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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/75915-0.txt b/75915-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..461a9dd --- /dev/null +++ b/75915-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8941 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75915 *** + + + + + + WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS + + + BY + + PROFESSOR DR. SIGMUND FREUD, LL.D. + + Authorized English Edition, with Introduction by + A. A. BRILL, PH.B., M.D. + + Lecturer in Psychoanalysis and Abnormal Psychology, New York University; + former Chief of Clinic of Psychiatry, Columbia University + +[Illustration: [Logo]] + + NEW YORK + MOFFAT, YARD AND COMPANY + 1916 + + + + + Copyright, 1916, BY + MOFFAT, YARD AND COMPANY + NEW YORK + + + _All Rights Reserved_ + + + + + TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE + + +In 1908 when it was agreed between Professor Freud and myself that I +should be his translator, it was decided to render into English first +the following five works: _Selected Papers on Hysteria and +Psychoneuroses_,[1] _Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex_,[2] _The +Interpretation of Dreams_,[3] _Psychopathology of Everyday Life_,[4] and +the present volume. These works were selected because they represent the +various stages of development of Professor Freud’s Psychoanalysis,[5] +and also because it was thought that they contain the material which one +must master before one is able to judge correctly the author’s theories +or apply them in practice. This undertaking, which was fraught with many +linguistic and other difficulties, has finally been accomplished with +the edition of the present volume, and it is therefore with a sense of +great satisfaction that the translator’s preface to this work is +written. But although the original task is finished the translator’s +work is only beginning. Psychoanalysis has made enormous strides. On the +foundation laid by Professor Freud there developed a literature rich in +ideas and content which has revolutionized the science of nervous and +mental diseases, and has thrown much light on the subject of dreams, +sex, mythology,[6] the history of civilization and racial psychology,[7] +philology,[8] æsthetics,[9] child psychology and pedagogics,[10] +philology,[11] and mysticism and occultism. With the _Interpretation of +Dreams_ and _Psychopathology of Everyday Life_, Professor Freud has +definitely bridged the gulf between normal and abnormal mental states by +demonstrating that dreams and faulty acts like some forms of forgetting, +slips of the tongue, slips of reading, writing, etc., are closely allied +to psychopathological states and represent the prototypes of such +abnormal mental conditions as neurotic symptoms, hallucinations, and +deliria. He also shows that all these productions are senseful and +purposive, and that their strange and peculiar appearance is due to +distortions produced by various psychic processes. These views are +confirmed in the present volume, where it is demonstrated that wit, +which belongs to æsthetics, is subject to the same laws, shows the same +mechanism, and serves the same tendencies as the other psychic +productions. With his wonted profundity and ingenuity the author adds +the solution of wit to those of the neuroses, dreams, and +psychopathological acts. + +I take great pleasure in tendering my thanks to Mr. Horatio Winslow, who +has read the manuscript and has given me valuable suggestions in the +choice of expressions and in the selection of substitutes for those +witticisms that could not be translated. + + A. A. BRILL. + + + _May, 1916._ + + + + + CONTENTS + + + A. ANALYSIS OF WIT + CHAPTER PAGE + I. INTRODUCTION 3 + II. THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 15 + III. THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 127 + + B. SYNTHESIS OF WIT + IV. THE PLEASURE MECHANISM AND THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF WIT 177 + V. THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 214 + + C. THEORIES OF WIT + VI. THE RELATION OF WIT TO DREAMS AND TO THE UNCONSCIOUS 249 + VII. WIT AND THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 288 + + + + + A. ANALYSIS + + + + + WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS + + + + + I + INTRODUCTION + + +Whoever has had occasion to examine that part of the literature of +æsthetics and psychology dealing with the nature and affinities of wit, +will, no doubt, concede that our philosophical inquiries have not +awarded to wit the important rôle that it plays in our mental life. One +can recount only a small number of thinkers who have penetrated at all +deeply into the problems of wit. To be sure, among the authors on wit +one finds the illustrious names of the poet Jean Paul (Fr. Richter), and +of the philosophers Th. Vischer, Kuno Fischer, and Th. Lipps. But even +these writers put the subject of wit in the background while their chief +interest centers around the more comprehensive and more alluring +problems of the comic. + +In the main this literature gives the impression that it is altogether +impractical to study wit except when treated as a part of the comic. + + + _Presentation of the Subject by Other Authors_ + +According to Th. Lipps (_Komik und Humor_, 1898[12]) wit is “essentially +the subjective side of the comic; i.e., it is that part of the comic +which we ourselves create, which colors our conduct as such, and to +which our relation is that of Superior Subject, never of Object, +certainly not Voluntary Object” (p. 80). The following comment might +also be added:—In general we designate as wit “every conscious and +clever evocation of the comic, whether the comic element lies in the +viewpoint or in the situation itself” (p. 78). + +K. Fischer explains the relation between wit and the comic by the aid of +caricature, which, according to his exposition, comes midway between the +two (_Über den Witz_, 1889). The subject of the comic is the hideous +element in any of its manifestations. “Where it is concealed it must be +disclosed in the light of the comic view; where it is not at all or but +slightly noticeable it must be rendered conspicuous and elucidated in +such a manner that it becomes clear and intelligible. Thus arises +caricature” (p. 45). “Our entire psychic world, the intellectual realm +of our thoughts and conceptions, does not reveal itself to us on +superficial consideration. It cannot be visualized directly either +figuratively or intuitively, moreover it contains inhibitions, weak +points, disfigurements, and an abundance of ludicrous and comical +contrasts. In order to bring it out and to make it accessible to +æsthetic examination, a force is necessary which is capable not only of +depicting objects directly, but also of reflecting upon these +conceptions and elucidating them—namely, a force capable of clarifying +thought. This force is nothing but judgment. The judgment which produces +the comic contrast is wit. In caricature wit has played its part +unnoticed, but only in judgment does it attain its own individual form +and the free domain of its evolution.” + +As can be seen Lipps assigns the determining factor which classifies wit +as part of the comic, to the activity or to the active behavior of the +subject, whereas K. Fischer characterizes wit by its relation to its +object, in which characterization he accentuates the hidden hideous +element in the realm of thought. One cannot put to test the cogency of +these definitions of wit; one can, in fact, hardly understand them +unless one studies the text from which they were taken. One is thus +forced to work his way through the author’s descriptions of the comic in +order to learn anything about wit. From other passages, however, one +discovers that the same authors attribute to wit essential +characteristics of general validity in which they disregard its relation +to the comic. + +K. Fischer’s characterization of wit which seems to be most satisfactory +to this author runs as follows: “Wit is a _playful_ judgment” (p. 51). +For an elucidation of this expression we are referred to the analogy: +“How æsthetic freedom consists in the playful contemplation of objects” +(p. 50). In another place (p. 20) the æsthetic attitude towards an +object is characterized by the condition that we expect nothing from +this object—especially no gratification of our serious needs—but that we +content ourselves with the pleasure of contemplating the same. In +contrast to labor the æsthetic attitude is _playful_. “It may be that +from æsthetic freedom there also results a kind of judgment, freed from +the conventional restrictions and rule of conduct, which, in view of its +genesis, I will call the _playful_ judgment. This conception contains +the first condition and possibly the entire formula for the solution of +our problem. ‘Freedom begets wit and wit begets freedom,’ says Jean +Paul. Wit is nothing but a free play of ideas” (p. 24). + +Since time immemorial a favorite definition of wit has been the ability +to discover similarities in dissimilarities, i.e., to find hidden +similarities. Jean Paul has jocosely expressed this idea by saying that +“wit is the disguised priest who unites every couple.” Th. Vischer adds +the postscript: “He likes best to unite those couples whose marriage the +relatives refuse to sanction.” Vischer refutes this, however, by +remarking that in some witticisms there is no question of comparison or +the discovery of similarities. Hence with very little deviation from +Jean Paul’s definition he defines wit as the skill to combine with +surprising quickness many ideas, which through inner content and +connections are foreign to one another. K. Fischer then calls attention +to the fact that in a large number of these witty judgments one does not +find similarities, but contrasts; and Lipps further remarks that these +definitions refer to the wit that the humorist possesses and not to the +wit that he produces. + +Other viewpoints, in some measure connected with one another, which have +been mentioned in defining and describing wit are: “the _contrast of +ideas_,” “_sense in nonsense_,” and “_confusion and clearness_.” + +Definitions like those of Kraepelin lay stress upon the contrast of +ideas. Wit is “the voluntary combination or linking of two ideas which +in some way are contrasted with each other, usually through the medium +of speech association.” For a critic like Lipps it would not be +difficult to reveal the utter inadequacy of this formula, but he himself +does not exclude the element of contrast—he merely assigns it elsewhere. +“The contrast remains, but is not formed in a manner to show the ideas +connected with the words, rather it shows the contrast or contradiction +in the meaning and lack of meaning of the words” (p. 87). Examples show +the better understanding of the latter. “A contrast arises first through +the fact that we adjudge a meaning to its words which after all we +cannot ascribe to them.” + +In the further development of this last condition the antithesis of +“sense in nonsense” becomes obvious. “What we accept one moment as +senseful we later perceive as perfect nonsense. Thereby arises, in this +case, the operation of the comic element” (p. 85). “A saying appears +witty when we ascribe to it a meaning through psychological necessity +and, while so doing, retract it. It may thus have many meanings. We lend +a meaning to an expression knowing that logically it does not belong to +it. We find in it a truth, however, which later we fail to find because +it is foreign to our laws of experience or usual modes of thinking. We +endow it with a logical or practical inference which transcends its true +content, only to contradict this inference as soon as we finally grasp +the nature of the expression itself. The psychological process evoked in +us by the witty expression which gives rise to the sense of the comic +depends in every case on the immediate transition from the borrowed +feeling of truth and conviction to the impression or consciousness of +relative nullity.” + +As impressive as this exposition sounds one cannot refrain from +questioning whether the contrast between the senseful and senseless upon +which the comic depends does not also contribute to the definition of +wit in so far as it is distinguished from the comic. Also the factor of +“confusion and clearness” leads one deeply into the problem of the +relation of wit to the comic. Kant, speaking of the comic element in +general, states that one of its remarkable attributes is the fact that +it can delude us for a moment only. Heymans (_Zeitschr. f. Psychologie_, +XI, 1896) explains how the mechanism of wit is produced through the +succession of confusion and clearness. He illustrates his meaning by an +excellent witticism from Heine, who causes one of his figures, the poor +lottery agent, Hirsch-Hyacinth, to boast that the great Baron Rothschild +treated him as an equal or quite FAMILLIONAIRE. Here the word which acts +as the carrier of the witticism appears in the first place simply as a +faulty word-formation, as something incomprehensible, inconceivable, and +enigmatic. It is for these reasons that it is confusing. The comic +element results from the solution of the enigma and from the +understanding of the word. Lipps adds that the first stage of +enlightenment, showing that the confusing word means this or that, is +followed by a second stage in which one perceives that this nonsensical +word has first deluded us and then given us the true meaning. Only this +second enlightenment, the realization that it is all due to a word that +is meaningless in ordinary usage—this reduction to nothingness produces +the comic effect (p. 95). + +Whether or not either the one or the other of these two conceptions may +seem more clear we are brought nearer to a definite insight through the +discussion of the processes of confusion and enlightenment. If the comic +effect of Heine’s _famillionaire_ depends upon the solution of the +seemingly senseless word, then the wit would have to be attributed to +the formation of this word and to the character of the word so formed. + +In addition to the associations of the viewpoints just discussed there +is another characteristic of wit which is recognized as peculiar to it +by all authors. “Brevity alone is the body and soul of wit,” declares +Jean Paul (_Vorschule der Aesthetik_, I, 45), and modifies it with a +speech of the old tongue-wagger, Polonius, from Shakespeare’s _Hamlet_ +(Act II, Scene 2): + + “Therefore, since brevity is the soul of wit, + And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes, + I will be brief.” + +Lipps’s description (p. 90) of the brevity of wit is also significant. +He states that wit says what it does say, not always in few, but always +in too few words; that is: “It expresses itself in words that will not +stand the test of strict logic or of the ordinary mode of thought and +expression. In fine it can express itself by leaving the thing unsaid.” + +That “wit must unearth something hidden and concealed”—to quote K. +Fischer (p. 51)—we have already been taught from the grouping of wit +with caricature. I re-emphasize this determinant because it also has +more to do with the nature of wit than with its relation to the comic. + +I am well aware that the foregoing scanty quotations from the works of +the authors on wit cannot do justice to the excellence of these works. +In view of the difficulties that confront one in reproducing clearly +such complicated and such delicately shaded streams of thought I cannot +spare inquiring minds the trouble of searching for the desired +information in the original sources. However, I do not know whether they +will return fully satisfied. For the criteria and attributes of wit +mentioned by these authors, such as—activity, the relation of the +content of wit to our thoughts, the character of the playful judgment, +the union of dissimilarities, contrasting ideas, “sense in nonsense,” +the succession of confusion and clearness, the sudden emergence of the +hidden, and the peculiar brevity of wit, seem to us, at first glance, so +very pertinent and so easily demonstrable by examples that we cannot +succumb to the danger of underestimating the value of such ideas. But +they are only disjointed fragments which we should like to see welded +into an organic whole. In the end they contribute no more to the +knowledge of wit than a number of anecdotes teach us of the true +characteristics of a personality whose biography interests us. We do not +at all understand the connection that is supposed to exist between the +individual conditions; for instance, what the brevity of wit may have to +do with that side of wit exhibited in the playful judgment; besides we +do not know whether wit must satisfy all or only some of these +conditions in order to form real wit; which of them may be replaced and +which ones are indispensable. We should also like a grouping and +classification of wit in respect to its essential attributes. The +classification as given by the authors is based, on the one hand, on the +technical means, and on the other hand, on the utilization of wit in +speech (sound-wit, play on words, the wit of caricature, +characterization wit, and witty repartee). + +Accordingly we should not find ourselves in a dilemma when it comes to +pointing out goals for a further effort to explain wit. In order to look +forward to success we must either introduce new viewpoints into the +work, or try to penetrate further by concentrating our attention or by +broadening the scope of our interest. We can prescribe for ourselves the +task of at least not permitting any lack along the latter lines. To be +sure, it is rather remarkable how few examples of recognized witticisms +suffice the authors for their investigations and how each one accepts +the ones used by his predecessors. We need not shirk the responsibility +of analyzing the same examples which have already served the classical +authors, but we contemplate new material besides to lay a broader +foundation for our deductions. It is quite natural that we should select +such examples of wit as objects for our investigation as have produced +the deepest impression upon our own lives and which have caused us the +greatest amount of laughter. + +Some may inquire whether the subject of wit is worthy of such effort. In +my opinion there is no doubt about it, for even if I disregard the +personal motives to be revealed during the development of this theme +(the motives which drove me to gain an insight into the problem of wit), +I can refer to the fact that there is an intimate connection between all +psychic occurrences; a connection which promises to furnish a +psychological insight into a sphere which, although remote, will +nevertheless be of considerable value to the other spheres. One may also +be reminded what a peculiar, overwhelmingly fascinating charm wit offers +in our society. A new joke operates almost as an event of universal +interest. It is passed on from one person to another just like the news +of the latest conquest. Even prominent men who consider it worth while +relating how they attained fame, what cities and countries they have +seen, and with what celebrated persons they have consorted, do not +disdain to dwell in their autobiographies upon this and that excellent +joke which they have heard.[13] + + + + + II + THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT + + +We follow the beckoning of chance and take up as our first example of +wit one which has already come to our notice in the previous chapter. + +In that part of the _Reisebilder_ entitled “Die Bäder von Lucca,” Heine +introduces the precious character, Hirsch-Hyacinth, the Hamburg lottery +agent and curer of corns, who, boasting to the poet of his relationship +with the rich Baron Rothschild, ends thus: “And as true as I pray that +the Lord may grant me all good things I sat next to Solomon Rothschild, +who treated me just as if I were his equal, quite _famillionaire_.” + +It is by means of this excellent and very funny example that Heymans and +Lipps have illustrated the origin of the comic effect of wit from the +succession of “confusion and clearness.” However, we shall pass over +this question and put to ourselves the following inquiry: What is it +that causes the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth to become witty? It can be +only one of two things; either it is the thought expressed in the +sentence which carries in itself the character of the witticism; or the +witticism adheres to the mode of expression which clothes the thought. +On whichever side the nature of the wit may lie, there we shall follow +it farther and endeavor to elucidate it. + +In general a thought may be expressed in different forms of speech—that +is, in different words—which may repeat it in its original accuracy. In +the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth we have before us a definite form of +thought expressed which seems to us especially peculiar and not very +readily comprehensible. Let us attempt to express as exactly as is +possible the same thought in other words. Lipps, indeed, has already +done this and has thus, to some degree, elucidated the meaning of the +poet. He says (p. 87), “We understand that Heine wishes to say that the +reception was on a familiar basis, that is, that it was of the friendly +sort.” We change nothing in the sense when we assume a different +interpretation which perhaps fits better into the speech of +Hirsch-Hyacinth: “Rothschild treated me quite as his equal, in a very +_familiar_ way; that is, as far as this can be done by a _millionaire_.” +We would only add, “The condescension of a rich man always carries +something embarrassing for the one experiencing it.”[14] + +Whether we shall remain content with this or with another equivalent +formulation of the thought, we can see that the question which we have +put to ourselves is already answered. The character of the wit in this +example does not adhere to the thought. It is a correct and ingenious +remark that Heine puts into the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth—a remark of +indubitable bitterness, as is easily understood in the case of the poor +man confronted with so much wealth; but we should not care to call it +witty. Now if any one who cannot forget the poet’s meaning in the +interpretation should insist that the thought in itself is also witty, +we can refer him to the definite fact that the witty character is lost +in the interpretation. It is true that Hirsch-Hyacinth’s speech made us +laugh loudly, but though Lipps’s or our own accurate rendering may +please us and cause us to reflect, yet it cannot make us laugh. + +But if the witty character of our example does not belong to the +thought, then it must be sought for in the form of expression in the +wording. We have only to study the peculiarity of this mode of +expression to realize what one may term word- or form-technique. Also we +may discover the things that are intimately related to the very nature +of wit, since the character as well as the effect of wit disappears when +one set of expressions is changed for others. At all events we are in +full accord with our authors when we put so much value upon the verbal +form of the wit. Thus K. Fischer (p. 72) says: “It is, in the first +place, the naked form which is responsible for the perception of wit, +and one is reminded of a saying of Jean Paul’s which affirms and proves +this nature of wit in the same expression. ‘Thus the mere position +conquers, be it that of warriors or of sentences.’” + + + _Formation of Mixed Words_ + +Now wherein lies the “technique” of this wit? What has occurred to the +thought, in our own conception, that it became changed into wit and +caused us to laugh heartily? The comparison of our conception with the +text of the poet teaches us that two processes took place. In the first +place there occurred an important abbreviation. In order to express +fully the thought contained in the witticism we had to append to the +words “Rothschild treated me just as an equal, on a familiar basis,” an +additional sentence which in its briefest form reads: i.e., so far as a +millionaire can do this. Even then we feel the necessity of an +additional explanatory sentence.[15] The poet expresses it in terser +terms as follows: “Rothschild treated me just like an equal, quite +_famillionaire_.” The entire restriction, which the second sentence +imposes on the first thus verifying the familiar treatment, has been +lost in the jest. But it has not been so entirely lost as not to leave a +substitute from which it can be reconstructed. A second change has also +taken place. The word “familiar” in the witless expression of the +thought has been transformed into “_famillionaire_” in the text of the +wit, and there is no doubt that the witty character and ludicrous effect +of the joke depends directly upon this word-formation. The newly formed +word is identical in its first part with the word “familiar” of the +first sentence, and its terminal syllables correspond to the word +“millionaire” of the second sentence. In this manner it puts us in a +position to conjecture the second sentence which was omitted in the text +of the wit. It may be described as a composite of two constituents +“familiar” and “millionaire,” and one is tempted to depict its origin +from the two words graphically. + + FAMIL I A R + MILLIONAIRE + ————————————— + FAMILLIONAIRE + +The process, then, which has carried the thought into the witticism can +be represented in the following manner, which, although at first rather +fantastic, nevertheless furnishes exactly the actual existing result: +“Rothschild treated me quite familiarly, i.e., as well as a millionaire +can do that sort of thing.” + +Now imagine that a compressing force is acting upon these sentences and +assume that for some reason or other the second sentence is of lesser +resistance. It is accordingly forced toward the vanishing point, but its +important component, the word “millionaire,” which strives against the +compressing power, is pushed, as it were, into the first sentence and +becomes fused with the very similar element, the word “familiar” of this +sentence. It is just this possibility, provided by chance to save the +essential part of the second sentence, which favors the disappearance of +the other less important components. The jest then takes shape in this +manner: “Rothschild treated me in a very + + famillionaire way.” + / (mili) (aire) + +Apart from such a compressing force, which is really unknown to us, we +may describe the origin of the wit-formation, that is, the technique of +the wit in this case, as a _condensation with substitutive formation_. +In our example the substitutive formation consists in the formation of a +mixed word. This fused word “famillionaire,” incomprehensible in itself +but instantly understood in its context and recognized as senseful, is +now the carrier of the mirth-provoking stimulus of the jest, whose +mechanism, to be sure, is in no way clearer to us through the discovery +of the technique. To what extent can a linguistic process of +condensation with substitutive formation produce pleasure through a +fused word and force us to laugh? We make note of the fact that this is +a different problem, the treatment of which we can postpone until we +shall find access to it later. For the present we shall continue to busy +ourselves with the technique of wit. + +Our expectation that the technique of wit cannot be considered an +indifferent factor in the examination of the nature of wit prompts us to +inquire next whether there are other examples of wit formed like Heine’s +“famillionaire.” Not many of these exist, but enough to constitute a +small group which may be characterized as the blend-word formations or +fusions. Heine himself has produced a second witticism from the word +“millionaire” by copying himself, as it were, when he speaks of a +“millionarr” (_Ideen_, Chap. XIV). This is a visible condensation of +“millionaire” and “narr” (fool) and, like the first example, expresses a +suppressed by-thought. Other examples of a similar nature are as +follows. + +During the war between Turkey and the Balkan States, in 1912, _Punch_ +depicted the part played by Rumania by representing the latter as a +highwayman holding up the members of the Balkan alliance. The picture +was entitled: _Kleptorumania_. Here the word is a fusion of Kleptomania +and Rumania and may be represented as follows: + + KLEPTOMANIA + RUMANIA + ————————————— + KLEPTORUMANIA + +A naughty jest of Europe has rebaptized a former potentate, Leopold, +into _Cleopold_ because of his relation to a lady surnamed Cleo. This is +a clear form of condensation which by the addition of a single letter +forever vividly preserves a scandalous allusion. + +In an excellent chapter on this same theme Brill gives the following +example.[16] + +“De Quincey once remarked that old persons are apt to fall into +‘anecdotage.’” The word _Anecdotage_, though in itself incomprehensible, +can be readily analyzed to show its original full sense; and on analysis +we find that it is made up of two words, _anecdote_ and _dotage_. That +is, instead of saying that old persons are apt to fall into dotage and +that old persons are fond of telling anecdotes, De Quincey fuses the two +words into a neologism, _anecdotage_, and thus simultaneously expresses +both ideas. The technique, therefore, lies in the fusion of the two +words. Such a fusion of words is called condensation. Condensation is a +substitutive formation, i.e., instead of _anecdote_ and _dotage_ we have +_anecdotage_. + +“In a short story which I have recently read, one of the characters, a +‘sport,’ speaks of the Christmas season as the _alcoholidays_. By +reduction it can be easily seen that we have here a compound word, a +combination of _alcohol_ and _holidays_ which can be graphically +represented as follows: + + alcoHOL + HOLidays + ———————————— + ALCOHOLIDAYS + +“Here the condensation expresses the idea that holidays are conducive to +alcoholic indulgence. In other words, we have here a fused word, which, +though strange in appearance, can be easily understood in its proper +context. The witticism may be described as a condensation with +substitution. + +“The same mechanism is found in the following: A dramatic critic, +summarizing three paragraphs to the effect that most plays now produced +in New York City are violently emotional and hysterical, remarks: +‘Thespis has taken up his home in Dramatteawan.’ The last word is a +condensation of _drama_ and _Matteawan_. The substitution not only +expressed the critic’s idea that most of the plays at present produced +in New York are violent, emotional and hysterical, that is insane, but +it also contains a clever allusion to the nature of the problem +presented by most of these plays. Matteawan is a state hospital for +criminal insane. Most of the plays are not only insane, but also +criminal since they treat of murders, divorces, robberies, scandals, +etc.” + +When Flaubert published his famous romance _Salammbo_, which treats of +life in ancient Carthage, it was scoffingly referred to by Sainte-Beuve +as _Carthaginoiserie_ on account of its tedious detailed descriptions. + + Carthaginoiserie + chinoiserie + +During a conversation with a lady I unintentionally furnished the +material for a jest. I spoke to her about the great merits of an +investigator whom I considered unjustly ignored. She remarked, “But the +man really deserves a monument.” “Perhaps he will get one some day,” I +answered, “but at the moment his success is very limited.” “Monument” +and “moment” are contrasts. The lady then united these contrasts and +said: “Well, let us wish him a _monumentary_ success.” + +If at this stage the reader should become displeased with a viewpoint +which threatens to destroy his pleasure in wit without explaining the +source of this pleasure I must beg him to be patient for a while, +because we are now confronted with the technique of wit, the examination +of which promises many revelations if only we enter into it far enough. +Besides the analysis of the examples thus far cited, which show simply a +process of condensation, there are others in which the changed +expressions manifest themselves in other ways. + + + _Condensation with Modification and Substitution_ + +The following witticisms of Mr. N. will serve as illustrations. + +“I was driving with him tête-à-bête.” Nothing is simpler than the +reduction of this jest. Evidently it can only mean: I was driving +tête-à-tête with Mr. X. and X. is a stupid ass (beast). + +Neither of these two sentences is witty nor is there any wit if one +combines them into this one: “I was out driving tête-à-tête with that +stupid ass (beast).” The wit appears when the words “stupid ass” are +omitted and when, as a substitute for them, the first “t” of the second +“tête” is changed to “b.” This slight modification brings back to +expression the suppressed “bête.” The technique of this group of +witticisms may be described as “condensation with a slight +modification.” And it would seem that the more insignificant the +substitutive modification, the better is the wit. + +Quite similar, although not without its complications, is the technique +of another form of witticism. During a discussion about a person in whom +there was something to praise and much to criticise, N. remarked: “Yes, +vanity is one of his four heels of Achilles.”[17] This modification +consists in the fact that instead of the one vulnerable heel which was +attributed to Achilles we have here four heels. Four heels means four +feet and that number is only found on animals. The two thoughts +condensed in the witticism are as follows: Except for his vanity he is +an admirable fellow; still I do not care for him, for he is more of an +animal than a human being.[18] + +A similar but simpler joke I heard _statu nascendi_ in a family circle. +One of two brothers who were attending college was an excellent scholar +while the other was only an average student. It so happened that the +model boy had a setback in school. The mother discussed this matter and +expressed her fear lest this event be the beginning of a lasting +deterioration. The boy who until then had been overshadowed by his +brother willingly grasped this opportunity to remark: “Yes, Carl is +going backward on all-fours.” + +Here the modification consists in a small addition as an assurance that +in his judgment his brother is going backward. This modification +represents and takes the place of a passionate plea for his own cause +which may be expressed as follows: After all, you must not think that he +is so much cleverer than I am simply because he has more success in +school. He is really a stupid ass, i.e., much more stupid than I am. + +A good illustration of condensation with slight modification is +furnished by a well-known witty jest of Mr. N., who remarked about a +character in public life that he had a “_great future behind him_.” The +butt of this joke was a young man whose ancestry, rearing, and personal +qualities seemed to destine him for the leadership of a great party and +the attainment of political power at its head. But times changed, the +party became politically incompetent, and it could readily be foreseen +that the man who was predestined to become its leader would come to +nothing. The briefest reduction of the meaning by which one could +replace this joke would be: The man has had a great future before him, +but that is now past. Instead of “has had” and the appended afterthought +there is a small change in the main sentence in which “before” is +replaced by its opposite “behind.”[19] + +Mr. N. made use of almost the same modification in the case of the +nobleman who was appointed minister of agriculture for no other reason +than that he was interested in agriculture. Public opinion had an +opportunity to find out that he was the most incompetent man who had +ever been intrusted with this office. When, however, he had relinquished +his portfolio and had withdrawn to his agricultural pursuits Mr. N. said +of him: “_Like Cincinnatus of Old he has returned to his place in front +of the plough._” + +That Roman, who was likewise called to his office from his farm, +returned to his place behind the plough. In those days, just as in the +present time, in front of the plough walked—the ox. + +We could easily increase these examples by many others, but I am of the +opinion that we are in need of no more cases in order to grasp +thoroughly the character of the technique of this second +group—condensation with modification. If we now compare the second group +with the first, the technique of which consisted in condensation with a +mixed word-formation, we readily see that the differences are not vital +and that the lines of demarcation are indistinct. The mixed +word-formation, like the modification, became subordinated to the idea +of substitutive formation, and if we desire we can also describe the +mixed word-formation as a modification of the parent word through the +second elements. + +We may make our first pause here and ask ourselves with what known +factor in the literature of wit our first result, either in whole or in +part, coincides. It obviously agrees with the factor of brevity which +Jean Paul calls the soul of wit (_supra_, p. 11). But brevity alone is +not wit or every laconism would be witty. The brevity of wit must be of +a special kind. We recall that Lipps has attempted to describe more +fully the peculiarity of the brevity of wit (_v. s._, p. 11). Here our +investigation started and demonstrated that the brevity of wit is often +the result of a special process which has left a second trace—the +substitutive formation—in the wording of the wit. By applying the +process of reduction, which aims to cause a retrogression in the +peculiar process of condensation, we find also that wit depends only +upon the verbal expression which was produced by the process of +condensation. Naturally our entire interest now centers upon this +peculiar and hitherto almost neglected mechanism. Furthermore, we cannot +yet comprehend how it can give origin to all that is valuable in wit; +namely, the resultant pleasure. + + + _Condensation in Dreams_ + +Have processes similar to those here described as the technique of wit +already been noted in another sphere of our psychic life? To be sure, in +one apparently remote sphere. In 1900 I published a book which, as +indicated by its title (_The Interpretation of Dreams_[20]), makes the +attempt to explain the riddle of the dream and to trace the dream to +normal psychic operations. I had occasion to contrast there the manifest +and often peculiar dream-content with the latent but altogether real +thoughts of the dream from which it originated, and I took up the +investigation of the processes which make the dream from the latent +dream-thought. I also investigated the psychological forces which +participated in this transposition. The sum of the transforming +processes I designated as the dream-work and, as a part of this +dream-work, I described the process of condensation. This process has a +striking similarity to the technique of wit and, like the latter, it +leads to abbreviations and brings about substitutive formations of like +character. + +From recollections of his own dreams the reader will be familiar with +the compositions of persons and objects that appear in them; indeed, the +dream makes similar compositions of words which can then be reduced by +analysis (e.g., Autodidasker—Autodidakt and Lasker[21]). On other +occasions and even much more frequently, the condensation work of the +dream produces no compositions, but pictures which closely resemble an +object or person up to a certain addition or variation which comes from +another source, like the modifications in the witticisms of Mr. N. We +cannot doubt that in this case, as in the other, we deal with a similar +psychic process which is recognizable by identical results. Such a +far-reaching analogy between wit-technique and dream-work will surely +arouse our interest in the former and stimulate our expectation of +finding some explanation of wit from a comparison with the dream. We +forbear, however, to enter upon this work by bearing in mind that we +have investigated the technique of wit in only a very small number of +witty jests, so that we cannot be certain that the analogy, the workings +of which we wish to explore, will hold good. Hence we turn away from the +comparison with the dream and again take up the technique of wit, +leaving, however, at this place of our investigation a visible thread, +as it were, which later we shall take up again. + + + _Wit Formed by Word-division_ + +The next point we shall discuss is whether the process of condensation +with substitutive formation is demonstrable in all witticisms so that it +may be designated as a universal character of the technique of wit. I +recall a joke which has clung to my mind through certain peculiar +circumstances. One of the great teachers of my youth, whom we considered +unable to appreciate a joke—he had never told us a single joke of his +own—came into the Institute laughing. With an unwonted readiness he +explained the cause of his good humor. “I have read an excellent joke,” +he said. “_A young man who claimed to be a relative of the great J. J. +Rousseau, and who bore his name, was introduced into a Parisian +drawing-room. It should be added that he was decidedly red-headed. He +behaved in such an awkward manner that the hostess ventured this +criticism to the gentleman who had introduced him—‘Vous m’avez fait +connaître un jeune homme roux et sot, mais non pas un Rousseau.’_” + +At this point our teacher started to laugh again. According to the +nomenclature of our authors this is sound-wit and a poor kind at that, +since it plays with a proper name. + +But what is the technique of this wit? It is quite clear that the +character which we had perhaps hoped to demonstrate universally leaves +us in the lurch in the first new example. Here there is no omission and +scarcely an abbreviation. In the witticism the lady expresses almost +everything that we can ascribe to the thoughts. “You have made me look +forward to meeting a relative of J. J. Rousseau. I expected that he was +perhaps even mentally related to him. Imagine my surprise to find this +red-haired foolish boy, a _roux et sot_.” To be sure, I was able to add +and insert something, but this attempt at reduction does not annul the +wit. It remains fixed and attached to the sound similarity of + + Rousseau. + ———————— + roux sot + +This proves that condensation with substitution plays no part in the +production of this witticism. + +With what else do we have to deal? New attempts at reduction taught me +that the joke will persistently continue until the name Rousseau is +replaced by another. If, e.g., I substitute the name Racine for it I +find that although the lady’s criticism is just as feasible as before it +immediately loses every trace of wit. Now I know where I can look for +the technique of this joke although I still hesitate to formulate it. I +shall make the following attempt: The technique of the witticism lies in +the fact that one and the same word—the name—is used in a twofold +application, once as a whole and once divided into its syllables like a +charade. + +I can mention a few examples of identical technique. A witticism of this +sort was utilized by an Italian lady to avenge a tactless remark made to +her by the first Napoleon. Pointing to her compatriots at a court ball +he said: “_Tutti gli Italian danzano si male_” (all Italians dance so +badly). To which she quickly replied: _“Non tutti, ma buona parte”_ (Not +all, but a great many)— + + Buona parte.[22] + ———————————— + Buonaparte. + +Brill reports still another example in which the wit depends on the +twofold application of a name: “_Hood once remarked that he had to be a +lively Hood for a livelihood._”[23] + +At one time when Antigone was produced in Berlin a critic found that the +presentation entirely lacked the character of antiquity. The wits of +Berlin incorporated this criticism in the following manner: “_Antique? +Oh, nay_” (Th. Vischer and K. Fischer). + + + _Manifold Application of the Same Material_ + +In these examples, which will suffice for this species of wit, the +technique is the same. A name is made use of twice; first, as a whole, +and then divided into its syllables—and in their divided state the +syllables yield a different meaning.[24] The manifold application of the +same word, once as a whole and then as the component syllables into +which it divides itself, was the first case that came to our attention +in which technique deviated from that of condensation. Upon brief +reflection, however, we must divine from the abundance of examples that +come to us that the newly discovered technique can hardly be limited to +this single means. Obviously there are any number of hitherto unobserved +possibilities for one to utilize the same word or the same material of +words in manifold application _in one sentence_. May not all these +possibilities furnish technical means for wit? It would seem so, judging +by the following examples. + +“_Two witty statesmen, X and Y, met at a dinner. X, acting as +toastmaster, introduced Y as follows: ‘My friend, Y, is a very wonderful +man. All you have to do is to open his mouth, put in a dinner, and a +speech appears, etc.’ Responding to the speaker, Y said: ‘My friend, the +toastmaster, told you what a wonderful man I am, that all you have to do +is to open my mouth, put in a dinner, and a speech appears. Now let me +tell you what a wonderful man he is. All you have to do is open +anybody’s mouth, put in his speech, and the dinner appears.’_”[25] + +In examples of this sort, one can use the same material of words and +simply change slightly their order. The slighter the change, the more +one gets the impression that different sense was expressed with the same +words, the better is the technical means of wit. And how simple are the +means of its production! “_Put in a dinner and a speech appears—put in a +speech and a dinner appears._” This is really nothing but an exchange of +places of these two phrases whereby what was said of Y becomes +differentiated from what is said of X. To be sure, this is not the whole +technique of the joke.[26] + +Great latitude is afforded the technique of wit if one so extends the +“_manifold application of the same material_” that the word—or the +words—upon which the wit depends may be used first unchanged and then +with a slight modification. An example is another joke of Mr. N. He +heard a gentleman, who himself was born a Jew, utter a malicious +statement about Jewish character. “Mr. Councilor,” said he, “I am +familiar with your _antesemitism_, but your _antisemitism_ is new to +me.” + +Here only one single letter is changed, the modification of which could +hardly be noticed in careless pronunciation. This example reminds one of +the other modification jokes of Mr. N., but it differs from them in +lacking the condensation. Everything that was to be said has been told +in the joke. “I know that you yourself were formerly a Jew, therefore I +am surprised that you should rail against the Jew.” + +An excellent example of such wit modification is also the familiar +exclamation: “_Traduttore—Traditore_.”[27] + +The similarity between the two words, almost approaching identity, +results in a very impressive representation of the inevitability by +which a translator becomes a transgressor—in the eyes of the author. + +The manifoldness of slight modifications possible in these jokes is so +great that none is quite similar to the other. Here is a joke which is +supposed to have arisen at an examination for the degree of law. The +candidate was translating a passage from the Corpus juris, “_Labeo +ait_.” “‘I fall (fail),’ says he,” volunteered the candidate. “‘You fall +(fail),’ says I,” replied the examiner and the examination ended. +Whoever mistakes the name of the celebrated Jurist for a word to which +he attaches a false meaning certainly deserves nothing better. But the +technique of the witticism lies in the fact that the examiner used +almost the same words in punishing the applicant which the latter used +to prove his ignorance. Besides, the joke is an example of repartee +whose technique, as we shall see, is closely allied to the one just +mentioned. + +Words are plastic and may be moulded into almost any shape. There are +some words which have lost their true original meaning in certain usages +which they still enjoy in other applications. In one of Lichtenberg’s +jokes just those conditions have been sought for in which the nuances of +the wordings have removed their basic meaning. + +_“How goes it?” asked the blind of the lame one. “As you see,” replied +the lame one to the blind._ + +Language is replete with words which taken in one sense are full of +meaning and in another are colorless. There may be two different +derivatives from the same root, one of which may develop into a word +with a full meaning while the other may become a colorless suffix or +prefix, and yet both may have the same sound. The similarity of sound +between a word having full meaning and one whose meaning is colorless +may also be accidental. In both cases the technique of wit can make use +of such relationship of the speech material. The following examples +illustrate some of these points. + +“_Do you call a man kind who remits nothing to his family while away?_” +asked an actor. “_Call that kindness?_” “_Yes, unremitting kindness_,” +was the reply of Douglas Jerrold. The wit here depends on the first +syllable _un_ of the word _unremitting_. Un is usually a prefix denoting +“not,” but by adding it to “remitting” a new relationship is +unexpectedly established which changes the meaning of the context. “_An +undertaker is one who always carries out what he undertakes._” The +striking character upon which the wit here depends is the manifold +application of the words _undertaker_ and _carry out_. Undertaker +commonly denotes one who manages funerals. Only when taken in this sense +and using the words _carry out_ literally is the sentence witty. The wit +lies in the manifold application of the same words. + + + _Double Meaning and Play on Words_ + +If we delve more deeply into the variety of “manifold application” of +the same word we suddenly notice that we are confronted with forms of +“double meaning” or “plays on words” which have been known a long time +and which are universally acknowledged as belonging to the technique of +wit. Then why have we bothered our brains about discovering something +new when we could just as well have gleaned it from the most superficial +treatise on wit? We can say in self-defense only that we are presenting +another side of the same phenomena of verbal expressions. What the +authors call the “playful” character of wit we treat from the point of +view of “manifold application.” + +Further examples of manifold application which may also be designated +under a new and third group, the class of double meaning, may be divided +into subdivisions. These, to be sure, are not essentially differentiated +from one another any more than the whole third group from the second. In +the first place we have: + +(a) Cases of double meaning of a name and its verbal significance: e.g., +“_Discharge thyself of our company, Pistol_” (_Henry IV_, Act II). “_For +Suffolk’s duke may he suffocate_” (_Henry IV_, Act I). Heine says, +“_Here in Hamburg rules not the rascally Macbeth, but Banko_ (Banquo).” + +In those cases where the unchanged name cannot be used,—one might say +“misused,”—one can get a double meaning by means of familiar slight +modifications: “_Why have the French rejected Lohengrin?_” was a +question asked some time ago. The answer was, “_On Elsa’s_ (Alsace) +_account._” + +(b) Cases where a double meaning is obtained by using a word which has +both a verbal and metaphoric sense furnish an abundant source for the +technique of wit. A medical colleague, who was well known for his wit, +once said to Arthur Schnitzler, the writer: “_I am not at all surprised +that you became a great poet. Your father had already held up the mirror +to his contemporaries._” The mirror used by the father of the writer, +the famous Dr. Schnitzler, was the laryngoscope. According to the +well-known quotation from _Hamlet_ (Act III, Scene 2), the object of the +play as well as the writer who creates it is to “hold, as’t were, the +mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own +image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.” + +(c) Cases of actual double meaning or play on words—the ideal case, as +it were, of manifold application. Here no violence is done to the word. +It is not torn into syllables. It need not undergo any modifications. It +need not exchange its own particular sphere, say as a proper name, for +another. Thanks to certain circumstances it can express two meanings +just as it stands in the structure of the sentence. Many examples are at +our disposal. + +One of the first royal acts of the last Napoleon was, as is well known, +the confiscation of the estates belonging to the House of Orleans. +“_C’est le premier vol de l’aigle_” was an excellent play on words +current at that time. “Vol” means both flight and theft. Louis XV wished +to test the wit of one of his courtiers whose talent in that direction +he had heard about. He seized his first opportunity to command the +cavalier to concoct a joke at his (the king’s) expense. He wanted to be +the “subject” of the witticism. The courtier answered him with the +clever _bonmot_, “_Le roi n’est pas sujet._” “Subject” also means +“vassal.” (Taken from K. Fischer.) + +_A physician, leaving the sick-bed of a wife, whose husband accompanied +him, exclaimed doubtfully: “I do not like her looks.” “I have not liked +her looks for a long time,” was the quick rejoinder of the husband._ The +physician, of course, referred to the condition of the wife, but he +expressed his apprehension about the patient in such words as to afford +the husband the means of utilizing them to assert his conjugal aversion. +Concerning a satirical comedy Heine remarked: “_This satire would not +have been so biting had the author of it had more to bite._” This jest +is a better example of metaphoric and common double meaning than of real +play upon words, but at present we are not concerned about such strict +lines of demarcation. _Charles Matthews, the elder, one of England’s +greatest actors, was asked what he was going to do with his son_ (the +young man was destined for architecture). “_Why_,” answered the +comedian, “_he is going to draw houses like his father_.” _Foote once +asked a man why he forever sang one tune. “Because it haunts me,” +replied the man. “No wonder,” said Foote, “you are continually murdering +it.”_ Said the Dyspeptic Philosopher: “_One swallow doesn’t make a +summer, nor quench the thirst._” + +_A gentleman had shown much ingenuity in evading a notorious borrower +whom he had sent away many times with the request to call when he was +“in.” One day, however, the borrower eluded the servant at the door and +cornered his victim._ + +_“Ah,” said the host, seeing there was no way out of it, “at last I am +in.”_ + +_“No,” returned the borrower in anticipation, “at last I am in and you +are out.”_ + +Heine said in the _Harzreise_: “_I cannot recall at the moment the names +of all the students, and among the professors there are some who have no +name as yet._” + +Dr. Johnson said of the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, which was +poor in purse, but prolific in the distribution of its degrees: “_Let it +persevere in its present plan and it may become rich_ by degrees.” Here +the wit depends more on the manifold application than on the play on +words. + +The keen-witted writer, Horatio Winslow, sums up the only too-familiar +history of some American families as follows: + + + A TALE OF TWO AMERICAN GENERATIONS + + _Gold Mine + Gold Spoon + Gold Cure_ + +The last couplet, gold cure, refers to the familiar cure for alcoholism. +This wit is an excellent example of unification—everything is, as it +were, of gold. The manifold meanings of the adjective which do not very +strikingly contrast with one another make possible this “manifold +application.” + + + _Ambiguity_ + +Another play on words will facilitate the transition to a new +subdivision of the technique of double meaning. The witty colleague who +was responsible for the joke mentioned on page 42 is likewise +responsible for this joke, current during the trial of Dreyfus: + +“_This girl reminds me of Dreyfus. The army does not believe in her +innocence._” + +The word innocence, whose double meaning furnishes the basis of the +witticism, has in one connection the customary meaning which is the +opposite of guilt or transgression, while in the other connection it has +a sexual sense, the opposite of which is sexual experience. There are +very many such examples of double meaning and in each one the point of +the joke refers especially to a sexual sense. The group could be +designated as “ambiguous.” _A good example to illustrate this is the +story told of a wealthy but elderly gentleman who showed his devotion to +a young actress by many lavish gifts. Being a respectable girl she took +the first opportunity to discourage his attentions by telling him that +her heart was already given to another man. “I never aspired as high as +that,” was his polite answer._ + +If one compares this example of double-meaning-with-ambiguity with other +examples one cannot help noticing a difference which is not altogether +inconsequential to the technique. In the joke about “innocence” one +meaning of the word is just as good for our understanding of it as the +other. One can really not decide whether the sexual or non-sexual +significance of the word is more applicable and more familiar. But it is +different with the other example mentioned. Here the final sense of the +words, “I never aspired as high as that,” is by far more obtrusive and +covers and conceals, as it were, the sexual sense which could easily +escape the unsuspecting person. In sharp contrast to this let us examine +another example of double meaning in which there is no attempt made to +veil its sexual significance—e.g., Heine’s characterization of a +complaisant lady: “_She could pass (abschlagen) nothing except her +water._” It sounds like an obscene joke and the wit in it is scarcely +noticed.[28] But the peculiarity that both senses of the double meaning +are not equally manifested can occur also in witticisms without sexual +reference providing that one sense is more common or that it is +preferred on account of its connection with the other parts of the +sentence (e.g., _c’est le premier vol de l’aigle_). All these examples I +propose to call double meaning with allusion. + +We have by this time become familiar with such a large number of +different techniques of wit that I am afraid we may lose sight of them. +Let us, therefore, attempt to make a summary. + + I. CONDENSATION + + (a) with mixed word-formation. + + (b) with modification. + + II. THE APPLICATION OF THE SAME MATERIAL + + (c) The whole and the part. + + (d) Change of order. + + (e) Slight modification. + + (f) The same words used in their full or colorless sense. + + III. DOUBLE MEANING + + (g) Name and verbal significance. + + (h) Metaphorical and verbal meaning. + + (i) True double meaning (play on words). + + (j) Ambiguous meaning. + + (k) Double meaning with allusion. + +This variety causes confusion. It might vex us because we have devoted +so much time to the consideration of the technical means of wit, and the +stress laid on the forms might possibly arouse our suspicions that we +are overvaluing their importance so far as the knowledge of the nature +of wit is concerned. But this conjecture is met by the one irrefutable +fact: namely, that each time the wit disappears as soon as we remove the +effect that was brought to expression by these techniques. We are thus +directed to search for the unity in this variety. It must be possible to +bring all these techniques under one head. As we have remarked before, +it is not difficult to unite the second and third groups, for the double +meaning, the play on words, is nothing but the ideal case of utilizing +the same material. The latter is here apparently the more comprehensive +conception. The examples of dividing, changing the order of the same +material, manifold application with slight modifications (c, d, e)—all +these could, without difficulty, be subordinated under the conception of +double meaning. But what community exists between the technique of the +first group—condensation with substitutive formation—and the two other +groups—manifold application of the same material? + + + _The Tendency to Economy_ + +It seems to me that this agreement is very simple and clear. The +application of the same material is only a special case of condensation +and the play on words is nothing but a condensation without substitutive +formation. Condensation thus remains as the chief category. A +compressing or—to be more exact—an economic tendency controls all these +techniques. As Prince Hamlet says: “Thrift, Horatio, thrift.” It seems +to be all a matter of economy. + +Let us examine this economy in individual cases. “_C’est le premier vol +de l’aigle._” That is, the first flight of the eagle. Certainly, but it +is a depredatious flight. Luckily for the gist of this joke “vol” +signifies flight as well as depredation. Has nothing been condensed and +economized by this? Certainly, the entire second thought, and it was +dropped without any substitution. The double sense of the word “vol” +makes such substitution superfluous, or what is just as correct: The +word “vol” contains the substitution for the repressed thought without +the necessity of supplementing or varying the first sentence. Therein +consists the benefit of the double meaning. + +Another example: _Gold mine_,—_gold spoon_, the enormous economy of +expression the single word “gold” produces. It really tells the history +of two generations in the life of some American families. The father +made his fortune through hard toiling in the gold fields during the +early pioneer days. The son was born with a golden spoon in his mouth; +having been brought up as the son of a wealthy man, he becomes a chronic +alcoholic and has to take the gold cure. + +Thus there is no doubt that the condensation in these examples produces +economy and we shall demonstrate that the same is true in all cases. +Where is the economy in such jokes as “_Rousseau_—_roux et sot_,” or +“_Antigone_—_antique-oh-nay_” in which we first failed to find the prime +factors in causing us to establish the technique of the manifold +application of the same material? In these cases condensation will +naturally not cover the ground, but when we exchange it for the broader +conception of “economy” we find no difficulty. What we save in such +examples as those just given is quite obvious. We save ourselves the +trouble of making a criticism, of forming a judgment. Both are contained +in the names. The same is true in the “_livelihood_” example and the +others thus far analyzed. Where one does not save much is in the example +of “_I am in and you are out_,” at least the wording of a new answer is +saved. The wording of the address, “_I am in_,” serves also for the +answer. It is little, but in this little lies the wit. The manifold +application of the same words in addressing and answering surely comes +under the heading of economy. Note how Hamlet sums up the quick +succession of the death of his father and the marriage of his mother: + + “the funeral baked meats + Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables.” + +But before we accept the “tendency to economize” as the universal +character of wit and ask whence it originates, what it signifies, and +how it gives origin to the resultant pleasure, we shall concede a doubt +which may justly be considered. It may be true that every technique of +wit shows the tendency to economize in expression, but the relationship +is not reversible. Not every economy in expression or every brevity is +witty on that account. We once raised this question when we still hoped +to demonstrate the condensation process in every witticism and at that +we justly objected by remarking that a laconism is not necessarily wit. +Hence it must be a peculiar form of brevity and economy upon which the +character of the wit depends, and just as long as we are ignorant of +this peculiarity the discovery of the common element in the technique of +wit will bring us no nearer a solution. Besides, we have the courage to +acknowledge that the economies caused by the technique of wit do not +impress us as very much. They remind one of the manner in which many a +housewife economizes when she spends time and money to reach a distant +market because the vegetables can there be had a cent cheaper. What does +wit save by means of its technique? Instead of putting together a few +new words, which, for the most part, could have been accomplished +without any effort, it goes to the trouble of searching for the word +which comprises both ideas. Indeed, it must often at first transform the +expression of one of the ideas into an unusual form until it furnishes +an associative connection with the second thought. Would it not have +been simpler, easier, and really more economical to express both +thoughts as they happen to come even if no agreement in expression +results? Is not the economy in verbal expression more than abrogated +through the expenditure of intellectual work? And who economized through +it, whom does it benefit? We can temporarily circumvent these doubts by +leaving them unsolved until later on. Are we really familiar enough with +all the forms of techniques of wit? It will surely be safer to gather +new examples and submit them to analysis. + + + _Puns_ + +Indeed, we have not yet given consideration to one of the largest groups +into which the techniques of wit may be divided. In this we have perhaps +been influenced by the low estimate in which this form of wit is held. +It embraces those jokes which are commonly called “puns.” These are +generally counted as the lowest form of wit, perhaps because they are +“cheapest” and can be formed with the least effort. They really make the +least demands on the technique of expression just as the actual play on +words makes the most. Whereas in the latter both meanings find +expression in the identical word, and hence usually in a word used only +once, in the pun it is enough if two words for both meanings resemble +each other through some slight similarity in structure, in rhythmic +consonance, in the community of several vowels, or in some other similar +manner. The following examples illustrate these points: + +“We are now fallen into that critical age wherein _censores_ liberorum +are become _censores librorum_: _Lectores_, _Lictores_.” + +Professor Cromwell says that Rome in exchanging her religion changed +_Jupiter_ to _Jew Peter_. + +_It is related that some students wishing to play a trick on Agassiz, +the great naturalist, constructed an insect made up of parts taken from +different bugs and sent it to him with the question, “What kind of a bug +is this?” His answer was “Humbug.”_ + +Puns are especially fond of modifying one of the vowels of the word; +e.g., Hevesi (_Almanaccando, Reisen in Italien_, p. 87) says of an +Italian poet who was hostile to the German emperor, but who was, +nevertheless, forced to sing his praises in his hexameters, “_Since he +could not exterminate the Cæsars he at least annihilated the cæsuras_.” + +From the multitude of puns which are at our disposal it may be of +special interest to us to quote a really poor example for which Heine +(_Book Le Grand_, Chapter V) is responsible. _After parading for a long +time before his lady as an “Indian Prince” the suitor suddenly lays +aside his mask and confesses, “Madam, I have lied to you. I have never +been in Calcutta any more than that Calcutta roast which I relished +yesterday for lunch.”_ Obviously the fault of this witticism lies in the +fact that both words are not merely similar, but identical. The bird +which served as a roast for his lunch is called so because it comes +from, or at least is supposed to come from, the same city of Calcutta. + +K. Fischer has given much attention to this form of wit and insists upon +making a sharp distinction between it and the “play on words” (p. 78). +“A pun,” he says, “is a bad play on words, for it does not play with the +word as a word, but merely as a sound.” The play on words, however, +“transfers itself from the sound of the word into the word itself.” On +the other hand, he also classifies such jokes as “famillionaire, +Antigone (Antique-Oh-nay),” etc., with sound-wit. I see no necessity to +follow him in this. In the plays on words, also, the word serves us only +as a sound to which this or that meaning attaches itself. Here also +usage of language makes no distinction, and when it treats “puns” with +disdain but the play on words with a certain respect it seems that these +estimations are determined by others as technical viewpoints. One should +bear in mind the forms of wit which are referred to as puns. There are +persons who have the ability, when they are in a high-spirited mood, to +reply with a pun for a long time to every sentence addressed to them. +Brill[29] relates that at a gathering some one spoke disparagingly of a +certain drama and wound up by saying, _“It was so poor that the first +act had to be rewritten.” “And now it is rerotten,” added the punster of +the gathering._ + +At all events we can already infer from the controversies about the line +of demarcation between puns and play on words that the former cannot aid +us in finding an entirely new technique of wit. Even if no claims are +made for the pun that it utilizes the manifold application of the same +material, the accent, nevertheless, falls upon the rediscovering of the +familiar and upon the agreement between both words forming the pun. Thus +the latter is only a subspecies of the group which reaches its height in +the real play on words. + + + _Displacements_ + +There are some witticisms, however, whose techniques baffle almost every +attempt to classify them under any of the groups so far investigated. +_It is related that while Heine and the poet Soulié were once chatting +together in a Parisian drawing-room, there entered one of those +Parisians whom one usually compared to Midas, but not alone on account +of their money. He was soon surrounded by a crowd which treated him with +the greatest deference. “Look over there,” said Soulié to Heine, “and +see how the nineteenth century is worshipping the Golden Calf.” Heine +cast one glance upon the object of adoration and replied, as if +correcting his friend: “Oh, he must be older than that”_ (K. Fischer, p. +82). + +Wherein lies the technique of this excellent witticism? According to K. +Fischer it lies in the play on words. Thus, for example, he says, “the +words ‘Golden Calf’ may signify Mammon as well as idol-worship,—in the +first case the gold is paramount; in the second case it is the animal +picture. It may likewise serve to designate in a rather uncomplimentary +way one who has very much money and very little brains.” If we apply the +test and take away the expression “Golden Calf” we naturally also +abrogate the wit. We then cause Soulié to say, “Just see how the people +are thronging about that blockhead only because he is rich.” To be sure, +this is no longer witty. Nor would Heine’s answer be possible under +these circumstances. But let us remember that it is not at all a matter +of Soulié’s witty comparison, but of Heine’s retort, which is surely +much more witty. We have then no right to disturb the phrase “the golden +calf” which remains as a basis for Heine’s words and the reduction can +only be applied to the latter. If we dilate upon the words, “Oh, he must +be older than that,” we can only proceed as follows: + +“Oh, he is no longer a calf; he is already a full-grown ox.” Heme’s wit +is therefore based on the fact that he no longer took the “golden calf” +metaphorically, but personally by referring it to the moneyed individual +himself. If this double meaning is not already contained in the opinion +of Soulié! + +Let us see. We believe that we can state that this reduction has not +altogether destroyed Heine’s joke, but, on the contrary, it has left its +essential element untouched. It reads as if Soulié were now saying, +“Just see how the nineteenth century is worshipping the golden calf,” +and as if Heine were retorting, “Oh, he is no longer a calf. He is +already an ox.” And even in this reduced form it is still a witticism. +However, another reduction of Heine’s words is not possible. + +It is a pity that this excellent example contains such complicated +technical conditions. And as it cannot aid us toward enlightenment we +shall leave it to search for another in which we imagine we can perceive +a relationship with the former one. + +It is a “bath” joke treating of the dread which some Jews are said to +have for bathing. We demand no patent of nobility for our examples nor +do we make inquiries about their origin. The only qualifications we +require are that they should make us laugh and serve our theoretical +interest. It is to be remarked that both these demands are satisfied +best by Jewish jokes. + +_Two Jews meet near a bathing establishment. “Have you taken a bath?” +asked one. “How is that?” replies the other. “Is one missing?”_ + +When one laughs very heartily about a joke he is not in the best mood to +investigate its technique. It is for this reason that some difficulties +are experienced in delving into their analyses. “That is a comic +misunderstanding” is the thought that comes to us. Yes, but how about +the technique of this joke? Obviously the technique lies in the double +meaning of the word _take_. In the first case the word is used in a +colorless idiomatic sense, while in the second it is the verb in its +full meaning. It is, therefore, a case where the same word is taken now +in the “full” and now in the “empty” sense (Group II, f). And if we +replace the expression “take a bath” by the simpler equivalent “bathed” +the wit disappears. The answer is no longer fitting. The joke, +therefore, lies in the expression “take a bath.” + +This is quite correct, yet it seems that in this case, also, the +reduction was applied in the wrong place, for the joke does not lie in +the question, but in the answer, or rather in the counter question: “How +is that? Is there one missing?” Provided the same is not destroyed the +answer cannot be robbed of its wit by any dilation or variation. We also +get the impression that in the answer of the second Jew the overlooking +of the bath is more significant than the misconception of the word +“take.” However, here, too, things do not look quite clear and we will, +therefore, look for a third example. + +Once more we shall resort to a Jewish joke in which, however, the Jewish +element is incidental only. Its essence is universally human. It is true +that this example, too, contains undesirable complications, but luckily +they are not of the kind so far which have kept us from seeing clearly. + +_In his distress a needy man borrowed twenty-five dollars from a wealthy +acquaintance. The same day he was discovered by his creditor in a +restaurant eating a dish of salmon with mayonnaise. The creditor +reproached him in these words: “You borrow money from me and then order +salmon with mayonnaise. Is that what you needed the money for?” “I don’t +understand you,” responded the debtor, “when I have no money I can’t eat +salmon with mayonnaise. When I have money I mustn’t eat it. Well then, +when shall I ever eat salmon with mayonnaise?”_ + +Here we no longer discover any double meaning. Even the repetition of +the words “salmon with mayonnaise” cannot contain the technique of the +witticism, as it is not the “manifold application of the same material,” +but an actual, identical repetition required by the context. We may be +temporarily nonplussed in this analysis, and, as a pretext, we may wish +to dispute the character of the wit in the anecdote which causes us to +laugh. What else worthy of notice can be said about the answer of the +poor man? It may be supposed that the striking thing about it is its +logical character, but, as a matter of fact, the answer is illogical. +The debtor endeavors to justify himself for spending the borrowed money +on luxuries and asks, with some semblance of right, when he is to be +allowed to eat salmon. But this is not at all the correct answer. The +creditor does not blame him for eating salmon on the day that he +borrowed the money, but reminds him that in his condition he has no +right to think of such luxuries at all. The poor _bon vivant_ disregards +this only possible meaning of the reproach, centers his answer about +another point, and acts as if he did not understand the reproach. + +Is it possible that the technique of this joke lies in this deviation of +the answer from the sense of reproach? A similar changing of the +viewpoint—displacement of the psychic accent—may perhaps also be +demonstrated in the two previous examples which we felt were related to +this one. This can be successfully shown and solves the technique of +these examples. Soulié calls Heine’s attention to the fact that society +worships the “golden calf” in the nineteenth century just as the Jewish +nation once did in the desert. To this an answer from Heine like the +following would seem fit: “Yes, that is human nature. Centuries have +changed nothing in it;” or he might have remarked something equally +apposite. But Heine deviates in his manner from the instigated thought. +Indeed, he does not answer at all. He makes use of the double meaning +found in the phrase “golden calf” to go off at a tangent. He seizes upon +one of the components of the phrase, namely, “the calf,” and answers as +if Soulié’s speech placed the emphasis on it—“Oh, he is no longer a +calf, etc.”[30] + +The deviation is much more evident in the bath joke. This example +requires a graphic representation. The first Jew asks, “Have you taken a +_bath_?” The emphasis lies upon the bath element. The second answers as +if the query were: “Have you _taken_ a bath?” The displacement would +have been impossible if the question had been: “Have you bathed?” The +witless answer would have been: “Bathed? What do you mean? I don’t know +what that means.” However, the technique of the wit lies in the +displacement of the emphasis from “to bathe” to “to take.”[31] + +Let us return to the example “salmon with mayonnaise,” which is the +purest of its kind. What is new in it will direct us into various paths. +In the first place we have to give the mechanism of this newly +discovered technique. I propose to designate it as having _displacement_ +for its most essential element. The deviation of the trend of thought +consists in displacing the psychic accent to another than the original +theme. It is then incumbent upon us to find out the relationship of the +technique of displacement to the expression of the witticism. Our +example (salmon with mayonnaise) shows us that the displacement +technique is absolutely independent of the verbal expression. It does +not depend upon words, but upon the mental trend, and to abrogate it we +are not helped by substitution so long as the sense of the answer is +adhered to. The reduction is possible only when we change the mental +trend and permit the gastronomist to answer directly to the reproach +which he eluded in the conception of the joke. The reduced conception +will then be: “What I like I cannot deny myself, and it is all the same +to me where I get the money for it. Here you have my explanation as to +why I happen to be eating salmon with mayonnaise to-day just after you +have loaned me some money.” But that would not be witticism but a +_cynicism_. It will be instructive to compare this joke with one which +is closely allied to it in meaning. + +_A man who was addicted to drink supported himself in a small city by +giving lessons. His vice gradually became known and he lost most of his +pupils in consequence. A friend of his took it upon himself to admonish +him to reform. “Look here,” he said, “you could have the best scholars +in town if you would give up drinking. Why not do it?” “What are you +talking about?” was the indignant reply. “I am giving lessons in order +to be able to drink. Shall I give up drinking in order to obtain +scholars?”_ + +This joke, too, carries the stamp of logic which we have noted in the +case of “salmon with mayonnaise,” but it is no longer displacement-wit. +The answer is a direct one. The cynicism, which is veiled there, is +openly admitted here, “For me drink is the most important thing.” The +technique of this witticism is really very poor and cannot explain its +effect. It lies merely in the change in order of the same material, or +to be more exact, in the reversal of the means-and-end relationship +between drink and giving lessons or getting scholars. As I gave no +greater emphasis in the reduction to this factor of the expression the +witticism is somewhat blurred; it may be expressed as follows: “What a +senseless demand to make. For me, drink is the most important thing and +not the scholars. Giving lessons is only a means towards more drink.” +The wit is really dependent upon the expression. + +In the bath wit, the dependence of the witticism upon the wording “have +you taken a bath” is unmistakable and a change in the wording nullifies +the joke. The technique in this case is quite complicated. It is a +combination of double meaning (sub-group f) and displacement. The +wording of the question admits a double meaning. The joke arises from +the fact that the answer is given not in the sense expected by the +questioner, but has a different subordinate sense. By making the +displacement retrogressive we are accordingly in position to find a +reduction which leaves the double meaning in the expression and still +does away with the wit. + +_“Have you taken a bath?” “Taken what? A bath? What is that?”_ But that +is no longer a witticism. It is simply either a spiteful or playful +exaggeration. + +In Heme’s joke about the “golden calf” the double meaning plays a quite +similar part. It makes it possible for the answer to deviate from the +instigated stream of thought—a thing which happens in the joke about +“salmon and mayonnaise”—without any such dependence upon the wording. In +the reduction Soulié’s speech and Heine’s answer would be as follows: +“It reminds one very much of the worship of the golden calf when one +sees the people throng around that man simply because he is rich.” +Heine’s answer would be: “That he is made so much of on account of his +wealth is not the worst part. You do not emphasize enough the fact that +his ignorance is forgiven on account of his wealth.” Thus, while the +double meaning would be retained the displacement-wit would be +eliminated. + +Here we may be prepared for the objection which might be raised, namely, +that we are seeking to tear asunder these delicate differentiations +which really belong together. Does not every double meaning furnish +occasion for displacement and for a deviation of the stream of thought +from one sense to another? And shall we agree that a “double meaning” +and “displacement” should be designated as representatives of two +entirely different types of wit? It is true that a relation between +double meaning and displacement actually exists, but it has nothing to +do with our differentiation of the techniques of wit. In cases of double +meaning the wit contains nothing but a word capable of several +interpretations which allows the hearer to find the transition from one +thought to another, and which with a little forcing may be compared to a +displacement. In the cases of displacement-wit, however, the witticism +itself contains a stream of thought in which the displacement is brought +about. Here the displacement belongs to the work which is necessary for +its understanding. Should this differentiation not be clear to us we can +make use of the reduction method, which is an unfailing way for tangible +demonstration. We do not deny, however, that there is something in this +objection. It calls our attention to the fact that we cannot confuse the +psychic processes in the formation of wit (the wit-work) with the +psychic processes in the conception of the wit (the understanding-work). +The object of our present investigation will be confined only to the +former.[32] + +Are there still other examples of the technique of displacement? They +are not easily found, but the following witticism is a very good +specimen. It also shows a lack of overemphasized logic found in our +former examples. + +_A horse-dealer in recommending a saddle horse to his client said: “If +you mount this horse at four o’clock in the morning you will be in +Monticello at six-thirty in the morning.” “What will I do in Monticello +at six-thirty in the morning?” asked the client._ + +Here the displacement is very striking. The horse-dealer mentions the +early arrival in the small city only with the obvious intention of +proving the efficiency of the horse. The client disregards the capacity +of the animal, about which he evidently has no more doubts, and takes up +only the data of the example selected for the test. The reduction of +this joke is comparatively simple. + +More difficulties are encountered by another example, the technique of +which is very obscure. It can be solved, however, through the +application of double meaning with displacement. The joke relates the +subterfuge employed by a “schadchen” (Jewish marriage broker). It +belongs to a class which will claim more of our attention later. + +_The “schadchen” had assured the suitor that the father of the girl was +no longer living. After the engagement had been announced the news +leaked out that the father was still living and serving a sentence in +prison. The suitor reproached the agent for deceiving him. “Well,” said +the latter, “what did I tell you? Do you call that living?”_ + +The double meaning lies in the word “living,” and the displacement +consists in the fact that the “schadchen” avoids the common meaning of +the word, which is a contrast to “death,” and uses it in the colloquial +sense: “You don’t call that living.” In doing this he explains his +former utterance as a double meaning, although this manifold application +is here quite out of place. Thus far the technique resembles that of the +“golden calf” and the “bath” jokes. Here, however, another factor comes +into consideration which disturbs the understanding of the technique +through its obtrusiveness. One might say that this joke is a +“characterization-wit.” It endeavors to illustrate by example the +marriage agent’s characteristic admixture of mendacious impudence and +repartee. We shall learn that this is only the “show-side” of the façade +of the witticism, that is, its sense. Its object serves a different +purpose. We shall also defer our attempt at reduction.[33] + +After these complicated examples, which are not at all easy to analyze, +it will be gratifying to find a perfectly pure and transparent example +of “displacement-wit.” _A beggar implored the help of a wealthy baron +for a trip to Ostend, where he asserted the physicians had ordered him +to take sea baths for his health. “Very well, I shall assist you,” said +the rich baron, “but is it absolutely necessary for you to go to Ostend, +which is the most expensive of all watering-places?” “Sir,” was the +reproving reply, “nothing is too expensive for my health.”_ Certainly +that is a proper attitude, but hardly proper for the supplicant. The +answer is given from the viewpoint of a rich man. The beggar acts as if +it were his own money that he was willing to sacrifice for his health, +as if money and health concerned the _same_ person. + + + _Nonsense as a Technical Means_ + +Let us take up again in this connection the instructive example of +“salmon with mayonnaise.” It also presents to us a side in which we +noticed a striking display of logical work and we have learned from +analyzing it that this logic concealed an error of thought, namely, a +displacement of the stream of thought. Henceforth, even if only by way +of contrast association, we shall be reminded of other jokes which, on +the contrary, present clearly something contradictory, something +nonsensical, or foolish. We shall be curious to discover wherein the +technique of the witticism lies. I shall first present the strongest and +at the same time the purest example of the entire group. Once more it is +a Jewish joke. + +_Ike was serving in the artillery corps. He was seemingly an intelligent +lad, but he was unwieldy and had no interest in the service. One of his +superiors, who was kindly disposed toward him, drew him aside and said +to him: “Ike, you are out of place among us. I would advise you to buy a +cannon and make yourself independent.”_ + +The advice, which makes us laugh heartily, is obvious nonsense. There +are no cannon to be bought and an individual cannot possibly make +himself independent as a fighting force or establish himself, as it +were. One cannot remain one minute in doubt but that this advice is not +pure nonsense, but witty nonsense and an excellent joke. By what means +does the nonsense become a witticism? + +We need not meditate very long. From the discussions of the authors in +the Introduction we can guess that sense lurks in such witty nonsense, +and that this sense in nonsense transforms nonsense into wit. In our +example the sense is easily found. The officer who gives the +artilleryman, Ike, the nonsensical advice pretends to be stupid in order +to show Ike how stupidly he is acting. He imitates Ike as if to say, “I +will now give you some advice which is exactly as stupid as you are.” He +enters into Ike’s stupidity and makes him conscious of it by making it +the basis of a proposition which must meet with Ike’s wishes, for if Ike +owned a cannon and took up the art of warfare on his own account, of +what advantage would his intelligence and ambition be to him? How would +he take care of the cannon and acquaint himself with its mechanism in +order to meet the competition of other possessors of cannon? + +I am breaking off the analysis of this example to show the same sense in +nonsense in a shorter and simpler, though less glaring case of +nonsense-wit. + +“_Never to be born would be best for mortal man._” “_But_,” added the +sages of the _Fliegende Blätter_, “_hardly one man in a hundred thousand +has this luck_.” + +The modern appendix to the ancient philosophical saying is pure +nonsense, and becomes still more stupid through the addition of the +seemingly careful “hardly.” But this appendix in attaching itself to the +first sentence incontestably and correctly limits it. It can thus open +our eyes to the fact that that piece of wisdom so reverently scanned, is +neither more nor less than sheer nonsense. He who is not born of woman +is not mortal; for him there exists no “good” and no “best.” The +nonsense of the joke, therefore, serves here to expose and present +another bit of nonsense as in the case of the artilleryman. Here I can +add a third example which, owing to its context, scarcely deserves a +detailed description. It serves, however, to illustrate the use of +nonsense in wit in order to represent another element of nonsense. + +_A man about to go upon a journey intrusted his daughter to his friend, +begging him to watch over her chastity during his absence. When he +returned some months later he found that she was pregnant. Naturally he +reproached his friend. The latter alleged that he could not explain this +unfortunate occurrence. “Where has she been sleeping?” the father +finally asked. “In the same room with my son,” replied the friend. “How +is it that you allowed her to sleep in the same room with your son after +I had begged you so earnestly to take good care of her?” remonstrated +the father. “Well,” explained the friend, “there was a screen between +them. There was your daughter’s bed and over there was my son’s bed and +between them stood the screen.” “And suppose he went behind the screen? +What then?” asked the parent. “Well, in that case,” rejoined the friend +thoughtfully, “it might be possible.”_ + +In this joke—aside from the other qualities of this poor witticism—we +can easily get the reduction. Obviously, it would read like this: “You +have no right to reproach me. How could you be so foolish as to leave +your daughter in a house where she must live in the constant +companionship of a young man? As if it were possible for a stranger to +be responsible for the chastity of a maiden under such circumstances!” +The seeming stupidity of the friend here also serves as a reflection of +the stupidity of the father. By means of the reduction we have +eliminated the nonsense contained in the witticism as well as the +witticism itself. We have not gotten rid of the “nonsense” element +itself, as it finds another place in the context of the sentence after +it has been reduced to its true meaning. + +We can now also attempt the reduction of the joke about the cannon. The +officer might have said: “I know, Ike, that you are an intelligent +business man, but I must tell you that you are very stupid if you do not +realize that one cannot act in the army as one does in business, where +each one is out for himself and competes with the other. Military +service demands subordination and co-operation.” + +The technique of the nonsense-witticisms hitherto discussed really +consists in advancing something apparently absurd or nonsensical which, +however, discloses a sense serving to illustrate and represent some +other actual absurdity and nonsense. + +Has the employment of contradiction in the technique of wit always this +meaning? Here is another example which answers this affirmatively. On an +occasion when Phocion’s speech was applauded he turned to his friends +and asked: “_Did I say something foolish?_” + +This question seems paradoxical, but we immediately comprehend its +meaning. “What have I said that has pleased this stupid crowd? I ought +really to be ashamed of the applause, for if it appealed to these fools, +it could not have been very clever after all.” + +Other examples teach us that absurdity is used very often in the +technique of wit without serving at all the purpose of uncovering +another piece of nonsense. + +_A well-known university teacher who was wont to spice richly with jokes +his rather dry specialty was once congratulated upon the birth of his +youngest son, who was bestowed upon him at a rather advanced age. “Yes,” +said he to the well-wishers, “it is remarkable what mortal hands can +accomplish.”_ This reply seems especially meaningless and out of place, +for children are called the blessings of God to distinguish them from +creations of mortal hands. But it soon dawns upon us that this answer +has a meaning and an obscene one at that. The point in question is not +that the happy father wishes to appear stupid in order to make something +else or some other persons appear stupid. The seemingly senseless answer +causes us astonishment. It puzzles us, as the authors would have it. We +have seen that the authors deduce the entire mechanism of such jokes +from the change of the succession of “clearness and confusion.” We shall +try to form an opinion about this later. Here we content ourselves by +remarking that the technique of this witticism consists in advancing +such confusing and senseless elements. + +An especially peculiar place among the nonsense-jokes is assumed by this +joke of Lichtenberg. + +“_He was surprised that the two holes were cut in the pelts of cats just +where their eyes were located._” It is certainly foolish to be surprised +about something that is obvious in itself, something which is really the +explanation of an identity. It reminds one of a seriously intended +utterance of Michelet (_The Woman_) which, as I remember it, runs as +follows: “_How beautifully everything is arranged by nature. As soon as +the child comes into the world it finds a mother who is ready to care +for it._” This utterance of Michelet is really silly, but the one of +Lichtenberg is a witticism, which makes use of the absurdity for some +purpose. There is something behind it. What? At present that is +something we cannot discuss. + + + _Sophistic Faulty Thinking_ + +We have learned from two groups of examples that the wit-work makes use +of deviations from normal thought, namely, _displacement_ and +_absurdity_, as technical means of presenting witty expressions. It is +only just to expect that other faulty thinking may find a similar +application. Indeed, a few examples of this sort can be cited. + +_A gentleman entered a shop and ordered a fancy cake, which, however, he +soon returned, asking for some liqueur in its stead. He drank the +liqueur, and was about to leave without paying for it. The shopkeeper +held him back. “What do you want of me?” he asked. “Please pay for the +liqueur,” said the shopkeeper. “But I have given you the fancy cake for +it.” “Yes, but you have not paid for that either.” “Well, neither have I +eaten it.”_ + +This little story also bears the semblance of logic which we already +know as the suitable façade for faulty thinking. The error, obviously, +lies in the fact that the cunning customer establishes a connection +between the return of the fancy cake and its exchange for the liqueur, a +connection which really does not exist. The state of affairs may be +divided into two processes which as far as the shopkeeper is concerned +are independent of each other. He first took the fancy cake and returned +it, so that he owes nothing for it. He then took the liqueur, for which +he owes money. One might say that the customer uses the relation “for +it” in a double sense, or, to speak more correctly, by means of a double +sense he forms a relation which does not hold in reality.[34] + +The opportunity now presents itself for making a not unimportant +confession. We are here busying ourselves with an investigation of +technique of wit by means of examples, and we ought to be sure that the +examples which we have selected are really true witticisms. The facts +are, however, that in a series of cases we fall into doubt as to whether +or not the example in question may be called a joke. We have no +criterion at our disposal before investigation itself furnishes one. +Usage of language is unreliable and is itself in need of examination for +its authority. To decide the question we can rely on nothing else but a +certain “feeling,” which we may interpret by saying that in our judgment +the decision follows certain criteria which are not yet accessible to +our knowledge. We shall naturally not appeal to this “feeling” for +substantial proof. In the case of the last-mentioned example we cannot +help doubting whether we may present it as a witticism, as a sophistical +witticism, or merely as a sophism. The fact is that we do not yet know +wherein the character of wit lies. + +On the other hand the following example, which evinces, as it were, the +complementary faulty thinking, is a witticism without any doubt. Again +it is a story of a marriage agent. _The agent is defending the girl he +has proposed against the attacks of her prospective fiancé. “The +mother-in-law does not suit me,” the latter remarks. “She is a crabbed, +foolish person.” “That’s true,” replies the agent, “but you are not +going to marry the mother-in-law, but the daughter.” “Yes, but she is no +longer young, and she is not pretty, either.” “That’s nothing: if she is +not young or pretty you can trust her all the more.” “But she hasn’t +much money.” “Why talk of money? Are you going to marry money? You want +a wife, don’t you?” “But she is a hunchback.” “Well, what of that? Do +you expect her to have no blemishes at all?”_ + +It is really a question of an ugly girl who is no longer young, who has +a paltry dowry and a repulsive mother, and who is besides equipped with +a pretty bad deformity, relations which are not at all inviting to +matrimony. The marriage agent knows how to present each individual fault +in a manner to cause one to become reconciled to it, and then takes up +the unpardonable hunch back as the one fault which can be excused in any +one. Here again there is the semblance of logic which is characteristic +of sophisms, and which serves to conceal the faulty thinking. It is +apparent that the girl possesses nothing but faults, many of which can +be overlooked, but one that cannot be passed by. The chances for the +marriage become very slim. The agent acts as if he removed each +individual fault by his evasions, forgetting that each leaves behind +some depreciation which is added to the next one. He insists upon +dealing with each factor individually, and refuses to combine them into +a sum total. + +A similar omission forms the nucleus of another sophism which causes +much laughter, though one can well question its right to be called a +joke. + +_A. had borrowed a copper kettle from B., and upon returning it was sued +by B. because it had a large hole which rendered it unserviceable. His +defense was this_: “_In the first place I never borrowed any kettle from +B., secondly the kettle had a hole in it when I received it from B., +thirdly the kettle was in perfect condition when I returned it._” Each +separate protest is good by itself, but taken together they exclude each +other. A. treats individually what must be taken as a whole, just as the +marriage agent when he deals with the imperfections of the bride. One +can also say that A. uses “and” where only an “either—or” is possible. + +Another sophism greets us in the following marriage agent story. _The +suitor objects because the bride has a short leg and therefore limps. +The agent contradicts him. “You are wrong,” he says. “Suppose you marry +a woman whose legs are sound and straight. What do you gain by it? You +are not sure from day to day that she will not fall down, break a leg, +and then be lame for the rest of her life. Just consider the pain, the +excitement, and the doctor’s bill. But if you marry this one nothing can +happen. Here you have a finished job.”_ + +Here the semblance of logic is very shallow, for no one will by any +means admit that a “finished misfortune” is to be preferred to a mere +possibility of such. The error in the stream of thought will be seen +more easily in a second example. + +_In the temple of Cracow sat the great Rabbi N. praying with his +disciples. Suddenly he emitted a cry and in response to his troubled +disciples said: “The great Rabbi L. died just now in Lemberg.” The +congregation thereupon went into mourning for the deceased. In the +course of the next day travelers from Lemberg were asked how the rabbi +had died, and what had caused his death. They knew nothing about the +event, however, as, they said, they had left him in the best of health. +Finally it was definitely ascertained that the Rabbi of Lemberg had not +died at the hour on which Rabbi N. had felt his death telepathically, +and that he was still living. A stranger seized the opportunity to +banter a pupil of the Cracow rabbi about the episode. “That was a +glorious exhibition that your rabbi made of himself when he saw the +Rabbi of Lemberg die,” he said. “Why, the man is still living!” “No +matter,” replied the pupil. “To look from Cracow to Lemberg was +wonderful anyhow.”_ + +Here the faulty thinking common to both of the last examples is openly +shown. The value of fanciful ideas is unfairly matched against reality; +possibility is made equivalent to actuality. To look from Cracow to +Lemberg despite the miles between would have been an imposing telepathic +feat had it resulted in some truth, but the disciple gives no heed to +that. It might have been possible that the Rabbi of Lemberg had died at +the moment when the Rabbi of Cracow had proclaimed his death, but the +pupil displaces the accent from the condition under which the teacher’s +act would be remarkable to the unconditional admiration of this act. +“_In magnis rebus voluisse sat est_” is a similar point of view. Just as +in this example reality is sacrificed in favor of possibility, so in the +foregoing example the marriage agent suggests to the suitor that the +possibility of the woman’s becoming lame through an accident is a far +more important consideration to be taken into account; whereas the +question as to whether or not she is lame is put altogether into the +background. + + + _Automatic Errors of Thought_ + +Another interesting group attaches itself to this one of sophistical +faulty thinking, a group in which the faulty thinking may be designated +as _automatic_. It is perhaps only a stroke of fate that all of the +examples which I shall cite for this new group are again stories +referring to marriage agents. + +_The agent brought along an assistant to a conference about a bride. +This assistant was to confirm his assertions. “She is as well made as a +pine tree,” said the agent. “Like a pine tree,” repeated the echo. “She +has eyes which one must appreciate.” “Wonderful eyes,” confirmed the +echo. “She is cultured beyond words. She possesses extraordinary +culture.” “Wonderfully cultured,” repeated the assistant. “However, one +thing is true,” confessed the agent. “She has a slight hunch on her +back.” “And what a hunch!” confirmed the echo._ + +The other stories are quite analogous to this one, but they are +cleverer. + +_On being introduced to his prospective bride the suitor was rather +unpleasantly surprised, and drawing aside the marriage agent he +reproachfully whispered to him: “Why have you brought me here? She is +ugly and old. She squints, has bad teeth, and bleary eyes.” “You can +talk louder,” interrupted the agent. “She is deaf, too.”_ + +_A prospective bridegroom made his first call on his future bride in +company with the agent, and while in the parlor waiting for the +appearance of the family the agent drew the young man’s attention to a +glass closet containing a handsome silver set. “Just look at these +things,” he said. “You can see how wealthy these people are.” “But is it +not possible that these articles were just borrowed for the occasion,” +inquired the suspicious young man, “so as to give the appearance of +wealth?” “What an idea,” answered the agent protestingly. “Who in the +world would lend them anything?”_ + +In all three cases one finds the same thing. A person who reacts several +times in succession in the same manner continues in the same manner on +the next occasion where it becomes unsuited and runs contrary to his +intentions. Falling into the automatism of habit he fails to adapt +himself to the demands of the situation. Thus in the first story the +assistant forgot that he was taken along in order to influence the +suitor in favor of the proposed bride, and as he had thus far +accomplished his task by emphasizing through repetition the excellencies +attributed to the lady, he now emphasizes also her timidly conceded +hunch back which he should have belittled. + +The marriage agent in the second story is so fascinated by the failings +and infirmities of the bride that he completes the list from his own +knowledge, which it was certainly neither his business nor his intention +to do. Finally in the third story he is so carried away by his zeal to +convince the young man of the family’s wealth that in order to +corroborate his proofs he blurts out something which must upset all his +efforts. Everywhere the automatism triumphs over the appropriate +variation of thought and expression. + +That is quite easy to understand, although it must cause confusion when +it is brought to our attention that these three stories could just as +well be termed “comical” as “witty.” Like every act of unmasking and +self-betrayal the discovery of the psychic automatism also belongs to +technique of the comic. We suddenly see ourselves here confronted with +the problem of the relationship of wit to the comic element—a subject +which we endeavored to avoid (see the Introduction). Are these stories +only “comical” and not “witty” also? Does the comic element employ here +the same means as does the wit? And again, of what does the peculiar +character of wit consist? + +We must adhere to the fact that the technique of the group of witticisms +examined last consists of nothing else but the establishment of “faulty +thinking.” We are forced to admit, however, that so far the +investigation has led us further into darkness than to illumination. +Nevertheless we do not abandon the hope of arriving at a result by means +of a more thorough knowledge of the technique of wit which may become +the starting-point for further insight. + + + _Unification_ + +The next examples of wit with which we wish to continue our +investigation do not give us as much work. Their technique reminds us +very much of what we already know. Here is one of Lichtenberg’s jokes. +“_January_,” he says, “_is the month in which one extends good wishes to +his friends, and the rest are months in which the good wishes are not +fulfilled._” + +As these witticisms may be called clever rather than strong, we shall +reinforce the impression by examining a few more. + +“_Human life is divided into two halves; during the first one looks +forward to the second, and during the second one looks backward to the +first._” + +“_Experience consists in experiencing what one does not care to +experience._” (The last two examples were cited by K. Fischer.) + +One cannot help being reminded by these examples of a group, treated of +before, which is characterized by the “manifold application of the same +material.” The last example especially will cause us to ask why we have +not inserted it there instead of presenting it here in a new connection. +“Experience” is described through its own terms just as some of the +examples cited above. Neither would I be against this correction. +However, I am of the opinion that the other two cases, which are surely +similar in character, contain a different factor which is more striking +and more important than the manifold application of the same word which +shows nothing here touching upon double meaning. And what is more, I +wish to emphasize that new and unexpected identities are here formed +which show themselves in relations of ideas to one another, in relations +of definitions to each other, or to a common third. I would call this +process _unification_. Obviously it is analogous to condensation by +compression into similar words. Thus the two halves of human life are +described by the inter-relationship discovered between them: during the +first part one longs for the second, and in the second one longs for the +first. To speak more precisely there were two relationships very similar +to each other which were selected for description. The similarity of the +relationship that corresponds to the similarity of the words which, just +for this reason, might recall the manifold application of the same + + material—(looks forward) + (looks backward). + +In Lichtenberg’s joke, January and the months contrasted with it are +characterized again by a modified relationship to a third factor: these +are good wishes which one receives in the first month, but are not +fulfilled during the other months. The differentiation from the manifold +application of the same material which is really related to double +meaning is here quite clear. + +A good example of unification-wit needing no explanation is the +following: + +_J. B. Rousseau, the French poet, wrote an ode to posterity (à la +postérité). Voltaire, thinking that the poor quality of the poem in no +way justified its reaching posterity, wittily remarked, “This poem will +not reach its destination”_ (K. Fischer). + +The last example may remind us of the fact that it is essentially +unification which forms the basis of the so-called repartee in wit. For +ready repartee consists in using the defense for aggression and in +“turning the tables” or in “paying with the same coin.” That is, the +repartee consists in establishing an unexpected identity between attack +and counter-attack. + +For example, _a baker said to a tavern keeper, one of whose fingers was +festering: “I guess your finger got into your beer.” The tavern keeper +replied: “You are wrong. One of your rolls got under my finger nail”_ +(Ueberhorst: _Das Komische_, II, 1900). + +While Serenissimus was traveling through his domains he noticed a man in +the crowds who bore a striking resemblance to himself. He beckoned him +to come over and asked: “_Was your mother ever employed in my home?_” +“_No, sire_,” replied the man, “_but my father was._” + +While Duke Karl of Würtemberg was riding horseback he met a dyer working +at his trade. “_Can you color my white horse blue?_” “_Yes, sire_,” was +the rejoinder, “_if the animal can stand the boiling!_” + +In this excellent repartee, which answers a foolish question with a +condition that is equally impossible, there occurs another technical +factor which would have been omitted if the dyer’s reply had been: “No, +sire, I am afraid that the horse could not stand being boiled.” + +Another peculiarly interesting technical means at the disposal of +unification is the addition of the conjunction “and.” Such correlation +signifies a connection which could not be understood otherwise. When +Heine (_Harzreise_) says of the city of Göttingen, “_In general the +inhabitants of Göttingen are divided into students, professors, +Philistines, and cattle_,” we understand this combination exactly in the +sense which he furthermore emphasized by adding: “These four social +groups are distinguished little less than sharply.” Again, when he +speaks about the school where he had to submit “_to so much Latin, +drubbing, and geography_,” he wants to convey by this combination, which +is made very conspicuous by placing the drubbing between the two +studies, that the schoolboy’s conception unmistakably described by the +drubbing should be extended also to Latin and geography. + +In Lipps’s book we find among the examples of “witty enumeration” +(Koordination) the following verse, which stands nearest to Heine’s +“students, professors, Philistines, and cattle.” + +“_With a fork and with much effort his mother pulled him from a mess._” + +“As if effort were an instrument like the fork,” adds Lipps by way of +explanation. But we get the impression that there is nothing witty in +this sentence. To be sure it is very comical, whereas Heine’s +co-ordination is undoubtedly witty. We shall, perhaps, recall these +examples later when we shall no longer be forced to evade the problem of +the relationship between wit and the comic. + + + _Representation Through the Opposite_ + +We have remarked in the example of the Duke and the dyer that it would +still have been a joke by means of unification had the dyer replied, +“No, I fear that the horse could not stand being boiled.” In +substituting a “yes” for the “no” which rightly belonged there, we meet +a new technical means of wit the application of which we shall study in +other examples. + +This joke, which resembles the one we have just cited from K. Fischer, +is somewhat simpler. “_Frederick the Great heard of a Silesian clergyman +who had the reputation of communicating with spirits. He sent for him +and received him with the following question: ‘Can you call up ghosts?’ +‘At your pleasure, your majesty,’ replied the clergyman, ‘but they won’t +come.’_” Here it is perfectly obvious that the wit lies in the +substitution of its opposite for the only possible answer, “No.” To +complete this substitution “but” had to be added to “yes,” so that “yes” +plus “but” gives the equivalent for “no.” + +This “representation through the opposite,” as we choose to call it, +serves the mechanism of wit in several ways. In the following cases it +appears almost in its pure form: + +“_This woman resembles Venus de Milo in many points. Like her she is +extraordinarily old, has no teeth, and has white spots on the yellow +surface of her body_” (Heine). + +Here ugliness is depicted by making it agree with the most beautiful. Of +course these agreements consist of attributes expressed in double +meaning or of matters of slight importance. The latter applies to the +second example. + +“_The attributes of the greatest men were all united in himself. Like +Alexander his head was tilted to one side: like Cæsar he always had +something in his hair. He could drink coffee like Leibnitz, and once +settled in his armchair he forgot eating and drinking like Newton, and +like him had to be awakened. He wore a wig like Dr. Johnson, and like +Cervantes the fly of his trousers was always open_” (Lichtenberg: _The +Great Mind_). + +J. V. Falke’s _Lebenserinnerungen an eine Reise nach Ireland_ (page 271) +furnishes an exceptionally good example of “representation through the +opposite” in which the use of words of a double meaning plays absolutely +no part. The scene is laid in a wax figure museum, like Mme. Tussaud’s. +A lecturer discourses on one figure after another to his audience, which +is composed of old and young people. “_This is the Duke of Wellington +and his horse_,” he says. Whereupon a young girl remarks, “_Which is the +duke and which is the horse?_” “_Just as you like, my pretty child_,” is +the reply. “_You pay your money and you take your choice._” + +The reduction of this Irish joke would be: “It is gross impudence on the +part of the museum’s management to offer such an exhibition to the +public. It is impossible to distinguish between the horse and the rider +(playful exaggeration), and it is for this exhibit that one pays one’s +hard-earned money!” The indignant expression is now dramatized and +applied to a trivial occurrence. In the place of the entire audience +there appears one woman and the riding figure becomes individually +determined. It is necessarily the Duke of Wellington, who is so very +popular in Ireland. But the insolence of the museum proprietor or +lecturer who takes money from the public and offers nothing in return is +represented by the opposite, through a speech, in which he extols +himself as a conscientious business man whose fondest desire is to +respect the rights to which the public is entitled through the admission +fee. One then realizes that the technique of this joke is not very +simple. In so far as a way is found to allow the swindler to assert his +scrupulosity it may be said that the joke is a case of “representation +through the opposite.” The fact, however, that he does it on an occasion +where something different is demanded of him, and the fact that he +replies in terms of commercial integrity when he is expected to discuss +the similarity of the figures, shows that it is a case of displacement. +The technique of the joke lies in the combination of both technical +means. + + + _Outdoing wit_ + +This example is closely allied to another small group which might be +called “outdoing-wit.” Here “yes,” which would be proper in the +reduction, is replaced by “no,” which, owing to its context, is +equivalent to a still stronger “yes.” The same mechanism holds true when +the case is reversed. The contradiction takes the place of an +exaggerated confirmation. An example of this nature is seen in the +following epigram from Lessing.[35] + +“_The good Galathee! ’Tis said that she dyes her hair black, yet it was +black when she bought it._” + +Lichtenberg’s make-believe mocking defense of philosophy is another +example. + +“_There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your +philosophy_,” Prince Hamlet had disdainfully declared. Lichtenberg well +knew that this condemnation was by no means severe enough, in that it +does not take into account all that can be said against philosophy. He +therefore added the following: “_But there is also much in philosophy +which is found neither in heaven nor on earth._” To be sure, his +assertion supplements what was lacking in Hamlet’s philosophical +utterance, but in doing this he adds another and still greater reproach. + +More transparent still, because they show no trace of displacement, are +two Jewish jokes which are, however, of the coarse kind. + +_Two Jews were conversing about bathing._ “_I take a bath once a year_,” +said one, “_whether I need one or not_.” + +It is clear that this boastful assurance of his cleanliness only betrays +his state of uncleanliness. + +_A Jew noticed remnants of food on the beard of another. “I can tell you +what you ate yesterday,” he remarked. “Well, let’s hear it,” said +another. “Beans,” said the first one. “You are wrong,” responded the +other. “I had beans the day before yesterday.”_ + +The following example is an excellent “outdoing” witticism which can be +traced easily to representation through the opposite. + +_The king condescended to pay a visit at a surgical clinic, and found +the professor of surgery engaged in amputating a leg. He watched the +various steps of the operation with interest and expressed his royal +approval with these loud utterances: “Bravo, bravo, Professor.” When the +operation was over the professor approached the king, bowed low, and +asked: “Does your majesty also command the amputation of the other +leg?”_ + +Whatever the professor may have thought during this royal applause +surely could not have been expressed unchanged. His real thoughts were: +“Judging by this applause he must be under the impression that I am +amputating the poor devil’s diseased leg by order of and for the +pleasure of the king. To be sure, I have other reasons for performing +this operation.” But instead of expressing these thoughts he goes to the +king and says: “I have no other reasons but your majesty’s order for +performing this operation. The applause you accorded me has inspired me +so much that I am only awaiting your majesty’s command to amputate the +other leg also.” He thus succeeded in making himself understood by +expressing the opposite of what he really thought but had to keep to +himself. Such an expression of the opposite represents an incredible +exaggeration or outdoing. + +As we gather from these examples, representation through the opposite is +a means frequently and effectively used in the technique of wit. We need +not overlook, however, something else, namely, that this technique is by +no means confined only to wit. When Marc Antony, after his long speech +in the Forum had changed the mood of the mob listening to Cæsar’s +obsequies, at last repeats the words, + + “For Brutus was an honorable man,” + +he well knows that the mob will scream the true meaning of his words at +him, namely, + + “They are traitors: nice honorable men!” + +Or when _Simplicissimus_ transcribes a collection of unheard-of +brutalities and cynicisms as expressions of “people with temperaments,” +this, too, is a representation through the opposite. However, this is no +longer designated as wit, but as “irony.” Indeed, the only technique +that is characteristic of irony is representation through the opposite. +Besides, one reads and hears about “ironical wit.” Hence there is no +longer any doubt that technique alone is not capable of characterizing +wit. There must be something else which we have not yet discovered. On +the other hand, however, the fact that the reduction of the technique +destroys the wit still remains uncontradicted. For the present it may be +difficult for us to unite for the explanation of wit the two strong +points which we have already gained. + + + _Indirect Expression_ + +Since representation through the opposite belongs to the technical means +of wit, we may also expect that wit could make use of its reverse, +namely, the representation through the similar and cognate. Indeed, when +we continue our investigation we find that this forms the technique of a +new and especially extensive group of thought-witticisms. We can +describe the peculiarity of this technique much better if instead of +representation through the “cognate” we use the expression +representation through “relationships and associations.” We shall start +with the last characteristic and illustrate it by an example. + + + _Indirect Expression with Allusion_ + +It is an American anecdote and runs as follows. _By undertaking a series +of risky schemes, two not very scrupulous business men had succeeded in +amassing an enormous fortune and were now intent on forcing their way +into good society. Among other things they thought it advisable to have +their portraits painted by the most prominent and most expensive +painters in the city, men whose works were considered masterpieces. The +costly pictures were exhibited for the first time at a great evening +gathering, and the hosts themselves led the most prominent connoisseur +and art critic to the wall of the salon on which both portraits were +hanging side by side, in order to elicit from him a favorable criticism. +He examined the portraits for a long time, then shook his head as if he +were missing something. At length he pointed to the bare space between +the pictures, and asked, “And where is the Savior?”_ + +The meaning of this expression is clear. It is again the expression of +something which cannot be represented directly. In what way does this +“indirect expression” come about? By a series of very obvious +associations and conclusions let us work backwards from the verbal +setting. + +The query, “_where is the Savior?_” or “_where is the picture of the +Savior?_” arouses the conjecture that the two pictures have reminded the +speaker of a similar arrangement familiar to him as it is familiar to +us. This arrangement, of which one element is here missing, shows the +figure of the Savior between two other figures. There is only one such +case: Christ hanging between the two thieves. The missing element is +emphasized by the witticism, and the similarity rests in the figures at +the right and left of the Savior, which are not mentioned in the jest. +It can only mean that the pictures hanging in the drawing-room are +likewise those of thieves. This is what the critic wished to, but could +not say, “You are a pair of scoundrels,” or more in detail, “What do I +care about your portraits? You are a pair of scoundrels, that I know.” +And by means of a few associations and conclusive inferences he has said +it in a manner which we designate as “allusion.” + +We immediately remember that we have encountered the process of allusion +before. Namely, in double meaning, when one of the two meanings +expressed by the same word stands out very prominently, because being +used much oftener and more commonly, our attention is directed to it +first, whereas the other meaning remains in the background because it is +more remote—such cases we wished to describe as double meaning with +allusion. In an entire series of examples which we have hitherto +examined, we have remarked that their technique is not simple and we +realized that the process of allusion was the factor that complicated +it. For example, see the contradiction-witticism in which the +congratulations on the birth of the youngest child are acknowledged by +the remark that it is remarkable what human hands can accomplish (p. +77). + +In the American anecdote we have the process of allusion without the +double meaning, and we find that the character of this process consists +in completing the picture through mental association. It is not +difficult to guess that the utilized association can be of more than one +kind. So as not to be confused by large numbers we shall discuss only +the most pronounced variations, and shall give only a few examples. + +The association used in the substitution may be a mere sound, so that +this sub-group may be analogous to word-wit in the pun. However, it is +not similarity in sound of two words, but of whole sentences, +characteristic combinations of words, and similar means. + +For example, Lichtenberg coined the saying: “_New baths heal well_,” +which immediately reminds one of the proverb, “_New brooms clean well_,” +whose first and last words, as well as whose whole sentence structure, +is the same as in the first saying. It has undoubtedly arisen in the +witty thinker’s mind as an imitation of the familiar proverb. Thus +Lichtenberg’s saying is an allusion to the latter. By means of this +allusion something is suggested that cannot be frankly said, namely, +that the efficacy of the baths taken as cures is due to other things +beside the thermal springs whose attributes are the same everywhere. + +The solution of the technique of another one of Lichtenberg’s jokes is +similar: “_The girl barely twelve modes old._” That sounds something +like the chronological term “_twelve moons_” (i.e., months), and may +originally have been a mistake in writing in the permissible poetical +expression. But there is a good deal of sense in designating the age of +a feminine creature by the changing modes instead of by the changing of +moons. + +The connection of similarity may even consist of a single slight +modification. This technique again runs parallel with a word-technique. +Both kinds of witticisms create almost the identical impression, but +they are more easily distinguishable by the processes of the wit-work. + +The following is an example of such a word-witticism or pun. The great +singer, Mary Wilt, who was famous not merely on account of the magnitude +of her voice, suffered the mortification of having a title of a play, +dramatized from the well-known novel of Jules Verne, serve as an +allusion to her corpulency. “_The trip around the Wilt_ (world) _in +eighty days_.” + +Or: “_Every fathom a queen_,” which is a modification of the familiar +Shakespearian quotation, “_Every inch a king_,” and served as an +allusion to a prominent woman who was unusually big physically. There +would really be no serious objection if one should prefer to classify +this witticism as a substitution for condensation with modification (cf. +tête-à-bête, p. 25). + +Discussing the hardships of the medical profession, namely, that +physicians are obliged to read and study constantly because remedies and +drugs once considered efficacious are later rejected as useless, and +that despite the physician’s best efforts the patient often refuses to +pay for the treatment, one of the doctors present remarked: “_Yes, every +drug has its day_,” to which another added, “_But not every Doc gets his +pay_.” These two witty remarks are both modifications with allusion of +the well-known saying, “_Every dog has his day_.” But here, too, the +technique could be described as fusion with modification. + +If the modification contents itself with a change in letters, allusions +through modifications are barely distinguishable from condensation with +substitutive formation, as shown in this example: “_Mellingitis_,” _the +allusion to the dangerous disease meningitis, refers to the danger which +the conservative members of a provincial borough in England thought +impended if the socialist candidate Mellon were elected_. + +The negative particles make very good allusions at the cost of very +little changing. Heine referred to Spinoza as: + +“My fellow _un_believer Spinoza.” + +“We, by the _Un_grace of God, Laborers, Bondsmen, Negroes, Serfs,” etc., +is a manifesto (which Lichtenberg quotes no further) of these +unfortunates who probably have more right to that title than kings and +dukes have to the unmodified one. + + + _Omission_ + +Finally _omission_, which is comparable to condensation without +substitutive formation, is also a form of allusion. For in every +allusion there is really something omitted, namely, the trend of thought +that leads to the allusion. It is only a question of whether the gap, or +the substitute in the wording of the allusion which partly fills in the +gap, is the more obvious element. Thus we come back through a series of +examples from the very clear cases of omission to those of actual +allusion. + +Omission without substitution is found in the following example. There +lived in Vienna a clever and bellicose writer whose sharp invectives had +repeatedly brought him bodily assault at the hands of the persons he +assailed. During a conversation about a new misdeed by one of his +habitual opponents, some one said, “_When X. hears this he will receive +another box on his ear_.” The technique of this wit shows in the first +place the confusion about the apparent contradiction, for it is by no +means clear to us why a box on one’s ear should be the direct result of +having heard something. The contradiction disappears if one fills in the +gap by adding to the remark: “_then he will write such a caustic article +against that person that, etc._” Allusions through omission and +contradiction are thus the technical means of this witticism. + +Heine remarked about some one: “_He praises himself so much that pastils +for fumigation are advancing in price._” This omission can easily be +filled in. What has been omitted is replaced by an inference which then +strikes back as an allusion to the same. For self-praise has always +carried an evil odor with it. + +Once more we encounter the two Jews in front of the bathing +establishment. “_Another year has passed by already_,” says one with a +sigh. + +These examples leave no doubt that the omission is meant as an allusion. + +A still more obvious omission is contained in the next example, which is +really a genuine and correct allusion-witticism. Subsequent to an +artists’ banquet in Vienna a joke book was given out in which, among +others, the following most remarkable proverb could be read: + +“_A wife is like an umbrella, at worst one may also take a cab._” + +An umbrella does not afford enough protection from rain. The words “_at +worst_” can mean only: when it is raining hard. A cab is a public +conveyance. As we have to deal here with the figure of comparison, we +shall put off the detailed investigation of this witticism until later +on. + +Heine’s “Bäder von Lucca” contains a veritable wasps’ nest of stinging +allusions which make the most artistic use of this form of wit as +polemics against the Count of Platen. Long before the reader can suspect +their application, a certain theme, which does not lend itself +especially to direct presentation, is preluded by allusions of the most +varied material possible; e.g., in Hirsch-Hyacinth’s twisting of words: +You are too corpulent and I am too lean; you possess too much conceit +and I the more business ability; I am a practicus and you are a +diarrheticus, in fine, “You are altogether my Antipodex”—“Venus +Urinia”—the thick Gudel of Dreckwall in Hamburg, etc. Then the +occurrences of which the poet speaks take a turn in which it merely +seems to show the impolite sportiveness of the poet, but soon it +discloses the symbolic relation to the polemical intention, and in this +way it also reveals itself as allusion. At last the attack against +Platen bursts forth, and now the allusions to the subject of the Count’s +love for men seethe and gush from each one of the sentences which Heine +directs against the talent and the character of his opponent, e.g.: + +“Even if the Muses are not well disposed to him, he has at least the +genius of speech in his power, or rather he knows how to violate him; +for he lacks the free love of this genius, besides he must perseveringly +run after this youth, and he knows only how to grasp the outer forms +which, in spite of their beautiful rotundity, never express anything +noble.” + +“He has the same experience as the ostrich, which considers itself +sufficiently hidden when it sticks its head into the sand so that only +its backside is visible. Our illustrious bird would have done better if +he had stuck his backside into the sand, and had shown us his head.” + +Allusion is perhaps the commonest and most easily employed means of wit, +and is at the basis of most of the short-lived witty productions which +we are wont to weave into our conversation. They cannot bear being +separated from their native soil nor can they exist independently. Once +more we are reminded by the process of allusion of that relationship +which has already begun to confuse our estimation of the technique of +wit. The process of allusion is not witty in itself; there are perfectly +formed allusions which have no claims to this character. Only those +allusions which show a “witty” element are witty, hence the +characteristics of wit, which we have followed even into its technique, +again escape us. + +I have sometimes called allusion “indirect expression,” and now +recognize that the different kinds of allusion with representation +through the opposite, as well as the techniques still to be mentioned, +can be united into a single large group for which “indirect +expression” would be the comprehensive name. Hence, _errors of +thought—unification—indirect representation_—are those points of view +under which we can group the techniques of thought-wit which became +known to us. + + + _Representation Through the Minute or the Minutest Element_ + +On continuing the investigation of our material we think we recognize a +new sub-group of indirect representation which though sharply defined +can be illustrated only by few examples. It is that of representation +through a minute or minutest element; solving the problem by bringing +the entire character to full expression through a minute detail. +Correlating this group with the mechanism of allusion is made possible +by looking at the triviality as connected with the thing to be presented +and as a result of it. For example: + +_A Jew who was riding in a train had made himself very comfortable; he +had unbuttoned his coat, and had put his feet on the seat, when a +fashionably dressed gentleman came in. The Jew immediately put on his +best behavior and assumed a modest position. The stranger turned over +the pages of a book, did some calculation, and pondered a moment and +suddenly addressed the Jew. “I beg your pardon, how soon will we have +Yom Kippur?” (Day of Atonement). “Oh, oh!” said the Jew, and put his +feet back on the seat before he answered._ + +It cannot be denied that this representation through something minute is +allied to the tendency of economy which we found to be the final common +element in the investigation of the technique of word-wit. + +The following example is much similar. + +_The doctor who had been summoned to help the baroness in her +confinement declared that the critical moment had not arrived, and +proposed to the baron that they play a game of cards in the adjoining +room in the meantime. After a while the doleful cry of the baroness +reached the ears of the men. “Ah, mon Dieu, que je souffre!” The husband +jumped up, but the physician stopped him saying, “That’s nothing; let us +play on.” A little while later the woman in labor-pains was heard again: +“My God, my God, what pains!” “Don’t you want to go in, Doctor?” asked +the baron. “By no means, it is not yet time,” answered the doctor. At +last there rang from the adjacent room the unmistakable cry, +“A-a-a-ai-e-e-e-e-e-e-E-E-E!” The physician then threw down the cards +and said, “Now it’s time.”