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If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus With the Encheiridion + +Author: Epictetus + +Translator: George Long + +Release Date: January 9, 2004 [eBook #10661] +[Most recently updated: March 4, 2023] + +Language: English + +Produced by: Ted Garvin, David King, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SELECTIONS FROM EPICTETUS *** + + + + +A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS WITH THE ENCHEIRIDION + +TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG + + + + +CONTENTS. + + EPICTETUS (BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE). + A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS. + THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. + + + + +EPICTETUS. + + +Very little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a +native of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and a +branch of the Maeander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in the +epistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv., 13); from which +it has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis +in the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is +unknown. The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a +slave in Rome, and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman +of the Emperor Nero. There is a story that the master broke his slave’s +leg by torturing him; but it is better to trust to the evidence of +Simplicius, the commentator on the Encheiridion, or Manual, who says +that Epictetus was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not +said how he became a slave; but it has been asserted in modern times +that the parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any +authority for this statement. + +It may be supposed that the young slave showed intelligence, for his +master sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius +Rufus, an eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange that such a +master should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher; +but Garnier, the author of a “Mémoire sur les Ouvrages d’Epictète,” +explains this matter very well in a communication to Schweighaeuser. +Garnier says: “Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor +parents, was indebted apparently for the advantages of a good education +to the whim, which was common at the end of the Republic and under the +first emperors, among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous +slaves grammarians, poets, rhetoricians, and philosophers, in the same +way as rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a +great cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only +one which can explain to us how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus, +had received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of +Epaphroditus, one of the officers of the imperial guard. For we cannot +suspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine, and +for his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the +debaucheries of Nero would have desired to possess such a slave.” + +Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master, but I +can find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nero +when he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable +tyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton., Domit. 14), afterwards +put Epaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude +that Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to +teach at Rome; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by +Domitian, A.D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by +Augustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a +school or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old +man. The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as +we learn from Lucian (Demonax, c. 55, torn, ii., ed. Hemsterh., p. +393). When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax, and advising him +to take a wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, +was a philosopher’s duty, to leave in place of himself another in the +universe, Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering: Give me then, +Epictetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Comment., c. 46, +p. 432, ed. Schweigh.) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last +he took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of +Epictetus’ friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, but +Epictetus took the child and brought it up. + +Epictetus wrote nothing; and all that we have under his name was +written + +Photius (Biblioth., 58) mentions among Arrian’s works “Conversations +with Epictetus,” [Greek: Homiliai Epichtaeton], in twelve books. Upton +thinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that +Photius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a +different work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight +books of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations. +Schweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works of Arrian +on Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these works +by Photius. The fact is that Photius does not say that he had read +these books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books +which he enumerates in his Bibliotheca. The conclusion is that we are +not certain that there was a work of Arrian entitled “The Conversations +of Epictetus.” + +Upton remarks in a note on iii., 23 (p. 184, Trans.), that “there are +many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather +confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is +not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes.” +The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and +so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker +(Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii., 336 of his +edition) that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure +through the omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the +connection of the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot +always understand Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, +and some passages more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he +will miss the meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this +trouble. Every man must judge for himself. But I should not have +translated the book, if I had not thought it worth study; and I think +that all books of this kind require careful reading, if they are worth +reading at all. + +G.L. + + + + +A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS. + + +OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER AND NOT IN OUR POWER.—Of all the +faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not +one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not +capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic +art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about +what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about +melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But +when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you +what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, +grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical +sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the +lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will +tell you? That which contemplates both itself and all other things. And +what is this faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only +faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and +what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all +other faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden +things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? Evidently it +is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances. What else +judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, +and points out the occasions for using them? Nothing else. + +What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What +else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is +permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I +then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I +must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles +and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess. +I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man, +what are you talking about? Me, in chains? You may fetter my leg, but +my will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into +prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then +have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the +things which philosophers should meditate on, which they should write +daily, in which they should exercise themselves. + +What then did Agrippinus say? He said, “I am not a hindrance to +myself.” When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the +Senate, he said: “I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour +of the day”—this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and +then take the cold bath,—“let us go and take our exercise.” After he +had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, “You have been +condemned.” “To banishment,” he replies, “or to death?” “To +banishment.” “What about my property?” “It is not taken from you.” “Let +us go to Aricia then,” he said, “and dine.” + + +HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER CHARACTER.—To the +rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is +rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is +that? See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned +that whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not +intolerable. When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go +and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the +animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; +and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is +rational. + +Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other +reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But +that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such +as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very +great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become +swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, +since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I +hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not +inferior, this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I +do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not +neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after +anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree. + + +HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD BEING THE FATHER OF +ALL MEN TO THE REST.—If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine +as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and +that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would +never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Cæsar +(the emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and +if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet +we do not so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation +of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in +common with the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable +and mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then +it is of necessity that every man uses everything according to the +opinion which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are +formed for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no +mean or ignoble thoughts about themselves; but with the many it is +quite the contrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable man, +with my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed; but you possess +something better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that +which is better, and why do you attach yourself to this? + +Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become +like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous; some become +like lions, savage and bestial and untamed; but the greater part of us +become foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and +malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner +animal? See then and take care that you do not become some one of these +miserable things. + + +OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT.—He who is making progress, having learned +from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and +aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that +happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by +not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which +he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and +confers it, but he employs his aversion only on things which are +dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent +of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with something +which he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue +promises good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also +the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these things. +For it is always true that to whatever point the perfecting of anything +leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. + +How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek +progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product +of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has +read many books of Chrysippus? But does virtue consist in having +understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else +than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue +produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is +another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says +one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you +are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock +the man? Why do you draw him away from the perception of his own +misfortunes? Will you not show him the effect of virtue that he may +learn where to look for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where your +work lies. And where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you +may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may not fall into +that which you would avoid; in your pursuit and avoiding, that you +commit no error; in assent and suspension of assent, that you be not +deceived. The first things, and the most necessary are those which I +have named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not to fall +into that which you avoid, tell me how you are improving. + +Do you then show me your improvement in these things? If I were talking +to an athlete, I should say, Show me your shoulders; and then he might +say, Here are my Halteres. You and your Halteres look to that. I should +reply, I wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say: Take +the treatise on the active powers ([Greek: hormea]), and see how I have +studied it, I reply: Slave, I am not inquiring about this, but how you +exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and aversion, how you design and +purpose and prepare yourself, whether conformably to nature or not. If +conformably, give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making +progress; but if not conformably, be gone, and not only expound your +books, but write such books yourself; and what will you gain by it? Do +you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Does then the +expounder seem to be worth more than five denarii? Never then look for +the matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another. +Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing himself from +externals, turns to his own will ([Greek: proairesis]) to exercise it +and to improve it by labor, so as to make it conformable to nature, +elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest; and if he +has learned that he who desires or avoids the things which are not in +his power can neither be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must +change with them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of +necessity must subject himself to others who have the power to procure +or prevent what lie desires or would avoid; finally, when he rises in +the morning, if he observes and keeps these rules, bathes as a man of +fidelity, eats as a modest man; in like manner, if in every matter that +occurs he works out his chief principles ([Greek: ta proaegoumena]) as +the runner does with reference to running, and the trainer of the voice +with reference to the voice—this is the man who truly makes progress, +and this is the man who has not travelled in vain. But if he has +strained his efforts to the practice of reading books, and labors only +at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to return home +immediately, and not to neglect his affairs there; for this for which +he has travelled is nothing. But the other thing is something, to study +how a man can rid his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, Woe +to me, and wretched that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and +disappointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, and prison, and +poison, that he may be able to say when he is in fetters, Dear Crito, +if it is the will of the gods that it be so, let it be so; and not to +say, Wretched am I, an old man: have I kept my gray hairs for this? Who +is it that speaks thus? Do you think that I shall name some man of no +repute and of low condition? Does not Priam say this? Does not Oedipus +say this? Nay, all kings say it! For what else is tragedy than the +perturbations ([Greek: pathae]) of men who value externals exhibited in +this kind of poetry? But if a man must learn by fiction that no +external things which are independent of the will concern us, for my +part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which I should live +happily and undisturbed. But you must consider for yourselves what you +wish. + +What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these +things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity +arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to +nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great +good fortune! O the great benefactor who points out the way! To +Triptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because he gave us +food by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to +light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to +live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an +altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for +this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to +them; but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by +which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, +shall we not thank God for this? + + +AGAINST THE ACADEMICS.—If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident +truths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him +change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man’s +strength or the teacher’s weakness; for when the man, though he has +been confuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to +deal with him by argument? + +Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, the +other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to +what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are +afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to +avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul’s mortification. And +indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to +apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad +condition; but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this we +call even power (or strength). + + +OF PROVIDENCE.—From everything, which is or happens in the world, it is +easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities: the +faculty of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, +and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities, +one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen: +another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If +God had made colors, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what +would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if he had +made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall +under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of +it? None at all. Well, suppose that he had made both, but had not made +light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it +then who has fitted this to that and that to this? + +What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, indeed, in us only, +of which the rational animal had peculiar need; but you will find many +common to us with irrational animals. Do they then understand what is +done? By no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is another; +God had need of irrational animals to make use of appearances, but of +us to understand the use of appearances. It is therefore enough for +them to eat and to drink, and to copulate, and to do all the other +things which they severally do. But for us, to whom he has given also +the intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient; for unless +we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to the nature +and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For +where the constitutions of living beings are different, there also the +acts and the ends are different. In those animals then whose +constitution is adapted only to use, use alone is enough; but in an +animal (man), which has also the power of understanding the use, unless +there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain +his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to be +eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and +another for some like use; for which purposes what need is there to +understand appearances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has +introduced man to be a spectator of God and of his works; and not only +a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful +for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do; but rather he +ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; +and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of +life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having +been spectators of these things. + +But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of Phidias, and all +of you think it a misfortune to die without having seen such things. +But when there is no need to take a journey, and where a man is, there +he has the works (of God) before him, will you not desire to see and +understand them? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what you +were born for, or what this is for which you have received the faculty +of sight? But you may say, There are some things disagreeable and +troublesome in life. And are there none at Olympia? Are you not +scorched? Are you not pressed by a crowd? Are you not without +comfortable means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? Have you +not abundance of noise, clamor, and other disagreeable things? But I +suppose that setting all these things off against the magnificence of +the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well then and have you not received +faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you +not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have +you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything +that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my +mind, or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for +the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament +over what happens? + +Come, then, do you also having observed these things look to the +faculties which you have, and when you have looked at them, say: Bring +now, O Zeus, any difficulty that thou pleasest, for I have means given +to me by thee and powers for honoring myself through the things which +happen. You do not so; but you sit still, trembling for fear that some +things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning for what +does happen; and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence +of such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given +us these faculties, by which we shall be able to bear everything that +happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king +and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, +subject to no compulsion, unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our +own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of +hindering or impeding. You, who have received these powers free and as +your own, use them not; you do not even see what you have received, and +from whom; some of you being blinded to the giver, and not even +acknowledging your benefactor, and others, through meanness of spirit, +betaking yourselves to fault-finding and making charges against God. +Yet I will show to you that you have powers and means for greatness of +soul and manliness; but what powers you have for finding fault making +accusations, do you show me. + + +HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN MAY PROCEED TO THE +CONSEQUENCES.—I indeed think that the old man ought to be sitting here, +not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor mean and ignoble +talk about yourselves, but to take care that there be not among us any +young men of such a mind, that when they have recognized their kinship +to God, and that we are fettered by these bonds, the body, I mean, and +its possessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary to +us for the economy and commerce of life, they should intend to throw +off these things as if they were burdens painful and intolerable, and +to depart to their kinsmen. But this is the labor that your teacher and +instructor ought to be employed upon, if he really were what he should +be. You should come to him and say: Epictetus, we can no longer endure +being bound to this poor body, and feeding it, and giving it drink and +rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of the body complying with the +wishes of these and of those. Are not these things indifferent and +nothing to us; and is not death no evil? And are we not in a manner +kinsmen of God, and did we not come from him? Allow us to depart to the +place from which we came; allow us to be released at last from these +bonds by which we are bound and weighed down. Here there are robbers +and thieves and courts of justice, and those who are named tyrants, and +think that they have some power over us by means of the body and its +possessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power over any +man. And I on my part would say: Friends, wait for God: when he shall +give the signal and release you from this service, then go to him; but +for the present endure to dwell in this place where he has put you. +Short indeed is this time of your dwelling here, and easy to bear for +those who are so disposed; for what tyrant, or what thief, or what +courts of justice are formidable to those who have thus considered as +things of no value the body and the possessions of the body? Wait then, +do not depart without a reason. + + +OF CONTENTMENT.—With respect to gods, there are some who say that a +divine being does not exist; others say that it exists, but is inactive +and careless, and takes no forethought about anything; a third class +say that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about +great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth; a +fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both about +things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and +not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and +Socrates belong, who say: + +I move not without thy knowledge.—Iliad, x., 278. + + +Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire about each of +these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if there +are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? And if they +exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will it be +right to follow them? But if indeed they do exist and look after +things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor in +fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow them)? The wise and +good man then, after considering all these things, submits his own mind +to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the +state. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed +with this intention, How shall I follow the gods in all things, how +shall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I +become free? For he is free to whom everything happens according to his +will, and whom no man can hinder. What then, is freedom madness? +Certainly not; for madness and freedom do not consist. But, you say, I +would have everything result just as I like, and in whatever way I +like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not know that +freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for me inconsiderately to +wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this appears to be +not only not noble, but even most base. For how do we proceed in the +matter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No, +but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And +how with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in +every art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of +no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man’s +whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest and the +chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to will +inconsiderately? By no means; but to be instructed is this, to learn to +wish that everything may happen as it does. And how do things happen? +As the disposer has disposed them? And he has appointed summer and +winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such +opposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he has given +a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions. + +What then remains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce +with them? Is there such a method by which they shall do what seems fit +to them, and we not the less shall be in a mood which is conformable to +nature? But you are unwilling to endure, and are discontented; and if +you are alone, you call it solitude; and if you are with men, you call +them knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own parents and +children, and brothers and neighbors. But you ought when you are alone +to call this condition by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to +think yourself like to the gods; and when you are with many, you ought +not to call it crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and +assembly, and so accept all contentedly. + +What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? It is to be +what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with being alone? Let him be +alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents? Let him be a bad son, +and lament. Is he dissatisfied with his children? Let him be a bad +father. Cast him into prison. What prison? Where he is already, for he +is there against his will; and where a man is against his will, there +he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was there +willingly. Must my leg then be lamed? Wretch, do you then on account of +one poor leg find fault with the world? Will you not willingly +surrender it for the whole? Will you not withdraw from it? Will you not +gladly part with it to him who gave it? And will you be vexed and +discontented with the things established by Zeus, which he, with the +Moirae (fates) who were present and spinning the thread of your +generation, defined and put in order? Know you not how small a part you +are compared with the whole. I mean with respect to the body, for as to +intelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less; for the +magnitude of intelligence is not measured by length nor yet by height, +but by thoughts. + + +HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS.—When some one asked, +How may a man eat acceptably to the gods, he answered: If he can eat +justly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately, and +orderly, will it not be also acceptable to the gods? But when you have +asked for warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has +brought only tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house, +then not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this acceptable +to the gods? How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave? +Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus +for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the +same descent from above? But if you have been put in any such higher +place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? Will you not +remember who you are, and whom you rule? That they are kinsmen, that +they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus? But I +have purchased them, and they have not purchased me. Do you see in what +direction you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the +pit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men? but towards +the laws of the gods you are not looking. + + +WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES.—When a man was consulting him how he should +persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, Epictetus replied: +Philosophy does not propose to secure for a man any external thing. If +it did (or if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allowing +something which is not within its province. For as the carpenter’s +material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, so the matter of +the art of living is each man’s life. When then is my brother’s? That +again belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of +the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like +reputation. But Philosophy promises none of these. In every +circumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable +to nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she says. + +How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me? Bring him to me +and I will tell him. But I have nothing to say to you about his anger. + +When the man who was consulting him said, I seek to know this, How, +even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in +a state conformable to nature? Nothing great, said Epictetus, is +produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say +to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires +time: let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is +then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, +and would you possess the fruit of a man’s mind in so short a time and +so easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you. + + +THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS (FAULTS) OF OTHERS.—Ought +not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means +say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken +and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the +faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the +faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If +you speak thus you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that +it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and +deaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest +things, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such +as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also +angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by +the bad things of another. Pity him rather; drop this readiness to be +offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: “These +accursed and odious fellows.” How have you been made so wise at once? +and how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because we +value so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your +clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Consider this +matter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbor has not; you have a +window; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein +man’s good consists, but he thinks that it consist in having fine +clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and +take them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it +all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not +provoke them; do not have a window; do not air your clothes. I also +lately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods; +hearing a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had +been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done +nothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen +lamp; for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment. +The reason is that you had a garment. I have a pain in my head. Have +you any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? For we only lose +those things, we have only pains about those things, which we possess. + +But the tyrant will chain—what? The leg. He will take away—what? The +neck. What then will he not chain and not take away? The will. This is +why the ancients taught the maxim, Know thyself. Therefore we ought to +exercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed +to the greater. I have pain in the head. Do not say, Alas! I have pain +in the ear. Do not say alas! And I do not say that you are not allowed +to groan, but do not groan inwardly; and if your slave is slow in +bringing a bandage, do not cry out and torment yourself, and say, Every +body hates me; for who would not hate such a man? For the future, +relying on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not trusting to +the size of your body, as an athlete, for a man ought not to be +invincible in the way that an ass is. + + +HOW WE SHOULD BEHAVE TO TYRANTS.—If a man possesses any superiority, or +thinks that he does when he does not, such a man, if he is +uninstructed, will of necessity be puffed up through it. For instance, +the tyrant says, I am master of all! And what can you do for me? Can +you give me desire which shall have no hindrance? How can you? Have you +the infallible power of avoiding what you would avoid? Have you the +power of moving towards an object without error? And how do you possess +this power? Come, when you are in a ship, do you trust to yourself or +to the helmsman? And when you are in a chariot, to whom do you trust +but to the driver? And how is it in all other arts? Just the same. In +what, then, lies your power? All men pay respect to me. Well, I also +pay respect to my platter, and I wash it and wipe it; and for the sake +of my oil-flask, I drive a peg into the wall. Well, then, are these +things superior to me? No, but they supply some of my wants, and for +this reason I take care of them. Well, do I not attend to my ass? Do I +not wash his feet? Do I not clean him? Do you not know that every man +has regard to himself, and to you just the same as he has regard to his +ass? For who has regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become +like you? Who imitates you, as he imitates Socrates? But I can cut off +your head. You say right. I had forgotten that I must have regard to +you, as I would to a fever and the bile, and raise an altar to you, as +there is at Rome an altar to fever. + +What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? Is it the +tyrant and his guards? (By no means.) I hope that it is not so. It is +not possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anything +else, or hindered by any other thing than by itself. But it is a man’s +own opinions which disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a man, I +will chain your leg, he who values his leg says, Do not; have pity. But +he who values his own will says, If it appears more advantageous to +you, chain it. Do you not care? I do not care. I will show you that I +am master. You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free; do you think that +he intended to allow his own son to be enslaved? But you are master of +my carcase; take it. So when you approach me, you have no regard to me? +No, but I have regard to myself; and if you wish me to say that I have +regard to you also, I tell you that I have the same regard to you that +I have to my pipkin. + +What then? When absurd notions about things independent of our will, as +if they were good and (or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we +must of necessity pay regard to tyrants: for I wish that men would pay +regard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men. How is it +that the man becomes all at once wise, when Cæsar has made him +superintendent of the close stool? How is it that we say immediately, +Felicion spoke sensibly to me? I wish he were ejected from the +bedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool. + +Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who meet him offer their +congratulations; one kisses his eyes, another the neck, and the slaves +kiss his hands. He goes to his house, he finds torches lighted. He +ascends the Capitol; he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Now who +ever sacrificed for having had good desires? for having acted +conformably to nature? For in fact we thank the gods for those things +in which we place our good. + +A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of Augustus. I +say to him: Man, let the thing alone; you will spend much for no +purpose. But he replies, Those who draw up agreements will write my +name. Do you then stand by those who read them, and say to such +persons, It is I whose name is written there? And if you can now be +present on ail such occasions, what will you do when you are dead? My +name will remain. Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But come, +what remembrance of you will there be beyond Nicopolis? But I shall +wear a crown of gold. If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of +roses and put it on, for it will be more elegant in appearance. + + +AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED.—When a man holds his proper +station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do +you wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid +conformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object +as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why +then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish has +always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who +follow me should exclaim, O the great philosopher! Who are they by whom +you wish to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say +that they are mad? Well, then, do you wish to be admired by madmen? + + +ON PRÆCOGNITIONS.—Præcognitions are common to all men, and præcognition +is not contradictory to præcognition. For who of us does not assume +that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we +ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that +Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction +arise? It arises in the adaptation of the præcognitions to the +particular cases. When one man says, “He has done well; he is a brave +man,” and another says, “Not so; but he has acted foolishly,” then the +disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the +Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should +be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but +whether it is holy to eat pig’s flesh or not holy. You will find this +dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What +do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and +right? “Certainly.” Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit +that what is good ought to be done? “I do most certainly.” Adapt your +præcognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. +Agamemnon says, “I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father.” +Achilles says, “You ought.” It is certain that one of the two makes a +wrong adaptation of the præcognition of “ought” or “duty.” Further, +Agamemnon says, “Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I +take his prize from some of you.” Achilles replies, “Would you then +take her whom I love?” “Yes, her whom you love.” “Must I then be the +only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has +no prize?” Thus the dispute begins. + +What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the +natural præcognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; +and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but +others are not. In our power are will and all acts which depend on the +will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, +possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and, generally, all +with whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To +what kind of things ([Greek: ousia]) shall we adapt it? To the things +which are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and soundness +of limb, and life, and are not children and parents and country? Who +will tolerate you if you deny this? + +Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it +possible, then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good +things, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain +towards society a proper behavior? He can not. For I am naturally +formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an +estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbor. If +it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it +from the bath. This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, +conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards +Zeus? For if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me. +And what is he to me if he cannot help me? And further, what is he to +me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to +hate him. Why then do we build temples, why setup statues to Zeus, as +well as to evil demons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour, +and how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we +place the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows. + +What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true philosopher who +is in labor. Now I do not see what the good is nor the bad. Am I not +mad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the things +which depend on the will; all will laugh at me. There will come some +greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his +head and say: “Hear, my child. It is right that you should +philosophize; but you ought to have some brains also; all this that you +are doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you +know how to act better than philosophers do.” Man why then do you blame +me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will +burst. I must speak in this way: “Excuse me, as you would excuse +lovers; I am not my own master; I am mad.” + + +HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES.—It is circumstances +(difficulties) which show what men are. Therefore when a difficulty +falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has +matched you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you may say. Why, +that you may become an Olympic conqueror; but it is not accomplished +without sweat. In my opinion no man has had a more profitable +difficulty than you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an +athlete would deal with a young antagonist. We are now sending a scout +to Rome; but no man sends a cowardly scout, who, if he only hears a +noise and sees a shadow anywhere, comes running back in terror and +reports that the enemy is close at hand. So now if you should come and +tell us: “Fearful is the state of affairs at Rome; terrible is death; +terrible is exile; terrible is calumny; terrible is poverty; fly, my +friends, the enemy is near,” we shall answer: “Begone, prophesy for +yourself; we have committed only one fault, that we sent such a scout.” + +Diogenes, who was sent as a scout before you, made a different report +to us. He says that death is no evil, for neither is it base; he says +that fame (reputation) is the noise of madmen. And what has this spy +said about pain, about pleasure, and about poverty? He says that to be +naked is better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the bare ground +is the softest bed; and he gives as a proof of each thing that he +affirms his own courage, his tranquillity, his freedom, and the healthy +appearance and compactness of his body. There is no enemy near, he +says; all is peace. How so, Diogenes? “See,” he replies, “if I am +struck, if I have been wounded, if I have fled from any man.” This is +what a scout ought to be. But you come to us and tell us one thing +after another. Will you not go back, and you will see clearer when you +have laid aside fear? + + +ON THE SAME.—If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are +not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the +will, and the evil too, and that everything else does not concern us, +why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things about +which we have been busied are in no man’s power; and the things which +are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have +we still? + +But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? Has not Zeus +given you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free +from hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own +subject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of +orders did you bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what +is your own; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) +is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things +from you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them? But +how do you act? When you seek what is not your own, you lose that which +is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind +do you still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy +of confidence? But if you observe these, do you want any others +besides? “Well, but he has not given these orders,” you will say. +Produce your præcognitions ([Greek: prolaepseis]), produce these proofs +of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what +you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you +have meditated on; and you will then see that all these things are from +God. + +If I have set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to +be a slave; if on my poor possessions, I also make myself a slave. For +I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snake +draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which he +guards; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard, +that part your master will attack. Remembering this, whom will you +still flatter or fear? + +But I should like to sit where the Senators sit. Do you see that you +are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself? How then +shall I see well in any other way in the amphitheatre? Man, do not be a +spectator at all, and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give +yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, +seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. +For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, +who put ourselves in straits; that is, our opinions squeeze us and put +us in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and +revile it, and what will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone, +what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a +stepping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he +accomplishes something. Strip him. What do you mean by him? Lay hold of +his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do +you. + +This was the practice of Socrates; this was the reason why he always +had one face. But we choose to practise and study anything rather than +the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say: +“Philosophers talk paradoxes.” But are there no paradoxes in the other +arts? And what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man’s eye in +order that he may see? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the +surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder, +then, if in philosophy also many things which are true appear +paradoxical to the inexperienced? + + +IN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST, AND WHAT AIDS WE SHOULD PROVIDE +AGAINST THEM.—Appearances are to us in four ways. For either things +appear as they are; or they are not, and do not even appear to be; or +they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to +be. Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit the +mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys +(troubles) us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of +Pyrrho and of the Academics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply +the remedy to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which +some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a +remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek +aid against habit. What aid, then, can we find against habit? The +contrary habit. You hear the ignorant say: “That unfortunate person is +dead; his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow; he was cut off +by an untimely death and in a foreign land.” Hear the contrary way of +speaking. Tear yourself from these expressions; oppose to one habit the +contrary habit; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and +discipline of reason; against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we +ought to have manifest præcognitions ([Greek: prolaepseis]), cleared of +all impurities and ready to hand. + +When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, +that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary +thing. For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that I +am not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way. +I will go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give +to another the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doing +anything myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something +noble. Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our +power to reason thus? Tell me where I can escape death; discover for me +the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not +visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do +you wish me to do? I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from +the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the +origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this +should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according +to my wish, I change them; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the +eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to +be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil. +Then at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to +tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and +abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not +care for me, what are they to me? Yes, but you will be an impious man. +In what respect, then, will it be worse for me than it is now? To sum +up, remember that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, +piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem +necessary (true)? + + +THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN; AND WHAT ARE THE SMALL AND THE +GREAT THINGS AMONG MEN.—What is the cause of assenting to anything? The +fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to +that which appears not to be true. Why? Because this is the nature of +the understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with the +false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof +of this? Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is now night. +It is not possible. Take away your persuasion that it is day. It is not +possible. Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the stars +are even in number. It is impossible. When then any man assents to that +which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as +false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato +says; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have +we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit +and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the +unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, +and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful +to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea? + +“’Tis true I know what evil I shall do, +But passion overpowers the better counsel.” + + +She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her +husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; but +she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will +not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow +except that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why +then are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered +about the most important things, and is become a viper instead of a +human creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity +the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the +faculties which are supreme? + +Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every +act is the appearance (the opinion), whether the thing appears good or +bad. If good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers the +penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one +person, and he who suffers another person—whoever remembers this will +not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not +revile or blame any man, nor hate, nor quarrel with any man. + +So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the +appearance (opinion)? Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is +nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared to +Alexander to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It appeared to Helene to +follow him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a +gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only +would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small a +matter then did such great things depend? But what do you mean by such +great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many +men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is it nothing? But what +great matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests +of swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? Are these things then +like those? Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of +oxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of +storks. What is there in this great or dreadful? Or show me what is the +difference between a man’s house and a stork’s nest, as far as each is +a dwelling; except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles +and bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork +and a man then like things? What say you? In body they are very much +alike. + +Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork? Don’t suppose that I +say so; but there is no difference in these matters (which I have +mentioned). In what then is the difference? Seek and you will find that +there is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man +the understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social +community, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. +Where then is the great good and evil in men? It is where the +difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains fenced round, +and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then +the man also is preserved; but if any of these things is destroyed and +stormed like a city, then the man too perishes: and in this consist the +great things. Alexander, you say, sustained great damage then when the +Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers +perished. By no means; for no man is damaged by an action which is not +his own; but what happened at that time was only the destruction of +stork’s nests. Now the ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character +of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was +Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened +when he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that +he was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are +the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of +cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted. + + +ON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS).—The being (nature) of the good is a certain +will; the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What, then, are +externals? Materials for the will, about which the will being +conversant shall obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain the +good? If it does not admire (over-value) the materials; for the +opinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will +good: but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has +fixed this law, and says, “If you would have anything good, receive it +from yourself.” You say, No, but I will have it from another. Do not +so: but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens +and calls me, I say, Whom do you threaten? If he says, I will put you +in chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my feet. If he says, I will +cut off your head, I reply, You threaten my head. If he says, I will +throw you into prison, I say, You threaten the whole of this poor body. +If he threatens me with banishment, I say the same. Does he then not +threaten you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern me, +he does not threaten me at all; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom +he threatens. Whom then do I fear? the master of what? The master of +things which are in my own power? There is no such master. Do I fear +the master of things which are not in my power? And what are these +things to me? + +Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I hope not. Who +among us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they +possess? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take +those who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, +they may truly accuse me. Yes, but I intend to command your opinions +also. And who has given you this power? How can you conquer the opinion +of another man? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer +it. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered +by another? But nothing else can conquer will except the will itself. +For this reason too the law of God is most powerful and most just, +which is this: Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten +are stronger than one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing, +for dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The +ten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. In +what then are the ten weaker? If the one possesses right opinions and +the others do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How +is it possible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier +draw down the scale in which it is. + +How strange then that Socrates should have been so treated by the +Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates? Speak of the thing as it is: +how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off +and dragged to prison by stronger men, and that anyone should have +given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe +out the life. Do these things seem strange, do they seem unjust, do you +on account of these things blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent +for these things? Where then for him was the nature of good? Whom shall +we listen to, you or him? And what does Socrates say? “Anytus and +Melitus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me.” And further, he says, +“If it so pleases God, so let it be.” + +But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who +is superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come near +showing it; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior +shall always overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is +superior. One body is stronger than another: many are stronger than +one: the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This is the +reason why I also lost my lamp, because in wakefulness the thief was +superior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp +he became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This +seemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the +cloak, and is drawing me to the public place: then others bawl out, +Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? see, you are +dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what system of +philosophy ([Greek: eisagogaen)] could I have made so that, if a +stronger man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged +off; that if ten men should have laid hold of me and cast me into +prison, I should not be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I +have learned to see that everything which happens, if it be independent +of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if you have not gained by +this. Why then do you seek advantage in anything else than in that in +which you have learned that advantage is? + +Will you not leave the small arguments ([Greek: logaria]) about these +matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit in a corner and +receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no one gives them anything; +and will you not come forward and make use of what you have learned? +For it is not these small arguments that are wanted now; the writings +of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is wanted? +A man who shall apply them, one who by his acts shall bear testimony to +his words. Assume, I intreat you, this character, that we may no longer +use in the schools the examples of the ancients, but may have some +example of our own. + +To whom then does the contemplation of these matters (philosophical +inquiries) belong? To him who has leisure, for man is an animal that +loves contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate these things as +runaway slaves do; we should sit, as in a theatre, free from +distraction, and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another +time to the lute-player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave +has taken his station he praises the actor and at the same time looks +round; then if any one calls out his master’s name, the slave is +immediately frightened and disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers +thus to contemplate the works of nature. For what is a master? Man is +not the master of man; but death is, and life and pleasure and pain; +for if he comes without these things, bring Cæsar to me and you will +see how firm I am. But when he shall come with these things, thundering +and lightning, and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except +to recognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long as I have +any respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the +theatre, so do I. I bathe, I drink, I sing; but all this I do with +terror and uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, +that is from those things by means of which masters are formidable, +what further trouble have I, what master have I still? + +What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? No, but we +ought to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant ([Greek: tois idiotais]) +and to say: “This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for +himself. I excuse him.” For Socrates also excused the jailer who had +the charge of him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to +drink the poison, and said, “How generously he laments over us.” Does +he then say to the jailer that for this reason we have sent away the +women? No, but he says it to his friends who were able to hear +(understand) it; and he treats the jailer as a child. + + +THAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION.—The opinion +of the philosophers perhaps seem to some to be a paradox; but still let +us examine as well as we can, if it is true that it is possible to do +everything both with caution and with confidence. For caution seems to +be in a manner contrary to confidence, and contraries are in no way +consistent. That which seems to many to be a paradox in the matter +under consideration in my opinion is of this kind; if we asserted that +we ought to employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might +justly accuse us of bringing together things which cannot be united. +But now where is the difficulty in what is said? for if these things +are true, which have been often said and often proved, that the nature +of good is in the use of appearances, and the nature of evil likewise, +and that things independent of our will do not admit either the nature +of evil or of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say +that where things are not dependent on the will, there you should +employ confidence, but where they are dependent on the will, there you +should employ caution? For if the bad consists in the bad exercise of +the will, caution ought only to be used where things are dependent on +the will. But if things independent of the will and not in our power +are nothing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; and +thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed confident +because of our caution. For by employing caution towards things which +are really bad, it will result that we shall have confidence with +respect to things which are not so. + +We are then in the condition of deer; when they flee from the +huntsmen’s feathers in fright, whither do they turn and in what do they +seek refuge as safe? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish by +confounding things which are objects of fear with things that they +ought not to fear. Thus we also act: in what cases do we fear? In +things which are independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary +do we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In things +dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or +shamelessly, or with base desire to seek something, does not concern us +at all, if we only hit the mark in things which are independent of our +will. But where there is death or exile or pain or infamy, there we +attempt to run away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore, as we +may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest matters, we +convert natural confidence (that is, according to nature) into +audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness; and we convert natural +caution and modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are full of fear +and confusion. For if a man should transfer caution to those things in +which the will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will +immediately by willing to be cautious have also the power of avoiding +what he chooses; but if he transfer it to the things which are not in +his power and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are in the +power of others, he will of necessity fear, he will be unstable, he +will be disturbed; for death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of +pain or death. For this reason we commend the poet, who said: + +“Not death is evil, but a shameful death.” + + +Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against death, and +caution against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary, and +employ against death the attempt to escape; and to our opinion about it +we employ carelessness, rashness, and indifference. These things +Socrates properly used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks +appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected in +like manner by events (the things which happen in life) for no other +reason than children are by masks. For what is a child? Ignorance. What +is a child? Want of knowledge. For when a child knows these things, he +is in no way inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it and +examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must be separated from +the spirit either now or later as it was separated from it before. Why +then are you troubled if it be separated now? for if it is not +separated now, it will be separated afterwards. Why? That the period of +the universe may be completed, for it has need of the present, and of +the future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it and examine +it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. If +this does not satisfy (please) you, the door is open; if it does, bear +(with things). For the door ought to be open for all occasions; and so +we have no trouble. + +What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be +the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, +release from perturbation, release from fear. Freedom. For in these +matters we must not believe the many, who say that free persons only +ought to be educated, but we should rather believe the philosophers who +say that the educated only are free. How is this? In this manner: Is +freedom anything else than the power of living as we choose? Nothing +else. Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error? We do not. No +one then who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? Do +you wish to live in sorrow? Do you wish to live in perturbation? By no +means. No one then who is in a state of fear or sorrow or perturbation +is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrows and fears and +perturbations, he is at the same time also delivered from servitude. +How then can we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when +you say, We only allow free persons to be educated? For philosophers +say we allow none to be free except the educated; that is, God does not +allow it. When then a man has turned round before the prætor his own +slave, has he done nothing? He has done something. What? He has turned +round his own slave before the prætor. Has he done nothing more? Yes: +he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twentieth. Well +then, is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free? No +more than he is become free from perturbations. Have you who are able +to turn round (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a +girl or a boy, or some tyrant or some friend of the tyrant? Why do you +trouble then when you are going off to any trial (danger) of this kind? +It is for this reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness +these principles by which you may determine what those things are with +reference to which you ought to be cautious, courageous in that which +does not depend on your will, cautious in that which does depend on it. + + +OF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION).—Consider, you who are +going into court, what you wish to maintain and what you wish to +succeed in. For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, +you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if +you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, +and if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For who +is the master of such things? Who can take them away? If you choose to +be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose +not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what +you think that you ought not to desire? who shall compel you to avoid +what you do not think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will +determine against you something that appears formidable; but that you +should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he do that? When then +the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power, what +else do you care for? Let this be your preface, this your narrative, +this your confirmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this +your applause (or the approbation which you will receive). + +Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him to prepare for his +trial, Do you not think then that I have been preparing for it all my +life? By what kind of preparation? I have maintained that which was in +my own power. How then? I have never done anything unjust either in my +private or in my public life. + +But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor body, your little +property, and your little estimation, I advise you to make from this +moment all possible preparation, and then consider both the nature of +your judge and your adversary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, +embrace his knees; if to weep, weep; if to groan, groan. For when you +have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave and do +not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes +not choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or +a slave, either instructed or uninstructed, either a well-bred cock or +a mean one, either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at once; +and let it not happen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. +But if these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the +nature of evil and good? It is where truth is: where truth is and where +nature is, there is caution: where truth is, there is courage where +nature is. + +For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest something to me +(tell me what to do). What should I suggest to you? Well, form my mind +so as to accommodate itself to any event. Why that is just the same as +if a man who is ignorant of letters should say, Tell me what to write +when any name is proposed to me. For if I should tell him to write +Dion, and then another should come and propose to him not the name of +Dion but that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if +you have practised writing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) +anything that is required. If you are not, what can I now suggest? For +if circumstances require something else, what will you say, or what +will you do? Remember then this general precept and you will need no +suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity +ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is +the master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to gain +or try to avoid. + + +HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE.—Things themselves (materials) +are indifferent; but the use of them is not indifferent. How then shall +a man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the same time be +careful and neither rash nor negligent? If he imitates those who play +at dice. The counters are indifferent; the dice are indifferent. How do +I know what the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously the +cast of the dice, this is my business. Thus then in life also the chief +business is this: distinguish and separate things, and say: Externals +are not in my power: will is in my power. Where shall I seek the good +and the bad? Within, in the things which are my own. But in what does +not belong to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage +or anything of the kind. + +What then? Should we use such things carelessly? In no way: for this on +the other hand is bad for the faculty of the will, and consequently +against nature; but we should act carefully because the use is not +indifferent, and we should also act with firmness and freedom from +perturbations because the material is indifferent. For where the +material is not indifferent, there no man can hinder me or compel me. +Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of those things is +not in my power, nor is it good or bad; but the use is either bad or +good, and the use is in my power. But it is difficult to mingle and to +bring together these two things—the carefulness of him who is affected +by the matter (or things about him), and the firmness of him who has no +regard for it; but it is not impossible: and if it is, happiness is +impossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What +can I do? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, +the opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for? for +my part is done. The business belongs to another, the master. But the +ship is sinking—what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, +not to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but +knowing that what has been produced must also perish: for I am not an +immortal being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of +the day: I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What +difference then does it make to me how I pass away, whether by being +suffocated or by a fever, for I must pass through some such means. + +How then is it said that some external things are according to nature +and others contrary to nature? It is said as it might be said if we +were separated from union (or society): for to the foot I shall say +that it is according to nature for it to be clean; but if you take it +as a foot and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it +both to step into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut +off for the good of the whole body; otherwise it is no longer a foot. +We should think in some such way about ourselves also. What are you? A +man. If you consider yourself as detached from other men, it is +according to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But +if you consider yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is +for the sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at +another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at another time be +in want, and in some cases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled? +Do you not know, that as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached +from the body, so you are no longer a man if you are separated from +other men. For what is a man? A part of a state, of that first which +consists of gods and of men; then of that which is called next to it, +which is a small image of the universal state. What then must I be +brought to trial; must another have a fever, another sail on the sea, +another die, and another be condemned? Yes, for it is impossible in +such a universe of things, among so many living together, that such +things should not happen, some to one and others to others. It is your +duty then since you are come here, to say what you ought, to arrange +these things as it is fit. Then some one says, “I shall charge you with +doing me wrong.” Much good may it do you: I have done my part; but +whether you also have done yours, you must look to that; for there is +some danger of this too, that it may escape your notice. + + +OF INDIFFERENCE.—The hypothetical proposition is indifferent: the +judgment about it is not indifferent, but it is either knowledge or +opinion or error. Thus life is indifferent: the use is not indifferent. +When any man then tells you that these things also are indifferent, do +not become negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about +such things), do not become abject and struck with admiration of +material things. And it is good for you to know your own preparation +and power, that in those matters where you have not been prepared, you +may keep quiet, and not be vexed, if others have the advantage over +you. For you too in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over +them; and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them by +saying, “I have learned them, and you have not.” Thus also where there +is need of any practice, seek not that which is acquired from the need +(of such practice), but yield in that matter to those who have had +practice, and be yourself content with firmness of mind. + +Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly. But I have been shut +out, for I have not learned to make my way through the window; and when +I have found the door shut, I must either come back or enter through +the window. But still speak to him. In what way? Not meanly. But +suppose that you have not got what you wanted. Was this your business, +and not his? Why then do you claim that which belongs to another? +Always remember what is your own, and what belongs to another; and you +will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, So long as +future things are uncertain, I always cling to those which are more +adapted to the conservation of that which is according to nature; for +God himself has given me the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that +it was fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even +move towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, would move +to go into the mud. For why are ears of corn produced? Is it not that +they may become dry? And do they not become dry that they may be +reaped? for they are not separated from communion with other things. If +then they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped? But +this is a curse upon ears of corn to be never reaped. So we must know +that in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just the same as +not to be ripened and not to be reaped. But since we must be reaped, +and we also know that we are reaped, we are vexed at it; for we neither +know what we are nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who +have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he +was going to strike the enemy checked himself when he heard the trumpet +sounding a retreat: so it seemed better to him to obey the general’s +command than to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, +even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weeping and +groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call them “circumstances.” +What kind of circumstances, man? If you give the name of circumstances +to the things which are around you, all things are circumstances; but +if you call hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying +of that which has been produced? But that which destroys is either a +sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care +about the way of going down to Hades? All ways are equal. But if you +will listen to the truth, the way which the tyrant sends you is +shorter. A tyrant never killed a man in six months: but a fever is +often a year about it. All these things are only sound and the noise of +empty names. + + +HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION.—Through an unreasonable regard to +divination many of us omit many duties. For what more can the diviner +see than death or danger or disease, or generally things of that kind? +If then I must expose myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my +duty even to die for him, what need have I then for divination? Have I +not within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and of evil, +and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of both? What need have I +then to consult the viscera of victims or the flight of birds, and why +do I submit when he says, It is for your interest? For does he know +what is for my interest, does he know what is good; and as he has +learned the signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs of good +and evil? For if he knows the signs of these, he knows the signs both +of the beautiful and of the ugly, and of the just and of the unjust. Do +you tell me, man, what is the thing which is signified for me: is it +life or death, poverty or wealth? But whether these things are for my +interest or whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. Why don’t +you give your opinion on matters of grammar, and why do you give it +here about things on which we are all in error and disputing with one +another? + +What then leads us to frequent use of divination? Cowardice, the dread +of what will happen. This is the reason why we flatter the diviners. +Pray, master, shall I succeed to the property of my father? Let us see: +let us sacrifice on the occasion. Yes, master, as fortune chooses. When +he has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him as if +we received the inheritance from him. The consequence is that they play +upon us. + +Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for +if it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any +other thing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals +also the works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor +yet parts of the gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion +separated from the Deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of +him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent? Why do you +not know whence you came? will you not remember when you are eating who +you are who eat and whom you feed? When you are in social intercourse, +when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, +know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a +god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it +not. Do you think that I mean some god of silver or of gold, and +external? You carry him within yourself, and you perceive not that you +are polluting him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image +of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which +you are doing; but when God himself is present within and sees all and +hears all, you are not ashamed of thinking such things and doing such +things, ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the anger +of God. Then why do we fear when we are sending a young man from the +school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat +improperly, have improper intercourse with women; and lest the rags in +which he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments should make +him proud. This youth (if he acts thus) does not know his own God; he +knows not with whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure +when he says, “I wish I had you (God) with me.” Have you not God with +you? and do you seek for any other when you have him? or will God tell +you anything else than this? If you were a statue of Phidias, either +Athena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself and of the artist, and +if you had any understanding (power of perception) you would try to do +nothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and try not to +appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) to those who look upon you. +But now because Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not how +you shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the +artist in the other? or the work in the one case like the other? And +what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the faculties, +which the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble or bronze, or +gold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias, when she has once extended +the hand and received in it the figure of Victory, stands in that +attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, they +breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things and +the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you +dishonor him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also +entrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will you +not think of this too, but do you also dishonor your guardianship? But +if God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He +has delivered yourself to your own care, and says: “I had no one fitter +to entrust him to than yourself; keep him for me such as he is by +nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrified, free from passion and +perturbation.” And then you do not keep him such. + +But some will say, Whence has this fellow got the arrogance which he +displays and these supercilious looks? I have not yet so much gravity +as befits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I +have learned and in what I have assented to. I still fear my own +weakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance +such as I ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have; then I +will show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished. +What do you expect? a supercilious countenance? Does the Zeus at +Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is +ready to say: + +Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail.—Iliad, i., 526. + + +Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from +perturbation. What, and immortal, too, except from old age, and from +sickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god. +This power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor +can I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What +nerves are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion which never +falls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit ([Greek: +hormaen]), a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you +shall see. + + +THAT WHEN WE CANNOT FULFIL THAT WHICH THE CHARACTER OF A MAN PROMISES, +WE ASSUME THE CHARACTER OF A PHILOSOPHER.—It is no common (easy) thing +to do this only, to fulfil the promise of a man’s nature. For what is a +man? The answer is, A rational and mortal being. Then by the rational +faculty from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from what +others? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like +a wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; you +have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep; +but if you do, in this case also the man is lost. What then do we do as +sheep? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act +rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined? To sheep. +What have we lost? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and +harmfully and passionately and violently, to what have we declined? To +wild beasts. Consequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others +little beasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let +me be eaten by a lion. But in all these ways the promise of a man +acting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex) +proposition maintained? When it fulfils what its nature promises; so +that the preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a +conjunction of truths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it +fulfils what it promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, +preserved? (When they severally keep their promise.) What is the wonder +then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in like manner is +lost? Each man is improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the +carpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But +if a man accustoms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his +art will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the +modest man, and immodest actions destroy him; and actions of fidelity +preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on +the other hand contrary actions strengthen contrary characters: +shamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the +faithless man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an angry +temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the avaricious man more +avaricious. + +For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with +learning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For we have +long been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice +opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also +put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the +expositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not able +to discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things +(in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and +some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which +participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the +indifferent are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of +our talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of +those who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed. +Philosopher, where are the things which you were talking about? Whence +did you produce and utter them? From the lips, and thence only. Why +then do you corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat the +weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice? For it is one +thing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to +eat. That which has been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become +sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy breath. Whatever is +stored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it; but you +have no other advantage from it except so far as to appear to possess +it. For what is the difference between explaining these doctrines and +those of men who have different opinions? Sit down now and explain +according to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you +will explain his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus +himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the +many? Why do you act the part of a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you +not see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian, or an Egyptian? +and when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say, +This man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has assumed the +affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has adopted +that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew. + + +HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM NAMES.—Consider who you +are. In the first place, you are a man; and this is one who has nothing +superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to +it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from +subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by +reason. You have been separated from wild beasts; you have been +separated from domestic animals ([Greek: probaton]). Further, you are a +citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient +(serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable +of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the +connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise +(profess)? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate +about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as +the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the +constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion +nor desire anything otherwise than with reference to the whole. +Therefore, the philosophers say well, that if the good man had +foreknowledge of what would happen, he would co-operate towards his own +sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are +assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the +whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. But now +because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the +things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we +were made among other things for this. + +After this, remember that you are a son. What does this character +promise? To consider that everything which is the son’s belongs to the +father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor +to say or do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all +things and give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After +this know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is +due to make concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your +brother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which +are independent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may +have the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a +thing it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, +to gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the +advantage. + +Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are +a senator; if a youth, that you are a youth; if an old man, that you +are an old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, +marks out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I +say to you, You have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In +the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, +you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the +brother and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear +not to have changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead +of a man, who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous +wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? But (I +suppose) you must lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And +does the loss of nothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art +of grammar or music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if +you shall lose modesty, moderation ([Greek: chtastolaen]) and +gentleness, do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first +mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the will, +and the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have +them nor to lose them is shameful; but as to the second, not to have +them and to lose them is shameful and matter of reproach and a +misfortune. + +What then? shall I not hurt him who has hurt me? In the first place +consider what hurt ([Greek: blabae]) is, and remember what you have +heard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will +(purpose, intention, [Greek: proaireeis]), and the evil also in the +will, see if what you say is not this: What then, since that man has +hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by +doing some unjust act to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves +(mentally think of) something of this kind? But where there is any +detriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm there; and +where the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is (you +suppose) no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done an +unjust act neither suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, +nor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than +(security to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest +and faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the least, except +only in the school so far as a few words are concerned. Therefore our +proficiency is limited to these few words; but beyond them it does not +exist even in the slightest degree. + + +WHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS.—The beginning of philosophy, to +him at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door is a +consciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things; +for we come into the world with no natural notion of a right-angled +triangle, or of a diesis (a quarter tone), or of a half-tone; but we +learn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art; +and for this reason those who do not know them do not think that they +know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and +becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and +improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever +came into the world without having an innate idea of them? Wherefore we +all use these names, and we endeavor to fit the preconceptions to the +several cases (things) thus: he has done well; he has not done well; he +has done as he ought, not as he ought; he has been unfortunate, he has +been fortunate; he is unjust, he is just; who does not use these names? +who among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he +defers the use of the words about lines (geometrical figures) or +sounds? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already +taught as it were by nature some things on this matter ([Greek: +topon]), and proceeding from these we have added to them self-conceit +([Greek: oiaesin]). For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful +and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it +to particulars? You do. Do I not then adapt it properly? In that lies +the whole question; and conceit is added here; for beginning from these +things which are admitted men proceed to that which is matter of +dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this +power of adaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them +from being perfect? But now since you think that you properly adapt the +preconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this +(assume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not seem so to +another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does +he not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that both of you +can properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you have +contrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything +better towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that +you do? Does the madman do any other things than the things which seem +to him right? Is then this criterion sufficient for him also? It is not +sufficient. Come then to something which is superior to seeming +([Greek: tou dochein]). What is this? + +Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the +disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of +the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only +“seems,” and a certain investigation of that which “seems” whether it +“seems” rightly, and a discovery of some rule ([Greek: chanonos]), as +we have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a +carpenter’s rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked +things.—This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all +things are right which seem so to all? And how is it possible that +contradictions can be right?—Not all then, but all which seem to us to +be right.—How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians? +why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what +seems right to me or to any other man? Not at all more. What then +“seems” to every man is not sufficient for determining what “is”; for +neither in the case of weights nor measures are we satisfied with the +bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In +this matter then is there no rule superior to what “seems”? And how is +it possible that the most necessary things among men should have no +sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some +rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and +afterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the +finger without it? For this, I think, is that which when it is +discovered cures of their madness those who use mere “seeming” as a +measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain +things (principles) known and made clear we may use in the case of +particular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed. + +What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring? +Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into the +balance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have +confidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to +be. Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No. Is then +pleasure anything secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the +scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you +are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring +another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper +then to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that +it is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of +the balance. Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are +ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules; +and then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good +man. + + +OF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION.—What things a man must learn in order to +be able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown by +our philosophers (the Stoics); but with respect to the proper use of +the things, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, +whom you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he cannot +discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a +little, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not know how to treat +him, but he then either abuses or ridicules him, and says, He is an +illiterate man; it is not possible to do anything with him. Now a +guide, when he has found a man out of the road, leads him into the +right way; he does not ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you +also show the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he +follows. But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule +him, but rather feel your own incapacity. + +Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, never to be +irritated in argument, never to utter anything abusive, anything +insulting, but to bear with abusive persons and to put an end to the +quarrel. If you would know what great power he had in this way, read +the Symposium of Xenophon, and you will see how many quarrels he put an +end to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power is most +highly praised: + +Quickly with skill he settles great disputes. +Hesiod, Theogony, v. 87. + + +ON ANXIETY (SOLICITUDE).