airs, for it is by these that bodies are held
+together, and of the individual qualities of things which are held
+together by cohesion, it is the air which is the compressing cause
+which in iron is called "hardness", in stone "thickness" and in
+solver "whiteness"'. Not only solidarity then, but also colours,
+which Zeno called 'the first schematisms' of matter were regarded as
+due to the mysterious agency of air. In fact, qualities in general
+were but blasts and tensions of the air, which gave form and figure
+to the inert matter underlying them.
+
+As the man is in one sense the soul, in another the body, and in a
+third the union of both, so it was with the cosmos. The word was used
+in three senses--
+  (1) God
+  (2) the arrangement of the stars, etc.
+  (3) the combination of both.
+
+The cosmos as identical with God was described as an individual made
+up of all being who is incorruptible and ungenerated, the fashioner
+of the ordered frame of the universe, who at certain periods of time
+absorbs all being into himself and again generates it from himself.
+Thus the cosmos on its external side was doomed to perish and the
+mode of its destruction was to be by fire, a doctrine which has been
+stamped upon the world's belief down to the present day. What was to
+bring about this consummation was the soul of the universe becoming
+too big for its body, which it would eventually swallow up
+altogether. In the efflagration, when everything went back to the
+primeval aether, the universe would be pure soul and alive equally
+through and through. In this subtle and attenuated state, it would
+require more room than before and so expand into the void,
+contracting again when another period of cosmic generation had set
+in. Hence the Stoic definition of the Void or Infinite as that into
+which the cosmos is resolved at the efflagration.
+
+In this theory of the contraction of the universe out of an ethereal
+state and ultimate return to the same condition one sees a
+resemblance to the modern scientific hypothesis of the origin of our
+planetary system out of the solar nebula, and its predestined end in
+the same. Especially is this the case with the form in which the
+theory was held by Cleanthes, who pictured the heavenly bodies as
+hastening to their own destruction by dashing themselves, like so
+many gigantic moths, into the sun. Cleanthes however did not conceive
+mere mechanical force to be at work in this matter. The grand
+apotheosis of suicide which he foresaw was a voluntary act; for the
+heavenly bodies were Gods and were willing to lose their own in a
+larger life.
+
+Thus all the deities except Zeus were mortal, or at all events,
+perishable. Gods, like men, were destined to have an end some day.
+They would melt in the great furnace of being as though they were
+made of wax or tin. Zeus then would be left alone with his own
+thoughts, or as the Stoics sometimes put it, Zeus would fall back
+upon Providence. For by Providence they meant the leading principle
+or mind of the whole, and by Zeus, as distinguished from Providence,
+this mind together with the cosmos, which was to it as body. In the
+efflagration the two would be fused into one in the single substance
+of aether. And then in the fulness of time there would be a
+restitution of all things. Everything would come round regularly
+again exactly as it had been before.
+
+To us who have been taught to pant for progress, this seems a dreary
+prospect. But the Stoics were consistent Optimists, and did not ask
+for a change in what was best. They were content that the one drama
+of existence should enjoy a perpetual run without perhaps too nice a
+consideration for the actors. Death intermitted life, but did not end
+it. For the candle of life, which was extinguished now, would be
+kindled again hereafter. Being and not being came round in endless
+succession for all save him, into whom all being was resolved, and
+out of whom it emerged again, as from the vortex of some aeonian
+Maelstrom.
+
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+When Socrates declared before his judges that "there is no evil to a
+good man either in life or after death, nor are his affairs neglected
+by the gods", he sounded the keynote of Stoicism, with its two main
+doctrines of virtue as the only good, and the government of the world
+by Providence. Let us weigh his words, lest we interpret them by the
+light of a comfortable modern piety. A great many things that are
+commonly called evil may and do happen to a good man in this life,
+and therefore presumably misfortunes may also overtake him in any
+other life that there may be. The only evil that can never befall him
+is vice, because that would be a contradiction in terms. Unless
+therefore Socrates was uttering idle words on the most solemn
+occasion of his life, he must be taken to have meant that there is no
+evil but vice, which implies that there is no good but virtue. Thus
+we are landed at once in the heart of the Stoic morality. To the
+question why, if there be a providence, so many evils happen to good
+men, Seneca unflinchingly replies: "No evil can happen to a good man,
+contraries do not mix." God has removed from the good all evil:
+because he has taken from them crimes and sins, bad thoughts and
+selfish designs and blind lust and grasping avarice. He has attended
+well to themselves, but he cannot be expected to look after their
+luggage: they relieve him of that care by being indifferent about it.