_ + +How the pain allows the original nature to break through all the strata +of education, and how an important decision is rightly made dependent +upon a seemingly inconsequential utterance—both are shown in this good +joke by the successive changes in the cries of this childbearing lady of +quality. + + + _Comparison_ + +Another kind of indirect expression of which wit makes use is +_comparison_, which we have not discussed so far because an examination +of comparison touches upon new difficulties, or rather it reveals +difficulties which have made their appearance on other occasions. We +have already admitted that in many of the examples examined we could not +banish all doubts as to whether they should really be counted as witty, +and have recognized in this uncertainty a serious shock to the +principles of our investigation. But in no other material do I feel this +uncertainty greater and nowhere does it occur more frequently than in +the case of comparison-wit. The feeling which usually says to me—and I +dare say to a great many others under the same conditions—this is a +joke, this may be written down as witty before even the hidden and +essential character of the wit has been uncovered—this feeling I lack +most. If at first I experience no hesitation in declaring the comparison +to be a witticism, then the next instant I seem to think that the +pleasure I thus found was of a different quality than that which I am +accustomed to ascribe to a joke. Also the fact that witty comparisons +but seldom can evoke the explosive variety of laughter by which a good +joke proves itself makes it impossible for me to cast aside the existing +doubts, even when I limit myself to the best and most effective +examples. + +It is easy to demonstrate that there are some especially good and +effective examples of comparison which in no way give us the impression +of witticisms. A beautiful example of this kind which I have not yet +tired of admiring, and the impression of which still clings to me, I +shall not deny myself the pleasure of citing. It is a comparison with +which Ferd. Lassalle concluded one of his famous pleas (_Die +Wissenschaft und die Arbeiter_): “A man like myself who, as I explained +to you, had devoted his whole life to the motto ‘Die Wissenschaft und +die Arbeiter’ (Science and the Workingman), would receive the same +impression from a condemnation which in the course of events confronts +him _as would the chemist, absorbed in his scientific experiments, from +the cracking of a retort. With a slight knitting of his brow at the +resistance of the material, he would, as soon as the disturbance was +quieted, calmly continue his labor and investigations._” + +One finds a rich assortment of pertinent and witty comparisons in the +writings of Lichtenberg (2 B. of the Göttingen edition, 1853). I shall +take the material for our investigation from that source. + +“_It is almost impossible to carry the torch of truth through a crowd +without singeing somebody’s beard._” This may seem witty, but on closer +examination one notices that the witty effect does not come from the +comparison itself but from a secondary attribute of the same. For the +expression “the torch of truth” is no new comparison, but one which has +been used for a long time and which has degenerated into a fixed phrase, +as always happens when a comparison has the luck to be absorbed into the +common usage of speech. But whereas we hardly notice the comparison in +the saying, “the torch of truth,” its original full force is restored it +by Lichtenberg, since by building further on the comparison it results +in a deduction. But the taking of blurred expressions in their full +sense is already known to us as a technique of wit; it finds a place +with the Manifold Application of the Same Material (p. 35). It may well +be that the witty impression created by Lichtenberg’s sentence is due +only to its relation to this technique of wit. + +The same explanation will undoubtedly hold good for another witty +comparison by the same author. + +“_The man was not exactly a shining light, but a great candlestick.... +He was a professor of philosophy._” + +To call a scholar a shining light, a “_lumen mundi_,” has long ceased to +be an effective comparison, whether it be originally qualified as a +witticism or not. But here the comparison was freshened up and its full +force was restored to it by deducting a modification from it and in this +way setting up a second and new comparison. The way in which the second +comparison came into existence seems to contain the condition of the +witticism and not the two comparisons themselves. This would then be a +case of Identical Wit-Technique as in the example of the torch. + +The following comparison seems witty on other but similarly classifiable +grounds: “_I look upon reviews as a kind of children’s disease_ which +more or less attacks new-born books. There are cases on record where the +healthiest died of it, and the puniest have often lived through it. Many +do not get it at all. Attempts have frequently been made to prevent the +disease by means of _amulets of prefaces and dedications, or to color +them up by personal pronunciamentos; but it does not always help_.” + +The comparison of reviews with children’s diseases is based in the first +place upon their susceptibility to attack shortly after they have seen +the light of the world. Whether this makes it witty I do not trust +myself to decide. But when the comparison is continued, it is found that +the later fates of the new books may be represented within the scope of +the same or by means of similar comparisons. Such a continuation of a +comparison is undoubtedly witty, but we know already to what technique +it owes its witty flavor; it is a case of _unification_ or the +establishment of an unexpected association. The character of the +unification, however, is not changed by the fact that it consists here +of a relationship with the first comparison. + + + _Doubt in Witty Comparisons_ + +In a series of other comparisons one is tempted to ascribe an +indisputably existing witty impression to another factor which again in +itself has nothing to do with the nature of the comparison. These are +comparisons which are strikingly grouped, often containing a combination +that sounds absurd, which comes into existence as a result of the +comparison. Most of Lichtenberg’s examples belong to this group. + +“It is a pity that one cannot see the _learned bowels_ of the writers, +in order to find out what they have eaten.” “_The learned bowels_” is a +confusing, really absurd attribute which is made clear only by the +comparison. How would it be if the witty impression of this comparison +should be referred entirely and fully to the confusing character of +their composition? This would correspond to one of the means of wit well +known to us, namely, representation through absurdity. + +Lichtenberg has used the same comparison of the imbibing of reading and +educational material with the imbibing of physical nourishment. + +“He thought highly of _studying in his room_ and was heartily in favor +of _learned stable fodder_.” + +The same absurd or at least conspicuous attributes, which as we are +beginning to notice are the real carriers of the wit, mark other +comparisons of the same author. + +“_This is the weatherside of my moral constitution, here I can stand +almost anything._” + +“Every person has also his _moral backside_ which he does not show +_except under the stress of necessity_ and which he covers as long as +possible with the _pants of good-breeding_.” + +The “moral backside” is the peculiar attribute which exists as the +result of a comparison. But this is followed by a continuation of the +comparison with a regular play on words (“necessity”) and a second, +still more unusual combination (“the pants of good-breeding”), which is +possibly witty in itself; for the pants become witty, as it were, +because they are the pants of good-breeding. Therefore it may not take +us by surprise if we get the impression of a very witty comparison; we +are beginning to notice that we show a general tendency in our +estimation to extend a quality to the whole thing when it clings only to +one part of it. Besides, the “pants of good-breeding” remind us of a +similar confusing verse of Heine. + +“_Until, at last, the buttons tore from the pants of my patience._” + +It is obvious that both of the last comparisons possess a character +which one cannot find in all good, i.e., fitting, comparisons. One might +say that they are in a large manner “debasing,” for they place a thing +of high category, an abstraction (good-breeding, patience), side by side +with a thing of a very concrete nature of a very low kind (pants). +Whether this peculiarity has something to do with wit we shall have to +consider in another connection. Let us attempt to analyze another +example in which the degrading character is exceptionally well defined. +In Nestroy’s farce “_Einen Jux will er sich machen_,” the clerk, +Weinberl, who resolves in his imagination how he will ponder over his +youth when he has some day become a well-established old merchant, says: +“_When in the course of confidential conversation the ice is chopped up +before the warehouse of memory; when the portal of the storehouse of +antiquity is unlocked again; and when the mattings of phantasy are +stocked full with wares of yore._” These are certainly comparisons of +abstractions with very common, concrete things, but the witticism +depends—exclusively or only partially—upon the circumstance that a clerk +makes use of these comparisons which are taken from the sphere of his +daily occupation. But to bring the abstract in relation to the +commonplace with which he is otherwise filled is an act of +_unification_. Let us revert to Lichtenberg’s comparisons. + + + _Peculiar Attributions_ + +“_The motives for our actions may be arranged like the thirty-two winds, +and their names may be classified in a similar way, e.g., +Bread-bread-glory or Glory-glory-bread._” + +As so often happens in Lichtenberg’s witticisms, in this case, too, the +impression of appropriateness, cleverness, and ingenuity is so marked +that our judgment of the character of the witty element is thereby +misled. If something witty is intermingled in such an utterance with the +excellent sense, we probably are deluded into declaring the whole to be +an exceptional joke. Moreover, I dare say that everything that is really +witty about it results from the strangeness of the peculiar combination +bread-bread-glory. Thus as far as wit is concerned it is representation +through absurdity. + +The peculiar combination or absurd attribution can alone be represented +as a product of a comparison. + +Lichtenberg says: “_A twice-sleepy woman—a once-sleepy church pew_.” +Behind each one there is a comparison with a bed; in both cases there is +besides the comparison also the technical factor of _allusion_. Once it +is an allusion to the soporific effect of sermons, and the second time +to the inexhaustible theme of sex. + +Having found hitherto that a comparison as often as it appears witty +owes this impression to its connection with one of the techniques of wit +known to us, there are nevertheless some other examples which seem to +point to the fact that a comparison as such can also be witty. + +This is Lichtenberg’s characteristic remark about certain odes. “They +are in poetry what Jacob Böhm’s immortal writings are in prose—_they are +a kind of picnic in which the author supplies the words, and the readers +the meaning_.” + +“When he _philosophizes_, he generally sheds _an agreeable moonlight_ +over his topics, which is in the main quite pleasant, but which does not +show any one subject clearly.” + +Again, Heine’s description: “_Her face resembled a kodex palimpsestus, +where under the new block-lettered text of a church father peek forth +the half-obliterated verses of an ancient Hellenic erotic poet._” + +Or, the continued comparison of a very degrading tendency, in the “Bäder +von Lucca.” + +“_The Catholic priest_ is more like a clerk who is employed in a big +business; the church, the big house at the head of which is the Pope, +gives him a definite salary. He works lazily like one who is not working +on his own account, he has many colleagues, and so easily remains +unnoticed in the big business enterprise. He is concerned only in the +credit of the house and still more in its preservation, since he would +be deprived of his means of sustenance in case it went bankrupt. _The +Protestant clergyman_, on the other hand, is his own boss, and carries +on the religious businesses on his own account. He has no wholesale +trade like his Catholic brother-tradesman, but deals merely at retail; +and since he himself must understand it, he cannot be lazy. He must +praise his _articles of faith_ to the people and must disparage the +articles of his competitors. Like a true small trader he stands in his +retail store, full of envy of the industry of all large houses, +particularly the large house in Rome which has so many thousand +bookkeepers and packers on its payroll, and which owns factories in all +four corners of the world.” + +In the face of this, as in many other examples, we can no longer dispute +the fact that a comparison may in itself be witty, and that the witty +impression need not necessarily depend on one of the known techniques of +wit. But we are entirely in the dark as to what determines the witty +character of the comparison, since it certainly does not cling to the +similarity as a form of expression of the thought, or to the operation +of the comparison. We can do nothing but include comparison with the +different forms of “indirect representation” which are at the disposal +of the technique of wit, and the problem, which confronted us more +distinctly in the mechanism of comparison than in the means of wit +hitherto treated, must remain unsolved. There must surely be a special +reason why the decision whether something is a witticism or not presents +more difficulties in cases of comparison than in other forms of +expression. + +This gap in our understanding, however, offers no ground for complaint +that our first investigation has been unsuccessful. Considering the +intimate connection which we had to be prepared to ascribe to the +different types of wit, it would have been imprudent to expect that we +could fully explain this aspect of the problem before we had cast a +glance over the others. We shall have to take up this problem at another +place. + +_Review of the Techniques of Wit_ + +Are we sure that none of the possible techniques of wit has escaped our +investigation? Not exactly; but by a continued examination of new +material, we can convince ourselves that we have become acquainted with +the most numerous and most important technical means of wit-work—at +least with as much as is necessary for formulating a judgment about the +nature of this psychic process. At present no such judgment exists; on +the other hand, we have come into possession of important indications, +from the direction of which we may expect a further explanation of the +problem. The interesting processes of condensation with substitutive +formation, which we have recognized as the nucleus of the technique of +word-wit, directed our attention to the dream-formation in whose +mechanism the identical psychic processes were discovered. Thither also +we are directed by the technique of the thought-wit, namely +displacement, faulty thinking, absurdity, indirect expression, and +representation through the opposite—each and all are also found in the +technique of dreams. The dream is indebted to displacement for its +strange appearance, which hinders us from recognizing in it the +continuation of our waking thoughts; the dream’s use of absurdity and +contradiction has cost it the dignity of a psychic product, and has +misled the authors to assume that the determinants of dream-formation +are: collapse of mental activity, cessation of criticism, morality, and +logic. Representation through the opposite is so common in dreams that +even the popular but entirely misleading books on dream interpretation +usually put it to good account. Indirect expression, the substitution +for the dream-thought by an allusion, by a trifle or by a symbolism +analogous to comparison, is just exactly what distinguishes the manner +of expression of the dream from our waking thoughts.[36] Such a +far-reaching agreement as found between the means of wit-work and those +of dream-work can scarcely be accidental. To show those agreements in +detail and to trace their motivations will be one of our future tasks. + + + + + III + THE TENDENCIES OF WIT[37] + + +Near the end of the preceding chapter as I was writing down Heine’s +comparison of the Catholic priest to an employee of a large business +house, and the comparison of the Protestant divine to an independent +retail dealer, I felt an inhibition which nearly prevented me from using +this comparison. I said to myself that among my readers probably there +would be some who hold in veneration not only religion, but also its +administration and administrators. These readers might take offense at +the comparison and get so wrought up about it that it would take away +all interest in the investigation as to whether the comparison seemed +witty in itself or was witty only through its garnishings. In other +examples, e.g., the one mentioned above concerning the agreeable +moonlight shed by a certain philosophy, there would be no worry that for +some readers it might be a disturbing influence in our investigation. +Even the most religious person would remain in the right mood to form a +judgment about our problem. + +It is easy to guess the character of the witticism by the kind of +reaction that wit exerts on the hearer. Sometimes wit is wit for its own +sake and serves no other particular purpose; then again, it places +itself at the service of such a purpose, i.e., it becomes purposive. +Only that form of wit which has such a tendency runs the risk of +ruffling people who do not wish to hear it. + +Theo. Vischer called wit without a tendency “_abstract_” wit, I prefer +to call it “_harmless_” wit. + +As we have already classified wit according to the material touched by +its technique into word- and thought-wit, it is incumbent upon us to +investigate the relation of this classification to the one just put +forward. Word- and thought-wit on the one hand, and abstract- and +tendency-wit on the other hand, bear no relation of dependence to each +other; they are two entirely independent classifications of witty +productions. Perhaps some one may have gotten the impression that +harmless witticisms are preponderately word-witticisms, whereas the +complicated techniques of thought-witticisms are mostly made to serve +strong tendencies. There are harmless witticisms that operate through +play on words and sound similarity, and just as harmless ones which make +use of all means of thought-wit. Nor is it less easy to prove that +tendency-wit as far as technique is concerned may be merely the wit of +words. Thus, for example, witticisms that “_play_” with proper names +often show an insulting and offending tendency, and yet they, too, +belong to word-wit. Again, the most harmless of all jests are +word-witticisms. Examples of this nature are the popular “shake-up” +rhymes (Schüttelreime) in which the technique is represented through the +manifold application of the same material with a very peculiar +modification: + +“Having been forsaken by _Dame Luck_, he degenerated into a _Lame +Duck_.” + +Let us hope that no one will deny that the pleasure experienced in this +kind of otherwise unpretentious rhyming is of the same nature as the one +by which we recognize wit. + +Good examples of abstract or harmless thought-witticisms abound in +Lichtenberg’s comparisons with which we have already become acquainted. +I add a few more. “_They sent a small Octavo to the University of +Göttingen; and received back in body and soul a quarto_” (a fourth-form +boy). + +“_In order to erect this budding well, one must lay above all things a +good foundation, and I know of no firmer than by laying immediately over +every pro-layer a contra-layer._” + +“_One man begets the thought, the second acts as its godfather, the +third begets children by it, the fourth visits it on its death-bed, and +the fifth buries it_” (comparison with unification). + +“_Not only did he disbelieve in ghosts, but he was not ever afraid of +them._” The witticism in this case lies exclusively in the absurd +representation which puts what is usually considered less important in +the comparative and what is considered more important in the positive +degree. If we divest it of its dress it says: it is much easier to use +our reason and make light of the fear of ghosts than to defend ourselves +against this fear when the occasion presents itself. But this rendering +is no longer witty; it is merely a correct and still too little +respected psychological fact suggesting what Lessing expresses in his +well-known words: + + “Not all are free who mock their chains.” + + + _Harmless and Tendency Wit_ + +I shall take the opportunity presented here of clearing up what may +still lead to a possible misunderstanding. “Harmless” or “abstract” wit +should in no way convey the same meaning as “shallow” or “poor” wit. It +is meant only to designate the opposite of the “tendency” wit to be +described later. As shown in the aforementioned examples, a harmless +jest, i.e., a witticism without a tendency, can also be very rich in +content and express something worth while. The quality of a witticism, +however, is independent of the wit and represents the quality of the +thought which is here expressed wittily by means of a special +contrivance. To be sure, just as watch-makers are wont to enclose very +good works in valuable cases, so it may likewise happen with wit that +the best witty activities are used to invest the richest thoughts. + +Now, if we pay strict attention to the distinction between +thought-content and the witty wording of thought-wit, we arrive at an +insight which may clear up much uncertainty in our judgment of wit. For +it turns out—astonishing as it may seem—that our enjoyment of a +witticism is supplied by the combined impression of content and +wit-activity, and that one of the factors is likely to deceive us about +the extent of the other. It is only the reduction of the witticism that +lays bare to us our mistaken judgment. + +The same thing applies to word-wit. When we hear that “_experience +consists simply of experiencing what one wishes he had not +experienced_,” we are puzzled, and believe that we have learnt a new +truth; it takes some time before we recognize in this disguise the +platitude, “adversity is the school of wisdom” (K. Fischer). The +excellent wit-activity which seeks to define “experience” by the almost +exclusive use of the word “experience” deceives us so completely that we +overestimate the content of the sentence. The same thing happens in many +similar cases and also in Lichtenberg’s unification-witticism about +January (p. 89), which expresses nothing but what we already know, +namely, that New Year’s wishes are as seldom realized as other wishes. + +We find the contrary true of other witticisms, in which obviously what +is striking and correct in the thought captivates us, so that we call +the saying an excellent witticism, whereas it is only the thought that +is brilliant while the wit-activity is often weak. It is especially true +of Lichtenberg’s wit that the path of the thought is often of more value +than its witty expression, though we unjustly extend the value of the +former to the latter. Thus the remark about the “torch of truth” (p. +115) is hardly a witty comparison, but it is so striking that we are +inclined to lay stress on the sentence as exceptionally witty. + +Lichtenberg’s witticisms are above all remarkable for their +thought-content and their certainty of hitting the mark. Goethe has +rightly remarked about this author that his witty and jocose thoughts +positively conceal problems. Or perhaps it may be more correct to say +that they touch upon the solutions of problems. When, for example, he +presents as a witty thought: + +“He always read _Agamemnon_ instead of the German word _angenommen_, so +thoroughly had he read Homer” (technically this is absurdity plus sound +similarity of words). Thus he discovered nothing less than the secret of +mistakes in reading.[38] The following joke, whose technique (p. 78) +seemed to us quite unsatisfactory, is of a similar nature. + +“_He was surprised that there were two holes cut in the pelts of cats +just where the eyes were located._” The stupidity here exhibited is only +seemingly so; in reality this ingenuous remark conceals the great +problem of teleology in the structure of animals; it is not at all so +self-evident that the eyelid cleft opens just where the cornea is +exposed, until the science of evolution explains to us this coincidence. + +Let us bear in mind that a witty sentence gave us a general impression +in which we were unable to distinguish the amount of thought-content +from the amount of wit-work; perhaps even a more significant parallel to +it will be found later. + + + _Pleasure Results from the Technique_ + +For our theoretical explanation of the nature of wit, harmless wit must +be of greater value to us than tendency-wit and shallow wit more than +profound wit. Harmless and shallow plays on words present to us the +problem of wit in its purest form, because of the good sense therein and +because there is no purposive factor nor underlying philosophy to +confuse the judgment. With such material our understanding can make +further progress. + +_At the end of a dinner to which I had been invited, a pastry called +Roulard was served; it was a culinary accomplishment which presupposed a +good deal of skill on the part of the cook. “Is it home-made?” asked one +of the guests. “Oh, yes,” replied the host, “it is a Home-Roulard”_ +(Home Rule). + +This time we shall not investigate the technique of this witticism, but +shall center our attention upon another, and that one the most important +factor. As I remember, this improvised joke delighted all the guests and +made us laugh. In this case, as in countless others, the feeling of +pleasure of the hearer cannot have originated from any purposive element +nor the thought-content of the wit; so we are forced to connect the +feeling of pleasure with the technique of wit. The technical means of +wit which we have described, such as condensation, displacement, +indirect expression, etc., have therefore the faculty to produce a +feeling of pleasure in the hearer, although we cannot as yet see how +they acquired that faculty. By such easy stages we get the second axiom +for the explanation of wit; the first one (p. 17) states that the +character of wit depends upon the mode of expression. Let us remember +also that the second axiom has really taught us nothing new. It merely +isolates a fact that was already contained in a discovery which we made +before. For we recall that whenever it was possible to reduce the wit by +substituting for its verbal expression another set of words, at the same +time carefully retaining the sense, it not only eliminated the witty +character but also the laughableness (_Lacheffekt_) that constitutes the +pleasure of wit. + +At present we cannot go further without first coming to an understanding +with our philosophical authorities. + +The philosophers who adjudge wit to be a part of the comic and deal with +the latter itself in the field of æsthetics, characterize the æsthetic +presentation by the following conditions: that we are not thereby +interested in or about the objects, that we do not need these objects to +satisfy our great wants in life, but that we are satisfied with the mere +contemplation of the same, and with the pleasure of the thought itself. +“This pleasure, this mode of conception is purely æsthetical, it depends +entirely on itself, its end is only itself and it fulfills no other end +in life” (K. Fischer, p. 68). + +We scarcely venture a contradiction to K. Fischer’s words—perhaps we +merely translate his thoughts into our own mode of expression—when we +insist that the witty activity is, after all, not to be designated as +aimless or purposeless, since it has for its aim the evocation of +pleasure in the hearer. I doubt whether we are able to undertake +anything which has no object in view. When we do not use our psychic +apparatus for the fulfillment of one of our indispensable +gratifications, we let it work for pleasure, and we seek to derive +pleasure from its own activity. I suspect that this is really the +condition which underlies all æsthetic thinking, but I know too little +about æsthetics to be willing to support this theory. About wit, +however, I can assert, on the strength of the two impressions gained +before, that it is an activity whose purpose is to derive pleasure—be it +intellectual or otherwise—from the psychic processes. To be sure, there +are other activities which accomplish the same thing. They may be +differentiated from each by the sphere of psychic activity from which +they wish to derive pleasure, or perhaps by the methods which they use +in accomplishing this. At present we cannot decide this, but we firmly +maintain that at last we have established a connection between the +technique of wit partly controlled by the tendency to economize (p. 53) +and the production of pleasure. + +But before we proceed to solve the riddle of how the technical means of +wit-work can produce pleasure in the hearer, we wish to mention that, +for the sake of simplicity and more lucidity, we have altogether put out +of the way all tendency-witticisms. Still we must attempt to explain +what the tendencies of wit are and in what manner wit makes use of these +tendencies. + + + _Hostile and Obscene Wit_ + +We are taught above all by an observation not to put aside the +tendency-wit when we are investigating the origin of the pleasure in +wit. The pleasurable effect of harmless wit is usually of a moderate +nature; all that it can be expected to produce in the hearer is a +distinct feeling of satisfaction and a slight ripple of laughter; and as +we have shown by fitting examples (p. 132) at least a part of this +effect is due to the thought-content. The sudden irresistible outburst +of laughter evoked by the tendency-wit rarely follows the wit without a +tendency. As the technique may be identical in both, it is fair to +assume that by virtue of its purpose, the tendency-wit has at its +disposal sources of pleasure to which harmless wit has no access. + +It is now easy to survey wit-tendencies. Wherever wit is not a means to +its end, i. e., harmless, it puts itself in the service of but two +tendencies which may themselves be united under one viewpoint; it is +either _hostile_ wit serving as an aggression, satire, or defense, or it +is _obscene_ wit serving as a sexual exhibition. Again it is to be +observed that the technical form of wit—be it a word- or +thought-witticism—bears no relation to these two tendencies. + +It is a much more complicated matter to show in what way wit serves +these tendencies. In this investigation I wish to present first not the +hostile but the exhibition wit. The latter has indeed very seldom been +deemed worthy of an investigation, as if an aversion had transferred +itself here from the material to the subject; however, we shall not +allow ourselves to be misled thereby, for we shall soon touch upon a +detail in wit which promises to throw light on more than one obscure +point. + +We all know what is meant by a “smutty” joke. It is the intentional +bringing into prominence of sexual facts or relations through speech. +However, this definition is no sounder than other definitions. A lecture +on the anatomy of the sexual organs or on the physiology of reproduction +need not, in spite of this definition, have anything in common with an +obscenity. It must be added that the smutty joke is directed toward a +certain person who excites one sexually, and who becomes cognizant of +the speaker’s excitement by listening to the smutty joke, and thereby in +turn becomes sexually excited. Instead of becoming sexually excited the +listener may react with shame and embarrassment, which merely signifies +a reaction against the excitement and indirectly an admission of the +same. The smutty joke was originally directed against the woman and is +comparable to an attempt at seduction. If a man tells or listens to +obscene jokes in male society, the original situation, which cannot be +realized on account of social inhibitions, is thereby also represented. +Whoever laughs at a smutty joke does the same as the spectator who +laughs at a sexual aggression. + +The sexual element which is at the basis of the obscene joke comprises +more than that which is peculiar to both sexes, and goes beyond that +which is common to both sexes, it is connected with all these things +that cause shame, and includes the whole domain of the excrementitious. +However, this was the sexual domain of childhood, where the imagination +fancied a cloaca, so to speak, within which the sexual elements were +either badly or not at all differentiated from the excrementitious.[39] +In the whole mental domain of the psychology of the neuroses, the sexual +still includes the excrementitious, and it is understood in the old, +infantile sense. + +The smutty joke is like the denudation of a person of the opposite sex +toward whom the joke is directed. Through the utterance of obscene words +the person attacked is forced to picture the parts of the body in +question, or the sexual act, and is shown that the aggressor himself +pictures the same thing. There is no doubt that the original motive of +the smutty joke was the pleasure of seeing the sexual displayed. + +It will only help to clarify the subject if here we go back to the +fundamentals. One of the primitive components of our libido is the +desire to see the sexual exposed. Perhaps this itself is a development—a +substitution for the desire to touch which is assumed to be the primary +pleasure. As it often happens, the desire to see has here also replaced +the desire to touch.[40] The libido for looking and touching is found in +every person in two forms, active and passive, or masculine and +feminine; and in accordance with the preponderance of sex +characteristics it develops preponderately in one or the other +direction. In young children one can readily observe the desire to +exhibit themselves nude. If the germ of this desire does not experience +the usual fate of being covered up and repressed, it develops into a +mania for exhibitionism, a familiar perversion among grown-up men. In +women the passive desire to exhibit is almost regularly covered by the +masked reaction of sexual modesty; despite this, however, remnants of +this desire may always be seen in women’s dress. I need only mention how +flexible and variable convention and circumstances make that remaining +portion of exhibitionism still allowed to women. + + + _The Transformation of the Obscenity into Obscene Wit_ + +In the case of men a great part of this striving to exhibit remains as a +part of the libido and serves to initiate the sexual act. If this +striving asserts itself on first meeting the woman it must make use of +speech for two motives. First, in order to make itself known to the +woman; and secondly, because the awakening of the imagination through +speech puts the woman herself in a corresponding excitement and awakens +in her the desire to passive exhibitionism. This speech of courtship is +not yet smutty, but may pass over into the same. Wherever the +yieldingness of the woman manifests itself quickly, smutty speech is +short-lived, for it gives way to the sexual act. It is different if the +rapid yielding of the woman cannot be counted upon, but instead there +appears the defense reaction. In that case the sexually exciting speech +changes into obscene wit as its own end; as the sexual aggression is +inhibited in its progress towards the act, it lingers at the evocation +of the excitement and derives pleasure from the indications of the same +in the woman. In this process the aggression changes its character in +the same way as any libidinous impulse confronted by a hindrance; it +becomes distinctly hostile and cruel, and utilizes the sadistical +components of the sexual impulse against the hindrance. + +Thus the unyieldingness of the woman is therefore the next condition for +the development of smutty wit; to be sure, this resistance must be of +the kind to indicate merely a deferment and make it appear that further +efforts will not be in vain. The ideal case of such resistance on the +part of the woman usually results from the simultaneous presence of +another man, a third person, whose presence almost excludes the +immediate yielding of the woman. This third person soon becomes of the +greatest importance for the development of the smutty wit, but next to +him the presence of the woman must be taken account of. Among rural +people or in the ordinary hostelry one can observe that not till the +waitress or the hostess approaches the guests does the obscene wit come +out; in a higher order of society just the opposite happens, here the +presence of a woman puts an end to smutty talk. The men reserve this +kind of conversation, which originally presupposed the presence of +bashful women, until they are alone, “by themselves.” Thus gradually the +spectator, now turned the listener, takes the place of the woman as the +object of the smutty joke, and through such a change the smutty joke +already approaches the character of wit. + +Henceforth our attention may be centered upon two factors, first upon +the rôle that the third person—the listener—plays, and secondly, upon +the intrinsic conditions of the smutty joke itself. + +Tendency-wit usually requires three persons. Besides the one who makes +the wit there is a second person who is taken as the object of the +hostile or sexual aggression, and a third person in whom the purpose of +the wit to produce pleasure is fulfilled. We shall later on inquire into +the deeper motive of this relationship, for the present we shall adhere +to the fact which states that it is not the maker of the wit who laughs +about it and enjoys its pleasurable effect, but it is the idle listener +who does. The same relationship exists among the three persons connected +with the smutty joke. The process may be described as follows: As soon +as the libidinous impulse of the first person, to satisfy himself +through the woman, is blocked, he immediately develops a hostile +attitude towards this second person and takes the originally intruding +third person as his confederate. Through the obscene speech of the first +person the woman is exposed before the third person, who as a listener +is fascinated by the easy gratification of his own libido. + +It is curious that common people so thoroughly enjoy such smutty talk, +and that it is a never-lacking activity of cheerful humor. It is also +worthy of notice that in this complicated process which shows so many +characteristics of tendency-wit, no formal demands, such as characterize +wit, are made upon “smutty wit.” The unveiled nudity affords pleasure to +the first and makes the third person laugh. + +Not until we come to the refined and cultured does the formal +determination of wit arise. The obscenity becomes witty and is tolerated +only if it is witty. The technical means of which it mostly makes use is +allusion, i.e., substitution through a trifle, something remotely +related, which the listener reconstructs in his imagination as a +full-fledged and direct obscenity. The greater the disproportion between +what is directly offered in the obscenity and what is necessarily +aroused by it in the mind of the listener, the finer is the witticism +and the higher it may venture in good society. Besides the coarse and +delicate allusions, the witty obscenity also utilizes all other means of +word- and thought-wit, as can be easily demonstrated by examples. + + + _The Function of Wit in the Service of the Tendency_ + +It now becomes comprehensible what wit accomplishes through this service +of its tendency. It makes possible the gratification of a craving (lewd +or hostile) despite a hindrance which stands in the way; it eludes the +hindrance and so derives pleasure from a source that has become +inaccessible on account of the hindrance. The hindrance in the way is +really nothing more than the higher degree of culture and education +which correspondingly increases the inability of the woman to tolerate +the stark sex. The woman thought of as present in the final situation is +still considered present, or her influence acts as a deterrent to the +men even in her absence. One often notices how cultured men are +influenced by the company of girls of a lower station in life to change +witty obscenities to broad smut. + +The power which renders it difficult or impossible for the woman, and in +a lesser degree for the man, to enjoy unveiled obscenities we call +“repression,” and we recognize in it the same psychic process which +keeps from consciousness in severe nervous attacks whole complexes of +emotions with their resultant affects, and has shown itself to be the +principal factor in the causation of the so-called psychoneuroses. We +acknowledge to culture and higher civilization an important influence in +the development of repressions, and assume that under these conditions +there has come about a change in our psychic organization which may also +have been brought along as an inherited disposition. In consequence of +it, what was once accepted as pleasureful is now counted unacceptable +and is rejected by means of all the psychic forces. Owing to the +repression brought about by civilization many primary pleasures are now +disapproved by the censor and lost. But the human psyche finds +renunciation very difficult; hence we discover that tendency-wit +furnishes us with a means to make the renunciation retrogressive and +thus to regain what has been lost. When we laugh over a delicately +obscene witticism, we laugh at the identical thing which causes laughter +in the ill-bred man when he hears a coarse, obscene joke; in both cases +the pleasure comes from the same source. The coarse, obscene joke, +however, could not incite us to laughter, because it would cause us +shame or would seem to us disgusting; we can laugh only when wit comes +to our aid. + +What we had presumed in the beginning seems to have been confirmed, +namely, that tendency-wit has access to other sources of pleasure than +harmless wit, in which all the pleasure is somehow dependent upon the +technique. We can also reiterate that owing to our feelings we are in no +position to distinguish in tendency-wit what part of the pleasure +originates from the technique and what part from the tendency. _Strictly +speaking, we do not know what we are laughing about._ In all obscene +jokes we succumb to striking mistakes of judgment about the “goodness” +of the joke as far as it depends upon formal conditions; the technique +of these jokes is often very poor while their laughing effect is +enormous. + + + _Invectives Made Possible Through Wit_ + +We next wish to determine whether the rôle of wit in the service of the +hostile tendency is the same. + +Right from the start we meet with similar conditions. Since our +individual childhood and the childhood of human civilization, our +hostile impulses towards our fellow-beings have been subjected to the +same restrictions and the same progressive repressions as our sexual +strivings. We have not yet progressed so far as to love our enemies, or +to extend to them our left cheek after we are smitten on the right. +Furthermore, all moral codes about the subjection of active hatred bear +even to-day the clearest indications that they were originally meant for +a small community of clansmen. As we all may consider ourselves members +of some nation, we permit ourselves for the most part to forget these +restrictions in matters touching a foreign people. But within our own +circles we have nevertheless made progress in the mastery of hostile +emotions. Lichtenberg drastically puts it when he says: “Where nowadays +one says, ‘I beg your pardon,’ formerly one had recourse to a cuff on +the ear.” Violent hostility, no longer tolerated by law, has been +replaced by verbal invectives, and the better understanding of the +concatenation of human emotions robs us, through its consequential +“_Tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner_,” more and more of the capacity +to become angry at our fellowman who is in our way. Having been endowed +with a strong hostile disposition in our childhood, higher personal +civilization teaches us later that it is undignified to use abusive +language; even where combat is still permitted, the number of things +which may be used as means of combat has been markedly restricted. +Society, as the third and dispassionate party in the combat to whose +interest it is to safeguard personal safety, prevents us from expressing +our hostile feelings in action; and hence, as in sexual aggression, +there has developed a new technique of invectives, the aim of which is +to enlist this third person against our enemy. By belittling and +humbling our enemy, by scorning and ridiculing him, we indirectly obtain +the pleasure of his defeat by the laughter of the third person, the +inactive spectator. + +We are now prepared for the rôle that wit plays in hostile aggression. +Wit permits us to make our enemy ridiculous through that which we could +not utter loudly or consciously on account of existing hindrances; in +other words, _wit affords us the means of surmounting restrictions and +of opening up otherwise inaccessible pleasure-sources_. Moreover, the +listener will be induced by the gain in pleasure to take our part, even +if he is not altogether convinced,—just as we on other occasions, when +fascinated by harmless witticism, were wont to overestimate the +substance of the sentence wittily expressed. “To prejudice the laughter +in one’s own favor” is a completely pertinent saying in the German +language. + +One may recall Mr. N.’s witticism given in the last chapter (p. 28). It +is of an insulting nature, as if the author wished to shout loudly: But +the minister of agriculture is himself an ox! But he, as a man of +culture, could not put his opinion in this form. He therefore appealed +to wit which assured his opinion a reception at the hands of the +listeners which, in spite of its amount of truth, never would have been +received if in an unwitty form. Brill cites an excellent example of a +similar kind: _Wendell Phillips, according to a recent biography by Dr. +Lorenzo Sears, was on one occasion lecturing in Ohio, and while on a +railroad journey going to keep one of his appointments met in the car a +number of clergymen returning from some sort of convention. One of the +ministers, feeling called upon to approach Mr. Phillips, asked him, “Are +you Mr. Phillips?” “I am, sir.” “Are you trying to free the niggers?” +“Yes, sir; I am an abolitionist.” “Well, why do you preach your +doctrines up here? Why don’t you go over into Kentucky?” “Excuse me, are +you a preacher?” “I am, sir.” “Are you trying to save souls from hell?” +“Yes, sir, that’s my business.” “Well, why don’t you go there?”_ The +assailant hurried into the smoker amid a roar of unsanctified laughter. +This anecdote nicely illustrates the tendency-wit in the service of +hostile aggression. The minister’s behavior was offensive and +irritating, yet Wendell Phillips as a man of culture could not defend +himself in the same manner as a common, ill-bred person would have done, +and as his inner feelings must have prompted him to do. The only +alternative under the circumstances would have been to take the affront +in silence, had not wit showed him the way, and enabled him by the +technical means of unification to turn the tables on his assailant. He +not only belittled him and turned him into ridicule, but by his clever +retort, “Well, why don’t you go there?” fascinated the other clergymen, +and thus brought them to his side. + +Although the hindrance to the aggression which the wit helped to elude +was in these cases of an inner nature—the æsthetic resistance against +insulting—it may at other times be of a purely outer nature. So it was +in the case when Serenissimus asked the stranger who had a striking +resemblance to himself: “Was your mother ever in my home?” and he +received the ready reply, “No, but my father was.” The stranger would +certainly have felled the imprudent inquirer who dared to make an +ignominious allusion to the memory of his mother; but this imprudent +person was Serenissimus, who may not be felled and not even insulted +unless one wishes to pay for this revenge with his life. The only thing +left was to swallow the insult in silence; but luckily wit pointed out +the way of requiting the insult without personally imperiling one’s +self. It was accomplished simply by treating the allusion with the +technical means of unification and employing it against the aggressor. +The impression of wit is here so thoroughly determined by the tendency +that in view of the witty rejoinder we are inclined to forget that the +aggressor’s inquiry is itself made witty by allusion. + + + _Rebellion Against Authority Through Wit_ + +The prevention of abuse or insulting retorts through outer circumstances +is so often the case that tendency-wit is used with special preference +as a weapon of attack or criticism of superiors who claim to be an +authority. Wit then serves as a resistance against such authority and as +an escape from its pressure. In this factor, too, lies the charm of +caricature, at which we laugh even if it is badly done simply because we +consider its resistance to authority a great merit. + +If we keep in mind that tendency-wit is so well adapted as a weapon of +attack upon what is great, dignified, and mighty, that which is shielded +by internal hindrances or external circumstance against direct +disparagement, we are forced to a special conception of certain groups +of witticisms which seem to occupy themselves with inferior and +powerless persons. I am referring to the marriage-agent stories,—with a +few of which we have become familiar in the investigation of the +manifold techniques of thought-wit. In some of these examples, “But she +is deaf, too!” and “Who in the world would ever lend these people +anything!” the agent was derided as a careless and thoughtless person +who becomes comical because the truth escapes his lips automatically, as +it were. But does on the one hand what we have learned about the nature +of tendency-wit, and on the other hand the amount of satisfaction in +these stories, harmonize with the misery of the persons at whom the joke +seems to be pointed? Are these worthy opponents of the wit? Or, is it +not more plausible to suppose that the wit puts the agent in the +foreground only in order to strike at something more important; does it, +as the saying goes, strike the saddle pack, when it is meant for the +mule? This conception can really not be rejected. + +The above-mentioned interpretation of the marriage-agent stories admits +of a continuation. It is true that I need not enter into them, that I +can content myself with seeing the farcical in these stories, and can +dispute their witty character. However, such subjective determination of +wit actually exists. We have now become cognizant of it and shall later +on have to investigate it. It means that only that is a witticism which +I wish to consider as such. What may be wit to me, may be only an +amusing story to another. But if a witticism admits of doubt, that can +be due only to the fact that it is possessed of a show-side,—in our +examples it happens to be a façade of the comic,—upon which one may be +satisfied to bestow a single glance while another may attempt to peep +behind. We also suspect that this façade is intended to dazzle the +prying glance which is to say that such stories have something to +conceal. + +At all events, if our marriage-agent stories are witticisms at all, they +are all the better witticisms because, thanks to their façade, they are +in a position to conceal not only what they have to say but also that +they have something—forbidden—to say. But the continuation of the +interpretation, which reveals this hidden part and shows that these +stories having a comical façade are tendency-witticisms, would be as +follows: Every one who allows the truth to escape his lips in an +unguarded moment is really pleased to have rid himself of this thought. +This is a correct and far-reaching psychological insight. Without the +inner assent no one would allow himself to be overpowered by the +automatism which here brings the truth to light.[41] The marriage agent +is thus transformed from a ludicrous personage into an object deserving +of pity and sympathy. How blest must be the man, able at last to +unburden himself of the weight of dissimulation, if he immediately +seizes the first opportunity to shout out the last fragment of truth! As +soon as he sees that his case is lost, that the prospective bride does +not suit the young man, he gladly betrays the secret that the girl has +still another blemish which the young man had overlooked, or he makes +use of the chance to present a conclusive argument in detail in order to +express his contempt for the people who employ him: “Who in the world +would ever lend these people anything!” The ludicrousness of the whole +thing now reverts upon the parents,—hardly mentioned in the story,—who +consider such deceptions justified to clutch a man for their daughter; +it also reflects upon the wretched state of the girls who get married +through such contrivances, and upon the want of dignity of the marriage +contracted after such preliminaries. The agent is the right person to +express such criticisms, for he is best acquainted with these abuses; +but he may not raise his voice, because he is a poor man whose +livelihood depends altogether on turning these abuses to his advantage. +But the same conflict is found in the national spirit which has given +rise to these and similar stories; for he is aware that the holiness of +wedlock suffers severely by reference to some of the methods of +marriage-making. + +We recall also the observation made during the investigation of +wit-technique, namely, that absurdity in wit frequently stands for +derision and criticism in the thought behind the witticism, wherein the +wit-work follows the dream-work. This state of affairs, we find, is here +once more confirmed. That the derision and criticism are not aimed at +the agent, who appears in the former examples only as the whipping boy +of the joke, is shown by another series in which the agent, on the +contrary, is pictured as a superior person whose dialectics are a match +for any difficulty. They are stories whose façades are logical instead +of comical—they are sophistic thought-witticisms. In one of them (p. 83) +the agent knows how to circumvent the limping of the bride by stating +that in her case it is at least “a finished job”; another woman with +straight limbs would be in constant danger of falling and breaking a +leg, which would be followed by sickness, pains, and doctor’s fees—all +of which can be avoided by marrying the one already limping. Again in +another example (p. 81) the agent is clever enough to refute by good +arguments each of the whole series of the suitor’s objections against +the bride; only to the last, which cannot be glossed over, he rejoins, +“Do you expect her to have no blemishes at all?” as if the other +objections had not left behind an important remnant. It is not difficult +to pick out the weak points of the arguments in both examples, a thing +which we have done during the investigation of the technique. But now +something else interests us. If the agent’s speech is endowed with such +a strong semblance of logic, which on more careful examination proves to +be merely a semblance, then the truth must be lurking in the fact that +the witticism adjudges the agent to be right. The thought does not dare +to admit that he is right in all seriousness, and replaces it by the +semblance which the wit brings forth; but here, as it often happens, the +jest betrays the seriousness of it. We shall not err if we assume that +all stories with logical façades really mean what they assert even if +these assertions are deliberately falsely motivated. Only this use of +sophism for the veiled presentation of the truth endows it with the +character of wit, which is mainly dependent upon tendency. What these +two stories wish to indicate is that the suitor really makes himself +ridiculous when he collects together so sedulously the individual charms +of the bride which are transient after all, and when he forgets at the +same time that he must be prepared to take as his wife a human being +with inevitable faults; whereas, the only virtue which might make +tolerable marriage with the more or less imperfect personality of the +woman,—mutual attachment and willingness for affectionate adaptation,—is +not once mentioned in the whole affair. + +Ridicule of the suitor as seen in these examples in which the agent +quite correctly assumes the rôle of superiority, is much more clearly +depicted in other examples. The more pointed the stories, the less +wit-technique they contain; they are, as it were, merely border-line +cases of wit with whose technique they have only the façade-formation in +common. However, in view of the same tendency and the concealment of the +same behind the façade, they obtain the full effect of wit. The poverty +of technical means makes it clear also that many witticisms of that kind +cannot dispense with the comic element of jargon which acts similarly to +wit-technique without great sacrifices. + +The following is such a story, which with all the force of tendency-wit +obviates all traces of that technique. _The agent asks: “What are you +looking for in your bride?” The reply is: “She must be pretty, she must +be rich, and she must be cultured.” “Very well,” was the agent’s +rejoinder. “But what you want will make three matches.”_ Here the +reproach is no longer embodied in wit, but is made directly to the man. + +In all the preceding examples the veiled aggression was still directed +against persons; in the marriage-agent jokes it is directed against all +the parties involved in the betrothal—the bridegroom, bride, and her +parents. The object of attack by wit may equally well be institutions, +persons, in so far as they may act as agents of these, moral or +religious precepts, or even philosophies of life which enjoy so much +respect that they can be challenged in no other way than under the guise +of a witticism, and one that is veiled by a façade at that. No matter +how few the themes upon which tendency-wit may play, its forms and +investments are manifold. I believe that we shall do well to designate +this species of tendency-wit by a special name. To decide what name will +be appropriate is possible only after analyzing a few examples of this +kind. + + + _The Witty Cynicism_ + +I recall the two little stories about the impecunious gourmand who was +caught eating “salmon with mayonnaise,” and about the tippling tutor; +these witty stories, which we have learned to regard as sophistical +displacement-wit, I shall continue to analyze. We have learned since +then that when the semblance of logic is attached to the façade of a +story, the actual thought is as follows: The man is right; but on +account of the opposing contradiction, I did not dare to admit the fact +except for one point in which his error is easily demonstrable. The +“point” chosen is the correct compromise between his right and his +wrong; this is really no decision, but bespeaks the conflict within +ourselves. Both stories are simply epicurean. They say, Yes, the man is +right; nothing is greater than pleasure, and it is fairly immaterial in +what manner one procures it. This sounds frightfully immoral, and +perhaps it is, but fundamentally it is nothing more than the “_Carpe +diem_” of the poet who refers to the uncertainty of life and the +bareness of virtuous renunciation. If we are repelled by the idea that +the man in the joke about “salmon with mayonnaise” is in the right, then +it is merely due to the fact that it illustrates the sound sense of the +man in indulging himself—an indulgence which seems to us wholly +unnecessary. In reality each one of us has experienced hours and times +during which he has admitted the justice of this philosophy of life and +has reproached our system of morality for knowing only how to make +claims upon us without reimbursing us. Since we no longer lend credence +to the idea of a hereafter in which all former renunciations are +supposed to be rewarded by gratification—(there are very few pious +persons if one makes renunciation the password of faith)—“_Carpe diem_” +becomes the first admonition. I am quite ready to postpone the +gratification, but how do I know whether I shall still be alive +to-morrow? + + “Di doman’ non c’e certezza.”[42] + +I am quite willing to give up all the paths to gratification interdicted +by society, but am I sure that society will reward me for this +renunciation by opening for me—even after a certain delay—one of the +permitted paths? One can plainly tell what these witticisms whisper, +namely, that the wishes and desires of man have a right to make +themselves perceptible next to our pretentious and inconsiderate +morality. And in our times it has been said in emphatic and striking +terms that this morality is merely the selfish precept of the few rich +and mighty who can gratify their desires at any time without deferment. +As long as the art of healing has not succeeded in safeguarding our +lives, and as long as the social organizations do not do more towards +making conditions more agreeable, just so long cannot the voice within +us which is striving against the demands of morality, be stifled. Every +honest person finally makes this admission—at least to himself. The +decision in this conflict is possible only through the roundabout way of +a new understanding. One must be able to knit one’s life so closely to +that of others, and to form such an intimate identification with others, +that the shortening of one’s own term of life becomes surmountable; one +should not unlawfully fulfill the demands of one’s own needs, but should +leave them unfulfilled, because only the continuance of so many +unfulfilled demands can develop the power to recast the social order. +But not all personal needs allow themselves to be displaced in such a +manner and transferred to others, nor is there a universal and definite +solution of the conflict. + +We now know how to designate the witticisms just discussed; they are +cynical witticisms, and what they conceal are cynicisms. + +Among the institutions which cynical wit is wont to attack there is none +more important and more completely protected by moral precepts, and yet +more inviting of attack, than the institution of marriage. Most of the +cynical jokes are directed against it. For no demand is more personal +than that made upon sexual freedom, and nowhere has civilization +attempted to exert a more stringent suppression than in the realm of +sexuality. For our purposes a single example suffices: the “Entries in +the Album of Prince Carnival” mentioned on page 108. + +“_A wife is like an umbrella, at worst one may always take a cab._” + +We have already elucidated the complicated technique of this example; it +is a puzzling and seemingly impossible comparison which however, as we +now see, is not in itself witty; it shows besides an allusion (cab = +public conveyance), and as the strongest technical means it also shows +an omission which serves to make it still more unintelligible. The +comparison may be worked out in the following manner. A man marries in +order to guard himself against the temptations of sensuality, but it +then turns out that after all marriage affords no gratification for one +of stronger needs, just as one takes along an umbrella for protection +against rain only to get wet in spite of it. In both cases one must +search for better protection; in one case one must take a public cab, in +the other women procurable for money. Now the wit has almost entirely +been replaced by cynicism. That marriage is not the organization which +can satisfy a man’s sexuality, one does not dare to say loudly and +frankly unless indeed it be one like Christian v. Ehrenfels,[43] who is +forced to it by the love of truth and the zeal of reform. The strength +of this witticism lies in the fact that it has expressed the thought +even though it had to be done through all sorts of roundabout ways. + + + _Cynical Witticisms and Self-criticism_ + +A particularly favorable case for tendency-wit results if the intended +criticism of the inner resistance is directed against one’s own person, +or, more carefully expressed, against a person in whom one takes +interest, that is, a composite personality such as one’s own people. +This determination of self-criticism may make clear why it is that a +number of the most excellent jokes of which we have shown here many +specimens should have sprung into existence from the soil of Jewish +national life. They are stories which were invented by Jews themselves +and which are directed against Jewish peculiarities. The Jewish jokes +made up by non-Jews are nearly all brutal buffooneries in which the wit +is spared by the fact that the Jew appears as a comic figure to a +stranger. The Jewish jokes which originate with Jews admit this, but +they know their real shortcomings as well as their merits, and the +interest of the person himself in the thing to be criticised produces +the subjective determination of the wit-work which would otherwise be +difficult to bring about. Incidentally I do not know whether one often +finds a people that makes merry so unreservedly over its own +shortcomings. + +As an illustration I can point to the story cited on page 112 in which +the Jew in the train immediately abandons all sense of decency of +deportment as soon as he recognizes the new arrival in his coupé as his +coreligionist. We have come to know this joke as an illustration by +means of a detail—representation through a trifle; it is supposed to +represent the democratic mode of thought of the Jew who recognizes no +difference between master and servant, but unfortunately this also +disturbs discipline and co-operation. Another especially interesting +series of jokes presents the relationship between the poor and the rich +Jews: their heroes are the “shnorrer,”[44] and the charitable gentleman +or the baron. _The shnorrer, who was a regular Sunday-dinner guest at a +certain house, appeared one day accompanied by a young stranger, who +prepared to seat himself at the table. “Who is that?” demanded the host. +“He became my son-in-law last week,” was the reply, “and I have agreed +to supply his board for the first year.”_ The tendency of these stories +is always the same, and is most distinctly shown in the following story. +_The shnorrer supplicates the baron for money to visit the bathing +resort Ostend, as the physician has ordered him to take sea baths for +his ailment. The baron remarks that Ostend is an especially expensive +resort, and that a less fashionable place would do just as well. But the +shnorrer rejects that proposition by saying, “Herr Baron, nothing is too +expensive for my health.”_ That is an excellent displacement-witticism +which we could have taken as a model of its kind. The baron is evidently +anxious to save his money, but the shnorrer replies as if the baron’s +money were his own, which he may then consider secondary to his health. +One is forced to laugh at the insolence of the demand, but these jokes +are exceptionally unequipped with a façade to becloud the understanding. +The truth is that the shnorrer who mentally treats the rich man’s money +as his own, really possesses almost the right to this mistake, according +to the sacred codes of the Jews. Naturally the resistance which is +responsible for this joke is directed against the law which even the +pious find very oppressing. + +Another story relates _how on the steps of a rich man’s house a shnorrer +met one of his own kind. The latter counseled him to depart, saying, “Do +not go up to-day, the Baron is out of sorts and refuses to give any one +more than a dollar.” “I will go up anyway,” replied the first. “Why in +the world should I make him, a present of a dollar? Is he making me any +presents?”_ + +This witticism makes use of the technique of absurdity by permitting the +shnorrer to declare that the baron gives him nothing at the same moment +in which he is preparing to beg him for the donation. But the absurdity +is only apparent, for it is almost true that the rich man gives him +nothing, since he is obligated by the mandate to give alms, and strictly +speaking must be thankful that the shnorrer gives him an opportunity to +be charitable. The ordinary, bourgeois conception of alms is at +cross-purposes with the religious one; it openly revolts against the +religious conception in the _story about the baron who, having been +deeply touched by the shnorrer’s tale of woe, rang for his servants and +said: “Throw him out of the house; he is breaking my heart.”_ This +obvious exposition of the tendency again creates a case of border-line +wit. From the no longer witty complaint: “It is really no advantage to +be a rich man among Jews. The foreign misery does not grant one the +pleasure of one’s own fortune,” these last stories are distinguished +only by the illustration of a single situation. + +Other stories as the following, which, technically again presenting +border-lines of wit, have their origin in a deeply pessimistic cynicism. +_A patient whose hearing was defective consulted a physician who made +the correct diagnosis, namely, that the patient probably drank too much +whiskey and consequently was becoming deaf. He advised him to desist +from drinking and the patient promised to follow his advice. Some time +thereafter the doctor met him on the street and inquired in a loud voice +about his condition. “Thank you, Doctor,” was the reply, “there is no +necessity for speaking so loudly, I have given up drinking whiskey and +consequently I hear perfectly.” Some time afterwards they met again. The +doctor again inquired into his condition in the usual voice, but noticed +that he did not make himself understood. “It seems to me that you are +deaf again because you have returned to drinking whiskey,” shouted the +doctor in the patient’s ear. “Perhaps you are right,” answered the +latter, “I have taken to drinking again, and I shall tell you why. As +long as I did not drink I could hear, but all that I heard was not as +good as the whiskey.”_ Technically this joke is nothing more than an +illustration. The jargon and the ability of the _raconteur_ must aid the +producing of laughter. But behind it there lies the sad question, “Is +not the man right in his choice?” + +It is the manifold hopeless misery of the Jews to which these +pessimistical stories allude, which urged me to add them to +tendency-wit. + + + _Critical and Blasphemous Witticisms_ + +Other jokes, cynical in a similar sense, and not only stories about +Jews, attack religious dogmas and the belief in God Himself. The story +about the “telepathic look of the rabbi,” whose technique consisted in +the faulty thinking which made phantasy equal to reality, (the +conception of displacement is also tenable) is such a cynical or +critical witticism directed against miracle-workers and also, surely, +against belief in miracles. Heine is reported to have made a directly +blasphemous joke as he lay dying. _When the kindly priest commended him +to God’s mercy and inspired him with the hope that God would forgive him +his sins, he replied: “Bien sûr qu’il me pardonnera; c’est son métier.”_ +That is a derogatory comparison; technically its value lies only in the +allusion, for a métier—business or vocation—is plied either by a +craftsman or a physician, and what is more he has only a single métier. +The strength of the wit, however, lies in its tendency. The joke is +intended to mean nothing else, but: Certainly he will forgive me; that +is what he is here for, and for no other purpose have I engaged him +(just as one retains one’s doctor or one’s lawyer). Thus, the helpless +dying man is still conscious of the fact that he has created God for +himself and has clothed Him with the power in order to make use of Him +as occasion arises. The so-called creature makes itself known as the +Creator only a short time before his extinction. + + + _Skeptical Wit_ + +To the three kinds of tendency-wit discussed so far—exhibitionistic or +obscene wit, aggressive or hostile wit, and cynical wit (critical, +blasphemous)—I desire to add a fourth and the most uncommon of all, +whose character can be elucidated by a good example. + +_Two Jews met in a train at a Galician railway station. “Where are you +traveling?” asked one. “To Cracow,” was the reply. “Now see here, what a +liar you are!” said the first one, bristling. “When you say that you are +traveling to Cracow, you really wish me to believe that you are +traveling to Lemberg. Well, but I am sure that you are really traveling +to Cracow, so why lie about it?”_ + +This precious story, which creates an impression of exaggerated +subtlety, evidently operates by means of the technique of absurdity. The +second Jew has put himself in the way of being called a liar because he +has said that he is traveling to Cracow, which is his real goal! +However, this strong technical means—absurdity—is paired here with +another technique—representation through the opposite, for, according to +the uncontradicted assertion of the first, the second one is lying when +he speaks the truth, and speaks the truth by means of a lie. However, +the more earnest content of this joke is the question of the conditions +of truth; again the joke points to a problem and makes use of the +uncertainty of one of our commonest notions. Does it constitute truth if +one describes things as they are and does not concern himself with the +way the hearers will interpret what one has said? Or is this merely +Jesuitical truth, and does not the real truthfulness consist much more +in having a regard for the hearer and of furnishing him an exact picture +of his own mind? I consider jokes of this type sufficiently different +from the others to assign them a special place. What they attack is not +a person nor an institution, but the certainty of our very knowledge—one +of our speculative gifts. Hence the name “skeptical” witticism will be +the most expressive for them. + +In the course of our discussion of the tendencies of wit we have gotten +perhaps many an elucidation and certainly found numerous incentives for +further investigations. But the results of this chapter combine with +those of the preceding chapter to form a difficult problem. If it be +true that the pleasure created by wit is dependent upon the technique on +one hand and upon the tendency on the other hand, under what common +point of view can these two utterly different pleasure-sources of wit he +united? + + + + + B. SYNTHESIS + + + + + IV + THE PLEASURE MECHANISM AND THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF WIT + + +We can now definitely assert that we know from what sources the peculiar +pleasure arises furnished us by wit. We know that we can be easily +misled to mistake our sense of satisfaction experienced through the +thought-content of the sentence for the actual pleasure derived from the +wit, on the other hand, the latter itself has two intrinsic sources, +namely, the wit-technique and the wit-tendency. What we now desire to +ascertain is the manner in which pleasure originates from these sources +and the mechanism of this resultant pleasure. + +It seems to us that the desired explanation can be more easily +ascertained in tendency-wit than in harmless wit. We shall therefore +commence with the former. + +The pleasure in tendency-wit results from the fact that a tendency, +whose gratification would otherwise remain unfulfilled, is actually +gratified. That such gratification is a source of pleasure is +self-evident without further discussion. But the manner in which wit +brings about gratification is connected with special conditions from +which we may perhaps gain further information. Here two cases must be +differentiated. The simpler case is the one in which the gratification +of the tendency is opposed by an external hindrance which is eluded by +the wit. This process we found, for example, in the reply which +Serenissimus received to his query whether the mother of the stranger he +addressed had ever sojourned in his home, and likewise in the question +of the art critic who asked: “And where is the Savior?” when the two +rich rogues showed him their portraits. In one case the tendency serves +to answer one insult with another; in the other case it offers an +affront instead of the demanded expert opinion; in both cases the +tendency was opposed by purely external factors, namely, the powerful +position of the persons who are the targets of the insult. Nevertheless +it may seem strange to us that these and analogous tendency-witticisms +have not the power to produce a strong laughing effect, no matter how +much they may gratify us. + +It is different, however, if no external factors but internal hindrances +stand in the way of the direct realization of the tendency, that is, if +an inner feeling opposes the tendency. This condition, according to our +assumption, was present in the aggressive joke of Mr. N. (p. 28) and in +the one of Wendell Phillips, in whom a strong inclination to use +invectives was stifled by a highly developed æsthetic sense. With the +aid of wit the inner resistances in these special cases were overcome +and the inhibition removed. As in the case of external hindrances, the +gratification of the tendency is made possible, and a suppression with +its concomitant “psychic damming” is thus obviated. So far the mechanism +of the development of pleasure would seem to be identical in both cases. + +At this place, however, we are inclined to feel that we should enter +more deeply into the differentiation of the psychological situation +between the cases of external and internal hindrance, as we have a faint +notion that the removal of the inner hindrance might possibly result in +a disproportionately higher contribution to pleasure. But I propose that +we rest content here, that we be satisfied for the present with this one +collection of evidence which adheres to what is essential to us. The +only difference between the cases of outer and inner hindrances consists +in the fact that here an already existing inhibition is removed, while +there the formation of a new inhibition is avoided. We hardly resort to +speculation when we assert that a “_psychic expenditure_” is required +for the formation as well as for the retention of a psychic inhibition. +Now if we find that in both cases the use of the tendency-wit produces +pleasure, then it may be assumed _that such resultant pleasure +corresponds to the economy of psychic expenditure_. + +Thus we are once more confronted with the principle of _economy_ which +we noticed first in the study of the technique of word-wit. But whereas +the economy we believed to have found at first was in the use of few or +possibly the same words, we can here foresee an economy of psychic +expenditure in general in a far more comprehensive sense, and we think +it possible to come nearer to the nature of wit through a better +determination of the as yet very obscure idea of “psychic expenditure.” + +A certain amount of haziness which we could not dissipate during the +study of the pleasure mechanism in tendency-wit we accept as a slight +punishment for attempting to elucidate more complicated problem before +the simpler one, or the tendency-wit before the harmless wit. We observe +that “_economy in the expenditure of inhibitions or suppressions_” seems +to be the secret of the pleasurable effect of tendency-wit, and we now +turn to the mechanism of the pleasure in harmless wit. + +While examining appropriate examples of harmless witticisms, in which we +had no fear of false judgment through content or tendency, we were +forced to the conclusion that the techniques of with themselves are +pleasure-sources; now we wish to ascertain whether the pleasure may be +traced to the economy in psychic expenditure. In a group of these +witticisms (plays on words) the technique consisted in directing the +psychic focus upon the sound instead of upon the sense of the word, and +in allowing the (acoustic) word-disguise to take the place of the +meaning accorded to it by its relations to reality. We are really +justified in assuming that great relief is thereby afforded to the +psychic work, and that in the serious use of words we refrain from this +convenient procedure only at the expense of a certain amount of +exertion. We can observe that abnormal mental states, in which the +possibility of concentrating psychic expenditure on one place is +probably restricted, actually allow to come to the foreground word-sound +associations of this kind rather than the significance of the words, and +that such patients react in their speech with “outer” instead of “inner” +associations. Also in children who are still accustomed to treat the +word as an object we notice the inclination to look for the same meaning +in words of the same or of similar sounds, which is a source of great +amusement to adults. If we experience in wit an unmistakable pleasure +because through the use of the same or similar words we reach from one +set of ideas to a distant other one, (as in “Home-Roulard” from the +kitchen to politics), we can justly refer this pleasure to the economy +of psychic expenditure. The pleasure of the wit resulting from such a +“short-circuit” appears greater the more remote and foreign the two +series of ideas which become related through the same word are to each +other, or the greater the economy in thought brought about by the +technical means of wit. We may add that in this case wit makes use of a +means of connection which is rejected by and carefully avoided in +serious thinking.[45] + +A second group of technical means of wit—unification, similar sounding +words, manifold application, modification of familiar idioms, allusions +to quotations—all evince one common character, namely, that one always +discovers something familiar where one expects to find something new +instead. To discover the familiar is pleasurable and it is not difficult +to recognize such pleasure as economy-pleasure and to refer it to the +economy of psychic expenditure. + +That the discovery of the familiar—“recognition”—causes pleasure seems +to be universally admitted. Groos says:[46] “Recognition is everywhere +bound up with feelings of pleasure where it has not been made too +mechanical, (as perhaps in dressing...). Even the mere quality of +acquaintanceship is easily accompanied by that gentle delight which +Faust experiences when, after an uncanny experience, he steps into his +study.” If the act of recognition is so pleasureful, we may expect that +man merges into the habit of practicing this activity for its own sake, +that is, he experiments playfully with it. In fact, Aristotle recognized +in the joy of rediscovery the basis of artistic pleasure, and it cannot +be denied that this principle must not be overlooked even if it has not +such a far-reaching significance as Aristotle assumes. + +Groos then discusses the games, whose character consists of heightening +the pleasure of rediscovery by putting hindrances in its path, or in +other words by raising a “psychic dam” which is removed by the act of +recognition. However, his attempted explanation leaves the assumption +that recognition as such is pleasurable, in that he attributes the +pleasure of recognition connected with these games to the pleasure in +power or to the surmounting of a difficulty. I consider this latter +factor as secondary, and I find no occasion for abandoning the simpler +explanation, that the recognition _per se_, i.e., through the +alleviation of the psychic expenditure, is pleasurable, and that the +games founded upon this pleasure make use of the damming-mechanism +merely in order to intensify their effect. + +We know also that the source of pleasure in rhyme, alliteration, +refrain, and other forms of repetition of similar sounding words in +poetry, is due merely to the discovery of the familiar. A “sense of +power” plays no perceptible rôle in these techniques, which show so +marked an agreement with the “manifold application” in wit. + +Considering the close connection between recognition and remembering, +the assumption is no longer daring that there exists also a pleasure in +remembering, i.e., that the act of remembering in itself is accompanied +by a feeling of pleasure of a similar origin. Groos seems to have no +objection to such an assumption, but he again deducts the pleasure of +remembering from the “sense of power” in which he seeks—as I believe +unjustly—the principal basis of pleasure in almost all games. + + + _The Factor of Actuality_ + +The use of another technical expedient of wit, which has not yet been +mentioned, is also dependent upon “the rediscovery of the familiar.” I +refer to the factor of _actuality_ (dealing with actual persons, things, +or events), which in many witticisms provides a prolific source of +pleasure and explains several peculiarities in the life history of wit. +There are witticisms which are entirely free from this condition, and in +a treatise on wit it is incumbent upon us to make use of such examples +almost exclusively. But we must not forget that we laughed perhaps more +heartily over such perennial witticisms than over others; witticisms +whose application now would be difficult, because they would require +long commentaries, and even with that aid the former effect could not be +attained. These latter witticisms contained allusions to persons and +occurrences which were “actual” at the time, which had stimulated +general interest and were endowed with tension. After the cessation of +this interest, after the settlement of these particular affairs, the +witticisms lost a part of their pleasurable effect, and a very +considerable. Thus, for example, the joke which my friendly host made +when he called the dish that was being served a “Home-Roulard,” seems to +me by no means as good now as when the question of Home Rule was a +continuous headline in the political columns of our newspaper. If I now +attempt to express my appreciation of this joke by stating that this one +word led us from the idea of the kitchen to the distant field of +politics, and saved us a long mental detour, I should have been forced +at that time to change this description as follows: “That this word led +us from the idea of the kitchen to the very distant field of politics; +but that our lively interest was all the keener because this question +was constantly absorbing us.” The same thing is true of another joke: +“_This girl reminds me of Dreyfus; the army does not believe in her +innocence_,” which has become blurred in spite of the fact that its +technical means has remained unchanged. The confusion arising from the +comparison with, and the double meaning of, the word “innocence” cannot +do away with the fact that the allusion, which at that time touched upon +a matter pregnant with excitement, now recalls an interest set at rest. +The many irresistible jokes about the present war will sink in our +estimation in a very short time. + +A great many witticisms in circulation reach a certain age or rather go +through a course composed of a flourishing season and a mature season, +and then sink into complete oblivion. The need that people feel to draw +pleasure from their mental processes continually creates new witticisms +which are supported by current interests of the day. The vitality of +actual witticisms is not their own, it is borrowed by way of allusion +from those other interests, the expiration of which determines the fate +of the witticism. The factor of actuality which may be added as a +transitory pleasure-source of wit, although it is productive in itself, +cannot be simply put on the same basis as the rediscovery of the +familiar. It is much more a question of a special qualification of the +familiar which must be aided by the quality of freshness and recency and +which has not been affected by forgetfulness. In the formation of the +dream one also finds that there is a special preference for what is +recent, and one cannot refrain from inferring that the association with +what is recent is rewarded or facilitated by a special pleasure premium. + +Unification, which is really nothing more than repetition in the sphere +of mental association instead of in material, has been accorded an +especial recognition as a pleasure-source of wit by G. Th. Fechner.[47] +He says: “In my opinion the principle of uniform connection of the +manifold, plays the most important rôle in the field under discussion; +it needs, however, the support of subsidiary determinations in order to +drive across the threshold the pleasure with its peculiar character +which the cases here belonging can furnish.”[48] + +In all of these cases of repetition of the same association or of the +same word-material, of refinding the familiar and recent, we surely +cannot be prevented from referring the pleasure thereby experienced to +the economy in psychic expenditure; providing that this viewpoint proves +fertile for the explanation of single facts as well as for bringing to +light new generalities. We are fully conscious of the fact that we have +yet to make clear the manner in which this economy results and also the +meaning of the expression “psychic expenditure.” + +The third group of the technique of wit, mostly thought-wit, which +includes false logic, displacement, absurdity, representation through +the opposite, and other varieties, may seem at first sight to present +special features and to be unrelated to the techniques of the discovery +of the familiar, or the replacing of object-associations by +word-associations. But it will not be difficult to demonstrate that this +group, too, shows an economy or facilitation of psychic expenditure. + +It is quite obvious that it is easier and more convenient to turn away +from a definite trend of thought than to stick to it; it is easier to +mix up different things than to distinguish them; and it is particularly +easier to travel over modes of reasoning unsanctioned by logic; finally +in connecting words or thoughts it is especially easy to overlook the +fact that such connections should result in sense. All this is +indubitable and this is exactly what is done by the techniques of the +wit in question. It will sound strange, however, to assert that such +processes in the wit-work may produce pleasure, since outside of wit we +can experience only unpleasant feelings of defense against all these +kinds of inferior achievement of our mental activity. + + + _Word-pleasure and Pleasure in Nonsense_ + +The “pleasure in nonsense,” as we may call it for short, is, in the +seriousness of our life, crowded back almost to the vanishing point. To +demonstrate it we must enter into the study of two cases in one of which +it is still visible and in the other becomes visible for the second +time. I refer to the behavior of the learning child and to the behavior +of the adult under unstable toxic influences. When the child learns to +control the vocabulary of its mother tongue it apparently takes great +pleasure in “experimenting playfully” with that material (Groos); it +connects words without regard for their meaning in order to obtain +pleasure from the rhyme and rhythm. Gradually the child is deprived of +this pleasure until only the senseful connection of words is allowed +him. But even in later life there is still a tendency to overstep the +acquired restrictions in the use of words, a tendency which manifests +itself in disfiguring the same by definite appendages, and in changing +their forms by means of certain contrivances (reduplication, trembling +speech) or even by developing an individual language for use in +playing,—efforts which reappear also among the insane of a certain +category. + +I believe that whatever the motive which actuated the child when it +began such playings, in its further development the child indulges in +them fully conscious that they are nonsensical and derives pleasure from +this stimulus which is interdicted by reason. It now makes use of play +in order to withdraw from the pressure of critical reason. More +powerful, however, are the restrictions which must develop in education +along the lines of right thinking and in the separation of reality from +fiction, and it is for this reason that the resistance against the +pressures of thinking and reality is far-reaching and persistent; even +the phenomena of phantasy formation come under this point of view. The +power of reason usually grows so strong during the later part of +childhood and during that period of education which extends over the age +of puberty, that the pleasure in “freed nonsense” rarely dares manifest +itself. One fears to utter nonsense; but it seems to me that the +inclination characteristic of boys to act in a contradictory and +inexpedient manner is a direct outcome of this pleasure in nonsense. In +pathological cases one often sees this tendency so accentuated that it +again controls the speeches and answers of the pupils. In the case of +some college students who merged into neuroses I could convince myself +that the unconscious pleasure derived from the nonsense produced by them +is just as much responsible for their mistakes as their actual +ignorance. + + + _Reproduction of Old Liberties_ + +The student does not give up his demonstrations against the pressures of +thinking and reality whose domination becomes unceasingly intolerant and +unrestricted. A good part of the tendency of students to skylarking is +responsible for this reaction. Man is an “untiring pleasure seeker”—I +can no longer recall which author coined this happy expression—and finds +it extremely difficult to renounce pleasure once experienced. With the +hilarious nonsense of “sprees” (_Bierschwefel_), college cries, and +songs, the student attempts to preserve that pleasure which results from +freedom of thought, a freedom of which he is more and more deprived +through scholastic discipline. Even much later, when as a mature man he +meets with others at scientific congresses and class reunions and feels +himself a student again, he must read at the end of the session the +“_Kneipzeitung_,” or the comic college paper, which distorts the newly +gained knowledge into the nonsensical and thus compensates him for the +newly added mental inhibitions. + +The very terms “_Bierschwefel_” and “_Kneipzeitung_” are proof that the +reason which has stifled the pleasure in nonsense has become so powerful +that not even temporarily can it be abandoned without toxic agency. The +change in the state of mind is the most valuable thing that alcohol +offers man, and that is the reason why this “poison” is not equally +indispensable for all people. The hilarious humor, whether due to +endogenous origin or whether produced toxically, weakens the inhibiting +forces among which is reason and thus again makes accessible +pleasure-sources which are burdened by suppression. It is very +instructive to see how the demand made upon wit sinks with the rise in +spirits. The latter actually replace wit, just as wit must make an +effort to replace the mental state in which the otherwise inhibited +pleasure possibilities (pleasure in nonsense among the rest) assert +themselves. + +“With little wit and much comfort.” + +Under the influence of alcohol the adult again becomes a child who +derives pleasure from the free disposal of his mental stream without +being restricted by the pressure of logic. + +We hope we have shown that the technique of absurdity in wit corresponds +to a source of pleasure. We need hardly repeat that this pleasure +results from the economy of psychic expenditure or alleviation from the +pressure of reason. + +On reviewing again the wit-technique classified under three headings we +notice that the first and last of these groups—the replacement of +object-association by word-association, and the use of absurdity as a +restorer of old liberties and as a relief from the pressure of +intellectual upbringing—can be taken collectively. Psychic relief may in +a way be compared to economy, which constitutes the technique of the +second group. Alleviation of the already existing psychic expenditure, +and economy in the yet to be offered psychic expenditure, are two +principles from which all techniques of wit and with them all pleasure +in these techniques can be deduced. The two forms of the technique and +the resultant pleasures correspond more or less in general to the +division of wit into word- and thought-witticisms. + + + _Play and Jest_ + +The preceding discussions have led us unexpectedly to an understanding +of the history of the development of psychogenesis of wit which we shall +now examine still further. We have become acquainted with the successive +steps in wit, the development of which up to tendency-wit will +undoubtedly reveal new relationships between the different characters of +wit. Antedating wit there exists something which we may designate as +“play” or “jest.” Play—we shall retain this name—appears in children +while they are learning how to use words and connect thoughts; this +playing is probably the result of an impulse which urges the child to +exercise its capacities (Groos). During this process it experiences +pleasurable effects which originate from the repetition of similarities, +the rediscovery of the familiar, sound-associations, etc., which may be +explained as an unexpected economy of psychic expenditure. Therefore it +surprises no one that these resulting pleasures urge the child to +practice playing and impel it to continue without regard for the meaning +of words or the connections between sentences. Playing with words and +thoughts, motivated by certain pleasures in economy, would thus be the +first step of wit. + +This playing is stopped by the growing strength of a factor which may +well be called criticism or reason. The play is then rejected as +senseless or as directly absurd, and by virtue of reason it becomes +impossible. Only accidentally is it now possible to derive pleasure from +those sources of rediscovery of the familiar, etc., which is explained +by the fact that the maturing person has then merged into a playful mood +which, as in the case of merriment in the child, removes inhibitions. In +this way only is the old pleasure-giving playing made possible, but as +men do not wish to wait for these propitious occasions and also hate to +forego this pleasure, they seek means to make themselves independent of +these pleasant states. The further development of wit is directed by +these two impulses; the one striving to elude reason and the other to +substitute for the adult an infantile state of mind. + +This gives rise to the second stage of wit, the _jest_ (_Scherz_). The +object of the jest is to bring about the resultant pleasure of playing +and at the same time appease the protesting reason which strives to +suppress the pleasant feeling. There is but one way to accomplish this. +The senseless combination of words or the absurd linking of thoughts +must make sense after all. The whole process of wit production is +therefore directed towards the discovery of words and thought +constellations which fulfill these conditions. The jest makes use of +almost all the technical means of wit, and usage of language makes no +consequential distinction between jest (_Scherz_) and wit (_Witz_). What +distinguishes the jest from wit is the fact that the pith of the +sentence withdrawn from criticism does not need to be valuable, new, or +even good; it matters only that it can be expressed, even though what it +may say is obsolete, superfluous, and useless. The most conspicuous +factor of the jest is the gratification it affords by making possible +that which reason forbids. + +A mere jest is the following of Professor Kästner, who taught physics at +Göttingen in the 16th century, and who was fond of making jokes. Wishing +to enroll a student named Warr in his class, he asked him his age, and +upon receiving the reply that he was thirty years of age he exclaimed: +“Aha, so I have the honor of seeing the thirty years’ War.”[49] When +asked what vocations his sons followed Rokitansky jestingly answered: +“Two are healing and two are howling,” (two physicians and two singers). +The reply was correct and therefore unimpeachable, but it added nothing +to what is contained in the parenthetic expression. There is no doubt +that the answer assumed another form only because of the pleasure which +arises from the unification and assonance of both words. + +I believe that we now see our way clear. In estimating the techniques of +wit we were constantly disturbed by the fact that these are not peculiar +to wit alone, and yet the nature of wit seemed to depend upon them, +since their removal by means of reduction nullified the character as +well as the pleasure of wit. Now we become aware that what we have +described as techniques of wit—and which in a certain sense we shall +have to continue to call so—are really the sources from which wit +derives pleasure; nor does it strike us as strange that other processes +draw from the same sources with the same object in view. The technique, +however, which is peculiar to and belongs to wit alone consists in a +process of safeguarding the use of this pleasure-forming means against +the protest of reason which would obviate the pleasure. We can make few +generalizations about this process. The wit-work, as we have already +remarked, expresses itself in the selection of such word-material and +such thought-situations as to permit the old play with words and +thoughts to stand the test of reason; but to accomplish this end the +cleverest use must be made of all the peculiarities of the stock of +words and of all constellations of mental combinations. Later on perhaps +we shall be in a position to characterize the wit-work by a definite +attribute; for the present it must remain unexplained how our wit makes +its advantageous selections. The tendency and capacity of wit to guard +the pleasure-forming word and thought combinations against reason, +already makes itself visible as an essential criterion in jests. From +the beginning its object is to remove inner inhibitions and thereby +render productive those pleasure-sources which have become inaccessible, +and we shall find that it remains true to this characteristic throughout +the course of its entire development. + +We are now in a position to prescribe a correct place for the factor +“sense in nonsense,” (see Introduction, page 8), to which the authors +ascribe so much significance in respect to the recognition of wit and +the explanation of the pleasurable effect. The two firmly established +points in the determination of wit—its tendency to carry through the +pleasureful play, and its effort to guard it against the criticism of +reason—make it perfectly clear why the individual witticism, even though +it appear nonsensical from one point of view, must appear full of +meaning or at least acceptable from another. How it accomplishes this is +the business of the wit-work; if it is not successful it is relegated to +the category of “nonsense.” Nor do we find it necessary to deduce the +resultant pleasure of wit from the conflict of feelings which emerge +either directly or by way of “confusion and clearness,” from the +simultaneous sense and nonsense of the wit. There is just as little +necessity for our delving deeper into the question how pleasure can come +from the succession of that part of the wit considered senseless and +from that part recognized as senseful. The psychogenesis of wit has +taught us that the pleasure of wit arises from word-play or from the +liberation of nonsense, and that the sense of wit is meant only to guard +this pleasure against suppression through reason. + + + _Jest and Wit_ + +Thus the problem of the essential character of wit could almost be +explained by means of the jest. We may follow the development of the +jest until it reaches its height in the tendency-wit. The jest gives +tendency a prior position when it is a question of supplying us with +pleasure, and it is content when its utterance does not appear utterly +senseless or insipid. But if this utterance is substantial and valuable +the jest changes into wit. A thought, which would have been worthy of +our interest even when expressed in the most unpretentious form, is now +invested in a form which must in itself excite our sense of +satisfaction. Such an association we cannot help thinking certainly has +not come into existence unintentionally; we must make effort to divine +the intention at the bottom of the formation of wit. An incidental +observation, made once before, will put us on the right track. We have +already remarked that a good witticism gives us, so to speak, a general +feeling of satisfaction without our being able to decide offhand which +part of the pleasure comes from the witty form and which part from the +excellent thought contained in the context (p. 131). We are deceiving +ourselves constantly about this division; sometimes we overvalue the +quality of the wit on account of our admiration for the thought +contained therein, and then again we overestimate the value of the +thought on account of the pleasure afforded us by the witty investment. +We know not what gives us pleasure nor at what we are laughing. This +uncertainty of our judgment, assuming it to be a fact, may have given +the motive for the formation of wit in the literal sense. The thought +seeks the witty disguise because it thereby recommends itself to our +attention and can thus appear to us more important and valuable than it +really is; but above all because this disguise fascinates and confuses +our reason. We are apt to attribute to the thought the pleasure derived +from the witty form, and we are not inclined to consider improper what +has given us pleasure, and in this way deprive ourselves of a source of +pleasure. For if wit made us laugh it was because it established in us a +mood most unfavorable to reason, which in turn has forced upon us that +state of mind which was once contented with mere playing and which wit +has attempted to replace with all the means at its command. Although we +have already established the fact that such wit is harmless and does not +yet show a tendency, we may not deny that, strictly speaking, it is the +jest alone which shows no tendency; that is, it serves to produce +pleasure only. For wit is really never purposeless even if the thought +contained therein shows no tendency and merely serves a theoretical, +intellectual interest. Wit carries out its purpose in advancing the +thought by magnifying it and by guarding it against reason. Here again +it reveals its original nature in that it sets itself up against an +inhibiting and restrictive power, or against the critical judgment. + +The first use of wit, which goes beyond the mere production of pleasure, +points out the road to be followed. Wit is now recognized as a powerful +psychic factor whose weight can decide the issue if it falls into this +or that side of the scale. The great tendencies and impulses of our +psychic life enlist its service for their own purposes. The original +purposeless wit, which began as play, becomes related in a _secondary_ +manner to tendencies from which nothing that is formed in psychic life +can escape for any length of time. We already know what it can achieve +in the service of the exhibitionistic, aggressive, cynical, and +sceptical tendencies. In the case of obscene wit, which originated in +the smutty joke, it makes a confederate of the third person who +originally disturbed the sexual situation, by giving him pleasure +through the utterance which causes the woman to be ashamed in his +presence. In the case of the aggressive tendency, wit by the same means +changes the original indifferent hearers into active haters and +scorners, and in this way confronts the enemy with a host of opponents +where formerly there was but one. In the first case it overcomes the +inhibitions of shame and decorum by the pleasure premium which it +offers. In the second case it overthrows the critical judgment which +would otherwise have examined the dispute in question. In the third and +fourth cases where wit is in the service of the cynical and sceptical +tendency, it shatters the respect for institutions and truths in which +the hearer had believed, first by strengthening the argument, and +secondly by resorting to a new method of attack. Where the argument +seeks to draw the hearer’s reason to its side, wit strives to push aside +this reason. There is no doubt that wit has chosen the way which is +psychologically more efficacious. + + + _The Development into Tendency-wit_ + +What impressed us in reviewing the achievements of tendency-wit was the +effect it produced on the hearer. It is more important, however, to +understand the effect produced by wit on the psychic life of the person +who makes it, or more precisely expressed, on the psychic life of the +person who conceives it. Once before we have expressed the intention, +which we find occasion to repeat here, that we wish to study the psychic +processes of wit in regard to its apportionment between two persons. We +can assume for the present that the psychic process aroused by wit in +the hearer is usually an imitation of the psychic processes of the wit +producer. The outer inhibitions which are to be overcome in the hearer +correspond to the inner inhibitions of the wit producer. In the latter +the expectation of the outer hindrance exists, at least as an inhibiting +idea. The inner hindrance, which is overcome in tendency-wit, is evident +in some single cases; for example, in Mr. N.’s joke (p. 28) we can +assume that it not only enables the hearer to enjoy the pleasure of the +aggression through injuries but it also makes it possible for him to +produce the wit in the first place. Of the different kinds of inner +inhibitions or suppressions one is especially worthy of our interest +because it is the most far-reaching. We designate that form by the term +“repression.” It is characterized by the fact that it excludes from +consciousness certain former emotions and their products. We shall learn +that tendency-wit itself is capable of liberating pleasure from sources +that have undergone repression. If the overcoming of outer hindrances +can be referred, in the manner indicated above, to inner inhibitions and +repressions we may say that tendency-wit proves more clearly than any +other developmental stage of wit that the main character of wit-making +is to set free pleasure by removing inhibitions. It reinforces +tendencies to which it gives its services by bringing them assistance +from repressed emotions; or it puts itself at the disposal of the +repressed tendencies directly. + +One may readily concede that these are the functions of tendency-wit, +but one must nevertheless admit that we do not understand in what manner +these functions can succeed in accomplishing their end. The power of +tendency-wit consists in the pleasure which it derives from the sources +of word-plays and liberated nonsense, and if one can judge from the +impressions received from purposeless jests, one cannot possibly +consider the amount of the pleasure so great as to believe that it has +the power to annul deep-rooted inhibitions and repressions. As a matter +of fact we do not deal here with a simple propelling power but rather +with a more complicated mechanism. Instead of covering the long +circuitous route through which I arrived at an understanding of this +relationship, I shall endeavor to demonstrate it by a short synthetic +route. + +G. Th. Fechner has established the principle of æsthetic assistance or +enhancement which he explains in the following words: “_From the +unopposed meeting of pleasurable states (Bedingungen) which individually +accomplish little, there results a greater, often much greater resultant +pleasure than is warranted by the sum of the pleasure values of the +separate states, or a greater result than could be accounted for as the +sum of the individual effects; in fact the mere meeting of this kind can +result in a positive pleasure product which overflows the threshold of +pleasure when the factors taken separately are too weak to accomplish +this. The only condition is that in comparison to others they must +produce a greater sense of satisfaction._”[50] I am of the opinion that +the theme of wit does not give us the opportunity to test the +correctness of this principle which is demonstrable in many other +artistic fields. But from wit we have learned something, which at least +comes near this principle, namely, that in a co-operation of many +pleasure-producing factors we are in no position to assign to each one +the resultant part which really belongs to it (see p. 131). But the +situation assumed in the principle of assistance can be varied, and for +these new conditions we can formulate the following combination of +questions which are worthy of a reply. What usually happens if in one +constellation there is a meeting of pleasurable and painful conditions? +Upon what depends the result and the previous intimations of the result? +Tendency-wit particularly shows these possibilities. There is one +feeling or impulse which strives to liberate pleasure from a certain +source and under unrestricted conditions certainly would liberate it, +but there is another impulse which works against this development of +pleasure, that is, which inhibits or suppresses it. The suppressing +stream, as the result shows, must be somewhat stronger than the one +suppressed, which however is by no means destroyed. + + + _The Fore-pleasure Principle_ + +But now there appears another impulse which strives to set free pleasure +by this identical process, even though from different sources it thus +acts like the suppressed stream. What can be the result in such a case? +An example can make this clearer than this schematization. There is an +impulse to insult a certain person; but this is so strongly opposed by a +feeling of decorum and æsthetic culture that the impulse to insult must +be crushed. If, for example, by virtue of some changed emotional state +the insult should happen to break through, this insulting tendency would +subsequently be painfully perceived. Therefore the insult is omitted. +There is a possibility, however, of making good wit from the words or +thoughts which would have served in the insult; that is, pleasure can be +set free from other sources without being hindered by the same +suppression. But the second development of pleasure would have to be +foregone if the insulting quality of the wit were not allowed to come +out, and as the latter is allowed to come to the surface, it is +connected with the new release of pleasure. Experience with tendency-wit +shows that under such circumstances the suppressed tendency can become +so strengthened by the aid of wit-pleasure as to overcome the otherwise +stronger inhibition. One resorts to insults because wit is thereby made +impossible. But the satisfaction thus obtained is not produced by wit +alone; it is incomparably greater, in fact it is by so much greater than +the pleasure of the wit, that we must assume that the former suppressed +tendency has succeeded in breaking through, perhaps without the need of +an outlet. Under these circumstances tendency-wit causes the most +prolific laughter. + +Perhaps the investigation of the determinations of laughter will aid us +in forming a clearer picture of the process of the aid of wit against +suppression. But we see even now that the case of tendency-wit is a +special case of the principle of aid. A possibility of the development +of pleasure enters into a situation in which another pleasure +possibility is so hindered that individually it would not result in +pleasure. The result is a development of pleasure which is greater by +far than the added possibility. The latter acted, as it were, as an +_alluring premium_; with the aid of a small sum of pleasure a very large +and almost inaccessible amount is obtained. I have good grounds for +thinking that this principle corresponds to an arrangement which holds +true in many widely separated spheres of the psychic life, and I +consider it appropriate to designate the pleasure serving to liberate +the large sum of pleasure as _fore-pleasure_ and the principle as the +_principle of fore-pleasure_. + + + _Play-pleasure and Removal-pleasure_ + +The effect of tendency-wit may now be formulated as follows: It enters +the service of tendencies in order to produce new pleasure by removing +suppressions and repressions. This it does, using wit-pleasure as +fore-pleasure. When we now review its development we may say that wit +has remained true to its nature from beginning to end. It begins as play +in order to obtain pleasure from the free use of words and thoughts. As +soon as the growing reason forbids this senseless play with words and +thoughts, it turns to the jest or joke in order to hold to these sources +of pleasure and in order to be able to gain new pleasure from the +liberation of the absurd. In the rôle of harmless wit it assists the +thoughts and fortifies them against the impugnment of the critical +judgment, whereby it makes use of the principle of intermingling the +pleasure-sources. Finally, it enters into the great struggling +suppressed tendencies in order to remove inner inhibitions in accordance +with the principle of fore-pleasure. Reason, critical judgment, and +suppression, these are the forces which it combats in turn. It firmly +holds on to the original word-pleasure-sources, and beginning with the +stage of the jest opens for itself new pleasure-sources by removing +inhibition. The pleasure which it produces, be it play-pleasure or +removal-pleasure, can at all times be traced to the economy of psychic +expenditure, in so far as such a conception does not contradict the +nature of pleasure, and proves itself productive also in other +fields.[51] + + + + + V + THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL PROCESS + + +It seems superfluous to speak of the motives of wit, since the purpose +of obtaining pleasure must be recognized as a sufficient motive of the +wit-work. But on the one hand it is not impossible that still other +motives participate in the production of wit, and on the other hand, in +view of certain well-known experiences, the theme of the subjective +determination of wit must be discussed. + +Two things above all urge us to it. Though wit-making is an excellent +means of obtaining pleasure from the psychic processes, we know that not +all persons are equally able to make use of it. Wit-making is not at the +disposal of all, in general there are but a few persons to whom one can +point and say that they are witty. Here wit seems to be a special +ability somewhere within the region of the old “psychic faculties,” and +this shows itself in its appearance as fairly independent of the other +faculties such as intelligence, phantasy, memory, etc. A special talent +or psychic determination permitting or favoring wit-making must be +presupposed in all wit-makers. + +I am afraid that we shall not get very far in the exploration of this +theme. Only now and then do we succeed in proceeding from the +understanding of a single witticism to the knowledge of the subjective +determinations in the mind of the wit-maker. It is quite accidental that +the example of wit with which we began our investigation of the +wit-technique permits us also to gain some insight into the subjective +determination of the witticism. I am referring to Heine’s witticism, to +which also Heymans and Lipps have paid attention. + +“_I was sitting next to Solomon Rothschild and he treated me just as an +equal, quite famillionaire_” (“Bäder von Lucca”). + + + _Subjective Determination of the “Famillionaire” Witticism_ + +Heine put this word in the mouth of a comical person, Hirsch-Hyacinth, +collector, operator and tax appraiser from Hamburg, and valet of the +aristocratic baron, Cristoforo Gumpelino (formerly Gumpel). Evidently +the poet has experienced great pleasure in these productions, for he +allows Hirsch-Hyacinth to talk big and puts in his mouth the most +amusing and most candid utterances; he positively endows him with the +practical wisdom of a Sancho Panza. It is a pity that Heine, as it +seems, had no liking for this dramatic figure and that he drops the +delightful character so soon. From many passages it would seem that the +poet himself is speaking behind the transparent mask of Hirsch-Hyacinth, +and we are quite convinced that this person is nothing but a parody of +the poet himself. Hirsch tells of reasons why he has discarded his +former name and now calls himself Hyacinth. “Besides I have the +advantage,” he continues, “of having an H on my seal already, and +therefore I am in no need of having a new letter engraved.” But Heine +himself resorted to this economy when he changed his surname “Harry” to +“Heinrich” at his baptism. Every one acquainted with the life of the +poet will recall that in Hamburg, where one also meets the personage +Hirsch-Hyacinth, Heine had an uncle of the same name, who played the +greatest rôle in Heine’s life as the wealthy member of the family. The +uncle’s name was likewise Solomon, just like the elderly Rothschild who +treated the impecunious Hirsch on such a famillionaire basis. What seems +to be merely a jest in the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth soon reveals a +background of earnest bitterness when we attribute it to the nephew +Harry-Heinrich. For he belonged to the family, nay, more, it was his +earnest wish to marry a daughter of this uncle, but she refused him, and +his uncle always treated him on a somewhat famillionaire basis, as a +poor relative. His rich relatives in Hamburg always dealt with him +condescendingly. I recall the story of one of his old aunts by marriage +who, when she was still young and pretty, sat next to some one at a +family dinner who seemed to her unprepossessing and whom the other +members of the family treated shabbily. She did not feel herself called +upon to be any more condescending towards him. Only many years later did +she discover that the careless and neglected cousin was the poet +Heinrich Heine. We know from many a record how keenly Heine suffered +from these repulses at the hands of his wealthy relatives in his youth +and during later years. The witticism “famillionaire” grew out of the +soil of such a subjective emotional feeling. + +One may suspect similar subjective determinations in many other +witticisms of the great scoffers, but I know of no other example by +which one can show this in such a convincing way. It is therefore +hazardous to venture a more definite opinion about the nature of this +personal determination. Furthermore, one is not inclined in the first +place to claim similar complicated conditions for the origin of each and +every witticism. Neither are the witty productions of other celebrated +men better suited to give us the desired insight into the subjective +determination of wit. In fact, one gets the impression that the +subjective determination of wit production is oftentimes not unrelated +to persons suffering from neurotic diseases, when, for example, one +learns that Lichtenberg was a confirmed hypochondriac burdened with all +kinds of eccentricities. The great majority of witticisms, especially +those produced from current happenings, are anonymous; one might be +inquisitive to know what kind of people they are who originate them. The +physician occasionally has an opportunity to make a study of persons +who, if not renowned wits, are recognized in their circle as witty and +as originators of many passable witticisms; he is often surprised to +find such persons showing dissociated personalities and a predisposition +to nervous affections. However, owing to insufficient data, we certainly +cannot maintain that such a psychoneurotic constitution is a regular or +necessary subjective condition for wit-making. + +A clearer case is afforded by Jewish witticisms which, as before +mentioned, are made exclusively by Jews themselves, whereas Jewish +stories of different origin rarely rise above the level of the comical +strain or of brutal mockery (p. 166). The determination for the +self-participation here, as in Heine’s joke “famillionaire,” seems to be +due to the fact that the person finds it difficult to express directly +his criticism or aggression and is thus compelled to resort to by-ways. + +Other subjective determinations or favorable conditions for wit-making +are less shrouded in darkness. The motive for the production of harmless +wit is usually the ambitious impulse to display one’s spirit or to “show +off.” It is an impulse comparable to the impulse toward sexual +exhibition. The existence of numerous inhibited impulses whose +suppression retains some weakness produces a state favorable for the +production of tendency-wit. Thus certain single components of the sexual +constitution may appear as motives for wit-formation. A whole series of +obscene witticisms lead one to the conclusion that a person who gives +origin to such wit conceals a desire to exhibit. Persons having a +powerful sadistical component in their sexuality, which is more or less +inhibited in life, are most successful with the tendency-wit of +aggression. + + + _The Impulse to Impart Wit_ + +The second fact which impels one to examine the subjective determination +of wit is the common experience that nobody is satisfied with making wit +for himself. Wit-making is inseparably connected with the desire to +impart it; in fact this impulse is so strong that it is often realized +after overcoming strong objections. In the comic, too, one experiences +pleasure by imparting it to another person; but this is not imperative; +one can enjoy the comic alone when one happens on it. Wit, on the other +hand, must be imparted. Apparently the process of wit-formation does not +end with the conception of wit. There remains something which strives to +complete the mysterious process of wit-formation by imparting it. + +We cannot conjecture, in the first place, what may have motivated the +impulse to impart wit. But in wit we notice another peculiarity which +again distinguishes it from the comic. If I encounter the latter I can +laugh heartily over it alone; I am naturally pleased if by imparting it +to some one else I make him laugh too. In the case of wit, however, +which occurs to me or which I have made, I cannot laugh over it in spite +of the unmistakable feeling of pleasure which I experience in the +witticism. It is possible that my need to impart the witticism to +another is in some way connected with the resultant laughter, which is +manifest in the other, but denied to me. + +But why do I not laugh over my own joke? And what rôle does the other +person play in it? + +Let us consider the last query first. In the comic usually two persons +come into consideration. Besides my own ego there is another person in +whom I find something comic; if objects appear comical to me, it takes +place by means of a sort of personification which is not uncommon in our +notional life. The comic process is satisfied with these two persons, +the ego and the object person; there may also be a third person, but it +is not obligatory. Wit as a play with one’s own words and thoughts at +first dispenses with an object person, but already, upon the first step +of the jest, it demands another person to whom it can impart its result, +if it has succeeded in safeguarding play and nonsense against the +remonstrance of reason. The second person in wit does not, however, +correspond to the object person, but to the third person who is the +other person in the comic. It seems that in the jest the decision as to +whether wit has fulfilled its task is transferred to the other person, +as if the ego were not quite certain of its opinion in the matter. The +harmless wit is also in need of the other person’s support in order to +ascertain whether it has accomplished its purpose. If wit enters the +service of sexual or hostile tendencies, it can be described as a +psychic process among three persons, just as in the comic, with the +exception that there the third person plays a different rôle. The +psychic process of wit is consummated here between the first person—the +ego, and the third person—the stranger, and not, as in the comic, +between the ego and the object person. + +Also, in the case of the third person of wit, the wit is confronted with +subjective determinations which can make the goal of the +pleasure-stimulus unattainable. As Shakespeare says in _Love’s Labor’s +Lost_ (Act V, Scene 2): + + “A jest’s prosperity lies in the ear + Of him that hears it, never in the tongue + Of him that makes it.” + +He whose thoughts run in sober channels is incompetent to declare +whether or not the jest is a good one. He himself must be in a jovial, +or at least indifferent, state of mind in order to become the third +person of the jest. The same hindrance is present in the case of both +harmless and tendency-wit; but in the latter the antagonism to the +tendency which wishes to serve wit, appears as a new hindrance. The +readiness to laugh about an excellent smutty joke cannot manifest itself +if the exposure concerns an honored kinsman of the third person. In an +assemblage of divines and pastors no one would dare to refer to Heine’s +comparison of Catholic and Protestant priests as retail dealers and +employees of a wholesale business. In the presence of my opponent’s +friends the wittiest invectives with which I might assail him would not +be considered witticisms but invectives, and in the minds of my hearers +it would create not pleasure, but indignation. A certain amount of +willingness or a certain indifference, the absence of all factors which +might evoke strong feelings in opposition to the tendency, are absolute +conditions for the participation of the third person in the completion +of the wit-process. + + + _The Third Person of the Witticism_ + +Wherever such hindrances to the operation of wit fail, we see the +phenomenon which we are now investigating, namely, that the pleasure +which the wit has provided manifests itself more clearly in the third +person than in the originator of the wit. We must be satisfied to use +the expression “more clearly” where we should be inclined to ask whether +the pleasure of the hearer is not more intensive than that of the wit +producer, because we are obviously lacking the means of measuring and +comparing it. We see, however, that the hearer shows his pleasure by +means of explosive laughter after the first person, in most cases with a +serious expression on his face, has related the joke. If I repeat a +witticism which I have heard, I am forced, in order not to spoil its +effect, to conduct myself during its recital exactly like him who made +it. We may now put the question whether from this determination of +laughter over wit we can draw conclusions concerning the psychic process +of wit-formation. + +Now it cannot be our intention to take into consideration everything +that has been asserted and printed about the nature of laughter. We are +deterred from this undertaking by the statement which Dugas, one of +Ribot’s pupils, put at the beginning of his book _Psychologie du rire_ +(1902). “Il n’est pas de fait plus banal et plus étudié que le rire, il +n’en est pas qui ait eu le don d’exciter davantage la curiosité du +vulgaire et celle des philosophes, il n’ent est pas sur lequel on ait +recueilli plus d’observations et bâti plus de théories, et avec cela il +n’en est pas qui demeure plus inexpliqué, on serait tenté de dire avec +les sceptiques qu’il faut être content de rire et de ne pas chercher à +savoir pourquoi on rit, d’autant que peut-être le réflexion tue le rire, +et qu’il serait alors contradictoire qu’elle en découvrit les causes” +(page 1). + +On the other hand, we must make sure to utilize for our purposes a view +of the mechanism of laughter which fits our own realm of thought +excellently. I refer to the attempted explanation of H. Spencer in his +essay entitled _Physiology of Laughter_.