—When I see a man anxious, I say, What does +this man want? If he did not want something which is not in his power, +how could he be anxious? For this reason a lute player when he is +singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the theatre, he +is anxious, even if he has a good voice and plays well on the lute; for +he not only wishes to sing well, but also to obtain applause: but this +is not in his power. Accordingly, where he has skill, there he has +confidence. Bring any single person who knows nothing of music, and the +musician does not care for him. But in the matter where a man knows +nothing and has not been practised, there he is anxious. What matter is +this? He knows not what a crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. +However, he has learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest; but +what the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life, he +neither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must of necessity +tremble and grow pale. Is any man then afraid about things which are +not evils? No. Is he afraid about things which are evils, but still so +far within his power that they may not happen? Certainly he is not. If +then the things which are independent of the will are neither good nor +bad, and all things which do depend on the will are within our power, +and no man can either take them from us or give them to us, if we do +not choose, where is room left for anxiety? But we are anxious about +our poor body, our little property, about the will of Cæsar; but not +anxious about things internal. Are we anxious about not forming a false +opinion? No, for this is in my power. About not exerting our movements +contrary to nature? No, not even about this. When then you see a man +pale, as the physician says, judging from the complexion, this man’s +spleen is disordered, that man’s liver; so also say, this man’s desire +and aversion are disordered, he is not in the right way, he is in a +fever. For nothing else changes the color, or causes trembling or +chattering of the teeth, or causes a man to + +Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot. +Iliad, xiii., 281. + + +For this reason, when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, he was not +anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any of the things which Zeno +admired; and Zeno did not care for those things over which Antigonus +had power. But Antigonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, +for he wished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of his +power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; for no man who is +skilled in any art wishes to please one who has no such skill. + +Should I try to please you? Why? I suppose, you know the measure by +which one man is estimated by another. Have you taken pains to learn +what is a good man and what is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or +the other? Why then are you not good yourself? How, he replies, am I +not good? Because no good man laments or groans or weeps, no good man +is pale and trembles, or says, How will he receive me, how will he +listen to me? Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do you care about what +belongs to others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what +proceeds from you? Certainly. And is it possible that a fault should be +one man’s, and the evil in another? No. Why then are you anxious about +that which belongs to others? Your question is reasonable; but I am +anxious how I shall speak to him. Cannot you then speak to him as you +choose? But I fear that I may be disconcerted? If you are going to +write the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be disconcerted? +By no means. Why? is it not because you have practised writing the +name? Certainly. Well, if you were going to read the name, would you +not feel the same? and why? Because every art has a certain strength +and confidence in the things which belong to it. Have you then not +practised speaking? and what else did you learn in the school? +Syllogisms and sophistical propositions? For what purpose? was it not +for the purpose of discoursing skilfully? and is not discoursing +skilfully the same as discoursing seasonably and cautiously and with +intelligence, and also without making mistakes and without hindrance, +and besides all this with confidence? Yes. When then you are mounted on +a horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched against a +man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in which you are practised, +and he is not? Yes, but that person (to whom I am going to speak) has +power to kill me. Speak the truth, then, unhappy man, and do not brag, +nor claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your masters, +but so long as you present this handle in your body, follow every man +who is stronger than yourself. Socrates used to practice speaking, he +who talked as he did to the tyrants, to the dicasts (judges), he who +talked in his prison. Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as +he did to Alexander, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. +These men were confident in the things which they practised. But do you +walk off to your own affairs and never leave them: go and sit in a +corner, and weave syllogisms, and propose them to another. There is not +in you the man who can rule a state. + + +TO NASO.—When a certain Roman entered with his son and listened to one +reading, Epictetus said, This is the method of instruction; and he +stopped. When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus said, Every art +when it is taught causes labor to him who is unacquainted with it and +is unskilled in it, and indeed the things which proceed from the arts +immediately show their use in the purpose for which they were made; and +most of them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed to +be present and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a pleasant +thing; but the shoe is useful and also not disagreeable to look at. And +the discipline of a smith when he is learning is very disagreeable to +one who chances to be present and is a stranger to the art: but the +work shows the use of the art. But you will see this much more in +music; for if you are present while a person is learning, the +discipline will appear most disagreeable; and yet the results of music +are pleasing and delightful to those who know nothing of music. And +here we conceive the work of a philosopher to be something of this +kind: he must adapt his wish ([Greek: boulaesin]) to what is going on, +so that neither any of the things which are taking place shall take +place contrary to our wish, nor any of the things which do not take +place shall not take place when we wish that they should. From this the +result is to those who have so arranged the work of philosophy, not to +fail in the desire, nor to fall in with that which they would avoid; +without uneasiness, without fear, without perturbation to pass through +life themselves, together with their associates maintaining the +relations both natural and acquired, as the relation of son, of father, +of brother, of citizen, of man, of wife, of neighbor, of +fellow-traveller, of ruler, of ruled. The work of a philosopher we +conceive to be something like this. It remains next to inquire how this +must be accomplished. + +We see then that the carpenter ([Greek: techton]) when he has learned +certain things becomes a carpenter; the pilot by learning certain +things becomes a pilot. May it not then in philosophy also not be +sufficient to wish to be wise and good, and that there is also a +necessity to learn certain things? We inquire then what these things +are. The philosophers say that we ought first to learn that there is a +God and that he provides for all things; also that it is not possible +to conceal from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts. The +next thing is to learn what is the nature of the gods; for such as they +are discovered to be, he, who would please and obey them, must try with +all his power to be like them. If the divine is faithful, man also must +be faithful; if it is free, man also must be free; if beneficent, man +also must be beneficent; if magnanimous, man also must be magnanimous; +as being then an imitator of God he must do and say everything +consistently with this fact. + + +TO OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN WHAT THEY HAVE +DETERMINED.—When some persons have heard these words, that a man ought +to be constant (firm), and that the will is naturally free and not +subject to compulsion, but that all other things are subject to +hindrance, to slavery, and are in the power of others, they suppose +that they ought without deviation to abide by everything which they +have determined. But in the first place that which has been determined +ought to be sound (true). I require tone (sinews) in the body, but such +as exists in a healthy body, in an athletic body; but if it is plain to +me that you have the tone of a frenzied man and you boast of it, I +shall say to you, Man, seek the physician; this is not tone, but atony +(deficiency in right tone). In a different way something of the same +kind is felt by those who listen to these discourses in a wrong manner; +which was the case with one of my companions, who for no reason +resolved to starve himself to death. I heard of it when it was the +third day of his abstinence from food, and I went to inquire what had +happened. “I have resolved,” he said. “But still tell me what it was +which induced you to resolve; for if you have resolved rightly, we +shall sit with you and assist you to depart, but if you have made an +unreasonable resolution, change your mind.” “We ought to keep to our +determinations.” “What are you doing, man? We ought to keep not to all +our determinations, but to those which are right; for if you are now +persuaded that it is right, do not change your mind, if you think fit, +but persist and say, We ought to abide by our determinations. Will you +not make the beginning and lay the foundation in an inquiry whether the +determination is sound or not sound, and so then build on it firmness +and security? But if you lay a rotten and ruinous foundation, will not +your miserable little building fall down the sooner, the more and the +stronger are the materials which you shall lay on it? Without any +reason would you withdraw from us out of life a man who is a friend and +a companion, a citizen of the same city, both the great and the small +city? Then while you are committing murder and destroying a man who has +done no wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by your +determinations? And if it ever in any way came into your head to kill +me, ought you to abide by your determinations?” + +Now this man was with difficulty persuaded to change his mind. But it +is impossible to convince some persons at present; so that I seem now +to know what I did not know before, the meaning of the common saying, +that you can neither persuade nor break a fool. May it never be my lot +to have a wise fool for my friend; nothing is more untractable. “I am +determined,” the man says. Madmen are also, but the more firmly they +form a judgment on things which do not exist, the more hellebore they +require. Will you not act like a sick man and call in the physician?—I +am sick, master, help me; consider what I must do: it is my duty to +obey you. So it is here also: I know not what I ought to do, but I am +come to learn.—Not so; but speak to me about other things: upon this I +have determined.—What other things? for what is greater and more useful +than for you to be persuaded that it is not sufficient to have made +your determination and not to change it. This is the tone (energy) of +madness, not of health.—I will die, if you compel me to this.—Why, man? +What has happened?—I have determined—I have had a lucky escape that you +have not determined to kill me—I take no money. Why?—I have +determined—Be assured that with the very tone (energy) which you now +use in refusing to take, there is nothing to hinder you at some time +from inclining without reason to take money, and then saying, I have +determined. As in a distempered body, subject to defluxions, the humor +inclines sometimes to these parts, and then to those, so too a sickly +soul knows not which way to incline; but if to this inclination and +movement there is added a tone (obstinate resolution), then the evil +becomes past help and cure. + + +THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD AND EVIL.—Where is +the good? In the will. Where is the evil? In the will. Where is neither +of them? In those things which are independent of the will. Well then? +Does any one among us think of these lessons out of the schools? Does +any one meditate (strive) by himself to give an answer to things as in +the case of questions?—Is it day?—Yes.—Is it night?—No.—Well, is the +number of stars even?—I cannot say.—When money is shown (offered) to +you, have you studied to make the proper answer, that money is not a +good thing? Have you practised yourself in these answers, or only +against sophisms? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which you have +studied, in those you have improved; but in those which you have not +studied, in those you remain the same? When the rhetorician knows that +he has written well, that he has committed to memory what he has +written, and brings an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious? +Because he is not satisfied with having studied. What then does he +want? To be praised by the audience? For the purpose then of being able +to practise declamation he has been disciplined; but with respect to +praise and blame he has not been disciplined. For when did he hear from +any one what praise is, what blame is, what the nature of each is, what +kind of praise should be sought, or what kind of blame should be +shunned? And when did he practise this discipline which follows these +words (things)? Why then do you still wonder, if in the matters which a +man has learned, there he surpasses others, and in those in which he +has not been disciplined, there he is the same with the many. So the +lute player knows how to play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and +yet he trembles when he enters on the stage; for these matters he +understands, but he does not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts of a +crowd, nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what anxiety is, +whether it is our work or the work of another, whether it is possible +to stop it or not. For this reason if he has been praised, he leaves +the theatre puffed up, but if he has been ridiculed, the swollen +bladder has been punctured and subsides. + +This is the case also with ourselves. What do we admire? Externals. +About what things are we busy? Externals. And have we any doubt then +why we fear or why we are anxious? What then happens when we think the +things, which are coming on us, to be evils? It is not in our power not +to be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious. Then we say, +Lord God, how shall I not be anxious? Fool, have you not hands, did not +God make them for you? Sit down now and pray that your nose may not +run. Wipe yourself rather and do not blame him. Well then, has he given +to you nothing in the present case? Has he not given to you endurance? +Has he not given to you magnanimity? Has he not given to you manliness? +When you have such hands do you still look for one who shall wipe your +nose? But we neither study these things nor care for them. Give me a +man who cares how he shall do anything, not for the obtaining of a +thing, but who cares about his own energy. What man, when he is walking +about, cares for his own energy? Who, when he is deliberating, cares +about his own deliberation, and not about obtaining that about which he +deliberates? And if he succeeds, he is elated and says, How well we +have deliberated; did I not tell you, brother, that it is impossible, +when we have thought about anything, that it should not turn out thus? +But if the thing should turn out otherwise, the wretched man is +humbled; he knows not even what to say about what has taken place. Who +among us for the sake of this matter has consulted a seer? Who among us +as to his actions has not slept in indifference? Who? Give (name) to me +one that I may see the man whom I have long been looking for, who is +truly noble and ingenuous, whether young or old; name him. + +What then are the things which are heavy on us and disturb us? What +else than opinions? What else than opinions lies heavy upon him who +goes away and leaves his companions and friends and places and habits +of life? Now little children, for instance, when they cry on the nurse +leaving them for a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive a +small cake. Do you choose then that we should compare you to little +children? No, by Zeus, for I do not wish to be pacified by a small +cake, but by right opinions. And what are these? Such as a man ought to +study all day, and not to be affected by anything that is not his own, +neither by companion nor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own +body, but to remember the law and to have it before his eyes. And what +is the divine law? To keep a man’s own, not to claim that which belongs +to others, but to use what is given, and when it is not given, not to +desire it; and when a thing is taken away, to give it up readily and +immediately, and to be thankful for the time that a man has had the use +of it, if you would not cry for your nurse and mamma. For what matter +does it make by what thing a man is subdued, and on what he depends? In +what respect are you better than he who cries for a girl, if you grieve +for a little gymnasium, and little porticos, and young men, and such +places of amusement? Another comes and laments that he shall no longer +drink the water of Dirce. Is the Marcian water worse than that of +Dirce? But I was used to the water of Dirce. And you in turn will be +used to the other. Then if you become attached to this also, cry for +this too, and try to make a verse like the verse of Euripides, + +The hot baths of Nero and the Marcian water. + + +See how tragedy is made when common things happen to silly men. + +When then shall I see Athens again and the Acropolis? Wretch, are you +not content with what you see daily? Have you anything better or +greater to see than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the +sea? But if indeed you comprehend Him who administers the whole, and +carry him about in yourself, do you still desire small stones and a +beautiful rock? + + +HOW WE MUST ADAPT PRECONCEPTIONS TO PARTICULAR CASES.—What is the first +business of him who philosophizes? To throw away self-conceit ([Greek: +oiaesis]). For it is impossible for a man to begin to learn that which +he thinks that he knows. As to things then which ought to be done and +ought not to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, all of +us talking of them at random go to the philosophers; and on these +matters we praise, we censure, we accuse, we blame, we judge and +determine about principles honorable and dishonorable. But why do we go +to the philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not think that +we know. And what is this? Theorems. For we wish to learn what +philosophers say as being something elegant and acute; and some wish to +learn that they may get profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous +then to think that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learn +another; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that which he +does not learn. But the many are deceived by this which deceived also +the rhetorician Theopompus, when he blames even Plato for wishing +everything to be defined. For what does he say? Did none of us before +you use the words good or just, or do we utter the sounds in an +unmeaning and empty way without understanding what they severally +signify? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural notions +of each of these things and preconceptions ([Greek: prolaepseis])? But +it is not possible to adapt preconceptions to their correspondent +objects if we have not distinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired what +object must be subjected to each preconception. You may make the same +charge against physicians also. For who among us did not use the words +healthy and unhealthy before Hippocrates lived, or did we utter these +words as empty sounds? For we have also a certain preconception of +health, but we are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says, +Abstain from food; another says, Give food; another says, Bleed; and +another says, Use cupping. What is the reason? is it any other than +that a man cannot properly adapt the preconceptions of health to +particulars? + + +HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES.—Every habit and faculty is +maintained and increased by the corresponding actions: the habit of +walking by walking, the habit of running by running. If you would be a +good reader, read; if a writer, write. But when you shall not have read +for thirty days in succession, but have done something else, you will +know the consequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten +days, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will see how your +legs are weakened. Generally then if you would make anything a habit, +do it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustom +yourself to do something else in place of it. + +So it is with respect to the affections of the soul: when you have been +angry, you must know that not only has this evil befallen you, but that +you have also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown fuel upon +fire. + +In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases of the +mind grow up. For when you have once desired money, if reason be +applied to lead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, and +the ruling faculty of our mind is restored to the original authority. +But if you apply no means of cure, it no longer returns to the same +state, but being again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is +inflamed to desire quicker than before: and when this takes place +continually, it is henceforth hardened (made callous), and the disease +of the mind confirms the love of money. For he who has had a fever, and +has been relieved from it, is not in the same state that he was before, +unless he has been completely cured. Something of the kind happens also +in diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in it, +and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is again lashed +on the same places, the lash will produce not blisters (weals) but +sores. If then you wish not to be of an angry temper, do not feed the +habit: throw nothing on it which will increase it: at first keep quiet, +and count the days on which you have not been angry. I used to be in +passion every day; now every second day; then every third, then every +fourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make a sacrifice to +God. For the habit at first begins to be weakened, and then is +completely destroyed. “I have not been vexed to-day, nor the day after, +nor yet on any succeeding day during two or three months; but I took +care when some exciting things happened.” Be assured that you are in a +good way. + +How then shall this be done? Be willing at length to be approved by +yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity +with your own pure self and with God. Then when any such appearance +visits you, Plato says, Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to +the temples of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you +resort to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself with +them, whether you find one who is living or dead. + +But in the first place, be not hurried away by the rapidity of the +appearance, but say, Appearances, wait for me a little; let me see who +you are, and what you are about; let me put you to the test. And then +do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw lively pictures of +the things which will follow; for if you do, it will carry you off +wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some other +beautiful and noble appearance, and cast out this base appearance. And +if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, you will see what +shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now it is only +trifling words, and nothing more. + +This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself against such +appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the combat, +divine is the work; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for +freedom from perturbation. Remember God; call on him as a helper and +protector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri in a storm. For what is a +greater storm than that which comes from appearances which are violent +and drive away the reason? For the storm itself, what else is it but an +appearance? For take away the fear of death, and suppose as many +thunders and lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm and +serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been +defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and then say the same +again, be assured that you will at last be in so wretched a condition +and so weak that you will not even know afterwards that you are doing +wrong, but you will even begin to make apologies (defences) for your +wrong-doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod to be true, + +With constant ills the dilatory strives. + + +OF INCONSISTENCY.