+This is the only form in which the doctrine of divine providence can
+be held consistently with the facts of life Again, when Socrates on
+the same occasion expressed his belief that it was not "permitted by
+the divine law for a better man to be harmed by a worse", he was
+asserting by implication the Stoic position. Neither Meletus nor
+Anytus could harm him, though they might have him killed or banished,
+or disfranchised. This passage of the Apology, in a condensed form,
+is adopted by Epictetus as one of the watchwords of Stoicism.
+
+There is nothing more distinctive of Socrates than the doctrine that
+virtue is knowledge. Here too the Stoics followed him, ignoring all
+that Aristotle had done in showing the part played by the emotions
+and the will in virtue. Reason was with them a principle of action;
+with Aristotle it was a principle that guided action, but the motive
+power had to come from elsewhere. Socrates must even be held
+responsible for the Stoic paradox of the madness of all ordinary
+folk.
+
+The Stoics did not owe much to the Peripatetics. There was too much
+balance about the master mind of Aristotle for their narrow
+intensity. His recognition of the value of the passions was to them
+an advocacy of disease in moderation: his admission of other elements
+besides virtue into the conception of happiness seemed to them to be
+a betrayal of the citadel, to say as he did that the exercise of
+virtue was the highest good was no merit in their eyes, unless it
+were added to the confession that there was none beside it. The
+Stoics tried to treat man as a being of pure reason. The Peripatetics
+would not shut their eyes to his mixed nature, and contended that the
+good of such a being must also be mixed, containing in it elements
+which had reference to the body and its environment. The goods of the
+soul indeed, they said, far outweighed those of body and estate, but
+still the latter had a right to be considered.
+
+Though the Stoics were religious to the point of superstition, yet
+they did not invoke the terrors of theology to enforce the lesson of
+virtue. Plato does this even in the very work, the professed object
+of which is to prove the _intrinsic_ superiority of justice to
+injustice. But Chrysippus protested against Plato's procedure on this
+point, declaring that the talk about punishment by the gods was mere
+'bugaboo'. By the Stoics indeed, no less than by the Epicureans, fear
+of the gods was discarded from philosophy. The Epicurean gods took no
+part in the affairs of men; the Stoic God was incapable of anger.
+
+The absence of any appeal to rewards and punishments was a natural
+consequence of the central tenet of the Stoic morality: that virtue
+is in itself the most desirable of all things. Another corollary that
+flows with equal directness from the same principle is that is better
+to be than to seem virtuous. Those who are sincerely convinced that
+happiness is to be found in wealth or pleasure or power prefer the
+reality to the appearance of these goods; it must be the same with
+him who is sincerely convinced that happiness lies in virtue.
+
+Despite the want of feeling in which the Stoics gloried, it is yet
+true to say that the humanity of their system constitutes one of its
+most just claims on our admiration. They were the first fully to
+recognise the worth of man as man; they heralded the reign of peace
+for which we are yet waiting; they proclaimed to the world the
+fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man; they were convinced of
+the solidarity of mankind, and laid down that the interest of one
+must be subordinated to that of all. The word "philanthrop," though
+not unheard before their time, was brought into prominence by them as
+a name for a virtue among the virtues.
+
+Aristotle's ideal state, like the Republic of Plato, is still an
+Hellenic city; Zeno was the first to dream of a republic which should
+embrace all mankind. In Plato's Republic all the material goods are
+contemptuously thrown to the lower classes, all the mental and
+spiritual reserved for the higher. In Aristotle's ideal the bulk of
+the population are mere conditions, not integral parts of the state.
+Aristotle's callous acceptance of the existing fact of slavery
+blinded his eyes to the wider outlook, which already in his time was
+beginning to be taken. His theories of the natural slave and of the
+natural nobility of the Greeks are mere attempts to justify practice.