[52] + +According to Spencer laughter is a phenomenon of discharge of psychic +irritation, and an evidence of the fact that the psychic utilization of +this irritation has suddenly met with a hindrance. The psychological +situation, which discharges itself in laughter, he describes in the +following words: “Laughter naturally results only when consciousness is +unawares transferred from great things to small—only when there is what +we call a descending incongruity.”[53] + +In an almost analogous sense the French authors (Dugas) designate +laughter as a “détente,” a manifestation of release of tension, and A. +Bain’s theory, “Laughter a relief from restraint,” seems to me to +approach Spencer’s conceptions nearer than many authors would have us +believe. + +However, we experience the desire to modify Spencer’s thought; to give a +more definite meaning to some of the ideas and to change others. We +would say that laughter arises when the sum total of psychic energy, +formerly used for the occupation of certain psychic channels, has become +unutilizable so that it can experience absolute discharge. We know what +criticism such a declaration invites, but for our defense we dare cite a +pertinent quotation from Lipps’s treatise on _Komik und Humor_, an +analysis which throws light on other problems besides the comic and +humor. He says: “In the end individual psychological problems always +lead us fairly deeply into psychology, so that fundamentally no +psychological problem may be considered by itself” (p. 71). The terms +“psychic energy,” “discharge,” and the treatment of psychic energy as a +quantity have become habitual modes of thinking since I began to explain +to myself the fact of psychopathology philosophically. Being of the same +opinion as Lipps I have essayed to represent in my _Interpretation of +Dreams_ the unconscious psychic processes as real entities, and I have +not represented the conscious contents as the “real psychic +activity.”[54] Only when I speak about the “investing energy +(_Besetzung_) of psychic channels,” do I seem to deviate from the +analogies that Lipps uses. The knowledge that I have gained about the +fact that psychic energy can be displaced from one idea to another along +certain association channels, and about the almost indestructible +conservation of the traces of psychic processes, have actually made it +possible for me to attempt such a representation of the unknown. In +order to obviate the possibility of a misunderstanding I must add that I +am making no attempt to proclaim that cells and fibers, or the neuron +system in vogue nowadays, represent these psychic paths, even if such +paths would have to be represented by the organic elements of the +nervous system in a manner which cannot yet be indicated. + + + _Laughter as a Discharge_ + +Thus, according to our assumption, the conditions for laughter are such +that a sum of psychic energy hitherto employed in the occupation of some +paths may experience free discharge. And since not all laughter, (but +surely the laughter of wit), is a sign of pleasure, we shall be inclined +to refer this pleasure to the release of previously existing static +energy (_Besetzungsenergie_). When we see that the hearer of the +witticism laughs, while the creator of the same cannot, then that must +indicate that in the hearer a sum of damming energy has been released +and discharged, whereas during the wit-formation, either in the release +or in the discharge, inhibitions resulted. One can characterize the +psychic process in the hearer, in the third person of the witticism, +hardly more pointedly than by asserting that he has bought the pleasure +of the witticism with very little expenditure on his part. One might say +that it is presented to him. The words of the witticism which he hears +necessarily produce in him that idea or thought-connection whose +formation in him was also resisted by great inner hindrances. He would +have had to make an effort of his own in order to bring it about +spontaneously like the first person, or he would have had to put forth +at least as much psychic expenditure as to equalize the force of the +suppression or repression of the inhibition. This psychic expenditure he +has saved himself; according to our former discussion (p. 80) we should +say that his pleasure corresponds to this economy. Following our +understanding of the mechanism of laughter we should be more likely to +say that the static energy utilized in the inhibition has now suddenly +become superfluous and neutralized because a forbidden idea came into +existence on the way to auditory perception and is therefore ready to be +discharged through laughter. Essentially both statements amount to the +same thing, for the economized expenditure corresponds exactly to the +now superfluous inhibition. The latter statement is more obvious, for it +permits us to say that the hearer of the witticism laughs with the +amount of psychic energy which was liberated by the suspension of +inhibition energy; that is, he laughs away, as it were, this amount of +psychic energy. + + + _Why the First Person Does Not Laugh_ + +If the person in whom the witticism is formed cannot laugh, then it +indicates, as we have just remarked, that there is a deviation from the +process in the case of the third person which concerns either the +suspension of the inhibition energy or the discharge possibility of the +same. But the first of the two cases is inconclusive, as we must +presently see. The inhibition energy of the first person must have been +dissipated, for otherwise there would have been no witticism, the +formation of which had to overcome just such a resistance. Otherwise, +too, it would have been impossible for the first person to experience +the wit-pleasure which the removal of the inhibition forced us to +deduce. But there remains a second possibility, namely, that even though +he experienced pleasure the first person cannot laugh, because the +possibility of discharge has been disturbed. In the production of +laughter such discharge is essential; an interruption in the possibility +of discharge might result from the attachment of the freed occupation +energy to some immediate endopsychic possibility. It is well that we +have become cognizant of this possibility; we shall soon pay more +attention to it. But with the wit-maker still another condition leading +to the same result is possible. Perhaps, after all, no appreciable +amount of energy has been liberated, in spite of the successful release +of occupation energy. In the first person of the witticism wit-work +actually takes place which must correspond to a certain amount of fresh +psychic expenditure. Thus the first person contributes the power which +removes the inhibitions and which surely results in a gain of pleasure +for himself; in the case of tendency-wit it is indeed a very big gain, +since the fore-pleasure gained from the wit-work takes upon itself the +further removal of inhibitions. But the expenditure of the wit-work is, +in every case, derived from the gain which is the result of the removal +of inhibitions; it is the same expenditure which escapes from the hearer +of the witticism. To confirm what was said above it may be added that +the witticism loses its laughter effect in the third person as soon as +an expenditure of mental work is exacted of him. The allusions of the +witticism must be striking, and the omissions easily supplemented; with +the awakening of conscious interest in thinking, the effect of the +witticism is regularly made impossible. Here lies the real distinction +between the witticism and the riddle. It may be that the psychic +constellations during wit-work are not at all favorable to the free +discharge of the energy gained. We are not here in a position to gain a +deeper understanding; our inquiry as to why the third person laughs we +have been able to clear up better than the question why the first person +does not laugh. + +At any rate, if we have well in mind these views about the conditions of +laughter and about the psychic process in the third person, we have +arrived at a place where we can satisfactorily elucidate an entire +series of peculiarities which are familiar in wit, but which have not +been understood. Before an amount of interlocked energy, capable of +discharge, is to be liberated in the third person, there are several +conditions which must be fulfilled or which at least are desirable. 1. +It must be definitely established that the third person really produces +this expenditure of energy. 2. Care must be taken that when the latter +becomes freed that it should find another psychic use instead of +offering itself to the motor discharge. 3. It can be of advantage only +if the energy to be liberated in the third person is first strengthened +and heightened. Certain processes of wit-work which we can gather +together under the caption of secondary or auxiliary techniques serve +all these purposes. + +The first of these conditions determines one of the qualifications of +the third person as hearer of the witticism. He must throughout be so +completely in psychic harmony with the first person that he makes use of +the same inner inhibitions which the wit-work has overcome in the first +person. Whoever is focused on smutty jokes will not be able to derive +pleasure from clever exhibitionistic wit. Mr. N.’s aggressions will not +be understood by uncultured people who are wont to give free rein to +their pleasure gained by insulting others. Every witticism thus demands +its own public, and to laugh over the same witticisms is a proof of +absolute psychic agreement. We have indeed arrived at a point where we +are at liberty to examine even more thoroughly the process in the third +person’s mind. The latter must be able habitually to produce the same +inhibition which the joke has surmounted in the first person, so that, +as soon as he hears the joke, there awakens within him compulsively and +automatically a readiness for this inhibition. This readiness for the +inhibition, which I must conceive as a true expenditure analogous to the +mobilization of an army, is simultaneously recognized as superfluous or +as belated, and is thus immediately discharged in its nascent state +through the channel of laughter.[55] + +The second condition for the production of the free discharge, a cutting +off of any other outlets for the liberated energy, seems to me of far +greater importance. It furnishes the theoretical explanation for the +uncertainty of the effect of wit; if the thoughts expressed in the +witticism evoke very exciting ideas in the hearer, (depending on the +agreement or antagonism between the wit’s tendencies and the train of +thought dominating the hearer), the witty process either receives or is +refused attention. Of still greater theoretical interest, however, are a +series of auxiliary wit-techniques which obviously serve the purpose of +diverting the attention of the listeners from the wit-process so as to +allow the latter to proceed automatically. I advisedly use the term +“automatically” rather than “unconsciously” because the latter +designation might prove misleading. It is only a question of keeping the +psychic process from getting more than its share of attention during the +recital of the witticism, and the usefulness of these auxiliary +techniques permits us to assume rightfully that it is just the +occupation of attention which has a large share in the control and in +the fresh utilization of the freed energy of occupation. + + + _The Automatism of the Wit-process_ + +It seems to be by no means easy to avoid the endopsychic utilization of +energy that has become superfluous, for in our mental processes we are +constantly in the habit of transferring such emotional outputs from one +path to another without losing any of their energy through discharge. +Wit prevents this in the following way. In the first place it strives +for the shortest possible expression in order to expose less points of +attack to the attention. Secondly, it strictly adheres to the condition +that it be easily understood (_v. s._), for as soon as it has recourse +to mental effort or demands a choice between different mental paths, it +imperils the effect not only through the unavoidable mental expenditure, +but also through the awakening of attention. Besides this, wit also +makes use of the artifice of diverting the attention by offering to it +something in the expression of the witticism which fascinates it so that +meanwhile the liberation of inhibition energy and its discharge can take +place undisturbed. The omissions in the wording of wit already carry out +this intention. They impel us to fill in the gaps and in this way they +keep the wit-process free from attention. The technique of the riddle, +as it were, which attracts attention is here pressed into the service of +the wit-work. The façade formations, which we have already discovered in +many groups of tendency-wit, are still more effective (see p. 155). The +syllogistical façades excellently fulfill the purpose of riveting the +attention by an allotted task. While we begin to ponder wherein the +given answer was lacking already we are laughing; our attention has been +surprised, and the discharge of the liberated emotional inhibition has +been effected. The same is true of witticisms possessing a comic façade +in which the comic serves to assist the wit-technique. A comic façade +promotes the effect of wit in more than one way; it makes possible not +only the automatism of the wit-process by riveting the attention, but +also it facilitates the discharge of wit by sending ahead a discharge +from the comic. Here the effect of the comic resembles that of a +fascinating fore-pleasure, and we can thus understand that many +witticisms are able to dispense entirely the fore-pleasures produced by +other means of wit, and make use of only the comic as a fore-pleasure. +Among the true techniques of wit it is especially displacement and +representation through absurdity which, besides other properties, also +develop the deviation of attention so desirable for the automatic +discharge of the wit-process.[56] + +We already surmise, and later will be able to see more clearly, that in +this condition of deviation of attention we have disclosed no +unessential characteristic of the psychic process in the hearer of wit. +In conjunction with this, we can understand something more. First, how +it happens that we rarely ever know in a joke why we are laughing, +although by analytical investigation we can determine the cause. This +laughing is the result of an automatic process which was first made +possible by keeping our conscious attention at a distance. Secondly, we +arrive at an understanding of that characteristic of wit as a result of +which wit can exert its full effect on the hearer only when it is new +and when it comes to him as a surprise. This property of wit, which +causes wit to be short-lived and forever urges the production of new +wit, is evidently due to the fact that it is inherent in the surprising +or the unexpected to succeed but once. When we repeat wit the awakened +memory leads the attention to the first hearing. This also explains the +desire to impart wit to others who have not heard it before, for the +impression made by wit on the new hearer replenishes that part of the +pleasure which has been lost by the lack of novelty. And an analogous +motive probably urges the wit producer to impart his wit to others. + + + _Elements Favoring the Wit-process_ + +As elements favoring the wit-process, even if we can no longer consider +them essentials, I present in the third place three technical aids to +wit-work which are destined to increase the sums of energy to be +discharged and thus enhance the effect of the wit. These technical aids +also very often accentuate the attention directed to the wit, but they +neutralize its influence by simultaneously fascinating it and impeding +its movements. Everything that provokes interest and confusion exerts +its influence in these two directions. This is especially true of the +nonsense and contrast elements, and above all the “contrast of ideas,” +which some authors consider the essential character of wit, but in which +I see only a means to reinforce the effect of wit. All that is confusing +evokes in the hearer that condition of distribution of energy which +Lipps has designated as “psychic damming”; and, doubtless, he has a +right to assume that the force of the “discharge” varies with the +success of the damming process which precedes it. Lipps’s exposition +does not explicitly refer to wit, but to the comic in general, yet it +seems quite probable that the discharge in wit, releasing a gush of +inhibition energy, is brought to its height in a similar manner by means +of the damming. + +At length we are aware that the technique of wit is really determined by +two kinds of tendencies, those which make possible the formation of wit +in the first person, and those guaranteeing that the witticism produces +in the third person as much pleasurable effect as possible. The +Janus-like double-facedness of wit, which safeguards its original +resultant pleasure against the impugnment of critical reason, belongs to +the first tendency together with the mechanism of fore-pleasure; the +other complications of technique produced by the conditions discussed in +this chapter concern the third person of the witticism. Thus wit in +itself is a double-tongued villain which serves two masters at the same +time. Everything that aims toward gaining pleasure is calculated by the +witticism to arouse the third person, as if inner, unsurmountable +inhibitions in the first person were in the way of the same. Thus one +gets the full impression of the absolute necessity of this third person +for the completion of the wit-process. But while we have succeeded in +obtaining a good insight concerning the nature of this process in the +third person, we feel that the corresponding process in the first person +is still shrouded in darkness. So far we have not succeeded in answering +the first of our two questions: Why can we not laugh over wit made by +ourselves? and: Why are we urged to impart our own witticisms to others? +We can only suspect that there is an intimate connection between the two +facts yet to be explained, and that we must impart our witticisms to +others for the reason that we ourselves are unable to laugh over them. +From our examinations of the conditions in the third person for pleasure +gaining and pleasure discharging we can draw the conclusion that in the +first person the conditions for discharge are lacking and that those for +gaining pleasure are only incompletely fulfilled. Thus it is not to be +disputed that we enhance our pleasure in that we attain the—to us +impossible—laughter in this roundabout way from the impression of the +person who was stimulated to laughter. Thus we laugh, so to speak, _par +ricochet_, as Dugas expresses it. Laughter belongs to those +manifestations of psychic states which are highly infectious; if I make +some one else laugh by imparting my wit to him, I am really using him as +a tool in order to arouse my own laughter. One can really notice that +the person who at first recites the witticism with a serious mien later +joins the hearer with a moderate amount of laughter. Imparting my +witticisms to others may thus serve several purposes. First, it serves +to give me the objective certainty of the success of the wit-work; +secondly, it serves to enhance my own pleasure through the reaction of +the hearer upon myself; thirdly, in the case of repeating a not original +joke, it serves to remedy the loss of pleasure due to the lack of +novelty. + + + _Economy and Full Expenditure_ + +At the end of these discussions about the psychic processes of wit, in +so far as they are enacted between two persons, we can glance back to +the factor of economy which impressed us as an important item in the +psychological conception of wit since we offered the first explanation +of wit-technique. Long ago we dismissed the nearest but also the +simplest conception of this economy, where it was a matter of avoiding +psychic expenditure in general by a maximum restriction in the use of +words and by the production of associations of ideas. We had then +already asserted that brevity and laconisms are not witty in themselves. +The brevity of wit is a peculiar one; it has to be a “witty” brevity. +The original pleasure gain produced by playing with words and thoughts +resulted, to be sure, from simple economy in expenditure, but with the +development of play into wit the tendency to economize also had to shift +its goals, for whatever might be saved by the use of the same words or +by avoiding new thought connections would surely be of no account when +compared to the colossal expenditure of our mental activity. We may be +permitted to make a comparison between the psychic economy and a +business enterprise. So long as the latter’s transactions are very +small, good policy demands that expenses be kept low and that the costs +of operation be minimized as much as possible. The economy still follows +the absolute height of the expenditure. Later on when the volume of +business has increased, the importance of the business expenses +dwindles; increases in the expenditure totals matter little so long as +the transactions and returns can be sufficiently increased. Keeping down +running expenses would be parsimonious; in fact, it would mean a direct +loss. Nevertheless it would be equally false to assume that with a very +great expenditure there would be no more room for saving. The manager +inclined to economize would now make an effort to save on particular +things and would feel satisfied if the same establishment, with its +costly upkeep, could reduce its expenses at all, no matter how small the +saving would seem in comparison to the entire expenditure. In quite an +analogous manner the detailed economy in our complicated psychic affairs +remains a source of pleasure, as may be shown by everyday occurrences. +Whoever used to have a gas lamp in his room, but now uses electric +light, will experience for a long time a definite feeling of pleasure +when he presses the electric light button; this pleasure continues as +long as at that moment he remembers the complicated arrangements +necessary to light the gas lamp. Similarly the economy of expenditure in +psychic inhibition brought about by wit—small though it may be in +comparison to the sum total of psychic expenditure—will remain a source +of pleasure for us, because we thereby save a particular expenditure +which we were wont to make and which as before we were ready to make. +That the expenditure is expected and prepared for is a factor which +stands unmistakably in the foreground. + +A localized economy, as the one just considered, will not fail to give +us momentary pleasure, but it will not bring about a lasting alleviation +so long as what has been saved here can be utilized in another place. +Only when this disposal into a different path can be avoided, will the +special economy be transformed into a general alleviation of the psychic +expenditures. Thus, with clearer insight into the psychic processes of +wit, we see that the factor of alleviation takes the place of economy. +Obviously the former gives us the greater feeling of pleasure. The +process in the first person of the witticism produces pleasure by +removing inhibitions and by diminishing local expenditure; it does not, +however, seem to come to rest until it succeeds through the intervention +of the third person in attaining general relief through discharge. + + + + + C. THEORETICAL PART + + + + + VI. + THE RELATION OF WIT TO DREAMS AND TO THE UNCONSCIOUS + + +At the end of the chapter which dealt with the elucidation of the +technique of wit (p. 125) we asserted that the processes of condensation +with and without substitutive formation, displacement, representation +through absurdity, representation through the opposite, indirect +representation, etc., all of which we found participated in the +formation of wit, evinced a far-reaching agreement with the processes of +“dream-work.” We promised, at that time, first to examine more carefully +these similarities, and secondly, so far as such indications point to +search for what is common to both wit and dreams. The discussion of this +comparison would be much easier for us if we could assume that one of +the subjects to be compared—the “dream-work”—were well known. But we +shall probably do better not to take this assumption for granted. I +received the impression that my book _The Interpretation of Dreams_ +created more “confusion” than “enlightenment” among my colleagues, and I +know that the wider reading circles have contented themselves to reduce +the contents of the book to a catchword, “Wish fulfillment”—a term +easily remembered and easily abused. + +However, in my continued occupation with the problems considered +therein, for the study of which my practice as a psychotherapeutist +affords me much opportunity, I found nothing that would impel me to +change or improve on my ideas; I can therefore peacefully wait until the +reader’s comprehension has risen to my level, or until an intelligent +critic has pointed out to me the basic faults in my conception. For the +purposes of comparison with wit, I shall briefly review the most +important features of dreams and dream-work. + +We know dreams by the recollection which usually seems fragmentary and +which occurs upon awakening. It is then a structure made up mostly of +visual or other sensory impressions, which represents to us a deceptive +picture of an experience, and may be mingled with mental processes (the +“knowledge” in the dream) and emotional manifestations. What we thus +remember as a dream I call “the manifest dream-content.” The latter is +often altogether absurd and confused, at other times it is merely one +part or another that is so affected. But even if it be entirely +coherent, as in the case of some anxiety dreams, it stands out in our +psychic life as something strange, for the origin of which one cannot +account. Until recently the explanation for these peculiarities of the +dream has been sought in the dream itself in that it was considered +roughly speaking an indication of a muddled, dissociated, and “sleepy” +activity of the nervous elements. + +As opposed to this view I have shown that the excessively peculiar +“manifest” dream-content can regularly be made comprehensible, and that +it is a disfigured and changed transcription of certain correct psychic +formations which deserve the name of “latent dream-thoughts.” One gains +an understanding of the latter by resolving the manifest dream-content +into its component parts without regard for its apparent meaning, and +then by following up the threads of associations which emanate from each +one of the now isolated elements. These become interwoven and in the end +lead to a structure of thoughts, which is not only entirely accurate, +but also fits easily into the familiar associations of our psychic +processes. During this “analysis” the dream-content loses all of the +peculiarities so strange to us; but if the analysis is to be successful, +we must firmly cast aside the critical objections which incessantly +arise against the reproduction of the individual associations. + + + _The Dream-work_ + +From the comparison of the remembered manifest dream-content with the +latent dream-thoughts thus discovered there arises the conception of +“dream-work.” The entire sum of the transforming processes which have +changed the latent dream-thought into the manifest dream is called the +dream-work. The astonishment which formerly the dream evoked in us is +now perceived to be due to the dream-work. + +The function of the dream-work may be described in the following manner. +A structure of thoughts, mostly very complicated, which has been built +up during the day and not brought to settlement—a day remnant—clings +firmly even during night to the energy which it had assumed—the +underlying center of interest—and thus threatens to disturb sleep. This +day remnant is transformed into a dream by the dream-work and in this +way rendered harmless to sleep. But in order to make possible its +employment by the dream-work, this day remnant must be capable of being +cast into the form of a wish, a condition that is not difficult to +fulfill. The wish emanating from the dream-thoughts forms the first step +and later on the nucleus of the dream. Experience gained from +analyses—not the theory of the dream—teaches us that with children a +fond wish left from the waking state suffices to evoke a dream, which is +coherent and senseful, but almost always short, and easily recognizable +as a “wish fulfillment.” In the case of adults the universally valid +condition for the dream-creating wish seems to be that the latter should +appear foreign to conscious thinking, that is, it should be a repressed +wish, or that it should supply consciousness with reinforcement from +unknown sources. Without the assumption of the unconscious activity in +the sense used above, I should be at a loss to develop further the +theory of dreams and to explain the material gleaned from experience in +dream-analyses. The action of this unconscious wish upon the logical +conscious material of dream-thoughts now results in the dream. The +latter is thereby drawn down into the unconscious, as it were, or to +speak more precisely, it is exposed to a treatment which usually takes +place at the level of unconscious mental activity, and which is +characteristic of this mental level. Only from the results of the +“dream-work” have we thus far learned to know the qualities of this +unconscious mental activity and its differentiation from the +“foreconscious” which is capable of consciousness. + + + _The Unconscious_ + +A novel and difficult theory that runs counter to our habitual modes of +thinking can hardly gain in lucidity by a condensed exposition. I can +therefore accomplish little more in this discussion than refer the +reader to the detailed treatment of the unconscious in my +_Interpretation of Dreams_, and also to Lipps’s work, which I consider +most important. I am aware that he who is under the spell of a good old +philosophical training, or stands aloof from a so-called philosophical +system, will oppose the assumption of the “unconscious psychic +processes” in Lipps’s sense and in mine and will desire to prove the +impossibility of it preferably by means of definitions of the term +psychic. But definitions are conventional and changeable. I have often +found that persons who dispute the unconscious on the grounds of its +absurdity or impossibility have not received their impressions from +those sources from which I, at least, have found it necessary to draw, +in order to become aware of its existence. These opponents had never +witnessed the effect of a posthypnotic suggestion, and they were +immensely surprised at the evidence I imparted to them gleaned from my +analysis of unhypnotized neurotics. They had never gained the conception +of the unconscious as something which one does not really know, while +cogent proofs force one to supplement this idea by saying that one +understands by the unconscious something capable of consciousness, +something concerning which one has not thought and which is not in the +field of vision of consciousness. Nor had they attempted to convince +themselves of the existence of such unconscious thoughts in their own +psychic life by means of an analysis of one of their own dreams, and +when I attempted this with them, they could perceive their own mental +occurrences only with astonishment and confusion. I have also gotten the +impression that these are essentially affective resistances which stand +in the way of the acceptation of the “unconscious,” and that they are +based on the fact that no one is desirous of becoming acquainted with +his unconscious, and it is most convenient to deny altogether its +possibility. + + + _Condensation and Displacement in the Dream-work_ + +The dream-work, to which I return after this digression, subjects the +thought material uttered in the optative mood to a very peculiar +elaboration. First of all it proceeds from the optative to the +indicative mood; it substitutes “it is” for “would it were!” This “it +is” is destined to become part of an hallucinatory representation which +I have called the “regression” of the dream-work. This regression +represents the path from the mental images to the sensory perceptions of +the same, or if one chooses to speak with reference to the still +unfamiliar—not to be understood anatomically—topic of the psychic +apparatus, it is the region of the thought-formation to the region of +the sensory perception. Along this road which runs in an opposite +direction to the course of development of psychic complications the +dream-thoughts gain in clearness; a plastic situation finally results as +a nucleus of the manifest “dream picture.” In order to arrive at such a +sensory representation the dream-thoughts have had to experience +tangible changes in their expression. But while the thoughts are changed +back into mental images they are subjected to still greater changes, +some of which are easily conceivable as necessary, while others are +surprising. As a necessary secondary result of the regression one +understands that nearly all relationships within the thoughts which have +organized the same are lost to the manifest dream. The dream-work takes +over, as it were, only the raw material of the ideas for representation, +and not the thought-relations which held each other in check; or at +least it reserves the freedom of leaving the latter out of the question. +On the other hand, there is a certain part of the dream-work which +cannot be traced to the regression or to the recasting into mental +images; it is just that part which is significant to us for the analogy +to wit-formation. The material of the dream-thoughts experiences an +extraordinary compression or _condensation_ during the dream-work. The +starting-points of this condensation are those points which are common +to two or more dream-thoughts because they naturally pertain to both or +because they are inevitable consequences of the contents of two or more +dream-thoughts, and since these points do not regularly suffice for a +prolific condensation new artificial and fleeting common points come +into existence, and for this purpose preferably words are used which +combine different meanings in their sounds. The newly framed common +points of condensation enter as representatives of the dream-thoughts +into the manifest dream-content, so that an element of the dream +corresponds to a point of junction or intersection of the +dream-thoughts, and with regard to the latter it must in general be +called “overdetermined.” The process of condensation is that part of the +dream-work which is most easily recognizable; it suffices to compare the +recorded wording of a dream with the written dream-thoughts gained by +means of analysis, in order to get a good impression of the +productiveness of dream condensation. + +It is not easy to convince one’s self of the second great change that +takes place in the dream-thoughts through the agency of the dream-work. +I refer to that process which I have called the dream _displacement_. It +manifests itself by the fact that what occupies the center of the +manifest dream and is endowed with vivid sensory intensity has occupied +a peripheral and secondary position in the dream-thoughts, and _vice +versa_. This process causes the dream to appear out of proportion when +compared with the dream-thoughts, and it is because of this displacement +that it seems strange and incomprehensible to the waking state. In order +that such a displacement should occur it must be possible for the +occupation energy to pass uninhibited from important to insignificant +ideas,—a process which in normal conscious thinking can only give the +impression of “faulty thinking.” + +Transformation into expressive activity, condensation, and displacement +are the three great functions which we can ascribe to the dream-work. A +fourth, to which too little attention was given in _The Interpretation +of Dreams_, does not come into consideration here for our purpose. In a +consistent elucidation of the ideas dealing with the “topic of the +psychic apparatus” and “regression,” which alone can lend value to these +working hypotheses, an effort would have to be made to determine at what +stages of regression the various transformations of the dream-thoughts +occur. As yet no serious effort has been made in this direction, but at +least we can speak definitely about displacement when we say that it +must arise in the thought material while the latter is in the level of +the unconscious processes. One will probably have to think of +condensation as a process that extends over the entire course up to the +outposts of the perceptive region; but in general it suffices to assume +that there is a simultaneous activity of all the forces which +participate in the formation of dreams. In view of the reserve which one +must naturally exercise in the treatment of such problems, and in +consideration of the inability to discuss here the main objections to +these problems, I should like to trust somewhat to the assertion that +the process of the dream-work which prepares the dream is situated in +the region of the unconscious. Roughly speaking, one can distinguish +three general stages in the formation of the dream; first, the +transference of the conscious day remnants into the unconscious, a +transference in which the conditions of the sleeping state must +co-operate; secondly, the actual dream-work in the unconscious; and +thirdly, the regression of the elaborated dream material to the region +of perception, whereby the dream becomes conscious. + +The forces participating in the dream-formation may be recognized as the +following: the wish to sleep; the sum of occupation energy which still +clings to the day remnants after the depression brought about by the +state of sleep; the psychic energy of the unconscious wish forming the +dream; and the opposing force of the “_censor_,” which exercises its +authority in our waking state, and is not entirely abolished during +sleep. The task of dream-formation is, above all, to overcome the +inhibition of the censor, and it is just this task that is fulfilled by +the displacement of the psychic energy within the material of the +dream-thoughts. + + + _The Formula for Wit-work_ + +Now we recall what caused us to think of the dream while investigating +wit. We found that the character and activity of wit were bound up in +certain forms of expression and technical means, among which the various +forms of condensation, displacement, and indirect representation were +the most conspicuous. But the processes which led to the same +results—condensation, displacement, and indirect expression—we learned +to know as peculiarities of dream-work. Does not this analogy almost +force us to the conclusion that wit-work and dream-work must be +identical at least in one essential point? I believe that the dream-work +lies revealed before us in its most important characters, but in wit we +find obscured just that portion of the psychic processes which we may +compare with the dream-work, namely, the process of wit-formation in the +first person. Shall we not yield to the temptation to construct this +process according to the analogy of dream-formation? Some of the +characteristics of dreams are so foreign to wit that that part of the +dream-work corresponding to them cannot be carried over to the +wit-formation. The regression of the stream of thought to perception +certainly falls away as far as wit is concerned. However, the other two +stages of dream-formation, the sinking of a foreconscious[57] thought +into the unconscious, and the unconscious elaboration, would give us +exactly the result which we might observe in wit if we assumed this +process in wit-formation. Let us decide to assume that this is the +proceeding of wit-formation in the case of the first person. _A +foreconscious thought is left for a moment to unconscious elaboration +and the results are forthwith grasped by the conscious perception._ + +Before, however, we attempt to prove the details of this assertion we +wish to consider an objection which may jeopardize our assumption. We +start with the fact that the techniques of wit point to the same +processes which become known to us as peculiarities of dream-work. Now +it is an easy matter to say in opposition that we would not have +described the techniques of wit as condensation, displacement, etc., nor +would we have arrived at such a comprehensive agreement in the means of +representation of wit and dreams, if our previous knowledge of +dream-work had not influenced our conception of the technique of wit; so +that at the bottom we find that wit confirms only those tentative +theories which we brought to it from our study of dreams. Such a genesis +of agreement would be no certain guarantee of its stability beyond our +preconceived judgment. No other author has thought of considering +condensation, displacement, and indirect expression as active factors of +wit. This might be a possible objection, but nevertheless it would not +be justified. It might just as well be said that in order to recognize +the real agreement between dreams and wit our ordinary knowledge must be +augmented by a specialized knowledge of dream-work. However, the +decision will really depend only upon the question whether the examining +critic can prove that such a conception of the technique of wit in the +individual examples is forced, and that other nearer and +farther-reaching interpretations have been suppressed in favor of mine; +or whether the critic will have to admit that the tentative theories +derived from the study of dreams can be really confirmed through wit. My +opinion is that we have nothing to fear from such a critic and that our +processes of reduction have confidently pointed out in which forms of +expression we must search for the techniques of wit. That we designated +these techniques by names which previously anticipated the result of the +agreement between the technique of wit and the dream-work was our just +prerogative, and really nothing more than an easily justified +simplification. + +There is still another objection which would not be vital, but which +could not be so completely refuted. One might think that the techniques +of wit that fit in so well considering the ends we have in view deserve +recognition, but that they do not represent all possible techniques of +wit or even all those in use. Also that we have selected only the +techniques of wit which were influenced by and would suit the pattern of +the dream-work, whereas others ignored by us would have demonstrated +that such an agreement was not common to all cases. I really do not +trust myself to make the assertion that I have succeeded in explaining +all the current witticisms with reference to their techniques, and I +therefore admit the possibility that my enumeration of wit-techniques +may show many gaps. But I have not purposely excluded from my discussion +any form of technique that was clear to me, and I can affirm that the +most frequent, the most essential, and the most characteristic technical +means of wit have not eluded my attention. + + + _Wit as an Inspiration_ + +Wit possesses still another character which entirely corresponds to our +conception of the wit-work as originally discovered in our study of +dreams. It is true that it is common to hear one say “I _made_ a joke,” +but one feels that one behaves differently during this process than when +one pronounces a judgment or offers an objection. Wit shows in a most +pronounced manner the character of an involuntary “inspiration” or a +sudden flash of thought. A moment before one cannot tell what kind of +joke one is going to make, though it lacks only the words to clothe it. +One usually experiences something indefinable which I should like most +to compare to an absence, or sudden drop of intellectual tension; then +all of a sudden the witticism appears, usually simultaneously with its +verbal investment. Some of the means of wit are also utilized in the +expression of thought along other lines, as in the cases of comparison +and allusion. I can purposely will to make an allusion. In doing this I +have first in mind (in the inner hearing) the direct expression of my +thought, but as I am inhibited from expressing the same through some +objection from the situation in question, I almost resolve to substitute +the direct expression by a form of indirect expression, and then I utter +it in the form of an allusion. But the allusion that comes into +existence in this manner having been formed under my continuous control +is never witty, no matter how useful it may be. On the other hand, the +witty allusion appears without my having been able to follow up these +preparatory stages in my mind. I do not wish to attribute too much value +to this procedure, it is scarcely decisive, but it does agree well with +our assumption that in wit-formation a stream of thought is dropped for +a moment and suddenly emerges from the unconscious as a witticism. + +Witticisms also evince a peculiar behavior along the lines of +association of ideas. Frequently they are not at the disposal of our +memory when we look for them; on the other hand, they often appear +unsolicited and at places in our train of thought where we cannot +understand their presence. Again, these are only minor qualities, but +none the less they point to their unconscious origin. + +Let us now collect the properties of wit whose formation can be referred +to the unconscious. Above all there is the peculiar brevity of wit +which, though not an indispensable, is a marked and distinctive +characteristic feature. When we first encountered it we were inclined to +see in it an expression of a tendency to economize, but owing to very +evident objections we ourselves depreciated the value of this +conception. At present we look upon it more as a sign of the unconscious +elaboration which the thought of wit has undergone. The process of +condensation which corresponds to it in dreams we can correlate with no +other factor than with the localization in the unconscious, and we must +assume that the conditions for such condensations which are lacking in +the foreconscious are present in the unconscious mental process.[58] It +is to be expected that in the process of condensation some of the +elements subjected to it become lost, while others which take over their +occupation energy are strengthened by the condensation or are built up +too energetically. The brevity of wit, like the brevity of dreams, would +thus be a necessary concomitant manifestation of the condensation which +occurs in both cases; both times it is a result of the condensation +process. The brevity of wit is indebted also to this origin for its +peculiar character which though not further assignable produces a +striking impression. + + + _The Unconscious and the Infantile_ + +We have defined above the one result of condensation—the manifold +application of the same material, play upon words, and similarity of +sound—as a localized economy, and have also referred the pleasure +produced by harmless wit to that economy. At a later place we have found +that the original purpose of wit consisted in producing this kind of +pleasure from words, a process which was permitted to the individual +during the stage of playing, but which became banked in during the +course of intellectual development or by rational criticism. Now we have +decided upon the assumption that such condensations as serve the +technique of wit originate automatically and without any particular +purpose during the process of thinking in the unconscious. Have we not +here two different conceptions of the same fact which seem to be +incompatible with each other? I do not think so. To be sure, there are +two different conceptions, and they demand to be brought in unison, but +they do not contradict each other. They are merely somewhat strange to +each other, and as soon as we have established a relationship between +them we shall probably gain in knowledge. That such condensations are +sources of pleasure is in perfect accord with the supposition that they +easily find in the unconscious the conditions necessary for their +origin; on the other hand, we see the motivation for the sinking into +the unconscious in the circumstance that the pleasure-bringing +condensation necessary to wit easily results there. Two other factors +also, which upon first examination seem entirely foreign to each other +and which are brought together quite accidentally, will be recognized on +deeper investigation as intimately connected, and perhaps may be found +to be substantially the same. I am referring to the two assertions that +on the one hand wit could form such pleasure-bringing condensations +during its development in the stage of playing, that is, during the +infancy of reason; and, on the other hand, that it accomplishes the same +function on higher levels by submerging the thought into the +unconscious. For the infantile is the source of the unconscious. The +unconscious mental processes are no others than those which are solely +produced during infancy. The thought which sinks into the unconscious +for the purpose of wit-formation only revisits there the old homestead +of the former playing with words. The thought is put back for a moment +into the infantile state in order to regain in this way childish +pleasure-sources. If, indeed, one were not already acquainted with it +from the investigation of the psychology of the neuroses, wit would +surely impress one with the idea that the peculiar unconscious +elaboration is nothing else but the infantile type of the mental +process. Only it is by no means an easy matter to grasp, in the +unconscious of the adult, this peculiar infantile manner of thinking, +because it is usually corrected, so to say, _statu nascendi_. However, +it is successfully grasped in a series of cases, and then we always +laugh about the “childish stupidity.” In fact every exposure of such an +unconscious fact affects us in a “comical” manner.[59] + +It is easier to comprehend the character of these unconscious mental +processes in the utterances of patients suffering from various psychic +disturbances. It is very probable that, following the assumption of old +Griesinger, we would be in a position to understand the deliria of the +insane and to turn them to good account as valuable information, if we +would not make the demands of conscious thinking upon them, but instead +treat them as we do dreams by means of our art of interpretation.[60] In +the dream, too, we were able to show the “return of psychic life to the +embryonal state.”[61] + +In discussing the processes of condensation we have entered so deeply +into the signification of the analogy between wit and dreams that we can +here be brief. As we know that displacements in dream-work point to the +influence of the censor of conscious thought, we will consequently be +inclined to assume that an inhibiting force also plays a part in the +formation of wit when we find the process of displacement among the +techniques of wit. We also know that this is commonly the case; the +endeavor of wit to revive the old pleasure in nonsense or the old +pleasure in word-play meets with resistance in every normal state, a +resistance which is exerted by the protest of critical reason, and which +must be overcome in each individual case. But a radical distinction +between wit and dreams is shown in the manner in which the wit-work +solves this difficulty. In the dream-work the solution of this task is +brought about regularly through displacements and through the choice of +ideas which are remote enough from the objectionable ones to secure +passage through the censor; the latter themselves are but offsprings of +those whose psychic energy they have taken upon themselves through full +transference. The displacements are therefore not lacking in any dream +and are far more comprehensive; they not only comprise the deviations +from the trend of thought but also all forms of indirect expression, the +substitution for an important but offensive element of one seemingly +indifferent and harmless to the censor which form very remote allusions +to the first, they include substitution also occurring through symbols, +comparisons, or trifles. It is not to be denied that parts of this +indirect representation really originate in the foreconscious thoughts +of the dream,—as, for example, symbolical representation and +representation through comparisons—because otherwise the thought would +not have reached the state of the foreconscious expression. Such +indirect expressions and allusions, whose reference to the original +thought is easily findable, are really permissible and customary means +of expression even in our conscious thought. The dream-work, however, +exaggerates the application of these means of indirect expression to an +unlimited degree. Under the pressure of the censor any kind of +association becomes good enough for substitution by allusion; the +displacement from one element to any other is permitted. The +substitution of the inner associations (similarity, causal connection, +etc.) by the so-called outer associations (simultaneity, contiguity in +space, assonance) is particularly conspicuous and characteristic of the +dream-work. + + + _The Difference between Dream-technique and Wit-technique_ + +All these means of displacement also occur as techniques of wit, but +when they do occur they usually restrict themselves to those limits +prescribed for their use in conscious thought; in fact they may be +lacking, even though wit must regularly solve a task of inhibition. One +can comprehend this retirement of the process of displacement in +wit-work when one remembers that wit usually has another technique at +its disposal through which it defends itself against inhibitions. +Indeed, we have discovered nothing more characteristic of it than just +this technique. For wit does not have recourse to compromises as does +the dream, nor does it evade the inhibition; it insists upon retaining +the play with words or nonsense unaltered, but thanks to the ambiguity +of words and multiplicity of thought-relations, it restricts itself to +the choice of cases in which this play or nonsense may appear at the +same time admissible (jest) or senseful (wit). Nothing distinguishes wit +from all other psychic formations better than this double-sidedness and +this double-dealing; by emphasizing the “sense in nonsense,” the authors +have approached nearest the understanding of wit, at least from this +angle. + +Considering the unexceptional predominance of this peculiar technique in +overcoming inhibitions in wit, one might find it superfluous that wit +should make use of the displacement-technique even in a single case. But +on the one hand certain kinds of this technique remain useful for wit as +objects and sources of pleasure—as, for example, the real displacement +(deviation of the trend of thought) which in fact shares in the nature +of nonsense,—and on the other hand one must not forget that the highest +stage of wit, tendency-wit, must frequently overcome two kinds of +inhibitions which oppose both itself and its tendency (p. 147), and that +allusion and displacements are qualified to facilitate this latter task. + +The numerous and unrestricted application of indirect representation, of +displacements, and especially of allusions in the dream-work, has a +result which I mention not because of its own significance but because +it became for me the subjective inducement to occupy myself with the +problem of wit. If a dream analysis is imparted to one unfamiliar with +the subject and unaccustomed to it, and the peculiar ways of allusions +and displacements (objectionable to the waking thoughts but utilized by +the dream-work) are explained, the hearer experiences an uncomfortable +impression; he declares these interpretations to be “witty,” but it +seems obvious to him that these are not successful jokes but forced ones +which run contrary to the rules of wit. This impression can be easily +explained; it is due to the fact that the dream-work operates with the +same means as wit, but in the application of the same the dream exceeds +the bounds which wit restricts. We shall soon learn that in consequence +of the rôle of the third person wit is bound by a certain condition +which does not affect the dream. + + + _Irony—Negativism_ + +Among those techniques which are common to both wit and dreams +representation through the opposite and the application of absurdity are +especially interesting. The first belongs to the strongly effective +means of wit as shown in the examples of “outdoing wit” (p. 98). The +representation through the opposite, unlike most of the wit-techniques, +is unable to withdraw itself from conscious attention. He who +intentionally tries to make use of wit-work, as in the case of the +“habitual wit,” soon discovers that the easiest way to answer an +assertion with a witticism is to concentrate one’s mind on the opposite +of this assertion and trust to the chance flash of thought to brush +aside the feared objection to this opposite by means of a different +interpretation. Maybe the representation through its opposite is +indebted for such a preference to the fact that it forms the nucleus of +another pleasurable mode of mental expression, for an understanding of +which we do not have to consult the unconscious. I refer to _irony_, +which is very similar to wit and is considered a subspecies of the +comic. The essence of irony consists in imparting the very opposite of +what one intended to express, but it precludes the anticipated +contradiction by indicating through the inflections, concomitant +gestures, and through slight changes in style—if it is done in +writing—that the speaker himself means to convey the opposite of what he +says. Irony is applicable only in cases where the other person is +prepared to hear the reverse of the statement actually made, so that he +cannot fail to be inclined to contradict. As a consequence of this +condition ironic expressions are particularly subject to the danger of +being misunderstood. To the person who uses it, it gives the advantage +of readily avoiding the difficulties to which direct expressions, as, +for example, invectives, are subject. In the hearer it produces comic +pleasure, probably by causing him to make preparations for +contradiction, which are immediately found to be unnecessary. Such a +comparison of wit with a form of the comical that is closely allied to +it might strengthen us in the assumption that the relation of wit to the +unconscious is the peculiarity that also distinguishes it from the +comical.[62] + +In dream-work, representation through the opposite has a far more +important part to play than in wit. The dream not only delights in +representing a pair of opposites by means of one and the same composite +image, but in addition it often changes an element from the +dream-thoughts into its opposite, thus causing considerable difficulty +in the work of interpretation. In the case of any element capable of +having an opposite it is impossible to tell whether it is to be taken +negatively or positively in the dream-thoughts.[63] + +I must emphasize that as yet this fact has by no means been understood. +Nevertheless, it seems to give indications of an important +characteristic of unconscious thinking which in all probability results +in a process comparable to “judging.” Instead of setting aside judgments +the unconscious forms “repressions.” The repression may correctly be +described as a stage intermediate between the defense reflex and +condemnation.[64] + + + _The Unconscious as the Psychic Stage of the Wit-work_ + +Nonsense, or absurdity, which occurs so often in dreams and which has +made them the object of so much contempt, has never really come into +being as the result of an accidental shuffling of conceptual elements, +but may in every case be proven to have been purposely admitted by the +dream-work. Nonsense and absurdity are intended to express embittered +criticism and scornful contradiction within the dream-thoughts. +Absurdity in the dream-content thus stands for the judgment: “It’s pure +nonsense,” expressed in dream-thoughts. In my work on the Interpretation +of Dreams, I have placed great emphasis on the demonstration of this +fact because I thought that I could in this manner most strikingly +controvert the error expressed by many that the dream is no psychic +phenomenon at all—an error which bars the way to an understanding of the +unconscious. Now we have learnt (in the analysis of certain +tendency-witticisms on p. 73) that nonsense in wit is made to serve the +same purposes of expression. We also know that a nonsensical façade of a +witticism is peculiarly adapted to enhance the psychic expenditure in +the hearer and hence also to increase the amount to be discharged +through laughter. Moreover, we must not forget that nonsense in wit is +an end in itself, since the purpose of reviving the old pleasure in +nonsense is one of the motives of the wit-work. There are other ways to +regain the feeling of nonsense in order to derive pleasure from it; +caricature, exaggeration, parody, and travesty utilize the same and thus +produce “comical nonsense.” If we subject these modes of expression to +an analysis similar to the one used in studying wit, we shall find that +there is no occasion in any of them for resorting to unconscious +processes in our sense for the purpose of getting explanations. We are +now also in a position to understand why the “witty” character may be +added as an embellishment to caricature, exaggeration, and parody; it is +the manifold character of the performance upon the “psychic stage”[65] +that makes this possible. + +I am of the opinion that by transferring the wit-work into the system of +the unconscious we have made a distinct gain, since it makes it possible +for us to understand the fact that the various techniques to which wit +admittedly adheres are on the other hand not its exclusive property. +Many doubts, which have arisen in the beginning of our investigation of +these techniques and which we were forced temporarily to leave, can now +be conveniently cleared up. Hence we shall give due consideration to the +doubt which expresses itself by asserting that the undeniable relation +of wit to the unconscious is correct only for certain categories of +tendency-wit, while we are ready to claim this relation for all forms +and all the stages of development of wit. We may not shirk the duty of +testing this objection. + +We may assume that we deal with a sure case of wit-formation in the +unconscious when it concerns witticisms that serve unconscious +tendencies, or those strengthened by unconscious tendencies, as, for +example, most “cynical” witticisms. For in such cases the unconscious +tendency draws the foreconscious thought down into the unconscious in +order to remodel it there; a process to which the study of the +psychology of the neuroses has added many analogies with which we are +acquainted. But in the case of tendency-wit of other varieties, namely, +harmless wit and the jest, this power seems to fall away, and the +relation of the wit to the unconscious is an open question. + +But now let us consider the case of the witty expression of a thought +that is not without value in itself and that comes to the surface in the +course of the association of mental processes. In order that this +thought may become a witticism, it is of course necessary that it make a +choice among the possible forms of expression in order to find the exact +form that will bring along the gain in word-pleasure. We know from +self-observation that this choice is not made by conscious attention; +but the selection will certainly be better if the occupation energy of +the foreconscious thought is lowered to the unconscious. For in the +unconscious, as we have learnt from the dream-work, the paths of +association emanating from a word are treated on a par with associations +from objects. The occupation energy from the unconscious presents by far +the more favorable conditions for the selection of the expression. +Moreover, we may assume without going farther that the possible +expression which contains the gain in word-pleasure exerts a lowering +effect on the still fluctuating self-command of the foreconscious, +similar to that exerted in the first case by the unconscious tendency. +As an explanation for the simpler case of the jest we may imagine that +an ever watchful intention of attaining the gain in word-pleasure seizes +the opportunity offered in the foreconscious of again drawing the +investing energy down into the unconscious, according to the familiar +scheme. + +I earnestly wish that it were possible for me on the one hand to present +one decisive point in my conception of wit more clearly, and on the +other hand to fortify it with compelling arguments. But as a matter of +fact it is not a question here of two failures, but of one and the same +failure. I can give no clearer exposition because I have no further +testimony on behalf of my conception. The latter has developed as the +result of my study of the technique and of comparison with dream-work, +and indeed from this one side only. I now find that the dream-work is +altogether excellently adapted to the peculiarities of wit. This +conception is now concluded; if the conclusion leads us not to a +familiar province, but rather to one that is strange and novel to our +modes of thought, the conclusion is called a “hypothesis,” and the +relation of the hypothesis to the material from which it is drawn is +justly not accepted as “proof.” The hypothesis is admitted as “proved” +only if it can be reached by other ways and if it can be shown to be the +junction point for other associations. But such proof, in view of the +fact that our knowledge of unconscious processes has hardly begun, +cannot be had. Realizing then that we are on soil still virgin, we shall +be content to project from our viewpoint of observation one narrow +slender plank into the unexplored region. + +We shall not build a great structure on such a foundation as this. If we +correlate the different stages of wit to the mental dispositions +favorable to them we may say: The _jest_ has its origin in the happy +mood; what seems to be peculiar to it is an inclination to lower the +psychic static energies (_Besetzungen_). The jest already makes use of +all the characteristic techniques of wit and satisfies the fundamental +conditions of the same through the choice of such an assortment of words +or mental associations as will conform not only to the requirements for +the production of pleasure, but also conform to the demands of the +intelligent critic. We shall conclude that the sinking of the mental +energy to the unconscious stage, a process facilitated by the happy +mood, has already taken place in the case of the jest. The mood does +away with this requirement in the case of _harmless_ wit connected with +the expression of a valuable thought; here we must assume a particular +_personal adaptation_ which finds it as easy to come to expression as it +is for the foreconscious thought to sink for a moment into the +unconscious. An ever watchful tendency to renew the original resultant +pleasure of wit exerts thereby a lowering effect upon the still +fluctuating foreconscious expression of the thought. Most people are +probably capable of making jests when in a happy mood; aptitude for +joking independent of the mood is found only in a few persons. Finally, +the most powerful incentive for wit-work is the presence of strong +tendencies which reach back into the unconscious and which indicate a +particular fitness for witty productions; these tendencies might explain +to us why the subjective conditions of wit are so frequently fulfilled +in the case of neurotic persons. Even the most inapt person may become +witty under the influence of strong tendencies. + + + _Differences Between Wit and Dreams_ + +This last contribution, the explanation of wit-work in the first person, +though still hypothetical, strictly speaking, ends our interest in wit. +There still remains a short comparison of wit to the more familiar dream +and we may expect that, outside of the one agreement already considered, +two such diverse mental activities should show nothing but differences. +The most important difference lies in their social behavior. The dream +is a perfectly asocial psychic product. It has nothing to tell to anyone +else, having originated in an individual as a compromise between +conflicting psychic forces it remains incomprehensible to the person +himself and has therefore altogether no interest for anybody else. Not +only does the dream find it unnecessary to place any value on +intelligibleness, but it must even guard against being understood, as it +would then be destroyed; it can only exist in disguised form. For this +reason the dream may make use freely of the mechanism that controls +unconscious thought processes to the extent of producing undecipherable +disfigurements. Wit, on the other hand, is the most social of all those +psychic functions whose aim is to gain pleasure. It often requires three +persons, and the psychic process which it incites always requires the +participation of at least one other person. It must therefore bind +itself to the condition of intelligibleness; it may employ disfigurement +made practicable in the unconscious through condensation and +displacement, to no greater extent than can be deciphered by the +intelligence of the third person. As for the rest, wit and dreams have +developed in altogether different spheres of the psychic life, and are +to be classed under widely separated categories of the psychological +system. No matter how concealed the dream is still a wish, while wit is +a developed play. Despite its apparent unreality the dream retains its +relation to the great interests of life; it seeks to supply what is +lacking through a regressive detour of hallucinations; and it owes its +existence solely to the strong need for sleep during the night. Wit, on +the other hand, seeks to draw a small amount of pleasure from the free +and unencumbered activities of our psychic apparatus, and later to seize +this pleasure as an incidental gain. It thus _secondarily_ reaches to +important functions relative to the outer world. The dream serves +preponderately to guard from pain while wit serves to acquire pleasure; +in these two aims all our psychic activities meet. + + + + + VII + WIT AND THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC + + +We have approached the problems of the comic in an unusual manner. It +appeared to us that wit, which is usually regarded as a subspecies of +the comic, offered enough peculiarities to warrant our taking it +directly under consideration, and thus it came about that we avoided +discussing its relation to the more comprehensive category of the comic +as long as it was possible to do so, yet we did not proceed without +picking up on the way some hints that might be valuable for studying the +comic. We found it easy to ascertain that the comic differs from wit in +its social behavior. The comic can be content with only two persons, one +who finds the comical, and one in whom it is found. The third person to +whom the comical may be imparted reinforces the comic process, but adds +nothing new to it. In wit, however, this third person is indispensable +for the completion of the pleasure-bearing process, while the second +person may be omitted, especially when it is not a question of +aggressive wit with a tendency. Wit is made, while the comical is found; +it is found first of all in persons, and only later by transference may +be seen also in objects, situations, and the like. We know, too, in the +case of wit that it is not strange persons, but one’s own mental +processes that contain the sources for the production of pleasure. In +addition we have heard that wit occasionally reopens inaccessible +sources of the comic, and that the comic often serves wit as a façade to +replace the fore-pleasure usually produced by the well-known technique +(p. 236). All of this does not really point to a very simple +relationship between wit and the comic. On the other hand, the problems +of the comic have shown themselves to be so complicated, and have until +now so successfully defied all attempts made by the philosophers to +solve them, that we have not been able to justify the expectation of +mastering it by a sudden stroke, so to speak, even if we approach it +along the paths of wit. Incidentally we came provided with an instrument +for investigating wit that had not yet been made use of by others; +namely, the knowledge of dream-work. We have no similar advantage at our +disposal for comprehending the comic, and we may therefore expect that +we shall learn nothing about the nature of the comic other than that +which we have already become aware of in wit; in so far as wit belongs +to the comic and retains certain features of the same unchanged or +modified in its own nature. + + + _The Naïve_ + +The species of the comic that is most closely allied to wit is the +_naïve_. Like the comic the naïve is found universally and is not made +like in the case of wit. The naïve cannot be made at all, while in the +case of the pure comic the question of making or evoking the comical may +be taken into account. The naïve must result without our intervention +from the speech and actions of other persons who take the place of the +_second_ person in the comic or in wit. The naïve originates when one +puts himself completely outside of inhibition, because it does not exist +for him; that is, if he seems to overcome it without any effort. What +conditions the function of the naïve is the fact that we are aware that +the person does not possess this inhibition, otherwise we should not +call it naïve but impudent, and instead of laughing we should be +indignant. The effect of the naïve, which is irresistible, seems easy to +understand. An expenditure of that inhibition energy which is commonly +already formed in us suddenly becomes inapplicable when we hear the +naïve and is discharged through laughter; as the removal of the +inhibition is direct, and not the result of an incited operation, there +is no need for a suspension of attention. We behave like the hearer in +wit, to whom the economy of inhibition is given without any effort on +his part. + +In view of the understanding about the genesis of inhibitions which we +obtained while tracing the development of play into wit, it will not +surprise us to learn that the naïve is mostly found in children, +although it may also be observed in uneducated adults, whom we look on +as children as far as their intellectual development is concerned. For +the purposes of comparison with wit, naïve speech is naturally better +adapted than naïve actions, for speech and not actions are the usual +forms of expression employed by wit. It is significant, however, that +naïve speeches, such as those of children, can without straining also be +designated as “naïve witticisms.” The points of agreement as well as +demonstration between wit and naïveté will become clear to us upon +consideration of a few examples.[66] + +_A little girl of three years was accustomed to hear from her German +nurse the exclamatory word “Gesundheit” (God bless you!; literally, may +you be healthy!) whenever she happened to sneeze. While suffering from a +severe cold during which the profuse coughing and sneezing caused her +considerable pain, she pointed to her chest and said to her father, +“Daddy, Gesundheit hurts.”_ + +_Another little girl of four years heard her parents refer to a Jewish +acquaintance as a Hebrew, and on later hearing the latter’s wife +referred to as Mrs. X, she corrected her mother, saying, “No, that is +not her name; if her husband is a Hebrew she is a Shebrew.”_ + +In the first example the wit is produced through the use of a contiguous +association in the form of an abstract thought for the concrete action. +The child so often heard the word “Gesundheit” associated with sneezing +that she took it for the act itself. While the second example may be +designated as word-wit formed by the technique of sound similarity. The +child divided the word Hebrew into He-brew and having been taught the +genders of the personal pronouns, she naturally imagined that if the man +is a He-brew his wife must be a She-brew. Both examples could have +originated as real witticisms upon which we would have unwillingly +bestowed a little mild laughter. But as examples of naïveté they seem +excellent and cause loud laughter. But what is it here that produces the +difference between wit and naïveté? Apparently it is neither the wording +nor the technique, which is the same for both wit and the naïve, but a +factor which at first sight seems remote from both. It is simply a +question whether we assume that the speakers had the intention of making +a witticism or whether we assume that they—the children—wished to draw +an earnest conclusion, a conclusion held in good faith though based on +uncorrected knowledge. Only the latter case is one of naïveté. It is +here that our attention is first called to the mechanism in which the +second person places himself into the psychic process of the person who +produces the wit. + +The investigation of a third example will confirm this opinion. A +brother and a sister, the former ten and the latter twelve years old, +produce a play of their own composition before an audience of uncles and +aunts. The scene represents a hut on the seashore. In the first act the +two dramatist-actors, a poor fisherman and his devoted wife, complain +about the hard times and the difficulty of getting a livelihood. The man +decides to sail over the wide ocean in his boat in order to seek wealth +elsewhere, and after a touching farewell the curtain is drawn. The +second act takes place several years later. The fisherman has come home +rich with a big bag of money and tells his wife, whom he finds waiting +in front of the hut, what good luck he has had in the far countries. His +wife interrupts him proudly, saying: “Nor have I been idle in the +meanwhile,” and opens the hut, on whose floor the fisherman sees twelve +large dolls representing children asleep. At this point of the drama the +performers were interrupted by an outburst of laughter on the part of +the audience, a thing which they could not understand. They stared +dumfounded at their dear relatives, who had thus far behaved respectably +and had listened attentively. The explanation of this laughter lies in +the assumption on the part of the audience that the young dramatists +know nothing as yet about the origin of children, and were therefore in +a position to believe that a wife would actually boast of bearing +offspring during the prolonged absence of her husband, and that the +husband would rejoice with her over it. But the results achieved by the +dramatists on the basis of this ignorance may be designated as nonsense +or absurdity. + +These examples show that the naïve occupies a position midway between +wit and the comic. As far as wording and contents are concerned, the +naïve speech is identical with wit; it produces a misuse of words, a bit +of nonsense, or an obscenity. But the psychic process of the first +person or producer which, in the case of wit, offered us so much that +was interesting and puzzling, is here entirely absent. The naïve person +imagines that he is using his thoughts and expressions in a simple and +normal manner; he has no other purpose in view, and receives no pleasure +from his naïve production. All the characteristics of the naïve lie in +the conception of the hearer, who corresponds to the third person in the +case of wit. The producing person creates the naïve without any effort. +The complicated technique, which in wit serves to paralyze the +inhibition produced by the critical reason, does not exist here, because +the person does not possess this inhibition, and he can therefore +readily produce the senseless and the obscene without any compromise. +The naïve may be added to the realm of wit if it comes into existence +after the important function of the censor, as observed in the formula +for wit-formation, has been reduced to zero. + +If the affective determination of wit consists in the fact that both +persons should be subject to about the same inhibitions or inner +resistances, we may say now that the determination of the naïve consists +in the fact that one person should have inhibitions which the other +lacks. It is the person provided with inhibitions who understands the +naïve, and it is he alone who gains the pleasure produced by the naïve. +We can easily understand that this pleasure is due to the removal of +inhibitions. Since the pleasure of wit is of the same origin—a kernel of +word-pleasure and nonsense-pleasure, and a shell of removal- and +release-pleasure,—the similarity of this connection to the inhibition +thus determines the inner relationship between the naïve and wit. In +both cases pleasure results from the removal of inner inhibitions. But +the psychic process of the recipient person (which in the naïve +regularly corresponds with our ego, whereas in wit we may also put +ourselves in place of the producing person) is by as much more +complicated in the case of the naïve as it is simpler in the producing +person in wit. For one thing, the naïve must produce the same effect +upon the receiving person as wit does, this may be fully confirmed by +our examples, for just as in wit the removal of the censor has been made +possible by the mere effort of hearing the naïve. But only a part of the +pleasure created by the naïve admits of this explanation, in other cases +of naïve utterances, even this portion would be endangered, as, for +example, while listening to naïve obscenities. We would react to a naïve +obscenity with the same indignation felt toward a real obscenity, were +it not for the fact that another factor saves us from this indignation +and at the same time furnishes the more important part of the pleasure +derived from the naïve. + +This other factor is the result of the condition mentioned before, +namely, that in order to recognize the naïve we have to be cognizant of +the fact that there are no inner inhibitions in the producing person. It +is only when this is assured that we laugh instead of being indignant. +Hence we take into consideration the psychic state of the producing +person; we imagine ourselves in this same psychic state and endeavor to +understand it by comparing it to our own. This putting ourselves into +the psychic state of the producing person and comparing it with our own +results in an economy of expenditure which we discharge through +laughing. + +We might prefer the simpler explanation, namely, that when we reflect +that the person has no inhibition to overcome our indignation becomes +superfluous; the laughing therefore results at the cost of economized +indignation. In order to avoid this conception, which is, in general, +misleading, I shall distinguish more sharply between two cases that I +had treated as one in the above discussion. The naïve, as it appears to +us, may either be in the nature of a witticism, as in our example, or an +obscenity, or of anything generally objectionable; which becomes +especially evident if the naïve is expressed not in speech but in +action. This latter case is really misleading; for it might lead one to +assume that the pleasure originated from the economized and transformed +indignation. The first case is the illuminating one. The naïve speech in +the example “Hebrew” can produce the effect of a light witticism and +give no cause for indignation; it is certainly the more rare, or the +more pure and by far the more instructive case. In so far as we think +that the child took the syllable “he” in “Hebrew” seriously, and without +any additional reason identified it with the masculine personal pronoun, +the increase in pleasure as a result of hearing it has no longer +anything to do with the pleasure of the wit. We shall now consider what +has been said from two viewpoints, first how it came into existence in +the mind of the child, and secondly, how it would occur to us. In +following this comparison we find that the child has discovered an +identity and has overcome barriers which exist in us, and by continuing +still further it may express itself as follows: “If you wish to +understand what you have heard, you may save yourself the expenditure +necessary for holding these barriers in place.” The expenditure which +became freed by this comparison is the source of pleasure in the naïve, +and is discharged through laughter; to be sure, it is the same +expenditure which we would have converted into indignation if our +understanding of the producing person, and in this case the nature of +his utterance, had not precluded it. But if we take the case of the +naïve joke as a model for the second case, viz., the objectionable +naïve, we shall see that here, too, the economy in inhibition may +originate directly from the comparison. That is, it is unnecessary for +us to assume an incipient and then a strangulated indignation, an +indignation corresponding to a different application of the freed +expenditure, against which, in the case of wit, complicated defensive +mechanisms were required. + + + _Source of Comic Pleasure in the Naïve_ + +This comparison and this economy of expenditure that occur as the result +of putting one’s self into the psychic process of the producing person +can have an important bearing on the naïve only if they do not belong to +the naïve alone. As a matter of fact we suspect that this mechanism +which is so completely foreign to wit is a part—perhaps the essential +part—of the psychic process of the comic. This aspect—it is perhaps the +most important aspect of the naïve—thus represents the naïve as a form +of the comic. Whatever is added to the wit-pleasure by the naïve +speeches in our examples is “comical” pleasure. Concerning the latter we +might be inclined to make a general assumption that this pleasure +originates through an economized expenditure by comparing the utterance +of some one else with our own. But since we are here in the presence of +very broad views we shall first conclude our consideration of the naïve. +The naïve would thus be a form of the comic, in so far as its pleasure +originates from the difference in expenditure which results in our +effort to understand the other person; and it resembles wit through the +condition that the expenditure saved by the comparison must be an +inhibition expenditure.[67] + +Before concluding we shall rapidly point out a few agreements and +differences between the conceptions at which we have just arrived and +those that have been known for a long time in the psychology of the +comic. The putting one’s self into the psychic process of another and +the desire to understand him is obviously nothing else than the “comic +burrowing” (_komisches Leihen_) which has played a part in the analysis +of the comic ever since the time of Jean Paul; the “comparing” of the +psychic process of another with our own corresponds to a “psychological +contrast,” for which we here at last find a place, after we did not know +what to do with it in wit. But in our explanation of comic pleasure we +take issue with many authors who contend that this pleasure originates +through the fluctuation of our attention to and fro between contrasting +ideas. We are unable to see how such a mechanism could produce pleasure, +and we point to the fact that in the comparing of contrasts there +results a difference in expenditure which, if not used for anything +else, becomes capable of discharge and hence a source of pleasure.[68] + +It is with misgiving only that we approach the problem of the comic. It +would be presumptuous to expect from our efforts any decisive +contribution to the solution of this problem after the works of a large +number of excellent thinkers have not resulted in an explanation that is +in every respect satisfactory. As a matter of fact, we intend simply to +follow out into the province of the comic certain observations that have +been found valuable in the study of wit. + + + _Occurrence and Origin of the Comic_ + +The comical appears primarily as an unintentional discovery in the +social relations of human beings. It is found in persons, that is, in +their movements, shapes, actions, and characteristic traits. In the +beginning it is found probably only in their psychical peculiarities and +later on in their mental qualities, especially in the expression of +these latter. Even animals and inanimate objects become comical as the +result of a widely used method of personification. However, the comical +can be considered apart from the person in whom it is found, if the +conditions under which a person becomes comical can be discerned. Thus +arises the comical situation, and this knowledge enables us to make a +person comical at will by putting him into situations in which the +conditions necessary for the comic are bound up with his actions. The +discovery that it is in our power to make another person comical opens +the way to unsuspected gains in comic pleasure, and forms the foundation +of a highly developed technique. It is also possible to make one’s self +just as comical as others. The means which serve to make a person +comical are transference into comic situations, imitations, disguise, +unmasking, caricature, parody, travesty, and the like. It is quite +evident that these techniques may enter into the service of hostile or +aggressive tendencies. A person may be made comical in order to render +him contemptible or in order to deprive him of his claims to dignity and +authority. But even if such a purpose were regularly at the bottom of +all attempts to make a person comical this need not necessarily be the +meaning of the spontaneous comic. + +As a result of this superficial survey of the manifestations of the +comic we can readily see that the comic originates from wide-spread +sources, and that conditions so specialized as those found in the naïve +cannot be expected in the case of the comic. In order to get a clue to +the conditions that are applicable to the comic the selection of the +first example is most important. We will examine first the comic +movement because we remember that the most primitive stage performance, +the pantomime, uses this means to make us laugh. The answer to the +question, Why do we laugh at the actions of clowns? would be that they +appear to us immoderate and inappropriate; that is, we really laugh over +the excessive expenditure of energy. Let us look for the same condition +outside of the manufactured comic, that is, under circumstances where it +may unintentionally be found. The child’s motions do not appear to us +comical, even if it jumps and fidgets, but it is comical to see a little +boy or girl follow with the tongue the movement of his pen-holder when +he is trying to master the art of writing; we see in these additional +motions a superfluous expenditure of energy which under similar +conditions we should save. In the same way we find it comical to see +unnecessary motions or even marked exaggeration of expressive motions in +adults. Among the genuinely comic cases we might mention the motions +made by the bowler after he has released the ball while he is following +its course as though he were still able to control it; all grimaces +which exaggerate the normal expression of the emotions are comical, even +if they are involuntary, as in the case of persons suffering from St. +Vitus’ dance (chorea); the impassioned movements of a modern orchestra +leader will appear comical to every unmusical person, who cannot +understand why they are necessary. Indeed, the comic element found in +bodily shapes and physiognomy is a branch of the comic of motion, in +that they are conceived as though they were the result of motion that +either has been carried too far or is purposeless. Wide exposed eyes, a +crook-shaped nose bent towards the mouth, handle-like ears, a hunch +back, and all similar physical defects probably produce a comical +impression only in so far as the movements that would be necessary to +produce these features are imagined, whereby the nose and other parts of +the body are pictured as more movable than they actually are. It is +certainly comical if some one can “wiggle his ears,” and it would +undoubtedly be a great deal more comical if he could raise and lower his +nose. A large part of the comical impression that animals make upon us +is due to the fact that we perceive in them movements which we cannot +imitate. + + + _Comic of Motion_ + +But how does it come about that we laugh as soon as we have recognized +that the actions of some one else are immoderate and inappropriate? I +believe that we laugh because we compare the motions observed in others +with those which we ourselves should produce if we were in their place. +The two persons must naturally be compared in accordance with the same +standard, but this standard is my own innervation expenditure connected +with my idea of motion in the one case as well as the other. This +assertion is in need of discussion and amplification. + +What we are here putting into juxtaposition is, on the one hand, the +psychic expenditure of a given idea, and on the other hand, the content +of this idea. We maintain that the former is not primarily and +principally independent of the latter—the content of the +idea—particularly because the idea of something great requires a larger +expenditure than the idea of something small. As long as we are +concerned only with the idea of different coarse movements we shall +encounter no difficulties in the theoretical determination of our thesis +or in establishing its proof through observation. It will be shown that +in this case an attribute of the idea actually coincides with an +attribute of the object conceived, although psychology warns us of +confusions of this sort. + +I obtain an idea of a definite coarse movement by performing this motion +or by imitating it, and in so doing I set a standard for this motion in +my feelings of innervation.[69] + +Now if I perceive a similar more or less coarse motion in some one else, +the surest way to the understanding—to apperception—of the same is to +carry it out imitatively and the comparison will then enable me to +decide in which motion I expended more energy. Such an impulse to +imitate certainly arises on perceiving a movement. But in reality I do +not carry out the imitation any more than I still spell out words simply +because I have learnt to read by means of spelling. Instead of imitating +the movement by my muscles I substitute the idea of the same through my +memory traces of the expenditures necessary for similar motions. +Perceiving, or “thinking,” differs above all from acting or carrying out +things by the fact that it entails a very much smaller displacement of +energy and keeps the main expenditure from being discharged. But how is +the quantitative factor, the more or less big element of the movement +perceived, given expression in the idea? And if the representation of +the quantity is left off from the idea that is composed of qualities, +how am I to differentiate the ideas of different big movements, how am I +to compare them? + +Here, physiology shows the way in that it teaches us that even while an +idea is in the process of conception innervations proceed to the +muscles, which naturally represent only a moderate expenditure. It is +now easy to assume that this expenditure of innervation which +accompanies the conception of the idea is utilized to represent the +quantitative factor of the idea, and that when a great motion is +imagined it is greater than it would be in the case of a small one. The +conception of greater motions would thus actually be greater, that is, +it would be a conception accompanied by greater expenditure. + + + _Ideational Mimicry_ + +Observation shows directly that human beings are in the habit of +expressing the big and small things in their ideation content by means +of a manifold expenditure or by means of a sort of _ideational mimicry_. + +When a child or a person of the common people or one belonging to a +certain race imparts or depicts something, one can easily observe that +he is not content to make his ideas intelligible to the hearer through +the choice of correct words alone, but that he also represents the +contents of the same through his expressive motions. Thus he designates +the quantities and intensities of “a high mountain” by raising his hands +over his head, and those of “a little dwarf” by lowering his hand to the +ground. If he broke himself of the habit of depicting with his hands, he +would nevertheless do it with his voice, and if he should also control +his voice, one may be sure that in picturing something big he would +distend his eyes, and describing something little he would press his +eyes together. It is not his own affects that he thus expresses, but it +is really the content of what he imagines. + +Shall we now assume that this need for mimicry is first aroused through +the demand for imparting, whereas a good part of this manner of +representation still escapes the attention of the hearer? I rather +believe that this mimicry, though less vivid, exists even if all +imparting is left out of the question, that it comes about when the +person imagines for himself alone, or thinks of something in a graphic +manner; that then such a person, just as in talking, expresses through +his body the idea of big and small which manifests itself at least +through a change of innervation in the facial expressions and sensory +organs. Indeed, I can imagine that the bodily innervation which is +consensual to the content of the idea conceived is the beginning and +origin of mimicry for purposes of communication. For, in order to be in +a position to serve this purpose, it is only necessary to increase it +and make it conspicuous to the other. When I take the view that this +“expression of the ideation content” should be added to the expression +of the emotions, which are known as a physical by-effect of psychic +processes, I am well aware that my observations which refer to the +category of the big and small do not exhaust the subject. I myself could +add still other things, even before reaching to the phenomenon of +tension through which a person physically indicates the accumulation of +his attention and the _niveau_ of abstraction upon which his thoughts +happen to rest. I maintain that this subject is very important, and I +believe that tracing the ideation mimicry in other fields of æsthetics +would be just as useful for the understanding of the comic as it is +here. + +To return to the comic movement, I repeat that with the perception of a +certain motion the impulse to conceive it will be given through a +certain expenditure. In the “desire to understand,” in the apperception +of this movement I produce a certain expenditure, and I behave in this +part of the psychic process just as if I put myself in the place of the +person observed. Simultaneously I probably grasp the aim of the motion, +and through former experiences I am able to estimate the amount of +expenditure necessary to attain this aim. I thereby drop out of +consideration the person observed and behave as if I myself wished to +attain the aim of the motion. These two ideational possibilities depend +on a comparison of the motion observed with my own inhibited motion. In +the case of an immoderate or inappropriate movement on the part of the +other, my greater expenditure for understanding becomes inhibited _statu +nascendi_ during the mobilization as it were, it is declared superfluous +and stands free for further use or for discharge through laughing. If +other favorable conditions supervened this would be the nature of the +origin of pleasure in comic movement,—an innervation expenditure which, +when compared with one’s own motion, becomes an inapplicable surplus. + + + _Comparison of Two Kinds of Expenditure as Pleasure-sources_ + +We now note that we must continue our discussion by following two +different paths; first, to determine the conditions for the discharge of +the surplus; secondly, to test whether the other cases of the comic can +be conceived similarly to our conception of comic motion. + +We shall turn first to the latter task and after considering comic +movement and action we shall turn to the comic found in the psychic +activities and peculiarities of others. + +As an example of this kind we may consider the comical nonsense produced +by ignorant students at examinations; it is more difficult, however, to +give a simple example of the peculiarities. We must not be confused by +the fact that nonsense and foolishness which so often act in a comical +manner are nevertheless not perceived as comical in all cases, just as +the same things which once made us laugh because they seemed comical +later may appear to us contemptible and hateful. This fact, which we +must not forget to take into account, seems only to show that besides +the comparison familiar to us other relations come into consideration +for the comic effect,—conditions which we can investigate in other +connections. + +The comic found in the mental and psychic attributes of another person +is apparently again the result of a comparison between him and my own +ego. But it is remarkable that it is a comparison which mostly furnishes +the result opposite to that obtained through comic movement and action. +In the latter case it is comical if the other person assumes a greater +expenditure than I believe to be necessary for me; in the case of +psychic activity it is just the reverse, it is comical if the other +person economizes in expenditure, which I consider indispensable; for +nonsense and foolishness are nothing but inferior activities. In the +first case I laugh because he makes it too difficult for himself, and in +the latter case because he makes it too easy for himself. In the case of +the comic effect it seems to be a question only of the difference +between the two energy expenditures—the one of “feeling one’s self into +something” (_Einfühlung_)—and the other of the ego—and it makes no +difference in whose favor this difference inclines. This peculiarity, +which at first confuses our judgment, disappears, however, when we +consider that it is in accord with our personal development towards a +higher stage of culture, to limit our muscular work and increase our +mental work. By heightening our mental expenditure we produce a +diminution of motion expenditure for the same activity. Our machines +bear witness to this cultural success.[70] + +Thus it coincides with a uniform understanding that that person appears +comical to us who puts forth too much expenditure in his psychical +activities and too little in his mental activities; and it cannot be +denied that in both cases our laughing is the expression of a +pleasurably perceived superiority which we adjudge to ourselves in +comparison with him. If the relation in both cases becomes reversed, +that is, if the somatic expenditure of the other is less and the psychic +expenditure greater, then we no longer laugh, but are struck with +amazement and admiration.[71] + + + _Comic of Situation._ + +The origin of the comic pleasure discussed here, that is, the origin of +such pleasure in a comparison of the other person with one’s own self in +respect to the difference between the identification expenditure +(_Einfühlungsaufwand_) and normal expenditure—is genetically probably +the most important. It is certain, however, that it is not the only one. +We have learned before to disregard any such comparison between the +other person and one’s self, and to obtain the pleasure-bringing +difference from one side only, either from identification, or from the +processes in one’s own ego, proving thereby that the feeling of +superiority bears no essential relations to comic pleasure. A comparison +is indispensable, however, for the origin of this pleasure, and we find +this comparison between two energy expenditures which rapidly follow +each other and refer to the same function. It is produced either in +ourselves by way of identification with the other, or we find it without +any identification in our own psychic processes. The first case, in +which the other person still plays a part, though he is not compared +with ourselves, results when the pleasure-producing difference of energy +expenditures comes into existence through outer influences which we can +comprehend as a “situation,” for which reason this species of comic is +also called the “comic of situation.” The peculiarities of the person +who furnishes the comic do not here come into essential consideration; +we laugh when we admit to ourselves that had we been placed in the same +situation we should have done the same thing. Here we draw the comic +from the relation of the individual to the often all-too-powerful outer +world, which is represented in the psychic processes of the individual +by the conventions and necessities of society, and even by his bodily +needs. A typical example of the latter is when a person engaged in an +activity, which claims all his psychic forces, is suddenly disturbed by +a pain or excremental need. The opposite case which furnishes us the +comic difference through identification, lies between the great interest +which existed before the disturbance occurred and the minimum left for +his psychic activity after the disturbance made its appearance. The +person who furnishes us this difference again becomes comical through +inferiority; but he is only inferior in comparison with his former ego +and not in comparison with us, for we know that in a similar case we +could not have behaved differently. It is remarkable, however, that we +find this inferiority of the person only in the case where we “feel +ourselves” into some one, that is, we can only find it comical in the +other, whereas we ourselves are conscious only of painful emotions when +such or similar embarrassments happen to us. It is by keeping away the +painful from our own person that we are probably first enabled to enjoy +as pleasurable the difference which resulted from the comparison of the +changing energy. + + + _Comic of Expectation_ + +The other source of the comic, which we find in our own changes of +investing energy, lies in our relations to the future, which we are +accustomed to anticipate through our ideas of expectation. I assume that +a quantitatively determined expenditure underlies our every idea of +expectation, which in case of disappointment becomes diminished by a +certain difference, and I again refer to the observations made before +concerning “ideational mimicry.” But it seems to me easier to +demonstrate the real mobilized psychic expenditure for the cases of +expectation. It is well known concerning a whole series of cases that +the manifestation of expectation is formed by motor preliminaries; this +is first of all true of cases in which the expected events make demands +on my motility, and these preparations are quantitatively determinable +without anything further. If I am expecting to catch a ball thrown at +me, I put my body in states of tension in order to enable me to +withstand the collision with the ball, and the superfluous motions which +I make if the ball turns out to be light make me look comical to the +spectators. I allowed myself to be misled by the expectation to exert an +immoderate expenditure of motion. A similar thing happens if, for +example, I lift out a basket of fruit which I took to be heavy but which +was hollow and formed out of wax in order to deceive me. By its upward +jerk my arm betrays the fact that I have prepared a superfluous +innervation for this purpose and hence I am laughed at. In fact there is +at least one case in which the expectation expenditure can be directly +demonstrated by means of physiological experimentation with animals. In +Pawlof’s experiments with salivary secretions of dogs who, provided with +salivary fistulæ, are shown different kinds of food, it is noticed that +the amount of saliva secreted through the fistulæ depends on whether the +conditions of the experiment have strengthened or disappointed the dogs’ +expectation to be fed with the food shown them. + +Even where the thing expected lays claims only to my sensory organs, and +not to my motility, I may assume that the expectation manifests itself +in a certain motor emanation causing tension of the senses, and I may +even conceive the suspension of attention as a motor activity which is +equivalent to a certain amount of expenditure. Moreover, I can +presuppose that the preparatory activity of expectation is not +independent of the amount of the expected impression, but that I +represent mimically the bigness and smallness of the same by means of a +greater or smaller preparatory expenditure, just as in the case of +imparting something and in the case of thinking when there is no +expectation. The expectation expenditure naturally will be composed of +many components, and also for my disappointment diverse factors will +come into consideration; it is not only a question whether the realized +event is perceptibly greater or smaller than the expected one, but also +whether the expectation is worthy of the great interest which I had +offered for it. In this manner I am instructed to consider, besides the +expenditure for the representation of bigness and smallness (the +conceptual mimicry), also the expenditure for the tension of attention +(expectation expenditure), and in addition to these two expenditures +there is in all cases the abstraction expenditure. But these other forms +of expenditure can easily be reduced to the one of bigness and +smallness, for what we call more interesting, more sublime, and even +more abstract, are only particularly qualified special cases of what is +greater. Let us add to this that, among other things, Lipps holds that +the quantitative, not the qualitative, contrast is primarily the source +of comic pleasure, and we shall be altogether content to have chosen the +comic element of motion as the starting-point of our investigation. + +In working out Kant’s thesis, “The comic is an expectation dwindled into +nothing,” Lipps made the attempt in his book, often cited here, to trace +the comic pleasure altogether to expectation. Despite the many +instructive and valuable results which this attempt brought to light I +should like to agree with the criticism expressed by other authors, +namely, that Lipps has formulated a field of origin of the comic which +is much too narrow, and that he could not subject its phenomena to his +formula without much forcing. + + + _Caricature_ + +Human beings are not satisfied with enjoying the comic as they encounter +it in life, but they aim to produce it purposely, thus we discover more +of the nature of the comic by studying the methods employed in producing +the comic. Above all one can produce comical elements in one’s +personality for the amusement of others, by making one’s self appear +awkward or stupid. One then produces the comic exactly as if one were +really so, by complying with the condition of comparison which leads to +the difference of expenditure; but one does not make himself laughable +or contemptible through this; indeed, under certain circumstances one +can even secure admiration. The feeling of superiority does not come +into existence in the other when he knows that the actor is only +shamming, and this furnishes us a good new proof that the comic is +independent in principle of the feeling of superiority. + +To make another comical, the method most commonly employed is to +transfer him into situations wherein he becomes comical regardless of +his personal qualities, as a result of human dependence upon external +circumstances, especially social factors; in other words, one resorts to +the comical situation. This transferring into a comic situation may be +real as in practical jokes, such as placing the foot in front of one so +that he falls like a clumsy person, or making one appear stupid by +utilizing his credulity to make him believe some nonsense, etc., or it +can be feigned by means of speech or play. It is a good aid in +aggression, in the service of which production of the comic is wont to +place itself in order that the comic pleasure may be independent of the +reality of the comic situation; thus every person is really defenseless +against being made comical. + +But there are still other means of making one comical which deserve +special attention and which in part also show new sources of comic +pleasure. _Imitation_, for example, belongs here; it accords the hearer +an extraordinary amount of pleasure and makes its subject comic, even if +it still keeps away from the exaggeration of caricature. It is much +easier to fathom the comic effect of caricature than that of simple +imitation. Caricature, parody and travesty, like their practical +counterpart—unmasking, range themselves against persons and objects who +command authority and respect and who are exalted in some sense—these +are procedures tending towards degradation.[72] In the transferred +psychic sense, the exalted is equivalent to something great and I want +to make the statement, or more accurately to repeat the statement, that +psychic greatness like somatic greatness is exhibited by means of an +increased expenditure. It needs little observation to ascertain that +when I speak of the exalted I give a different innervation to my voice, +I change my facial expression, an attempt to bring my entire bearing as +it were into complete accord with the dignity of that which I present. I +impose upon myself a dignified restriction not much different than if I +were coming into the presence of an illustrious personage, monarch, or +prince of science. I can scarcely err when I assume that this added +innervation of conceptual mimicry corresponds to an increased +expenditure. The third case of such an added expenditure I readily find +when I indulge in abstract trains of thought instead of in the concrete +and plastic ideas. If I can now imagine that the mentioned processes for +degrading the illustrious are quite ordinary, that during their activity +I need not be on my guard and in whose ideal presence I may, to use a +military formula, put myself “at ease,” all that saves me the added +expenditure of dignified restriction. Moreover, the comparison of this +manner of presentation instigated by identification with the manner of +presentation to which I have been hitherto accustomed which seeks to +present itself at the same time, again produces a difference in +expenditure which can be discharged through laughter. + +As is known, caricature brings about the degradation by rendering +prominent one feature, comic in itself, from the entire picture of the +exalted object, a feature which would be overlooked if viewed with the +entire picture. Only by isolating this feature can the comic effect be +obtained which spreads in our memory over the whole picture. This has, +however, this condition; the presence of the exalted itself must not +force us into a disposition of reverence. Where such a comical feature +is really lacking then caricature unhesitatingly creates it by +exaggerating one that is not comical in itself. It is again +characteristic of the origin of comic pleasure that the effect of the +caricature is not essentially impaired through such a falsifying of +reality. + + + _Unmasking_ + +_Parody_ and _travesty_ accomplish the degradation of the exalted by +other means; they destroy the uniformity between the attributes of +persons familiar to us and their speech and actions; by replacing +either the illustrious persons or their utterances by lowly ones. +Therein they differ from caricature, but not through the mechanism of +the production of the comic pleasure. The same mechanism also holds +true in _unmasking_, which comes into consideration only where some +one has attached to himself dignity and authority which in reality +should be taken from him. We have seen the comic effect of unmasking +through several examples of wit, for example, in the story of the +fashionable lady who in her first labor-pains cries: “Ah, mon Dieu!” +but to whom the physician paid no attention until she screamed: +“A-a-a-ai-e-e-e-e-e-e-E-E-E!” Being now acquainted with the character +of the comic, we can no longer dispute that this story is really an +example of comical unmasking and has no just claim to the term +witticism. It recalls wit only through the setting, through the +technical means of “representation through a trifle”; here it is the +cry which was found sufficient to indicate the point. The fact +remains, however, that our feeling for the niceties of speech, when we +call on it for judgment, does not oppose calling such a story a +witticism. We can find the explanation for this in the reflection that +usage of speech does not enter scientifically into the nature of wit +so far as we have evolved it by means of this painstaking examination. +As it is a function of the activities of wit to reopen hidden sources +of comic pleasure (p. 150), every artifice which does not bring to +light barefaced comic may in looser analogy be called a witticism. +This is especially true in the case of unmasking, though in other +methods of comic-making the appellation also holds good.[73] + +In the mechanism of “unmasking” one can also utilize those processes of +comic-making already known to us which degrade the dignity of +individuals in that they call attention to one of the common human +frailties, but particularly to the dependence of his mental functions +upon physical needs. Unmasking them becomes equivalent to the reminder: +This or that one who is admired like a demigod is only a human being +like you and me after all. Moreover, all efforts in this mechanism serve +to lay bare the monotonous psychic automatism which is behind wealth and +apparent freedom of psychic achievements. We have become acquainted with +examples of such “unmasking” through the witticisms dealing with +marriage agents, and at that time to be sure we felt doubt whether we +could rightly count these stories as wit. Now we can decide with more +certainty that the anecdote of the echo who reinforces all assertions of +the marriage agent and in the end reinforces the latter’s admission that +the bride has a hunch back with the exclamation “And what a hunch!” is +essentially a comic story, an example of the unmasking of the psychic +automatism. But here the comic story serves only as a façade; to any one +who wishes to note the hidden meaning of the marriage agent, the whole +remains a splendidly put together piece of wit. He who does not +penetrate so far sees only the comic story. The same is true of the +other witticism of the agent who, to refute an objection, finally +confirms the truth through the exclamation: “But who in the world would +lend them anything?” This is a comic unmasking which serves as a façade +for a witticism. Still the character of the wit is here quite evident, +as the speech of the agent is at the same time an expression through the +opposite. In trying to prove that the people are rich he proves at the +same time that they are not rich but very poor. Wit and the comic unite +here and teach us that a statement may be simultaneously witty and +comical. + +We eagerly grasp the opportunity to return from the comic of unmasking +to wit, for our real task is to explain the relation between wit and +comic and not to determine the nature of the comic. Hence to the case of +uncovering the psychic automatism, wherein our feeling left us in doubt +as to whether the matter was comical or witty, we add another, the case +of nonsense-wit, wherein likewise wit and the comic fuse. But our +investigation will ultimately show us that in this second case the +meeting of wit and comic may be theoretically deduced. + +In the discussion of the techniques of wit we have found that giving +free play to such modes of thinking as are common in the unconscious and +which in consciousness are conceived only as “faulty thinking,” +furnishes the technical means of a great many witticisms. We had then +doubted their witty character and were inclined to classify them simply +as comic stories. We could come to no decision regarding our uncertainty +because in the first place the real character of wit was not familiar to +us. Later we found this character by following the analogy to the +dream-work as to the compromise formed by the wit-work between the +demands of the rational critic and the impulse not to abandon the old +word-pleasure and nonsense-pleasure. What thus came into existence as a +compromise, when the foreconscious thought was left for a moment to +unconscious elaboration, satisfied both demands in all cases, but it +presented itself to the critic, in various forms and had to stand +various criticisms from it. In one case wit succeeded in surreptitiously +assuming the form of an unimportant but none the less admissible +proposition; a second time it smuggled itself into the expression of a +valuable thought. But within the outer limit of the compromise activity +it made no effort to satisfy the critic, and defiantly utilizing the +pleasure-sources at its disposal, it appeared before the critic as pure +nonsense. It had no fear of provoking contradiction because it could +rely on the fact that the hearer would decipher the disfigurement of the +expression through the operation of his unconscious and thus give back +to it its meaning. + +Now in what case will wit appear to the critic as nonsense? Particularly +when it makes use of those modes of thought, which are common in the +unconscious, but forbidden in conscious thought; that is, when it +resorts to faulty thinking. Some of the modes of thinking, of the +unconscious, have also been retained in conscious thinking, for example, +many forms of indirect expression, allusions, etc., even though their +conscious use has to be much restricted. Using these techniques wit will +arouse little or no opposition on the part of the critic; but this only +happens when it also uses that technical means with which conscious +thought no longer cares to have anything to do. Wit can still further +avoid offending if it disguises the faulty thinking by investing it with +a semblance of logic as in the story of the fancy cake and liqueur, +salmon with mayonnaise, and similar ones. But should it present the +faulty thinking undisguised, the critic is sure to protest. + + + _The Meeting of Wit and the Comic_ + +In this case, something else comes to the aid of wit. The faulty +thinking, which as a form of thinking of the unconscious, wit utilizes +for its technique, appears comical to the critic, although this is not +necessarily the case. The conscious giving of free play to the +unconscious and to those forms of thinking which are rejected as faulty, +furnishes a means for the production of comic pleasure. This can be +easily understood, as a greater expenditure is surely needed for the +production of the foreconscious investing energy than for the giving of +free play to the unconscious. When we hear the thought which is formed +like one from the unconscious we compare it to its correct form, and +this results in a difference of expenditure which gives origin to comic +pleasure. A witticism which makes use of such faulty thinking as its +technique and therefore appears absurd can produce a comic impression at +the same time. If we do not strike the trail of the wit, there remains +to us only the comic or funny story. + +The story of the borrowed kettle, which showed a hole on being returned, +whereupon the borrower excused himself by stating that in the first +place he had not borrowed the kettle; secondly, that it already had a +hole when he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he had returned it intact +without any hole (p. 82), is an excellent example of a purely comic +effect through giving free play to one’s unconscious modes of thinking. +Just this mutual neutralization of several thoughts, each of which is +well motivated in itself, is the province of the unconscious. +Corresponding to this, the dream in which the unconscious thoughts +become manifest, also shows an absence of either—or.