+In the Ethics there is indeed a recognition of the rights of man, but
+it is faint and grudging. Aristotle there tells us that a slave, as a
+man, admits of justice, and therefore of friendship, but
+unfortunately it is not this concession which is dominant in his
+system, but rather the reduction of a slave to a living tool by which
+it is immediately preceded. In another passage Aristotle points out
+that men, like other animals, have a natural affection for the
+members of their own species, a fact, he adds, which is best seen in
+travelling. This incipient humanitarianism seems to have been
+developed in a much more marked way by Aristotle's followers, but it
+is the Stoics who have won the glory of having initiated humanitarian
+sentiment.
+
+Virtue, with the earlier Greek philosophers, was aristocratic and
+exclusive. Stoicism, like Christianity, threw it open to the meanest
+of mankind. In the kingdom of wisdom, as in the kingdom of Christ,
+there was neither barbarian, Scythian, bond, nor free. The only true
+freedom was to serve philosophy, or, which was the same thing, to
+serve God; and that could be done in any station in life. The sole
+condition of communion with gods and good men was the possession of a
+certain frame of mind, which might belong equally to a gentleman, to
+a freedman, or to a slave. In place of the arrogant assertion of the
+natural nobility of the Greeks, we now hear that a good mind is the
+true nobility. Birth is of no importance; all are sprung from the
+gods. "The door of virtue is shut to no man; it is open to all,
+admits all, invites all--free men, freedmen, slaves, kings and
+exiles. Its election is not of family or fortune; it is content with
+the bare man." Wherever there was a human being, there Stoicism saw a
+field for well doing. Its followers were always to have in their
+mouths and hearts the well-known line--
+ Homo sum humani nihil a me allenum puto
+
+Closely connected with the humanitarianism of the Greeks is their
+cosmopolitanism.
+
+Cosmopolitanism is a word which has contracted rather than expanded
+in meaning with the advance of time. We mean by it freedom from the
+shackles of nationality. The Stoics meant this and more. The city of
+which they claimed to be citizens was not merely this round world on
+which we dwell, but the universe at large with all the mighty life
+therein contained. In this city, the greatest of earth's
+cities--Rome, Ephesus or Alexandria, were but houses. To be exiled
+from one of them was only like changing your lodgings, and death but
+a removal from one quarter to another. The freemen of this city were
+all rational beings--sages on earth and the stars in heaven. Such an
+idea was thoroughly in keeping with the soaring genius of Stoicism.
+It was proclaimed by Zeno in his Republic, and after him by
+Chrysippus and his followers. It caught the imagination of alien
+writers as of the author of the Peripatetic _De Mundo_ who was
+possibly of Jewish origin and of Philo and St Paul who were certainly
+so. Cicero does not fail to make of it on behalf of the Stoics;
+Seneca revels in it; Epictetus employs it for edification and Maucus
+Aurelius finds solace in his heavenly citizenship for the cares of an
+earthly ruler--as Antoninus indeed his city is Rome, but as a man it
+is the universe.
+
+The philosophy of an age cannot perhaps be inferred from its
+political conditions with that certainty which some writers assume;
+still there are cases in which the connection is obvious. On a wide
+view of the matter we may say that the opening up of the East by the
+arms of Alexander was the cause of the shifting of the philosophic
+standpoint from Hellenism to cosmopolitanism. If we reflect that the
+Cynic and Stoic teachers were mostly foreigners in Greece we shall
+find a very tangible reason for the change of view. Greece had done
+her work in educating the world and the world was beginning to make
+payment in kind. Those who had been branded as natural slaves were
+now giving laws to philosophy. The kingdom of wisdom was suffering
+violence at the hands of barbarians.
+
+
+
+DATES AND AUTHORITIES
+                                             BC
+Death of Socrates                              399
+Death of Plato                                 347
+Zeno                                       347 275
+  Studied under Crates                         325
+  Studied under Stilpo and Xenocrates      325 315
+  Began teaching                               315
+Epicurus                                   341 270
+Death of Aristotle                             322
+Death of Xenocrates                            315
+Cleanthes succeeded Zeno                       275
+Chrysippus died                                207
+Zeno of Tarsus succeeded Chrysippus            ---
+Decree of the Senate forbidding the
+           teaching of philosophy at Rome      161
+Diogenes of Babylon
+Embassy of the philosophers to Rome            155
+Antipater of Tarsus
+Panaetius Accompanied Africanus on
+  his mission to the East                      143
+  His treatise on Propriety was the
+  basis of Cicero's De Officiis.