[74] These are +expressed by putting the thoughts next to one another. In that dream +example given in my _Interpretation of Dreams_,[75] which in spite of +its complication I have chosen as a type of the work of interpretation, +I seek to rid myself of the reproach that I have not removed the pains +of a patient by psychic treatment. My arguments are: 1. she is herself +to blame for her illness, because she does not wish to accept my +solution, 2. her pains are of organic origin, therefore none of my +concern, 3. her pains are connected with her widowhood, for which I am +certainly not to blame, 4. her pains resulted from an injection with a +dirty syringe, which was given by another. All these motives follow one +another just as though one did not exclude the other. In order to escape +the reproach that it was nonsense I had to insert the words “either—or” +instead of the “and” of the dream. + +_A similar comical story is the one which tells of a blacksmith in a +Hungarian village who has committed a crime punishable by death; the +bürgomaster, however, decreed that not the smith but a tailor was to be +hanged, as there were two tailors in the village but only one +blacksmith, and the crime had to be expiated._ Such a displacement of +guilt from one person to another naturally contradicts all laws of +conscious logic, but in no ways the mental trends of the unconscious. I +am in doubt whether to call this story comic, and still I put the story +of the kettle among the witticisms. Now I admit that it is far more +correct to designate the latter as comic rather than witty. But now I +understand how it happens that my feelings, usually so reliable, can +leave me in the lurch as to whether this story be comic or witty. The +case in which I cannot come to a conclusion through my feelings is the +one in which the comic results through the uncovering of modes of +thought which exclusively belong to the unconscious. A story of that +kind can be comic and witty at the same time; but it will impress me as +being witty even if it be only comic, because the use of the faulty +thinking of the unconscious reminds me of wit, just as in the case of +the arrangements for the uncovering of the hidden comic discussed before +(p. 325). + +I must lay great stress upon making clear this most delicate point of my +analysis, namely, the relation of wit to the comic, and will therefore +supplement what has been said with some negative statements. First of +all, I call attention to the fact that the case of the meeting of wit +and comic treated here (p. 327) is not identical with the preceding one. +I grant it is a fine distinction, but it can be drawn with certainty. In +the preceding case the comic originated from the uncovering of the +psychic automatism. This is in no way peculiar to the unconscious alone +and it does not at all play a conspicuous part in the technique of wit. +Unmasking appears only accidentally in relation with wit, in that it +serves another technique of wit, namely, representation through the +opposite. But in the case of giving free play to unconscious ways of +thinking the union of wit and comic is an essential one, because the +same method which is used by the first person in wit as the technique of +releasing pleasure will naturally produce comic pleasure in the third +person. + +We might be tempted to generalize this last case and seek the relation +of wit to the comic in the fact that the effect of wit upon the third +person follows the mechanism of comic pleasure. But there is no question +about that; contact with the comic is not in any way found in all nor +even in most witticisms; in most cases wit and the comic can be cleanly +separated. As often as wit succeeds in escaping the appearance of +absurdity, which is to say in most witticisms of double meaning or of +allusion, one cannot discover any effect in the hearer resembling the +comic. One can make the test with examples previously cited or with some +new ones given here. + +Congratulatory telegram to be sent to a gambler on his 70th birthday. + +“_Trente et quarante_”[76] (word-division with allusion). + +Madame de _Maintenon_ was called Madame de _Maintenant_ (modification of +a name). + +We might further believe that at least all jokes with nonsense façades +appear comical and must impress us as such. But I recall here the fact +that such witticisms often have a different effect on the hearer, +calling forth confusion and a tendency to rejection (see footnote, p. +212). Therefore it evidently depends whether the nonsense of the wit +appears comical or common plain nonsense, and the conditions for this we +have not yet investigated. Accordingly we hold to the conclusion that +wit, judging by its nature, can be separated from the comic, and that it +unites with it on the one hand only in certain special cases, on the +other in the tendency to gain pleasure from intellectual sources. + +In the course of these examinations concerning the relations of wit and +the comic there revealed itself to us that distinction which we must +emphasize as most significant, and which at the same time points to a +psychologically important characteristic of the comic. We had to +transfer to the unconscious the source of wit-pleasure; there is no +occasion which can be discovered for the same localization of the comic. +On the contrary all analyses which we have made thus far indicate that +the source of comic pleasure lies in the comparison of two expenditures, +both of which we must adjudge to the foreconscious. Wit and the comic +can above all be differentiated in the psychic localization; _wit is, so +to speak, the contribution to the comic from the sphere of the +unconscious_. + + + _Comic of Imitation_ + +We need not blame ourselves for digressing from the subject, for the +relation of wit to the comic is really the occasion which urged us to +the examination of the comic. But it is time for us to return to the +point under discussion, to the treatment of the means which serve to +produce the comic. We have advanced the discussion of caricature and +unmasking, because from both of them we can borrow several points of +similarity for the analysis of the comic of _imitation_. Imitation is +mostly replaced by caricature, which consists in the exaggeration of +certain otherwise not striking traits, and also bears the character of +degradation. Still this does not seem to exhaust the nature of +imitation; it is incontestable that in itself it represents an +extraordinarily rich source of comic pleasure, for we laugh particularly +over faithful imitations. It is not easy to give a satisfactory +explanation of this if we do not accept Bergson’s view,[77] according to +which the comic of imitation is put next to the comic produced by +uncovering the psychic automatism. Bergson believes that everything +gives a comic impression which manifests itself in the shape of a +machine-like inanimate movement in the human being. His law is that “the +attitudes, gestures, and movements of the human body are laughable in +exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine.” He explains +the comic of imitation by connecting it with a problem formulated by +Pascal in his _Thoughts_, why is it that we laugh at the comparison of +two faces that are alike although neither of them excites laughter by +itself. “The truth is that a really living life should never repeat +itself. Wherever there is repetition or complete similarity, we always +suspect some mechanism at work behind the living.” Analyze the +impression you get from two faces that are too much alike, and you will +find that you are thinking of two copies cast in the same mould, or two +impressions of the same soul, or two reproductions of the same +negative,—in a word, of some manufacturing process or other. This +deflection of life towards the mechanical is here the real cause of +laughter (l. c., p. 34). We might say, it is the degradation of the +human to the mechanical or inanimate. If we accept these winning +arguments of Bergson, it is moreover not difficult to subject his view +to our own formula. Taught by experience that every living being is +different and demands a definite amount of expenditure from our +understanding, we find ourselves disappointed when, as a result of a +perfect agreement or deceptive imitation, we need no new expenditure. +But we are disappointed in the sense of being relieved, and the +expenditure of expectation which has become superfluous is discharged +through laughter. The same formula will also cover all cases of comic +rigidity considered by Bergson, such as professional habits, fixed +ideas, and modes of expression which are repeated on every occasion. All +these cases aim to compare the expenditure of expectation with what is +commonly required for the understanding, whereby the greater expectation +depends on observation of individual variety and human plasticity. Hence +in imitation the source of comic pleasure is not the comic of situation +but that of expectation. + +As we trace the comic pleasure in general to comparison, it is incumbent +upon us to investigate also the comic element of the comparison itself, +which likewise serves as a means of producing the comic. Our interest in +this question will be enhanced when we recall that in the case of +comparison the “feeling” as to whether something was to be classed as +witty or merely comical often left us in the lurch (v. p. 114). + +The subject really deserves more attention than we can bestow upon it. +The main quality for which we ask in comparison is whether it is +pertinent, that is, whether it really calls our attention to an existing +agreement between two different objects. The original pleasure in +refinding the same thing (Groos, p. 103) is not the only motive which +favors the use of comparison. Besides this there is the fact that +comparison is capable of a utilization which facilitates intellectual +work; when for example, as is usually the case, one compares the less +familiar to the more familiar, the abstract to the concrete, and +explains through this comparison the more strange and the more difficult +objects. With every such comparison, especially of the abstract to the +concrete, there is a certain degradation and a certain economy in +abstraction expenditure (in the sense of a conceptual mimicry) yet this +naturally does not suffice to render prominent the character of the +comic. The latter does not emerge suddenly from the freed pleasure of +the comparison but comes gradually; there are many cases which only +touch the comic, in which one might doubt whether they show the comic +character. The comparison undoubtedly becomes comical when the _niveau_ +difference of the expenditure of abstraction between the two things +compared becomes increased, if something serious and strange, especially +of intellectual or moral nature is compared to something banal and +lowly. The former release of pleasure and the contribution from the +conditions of conceptual mimicry may perhaps explain the gradual +change—which is determined by quantitative relations,—from the +universally pleasurable to the comic, which takes place during the +comparison. I am certainly avoiding misunderstandings in that I +emphasize that I deduce the comic pleasure in the comparison, not from +the contrast of the two things compared but from the difference of the +two abstraction expenditures. The strange which is difficult to grasp, +the abstract and really intellectually sublime, through its alleged +agreement with a familiar lowly one, in the imagination of which every +abstraction expenditure disappears, is now itself unmasked as something +equally lowly. The comic of comparison thus becomes reduced to a case of +degradation. + +The comparison, as we have seen above, can now be witty without a trace +of comic admixture, especially when it happens to evade the degradation. +Thus the comparison of Truth to a torch which one cannot carry through a +crowd without singeing somebody’s beard is pure wit, because it takes an +obsolete expression (“The torch of truth”) at its full value and not at +all in a comical sense, and because the torch as an object does not lack +a certain distinction, though it is a concrete object. However, a +comparison may just as well be witty as comic, and what is more one may +be independent of the other, in that the comparison becomes an aid for +certain techniques of wit, as, for example, unification or allusion. +Thus Nestroy’s comparison of memory to a “Warehouse” (p. 120) is +simultaneously comical and witty, first, on account of the extraordinary +degradation to which the psychological conception must consent in the +comparison to a “Warehouse,” and secondly, because he who utilizes the +comparison is a clerk, and in this comparison he establishes a rather +unexpected unification between psychology and his vocation. Heine’s +verse, “until at last the buttons tore from the pants of my patience,” +seems at first an excellent example of a comic degrading comparison, but +on closer reflection we must ascribe to it also the attribute of +wittiness, since the comparison as a means of allusion strikes into the +realm of the obscene and causes a release of pleasure from the obscene. +Through a union not altogether incidental the same material also gives +us a resultant pleasure which is at the same time comical and witty; it +does not matter whether or not the conditions of the one promote the +origin of the other, such a union acts confusingly on the “feeling” +whose function it is to announce to us whether we have before us wit or +the comic, and only a careful examination independent of the disposition +of pleasure can decide the question. + +As tempting as it would be to trace these more intimate determinations +of comic pleasure, the author must remember that neither his previous +education nor his daily vocation justifies him in extending his +investigations beyond the spheres of wit, and he must confess that it is +precisely the subject of comic comparison which makes him feel his +incompetence. + +We are quite willing to be reminded that many authors do not recognize +the clear notional and objective distinction between wit and comic, as +we were impelled to do, and that they classify wit merely as “the comic +of speech” or “of words.” To test this view let us select one example of +intentional and one of involuntary comic of speech and compare it with +wit. We have already mentioned before that we are in a good position to +distinguish comic from witty speech. “With a fork and with effort, his +mother pulled him out of the mess,” is only comical, but Heine’s verse +about the four castes of the population of Göttingen: “Professors, +students, Philistines, and cattle,” is exquisitely witty. + +As an example of the intentional comic of speech I will take as a model +Stettenheim’s _Wippchen_. We call Stettenheim witty because he possesses +the cleverness that evokes the comic. The wit which one “has” in +contradistinction to the wit which one “makes,” is indeed correctly +conditioned by this ability. It is true that the letters of Wippchen are +also witty in so far as they are interspersed with a rich collection of +all sorts of witticisms, some of which very successful ones, (as +“festively undressed” when he speaks of a parade of savages), but what +lends the peculiar character to these productions is not these isolated +witticisms, but the superabundant flow of comic speech contained +therein. Originally _Wippchen_ was certainly meant to represent a +satirical character, a modification of Freytag’s Schmock, one of those +uneducated persons who trade in the educational treasure of the nation +and abuse it; but the pleasure in the comic effect experienced in +representing this person seems gradually to have pushed to the +background the author’s satirical tendency. Wippchen’s productions are +for the most part “comic nonsense.” The author has justly utilized the +pleasant mood resulting from the accumulation of such achievements to +present beside the altogether admissible material all sorts of +absurdities which would be intolerable in themselves. Wippchen’s +nonsense appears to be of a specific nature only on account of its +special technique. If we look closer into some of these “witticisms,” we +find that some forms which have impressed their character on the whole +production are especially conspicuous. Wippchen makes use mostly of +compositions (fusions), of modifications of familiar expressions and +quotations. He replaces some of the banal elements in these expressions +by others which are usually more pretentious and more valuable. This +naturally comes near to the techniques of wit. + + + _The Comic of Speech_ + +Some of the fusions taken from the preface and the first pages are the +following: “_Turkey’s money is like the hay of the sea._” This is only a +condensation of the two expressions, “Money like hay,” “Money like the +sands of the sea.” Or: “_I am nothing but a leafless pillar which tells +of a vanished splendor_,” which is a fusion of “leafless trunk” and “a +pillar which, etc.” Or: “_Where is Ariadne’s thread which leads out of +the Scylla of this Augean stable?_” for which three different Greek +myths contribute an element each. + +The modifications and substitutions can be treated collectively without +much forcing; their character can be seen from the following examples +which are peculiar to Wippchen, they are regularly permeated by a +different wording which is more fluent, most banal, and reduced to mere +platitudes. + +“_To hang my paper and ink high._” The saying: “To hang one’s +bread-basket high,” expresses metaphorically the idea of placing one +under difficult conditions. But why not stretch this figure to other +material? + +“_Already in my youth Pegasus was alive in me._” When the word “pegasus” +is replaced by “the poet,” one can recognize it as an expression often +used in autobiographies. Naturally “pegasus” is not the proper word to +replace the words “the poet,” but it has thought associations to it and +is a high-sounding word. + +From Wippchen’s other numerous productions some examples can be shown +which present the pure comic. As an example of comic disillusionment the +following can be cited: “_For hours the battle raged, finally it +remained undecisive_”; an example of comical unmasking (of ignorance) is +the following: “_Clio, the Medusa of history_,” or quotations like the +following: “_Habent sua fata morgana._” But our interest is aroused more +by the fusions and modifications because they recall familiar techniques +of wit. We may compare them to such modification witticisms as the +following: “He has a great future behind him,” and Lichtenberg’s +modification witticisms such as: “New baths heal well,” etc. Should +Wippchen’s productions having the same technique be called witticisms, +or what distinguishes them from the latter? + +It is surely not difficult to answer this. Let us remember that wit +presents to the hearer a double face, and forces him to two different +views. In nonsense-witticisms such as those mentioned last, one view, +which considers only the wording, states that they are nonsense; the +other view, which, in obedience to suggestion, follows the road that +leads through the hearer’s unconscious, finds very good sense in these +witticisms. In Wippchen’s wit-like productions one of these views of wit +is empty, as if stunted. It is a Janus head with only one countenance +developed. One would get nowhere should he be tempted to proceed by +means of this technique to the unconscious. The condensations lead to no +case in which the two fused elements really result in a new sense; they +fall to pieces when an attempt is made to analyze them. As in wit, the +modifications and substitutions lead to a current and familiar wording, +but they themselves tell us little else and as a rule nothing that is of +any possible use. Hence the only thing remaining to these “witticisms” +is the nonsense view. Whether such productions, which have freed +themselves from one of the most essential characters of wit, should be +called “bad” wit or not wit at all, every one must decide as he feels +inclined. + +There is no doubt that such stunted wit produces a comic effect for +which we can account in more than one way. Either the comic originates +through the uncovering of the unconscious modes of thinking in a manner +similar to the cases considered above, or the wit originates by +comparison with perfect wit. Nothing prevents us from assuming that we +here deal with a union of both modes of origin of the comic pleasure. It +is not to be denied that it is precisely the inadequate dependence on +wit which here shapes the nonsense into comic nonsense. + + + _Comic of Inadequacy_ + +There are, of course, other quite apparent cases, in which such +inadequacy produced by the comparison with wit, makes the nonsense +irresistibly comic. The counterpart to wit, the riddle, can perhaps give +us better examples for this than wit itself. A facetious question +states: _What is this: It hangs on the wall and one can dry his hands on +it? It would be a foolish riddle if the answer were: a towel. On the +contrary this answer is rejected with the statement: No, it is a +herring,—“But, for mercy’s sake,” is the objection, “a herring does not +hang on the wall.”—“But you can hang it there,”—“But who wants to dry +his hands on a herring?”—“Well,” is the soft answer, “you don’t have +to.”_ This explanation given through two typical displacements show how +much this question lacks of being a real riddle, and because of this +absolute insufficiency it impresses one as irresistibly comic, rather +than mere nonsensical foolishness. Through such means, that is, by not +restricting essential conditions, wit, riddles, and other forms, which +in themselves produce no comic pleasure, can be made into sources of +comic pleasure. + +It is not so difficult to understand the case of the involuntary comic +of speech which we can perhaps find realized with as much frequency as +we like in the poems of Frederika Kempner.[78] + + ANTI-VIVISECTION. + + Fraternal sentiment should urge us + To champion the Guinea-pig, + For has it not a soul like ours, + Although most likely not as big? + +Or a conversation between a loving couple. + + THE CONTRAST. + + The young wife whispers “I’m so happy,” + “And I!” chimes in her husband’s voice, + “Because your virtues, dearest help-mate, + Reveal the wisdom of my choice.” + +There is nothing here which makes one think of wit. Doubtless, however, +it is the inadequacy of these “poetic productions,” as the very +extraordinary clumsiness of the expressions which recall the most +commonplace or newspaper style, the ingenious poverty of thoughts, the +absence of every trace of poetic manner of thinking or speaking,—it is +all these inadequacies which make these poems comic. Nevertheless it is +not at all self-evident that we should find Kempner’s poems comical; +many similar productions we merely consider very bad, we do not laugh at +them but are rather vexed with them. But here it is the great disparity +in our demand of a poem which impels us to the comic conception; where +this difference is less, we are inclined to criticise rather than laugh. +The comic effect of Kempner’s poetic productions is furthermore assured +by the additional circumstances of the lady author’s unmistakably good +intentions, and by the fact that her helpless phrases disarm our feeling +of mockery and anger. We are now reminded of a problem the consideration +of which we have so far postponed. The difference of expenditure is +surely the main condition of the comic pleasure, but observation teaches +that such difference does not always produce pleasure. What other +conditions must be added, or what disturbances must be checked in order +that pleasure should result from the difference of expenditure? But +before proceeding with the answers to these questions we wish to verify +what was said in the conclusions of the former discussion, namely, that +the comic of speech is not synonymous with wit, and that wit must be +something quite different from speech comic. + +As we are about to attack the problem just formulated, concerning the +conditions of the origin of comic pleasure from the difference of +expenditure, we may permit ourselves to facilitate this task so as to +cause ourselves some pleasure. To give a correct answer to this question +would amount to an exhaustive presentation of the nature of the comic +for which we are fitted neither by ability nor authority. We shall +therefore again be content to elucidate the problem of the comic only so +far as it distinctly separates itself from wit. + +All theories of the comic were objected to by the critics on the ground +that in defining the comic these theories overlooked the essential +element of it. This can be seen from the following theories, with their +objections. The comic depends on a contrasting idea; yes, in so far as +this contrast effects one comically and in no other way. The feeling of +the comic results from the dwindling away of an expectation; yes, if the +disappointment does not prove to be painful. There is no doubt that +these objections are justified, but they are overestimated if one +concludes from them that the essential characteristic mark of the comic +has hitherto escaped our conception. What depreciates the general +validity of these definitions are conditions which are indispensable for +the origin of the comic pleasure, but which will be searched in vain for +the nature of comic pleasure. The rejection of the objections and the +explanations of the contradictions to the definitions of the comic will +become easy for us, only after we trace back comic pleasure to the +difference resulting from a comparison of two expenditures. Comic +pleasure and the effect by which it is recognized—laughter, can +originate only when this difference is no longer utilizable and when it +is capable of discharge. We gain no pleasurable effect, or at most a +flighty feeling of pleasure in which the comic does not appear, if the +difference is put to other use as soon as it is recognized. Just as +special precautions must be taken in wit, in order to guard against +making new use of expenditure recognized as superfluous, so also can +comic pleasure originate only under relations which fulfil this latter +condition. The cases in which such differences of expenditure originate +in our ideational life are therefore uncommonly numerous, while the +cases in which the comic originates from them is comparatively very +rare. + + + _The Conditions of Isolation of the Comic_ + +Two observations obtrude themselves upon the observer who reviews even +only superficially the origin of comic pleasure from the difference of +expenditure; first, that there are cases in which the comic appears +regularly and as if necessarily; and, in contrast to these cases, others +in which this appearance depends on the conditions of the case and on +the viewpoint of the observer; but secondly, that unusually large +differences very often triumph over unfavorable conditions, so that the +comic feeling originates in spite of it. In reference to the first point +one may set up two classes, the inevitable comic and the accidental +comic, although one will have to be prepared from the beginning to find +exceptions in the first class to the inevitableness of the comic. It +would be tempting to follow the conditions which are essential to each +class. + +What is important in the second class are the conditions of which one +may be designated as the “isolation” of the comic case. A closer +analysis renders conspicuous relations something like the following: + +a) The favorable condition for the origin of comic pleasure is brought +about by a general happy disposition in which “one is in the mood for +laughing.” In happy toxic states almost everything seems comic, which +probably results from a comparison with the expenditure in normal +conditions. For wit, the comic, and all similar methods of gaining +pleasure from the psychic activities, are nothing but ways to regain +this happy state—euphoria—from one single point, when it does not exist +as a general disposition of the psyche. + +b) A similar favorable condition is produced by the expectation of the +comic or by putting one’s self in the right mood for comic pleasure. +Hence when the intention to make things comical exists and when this +feeling is shared by others, the differences required are so slight that +they probably would have been overlooked had they been experienced in +unpremeditated occurrences. He who decides to attend a comic lecture or +a farce at the theater is indebted to this intention for laughing over +things which in his everyday life would hardly produce in him a comic +effect. He finally laughs at the recollection of having laughed, at the +expectation of laughing, and at the appearance of the one who is to +present the comic, even before the latter makes the attempt to make him +laugh. It is for this reason that people admit that they are ashamed of +that which made them laugh at the theater. + +c) Unfavorable conditions for the comic result from the kind of psychic +activity which may occupy the individual at the moment. Imaginative or +mental activity tending towards serious aims disturbs the discharging +capacity of the investing energies which the activity needs for its own +displacements, so that only unexpected and great differences of +expenditure can break through to form comic pleasure. All manner of +mental processes far enough removed from the obvious to cause a +suspension of ideational mimicry are unfavorable to the comic; in +abstract contemplation there is hardly any room left for the comic, +except when this form of thinking is suddenly interrupted. + +d) The occasion for releasing comic pleasure vanishes when the attention +is fixed on the comparison capable of giving rise to the comic. Under +such circumstances the comic force is lost from that which is otherwise +sure to produce a comic effect. A movement or a mental activity cannot +become comical to him whose interest is fixed at the time of comparing +this movement with a standard which distinctly presents itself to him. +Thus the examiner does not see the comical in the nonsense produced by +the student in his ignorance; he is simply annoyed by it, whereas the +offender’s classmates who are more interested in his chances of passing +the examination than in what he knows, laugh heartily over the same +nonsense. The teacher of dancing or gymnastics seldom has any eyes for +the comic movements of his pupils, and the preacher entirely loses sight +of humanity’s defects of character, which the writer of comedy brings +out with so much effect. The comic process cannot stand examination by +the attention, it must be able to proceed absolutely unnoticed in a +manner similar to wit. But for good reasons, it would contradict the +nomenclature of “conscious processes” which I have used in _The +Interpretation of Dreams_, if one wished to call it of necessity +_unconscious_. It rather belongs to the _foreconscious_, and one may use +the fitting name “automatic” for all those processes which are enacted +in the foreconscious and dispense with the attention energy which is +connected with consciousness. The process of comparison of the +expenditures must remain automatic if it is to produce comic pleasure. + + + _Conditions Disturbing the Discharge_ + +e) It is exceedingly disturbing to the comic if the case from which it +originates gives rise at the same time to a marked release of affect. +The discharge of the affective difference is then as a rule excluded. +Affects, disposition, and the attitude of the individual in occasional +cases make it clear that the comic comes or goes with the viewpoint of +the individual person; that only in exceptional cases is there an +absolute comic. The dependence or relativity of the comic is therefore +much greater than of wit, which never happens but is regularly made, and +at its production one may already give attention to the conditions under +which it finds acceptance. But affective development is the most +intensive of the conditions which disturb the comic, the significance of +which is well known.[79] It is therefore said that the comic feeling +comes most in tolerably indifferent cases which evince no strong +feelings or interests. Nevertheless it is just in cases with affective +release that one may witness the production of a particularly strong +expenditure-difference in the automatism of discharge. When Colonel +Butler answers Octavio’s admonitions with “bitter laughter,” exclaiming: + + “Thanks from the house of Austria!” + +his bitterness has thus not prevented the laughter which results from +the recollection of the disappointment which he believes he has +experienced; and on the other hand, the magnitude of this disappointment +could not have been more impressively depicted by the poet than by +showing it capable of affecting laughter in the midst of the storm of +unchained affects. It is my belief that this explanation may be +applicable in all cases in which laughing occurs on other than +pleasurable occasions, and in conjunction with exceedingly painful or +tense affects. + +f) If we also mention that the development of the comic pleasure can be +promoted by means of any other pleasurable addition to the case which +acts like a sort of contact-effect (after the manner of the +fore-pleasure principle in the tendency-wit), then we have discussed +surely not all the conditions of comic pleasure, yet enough of them to +serve our purpose. We then see that no other assumption so easily covers +these conditions, as well as the inconstancy and dependence of the comic +effect, as this: the assumption that comic pleasure is derived from the +discharge of a difference, which under many conditions can be diverted +to a different use than discharge. + + +It still remains to give a thorough consideration of the comic of the +sexual and obscene, but we shall only skim over it with a few +observations. Here, too, we shall take the act of exposing one’s body as +the starting-point. An accidental exposure produces a comical effect on +us, because we compare the ease with which we attained the enjoyment of +this view with the great expenditure otherwise necessary for the +attainment of this object. The case thus comes nearer to the +naïve-comic, but it is simpler than the latter. In every case of +exhibitionism in which we are made spectators—or, in the case of the +smutty joke hearers,—we play the part of the third person, and the +person exposed is made comical. We have heard that it is the purpose of +wit to replace obscenity and in this manner to reopen a source of comic +pleasure that has been lost. On the contrary, spying out an exposure +forms no example of the comic for the one spying, because the effort he +exerts thereby abrogates the condition of comic pleasure; the only thing +remaining is the sexual pleasure in what is seen. If the spy relates to +another what he has seen, the person looked at again becomes comical, +because the viewpoint that predominates is that the expenditure was +omitted which would have been necessary for the concealment of the +private parts. At all events, the sphere of the sexual or obscene offers +the richest opportunities for gaining comic pleasure beside the +pleasurable sexual stimulation, as it exposes the person’s dependence on +his physical needs (degradation) or it can uncover behind the spiritual +love the physical demands of the same (unmasking.) + + + _The Psychogenesis of the Comic_ + +An invitation to seek the understanding of the comic in its +psychogenesis comes surprisingly from Bergson’s well written and +stimulating book _Laughter_. Bergson, whose formula for the conception +of the comic character has already become known to us—“mechanization of +life,” “the substitution of something mechanical for the +natural”—reaches by obvious associations from automatism to the +automaton, and seeks to trace a series of comic effects to the blurred +memories of children’s toys. In this connection he once reaches this +viewpoint, which, to be sure, he soon drops; he seeks to trace the comic +to the after-effect of childish pleasure. “Perhaps we ought even to +carry simplification still farther, and, going back to our earliest +recollection, try to discover in the games that amused us as children +the first faint traces of the combinations that make us laugh as +grown-up persons.”... “Above all, we are too apt to ignore the childish +element, so to speak, latent in most of our joyful emotions” (p. 67). As +we have now traced wit to that childish playing with words and thoughts +which is prohibited by the rational critic, we must be tempted to trace +also these infantile roots of the comic, conjectured by Bergson. + +As a matter of fact we meet a whole series of conditions which seem most +promising, when we examine the relation of the comic to the child. The +child itself does not by any means seem comic to us, although its +character fulfills all conditions which, in comparison to our own, would +result in a comic difference. Thus we see the immoderate expenditure of +motion as well as the slight psychic expenditure, the control of the +psychic activities through bodily functions, and other features. The +child gives us a comic impression only when it does not behave as a +child but as an earnest grown-up, and even then it affects us only in +the same manner as other persons in disguise; but as long as it retains +the nature of the child our perception of it furnishes us a pure +pleasure, which perhaps recalls the comic. We call it naïve in so far as +it displays to us the absence of inhibitions, and we call naïve-comic +those of its utterances which in another we would have considered +obscene or witty. + +On the other hand the child lacks all feeling for the comic. This +sentence seems to say no more than that this comic feeling, like many +others, first makes its appearance in the course of psychic development; +and that would by no means be remarkable, especially since we must admit +that it shows itself distinctly even during years which must be +accredited to childhood. Nevertheless it can be demonstrated that the +assertion that the child lacks feeling for the comic has a deeper +meaning than one would suppose. In the first place it will readily be +seen that it cannot be different, if our conception is correct, that the +comic feeling results from a difference of expenditure produced in the +effort to understand the other. Let us again take comic motion as an +example. The comparison which furnishes the difference reads as follows, +when put in conscious formulæ: “So he does it,” and: “So I would do it,” +or “So I have done it.” But the child lacks the standard contained in +the second sentence, it understands simply through imitation; it just +does it. Education of the child furnishes it with the standard: “So you +shall do it,” and if it now makes use of the same in comparisons, the +nearest conclusion is: “He has not done it right, and I can do it +better.” In this case it laughs at the other, it laughs at him with a +feeling of superiority. There is nothing to prevent us from tracing this +laughter also to a difference of expenditure; but according to the +analogy with the examples of laughter occurring in us we may conclude +that the comic feeling is not experienced by the child when it laughs as +an expression of superiority. It is a laughter of pure pleasure. In our +own case whenever the judgment of our own superiority occurs we smile +rather than laugh, or if we laugh, we are still able to distinguish +clearly this conscious realization of our superiority from the comic +which makes us laugh. + +It is probably correct to say that in many cases which we perceive as +“comical” and which we cannot explain, the child laughs out of pure +pleasure, whereas the child’s motives are clear and assignable. If, for +instance, some one slips on the street and falls, we laugh because this +impression—we know not why—is comical. The child laughs in the same case +out of a feeling of superiority or out of joy over the calamity of +others. It amounts to saying: “You fell, but I did not.” Certain +pleasure motives of the child seems to be lost for us grown-ups, but as +a substitute for these we perceive under the same conditions the “comic” +feeling. + + + _The Infantile and the Comic_ + +If we were permitted to generalize, it would seem very tempting to +transfer the desired specific character of the comic into the awakening +of the infantile, and to conceive the comic as a regaining of “lost +infantile laughing.” One could then say, “I laugh every time over a +difference of expenditure between the other and myself, when I discover +in the other the child.” Or expressed more precisely, the whole +comparison leading to the comic would read as follows: + + “He does it this way—I do it differently— + He does it just as I did when I was a child.” + +This laughter would thus result every time from the comparison between +the ego of the grown-up and the ego of the child. The uncertainty itself +of the comic difference, causing now the lesser and now the greater +expenditure to appear comical to me, would correspond to the infantile +determination; the comic therein is actually always on the side of the +infantile. + +This is not contradicted by the fact that the child itself as an object +of comparison does not make a comic impression on me but a purely +pleasurable one, nor by the fact that this comparison with the infantile +produces a comic effect only when any other use of the difference is +avoided. For the conditions of the discharge come thereby into +consideration. Everything that confines a psychic process in an +association of ideas works against the discharge of the surplus +occupation of energy and directs the same to other utilization; whatever +isolates a psychic act favors the discharge. By consciously focussing on +the child as the person of comparison, the discharge necessary for the +production of comic pleasure therefore becomes impossible; only in +foreconscious energetic states is there a similar approach to the +isolation which we may moreover also ascribe to the psychic processes in +the child. The addition to the comparison: “Thus I have also done it as +a child,” from which the comic effect would emanate, could come into +consideration for the average difference only when no other association +could obtain control over the freed surplus. + +If we still continue with our attempt to find the nature of the comic in +the foreconscious association of the infantile, we have to go a step +further than Bergson and admit that the comparison resulting in the +comic need not necessarily awake old childish pleasure and play, but +that it is enough if it touches the childish nature in general, perhaps +even childish pain. Herein we deviate from Bergson, but remain +consistent with ourselves, when we connect the comic pleasure not with +remembered pleasure but always with a comparison. This is possible, for +cases of the first kind comprise in a measure those which are regularly +and irresistibly comic. Let us now draw up the scheme of the comic +possibilities instanced above. We stated that the comic difference would +be found either + +(a) through a comparison between the other and one’s self, or (b) +through a comparison altogether within the other, or (c) through a +comparison altogether within one’s self. + +In the first case the other would appear to me as a child, in the second +he would put himself on the level of a child, and in the third I would +find the child in myself. To the first class belong the comic of +movement and of forms, of psychic activity and of character. The +infantile corresponding to it would be the motion-impulse and the +inferior mental and moral development of the child, so that the fool +would perhaps become comical to me by reminding me of a lazy child, and +the bad person by reminding me of a naughty child. The only time one +might speak of a childish pleasure lost to grown-ups would be where the +child’s own motion pleasure came into consideration. + +The second case, in which the comic altogether depends on identification +with the other, comprises numerous possibilities such as the comic +situation, exaggeration (caricature), imitation, degradation, and +unmasking. It is under this head that the presentation of infantile +viewpoints mostly take place. For the comic situation is largely based +on embarrassment, in which we feel again the helplessness of the child. +The worst of these embarrassments, the disturbance of other activities +through the imperative demands of natural wants, corresponds to the +child’s lack of control of the physical functions. Where the comic +situation acts through repetitions it is based on the pleasure of +constant repetition peculiar to the child (asking questions, telling +stories), through which it makes itself a nuisance to grown-ups. +Exaggeration, which also affords pleasure even to the grown-up in so far +as it is justified by his reason, corresponds to the characteristic want +of moderation in the child, and its ignorance of all quantitative +relations which it later really learns to know as qualitative. To keep +within bounds, to practice moderation even in permissible feelings is a +late fruit of education, and is gained through opposing inhibitions of +the psychic activity acquired in the same association. Wherever this +association is weakened as in the unconscious of dreams and in the +monoideation of the psychoneuroses, the want of moderation of the child +again makes its appearance. + +The understanding of comic imitation has caused us many difficulties so +long as we left out of consideration the infantile factor. But imitation +is the child’s best art and is the impelling motive of most of its +playing. The child’s ambition is not so much to distinguish himself +among his equals as to imitate the big fellows. The relation of the +child to the grown-up determines also the comic of degradation, which +corresponds to the lowering of the grown-up in the life of the child. +Few things can afford the child greater pleasure than when the grown-up +lowers himself to its level, disregards his superiority, and plays with +the child as its equal. The alleviation which furnishes the child pure +pleasure is a debasement used by the adult as a means of making things +comic and as a source of comic pleasure. As for unmasking we know that +it is based on degradation. + +The infantile determination of the third case, the comic of expectation, +presents most of the difficulties; this really explains why those +authors who put this case to the foreground in their conception of the +comic, found no occasion to consider the infantile factor in their +studies of the comic. The comic of expectation is farthest from the +child’s thoughts, the ability to understand this is the latest quality +to appear in him. Most of those cases which produce a comic effect in +the grown-up are probably felt by the child as a disappointment. One can +refer, however, to the blissful expectation and gullibility of the child +in order to understand why one considers himself as comical “as a +child,” when he succumbs to comic disappointment. + +If the preceding remarks produce a certain probability that the comic +feeling may be translated into the thought; everything is comic that +does not fit the grown-up, I still do not feel bold enough,—in view of +my whole position to the problem of the comic—to defend this last +proposition with the same earnestness as those that I formulated before. +I am unable to decide whether the lowering to the level of the child is +only a special case of comic degradation, or whether everything comical +fundamentally depends on the degradation to the level of the child.[80] + + + _Humor_ + +An examination of the comic, however superficial it may be, would be +most incomplete if it did not devote at least a few remarks to the +consideration of _humor_. There is so little doubt as to the essential +relationship between the two that a tentative explanation of the comic +must furnish at least one component for the understanding of humor. It +does not matter how much appropriate and important material was +presented as an appreciation of humor, which, as one of the highest +psychic functions, enjoys the special favor of thinkers, we still cannot +elude the temptation to express its essence through an approach to the +formulæ given for wit and the comic. + +We have heard that the release of painful emotions is the strongest +hindrance to the comic effect. Just as aimless motion causes harm, +stupidity mischief, and disappointment pain;—the possibility of a comic +effect eventually ends, at least for him who cannot defend himself +against such pain, who is himself affected by it or must participate in +it, whereas the disinterested party shows by his behavior that the +situation of the case in question contains everything necessary to +produce comic effect. Humor is thus a means to gain pleasure despite the +painful affects which disturb it; it acts as a substitute for this +affective development, and takes its place. If we are in a situation +which tempts us to liberate painful affects according to our habits, and +motives then urge us to suppress these affects _statu nascendi_, we have +the conditions for humor. In the cases just cited the person affected by +misfortune, pain, etc., could obtain humoristic pleasure while the +disinterested party laughs over the comic pleasure. We can only say that +the pleasure of humor results at the cost of this discontinued +liberation of affect; it originates through the _economized expenditure +of affect_. + + + _The Economy in Expenditure of Affect_ + +Humor is the most self-sufficient of the forms of the comic; its process +consummating itself in one single person and the participation of +another adds nothing new to it. I can enjoy the pleasure of humor +originating in myself without feeling the necessity of imparting it to +another. It is not easy to tell what happens dining the production of +humoristic pleasure in a person; but one gains a certain insight by +investigating these cases of humor which have emanated from persons with +whom we have entered into a sympathetic understanding. By +sympathetically understanding the humoristic person in these cases one +gets the same pleasure. The coarsest form of humor, the so-called humor +of the gallows or grim-humor (_Galgenhumor_), may enlighten us in this +regard. The rogue, on being led to execution on Monday, remarked: “Yes, +this week is beginning well.” This is really a witticism, as the remark +is quite appropriate in itself, on the other hand it is displaced in the +most nonsensical fashion, as there can be no further happening for him +this week. But it required humor to make such wit, that is, to overlook +what distinguished the beginning of this week from other weeks, and to +deny the difference which could give rise to motives for very particular +emotional feelings. The case is the same when on the way to the gallows +he requests a neckerchief for his bare neck, in order to guard against +taking cold, a precaution which would be quite praiseworthy under +different circumstances, but becomes exceedingly superfluous and +indifferent in view of the impending fate of this same neck. We must say +that there is something like greatness of soul in this _blague_, in this +clinging to his usual nature and in deviating from that which would +overthrow and drive this nature into despair. This form of grandeur of +humor thus appears unmistakably in cases in which our admiration is not +inhibited by the circumstances of the humoristic person. + +In Victor Hugo’s _Ernani_ the bandit who entered into a conspiracy +against his king, Charles I, of Spain, (Charles V, as the German +Emperor), falls into the hands of his most powerful enemy; he foresees +his fate; as one convicted of high treason his head will fall. But this +prospect does not deter him from introducing himself as a hereditary +Grandee of Spain and from declaring that he has no intention of waiving +any prerogative belonging to such personage. A Grandee of Spain could +appear before his royal master with his head covered. Well: + + “Nos têtes ont le droit + De tomber couvertes devant de toi.”[81] + +This is excellent humor and if we do not laugh on hearing it, it is +because our admiration covers the humoristic pleasure. In the case of +the rogue who did not wish to take cold on the way to the gallows we +roar with laughter. The situation which should have driven this criminal +to despair, might have evoked in us intense pity, but this pity is +inhibited because we understand that he who is most concerned is quite +indifferent to the situation. As a result of this understanding the +expenditure for pity, which was already prepared in us, became +inapplicable and we laughed it off. The indifference of the rogue, which +we notice has cost him a great expenditure of psychic labor, infects us +as it were. + +Economy of sympathy is one of the most frequent sources of humoristic +pleasure. Mark Twain’s humor usually follows this mechanism. When he +tells us about the life of his brother, how, as mi employee in a large +road-building enterprise, he was hurled into the air through a premature +explosion of a blast, to come to earth again far from the place where he +was working, feelings of sympathy for this unfortunate are invariably +aroused in us. We should like to inquire whether he sustained no injury +in this accident; but the continuation of the story that the brother +lost a half-day’s pay for being away from the place he worked diverts us +entirely from sympathy and makes us almost as hard-hearted as that +employer, and just as indifferent to the possible injury to the victim’s +health. Another time Mark Twain presents us his pedigree, which he +traces back almost as far back as one of the companions of Columbus. But +after describing the character of this ancestor, whose entire +possessions consisted of several pieces of linen each bearing a +different mark, we cannot help laughing at the expense of the stored-up +piety, a piety which characterized our frame of mind at the beginning of +this family history. The mechanism of humoristic pleasure is not +disturbed by our knowing that this family history is a fictitious one, +and that this fiction serves a satirical tendency to expose the +embellishments which result in imparting such pedigrees to others; it is +just as independent of the conditions of reality as the manufactured +comic. Another of Mark Twain’s stories relates how his brother +constructed for himself subterranean quarters into which he brought a +bed, a table, and a lamp, and that as a roof he used a large piece of +sail-cloth with a hole through the centre; how during the night after +the room was completed, a cow being driven home fell through the opening +in the ceiling on to the table and extinguished the lamp; how his +brother helped patiently to hoist the animal out and to rearrange +everything; how he did the same thing when the same disturbance was +repeated the following night; and then every succeeding night; such a +story becomes comical through repetition. But Mark Twain closes with the +information that in the forty-sixth night when the cow again fell +through, his brother finally remarked that the thing was beginning to +grow monotonous; and here we can no longer restrain our humoristic +pleasure, for we had long expected to hear how the brother would express +his anger over this chronic _malheur_. The slight humor which we draw +from our own life we usually produce at the expense of anger instead of +irritating ourselves.[82] + + + _Forms of Humor_ + +The forms of humor are extraordinarily varied according to the nature of +the emotional feelings which are economized in favor of humor, as +sympathy, anger, pain, compassion, etc. And this series seems incomplete +because the sphere of humor experiences a constant enlargement, as often +as an artist or writer succeeds in mastering humoristically the, as yet, +unconquered emotional feelings and in making them, through artifices +similar to those in the above example, a source of humoristic pleasure. +Thus the artists of _Simplicissimus_ have worked wonders in gaining +humor at the expense of fear and disgust. The manifestations of humor +are above all determined by two peculiarities, which are connected with +the conditions of its origin. In the first place, humor may appear fused +with wit or any other form of the comic; whereby it is entrusted with +the task of removing a possible emotional development which would form a +hindrance to the pleasurable effect. Secondly, it can entirely set aside +this emotional development or only partially, which is really the more +frequent case, because the simpler function and the different forms of +“broken”[83] humor, results in that humor which smiles under its tears. +It withdraws from the affect a part of its energy and gives instead the +accompanying humoristic sound. + +As may be noticed by former examples the humoristic pleasure gained by +entering into sympathy with a thing results from a special technique +resembling displacement through which the liberation of affect held +ready is disappointed and the energy occupation is deflected to other, +and, not often, to secondary matters. This does not help us, however, to +understand the process by which the displacement from the development of +affect proceeds in the humoristic person himself. We see that the +recipient intimates the producer of the humor in his psychic processes, +but we discover nothing thereby concerning the forces which make this +process possible in the latter. + +We can only say, when, for example, somebody succeeds in paying no heed +to a painful affect because he holds before himself the greatness of the +world’s interest as a contrast to his own smallness, that we see in this +no function of humor but one of philosophic thinking, and we gain no +pleasure even if we put ourselves into his train of thought. The +humoristic displacement is therefore just as impossible in the light of +conscious attention as is the comic comparison; like the latter it is +connected with the condition to remain in the foreconscious—that is to +say, to remain automatic. + +One reaches some solution of humoristic displacement if one examines it +in the light of a defense process. The defense processes are the psychic +correlates of the flight reflex and follow the task of guarding against +the origin of pain from inner sources; in fulfilling this task they +serve the psychic function as an automatic adjustment, which finally +proves harmful and therefore must be subjected to the control of the +conscious thinking. A definite form of this defense, the failure of +repression, I have demonstrated as the effective mechanism in the origin +of the psychoneuroses. Humor can now be conceived as the loftiest +variant of this defense activity. It disdains to withdraw from conscious +attention the ideas which are connected with the painful affect, as +repression does, and thus it overcomes the defense automatism. It brings +this about by finding the means to withdraw the energy resulting from +the liberation of pain which is held in readiness and through discharge +changes the same into pleasure. It is even credible that it is again the +connection with the infantile that puts at humor’s disposal the means +for this function. Only in childhood did we experience intensively +painful affects over which to-day as grown-ups we would laugh; just as a +humorist laughs over his present painful affects. The elevation of his +ego, of which humoristic displacement gives evidence,—the translation of +which would read: I am too big to have these causes affect me +painfully—he could find in the comparison of his present ego with his +infantile ego. This conception is to some extent confirmed by the rôle +which falls to the infantile in the neurotic processes of repression. + + + _The Relation of Humor to Wit and Comic_ + +On the whole humor is closer to the comic than wit. Like the former its +psychic localization is in the foreconscious, whereas wit, as we had to +assume, is formed as a compromise between the unconscious and the +foreconscious. On the other hand, humor has no share in the peculiar +nature in which wit and the comic meet, a peculiarity which perhaps we +have not hitherto emphasized strongly enough. It is a condition for the +origin of the comic that we be induced to apply—either _simultaneously_ +or in rapid succession—to the same thought function two different modes +of ideas, between which the “comparison” then takes place and thus forms +the comic difference. Such differences originate between the expenditure +of the stranger and one’s own, between the usual expenditure and the +emergency expenditure, between an anticipated expenditure and one which +has already occurred.[84] + +The difference between two forms of conception resulting simultaneously, +which work with different expenditures, comes into consideration in wit, +in respect to the hearer. The one of these two conceptions, by taking +the hints contained in the witticism, follows the train of thought +through the unconscious, while the other conception remains on the +surface and presents the witticism like any wording from the +foreconscious which has become conscious. Perhaps it would not be +considered an unjustified statement if we should refer the pleasure of +the witticism heard to the difference between these two forms of +presentation. + +Concerning wit we here repeat our former statement concerning its +Janus-like double-facedness, a simile we used when the relation between +wit and the comic still appeared to us unsettled.[85] + +The character thus put into the foreground becomes indistinct when we +deal with humor. To be sure, we feel the humoristic pleasure where an +emotional feeling is evaded, which we might have expected as a pleasure +usually belonging to the situation; and in so far humor really falls +under the broadened conception of the comic of expectation. But in humor +it is no longer a question of two different kinds of presentations +having the same content; the fact that the situation comes under the +domination of a painful emotional feeling which should have been +avoided, puts an end to possible comparison with the nature in the comic +and in wit. The humoristic displacement is really a case of that +different kind of utilization of a freed expenditure which proved to be +so dangerous for the comic effect. + + + _Formulæ for Wit, Comic, and Humor_ + +Now, that we have reduced the mechanism of humoristic pleasure to a +formula analogous to the formula of comic pleasure and of wit, we are at +the end of our task. It has seemed to us that the pleasure of wit +originates from an _economy of expenditure in inhibition_, of the comic +from an _economy of expenditure in thought_, and of humor from an +_economy of expenditure in feeling_. All three activities of our psychic +apparatus derive pleasure from economy. They all strive to bring back +from the psychic activity a pleasure which has really been lost in the +development of this activity. For the euphoria which we are thus +striving to obtain is nothing but the state of a bygone time in which we +were wont to defray our psychic work with slight expenditure. It is the +state of our childhood in which we did not know the comic, were +incapable of wit, and did not need humor to make us happy. + + + + + INDEX + + + A + + Abstract wit, 128 + + Absurdity, 77 + + Actuality, 186 + + Æsthetics, vi + + Agassiz, 54 + + Aggression, 138, 152, 160, 232 + + Alluring-premiums, 210 + + Allusions, 107, 108, 232 + + Ambiguity, 45 + + Ambitious impulse, 219 + + Application of same material, 49 + + Aristotle, 184 + + Attributions, 121 + + Automatic process, 238 + + Automatisms, 85, 86, 87, 235, 358 + + + B + + Bain, 226, 322 + + Bergson, 301, 337, 360 + + Blasphemous witticisms, 171 + + Bleuler, 278 + + _Bonmot_, 43 + + Brevity, 10, 29, 52, 243 + + Brill, 22, 31, 35, 37, 38, 56 + + + C + + Caricature, 280, 303, 320 + + Censor, 260 + + Characterization-wit, 71 + + Child, 190, 309, 362 + + Childhood, 149 + + Comic, 4, 10, 221, 287, 313 + element, 88 + façade, 236 + its origin, 302 + its psychogenesis, 360 + of expectation, 317 + of imitation, 336 + + Comic, of speech, 345 + motion, 304 + pleasure, its origin, 351 + situations, 303, 314 + + Comical character, 277 + + Comparison, 113 + with unification, 130 + + Composition, 31 + + Condensation, 20, 48 + examples of, 21, 22, 23 + in dreams, 31, 49, 256 + with modification and substitution, 25 + + Conflict, 163 + + Contrast, 8 + + Critical witticisms, 171 + + Cynical tendency, 204 + witticisms and self-criticism, 166 + + Cynicism, 65, 161 + pessimistic, 170 + + + D + + Darwin, 226 + + Defence, 138 + reaction, 142 + + Derision, 157 + + De Quincey, 22 + + Disguise, 303 + + Displacement, 67, 61, 161 + in dreams, 256 + + Displacement-wit, 68, 71, 237 + + Don Quixote, 377 + + Double meaning, 40, 103 + and displacement, 66 + of a name, 41 + + Doubt in witty comparisons, 118 + + Dream-formation, 260 + + Dream-work, 249, 275 + + Dreams, 30, 250, 251 + + Dugas, 224, 242 + + + E + + Economy, 49, 52, 242, 245 + of psychic expenditure, 180 + + Ehrenfels, 165 + + Exaggeration, 280 + + Exhibitionism, 142 + + + F + + Façade, 155, 158 + + Facetious questions, 238 + + Falke, 14, 80, 95 + + Falstaff, Sir John, 376 + + Faulty thinking, 81, 84 + + Fechner, 188, 207, 280 + + Fischer, 3, 4, 6, 11, 43, 47, 55, 89, 132, 136 + + Flaubert, 24 + + Foreconscious, 282 + + Fore-pleasure, 209, 211 + + + G + + Goethe, 133 + + Grim-humor, 372 + + Groos, 183, 184, 185, 195 + + Gross, 278 + + + H + + Harmless wit, 128, 211, 219, 222, 284 + and tendency-wit, 130 + + Heine, 9, 15, 26, 43, 44, 47, 55, 57, 92, 94, 106, 109, 119, 122, 171, + 215, 216, 223, 341 + + Heymans, 9, 215 + + Holmes, 37 + + Hugo, 373 + + Humor, 370 + Mark Twain’s, 374 + + + I + + Imitations, 303, 322 + + Impulse to impart wit, 200 + + Indirect expression, 100 + with allusion, 101 + + Infantile and the comic, 364 + + Inhibitions, 140, 197, 206, 230, 231, 236, 290 + expenditure of, 180 + + Insults, 209 + + Invectives, 148, 277 + + Ironical wit, 100 + + Irony, 276 + + + J + + Jest, 197, 201, 211, 274, 284 + + Johnson, 45 + + Jokes, cynical, 164 + good or poor, 182 + Jewish, 59, 72, 97, 166, 218 + smutty, 139, 140, 145, 233 + + + K + + Kant, 320 + + Kleinpaul, 198 + + Kraepelin, 7 + + + L + + Lassalle, 115 + + Laugh, 221 + + Laughter as a discharge, 228 + its determination, 224, 226 + + Lessing, 97, 130 + + Libido, 141 + + Lichtenberg, 39, 78, 89, 95, 97, 104, 115, 118, 121, 122, 129, 132, + 149, 218 + + Lipps, 3, 4, 6, 10, 30, 93, 215, 227, 254, 320, 326 + + + M + + Manifold application, 40, 45 + + Matthews, 44 + + Michelet, 78 + + Modification, 42 + + Moll, 141 + + Morality, 163 + + Motives, 214, 239 + + + N + + Naïve, 290 + characteristics of, 295 + examples of, 291 + + Negativism, 276 + + Nestroy, 120, 341 + + Nonsense, 72, 192, 200, 279 + + Nonsense-witticisms, 76 + + + O + + Obscene wit, 138, 203 + + Obscenity, 142 + + Omission, 82, 107, 232 + + Outdoing wit, 96, 97 + + + P + + Parody, 280, 324 + + Pascal, 337 + + Paul, 3, 7, 8, 18, 29, 301 + + Persons in tendency-wit, 144, 221, 222, 230, 231, 240 + + Perversion, 141 + + Phillips, 151 + + Play, 211 + and jest, 195 + on words, 40 + + Playing with words, 196 + + Pleasure in nonsense, 190, 271 + mechanisms of wit, 177 + sources, 150 + + Psychic energy, 227 + + Psychoneuroses, 147 + + Puns, 53 + + + R + + Recognition, 183 + + Regression, 259 + + Representation through the opposite, 93, 95 + through the minute, 111, 112 + + Repression, 147, 205, 211 + + Riddle, 232 + + Rousseau, J. B., 91 + + Rousseau, J. J., 33 + + + S + + Sancho Panza, 216 + + Satire, 43, 137 + + Schnitzler, 42 + + Sense in nonsense, 73, 74, 75, 199 + + Sexual elements, 139, 140, 219 + + Shakespeare, 222 + + Shake-up rhymes, 129 + + Sky-larking, 192 + + Smutty jokes, 139, 145, 233 + + Society, 150 + + Sophism, 82, 83, 159 + + Sophistic displacement, 161 + faulty thinking, 78, 79 + + Soulié, 57 + + Sound, similarity, 39 + + Spencer, 225 + + Spinoza, 106 + + Stettenheim, 343 + + Subjective determinations, 155, 156, 166, 215, 217 + + Substitutive formation, 20 + + + T + + Tendencies of wit, 127, 206 + + Tendency to economy, 49 + + Tendency-wit, 130 + its effect, 210 + + Thought-wit, 128 + its techniques, 154 + + Travesty, 280, 324 + + + U + + Ueberhorst, 91 + + Unconscious, 254, 255, 269, 279, 281, 329 + and the infantile, 268 + + Unification, 45, 88, 117, 121, 188 + + Unmasking, 303, 324 + + + V + + Vischer, 3, 8, 128 + + Voltaire, 91 + + + W + + Winslow, 45 + + Wish fulfilment, 249, 253 + + Wit, 4 + and comic, 4, 330 + and dreams, 249, 273, 285 + and rebellion against authority, 153 + as an inspiration, 265 + as a social process, 214 + by word-division, 32 + definitions of, 6, 7, 8 + desire to impart it, 239 + double-facedness of, 240 + harmless, 128 + hostile and obscene, 138 + in the service of tendencies, 146 + ironical, 100 + its motives, 214 + its subjective determinations, 155 + its tendencies, 127 + + Wit, literature of, 134 + outdoing, 96, 97 + pleasure mechanisms of, 177, 230 + psychogenesis of, 177, 195, 200 + shallow, 131 + skeptical, 172, 173 + technique of, 14, 194, 240 + + Wit-work, its formula, 261 + + Witticism and riddle, 232 + critical, 171 + + Witticisms, blasphemous, 171 + + Witty nonsense, 211, 212 + + Woman, unyieldingness of, 143 + + Word-division, 32, 33, 34 + + Word-pleasure, 190 + + Word-wit, 128, 131 + +----- + +Footnote 1: + + Monograph Series, Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases Pub. Co., 2nd + Ed., 1912. + +Footnote 2: + + Monograph Series, Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases Pub. Co., 2nd + Ed., 1916. + +Footnote 3: + + The Macmillan Co., New York, and Allen & + Unwin, London. + +Footnote 4: + + The Macmillan Co., New York, and T. Fisher Unwin, London. + +Footnote 5: + + This expression is used advisedly in order to distinguish it from + other methods of “analysis,” which Professor Freud fully disavows. Cf. + _The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement_, translated by A. A. + Brill, _The Psychoanalytic Review_, June-Sept., 1916. + +Footnote 6: + + Cf. the works of Freud, Abraham, Rank, and others. + +Footnote 7: + + Cf. Freud: _Totem and Taboo_, a translation in preparation, and the + works of Jones, Rank and Sachs, Jung, and Storfer. + +Footnote 8: + + Cf. Freud, Berny, Rank, and Sachs, and Sperber. + +Footnote 9: + + Cf. Freud: _Leonardo da Vinci_, a translation in preparation, and the + works of many others. + +Footnote 10: + + Cf. _v._ Hug-Hellmuth: _Aus dem Seelenleben des Kindes_, and the works + of Jones, Pfister, and many others. + +Footnote 11: + + Cf. the works of Freud, Putnam, Hitschmann, Winterstein, and others. + +Footnote 12: + + _Beiträge zur Aesthetik_, edited by Theodor Lipps and Richard Maria + Werner, VI,—a book to which I am indebted for the courage and capacity + to undertake this attempt. + +Footnote 13: + + J. V. Falke: _Lebenserinnerungen_, 1897. + +Footnote 14: + + Since this joke will occupy us again and we do not wish to disturb the + discussion following here, we shall find occasion later to point out a + correction in Lipps’s given interpretation which follows our own. + +Footnote 15: + + The same holds true for Lipps’s interpretation. + +Footnote 16: + + _Psychanalysis_: Its Theories and Application, 2nd Ed., p. 331. + +Footnote 17: + + This same witticism was supposed to have been coined before by Heine + concerning Alfred de Musset. + +Footnote 18: + + One of the complications involved in the technique of this example + lies in the fact that the modification through which the omitted abuse + is substituted is to be taken as an allusion to the latter, for it + leads to it only through a process of deduction. + +Footnote 19: + + Another factor which I shall mention later on is also effective in the + technique of this witticism. It has to do with the inner character of + the modification (representation through the opposite—contradiction). + The technique of wit does not hesitate to make use simultaneously of + several means, with which, however, we can only become acquainted in + their sequential order. + +Footnote 20: + + Translation of 4th Ed. by A. A. Brill, the Macmillan Co., New York, + and Allen & + Unwin, London. + +Footnote 21: + + _The Interpretation of Dreams_, p. 280. + +Footnote 22: + + Cited by Brill: _Psychanalysis_, p. 335. + +Footnote 23: + + l. c., p. 334. + +Footnote 24: + + The excellence of these jokes depends upon the fact that they, at the + same time, present another technical means of a much higher order. + +Footnote 25: + + Given by Translator. + +Footnote 26: + + This resembles an excellent joke of Oliver Wendell Holmes cited by + Brill: “Put not your trust in money, but put your money in trust.” A + contradiction is here announced which does not appear. At all events + it is a good example of the untranslatableness of the witticisms of + such technique. + +Footnote 27: + + Brill cites a very analogous modification wit: _Amantes—Amentes_ + (lovers—lunatics). + +Footnote 28: + + Compare here K. Fischer (p. 85), who applies the term “double meaning” + to those witticisms in which both meanings are not equally prominent, + but where one overshadows the other. I have applied this term + differently. Such a nomenclature is a matter of choice. Usage of + speech has rendered no definite decision about them. + +Footnote 29: + + L. c., page 339. + +Footnote 30: + + Heine’s answer is a combination of two wit-techniques—a displacement + and an allusion—for he does not say directly: “He is an ox.” + +Footnote 31: + + The word “take,” owing to its meanings, lends itself very well towards + the formation of plays upon words, a pure example of which I wish to + cite as a contrast to the displacement mentioned above. While walking + with his friend, in front of a café, a well-known stock-plunger and + bank director made this proposal: “Let us go in and take something.” + His friend held him back and said: “My dear sir, remember there are + people in there.” + +Footnote 32: + + For the latter see a later chapter. It will perhaps not be superfluous + to add here a few words for better understanding. The displacement + regularly occurs between a statement and an answer, and turns the + stream of thought to a direction different from the one started in the + statement. The justification for separating the displacement from the + double meaning is best seen in the examples where both are combined, + that is, where the wording of the statement admits of a double meaning + which was not intended by the speaker, but which reveals in the answer + the way to the displacement (see examples). + +Footnote 33: + + See Chapter III. + +Footnote 34: + + A similar nonsense technique results when the joke aims to maintain a + connection which seems to be removed through the special conditions of + its content. A joke of this sort is related by J. Falke (l. c.): “_Is + this the place where the Duke of Wellington spoke these words?_” + “_Yes, this is the place; but he never spoke these words._” + +Footnote 35: + + Following an example of the _Greek Anthology_. + +Footnote 36: + + Cf. my _Interpretation of Dreams_, Chap. VI, _The Dream Work_, + translated by A. A. Brill, The Macmillan Co., New York, and Allen + & Unwin, London. + +Footnote 37: + + The word tendency encountered hereafter in the expression + “Tendency-Wit” (Tendenz Witz) is used adjectively in the same sense as + in the familiar phrase “Tendency Play.” + +Footnote 38: + + Cf. my _Psychopathology of Everyday Life_, translated by A. A. Brill, + The Macmillan Co., New York, and T. Fisher Unwin, London. + +Footnote 39: + + Cf. _Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex_, 2nd Ed., 1916, + translated by A. A. Brill, Monograph Series, _Journal of Nervous and + Mental Diseases_. + +Footnote 40: + + Moll’s _Kontrektationstrieb_ (Untersuchungen über die Libido + sexualies, 1898). + +Footnote 41: + + It is the same mechanism that controls “slips of the tongue” and other + phenomena of self-betrayal. Cf. _The Psychopathology of Everyday + Life_. + +Footnote 42: + + “There is nothing certain about to-morrow,” Lorenzo del Medici. + +Footnote 43: + + See his essays in the _Politisch-anthropologischen Revue_, II, 1903. + +Footnote 44: + + An habitual beggar. + +Footnote 45: + + If I may be permitted to anticipate what later is discussed in the + text I can here throw some light upon the condition which seems to be + authoritative in the usage of language when it is a question of + calling a joke “good” or “poor.” If by means of a double meaning or + slightly modified word I have gotten from one idea to another by a + short route, and if this does not also simultaneously result in + senseful association between the two ideas, then I have made a “poor” + joke. In this poor joke one word or the “point” forms the only + existing association between the two widely separated ideas. The joke + “Home-Roulard” used above is such an example. But a “good” joke + results if the infantile expectation is right in the end and if with + the similarity of the word another essential similarity in meaning is + really simultaneously produced—as in the examples Traduttore—Traditore + (translator—traitor), and Amantes—Amentes (lovers—lunatics). The two + disparate ideas which are here linked by an outer association are held + together besides by a senseful connection which expresses an important + relationship between them. The outer association only replaces the + inner connection; it serves to indicate the latter or to clarify it. + Not only does “translator” sound somewhat similar to “traitor,” but he + is a sort of a traitor whose claims to that name are good. The same + may be said of Amantes—Amentes. Not only do the words bear a + resemblance, but the similarity between “love” and “lunacy” has been + noted from time immemorial. + + The distinction made here agrees with the differentiation, to be made + later, between a “witticism” and a “jest.” However, it would not be + correct to exclude examples like Home-Roulard from the discussion of + the nature of wit. As soon as we take into consideration the peculiar + pleasure of wit, we discover that the “poor” witticisms are by no + means poor as witticisms, i.e., they are by no means unsuited for the + production of pleasure. + +Footnote 46: + + _Die Spiele der Menschen_, 1899, p. 153. + +Footnote 47: + + _Vorschule der Aesthetik_, 1, XVII. + +Footnote 48: + + Chapter XVII. + +Footnote 49: + + Kleinpaul: _Die Rätsel der Sprache_, 1890. + +Footnote 50: + + _Vorschule der Aesthetik_, Vol. 1, V, p. 51, 2nd Ed., Leipzig, 1897. + +Footnote 51: + + The nonsense-witticisms, which have been somewhat slighted in this + treatise, deserve a short supplementary comment. + + In view of the significance attributed by our conception to the factor + “sense in nonsense,” one might be tempted to demand that every + witticism should be a nonsense-joke. But this is not necessary, + because only the play with thoughts inevitably leads to nonsense, + whereas the other source of wit-pleasure, the play with words, makes + this impression incidental and does not regularly invoke the criticism + connected with it. The double root of wit-pleasure—from the play with + words and thoughts, which corresponds to the most important division + into word- and thought-witticisms—sets its face against a short + formulation of general principles about wit as a tangible aggravation + of difficulties. The play with words produces laughter, as is well + known, in consequence of the factor of recognition described above, + and therefore suffers suppression only in a small degree. The play + with thoughts cannot be motivated through such pleasure: it has + suffered a very energetic suppression and the pleasure which it can + give is only the pleasure of released inhibitions. Accordingly one may + say that wit-pleasure shows a kernel of the original play-pleasure and + a shell of removal-pleasure. Naturally we do not grant that the + pleasure in nonsense-wit is due to the fact that we have succeeded in + making nonsense despite the suppression, while we do notice that the + play with words gives us pleasure. Nonsense, which has remained fixed + in thought-wit, acquires secondarily the function of stimulating our + attention through confusion, it serves as a reinforcement of the + effect of wit, but only when it is insistent, so that the confusion + can anticipate the intellect by a definite fraction of time. That + nonsense in wit may also be employed to represent a judgment contained + within the thought has been demonstrated by the example on p. 73. But + even this is not the primal signification of nonsense in wit. + + A series of wit-like productions for which we have no appropriate + name, but which may lay claim to the designation of “witty nonsense,” + may be added to the nonsense-jokes. They are very numerous, but I + shall cite only two examples: As the fish was served to a guest at the + table he put both hands twice into the mayonnaise and then ran them + through his hair. Being looked at by his neighbor with astonishment he + seemed to have noticed his mistake and excused himself, saying: + “Pardon me, I thought it was spinach.” + + Or: “Life is like a suspension bridge,” said the one. “How is that?” + asked the other. “How should I know?” was the answer. + + These extreme examples produce an effect through the fact that they + give rise to the expectation of wit, so that one makes the effort to + find the hidden sense behind the nonsense. But none is found, they are + really nonsense. Under that deception it was possible for one moment + to liberate the pleasure in nonsense. These witticisms are not + altogether without tendencies, they furnish the narrator a certain + pleasure in that they deceive and annoy the hearer. The latter then + calms his anger by resolving that he himself should take the place of + the narrator. + +Footnote 52: + + H. Spencer, _The Physiology of Laughter_ (first published in + _Macmillan’s Magazine_ for March, 1860), Essays, Vol. 11, 1901. + +Footnote 53: + + Different points in this declaration would demand an exhaustive + inquiry into an investigation of the pleasure of the comic, a thing + that other authors have already done, and which, at all events, does + not touch our discussion. It seems to me that Spencer was not happy in + his explanation of why the discharge happens to find just that path, + the excitement of which results in the physical picture of laughter. I + should like to add one single contribution to the subject of the + physiological explanation of laughter, that is, to the derivation or + interpretation of the muscular actions that characterize laughter—a + subject that has been often treated before and since Darwin, but which + has never been conclusively settled. According to the best of my + knowledge the grimaces and contortions of the corners of the mouth + that characterize laughter appear first in the satisfied and satiated + nursling when he drowsily quits the breasts. There it is a correct + motion of expression since it bespeaks the determination to take no + more nourishment, an “enough,” so to speak, or rather a “more than + enough.” This primal sense of pleasurable satiation may have furnished + the smile, which ever remains the basic phenomenon of laughter, the + later connection with the pleasurable processes of discharge. + +Footnote 54: + + Cf. _The Interpretation of Dreams_, Chap. VII, also _On the Psychic + Force_, etc., in the above cited book of Lipps (p. 123), where he + says: “This is the general principle: The dominant factors of the + psychic life are not represented by the contents of consciousness but + by those psychic processes which are unconscious. The task of + psychology, provided it does not limit itself to a mere description of + the content of consciousness, must also consist of revealing the + nature of these unconscious processes from the nature of the contents + of consciousness and its temporal relationship. Psychology must itself + be a theory of these processes. But such a psychology will soon find + that there exist quite a number of characteristics of these processes + which are unrepresented in the corresponding contents of + consciousness.” + +Footnote 55: + + Heymans (_Zeitschrift für Psychol._, XI) has taken up the viewpoint of + the nascent state in a somewhat different connection. + +Footnote 56: + + Through an example of displacement-wit I desire to discuss another + interesting character of the technique of wit. The genial actress + Gallmeyer when once asked how old she was is said to have answered + this unwelcome question with abashed and downcast eyes, by saying, “In + Brünn.” This is a very good example of displacement. Having been asked + her age, she replied by naming the place of her birth, thus + anticipating the next query, and in this manner she wishes to imply: + “This is a question which I prefer to pass by.” And still we feel that + the character of the witticism does not here come to expression + undimmed. The deviation from the question is too obvious; the + displacement is much too conspicuous. Our attention understands + immediately that it is a matter of an intentional displacement. In + other displacement-witticisms the displacement is disguised and our + attention is riveted by the effort to discover it. In one of the + displacement-witticisms (p. 69) the reply to the recommendation of the + horse—“What in the world should I do in Monticello at 6:30 in the + morning?”—the displacement is also an obtrusive one, but as a + substitute for it it acts upon the attention in a senseless and + confusing manner, whereas in the interrogation of the actress we know + immediately how to dispose of her displacement answer. + + The so-called “facetious questions” which may make use of the best + techniques deviate from wit in other ways. An example of the facetious + question with displacement is the following: “What is a cannibal who + devours his father and mother?—Answer: An orphan.—And when he has + devoured all his other relatives?—Sole-heir.—And where can such a + monster ever find sympathy?—In the dictionary under S.” The facetious + questions are not full witticisms because the required witty answers + cannot be guessed like the allusions, omissions, etc., of wit. + +Footnote 57: + + Cf. _The Interpretation of Dreams_, Chapter VII. + +Footnote 58: + + Besides the dream-work and the technique of wit I have been able to + demonstrate condensation as a regular and significant process in + another psychic occurrence, in the mechanism of normal (not purposive) + forgetting. Singular impressions put difficulties in the way of + forgetting; impressions in any way analogous are forgotten by becoming + fused at their points of contact. The confusion of analogous + impressions is one of the first steps in forgetting. + +Footnote 59: + + Many of my patients while under psychoanalytic treatment are wont to + prove regularly by their laughter that I have succeeded in + demonstrating faithfully to their conscious perception the veiled + unconscious; they laugh also when the content of what is disclosed + does not at all justify this laughter. To be sure, it is conditional + that they have approached this unconscious closely enough to grasp it + when the physician has conjectured it and presented it to them. + +Footnote 60: + + In doing this we must not forget to reckon with the distortion brought + about by the censor which is still active in the psychoses. + +Footnote 61: + + _The Interpretation of Dreams._ + +Footnote 62: + + The character of the comical which is referred to as its “dryness” + also depends in the broadest sense upon the differentiation of the + things spoken from the antics accompanying it. + +Footnote 63: + + _The Interpretation of Dreams_, p. 296. + +Footnote 64: + + This very remarkable and still inadequately understood behavior of + antagonistic relationships is probably not without value for the + understanding of the symptom of negativism in neurotics and in the + insane. Cf. the two latest works on the subject: Bleuler, “Über die + negative Suggestibilität,” _Psych.-Neurol. Wochenschrift_, 1904, and + Otto Groos’s _Zur Differential diagnostik negativistischer Phänomene_, + also my review of the _Gegensinn der Urworte_, in _Jahrb. f. + Psychonalyse_ II, 1910. + +Footnote 65: + + An expression of G. T. Fechner’s which has acquired significance from + the point of view of my conception. + +Footnote 66: + + Given by Translator. + +Footnote 67: + + I have everywhere identified the naïve with the naïve-comic, a + practice which is certainly not permissible in all cases. But it is + sufficient for our purposes to study the characteristics of the naïve + as exhibited by the “naïve joke” and the “naïve obscenity.” It is our + intention to proceed from here with the investigation of the nature of + the comic. + +Footnote 68: + + Also Bergson (_Laughter_, An essay on the Meaning of the Comic, + translated by Brereton and Rothwell, The Macmillan Co., 1914) rejects + with sound arguments this sort of explanation of comic pleasure, which + has unmistakably been influenced by the effort to create an analogy to + the laughing of a person tickled. The explanation of comic pleasure by + Lipps which might, in connection with his conception of the comic, be + represented as an “unexpected trifle,” is of an entirely different + nature. + +Footnote 69: + + The recollection of this innervation expenditure will remain the + essential part of the idea of this motion, and there will always be + methods of thought in my psychic life in which the idea will be + represented by nothing else than this expenditure. In other + connections a substitute for this element may possibly be put in the + form of other ideas, for instance the visual idea of the object of the + motion, or it may be put in the form of the word-idea; and in certain + types of abstract thought a sign instead of the full content itself + may suffice. + +Footnote 70: + + “What one has not in his head,” as the saying goes, “he must have in + his legs.” + +Footnote 71: + + The problem has been greatly confused by the general conditions + determining the comic, whereby the comic pleasure is seen to have its + source now in a too-muchness and now in a not-enoughness. + +Footnote 72: + + Degradation: A. Bain (_The Emotions and the Will_, 2nd Ed., 1865) + states: “The occasion of the ludicrous is the degradation of some + person of interest possessing dignity, in circumstances that excite no + other strong emotion” (p. 248). + +Footnote 73: + + “Thus every conscious and clever evocation of the comic is called wit, + be it the comic of views or situations. Naturally we cannot use this + view of wit here.” Lipps, l. c., p. 78. + +Footnote 74: + + At the most this is inserted by the dreamer as an explanation. + +Footnote 75: + + l. c., p. 294. + +Footnote 76: + + “Trente et quarante” is a gambling game. + +Footnote 77: + + Bergson, l. c., p. 29. + +Footnote 78: + + Sixth Ed., Berlin, 1891. + +Footnote 79: + + “You may well laugh, that no longer concerns you.” + +Footnote 80: + + That comic pleasure has its source in the “quantitative contrast,” in + the comparison of big and small, which ultimately also expresses the + essential relation of the child to the grown-up, would indeed be a + peculiar coincidence if the comic had nothing else to do with the + infantile. + +Footnote 81: + + “Our heads have the right to fall covered before thee.” + +Footnote 82: + + The excellent humoristic effect of a character like that of the fat + knight, Sir John Falstaff, is based on economised contempt and + indignation. To be sure we recognise in him the unworthy glutton and + fashionably dressed swindler, but our condemnation is disarmed through + a whole series of factors. We understand that he knows himself to be + just as we estimate him; he impresses us through his wit; and besides + that, his physical deformity produces a contact-effect in favor of a + comic conception of his personality instead of a serious one; as if + our demands for morality and honor must recoil from such a big + stomach. His activities are altogether harmless and are almost excused + by the comic lowness of those he deceives. We admit that the poor + devil has a right to live and enjoy himself like any one else, and we + almost pity him because in the principal situation we find him a + puppet in the hands of one much his superior. It is for this reason + that we cannot bear him any grudge and turn all we economize in him in + indignation into comic pleasure which he otherwise provides. Sir + John’s own humor really emanates from the superiority of an ego which + neither his physical nor his moral defects can rob of its joviality + and security. + + On the other hand the courageous knight Don Quixote de la Mancha is a + figure who possesses no humor, and in his seriousness furnishes us a + pleasure which can be called humoristic although its mechanism shows a + decided deviation from that of humor. Originally Don Quixote is a + purely comic figure, a big child whose fancies from his books on + knighthood have gone to his head. It is known that at first the poet + wanted to show only that phase of his character, and that the creation + gradually outgrew the author’s original intentions. But after the poet + endowed this ludicrous person with the profoundest wisdom and noblest + aims and made him the symbolic representation of an idealism, a man + who believed in the realization of his aims, who took duties seriously + and promises literally, he ceased to be a comic personality. Like + humoristic pleasure which results from a prevention of emotional + feelings it originates here through the disturbance of comic pleasure. + However, in these examples we already depart perceptibly from the + simple cases of humor. + +Footnote 83: + + A term which is used in quite a different sense in the _Aesthetik_ of + Theo. Vischer. + +Footnote 84: + + If one does not hesitate to do some violence to the conception of + expectation, one may ascribe—according to the process of Lipps—a very + large sphere of the comic to the comic of expectation; but probably + the most original cases of the comic which result through a comparison + of a strange expenditure with one’s own will fit least into this + conception. + +Footnote 85: + + The characteristic of the “double face” naturally did not escape the + authors. Melinaud, from whom I borrowed the above expression, + conceives the condition for laughing in the following formula: “Ce qui + fait rire c’est qui est à la fois, d’un coté, absurde et de l’autre, + familier” (“Pourquoi rit-on?” _Revue de deux mondes_, February, 1895). + This formula fits in better with wit than with the comic, but it + really does not altogether cover the former. Bergson (l. c., p. 96) + defines the comic situation by the “reciprocal interference of + series,” and states: “A situation is invariably comic when it belongs + simultaneously to two altogether independent series of events and is + capable of being interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the + same time.” According to Lipps the comic is “the greatness and + smallness of the same.” + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + + + + TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES + + + ● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. + ● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last + chapter. + ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75915 *** diff --git a/75915-h/75915-h.htm b/75915-h/75915-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb5ab17 --- /dev/null +++ b/75915-h/75915-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,12447 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> + <head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title>Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious | Project Gutenberg</title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + body { margin-left: 8%; 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} + table {font-size: .9em; padding: 1.5em .5em 1em; page-break-inside: avoid; + clear: both; } + div.titlepage {text-align: center; page-break-before: always; + page-break-after: always; } + div.titlepage p {text-align: center; text-indent: 0em; font-weight: bold; + line-height: 1.5; margin-top: 3em; } + .ph1 { text-indent: 0em; font-weight: bold; font-size: xx-large; + margin: .67em auto; page-break-before: always; } + .ph2 { text-indent: 0em; font-weight: bold; font-size: x-large; margin: .75em auto; + page-break-before: always; } + .fraction {display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; text-align: center; + text-indent: 0; } + .center {text-align: center; display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; + max-width: 50%; } + .x-ebookmaker p.dropcap:first-letter { float: left; } + </style> + </head> + <body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75915 ***</div> + +<div class='tnotes covernote'> + +<p class='c000'><strong>Transcriber’s Note:</strong></p> + +<p class='c000'>New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the public domain.</p> + +</div> + +<div class='titlepage'> + +<div> + <h1 class='c001'>WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS</h1> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c002'> + <div>BY</div> + <div class='c003'><span class='xlarge'><span class='sc'>Professor Dr.</span> SIGMUND FREUD, LL.D.</span></div> + <div class='c003'>Authorized English Edition, with Introduction by</div> + <div><span class='large'>A. A. BRILL, <span class='sc'>Ph.B.</span>, M.D.</span></div> + <div class='c003'><span class='small'>Lecturer in Psychoanalysis and Abnormal Psychology, New York University; former Chief of Clinic of Psychiatry, Columbia University</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='figcenter id001'> +<img src='images/i_title.jpg' alt='[Logo]' class='ig001'> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div>NEW YORK</div> + <div>MOFFAT, YARD AND COMPANY</div> + <div>1916</div> + </div> +</div> + +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c004'> + <div><span class='small'>Copyright, 1916, <span class='fss'>BY</span></span></div> + <div><span class='small'>MOFFAT, YARD AND COMPANY</span></div> + <div><span class='small'><span class='sc'>New York</span></span></div> + <div class='c002'><span class='small'><em>All Rights Reserved</em></span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_v'>v</span> + <h2 class='c005'>TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE</h2> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>In 1908 when it was agreed between Professor +Freud and myself that I should be his translator, +it was decided to render into English first the +following five works: <cite>Selected Papers on Hysteria +and Psychoneuroses</cite>,<a id='r1'></a><a href='#f1' class='c007'><sup>[1]</sup></a> <cite>Three Contributions +to the Theory of Sex</cite>,<a id='r2'></a><a href='#f2' class='c007'><sup>[2]</sup></a> <cite>The Interpretation +of Dreams</cite>,<a id='r3'></a><a href='#f3' class='c007'><sup>[3]</sup></a> <cite>Psychopathology of Everyday +Life</cite>,<a id='r4'></a><a href='#f4' class='c007'><sup>[4]</sup></a> and the present volume. These works +were selected because they represent the various +stages of development of Professor Freud’s Psychoanalysis,<a id='r5'></a><a href='#f5' class='c007'><sup>[5]</sup></a> +and also because it was thought that +they contain the material which one must master +before one is able to judge correctly the author’s +theories or apply them in practice. This undertaking, +which was fraught with many linguistic +and other difficulties, has finally been accomplished +<span class='pageno' id='Page_vi'>vi</span>with the edition of the present volume, +and it is therefore with a sense of great satisfaction +that the translator’s preface to this work +is written. But although the original task is +finished the translator’s work is only beginning. +Psychoanalysis has made enormous strides. On +the foundation laid by Professor Freud there +developed a literature rich in ideas and content +which has revolutionized the science of nervous +and mental diseases, and has thrown much light +on the subject of dreams, sex, mythology,<a id='r6'></a><a href='#f6' class='c007'><sup>[6]</sup></a> the +history of civilization and racial psychology,<a id='r7'></a><a href='#f7' class='c007'><sup>[7]</sup></a> +philology,<a id='r8'></a><a href='#f8' class='c007'><sup>[8]</sup></a> æsthetics,<a id='r9'></a><a href='#f9' class='c007'><sup>[9]</sup></a> child psychology and +pedagogics,<a id='r10'></a><a href='#f10' class='c007'><sup>[10]</sup></a> philology,<a id='r11'></a><a href='#f11' class='c007'><sup>[11]</sup></a> and mysticism and occultism. +With the <cite>Interpretation of Dreams</cite> and +<cite>Psychopathology of Everyday Life</cite>, Professor +Freud has definitely bridged the gulf between +normal and abnormal mental states by demonstrating +that dreams and faulty acts like some +forms of forgetting, slips of the tongue, slips of +reading, writing, etc., are closely allied to psychopathological +<span class='pageno' id='Page_vii'>vii</span>states and represent the prototypes +of such abnormal mental conditions as neurotic +symptoms, hallucinations, and deliria. He also +shows that all these productions are senseful +and purposive, and that their strange and peculiar +appearance is due to distortions produced by +various psychic processes. These views are confirmed +in the present volume, where it is demonstrated +that wit, which belongs to æsthetics, is +subject to the same laws, shows the same mechanism, +and serves the same tendencies as the +other psychic productions. With his wonted +profundity and ingenuity the author adds the +solution of wit to those of the neuroses, dreams, +and psychopathological acts.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I take great pleasure in tendering my thanks +to Mr. Horatio Winslow, who has read the manuscript +and has given me valuable suggestions in +the choice of expressions and in the selection of +substitutes for those witticisms that could not be +translated.</p> + +<div class='lg-container-r'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span class='sc'>A. A. Brill.</span></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'><em>May, 1916.</em></p> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_ix'>ix</span> + <h2 class='c005'>CONTENTS</h2> +</div> + +<table class='table0'> + <tr><td class='c010' colspan='3'>A. ANALYSIS OF WIT</td></tr> + <tr> + <th class='c011'>CHAPTER</th> + <th class='c012'> </th> + <th class='c013'>PAGE</th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'>I.</td> + <td class='c012'><span class='sc'>Introduction</span></td> + <td class='c013'><a href='#Page_3'>3</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'>II.</td> + <td class='c012'><span class='sc'>The Technique of Wit</span></td> + <td class='c013'><a href='#Page_15'>15</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'>III.</td> + <td class='c012'><span class='sc'>The Tendencies of Wit</span></td> + <td class='c013'><a href='#Page_127'>127</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'> </td> + <td class='c012'> </td> + <td class='c013'> </td> + </tr> + <tr><td class='c010' colspan='3'>B. SYNTHESIS OF WIT</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'>IV.</td> + <td class='c012'><span class='sc'>The Pleasure Mechanism and the Psychogenesis of Wit</span></td> + <td class='c013'><a href='#Page_177'>177</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'>V.</td> + <td class='c012'><span class='sc'>The Motives of Wit and Wit as a Social Process</span></td> + <td class='c013'><a href='#Page_214'>214</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'> </td> + <td class='c012'> </td> + <td class='c013'> </td> + </tr> + <tr><td class='c010' colspan='3'>C. THEORIES OF WIT</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'>VI.</td> + <td class='c012'><span class='sc'>The Relation of Wit to Dreams and to the Unconscious</span></td> + <td class='c013'><a href='#Page_249'>249</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c011'>VII.</td> + <td class='c012'><span class='sc'>Wit and the Various Forms of the Comic</span></td> + <td class='c013'><a href='#Page_288'>288</a></td> + </tr> +</table> + +<div class='chapter'> + <h2 class='c005'>A. ANALYSIS</h2> +</div> + +<div class='chapter ph1'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c004'> + <div>WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS</div> + </div> +</div> + +</div> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_3'>3</span> + <h3 class='c014'>I<br> <span class='c015'>INTRODUCTION</span></h3> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>Whoever has had occasion to examine that +part of the literature of æsthetics and psychology +dealing with the nature and affinities of +wit, will, no doubt, concede that our philosophical +inquiries have not awarded to wit the +important rôle that it plays in our mental life. +One can recount only a small number of thinkers +who have penetrated at all deeply into the +problems of wit. To be sure, among the authors +on wit one finds the illustrious names of +the poet Jean Paul (Fr. Richter), and of the +philosophers Th. Vischer, Kuno Fischer, and Th. +Lipps. But even these writers put the subject +of wit in the background while their chief +interest centers around the more comprehensive +and more alluring problems of the comic.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the main this literature gives the impression +that it is altogether impractical to study +wit except when treated as a part of the comic.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_4'>4</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Presentation of the Subject by Other Authors</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>According to Th. Lipps (<cite><span lang="de">Komik und Humor</span></cite>, +1898<a id='r12'></a><a href='#f12' class='c007'><sup>[12]</sup></a>) wit is “essentially the subjective side +of the comic; i.e., it is that part of the comic +which we ourselves create, which colors our conduct +as such, and to which our relation is that +of Superior Subject, never of Object, certainly +not Voluntary Object” (p. 80). The following +comment might also be added:—In general +we designate as wit “every conscious and clever +evocation of the comic, whether the comic element +lies in the viewpoint or in the situation +itself” (p. 78).</p> + +<p class='c008'>K. Fischer explains the relation between wit +and the comic by the aid of caricature, which, +according to his exposition, comes midway between +the two (<cite><span lang="de">Über den Witz</span></cite>, 1889). The +subject of the comic is the hideous element in +any of its manifestations. “Where it is concealed +it must be disclosed in the light of the +comic view; where it is not at all or but slightly +noticeable it must be rendered conspicuous and +elucidated in such a manner that it becomes +clear and intelligible. Thus arises caricature” +(p. 45). “Our entire psychic world, the intellectual +realm of our thoughts and conceptions, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_5'>5</span>does not reveal itself to us on superficial +consideration. It cannot be visualized directly +either figuratively or intuitively, moreover it +contains inhibitions, weak points, disfigurements, +and an abundance of ludicrous and comical contrasts. +In order to bring it out and to make +it accessible to æsthetic examination, a force is +necessary which is capable not only of depicting +objects directly, but also of reflecting upon +these conceptions and elucidating them—namely, +a force capable of clarifying thought. +This force is nothing but judgment. The judgment +which produces the comic contrast is +wit. In caricature wit has played its part unnoticed, +but only in judgment does it attain +its own individual form and the free domain of +its evolution.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>As can be seen Lipps assigns the determining +factor which classifies wit as part of the +comic, to the activity or to the active behavior +of the subject, whereas K. Fischer characterizes +wit by its relation to its object, in which characterization +he accentuates the hidden hideous +element in the realm of thought. One cannot +put to test the cogency of these definitions of +wit; one can, in fact, hardly understand them +unless one studies the text from which they were +taken. One is thus forced to work his way +through the author’s descriptions of the comic +<span class='pageno' id='Page_6'>6</span>in order to learn anything about wit. From +other passages, however, one discovers that the +same authors attribute to wit essential characteristics +of general validity in which they disregard +its relation to the comic.</p> + +<p class='c008'>K. Fischer’s characterization of wit which +seems to be most satisfactory to this author runs +as follows: “Wit is a <em>playful</em> judgment” (p. +51). For an elucidation of this expression we +are referred to the analogy: “How æsthetic +freedom consists in the playful contemplation +of objects” (p. 50). In another place (p. 20) +the æsthetic attitude towards an object is characterized +by the condition that we expect nothing +from this object—especially no gratification +of our serious needs—but that we content ourselves +with the pleasure of contemplating the +same. In contrast to labor the æsthetic attitude +is <em>playful</em>. “It may be that from æsthetic freedom +there also results a kind of judgment, freed +from the conventional restrictions and rule of +conduct, which, in view of its genesis, I will +call the <em>playful</em> judgment. This conception contains +the first condition and possibly the entire +formula for the solution of our problem. ‘Freedom +begets wit and wit begets freedom,’ says +Jean Paul. Wit is nothing but a free play of +ideas” (p. 24).</p> + +<p class='c008'>Since time immemorial a favorite definition +<span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>of wit has been the ability to discover similarities +in dissimilarities, i.e., to find hidden similarities. +Jean Paul has jocosely expressed this idea by +saying that “wit is the disguised priest who +unites every couple.” Th. Vischer adds the +postscript: “He likes best to unite those couples +whose marriage the relatives refuse to +sanction.” Vischer refutes this, however, by +remarking that in some witticisms there is no +question of comparison or the discovery of +similarities. Hence with very little deviation +from Jean Paul’s definition he defines wit as +the skill to combine with surprising quickness +many ideas, which through inner content and +connections are foreign to one another. K. +Fischer then calls attention to the fact that +in a large number of these witty judgments one +does not find similarities, but contrasts; and +Lipps further remarks that these definitions +refer to the wit that the humorist possesses and +not to the wit that he produces.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Other viewpoints, in some measure connected +with one another, which have been mentioned in +defining and describing wit are: “the <em>contrast +of ideas</em>,” “<em>sense in nonsense</em>,” and “<em>confusion +and clearness</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Definitions like those of Kraepelin lay stress +upon the contrast of ideas. Wit is “the voluntary +combination or linking of two ideas which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>in some way are contrasted with each other, +usually through the medium of speech association.” +For a critic like Lipps it would not be +difficult to reveal the utter inadequacy of this +formula, but he himself does not exclude the +element of contrast—he merely assigns it elsewhere. +“The contrast remains, but is not +formed in a manner to show the ideas connected +with the words, rather it shows the contrast or +contradiction in the meaning and lack of meaning +of the words” (p. 87). Examples show the +better understanding of the latter. “A contrast +arises first through the fact that we adjudge a +meaning to its words which after all we cannot +ascribe to them.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the further development of this last condition +the antithesis of “sense in nonsense” becomes +obvious. “What we accept one moment +as senseful we later perceive as perfect nonsense. +Thereby arises, in this case, the operation of the +comic element” (p. 85). “A saying appears +witty when we ascribe to it a meaning through +psychological necessity and, while so doing, retract +it. It may thus have many meanings. We +lend a meaning to an expression knowing that +logically it does not belong to it. We find in +it a truth, however, which later we fail to find +because it is foreign to our laws of experience or +usual modes of thinking. We endow it with a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>logical or practical inference which transcends +its true content, only to contradict this inference +as soon as we finally grasp the nature of the expression +itself. The psychological process +evoked in us by the witty expression which gives +rise to the sense of the comic depends in every +case on the immediate transition from the borrowed +feeling of truth and conviction to the impression +or consciousness of relative nullity.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>As impressive as this exposition sounds one +cannot refrain from questioning whether the contrast +between the senseful and senseless upon +which the comic depends does not also contribute +to the definition of wit in so far as it is distinguished +from the comic. Also the factor of +“confusion and clearness” leads one deeply into +the problem of the relation of wit to the comic. +Kant, speaking of the comic element in general, +states that one of its remarkable attributes is +the fact that it can delude us for a moment only. +Heymans (<cite><span lang="de">Zeitschr. f. Psychologie</span></cite>, XI, 1896) +explains how the mechanism of wit is produced +through the succession of confusion and clearness. +He illustrates his meaning by an excellent +witticism from Heine, who causes one of his figures, +the poor lottery agent, Hirsch-Hyacinth, +to boast that the great Baron Rothschild treated +him as an equal or quite FAMILLIONAIRE. +Here the word which acts as the carrier of the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>witticism appears in the first place simply as a +faulty word-formation, as something incomprehensible, +inconceivable, and enigmatic. It is for +these reasons that it is confusing. The comic +element results from the solution of the enigma +and from the understanding of the word. Lipps +adds that the first stage of enlightenment, showing +that the confusing word means this or that, is +followed by a second stage in which one perceives +that this nonsensical word has first deluded us +and then given us the true meaning. Only this +second enlightenment, the realization that it is +all due to a word that is meaningless in ordinary +usage—this reduction to nothingness produces +the comic effect (p. 95).</p> + +<p class='c008'>Whether or not either the one or the other +of these two conceptions may seem more clear +we are brought nearer to a definite insight +through the discussion of the processes of confusion +and enlightenment. If the comic effect of +Heine’s <em>famillionaire</em> depends upon the solution +of the seemingly senseless word, then the wit +would have to be attributed to the formation of +this word and to the character of the word so +formed.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In addition to the associations of the viewpoints +just discussed there is another characteristic +of wit which is recognized as peculiar to it +by all authors. “Brevity alone is the body and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span>soul of wit,” declares Jean Paul (<cite><span lang="fr">Vorschule der +Aesthetik</span></cite>, I, 45), and modifies it with a speech of +the old tongue-wagger, Polonius, from Shakespeare’s +<cite>Hamlet</cite> (Act II, Scene 2):</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“Therefore, since brevity is the soul of wit,</div> + <div class='line'>And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes,</div> + <div class='line'>I will be brief.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>Lipps’s description (p. 90) of the brevity of +wit is also significant. He states that wit says +what it does say, not always in few, but always +in too few words; that is: “It expresses itself in +words that will not stand the test of strict logic +or of the ordinary mode of thought and expression. +In fine it can express itself by leaving the +thing unsaid.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>That “wit must unearth something hidden and +concealed”—to quote K. Fischer (p. 51)—we +have already been taught from the grouping of +wit with caricature. I re-emphasize this determinant +because it also has more to do with the +nature of wit than with its relation to the comic.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I am well aware that the foregoing scanty +quotations from the works of the authors on wit +cannot do justice to the excellence of these works. +In view of the difficulties that confront one in +reproducing clearly such complicated and such +delicately shaded streams of thought I cannot +<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>spare inquiring minds the trouble of searching +for the desired information in the original +sources. However, I do not know whether they +will return fully satisfied. For the criteria and +attributes of wit mentioned by these authors, +such as—activity, the relation of the content of +wit to our thoughts, the character of the playful +judgment, the union of dissimilarities, contrasting +ideas, “sense in nonsense,” the succession of +confusion and clearness, the sudden emergence +of the hidden, and the peculiar brevity of wit, +seem to us, at first glance, so very pertinent and +so easily demonstrable by examples that we cannot +succumb to the danger of underestimating +the value of such ideas. But they are only disjointed +fragments which we should like to see +welded into an organic whole. In the end they +contribute no more to the knowledge of wit than +a number of anecdotes teach us of the true characteristics +of a personality whose biography interests +us. We do not at all understand the connection +that is supposed to exist between the individual +conditions; for instance, what the brevity +of wit may have to do with that side of wit +exhibited in the playful judgment; besides we do +not know whether wit must satisfy all or only +some of these conditions in order to form real +wit; which of them may be replaced and which +ones are indispensable. We should also like a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>grouping and classification of wit in respect to +its essential attributes. The classification as +given by the authors is based, on the one hand, on +the technical means, and on the other hand, on +the utilization of wit in speech (sound-wit, play +on words, the wit of caricature, characterization +wit, and witty repartee).</p> + +<p class='c008'>Accordingly we should not find ourselves in a +dilemma when it comes to pointing out goals for +a further effort to explain wit. In order to look +forward to success we must either introduce new +viewpoints into the work, or try to penetrate +further by concentrating our attention or by +broadening the scope of our interest. We can +prescribe for ourselves the task of at least not +permitting any lack along the latter lines. To +be sure, it is rather remarkable how few examples +of recognized witticisms suffice the authors for +their investigations and how each one accepts +the ones used by his predecessors. We need not +shirk the responsibility of analyzing the same examples +which have already served the classical +authors, but we contemplate new material besides +to lay a broader foundation for our deductions. +It is quite natural that we should select such examples +of wit as objects for our investigation as +have produced the deepest impression upon our +own lives and which have caused us the greatest +amount of laughter.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>Some may inquire whether the subject of wit +is worthy of such effort. In my opinion there is +no doubt about it, for even if I disregard the +personal motives to be revealed during the development +of this theme (the motives which drove +me to gain an insight into the problem of wit), +I can refer to the fact that there is an intimate +connection between all psychic occurrences; a +connection which promises to furnish a psychological +insight into a sphere which, although remote, +will nevertheless be of considerable value +to the other spheres. One may also be reminded +what a peculiar, overwhelmingly fascinating +charm wit offers in our society. A new joke +operates almost as an event of universal interest. +It is passed on from one person to another just +like the news of the latest conquest. Even prominent +men who consider it worth while relating +how they attained fame, what cities and countries +they have seen, and with what celebrated persons +they have consorted, do not disdain to dwell +in their autobiographies upon this and that excellent +joke which they have heard.<a id='r13'></a><a href='#f13' class='c007'><sup>[13]</sup></a></p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span> + <h3 class='c001'>II<br> <span class='c015'>THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT</span></h3> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>We follow the beckoning of chance and take +up as our first example of wit one which has already +come to our notice in the previous chapter.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In that part of the <cite><span lang="no">Reisebilder</span></cite> entitled “<span lang="de">Die +Bäder von Lucca</span>,” Heine introduces the precious +character, Hirsch-Hyacinth, the Hamburg lottery +agent and curer of corns, who, boasting to +the poet of his relationship with the rich Baron +Rothschild, ends thus: “And as true as I pray +that the Lord may grant me all good things I +sat next to Solomon Rothschild, who treated me +just as if I were his equal, quite <em>famillionaire</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is by means of this excellent and very funny +example that Heymans and Lipps have illustrated +the origin of the comic effect of wit from the succession +of “confusion and clearness.” However, +we shall pass over this question and put to ourselves +the following inquiry: What is it that +causes the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth to become +witty? It can be only one of two things; +either it is the thought expressed in the sentence +which carries in itself the character of the witticism; +or the witticism adheres to the mode of expression +<span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>which clothes the thought. On whichever +side the nature of the wit may lie, there we +shall follow it farther and endeavor to elucidate +it.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In general a thought may be expressed in different +forms of speech—that is, in different +words—which may repeat it in its original accuracy. +In the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth we +have before us a definite form of thought expressed +which seems to us especially peculiar and +not very readily comprehensible. Let us attempt +to express as exactly as is possible the same +thought in other words. Lipps, indeed, has already +done this and has thus, to some degree, +elucidated the meaning of the poet. He says (p. +87), “We understand that Heine wishes to say +that the reception was on a familiar basis, that +is, that it was of the friendly sort.” We change +nothing in the sense when we assume a different +interpretation which perhaps fits better into +the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth: “Rothschild +treated me quite as his equal, in a very <em>familiar</em> +way; that is, as far as this can be done by a +<em>millionaire</em>.” We would only add, “The condescension +of a rich man always carries something +embarrassing for the one experiencing it.”<a id='r14'></a><a href='#f14' class='c007'><sup>[14]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>Whether we shall remain content with this or +with another equivalent formulation of the +thought, we can see that the question which we +have put to ourselves is already answered. The +character of the wit in this example does not +adhere to the thought. It is a correct and ingenious +remark that Heine puts into the mouth +of Hirsch-Hyacinth—a remark of indubitable +bitterness, as is easily understood in the case of +the poor man confronted with so much wealth; +but we should not care to call it witty. Now if +any one who cannot forget the poet’s meaning +in the interpretation should insist that the +thought in itself is also witty, we can refer him +to the definite fact that the witty character is +lost in the interpretation. It is true that Hirsch-Hyacinth’s +speech made us laugh loudly, but +though Lipps’s or our own accurate rendering +may please us and cause us to reflect, yet it cannot +make us laugh.</p> + +<p class='c008'>But if the witty character of our example does +not belong to the thought, then it must be sought +for in the form of expression in the wording. +We have only to study the peculiarity of this +mode of expression to realize what one may term +word- or form-technique. Also we may discover +the things that are intimately related to the very +nature of wit, since the character as well as the +effect of wit disappears when one set of expressions +<span class='pageno' id='Page_18'>18</span>is changed for others. At all events we +are in full accord with our authors when we put +so much value upon the verbal form of the wit. +Thus K. Fischer (p. 72) says: “It is, in the first +place, the naked form which is responsible for +the perception of wit, and one is reminded of a +saying of Jean Paul’s which affirms and proves +this nature of wit in the same expression. ‘Thus +the mere position conquers, be it that of warriors +or of sentences.’”</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Formation of Mixed Words</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Now wherein lies the “technique” of this +wit? What has occurred to the thought, in our +own conception, that it became changed into wit +and caused us to laugh heartily? The comparison +of our conception with the text of the poet +teaches us that two processes took place. In the +first place there occurred an important abbreviation. +In order to express fully the thought contained +in the witticism we had to append to the +words “Rothschild treated me just as an equal, +on a familiar basis,” an additional sentence +which in its briefest form reads: i.e., so far as +a millionaire can do this. Even then we feel the +necessity of an additional explanatory sentence.<a id='r15'></a><a href='#f15' class='c007'><sup>[15]</sup></a> +The poet expresses it in terser terms as follows: +“Rothschild treated me just like an equal, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_19'>19</span>quite <em>famillionaire</em>.” The entire restriction, +which the second sentence imposes on the first +thus verifying the familiar treatment, has been +lost in the jest. But it has not been so entirely +lost as not to leave a substitute from which it +can be reconstructed. A second change has also +taken place. The word “familiar” in the witless +expression of the thought has been transformed +into “<em>famillionaire</em>” in the text of the +wit, and there is no doubt that the witty character +and ludicrous effect of the joke depends +directly upon this word-formation. The newly +formed word is identical in its first part with +the word “familiar” of the first sentence, and +its terminal syllables correspond to the word +“millionaire” of the second sentence. In this +manner it puts us in a position to conjecture the +second sentence which was omitted in the text +of the wit. It may be described as a composite +of two constituents “familiar” and “millionaire,” +and one is tempted to depict its origin from +the two words graphically.</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>FAMIL I A R</div> + <div class='line in2'>MILLIONAIRE</div> + <div class='line'>—————————————</div> + <div class='line'>FAMILLIONAIRE</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>The process, then, which has carried the +thought into the witticism can be represented in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_20'>20</span>the following manner, which, although at first +rather fantastic, nevertheless furnishes exactly +the actual existing result: “Rothschild treated +me quite familiarly, i.e., as well as a millionaire +can do that sort of thing.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Now imagine that a compressing force is acting +upon these sentences and assume that for +some reason or other the second sentence is of +lesser resistance. It is accordingly forced toward +the vanishing point, but its important component, +the word “millionaire,” which strives +against the compressing power, is pushed, as it +were, into the first sentence and becomes fused +with the very similar element, the word “familiar” +of this sentence. It is just this possibility, +provided by chance to save the essential part of +the second sentence, which favors the disappearance +of the other less important components. +The jest then takes shape in this +manner: “Rothschild treated me in a very</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>famillionaire way.”</div> + <div class='line in7'>/   (mili) (aire)</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>Apart from such a compressing force, which is +really unknown to us, we may describe the origin +of the wit-formation, that is, the technique of the +wit in this case, as a <em>condensation with substitutive +formation</em>. In our example the substitutive +formation consists in the formation of a mixed +word. This fused word “famillionaire,” incomprehensible +<span class='pageno' id='Page_21'>21</span>in itself but instantly understood +in its context and recognized as senseful, +is now the carrier of the mirth-provoking +stimulus of the jest, whose mechanism, to be +sure, is in no way clearer to us through the +discovery of the technique. To what extent +can a linguistic process of condensation with +substitutive formation produce pleasure through +a fused word and force us to laugh? We +make note of the fact that this is a different +problem, the treatment of which we can postpone +until we shall find access to it later. For +the present we shall continue to busy ourselves +with the technique of wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Our expectation that the technique of wit cannot +be considered an indifferent factor in the examination +of the nature of wit prompts us to inquire +next whether there are other examples of +wit formed like Heine’s “famillionaire.” Not +many of these exist, but enough to constitute a +small group which may be characterized as the +blend-word formations or fusions. Heine himself +has produced a second witticism from the +word “millionaire” by copying himself, as it +were, when he speaks of a “millionarr” (<cite>Ideen</cite>, +Chap. XIV). This is a visible condensation +of “millionaire” and “narr” (fool) and, like +the first example, expresses a suppressed by-thought. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_22'>22</span>Other examples of a similar nature +are as follows.</p> + +<p class='c008'>During the war between Turkey and the Balkan +States, in 1912, <cite>Punch</cite> depicted the part +played by Rumania by representing the latter +as a highwayman holding up the members of +the Balkan alliance. The picture was entitled: +<cite>Kleptorumania</cite>. Here the word is a fusion of +Kleptomania and Rumania and may be represented +as follows:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line in2'>KLEPTOMANIA</div> + <div class='line in6'>RUMANIA</div> + <div class='line'>—————————————</div> + <div class='line'>KLEPTORUMANIA</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>A naughty jest of Europe has rebaptized a +former potentate, Leopold, into <em>Cleopold</em> because +of his relation to a lady surnamed Cleo. +This is a clear form of condensation which by +the addition of a single letter forever vividly +preserves a scandalous allusion.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In an excellent chapter on this same theme +Brill gives the following example.<a id='r16'></a><a href='#f16' class='c007'><sup>[16]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>“De Quincey once remarked that old persons +are apt to fall into ‘anecdotage.’” The word +<em>Anecdotage</em>, though in itself incomprehensible, +can be readily analyzed to show its original full +sense; and on analysis we find that it is made up +of two words, <em>anecdote</em> and <em>dotage</em>. That is, instead +<span class='pageno' id='Page_23'>23</span>of saying that old persons are apt to fall +into dotage and that old persons are fond of telling +anecdotes, De Quincey fuses the two words +into a neologism, <em>anecdotage</em>, and thus simultaneously +expresses both ideas. The technique, +therefore, lies in the fusion of the two words. +Such a fusion of words is called condensation. +Condensation is a substitutive formation, i.e., instead +of <em>anecdote</em> and <em>dotage</em> we have <em>anecdotage</em>.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“In a short story which I have recently read, +one of the characters, a ‘sport,’ speaks of the +Christmas season as the <em>alcoholidays</em>. By reduction +it can be easily seen that we have here a compound +word, a combination of <em>alcohol</em> and <em>holidays</em> +which can be graphically represented as +follows:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>alcoHOL</div> + <div class='line in4'>HOLidays</div> + <div class='line'>————————————</div> + <div class='line'>ALCOHOLIDAYS</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>“Here the condensation expresses the idea +that holidays are conducive to alcoholic indulgence. +In other words, we have here a fused +word, which, though strange in appearance, can +be easily understood in its proper context. The +witticism may be described as a condensation +with substitution.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“The same mechanism is found in the following: +A dramatic critic, summarizing three paragraphs +<span class='pageno' id='Page_24'>24</span>to the effect that most plays now produced +in New York City are violently emotional +and hysterical, remarks: ‘Thespis has taken up +his home in Dramatteawan.’ The last word is +a condensation of <em>drama</em> and <em>Matteawan</em>. The +substitution not only expressed the critic’s idea +that most of the plays at present produced in +New York are violent, emotional and hysterical, +that is insane, but it also contains a clever allusion +to the nature of the problem presented by +most of these plays. Matteawan is a state hospital +for criminal insane. Most of the plays are +not only insane, but also criminal since they treat +of murders, divorces, robberies, scandals, etc.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>When Flaubert published his famous romance +<cite>Salammbo</cite>, which treats of life in ancient Carthage, +it was scoffingly referred to by Sainte-Beuve +as <em>Carthaginoiserie</em> on account of its +tedious detailed descriptions.</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>Carthaginoiserie</div> + <div class='line in5'>chinoiserie</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>During a conversation with a lady I unintentionally +furnished the material for a jest. I +spoke to her about the great merits of an investigator +whom I considered unjustly ignored. She +remarked, “But the man really deserves a monument.” +“Perhaps he will get one some day,” I +answered, “but at the moment his success is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_25'>25</span>very limited.” “Monument” and “moment” +are contrasts. The lady then united these contrasts +and said: “Well, let us wish him a <em>monumentary</em> +success.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>If at this stage the reader should become +displeased with a viewpoint which threatens to +destroy his pleasure in wit without explaining +the source of this pleasure I must beg him to +be patient for a while, because we are now confronted +with the technique of wit, the examination +of which promises many revelations if +only we enter into it far enough. Besides the +analysis of the examples thus far cited, which +show simply a process of condensation, there +are others in which the changed expressions +manifest themselves in other ways.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Condensation with Modification and Substitution</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The following witticisms of Mr. N. will serve +as illustrations.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“I was driving with him tête-à-bête.” Nothing +is simpler than the reduction of this jest. +Evidently it can only mean: I was driving +tête-à-tête with Mr. X. and X. is a stupid ass +(beast).</p> + +<p class='c008'>Neither of these two sentences is witty nor +is there any wit if one combines them into this +one: “I was out driving tête-à-tête with that +stupid ass (beast).” The wit appears when +<span class='pageno' id='Page_26'>26</span>the words “stupid ass” are omitted and when, +as a substitute for them, the first “t” of the +second “tête” is changed to “b.” This slight +modification brings back to expression the suppressed +“bête.” The technique of this group +of witticisms may be described as “condensation +with a slight modification.” And it would +seem that the more insignificant the substitutive +modification, the better is the wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Quite similar, although not without its complications, +is the technique of another form of +witticism. During a discussion about a person +in whom there was something to praise and +much to criticise, N. remarked: “Yes, vanity +is one of his four heels of Achilles.”<a id='r17'></a><a href='#f17' class='c007'><sup>[17]</sup></a> This +modification consists in the fact that instead of +the one vulnerable heel which was attributed to +Achilles we have here four heels. Four heels +means four feet and that number is only found +on animals. The two thoughts condensed in +the witticism are as follows: Except for his +vanity he is an admirable fellow; still I do not +care for him, for he is more of an animal than +a human being.<a id='r18'></a><a href='#f18' class='c007'><sup>[18]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_27'>27</span>A similar but simpler joke I heard <i><span lang="la">statu +nascendi</span></i> in a family circle. One of two brothers +who were attending college was an excellent +scholar while the other was only an average +student. It so happened that the model boy +had a setback in school. The mother discussed +this matter and expressed her fear lest this event +be the beginning of a lasting deterioration. +The boy who until then had been overshadowed +by his brother willingly grasped this opportunity +to remark: “Yes, Carl is going backward +on all-fours.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Here the modification consists in a small +addition as an assurance that in his judgment +his brother is going backward. This modification +represents and takes the place of a passionate +plea for his own cause which may be +expressed as follows: After all, you must not +think that he is so much cleverer than I am +simply because he has more success in school. +He is really a stupid ass, i.e., much more stupid +than I am.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A good illustration of condensation with +slight modification is furnished by a well-known +witty jest of Mr. N., who remarked about a +character in public life that he had a “<em>great +future behind him</em>.” The butt of this joke +was a young man whose ancestry, rearing, and +personal qualities seemed to destine him for the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_28'>28</span>leadership of a great party and the attainment +of political power at its head. But times +changed, the party became politically incompetent, +and it could readily be foreseen that the +man who was predestined to become its leader +would come to nothing. The briefest reduction +of the meaning by which one could replace this +joke would be: The man has had a great future +before him, but that is now past. Instead of “has +had” and the appended afterthought there is a +small change in the main sentence in which “before” +is replaced by its opposite “behind.”<a id='r19'></a><a href='#f19' class='c007'><sup>[19]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>Mr. N. made use of almost the same modification +in the case of the nobleman who was +appointed minister of agriculture for no other +reason than that he was interested in agriculture. +Public opinion had an opportunity to +find out that he was the most incompetent man +who had ever been intrusted with this office. +When, however, he had relinquished his portfolio +and had withdrawn to his agricultural +pursuits Mr. N. said of him: “<em>Like Cincinnatus +of Old he has returned to his place in front of +the plough.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_29'>29</span>That Roman, who was likewise called to his +office from his farm, returned to his place +behind the plough. In those days, just as in +the present time, in front of the plough walked—the +ox.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We could easily increase these examples by +many others, but I am of the opinion that we +are in need of no more cases in order to grasp +thoroughly the character of the technique of +this second group—condensation with modification. +If we now compare the second group +with the first, the technique of which consisted +in condensation with a mixed word-formation, +we readily see that the differences are not vital +and that the lines of demarcation are indistinct. +The mixed word-formation, like the modification, +became subordinated to the idea of substitutive +formation, and if we desire we can +also describe the mixed word-formation as a +modification of the parent word through the +second elements.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We may make our first pause here and ask +ourselves with what known factor in the literature +of wit our first result, either in whole or +in part, coincides. It obviously agrees with the +factor of brevity which Jean Paul calls the soul +of wit (<em>supra</em>, p. 11). But brevity alone is not +wit or every laconism would be witty. The +brevity of wit must be of a special kind. We +<span class='pageno' id='Page_30'>30</span>recall that Lipps has attempted to describe +more fully the peculiarity of the brevity of +wit (<em>v. s.</em>, p. 11). Here our investigation started +and demonstrated that the brevity of wit is +often the result of a special process which has +left a second trace—the substitutive formation—in +the wording of the wit. By applying the +process of reduction, which aims to cause a +retrogression in the peculiar process of condensation, +we find also that wit depends only +upon the verbal expression which was produced +by the process of condensation. Naturally our +entire interest now centers upon this peculiar +and hitherto almost neglected mechanism. +Furthermore, we cannot yet comprehend how +it can give origin to all that is valuable in wit; +namely, the resultant pleasure.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Condensation in Dreams</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Have processes similar to those here described +as the technique of wit already been +noted in another sphere of our psychic life? +To be sure, in one apparently remote sphere. +In 1900 I published a book which, as indicated +by its title (<cite>The Interpretation of Dreams</cite><a id='r20'></a><a href='#f20' class='c007'><sup>[20]</sup></a>), +makes the attempt to explain the riddle of the +dream and to trace the dream to normal psychic +<span class='pageno' id='Page_31'>31</span>operations. I had occasion to contrast there the +manifest and often peculiar dream-content with +the latent but altogether real thoughts of the +dream from which it originated, and I took up +the investigation of the processes which make +the dream from the latent dream-thought. I +also investigated the psychological forces which +participated in this transposition. The sum +of the transforming processes I designated as +the dream-work and, as a part of this dream-work, +I described the process of condensation. +This process has a striking similarity to the +technique of wit and, like the latter, it leads to +abbreviations and brings about substitutive +formations of like character.</p> + +<p class='c008'>From recollections of his own dreams the +reader will be familiar with the compositions +of persons and objects that appear in them; +indeed, the dream makes similar compositions +of words which can then be reduced by analysis +(e.g., Autodidasker—Autodidakt and Lasker<a id='r21'></a><a href='#f21' class='c007'><sup>[21]</sup></a>). +On other occasions and even much more frequently, +the condensation work of the dream +produces no compositions, but pictures which +closely resemble an object or person up to a +certain addition or variation which comes from +another source, like the modifications in the +witticisms of Mr. N. We cannot doubt that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_32'>32</span>in this case, as in the other, we deal with a +similar psychic process which is recognizable by +identical results. Such a far-reaching analogy +between wit-technique and dream-work will +surely arouse our interest in the former and +stimulate our expectation of finding some explanation +of wit from a comparison with the +dream. We forbear, however, to enter upon +this work by bearing in mind that we have investigated +the technique of wit in only a very +small number of witty jests, so that we cannot +be certain that the analogy, the workings of +which we wish to explore, will hold good. +Hence we turn away from the comparison with +the dream and again take up the technique of +wit, leaving, however, at this place of our investigation +a visible thread, as it were, which +later we shall take up again.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Wit Formed by Word-division</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The next point we shall discuss is whether the +process of condensation with substitutive formation +is demonstrable in all witticisms so that +it may be designated as a universal character of +the technique of wit. I recall a joke which has +clung to my mind through certain peculiar circumstances. +One of the great teachers of my +youth, whom we considered unable to appreciate +<span class='pageno' id='Page_33'>33</span>a joke—he had never told us a single joke of +his own—came into the Institute laughing. +With an unwonted readiness he explained the +cause of his good humor. “I have read an +excellent joke,” he said. “<em>A young man who +claimed to be a relative of the great J. J. +Rousseau, and who bore his name, was introduced +into a Parisian drawing-room. It should +be added that he was decidedly red-headed. He +behaved in such an awkward manner that the +hostess ventured this criticism to the gentleman +who had introduced him—‘Vous m’avez fait connaître +un jeune homme roux et sot, mais non pas +un Rousseau.’</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>At this point our teacher started to laugh +again. According to the nomenclature of our +authors this is sound-wit and a poor kind at +that, since it plays with a proper name.</p> + +<p class='c008'>But what is the technique of this wit? It is +quite clear that the character which we had perhaps +hoped to demonstrate universally leaves us +in the lurch in the first new example. Here +there is no omission and scarcely an abbreviation. +In the witticism the lady expresses almost +everything that we can ascribe to the thoughts. +“You have made me look forward to meeting a +relative of J. J. Rousseau. I expected that he +was perhaps even mentally related to him. +Imagine my surprise to find this red-haired +<span class='pageno' id='Page_34'>34</span>foolish boy, a <i><span lang="fr">roux et sot</span></i>.” To be sure, I was +able to add and insert something, but this +attempt at reduction does not annul the wit. +It remains fixed and attached to the sound +similarity of +<span class='fraction'><span class='under'>Rousseau.</span><br>roux sot</span> +This proves that condensation +with substitution plays no part in +the production of this witticism.</p> + +<p class='c008'>With what else do we have to deal? New +attempts at reduction taught me that the joke +will persistently continue until the name Rousseau +is replaced by another. If, e.g., I substitute +the name Racine for it I find that although +the lady’s criticism is just as feasible +as before it immediately loses every trace of wit. +Now I know where I can look for the technique +of this joke although I still hesitate to formulate +it. I shall make the following attempt: +The technique of the witticism lies in the fact +that one and the same word—the name—is +used in a twofold application, once as a whole +and once divided into its syllables like a charade.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I can mention a few examples of identical +technique. A witticism of this sort was utilized +by an Italian lady to avenge a tactless remark +made to her by the first Napoleon. Pointing +to her compatriots at a court ball he said: +“<i><span lang="it">Tutti gli Italian danzano si male</span></i>” (all +Italians dance so badly). To which she quickly +<span class='pageno' id='Page_35'>35</span>replied: <i>“<span lang="it">Non tutti, ma buona parte</span>”</i> (Not +all, but a great many)—<span class='fraction'><span class='under'><span lang="it">Buona parte</span>.<a id='r22'></a><a href='#f22' class='c007'><sup>[22]</sup></a></span><br><span lang="it">Buonaparte</span>.</span> Brill +reports still another example in which the wit +depends on the twofold application of a name: +“<em>Hood once remarked that he had to be a lively +Hood for a livelihood.</em>”<a id='r23'></a><a href='#f23' class='c007'><sup>[23]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>At one time when Antigone was produced +in Berlin a critic found that the presentation +entirely lacked the character of antiquity. The +wits of Berlin incorporated this criticism in +the following manner: “<em>Antique? Oh, nay</em>” +(Th. Vischer and K. Fischer).</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Manifold Application of the Same Material</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>In these examples, which will suffice for this +species of wit, the technique is the same. A +name is made use of twice; first, as a whole, and +then divided into its syllables—and in their +divided state the syllables yield a different +meaning.<a id='r24'></a><a href='#f24' class='c007'><sup>[24]</sup></a> The manifold application of the +same word, once as a whole and then as the +component syllables into which it divides itself, +was the first case that came to our attention +in which technique deviated from that of condensation. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_36'>36</span>Upon brief reflection, however, we +must divine from the abundance of examples +that come to us that the newly discovered +technique can hardly be limited to this single +means. Obviously there are any number of +hitherto unobserved possibilities for one to +utilize the same word or the same material of +words in manifold application <em>in one sentence</em>. +May not all these possibilities furnish technical +means for wit? It would seem so, judging +by the following examples.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>Two witty statesmen, X and Y, met at a +dinner. X, acting as toastmaster, introduced Y +as follows: ‘My friend, Y, is a very wonderful +man. All you have to do is to open his mouth, +put in a dinner, and a speech appears, etc.’ +Responding to the speaker, Y said: ‘My +friend, the toastmaster, told you what a wonderful +man I am, that all you have to do is to +open my mouth, put in a dinner, and a speech +appears. Now let me tell you what a wonderful +man he is. All you have to do is open +anybody’s mouth, put in his speech, and the dinner +appears.’</em>”<a id='r25'></a><a href='#f25' class='c007'><sup>[25]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>In examples of this sort, one can use the +same material of words and simply change +slightly their order. The slighter the change, +the more one gets the impression that different +<span class='pageno' id='Page_37'>37</span>sense was expressed with the same words, +the better is the technical means of wit. And +how simple are the means of its production! +“<em>Put in a dinner and a speech appears—put +in a speech and a dinner appears.</em>” This is +really nothing but an exchange of places of +these two phrases whereby what was said of Y +becomes differentiated from what is said of +X. To be sure, this is not the whole technique +of the joke.<a id='r26'></a><a href='#f26' class='c007'><sup>[26]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>Great latitude is afforded the technique of +wit if one so extends the “<em>manifold application +of the same material</em>” that the word—or the +words—upon which the wit depends may be +used first unchanged and then with a slight +modification. An example is another joke of +Mr. N. He heard a gentleman, who himself +was born a Jew, utter a malicious statement +about Jewish character. “Mr. Councilor,” +said he, “I am familiar with your <em>antesemitism</em>, +but your <em>antisemitism</em> is new to me.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Here only one single letter is changed, the +modification of which could hardly be noticed +in careless pronunciation. This example reminds +one of the other modification jokes of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_38'>38</span>Mr. N., but it differs from them in lacking the +condensation. Everything that was to be said +has been told in the joke. “I know that you +yourself were formerly a Jew, therefore I am +surprised that you should rail against the +Jew.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>An excellent example of such wit modification +is also the familiar exclamation: “<i><span lang="it">Traduttore—Traditore</span></i>.”<a id='r27'></a><a href='#f27' class='c007'><sup>[27]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>The similarity between the two words, almost +approaching identity, results in a very impressive +representation of the inevitability by +which a translator becomes a transgressor—in +the eyes of the author.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The manifoldness of slight modifications possible +in these jokes is so great that none is +quite similar to the other. Here is a joke which +is supposed to have arisen at an examination for +the degree of law. The candidate was translating +a passage from the Corpus juris, “<em>Labeo +ait</em>.” “‘I fall (fail),’ says he,” volunteered +the candidate. “‘You fall (fail),’ says I,” replied +the examiner and the examination ended. +Whoever mistakes the name of the celebrated +Jurist for a word to which he attaches a false +meaning certainly deserves nothing better. But +the technique of the witticism lies in the fact +<span class='pageno' id='Page_39'>39</span>that the examiner used almost the same words +in punishing the applicant which the latter used +to prove his ignorance. Besides, the joke is an +example of repartee whose technique, as we +shall see, is closely allied to the one just +mentioned.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Words are plastic and may be moulded into +almost any shape. There are some words which +have lost their true original meaning in certain +usages which they still enjoy in other +applications. In one of Lichtenberg’s jokes +just those conditions have been sought for in +which the nuances of the wordings have removed +their basic meaning.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>“How goes it?” asked the blind of the lame +one. “As you see,” replied the lame one to the +blind.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Language is replete with words which taken +in one sense are full of meaning and in another +are colorless. There may be two different +derivatives from the same root, one of which +may develop into a word with a full meaning +while the other may become a colorless suffix or +prefix, and yet both may have the same sound. +The similarity of sound between a word having +full meaning and one whose meaning is colorless +may also be accidental. In both cases +the technique of wit can make use of such +relationship of the speech material. The +<span class='pageno' id='Page_40'>40</span>following examples illustrate some of these +points.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>Do you call a man kind who remits nothing +to his family while away?</em>” asked an actor. +“<em>Call that kindness?</em>” “<em>Yes, unremitting +kindness</em>,” was the reply of Douglas Jerrold. +The wit here depends on the first syllable <em>un</em> +of the word <em>unremitting</em>. Un is usually a prefix +denoting “not,” but by adding it to “remitting” +a new relationship is unexpectedly +established which changes the meaning of the +context. “<em>An undertaker is one who always +carries out what he undertakes.</em>” The striking +character upon which the wit here depends +is the manifold application of the words <em>undertaker</em> +and <em>carry out</em>. Undertaker commonly +denotes one who manages funerals. Only when +taken in this sense and using the words <em>carry +out</em> literally is the sentence witty. The wit +lies in the manifold application of the same +words.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Double Meaning and Play on Words</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>If we delve more deeply into the variety of +“manifold application” of the same word we +suddenly notice that we are confronted with +forms of “double meaning” or “plays on +words” which have been known a long time and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_41'>41</span>which are universally acknowledged as belonging +to the technique of wit. Then why have we +bothered our brains about discovering something +new when we could just as well have gleaned it +from the most superficial treatise on wit? We +can say in self-defense only that we are presenting +another side of the same phenomena +of verbal expressions. What the authors +call the “playful” character of wit we treat +from the point of view of “manifold application.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Further examples of manifold application +which may also be designated under a new and +third group, the class of double meaning, may +be divided into subdivisions. These, to be sure, +are not essentially differentiated from one another +any more than the whole third group from +the second. In the first place we have:</p> + +<p class='c008'>(a) Cases of double meaning of a name and +its verbal significance: e.g., “<em>Discharge thyself +of our company, Pistol</em>” (<cite>Henry IV</cite>, Act +II). “<em>For Suffolk’s duke may he suffocate</em>” +(<cite>Henry IV</cite>, Act I). Heine says, “<em>Here in +Hamburg rules not the rascally Macbeth, but +Banko</em> (Banquo).”</p> + +<p class='c008'>In those cases where the unchanged name +cannot be used,—one might say “misused,”—one +can get a double meaning by means of +familiar slight modifications: “<em>Why have the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_42'>42</span>French rejected Lohengrin?</em>” was a question +asked some time ago. The answer was, “<em>On +Elsa’s</em> (Alsace) <em>account.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>(b) Cases where a double meaning is obtained +by using a word which has both a verbal and +metaphoric sense furnish an abundant source +for the technique of wit. A medical colleague, +who was well known for his wit, once said to +Arthur Schnitzler, the writer: “<em>I am not at all +surprised that you became a great poet. Your +father had already held up the mirror to his +contemporaries.</em>” The mirror used by the +father of the writer, the famous Dr. Schnitzler, +was the laryngoscope. According to the well-known +quotation from <cite>Hamlet</cite> (Act III, +Scene 2), the object of the play as well as +the writer who creates it is to “hold, as’t were, +the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her +own feature, scorn her own image, and the very +age and body of the time his form and pressure.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>(c) Cases of actual double meaning or play +on words—the ideal case, as it were, of manifold +application. Here no violence is done to the +word. It is not torn into syllables. It need +not undergo any modifications. It need not +exchange its own particular sphere, say as a +proper name, for another. Thanks to certain +circumstances it can express two meanings just +<span class='pageno' id='Page_43'>43</span>as it stands in the structure of the sentence. +Many examples are at our disposal.</p> + +<p class='c008'>One of the first royal acts of the last Napoleon +was, as is well known, the confiscation +of the estates belonging to the House of Orleans. +“<i><span lang="fr">C’est le premier vol de l’aigle</span></i>” was +an excellent play on words current at that time. +“Vol” means both flight and theft. Louis XV +wished to test the wit of one of his courtiers +whose talent in that direction he had heard +about. He seized his first opportunity to command +the cavalier to concoct a joke at his +(the king’s) expense. He wanted to be the +“subject” of the witticism. The courtier answered +him with the clever <em>bonmot</em>, “<i><span lang="fr">Le roi +n’est pas sujet</span>.</i>” “Subject” also means “vassal.” +(Taken from K. Fischer.)</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A physician, leaving the sick-bed of a wife, +whose husband accompanied him, exclaimed +doubtfully: “I do not like her looks.” “I +have not liked her looks for a long time,” was +the quick rejoinder of the husband.</em> The +physician, of course, referred to the condition +of the wife, but he expressed his apprehension +about the patient in such words as to afford +the husband the means of utilizing them to +assert his conjugal aversion. Concerning a +satirical comedy Heine remarked: “<em>This satire +would not have been so biting had the author +<span class='pageno' id='Page_44'>44</span>of it had more to bite.</em>” This jest is a better +example of metaphoric and common double +meaning than of real play upon words, but +at present we are not concerned about such +strict lines of demarcation. <em>Charles Matthews, +the elder, one of England’s greatest actors, +was asked what he was going to do with his +son</em> (the young man was destined for architecture). +“<em>Why</em>,” answered the comedian, “<em>he +is going to draw houses like his father</em>.” <em>Foote +once asked a man why he forever sang one +tune. “Because it haunts me,” replied the man. +“No wonder,” said Foote, “you are continually +murdering it.”</em> Said the Dyspeptic Philosopher: +“<em>One swallow doesn’t make a summer, +nor quench the thirst.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A gentleman had shown much ingenuity in +evading a notorious borrower whom he had +sent away many times with the request to call +when he was “in.” One day, however, the +borrower eluded the servant at the door and cornered +his victim.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'><em>“Ah,” said the host, seeing there was no way +out of it, “at last I am in.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'><em>“No,” returned the borrower in anticipation, +“at last I am in and you are out.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Heine said in the <cite>Harzreise</cite>: “<em>I cannot recall +at the moment the names of all the students, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_45'>45</span>and among the professors there are some who +have no name as yet.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Dr. Johnson said of the University of St. +Andrews in Scotland, which was poor in purse, +but prolific in the distribution of its degrees: +“<em>Let it persevere in its present plan and it may +become rich</em> by degrees.” Here the wit depends +more on the manifold application than +on the play on words.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The keen-witted writer, Horatio Winslow, +sums up the only too-familiar history of some +American families as follows:</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><span class='sc'>A Tale of Two American Generations</span></h4> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><em>Gold Mine</em></div> + <div class='line'><em>Gold Spoon</em></div> + <div class='line'><em>Gold Cure</em></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>The last couplet, gold cure, refers to the +familiar cure for alcoholism. This wit is an +excellent example of unification—everything is, +as it were, of gold. The manifold meanings +of the adjective which do not very strikingly +contrast with one another make possible this +“manifold application.”</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Ambiguity</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Another play on words will facilitate the +transition to a new subdivision of the technique +of double meaning. The witty colleague who +<span class='pageno' id='Page_46'>46</span>was responsible for the joke mentioned on +page 42 is likewise responsible for this joke, +current during the trial of Dreyfus:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>This girl reminds me of Dreyfus. The +army does not believe in her innocence.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The word innocence, whose double meaning +furnishes the basis of the witticism, has in one +connection the customary meaning which is the +opposite of guilt or transgression, while in the +other connection it has a sexual sense, the +opposite of which is sexual experience. There +are very many such examples of double meaning +and in each one the point of the joke refers +especially to a sexual sense. The group could +be designated as “ambiguous.” <em>A good example +to illustrate this is the story told of a +wealthy but elderly gentleman who showed +his devotion to a young actress by many lavish +gifts. Being a respectable girl she took the +first opportunity to discourage his attentions by +telling him that her heart was already given +to another man. “I never aspired as high as +that,” was his polite answer.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>If one compares this example of double-meaning-with-ambiguity +with other examples +one cannot help noticing a difference which is +not altogether inconsequential to the technique. +In the joke about “innocence” one meaning of +the word is just as good for our understanding +<span class='pageno' id='Page_47'>47</span>of it as the other. One can really not decide +whether the sexual or non-sexual significance +of the word is more applicable and more +familiar. But it is different with the other +example mentioned. Here the final sense of +the words, “I never aspired as high as that,” +is by far more obtrusive and covers and conceals, +as it were, the sexual sense which could +easily escape the unsuspecting person. In sharp +contrast to this let us examine another example +of double meaning in which there is no attempt +made to veil its sexual significance—e.g., Heine’s +characterization of a complaisant lady: “<em>She +could pass (abschlagen) nothing except her +water.</em>” It sounds like an obscene joke and +the wit in it is scarcely noticed.<a id='r28'></a><a href='#f28' class='c007'><sup>[28]</sup></a> But the +peculiarity that both senses of the double meaning +are not equally manifested can occur also in +witticisms without sexual reference providing +that one sense is more common or that it is +preferred on account of its connection with the +other parts of the sentence (e.g., <i><span lang="fr">c’est le premier +vol de l’aigle</span></i>). All these examples I propose +to call double meaning with allusion.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_48'>48</span>We have by this time become familiar with +such a large number of different techniques of +wit that I am afraid we may lose sight of them. +Let us, therefore, attempt to make a summary.</p> + + <dl class='dl_1'> + <dt>I.</dt> + <dd><span class='sc'>Condensation</span> + <dl class='dl_1'> + <dt>(a)</dt> + <dd>with mixed word-formation. + </dd> + <dt>(b)</dt> + <dd>with modification. + </dd> + </dl> + </dd> + <dt>II.</dt> + <dd><span class='sc'>The Application of the Same Material</span> + <dl class='dl_1'> + <dt>(c)</dt> + <dd>The whole and the part. + </dd> + <dt>(d)</dt> + <dd>Change of order. + </dd> + <dt>(e)</dt> + <dd>Slight modification. + </dd> + <dt>(f)</dt> + <dd>The same words used in their full or colorless sense. + </dd> + </dl> + </dd> + <dt>III.</dt> + <dd><span class='sc'>Double Meaning</span> + <dl class='dl_1'> + <dt>(g)</dt> + <dd>Name and verbal significance. + </dd> + <dt>(h)</dt> + <dd>Metaphorical and verbal meaning. + </dd> + <dt>(i)</dt> + <dd>True double meaning (play on words). + </dd> + <dt>(j)</dt> + <dd>Ambiguous meaning. + </dd> + <dt>(k)</dt> + <dd>Double meaning with allusion. + </dd> + </dl> + </dd> + </dl> + +<p class='c008'>This variety causes confusion. It might vex +us because we have devoted so much time to +the consideration of the technical means of wit, +and the stress laid on the forms might possibly +arouse our suspicions that we are overvaluing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_49'>49</span>their importance so far as the knowledge of the +nature of wit is concerned. But this conjecture +is met by the one irrefutable fact: namely, that +each time the wit disappears as soon as we +remove the effect that was brought to expression +by these techniques. We are thus directed +to search for the unity in this variety. It must +be possible to bring all these techniques under +one head. As we have remarked before, it is +not difficult to unite the second and third +groups, for the double meaning, the play on +words, is nothing but the ideal case of utilizing +the same material. The latter is here apparently +the more comprehensive conception. The +examples of dividing, changing the order of the +same material, manifold application with slight +modifications (c, d, e)—all these could, without +difficulty, be subordinated under the conception +of double meaning. But what community exists +between the technique of the first group—condensation +with substitutive formation—and +the two other groups—manifold application of +the same material?</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Tendency to Economy</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>It seems to me that this agreement is very +simple and clear. The application of the same +material is only a special case of condensation +and the play on words is nothing but a condensation +<span class='pageno' id='Page_50'>50</span>without substitutive formation. Condensation +thus remains as the chief category. A +compressing or—to be more exact—an economic +tendency controls all these techniques. +As Prince Hamlet says: “Thrift, Horatio, +thrift.” It seems to be all a matter of economy.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Let us examine this economy in individual +cases. “<i><span lang="fr">C’est le premier vol de l’aigle.</span></i>” That +is, the first flight of the eagle. Certainly, but +it is a depredatious flight. Luckily for the gist +of this joke “vol” signifies flight as well as +depredation. Has nothing been condensed and +economized by this? Certainly, the entire second +thought, and it was dropped without any +substitution. The double sense of the word +“vol” makes such substitution superfluous, or +what is just as correct: The word “vol” contains +the substitution for the repressed thought +without the necessity of supplementing or +varying the first sentence. Therein consists the +benefit of the double meaning.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Another example: <em>Gold mine</em>,—<em>gold spoon</em>, +the enormous economy of expression the single +word “gold” produces. It really tells the history +of two generations in the life of some +American families. The father made his fortune +through hard toiling in the gold fields during +the early pioneer days. The son was born +with a golden spoon in his mouth; having been +<span class='pageno' id='Page_51'>51</span>brought up as the son of a wealthy man, he becomes +a chronic alcoholic and has to take the +gold cure.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Thus there is no doubt that the condensation +in these examples produces economy and we +shall demonstrate that the same is true in all +cases. Where is the economy in such jokes +as “<em>Rousseau</em>—<i><span lang="fr">roux et sot</span></i>,” or “<em>Antigone</em>—<em>antique-oh-nay</em>” +in which we first failed to +find the prime factors in causing us to establish +the technique of the manifold application of the +same material? In these cases condensation +will naturally not cover the ground, but when +we exchange it for the broader conception of +“economy” we find no difficulty. What we +save in such examples as those just given is +quite obvious. We save ourselves the trouble +of making a criticism, of forming a judgment. +Both are contained in the names. The same is +true in the “<em>livelihood</em>” example and the others +thus far analyzed. Where one does not save +much is in the example of “<em>I am in and you +are out</em>,” at least the wording of a new answer is +saved. The wording of the address, “<em>I am in</em>,” +serves also for the answer. It is little, but in +this little lies the wit. The manifold application +of the same words in addressing and answering +surely comes under the heading of economy. +Note how Hamlet sums up the quick succession +<span class='pageno' id='Page_52'>52</span>of the death of his father and the marriage of +his mother:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line in14'>“the funeral baked meats</div> + <div class='line'>Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>But before we accept the “tendency to economize” +as the universal character of wit and ask +whence it originates, what it signifies, and how +it gives origin to the resultant pleasure, we shall +concede a doubt which may justly be considered. +It may be true that every technique +of wit shows the tendency to economize in expression, +but the relationship is not reversible. +Not every economy in expression or every +brevity is witty on that account. We once +raised this question when we still hoped to +demonstrate the condensation process in every +witticism and at that we justly objected by +remarking that a laconism is not necessarily +wit. Hence it must be a peculiar form of +brevity and economy upon which the character +of the wit depends, and just as long as we are +ignorant of this peculiarity the discovery of the +common element in the technique of wit will +bring us no nearer a solution. Besides, we have +the courage to acknowledge that the economies +caused by the technique of wit do not impress us +as very much. They remind one of the manner +in which many a housewife economizes +<span class='pageno' id='Page_53'>53</span>when she spends time and money to reach a +distant market because the vegetables can there +be had a cent cheaper. What does wit save by +means of its technique? Instead of putting together +a few new words, which, for the most +part, could have been accomplished without any +effort, it goes to the trouble of searching for +the word which comprises both ideas. Indeed, +it must often at first transform the expression +of one of the ideas into an unusual form until +it furnishes an associative connection with the +second thought. Would it not have been +simpler, easier, and really more economical to +express both thoughts as they happen to come +even if no agreement in expression results? Is +not the economy in verbal expression more than +abrogated through the expenditure of intellectual +work? And who economized through it, +whom does it benefit? We can temporarily circumvent +these doubts by leaving them unsolved +until later on. Are we really familiar enough +with all the forms of techniques of wit? It will +surely be safer to gather new examples and +submit them to analysis.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Puns</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Indeed, we have not yet given consideration +to one of the largest groups into which the +techniques of wit may be divided. In this we +<span class='pageno' id='Page_54'>54</span>have perhaps been influenced by the low estimate +in which this form of wit is held. It +embraces those jokes which are commonly called +“puns.” These are generally counted as the +lowest form of wit, perhaps because they are +“cheapest” and can be formed with the least +effort. They really make the least demands on +the technique of expression just as the actual +play on words makes the most. Whereas in +the latter both meanings find expression in the +identical word, and hence usually in a word +used only once, in the pun it is enough if two +words for both meanings resemble each other +through some slight similarity in structure, in +rhythmic consonance, in the community of +several vowels, or in some other similar manner. +The following examples illustrate these points:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“We are now fallen into that critical age +wherein <i><span lang="la">censores</span></i> <span lang="la">liberorum</span> are become <i><span lang="la">censores +librorum</span></i>: <i><span lang="la">Lectores</span></i>, <i><span lang="la">Lictores</span></i>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Professor Cromwell says that Rome in exchanging +her religion changed <em>Jupiter</em> to <em>Jew +Peter</em>.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>It is related that some students wishing to +play a trick on Agassiz, the great naturalist, +constructed an insect made up of parts taken +from different bugs and sent it to him with the +question, “What kind of a bug is this?” His +answer was “Humbug.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_55'>55</span>Puns are especially fond of modifying one +of the vowels of the word; e.g., Hevesi (<cite><span lang="de">Almanaccando, +Reisen in Italien</span></cite>, p. 87) says of an +Italian poet who was hostile to the German +emperor, but who was, nevertheless, forced to +sing his praises in his hexameters, “<em>Since he +could not exterminate the Cæsars he at least +annihilated the cæsuras</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>From the multitude of puns which are at +our disposal it may be of special interest to +us to quote a really poor example for which +Heine (<cite>Book Le Grand</cite>, Chapter V) is responsible. +<em>After parading for a long time before his +lady as an “Indian Prince” the suitor suddenly +lays aside his mask and confesses, “Madam, I +have lied to you. I have never been in Calcutta +any more than that Calcutta roast which +I relished yesterday for lunch.”</em> Obviously the +fault of this witticism lies in the fact that both +words are not merely similar, but identical. +The bird which served as a roast for his lunch +is called so because it comes from, or at least +is supposed to come from, the same city of +Calcutta.</p> + +<p class='c008'>K. Fischer has given much attention to this +form of wit and insists upon making a sharp +distinction between it and the “play on words” +(p. 78). “A pun,” he says, “is a bad play on +words, for it does not play with the word as +<span class='pageno' id='Page_56'>56</span>a word, but merely as a sound.” The play on +words, however, “transfers itself from the +sound of the word into the word itself.” On +the other hand, he also classifies such jokes as +“famillionaire, Antigone (Antique-Oh-nay),” +etc., with sound-wit. I see no necessity to follow +him in this. In the plays on words, also, +the word serves us only as a sound to which +this or that meaning attaches itself. Here also +usage of language makes no distinction, and +when it treats “puns” with disdain but the play +on words with a certain respect it seems that +these estimations are determined by others as +technical viewpoints. One should bear in mind +the forms of wit which are referred to as puns. +There are persons who have the ability, when +they are in a high-spirited mood, to reply with +a pun for a long time to every sentence addressed +to them. Brill<a id='r29'></a><a href='#f29' class='c007'><sup>[29]</sup></a> relates that at a gathering +some one spoke disparagingly of a certain +drama and wound up by saying, <em>“It was so +poor that the first act had to be rewritten.” +“And now it is rerotten,” added the punster of +the gathering.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>At all events we can already infer from the +controversies about the line of demarcation between +puns and play on words that the former +cannot aid us in finding an entirely new technique +<span class='pageno' id='Page_57'>57</span>of wit. Even if no claims are made for +the pun that it utilizes the manifold application +of the same material, the accent, nevertheless, +falls upon the rediscovering of the familiar and +upon the agreement between both words forming +the pun. Thus the latter is only a subspecies +of the group which reaches its height +in the real play on words.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Displacements</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>There are some witticisms, however, whose +techniques baffle almost every attempt to classify +them under any of the groups so far investigated. +<em>It is related that while Heine and the +poet Soulié were once chatting together in a +Parisian drawing-room, there entered one of +those Parisians whom one usually compared to +Midas, but not alone on account of their money. +He was soon surrounded by a crowd which +treated him with the greatest deference. “Look +over there,” said Soulié to Heine, “and see +how the nineteenth century is worshipping the +Golden Calf.” Heine cast one glance upon the +object of adoration and replied, as if correcting +his friend: “Oh, he must be older than +that”</em> (K. Fischer, p. 82).</p> + +<p class='c008'>Wherein lies the technique of this excellent +witticism? According to K. Fischer it lies in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_58'>58</span>the play on words. Thus, for example, he says, +“the words ‘Golden Calf’ may signify Mammon +as well as idol-worship,—in the first case +the gold is paramount; in the second case it is +the animal picture. It may likewise serve to +designate in a rather uncomplimentary way one +who has very much money and very little +brains.” If we apply the test and take away +the expression “Golden Calf” we naturally +also abrogate the wit. We then cause Soulié +to say, “Just see how the people are thronging +about that blockhead only because he is +rich.” To be sure, this is no longer witty. Nor +would Heine’s answer be possible under these +circumstances. But let us remember that it is +not at all a matter of Soulié’s witty comparison, +but of Heine’s retort, which is surely much +more witty. We have then no right to disturb +the phrase “the golden calf” which remains +as a basis for Heine’s words and the +reduction can only be applied to the latter. If +we dilate upon the words, “Oh, he must be +older than that,” we can only proceed as follows:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“Oh, he is no longer a calf; he is already a +full-grown ox.” Heme’s wit is therefore based +on the fact that he no longer took the “golden +calf” metaphorically, but personally by referring +it to the moneyed individual himself. If +<span class='pageno' id='Page_59'>59</span>this double meaning is not already contained +in the opinion of Soulié!</p> + +<p class='c008'>Let us see. We believe that we can state +that this reduction has not altogether destroyed +Heine’s joke, but, on the contrary, it has left +its essential element untouched. It reads as if +Soulié were now saying, “Just see how the +nineteenth century is worshipping the golden +calf,” and as if Heine were retorting, “Oh, he +is no longer a calf. He is already an ox.” And +even in this reduced form it is still a witticism. +However, another reduction of Heine’s words +is not possible.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is a pity that this excellent example contains +such complicated technical conditions. +And as it cannot aid us toward enlightenment +we shall leave it to search for another in which +we imagine we can perceive a relationship with +the former one.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is a “bath” joke treating of the dread which +some Jews are said to have for bathing. We demand +no patent of nobility for our examples +nor do we make inquiries about their origin. +The only qualifications we require are that they +should make us laugh and serve our theoretical +interest. It is to be remarked that both these +demands are satisfied best by Jewish jokes.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>Two Jews meet near a bathing establishment. +“Have you taken a bath?” asked one. “How +<span class='pageno' id='Page_60'>60</span>is that?” replies the other. “Is one missing?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>When one laughs very heartily about a joke +he is not in the best mood to investigate its +technique. It is for this reason that some +difficulties are experienced in delving into their +analyses. “That is a comic misunderstanding” +is the thought that comes to us. Yes, but how +about the technique of this joke? Obviously +the technique lies in the double meaning of the +word <em>take</em>. In the first case the word is used +in a colorless idiomatic sense, while in the second +it is the verb in its full meaning. It is, +therefore, a case where the same word is taken +now in the “full” and now in the “empty” +sense (Group II, f). And if we replace the +expression “take a bath” by the simpler +equivalent “bathed” the wit disappears. The +answer is no longer fitting. The joke, therefore, +lies in the expression “take a bath.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>This is quite correct, yet it seems that in +this case, also, the reduction was applied in +the wrong place, for the joke does not lie in +the question, but in the answer, or rather in the +counter question: “How is that? Is there +one missing?” Provided the same is not destroyed +the answer cannot be robbed of its wit +by any dilation or variation. We also get the +impression that in the answer of the second +Jew the overlooking of the bath is more significant +<span class='pageno' id='Page_61'>61</span>than the misconception of the word “take.” +However, here, too, things do not look quite +clear and we will, therefore, look for a third +example.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Once more we shall resort to a Jewish joke +in which, however, the Jewish element is incidental +only. Its essence is universally human. +It is true that this example, too, contains undesirable +complications, but luckily they are +not of the kind so far which have kept us from +seeing clearly.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>In his distress a needy man borrowed twenty-five +dollars from a wealthy acquaintance. The +same day he was discovered by his creditor in a +restaurant eating a dish of salmon with mayonnaise. +The creditor reproached him in these +words: “You borrow money from me and then +order salmon with mayonnaise. Is that what +you needed the money for?” “I don’t understand +you,” responded the debtor, “when I have +no money I can’t eat salmon with mayonnaise. +When I have money I mustn’t eat it. Well +then, when shall I ever eat salmon with mayonnaise?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Here we no longer discover any double meaning. +Even the repetition of the words “salmon +with mayonnaise” cannot contain the technique +of the witticism, as it is not the “manifold application +of the same material,” but an actual, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_62'>62</span>identical repetition required by the context. +We may be temporarily nonplussed in this +analysis, and, as a pretext, we may wish to dispute +the character of the wit in the anecdote +which causes us to laugh. What else worthy +of notice can be said about the answer of the +poor man? It may be supposed that the striking +thing about it is its logical character, but, +as a matter of fact, the answer is illogical. The +debtor endeavors to justify himself for spending +the borrowed money on luxuries and asks, with +some semblance of right, when he is to be allowed +to eat salmon. But this is not at all +the correct answer. The creditor does not blame +him for eating salmon on the day that he borrowed +the money, but reminds him that in his +condition he has no right to think of such luxuries +at all. The poor <em>bon vivant</em> disregards +this only possible meaning of the reproach, +centers his answer about another point, and acts +as if he did not understand the reproach.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Is it possible that the technique of this joke +lies in this deviation of the answer from the +sense of reproach? A similar changing of the +viewpoint—displacement of the psychic accent—may +perhaps also be demonstrated in the two +previous examples which we felt were related +to this one. This can be successfully shown +and solves the technique of these examples. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_63'>63</span>Soulié calls Heine’s attention to the fact that +society worships the “golden calf” in the nineteenth +century just as the Jewish nation once +did in the desert. To this an answer from +Heine like the following would seem fit: “Yes, +that is human nature. Centuries have changed +nothing in it;” or he might have remarked +something equally apposite. But Heine deviates +in his manner from the instigated thought. +Indeed, he does not answer at all. He makes +use of the double meaning found in the phrase +“golden calf” to go off at a tangent. He seizes +upon one of the components of the phrase, +namely, “the calf,” and answers as if Soulié’s +speech placed the emphasis on it—“Oh, he is +no longer a calf, etc.”<a id='r30'></a><a href='#f30' class='c007'><sup>[30]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>The deviation is much more evident in the +bath joke. This example requires a graphic +representation. The first Jew asks, “Have +you taken a <em>bath</em>?” The emphasis lies upon +the bath element. The second answers as if the +query were: “Have you <em>taken</em> a bath?” The +displacement would have been impossible if +the question had been: “Have you bathed?” +The witless answer would have been: “Bathed? +What do you mean? I don’t know what that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_64'>64</span>means.” However, the technique of the wit lies +in the displacement of the emphasis from “to +bathe” to “to take.”<a id='r31'></a><a href='#f31' class='c007'><sup>[31]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>Let us return to the example “salmon with +mayonnaise,” which is the purest of its kind. +What is new in it will direct us into various +paths. In the first place we have to give +the mechanism of this newly discovered technique. +I propose to designate it as having +<em>displacement</em> for its most essential element. +The deviation of the trend of thought consists +in displacing the psychic accent to another +than the original theme. It is then incumbent +upon us to find out the relationship of the +technique of displacement to the expression of +the witticism. Our example (salmon with +mayonnaise) shows us that the displacement +technique is absolutely independent of the verbal +expression. It does not depend upon words, +but upon the mental trend, and to abrogate it +we are not helped by substitution so long as +the sense of the answer is adhered to. The reduction +is possible only when we change the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_65'>65</span>mental trend and permit the gastronomist to +answer directly to the reproach which he eluded +in the conception of the joke. The reduced +conception will then be: “What I like I cannot +deny myself, and it is all the same to me where +I get the money for it. Here you have my +explanation as to why I happen to be eating +salmon with mayonnaise to-day just after you +have loaned me some money.” But that would +not be witticism but a <em>cynicism</em>. It will be +instructive to compare this joke with one +which is closely allied to it in meaning.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A man who was addicted to drink supported +himself in a small city by giving lessons. His +vice gradually became known and he lost most +of his pupils in consequence. A friend of his +took it upon himself to admonish him to reform. +“Look here,” he said, “you could have +the best scholars in town if you would give up +drinking. Why not do it?” “What are you +talking about?” was the indignant reply. “I +am giving lessons in order to be able to drink. +Shall I give up drinking in order to obtain +scholars?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>This joke, too, carries the stamp of logic +which we have noted in the case of “salmon +with mayonnaise,” but it is no longer displacement-wit. +The answer is a direct one. The +cynicism, which is veiled there, is openly admitted +<span class='pageno' id='Page_66'>66</span>here, “For me drink is the most important +thing.” The technique of this witticism +is really very poor and cannot explain its +effect. It lies merely in the change in order +of the same material, or to be more exact, in +the reversal of the means-and-end relationship +between drink and giving lessons or getting +scholars. As I gave no greater emphasis in +the reduction to this factor of the expression +the witticism is somewhat blurred; it may be +expressed as follows: “What a senseless demand +to make. For me, drink is the most important +thing and not the scholars. Giving +lessons is only a means towards more drink.” +The wit is really dependent upon the expression.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the bath wit, the dependence of the witticism +upon the wording “have you taken a +bath” is unmistakable and a change in the +wording nullifies the joke. The technique in +this case is quite complicated. It is a combination +of double meaning (sub-group f) and +displacement. The wording of the question +admits a double meaning. The joke arises +from the fact that the answer is given not in +the sense expected by the questioner, but has a +different subordinate sense. By making the +displacement retrogressive we are accordingly +in position to find a reduction which leaves the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_67'>67</span>double meaning in the expression and still does +away with the wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>“Have you taken a bath?” “Taken what? +A bath? What is that?”</em> But that is no longer +a witticism. It is simply either a spiteful or +playful exaggeration.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In Heme’s joke about the “golden calf” the +double meaning plays a quite similar part. It +makes it possible for the answer to deviate from +the instigated stream of thought—a thing which +happens in the joke about “salmon and mayonnaise”—without +any such dependence upon the +wording. In the reduction Soulié’s speech and +Heine’s answer would be as follows: “It reminds +one very much of the worship of the +golden calf when one sees the people throng +around that man simply because he is rich.” +Heine’s answer would be: “That he is made +so much of on account of his wealth is not the +worst part. You do not emphasize enough the +fact that his ignorance is forgiven on account +of his wealth.” Thus, while the double meaning +would be retained the displacement-wit +would be eliminated.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Here we may be prepared for the objection +which might be raised, namely, that we are +seeking to tear asunder these delicate differentiations +which really belong together. Does +not every double meaning furnish occasion for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_68'>68</span>displacement and for a deviation of the stream +of thought from one sense to another? And +shall we agree that a “double meaning” and +“displacement” should be designated as representatives +of two entirely different types of +wit? It is true that a relation between double +meaning and displacement actually exists, but +it has nothing to do with our differentiation +of the techniques of wit. In cases of double +meaning the wit contains nothing but a word +capable of several interpretations which allows +the hearer to find the transition from one +thought to another, and which with a little +forcing may be compared to a displacement. +In the cases of displacement-wit, however, the +witticism itself contains a stream of thought +in which the displacement is brought about. +Here the displacement belongs to the work +which is necessary for its understanding. +Should this differentiation not be clear to us we +can make use of the reduction method, which is +an unfailing way for tangible demonstration. +We do not deny, however, that there is something +in this objection. It calls our attention +to the fact that we cannot confuse the psychic +processes in the formation of wit (the wit-work) +with the psychic processes in the conception of +the wit (the understanding-work). The object +<span class='pageno' id='Page_69'>69</span>of our present investigation will be confined +only to the former.<a id='r32'></a><a href='#f32' class='c007'><sup>[32]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>Are there still other examples of the technique +of displacement? They are not easily +found, but the following witticism is a very +good specimen. It also shows a lack of overemphasized +logic found in our former examples.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A horse-dealer in recommending a saddle +horse to his client said: “If you mount this +horse at four o’clock in the morning you will +be in Monticello at six-thirty in the morning.” +“What will I do in Monticello at six-thirty in +the morning?” asked the client.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Here the displacement is very striking. The +horse-dealer mentions the early arrival in the +small city only with the obvious intention of +proving the efficiency of the horse. The client +disregards the capacity of the animal, about +which he evidently has no more doubts, and +takes up only the data of the example selected +<span class='pageno' id='Page_70'>70</span>for the test. The reduction of this joke is comparatively +simple.</p> + +<p class='c008'>More difficulties are encountered by another +example, the technique of which is very obscure. +It can be solved, however, through the application +of double meaning with displacement. The +joke relates the subterfuge employed by a +“schadchen” (Jewish marriage broker). It +belongs to a class which will claim more of our +attention later.</p> + +<p class='c008'><i>The “<span lang="de">schadchen</span>” had assured the suitor +that the father of the girl was no longer living. +After the engagement had been announced the +news leaked out that the father was still living +and serving a sentence in prison. The suitor +reproached the agent for deceiving him. +“Well,” said the latter, “what did I tell you? +Do you call that living?”</i></p> + +<p class='c008'>The double meaning lies in the word “living,” +and the displacement consists in the fact that +the “schadchen” avoids the common meaning +of the word, which is a contrast to “death,” and +uses it in the colloquial sense: “You don’t call +that living.” In doing this he explains his +former utterance as a double meaning, although +this manifold application is here quite out of +place. Thus far the technique resembles that +of the “golden calf” and the “bath” jokes. +Here, however, another factor comes into consideration +<span class='pageno' id='Page_71'>71</span>which disturbs the understanding of +the technique through its obtrusiveness. One +might say that this joke is a “characterization-wit.” +It endeavors to illustrate by example the +marriage agent’s characteristic admixture of +mendacious impudence and repartee. We shall +learn that this is only the “show-side” of the +façade of the witticism, that is, its sense. Its +object serves a different purpose. We shall +also defer our attempt at reduction.<a id='r33'></a><a href='#f33' class='c007'><sup>[33]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>After these complicated examples, which are +not at all easy to analyze, it will be gratifying +to find a perfectly pure and transparent example +of “displacement-wit.” <em>A beggar implored +the help of a wealthy baron for a trip +to Ostend, where he asserted the physicians had +ordered him to take sea baths for his health. +“Very well, I shall assist you,” said the rich +baron, “but is it absolutely necessary for you to +go to Ostend, which is the most expensive of all +watering-places?” “Sir,” was the reproving +reply, “nothing is too expensive for my health.”</em> +Certainly that is a proper attitude, but hardly +proper for the supplicant. The answer is given +from the viewpoint of a rich man. The beggar +acts as if it were his own money that he was +willing to sacrifice for his health, as if money +and health concerned the <em>same</em> person.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_72'>72</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Nonsense as a Technical Means</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>Let us take up again in this connection the +instructive example of “salmon with mayonnaise.” +It also presents to us a side in which +we noticed a striking display of logical work +and we have learned from analyzing it that +this logic concealed an error of thought, namely, +a displacement of the stream of thought. +Henceforth, even if only by way of contrast +association, we shall be reminded of other jokes +which, on the contrary, present clearly something +contradictory, something nonsensical, or +foolish. We shall be curious to discover wherein +the technique of the witticism lies. I shall +first present the strongest and at the same time +the purest example of the entire group. Once +more it is a Jewish joke.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>Ike was serving in the artillery corps. He +was seemingly an intelligent lad, but he was +unwieldy and had no interest in the service. +One of his superiors, who was kindly disposed +toward him, drew him aside and said to him: +“Ike, you are out of place among us. I would +advise you to buy a cannon and make yourself +independent.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>The advice, which makes us laugh heartily, +is obvious nonsense. There are no cannon to +be bought and an individual cannot possibly +<span class='pageno' id='Page_73'>73</span>make himself independent as a fighting force +or establish himself, as it were. One cannot +remain one minute in doubt but that this advice +is not pure nonsense, but witty nonsense +and an excellent joke. By what means does +the nonsense become a witticism?</p> + +<p class='c008'>We need not meditate very long. From the +discussions of the authors in the Introduction +we can guess that sense lurks in such witty +nonsense, and that this sense in nonsense transforms +nonsense into wit. In our example the +sense is easily found. The officer who gives +the artilleryman, Ike, the nonsensical advice +pretends to be stupid in order to show Ike how +stupidly he is acting. He imitates Ike as if to +say, “I will now give you some advice which is +exactly as stupid as you are.” He enters into +Ike’s stupidity and makes him conscious of it by +making it the basis of a proposition which must +meet with Ike’s wishes, for if Ike owned a cannon +and took up the art of warfare on his own +account, of what advantage would his intelligence +and ambition be to him? How would +he take care of the cannon and acquaint +himself with its mechanism in order to meet +the competition of other possessors of cannon?</p> + +<p class='c008'>I am breaking off the analysis of this example +to show the same sense in nonsense in a shorter +<span class='pageno' id='Page_74'>74</span>and simpler, though less glaring case of nonsense-wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>Never to be born would be best for mortal +man.</em>” “<em>But</em>,” added the sages of the <cite><span lang="de">Fliegende +Blätter</span></cite>, “<em>hardly one man in a hundred thousand +has this luck</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The modern appendix to the ancient philosophical +saying is pure nonsense, and becomes +still more stupid through the addition of the +seemingly careful “hardly.” But this appendix +in attaching itself to the first sentence incontestably +and correctly limits it. It can thus +open our eyes to the fact that that piece of +wisdom so reverently scanned, is neither more +nor less than sheer nonsense. He who is not +born of woman is not mortal; for him there +exists no “good” and no “best.” The nonsense +of the joke, therefore, serves here to expose +and present another bit of nonsense as in the +case of the artilleryman. Here I can add a +third example which, owing to its context, +scarcely deserves a detailed description. It +serves, however, to illustrate the use of nonsense +in wit in order to represent another element +of nonsense.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A man about to go upon a journey intrusted +his daughter to his friend, begging him to watch +over her chastity during his absence. When +he returned some months later he found that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_75'>75</span>she was pregnant. Naturally he reproached +his friend. The latter alleged that he could not +explain this unfortunate occurrence. “Where +has she been sleeping?” the father finally asked. +“In the same room with my son,” replied the +friend. “How is it that you allowed her to +sleep in the same room with your son after I +had begged you so earnestly to take good care +of her?” remonstrated the father. “Well,” +explained the friend, “there was a screen between +them. There was your daughter’s bed +and over there was my son’s bed and between +them stood the screen.” “And suppose he +went behind the screen? What then?” asked +the parent. “Well, in that case,” rejoined the +friend thoughtfully, “it might be possible.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>In this joke—aside from the other qualities +of this poor witticism—we can easily get the +reduction. Obviously, it would read like this: +“You have no right to reproach me. How +could you be so foolish as to leave your daughter +in a house where she must live in the constant +companionship of a young man? As if it were +possible for a stranger to be responsible for +the chastity of a maiden under such circumstances!” +The seeming stupidity of the friend +here also serves as a reflection of the stupidity +of the father. By means of the reduction we +have eliminated the nonsense contained in the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_76'>76</span>witticism as well as the witticism itself. We +have not gotten rid of the “nonsense” element +itself, as it finds another place in the context of +the sentence after it has been reduced to its +true meaning.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We can now also attempt the reduction of +the joke about the cannon. The officer might +have said: “I know, Ike, that you are an intelligent +business man, but I must tell you that +you are very stupid if you do not realize that +one cannot act in the army as one does in +business, where each one is out for himself +and competes with the other. Military service +demands subordination and co-operation.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The technique of the nonsense-witticisms +hitherto discussed really consists in advancing +something apparently absurd or nonsensical +which, however, discloses a sense serving to +illustrate and represent some other actual +absurdity and nonsense.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Has the employment of contradiction in the +technique of wit always this meaning? Here is +another example which answers this affirmatively. +On an occasion when Phocion’s speech +was applauded he turned to his friends and +asked: “<em>Did I say something foolish?</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>This question seems paradoxical, but we +immediately comprehend its meaning. “What +have I said that has pleased this stupid crowd? +<span class='pageno' id='Page_77'>77</span>I ought really to be ashamed of the applause, +for if it appealed to these fools, it could not +have been very clever after all.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Other examples teach us that absurdity is +used very often in the technique of wit without +serving at all the purpose of uncovering another +piece of nonsense.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A well-known university teacher who was +wont to spice richly with jokes his rather dry +specialty was once congratulated upon the +birth of his youngest son, who was bestowed +upon him at a rather advanced age. “Yes,” +said he to the well-wishers, “it is remarkable +what mortal hands can accomplish.”</em> This reply +seems especially meaningless and out of place, +for children are called the blessings of God to +distinguish them from creations of mortal hands. +But it soon dawns upon us that this answer has +a meaning and an obscene one at that. The +point in question is not that the happy father +wishes to appear stupid in order to make something +else or some other persons appear stupid. +The seemingly senseless answer causes us astonishment. +It puzzles us, as the authors would +have it. We have seen that the authors deduce +the entire mechanism of such jokes from the +change of the succession of “clearness and confusion.” +We shall try to form an opinion about +this later. Here we content ourselves by remarking +<span class='pageno' id='Page_78'>78</span>that the technique of this witticism +consists in advancing such confusing and senseless +elements.</p> + +<p class='c008'>An especially peculiar place among the nonsense-jokes +is assumed by this joke of Lichtenberg.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>He was surprised that the two holes were +cut in the pelts of cats just where their eyes +were located.</em>” It is certainly foolish to be +surprised about something that is obvious in +itself, something which is really the explanation +of an identity. It reminds one of a seriously +intended utterance of Michelet (<cite>The Woman</cite>) +which, as I remember it, runs as follows: “<em>How +beautifully everything is arranged by nature. +As soon as the child comes into the world it +finds a mother who is ready to care for it.</em>” +This utterance of Michelet is really silly, but +the one of Lichtenberg is a witticism, which +makes use of the absurdity for some purpose. +There is something behind it. What? At +present that is something we cannot discuss.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Sophistic Faulty Thinking</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>We have learned from two groups of examples +that the wit-work makes use of deviations +from normal thought, namely, <em>displacement</em> +and <em>absurdity</em>, as technical means of presenting +<span class='pageno' id='Page_79'>79</span>witty expressions. It is only just to +expect that other faulty thinking may find a +similar application. Indeed, a few examples of +this sort can be cited.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A gentleman entered a shop and ordered a +fancy cake, which, however, he soon returned, +asking for some liqueur in its stead. He drank +the liqueur, and was about to leave without +paying for it. The shopkeeper held him back. +“What do you want of me?” he asked. +“Please pay for the liqueur,” said the shopkeeper. +“But I have given you the fancy cake +for it.” “Yes, but you have not paid for that +either.” “Well, neither have I eaten it.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>This little story also bears the semblance of +logic which we already know as the suitable +façade for faulty thinking. The error, obviously, +lies in the fact that the cunning customer +establishes a connection between the return +of the fancy cake and its exchange for the +liqueur, a connection which really does not +exist. The state of affairs may be divided into +two processes which as far as the shopkeeper +is concerned are independent of each other. +He first took the fancy cake and returned it, +so that he owes nothing for it. He then took +the liqueur, for which he owes money. One +might say that the customer uses the relation +“for it” in a double sense, or, to speak more +<span class='pageno' id='Page_80'>80</span>correctly, by means of a double sense he forms +a relation which does not hold in reality.<a id='r34'></a><a href='#f34' class='c007'><sup>[34]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>The opportunity now presents itself for making +a not unimportant confession. We are +here busying ourselves with an investigation of +technique of wit by means of examples, and +we ought to be sure that the examples which +we have selected are really true witticisms. +The facts are, however, that in a series of +cases we fall into doubt as to whether or not +the example in question may be called a joke. +We have no criterion at our disposal before +investigation itself furnishes one. Usage of +language is unreliable and is itself in need of +examination for its authority. To decide the +question we can rely on nothing else but a +certain “feeling,” which we may interpret by +saying that in our judgment the decision follows +certain criteria which are not yet accessible +to our knowledge. We shall naturally not +appeal to this “feeling” for substantial proof. +In the case of the last-mentioned example we +cannot help doubting whether we may present +it as a witticism, as a sophistical witticism, or +<span class='pageno' id='Page_81'>81</span>merely as a sophism. The fact is that we do +not yet know wherein the character of wit lies.</p> + +<p class='c008'>On the other hand the following example, +which evinces, as it were, the complementary +faulty thinking, is a witticism without any +doubt. Again it is a story of a marriage agent. +<em>The agent is defending the girl he has proposed +against the attacks of her prospective fiancé. +“The mother-in-law does not suit me,” the +latter remarks. “She is a crabbed, foolish person.” +“That’s true,” replies the agent, “but +you are not going to marry the mother-in-law, +but the daughter.” “Yes, but she is no longer +young, and she is not pretty, either.” “That’s +nothing: if she is not young or pretty you can +trust her all the more.” “But she hasn’t much +money.” “Why talk of money? Are you going +to marry money? You want a wife, don’t +you?” “But she is a hunchback.” “Well, +what of that? Do you expect her to have no +blemishes at all?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>It is really a question of an ugly girl who is +no longer young, who has a paltry dowry and a +repulsive mother, and who is besides equipped +with a pretty bad deformity, relations which are +not at all inviting to matrimony. The marriage +agent knows how to present each individual +fault in a manner to cause one to become +reconciled to it, and then takes up the unpardonable +<span class='pageno' id='Page_82'>82</span>hunch back as the one fault which +can be excused in any one. Here again there +is the semblance of logic which is characteristic +of sophisms, and which serves to conceal the +faulty thinking. It is apparent that the girl +possesses nothing but faults, many of which +can be overlooked, but one that cannot be passed +by. The chances for the marriage become very +slim. The agent acts as if he removed each +individual fault by his evasions, forgetting that +each leaves behind some depreciation which is +added to the next one. He insists upon dealing +with each factor individually, and refuses to +combine them into a sum total.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A similar omission forms the nucleus of another +sophism which causes much laughter, +though one can well question its right to be +called a joke.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A. had borrowed a copper kettle from B., and +upon returning it was sued by B. because it had +a large hole which rendered it unserviceable. +His defense was this</em>: “<em>In the first place I +never borrowed any kettle from B., secondly +the kettle had a hole in it when I received it +from B., thirdly the kettle was in perfect condition +when I returned it.</em>” Each separate protest +is good by itself, but taken together they +exclude each other. A. treats individually +what must be taken as a whole, just as the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_83'>83</span>marriage agent when he deals with the imperfections +of the bride. One can also say that A. +uses “and” where only an “either—or” is +possible.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Another sophism greets us in the following +marriage agent story. <em>The suitor objects because +the bride has a short leg and therefore +limps. The agent contradicts him. “You are +wrong,” he says. “Suppose you marry a +woman whose legs are sound and straight. +What do you gain by it? You are not sure +from day to day that she will not fall down, +break a leg, and then be lame for the rest of +her life. Just consider the pain, the excitement, +and the doctor’s bill. But if you marry +this one nothing can happen. Here you have +a finished job.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Here the semblance of logic is very shallow, +for no one will by any means admit that a +“finished misfortune” is to be preferred to a +mere possibility of such. The error in the +stream of thought will be seen more easily in a +second example.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>In the temple of Cracow sat the great Rabbi +N. praying with his disciples. Suddenly he +emitted a cry and in response to his troubled +disciples said: “The great Rabbi L. died just +now in Lemberg.” The congregation thereupon +went into mourning for the deceased. In the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_84'>84</span>course of the next day travelers from Lemberg +were asked how the rabbi had died, and what +had caused his death. They knew nothing +about the event, however, as, they said, they +had left him in the best of health. Finally it +was definitely ascertained that the Rabbi of +Lemberg had not died at the hour on which +Rabbi N. had felt his death telepathically, and +that he was still living. A stranger seized the +opportunity to banter a pupil of the Cracow +rabbi about the episode. “That was a glorious +exhibition that your rabbi made of himself +when he saw the Rabbi of Lemberg die,” he +said. “Why, the man is still living!” “No +matter,” replied the pupil. “To look from +Cracow to Lemberg was wonderful anyhow.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Here the faulty thinking common to both +of the last examples is openly shown. The +value of fanciful ideas is unfairly matched +against reality; possibility is made equivalent +to actuality. To look from Cracow to Lemberg +despite the miles between would have been +an imposing telepathic feat had it resulted in +some truth, but the disciple gives no heed to +that. It might have been possible that the +Rabbi of Lemberg had died at the moment +when the Rabbi of Cracow had proclaimed his +death, but the pupil displaces the accent from +the condition under which the teacher’s act +<span class='pageno' id='Page_85'>85</span>would be remarkable to the unconditional admiration +of this act. “<i><span lang="la">In magnis rebus voluisse +sat est</span></i>” is a similar point of view. Just as in +this example reality is sacrificed in favor of +possibility, so in the foregoing example the +marriage agent suggests to the suitor that the +possibility of the woman’s becoming lame +through an accident is a far more important +consideration to be taken into account; whereas +the question as to whether or not she is lame +is put altogether into the background.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Automatic Errors of Thought</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Another interesting group attaches itself to +this one of sophistical faulty thinking, a group +in which the faulty thinking may be designated +as <em>automatic</em>. It is perhaps only a stroke of +fate that all of the examples which I shall cite +for this new group are again stories referring +to marriage agents.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>The agent brought along an assistant to a +conference about a bride. This assistant was +to confirm his assertions. “She is as well made +as a pine tree,” said the agent. “Like a pine +tree,” repeated the echo. “She has eyes which +one must appreciate.” “Wonderful eyes,” confirmed +the echo. “She is cultured beyond +words. She possesses extraordinary culture.” +<span class='pageno' id='Page_86'>86</span>“Wonderfully cultured,” repeated the assistant. +“However, one thing is true,” confessed the +agent. “She has a slight hunch on her back.” +“And what a hunch!” confirmed the echo.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>The other stories are quite analogous to this +one, but they are cleverer.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>On being introduced to his prospective bride +the suitor was rather unpleasantly surprised, +and drawing aside the marriage agent he reproachfully +whispered to him: “Why have you +brought me here? She is ugly and old. She +squints, has bad teeth, and bleary eyes.” +“You can talk louder,” interrupted the agent. +“She is deaf, too.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A prospective bridegroom made his first call +on his future bride in company with the agent, +and while in the parlor waiting for the appearance +of the family the agent drew the young +man’s attention to a glass closet containing a +handsome silver set. “Just look at these +things,” he said. “You can see how wealthy +these people are.” “But is it not possible that +these articles were just borrowed for the occasion,” +inquired the suspicious young man, “so +as to give the appearance of wealth?” “What +an idea,” answered the agent protestingly. +“Who in the world would lend them anything?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>In all three cases one finds the same thing. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_87'>87</span>A person who reacts several times in succession +in the same manner continues in the same +manner on the next occasion where it becomes +unsuited and runs contrary to his intentions. +Falling into the automatism of habit he fails +to adapt himself to the demands of the situation. +Thus in the first story the assistant forgot +that he was taken along in order to influence +the suitor in favor of the proposed bride, and +as he had thus far accomplished his task by +emphasizing through repetition the excellencies +attributed to the lady, he now emphasizes also +her timidly conceded hunch back which he +should have belittled.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The marriage agent in the second story is so +fascinated by the failings and infirmities of the +bride that he completes the list from his own +knowledge, which it was certainly neither his +business nor his intention to do. Finally in +the third story he is so carried away by his +zeal to convince the young man of the family’s +wealth that in order to corroborate his proofs +he blurts out something which must upset all +his efforts. Everywhere the automatism triumphs +over the appropriate variation of +thought and expression.</p> + +<p class='c008'>That is quite easy to understand, although +it must cause confusion when it is brought to +our attention that these three stories could just +<span class='pageno' id='Page_88'>88</span>as well be termed “comical” as “witty.” Like +every act of unmasking and self-betrayal the +discovery of the psychic automatism also belongs +to technique of the comic. We suddenly +see ourselves here confronted with the problem +of the relationship of wit to the comic element—a +subject which we endeavored to avoid (see +the Introduction). Are these stories only +“comical” and not “witty” also? Does the +comic element employ here the same means as +does the wit? And again, of what does the +peculiar character of wit consist?</p> + +<p class='c008'>We must adhere to the fact that the technique +of the group of witticisms examined last +consists of nothing else but the establishment of +“faulty thinking.” We are forced to admit, +however, that so far the investigation has led +us further into darkness than to illumination. +Nevertheless we do not abandon the hope of +arriving at a result by means of a more thorough +knowledge of the technique of wit which +may become the starting-point for further insight.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Unification</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The next examples of wit with which we wish +to continue our investigation do not give us as +much work. Their technique reminds us very +much of what we already know. Here is one +<span class='pageno' id='Page_89'>89</span>of Lichtenberg’s jokes. “<em>January</em>,” he says, +“<em>is the month in which one extends good wishes +to his friends, and the rest are months in which +the good wishes are not fulfilled.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>As these witticisms may be called clever +rather than strong, we shall reinforce the impression +by examining a few more.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>Human life is divided into two halves; during +the first one looks forward to the second, +and during the second one looks backward to +the first.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>Experience consists in experiencing what +one does not care to experience.</em>” (The last +two examples were cited by K. Fischer.)</p> + +<p class='c008'>One cannot help being reminded by these examples +of a group, treated of before, which is +characterized by the “manifold application of +the same material.” The last example especially +will cause us to ask why we have not +inserted it there instead of presenting it here +in a new connection. “Experience” is described +through its own terms just as some of +the examples cited above. Neither would I be +against this correction. However, I am of the +opinion that the other two cases, which are +surely similar in character, contain a different +factor which is more striking and more important +than the manifold application of the +same word which shows nothing here touching +<span class='pageno' id='Page_90'>90</span>upon double meaning. And what is more, I +wish to emphasize that new and unexpected +identities are here formed which show themselves +in relations of ideas to one another, in +relations of definitions to each other, or to a +common third. I would call this process <em>unification</em>. +Obviously it is analogous to condensation +by compression into similar words. Thus the +two halves of human life are described by the +inter-relationship discovered between them: +during the first part one longs for the second, +and in the second one longs for the first. To +speak more precisely there were two relationships +very similar to each other which were +selected for description. The similarity of the +relationship that corresponds to the similarity of +the words which, just for this reason, might +recall the manifold application of the same +material—<span class='fraction'>(looks forward)<br>(looks backward).</span></p> + +<p class='c008'>In Lichtenberg’s joke, January and the +months contrasted with it are characterized +again by a modified relationship to a third +factor: these are good wishes which one receives +in the first month, but are not fulfilled +during the other months. The differentiation +from the manifold application of the same material +which is really related to double meaning +is here quite clear.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_91'>91</span>A good example of unification-wit needing +no explanation is the following:</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>J. B. Rousseau, the French poet, wrote an +ode to posterity (à la postérité). Voltaire, +thinking that the poor quality of the poem in +no way justified its reaching posterity, wittily +remarked, “This poem will not reach its destination”</em> +(K. Fischer).</p> + +<p class='c008'>The last example may remind us of the fact +that it is essentially unification which forms +the basis of the so-called repartee in wit. For +ready repartee consists in using the defense for +aggression and in “turning the tables” or in +“paying with the same coin.” That is, the +repartee consists in establishing an unexpected +identity between attack and counter-attack.</p> + +<p class='c008'>For example, <em>a baker said to a tavern keeper, +one of whose fingers was festering: “I guess +your finger got into your beer.” The tavern +keeper replied: “You are wrong. One of your +rolls got under my finger nail”</em> (Ueberhorst: +<cite><span lang="de">Das Komische</span></cite>, II, 1900).</p> + +<p class='c008'>While Serenissimus was traveling through his +domains he noticed a man in the crowds who +bore a striking resemblance to himself. He +beckoned him to come over and asked: “<em>Was +your mother ever employed in my home?</em>” +“<em>No, sire</em>,” replied the man, “<em>but my father +was.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_92'>92</span>While Duke Karl of Würtemberg was riding +horseback he met a dyer working at his trade. +“<em>Can you color my white horse blue?</em>” “<em>Yes, +sire</em>,” was the rejoinder, “<em>if the animal can +stand the boiling!</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>In this excellent repartee, which answers a +foolish question with a condition that is equally +impossible, there occurs another technical +factor which would have been omitted if the +dyer’s reply had been: “No, sire, I am afraid +that the horse could not stand being boiled.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Another peculiarly interesting technical +means at the disposal of unification is the addition +of the conjunction “and.” Such correlation +signifies a connection which could not be +understood otherwise. When Heine (<i><span lang="de">Harzreise</span></i>) +says of the city of Göttingen, “<em>In general the +inhabitants of Göttingen are divided into students, +professors, Philistines, and cattle</em>,” we +understand this combination exactly in the sense +which he furthermore emphasized by adding: +“These four social groups are distinguished little +less than sharply.” Again, when he speaks +about the school where he had to submit “<em>to +so much Latin, drubbing, and geography</em>,” he +wants to convey by this combination, which is +made very conspicuous by placing the drubbing +between the two studies, that the schoolboy’s +conception unmistakably described by the drubbing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_93'>93</span>should be extended also to Latin and +geography.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In Lipps’s book we find among the examples +of “witty enumeration” (Koordination) the +following verse, which stands nearest to Heine’s +“students, professors, Philistines, and cattle.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>With a fork and with much effort his +mother pulled him from a mess.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“As if effort were an instrument like the +fork,” adds Lipps by way of explanation. But +we get the impression that there is nothing +witty in this sentence. To be sure it is very +comical, whereas Heine’s co-ordination is undoubtedly +witty. We shall, perhaps, recall these +examples later when we shall no longer be +forced to evade the problem of the relationship +between wit and the comic.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Representation Through the Opposite</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>We have remarked in the example of the +Duke and the dyer that it would still have been +a joke by means of unification had the dyer +replied, “No, I fear that the horse could not +stand being boiled.” In substituting a “yes” +for the “no” which rightly belonged there, we +meet a new technical means of wit the application +of which we shall study in other examples.</p> + +<p class='c008'>This joke, which resembles the one we have +<span class='pageno' id='Page_94'>94</span>just cited from K. Fischer, is somewhat simpler. +“<em>Frederick the Great heard of a Silesian +clergyman who had the reputation of communicating +with spirits. He sent for him and received +him with the following question: ‘Can +you call up ghosts?’ ‘At your pleasure, your +majesty,’ replied the clergyman, ‘but they +won’t come.’</em>” Here it is perfectly obvious +that the wit lies in the substitution of its opposite +for the only possible answer, “No.” To +complete this substitution “but” had to be +added to “yes,” so that “yes” plus “but” +gives the equivalent for “no.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>This “representation through the opposite,” as +we choose to call it, serves the mechanism of +wit in several ways. In the following cases it +appears almost in its pure form:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>This woman resembles Venus de Milo in +many points. Like her she is extraordinarily +old, has no teeth, and has white spots on the +yellow surface of her body</em>” (Heine).</p> + +<p class='c008'>Here ugliness is depicted by making it agree +with the most beautiful. Of course these agreements +consist of attributes expressed in double +meaning or of matters of slight importance. +The latter applies to the second example.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>The attributes of the greatest men were all +united in himself. Like Alexander his head +was tilted to one side: like Cæsar he always had +<span class='pageno' id='Page_95'>95</span>something in his hair. He could drink coffee +like Leibnitz, and once settled in his armchair +he forgot eating and drinking like Newton, and +like him had to be awakened. He wore a wig +like Dr. Johnson, and like Cervantes the fly of +his trousers was always open</em>” (Lichtenberg: +<cite>The Great Mind</cite>).</p> + +<p class='c008'>J. V. Falke’s <cite><span lang="de">Lebenserinnerungen an eine +Reise nach Ireland</span></cite> (page 271) furnishes an exceptionally +good example of “representation +through the opposite” in which the use of +words of a double meaning plays absolutely no +part. The scene is laid in a wax figure museum, +like Mme. Tussaud’s. A lecturer discourses on +one figure after another to his audience, which +is composed of old and young people. “<em>This is +the Duke of Wellington and his horse</em>,” he says. +Whereupon a young girl remarks, “<em>Which is +the duke and which is the horse?</em>” “<em>Just as +you like, my pretty child</em>,” is the reply. “<em>You +pay your money and you take your choice.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The reduction of this Irish joke would be: +“It is gross impudence on the part of the +museum’s management to offer such an exhibition +to the public. It is impossible to distinguish +between the horse and the rider (playful +exaggeration), and it is for this exhibit that +one pays one’s hard-earned money!” The indignant +expression is now dramatized and applied +<span class='pageno' id='Page_96'>96</span>to a trivial occurrence. In the place of +the entire audience there appears one woman +and the riding figure becomes individually determined. +It is necessarily the Duke of Wellington, +who is so very popular in Ireland. But +the insolence of the museum proprietor or lecturer +who takes money from the public and +offers nothing in return is represented by the +opposite, through a speech, in which he extols +himself as a conscientious business man whose +fondest desire is to respect the rights to which +the public is entitled through the admission +fee. One then realizes that the technique of this +joke is not very simple. In so far as a way +is found to allow the swindler to assert his +scrupulosity it may be said that the joke is a +case of “representation through the opposite.” +The fact, however, that he does it on an occasion +where something different is demanded of +him, and the fact that he replies in terms of +commercial integrity when he is expected to discuss +the similarity of the figures, shows that it +is a case of displacement. The technique of +the joke lies in the combination of both technical +means.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Outdoing wit</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>This example is closely allied to another +small group which might be called “outdoing-wit.” +<span class='pageno' id='Page_97'>97</span>Here “yes,” which would be proper in +the reduction, is replaced by “no,” which, owing +to its context, is equivalent to a still stronger +“yes.” The same mechanism holds true when +the case is reversed. The contradiction takes +the place of an exaggerated confirmation. An +example of this nature is seen in the following +epigram from Lessing.<a id='r35'></a><a href='#f35' class='c007'><sup>[35]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>The good Galathee! ’Tis said that she dyes +her hair black, yet it was black when she bought +it.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Lichtenberg’s make-believe mocking defense +of philosophy is another example.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>There are more things in heaven and earth +than are dreamt of in your philosophy</em>,” Prince +Hamlet had disdainfully declared. Lichtenberg +well knew that this condemnation was +by no means severe enough, in that it does not +take into account all that can be said against +philosophy. He therefore added the following: +“<em>But there is also much in philosophy which is +found neither in heaven nor on earth.</em>” To be +sure, his assertion supplements what was lacking +in Hamlet’s philosophical utterance, but in +doing this he adds another and still greater reproach.</p> + +<p class='c008'>More transparent still, because they show +no trace of displacement, are two Jewish +<span class='pageno' id='Page_98'>98</span>jokes which are, however, of the coarse +kind.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>Two Jews were conversing about bathing.</em> +“<em>I take a bath once a year</em>,” said one, “<em>whether +I need one or not</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is clear that this boastful assurance of his +cleanliness only betrays his state of uncleanliness.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A Jew noticed remnants of food on the beard +of another. “I can tell you what you ate yesterday,” +he remarked. “Well, let’s hear it,” +said another. “Beans,” said the first one. “You +are wrong,” responded the other. “I had beans +the day before yesterday.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>The following example is an excellent “outdoing” +witticism which can be traced easily +to representation through the opposite.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>The king condescended to pay a visit at a +surgical clinic, and found the professor of surgery +engaged in amputating a leg. He watched +the various steps of the operation with interest +and expressed his royal approval with these +loud utterances: “Bravo, bravo, Professor.” +When the operation was over the professor +approached the king, bowed low, and asked: +“Does your majesty also command the amputation +of the other leg?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Whatever the professor may have thought +during this royal applause surely could not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_99'>99</span>have been expressed unchanged. His real +thoughts were: “Judging by this applause he +must be under the impression that I am amputating +the poor devil’s diseased leg by order +of and for the pleasure of the king. To be +sure, I have other reasons for performing this +operation.” But instead of expressing these +thoughts he goes to the king and says: “I have +no other reasons but your majesty’s order for +performing this operation. The applause you +accorded me has inspired me so much that I +am only awaiting your majesty’s command to +amputate the other leg also.” He thus succeeded +in making himself understood by expressing +the opposite of what he really thought +but had to keep to himself. Such an expression +of the opposite represents an incredible +exaggeration or outdoing.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As we gather from these examples, representation +through the opposite is a means frequently +and effectively used in the technique +of wit. We need not overlook, however, something +else, namely, that this technique is by +no means confined only to wit. When Marc +Antony, after his long speech in the Forum +had changed the mood of the mob listening +to Cæsar’s obsequies, at last repeats the +words,</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“For Brutus was an honorable man,”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c019'><span class='pageno' id='Page_100'>100</span>he well knows that the mob will scream the +true meaning of his words at him, namely,</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div>“They are traitors: nice honorable men!”</div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>Or when <i><span lang="la">Simplicissimus</span></i> transcribes a collection +of unheard-of brutalities and cynicisms +as expressions of “people with temperaments,” +this, too, is a representation through the opposite. +However, this is no longer designated as +wit, but as “irony.” Indeed, the only technique +that is characteristic of irony is representation +through the opposite. Besides, one reads and +hears about “ironical wit.” Hence there is no +longer any doubt that technique alone is not +capable of characterizing wit. There must be +something else which we have not yet discovered. +On the other hand, however, the fact +that the reduction of the technique destroys the +wit still remains uncontradicted. For the present +it may be difficult for us to unite for the +explanation of wit the two strong points which +we have already gained.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Indirect Expression</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Since representation through the opposite +belongs to the technical means of wit, we may +also expect that wit could make use of its reverse, +namely, the representation through the +similar and cognate. Indeed, when we continue +<span class='pageno' id='Page_101'>101</span>our investigation we find that this forms the +technique of a new and especially extensive +group of thought-witticisms. We can describe +the peculiarity of this technique much better +if instead of representation through the “cognate” +we use the expression representation +through “relationships and associations.” We +shall start with the last characteristic and illustrate +it by an example.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Indirect Expression with Allusion</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>It is an American anecdote and runs as +follows. <em>By undertaking a series of risky +schemes, two not very scrupulous business men +had succeeded in amassing an enormous fortune +and were now intent on forcing their way +into good society. Among other things they +thought it advisable to have their portraits +painted by the most prominent and most expensive +painters in the city, men whose works +were considered masterpieces. The costly pictures +were exhibited for the first time at a great +evening gathering, and the hosts themselves led +the most prominent connoisseur and art critic +to the wall of the salon on which both portraits +were hanging side by side, in order to elicit +from him a favorable criticism. He examined +the portraits for a long time, then shook his +<span class='pageno' id='Page_102'>102</span>head as if he were missing something. At +length he pointed to the bare space between +the pictures, and asked, “And where is the +Savior?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>The meaning of this expression is clear. It +is again the expression of something which cannot +be represented directly. In what way does +this “indirect expression” come about? By a +series of very obvious associations and conclusions +let us work backwards from the verbal +setting.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The query, “<em>where is the Savior?</em>” or “<em>where +is the picture of the Savior?</em>” arouses the conjecture +that the two pictures have reminded the +speaker of a similar arrangement familiar to +him as it is familiar to us. This arrangement, +of which one element is here missing, shows the +figure of the Savior between two other figures. +There is only one such case: Christ hanging +between the two thieves. The missing element +is emphasized by the witticism, and the similarity +rests in the figures at the right and left of +the Savior, which are not mentioned in the jest. +It can only mean that the pictures hanging in +the drawing-room are likewise those of thieves. +This is what the critic wished to, but could +not say, “You are a pair of scoundrels,” or +more in detail, “What do I care about your +portraits? You are a pair of scoundrels, that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_103'>103</span>I know.” And by means of a few associations +and conclusive inferences he has said it in a +manner which we designate as “allusion.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>We immediately remember that we have +encountered the process of allusion before. +Namely, in double meaning, when one of the +two meanings expressed by the same word +stands out very prominently, because being used +much oftener and more commonly, our attention +is directed to it first, whereas the other +meaning remains in the background because it +is more remote—such cases we wished to describe +as double meaning with allusion. In an +entire series of examples which we have hitherto +examined, we have remarked that their technique +is not simple and we realized that the +process of allusion was the factor that complicated +it. For example, see the contradiction-witticism +in which the congratulations on the +birth of the youngest child are acknowledged by +the remark that it is remarkable what human +hands can accomplish (p. 77).</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the American anecdote we have the process +of allusion without the double meaning, and we +find that the character of this process consists +in completing the picture through mental association. +It is not difficult to guess that the +utilized association can be of more than one +kind. So as not to be confused by large numbers +<span class='pageno' id='Page_104'>104</span>we shall discuss only the most pronounced +variations, and shall give only a few examples.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The association used in the substitution may +be a mere sound, so that this sub-group may +be analogous to word-wit in the pun. However, +it is not similarity in sound of two words, +but of whole sentences, characteristic combinations +of words, and similar means.</p> + +<p class='c008'>For example, Lichtenberg coined the saying: +“<em>New baths heal well</em>,” which immediately reminds +one of the proverb, “<em>New brooms clean +well</em>,” whose first and last words, as well as +whose whole sentence structure, is the same as +in the first saying. It has undoubtedly arisen +in the witty thinker’s mind as an imitation of +the familiar proverb. Thus Lichtenberg’s saying +is an allusion to the latter. By means of +this allusion something is suggested that cannot +be frankly said, namely, that the efficacy +of the baths taken as cures is due to other +things beside the thermal springs whose attributes +are the same everywhere.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The solution of the technique of another one +of Lichtenberg’s jokes is similar: “<em>The girl +barely twelve modes old.</em>” That sounds something +like the chronological term “<em>twelve +moons</em>” (i.e., months), and may originally have +been a mistake in writing in the permissible +poetical expression. But there is a good deal +<span class='pageno' id='Page_105'>105</span>of sense in designating the age of a feminine +creature by the changing modes instead of by +the changing of moons.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The connection of similarity may even consist +of a single slight modification. This technique +again runs parallel with a word-technique. +Both kinds of witticisms create almost the +identical impression, but they are more easily +distinguishable by the processes of the wit-work.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The following is an example of such a word-witticism +or pun. The great singer, Mary +Wilt, who was famous not merely on account +of the magnitude of her voice, suffered the +mortification of having a title of a play, dramatized +from the well-known novel of Jules +Verne, serve as an allusion to her corpulency. +“<em>The trip around the Wilt</em> (world) <em>in eighty +days</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Or: “<em>Every fathom a queen</em>,” which is a +modification of the familiar Shakespearian +quotation, “<em>Every inch a king</em>,” and served as +an allusion to a prominent woman who was unusually +big physically. There would really be +no serious objection if one should prefer to +classify this witticism as a substitution for condensation +with modification (cf. tête-à-bête, +p. 25).</p> + +<p class='c008'>Discussing the hardships of the medical profession, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_106'>106</span>namely, that physicians are obliged to +read and study constantly because remedies and +drugs once considered efficacious are later rejected +as useless, and that despite the physician’s +best efforts the patient often refuses to +pay for the treatment, one of the doctors present +remarked: “<em>Yes, every drug has its day</em>,” to +which another added, “<em>But not every Doc gets +his pay</em>.” These two witty remarks are both +modifications with allusion of the well-known +saying, “<em>Every dog has his day</em>.” But here, +too, the technique could be described as fusion +with modification.</p> + +<p class='c008'>If the modification contents itself with a +change in letters, allusions through modifications +are barely distinguishable from condensation +with substitutive formation, as shown in +this example: “<em>Mellingitis</em>,” <em>the allusion to the +dangerous disease meningitis, refers to the +danger which the conservative members of a +provincial borough in England thought impended +if the socialist candidate Mellon were +elected</em>.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The negative particles make very good allusions +at the cost of very little changing. Heine +referred to Spinoza as:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“My fellow <em>un</em>believer Spinoza.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“We, by the <em>Un</em>grace of God, Laborers, +Bondsmen, Negroes, Serfs,” etc., is a manifesto +<span class='pageno' id='Page_107'>107</span>(which Lichtenberg quotes no further) of these +unfortunates who probably have more right to +that title than kings and dukes have to the unmodified +one.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Omission</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Finally <em>omission</em>, which is comparable to condensation +without substitutive formation, is also +a form of allusion. For in every allusion there +is really something omitted, namely, the trend +of thought that leads to the allusion. It is +only a question of whether the gap, or the substitute +in the wording of the allusion which +partly fills in the gap, is the more obvious +element. Thus we come back through a series +of examples from the very clear cases of omission +to those of actual allusion.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Omission without substitution is found in +the following example. There lived in Vienna +a clever and bellicose writer whose sharp invectives +had repeatedly brought him bodily +assault at the hands of the persons he assailed. +During a conversation about a new misdeed by +one of his habitual opponents, some one said, +“<em>When X. hears this he will receive another +box on his ear</em>.” The technique of this wit +shows in the first place the confusion about +the apparent contradiction, for it is by no means +<span class='pageno' id='Page_108'>108</span>clear to us why a box on one’s ear should be +the direct result of having heard something. +The contradiction disappears if one fills in the +gap by adding to the remark: “<em>then he will +write such a caustic article against that person +that, etc.</em>” Allusions through omission and contradiction +are thus the technical means of this +witticism.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Heine remarked about some one: “<em>He praises +himself so much that pastils for fumigation are +advancing in price.</em>” This omission can easily +be filled in. What has been omitted is replaced +by an inference which then strikes back as an +allusion to the same. For self-praise has always +carried an evil odor with it.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Once more we encounter the two Jews in +front of the bathing establishment. “<em>Another +year has passed by already</em>,” says one with a +sigh.</p> + +<p class='c008'>These examples leave no doubt that the omission +is meant as an allusion.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A still more obvious omission is contained +in the next example, which is really a genuine +and correct allusion-witticism. Subsequent to +an artists’ banquet in Vienna a joke book was +given out in which, among others, the following +most remarkable proverb could be read:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>A wife is like an umbrella, at worst one may +also take a cab.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_109'>109</span>An umbrella does not afford enough protection +from rain. The words “<em>at worst</em>” can +mean only: when it is raining hard. A cab +is a public conveyance. As we have to deal +here with the figure of comparison, we shall put +off the detailed investigation of this witticism +until later on.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Heine’s “Bäder von Lucca” contains a veritable +wasps’ nest of stinging allusions which +make the most artistic use of this form of wit as +polemics against the Count of Platen. Long +before the reader can suspect their application, +a certain theme, which does not lend itself especially +to direct presentation, is preluded by +allusions of the most varied material possible; +e.g., in Hirsch-Hyacinth’s twisting of words: +You are too corpulent and I am too lean; you +possess too much conceit and I the more business +ability; I am a practicus and you are a +diarrheticus, in fine, “You are altogether my +Antipodex”—“Venus Urinia”—the thick Gudel +of Dreckwall in Hamburg, etc. Then the +occurrences of which the poet speaks take a +turn in which it merely seems to show the impolite +sportiveness of the poet, but soon it discloses +the symbolic relation to the polemical intention, +and in this way it also reveals itself as +allusion. At last the attack against Platen +bursts forth, and now the allusions to the subject +<span class='pageno' id='Page_110'>110</span>of the Count’s love for men seethe and +gush from each one of the sentences which +Heine directs against the talent and the character +of his opponent, e.g.:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“Even if the Muses are not well disposed +to him, he has at least the genius of speech in +his power, or rather he knows how to violate +him; for he lacks the free love of this genius, +besides he must perseveringly run after this +youth, and he knows only how to grasp the +outer forms which, in spite of their beautiful +rotundity, never express anything noble.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“He has the same experience as the ostrich, +which considers itself sufficiently hidden when +it sticks its head into the sand so that only its +backside is visible. Our illustrious bird would +have done better if he had stuck his backside +into the sand, and had shown us his head.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Allusion is perhaps the commonest and most +easily employed means of wit, and is at the basis +of most of the short-lived witty productions +which we are wont to weave into our conversation. +They cannot bear being separated from +their native soil nor can they exist independently. +Once more we are reminded by the +process of allusion of that relationship which +has already begun to confuse our estimation of +the technique of wit. The process of allusion +is not witty in itself; there are perfectly formed +<span class='pageno' id='Page_111'>111</span>allusions which have no claims to this character. +Only those allusions which show a “witty” +element are witty, hence the characteristics of +wit, which we have followed even into its technique, +again escape us.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I have sometimes called allusion “indirect expression,” +and now recognize that the different +kinds of allusion with representation through +the opposite, as well as the techniques still to be +mentioned, can be united into a single large +group for which “indirect expression” would +be the comprehensive name. Hence, <em>errors of +thought—unification—indirect representation</em>—are +those points of view under which we can +group the techniques of thought-wit which became +known to us.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Representation Through the Minute or the Minutest Element</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>On continuing the investigation of our material +we think we recognize a new sub-group +of indirect representation which though sharply +defined can be illustrated only by few examples. +It is that of representation through a minute +or minutest element; solving the problem by +bringing the entire character to full expression +through a minute detail. Correlating this +group with the mechanism of allusion is made +<span class='pageno' id='Page_112'>112</span>possible by looking at the triviality as connected +with the thing to be presented and as a +result of it. For example:</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A Jew who was riding in a train had made +himself very comfortable; he had unbuttoned +his coat, and had put his feet on the seat, when +a fashionably dressed gentleman came in. The +Jew immediately put on his best behavior and +assumed a modest position. The stranger +turned over the pages of a book, did some calculation, +and pondered a moment and suddenly +addressed the Jew. “I beg your pardon, how +soon will we have Yom Kippur?” (Day of +Atonement). “Oh, oh!” said the Jew, and +put his feet back on the seat before he answered.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>It cannot be denied that this representation +through something minute is allied to the tendency +of economy which we found to be the final +common element in the investigation of the +technique of word-wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The following example is much similar.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>The doctor who had been summoned to help +the baroness in her confinement declared that +the critical moment had not arrived, and proposed +to the baron that they play a game of +cards in the adjoining room in the meantime. +After a while the doleful cry of the baroness +reached the ears of the men. “Ah, mon Dieu, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_113'>113</span>que je souffre!” The husband jumped up, but +the physician stopped him saying, “That’s +nothing; let us play on.” A little while later +the woman in labor-pains was heard again: +“My God, my God, what pains!” “Don’t +you want to go in, Doctor?” asked the baron. +“By no means, it is not yet time,” answered the +doctor. At last there rang from the adjacent +room the unmistakable cry, “A-a-a-ai-e-e-e-e-e-e-E-E-E!” +The physician then threw down the +cards and said, “Now it’s time.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>How the pain allows the original nature to +break through all the strata of education, and +how an important decision is rightly made dependent +upon a seemingly inconsequential utterance—both +are shown in this good joke by the +successive changes in the cries of this childbearing +lady of quality.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Comparison</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Another kind of indirect expression of which +wit makes use is <em>comparison</em>, which we have not +discussed so far because an examination of comparison +touches upon new difficulties, or rather +it reveals difficulties which have made their +appearance on other occasions. We have already +admitted that in many of the examples +examined we could not banish all doubts as to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_114'>114</span>whether they should really be counted as witty, +and have recognized in this uncertainty a serious +shock to the principles of our investigation. +But in no other material do I feel this uncertainty +greater and nowhere does it occur more +frequently than in the case of comparison-wit. +The feeling which usually says to me—and I +dare say to a great many others under the same +conditions—this is a joke, this may be written +down as witty before even the hidden and +essential character of the wit has been uncovered—this +feeling I lack most. If at first I +experience no hesitation in declaring the comparison +to be a witticism, then the next instant +I seem to think that the pleasure I thus found +was of a different quality than that which I am +accustomed to ascribe to a joke. Also the fact +that witty comparisons but seldom can evoke +the explosive variety of laughter by which a +good joke proves itself makes it impossible for +me to cast aside the existing doubts, even when +I limit myself to the best and most effective +examples.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is easy to demonstrate that there are some +especially good and effective examples of comparison +which in no way give us the impression +of witticisms. A beautiful example of this +kind which I have not yet tired of admiring, +and the impression of which still clings to me, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_115'>115</span>I shall not deny myself the pleasure of citing. +It is a comparison with which Ferd. Lassalle +concluded one of his famous pleas (<i><span lang="de">Die Wissenschaft +und die Arbeiter</span></i>): “A man like myself +who, as I explained to you, had devoted his +whole life to the motto ‘<span lang="de">Die Wissenschaft und +die Arbeiter</span>’ (Science and the Workingman), +would receive the same impression from a condemnation +which in the course of events confronts +him <em>as would the chemist, absorbed in +his scientific experiments, from the cracking of +a retort. With a slight knitting of his brow at +the resistance of the material, he would, as soon +as the disturbance was quieted, calmly continue +his labor and investigations.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>One finds a rich assortment of pertinent and +witty comparisons in the writings of Lichtenberg +(2 B. of the Göttingen edition, 1853). +I shall take the material for our investigation +from that source.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>It is almost impossible to carry the torch +of truth through a crowd without singeing +somebody’s beard.</em>” This may seem witty, but +on closer examination one notices that the witty +effect does not come from the comparison itself +but from a secondary attribute of the same. +For the expression “the torch of truth” is no +new comparison, but one which has been used +for a long time and which has degenerated into +<span class='pageno' id='Page_116'>116</span>a fixed phrase, as always happens when a comparison +has the luck to be absorbed into the +common usage of speech. But whereas we +hardly notice the comparison in the saying, +“the torch of truth,” its original full force is +restored it by Lichtenberg, since by building +further on the comparison it results in a deduction. +But the taking of blurred expressions +in their full sense is already known to us as a +technique of wit; it finds a place with the Manifold +Application of the Same Material (p. 35). +It may well be that the witty impression created +by Lichtenberg’s sentence is due only to its relation +to this technique of wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The same explanation will undoubtedly hold +good for another witty comparison by the same +author.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>The man was not exactly a shining light, +but a great candlestick.... He was a professor +of philosophy.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>To call a scholar a shining light, a “<i><span lang="la">lumen +mundi</span></i>,” has long ceased to be an effective comparison, +whether it be originally qualified as a +witticism or not. But here the comparison was +freshened up and its full force was restored to +it by deducting a modification from it and in +this way setting up a second and new comparison. +The way in which the second comparison +came into existence seems to contain +<span class='pageno' id='Page_117'>117</span>the condition of the witticism and not the two +comparisons themselves. This would then be +a case of Identical Wit-Technique as in the +example of the torch.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The following comparison seems witty on +other but similarly classifiable grounds: “<em>I +look upon reviews as a kind of children’s disease</em> +which more or less attacks new-born books. +There are cases on record where the healthiest +died of it, and the puniest have often lived +through it. Many do not get it at all. Attempts +have frequently been made to prevent +the disease by means of <em>amulets of prefaces and +dedications, or to color them up by personal +pronunciamentos; but it does not always help</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The comparison of reviews with children’s +diseases is based in the first place upon their +susceptibility to attack shortly after they have +seen the light of the world. Whether this +makes it witty I do not trust myself to decide. +But when the comparison is continued, it is +found that the later fates of the new books may +be represented within the scope of the same or +by means of similar comparisons. Such a continuation +of a comparison is undoubtedly witty, +but we know already to what technique it owes +its witty flavor; it is a case of <em>unification</em> or the +establishment of an unexpected association. +The character of the unification, however, is not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_118'>118</span>changed by the fact that it consists here of a +relationship with the first comparison.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Doubt in Witty Comparisons</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>In a series of other comparisons one is +tempted to ascribe an indisputably existing +witty impression to another factor which again +in itself has nothing to do with the nature of +the comparison. These are comparisons which +are strikingly grouped, often containing a combination +that sounds absurd, which comes into +existence as a result of the comparison. Most +of Lichtenberg’s examples belong to this group.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“It is a pity that one cannot see the <em>learned +bowels</em> of the writers, in order to find out what +they have eaten.” “<em>The learned bowels</em>” is a +confusing, really absurd attribute which is +made clear only by the comparison. How +would it be if the witty impression of this comparison +should be referred entirely and fully to +the confusing character of their composition? +This would correspond to one of the means of +wit well known to us, namely, representation +through absurdity.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Lichtenberg has used the same comparison of +the imbibing of reading and educational material +with the imbibing of physical nourishment.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“He thought highly of <em>studying in his room</em> +<span class='pageno' id='Page_119'>119</span>and was heartily in favor of <em>learned stable +fodder</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The same absurd or at least conspicuous attributes, +which as we are beginning to notice are +the real carriers of the wit, mark other comparisons +of the same author.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>This is the weatherside of my moral constitution, +here I can stand almost anything.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“Every person has also his <em>moral backside</em> +which he does not show <em>except under the stress +of necessity</em> and which he covers as long as +possible with the <em>pants of good-breeding</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The “moral backside” is the peculiar attribute +which exists as the result of a comparison. +But this is followed by a continuation of the +comparison with a regular play on words +(“necessity”) and a second, still more unusual +combination (“the pants of good-breeding”), +which is possibly witty in itself; for the pants +become witty, as it were, because they are the +pants of good-breeding. Therefore it may not +take us by surprise if we get the impression of +a very witty comparison; we are beginning to +notice that we show a general tendency in our +estimation to extend a quality to the whole +thing when it clings only to one part of it. +Besides, the “pants of good-breeding” remind +us of a similar confusing verse of Heine.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_120'>120</span>“<em>Until, at last, the buttons tore from the +pants of my patience.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is obvious that both of the last comparisons +possess a character which one cannot find in all +good, i.e., fitting, comparisons. One might say +that they are in a large manner “debasing,” for +they place a thing of high category, an abstraction +(good-breeding, patience), side by side with +a thing of a very concrete nature of a very low +kind (pants). Whether this peculiarity has +something to do with wit we shall have to +consider in another connection. Let us attempt +to analyze another example in which the degrading +character is exceptionally well defined. +In Nestroy’s farce “<cite><span lang="de">Einen Jux will er sich +machen</span></cite>,” the clerk, Weinberl, who resolves in +his imagination how he will ponder over his +youth when he has some day become a well-established +old merchant, says: “<em>When in the +course of confidential conversation the ice is +chopped up before the warehouse of memory; +when the portal of the storehouse of antiquity +is unlocked again; and when the mattings of +phantasy are stocked full with wares of yore.</em>” +These are certainly comparisons of abstractions +with very common, concrete things, but the +witticism depends—exclusively or only partially—upon +the circumstance that a clerk +makes use of these comparisons which are taken +<span class='pageno' id='Page_121'>121</span>from the sphere of his daily occupation. But +to bring the abstract in relation to the commonplace +with which he is otherwise filled is an act +of <em>unification</em>. Let us revert to Lichtenberg’s +comparisons.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Peculiar Attributions</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>“<em>The motives for our actions may be arranged +like the thirty-two winds, and their +names may be classified in a similar way, e.g., +Bread-bread-glory or Glory-glory-bread.