+The Scipionic Circle at Rome
+  The coterie was deeply tinctured with
+    Stoicism. Its chief members were--
+    The younger Africanus
+    the younger Laelius
+    L. Furius Philus
+    Manilius
+    Spurius Mummius
+    P. Rutillus Rufus
+    Q. Aelius,
+    Tubero
+    Polybius and
+    Panaetius
+Suicide of Blossius of Cumae, the adviser
+  of Tiberius Gracchus and a disciple
+  of Antipater of Tarsus                       130
+Mnesarchus, a disciple of Panaetius, was
+  teaching at Athens when the orator
+  Crassus visited that city                    111
+Hecaton of Rhodes
+  A great Stoic writer, a disciple of
+  Panaetius and a friend of Tubero
+Posidonius                            About 128-44
+  Born at Apameia in Syria
+  Became a citizen of Rhodes
+  Represented the Rhodians at Rome              86
+  Cicero studied under him at Rhodes            78
+  Came to Rome again at an advanced age         51
+Cicero's philosophical works                 54-44
+  These are a main authority for our
+  knowledge of the Stoics.
+                                               A.D.
+Philo of Alexandria came on an embassy to Rome  39
+  The works of Philo are saturated with Stoic
+  ideas and he displays an exact acquaintance
+  with their terminology
+Seneca
+  Exiled to Corsica                             41
+  Recalled from exile                           49
+  Forced by Nero to commit suicide              65
+  His Moral Epistles and philosophical
+    works generally are written from
+    the Stoic standpoint though somewhat
+    affected by Eclecticism
+Plutarch                                  Flor. 80
+  The Philosophical works of Plutarch
+    which have most bearing upon the
+    Stoics are--
+      De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute,
+      De Virtute Morali,
+      De Placitis Philosophorum,
+      De Stoicorum Repugnantiis,
+      Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere,
+      De Communibus Notitiis.
+Epictetus                                 Flor. 90
+  A freedman of Epaphroditus,
+  Disciple of C Musonius Rufus,
+  Lived and taught at Rome until A. D. 90
+    when the philosophers were expelled by
+    Domitian. Then retired to Nicopolis in
+    Epirus, where he spent the rest of his life.
+  Epictetus wrote nothing himself, but his
+    Dissertations, as preserved by Arrian,
+    from which the Encheiridion is excerpted,
+    contain the most pleasing presentation that
+    we have of the moral philosophy of the Stoics.
+C Musonius Rufus
+  Banished to Gyaros ...                        65
+  Returned to Rome ...                          68
+  Tried to intervene between the armies
+    of Vitellius and Vespasian ...              69
+  Procured the condemnation of Publius Celer
+   (Tac H iv 10, Juv Sat iii 116) ...           --
+Q Junius Rusticus ...                      Cos 162
+  Teacher of M Aurelius who learnt
+    from him to appreciate Epictetus
+
+M Aurelius Antoninus Emperor ...           161-180
+  Wrote the book commonly called his
+    "Meditations" under the title of
+    "to himself"
+  He may be considered the last of the
+    Stoics
+
+Three later authorities for the Stoic teaching are--
+  Diogenes Laertius ...                        200?
+  Sextus Empiricus ...                         225?
+  Stobaeus ...                                 500?
+
+Modern works--
+  Von Arnim's edition of the "Fragmenta Stoicorum Veterum"
+  Pearson's "Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes" Pitt Press
+  Remains of C Musonius Rufus in the Teubner series
+  Zeller's "Stoics and Epicureans."
+  Sir Alexander Grant, "Ethics of Aristotle"
+  Essay VI on the Ancient Stoics
+  Lightfoot on the Philippians, Dissertation II,
+  "St. Paul and Seneca."
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's A Little Book of Stoicism, by St George Stock
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