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>As so often happens in Lichtenberg’s witticisms, +in this case, too, the impression of appropriateness, +cleverness, and ingenuity is so +marked that our judgment of the character of +the witty element is thereby misled. If something +witty is intermingled in such an utterance +with the excellent sense, we probably are deluded +into declaring the whole to be an exceptional +joke. Moreover, I dare say that everything +that is really witty about it results from +the strangeness of the peculiar combination +bread-bread-glory. Thus as far as wit is concerned +it is representation through absurdity.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The peculiar combination or absurd attribution +can alone be represented as a product of a +comparison.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Lichtenberg says: “<em>A twice-sleepy woman—a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_122'>122</span>once-sleepy church pew</em>.” Behind each one +there is a comparison with a bed; in both cases +there is besides the comparison also the technical +factor of <em>allusion</em>. Once it is an allusion +to the soporific effect of sermons, and the second +time to the inexhaustible theme of sex.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Having found hitherto that a comparison as +often as it appears witty owes this impression +to its connection with one of the techniques of +wit known to us, there are nevertheless some +other examples which seem to point to the fact +that a comparison as such can also be witty.</p> + +<p class='c008'>This is Lichtenberg’s characteristic remark +about certain odes. “They are in poetry what +Jacob Böhm’s immortal writings are in prose—<em>they +are a kind of picnic in which the author +supplies the words, and the readers the meaning</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“When he <em>philosophizes</em>, he generally sheds +<em>an agreeable moonlight</em> over his topics, which is +in the main quite pleasant, but which does not +show any one subject clearly.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Again, Heine’s description: “<em>Her face resembled +a kodex palimpsestus, where under the new +block-lettered text of a church father peek forth +the half-obliterated verses of an ancient Hellenic +erotic poet.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Or, the continued comparison of a very degrading +tendency, in the “Bäder von Lucca.”</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_123'>123</span>“<em>The Catholic priest</em> is more like a clerk +who is employed in a big business; the church, +the big house at the head of which is the Pope, +gives him a definite salary. He works lazily +like one who is not working on his own account, +he has many colleagues, and so easily remains +unnoticed in the big business enterprise. He is +concerned only in the credit of the house and +still more in its preservation, since he would be +deprived of his means of sustenance in case +it went bankrupt. <em>The Protestant clergyman</em>, +on the other hand, is his own boss, and carries +on the religious businesses on his own account. +He has no wholesale trade like his Catholic +brother-tradesman, but deals merely at retail; +and since he himself must understand it, he +cannot be lazy. He must praise his <em>articles of +faith</em> to the people and must disparage the +articles of his competitors. Like a true small +trader he stands in his retail store, full of envy +of the industry of all large houses, particularly +the large house in Rome which has so many +thousand bookkeepers and packers on its payroll, +and which owns factories in all four corners +of the world.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the face of this, as in many other examples, +we can no longer dispute the fact that a comparison +may in itself be witty, and that the +witty impression need not necessarily depend +<span class='pageno' id='Page_124'>124</span>on one of the known techniques of wit. But +we are entirely in the dark as to what determines +the witty character of the comparison, +since it certainly does not cling to the similarity +as a form of expression of the thought, or to +the operation of the comparison. We can do +nothing but include comparison with the different +forms of “indirect representation” which +are at the disposal of the technique of wit, and +the problem, which confronted us more distinctly +in the mechanism of comparison than +in the means of wit hitherto treated, must remain +unsolved. There must surely be a special +reason why the decision whether something is a +witticism or not presents more difficulties in +cases of comparison than in other forms of expression.</p> + +<p class='c008'>This gap in our understanding, however, offers +no ground for complaint that our first investigation +has been unsuccessful. Considering +the intimate connection which we had to be prepared +to ascribe to the different types of wit, +it would have been imprudent to expect that +we could fully explain this aspect of the problem +before we had cast a glance over the others. +We shall have to take up this problem at +another place.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_125'>125</span><em>Review of the Techniques of Wit</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Are we sure that none of the possible techniques +of wit has escaped our investigation? +Not exactly; but by a continued examination +of new material, we can convince ourselves that +we have become acquainted with the most numerous +and most important technical means of +wit-work—at least with as much as is necessary +for formulating a judgment about the nature +of this psychic process. At present no such +judgment exists; on the other hand, we have +come into possession of important indications, +from the direction of which we may expect a +further explanation of the problem. The interesting +processes of condensation with substitutive +formation, which we have recognized as +the nucleus of the technique of word-wit, directed +our attention to the dream-formation in +whose mechanism the identical psychic processes +were discovered. Thither also we are directed +by the technique of the thought-wit, namely displacement, +faulty thinking, absurdity, indirect +expression, and representation through the opposite—each +and all are also found in the technique +of dreams. The dream is indebted to +displacement for its strange appearance, which +hinders us from recognizing in it the continuation +of our waking thoughts; the dream’s use +<span class='pageno' id='Page_126'>126</span>of absurdity and contradiction has cost it the +dignity of a psychic product, and has misled the +authors to assume that the determinants of +dream-formation are: collapse of mental activity, +cessation of criticism, morality, and logic. +Representation through the opposite is so common +in dreams that even the popular but entirely +misleading books on dream interpretation +usually put it to good account. Indirect +expression, the substitution for the dream-thought +by an allusion, by a trifle or by a +symbolism analogous to comparison, is just exactly +what distinguishes the manner of expression +of the dream from our waking thoughts.<a id='r36'></a><a href='#f36' class='c007'><sup>[36]</sup></a> +Such a far-reaching agreement as found between +the means of wit-work and those of +dream-work can scarcely be accidental. To +show those agreements in detail and to trace +their motivations will be one of our future tasks.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_127'>127</span> + <h3 class='c001'>III<br> <span class='c015'>THE TENDENCIES OF WIT<a id='r37'></a><a href='#f37' class='c007'><sup>[37]</sup></a></span></h3> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>Near the end of the preceding chapter as I +was writing down Heine’s comparison of the +Catholic priest to an employee of a large business +house, and the comparison of the Protestant +divine to an independent retail dealer, +I felt an inhibition which nearly prevented me +from using this comparison. I said to myself +that among my readers probably there would +be some who hold in veneration not only religion, +but also its administration and administrators. +These readers might take offense at +the comparison and get so wrought up about +it that it would take away all interest in the +investigation as to whether the comparison +seemed witty in itself or was witty only through +its garnishings. In other examples, e.g., the +one mentioned above concerning the agreeable +moonlight shed by a certain philosophy, there +would be no worry that for some readers it +might be a disturbing influence in our investigation. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_128'>128</span>Even the most religious person would +remain in the right mood to form a judgment +about our problem.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is easy to guess the character of the witticism +by the kind of reaction that wit exerts +on the hearer. Sometimes wit is wit for its +own sake and serves no other particular purpose; +then again, it places itself at the service +of such a purpose, i.e., it becomes purposive. +Only that form of wit which has such a tendency +runs the risk of ruffling people who do +not wish to hear it.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Theo. Vischer called wit without a tendency +“<em>abstract</em>” wit, I prefer to call it “<em>harmless</em>” +wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As we have already classified wit according +to the material touched by its technique into +word- and thought-wit, it is incumbent upon us +to investigate the relation of this classification +to the one just put forward. Word- and +thought-wit on the one hand, and abstract- and +tendency-wit on the other hand, bear no relation +of dependence to each other; they are two entirely +independent classifications of witty productions. +Perhaps some one may have gotten +the impression that harmless witticisms are preponderately +word-witticisms, whereas the complicated +techniques of thought-witticisms are +mostly made to serve strong tendencies. There +<span class='pageno' id='Page_129'>129</span>are harmless witticisms that operate through +play on words and sound similarity, and just as +harmless ones which make use of all means of +thought-wit. Nor is it less easy to prove that +tendency-wit as far as technique is concerned +may be merely the wit of words. Thus, for example, +witticisms that “<em>play</em>” with proper +names often show an insulting and offending +tendency, and yet they, too, belong to word-wit. +Again, the most harmless of all jests are word-witticisms. +Examples of this nature are the +popular “shake-up” rhymes (Schüttelreime) +in which the technique is represented through +the manifold application of the same material +with a very peculiar modification:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“Having been forsaken by <em>Dame Luck</em>, he +degenerated into a <em>Lame Duck</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Let us hope that no one will deny that the +pleasure experienced in this kind of otherwise +unpretentious rhyming is of the same nature as +the one by which we recognize wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Good examples of abstract or harmless +thought-witticisms abound in Lichtenberg’s comparisons +with which we have already become acquainted. +I add a few more. “<em>They sent a +small Octavo to the University of Göttingen; +and received back in body and soul a quarto</em>” +(a fourth-form boy).</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>In order to erect this budding well, one +<span class='pageno' id='Page_130'>130</span>must lay above all things a good foundation, +and I know of no firmer than by laying immediately +over every pro-layer a contra-layer.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>One man begets the thought, the second +acts as its godfather, the third begets children +by it, the fourth visits it on its death-bed, and +the fifth buries it</em>” (comparison with unification).</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>Not only did he disbelieve in ghosts, but he +was not ever afraid of them.</em>” The witticism in +this case lies exclusively in the absurd representation +which puts what is usually considered +less important in the comparative and what is +considered more important in the positive degree. +If we divest it of its dress it says: it is +much easier to use our reason and make light +of the fear of ghosts than to defend ourselves +against this fear when the occasion presents itself. +But this rendering is no longer witty; it +is merely a correct and still too little respected +psychological fact suggesting what Lessing expresses +in his well-known words:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“Not all are free who mock their chains.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Harmless and Tendency Wit</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>I shall take the opportunity presented here +of clearing up what may still lead to a possible +<span class='pageno' id='Page_131'>131</span>misunderstanding. “Harmless” or “abstract” +wit should in no way convey the same meaning +as “shallow” or “poor” wit. It is meant +only to designate the opposite of the “tendency” +wit to be described later. As shown +in the aforementioned examples, a harmless +jest, i.e., a witticism without a tendency, can +also be very rich in content and express something +worth while. The quality of a witticism, +however, is independent of the wit and represents +the quality of the thought which is here +expressed wittily by means of a special contrivance. +To be sure, just as watch-makers are +wont to enclose very good works in valuable +cases, so it may likewise happen with wit that +the best witty activities are used to invest the +richest thoughts.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Now, if we pay strict attention to the distinction +between thought-content and the witty +wording of thought-wit, we arrive at an insight +which may clear up much uncertainty in our +judgment of wit. For it turns out—astonishing +as it may seem—that our enjoyment of a +witticism is supplied by the combined impression +of content and wit-activity, and that one +of the factors is likely to deceive us about the +extent of the other. It is only the reduction of +the witticism that lays bare to us our mistaken +judgment.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_132'>132</span>The same thing applies to word-wit. When +we hear that “<em>experience consists simply of experiencing +what one wishes he had not experienced</em>,” +we are puzzled, and believe that we +have learnt a new truth; it takes some time before +we recognize in this disguise the platitude, +“adversity is the school of wisdom” (K. +Fischer). The excellent wit-activity which +seeks to define “experience” by the almost +exclusive use of the word “experience” deceives +us so completely that we overestimate +the content of the sentence. The same thing +happens in many similar cases and also in +Lichtenberg’s unification-witticism about January +(p. 89), which expresses nothing but what +we already know, namely, that New Year’s +wishes are as seldom realized as other wishes.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We find the contrary true of other witticisms, +in which obviously what is striking and correct +in the thought captivates us, so that we call +the saying an excellent witticism, whereas it +is only the thought that is brilliant while the +wit-activity is often weak. It is especially true +of Lichtenberg’s wit that the path of the +thought is often of more value than its witty +expression, though we unjustly extend the +value of the former to the latter. Thus the +remark about the “torch of truth” (p. 115) is +hardly a witty comparison, but it is so striking +<span class='pageno' id='Page_133'>133</span>that we are inclined to lay stress on the sentence +as exceptionally witty.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Lichtenberg’s witticisms are above all remarkable +for their thought-content and their +certainty of hitting the mark. Goethe has +rightly remarked about this author that his +witty and jocose thoughts positively conceal +problems. Or perhaps it may be more correct +to say that they touch upon the solutions of +problems. When, for example, he presents as +a witty thought:</p> + +<p class='c008'>“He always read <em>Agamemnon</em> instead of the +German word <i><span lang="de">angenommen</span></i>, so thoroughly had +he read Homer” (technically this is absurdity +plus sound similarity of words). Thus he discovered +nothing less than the secret of mistakes +in reading.<a id='r38'></a><a href='#f38' class='c007'><sup>[38]</sup></a> The following joke, whose technique +(p. 78) seemed to us quite unsatisfactory, +is of a similar nature.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>He was surprised that there were two holes +cut in the pelts of cats just where the eyes were +located.</em>” The stupidity here exhibited is only +seemingly so; in reality this ingenuous remark +conceals the great problem of teleology in the +structure of animals; it is not at all so self-evident +that the eyelid cleft opens just where the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_134'>134</span>cornea is exposed, until the science of evolution +explains to us this coincidence.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Let us bear in mind that a witty sentence +gave us a general impression in which we were +unable to distinguish the amount of thought-content +from the amount of wit-work; perhaps +even a more significant parallel to it will be +found later.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Pleasure Results from the Technique</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>For our theoretical explanation of the nature +of wit, harmless wit must be of greater value +to us than tendency-wit and shallow wit more +than profound wit. Harmless and shallow +plays on words present to us the problem of +wit in its purest form, because of the good +sense therein and because there is no purposive +factor nor underlying philosophy to confuse +the judgment. With such material our understanding +can make further progress.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>At the end of a dinner to which I had been +invited, a pastry called Roulard was served; it +was a culinary accomplishment which presupposed +a good deal of skill on the part of the +cook. “Is it home-made?” asked one of the +guests. “Oh, yes,” replied the host, “it is a +Home-Roulard”</em> (Home Rule).</p> + +<p class='c008'>This time we shall not investigate the technique +<span class='pageno' id='Page_135'>135</span>of this witticism, but shall center our attention +upon another, and that one the most +important factor. As I remember, this improvised +joke delighted all the guests and made us +laugh. In this case, as in countless others, the +feeling of pleasure of the hearer cannot have +originated from any purposive element nor the +thought-content of the wit; so we are forced to +connect the feeling of pleasure with the technique +of wit. The technical means of wit which +we have described, such as condensation, displacement, +indirect expression, etc., have therefore +the faculty to produce a feeling of pleasure +in the hearer, although we cannot as yet +see how they acquired that faculty. By such +easy stages we get the second axiom for the +explanation of wit; the first one (p. 17) states +that the character of wit depends upon the mode +of expression. Let us remember also that the +second axiom has really taught us nothing new. +It merely isolates a fact that was already contained +in a discovery which we made before. +For we recall that whenever it was possible to +reduce the wit by substituting for its verbal +expression another set of words, at the same +time carefully retaining the sense, it not only +eliminated the witty character but also the +laughableness (<i><span lang="de">Lacheffekt</span></i>) that constitutes the +pleasure of wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_136'>136</span>At present we cannot go further without +first coming to an understanding with our philosophical +authorities.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The philosophers who adjudge wit to be a +part of the comic and deal with the latter itself +in the field of æsthetics, characterize the æsthetic +presentation by the following conditions: +that we are not thereby interested in or about +the objects, that we do not need these objects +to satisfy our great wants in life, but that we +are satisfied with the mere contemplation of the +same, and with the pleasure of the thought itself. +“This pleasure, this mode of conception +is purely æsthetical, it depends entirely on itself, +its end is only itself and it fulfills no other +end in life” (K. Fischer, p. 68).</p> + +<p class='c008'>We scarcely venture a contradiction to K. +Fischer’s words—perhaps we merely translate +his thoughts into our own mode of expression—when +we insist that the witty activity is, after +all, not to be designated as aimless or purposeless, +since it has for its aim the evocation of +pleasure in the hearer. I doubt whether we +are able to undertake anything which has no +object in view. When we do not use our +psychic apparatus for the fulfillment of one of +our indispensable gratifications, we let it work +for pleasure, and we seek to derive pleasure +from its own activity. I suspect that this is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_137'>137</span>really the condition which underlies all æsthetic +thinking, but I know too little about æsthetics +to be willing to support this theory. About +wit, however, I can assert, on the strength of +the two impressions gained before, that it is +an activity whose purpose is to derive pleasure—be +it intellectual or otherwise—from the +psychic processes. To be sure, there are other +activities which accomplish the same thing. +They may be differentiated from each by the +sphere of psychic activity from which they wish +to derive pleasure, or perhaps by the methods +which they use in accomplishing this. At present +we cannot decide this, but we firmly maintain +that at last we have established a connection +between the technique of wit partly controlled +by the tendency to economize (p. 53) +and the production of pleasure.</p> + +<p class='c008'>But before we proceed to solve the riddle of +how the technical means of wit-work can produce +pleasure in the hearer, we wish to mention +that, for the sake of simplicity and more lucidity, +we have altogether put out of the way all +tendency-witticisms. Still we must attempt to +explain what the tendencies of wit are and in +what manner wit makes use of these tendencies.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_138'>138</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Hostile and Obscene Wit</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>We are taught above all by an observation +not to put aside the tendency-wit when we +are investigating the origin of the pleasure in +wit. The pleasurable effect of harmless wit +is usually of a moderate nature; all that it +can be expected to produce in the hearer is a +distinct feeling of satisfaction and a slight ripple +of laughter; and as we have shown by fitting +examples (p. 132) at least a part of this +effect is due to the thought-content. The sudden +irresistible outburst of laughter evoked by +the tendency-wit rarely follows the wit without +a tendency. As the technique may be identical +in both, it is fair to assume that by virtue of +its purpose, the tendency-wit has at its disposal +sources of pleasure to which harmless wit has +no access.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is now easy to survey wit-tendencies. +Wherever wit is not a means to its end, i. e., +harmless, it puts itself in the service of but two +tendencies which may themselves be united +under one viewpoint; it is either <em>hostile</em> wit +serving as an aggression, satire, or defense, or +it is <em>obscene</em> wit serving as a sexual exhibition. +Again it is to be observed that the technical +form of wit—be it a word- or thought-witticism—bears +no relation to these two tendencies.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_139'>139</span>It is a much more complicated matter to +show in what way wit serves these tendencies. +In this investigation I wish to present first +not the hostile but the exhibition wit. The latter +has indeed very seldom been deemed worthy +of an investigation, as if an aversion had transferred +itself here from the material to the subject; +however, we shall not allow ourselves to +be misled thereby, for we shall soon touch +upon a detail in wit which promises to throw +light on more than one obscure point.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We all know what is meant by a “smutty” +joke. It is the intentional bringing into prominence +of sexual facts or relations through +speech. However, this definition is no sounder +than other definitions. A lecture on the anatomy +of the sexual organs or on the physiology +of reproduction need not, in spite of this definition, +have anything in common with an obscenity. +It must be added that the smutty joke is +directed toward a certain person who excites +one sexually, and who becomes cognizant +of the speaker’s excitement by listening to the +smutty joke, and thereby in turn becomes sexually +excited. Instead of becoming sexually +excited the listener may react with shame and +embarrassment, which merely signifies a reaction +against the excitement and indirectly an +admission of the same. The smutty joke was +<span class='pageno' id='Page_140'>140</span>originally directed against the woman and is +comparable to an attempt at seduction. If a +man tells or listens to obscene jokes in male +society, the original situation, which cannot be +realized on account of social inhibitions, is +thereby also represented. Whoever laughs at +a smutty joke does the same as the spectator +who laughs at a sexual aggression.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The sexual element which is at the basis of +the obscene joke comprises more than that +which is peculiar to both sexes, and goes beyond +that which is common to both sexes, it +is connected with all these things that cause +shame, and includes the whole domain of the +excrementitious. However, this was the sexual +domain of childhood, where the imagination +fancied a cloaca, so to speak, within which the +sexual elements were either badly or not at all +differentiated from the excrementitious.<a id='r39'></a><a href='#f39' class='c007'><sup>[39]</sup></a> In +the whole mental domain of the psychology of +the neuroses, the sexual still includes the excrementitious, +and it is understood in the old, +infantile sense.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The smutty joke is like the denudation of a +person of the opposite sex toward whom the +joke is directed. Through the utterance of obscene +<span class='pageno' id='Page_141'>141</span>words the person attacked is forced to +picture the parts of the body in question, or +the sexual act, and is shown that the aggressor +himself pictures the same thing. There is no +doubt that the original motive of the smutty +joke was the pleasure of seeing the sexual displayed.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It will only help to clarify the subject if +here we go back to the fundamentals. One of +the primitive components of our libido is the +desire to see the sexual exposed. Perhaps this +itself is a development—a substitution for the +desire to touch which is assumed to be the primary +pleasure. As it often happens, the desire +to see has here also replaced the desire to +touch.<a id='r40'></a><a href='#f40' class='c007'><sup>[40]</sup></a> The libido for looking and touching is +found in every person in two forms, active and +passive, or masculine and feminine; and in accordance +with the preponderance of sex characteristics +it develops preponderately in one or +the other direction. In young children one can +readily observe the desire to exhibit themselves +nude. If the germ of this desire does not experience +the usual fate of being covered up and +repressed, it develops into a mania for exhibitionism, +a familiar perversion among grown-up +men. In women the passive desire to exhibit +<span class='pageno' id='Page_142'>142</span>is almost regularly covered by the masked reaction +of sexual modesty; despite this, however, +remnants of this desire may always be seen in +women’s dress. I need only mention how flexible +and variable convention and circumstances +make that remaining portion of exhibitionism +still allowed to women.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Transformation of the Obscenity into Obscene Wit</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>In the case of men a great part of this striving +to exhibit remains as a part of the libido +and serves to initiate the sexual act. If this +striving asserts itself on first meeting the +woman it must make use of speech for two motives. +First, in order to make itself known to +the woman; and secondly, because the awakening +of the imagination through speech puts +the woman herself in a corresponding excitement +and awakens in her the desire to passive +exhibitionism. This speech of courtship is not +yet smutty, but may pass over into the same. +Wherever the yieldingness of the woman manifests +itself quickly, smutty speech is short-lived, +for it gives way to the sexual act. It +is different if the rapid yielding of the woman +cannot be counted upon, but instead there appears +the defense reaction. In that case the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_143'>143</span>sexually exciting speech changes into obscene +wit as its own end; as the sexual aggression +is inhibited in its progress towards the act, it +lingers at the evocation of the excitement and +derives pleasure from the indications of the +same in the woman. In this process the aggression +changes its character in the same way +as any libidinous impulse confronted by a +hindrance; it becomes distinctly hostile and +cruel, and utilizes the sadistical components of +the sexual impulse against the hindrance.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Thus the unyieldingness of the woman is +therefore the next condition for the development +of smutty wit; to be sure, this resistance +must be of the kind to indicate merely a deferment +and make it appear that further efforts +will not be in vain. The ideal case of such +resistance on the part of the woman usually results +from the simultaneous presence of another +man, a third person, whose presence almost +excludes the immediate yielding of the woman. +This third person soon becomes of the greatest +importance for the development of the smutty +wit, but next to him the presence of the +woman must be taken account of. Among +rural people or in the ordinary hostelry one +can observe that not till the waitress or the +hostess approaches the guests does the obscene +wit come out; in a higher order of society just +<span class='pageno' id='Page_144'>144</span>the opposite happens, here the presence of a +woman puts an end to smutty talk. The men +reserve this kind of conversation, which originally +presupposed the presence of bashful +women, until they are alone, “by themselves.” +Thus gradually the spectator, now turned the +listener, takes the place of the woman as the +object of the smutty joke, and through such +a change the smutty joke already approaches +the character of wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Henceforth our attention may be centered +upon two factors, first upon the rôle that the +third person—the listener—plays, and secondly, +upon the intrinsic conditions of the smutty joke +itself.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Tendency-wit usually requires three persons. +Besides the one who makes the wit there is a +second person who is taken as the object of +the hostile or sexual aggression, and a third +person in whom the purpose of the wit to produce +pleasure is fulfilled. We shall later on +inquire into the deeper motive of this relationship, +for the present we shall adhere to the +fact which states that it is not the maker of +the wit who laughs about it and enjoys its +pleasurable effect, but it is the idle listener who +does. The same relationship exists among the +three persons connected with the smutty joke. +The process may be described as follows: As +<span class='pageno' id='Page_145'>145</span>soon as the libidinous impulse of the first person, +to satisfy himself through the woman, is +blocked, he immediately develops a hostile attitude +towards this second person and takes the +originally intruding third person as his confederate. +Through the obscene speech of the first +person the woman is exposed before the third +person, who as a listener is fascinated by the +easy gratification of his own libido.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is curious that common people so +thoroughly enjoy such smutty talk, and that it +is a never-lacking activity of cheerful humor. +It is also worthy of notice that in this complicated +process which shows so many characteristics +of tendency-wit, no formal demands, such +as characterize wit, are made upon “smutty +wit.” The unveiled nudity affords pleasure to +the first and makes the third person laugh.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Not until we come to the refined and cultured +does the formal determination of wit +arise. The obscenity becomes witty and is tolerated +only if it is witty. The technical means +of which it mostly makes use is allusion, i.e., +substitution through a trifle, something remotely +related, which the listener reconstructs +in his imagination as a full-fledged and direct +obscenity. The greater the disproportion between +what is directly offered in the obscenity +and what is necessarily aroused by it in the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_146'>146</span>mind of the listener, the finer is the witticism +and the higher it may venture in good society. +Besides the coarse and delicate allusions, the +witty obscenity also utilizes all other means of +word- and thought-wit, as can be easily demonstrated +by examples.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Function of Wit in the Service of the Tendency</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>It now becomes comprehensible what wit accomplishes +through this service of its tendency. +It makes possible the gratification of a craving +(lewd or hostile) despite a hindrance which +stands in the way; it eludes the hindrance and +so derives pleasure from a source that has become +inaccessible on account of the hindrance. +The hindrance in the way is really nothing +more than the higher degree of culture and education +which correspondingly increases the inability +of the woman to tolerate the stark sex. +The woman thought of as present in the final +situation is still considered present, or her influence +acts as a deterrent to the men even in +her absence. One often notices how cultured +men are influenced by the company of girls of +a lower station in life to change witty obscenities +to broad smut.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The power which renders it difficult or impossible +<span class='pageno' id='Page_147'>147</span>for the woman, and in a lesser degree +for the man, to enjoy unveiled obscenities we +call “repression,” and we recognize in it the +same psychic process which keeps from consciousness +in severe nervous attacks whole complexes +of emotions with their resultant affects, +and has shown itself to be the principal factor +in the causation of the so-called psychoneuroses. +We acknowledge to culture and higher civilization +an important influence in the development +of repressions, and assume that under +these conditions there has come about a change +in our psychic organization which may also +have been brought along as an inherited disposition. +In consequence of it, what was once +accepted as pleasureful is now counted unacceptable +and is rejected by means of all the +psychic forces. Owing to the repression +brought about by civilization many primary +pleasures are now disapproved by the censor +and lost. But the human psyche finds renunciation +very difficult; hence we discover that +tendency-wit furnishes us with a means to make +the renunciation retrogressive and thus to regain +what has been lost. When we laugh over +a delicately obscene witticism, we laugh at the +identical thing which causes laughter in the ill-bred +man when he hears a coarse, obscene joke; +in both cases the pleasure comes from the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_148'>148</span>same source. The coarse, obscene joke, however, +could not incite us to laughter, because +it would cause us shame or would seem to us +disgusting; we can laugh only when wit comes +to our aid.</p> + +<p class='c008'>What we had presumed in the beginning +seems to have been confirmed, namely, that +tendency-wit has access to other sources of +pleasure than harmless wit, in which all the +pleasure is somehow dependent upon the technique. +We can also reiterate that owing to +our feelings we are in no position to distinguish +in tendency-wit what part of the pleasure +originates from the technique and what +part from the tendency. <em>Strictly speaking, we +do not know what we are laughing about.</em> In +all obscene jokes we succumb to striking mistakes +of judgment about the “goodness” of +the joke as far as it depends upon formal conditions; +the technique of these jokes is often +very poor while their laughing effect is +enormous.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Invectives Made Possible Through Wit</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>We next wish to determine whether the rôle +of wit in the service of the hostile tendency +is the same.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Right from the start we meet with similar +<span class='pageno' id='Page_149'>149</span>conditions. Since our individual childhood +and the childhood of human civilization, our +hostile impulses towards our fellow-beings have +been subjected to the same restrictions and the +same progressive repressions as our sexual +strivings. We have not yet progressed so far +as to love our enemies, or to extend to them +our left cheek after we are smitten on the +right. Furthermore, all moral codes about the +subjection of active hatred bear even to-day +the clearest indications that they were originally +meant for a small community of clansmen. As +we all may consider ourselves members of some +nation, we permit ourselves for the most part +to forget these restrictions in matters touching +a foreign people. But within our own circles +we have nevertheless made progress in the +mastery of hostile emotions. Lichtenberg +drastically puts it when he says: “Where nowadays +one says, ‘I beg your pardon,’ formerly +one had recourse to a cuff on the ear.” Violent +hostility, no longer tolerated by law, has +been replaced by verbal invectives, and the better +understanding of the concatenation of human +emotions robs us, through its consequential +“<i><span lang="fr">Tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner</span></i>,” +more and more of the capacity to become angry +at our fellowman who is in our way. Having +been endowed with a strong hostile disposition +<span class='pageno' id='Page_150'>150</span>in our childhood, higher personal civilization +teaches us later that it is undignified to use +abusive language; even where combat is still +permitted, the number of things which may be +used as means of combat has been markedly +restricted. Society, as the third and dispassionate +party in the combat to whose interest it +is to safeguard personal safety, prevents us +from expressing our hostile feelings in action; +and hence, as in sexual aggression, there has +developed a new technique of invectives, the +aim of which is to enlist this third person +against our enemy. By belittling and humbling +our enemy, by scorning and ridiculing +him, we indirectly obtain the pleasure of his +defeat by the laughter of the third person, +the inactive spectator.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We are now prepared for the rôle that wit +plays in hostile aggression. Wit permits us +to make our enemy ridiculous through that +which we could not utter loudly or consciously +on account of existing hindrances; in other +words, <em>wit affords us the means of surmounting +restrictions and of opening up otherwise +inaccessible pleasure-sources</em>. Moreover, the +listener will be induced by the gain in pleasure +to take our part, even if he is not altogether +convinced,—just as we on other occasions, +when fascinated by harmless witticism, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_151'>151</span>were wont to overestimate the substance of the +sentence wittily expressed. “To prejudice +the laughter in one’s own favor” is a completely +pertinent saying in the German language.</p> + +<p class='c008'>One may recall Mr. N.’s witticism given in the +last chapter (p. 28). It is of an insulting nature, +as if the author wished to shout loudly: +But the minister of agriculture is himself an ox! +But he, as a man of culture, could not put +his opinion in this form. He therefore appealed +to wit which assured his opinion a reception +at the hands of the listeners which, +in spite of its amount of truth, never would +have been received if in an unwitty form. +Brill cites an excellent example of a similar +kind: <em>Wendell Phillips, according to a recent +biography by Dr. Lorenzo Sears, was on one +occasion lecturing in Ohio, and while on a +railroad journey going to keep one of his appointments +met in the car a number of clergymen +returning from some sort of convention. +One of the ministers, feeling called upon to +approach Mr. Phillips, asked him, “Are you +Mr. Phillips?” “I am, sir.” “Are you trying +to free the niggers?” “Yes, sir; I am an +abolitionist.” “Well, why do you preach your +doctrines up here? Why don’t you go over +into Kentucky?” “Excuse me, are you a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_152'>152</span>preacher?” “I am, sir.” “Are you trying to +save souls from hell?” “Yes, sir, that’s my +business.” “Well, why don’t you go there?”</em> +The assailant hurried into the smoker amid a +roar of unsanctified laughter. This anecdote +nicely illustrates the tendency-wit in the +service of hostile aggression. The minister’s +behavior was offensive and irritating, yet +Wendell Phillips as a man of culture could +not defend himself in the same manner as a +common, ill-bred person would have done, and +as his inner feelings must have prompted him +to do. The only alternative under the circumstances +would have been to take the affront +in silence, had not wit showed him the way, +and enabled him by the technical means of +unification to turn the tables on his assailant. +He not only belittled him and turned him +into ridicule, but by his clever retort, “Well, +why don’t you go there?” fascinated the other +clergymen, and thus brought them to his side.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Although the hindrance to the aggression +which the wit helped to elude was in these +cases of an inner nature—the æsthetic resistance +against insulting—it may at other +times be of a purely outer nature. So it was +in the case when Serenissimus asked the +stranger who had a striking resemblance to +himself: “Was your mother ever in my home?” +<span class='pageno' id='Page_153'>153</span>and he received the ready reply, “No, but +my father was.” The stranger would certainly +have felled the imprudent inquirer who +dared to make an ignominious allusion to the +memory of his mother; but this imprudent +person was Serenissimus, who may not be felled +and not even insulted unless one wishes to +pay for this revenge with his life. The only +thing left was to swallow the insult in silence; +but luckily wit pointed out the way of requiting +the insult without personally imperiling +one’s self. It was accomplished simply by +treating the allusion with the technical means +of unification and employing it against the +aggressor. The impression of wit is here so +thoroughly determined by the tendency that +in view of the witty rejoinder we are inclined +to forget that the aggressor’s inquiry is itself +made witty by allusion.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Rebellion Against Authority Through Wit</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The prevention of abuse or insulting retorts +through outer circumstances is so often the +case that tendency-wit is used with special +preference as a weapon of attack or criticism +of superiors who claim to be an authority. +Wit then serves as a resistance against such +authority and as an escape from its pressure. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_154'>154</span>In this factor, too, lies the charm of caricature, +at which we laugh even if it is badly done +simply because we consider its resistance to +authority a great merit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>If we keep in mind that tendency-wit is so +well adapted as a weapon of attack upon what +is great, dignified, and mighty, that which is +shielded by internal hindrances or external +circumstance against direct disparagement, we +are forced to a special conception of certain +groups of witticisms which seem to occupy +themselves with inferior and powerless persons. +I am referring to the marriage-agent stories,—with +a few of which we have become familiar +in the investigation of the manifold techniques +of thought-wit. In some of these examples, +“But she is deaf, too!” and “Who in the world +would ever lend these people anything!” the +agent was derided as a careless and thoughtless +person who becomes comical because the truth +escapes his lips automatically, as it were. But +does on the one hand what we have learned +about the nature of tendency-wit, and on the +other hand the amount of satisfaction in these +stories, harmonize with the misery of the persons +at whom the joke seems to be pointed? +Are these worthy opponents of the wit? Or, +is it not more plausible to suppose that the +wit puts the agent in the foreground only in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_155'>155</span>order to strike at something more important; +does it, as the saying goes, strike the saddle +pack, when it is meant for the mule? This +conception can really not be rejected.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The above-mentioned interpretation of the +marriage-agent stories admits of a continuation. +It is true that I need not enter into +them, that I can content myself with seeing +the farcical in these stories, and can dispute +their witty character. However, such subjective +determination of wit actually exists. We +have now become cognizant of it and shall +later on have to investigate it. It means that +only that is a witticism which I wish to consider +as such. What may be wit to me, may +be only an amusing story to another. But if +a witticism admits of doubt, that can be due +only to the fact that it is possessed of a show-side,—in +our examples it happens to be a +façade of the comic,—upon which one may be +satisfied to bestow a single glance while another +may attempt to peep behind. We also suspect +that this façade is intended to dazzle the prying +glance which is to say that such stories +have something to conceal.</p> + +<p class='c008'>At all events, if our marriage-agent stories +are witticisms at all, they are all the better +witticisms because, thanks to their façade, they +are in a position to conceal not only what they +<span class='pageno' id='Page_156'>156</span>have to say but also that they have something—forbidden—to +say. But the continuation of +the interpretation, which reveals this hidden +part and shows that these stories having a comical +façade are tendency-witticisms, would be +as follows: Every one who allows the truth to +escape his lips in an unguarded moment is +really pleased to have rid himself of this +thought. This is a correct and far-reaching +psychological insight. Without the inner assent +no one would allow himself to be overpowered +by the automatism which here brings the +truth to light.<a id='r41'></a><a href='#f41' class='c007'><sup>[41]</sup></a> The marriage agent is thus +transformed from a ludicrous personage into +an object deserving of pity and sympathy. +How blest must be the man, able at last to unburden +himself of the weight of dissimulation, +if he immediately seizes the first opportunity +to shout out the last fragment of truth! As +soon as he sees that his case is lost, that the +prospective bride does not suit the young man, +he gladly betrays the secret that the girl has +still another blemish which the young man had +overlooked, or he makes use of the chance to +present a conclusive argument in detail in +order to express his contempt for the people +<span class='pageno' id='Page_157'>157</span>who employ him: “Who in the world would +ever lend these people anything!” The ludicrousness +of the whole thing now reverts upon +the parents,—hardly mentioned in the story,—who +consider such deceptions justified to clutch +a man for their daughter; it also reflects upon +the wretched state of the girls who get married +through such contrivances, and upon the +want of dignity of the marriage contracted +after such preliminaries. The agent is the +right person to express such criticisms, for he +is best acquainted with these abuses; but he +may not raise his voice, because he is a poor +man whose livelihood depends altogether on +turning these abuses to his advantage. But the +same conflict is found in the national spirit +which has given rise to these and similar +stories; for he is aware that the holiness of wedlock +suffers severely by reference to some of +the methods of marriage-making.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We recall also the observation made during +the investigation of wit-technique, namely, that +absurdity in wit frequently stands for derision +and criticism in the thought behind the witticism, +wherein the wit-work follows the dream-work. +This state of affairs, we find, is here +once more confirmed. That the derision and +criticism are not aimed at the agent, who appears +in the former examples only as the whipping +<span class='pageno' id='Page_158'>158</span>boy of the joke, is shown by another series +in which the agent, on the contrary, is pictured +as a superior person whose dialectics are a +match for any difficulty. They are stories +whose façades are logical instead of comical—they +are sophistic thought-witticisms. In one +of them (p. 83) the agent knows how to circumvent +the limping of the bride by stating +that in her case it is at least “a finished job”; +another woman with straight limbs would be +in constant danger of falling and breaking +a leg, which would be followed by sickness, +pains, and doctor’s fees—all of which can be +avoided by marrying the one already limping. +Again in another example (p. 81) the agent +is clever enough to refute by good arguments +each of the whole series of the suitor’s +objections against the bride; only to the +last, which cannot be glossed over, he rejoins, +“Do you expect her to have no blemishes +at all?” as if the other objections had +not left behind an important remnant. It is +not difficult to pick out the weak points of the +arguments in both examples, a thing which we +have done during the investigation of the technique. +But now something else interests us. +If the agent’s speech is endowed with such a +strong semblance of logic, which on more careful +examination proves to be merely a semblance, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_159'>159</span>then the truth must be lurking in the +fact that the witticism adjudges the agent to +be right. The thought does not dare to admit +that he is right in all seriousness, and replaces +it by the semblance which the wit brings forth; +but here, as it often happens, the jest betrays +the seriousness of it. We shall not err if we +assume that all stories with logical façades +really mean what they assert even if these assertions +are deliberately falsely motivated. +Only this use of sophism for the veiled presentation +of the truth endows it with the character +of wit, which is mainly dependent upon +tendency. What these two stories wish to indicate +is that the suitor really makes himself +ridiculous when he collects together so sedulously +the individual charms of the bride which +are transient after all, and when he forgets at +the same time that he must be prepared to +take as his wife a human being with inevitable +faults; whereas, the only virtue which might +make tolerable marriage with the more or less +imperfect personality of the woman,—mutual +attachment and willingness for affectionate +adaptation,—is not once mentioned in the +whole affair.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Ridicule of the suitor as seen in these examples +in which the agent quite correctly assumes +the rôle of superiority, is much more +<span class='pageno' id='Page_160'>160</span>clearly depicted in other examples. The more +pointed the stories, the less wit-technique they +contain; they are, as it were, merely border-line +cases of wit with whose technique they +have only the façade-formation in common. +However, in view of the same tendency and +the concealment of the same behind the façade, +they obtain the full effect of wit. The poverty +of technical means makes it clear also that +many witticisms of that kind cannot dispense +with the comic element of jargon which acts +similarly to wit-technique without great sacrifices.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The following is such a story, which with all +the force of tendency-wit obviates all traces +of that technique. <em>The agent asks: “What +are you looking for in your bride?” The +reply is: “She must be pretty, she must be +rich, and she must be cultured.” “Very well,” +was the agent’s rejoinder. “But what you +want will make three matches.”</em> Here the reproach +is no longer embodied in wit, but is +made directly to the man.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In all the preceding examples the veiled aggression +was still directed against persons; in +the marriage-agent jokes it is directed against +all the parties involved in the betrothal—the +bridegroom, bride, and her parents. The object +of attack by wit may equally well be institutions, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_161'>161</span>persons, in so far as they may act +as agents of these, moral or religious precepts, +or even philosophies of life which enjoy so +much respect that they can be challenged in no +other way than under the guise of a witticism, +and one that is veiled by a façade at that. No +matter how few the themes upon which tendency-wit +may play, its forms and investments +are manifold. I believe that we shall do well +to designate this species of tendency-wit by a +special name. To decide what name will be +appropriate is possible only after analyzing a +few examples of this kind.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Witty Cynicism</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>I recall the two little stories about the impecunious +gourmand who was caught eating +“salmon with mayonnaise,” and about the tippling +tutor; these witty stories, which we have +learned to regard as sophistical displacement-wit, +I shall continue to analyze. We have +learned since then that when the semblance of +logic is attached to the façade of a story, the +actual thought is as follows: The man is +right; but on account of the opposing contradiction, +I did not dare to admit the fact except +for one point in which his error is easily +demonstrable. The “point” chosen is the correct +<span class='pageno' id='Page_162'>162</span>compromise between his right and his +wrong; this is really no decision, but bespeaks +the conflict within ourselves. Both stories are +simply epicurean. They say, Yes, the man is +right; nothing is greater than pleasure, and it +is fairly immaterial in what manner one procures +it. This sounds frightfully immoral, and +perhaps it is, but fundamentally it is nothing +more than the “<em>Carpe diem</em>” of the poet who +refers to the uncertainty of life and the bareness +of virtuous renunciation. If we are repelled +by the idea that the man in the joke +about “salmon with mayonnaise” is in the +right, then it is merely due to the fact that it +illustrates the sound sense of the man in indulging +himself—an indulgence which seems to +us wholly unnecessary. In reality each one of +us has experienced hours and times during +which he has admitted the justice of this +philosophy of life and has reproached our system +of morality for knowing only how to +make claims upon us without reimbursing us. +Since we no longer lend credence to the idea +of a hereafter in which all former renunciations +are supposed to be rewarded by gratification—(there +are very few pious persons if one +makes renunciation the password of faith)—“<em>Carpe +diem</em>” becomes the first admonition. I +am quite ready to postpone the gratification, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_163'>163</span>but how do I know whether I shall still be +alive to-morrow?</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“<span lang="it">Di doman’ non c’e certezza.</span>”<a id='r42'></a><a href='#f42' class='c007'><sup>[42]</sup></a></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>I am quite willing to give up all the paths +to gratification interdicted by society, but am +I sure that society will reward me for this renunciation +by opening for me—even after a +certain delay—one of the permitted paths? +One can plainly tell what these witticisms +whisper, namely, that the wishes and desires of +man have a right to make themselves perceptible +next to our pretentious and inconsiderate +morality. And in our times it has been said in +emphatic and striking terms that this morality +is merely the selfish precept of the few rich +and mighty who can gratify their desires at +any time without deferment. As long as the art +of healing has not succeeded in safeguarding +our lives, and as long as the social organizations +do not do more towards making conditions +more agreeable, just so long cannot the +voice within us which is striving against the +demands of morality, be stifled. Every honest +person finally makes this admission—at least +to himself. The decision in this conflict is possible +only through the roundabout way of a +new understanding. One must be able to knit +<span class='pageno' id='Page_164'>164</span>one’s life so closely to that of others, and to +form such an intimate identification with +others, that the shortening of one’s own term +of life becomes surmountable; one should not +unlawfully fulfill the demands of one’s own +needs, but should leave them unfulfilled, because +only the continuance of so many unfulfilled +demands can develop the power to recast +the social order. But not all personal +needs allow themselves to be displaced in such +a manner and transferred to others, nor is +there a universal and definite solution of the +conflict.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We now know how to designate the witticisms +just discussed; they are cynical witticisms, +and what they conceal are cynicisms.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Among the institutions which cynical wit is +wont to attack there is none more important +and more completely protected by moral precepts, +and yet more inviting of attack, than the +institution of marriage. Most of the cynical +jokes are directed against it. For no demand +is more personal than that made upon sexual +freedom, and nowhere has civilization attempted +to exert a more stringent suppression +than in the realm of sexuality. For our purposes +a single example suffices: the “Entries +in the Album of Prince Carnival” mentioned +on page 108.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_165'>165</span>“<em>A wife is like an umbrella, at worst one +may always take a cab.</em>”</p> + +<p class='c008'>We have already elucidated the complicated +technique of this example; it is a puzzling and +seemingly impossible comparison which however, +as we now see, is not in itself witty; it +shows besides an allusion (cab = public conveyance), +and as the strongest technical means +it also shows an omission which serves to make +it still more unintelligible. The comparison +may be worked out in the following manner. +A man marries in order to guard himself +against the temptations of sensuality, but it +then turns out that after all marriage affords +no gratification for one of stronger needs, just +as one takes along an umbrella for protection +against rain only to get wet in spite of it. In +both cases one must search for better protection; +in one case one must take a public cab, +in the other women procurable for money. +Now the wit has almost entirely been replaced +by cynicism. That marriage is not the organization +which can satisfy a man’s sexuality, one +does not dare to say loudly and frankly unless +indeed it be one like Christian v. Ehrenfels,<a id='r43'></a><a href='#f43' class='c007'><sup>[43]</sup></a> +who is forced to it by the love of truth and the +zeal of reform. The strength of this witticism +<span class='pageno' id='Page_166'>166</span>lies in the fact that it has expressed the +thought even though it had to be done through +all sorts of roundabout ways.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Cynical Witticisms and Self-criticism</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>A particularly favorable case for tendency-wit +results if the intended criticism of the +inner resistance is directed against one’s own +person, or, more carefully expressed, against a +person in whom one takes interest, that is, a +composite personality such as one’s own people. +This determination of self-criticism may +make clear why it is that a number of the most +excellent jokes of which we have shown here +many specimens should have sprung into existence +from the soil of Jewish national life. +They are stories which were invented by Jews +themselves and which are directed against Jewish +peculiarities. The Jewish jokes made up +by non-Jews are nearly all brutal buffooneries +in which the wit is spared by the fact that the +Jew appears as a comic figure to a stranger. +The Jewish jokes which originate with Jews +admit this, but they know their real shortcomings +as well as their merits, and the interest +of the person himself in the thing to be criticised +produces the subjective determination of +the wit-work which would otherwise be difficult +to bring about. Incidentally I do not know +<span class='pageno' id='Page_167'>167</span>whether one often finds a people that makes +merry so unreservedly over its own shortcomings.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As an illustration I can point to the story +cited on page 112 in which the Jew in the train +immediately abandons all sense of decency of +deportment as soon as he recognizes the new +arrival in his coupé as his coreligionist. We +have come to know this joke as an illustration +by means of a detail—representation through +a trifle; it is supposed to represent the democratic +mode of thought of the Jew who recognizes +no difference between master and servant, +but unfortunately this also disturbs discipline +and co-operation. Another especially +interesting series of jokes presents the relationship +between the poor and the rich Jews: their +heroes are the “shnorrer,”<a id='r44'></a><a href='#f44' class='c007'><sup>[44]</sup></a> and the charitable +gentleman or the baron. <em>The shnorrer, who +was a regular Sunday-dinner guest at a certain +house, appeared one day accompanied by +a young stranger, who prepared to seat himself +at the table. “Who is that?” demanded the +host. “He became my son-in-law last week,” +was the reply, “and I have agreed to supply +his board for the first year.”</em> The tendency of +these stories is always the same, and is most +distinctly shown in the following story. <em>The +<span class='pageno' id='Page_168'>168</span>shnorrer supplicates the baron for money to +visit the bathing resort Ostend, as the physician +has ordered him to take sea baths for +his ailment. The baron remarks that Ostend +is an especially expensive resort, and that a +less fashionable place would do just as well. +But the shnorrer rejects that proposition by +saying, “Herr Baron, nothing is too expensive +for my health.”</em> That is an excellent displacement-witticism +which we could have taken as +a model of its kind. The baron is evidently +anxious to save his money, but the shnorrer replies +as if the baron’s money were his own, +which he may then consider secondary to his +health. One is forced to laugh at the insolence +of the demand, but these jokes are exceptionally +unequipped with a façade to becloud the +understanding. The truth is that the shnorrer +who mentally treats the rich man’s money as +his own, really possesses almost the right to +this mistake, according to the sacred codes of +the Jews. Naturally the resistance which is +responsible for this joke is directed against the +law which even the pious find very oppressing.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Another story relates <em>how on the steps of a +rich man’s house a shnorrer met one of his own +kind. The latter counseled him to depart, saying, +“Do not go up to-day, the Baron is out +of sorts and refuses to give any one more than +<span class='pageno' id='Page_169'>169</span>a dollar.” “I will go up anyway,” replied the +first. “Why in the world should I make him, +a present of a dollar? Is he making me any +presents?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>This witticism makes use of the technique of +absurdity by permitting the shnorrer to declare +that the baron gives him nothing at the same +moment in which he is preparing to beg him +for the donation. But the absurdity is only +apparent, for it is almost true that the rich +man gives him nothing, since he is obligated by +the mandate to give alms, and strictly speaking +must be thankful that the shnorrer gives +him an opportunity to be charitable. The +ordinary, bourgeois conception of alms is at +cross-purposes with the religious one; it openly +revolts against the religious conception in the +<em>story about the baron who, having been deeply +touched by the shnorrer’s tale of woe, rang +for his servants and said: “Throw him out of +the house; he is breaking my heart.”</em> This obvious +exposition of the tendency again creates +a case of border-line wit. From the no longer +witty complaint: “It is really no advantage to +be a rich man among Jews. The foreign +misery does not grant one the pleasure of one’s +own fortune,” these last stories are distinguished +only by the illustration of a single situation.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_170'>170</span>Other stories as the following, which, technically +again presenting border-lines of wit, +have their origin in a deeply pessimistic cynicism. +<em>A patient whose hearing was defective +consulted a physician who made the correct +diagnosis, namely, that the patient probably +drank too much whiskey and consequently was +becoming deaf. He advised him to desist from +drinking and the patient promised to follow +his advice. Some time thereafter the doctor +met him on the street and inquired in a loud +voice about his condition. “Thank you, Doctor,” +was the reply, “there is no necessity for +speaking so loudly, I have given up drinking +whiskey and consequently I hear perfectly.” +Some time afterwards they met again. The +doctor again inquired into his condition in the +usual voice, but noticed that he did not make +himself understood. “It seems to me that you +are deaf again because you have returned to +drinking whiskey,” shouted the doctor in the +patient’s ear. “Perhaps you are right,” answered +the latter, “I have taken to drinking +again, and I shall tell you why. As long as I +did not drink I could hear, but all that I +heard was not as good as the whiskey.”</em> +Technically this joke is nothing more than an +illustration. The jargon and the ability of the +<em>raconteur</em> must aid the producing of laughter. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_171'>171</span>But behind it there lies the sad question, “Is +not the man right in his choice?”</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is the manifold hopeless misery of the +Jews to which these pessimistical stories allude, +which urged me to add them to tendency-wit.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Critical and Blasphemous Witticisms</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Other jokes, cynical in a similar sense, +and not only stories about Jews, attack religious +dogmas and the belief in God Himself. +The story about the “telepathic look of the +rabbi,” whose technique consisted in the faulty +thinking which made phantasy equal to reality, +(the conception of displacement is also tenable) +is such a cynical or critical witticism directed +against miracle-workers and also, surely, +against belief in miracles. Heine is reported +to have made a directly blasphemous joke as +he lay dying. <i>When the kindly priest commended +him to God’s mercy and inspired him +with the hope that God would forgive him his +sins, he replied: “<span lang="fr">Bien sûr qu’il me pardonnera; +c’est son métier.</span>”</i> That is a derogatory +comparison; technically its value lies only in +the allusion, for a métier—business or vocation—is +plied either by a craftsman or a physician, +and what is more he has only a single métier. +The strength of the wit, however, lies in its +<span class='pageno' id='Page_172'>172</span>tendency. The joke is intended to mean nothing +else, but: Certainly he will forgive me; that +is what he is here for, and for no other purpose +have I engaged him (just as one retains +one’s doctor or one’s lawyer). Thus, the helpless +dying man is still conscious of the fact that +he has created God for himself and has clothed +Him with the power in order to make use of +Him as occasion arises. The so-called creature +makes itself known as the Creator only a short +time before his extinction.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Skeptical Wit</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>To the three kinds of tendency-wit discussed +so far—exhibitionistic or obscene wit, aggressive +or hostile wit, and cynical wit (critical, blasphemous)—I +desire to add a fourth and the +most uncommon of all, whose character can be +elucidated by a good example.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>Two Jews met in a train at a Galician railway +station. “Where are you traveling?” +asked one. “To Cracow,” was the reply. “Now +see here, what a liar you are!” said the first +one, bristling. “When you say that you are +traveling to Cracow, you really wish me to believe +that you are traveling to Lemberg. Well, +but I am sure that you are really traveling to +Cracow, so why lie about it?”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_173'>173</span>This precious story, which creates an impression +of exaggerated subtlety, evidently operates +by means of the technique of absurdity. +The second Jew has put himself in the way of +being called a liar because he has said that he +is traveling to Cracow, which is his real goal! +However, this strong technical means—absurdity—is +paired here with another technique—representation +through the opposite, for, according +to the uncontradicted assertion of the +first, the second one is lying when he speaks +the truth, and speaks the truth by means of a +lie. However, the more earnest content of this +joke is the question of the conditions of truth; +again the joke points to a problem and makes +use of the uncertainty of one of our commonest +notions. Does it constitute truth if one +describes things as they are and does not concern +himself with the way the hearers will interpret +what one has said? Or is this merely +Jesuitical truth, and does not the real truthfulness +consist much more in having a regard for +the hearer and of furnishing him an exact picture +of his own mind? I consider jokes of this +type sufficiently different from the others to +assign them a special place. What they attack +is not a person nor an institution, but the certainty +of our very knowledge—one of our +speculative gifts. Hence the name “skeptical” +<span class='pageno' id='Page_174'>174</span>witticism will be the most expressive for +them.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the course of our discussion of the tendencies +of wit we have gotten perhaps many an +elucidation and certainly found numerous incentives +for further investigations. But the results +of this chapter combine with those of the preceding +chapter to form a difficult problem. If +it be true that the pleasure created by wit is dependent +upon the technique on one hand and +upon the tendency on the other hand, under +what common point of view can these two utterly +different pleasure-sources of wit he +united?</p> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_175'>175</span> + <h2 class='c005'>B. SYNTHESIS</h2> +</div> +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_177'>177</span> + <h3 class='c001'>IV<br> <span class='c015'>THE PLEASURE MECHANISM AND THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF WIT</span></h3> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>We can now definitely assert that we know +from what sources the peculiar pleasure arises +furnished us by wit. We know that we can be +easily misled to mistake our sense of satisfaction +experienced through the thought-content +of the sentence for the actual pleasure derived +from the wit, on the other hand, the latter itself +has two intrinsic sources, namely, the wit-technique +and the wit-tendency. What we now +desire to ascertain is the manner in which +pleasure originates from these sources and the +mechanism of this resultant pleasure.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It seems to us that the desired explanation +can be more easily ascertained in tendency-wit +than in harmless wit. We shall therefore commence +with the former.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The pleasure in tendency-wit results from +the fact that a tendency, whose gratification +would otherwise remain unfulfilled, is actually +gratified. That such gratification is a source +of pleasure is self-evident without further discussion. +But the manner in which wit brings +<span class='pageno' id='Page_178'>178</span>about gratification is connected with special +conditions from which we may perhaps gain +further information. Here two cases must be +differentiated. The simpler case is the one in +which the gratification of the tendency is opposed +by an external hindrance which is eluded +by the wit. This process we found, for example, +in the reply which Serenissimus received +to his query whether the mother of the stranger +he addressed had ever sojourned in his home, +and likewise in the question of the art critic +who asked: “And where is the Savior?” when +the two rich rogues showed him their portraits. +In one case the tendency serves to answer one +insult with another; in the other case it offers +an affront instead of the demanded expert +opinion; in both cases the tendency was opposed +by purely external factors, namely, the +powerful position of the persons who are the +targets of the insult. Nevertheless it may seem +strange to us that these and analogous tendency-witticisms +have not the power to produce +a strong laughing effect, no matter how much +they may gratify us.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is different, however, if no external factors +but internal hindrances stand in the way +of the direct realization of the tendency, that +is, if an inner feeling opposes the tendency. +This condition, according to our assumption, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_179'>179</span>was present in the aggressive joke of Mr. N. +(p. 28) and in the one of Wendell Phillips, in +whom a strong inclination to use invectives was +stifled by a highly developed æsthetic sense. +With the aid of wit the inner resistances in +these special cases were overcome and the inhibition +removed. As in the case of external +hindrances, the gratification of the tendency is +made possible, and a suppression with its concomitant +“psychic damming” is thus obviated. +So far the mechanism of the development of +pleasure would seem to be identical in both +cases.</p> + +<p class='c008'>At this place, however, we are inclined to +feel that we should enter more deeply into the +differentiation of the psychological situation between +the cases of external and internal hindrance, +as we have a faint notion that the removal +of the inner hindrance might possibly +result in a disproportionately higher contribution +to pleasure. But I propose that we rest +content here, that we be satisfied for the present +with this one collection of evidence which +adheres to what is essential to us. The only +difference between the cases of outer and inner +hindrances consists in the fact that here an already +existing inhibition is removed, while +there the formation of a new inhibition is +avoided. We hardly resort to speculation when +<span class='pageno' id='Page_180'>180</span>we assert that a “<em>psychic expenditure</em>” is required +for the formation as well as for the retention +of a psychic inhibition. Now if we find +that in both cases the use of the tendency-wit +produces pleasure, then it may be assumed +<em>that such resultant pleasure corresponds to the +economy of psychic expenditure</em>.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Thus we are once more confronted with the +principle of <em>economy</em> which we noticed first in +the study of the technique of word-wit. But +whereas the economy we believed to have found +at first was in the use of few or possibly the +same words, we can here foresee an economy +of psychic expenditure in general in a far more +comprehensive sense, and we think it possible +to come nearer to the nature of wit through +a better determination of the as yet very obscure +idea of “psychic expenditure.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>A certain amount of haziness which we could +not dissipate during the study of the pleasure +mechanism in tendency-wit we accept as a +slight punishment for attempting to elucidate +more complicated problem before the simpler +one, or the tendency-wit before the harmless +wit. We observe that “<em>economy in the expenditure +of inhibitions or suppressions</em>” seems +to be the secret of the pleasurable effect of +tendency-wit, and we now turn to the mechanism +of the pleasure in harmless wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_181'>181</span>While examining appropriate examples of +harmless witticisms, in which we had no fear +of false judgment through content or tendency, +we were forced to the conclusion that the +techniques of with themselves are pleasure-sources; +now we wish to ascertain whether the +pleasure may be traced to the economy in +psychic expenditure. In a group of these witticisms +(plays on words) the technique consisted +in directing the psychic focus upon the +sound instead of upon the sense of the word, +and in allowing the (acoustic) word-disguise +to take the place of the meaning accorded to it +by its relations to reality. We are really justified +in assuming that great relief is thereby afforded +to the psychic work, and that in the +serious use of words we refrain from this convenient +procedure only at the expense of a +certain amount of exertion. We can observe +that abnormal mental states, in which the possibility +of concentrating psychic expenditure on +one place is probably restricted, actually allow +to come to the foreground word-sound associations +of this kind rather than the significance of +the words, and that such patients react in their +speech with “outer” instead of “inner” associations. +Also in children who are still accustomed +to treat the word as an object we +notice the inclination to look for the same +<span class='pageno' id='Page_182'>182</span>meaning in words of the same or of similar +sounds, which is a source of great amusement +to adults. If we experience in wit an unmistakable +pleasure because through the use of the +same or similar words we reach from one set +of ideas to a distant other one, (as in “Home-Roulard” +from the kitchen to politics), we can +justly refer this pleasure to the economy of +psychic expenditure. The pleasure of the wit +resulting from such a “short-circuit” appears +greater the more remote and foreign the two +series of ideas which become related through +the same word are to each other, or the greater +the economy in thought brought about by the +technical means of wit. We may add that in +this case wit makes use of a means of connection +which is rejected by and carefully avoided +in serious thinking.<a id='r45'></a><a href='#f45' class='c007'><sup>[45]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_183'>183</span>A second group of technical means of wit—unification, +similar sounding words, manifold +application, modification of familiar idioms, allusions +to quotations—all evince one common +character, namely, that one always discovers +something familiar where one expects to find +something new instead. To discover the familiar +is pleasurable and it is not difficult to +recognize such pleasure as economy-pleasure +and to refer it to the economy of psychic expenditure.</p> + +<p class='c008'>That the discovery of the familiar—“recognition”—causes +pleasure seems to be universally +admitted. Groos says:<a id='r46'></a><a href='#f46' class='c007'><sup>[46]</sup></a> “Recognition +is everywhere bound up with feelings of pleasure +<span class='pageno' id='Page_184'>184</span>where it has not been made too mechanical, +(as perhaps in dressing...). Even the mere +quality of acquaintanceship is easily accompanied +by that gentle delight which Faust experiences +when, after an uncanny experience, he +steps into his study.” If the act of recognition +is so pleasureful, we may expect that man +merges into the habit of practicing this activity +for its own sake, that is, he experiments +playfully with it. In fact, Aristotle recognized +in the joy of rediscovery the basis of artistic +pleasure, and it cannot be denied that this +principle must not be overlooked even if it has +not such a far-reaching significance as Aristotle +assumes.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Groos then discusses the games, whose character +consists of heightening the pleasure of +rediscovery by putting hindrances in its path, +or in other words by raising a “psychic dam” +which is removed by the act of recognition. +However, his attempted explanation leaves the +assumption that recognition as such is pleasurable, +in that he attributes the pleasure of recognition +connected with these games to the +pleasure in power or to the surmounting of a +difficulty. I consider this latter factor as secondary, +and I find no occasion for abandoning +the simpler explanation, that the recognition +<em>per se</em>, i.e., through the alleviation of the psychic +<span class='pageno' id='Page_185'>185</span>expenditure, is pleasurable, and that the +games founded upon this pleasure make use +of the damming-mechanism merely in order to +intensify their effect.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We know also that the source of pleasure in +rhyme, alliteration, refrain, and other forms of +repetition of similar sounding words in poetry, +is due merely to the discovery of the familiar. +A “sense of power” plays no perceptible rôle +in these techniques, which show so marked an +agreement with the “manifold application” in +wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Considering the close connection between recognition +and remembering, the assumption is +no longer daring that there exists also a pleasure +in remembering, i.e., that the act of remembering +in itself is accompanied by a feeling of +pleasure of a similar origin. Groos seems to +have no objection to such an assumption, but +he again deducts the pleasure of remembering +from the “sense of power” in which he seeks—as +I believe unjustly—the principal basis of +pleasure in almost all games.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Factor of Actuality</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The use of another technical expedient of +wit, which has not yet been mentioned, is also +dependent upon “the rediscovery of the familiar.” +<span class='pageno' id='Page_186'>186</span>I refer to the factor of <em>actuality</em> +(dealing with actual persons, things, or events), +which in many witticisms provides a prolific +source of pleasure and explains several peculiarities +in the life history of wit. There are +witticisms which are entirely free from this condition, +and in a treatise on wit it is incumbent +upon us to make use of such examples almost +exclusively. But we must not forget that we +laughed perhaps more heartily over such perennial +witticisms than over others; witticisms +whose application now would be difficult, because +they would require long commentaries, +and even with that aid the former effect could +not be attained. These latter witticisms contained +allusions to persons and occurrences +which were “actual” at the time, which had +stimulated general interest and were endowed +with tension. After the cessation of this +interest, after the settlement of these particular +affairs, the witticisms lost a part of +their pleasurable effect, and a very considerable. +Thus, for example, the joke which +my friendly host made when he called +the dish that was being served a “Home-Roulard,” +seems to me by no means as good +now as when the question of Home Rule was +a continuous headline in the political columns +of our newspaper. If I now attempt to express +<span class='pageno' id='Page_187'>187</span>my appreciation of this joke by stating +that this one word led us from the idea of the +kitchen to the distant field of politics, and +saved us a long mental detour, I should have +been forced at that time to change this description +as follows: “That this word led us from +the idea of the kitchen to the very distant field +of politics; but that our lively interest was all +the keener because this question was constantly +absorbing us.” The same thing is true of +another joke: “<em>This girl reminds me of +Dreyfus; the army does not believe in her innocence</em>,” +which has become blurred in spite of +the fact that its technical means has remained +unchanged. The confusion arising from the +comparison with, and the double meaning of, +the word “innocence” cannot do away with the +fact that the allusion, which at that time +touched upon a matter pregnant with excitement, +now recalls an interest set at rest. The +many irresistible jokes about the present war +will sink in our estimation in a very short time.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A great many witticisms in circulation reach +a certain age or rather go through a course +composed of a flourishing season and a mature +season, and then sink into complete oblivion. +The need that people feel to draw pleasure +from their mental processes continually creates +new witticisms which are supported by current +<span class='pageno' id='Page_188'>188</span>interests of the day. The vitality of actual witticisms +is not their own, it is borrowed by way +of allusion from those other interests, the expiration +of which determines the fate of the +witticism. The factor of actuality which may +be added as a transitory pleasure-source of wit, +although it is productive in itself, cannot be +simply put on the same basis as the rediscovery +of the familiar. It is much more a question of +a special qualification of the familiar which +must be aided by the quality of freshness and +recency and which has not been affected by forgetfulness. +In the formation of the dream one +also finds that there is a special preference for +what is recent, and one cannot refrain from inferring +that the association with what is recent +is rewarded or facilitated by a special pleasure +premium.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Unification, which is really nothing more +than repetition in the sphere of mental association +instead of in material, has been accorded +an especial recognition as a pleasure-source +of wit by G. Th. Fechner.<a id='r47'></a><a href='#f47' class='c007'><sup>[47]</sup></a> He says: +“In my opinion the principle of uniform connection +of the manifold, plays the most important +rôle in the field under discussion; it +needs, however, the support of subsidiary determinations +in order to drive across the threshold +<span class='pageno' id='Page_189'>189</span>the pleasure with its peculiar character +which the cases here belonging can furnish.”<a id='r48'></a><a href='#f48' class='c007'><sup>[48]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>In all of these cases of repetition of the same +association or of the same word-material, of refinding +the familiar and recent, we surely cannot +be prevented from referring the pleasure +thereby experienced to the economy in psychic +expenditure; providing that this viewpoint +proves fertile for the explanation of single +facts as well as for bringing to light new generalities. +We are fully conscious of the fact +that we have yet to make clear the manner in +which this economy results and also the meaning +of the expression “psychic expenditure.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>The third group of the technique of wit, +mostly thought-wit, which includes false logic, +displacement, absurdity, representation through +the opposite, and other varieties, may seem at +first sight to present special features and to be +unrelated to the techniques of the discovery +of the familiar, or the replacing of object-associations +by word-associations. But it will not +be difficult to demonstrate that this group, too, +shows an economy or facilitation of psychic +expenditure.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is quite obvious that it is easier and more +convenient to turn away from a definite trend +of thought than to stick to it; it is easier to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_190'>190</span>mix up different things than to distinguish +them; and it is particularly easier to travel +over modes of reasoning unsanctioned by logic; +finally in connecting words or thoughts it is +especially easy to overlook the fact that such +connections should result in sense. All this is +indubitable and this is exactly what is done by +the techniques of the wit in question. It will +sound strange, however, to assert that such +processes in the wit-work may produce pleasure, +since outside of wit we can experience only +unpleasant feelings of defense against all these +kinds of inferior achievement of our mental activity.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Word-pleasure and Pleasure in Nonsense</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The “pleasure in nonsense,” as we may call +it for short, is, in the seriousness of our life, +crowded back almost to the vanishing point. +To demonstrate it we must enter into the study +of two cases in one of which it is still visible +and in the other becomes visible for the second +time. I refer to the behavior of the learning +child and to the behavior of the adult under unstable +toxic influences. When the child learns +to control the vocabulary of its mother tongue +it apparently takes great pleasure in “experimenting +playfully” with that material +<span class='pageno' id='Page_191'>191</span>(Groos); it connects words without regard for +their meaning in order to obtain pleasure from +the rhyme and rhythm. Gradually the child +is deprived of this pleasure until only the senseful +connection of words is allowed him. But +even in later life there is still a tendency to +overstep the acquired restrictions in the use of +words, a tendency which manifests itself in +disfiguring the same by definite appendages, +and in changing their forms by means of certain +contrivances (reduplication, trembling +speech) or even by developing an individual +language for use in playing,—efforts which reappear +also among the insane of a certain category.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I believe that whatever the motive which +actuated the child when it began such playings, +in its further development the child indulges in +them fully conscious that they are nonsensical +and derives pleasure from this stimulus which +is interdicted by reason. It now makes use +of play in order to withdraw from the pressure +of critical reason. More powerful, however, +are the restrictions which must develop in education +along the lines of right thinking and in +the separation of reality from fiction, and it is +for this reason that the resistance against the +pressures of thinking and reality is far-reaching +and persistent; even the phenomena of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_192'>192</span>phantasy formation come under this point of +view. The power of reason usually grows so +strong during the later part of childhood and +during that period of education which extends +over the age of puberty, that the pleasure in +“freed nonsense” rarely dares manifest itself. +One fears to utter nonsense; but it seems to +me that the inclination characteristic of boys +to act in a contradictory and inexpedient manner +is a direct outcome of this pleasure in nonsense. +In pathological cases one often sees +this tendency so accentuated that it again controls +the speeches and answers of the pupils. +In the case of some college students who +merged into neuroses I could convince myself +that the unconscious pleasure derived from the +nonsense produced by them is just as much +responsible for their mistakes as their actual +ignorance.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Reproduction of Old Liberties</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The student does not give up his demonstrations +against the pressures of thinking and +reality whose domination becomes unceasingly +intolerant and unrestricted. A good part of +the tendency of students to skylarking is responsible +for this reaction. Man is an “untiring +pleasure seeker”—I can no longer recall +<span class='pageno' id='Page_193'>193</span>which author coined this happy expression—and +finds it extremely difficult to renounce +pleasure once experienced. With the hilarious +nonsense of “sprees” (<i><span lang="de">Bierschwefel</span></i>), college +cries, and songs, the student attempts to preserve +that pleasure which results from freedom +of thought, a freedom of which he is more and +more deprived through scholastic discipline. +Even much later, when as a mature man he +meets with others at scientific congresses and +class reunions and feels himself a student +again, he must read at the end of the session +the “<i><span lang="de">Kneipzeitung</span></i>,” or the comic college paper, +which distorts the newly gained knowledge into +the nonsensical and thus compensates him for the +newly added mental inhibitions.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The very terms “<i><span lang="de">Bierschwefel</span></i>” and “<i><span lang="de">Kneipzeitung</span></i>” +are proof that the reason which has +stifled the pleasure in nonsense has become so +powerful that not even temporarily can it be +abandoned without toxic agency. The change +in the state of mind is the most valuable thing +that alcohol offers man, and that is the reason +why this “poison” is not equally indispensable +for all people. The hilarious humor, whether +due to endogenous origin or whether produced +toxically, weakens the inhibiting forces among +which is reason and thus again makes accessible +pleasure-sources which are burdened by +<span class='pageno' id='Page_194'>194</span>suppression. It is very instructive to see how +the demand made upon wit sinks with the rise +in spirits. The latter actually replace wit, just +as wit must make an effort to replace the mental +state in which the otherwise inhibited pleasure +possibilities (pleasure in nonsense among +the rest) assert themselves.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“With little wit and much comfort.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Under the influence of alcohol the adult +again becomes a child who derives pleasure +from the free disposal of his mental stream +without being restricted by the pressure of +logic.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We hope we have shown that the technique +of absurdity in wit corresponds to a source of +pleasure. We need hardly repeat that this +pleasure results from the economy of psychic +expenditure or alleviation from the pressure +of reason.</p> + +<p class='c008'>On reviewing again the wit-technique classified +under three headings we notice that the +first and last of these groups—the replacement +of object-association by word-association, and +the use of absurdity as a restorer of old liberties +and as a relief from the pressure of +intellectual upbringing—can be taken collectively. +Psychic relief may in a way be compared +to economy, which constitutes the technique +of the second group. Alleviation of the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_195'>195</span>already existing psychic expenditure, and economy +in the yet to be offered psychic expenditure, +are two principles from which all techniques +of wit and with them all pleasure in +these techniques can be deduced. The two +forms of the technique and the resultant pleasures +correspond more or less in general to the +division of wit into word- and thought-witticisms.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Play and Jest</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The preceding discussions have led us unexpectedly +to an understanding of the history of +the development of psychogenesis of wit which +we shall now examine still further. We have +become acquainted with the successive steps in +wit, the development of which up to tendency-wit +will undoubtedly reveal new relationships +between the different characters of wit. Antedating +wit there exists something which we +may designate as “play” or “jest.” Play—we +shall retain this name—appears in children +while they are learning how to use words and +connect thoughts; this playing is probably the +result of an impulse which urges the child to +exercise its capacities (Groos). During this +process it experiences pleasurable effects which +originate from the repetition of similarities, +the rediscovery of the familiar, sound-associations, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_196'>196</span>etc., which may be explained as an unexpected +economy of psychic expenditure. +Therefore it surprises no one that these resulting +pleasures urge the child to practice playing +and impel it to continue without regard +for the meaning of words or the connections +between sentences. Playing with words and +thoughts, motivated by certain pleasures in +economy, would thus be the first step of wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>This playing is stopped by the growing +strength of a factor which may well be called +criticism or reason. The play is then rejected +as senseless or as directly absurd, and by virtue +of reason it becomes impossible. Only accidentally +is it now possible to derive pleasure +from those sources of rediscovery of the familiar, +etc., which is explained by the fact that +the maturing person has then merged into a +playful mood which, as in the case of merriment +in the child, removes inhibitions. In this +way only is the old pleasure-giving playing +made possible, but as men do not wish to wait +for these propitious occasions and also hate to +forego this pleasure, they seek means to make +themselves independent of these pleasant states. +The further development of wit is directed by +these two impulses; the one striving to elude +reason and the other to substitute for the adult +an infantile state of mind.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_197'>197</span>This gives rise to the second stage of wit, the +<em>jest</em> (<i><span lang="de">Scherz</span></i>). The object of the jest is to +bring about the resultant pleasure of playing +and at the same time appease the protesting +reason which strives to suppress the pleasant +feeling. There is but one way to accomplish this. +The senseless combination of words or +the absurd linking of thoughts must make sense +after all. The whole process of wit production +is therefore directed towards the discovery of +words and thought constellations which fulfill +these conditions. The jest makes use of almost +all the technical means of wit, and usage of +language makes no consequential distinction +between jest (<i><span lang="de">Scherz</span></i>) and wit (<i><span lang="de">Witz</span></i>). What +distinguishes the jest from wit is the fact that +the pith of the sentence withdrawn from criticism +does not need to be valuable, new, or even +good; it matters only that it can be expressed, +even though what it may say is obsolete, superfluous, +and useless. The most conspicuous factor +of the jest is the gratification it affords by +making possible that which reason forbids.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A mere jest is the following of Professor +Kästner, who taught physics at Göttingen in +the 16th century, and who was fond of making +jokes. Wishing to enroll a student named +Warr in his class, he asked him his age, and +upon receiving the reply that he was thirty +<span class='pageno' id='Page_198'>198</span>years of age he exclaimed: “Aha, so I have +the honor of seeing the thirty years’ War.”<a id='r49'></a><a href='#f49' class='c007'><sup>[49]</sup></a> +When asked what vocations his sons followed +Rokitansky jestingly answered: “Two are healing +and two are howling,” (two physicians and +two singers). The reply was correct and therefore +unimpeachable, but it added nothing to +what is contained in the parenthetic expression. +There is no doubt that the answer assumed +another form only because of the pleasure +which arises from the unification and assonance +of both words.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I believe that we now see our way clear. In +estimating the techniques of wit we were constantly +disturbed by the fact that these are not +peculiar to wit alone, and yet the nature of wit +seemed to depend upon them, since their removal +by means of reduction nullified the character +as well as the pleasure of wit. Now we +become aware that what we have described as +techniques of wit—and which in a certain sense +we shall have to continue to call so—are really +the sources from which wit derives pleasure; +nor does it strike us as strange that other +processes draw from the same sources with the +same object in view. The technique, however, +which is peculiar to and belongs to wit alone +consists in a process of safeguarding the use +<span class='pageno' id='Page_199'>199</span>of this pleasure-forming means against the +protest of reason which would obviate the pleasure. +We can make few generalizations about +this process. The wit-work, as we have already +remarked, expresses itself in the selection of +such word-material and such thought-situations +as to permit the old play with words and +thoughts to stand the test of reason; but to accomplish +this end the cleverest use must be +made of all the peculiarities of the stock of +words and of all constellations of mental combinations. +Later on perhaps we shall be in a +position to characterize the wit-work by a +definite attribute; for the present it must remain +unexplained how our wit makes its advantageous +selections. The tendency and capacity +of wit to guard the pleasure-forming +word and thought combinations against reason, +already makes itself visible as an essential criterion +in jests. From the beginning its object +is to remove inner inhibitions and thereby render +productive those pleasure-sources which have +become inaccessible, and we shall find that it +remains true to this characteristic throughout +the course of its entire development.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We are now in a position to prescribe a correct +place for the factor “sense in nonsense,” +(see Introduction, page 8), to which the authors +ascribe so much significance in respect to the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_200'>200</span>recognition of wit and the explanation of the +pleasurable effect. The two firmly established +points in the determination of wit—its tendency +to carry through the pleasureful play, and its +effort to guard it against the criticism of reason—make +it perfectly clear why the individual +witticism, even though it appear nonsensical +from one point of view, must appear full of +meaning or at least acceptable from another. +How it accomplishes this is the business of the +wit-work; if it is not successful it is relegated +to the category of “nonsense.” Nor do we find +it necessary to deduce the resultant pleasure +of wit from the conflict of feelings which +emerge either directly or by way of “confusion +and clearness,” from the simultaneous +sense and nonsense of the wit. There is just +as little necessity for our delving deeper into +the question how pleasure can come from the +succession of that part of the wit considered +senseless and from that part recognized as +senseful. The psychogenesis of wit has taught +us that the pleasure of wit arises from word-play +or from the liberation of nonsense, and +that the sense of wit is meant only to +guard this pleasure against suppression through +reason.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_201'>201</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Jest and Wit</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>Thus the problem of the essential character +of wit could almost be explained by means of +the jest. We may follow the development of +the jest until it reaches its height in the tendency-wit. +The jest gives tendency a prior +position when it is a question of supplying us +with pleasure, and it is content when its utterance +does not appear utterly senseless or insipid. +But if this utterance is substantial and +valuable the jest changes into wit. A thought, +which would have been worthy of our interest +even when expressed in the most unpretentious +form, is now invested in a form which must in +itself excite our sense of satisfaction. Such +an association we cannot help thinking certainly +has not come into existence unintentionally; +we must make effort to divine the intention +at the bottom of the formation of wit. +An incidental observation, made once before, +will put us on the right track. We have already +remarked that a good witticism gives +us, so to speak, a general feeling of satisfaction +without our being able to decide offhand +which part of the pleasure comes from the +witty form and which part from the excellent +thought contained in the context (p. 131). We +are deceiving ourselves constantly about this +<span class='pageno' id='Page_202'>202</span>division; sometimes we overvalue the quality of +the wit on account of our admiration for the +thought contained therein, and then again we +overestimate the value of the thought on account +of the pleasure afforded us by the witty +investment. We know not what gives us pleasure +nor at what we are laughing. This uncertainty +of our judgment, assuming it to be +a fact, may have given the motive for the +formation of wit in the literal sense. The +thought seeks the witty disguise because it +thereby recommends itself to our attention and +can thus appear to us more important and valuable +than it really is; but above all because +this disguise fascinates and confuses our reason. +We are apt to attribute to the thought +the pleasure derived from the witty form, and +we are not inclined to consider improper what +has given us pleasure, and in this way deprive +ourselves of a source of pleasure. For if wit +made us laugh it was because it established in +us a mood most unfavorable to reason, which +in turn has forced upon us that state of mind +which was once contented with mere playing +and which wit has attempted to replace with +all the means at its command. Although we +have already established the fact that such wit +is harmless and does not yet show a tendency, +we may not deny that, strictly speaking, it is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_203'>203</span>the jest alone which shows no tendency; that +is, it serves to produce pleasure only. For wit +is really never purposeless even if the thought +contained therein shows no tendency and +merely serves a theoretical, intellectual interest. +Wit carries out its purpose in advancing the +thought by magnifying it and by guarding it +against reason. Here again it reveals its original +nature in that it sets itself up against an +inhibiting and restrictive power, or against the +critical judgment.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The first use of wit, which goes beyond the +mere production of pleasure, points out the +road to be followed. Wit is now recognized +as a powerful psychic factor whose weight can +decide the issue if it falls into this or that side +of the scale. The great tendencies and impulses +of our psychic life enlist its service for +their own purposes. The original purposeless +wit, which began as play, becomes related in a +<em>secondary</em> manner to tendencies from which +nothing that is formed in psychic life can +escape for any length of time. We already +know what it can achieve in the service of the +exhibitionistic, aggressive, cynical, and sceptical +tendencies. In the case of obscene wit, +which originated in the smutty joke, it makes +a confederate of the third person who originally +disturbed the sexual situation, by giving +<span class='pageno' id='Page_204'>204</span>him pleasure through the utterance which +causes the woman to be ashamed in his presence. +In the case of the aggressive tendency, +wit by the same means changes the original indifferent +hearers into active haters and scorners, +and in this way confronts the enemy with +a host of opponents where formerly there was +but one. In the first case it overcomes the inhibitions +of shame and decorum by the pleasure +premium which it offers. In the second +case it overthrows the critical judgment which +would otherwise have examined the dispute in +question. In the third and fourth cases where +wit is in the service of the cynical and sceptical +tendency, it shatters the respect for institutions +and truths in which the hearer had believed, +first by strengthening the argument, +and secondly by resorting to a new method of +attack. Where the argument seeks to draw +the hearer’s reason to its side, wit strives to +push aside this reason. There is no doubt that +wit has chosen the way which is psychologically +more efficacious.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Development into Tendency-wit</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>What impressed us in reviewing the achievements +of tendency-wit was the effect it produced +on the hearer. It is more important, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_205'>205</span>however, to understand the effect produced by +wit on the psychic life of the person who makes +it, or more precisely expressed, on the psychic +life of the person who conceives it. Once before +we have expressed the intention, which we +find occasion to repeat here, that we wish to +study the psychic processes of wit in regard +to its apportionment between two persons. +We can assume for the present that the psychic +process aroused by wit in the hearer is usually +an imitation of the psychic processes of the wit +producer. The outer inhibitions which are to +be overcome in the hearer correspond to the +inner inhibitions of the wit producer. In the +latter the expectation of the outer hindrance +exists, at least as an inhibiting idea. The inner +hindrance, which is overcome in tendency-wit, +is evident in some single cases; for example, in +Mr. N.’s joke (p. 28) we can assume that it +not only enables the hearer to enjoy the pleasure +of the aggression through injuries but it +also makes it possible for him to produce the +wit in the first place. Of the different kinds +of inner inhibitions or suppressions one is +especially worthy of our interest because it is +the most far-reaching. We designate that +form by the term “repression.” It is characterized +by the fact that it excludes from consciousness +certain former emotions and their +<span class='pageno' id='Page_206'>206</span>products. We shall learn that tendency-wit +itself is capable of liberating pleasure from +sources that have undergone repression. If the +overcoming of outer hindrances can be referred, +in the manner indicated above, to inner +inhibitions and repressions we may say that +tendency-wit proves more clearly than any +other developmental stage of wit that the main +character of wit-making is to set free pleasure +by removing inhibitions. It reinforces tendencies +to which it gives its services by bringing them +assistance from repressed emotions; or it puts +itself at the disposal of the repressed tendencies +directly.</p> + +<p class='c008'>One may readily concede that these are the +functions of tendency-wit, but one must nevertheless +admit that we do not understand in +what manner these functions can succeed in +accomplishing their end. The power of tendency-wit +consists in the pleasure which it derives +from the sources of word-plays and liberated +nonsense, and if one can judge from +the impressions received from purposeless jests, +one cannot possibly consider the amount of the +pleasure so great as to believe that it has the +power to annul deep-rooted inhibitions and repressions. +As a matter of fact we do not deal +here with a simple propelling power but rather +with a more complicated mechanism. Instead +<span class='pageno' id='Page_207'>207</span>of covering the long circuitous route through +which I arrived at an understanding of this relationship, +I shall endeavor to demonstrate it by +a short synthetic route.</p> + +<p class='c008'>G. Th. Fechner has established the principle +of æsthetic assistance or enhancement which he +explains in the following words: “<em>From the +unopposed meeting of pleasurable states (Bedingungen) +which individually accomplish little, +there results a greater, often much greater +resultant pleasure than is warranted by the +sum of the pleasure values of the separate +states, or a greater result than could be accounted +for as the sum of the individual effects; +in fact the mere meeting of this kind can +result in a positive pleasure product which +overflows the threshold of pleasure when the +factors taken separately are too weak to accomplish +this. The only condition is that in +comparison to others they must produce a +greater sense of satisfaction.</em>”<a id='r50'></a><a href='#f50' class='c007'><sup>[50]</sup></a> I am of the +opinion that the theme of wit does not give us +the opportunity to test the correctness of this +principle which is demonstrable in many other +artistic fields. But from wit we have learned +something, which at least comes near this principle, +namely, that in a co-operation of many +<span class='pageno' id='Page_208'>208</span>pleasure-producing factors we are in no position +to assign to each one the resultant part +which really belongs to it (see p. 131). But the +situation assumed in the principle of assistance +can be varied, and for these new conditions we +can formulate the following combination of +questions which are worthy of a reply. What +usually happens if in one constellation there is +a meeting of pleasurable and painful conditions? +Upon what depends the result and the +previous intimations of the result? Tendency-wit +particularly shows these possibilities. +There is one feeling or impulse which strives +to liberate pleasure from a certain source and +under unrestricted conditions certainly would +liberate it, but there is another impulse which +works against this development of pleasure, +that is, which inhibits or suppresses it. The +suppressing stream, as the result shows, must +be somewhat stronger than the one suppressed, +which however is by no means destroyed.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Fore-pleasure Principle</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>But now there appears another impulse +which strives to set free pleasure by this identical +process, even though from different sources +it thus acts like the suppressed stream. What +can be the result in such a case? An example +can make this clearer than this schematization. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_209'>209</span>There is an impulse to insult a certain person; +but this is so strongly opposed by a feeling +of decorum and æsthetic culture that the impulse +to insult must be crushed. If, for example, +by virtue of some changed emotional state +the insult should happen to break through, this +insulting tendency would subsequently be painfully +perceived. Therefore the insult is omitted. +There is a possibility, however, of making +good wit from the words or thoughts which +would have served in the insult; that is, pleasure +can be set free from other sources without +being hindered by the same suppression. But +the second development of pleasure would have +to be foregone if the insulting quality of the +wit were not allowed to come out, and as the +latter is allowed to come to the surface, it is +connected with the new release of pleasure. +Experience with tendency-wit shows that under +such circumstances the suppressed tendency +can become so strengthened by the aid of wit-pleasure +as to overcome the otherwise stronger +inhibition. One resorts to insults because wit +is thereby made impossible. But the satisfaction +thus obtained is not produced by wit +alone; it is incomparably greater, in fact it is +by so much greater than the pleasure of the +wit, that we must assume that the former suppressed +tendency has succeeded in breaking +<span class='pageno' id='Page_210'>210</span>through, perhaps without the need of an outlet. +Under these circumstances tendency-wit +causes the most prolific laughter.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Perhaps the investigation of the determinations +of laughter will aid us in forming a +clearer picture of the process of the aid of wit +against suppression. But we see even now +that the case of tendency-wit is a special case +of the principle of aid. A possibility of the +development of pleasure enters into a situation +in which another pleasure possibility is so +hindered that individually it would not result +in pleasure. The result is a development of +pleasure which is greater by far than the added +possibility. The latter acted, as it were, as an +<em>alluring premium</em>; with the aid of a small sum +of pleasure a very large and almost inaccessible +amount is obtained. I have good grounds +for thinking that this principle corresponds to +an arrangement which holds true in many +widely separated spheres of the psychic life, +and I consider it appropriate to designate the +pleasure serving to liberate the large sum of +pleasure as <em>fore-pleasure</em> and the principle as +the <em>principle of fore-pleasure</em>.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Play-pleasure and Removal-pleasure</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The effect of tendency-wit may now be +formulated as follows: It enters the service of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_211'>211</span>tendencies in order to produce new pleasure by +removing suppressions and repressions. This it +does, using wit-pleasure as fore-pleasure. +When we now review its development we may +say that wit has remained true to its nature +from beginning to end. It begins as play in +order to obtain pleasure from the free use of +words and thoughts. As soon as the growing +reason forbids this senseless play with words +and thoughts, it turns to the jest or joke in +order to hold to these sources of pleasure and +in order to be able to gain new pleasure from +the liberation of the absurd. In the rôle of +harmless wit it assists the thoughts and fortifies +them against the impugnment of the critical +judgment, whereby it makes use of the +principle of intermingling the pleasure-sources. +Finally, it enters into the great struggling +suppressed tendencies in order to remove inner +inhibitions in accordance with the principle of +fore-pleasure. Reason, critical judgment, and +suppression, these are the forces which it combats +in turn. It firmly holds on to the original +word-pleasure-sources, and beginning with the +stage of the jest opens for itself new pleasure-sources +by removing inhibition. The pleasure +which it produces, be it play-pleasure or removal-pleasure, +can at all times be traced to +the economy of psychic expenditure, in so far +<span class='pageno' id='Page_212'>212</span>as such a conception does not contradict the +nature of pleasure, and proves itself productive +also in other fields.<a id='r51'></a><a href='#f51' class='c007'><sup>[51]</sup></a></p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_214'>214</span> + <h3 class='c001'>V<br> <span class='c015'>THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL PROCESS</span></h3> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>It seems superfluous to speak of the motives +of wit, since the purpose of obtaining pleasure +must be recognized as a sufficient motive of the +wit-work. But on the one hand it is not impossible +that still other motives participate in +the production of wit, and on the other hand, +in view of certain well-known experiences, the +theme of the subjective determination of wit +must be discussed.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Two things above all urge us to it. Though +wit-making is an excellent means of obtaining +pleasure from the psychic processes, we know +that not all persons are equally able to make +use of it. Wit-making is not at the disposal +of all, in general there are but a few persons +to whom one can point and say that they are +witty. Here wit seems to be a special ability +somewhere within the region of the old “psychic +faculties,” and this shows itself in its appearance +as fairly independent of the other +faculties such as intelligence, phantasy, memory, +etc. A special talent or psychic determination +<span class='pageno' id='Page_215'>215</span>permitting or favoring wit-making +must be presupposed in all wit-makers.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I am afraid that we shall not get very far +in the exploration of this theme. Only now +and then do we succeed in proceeding from +the understanding of a single witticism to the +knowledge of the subjective determinations in +the mind of the wit-maker. It is quite accidental +that the example of wit with which we +began our investigation of the wit-technique +permits us also to gain some insight into the +subjective determination of the witticism. I +am referring to Heine’s witticism, to which also +Heymans and Lipps have paid attention.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>I was sitting next to Solomon Rothschild +and he treated me just as an equal, quite famillionaire</em>” +(“Bäder von Lucca”).</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Subjective Determination of the “Famillionaire” Witticism</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Heine put this word in the mouth of a comical +person, Hirsch-Hyacinth, collector, operator +and tax appraiser from Hamburg, and +valet of the aristocratic baron, Cristoforo Gumpelino +(formerly Gumpel). Evidently the +poet has experienced great pleasure in these +productions, for he allows Hirsch-Hyacinth to +talk big and puts in his mouth the most amusing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_216'>216</span>and most candid utterances; he positively +endows him with the practical wisdom of a +Sancho Panza. It is a pity that Heine, as it +seems, had no liking for this dramatic figure +and that he drops the delightful character so +soon. From many passages it would seem that +the poet himself is speaking behind the transparent +mask of Hirsch-Hyacinth, and we are +quite convinced that this person is nothing but +a parody of the poet himself. Hirsch tells of +reasons why he has discarded his former name +and now calls himself Hyacinth. “Besides I +have the advantage,” he continues, “of having +an H on my seal already, and therefore I am +in no need of having a new letter engraved.” +But Heine himself resorted to this economy +when he changed his surname “Harry” to +“Heinrich” at his baptism. Every one acquainted +with the life of the poet will recall +that in Hamburg, where one also meets the +personage Hirsch-Hyacinth, Heine had an uncle +of the same name, who played the greatest +rôle in Heine’s life as the wealthy member of +the family. The uncle’s name was likewise Solomon, +just like the elderly Rothschild who +treated the impecunious Hirsch on such a famillionaire +basis. What seems to be merely +a jest in the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth soon +reveals a background of earnest bitterness +<span class='pageno' id='Page_217'>217</span>when we attribute it to the nephew Harry-Heinrich. +For he belonged to the family, nay, +more, it was his earnest wish to marry a +daughter of this uncle, but she refused him, +and his uncle always treated him on a somewhat +famillionaire basis, as a poor relative. +His rich relatives in Hamburg always dealt +with him condescendingly. I recall the story +of one of his old aunts by marriage who, when +she was still young and pretty, sat next to some +one at a family dinner who seemed to her unprepossessing +and whom the other members +of the family treated shabbily. She did not +feel herself called upon to be any more condescending +towards him. Only many years +later did she discover that the careless and +neglected cousin was the poet Heinrich Heine. +We know from many a record how keenly +Heine suffered from these repulses at the +hands of his wealthy relatives in his youth and +during later years. The witticism “famillionaire” +grew out of the soil of such a subjective +emotional feeling.</p> + +<p class='c008'>One may suspect similar subjective determinations +in many other witticisms of the great +scoffers, but I know of no other example by +which one can show this in such a convincing +way. It is therefore hazardous to venture a +more definite opinion about the nature of this +<span class='pageno' id='Page_218'>218</span>personal determination. Furthermore, one is +not inclined in the first place to claim similar +complicated conditions for the origin of each +and every witticism. Neither are the witty +productions of other celebrated men better +suited to give us the desired insight into the +subjective determination of wit. In fact, one +gets the impression that the subjective determination +of wit production is oftentimes not +unrelated to persons suffering from neurotic +diseases, when, for example, one learns that +Lichtenberg was a confirmed hypochondriac +burdened with all kinds of eccentricities. The +great majority of witticisms, especially those +produced from current happenings, are anonymous; +one might be inquisitive to know what +kind of people they are who originate them. +The physician occasionally has an opportunity +to make a study of persons who, if not renowned +wits, are recognized in their circle as +witty and as originators of many passable witticisms; +he is often surprised to find such persons +showing dissociated personalities and a +predisposition to nervous affections. However, +owing to insufficient data, we certainly cannot +maintain that such a psychoneurotic constitution +is a regular or necessary subjective condition +for wit-making.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A clearer case is afforded by Jewish witticisms +<span class='pageno' id='Page_219'>219</span>which, as before mentioned, are made exclusively +by Jews themselves, whereas Jewish +stories of different origin rarely rise above the +level of the comical strain or of brutal mockery +(p. 166). The determination for the self-participation +here, as in Heine’s joke “famillionaire,” +seems to be due to the fact that +the person finds it difficult to express directly +his criticism or aggression and is thus compelled +to resort to by-ways.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Other subjective determinations or favorable +conditions for wit-making are less shrouded +in darkness. The motive for the production of +harmless wit is usually the ambitious impulse +to display one’s spirit or to “show off.” It is +an impulse comparable to the impulse toward +sexual exhibition. The existence of numerous +inhibited impulses whose suppression retains +some weakness produces a state favorable for +the production of tendency-wit. Thus certain +single components of the sexual constitution +may appear as motives for wit-formation. A +whole series of obscene witticisms lead one to +the conclusion that a person who gives origin +to such wit conceals a desire to exhibit. Persons +having a powerful sadistical component in +their sexuality, which is more or less inhibited +in life, are most successful with the tendency-wit +of aggression.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_220'>220</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>The Impulse to Impart Wit</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>The second fact which impels one to examine +the subjective determination of wit is the common +experience that nobody is satisfied with +making wit for himself. Wit-making is inseparably +connected with the desire to impart it; +in fact this impulse is so strong that it is often +realized after overcoming strong objections. +In the comic, too, one experiences pleasure by +imparting it to another person; but this is not +imperative; one can enjoy the comic alone +when one happens on it. Wit, on the other +hand, must be imparted. Apparently the +process of wit-formation does not end with the +conception of wit. There remains something +which strives to complete the mysterious process +of wit-formation by imparting it.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We cannot conjecture, in the first place, +what may have motivated the impulse to impart +wit. But in wit we notice another peculiarity +which again distinguishes it from the +comic. If I encounter the latter I can laugh +heartily over it alone; I am naturally pleased +if by imparting it to some one else I make him +laugh too. In the case of wit, however, which +occurs to me or which I have made, I cannot +laugh over it in spite of the unmistakable feeling +of pleasure which I experience in the witticism. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_221'>221</span>It is possible that my need to impart +the witticism to another is in some way connected +with the resultant laughter, which is +manifest in the other, but denied to me.</p> + +<p class='c008'>But why do I not laugh over my own joke? +And what rôle does the other person play in +it?</p> + +<p class='c008'>Let us consider the last query first. In the +comic usually two persons come into consideration. +Besides my own ego there is another person +in whom I find something comic; if objects +appear comical to me, it takes place by +means of a sort of personification which is not +uncommon in our notional life. The comic +process is satisfied with these two persons, the +ego and the object person; there may also be +a third person, but it is not obligatory. Wit +as a play with one’s own words and thoughts +at first dispenses with an object person, but +already, upon the first step of the jest, it demands +another person to whom it can impart +its result, if it has succeeded in safeguarding +play and nonsense against the remonstrance +of reason. The second person in wit does not, +however, correspond to the object person, but +to the third person who is the other person in +the comic. It seems that in the jest the decision +as to whether wit has fulfilled its task is +transferred to the other person, as if the ego +<span class='pageno' id='Page_222'>222</span>were not quite certain of its opinion in the +matter. The harmless wit is also in need of +the other person’s support in order to ascertain +whether it has accomplished its purpose. +If wit enters the service of sexual or hostile +tendencies, it can be described as a psychic +process among three persons, just as in the +comic, with the exception that there the third +person plays a different rôle. The psychic +process of wit is consummated here between +the first person—the ego, and the third person—the +stranger, and not, as in the comic, between +the ego and the object person.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Also, in the case of the third person of wit, +the wit is confronted with subjective determinations +which can make the goal of the pleasure-stimulus +unattainable. As Shakespeare says +in <cite>Love’s Labor’s Lost</cite> (Act V, Scene 2):</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“A jest’s prosperity lies in the ear</div> + <div class='line'>Of him that hears it, never in the tongue</div> + <div class='line'>Of him that makes it.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>He whose thoughts run in sober channels is +incompetent to declare whether or not the jest +is a good one. He himself must be in a jovial, +or at least indifferent, state of mind in order +to become the third person of the jest. The +same hindrance is present in the case of both +<span class='pageno' id='Page_223'>223</span>harmless and tendency-wit; but in the latter +the antagonism to the tendency which wishes +to serve wit, appears as a new hindrance. The +readiness to laugh about an excellent smutty +joke cannot manifest itself if the exposure concerns +an honored kinsman of the third person. +In an assemblage of divines and pastors no one +would dare to refer to Heine’s comparison of +Catholic and Protestant priests as retail dealers +and employees of a wholesale business. In +the presence of my opponent’s friends the wittiest +invectives with which I might assail him +would not be considered witticisms but invectives, +and in the minds of my hearers it would +create not pleasure, but indignation. A certain +amount of willingness or a certain indifference, +the absence of all factors which might +evoke strong feelings in opposition to the tendency, +are absolute conditions for the participation +of the third person in the completion of +the wit-process.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Third Person of the Witticism</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Wherever such hindrances to the operation +of wit fail, we see the phenomenon which we +are now investigating, namely, that the pleasure +which the wit has provided manifests itself +more clearly in the third person than in the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_224'>224</span>originator of the wit. We must be satisfied to +use the expression “more clearly” where we +should be inclined to ask whether the pleasure +of the hearer is not more intensive than that of +the wit producer, because we are obviously +lacking the means of measuring and comparing +it. We see, however, that the hearer shows his +pleasure by means of explosive laughter after +the first person, in most cases with a serious +expression on his face, has related the joke. +If I repeat a witticism which I have heard, I +am forced, in order not to spoil its effect, to +conduct myself during its recital exactly like +him who made it. We may now put the question +whether from this determination of +laughter over wit we can draw conclusions concerning +the psychic process of wit-formation.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Now it cannot be our intention to take into +consideration everything that has been asserted +and printed about the nature of laughter. We +are deterred from this undertaking by the +statement which Dugas, one of Ribot’s pupils, +put at the beginning of his book <cite><span lang="fr">Psychologie +du rire</span></cite> (1902). “<span lang="fr">Il n’est pas de fait plus +banal et plus étudié que le rire, il n’en est pas +qui ait eu le don d’exciter davantage la curiosité +du vulgaire et celle des philosophes, il n’ent +est pas sur lequel on ait recueilli plus d’observations +et bâti plus de théories, et avec cela +<span class='pageno' id='Page_225'>225</span>il n’en est pas qui demeure plus inexpliqué, on +serait tenté de dire avec les sceptiques qu’il +faut être content de rire et de ne pas chercher +à savoir pourquoi on rit, d’autant que peut-être +le réflexion tue le rire, et qu’il serait alors contradictoire +qu’elle en découvrit les causes</span>” +(page 1).</p> + +<p class='c008'>On the other hand, we must make sure to +utilize for our purposes a view of the mechanism +of laughter which fits our own realm of +thought excellently. I refer to the attempted +explanation of H. Spencer in his essay entitled +<em>Physiology of Laughter</em>.<a id='r52'></a><a href='#f52' class='c007'><sup>[52]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>According to Spencer laughter is a phenomenon +of discharge of psychic irritation, and an +evidence of the fact that the psychic utilization +of this irritation has suddenly met with a +hindrance. The psychological situation, which +discharges itself in laughter, he describes in the +following words: “Laughter naturally results +only when consciousness is unawares transferred +from great things to small—only when +there is what we call a descending incongruity.”<a id='r53'></a><a href='#f53' class='c007'><sup>[53]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_226'>226</span>In an almost analogous sense the French +authors (Dugas) designate laughter as a +“détente,” a manifestation of release of tension, +and A. Bain’s theory, “Laughter a relief +from restraint,” seems to me to approach +Spencer’s conceptions nearer than many +authors would have us believe.</p> + +<p class='c008'>However, we experience the desire to modify +Spencer’s thought; to give a more definite +meaning to some of the ideas and to change +others. We would say that laughter arises +when the sum total of psychic energy, formerly +used for the occupation of certain psychic +channels, has become unutilizable so that it can +experience absolute discharge. We know what +criticism such a declaration invites, but for our +<span class='pageno' id='Page_227'>227</span>defense we dare cite a pertinent quotation from +Lipps’s treatise on <cite><span lang="de">Komik und Humor</span></cite>, an +analysis which throws light on other problems +besides the comic and humor. He says: “In +the end individual psychological problems always +lead us fairly deeply into psychology, so +that fundamentally no psychological problem +may be considered by itself” (p. 71). The +terms “psychic energy,” “discharge,” and the +treatment of psychic energy as a quantity have +become habitual modes of thinking since I began +to explain to myself the fact of psychopathology +philosophically. Being of the same +opinion as Lipps I have essayed to represent +in my <cite>Interpretation of Dreams</cite> the unconscious +psychic processes as real entities, and +I have not represented the conscious contents +as the “real psychic activity.”<a id='r54'></a><a href='#f54' class='c007'><sup>[54]</sup></a> Only when I +speak about the “investing energy (<i><span lang="de">Besetzung</span></i>) +<span class='pageno' id='Page_228'>228</span>of psychic channels,” do I seem to deviate +from the analogies that Lipps uses. The +knowledge that I have gained about the fact +that psychic energy can be displaced from one +idea to another along certain association channels, +and about the almost indestructible conservation +of the traces of psychic processes, +have actually made it possible for me to attempt +such a representation of the unknown. +In order to obviate the possibility of a misunderstanding +I must add that I am making no +attempt to proclaim that cells and fibers, or +the neuron system in vogue nowadays, represent +these psychic paths, even if such paths +would have to be represented by the organic +elements of the nervous system in a manner +which cannot yet be indicated.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Laughter as a Discharge</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Thus, according to our assumption, the conditions +for laughter are such that a sum of +psychic energy hitherto employed in the occupation +of some paths may experience free discharge. +And since not all laughter, (but +surely the laughter of wit), is a sign of pleasure, +we shall be inclined to refer this pleasure +to the release of previously existing static +energy (<i><span lang="de">Besetzungsenergie</span></i>). When we see +<span class='pageno' id='Page_229'>229</span>that the hearer of the witticism laughs, while +the creator of the same cannot, then that must +indicate that in the hearer a sum of damming +energy has been released and discharged, +whereas during the wit-formation, either in the +release or in the discharge, inhibitions resulted. +One can characterize the psychic process in the +hearer, in the third person of the witticism, +hardly more pointedly than by asserting that +he has bought the pleasure of the witticism +with very little expenditure on his part. One +might say that it is presented to him. The +words of the witticism which he hears necessarily +produce in him that idea or thought-connection +whose formation in him was also resisted +by great inner hindrances. He would have +had to make an effort of his own in order to +bring it about spontaneously like the first person, +or he would have had to put forth at least +as much psychic expenditure as to equalize the +force of the suppression or repression of the +inhibition. This psychic expenditure he has +saved himself; according to our former discussion +(p. 80) we should say that his pleasure +corresponds to this economy. Following our +understanding of the mechanism of laughter +we should be more likely to say that the static +energy utilized in the inhibition has now suddenly +become superfluous and neutralized because +<span class='pageno' id='Page_230'>230</span>a forbidden idea came into existence on +the way to auditory perception and is therefore +ready to be discharged through laughter. +Essentially both statements amount to the +same thing, for the economized expenditure +corresponds exactly to the now superfluous inhibition. +The latter statement is more obvious, +for it permits us to say that the hearer of the +witticism laughs with the amount of psychic +energy which was liberated by the suspension +of inhibition energy; that is, he laughs away, +as it were, this amount of psychic energy.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Why the First Person Does Not Laugh</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>If the person in whom the witticism is +formed cannot laugh, then it indicates, as we +have just remarked, that there is a deviation +from the process in the case of the third person +which concerns either the suspension of the +inhibition energy or the discharge possibility of +the same. But the first of the two cases is inconclusive, +as we must presently see. The inhibition +energy of the first person must have +been dissipated, for otherwise there would have +been no witticism, the formation of which had +to overcome just such a resistance. Otherwise, +too, it would have been impossible for the first +person to experience the wit-pleasure which the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_231'>231</span>removal of the inhibition forced us to deduce. +But there remains a second possibility, namely, +that even though he experienced pleasure the +first person cannot laugh, because the possibility +of discharge has been disturbed. In the +production of laughter such discharge is essential; +an interruption in the possibility of discharge +might result from the attachment of +the freed occupation energy to some immediate +endopsychic possibility. It is well that we have +become cognizant of this possibility; we shall +soon pay more attention to it. But with the +wit-maker still another condition leading to the +same result is possible. Perhaps, after all, no +appreciable amount of energy has been liberated, +in spite of the successful release of occupation +energy. In the first person of the witticism +wit-work actually takes place which +must correspond to a certain amount of fresh +psychic expenditure. Thus the first person +contributes the power which removes the inhibitions +and which surely results in a gain of +pleasure for himself; in the case of tendency-wit +it is indeed a very big gain, since the fore-pleasure +gained from the wit-work takes upon +itself the further removal of inhibitions. But +the expenditure of the wit-work is, in every +case, derived from the gain which is the result +of the removal of inhibitions; it is the same +<span class='pageno' id='Page_232'>232</span>expenditure which escapes from the hearer of +the witticism. To confirm what was said above +it may be added that the witticism loses its +laughter effect in the third person as soon as +an expenditure of mental work is exacted of +him. The allusions of the witticism must be +striking, and the omissions easily supplemented; +with the awakening of conscious interest in +thinking, the effect of the witticism is regularly +made impossible. Here lies the real distinction +between the witticism and the riddle. It may +be that the psychic constellations during wit-work +are not at all favorable to the free discharge +of the energy gained. We are not here +in a position to gain a deeper understanding; +our inquiry as to why the third person laughs +we have been able to clear up better than the +question why the first person does not laugh.</p> + +<p class='c008'>At any rate, if we have well in mind these +views about the conditions of laughter and +about the psychic process in the third person, +we have arrived at a place where we can satisfactorily +elucidate an entire series of peculiarities +which are familiar in wit, but which have +not been understood. Before an amount of +interlocked energy, capable of discharge, is to +be liberated in the third person, there are several +conditions which must be fulfilled or which at +least are desirable. 1. It must be definitely +<span class='pageno' id='Page_233'>233</span>established that the third person really produces +this expenditure of energy. 2. Care +must be taken that when the latter becomes +freed that it should find another psychic use +instead of offering itself to the motor discharge. +3. It can be of advantage only if the +energy to be liberated in the third person is +first strengthened and heightened. Certain +processes of wit-work which we can gather together +under the caption of secondary or auxiliary +techniques serve all these purposes.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The first of these conditions determines one +of the qualifications of the third person as +hearer of the witticism. He must throughout +be so completely in psychic harmony with the +first person that he makes use of the same inner +inhibitions which the wit-work has overcome in +the first person. Whoever is focused on smutty +jokes will not be able to derive pleasure from +clever exhibitionistic wit. Mr. N.’s aggressions +will not be understood by uncultured people +who are wont to give free rein to their pleasure +gained by insulting others. Every witticism +thus demands its own public, and to laugh +over the same witticisms is a proof of absolute +psychic agreement. We have indeed arrived at +a point where we are at liberty to examine even +more thoroughly the process in the third person’s +mind. The latter must be able habitually +<span class='pageno' id='Page_234'>234</span>to produce the same inhibition which the joke +has surmounted in the first person, so that, as +soon as he hears the joke, there awakens within +him compulsively and automatically a readiness +for this inhibition. This readiness for the inhibition, +which I must conceive as a true expenditure +analogous to the mobilization of an +army, is simultaneously recognized as superfluous +or as belated, and is thus immediately +discharged in its nascent state through the +channel of laughter.<a id='r55'></a><a href='#f55' class='c007'><sup>[55]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>The second condition for the production of +the free discharge, a cutting off of any other +outlets for the liberated energy, seems to me of +far greater importance. It furnishes the theoretical +explanation for the uncertainty of the +effect of wit; if the thoughts expressed in the +witticism evoke very exciting ideas in the +hearer, (depending on the agreement or antagonism +between the wit’s tendencies and the +train of thought dominating the hearer), the +witty process either receives or is refused attention. +Of still greater theoretical interest, +however, are a series of auxiliary wit-techniques +which obviously serve the purpose of +diverting the attention of the listeners from the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_235'>235</span>wit-process so as to allow the latter to proceed +automatically. I advisedly use the term “automatically” +rather than “unconsciously” because +the latter designation might prove misleading. +It is only a question of keeping the +psychic process from getting more than its +share of attention during the recital of the witticism, +and the usefulness of these auxiliary +techniques permits us to assume rightfully that +it is just the occupation of attention which has +a large share in the control and in the fresh +utilization of the freed energy of occupation.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Automatism of the Wit-process</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>It seems to be by no means easy to avoid +the endopsychic utilization of energy that has +become superfluous, for in our mental processes +we are constantly in the habit of transferring +such emotional outputs from one path to +another without losing any of their energy +through discharge. Wit prevents this in the +following way. In the first place it strives +for the shortest possible expression in order +to expose less points of attack to the attention. +Secondly, it strictly adheres to the condition +that it be easily understood (<em>v. s.</em>), for as soon +as it has recourse to mental effort or demands +a choice between different mental paths, it +<span class='pageno' id='Page_236'>236</span>imperils the effect not only through the unavoidable +mental expenditure, but also through +the awakening of attention. Besides this, wit +also makes use of the artifice of diverting the +attention by offering to it something in the expression +of the witticism which fascinates it so +that meanwhile the liberation of inhibition +energy and its discharge can take place undisturbed. +The omissions in the wording of wit +already carry out this intention. They impel +us to fill in the gaps and in this way they keep +the wit-process free from attention. The technique +of the riddle, as it were, which attracts +attention is here pressed into the service of the +wit-work. The façade formations, which we +have already discovered in many groups of +tendency-wit, are still more effective (see p. +155). The syllogistical façades excellently fulfill +the purpose of riveting the attention by an +allotted task. While we begin to ponder +wherein the given answer was lacking already +we are laughing; our attention has been surprised, +and the discharge of the liberated emotional +inhibition has been effected. The same +is true of witticisms possessing a comic façade +in which the comic serves to assist the wit-technique. +A comic façade promotes the effect +of wit in more than one way; it makes +possible not only the automatism of the wit-process +<span class='pageno' id='Page_237'>237</span>by riveting the attention, but also it +facilitates the discharge of wit by sending +ahead a discharge from the comic. Here the +effect of the comic resembles that of a fascinating +fore-pleasure, and we can thus understand +that many witticisms are able to dispense entirely +the fore-pleasures produced by other +means of wit, and make use of only the comic +as a fore-pleasure. Among the true techniques +of wit it is especially displacement and representation +through absurdity which, besides +other properties, also develop the deviation of +attention so desirable for the automatic discharge +of the wit-process.<a id='r56'></a><a href='#f56' class='c007'><sup>[56]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>We already surmise, and later will be able +to see more clearly, that in this condition of +deviation of attention we have disclosed no unessential +<span class='pageno' id='Page_238'>238</span>characteristic of the psychic process +in the hearer of wit. In conjunction with this, +we can understand something more. First, +how it happens that we rarely ever know in a +joke why we are laughing, although by analytical +investigation we can determine the +cause. This laughing is the result of an automatic +process which was first made possible by +keeping our conscious attention at a distance. +Secondly, we arrive at an understanding of +that characteristic of wit as a result of which +wit can exert its full effect on the hearer only +when it is new and when it comes to him as +a surprise. This property of wit, which causes +wit to be short-lived and forever urges the +production of new wit, is evidently due to the +fact that it is inherent in the surprising or the +unexpected to succeed but once. When we repeat +<span class='pageno' id='Page_239'>239</span>wit the awakened memory leads the attention +to the first hearing. This also explains +the desire to impart wit to others who have not +heard it before, for the impression made by +wit on the new hearer replenishes that part of +the pleasure which has been lost by the lack of +novelty. And an analogous motive probably +urges the wit producer to impart his wit to +others.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Elements Favoring the Wit-process</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>As elements favoring the wit-process, even +if we can no longer consider them essentials, +I present in the third place three technical +aids to wit-work which are destined to increase +the sums of energy to be discharged and thus +enhance the effect of the wit. These technical +aids also very often accentuate the attention +directed to the wit, but they neutralize its influence +by simultaneously fascinating it and +impeding its movements. Everything that +provokes interest and confusion exerts its influence +in these two directions. This is especially +true of the nonsense and contrast elements, +and above all the “contrast of ideas,” +which some authors consider the essential character +of wit, but in which I see only a means +to reinforce the effect of wit. All that is confusing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_240'>240</span>evokes in the hearer that condition of +distribution of energy which Lipps has designated +as “psychic damming”; and, doubtless, +he has a right to assume that the force of the +“discharge” varies with the success of the +damming process which precedes it. Lipps’s exposition +does not explicitly refer to wit, but to +the comic in general, yet it seems quite probable +that the discharge in wit, releasing a gush +of inhibition energy, is brought to its height +in a similar manner by means of the damming.</p> + +<p class='c008'>At length we are aware that the technique +of wit is really determined by two kinds of +tendencies, those which make possible the +formation of wit in the first person, and those +guaranteeing that the witticism produces in the +third person as much pleasurable effect as possible. +The Janus-like double-facedness of +wit, which safeguards its original resultant +pleasure against the impugnment of critical +reason, belongs to the first tendency together +with the mechanism of fore-pleasure; the other +complications of technique produced by the +conditions discussed in this chapter concern the +third person of the witticism. Thus wit in itself +is a double-tongued villain which serves +two masters at the same time. Everything +that aims toward gaining pleasure is calculated +by the witticism to arouse the third person, as +<span class='pageno' id='Page_241'>241</span>if inner, unsurmountable inhibitions in the first +person were in the way of the same. Thus one +gets the full impression of the absolute necessity +of this third person for the completion of +the wit-process. But while we have succeeded +in obtaining a good insight concerning the nature +of this process in the third person, we feel +that the corresponding process in the first person +is still shrouded in darkness. So far we +have not succeeded in answering the first of +our two questions: Why can we not laugh +over wit made by ourselves? and: Why are we +urged to impart our own witticisms to others? +We can only suspect that there is an intimate +connection between the two facts yet to be explained, +and that we must impart our witticisms +to others for the reason that we ourselves +are unable to laugh over them. From +our examinations of the conditions in the third +person for pleasure gaining and pleasure discharging +we can draw the conclusion that in +the first person the conditions for discharge +are lacking and that those for gaining pleasure +are only incompletely fulfilled. Thus it is not +to be disputed that we enhance our pleasure +in that we attain the—to us impossible—laughter +in this roundabout way from the impression +of the person who was stimulated to +laughter. Thus we laugh, so to speak, <i><span lang="fr">par +<span class='pageno' id='Page_242'>242</span>ricochet</span></i>, as Dugas expresses it. Laughter +belongs to those manifestations of psychic +states which are highly infectious; if I make +some one else laugh by imparting my wit to +him, I am really using him as a tool in order +to arouse my own laughter. One can really +notice that the person who at first recites the +witticism with a serious mien later joins the +hearer with a moderate amount of laughter. +Imparting my witticisms to others may thus +serve several purposes. First, it serves to give +me the objective certainty of the success of the +wit-work; secondly, it serves to enhance my +own pleasure through the reaction of the hearer +upon myself; thirdly, in the case of repeating +a not original joke, it serves to remedy the loss +of pleasure due to the lack of novelty.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Economy and Full Expenditure</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>At the end of these discussions about the +psychic processes of wit, in so far as they are +enacted between two persons, we can glance +back to the factor of economy which impressed +us as an important item in the psychological +conception of wit since we offered the first explanation +of wit-technique. Long ago we dismissed +the nearest but also the simplest conception +of this economy, where it was a matter +<span class='pageno' id='Page_243'>243</span>of avoiding psychic expenditure in general by +a maximum restriction in the use of words and +by the production of associations of ideas. We +had then already asserted that brevity and +laconisms are not witty in themselves. The +brevity of wit is a peculiar one; it has to be +a “witty” brevity. The original pleasure +gain produced by playing with words and +thoughts resulted, to be sure, from simple +economy in expenditure, but with the development +of play into wit the tendency to economize +also had to shift its goals, for whatever +might be saved by the use of the same words +or by avoiding new thought connections would +surely be of no account when compared to the +colossal expenditure of our mental activity. +We may be permitted to make a comparison +between the psychic economy and a business +enterprise. So long as the latter’s transactions +are very small, good policy demands that expenses +be kept low and that the costs of operation +be minimized as much as possible. +The economy still follows the absolute height +of the expenditure. Later on when the volume +of business has increased, the importance +of the business expenses dwindles; increases in +the expenditure totals matter little so long as +the transactions and returns can be sufficiently +increased. Keeping down running expenses +<span class='pageno' id='Page_244'>244</span>would be parsimonious; in fact, it would mean +a direct loss. Nevertheless it would be equally +false to assume that with a very great expenditure +there would be no more room for saving. +The manager inclined to economize would now +make an effort to save on particular things and +would feel satisfied if the same establishment, +with its costly upkeep, could reduce its expenses +at all, no matter how small the saving +would seem in comparison to the entire expenditure. +In quite an analogous manner the +detailed economy in our complicated psychic +affairs remains a source of pleasure, as may be +shown by everyday occurrences. Whoever +used to have a gas lamp in his room, but now +uses electric light, will experience for a long +time a definite feeling of pleasure when he +presses the electric light button; this pleasure +continues as long as at that moment he remembers +the complicated arrangements necessary +to light the gas lamp. Similarly the economy +of expenditure in psychic inhibition brought +about by wit—small though it may be in comparison +to the sum total of psychic expenditure—will +remain a source of pleasure for us, +because we thereby save a particular expenditure +which we were wont to make and which +as before we were ready to make. That the +expenditure is expected and prepared for is a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_245'>245</span>factor which stands unmistakably in the foreground.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A localized economy, as the one just considered, +will not fail to give us momentary pleasure, +but it will not bring about a lasting alleviation +so long as what has been saved here +can be utilized in another place. Only when +this disposal into a different path can be +avoided, will the special economy be transformed +into a general alleviation of the psychic +expenditures. Thus, with clearer insight into +the psychic processes of wit, we see that the factor +of alleviation takes the place of economy. +Obviously the former gives us the greater feeling +of pleasure. The process in the first person +of the witticism produces pleasure by removing +inhibitions and by diminishing local expenditure; +it does not, however, seem to come +to rest until it succeeds through the intervention +of the third person in attaining general +relief through discharge.</p> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_247'>247</span> + <h2 class='c005'>C. THEORETICAL PART</h2> +</div> +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_249'>249</span> + <h3 class='c001'>VI.<br> <span class='c015'>THE RELATION OF WIT TO DREAMS AND TO THE UNCONSCIOUS</span></h3> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>At the end of the chapter which dealt with +the elucidation of the technique of wit (p. 125) +we asserted that the processes of condensation +with and without substitutive formation, displacement, +representation through absurdity, +representation through the opposite, indirect +representation, etc., all of which we found participated +in the formation of wit, evinced a +far-reaching agreement with the processes of +“dream-work.” We promised, at that time, +first to examine more carefully these similarities, +and secondly, so far as such indications +point to search for what is common to both wit +and dreams. The discussion of this comparison +would be much easier for us if we could +assume that one of the subjects to be compared—the +“dream-work”—were well known. +But we shall probably do better not to take +this assumption for granted. I received the +impression that my book <cite>The Interpretation +of Dreams</cite> created more “confusion” than +“enlightenment” among my colleagues, and I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_250'>250</span>know that the wider reading circles have contented +themselves to reduce the contents of +the book to a catchword, “Wish fulfillment”—a +term easily remembered and easily abused.</p> + +<p class='c008'>However, in my continued occupation with +the problems considered therein, for the study +of which my practice as a psychotherapeutist +affords me much opportunity, I found nothing +that would impel me to change or improve on +my ideas; I can therefore peacefully wait until +the reader’s comprehension has risen to my +level, or until an intelligent critic has pointed +out to me the basic faults in my conception. +For the purposes of comparison with wit, I +shall briefly review the most important features +of dreams and dream-work.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We know dreams by the recollection which +usually seems fragmentary and which occurs +upon awakening. It is then a structure made +up mostly of visual or other sensory impressions, +which represents to us a deceptive picture +of an experience, and may be mingled +with mental processes (the “knowledge” in +the dream) and emotional manifestations. +What we thus remember as a dream I call +“the manifest dream-content.” The latter is +often altogether absurd and confused, at other +times it is merely one part or another that is +so affected. But even if it be entirely coherent, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_251'>251</span>as in the case of some anxiety dreams, it stands +out in our psychic life as something strange, +for the origin of which one cannot account. +Until recently the explanation for these peculiarities +of the dream has been sought in the +dream itself in that it was considered roughly +speaking an indication of a muddled, dissociated, +and “sleepy” activity of the nervous elements.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As opposed to this view I have shown that +the excessively peculiar “manifest” dream-content +can regularly be made comprehensible, +and that it is a disfigured and changed +transcription of certain correct psychic formations +which deserve the name of “latent dream-thoughts.” +One gains an understanding of +the latter by resolving the manifest dream-content +into its component parts without regard +for its apparent meaning, and then by following +up the threads of associations which emanate +from each one of the now isolated elements. +These become interwoven and in the +end lead to a structure of thoughts, which is +not only entirely accurate, but also fits easily +into the familiar associations of our psychic +processes. During this “analysis” the dream-content +loses all of the peculiarities so strange +to us; but if the analysis is to be successful, +we must firmly cast aside the critical objections +<span class='pageno' id='Page_252'>252</span>which incessantly arise against the reproduction +of the individual associations.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Dream-work</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>From the comparison of the remembered +manifest dream-content with the latent dream-thoughts +thus discovered there arises the conception +of “dream-work.” The entire sum of +the transforming processes which have changed +the latent dream-thought into the manifest +dream is called the dream-work. The astonishment +which formerly the dream evoked in +us is now perceived to be due to the dream-work.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The function of the dream-work may be +described in the following manner. A structure +of thoughts, mostly very complicated, +which has been built up during the day and +not brought to settlement—a day remnant—clings +firmly even during night to the energy +which it had assumed—the underlying center +of interest—and thus threatens to disturb sleep. +This day remnant is transformed into a dream +by the dream-work and in this way rendered +harmless to sleep. But in order to make possible +its employment by the dream-work, this +day remnant must be capable of being cast +into the form of a wish, a condition that is not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_253'>253</span>difficult to fulfill. The wish emanating from +the dream-thoughts forms the first step and +later on the nucleus of the dream. Experience +gained from analyses—not the theory of the +dream—teaches us that with children a fond +wish left from the waking state suffices to +evoke a dream, which is coherent and senseful, +but almost always short, and easily recognizable +as a “wish fulfillment.” In the case of +adults the universally valid condition for the +dream-creating wish seems to be that the latter +should appear foreign to conscious thinking, +that is, it should be a repressed wish, or that +it should supply consciousness with reinforcement +from unknown sources. Without the assumption +of the unconscious activity in the +sense used above, I should be at a loss to develop +further the theory of dreams and to explain +the material gleaned from experience in +dream-analyses. The action of this unconscious +wish upon the logical conscious material of +dream-thoughts now results in the dream. The +latter is thereby drawn down into the unconscious, +as it were, or to speak more precisely, +it is exposed to a treatment which usually +takes place at the level of unconscious mental +activity, and which is characteristic of this +mental level. Only from the results of the +“dream-work” have we thus far learned to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_254'>254</span>know the qualities of this unconscious mental +activity and its differentiation from the “foreconscious” +which is capable of consciousness.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Unconscious</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>A novel and difficult theory that runs +counter to our habitual modes of thinking can +hardly gain in lucidity by a condensed exposition. +I can therefore accomplish little more +in this discussion than refer the reader to the +detailed treatment of the unconscious in my +<cite>Interpretation of Dreams</cite>, and also to Lipps’s +work, which I consider most important. I +am aware that he who is under the spell of +a good old philosophical training, or stands +aloof from a so-called philosophical system, +will oppose the assumption of the “unconscious +psychic processes” in Lipps’s sense and in mine +and will desire to prove the impossibility of it +preferably by means of definitions of the term +psychic. But definitions are conventional and +changeable. I have often found that persons +who dispute the unconscious on the grounds of +its absurdity or impossibility have not received +their impressions from those sources from +which I, at least, have found it necessary to +draw, in order to become aware of its existence. +These opponents had never witnessed the effect +<span class='pageno' id='Page_255'>255</span>of a posthypnotic suggestion, and they +were immensely surprised at the evidence I +imparted to them gleaned from my analysis of +unhypnotized neurotics. They had never +gained the conception of the unconscious as +something which one does not really know, +while cogent proofs force one to supplement +this idea by saying that one understands by +the unconscious something capable of consciousness, +something concerning which one has +not thought and which is not in the field of +vision of consciousness. Nor had they attempted +to convince themselves of the existence +of such unconscious thoughts in their own +psychic life by means of an analysis of one +of their own dreams, and when I attempted +this with them, they could perceive their +own mental occurrences only with astonishment +and confusion. I have also gotten +the impression that these are essentially affective +resistances which stand in the way of +the acceptation of the “unconscious,” and that +they are based on the fact that no one is desirous +of becoming acquainted with his unconscious, +and it is most convenient to deny altogether +its possibility.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_256'>256</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Condensation and Displacement in the Dream-work</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>The dream-work, to which I return after +this digression, subjects the thought material +uttered in the optative mood to a very peculiar +elaboration. First of all it proceeds from the +optative to the indicative mood; it substitutes +“it is” for “would it were!” This “it +is” is destined to become part of an hallucinatory +representation which I have called the +“regression” of the dream-work. This regression +represents the path from the mental +images to the sensory perceptions of the same, +or if one chooses to speak with reference to +the still unfamiliar—not to be understood +anatomically—topic of the psychic apparatus, +it is the region of the thought-formation to the +region of the sensory perception. Along this +road which runs in an opposite direction to the +course of development of psychic complications +the dream-thoughts gain in clearness; a plastic +situation finally results as a nucleus of the +manifest “dream picture.” In order to arrive +at such a sensory representation the dream-thoughts +have had to experience tangible +changes in their expression. But while the +thoughts are changed back into mental images +they are subjected to still greater changes, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_257'>257</span>some of which are easily conceivable as necessary, +while others are surprising. As a necessary +secondary result of the regression one +understands that nearly all relationships within +the thoughts which have organized the same +are lost to the manifest dream. The dream-work +takes over, as it were, only the raw material +of the ideas for representation, and not +the thought-relations which held each other in +check; or at least it reserves the freedom of +leaving the latter out of the question. On the +other hand, there is a certain part of the dream-work +which cannot be traced to the regression +or to the recasting into mental images; it is +just that part which is significant to us for the +analogy to wit-formation. The material of the +dream-thoughts experiences an extraordinary +compression or <em>condensation</em> during the dream-work. +The starting-points of this condensation +are those points which are common to two +or more dream-thoughts because they naturally +pertain to both or because they are inevitable +consequences of the contents of two or more +dream-thoughts, and since these points do not +regularly suffice for a prolific condensation +new artificial and fleeting common points come +into existence, and for this purpose preferably +words are used which combine different meanings +in their sounds. The newly framed common +<span class='pageno' id='Page_258'>258</span>points of condensation enter as representatives +of the dream-thoughts into the manifest +dream-content, so that an element of the dream +corresponds to a point of junction or intersection +of the dream-thoughts, and with regard +to the latter it must in general be called “overdetermined.” +The process of condensation is +that part of the dream-work which is most +easily recognizable; it suffices to compare the +recorded wording of a dream with the written +dream-thoughts gained by means of analysis, +in order to get a good impression of the productiveness +of dream condensation.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is not easy to convince one’s self of the +second great change that takes place in the +dream-thoughts through the agency of the +dream-work. I refer to that process which I +have called the dream <em>displacement</em>. It manifests +itself by the fact that what occupies the +center of the manifest dream and is endowed +with vivid sensory intensity has occupied a +peripheral and secondary position in the dream-thoughts, +and <em>vice versa</em>. This process causes +the dream to appear out of proportion when +compared with the dream-thoughts, and it is +because of this displacement that it seems +strange and incomprehensible to the waking +state. In order that such a displacement +should occur it must be possible for the occupation +<span class='pageno' id='Page_259'>259</span>energy to pass uninhibited from important +to insignificant ideas,—a process which +in normal conscious thinking can only give the +impression of “faulty thinking.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Transformation into expressive activity, condensation, +and displacement are the three +great functions which we can ascribe to the +dream-work. A fourth, to which too little attention +was given in <cite>The Interpretation of +Dreams</cite>, does not come into consideration here +for our purpose. In a consistent elucidation +of the ideas dealing with the “topic of the +psychic apparatus” and “regression,” which +alone can lend value to these working hypotheses, +an effort would have to be made to +determine at what stages of regression the various +transformations of the dream-thoughts occur. +As yet no serious effort has been made +in this direction, but at least we can speak +definitely about displacement when we say that +it must arise in the thought material while the +latter is in the level of the unconscious processes. +One will probably have to think of +condensation as a process that extends over the +entire course up to the outposts of the perceptive +region; but in general it suffices to assume +that there is a simultaneous activity of all the +forces which participate in the formation of +dreams. In view of the reserve which one must +<span class='pageno' id='Page_260'>260</span>naturally exercise in the treatment of such +problems, and in consideration of the inability +to discuss here the main objections to these +problems, I should like to trust somewhat to +the assertion that the process of the dream-work +which prepares the dream is situated in +the region of the unconscious. Roughly speaking, +one can distinguish three general stages +in the formation of the dream; first, the transference +of the conscious day remnants into the +unconscious, a transference in which the conditions +of the sleeping state must co-operate; +secondly, the actual dream-work in the +unconscious; and thirdly, the regression of +the elaborated dream material to the region +of perception, whereby the dream becomes +conscious.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The forces participating in the dream-formation +may be recognized as the following: the +wish to sleep; the sum of occupation energy +which still clings to the day remnants after the +depression brought about by the state of sleep; +the psychic energy of the unconscious wish +forming the dream; and the opposing force of +the “<em>censor</em>,” which exercises its authority in +our waking state, and is not entirely abolished +during sleep. The task of dream-formation is, +above all, to overcome the inhibition of the +censor, and it is just this task that is fulfilled +<span class='pageno' id='Page_261'>261</span>by the displacement of the psychic energy +within the material of the dream-thoughts.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Formula for Wit-work</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Now we recall what caused us to think of +the dream while investigating wit. We found +that the character and activity of wit were +bound up in certain forms of expression and +technical means, among which the various +forms of condensation, displacement, and indirect +representation were the most conspicuous. +But the processes which led to the same results—condensation, +displacement, and indirect expression—we +learned to know as peculiarities +of dream-work. Does not this analogy almost +force us to the conclusion that wit-work and +dream-work must be identical at least in one +essential point? I believe that the dream-work +lies revealed before us in its most important +characters, but in wit we find obscured just +that portion of the psychic processes which we +may compare with the dream-work, namely, +the process of wit-formation in the first person. +Shall we not yield to the temptation to +construct this process according to the analogy +of dream-formation? Some of the characteristics +of dreams are so foreign to wit that that +part of the dream-work corresponding to them +<span class='pageno' id='Page_262'>262</span>cannot be carried over to the wit-formation. The +regression of the stream of thought to perception +certainly falls away as far as wit is concerned. +However, the other two stages of +dream-formation, the sinking of a foreconscious<a id='r57'></a><a href='#f57' class='c007'><sup>[57]</sup></a> +thought into the unconscious, and the +unconscious elaboration, would give us exactly +the result which we might observe in wit if we +assumed this process in wit-formation. Let us +decide to assume that this is the proceeding of +wit-formation in the case of the first person. +<em>A foreconscious thought is left for a moment +to unconscious elaboration and the results are +forthwith grasped by the conscious perception.</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>Before, however, we attempt to prove the +details of this assertion we wish to consider an +objection which may jeopardize our assumption. +We start with the fact that the techniques of +wit point to the same processes which become +known to us as peculiarities of dream-work. +Now it is an easy matter to say in opposition +that we would not have described the techniques +of wit as condensation, displacement, +etc., nor would we have arrived at such a comprehensive +agreement in the means of representation +of wit and dreams, if our previous +knowledge of dream-work had not influenced +our conception of the technique of wit; so that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_263'>263</span>at the bottom we find that wit confirms only +those tentative theories which we brought to it +from our study of dreams. Such a genesis of +agreement would be no certain guarantee of its +stability beyond our preconceived judgment. +No other author has thought of considering +condensation, displacement, and indirect expression +as active factors of wit. This might +be a possible objection, but nevertheless it +would not be justified. It might just as well +be said that in order to recognize the real +agreement between dreams and wit our ordinary +knowledge must be augmented by a +specialized knowledge of dream-work. However, +the decision will really depend only upon +the question whether the examining critic can +prove that such a conception of the technique +of wit in the individual examples is forced, and +that other nearer and farther-reaching interpretations +have been suppressed in favor of +mine; or whether the critic will have to admit +that the tentative theories derived from the +study of dreams can be really confirmed +through wit. My opinion is that we have +nothing to fear from such a critic and that +our processes of reduction have confidently +pointed out in which forms of expression +we must search for the techniques of wit. +That we designated these techniques by names +<span class='pageno' id='Page_264'>264</span>which previously anticipated the result of the +agreement between the technique of wit and +the dream-work was our just prerogative, and +really nothing more than an easily justified +simplification.</p> + +<p class='c008'>There is still another objection which would +not be vital, but which could not be so completely +refuted. One might think that the +techniques of wit that fit in so well considering +the ends we have in view deserve recognition, +but that they do not represent all possible +techniques of wit or even all those in use. +Also that we have selected only the techniques +of wit which were influenced by and would suit +the pattern of the dream-work, whereas others +ignored by us would have demonstrated that +such an agreement was not common to all +cases. I really do not trust myself to make the +assertion that I have succeeded in explaining +all the current witticisms with reference to +their techniques, and I therefore admit the +possibility that my enumeration of wit-techniques +may show many gaps. But I have not +purposely excluded from my discussion any +form of technique that was clear to me, and I +can affirm that the most frequent, the most essential, +and the most characteristic technical +means of wit have not eluded my attention.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_265'>265</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Wit as an Inspiration</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>Wit possesses still another character which +entirely corresponds to our conception of the +wit-work as originally discovered in our study +of dreams. It is true that it is common to hear +one say “I <em>made</em> a joke,” but one feels that +one behaves differently during this process +than when one pronounces a judgment or offers +an objection. Wit shows in a most pronounced +manner the character of an involuntary +“inspiration” or a sudden flash of +thought. A moment before one cannot tell +what kind of joke one is going to make, though +it lacks only the words to clothe it. One +usually experiences something indefinable +which I should like most to compare to an +absence, or sudden drop of intellectual tension; +then all of a sudden the witticism appears, +usually simultaneously with its verbal investment. +Some of the means of wit are also +utilized in the expression of thought along +other lines, as in the cases of comparison and +allusion. I can purposely will to make an allusion. +In doing this I have first in mind (in +the inner hearing) the direct expression of my +thought, but as I am inhibited from expressing +the same through some objection from the situation +in question, I almost resolve to substitute +<span class='pageno' id='Page_266'>266</span>the direct expression by a form of indirect +expression, and then I utter it in the form +of an allusion. But the allusion that comes +into existence in this manner having been +formed under my continuous control is never +witty, no matter how useful it may be. On +the other hand, the witty allusion appears +without my having been able to follow +up these preparatory stages in my mind. +I do not wish to attribute too much value to +this procedure, it is scarcely decisive, but it +does agree well with our assumption that in +wit-formation a stream of thought is dropped +for a moment and suddenly emerges from the +unconscious as a witticism.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Witticisms also evince a peculiar behavior +along the lines of association of ideas. Frequently +they are not at the disposal of our +memory when we look for them; on the other +hand, they often appear unsolicited and at +places in our train of thought where we cannot +understand their presence. Again, these are +only minor qualities, but none the less they +point to their unconscious origin.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Let us now collect the properties of wit +whose formation can be referred to the unconscious. +Above all there is the peculiar brevity +of wit which, though not an indispensable, is a +marked and distinctive characteristic feature. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_267'>267</span>When we first encountered it we were inclined +to see in it an expression of a tendency to +economize, but owing to very evident objections +we ourselves depreciated the value of this +conception. At present we look upon it more +as a sign of the unconscious elaboration which +the thought of wit has undergone. The +process of condensation which corresponds to +it in dreams we can correlate with no other +factor than with the localization in the unconscious, +and we must assume that the conditions +for such condensations which are lacking in the +foreconscious are present in the unconscious +mental process.<a id='r58'></a><a href='#f58' class='c007'><sup>[58]</sup></a> It is to be expected that in +the process of condensation some of the elements +subjected to it become lost, while others +which take over their occupation energy are +strengthened by the condensation or are built +up too energetically. The brevity of wit, like +the brevity of dreams, would thus be a necessary +concomitant manifestation of the condensation +which occurs in both cases; both +times it is a result of the condensation process. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_268'>268</span>The brevity of wit is indebted also to this +origin for its peculiar character which though +not further assignable produces a striking impression.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Unconscious and the Infantile</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>We have defined above the one result +of condensation—the manifold application +of the same material, play upon words, and +similarity of sound—as a localized economy, +and have also referred the pleasure produced +by harmless wit to that economy. At a later +place we have found that the original purpose +of wit consisted in producing this kind of pleasure +from words, a process which was permitted +to the individual during the stage of playing, +but which became banked in during the course +of intellectual development or by rational criticism. +Now we have decided upon the assumption +that such condensations as serve the technique +of wit originate automatically and without +any particular purpose during the process +of thinking in the unconscious. Have we not +here two different conceptions of the same fact +which seem to be incompatible with each other? +I do not think so. To be sure, there are two +different conceptions, and they demand to be +brought in unison, but they do not contradict +<span class='pageno' id='Page_269'>269</span>each other. They are merely somewhat +strange to each other, and as soon as we have +established a relationship between them we +shall probably gain in knowledge. That such +condensations are sources of pleasure is in perfect +accord with the supposition that they +easily find in the unconscious the conditions +necessary for their origin; on the other hand, +we see the motivation for the sinking into the +unconscious in the circumstance that the pleasure-bringing +condensation necessary to wit +easily results there. Two other factors also, +which upon first examination seem entirely +foreign to each other and which are brought +together quite accidentally, will be recognized +on deeper investigation as intimately +connected, and perhaps may be found to +be substantially the same. I am referring +to the two assertions that on the one hand +wit could form such pleasure-bringing condensations +during its development in the stage +of playing, that is, during the infancy of reason; +and, on the other hand, that it accomplishes +the same function on higher levels by +submerging the thought into the unconscious. +For the infantile is the source of the unconscious. +The unconscious mental processes are +no others than those which are solely produced +during infancy. The thought which sinks into +<span class='pageno' id='Page_270'>270</span>the unconscious for the purpose of wit-formation +only revisits there the old homestead of +the former playing with words. The thought +is put back for a moment into the infantile +state in order to regain in this way childish +pleasure-sources. If, indeed, one were not already +acquainted with it from the investigation +of the psychology of the neuroses, wit would +surely impress one with the idea that the peculiar +unconscious elaboration is nothing else +but the infantile type of the mental process. +Only it is by no means an easy matter to +grasp, in the unconscious of the adult, this peculiar +infantile manner of thinking, because it +is usually corrected, so to say, <i><span lang="la">statu nascendi</span></i>. +However, it is successfully grasped in a series +of cases, and then we always laugh about the +“childish stupidity.” In fact every exposure +of such an unconscious fact affects us in a +“comical” manner.<a id='r59'></a><a href='#f59' class='c007'><sup>[59]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>It is easier to comprehend the character of +these unconscious mental processes in the utterances +of patients suffering from various psychic +<span class='pageno' id='Page_271'>271</span>disturbances. It is very probable that, +following the assumption of old Griesinger, +we would be in a position to understand the +deliria of the insane and to turn them to good +account as valuable information, if we would +not make the demands of conscious thinking +upon them, but instead treat them as we do +dreams by means of our art of interpretation.<a id='r60'></a><a href='#f60' class='c007'><sup>[60]</sup></a> +In the dream, too, we were able to show the +“return of psychic life to the embryonal state.”<a id='r61'></a><a href='#f61' class='c007'><sup>[61]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>In discussing the processes of condensation +we have entered so deeply into the signification +of the analogy between wit and dreams that we +can here be brief. As we know that displacements +in dream-work point to the influence of +the censor of conscious thought, we will consequently +be inclined to assume that an inhibiting +force also plays a part in the formation of +wit when we find the process of displacement +among the techniques of wit. We also know +that this is commonly the case; the endeavor of +wit to revive the old pleasure in nonsense or +the old pleasure in word-play meets with resistance +in every normal state, a resistance +which is exerted by the protest of critical reason, +and which must be overcome in each individual +<span class='pageno' id='Page_272'>272</span>case. But a radical distinction between +wit and dreams is shown in the manner +in which the wit-work solves this difficulty. In +the dream-work the solution of this task is +brought about regularly through displacements +and through the choice of ideas which are remote +enough from the objectionable ones to +secure passage through the censor; the latter +themselves are but offsprings of those whose +psychic energy they have taken upon themselves +through full transference. The displacements +are therefore not lacking in any +dream and are far more comprehensive; they not +only comprise the deviations from the trend of +thought but also all forms of indirect expression, +the substitution for an important but offensive +element of one seemingly indifferent and harmless +to the censor which form very remote allusions +to the first, they include substitution also +occurring through symbols, comparisons, or +trifles. It is not to be denied that parts of this +indirect representation really originate in the +foreconscious thoughts of the dream,—as, for +example, symbolical representation and representation +through comparisons—because otherwise +the thought would not have reached the state +of the foreconscious expression. Such indirect +expressions and allusions, whose reference +to the original thought is easily findable, are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_273'>273</span>really permissible and customary means of expression +even in our conscious thought. The +dream-work, however, exaggerates the application +of these means of indirect expression to an +unlimited degree. Under the pressure of the +censor any kind of association becomes good +enough for substitution by allusion; the displacement +from one element to any other is +permitted. The substitution of the inner associations +(similarity, causal connection, etc.) +by the so-called outer associations (simultaneity, +contiguity in space, assonance) is particularly +conspicuous and characteristic of the +dream-work.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Difference between Dream-technique and Wit-technique</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>All these means of displacement also occur +as techniques of wit, but when they do occur +they usually restrict themselves to those limits +prescribed for their use in conscious thought; +in fact they may be lacking, even though wit +must regularly solve a task of inhibition. One +can comprehend this retirement of the process +of displacement in wit-work when one remembers +that wit usually has another technique at +its disposal through which it defends itself +against inhibitions. Indeed, we have discovered +<span class='pageno' id='Page_274'>274</span>nothing more characteristic of it than just +this technique. For wit does not have recourse +to compromises as does the dream, nor does it +evade the inhibition; it insists upon retaining +the play with words or nonsense unaltered, but +thanks to the ambiguity of words and multiplicity +of thought-relations, it restricts itself to +the choice of cases in which this play or nonsense +may appear at the same time admissible +(jest) or senseful (wit). Nothing distinguishes +wit from all other psychic formations +better than this double-sidedness and this double-dealing; +by emphasizing the “sense in nonsense,” +the authors have approached nearest +the understanding of wit, at least from this angle.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Considering the unexceptional predominance +of this peculiar technique in overcoming inhibitions +in wit, one might find it superfluous that +wit should make use of the displacement-technique +even in a single case. But on the one +hand certain kinds of this technique remain +useful for wit as objects and sources of pleasure—as, +for example, the real displacement +(deviation of the trend of thought) which in +fact shares in the nature of nonsense,—and on +the other hand one must not forget that the +highest stage of wit, tendency-wit, must frequently +overcome two kinds of inhibitions which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_275'>275</span>oppose both itself and its tendency (p. 147), +and that allusion and displacements are qualified +to facilitate this latter task.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The numerous and unrestricted application +of indirect representation, of displacements, +and especially of allusions in the dream-work, +has a result which I mention not because of +its own significance but because it became for +me the subjective inducement to occupy myself +with the problem of wit. If a dream +analysis is imparted to one unfamiliar with the +subject and unaccustomed to it, and the peculiar +ways of allusions and displacements +(objectionable to the waking thoughts but +utilized by the dream-work) are explained, the +hearer experiences an uncomfortable impression; +he declares these interpretations to be +“witty,” but it seems obvious to him that these +are not successful jokes but forced ones which +run contrary to the rules of wit. This impression +can be easily explained; it is due to the +fact that the dream-work operates with the +same means as wit, but in the application of +the same the dream exceeds the bounds which +wit restricts. We shall soon learn that in consequence +of the rôle of the third person wit +is bound by a certain condition which does not +affect the dream.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_276'>276</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Irony—Negativism</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>Among those techniques which are common +to both wit and dreams representation through +the opposite and the application of absurdity +are especially interesting. The first belongs +to the strongly effective means of wit as shown +in the examples of “outdoing wit” (p. <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>). +The representation through the opposite, unlike +most of the wit-techniques, is unable to +withdraw itself from conscious attention. He +who intentionally tries to make use of wit-work, +as in the case of the “habitual wit,” soon +discovers that the easiest way to answer an assertion +with a witticism is to concentrate one’s +mind on the opposite of this assertion and +trust to the chance flash of thought to brush +aside the feared objection to this opposite by +means of a different interpretation. Maybe +the representation through its opposite is indebted +for such a preference to the fact that +it forms the nucleus of another pleasurable +mode of mental expression, for an understanding +of which we do not have to consult the unconscious. +I refer to <em>irony</em>, which is very similar +to wit and is considered a subspecies of +the comic. The essence of irony consists in imparting +the very opposite of what one intended +to express, but it precludes the anticipated +<span class='pageno' id='Page_277'>277</span>contradiction by indicating through the inflections, +concomitant gestures, and through slight +changes in style—if it is done in writing—that +the speaker himself means to convey the opposite +of what he says. Irony is applicable +only in cases where the other person is prepared +to hear the reverse of the statement +actually made, so that he cannot fail to be inclined +to contradict. As a consequence of this +condition ironic expressions are particularly +subject to the danger of being misunderstood. +To the person who uses it, it gives the advantage +of readily avoiding the difficulties to which +direct expressions, as, for example, invectives, +are subject. In the hearer it produces comic +pleasure, probably by causing him to make +preparations for contradiction, which are immediately +found to be unnecessary. Such a +comparison of wit with a form of the comical +that is closely allied to it might strengthen us +in the assumption that the relation of wit to +the unconscious is the peculiarity that also distinguishes +it from the comical.<a id='r62'></a><a href='#f62' class='c007'><sup>[62]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>In dream-work, representation through the +opposite has a far more important part to play +than in wit. The dream not only delights in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_278'>278</span>representing a pair of opposites by means of +one and the same composite image, but in addition +it often changes an element from the +dream-thoughts into its opposite, thus causing +considerable difficulty in the work of interpretation. +In the case of any element capable of +having an opposite it is impossible to tell +whether it is to be taken negatively or positively +in the dream-thoughts.<a id='r63'></a><a href='#f63' class='c007'><sup>[63]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>I must emphasize that as yet this fact has +by no means been understood. Nevertheless, +it seems to give indications of an important +characteristic of unconscious thinking which in +all probability results in a process comparable +to “judging.” Instead of setting aside judgments +the unconscious forms “repressions.” +The repression may correctly be described as +a stage intermediate between the defense reflex +and condemnation.<a id='r64'></a><a href='#f64' class='c007'><sup>[64]</sup></a></p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_279'>279</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>The Unconscious as the Psychic Stage of the Wit-work</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>Nonsense, or absurdity, which occurs so +often in dreams and which has made them the +object of so much contempt, has never really +come into being as the result of an accidental +shuffling of conceptual elements, but may in +every case be proven to have been purposely +admitted by the dream-work. Nonsense and +absurdity are intended to express embittered +criticism and scornful contradiction within the +dream-thoughts. Absurdity in the dream-content +thus stands for the judgment: “It’s pure +nonsense,” expressed in dream-thoughts. In +my work on the Interpretation of Dreams, +I have placed great emphasis on the demonstration +of this fact because I thought that I +could in this manner most strikingly controvert +the error expressed by many that the +dream is no psychic phenomenon at all—an +error which bars the way to an understanding +of the unconscious. Now we have learnt (in +the analysis of certain tendency-witticisms on +p. 73) that nonsense in wit is made to serve +the same purposes of expression. We also +know that a nonsensical façade of a witticism +is peculiarly adapted to enhance the psychic +expenditure in the hearer and hence also to increase +<span class='pageno' id='Page_280'>280</span>the amount to be discharged through +laughter. Moreover, we must not forget that +nonsense in wit is an end in itself, since the +purpose of reviving the old pleasure in nonsense +is one of the motives of the wit-work. +There are other ways to regain the feeling of +nonsense in order to derive pleasure from it; +caricature, exaggeration, parody, and travesty +utilize the same and thus produce “comical +nonsense.” If we subject these modes of expression +to an analysis similar to the one used +in studying wit, we shall find that there is no +occasion in any of them for resorting to unconscious +processes in our sense for the purpose +of getting explanations. We are now +also in a position to understand why the +“witty” character may be added as an embellishment +to caricature, exaggeration, and +parody; it is the manifold character of the performance +upon the “psychic stage”<a id='r65'></a><a href='#f65' class='c007'><sup>[65]</sup></a> that +makes this possible.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I am of the opinion that by transferring the +wit-work into the system of the unconscious we +have made a distinct gain, since it makes it possible +for us to understand the fact that the +various techniques to which wit admittedly adheres +are on the other hand not its exclusive +<span class='pageno' id='Page_281'>281</span>property. Many doubts, which have arisen in +the beginning of our investigation of these +techniques and which we were forced temporarily +to leave, can now be conveniently cleared +up. Hence we shall give due consideration to +the doubt which expresses itself by asserting +that the undeniable relation of wit to the unconscious +is correct only for certain categories +of tendency-wit, while we are ready to claim +this relation for all forms and all the stages of +development of wit. We may not shirk the duty +of testing this objection.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We may assume that we deal with a sure +case of wit-formation in the unconscious when +it concerns witticisms that serve unconscious +tendencies, or those strengthened by unconscious +tendencies, as, for example, most “cynical” +witticisms. For in such cases the unconscious +tendency draws the foreconscious +thought down into the unconscious in order to +remodel it there; a process to which the study +of the psychology of the neuroses has added +many analogies with which we are acquainted. +But in the case of tendency-wit of other varieties, +namely, harmless wit and the jest, this +power seems to fall away, and the relation of +the wit to the unconscious is an open question.</p> + +<p class='c008'>But now let us consider the case of the witty +expression of a thought that is not without +<span class='pageno' id='Page_282'>282</span>value in itself and that comes to the surface in +the course of the association of mental +processes. In order that this thought may become +a witticism, it is of course necessary that +it make a choice among the possible forms of +expression in order to find the exact form that +will bring along the gain in word-pleasure. +We know from self-observation that this choice +is not made by conscious attention; but the +selection will certainly be better if the occupation +energy of the foreconscious thought is +lowered to the unconscious. For in the unconscious, +as we have learnt from the dream-work, +the paths of association emanating from a +word are treated on a par with associations +from objects. The occupation energy from +the unconscious presents by far the more favorable +conditions for the selection of the expression. +Moreover, we may assume without +going farther that the possible expression +which contains the gain in word-pleasure exerts +a lowering effect on the still fluctuating self-command +of the foreconscious, similar to that +exerted in the first case by the unconscious +tendency. As an explanation for the simpler +case of the jest we may imagine that an ever watchful +intention of attaining the gain in +word-pleasure seizes the opportunity offered +in the foreconscious of again drawing the investing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_283'>283</span>energy down into the unconscious, according +to the familiar scheme.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I earnestly wish that it were possible for me +on the one hand to present one decisive point +in my conception of wit more clearly, and on +the other hand to fortify it with compelling +arguments. But as a matter of fact it is not +a question here of two failures, but of one +and the same failure. I can give no clearer +exposition because I have no further testimony +on behalf of my conception. The latter has +developed as the result of my study of the +technique and of comparison with dream-work, +and indeed from this one side only. I now +find that the dream-work is altogether excellently +adapted to the peculiarities of wit. This +conception is now concluded; if the conclusion +leads us not to a familiar province, but rather +to one that is strange and novel to our modes +of thought, the conclusion is called a “hypothesis,” +and the relation of the hypothesis to +the material from which it is drawn is justly +not accepted as “proof.” The hypothesis is +admitted as “proved” only if it can be reached +by other ways and if it can be shown to be the +junction point for other associations. But +such proof, in view of the fact that our knowledge +of unconscious processes has hardly begun, +cannot be had. Realizing then that we are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_284'>284</span>on soil still virgin, we shall be content to project +from our viewpoint of observation one narrow +slender plank into the unexplored region.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We shall not build a great structure on such +a foundation as this. If we correlate the different +stages of wit to the mental dispositions +favorable to them we may say: The <em>jest</em> has +its origin in the happy mood; what seems to +be peculiar to it is an inclination to lower the +psychic static energies (<i><span lang="de">Besetzungen</span></i>). The +jest already makes use of all the characteristic +techniques of wit and satisfies the fundamental +conditions of the same through the choice of +such an assortment of words or mental associations +as will conform not only to the requirements +for the production of pleasure, but also +conform to the demands of the intelligent critic. +We shall conclude that the sinking of the mental +energy to the unconscious stage, a process +facilitated by the happy mood, has already +taken place in the case of the jest. The mood +does away with this requirement in the case of +<em>harmless</em> wit connected with the expression of +a valuable thought; here we must assume a +particular <em>personal adaptation</em> which finds it as +easy to come to expression as it is for the foreconscious +thought to sink for a moment into +the unconscious. An ever watchful tendency +to renew the original resultant pleasure of wit +<span class='pageno' id='Page_285'>285</span>exerts thereby a lowering effect upon the still +fluctuating foreconscious expression of the +thought. Most people are probably capable of +making jests when in a happy mood; aptitude +for joking independent of the mood is found +only in a few persons. Finally, the most powerful +incentive for wit-work is the presence of +strong tendencies which reach back into the unconscious +and which indicate a particular fitness +for witty productions; these tendencies +might explain to us why the subjective conditions +of wit are so frequently fulfilled in the +case of neurotic persons. Even the most inapt +person may become witty under the influence +of strong tendencies.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Differences Between Wit and Dreams</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>This last contribution, the explanation of +wit-work in the first person, though still hypothetical, +strictly speaking, ends our interest +in wit. There still remains a short comparison +of wit to the more familiar dream and we may +expect that, outside of the one agreement already +considered, two such diverse mental activities +should show nothing but differences. +The most important difference lies in their social +behavior. The dream is a perfectly asocial +psychic product. It has nothing to tell to anyone +<span class='pageno' id='Page_286'>286</span>else, having originated in an individual as +a compromise between conflicting psychic +forces it remains incomprehensible to the person +himself and has therefore altogether no +interest for anybody else. Not only does the +dream find it unnecessary to place any value +on intelligibleness, but it must even guard +against being understood, as it would then be +destroyed; it can only exist in disguised form. +For this reason the dream may make use +freely of the mechanism that controls unconscious +thought processes to the extent of producing +undecipherable disfigurements. Wit, on +the other hand, is the most social of all those +psychic functions whose aim is to gain pleasure. +It often requires three persons, and the +psychic process which it incites always requires +the participation of at least one other person. +It must therefore bind itself to the condition +of intelligibleness; it may employ disfigurement +made practicable in the unconscious +through condensation and displacement, to no +greater extent than can be deciphered by the +intelligence of the third person. As for the +rest, wit and dreams have developed in altogether +different spheres of the psychic life, and +are to be classed under widely separated categories +of the psychological system. No matter +how concealed the dream is still a wish, while +<span class='pageno' id='Page_287'>287</span>wit is a developed play. Despite its apparent +unreality the dream retains its relation to the +great interests of life; it seeks to supply what +is lacking through a regressive detour of hallucinations; +and it owes its existence solely to +the strong need for sleep during the night. +Wit, on the other hand, seeks to draw a small +amount of pleasure from the free and unencumbered +activities of our psychic apparatus, +and later to seize this pleasure as an incidental +gain. It thus <em>secondarily</em> reaches to important +functions relative to the outer world. The +dream serves preponderately to guard from +pain while wit serves to acquire pleasure; in +these two aims all our psychic activities meet.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_288'>288</span> + <h3 class='c001'>VII<br> <span class='c015'>WIT AND THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC</span></h3> +</div> + +<p class='c006'>We have approached the problems of the +comic in an unusual manner. It appeared to us +that wit, which is usually regarded as a subspecies +of the comic, offered enough peculiarities +to warrant our taking it directly under consideration, +and thus it came about that we avoided +discussing its relation to the more comprehensive +category of the comic as long as it was +possible to do so, yet we did not proceed without +picking up on the way some hints that +might be valuable for studying the comic. We +found it easy to ascertain that the comic differs +from wit in its social behavior. The comic can +be content with only two persons, one who +finds the comical, and one in whom it is found. +The third person to whom the comical may be +imparted reinforces the comic process, but adds +nothing new to it. In wit, however, this third +person is indispensable for the completion of +the pleasure-bearing process, while the second +person may be omitted, especially when it is +not a question of aggressive wit with a tendency. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_289'>289</span>Wit is made, while the comical is found; +it is found first of all in persons, and only +later by transference may be seen also in objects, +situations, and the like. We know, too, +in the case of wit that it is not strange persons, +but one’s own mental processes that contain +the sources for the production of pleasure. +In addition we have heard that wit occasionally +reopens inaccessible sources of the +comic, and that the comic often serves wit as +a façade to replace the fore-pleasure usually +produced by the well-known technique (p. +236). All of this does not really point to a +very simple relationship between wit and the +comic. On the other hand, the problems of the +comic have shown themselves to be so complicated, +and have until now so successfully defied +all attempts made by the philosophers to +solve them, that we have not been able to +justify the expectation of mastering it by a +sudden stroke, so to speak, even if we approach +it along the paths of wit. Incidentally we +came provided with an instrument for investigating +wit that had not yet been made use of +by others; namely, the knowledge of dream-work. +We have no similar advantage at our +disposal for comprehending the comic, and we +may therefore expect that we shall learn nothing +about the nature of the comic other than +<span class='pageno' id='Page_290'>290</span>that which we have already become aware of +in wit; in so far as wit belongs to the comic +and retains certain features of the same unchanged +or modified in its own nature.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Naïve</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The species of the comic that is most closely +allied to wit is the <em>naïve</em>. Like the comic the +naïve is found universally and is not made like +in the case of wit. The naïve cannot be made +at all, while in the case of the pure comic the +question of making or evoking the comical may +be taken into account. The naïve must result +without our intervention from the speech +and actions of other persons who take the place +of the <em>second</em> person in the comic or in wit. +The naïve originates when one puts himself +completely outside of inhibition, because it +does not exist for him; that is, if he seems to +overcome it without any effort. What conditions +the function of the naïve is the fact that +we are aware that the person does not possess +this inhibition, otherwise we should not call it +naïve but impudent, and instead of laughing +we should be indignant. The effect of the +naïve, which is irresistible, seems easy to understand. +An expenditure of that inhibition energy +which is commonly already formed in us +<span class='pageno' id='Page_291'>291</span>suddenly becomes inapplicable when we hear +the naïve and is discharged through laughter; +as the removal of the inhibition is direct, and +not the result of an incited operation, there is +no need for a suspension of attention. We behave +like the hearer in wit, to whom the economy +of inhibition is given without any effort +on his part.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In view of the understanding about the +genesis of inhibitions which we obtained while +tracing the development of play into wit, it +will not surprise us to learn that the naïve is +mostly found in children, although it may also +be observed in uneducated adults, whom we +look on as children as far as their intellectual +development is concerned. For the purposes +of comparison with wit, naïve speech is naturally +better adapted than naïve actions, for +speech and not actions are the usual forms of +expression employed by wit. It is significant, +however, that naïve speeches, such as those of +children, can without straining also be designated +as “naïve witticisms.” The points of +agreement as well as demonstration between +wit and naïveté will become clear to us upon +consideration of a few examples.<a id='r66'></a><a href='#f66' class='c007'><sup>[66]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A little girl of three years was accustomed +to hear from her German nurse the exclamatory +<span class='pageno' id='Page_292'>292</span>word “Gesundheit” (God bless you!; literally, +may you be healthy!) whenever she happened +to sneeze. While suffering from a severe +cold during which the profuse coughing +and sneezing caused her considerable pain, she +pointed to her chest and said to her father, +“Daddy, Gesundheit hurts.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'><em>Another little girl of four years heard her +parents refer to a Jewish acquaintance as a +Hebrew, and on later hearing the latter’s wife +referred to as Mrs. X, she corrected her +mother, saying, “No, that is not her name; if +her husband is a Hebrew she is a Shebrew.”</em></p> + +<p class='c008'>In the first example the wit is produced +through the use of a contiguous association in +the form of an abstract thought for the concrete +action. The child so often heard the +word “Gesundheit” associated with sneezing +that she took it for the act itself. While the +second example may be designated as word-wit +formed by the technique of sound similarity. +The child divided the word Hebrew into +He-brew and having been taught the genders +of the personal pronouns, she naturally +imagined that if the man is a He-brew his wife +must be a She-brew. Both examples could +have originated as real witticisms upon which +we would have unwillingly bestowed a little +mild laughter. But as examples of naïveté +<span class='pageno' id='Page_293'>293</span>they seem excellent and cause loud laughter. +But what is it here that produces the difference +between wit and naïveté? Apparently it is +neither the wording nor the technique, which is +the same for both wit and the naïve, but a factor +which at first sight seems remote from both. +It is simply a question whether we assume that +the speakers had the intention of making a witticism +or whether we assume that they—the +children—wished to draw an earnest conclusion, +a conclusion held in good faith though based +on uncorrected knowledge. Only the latter +case is one of naïveté. It is here that our attention +is first called to the mechanism in which +the second person places himself into the psychic +process of the person who produces the +wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The investigation of a third example will +confirm this opinion. A brother and a sister, +the former ten and the latter twelve years old, +produce a play of their own composition before +an audience of uncles and aunts. The scene +represents a hut on the seashore. In the first +act the two dramatist-actors, a poor fisherman +and his devoted wife, complain about the hard +times and the difficulty of getting a livelihood. +The man decides to sail over the wide ocean +in his boat in order to seek wealth elsewhere, +and after a touching farewell the curtain is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_294'>294</span>drawn. The second act takes place several +years later. The fisherman has come home +rich with a big bag of money and tells his wife, +whom he finds waiting in front of the hut, +what good luck he has had in the far countries. +His wife interrupts him proudly, saying: “Nor +have I been idle in the meanwhile,” and opens +the hut, on whose floor the fisherman sees +twelve large dolls representing children asleep. +At this point of the drama the performers +were interrupted by an outburst of laughter +on the part of the audience, a thing which they +could not understand. They stared dumfounded +at their dear relatives, who had thus +far behaved respectably and had listened attentively. +The explanation of this laughter +lies in the assumption on the part of the audience +that the young dramatists know nothing +as yet about the origin of children, and were +therefore in a position to believe that a wife +would actually boast of bearing offspring +during the prolonged absence of her husband, +and that the husband would rejoice with her +over it. But the results achieved by the dramatists +on the basis of this ignorance may be +designated as nonsense or absurdity.</p> + +<p class='c008'>These examples show that the naïve occupies +a position midway between wit and the +comic. As far as wording and contents are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_295'>295</span>concerned, the naïve speech is identical with +wit; it produces a misuse of words, a bit of +nonsense, or an obscenity. But the psychic +process of the first person or producer which, +in the case of wit, offered us so much that was +interesting and puzzling, is here entirely absent. +The naïve person imagines that he is +using his thoughts and expressions in a simple +and normal manner; he has no other purpose +in view, and receives no pleasure from his +naïve production. All the characteristics of +the naïve lie in the conception of the hearer, +who corresponds to the third person in the case +of wit. The producing person creates the +naïve without any effort. The complicated +technique, which in wit serves to paralyze the +inhibition produced by the critical reason, does +not exist here, because the person does not possess +this inhibition, and he can therefore readily +produce the senseless and the obscene without +any compromise. The naïve may be added +to the realm of wit if it comes into existence +after the important function of the censor, as +observed in the formula for wit-formation, has +been reduced to zero.</p> + +<p class='c008'>If the affective determination of wit consists +in the fact that both persons should be +subject to about the same inhibitions or inner +resistances, we may say now that the determination +<span class='pageno' id='Page_296'>296</span>of the naïve consists in the fact that one +person should have inhibitions which the other +lacks. It is the person provided with inhibitions +who understands the naïve, and it is he +alone who gains the pleasure produced by the +naïve. We can easily understand that this +pleasure is due to the removal of inhibitions. +Since the pleasure of wit is of the same origin—a +kernel of word-pleasure and nonsense-pleasure, +and a shell of removal- and release-pleasure,—the +similarity of this connection to +the inhibition thus determines the inner relationship +between the naïve and wit. In both +cases pleasure results from the removal of inner +inhibitions. But the psychic process of the +recipient person (which in the naïve regularly +corresponds with our ego, whereas in wit we +may also put ourselves in place of the producing +person) is by as much more complicated in +the case of the naïve as it is simpler in the producing +person in wit. For one thing, the +naïve must produce the same effect upon the +receiving person as wit does, this may be fully +confirmed by our examples, for just as in wit +the removal of the censor has been made possible +by the mere effort of hearing the naïve. +But only a part of the pleasure created by the +naïve admits of this explanation, in other cases +of naïve utterances, even this portion would be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_297'>297</span>endangered, as, for example, while listening to +naïve obscenities. We would react to a naïve +obscenity with the same indignation felt toward +a real obscenity, were it not for the fact +that another factor saves us from this indignation +and at the same time furnishes the more +important part of the pleasure derived from +the naïve.</p> + +<p class='c008'>This other factor is the result of the condition +mentioned before, namely, that in order to +recognize the naïve we have to be cognizant of +the fact that there are no inner inhibitions in +the producing person. It is only when this is +assured that we laugh instead of being indignant. +Hence we take into consideration the +psychic state of the producing person; we +imagine ourselves in this same psychic state +and endeavor to understand it by comparing +it to our own. This putting ourselves into the +psychic state of the producing person and comparing +it with our own results in an economy +of expenditure which we discharge through +laughing.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We might prefer the simpler explanation, +namely, that when we reflect that the person +has no inhibition to overcome our indignation +becomes superfluous; the laughing therefore +results at the cost of economized indignation. +In order to avoid this conception, which is, in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_298'>298</span>general, misleading, I shall distinguish more +sharply between two cases that I had treated +as one in the above discussion. The naïve, as +it appears to us, may either be in the nature +of a witticism, as in our example, or an obscenity, +or of anything generally objectionable; +which becomes especially evident if the naïve +is expressed not in speech but in action. +This latter case is really misleading; for +it might lead one to assume that the pleasure +originated from the economized and transformed +indignation. The first case is the illuminating +one. The naïve speech in the example +“Hebrew” can produce the effect of a +light witticism and give no cause for indignation; +it is certainly the more rare, or the more +pure and by far the more instructive case. In +so far as we think that the child took the syllable +“he” in “Hebrew” seriously, and without +any additional reason identified it with the +masculine personal pronoun, the increase in +pleasure as a result of hearing it has no longer +anything to do with the pleasure of the wit. +We shall now consider what has been said +from two viewpoints, first how it came into +existence in the mind of the child, and secondly, +how it would occur to us. In following +this comparison we find that the child has +discovered an identity and has overcome barriers +<span class='pageno' id='Page_299'>299</span>which exist in us, and by continuing still +further it may express itself as follows: “If +you wish to understand what you have heard, +you may save yourself the expenditure necessary +for holding these barriers in place.” The +expenditure which became freed by this comparison +is the source of pleasure in the naïve, +and is discharged through laughter; to be sure, +it is the same expenditure which we would +have converted into indignation if our understanding +of the producing person, and in this +case the nature of his utterance, had not precluded +it. But if we take the case of the naïve +joke as a model for the second case, viz., the +objectionable naïve, we shall see that here, too, +the economy in inhibition may originate directly +from the comparison. That is, it is unnecessary +for us to assume an incipient and +then a strangulated indignation, an indignation +corresponding to a different application of +the freed expenditure, against which, in the +case of wit, complicated defensive mechanisms +were required.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Source of Comic Pleasure in the Naïve</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>This comparison and this economy of expenditure +that occur as the result of putting +one’s self into the psychic process of the producing +person can have an important bearing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_300'>300</span>on the naïve only if they do not belong to the +naïve alone. As a matter of fact we suspect +that this mechanism which is so completely +foreign to wit is a part—perhaps the essential +part—of the psychic process of the comic. +This aspect—it is perhaps the most important +aspect of the naïve—thus represents +the naïve as a form of the comic. +Whatever is added to the wit-pleasure by the +naïve speeches in our examples is “comical” +pleasure. Concerning the latter we might be +inclined to make a general assumption that +this pleasure originates through an economized +expenditure by comparing the utterance of +some one else with our own. But since we are +here in the presence of very broad views we +shall first conclude our consideration of the +naïve. The naïve would thus be a form of the +comic, in so far as its pleasure originates from +the difference in expenditure which results in +our effort to understand the other person; and +it resembles wit through the condition that the +expenditure saved by the comparison must be +an inhibition expenditure.<a id='r67'></a><a href='#f67' class='c007'><sup>[67]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_301'>301</span>Before concluding we shall rapidly point out +a few agreements and differences between the +conceptions at which we have just arrived and +those that have been known for a long time +in the psychology of the comic. The putting +one’s self into the psychic process of another +and the desire to understand him is obviously +nothing else than the “comic burrowing” +(<i><span lang="de">komisches Leihen</span></i>) which has played a part +in the analysis of the comic ever since the time +of Jean Paul; the “comparing” of the psychic +process of another with our own corresponds +to a “psychological contrast,” for which we here +at last find a place, after we did not know +what to do with it in wit. But in our explanation +of comic pleasure we take issue with +many authors who contend that this pleasure +originates through the fluctuation of our attention +to and fro between contrasting ideas. +We are unable to see how such a mechanism +could produce pleasure, and we point to the +fact that in the comparing of contrasts there +results a difference in expenditure which, if +not used for anything else, becomes capable of +discharge and hence a source of pleasure.<a id='r68'></a><a href='#f68' class='c007'><sup>[68]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_302'>302</span>It is with misgiving only that we approach +the problem of the comic. It would be presumptuous +to expect from our efforts any decisive +contribution to the solution of this problem +after the works of a large number of excellent +thinkers have not resulted in an explanation +that is in every respect satisfactory. As a matter +of fact, we intend simply to follow out into +the province of the comic certain observations +that have been found valuable in the study of wit.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Occurrence and Origin of the Comic</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The comical appears primarily as an unintentional +discovery in the social relations of +human beings. It is found in persons, that is, +in their movements, shapes, actions, and characteristic +traits. In the beginning it is found +probably only in their psychical peculiarities +and later on in their mental qualities, especially +in the expression of these latter. Even animals +and inanimate objects become comical as the +result of a widely used method of personification. +However, the comical can be considered +apart from the person in whom it is found, if +the conditions under which a person becomes +<span class='pageno' id='Page_303'>303</span>comical can be discerned. Thus arises the comical +situation, and this knowledge enables us +to make a person comical at will by putting +him into situations in which the conditions necessary +for the comic are bound up with his actions. +The discovery that it is in our power to +make another person comical opens the way to +unsuspected gains in comic pleasure, and forms +the foundation of a highly developed technique. +It is also possible to make one’s self +just as comical as others. The means which +serve to make a person comical are transference +into comic situations, imitations, disguise, +unmasking, caricature, parody, travesty, +and the like. It is quite evident that these +techniques may enter into the service of hostile +or aggressive tendencies. A person may be +made comical in order to render him contemptible +or in order to deprive him of his claims +to dignity and authority. But even if such a +purpose were regularly at the bottom of all attempts +to make a person comical this need not +necessarily be the meaning of the spontaneous +comic.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As a result of this superficial survey of the +manifestations of the comic we can readily see +that the comic originates from wide-spread +sources, and that conditions so specialized as +those found in the naïve cannot be expected +<span class='pageno' id='Page_304'>304</span>in the case of the comic. In order to get a +clue to the conditions that are applicable to +the comic the selection of the first example is +most important. We will examine first the +comic movement because we remember that +the most primitive stage performance, the +pantomime, uses this means to make us laugh. +The answer to the question, Why do we laugh +at the actions of clowns? would be that they +appear to us immoderate and inappropriate; +that is, we really laugh over the excessive expenditure +of energy. Let us look for the +same condition outside of the manufactured +comic, that is, under circumstances where it +may unintentionally be found. The child’s +motions do not appear to us comical, even if it +jumps and fidgets, but it is comical to see a +little boy or girl follow with the tongue the +movement of his pen-holder when he is trying +to master the art of writing; we see in these +additional motions a superfluous expenditure +of energy which under similar conditions we +should save. In the same way we find it comical +to see unnecessary motions or even +marked exaggeration of expressive motions in +adults. Among the genuinely comic cases we +might mention the motions made by the bowler +after he has released the ball while he is following +its course as though he were still able +<span class='pageno' id='Page_305'>305</span>to control it; all grimaces which exaggerate +the normal expression of the emotions are comical, +even if they are involuntary, as in the +case of persons suffering from St. Vitus’ +dance (chorea); the impassioned movements +of a modern orchestra leader will appear comical +to every unmusical person, who cannot +understand why they are necessary. Indeed, +the comic element found in bodily shapes and +physiognomy is a branch of the comic of motion, +in that they are conceived as though they were +the result of motion that either has been carried +too far or is purposeless. Wide exposed eyes, +a crook-shaped nose bent towards the mouth, +handle-like ears, a hunch back, and all similar +physical defects probably produce a comical +impression only in so far as the movements +that would be necessary to produce these +features are imagined, whereby the nose and +other parts of the body are pictured as more +movable than they actually are. It is certainly +comical if some one can “wiggle his +ears,” and it would undoubtedly be a great +deal more comical if he could raise and lower +his nose. A large part of the comical impression +that animals make upon us is due to the fact that +we perceive in them movements which we cannot +imitate.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_306'>306</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Comic of Motion</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>But how does it come about that we laugh +as soon as we have recognized that the actions +of some one else are immoderate and inappropriate? +I believe that we laugh because we +compare the motions observed in others with +those which we ourselves should produce if we +were in their place. The two persons must +naturally be compared in accordance with the +same standard, but this standard is my own +innervation expenditure connected with my +idea of motion in the one case as well as the +other. This assertion is in need of discussion +and amplification.</p> + +<p class='c008'>What we are here putting into juxtaposition +is, on the one hand, the psychic expenditure of +a given idea, and on the other hand, the content +of this idea. We maintain that the +former is not primarily and principally independent +of the latter—the content of the +idea—particularly because the idea of something +great requires a larger expenditure +than the idea of something small. As long as +we are concerned only with the idea of different +coarse movements we shall encounter no +difficulties in the theoretical determination of +our thesis or in establishing its proof through +observation. It will be shown that in this case +<span class='pageno' id='Page_307'>307</span>an attribute of the idea actually coincides with +an attribute of the object conceived, although +psychology warns us of confusions of this sort.</p> + +<p class='c008'>I obtain an idea of a definite coarse movement +by performing this motion or by imitating +it, and in so doing I set a standard for +this motion in my feelings of innervation.<a id='r69'></a><a href='#f69' class='c007'><sup>[69]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>Now if I perceive a similar more or less +coarse motion in some one else, the surest way +to the understanding—to apperception—of the +same is to carry it out imitatively and the comparison +will then enable me to decide in which +motion I expended more energy. Such an impulse +to imitate certainly arises on perceiving +a movement. But in reality I do not carry +out the imitation any more than I still spell +out words simply because I have learnt to read +by means of spelling. Instead of imitating the +movement by my muscles I substitute the idea +of the same through my memory traces of the +expenditures necessary for similar motions. +Perceiving, or “thinking,” differs above all +<span class='pageno' id='Page_308'>308</span>from acting or carrying out things by the fact +that it entails a very much smaller displacement +of energy and keeps the main expenditure +from being discharged. But how is the +quantitative factor, the more or less big element +of the movement perceived, given expression +in the idea? And if the representation +of the quantity is left off from the idea that +is composed of qualities, how am I to differentiate +the ideas of different big movements, +how am I to compare them?</p> + +<p class='c008'>Here, physiology shows the way in that it +teaches us that even while an idea is in the +process of conception innervations proceed to +the muscles, which naturally represent only a +moderate expenditure. It is now easy to assume +that this expenditure of innervation +which accompanies the conception of the idea +is utilized to represent the quantitative factor +of the idea, and that when a great motion is +imagined it is greater than it would be in the +case of a small one. The conception of greater +motions would thus actually be greater, that +is, it would be a conception accompanied by +greater expenditure.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Ideational Mimicry</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Observation shows directly that human beings +are in the habit of expressing the big and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_309'>309</span>small things in their ideation content by means +of a manifold expenditure or by means of a +sort of <em>ideational mimicry</em>.</p> + +<p class='c008'>When a child or a person of the common +people or one belonging to a certain race imparts +or depicts something, one can easily observe +that he is not content to make his ideas +intelligible to the hearer through the choice of +correct words alone, but that he also represents +the contents of the same through his expressive +motions. Thus he designates the +quantities and intensities of “a high mountain” +by raising his hands over his head, and +those of “a little dwarf” by lowering his +hand to the ground. If he broke himself of +the habit of depicting with his hands, he would +nevertheless do it with his voice, and if he +should also control his voice, one may be sure +that in picturing something big he would distend +his eyes, and describing something little +he would press his eyes together. It is not his +own affects that he thus expresses, but it is +really the content of what he imagines.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Shall we now assume that this need for +mimicry is first aroused through the demand +for imparting, whereas a good part of this +manner of representation still escapes the attention +of the hearer? I rather believe that this +mimicry, though less vivid, exists even if all +<span class='pageno' id='Page_310'>310</span>imparting is left out of the question, that it +comes about when the person imagines for +himself alone, or thinks of something in a +graphic manner; that then such a person, just +as in talking, expresses through his body the +idea of big and small which manifests itself at +least through a change of innervation in the +facial expressions and sensory organs. Indeed, +I can imagine that the bodily innervation +which is consensual to the content of the idea +conceived is the beginning and origin of mimicry +for purposes of communication. For, in +order to be in a position to serve this purpose, +it is only necessary to increase it and make it +conspicuous to the other. When I take the +view that this “expression of the ideation content” +should be added to the expression of the +emotions, which are known as a physical by-effect +of psychic processes, I am well aware +that my observations which refer to the category +of the big and small do not exhaust +the subject. I myself could add still other +things, even before reaching to the phenomenon +of tension through which a person +physically indicates the accumulation of his attention +and the <i><span lang="fr">niveau</span></i> of abstraction upon +which his thoughts happen to rest. I maintain +that this subject is very important, and I believe +that tracing the ideation mimicry in other +<span class='pageno' id='Page_311'>311</span>fields of æsthetics would be just as useful for +the understanding of the comic as it is here.</p> + +<p class='c008'>To return to the comic movement, I repeat +that with the perception of a certain motion +the impulse to conceive it will be given through +a certain expenditure. In the “desire to +understand,” in the apperception of this movement +I produce a certain expenditure, and I +behave in this part of the psychic process just +as if I put myself in the place of the person +observed. Simultaneously I probably grasp +the aim of the motion, and through former experiences +I am able to estimate the amount of +expenditure necessary to attain this aim. I +thereby drop out of consideration the person +observed and behave as if I myself wished to +attain the aim of the motion. These two ideational +possibilities depend on a comparison of +the motion observed with my own inhibited +motion. In the case of an immoderate or inappropriate +movement on the part of the other, +my greater expenditure for understanding becomes +inhibited <i><span lang="la">statu nascendi</span></i> during the mobilization +as it were, it is declared superfluous +and stands free for further use or for discharge +through laughing. If other favorable +conditions supervened this would be the nature +of the origin of pleasure in comic movement,—an +innervation expenditure which, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_312'>312</span>when compared with one’s own motion, becomes +an inapplicable surplus.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Comparison of Two Kinds of Expenditure as Pleasure-sources</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>We now note that we must continue our +discussion by following two different paths; +first, to determine the conditions for the discharge +of the surplus; secondly, to test +whether the other cases of the comic can be +conceived similarly to our conception of comic +motion.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We shall turn first to the latter task and +after considering comic movement and action +we shall turn to the comic found in the psychic +activities and peculiarities of others.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As an example of this kind we may consider +the comical nonsense produced by ignorant +students at examinations; it is more difficult, +however, to give a simple example of +the peculiarities. We must not be confused +by the fact that nonsense and foolishness which +so often act in a comical manner are nevertheless +not perceived as comical in all cases, just +as the same things which once made us laugh +because they seemed comical later may appear +to us contemptible and hateful. This fact, +which we must not forget to take into account, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_313'>313</span>seems only to show that besides the comparison +familiar to us other relations come into consideration +for the comic effect,—conditions +which we can investigate in other connections.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The comic found in the mental and psychic +attributes of another person is apparently +again the result of a comparison between him +and my own ego. But it is remarkable that it +is a comparison which mostly furnishes the +result opposite to that obtained through comic +movement and action. In the latter case it is +comical if the other person assumes a greater +expenditure than I believe to be necessary for +me; in the case of psychic activity it is just +the reverse, it is comical if the other person +economizes in expenditure, which I consider +indispensable; for nonsense and foolishness are +nothing but inferior activities. In the first +case I laugh because he makes it too difficult +for himself, and in the latter case because he +makes it too easy for himself. In the case of +the comic effect it seems to be a question only +of the difference between the two energy expenditures—the +one of “feeling one’s self into +something” (<i><span lang="de">Einfühlung</span></i>)—and the other of +the ego—and it makes no difference in whose +favor this difference inclines. This peculiarity, +which at first confuses our judgment, disappears, +however, when we consider that it is in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_314'>314</span>accord with our personal development towards +a higher stage of culture, to limit our muscular +work and increase our mental work. By +heightening our mental expenditure we produce +a diminution of motion expenditure for +the same activity. Our machines bear witness +to this cultural success.<a id='r70'></a><a href='#f70' class='c007'><sup>[70]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>Thus it coincides with a uniform understanding +that that person appears comical to us who +puts forth too much expenditure in his psychical +activities and too little in his mental activities; +and it cannot be denied that in both cases our +laughing is the expression of a pleasurably +perceived superiority which we adjudge to +ourselves in comparison with him. If the relation +in both cases becomes reversed, that is, +if the somatic expenditure of the other is less +and the psychic expenditure greater, then we +no longer laugh, but are struck with amazement +and admiration.<a id='r71'></a><a href='#f71' class='c007'><sup>[71]</sup></a></p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Comic of Situation.</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The origin of the comic pleasure discussed here, +that is, the origin of such pleasure in a comparison +<span class='pageno' id='Page_315'>315</span>of the other person with one’s own self +in respect to the difference between the identification +expenditure (<i><span lang="de">Einfühlungsaufwand</span></i>) +and normal expenditure—is genetically probably +the most important. It is certain, however, +that it is not the only one. We have learned +before to disregard any such comparison between +the other person and one’s self, and to +obtain the pleasure-bringing difference from +one side only, either from identification, or +from the processes in one’s own ego, proving +thereby that the feeling of superiority bears +no essential relations to comic pleasure. A +comparison is indispensable, however, for the +origin of this pleasure, and we find this comparison +between two energy expenditures +which rapidly follow each other and refer to +the same function. It is produced either in +ourselves by way of identification with the +other, or we find it without any identification +in our own psychic processes. The first case, +in which the other person still plays a part, +though he is not compared with ourselves, results +when the pleasure-producing difference +of energy expenditures comes into existence +through outer influences which we can comprehend +as a “situation,” for which reason this +species of comic is also called the “comic of +situation.” The peculiarities of the person who +<span class='pageno' id='Page_316'>316</span>furnishes the comic do not here come into essential +consideration; we laugh when we admit +to ourselves that had we been placed in the +same situation we should have done the same +thing. Here we draw the comic from the relation +of the individual to the often all-too-powerful +outer world, which is represented in +the psychic processes of the individual by the +conventions and necessities of society, and even +by his bodily needs. A typical example of the +latter is when a person engaged in an activity, +which claims all his psychic forces, is suddenly +disturbed by a pain or excremental need. The +opposite case which furnishes us the comic +difference through identification, lies between +the great interest which existed before the +disturbance occurred and the minimum left +for his psychic activity after the disturbance +made its appearance. The person who +furnishes us this difference again becomes +comical through inferiority; but he is only inferior +in comparison with his former ego and +not in comparison with us, for we know that +in a similar case we could not have behaved +differently. It is remarkable, however, that +we find this inferiority of the person only in +the case where we “feel ourselves” into some +one, that is, we can only find it comical in the +other, whereas we ourselves are conscious only +<span class='pageno' id='Page_317'>317</span>of painful emotions when such or similar embarrassments +happen to us. It is by keeping +away the painful from our own person that we +are probably first enabled to enjoy as pleasurable +the difference which resulted from the +comparison of the changing energy.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Comic of Expectation</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>The other source of the comic, which we find +in our own changes of investing energy, lies +in our relations to the future, which we are +accustomed to anticipate through our ideas of +expectation. I assume that a quantitatively +determined expenditure underlies our every +idea of expectation, which in case of disappointment +becomes diminished by a certain difference, +and I again refer to the observations +made before concerning “ideational mimicry.” +But it seems to me easier to demonstrate +the real mobilized psychic expenditure for the +cases of expectation. It is well known concerning +a whole series of cases that the manifestation +of expectation is formed by motor +preliminaries; this is first of all true of cases +in which the expected events make demands +on my motility, and these preparations are +quantitatively determinable without anything +further. If I am expecting to catch a ball +<span class='pageno' id='Page_318'>318</span>thrown at me, I put my body in states of tension +in order to enable me to withstand the +collision with the ball, and the superfluous motions +which I make if the ball turns out to be +light make me look comical to the spectators. +I allowed myself to be misled by the expectation +to exert an immoderate expenditure of +motion. A similar thing happens if, for example, +I lift out a basket of fruit which I took +to be heavy but which was hollow and formed +out of wax in order to deceive me. By its upward +jerk my arm betrays the fact that I have +prepared a superfluous innervation for this +purpose and hence I am laughed at. In fact +there is at least one case in which the expectation +expenditure can be directly demonstrated +by means of physiological experimentation with +animals. In Pawlof’s experiments with salivary +secretions of dogs who, provided with salivary +fistulæ, are shown different kinds of food, +it is noticed that the amount of saliva secreted +through the fistulæ depends on whether the +conditions of the experiment have strengthened +or disappointed the dogs’ expectation to be +fed with the food shown them.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Even where the thing expected lays claims +only to my sensory organs, and not to my motility, +I may assume that the expectation manifests +itself in a certain motor emanation causing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_319'>319</span>tension of the senses, and I may even conceive +the suspension of attention as a motor +activity which is equivalent to a certain amount +of expenditure. Moreover, I can presuppose +that the preparatory activity of expectation +is not independent of the amount of the expected +impression, but that I represent mimically +the bigness and smallness of the same +by means of a greater or smaller preparatory +expenditure, just as in the case of imparting +something and in the case of thinking when +there is no expectation. The expectation expenditure +naturally will be composed of many +components, and also for my disappointment +diverse factors will come into consideration; it +is not only a question whether the realized +event is perceptibly greater or smaller than the +expected one, but also whether the expectation +is worthy of the great interest which I had offered +for it. In this manner I am instructed +to consider, besides the expenditure for the +representation of bigness and smallness (the +conceptual mimicry), also the expenditure for +the tension of attention (expectation expenditure), +and in addition to these two expenditures +there is in all cases the abstraction expenditure. +But these other forms of expenditure +can easily be reduced to the one of bigness +and smallness, for what we call more interesting, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_320'>320</span>more sublime, and even more abstract, +are only particularly qualified special +cases of what is greater. Let us add to this +that, among other things, Lipps holds that the +quantitative, not the qualitative, contrast is +primarily the source of comic pleasure, and we +shall be altogether content to have chosen the +comic element of motion as the starting-point +of our investigation.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In working out Kant’s thesis, “The comic +is an expectation dwindled into nothing,” +Lipps made the attempt in his book, often +cited here, to trace the comic pleasure altogether +to expectation. Despite the many instructive +and valuable results which this attempt +brought to light I should like to agree +with the criticism expressed by other authors, +namely, that Lipps has formulated a field of +origin of the comic which is much too narrow, +and that he could not subject its phenomena +to his formula without much forcing.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Caricature</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Human beings are not satisfied with enjoying +the comic as they encounter it in life, but +they aim to produce it purposely, thus we discover +more of the nature of the comic by +studying the methods employed in producing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_321'>321</span>the comic. Above all one can produce comical +elements in one’s personality for the amusement +of others, by making one’s self appear +awkward or stupid. One then produces the +comic exactly as if one were really so, by complying +with the condition of comparison which +leads to the difference of expenditure; but one +does not make himself laughable or contemptible +through this; indeed, under certain circumstances +one can even secure admiration. The +feeling of superiority does not come into existence +in the other when he knows that the actor +is only shamming, and this furnishes us a good +new proof that the comic is independent in +principle of the feeling of superiority.</p> + +<p class='c008'>To make another comical, the method most +commonly employed is to transfer him into +situations wherein he becomes comical regardless +of his personal qualities, as a result of human +dependence upon external circumstances, +especially social factors; in other words, one +resorts to the comical situation. This transferring +into a comic situation may be real as +in practical jokes, such as placing the foot in +front of one so that he falls like a clumsy person, +or making one appear stupid by utilizing +his credulity to make him believe some nonsense, +etc., or it can be feigned by means of +speech or play. It is a good aid in aggression, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_322'>322</span>in the service of which production of the +comic is wont to place itself in order that the +comic pleasure may be independent of the +reality of the comic situation; thus every person +is really defenseless against being made +comical.</p> + +<p class='c008'>But there are still other means of making +one comical which deserve special attention +and which in part also show new sources of +comic pleasure. <em>Imitation</em>, for example, belongs +here; it accords the hearer an extraordinary +amount of pleasure and makes its +subject comic, even if it still keeps away from +the exaggeration of caricature. It is much +easier to fathom the comic effect of caricature +than that of simple imitation. Caricature, +parody and travesty, like their practical +counterpart—unmasking, range themselves +against persons and objects who command +authority and respect and who are exalted in +some sense—these are procedures tending towards +degradation.<a id='r72'></a><a href='#f72' class='c007'><sup>[72]</sup></a> In the transferred psychic +sense, the exalted is equivalent to something +great and I want to make the statement, +or more accurately to repeat the statement, +that psychic greatness like somatic greatness +<span class='pageno' id='Page_323'>323</span>is exhibited by means of an increased expenditure. +It needs little observation to ascertain +that when I speak of the exalted I give a different +innervation to my voice, I change my +facial expression, an attempt to bring my entire +bearing as it were into complete accord +with the dignity of that which I present. I +impose upon myself a dignified restriction not +much different than if I were coming into the +presence of an illustrious personage, monarch, +or prince of science. I can scarcely err when +I assume that this added innervation of conceptual +mimicry corresponds to an increased +expenditure. The third case of such an added +expenditure I readily find when I indulge in +abstract trains of thought instead of in the +concrete and plastic ideas. If I can now +imagine that the mentioned processes for degrading +the illustrious are quite ordinary, that +during their activity I need not be on my +guard and in whose ideal presence I may, to +use a military formula, put myself “at ease,” +all that saves me the added expenditure of +dignified restriction. Moreover, the comparison +of this manner of presentation instigated +by identification with the manner of presentation +to which I have been hitherto accustomed +which seeks to present itself at the +same time, again produces a difference in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_324'>324</span>expenditure which can be discharged through +laughter.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As is known, caricature brings about the +degradation by rendering prominent one feature, +comic in itself, from the entire picture of +the exalted object, a feature which would be +overlooked if viewed with the entire picture. +Only by isolating this feature can the comic +effect be obtained which spreads in our memory +over the whole picture. This has, however, +this condition; the presence of the exalted +itself must not force us into a disposition of +reverence. Where such a comical feature is +really lacking then caricature unhesitatingly +creates it by exaggerating one that is not comical +in itself. It is again characteristic of the +origin of comic pleasure that the effect of the +caricature is not essentially impaired through +such a falsifying of reality.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Unmasking</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'><em>Parody</em> and <em>travesty</em> accomplish the degradation +of the exalted by other means; they +destroy the uniformity between the attributes +of persons familiar to us and their speech and +actions; by replacing either the illustrious persons +or their utterances by lowly ones. +Therein they differ from caricature, but not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_325'>325</span>through the mechanism of the production of +the comic pleasure. The same mechanism also +holds true in <em>unmasking</em>, which comes into +consideration only where some one has attached +to himself dignity and authority which in +reality should be taken from him. We have +seen the comic effect of unmasking through +several examples of wit, for example, in the +story of the fashionable lady who in her first +labor-pains cries: “Ah, mon Dieu!” but to +whom the physician paid no attention until she +screamed: “A-a-a-ai-e-e-e-e-e-e-E-E-E!” Being +now acquainted with the character of the +comic, we can no longer dispute that this story +is really an example of comical unmasking and +has no just claim to the term witticism. It +recalls wit only through the setting, through +the technical means of “representation through +a trifle”; here it is the cry which was found +sufficient to indicate the point. The fact remains, +however, that our feeling for the niceties +of speech, when we call on it for judgment, +does not oppose calling such a story a +witticism. We can find the explanation for +this in the reflection that usage of speech does +not enter scientifically into the nature of wit +so far as we have evolved it by means of this +painstaking examination. As it is a function +of the activities of wit to reopen hidden +<span class='pageno' id='Page_326'>326</span>sources of comic pleasure (p. 150), every artifice +which does not bring to light barefaced +comic may in looser analogy be called a witticism. +This is especially true in the case of +unmasking, though in other methods of comic-making +the appellation also holds good.<a id='r73'></a><a href='#f73' class='c007'><sup>[73]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>In the mechanism of “unmasking” one can +also utilize those processes of comic-making +already known to us which degrade the dignity +of individuals in that they call attention to one +of the common human frailties, but particularly +to the dependence of his mental functions +upon physical needs. Unmasking them +becomes equivalent to the reminder: This or +that one who is admired like a demigod is +only a human being like you and me after all. +Moreover, all efforts in this mechanism serve +to lay bare the monotonous psychic automatism +which is behind wealth and apparent freedom +of psychic achievements. We have become +acquainted with examples of such “unmasking” +through the witticisms dealing with marriage +agents, and at that time to be sure we +felt doubt whether we could rightly count +these stories as wit. Now we can decide with +more certainty that the anecdote of the echo +who reinforces all assertions of the marriage +<span class='pageno' id='Page_327'>327</span>agent and in the end reinforces the latter’s +admission that the bride has a hunch back with +the exclamation “And what a hunch!” is essentially +a comic story, an example of the unmasking +of the psychic automatism. But here +the comic story serves only as a façade; to +any one who wishes to note the hidden meaning +of the marriage agent, the whole remains a +splendidly put together piece of wit. He who +does not penetrate so far sees only the comic +story. The same is true of the other witticism +of the agent who, to refute an objection, finally +confirms the truth through the exclamation: +“But who in the world would lend them +anything?” This is a comic unmasking which +serves as a façade for a witticism. Still the +character of the wit is here quite evident, as +the speech of the agent is at the same time an +expression through the opposite. In trying to +prove that the people are rich he proves at the +same time that they are not rich but very poor. +Wit and the comic unite here and teach us +that a statement may be simultaneously witty +and comical.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We eagerly grasp the opportunity to return +from the comic of unmasking to wit, for +our real task is to explain the relation between +wit and comic and not to determine the nature +of the comic. Hence to the case of uncovering +<span class='pageno' id='Page_328'>328</span>the psychic automatism, wherein our +feeling left us in doubt as to whether the matter +was comical or witty, we add another, the +case of nonsense-wit, wherein likewise wit and +the comic fuse. But our investigation will +ultimately show us that in this second case the +meeting of wit and comic may be theoretically +deduced.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the discussion of the techniques of wit +we have found that giving free play to such +modes of thinking as are common in the unconscious +and which in consciousness are conceived +only as “faulty thinking,” furnishes the +technical means of a great many witticisms. +We had then doubted their witty character +and were inclined to classify them simply as +comic stories. We could come to no decision +regarding our uncertainty because in the first +place the real character of wit was not familiar +to us. Later we found this character by following +the analogy to the dream-work as to +the compromise formed by the wit-work between +the demands of the rational critic and +the impulse not to abandon the old word-pleasure +and nonsense-pleasure. What thus came +into existence as a compromise, when the foreconscious +thought was left for a moment to +unconscious elaboration, satisfied both demands +in all cases, but it presented itself to the critic, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_329'>329</span>in various forms and had to stand various criticisms +from it. In one case wit succeeded in +surreptitiously assuming the form of an unimportant +but none the less admissible proposition; +a second time it smuggled itself into the +expression of a valuable thought. But within +the outer limit of the compromise activity it +made no effort to satisfy the critic, and defiantly +utilizing the pleasure-sources at its disposal, +it appeared before the critic as pure +nonsense. It had no fear of provoking contradiction +because it could rely on the fact that +the hearer would decipher the disfigurement of +the expression through the operation of his unconscious +and thus give back to it its meaning.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Now in what case will wit appear to the +critic as nonsense? Particularly when it makes +use of those modes of thought, which are common +in the unconscious, but forbidden in conscious +thought; that is, when it resorts to +faulty thinking. Some of the modes of thinking, +of the unconscious, have also been retained +in conscious thinking, for example, +many forms of indirect expression, allusions, +etc., even though their conscious use +has to be much restricted. Using these +techniques wit will arouse little or no opposition +on the part of the critic; but this only +happens when it also uses that technical means +<span class='pageno' id='Page_330'>330</span>with which conscious thought no longer cares +to have anything to do. Wit can still further +avoid offending if it disguises the faulty thinking +by investing it with a semblance of logic +as in the story of the fancy cake and liqueur, +salmon with mayonnaise, and similar ones. +But should it present the faulty thinking undisguised, +the critic is sure to protest.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Meeting of Wit and the Comic</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>In this case, something else comes to the aid +of wit. The faulty thinking, which as a form +of thinking of the unconscious, wit utilizes for +its technique, appears comical to the critic, +although this is not necessarily the case. The +conscious giving of free play to the unconscious +and to those forms of thinking which are rejected +as faulty, furnishes a means for the production +of comic pleasure. This can be easily +understood, as a greater expenditure is surely +needed for the production of the foreconscious +investing energy than for the giving of free +play to the unconscious. When we hear the +thought which is formed like one from the unconscious +we compare it to its correct form, +and this results in a difference of expenditure +which gives origin to comic pleasure. A witticism +which makes use of such faulty thinking +as its technique and therefore appears absurd +<span class='pageno' id='Page_331'>331</span>can produce a comic impression at the same +time. If we do not strike the trail of the wit, +there remains to us only the comic or funny +story.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The story of the borrowed kettle, which +showed a hole on being returned, whereupon +the borrower excused himself by stating that +in the first place he had not borrowed the kettle; +secondly, that it already had a hole when +he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he had returned +it intact without any hole (p. 82), is an +excellent example of a purely comic effect +through giving free play to one’s unconscious +modes of thinking. Just this mutual neutralization +of several thoughts, each of which is well +motivated in itself, is the province of the unconscious. +Corresponding to this, the dream in +which the unconscious thoughts become manifest, +also shows an absence of either—or.<a id='r74'></a><a href='#f74' class='c007'><sup>[74]</sup></a> +These are expressed by putting the thoughts +next to one another. In that dream example +given in my <cite>Interpretation of Dreams</cite>,<a id='r75'></a><a href='#f75' class='c007'><sup>[75]</sup></a> which +in spite of its complication I have chosen as +a type of the work of interpretation, I seek +to rid myself of the reproach that I have not +removed the pains of a patient by psychic +treatment. My arguments are: 1. she is herself +<span class='pageno' id='Page_332'>332</span>to blame for her illness, because she does +not wish to accept my solution, 2. her pains +are of organic origin, therefore none of my +concern, 3. her pains are connected with her +widowhood, for which I am certainly not to +blame, 4. her pains resulted from an injection +with a dirty syringe, which was given by +another. All these motives follow one another +just as though one did not exclude the +other. In order to escape the reproach that +it was nonsense I had to insert the words +“either—or” instead of the “and” of the +dream.</p> + +<p class='c008'><em>A similar comical story is the one which tells +of a blacksmith in a Hungarian village who has +committed a crime punishable by death; the +bürgomaster, however, decreed that not the +smith but a tailor was to be hanged, as there +were two tailors in the village but only one +blacksmith, and the crime had to be expiated.</em> +Such a displacement of guilt from one person +to another naturally contradicts all laws of +conscious logic, but in no ways the mental +trends of the unconscious. I am in doubt +whether to call this story comic, and still I put +the story of the kettle among the witticisms. +Now I admit that it is far more correct to designate +the latter as comic rather than witty. +But now I understand how it happens that my +<span class='pageno' id='Page_333'>333</span>feelings, usually so reliable, can leave me in +the lurch as to whether this story be comic +or witty. The case in which I cannot come +to a conclusion through my feelings is the one +in which the comic results through the uncovering +of modes of thought which exclusively +belong to the unconscious. A story of that +kind can be comic and witty at the same time; +but it will impress me as being witty even if +it be only comic, because the use of the faulty +thinking of the unconscious reminds me of +wit, just as in the case of the arrangements +for the uncovering of the hidden comic discussed +before (p. 325).</p> + +<p class='c008'>I must lay great stress upon making clear +this most delicate point of my analysis, namely, +the relation of wit to the comic, and will therefore +supplement what has been said with some +negative statements. First of all, I call attention +to the fact that the case of the meeting +of wit and comic treated here (p. 327) is not +identical with the preceding one. I grant it +is a fine distinction, but it can be drawn with +certainty. In the preceding case the comic +originated from the uncovering of the psychic +automatism. This is in no way peculiar to the +unconscious alone and it does not at all play a +conspicuous part in the technique of wit. Unmasking +appears only accidentally in relation +<span class='pageno' id='Page_334'>334</span>with wit, in that it serves another technique of +wit, namely, representation through the opposite. +But in the case of giving free play to +unconscious ways of thinking the union of wit +and comic is an essential one, because the +same method which is used by the first person +in wit as the technique of releasing pleasure +will naturally produce comic pleasure in the +third person.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We might be tempted to generalize this last +case and seek the relation of wit to the comic +in the fact that the effect of wit upon the third +person follows the mechanism of comic pleasure. +But there is no question about that; contact +with the comic is not in any way found +in all nor even in most witticisms; in most +cases wit and the comic can be cleanly separated. +As often as wit succeeds in escaping +the appearance of absurdity, which is to say +in most witticisms of double meaning or of allusion, +one cannot discover any effect in the +hearer resembling the comic. One can make +the test with examples previously cited or with +some new ones given here.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Congratulatory telegram to be sent to a +gambler on his 70th birthday.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<i><span lang="fr">Trente et quarante</span></i>”<a id='r76'></a><a href='#f76' class='c007'><sup>[76]</sup></a> (word-division with +allusion).</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_335'>335</span>Madame de <em>Maintenon</em> was called Madame +de <i><span lang="fr">Maintenant</span></i> (modification of a name).</p> + +<p class='c008'>We might further believe that at least all +jokes with nonsense façades appear comical +and must impress us as such. But I recall +here the fact that such witticisms often have +a different effect on the hearer, calling forth +confusion and a tendency to rejection (see footnote, +p. 212). Therefore it evidently depends +whether the nonsense of the wit appears comical +or common plain nonsense, and the conditions +for this we have not yet investigated. Accordingly +we hold to the conclusion that wit, judging +by its nature, can be separated from the +comic, and that it unites with it on the one +hand only in certain special cases, on the other +in the tendency to gain pleasure from intellectual +sources.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the course of these examinations concerning +the relations of wit and the comic there +revealed itself to us that distinction which we +must emphasize as most significant, and which +at the same time points to a psychologically +important characteristic of the comic. We had +to transfer to the unconscious the source of +wit-pleasure; there is no occasion which can be +discovered for the same localization of the +comic. On the contrary all analyses which we +have made thus far indicate that the source +<span class='pageno' id='Page_336'>336</span>of comic pleasure lies in the comparison of +two expenditures, both of which we must +adjudge to the foreconscious. Wit and the +comic can above all be differentiated in the +psychic localization; <em>wit is, so to speak, the +contribution to the comic from the sphere of +the unconscious</em>.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Comic of Imitation</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>We need not blame ourselves for digressing +from the subject, for the relation of wit to the +comic is really the occasion which urged us to +the examination of the comic. But it is time +for us to return to the point under discussion, +to the treatment of the means which serve to +produce the comic. We have advanced the +discussion of caricature and unmasking, because +from both of them we can borrow several +points of similarity for the analysis of the +comic of <em>imitation</em>. Imitation is mostly replaced +by caricature, which consists in the exaggeration +of certain otherwise not striking +traits, and also bears the character of degradation. +Still this does not seem to exhaust the +nature of imitation; it is incontestable that in +itself it represents an extraordinarily rich +source of comic pleasure, for we laugh particularly +over faithful imitations. It is not easy +<span class='pageno' id='Page_337'>337</span>to give a satisfactory explanation of this if we +do not accept Bergson’s view,<a id='r77'></a><a href='#f77' class='c007'><sup>[77]</sup></a> according to +which the comic of imitation is put next to the +comic produced by uncovering the psychic +automatism. Bergson believes that everything +gives a comic impression which manifests itself +in the shape of a machine-like inanimate movement +in the human being. His law is that +“the attitudes, gestures, and movements of +the human body are laughable in exact proportion +as that body reminds us of a mere +machine.” He explains the comic of imitation +by connecting it with a problem formulated +by Pascal in his <cite>Thoughts</cite>, why is it that we +laugh at the comparison of two faces that are +alike although neither of them excites laughter +by itself. “The truth is that a really living +life should never repeat itself. Wherever +there is repetition or complete similarity, we +always suspect some mechanism at work behind +the living.” Analyze the impression you get +from two faces that are too much alike, and +you will find that you are thinking of two +copies cast in the same mould, or two impressions +of the same soul, or two reproductions of +the same negative,—in a word, of some manufacturing +process or other. This deflection of +life towards the mechanical is here the real +<span class='pageno' id='Page_338'>338</span>cause of laughter (l. c., p. 34). We might say, it +is the degradation of the human to the mechanical +or inanimate. If we accept these +winning arguments of Bergson, it is moreover +not difficult to subject his view to our own +formula. Taught by experience that every +living being is different and demands a definite +amount of expenditure from our understanding, +we find ourselves disappointed when, as +a result of a perfect agreement or deceptive +imitation, we need no new expenditure. But +we are disappointed in the sense of being relieved, +and the expenditure of expectation +which has become superfluous is discharged +through laughter. The same formula will also +cover all cases of comic rigidity considered by +Bergson, such as professional habits, fixed +ideas, and modes of expression which are repeated +on every occasion. All these cases aim +to compare the expenditure of expectation +with what is commonly required for the understanding, +whereby the greater expectation depends +on observation of individual variety and +human plasticity. Hence in imitation the +source of comic pleasure is not the comic of +situation but that of expectation.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As we trace the comic pleasure in general +to comparison, it is incumbent upon us to investigate +also the comic element of the comparison +<span class='pageno' id='Page_339'>339</span>itself, which likewise serves as a means +of producing the comic. Our interest in this +question will be enhanced when we recall that +in the case of comparison the “feeling” as +to whether something was to be classed as +witty or merely comical often left us in the +lurch (v. p. 114).</p> + +<p class='c008'>The subject really deserves more attention +than we can bestow upon it. The main quality +for which we ask in comparison is whether +it is pertinent, that is, whether it really calls +our attention to an existing agreement between +two different objects. The original pleasure +in refinding the same thing (Groos, p. 103) +is not the only motive which favors the use +of comparison. Besides this there is the fact +that comparison is capable of a utilization +which facilitates intellectual work; when for +example, as is usually the case, one compares +the less familiar to the more familiar, the abstract +to the concrete, and explains through +this comparison the more strange and the more +difficult objects. With every such comparison, +especially of the abstract to the concrete, +there is a certain degradation and a certain +economy in abstraction expenditure (in the +sense of a conceptual mimicry) yet this naturally +does not suffice to render prominent +the character of the comic. The latter does not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_340'>340</span>emerge suddenly from the freed pleasure of +the comparison but comes gradually; there +are many cases which only touch the comic, in +which one might doubt whether they show the +comic character. The comparison undoubtedly +becomes comical when the <i><span lang="fr">niveau</span></i> difference +of the expenditure of abstraction between the +two things compared becomes increased, if +something serious and strange, especially of +intellectual or moral nature is compared to +something banal and lowly. The former release +of pleasure and the contribution from +the conditions of conceptual mimicry may perhaps +explain the gradual change—which is determined +by quantitative relations,—from the +universally pleasurable to the comic, which +takes place during the comparison. I am +certainly avoiding misunderstandings in that +I emphasize that I deduce the comic pleasure +in the comparison, not from the contrast of +the two things compared but from the difference +of the two abstraction expenditures. +The strange which is difficult to grasp, the abstract +and really intellectually sublime, through +its alleged agreement with a familiar lowly +one, in the imagination of which every abstraction +expenditure disappears, is now itself unmasked +as something equally lowly. The +<span class='pageno' id='Page_341'>341</span>comic of comparison thus becomes reduced to +a case of degradation.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The comparison, as we have seen above, can +now be witty without a trace of comic admixture, +especially when it happens to evade the +degradation. Thus the comparison of Truth +to a torch which one cannot carry through a +crowd without singeing somebody’s beard is +pure wit, because it takes an obsolete expression +(“The torch of truth”) at its full value +and not at all in a comical sense, and because +the torch as an object does not lack a certain +distinction, though it is a concrete object. +However, a comparison may just as well be +witty as comic, and what is more one may be +independent of the other, in that the comparison +becomes an aid for certain techniques of +wit, as, for example, unification or allusion. +Thus Nestroy’s comparison of memory to a +“Warehouse” (p. 120) is simultaneously comical +and witty, first, on account of the extraordinary +degradation to which the psychological +conception must consent in the comparison +to a “Warehouse,” and secondly, because he +who utilizes the comparison is a clerk, and in +this comparison he establishes a rather unexpected +unification between psychology and his +vocation. Heine’s verse, “until at last the +buttons tore from the pants of my patience,” +<span class='pageno' id='Page_342'>342</span>seems at first an excellent example of a comic +degrading comparison, but on closer reflection +we must ascribe to it also the attribute of wittiness, +since the comparison as a means of allusion +strikes into the realm of the obscene and +causes a release of pleasure from the obscene. +Through a union not altogether incidental the +same material also gives us a resultant pleasure +which is at the same time comical and +witty; it does not matter whether or not the +conditions of the one promote the origin of the +other, such a union acts confusingly on the +“feeling” whose function it is to announce to +us whether we have before us wit or the comic, +and only a careful examination independent +of the disposition of pleasure can decide the +question.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As tempting as it would be to trace these +more intimate determinations of comic pleasure, +the author must remember that neither +his previous education nor his daily vocation +justifies him in extending his investigations beyond +the spheres of wit, and he must confess +that it is precisely the subject of comic comparison +which makes him feel his incompetence.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We are quite willing to be reminded that +many authors do not recognize the clear notional +and objective distinction between wit +and comic, as we were impelled to do, and that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_343'>343</span>they classify wit merely as “the comic of +speech” or “of words.” To test this view let +us select one example of intentional and one +of involuntary comic of speech and compare +it with wit. We have already mentioned before +that we are in a good position to distinguish +comic from witty speech. “With a +fork and with effort, his mother pulled him +out of the mess,” is only comical, but Heine’s +verse about the four castes of the population +of Göttingen: “Professors, students, Philistines, +and cattle,” is exquisitely witty.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As an example of the intentional comic of +speech I will take as a model Stettenheim’s +<cite>Wippchen</cite>. We call Stettenheim witty because +he possesses the cleverness that evokes +the comic. The wit which one “has” in contradistinction +to the wit which one “makes,” +is indeed correctly conditioned by this ability. +It is true that the letters of Wippchen are +also witty in so far as they are interspersed +with a rich collection of all sorts of witticisms, +some of which very successful ones, (as “festively +undressed” when he speaks of a parade +of savages), but what lends the peculiar character +to these productions is not these isolated +witticisms, but the superabundant flow +of comic speech contained therein. Originally +<em>Wippchen</em> was certainly meant to represent +<span class='pageno' id='Page_344'>344</span>a satirical character, a modification of Freytag’s +Schmock, one of those uneducated persons +who trade in the educational treasure of +the nation and abuse it; but the pleasure in +the comic effect experienced in representing +this person seems gradually to have pushed to +the background the author’s satirical tendency. +Wippchen’s productions are for the most part +“comic nonsense.” The author has justly +utilized the pleasant mood resulting from the +accumulation of such achievements to present +beside the altogether admissible material all +sorts of absurdities which would be intolerable +in themselves. Wippchen’s nonsense appears +to be of a specific nature only on account of +its special technique. If we look closer into +some of these “witticisms,” we find that some +forms which have impressed their character on +the whole production are especially conspicuous. +Wippchen makes use mostly of compositions +(fusions), of modifications of familiar +expressions and quotations. He replaces some +of the banal elements in these expressions by +others which are usually more pretentious and +more valuable. This naturally comes near to +the techniques of wit.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_345'>345</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>The Comic of Speech</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>Some of the fusions taken from the preface +and the first pages are the following: “<em>Turkey’s +money is like the hay of the sea.</em>” This +is only a condensation of the two expressions, +“Money like hay,” “Money like the sands of +the sea.” Or: “<em>I am nothing but a leafless pillar +which tells of a vanished splendor</em>,” which +is a fusion of “leafless trunk” and “a pillar +which, etc.” Or: “<em>Where is Ariadne’s thread +which leads out of the Scylla of this Augean +stable?</em>” for which three different Greek myths +contribute an element each.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The modifications and substitutions can be +treated collectively without much forcing; their +character can be seen from the following examples +which are peculiar to Wippchen, they are +regularly permeated by a different wording +which is more fluent, most banal, and reduced +to mere platitudes.</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>To hang my paper and ink high.</em>” The +saying: “To hang one’s bread-basket high,” +expresses metaphorically the idea of placing +one under difficult conditions. But why not +stretch this figure to other material?</p> + +<p class='c008'>“<em>Already in my youth Pegasus was alive in +me.</em>” When the word “pegasus” is replaced +by “the poet,” one can recognize it as an expression +<span class='pageno' id='Page_346'>346</span>often used in autobiographies. Naturally +“pegasus” is not the proper word to +replace the words “the poet,” but it has +thought associations to it and is a high-sounding +word.</p> + +<p class='c008'>From Wippchen’s other numerous productions +some examples can be shown which present +the pure comic. As an example of comic +disillusionment the following can be cited: +“<em>For hours the battle raged, finally it remained +undecisive</em>”; an example of comical +unmasking (of ignorance) is the following: +“<em>Clio, the Medusa of history</em>,” or quotations +like the following: “<i><span lang="la">Habent sua fata morgana.</span></i>” +But our interest is aroused more by +the fusions and modifications because they recall +familiar techniques of wit. We may compare +them to such modification witticisms as +the following: “He has a great future behind +him,” and Lichtenberg’s modification witticisms +such as: “New baths heal well,” etc. Should +Wippchen’s productions having the same technique +be called witticisms, or what distinguishes +them from the latter?</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is surely not difficult to answer this. +Let us remember that wit presents to the +hearer a double face, and forces him to two +different views. In nonsense-witticisms such +as those mentioned last, one view, which considers +<span class='pageno' id='Page_347'>347</span>only the wording, states that they are +nonsense; the other view, which, in obedience +to suggestion, follows the road that leads +through the hearer’s unconscious, finds very +good sense in these witticisms. In Wippchen’s +wit-like productions one of these views of wit +is empty, as if stunted. It is a Janus head +with only one countenance developed. One +would get nowhere should he be tempted to +proceed by means of this technique to the unconscious. +The condensations lead to no case +in which the two fused elements really result +in a new sense; they fall to pieces when an +attempt is made to analyze them. As in wit, +the modifications and substitutions lead to a +current and familiar wording, but they themselves +tell us little else and as a rule nothing +that is of any possible use. Hence the only +thing remaining to these “witticisms” is the +nonsense view. Whether such productions, +which have freed themselves from one of the +most essential characters of wit, should be +called “bad” wit or not wit at all, every one +must decide as he feels inclined.</p> + +<p class='c008'>There is no doubt that such stunted wit produces +a comic effect for which we can account +in more than one way. Either the comic +originates through the uncovering of the unconscious +modes of thinking in a manner similar +<span class='pageno' id='Page_348'>348</span>to the cases considered above, or the wit +originates by comparison with perfect wit. +Nothing prevents us from assuming that we +here deal with a union of both modes of origin +of the comic pleasure. It is not to be denied +that it is precisely the inadequate dependence +on wit which here shapes the nonsense into +comic nonsense.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Comic of Inadequacy</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>There are, of course, other quite apparent +cases, in which such inadequacy produced by +the comparison with wit, makes the nonsense +irresistibly comic. The counterpart to wit, the +riddle, can perhaps give us better examples +for this than wit itself. A facetious question +states: <em>What is this: It hangs on the wall and +one can dry his hands on it? It would be a +foolish riddle if the answer were: a towel. On +the contrary this answer is rejected with the +statement: No, it is a herring,—“But, for +mercy’s sake,” is the objection, “a herring +does not hang on the wall.”—“But you can +hang it there,”—“But who wants to dry his +hands on a herring?”—“Well,” is the soft +answer, “you don’t have to.”</em> This explanation +given through two typical displacements +show how much this question lacks of being a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_349'>349</span>real riddle, and because of this absolute insufficiency +it impresses one as irresistibly comic, +rather than mere nonsensical foolishness. +Through such means, that is, by not restricting +essential conditions, wit, riddles, and other +forms, which in themselves produce no comic +pleasure, can be made into sources of comic +pleasure.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is not so difficult to understand the case +of the involuntary comic of speech which we +can perhaps find realized with as much frequency +as we like in the poems of Frederika +Kempner.<a id='r78'></a><a href='#f78' class='c007'><sup>[78]</sup></a></p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line in8'>ANTI-VIVISECTION.</div> + </div> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>Fraternal sentiment should urge us</div> + <div class='line'>To champion the Guinea-pig,</div> + <div class='line'>For has it not a soul like ours,</div> + <div class='line'>Although most likely not as big?</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c019'>Or a conversation between a loving couple.</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line in12'>THE CONTRAST.</div> + </div> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>The young wife whispers “I’m so happy,”</div> + <div class='line'>“And I!” chimes in her husband’s voice,</div> + <div class='line'>“Because your virtues, dearest help-mate,</div> + <div class='line'>Reveal the wisdom of my choice.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_350'>350</span>There is nothing here which makes one think +of wit. Doubtless, however, it is the inadequacy +of these “poetic productions,” as the very extraordinary +clumsiness of the expressions which +recall the most commonplace or newspaper +style, the ingenious poverty of thoughts, the +absence of every trace of poetic manner of +thinking or speaking,—it is all these inadequacies +which make these poems comic. Nevertheless +it is not at all self-evident that we +should find Kempner’s poems comical; many +similar productions we merely consider very +bad, we do not laugh at them but are rather +vexed with them. But here it is the great disparity +in our demand of a poem which impels +us to the comic conception; where this difference +is less, we are inclined to criticise rather +than laugh. The comic effect of Kempner’s +poetic productions is furthermore assured by +the additional circumstances of the lady author’s +unmistakably good intentions, and by +the fact that her helpless phrases disarm our +feeling of mockery and anger. We are now +reminded of a problem the consideration of +which we have so far postponed. The difference +of expenditure is surely the main condition +of the comic pleasure, but observation +teaches that such difference does not always +produce pleasure. What other conditions must +<span class='pageno' id='Page_351'>351</span>be added, or what disturbances must be +checked in order that pleasure should result +from the difference of expenditure? But before +proceeding with the answers to these +questions we wish to verify what was said in +the conclusions of the former discussion, +namely, that the comic of speech is not synonymous +with wit, and that wit must be something +quite different from speech comic.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As we are about to attack the problem just +formulated, concerning the conditions of the +origin of comic pleasure from the difference of +expenditure, we may permit ourselves to facilitate +this task so as to cause ourselves some +pleasure. To give a correct answer to this +question would amount to an exhaustive +presentation of the nature of the comic for +which we are fitted neither by ability nor authority. +We shall therefore again be content to +elucidate the problem of the comic only +so far as it distinctly separates itself from +wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>All theories of the comic were objected to +by the critics on the ground that in defining +the comic these theories overlooked the essential +element of it. This can be seen from the +following theories, with their objections. The +comic depends on a contrasting idea; yes, in +so far as this contrast effects one comically and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_352'>352</span>in no other way. The feeling of the comic results +from the dwindling away of an expectation; +yes, if the disappointment does not prove +to be painful. There is no doubt that these +objections are justified, but they are overestimated +if one concludes from them that the essential +characteristic mark of the comic has +hitherto escaped our conception. What depreciates +the general validity of these definitions +are conditions which are indispensable for the +origin of the comic pleasure, but which will be +searched in vain for the nature of comic pleasure. +The rejection of the objections and the +explanations of the contradictions to the definitions +of the comic will become easy for us, +only after we trace back comic pleasure to the +difference resulting from a comparison of two +expenditures. Comic pleasure and the effect +by which it is recognized—laughter, can originate +only when this difference is no longer +utilizable and when it is capable of discharge. +We gain no pleasurable effect, or at most a +flighty feeling of pleasure in which the comic +does not appear, if the difference is put to +other use as soon as it is recognized. Just +as special precautions must be taken in wit, +in order to guard against making new use of +expenditure recognized as superfluous, so also +can comic pleasure originate only under relations +<span class='pageno' id='Page_353'>353</span>which fulfil this latter condition. The +cases in which such differences of expenditure +originate in our ideational life are therefore +uncommonly numerous, while the cases in +which the comic originates from them is comparatively +very rare.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Conditions of Isolation of the Comic</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Two observations obtrude themselves upon +the observer who reviews even only superficially +the origin of comic pleasure from the difference +of expenditure; first, that there are cases in +which the comic appears regularly and as if +necessarily; and, in contrast to these cases, +others in which this appearance depends on the +conditions of the case and on the viewpoint of +the observer; but secondly, that unusually +large differences very often triumph over unfavorable +conditions, so that the comic feeling +originates in spite of it. In reference to the +first point one may set up two classes, the inevitable +comic and the accidental comic, although +one will have to be prepared from the +beginning to find exceptions in the first class +to the inevitableness of the comic. It would +be tempting to follow the conditions which are +essential to each class.</p> + +<p class='c008'>What is important in the second class are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_354'>354</span>the conditions of which one may be designated +as the “isolation” of the comic case. A closer +analysis renders conspicuous relations something +like the following:</p> + +<p class='c008'>a) The favorable condition for the origin +of comic pleasure is brought about by a general +happy disposition in which “one is in the +mood for laughing.” In happy toxic states almost +everything seems comic, which probably +results from a comparison with the expenditure +in normal conditions. For wit, the comic, +and all similar methods of gaining pleasure +from the psychic activities, are nothing but +ways to regain this happy state—euphoria—from +one single point, when it does not exist +as a general disposition of the psyche.</p> + +<p class='c008'>b) A similar favorable condition is produced +by the expectation of the comic or by +putting one’s self in the right mood for comic +pleasure. Hence when the intention to make +things comical exists and when this feeling is +shared by others, the differences required are +so slight that they probably would have been +overlooked had they been experienced in unpremeditated +occurrences. He who decides to +attend a comic lecture or a farce at the theater +is indebted to this intention for laughing over +things which in his everyday life would hardly +produce in him a comic effect. He finally +<span class='pageno' id='Page_355'>355</span>laughs at the recollection of having laughed, at +the expectation of laughing, and at the appearance +of the one who is to present the comic, +even before the latter makes the attempt to +make him laugh. It is for this reason that +people admit that they are ashamed of that +which made them laugh at the theater.</p> + +<p class='c008'>c) Unfavorable conditions for the comic result +from the kind of psychic activity which +may occupy the individual at the moment. +Imaginative or mental activity tending towards +serious aims disturbs the discharging capacity +of the investing energies which the activity +needs for its own displacements, so that only +unexpected and great differences of expenditure +can break through to form comic pleasure. +All manner of mental processes far +enough removed from the obvious to cause a +suspension of ideational mimicry are unfavorable +to the comic; in abstract contemplation +there is hardly any room left for the comic, +except when this form of thinking is suddenly +interrupted.</p> + +<p class='c008'>d) The occasion for releasing comic pleasure +vanishes when the attention is fixed on the +comparison capable of giving rise to the comic. +Under such circumstances the comic force is +lost from that which is otherwise sure to produce +a comic effect. A movement or a mental +<span class='pageno' id='Page_356'>356</span>activity cannot become comical to him whose +interest is fixed at the time of comparing this +movement with a standard which distinctly +presents itself to him. Thus the examiner does +not see the comical in the nonsense produced +by the student in his ignorance; he is simply +annoyed by it, whereas the offender’s classmates +who are more interested in his chances +of passing the examination than in what he +knows, laugh heartily over the same nonsense. +The teacher of dancing or gymnastics seldom +has any eyes for the comic movements of his +pupils, and the preacher entirely loses sight of +humanity’s defects of character, which the +writer of comedy brings out with so much effect. +The comic process cannot stand examination +by the attention, it must be able to proceed +absolutely unnoticed in a manner similar +to wit. But for good reasons, it would contradict +the nomenclature of “conscious processes” +which I have used in <cite>The Interpretation +of Dreams</cite>, if one wished to call it of +necessity <em>unconscious</em>. It rather belongs to +the <em>foreconscious</em>, and one may use the fitting +name “automatic” for all those processes +which are enacted in the foreconscious and +dispense with the attention energy which is +connected with consciousness. The process +of comparison of the expenditures must remain +<span class='pageno' id='Page_357'>357</span>automatic if it is to produce comic +pleasure.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Conditions Disturbing the Discharge</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>e) It is exceedingly disturbing to the comic +if the case from which it originates gives rise +at the same time to a marked release of affect. +The discharge of the affective difference +is then as a rule excluded. Affects, disposition, +and the attitude of the individual in occasional +cases make it clear that the comic comes or +goes with the viewpoint of the individual person; +that only in exceptional cases is there an +absolute comic. The dependence or relativity +of the comic is therefore much greater than +of wit, which never happens but is regularly +made, and at its production one may already +give attention to the conditions under which +it finds acceptance. But affective development +is the most intensive of the conditions which +disturb the comic, the significance of which is +well known.<a id='r79'></a><a href='#f79' class='c007'><sup>[79]</sup></a> It is therefore said that the +comic feeling comes most in tolerably indifferent +cases which evince no strong feelings or +interests. Nevertheless it is just in cases with +affective release that one may witness the production +of a particularly strong expenditure-difference +<span class='pageno' id='Page_358'>358</span>in the automatism of discharge. +When Colonel Butler answers Octavio’s admonitions +with “bitter laughter,” exclaiming:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“Thanks from the house of Austria!”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c019'>his bitterness has thus not prevented the laughter +which results from the recollection of the +disappointment which he believes he has experienced; +and on the other hand, the magnitude +of this disappointment could not have been +more impressively depicted by the poet than +by showing it capable of affecting laughter in +the midst of the storm of unchained affects. +It is my belief that this explanation may be +applicable in all cases in which laughing occurs +on other than pleasurable occasions, and in +conjunction with exceedingly painful or tense +affects.</p> + +<p class='c008'>f) If we also mention that the development +of the comic pleasure can be promoted by +means of any other pleasurable addition to the +case which acts like a sort of contact-effect +(after the manner of the fore-pleasure principle +in the tendency-wit), then we have discussed +surely not all the conditions of comic +pleasure, yet enough of them to serve our purpose. +We then see that no other assumption +so easily covers these conditions, as well as the +inconstancy and dependence of the comic effect, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_359'>359</span>as this: the assumption that comic pleasure +is derived from the discharge of a difference, +which under many conditions can be diverted +to a different use than discharge.</p> + +<p class='c006'>It still remains to give a thorough consideration +of the comic of the sexual and obscene, +but we shall only skim over it with a few observations. +Here, too, we shall take the act +of exposing one’s body as the starting-point. +An accidental exposure produces a comical +effect on us, because we compare the ease with +which we attained the enjoyment of this view +with the great expenditure otherwise necessary +for the attainment of this object. The case +thus comes nearer to the naïve-comic, but it is +simpler than the latter. In every case of exhibitionism +in which we are made spectators—or, +in the case of the smutty joke hearers,—we +play the part of the third person, and the +person exposed is made comical. We have +heard that it is the purpose of wit to replace +obscenity and in this manner to reopen a +source of comic pleasure that has been lost. +On the contrary, spying out an exposure forms +no example of the comic for the one spying, +because the effort he exerts thereby abrogates +the condition of comic pleasure; the only thing +remaining is the sexual pleasure in what is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_360'>360</span>seen. If the spy relates to another what he +has seen, the person looked at again becomes +comical, because the viewpoint that predominates +is that the expenditure was omitted +which would have been necessary for the concealment +of the private parts. At all events, +the sphere of the sexual or obscene offers the +richest opportunities for gaining comic pleasure +beside the pleasurable sexual stimulation, +as it exposes the person’s dependence on his +physical needs (degradation) or it can uncover +behind the spiritual love the physical demands +of the same (unmasking.)</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Psychogenesis of the Comic</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>An invitation to seek the understanding of +the comic in its psychogenesis comes surprisingly +from Bergson’s well written and +stimulating book <em>Laughter</em>. Bergson, whose +formula for the conception of the comic character +has already become known to us—“mechanization +of life,” “the substitution of +something mechanical for the natural”—reaches +by obvious associations from automatism +to the automaton, and seeks to trace +a series of comic effects to the blurred memories +of children’s toys. In this connection he once +reaches this viewpoint, which, to be sure, he soon +<span class='pageno' id='Page_361'>361</span>drops; he seeks to trace the comic to the after-effect +of childish pleasure. “Perhaps we +ought even to carry simplification still farther, +and, going back to our earliest recollection, +try to discover in the games that amused us +as children the first faint traces of the combinations +that make us laugh as grown-up +persons.”... “Above all, we are too apt +to ignore the childish element, so to speak, +latent in most of our joyful emotions” (p. 67). +As we have now traced wit to that childish +playing with words and thoughts which is +prohibited by the rational critic, we must be +tempted to trace also these infantile roots of +the comic, conjectured by Bergson.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As a matter of fact we meet a whole series +of conditions which seem most promising, when +we examine the relation of the comic to the +child. The child itself does not by any means +seem comic to us, although its character fulfills +all conditions which, in comparison to our own, +would result in a comic difference. Thus we +see the immoderate expenditure of motion as +well as the slight psychic expenditure, the control +of the psychic activities through bodily +functions, and other features. The child gives +us a comic impression only when it does not +behave as a child but as an earnest grown-up, +and even then it affects us only in the same +<span class='pageno' id='Page_362'>362</span>manner as other persons in disguise; but as +long as it retains the nature of the child our +perception of it furnishes us a pure pleasure, +which perhaps recalls the comic. We call it +naïve in so far as it displays to us the absence +of inhibitions, and we call naïve-comic those of +its utterances which in another we would have +considered obscene or witty.</p> + +<p class='c008'>On the other hand the child lacks all feeling +for the comic. This sentence seems to say +no more than that this comic feeling, like many +others, first makes its appearance in the course +of psychic development; and that would by no +means be remarkable, especially since we must +admit that it shows itself distinctly even during +years which must be accredited to childhood. +Nevertheless it can be demonstrated +that the assertion that the child lacks feeling +for the comic has a deeper meaning than one +would suppose. In the first place it will readily +be seen that it cannot be different, if our +conception is correct, that the comic feeling results +from a difference of expenditure produced +in the effort to understand the other. +Let us again take comic motion as an example. +The comparison which furnishes the difference +reads as follows, when put in conscious formulæ: +“So he does it,” and: “So I would do +it,” or “So I have done it.” But the child +<span class='pageno' id='Page_363'>363</span>lacks the standard contained in the second +sentence, it understands simply through imitation; +it just does it. Education of the child +furnishes it with the standard: “So you shall +do it,” and if it now makes use of the same +in comparisons, the nearest conclusion is: “He +has not done it right, and I can do it better.” +In this case it laughs at the other, it laughs +at him with a feeling of superiority. There +is nothing to prevent us from tracing this +laughter also to a difference of expenditure; +but according to the analogy with the examples +of laughter occurring in us we may conclude +that the comic feeling is not experienced +by the child when it laughs as an expression +of superiority. It is a laughter of pure pleasure. +In our own case whenever the judgment +of our own superiority occurs we smile rather +than laugh, or if we laugh, we are still able +to distinguish clearly this conscious realization +of our superiority from the comic which makes +us laugh.</p> + +<p class='c008'>It is probably correct to say that in many +cases which we perceive as “comical” and +which we cannot explain, the child laughs out +of pure pleasure, whereas the child’s motives +are clear and assignable. If, for instance, +some one slips on the street and falls, we laugh +because this impression—we know not why—is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_364'>364</span>comical. The child laughs in the same case +out of a feeling of superiority or out of joy +over the calamity of others. It amounts to +saying: “You fell, but I did not.” Certain +pleasure motives of the child seems to be lost +for us grown-ups, but as a substitute for these +we perceive under the same conditions the +“comic” feeling.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Infantile and the Comic</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>If we were permitted to generalize, it would +seem very tempting to transfer the desired +specific character of the comic into the awakening +of the infantile, and to conceive the +comic as a regaining of “lost infantile laughing.” +One could then say, “I laugh every time +over a difference of expenditure between the +other and myself, when I discover in the other +the child.” Or expressed more precisely, the +whole comparison leading to the comic would +read as follows:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“He does it this way—I do it differently—</div> + <div class='line'>He does it just as I did when I was a child.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>This laughter would thus result every time +from the comparison between the ego of the +grown-up and the ego of the child. The uncertainty +itself of the comic difference, causing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_365'>365</span>now the lesser and now the greater expenditure +to appear comical to me, would correspond +to the infantile determination; the comic +therein is actually always on the side of the infantile.</p> + +<p class='c008'>This is not contradicted by the fact that the +child itself as an object of comparison does not +make a comic impression on me but a purely +pleasurable one, nor by the fact that this comparison +with the infantile produces a comic +effect only when any other use of the difference +is avoided. For the conditions of the +discharge come thereby into consideration. +Everything that confines a psychic process in +an association of ideas works against the discharge +of the surplus occupation of energy +and directs the same to other utilization; whatever +isolates a psychic act favors the discharge. +By consciously focussing on the child as the +person of comparison, the discharge necessary +for the production of comic pleasure therefore +becomes impossible; only in foreconscious energetic +states is there a similar approach to the +isolation which we may moreover also ascribe +to the psychic processes in the child. The addition +to the comparison: “Thus I have also +done it as a child,” from which the comic effect +would emanate, could come into consideration +for the average difference only when no +<span class='pageno' id='Page_366'>366</span>other association could obtain control over the +freed surplus.</p> + +<p class='c008'>If we still continue with our attempt to find +the nature of the comic in the foreconscious +association of the infantile, we have to go a +step further than Bergson and admit that the +comparison resulting in the comic need not +necessarily awake old childish pleasure and +play, but that it is enough if it touches the +childish nature in general, perhaps even childish +pain. Herein we deviate from Bergson, +but remain consistent with ourselves, when we +connect the comic pleasure not with remembered +pleasure but always with a comparison. +This is possible, for cases of the first kind comprise +in a measure those which are regularly +and irresistibly comic. Let us now draw up +the scheme of the comic possibilities instanced +above. We stated that the comic difference +would be found either</p> + +<p class='c008'>(a) through a comparison between the other +and one’s self, or (b) through a comparison altogether +within the other, or (c) through a +comparison altogether within one’s self.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In the first case the other would appear to +me as a child, in the second he would put himself +on the level of a child, and in the third I +would find the child in myself. To the first +class belong the comic of movement and of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_367'>367</span>forms, of psychic activity and of character. +The infantile corresponding to it would be the +motion-impulse and the inferior mental and +moral development of the child, so that the fool +would perhaps become comical to me by reminding +me of a lazy child, and the bad person +by reminding me of a naughty child. +The only time one might speak of a childish +pleasure lost to grown-ups would be where the +child’s own motion pleasure came into consideration.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The second case, in which the comic altogether +depends on identification with the other, +comprises numerous possibilities such as the +comic situation, exaggeration (caricature), imitation, +degradation, and unmasking. It is +under this head that the presentation of infantile +viewpoints mostly take place. For the +comic situation is largely based on embarrassment, +in which we feel again the helplessness +of the child. The worst of these embarrassments, +the disturbance of other activities +through the imperative demands of natural +wants, corresponds to the child’s lack of control +of the physical functions. Where the +comic situation acts through repetitions it is +based on the pleasure of constant repetition +peculiar to the child (asking questions, telling +stories), through which it makes itself a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_368'>368</span>nuisance to grown-ups. Exaggeration, which +also affords pleasure even to the grown-up in +so far as it is justified by his reason, corresponds +to the characteristic want of moderation +in the child, and its ignorance of all quantitative +relations which it later really learns to +know as qualitative. To keep within bounds, +to practice moderation even in permissible feelings +is a late fruit of education, and is gained +through opposing inhibitions of the psychic +activity acquired in the same association. +Wherever this association is weakened as in the +unconscious of dreams and in the monoideation +of the psychoneuroses, the want of moderation +of the child again makes its appearance.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The understanding of comic imitation has +caused us many difficulties so long as we left +out of consideration the infantile factor. But +imitation is the child’s best art and is the impelling +motive of most of its playing. The +child’s ambition is not so much to distinguish +himself among his equals as to imitate the big +fellows. The relation of the child to the +grown-up determines also the comic of degradation, +which corresponds to the lowering of the +grown-up in the life of the child. Few things +can afford the child greater pleasure than when +the grown-up lowers himself to its level, disregards +his superiority, and plays with the child +<span class='pageno' id='Page_369'>369</span>as its equal. The alleviation which furnishes +the child pure pleasure is a debasement used by +the adult as a means of making things comic +and as a source of comic pleasure. As for unmasking +we know that it is based on degradation.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The infantile determination of the third case, +the comic of expectation, presents most of the +difficulties; this really explains why those authors +who put this case to the foreground in +their conception of the comic, found no occasion +to consider the infantile factor in their +studies of the comic. The comic of expectation +is farthest from the child’s thoughts, the +ability to understand this is the latest quality +to appear in him. Most of those cases which +produce a comic effect in the grown-up are +probably felt by the child as a disappointment. +One can refer, however, to the blissful expectation +and gullibility of the child in order +to understand why one considers himself as +comical “as a child,” when he succumbs to +comic disappointment.</p> + +<p class='c008'>If the preceding remarks produce a certain +probability that the comic feeling may be +translated into the thought; everything is comic +that does not fit the grown-up, I still do not +feel bold enough,—in view of my whole position +to the problem of the comic—to defend +<span class='pageno' id='Page_370'>370</span>this last proposition with the same earnestness +as those that I formulated before. I am unable +to decide whether the lowering to the level +of the child is only a special case of comic +degradation, or whether everything comical +fundamentally depends on the degradation to +the level of the child.<a id='r80'></a><a href='#f80' class='c007'><sup>[80]</sup></a></p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Humor</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>An examination of the comic, however superficial +it may be, would be most incomplete if +it did not devote at least a few remarks to the +consideration of <em>humor</em>. There is so little +doubt as to the essential relationship between +the two that a tentative explanation of the +comic must furnish at least one component for +the understanding of humor. It does not matter +how much appropriate and important material +was presented as an appreciation of humor, +which, as one of the highest psychic functions, +enjoys the special favor of thinkers, we +still cannot elude the temptation to express +its essence through an approach to the formulæ +given for wit and the comic.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_371'>371</span>We have heard that the release of painful +emotions is the strongest hindrance to the +comic effect. Just as aimless motion causes +harm, stupidity mischief, and disappointment +pain;—the possibility of a comic effect eventually +ends, at least for him who cannot defend +himself against such pain, who is himself affected +by it or must participate in it, whereas +the disinterested party shows by his behavior +that the situation of the case in question contains +everything necessary to produce comic +effect. Humor is thus a means to gain pleasure +despite the painful affects which disturb +it; it acts as a substitute for this affective development, +and takes its place. If we are in +a situation which tempts us to liberate painful +affects according to our habits, and motives +then urge us to suppress these affects <i><span lang="la">statu +nascendi</span></i>, we have the conditions for humor. +In the cases just cited the person affected by +misfortune, pain, etc., could obtain humoristic +pleasure while the disinterested party laughs +over the comic pleasure. We can only say that +the pleasure of humor results at the cost of +this discontinued liberation of affect; it originates +through the <em>economized expenditure of +affect</em>.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_372'>372</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>The Economy in Expenditure of Affect</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>Humor is the most self-sufficient of the +forms of the comic; its process consummating +itself in one single person and the participation +of another adds nothing new to it. I can +enjoy the pleasure of humor originating in myself +without feeling the necessity of imparting +it to another. It is not easy to tell what happens +dining the production of humoristic pleasure +in a person; but one gains a certain insight +by investigating these cases of humor +which have emanated from persons with whom +we have entered into a sympathetic understanding. +By sympathetically understanding +the humoristic person in these cases one gets +the same pleasure. The coarsest form of humor, +the so-called humor of the gallows or +grim-humor (<i><span lang="no">Galgenhumor</span></i>), may enlighten +us in this regard. The rogue, on being led to +execution on Monday, remarked: “Yes, this +week is beginning well.” This is really a witticism, +as the remark is quite appropriate in itself, +on the other hand it is displaced in the +most nonsensical fashion, as there can be no +further happening for him this week. But it +required humor to make such wit, that is, to +overlook what distinguished the beginning of +this week from other weeks, and to deny the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_373'>373</span>difference which could give rise to motives for +very particular emotional feelings. The case +is the same when on the way to the gallows he +requests a neckerchief for his bare neck, in +order to guard against taking cold, a precaution +which would be quite praiseworthy under +different circumstances, but becomes exceedingly +superfluous and indifferent in view of +the impending fate of this same neck. We +must say that there is something like greatness +of soul in this <em>blague</em>, in this clinging to his +usual nature and in deviating from that which +would overthrow and drive this nature into +despair. This form of grandeur of humor thus +appears unmistakably in cases in which our +admiration is not inhibited by the circumstances +of the humoristic person.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In Victor Hugo’s <cite>Ernani</cite> the bandit who +entered into a conspiracy against his king, +Charles I, of Spain, (Charles V, as the German +Emperor), falls into the hands of his +most powerful enemy; he foresees his fate; as +one convicted of high treason his head will +fall. But this prospect does not deter him +from introducing himself as a hereditary +Grandee of Spain and from declaring that he +has no intention of waiving any prerogative +belonging to such personage. A Grandee of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_374'>374</span>Spain could appear before his royal master +with his head covered. Well:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c018'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>“<span lang="fr">Nos têtes ont le droit</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="fr">De tomber couvertes devant de toi.</span>”<a id='r81'></a><a href='#f81' class='c007'><sup>[81]</sup></a></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c019'>This is excellent humor and if we do not laugh +on hearing it, it is because our admiration covers +the humoristic pleasure. In the case of the +rogue who did not wish to take cold on the +way to the gallows we roar with laughter. +The situation which should have driven this +criminal to despair, might have evoked in us +intense pity, but this pity is inhibited because +we understand that he who is most concerned +is quite indifferent to the situation. As a result +of this understanding the expenditure for +pity, which was already prepared in us, became +inapplicable and we laughed it off. The indifference +of the rogue, which we notice has +cost him a great expenditure of psychic labor, +infects us as it were.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Economy of sympathy is one of the most +frequent sources of humoristic pleasure. +Mark Twain’s humor usually follows this +mechanism. When he tells us about the life of +his brother, how, as mi employee in a large +road-building enterprise, he was hurled into +the air through a premature explosion of a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_375'>375</span>blast, to come to earth again far from the place +where he was working, feelings of sympathy +for this unfortunate are invariably aroused in +us. We should like to inquire whether he sustained +no injury in this accident; but the continuation +of the story that the brother lost a +half-day’s pay for being away from the place +he worked diverts us entirely from sympathy +and makes us almost as hard-hearted as that +employer, and just as indifferent to the possible +injury to the victim’s health. Another time +Mark Twain presents us his pedigree, which he +traces back almost as far back as one of the +companions of Columbus. But after describing +the character of this ancestor, whose entire +possessions consisted of several pieces of linen +each bearing a different mark, we cannot help +laughing at the expense of the stored-up piety, +a piety which characterized our frame of mind +at the beginning of this family history. The +mechanism of humoristic pleasure is not disturbed +by our knowing that this family history +is a fictitious one, and that this fiction serves +a satirical tendency to expose the embellishments +which result in imparting such pedigrees +to others; it is just as independent of the conditions +of reality as the manufactured comic. +Another of Mark Twain’s stories relates how +his brother constructed for himself subterranean +<span class='pageno' id='Page_376'>376</span>quarters into which he brought a bed, a +table, and a lamp, and that as a roof he used +a large piece of sail-cloth with a hole through +the centre; how during the night after the +room was completed, a cow being driven home +fell through the opening in the ceiling on to +the table and extinguished the lamp; how his +brother helped patiently to hoist the animal out +and to rearrange everything; how he did the +same thing when the same disturbance was repeated +the following night; and then every +succeeding night; such a story becomes comical +through repetition. But Mark Twain +closes with the information that in the forty-sixth +night when the cow again fell through, +his brother finally remarked that the thing was +beginning to grow monotonous; and here we +can no longer restrain our humoristic pleasure, +for we had long expected to hear how the +brother would express his anger over this +chronic <i><span lang="fr">malheur</span></i>. The slight humor which we +draw from our own life we usually produce at +the expense of anger instead of irritating ourselves.<a id='r82'></a><a href='#f82' class='c007'><sup>[82]</sup></a></p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_377'>377</span> + <h4 class='c016'><em>Forms of Humor</em></h4> +</div> + +<p class='c017'>The forms of humor are extraordinarily +varied according to the nature of the emotional +feelings which are economized in favor of humor, +as sympathy, anger, pain, compassion, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_378'>378</span>etc. And this series seems incomplete because +the sphere of humor experiences a constant enlargement, +as often as an artist or writer succeeds +in mastering humoristically the, as yet, +unconquered emotional feelings and in making +them, through artifices similar to those in the +above example, a source of humoristic pleasure. +Thus the artists of <i><span lang="la">Simplicissimus</span></i> +have worked wonders in gaining humor at the +expense of fear and disgust. The manifestations +of humor are above all determined by two +peculiarities, which are connected with the conditions +of its origin. In the first place, humor +may appear fused with wit or any other form +of the comic; whereby it is entrusted with the +task of removing a possible emotional development +which would form a hindrance to the +pleasurable effect. Secondly, it can entirely +set aside this emotional development or only +partially, which is really the more frequent +case, because the simpler function and the different +forms of “broken”<a id='r83'></a><a href='#f83' class='c007'><sup>[83]</sup></a> humor, results in +that humor which smiles under its tears. It +withdraws from the affect a part of its energy +and gives instead the accompanying humoristic +sound.</p> + +<p class='c008'>As may be noticed by former examples the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_379'>379</span>humoristic pleasure gained by entering into +sympathy with a thing results from a special +technique resembling displacement through +which the liberation of affect held ready is disappointed +and the energy occupation is deflected +to other, and, not often, to secondary +matters. This does not help us, however, to +understand the process by which the displacement +from the development of affect proceeds +in the humoristic person himself. We see that +the recipient intimates the producer of the +humor in his psychic processes, but we +discover nothing thereby concerning the +forces which make this process possible in +the latter.</p> + +<p class='c008'>We can only say, when, for example, somebody +succeeds in paying no heed to a painful +affect because he holds before himself the +greatness of the world’s interest as a contrast +to his own smallness, that we see in this no +function of humor but one of philosophic +thinking, and we gain no pleasure even if we +put ourselves into his train of thought. The +humoristic displacement is therefore just as +impossible in the light of conscious attention as +is the comic comparison; like the latter it is +connected with the condition to remain in the +foreconscious—that is to say, to remain automatic.</p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_380'>380</span>One reaches some solution of humoristic displacement +if one examines it in the light of a +defense process. The defense processes are +the psychic correlates of the flight reflex and +follow the task of guarding against the origin +of pain from inner sources; in fulfilling this +task they serve the psychic function as an +automatic adjustment, which finally proves +harmful and therefore must be subjected to +the control of the conscious thinking. A +definite form of this defense, the failure of repression, +I have demonstrated as the effective +mechanism in the origin of the psychoneuroses. +Humor can now be conceived as the loftiest +variant of this defense activity. It disdains to +withdraw from conscious attention the ideas +which are connected with the painful affect, as +repression does, and thus it overcomes the defense +automatism. It brings this about by +finding the means to withdraw the energy resulting +from the liberation of pain which is held +in readiness and through discharge changes the +same into pleasure. It is even credible that it is +again the connection with the infantile that +puts at humor’s disposal the means for this +function. Only in childhood did we experience +intensively painful affects over which to-day as +grown-ups we would laugh; just as a humorist +laughs over his present painful affects. The +<span class='pageno' id='Page_381'>381</span>elevation of his ego, of which humoristic displacement +gives evidence,—the translation of +which would read: I am too big to have these +causes affect me painfully—he could find in +the comparison of his present ego with his infantile +ego. This conception is to some extent +confirmed by the rôle which falls to the infantile +in the neurotic processes of repression.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>The Relation of Humor to Wit and Comic</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>On the whole humor is closer to the comic +than wit. Like the former its psychic localization +is in the foreconscious, whereas wit, +as we had to assume, is formed as a compromise +between the unconscious and the foreconscious. +On the other hand, humor has no share +in the peculiar nature in which wit and the +comic meet, a peculiarity which perhaps we have +not hitherto emphasized strongly enough. It +is a condition for the origin of the comic that +we be induced to apply—either <em>simultaneously</em> +or in rapid succession—to the same thought +function two different modes of ideas, between +which the “comparison” then takes place and +thus forms the comic difference. Such differences +originate between the expenditure of the +stranger and one’s own, between the usual expenditure +and the emergency expenditure, between +<span class='pageno' id='Page_382'>382</span>an anticipated expenditure and one +which has already occurred.<a id='r84'></a><a href='#f84' class='c007'><sup>[84]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'>The difference between two forms of conception +resulting simultaneously, which work with +different expenditures, comes into consideration +in wit, in respect to the hearer. The one +of these two conceptions, by taking the hints +contained in the witticism, follows the train of +thought through the unconscious, while the +other conception remains on the surface and +presents the witticism like any wording from +the foreconscious which has become conscious. +Perhaps it would not be considered an unjustified +statement if we should refer the pleasure +of the witticism heard to the difference between +these two forms of presentation.</p> + +<p class='c008'>Concerning wit we here repeat our former +statement concerning its Janus-like double-facedness, +a simile we used when the relation +between wit and the comic still appeared to us +unsettled.<a id='r85'></a><a href='#f85' class='c007'><sup>[85]</sup></a></p> + +<p class='c008'><span class='pageno' id='Page_383'>383</span>The character thus put into the foreground +becomes indistinct when we deal with humor. +To be sure, we feel the humoristic pleasure +where an emotional feeling is evaded, which we +might have expected as a pleasure usually belonging +to the situation; and in so far humor +really falls under the broadened conception of +the comic of expectation. But in humor it is +no longer a question of two different kinds of +presentations having the same content; the +fact that the situation comes under the domination +of a painful emotional feeling which +should have been avoided, puts an end to possible +comparison with the nature in the comic +and in wit. The humoristic displacement is +really a case of that different kind of utilization +of a freed expenditure which proved to +be so dangerous for the comic effect.</p> + +<h4 class='c016'><em>Formulæ for Wit, Comic, and Humor</em></h4> + +<p class='c017'>Now, that we have reduced the mechanism +of humoristic pleasure to a formula analogous +<span class='pageno' id='Page_384'>384</span>to the formula of comic pleasure and of wit, +we are at the end of our task. It has seemed +to us that the pleasure of wit originates from +an <em>economy of expenditure in inhibition</em>, of +the comic from an <em>economy of expenditure in +thought</em>, and of humor from an <em>economy of expenditure +in feeling</em>. All three activities of +our psychic apparatus derive pleasure from +economy. They all strive to bring back from +the psychic activity a pleasure which has really +been lost in the development of this activity. +For the euphoria which we are thus striving +to obtain is nothing but the state of a bygone +time in which we were wont to defray our +psychic work with slight expenditure. It is +the state of our childhood in which we did not +know the comic, were incapable of wit, and did +not need humor to make us happy.</p> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_385'>385</span> + <h2 class='c005'>INDEX</h2> +</div> + +<ul class='index c002'> + <li class='center'>A</li> + <li class='c020'>Abstract wit, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Absurdity, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Actuality, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Æsthetics, <a href='#Page_vi'>vi</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Agassiz, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Aggression, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Alluring-premiums, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Allusions, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Ambiguity, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Ambitious impulse, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Application of same material, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Aristotle, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Attributions, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Automatic process, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Automatisms, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page_358'>358</a></li> + <li class='center'>B</li> + <li class='c020'>Bain, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_322'>322</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Bergson, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>, <a href='#Page_360'>360</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Blasphemous witticisms, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Bleuler, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a></li> + <li class='c020'><em>Bonmot</em>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Brevity, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Brill, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a></li> + <li class='center'>C</li> + <li class='c020'>Caricature, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_320'>320</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Censor, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Characterization-wit, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Child, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_309'>309</a>, <a href='#Page_362'>362</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Childhood, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Comic, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a> + <ul> + <li>element, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a></li> + <li>façade, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a></li> + <li>its origin, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a></li> + <li>its psychogenesis, <a href='#Page_360'>360</a></li> + <li>of expectation, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a></li> + <li>of imitation, <a href='#Page_336'>336</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Comic, of speech, <a href='#Page_345'>345</a> + <ul> + <li>motion, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></li> + <li>pleasure, its origin, <a href='#Page_351'>351</a></li> + <li>situations, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Comical character, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Comparison, <a href='#Page_113'>113</a> + <ul> + <li>with unification, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Composition, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Condensation, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a> + <ul> + <li>examples of, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a></li> + <li>in dreams, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_256'>256</a></li> + <li>with modification and substitution, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Conflict, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Contrast, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Critical witticisms, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Cynical tendency, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a> + <ul> + <li>witticisms and self-criticism, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Cynicism, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a> + <ul> + <li>pessimistic, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='center'>D</li> + <li class='c020'>Darwin, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Defence, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a> + <ul> + <li>reaction, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Derision, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></li> + <li class='c020'>De Quincey, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Disguise, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Displacement, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a> + <ul> + <li>in dreams, <a href='#Page_256'>256</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Displacement-wit, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Don Quixote, <a href='#Page_377'>377</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Double meaning, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a> + <ul> + <li>and displacement, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a></li> + <li>of a name, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Doubt in witty comparisons, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Dream-formation, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Dream-work, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Dreams, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Dugas, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></li> + <li class='c020 center'><span class='pageno' id='Page_386'>386</span>E</li> + <li class='c020'>Economy, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a> + <ul> + <li>of psychic expenditure, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Ehrenfels, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Exaggeration, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Exhibitionism, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a></li> + <li class='center'>F</li> + <li class='c020'>Façade, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Facetious questions, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Falke, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Falstaff, Sir John, <a href='#Page_376'>376</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Faulty thinking, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Fechner, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Fischer, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Flaubert, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Foreconscious, <a href='#Page_282'>282</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Fore-pleasure, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + <li class='center'>G</li> + <li class='c020'>Goethe, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Grim-humor, <a href='#Page_372'>372</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Groos, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Gross, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a></li> + <li class='center'>H</li> + <li class='c020'>Harmless wit, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a> + <ul> + <li>and tendency-wit, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Heine, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <a href='#Page_341'>341</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Heymans, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Holmes, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Hugo, <a href='#Page_373'>373</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Humor, <a href='#Page_370'>370</a> + <ul> + <li>Mark Twain’s, <a href='#Page_374'>374</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='center'>I</li> + <li class='c020'>Imitations, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_322'>322</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Impulse to impart wit, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Indirect expression, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a> + <ul> + <li>with allusion, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Infantile and the comic, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Inhibitions, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a> + <ul> + <li>expenditure of, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Insults, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Invectives, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Ironical wit, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Irony, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a></li> + <li class='center'>J</li> + <li class='c020'>Jest, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Johnson, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Jokes, cynical, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a> + <ul> + <li>good or poor, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a></li> + <li>Jewish, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></li> + <li>smutty, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='center'>K</li> + <li class='c020'>Kant, <a href='#Page_320'>320</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Kleinpaul, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Kraepelin, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a></li> + <li class='center'>L</li> + <li class='c020'>Lassalle, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Laugh, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Laughter as a discharge, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a> + <ul> + <li>its determination, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Lessing, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Libido, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Lichtenberg, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Lipps, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>, <a href='#Page_320'>320</a>, <a href='#Page_326'>326</a></li> + <li class='center'>M</li> + <li class='c020'>Manifold application, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Matthews, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Michelet, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Modification, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Moll, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Morality, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Motives, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> + <li class='center'>N</li> + <li class='c020'>Naïve, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a> + <ul> + <li>characteristics of, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a></li> + <li>examples of, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'><span class='pageno' id='Page_387'>387</span>Negativism, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Nestroy, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_341'>341</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Nonsense, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Nonsense-witticisms, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a></li> + <li class='center'>O</li> + <li class='c020'>Obscene wit, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Obscenity, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Omission, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Outdoing wit, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a></li> + <li class='center'>P</li> + <li class='c020'>Parody, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Pascal, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Paul, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Persons in tendency-wit, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Perversion, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Phillips, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Play, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> + <ul> + <li>and jest, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a></li> + <li>on words, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Playing with words, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Pleasure in nonsense, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a> + <ul> + <li>mechanisms of wit, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a></li> + <li>sources, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Psychic energy, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Psychoneuroses, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Puns, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a></li> + <li class='center'>R</li> + <li class='c020'>Recognition, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Regression, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Representation through the opposite, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a> + <ul> + <li>through the minute, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Repression, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Riddle, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Rousseau, J. B., <a href='#Page_91'>91</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Rousseau, J. J., <a href='#Page_33'>33</a></li> + <li class='center'>S</li> + <li class='c020'>Sancho Panza, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Satire, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Schnitzler, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Sense in nonsense, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Sexual elements, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Shakespeare, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Shake-up rhymes, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Sky-larking, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Smutty jokes, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Society, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Sophism, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Sophistic displacement, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a> + <ul> + <li>faulty thinking, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Soulié, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Sound, similarity, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Spencer, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Spinoza, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Stettenheim, <a href='#Page_343'>343</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Subjective determinations, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Substitutive formation, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a></li> + <li class='center'>T</li> + <li class='c020'>Tendencies of wit, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Tendency to economy, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Tendency-wit, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a> + <ul> + <li>its effect, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Thought-wit, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a> + <ul> + <li>its techniques, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Travesty, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a></li> + <li class='center'>U</li> + <li class='c020'>Ueberhorst, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Unconscious, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a> + <ul> + <li>and the infantile, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Unification, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Unmasking, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a></li> + <li class='center'>V</li> + <li class='c020'>Vischer, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Voltaire, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a></li> + <li class='center'>W</li> + <li class='c020'>Winslow, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Wish fulfilment, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Wit, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a> + <ul> + <li>and comic, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a></li> + <li><span class='pageno' id='Page_388'>388</span>and dreams, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a></li> + <li>and rebellion against authority, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a></li> + <li>as an inspiration, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a></li> + <li>as a social process, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + <li>by word-division, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></li> + <li>definitions of, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a></li> + <li>desire to impart it, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> + <li>double-facedness of, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></li> + <li>harmless, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a></li> + <li>hostile and obscene, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a></li> + <li>in the service of tendencies, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a></li> + <li>ironical, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a></li> + <li>its motives, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a></li> + <li>its subjective determinations, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a></li> + <li>its tendencies, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Wit, literature of, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a> + <ul> + <li>outdoing, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a></li> + <li>pleasure mechanisms of, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a></li> + <li>psychogenesis of, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a></li> + <li>shallow, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a></li> + <li>skeptical, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a></li> + <li>technique of, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Wit-work, its formula, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Witticism and riddle, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a> + <ul> + <li>critical, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c020'>Witticisms, blasphemous, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Witty nonsense, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Woman, unyieldingness of, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Word-division, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Word-pleasure, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a></li> + <li class='c020'>Word-wit, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a></li> +</ul> + +<hr class='c021'> +<div class='footnote' id='f1'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r1'>1</a>. Monograph Series, Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases +Pub. Co., 2nd Ed., 1912.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f2'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r2'>2</a>. Monograph Series, Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases +Pub. Co., 2nd Ed., 1916.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f3'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r3'>3</a>. The Macmillan Co., New York, and Allen & Unwin, London.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f4'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r4'>4</a>. The Macmillan Co., New York, and T. Fisher Unwin, London.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f5'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r5'>5</a>. This expression is used advisedly in order to distinguish it +from other methods of “analysis,” which Professor Freud fully +disavows. Cf. <cite>The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement</cite>, +translated by A. A. Brill, <cite>The Psychoanalytic Review</cite>, June-Sept., +1916.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f6'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r6'>6</a>. Cf. the works of Freud, Abraham, Rank, and others.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f7'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r7'>7</a>. Cf. Freud: <cite>Totem and Taboo</cite>, a translation in preparation, +and the works of Jones, Rank and Sachs, Jung, and Storfer.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f8'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r8'>8</a>. Cf. Freud, Berny, Rank, and Sachs, and Sperber.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f9'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r9'>9</a>. Cf. Freud: <cite>Leonardo da Vinci</cite>, a translation in preparation, +and the works of many others.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f10'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r10'>10</a>. Cf. <em>v.</em> Hug-Hellmuth: <cite><span lang="de">Aus dem Seelenleben des Kindes</span></cite>, and +the works of Jones, Pfister, and many others.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f11'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r11'>11</a>. Cf. the works of Freud, Putnam, Hitschmann, Winterstein, +and others.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f12'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r12'>12</a>. <cite><span lang="de">Beiträge zur Aesthetik</span></cite>, edited by Theodor Lipps and Richard +Maria Werner, VI,—a book to which I am indebted for the +courage and capacity to undertake this attempt.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f13'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r13'>13</a>. J. V. Falke: <cite><span lang="de">Lebenserinnerungen</span></cite>, 1897.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f14'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r14'>14</a>. Since this joke will occupy us again and we do not wish to +disturb the discussion following here, we shall find occasion later +to point out a correction in Lipps’s given interpretation which +follows our own.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f15'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r15'>15</a>. The same holds true for Lipps’s interpretation.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f16'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r16'>16</a>. <cite>Psychanalysis</cite>: Its Theories and Application, 2nd Ed., p. 331.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f17'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r17'>17</a>. This same witticism was supposed to have been coined before +by Heine concerning Alfred de Musset.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f18'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r18'>18</a>. One of the complications involved in the technique of this +example lies in the fact that the modification through which the +omitted abuse is substituted is to be taken as an allusion to the +latter, for it leads to it only through a process of deduction.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f19'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r19'>19</a>. Another factor which I shall mention later on is also effective +in the technique of this witticism. It has to do with the inner +character of the modification (representation through the opposite—contradiction). +The technique of wit does not hesitate to +make use simultaneously of several means, with which, however, +we can only become acquainted in their sequential order.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f20'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r20'>20</a>. Translation of 4th Ed. by A. A. Brill, the Macmillan Co., +New York, and Allen & Unwin, London.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f21'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r21'>21</a>. <cite>The Interpretation of Dreams</cite>, p. 280.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f22'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r22'>22</a>. Cited by Brill: <cite>Psychanalysis</cite>, p. 335.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f23'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r23'>23</a>. l. c., p. 334.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f24'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r24'>24</a>. The excellence of these jokes depends upon the fact that they, +at the same time, present another technical means of a much +higher order.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f25'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r25'>25</a>. Given by Translator.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f26'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r26'>26</a>. This resembles an excellent joke of Oliver Wendell Holmes +cited by Brill: “Put not your trust in money, but put your money +in trust.” A contradiction is here announced which does not +appear. At all events it is a good example of the untranslatableness +of the witticisms of such technique.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f27'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r27'>27</a>. Brill cites a very analogous modification wit: <cite><span lang="la">Amantes—Amentes</span></cite> +(lovers—lunatics).</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f28'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r28'>28</a>. Compare here K. Fischer (p. 85), who applies the term “double +meaning” to those witticisms in which both meanings are not +equally prominent, but where one overshadows the other. I +have applied this term differently. Such a nomenclature is a matter +of choice. Usage of speech has rendered no definite decision +about them.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f29'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r29'>29</a>. L. c., page 339.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f30'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r30'>30</a>. Heine’s answer is a combination of two wit-techniques—a displacement +and an allusion—for he does not say directly: “He +is an ox.”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f31'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r31'>31</a>. The word “take,” owing to its meanings, lends itself very +well towards the formation of plays upon words, a pure example +of which I wish to cite as a contrast to the displacement mentioned +above. While walking with his friend, in front of a +café, a well-known stock-plunger and bank director made this +proposal: “Let us go in and take something.” His friend +held him back and said: “My dear sir, remember there are people +in there.”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f32'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r32'>32</a>. For the latter see a later chapter. It will perhaps not be +superfluous to add here a few words for better understanding. +The displacement regularly occurs between a statement and an +answer, and turns the stream of thought to a direction different +from the one started in the statement. The justification for +separating the displacement from the double meaning is best +seen in the examples where both are combined, that is, where the +wording of the statement admits of a double meaning which +was not intended by the speaker, but which reveals in the +answer the way to the displacement (see examples).</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f33'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r33'>33</a>. See Chapter III.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f34'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r34'>34</a>. A similar nonsense technique results when the joke aims to +maintain a connection which seems to be removed through the +special conditions of its content. A joke of this sort is related +by J. Falke (l. c.): “<em>Is this the place where the Duke of Wellington +spoke these words?</em>” “<em>Yes, this is the place; but he never +spoke these words.</em>”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f35'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r35'>35</a>. Following an example of the <cite>Greek Anthology</cite>.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f36'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r36'>36</a>. Cf. my <cite>Interpretation of Dreams</cite>, Chap. VI, <cite>The Dream Work</cite>, +translated by A. A. Brill, The Macmillan Co., New York, and +Allen & Unwin, London.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f37'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r37'>37</a>. The word tendency encountered hereafter in the expression +“Tendency-Wit” (Tendenz Witz) is used adjectively in the same +sense as in the familiar phrase “Tendency Play.”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f38'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r38'>38</a>. Cf. my <cite>Psychopathology of Everyday Life</cite>, translated by A. +A. Brill, The Macmillan Co., New York, and T. Fisher Unwin, +London.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f39'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r39'>39</a>. Cf. <cite>Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex</cite>, 2nd Ed., 1916, +translated by A. A. Brill, Monograph Series, <cite>Journal of Nervous +and Mental Diseases</cite>.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f40'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r40'>40</a>. Moll’s <cite><span lang="da">Kontrektationstrieb</span></cite> (<span lang="de">Untersuchungen über die Libido +sexualies, 1898</span>).</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f41'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r41'>41</a>. It is the same mechanism that controls “slips of the tongue” +and other phenomena of self-betrayal. Cf. <cite>The Psychopathology +of Everyday Life</cite>.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f42'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r42'>42</a>. “There is nothing certain about to-morrow,” Lorenzo del +Medici.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f43'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r43'>43</a>. See his essays in the <cite><span lang="de">Politisch-anthropologischen Revue</span></cite>, II, +1903.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f44'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r44'>44</a>. An habitual beggar.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f45'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r45'>45</a>. If I may be permitted to anticipate what later is discussed +in the text I can here throw some light upon the condition which +seems to be authoritative in the usage of language when it is a +question of calling a joke “good” or “poor.” If by means of +a double meaning or slightly modified word I have gotten from +one idea to another by a short route, and if this does not also +simultaneously result in senseful association between the two +ideas, then I have made a “poor” joke. In this poor joke one +word or the “point” forms the only existing association between +the two widely separated ideas. The joke “Home-Roulard” +used above is such an example. But a “good” joke +results if the infantile expectation is right in the end and if with +the similarity of the word another essential similarity in meaning +is really simultaneously produced—as in the examples Traduttore—Traditore +(translator—traitor), and Amantes—Amentes +(lovers—lunatics). The two disparate ideas which are here +linked by an outer association are held together besides by a +senseful connection which expresses an important relationship +between them. The outer association only replaces the inner connection; +it serves to indicate the latter or to clarify it. Not only +does “translator” sound somewhat similar to “traitor,” but he +is a sort of a traitor whose claims to that name are good. The +same may be said of Amantes—Amentes. Not only do the words +bear a resemblance, but the similarity between “love” and +“lunacy” has been noted from time immemorial.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The distinction made here agrees with the differentiation, to be +made later, between a “witticism” and a “jest.” However, it +would not be correct to exclude examples like Home-Roulard +from the discussion of the nature of wit. As soon as we take +into consideration the peculiar pleasure of wit, we discover that +the “poor” witticisms are by no means poor as witticisms, i.e., +they are by no means unsuited for the production of pleasure.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f46'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r46'>46</a>. <cite><span lang="de">Die Spiele der Menschen</span></cite>, 1899, p. 153.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f47'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r47'>47</a>. <cite><span lang="de">Vorschule der Aesthetik</span></cite>, 1, XVII.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f48'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r48'>48</a>. Chapter XVII.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f49'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r49'>49</a>. Kleinpaul: <cite><span lang="de">Die Rätsel der Sprache</span></cite>, 1890.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f50'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r50'>50</a>. <cite><span lang="de">Vorschule der Aesthetik</span></cite>, Vol. 1, V, p. 51, 2nd Ed., Leipzig, +1897.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f51'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r51'>51</a>. The nonsense-witticisms, which have been somewhat slighted +in this treatise, deserve a short supplementary comment.</p> + +<p class='c008'>In view of the significance attributed by our conception to the +factor “sense in nonsense,” one might be tempted to demand +that every witticism should be a nonsense-joke. But this is not +necessary, because only the play with thoughts inevitably leads +to nonsense, whereas the other source of wit-pleasure, the play +with words, makes this impression incidental and does not regularly +invoke the criticism connected with it. The double root of +wit-pleasure—from the play with words and thoughts, which +corresponds to the most important division into word- and thought-witticisms—sets +its face against a short formulation of general +principles about wit as a tangible aggravation of difficulties. +The play with words produces laughter, as is well known, in consequence +of the factor of recognition described above, and therefore +suffers suppression only in a small degree. The play with +thoughts cannot be motivated through such pleasure: it has +suffered a very energetic suppression and the pleasure which it +can give is only the pleasure of released inhibitions. Accordingly +one may say that wit-pleasure shows a kernel of the original +play-pleasure and a shell of removal-pleasure. Naturally we +do not grant that the pleasure in nonsense-wit is due to the +fact that we have succeeded in making nonsense despite the suppression, +while we do notice that the play with words gives us +pleasure. Nonsense, which has remained fixed in thought-wit, +acquires secondarily the function of stimulating our attention +through confusion, it serves as a reinforcement of the effect of +wit, but only when it is insistent, so that the confusion can +anticipate the intellect by a definite fraction of time. That +nonsense in wit may also be employed to represent a judgment +contained within the thought has been demonstrated by the example +on p. <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>. But even this is not the primal signification of +nonsense in wit.</p> + +<p class='c008'>A series of wit-like productions for which we have no appropriate +name, but which may lay claim to the designation of +“witty nonsense,” may be added to the nonsense-jokes. They +are very numerous, but I shall cite only two examples: As the +fish was served to a guest at the table he put both hands twice +into the mayonnaise and then ran them through his hair. Being +looked at by his neighbor with astonishment he seemed to have +noticed his mistake and excused himself, saying: “Pardon me, +I thought it was spinach.”</p> + +<p class='c008'>Or: “Life is like a suspension bridge,” said the one. “How is +that?” asked the other. “How should I know?” was the answer.</p> + +<p class='c008'>These extreme examples produce an effect through the fact that +they give rise to the expectation of wit, so that one makes the +effort to find the hidden sense behind the nonsense. But none +is found, they are really nonsense. Under that deception it was +possible for one moment to liberate the pleasure in nonsense. +These witticisms are not altogether without tendencies, they furnish +the narrator a certain pleasure in that they deceive and +annoy the hearer. The latter then calms his anger by resolving +that he himself should take the place of the narrator.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f52'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r52'>52</a>. H. Spencer, <cite>The Physiology of Laughter</cite> (first published in +<cite>Macmillan’s Magazine</cite> for March, 1860), Essays, Vol. 11, 1901.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f53'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r53'>53</a>. Different points in this declaration would demand an exhaustive +inquiry into an investigation of the pleasure of the +comic, a thing that other authors have already done, and which, +at all events, does not touch our discussion. It seems to me +that Spencer was not happy in his explanation of why the discharge +happens to find just that path, the excitement of which +results in the physical picture of laughter. I should like to add +one single contribution to the subject of the physiological explanation +of laughter, that is, to the derivation or interpretation +of the muscular actions that characterize laughter—a subject +that has been often treated before and since Darwin, but which +has never been conclusively settled. According to the best of +my knowledge the grimaces and contortions of the corners of the +mouth that characterize laughter appear first in the satisfied and +satiated nursling when he drowsily quits the breasts. There it +is a correct motion of expression since it bespeaks the determination +to take no more nourishment, an “enough,” so to speak, +or rather a “more than enough.” This primal sense of pleasurable +satiation may have furnished the smile, which ever remains +the basic phenomenon of laughter, the later connection with the +pleasurable processes of discharge.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f54'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r54'>54</a>. Cf. <cite>The Interpretation of Dreams</cite>, Chap. VII, also <cite>On the +Psychic Force</cite>, etc., in the above cited book of Lipps (p. 123), +where he says: “This is the general principle: The dominant +factors of the psychic life are not represented by the contents +of consciousness but by those psychic processes which are unconscious. +The task of psychology, provided it does not limit +itself to a mere description of the content of consciousness, must +also consist of revealing the nature of these unconscious processes +from the nature of the contents of consciousness and its temporal +relationship. Psychology must itself be a theory of these +processes. But such a psychology will soon find that there +exist quite a number of characteristics of these processes which +are unrepresented in the corresponding contents of consciousness.”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f55'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r55'>55</a>. Heymans (<cite><span lang="de">Zeitschrift für Psychol.</span></cite>, XI) has taken up the +viewpoint of the nascent state in a somewhat different connection.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f56'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r56'>56</a>. Through an example of displacement-wit I desire to discuss +another interesting character of the technique of wit. The +genial actress Gallmeyer when once asked how old she was is +said to have answered this unwelcome question with abashed and +downcast eyes, by saying, “In Brünn.” This is a very good +example of displacement. Having been asked her age, she replied +by naming the place of her birth, thus anticipating the +next query, and in this manner she wishes to imply: “This is a +question which I prefer to pass by.” And still we feel that the +character of the witticism does not here come to expression undimmed. +The deviation from the question is too obvious; the +displacement is much too conspicuous. Our attention understands +immediately that it is a matter of an intentional displacement. +In other displacement-witticisms the displacement +is disguised and our attention is riveted by the effort to discover +it. In one of the displacement-witticisms (p. 69) the reply +to the recommendation of the horse—“What in the world should +I do in Monticello at 6:30 in the morning?”—the displacement is +also an obtrusive one, but as a substitute for it it acts upon +the attention in a senseless and confusing manner, whereas in +the interrogation of the actress we know immediately how to +dispose of her displacement answer.</p> + +<p class='c008'>The so-called “facetious questions” which may make use of +the best techniques deviate from wit in other ways. An example +of the facetious question with displacement is the following: +“What is a cannibal who devours his father and mother?—Answer: +An orphan.—And when he has devoured all his other relatives?—Sole-heir.—And +where can such a monster ever find +sympathy?—In the dictionary under S.” The facetious questions +are not full witticisms because the required witty answers +cannot be guessed like the allusions, omissions, etc., of wit.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f57'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r57'>57</a>. Cf. <cite>The Interpretation of Dreams</cite>, Chapter VII.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f58'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r58'>58</a>. Besides the dream-work and the technique of wit I have been +able to demonstrate condensation as a regular and significant +process in another psychic occurrence, in the mechanism of +normal (not purposive) forgetting. Singular impressions put +difficulties in the way of forgetting; impressions in any way +analogous are forgotten by becoming fused at their points of +contact. The confusion of analogous impressions is one of the +first steps in forgetting.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f59'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r59'>59</a>. Many of my patients while under psychoanalytic treatment +are wont to prove regularly by their laughter that I have succeeded +in demonstrating faithfully to their conscious perception +the veiled unconscious; they laugh also when the content of +what is disclosed does not at all justify this laughter. To be sure, +it is conditional that they have approached this unconscious +closely enough to grasp it when the physician has conjectured it +and presented it to them.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f60'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r60'>60</a>. In doing this we must not forget to reckon with the distortion +brought about by the censor which is still active in the +psychoses.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f61'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r61'>61</a>. <cite>The Interpretation of Dreams.</cite></p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f62'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r62'>62</a>. The character of the comical which is referred to as its +“dryness” also depends in the broadest sense upon the differentiation +of the things spoken from the antics accompanying it.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f63'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r63'>63</a>. <cite>The Interpretation of Dreams</cite>, p. 296.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f64'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r64'>64</a>. This very remarkable and still inadequately understood behavior +of antagonistic relationships is probably not without value +for the understanding of the symptom of negativism in neurotics +and in the insane. Cf. the two latest works on the subject: Bleuler, +“Über die negative Suggestibilität,” <cite><span lang="de">Psych.-Neurol. Wochenschrift</span></cite>, +1904, and Otto Groos’s <cite><span lang="de">Zur Differential diagnostik negativistischer +Phänomene</span></cite>, also my review of the <cite><span lang="de">Gegensinn der +Urworte</span></cite>, in <cite><span lang="de">Jahrb. f. Psychonalyse</span></cite> II, 1910.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f65'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r65'>65</a>. An expression of G. T. Fechner’s which has acquired significance +from the point of view of my conception.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f66'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r66'>66</a>. Given by Translator.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f67'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r67'>67</a>. I have everywhere identified the naïve with the naïve-comic, +a practice which is certainly not permissible in all cases. But +it is sufficient for our purposes to study the characteristics of the +naïve as exhibited by the “naïve joke” and the “naïve obscenity.” +It is our intention to proceed from here with the investigation of +the nature of the comic.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f68'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r68'>68</a>. Also Bergson (<cite>Laughter</cite>, An essay on the Meaning of the +Comic, translated by Brereton and Rothwell, The Macmillan Co., +1914) rejects with sound arguments this sort of explanation of +comic pleasure, which has unmistakably been influenced by the +effort to create an analogy to the laughing of a person tickled. +The explanation of comic pleasure by Lipps which might, in +connection with his conception of the comic, be represented as an +“unexpected trifle,” is of an entirely different nature.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f69'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r69'>69</a>. The recollection of this innervation expenditure will remain +the essential part of the idea of this motion, and there will +always be methods of thought in my psychic life in which the +idea will be represented by nothing else than this expenditure. +In other connections a substitute for this element may possibly +be put in the form of other ideas, for instance the visual idea +of the object of the motion, or it may be put in the form of the +word-idea; and in certain types of abstract thought a sign instead +of the full content itself may suffice.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f70'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r70'>70</a>. “What one has not in his head,” as the saying goes, “he +must have in his legs.”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f71'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r71'>71</a>. The problem has been greatly confused by the general conditions +determining the comic, whereby the comic pleasure is seen +to have its source now in a too-muchness and now in a not-enoughness.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f72'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r72'>72</a>. Degradation: A. Bain (<cite>The Emotions and the Will</cite>, 2nd Ed., +1865) states: “The occasion of the ludicrous is the degradation +of some person of interest possessing dignity, in circumstances +that excite no other strong emotion” (p. 248).</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f73'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r73'>73</a>. “Thus every conscious and clever evocation of the comic is +called wit, be it the comic of views or situations. Naturally we +cannot use this view of wit here.” Lipps, l. c., p. 78.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f74'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r74'>74</a>. At the most this is inserted by the dreamer as an explanation.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f75'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r75'>75</a>. l. c., p. 294.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f76'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r76'>76</a>. “Trente et quarante” is a gambling game.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f77'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r77'>77</a>. Bergson, l. c., p. 29.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f78'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r78'>78</a>. Sixth Ed., Berlin, 1891.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f79'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r79'>79</a>. “You may well laugh, that no longer concerns you.”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f80'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r80'>80</a>. That comic pleasure has its source in the “quantitative contrast,” +in the comparison of big and small, which ultimately also +expresses the essential relation of the child to the grown-up, +would indeed be a peculiar coincidence if the comic had nothing +else to do with the infantile.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f81'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r81'>81</a>. “Our heads have the right to fall covered before thee.”</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f82'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r82'>82</a>. The excellent humoristic effect of a character like that of +the fat knight, Sir John Falstaff, is based on economised contempt +and indignation. To be sure we recognise in him the +unworthy glutton and fashionably dressed swindler, but our condemnation +is disarmed through a whole series of factors. We +understand that he knows himself to be just as we estimate him; +he impresses us through his wit; and besides that, his physical +deformity produces a contact-effect in favor of a comic conception +of his personality instead of a serious one; as if our demands +for morality and honor must recoil from such a big +stomach. His activities are altogether harmless and are almost +excused by the comic lowness of those he deceives. We admit +that the poor devil has a right to live and enjoy himself like any +one else, and we almost pity him because in the principal situation +we find him a puppet in the hands of one much his superior. +It is for this reason that we cannot bear him any grudge and +turn all we economize in him in indignation into comic pleasure +which he otherwise provides. Sir John’s own humor really +emanates from the superiority of an ego which neither his physical +nor his moral defects can rob of its joviality and security.</p> + +<p class='c008'>On the other hand the courageous knight Don Quixote de la +Mancha is a figure who possesses no humor, and in his seriousness +furnishes us a pleasure which can be called humoristic +although its mechanism shows a decided deviation from that of +humor. Originally Don Quixote is a purely comic figure, a big +child whose fancies from his books on knighthood have gone to +his head. It is known that at first the poet wanted to show only +that phase of his character, and that the creation gradually outgrew +the author’s original intentions. But after the poet endowed +this ludicrous person with the profoundest wisdom and +noblest aims and made him the symbolic representation of an +idealism, a man who believed in the realization of his aims, who +took duties seriously and promises literally, he ceased to be a +comic personality. Like humoristic pleasure which results from +a prevention of emotional feelings it originates here through the +disturbance of comic pleasure. However, in these examples we +already depart perceptibly from the simple cases of humor.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f83'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r83'>83</a>. A term which is used in quite a different sense in the <cite>Aesthetik</cite> +of Theo. Vischer.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f84'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r84'>84</a>. If one does not hesitate to do some violence to the conception +of expectation, one may ascribe—according to the process +of Lipps—a very large sphere of the comic to the comic of expectation; +but probably the most original cases of the comic which +result through a comparison of a strange expenditure with one’s +own will fit least into this conception.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f85'> +<p class='c008'><a href='#r85'>85</a>. The characteristic of the “double face” naturally did not +escape the authors. Melinaud, from whom I borrowed the above +expression, conceives the condition for laughing in the following +formula: “<span lang="fr">Ce qui fait rire c’est qui est à la fois, d’un coté, +absurde et de l’autre, familier</span>” (“<span lang="fr">Pourquoi rit-on?</span>” <cite><span lang="fr">Revue de +deux mondes</span></cite>, February, 1895). This formula fits in better with +wit than with the comic, but it really does not altogether cover +the former. Bergson (l. c., p. 96) defines the comic situation by +the “reciprocal interference of series,” and states: “A situation +is invariably comic when it belongs simultaneously to two altogether +independent series of events and is capable of being +interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the same time.” +According to Lipps the comic is “the greatness and smallness of +the same.”</p> +</div> + +<div class='pbb'> + <hr class='pb c003'> +</div> +<div class='tnotes x-ebookmaker'> + +<div class='chapter ph2'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c004'> + <div>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES</div> + </div> +</div> + +</div> + + <ul class='ul_1 c002'> + <li>Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. + + </li> + <li>Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last chapter. + </li> + </ul> + +</div> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75915 ***</div> + </body> + <!-- created with ppgen.py 3.57e (with regex) on 2025-03-29 22:18:34 GMT --> +</html> + diff --git a/75915-h/images/cover.jpg b/75915-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..e869414 --- /dev/null +++ b/75915-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/75915-h/images/i_title.jpg b/75915-h/images/i_title.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba80fb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/75915-h/images/i_title.jpg diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5dba15 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This book, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. 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