—Some things men readily confess, and other things +they do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or without +understanding; but quite the contrary you will hear all men saying, I +wish that I had fortune equal to my understanding. But men readily +confess that they are timid, and they say: I am rather timid, I +confess; but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish. A +man will not readily confess that he is intemperate; and that he is +unjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no means confess that he +is envious or a busybody. Most men will confess that they are +compassionate. What then is the reason? + +The chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency and confusion in +the things which relate to good and evil. But different men have +different reasons; and generally what they imagine to be base, they do +not confess at all. But they suppose timidity to be a characteristic of +a good disposition, and compassion also; but silliness to be the +absolute characteristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit +(confess) the things which are offences against society. But in the +case of most errors for this reason chiefly they are induced to confess +them, because they imagine that there is something involuntary in them +as in timidity and compassion; and if a man confess that he is in any +respect intemperate, he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what +is involuntary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all +involuntary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something +involuntary; and for this reason they confess to jealousy also. + +Living then among such men, who are so confused, so ignorant of what +they say, and of the evils which they have or have not, and why they +have them, or how they shall be relieved of them, I think it is worth +the trouble for a man to watch constantly (and to ask) whether I also +am one of them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct +myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether I conduct +myself as a temperate man, whether I ever say this, that I have been +taught to be prepared for everything that may happen. Have I the +consciousness, which a man who knows nothing ought to have, that I know +nothing? Do I go to my teacher as men go to oracles, prepared to obey? +or do I like a snivelling boy go to my school to learn history and +understand the books which I did not understand before, and, if it +should happen so, to explain them also to others? Man, you have had a +fight in the house with a poor slave, you have turned the family upside +down, you have frightened the neighbors, and you come to me as if you +were a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how I have explained +some word, and how I have babbled whatever came into my head. You come +full of envy, and humbled, because you bring nothing from home; and you +sit during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how your father +is disposed towards you and your brother. What are they saying about me +there? now they think that I am improving, and are saying, He will +return with all knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before I +return; but much labor is necessary, and no one sends me anything, and +the baths at Nicopolis are dirty; everything is bad at home, and bad +here. + + +ON FRIENDSHIP.—What a man applies himself to earnestly, that he +naturally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to the things +which are bad? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to things +which in no way concern themselves? Not to these either. It remains +then that they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are +good; and if they are earnestly employed about things, they love such +things also. Whoever then understands what is good can also know how to +love; but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are +neither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving? +To love, then, is only in the power of the wise. + +For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached to nothing +so much as to its own interests. Whatever then appears to it an +impediment to this interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or +a child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses; for its nature +is to love nothing so much as its own interests: this is father, and +brother, and kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods appear +to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and throw down their +statues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of +Aesculapius to be burned when his dear friend died. + +For this reason, if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, +goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured: +but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and +his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way, +being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the +Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines; if in +the flesh, there is the ruling power; if in the will, it is there; and +if it is in externals, it is there. If then I am there where my will +is, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and +father; for this will be my interest, to maintain the character of +fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active +co-operation, of observing my relations (towards all). But if I put +myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of +Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty +or it is that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous). + +It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians +quarrelled, and the Thebans with both; and the great king quarrelled +with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both: and the Romans with the +Getae. And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. +Alexander was the guest of Menelaus, and if any man had seen their +friendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said that +they were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between +dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now +when you see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do not +conclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if they +swear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from +one another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted; +it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is +overpowered at different times by different appearances. But examine, +not what other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and +brought up together, and under the same pedagogue; but examine this +only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the +will. If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them +trustworthy or constant, or brave or free; do not name them even men, +if you have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human nature +which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy +deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the +courts of justice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes +them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes +them do whatever else men do against one another through this one +opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the +things which are not within the power of their will. But if you hear +that in truth these men think the good to be only there, where will is, +and where there is a right use of appearances, no longer trouble +yourself whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have +associated a long time and are companions, but when you have +ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are friends, as +you declare that they are faithful, that they are just. For where else +is friendship than where there is fidelity, and modesty, where there is +a communion of honest things and of nothing else. + +But you may say, Such a one treated me with regard so long; and did he +not love me? How do you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the +same way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of +his beast? How do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a +vessel, he will not throw you away like a broken platter? But this +woman is my wife, and we have lived together so long. And how long did +Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children and of +many? But a necklace came between them: and what is a necklace? It is +the opinion about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was +the thing which broke asunder the friendship between husband and wife, +that which did not allow the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a +mother. And let every man among you who has seriously resolved either +to be a friend himself or to have another for his friend, cut out these +opinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all he +will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with himself, he +will not change his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next +place, to another also, who is like himself, he will be altogether and +completely a friend. But he will bear with the man who is unlike +himself, he will be kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of +his ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in things of the +greatest importance; but he will be harsh to no man, being well +convinced of Plato’s doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth +unwillingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all other +respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge together, and sail +together, and you may be born of the same parents, for snakes also are: +but neither will they be friends, nor you, so long as you retain these +bestial and cursed opinions. + + +ON THE POWER OF SPEAKING.—Every man will read a book with more pleasure +or even with more ease, if it is written in fairer characters. +Therefore every man will also listen more readily to what is spoken, if +it is signified by appropriate and becoming words. We must not say then +that there is no faculty of expression: for this affirmation is the +characteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of an impious +man, because he undervalues the gifts which come from God, just as if +he would take away the commodity of the power of vision, or hearing, or +of seeing. Has then God given you eyes to no purpose? and to no purpose +has he infused into them a spirit so strong and of such skilful +contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the forms of things +which are seen? What messenger is so swift and vigilant? And to no +purpose has he made the interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and +elastic that the vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a +manner moved? And to no purpose has he made light, without the presence +of which there would be no use in any other thing? + +Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget the things +which are superior to them. But indeed for the power of seeing and +hearing, and indeed for life itself, and for the things which +contribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, and for wine +and oil give thanks to God: but remember that he has given you +something else better than all these, I mean the power of using them, +proving them, and estimating the value of each. For what is that which +gives information about each of these powers, what each of them is +worth? Is it each faculty itself? Did you ever hear the faculty of +vision saying anything about itself? or the faculty of hearing? or +wheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog? No; but they are appointed as +ministers and slaves to serve the faculty which has the power of making +use of the appearances of things. And if you inquire what is the value +of each thing, of whom do you inquire? who answers you? How then can +any other faculty be more powerful than this, which uses the rest as +ministers and itself proves each and pronounces about them? for which +of them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? which of them +knows when it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it +which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from objects to +which it ought not to apply them and does apply them to other objects? +Is it the faculty of vision? No, but it is the faculty of the will. +What is that faculty which closes and opens the ears? what is that by +which they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved by +what is said? is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than the +faculty of the will. Will this faculty then, seeing that it is amidst +all the other faculties which are blind and dumb and unable to see +anything else except the very acts for which they are appointed in +order to minister to this (faculty) and serve it, but this faculty +alone sees sharp and sees what is the value of each of the rest; will +this faculty declare to us that anything else is the best, or that +itself is? And what else does the eye do when it is opened than see? +But whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain person, and in +what manner, who tells us? The faculty of the will. And whether we +ought to believe what is said or not to believe it, and if we do +believe, whether we ought to be moved by it or not, who tells us? Is it +not the faculty of the will? + +But if you ask me what then is the most excellent of all things, what +must I say? I cannot say the power of speaking, but the power of the +will, when it is right ([Greek: orthae]). For it is this which uses the +other (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both small +and great. For when this faculty of the will is set right, a man who is +not good becomes good: but when it fails, a man becomes bad. It is +through this that we are unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we +blame one another, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this +which if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we carefully look +after it, makes happiness. + +What then is usually done? Men generally act as a traveller would do on +his way to his own country, when he enters a good inn, and being +pleased with it should remain there. Man, you have forgotten your +purpose: you were not travelling to this inn, but you were passing +through it. But this is a pleasant inn. And how many other inns are +pleasant? and how many meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing +through. But your purpose is this, to return to your country, to +relieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the duties of a citizen, +to marry, to beget children, to fill the usual magistracies. For you +are not come to select more pleasant places, but to live in these where +you were born and of which you were made a citizen. Something of the +kind takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since by the +aid of speech and such communication as you receive here you must +advance to perfection, and purge your will and correct the faculty +which makes use of the appearances of things; and since it is necessary +also for the teaching (delivery) of theorems to be effected by a +certain mode of expression and with a certain variety and sharpness, +some persons captivated by these very things abide in them, one +captivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another again by +sophisms, and still another by some other inn ([Greek: paudocheiou]) of +the kind; and there they stay and waste away as they were among sirens. + +Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself capable of using +conformably to nature the appearances presented to you, in your desires +not to be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to fall into +that which you would avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor +ever to have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, +conforming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, well +satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one with fault, able +from your whole soul to utter these verses: + +Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny. + + +TO (OR AGAINST) A PERSON WHO WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT VALUED +(ESTEEMED) BY HIM.—A certain person said to him (Epictetus): Frequently +I desired to hear you and came to you, and you never gave me any +answer; and now, if it is possible, I entreat you to say something to +me. Do you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in anything +else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has the art, +will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak unskilfully?—I do +think so.—He then who by speaking receives benefit himself, and is able +to benefit others, will speak skilfully; but he who is rather damaged +by speaking and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art +of speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and others +benefited by speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what they +hear? Or will you find that among them also some are benefited and some +damaged? There are both among these also, he said. In this case also +then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear +unskilfully are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in +hearing also, as there is in speaking? It seems so. If you choose, +consider the matter in this way also. The practice of music, to whom +does it belong? To a musician. And the proper making of a statue, to +whom do you think that it belongs? To a statuary. And the looking at a +statue skilfully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art? +This also requires the aid of art. Then if speaking properly is the +business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear also with benefit +is the business of the skilful man? Now as to speaking and hearing +perfectly, and usefully, let us for the present, if you please, say no +more, for both of us are a long way from everything of the kind. But I +think that every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear +philosophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is it not so? + +Why then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this to you, that he +who knows not who he is, and for what purpose he exists, and what is +this world, and with whom he is associated, and what things are the +good and the bad, and the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither +understands discourse nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is +false, and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire +according to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor intend (to +act), nor assent, nor dissent, nor suspend his judgment: to say all in +a few words, he will go about dumb and blind, thinking that he is +somebody, but being nobody. Is this so now for the first time? Is it +not the fact that ever since the human race existed, all errors and +misfortunes have arisen through this ignorance? + +This is all that I have to say to you; and I say even this not +willingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. For what must I look to +in order to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are roused by +generous horses? Must I look to your body? You treat it disgracefully. +To your dress? That is luxurious. To your behavior, to your look? That +is the same as nothing. When you would listen to a philosopher, do not +say to him, You tell me nothing; but only show yourself worthy of +hearing or fit for hearing; and you will see how you will move the +speaker. + + +THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY.—When one of those who were present said, +Persuade me that logic is necessary, he replied, Do you wish me to +prove this to you? The answer was, Yes. Then I must use a demonstrative +form of speech. This was granted. How then will you know if I am +cheating you by my argument? The man was silent. Do you see, said +Epictetus, that you yourself are admitting that logic is necessary, if +without it you cannot know so much as this, whether logic is necessary +or not necessary? + + +OF FINERY IN DRESS.—A certain young man, a rhetorician, came to see +Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than was usual and his +attire in an ornamental style; whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you +do not think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of +all other animals. I do think so, the youth replied. Are not then some +men also beautiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for the same +reason call each of them in the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful +for something peculiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since +we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for another, +and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, we may generally +and not improperly declare each of them to be beautiful then when it is +most excellent according to its nature; but since the nature of each is +different, each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. +Is it not so? He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog +beautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a horse beautiful, +makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their natures are different. It +seems to be so. For I think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, +makes a wrestler to be not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous; +and he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling. +It is so, said he. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it that which in +its kind makes both a dog and a horse beautiful? It is, he said. What +then makes a dog beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a dog. +And what makes a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a +horse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the possession of the +excellence of a man? And do you then, if you wish to be beautiful, +young man, labor at this, the acquisition of human excellence? But what +is this? Observe whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons +without partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? The just. +Whether do you praise the moderate or the immoderate? The moderate. And +the temperate or the intemperate? The temperate. If then you make +yourself such a person, you will know that you will make yourself +beautiful; but so long as you neglect these things, you must be ugly +([Greek: aischron]), even though you contrive all you can to appear +beautiful. + + +IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE PROFICIENCY; AND THAT +WE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS.—There are three things (topics, [Greek: +topoi]) in which a man ought to exercise himself who would be wise and +good. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a man may +not fail to get what he desires, and that he may not fall into that +which he does not desire. The second concerns the movements towards an +object and the movements from an object, and generally in doing what a +man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to reason, and not +carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from deception and +rashness in judgment, and generally it concerns the assents ([Greek: +sugchatatheseis]). Of these topics the chief and the most urgent is +that which relates to the affects ([Greek: ta pathae] perturbations); +for an affect is produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain +that which a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish to +avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, disorders, bad +fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and envy; that which makes +men envious and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even to +listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic concerns the duties +of a man; for I ought not to be free from affects ([Greek: apathae]) +like a statue, but I ought to maintain the relations ([Greek: +scheseis]) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, +as a citizen. + +The third topic is that which immediately concerns those who are making +proficiency, that which concerns the security of the other two, so that +not even in sleep any appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in +intoxication, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our +power. But the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the +second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on the third, using +sophistical arguments ([Greek: metapiptontas]), making conclusions from +questioning, employing hypotheses, lying. For a man must, it is said, +when employed on these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who +must? The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting to you. +Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are you free from deception +in the matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl do you resist the +appearance? If your neighbor obtains an estate by will, are you not +vexed? Now is there nothing else wanting to you except unchangeable +firmness of mind ([Greek: ametaptosia])? Wretch, you hear these very +things with fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and with +inquiries about what any person may say about you. And if a man come +and tell you that in a certain conversation in which the question was, +Who is the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a certain +person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only a +finger’s length stretches out to two cubits. But if another who is +present says, You are mistaken; it is not worth while to listen to a +certain person, for what does he know? he has only the first +principles, and no more? then you are confounded, you grow pale, you +cry out immediately, I will show him who I am, that I am a great +philosopher. It is seen by these very things: why do you wish to show +it by others? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of the +sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger? And then when +the man was wild with rage, This, he said, is the certain person: I +have pointed him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as a +stone or a piece of wood; but when any person shows the man’s +principles, then he shows him as a man. + +Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain that you value +not at all your own will ([Greek: proairesis]), but you look externally +to things which are independent of your will? For instance, what will a +certain person say? and what will people think of you? Will you be +considered a man of learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? +for if you have read Archedamus also, you have every thing (that you +can desire). Why you are still uneasy lest you should not show us who +you are? Would you let me tell you what manner of man you have shown us +that you are? You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, +querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with everything, blaming +everybody, never quiet, vain: this is what you have exhibited to us. Go +away now and read Archedamus; then if a mouse should leap down and make +a noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you as it did—what +was the man’s name—Crinis; and he too was proud, because he understood +Archedamus. Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not +concern you at all? These things are suitable to those who are able to +learn them without perturbation, to those who can say: “I am not +subject to anger, to grief, to envy: I am not hindered, I am not +restrained. What remains for me? I have leisure, I am tranquil: let us +see how we must deal with sophistical arguments; let us see how when a +man has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any thing +absurd.” To them such things belong. To those who are happy it is +appropriate to light a fire, to dine; if they choose, both to sing and +to dance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to me and hoist the +sails. + + +WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT +WE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTISE OURSELVES.—The material for the wise and +good man is his own ruling faculty: and the body is the material for +the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); the land is +the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good man is +to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of +every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to +remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature +to be moved towards the desire for the good, and to aversion from the +evil; and with respect to that which is neither good nor bad it feels +indifferent. For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed to reject +Cæsar’s coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if you show the coin, +whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for the coin; +so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it +immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself. But the +soul will never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more +than persons will reject Cæsar’s coin. On this principle depends every +movement both of man and God. + +Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should +exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every +man whom you see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question, +What have you seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this +independent of the will, or dependent? Independent. Take it away. What +have you seen? A man lamenting over the death of a child. Apply the +rule. Death is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. Has the +proconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of a thing is a +proconsul’s office? Independent of the will or dependent on it? +Independent. Take this away also; it does not stand examination; cast +it away; it is nothing to you. + +If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning +to night, something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith +caught half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that +in the school we are roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a +man lamenting, we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say, He is +happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is miserable. If we see a +poor man, we say, He is wretched; he has nothing to eat. + +We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we +should direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting? +Opinion. What is bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is +divided opinion, what is blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, +what is trifling? All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and +opinions about things independent of the will, as if they were good and +bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things dependent on the will, +and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, whatever may be +the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the +soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are +the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be +moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with +giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, but +the spirit (the nervous power) on which they are impressed; but if the +spirit be restored to its settled state, those things also are +restored. + + +MISCELLANEOUS.—When some person asked him how it happened that since +reason has been more cultivated by the men of the present age, the +progress made in former times was greater. In what respect, he +answered, has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the +progress greater then? For in that in which it has now been more +cultivated, in that also the progress will now be found. At present it +has been cultivated for the purpose of resolving syllogisms, and +progress is made. But in former times it was cultivated for the purpose +of maintaining the governing faculty in a condition conformable to +nature, and progress was made. Do not then mix things which are +different, and do not expect, when you are laboring at one thing to +make progress in another. But see if any man among us when he is intent +upon this, the keeping himself in a state conformable to nature and +living so always, does not make progress. For you will not find such a +man. + +It is not easy to exhort weak young men; for neither is it easy to hold +(soft) cheese with a hook. But those who have a good natural +disposition, even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to +reason. + + +TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.—When the +administrator came to visit him, and the man was an Epicurean, +Epictetus said, It is proper for us who are not philosophers to inquire +of you who are philosophers, as those who come to a strange city +inquire of the citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is +the best thing in the world, in order that we also after inquiry may go +in quest of that which is best and look at it, as strangers do with the +things in cities. For that there are three things which relate to +man—soul, body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It +remains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. What shall we +say to men? Is the flesh the best? and was it for this that Maximus +sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and +accompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh? When the man +said that it was not, and added, Far be that from him. Is it not fit +then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best? It is +certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we possess which is +better than the flesh? The soul, he replied. And the good things of the +best, are they better, or the good things of the worse? The good things +of the best. And are the good things of the best within the power of +the will or not within the power of the will? They are within the power +of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a thing within the power +of the will? It is, he replied. And on what shall this pleasure depend? +On itself? But that cannot be conceived; for there must first exist a +certain substance or nature ([Greek: ousia]) of good, by obtaining +which we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. On +what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul? for if it +shall depend on things of the soul, the substance (nature) of the good +is discovered; for good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are +rationally delighted another thing; nor if that which precedes is not +good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that the thing +which comes after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But +you would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for you would +then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of your +doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the soul is in the +pleasure from things of the body; and again that those bodily things +must be the things which precede and the substance (nature) of the +good. + +Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and by making +them your guide you will with pleasure abstain from things which have +such persuasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the +persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a philosophy as +this which helps to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this +end, what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic art which is +the best part? the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand +is the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal part (that +which precedes and leads the rest). The duties then are also three: +those which are directed towards the existence of a thing; those which +are directed towards its existence in a particular kind; and third, the +chief or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not to +value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (leading things, +[Greek: ta proaegoumena]). What are these? Engaging in public business, +marrying, begetting children, venerating God, taking care of parents, +and generally, having desires, aversions ([Greek: echchlinein]), +pursuits of things and avoidances, in the way in which we ought to do +these things, and according to our nature. And how are we constituted +by nature? Free, noble, modest; for what other animal blushes? what +other is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) of shame? +and we are so constituted by nature as to subject pleasure to these +things, as a minister, a servant, in order that it may call forth our +activity, in order that it may keep us constant in acts which are +conformable to nature. + + +HOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES ([Greek: +phantasias]).—As we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, +so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against appearances; for these +appearances also propose questions to us. A certain person’s son is +dead. Answer; the thing is not within the power of the will: it is not +an evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you think of +it? It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil. Cæsar has +condemned a person. It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an +evil. The man is afflicted at this. Affliction is a thing which depends +on the will: it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely. That +is a thing within the power of the will: it is a good. If we train +ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress; for we shall never +assent to anything of which there is not an appearance capable of being +comprehended. Your son is dead. What has happened? Your son is dead. +Nothing more? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened? Your ship +is lost. A man has been led to prison. What has happened? He has been +led to prison. But that herein he has fared badly, every man adds from +his own opinion. But Zeus, you say, does not do right in these matters. +Why? because he has made you capable of endurance? because he has made +you magnanimous? because he has taken from that which befalls you the +power of being evils? because it is in your power to be happy while you +are suffering what you suffer? because he has opened the door to you, +when things do not please you? Man, go out and do not complain! + +Hear how the Romans feel towards philosophers, if you would like to +know. Italicus, who was the most in repute of the philosophers, once +when I was present, being vexed with his own friends and as if he was +suffering something intolerable, said: “I cannot bear it, you are +killing me; you will make me such as that man is,” pointing to me. + + +TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP TO ROME ON A SUIT.—When a +certain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of a +suit which had regard to his rank, Epictetus inquired the reason of his +going to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the matter. +Epictetus replied: If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you +will succeed or fail, I have no rule ([Greek: theoraema]) about this. +But if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have right +opinions ([Greek: dogmata]), you will fare well; if they are false, you +will fare ill. For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For +what is the reason why you desired to be elected governor of the +Cnossians? Your opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up +to Rome? Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and +expense? I must go. What tells you this? Your opinion. Then if opinions +are the causes of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the +cause may be, such also is the effect! Have we then all sound opinions, +both you and your adversary? And how do you differ? But have you +sounder opinions than your adversary? Why? You think so. And so does he +think that his opinions are better; and so do madmen. This is a bad +criterion. But show to me that you have made some inquiry into your +opinions and have taken some pains about them. And as now you are +sailing to Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and you +are not content to stay at home with the honors which you had, but you +desire something greater and more conspicuous, so when did you ever +make a voyage for the purpose of examining your own opinions, and +casting them out, if you have any that are bad? Whom have you +approached for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it? What age? +Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you are ashamed of me +(knowing the fact) when you were a boy, did you examine your own +opinions? and did you not then, as you do all things now, do as you did +do? and when you were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and +yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine that you were +deficient in? And when you were a young man and engaged in public +matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and were gaining reputation, who +then seemed your equal? And when would you have submitted to any man +examining and showing that your opinions are bad? What then do you wish +me to say to you? Help me in this matter. I have no theorem (rule) for +this. Nor have you, if you came to me for this purpose, come to me as a +philosopher, but as to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what +purpose then have philosophers theorems? For this purpose, that +whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and continue to be +conformable to nature. Does this seem to you a small thing? No; but the +greatest. What then? does it need only a short time? and is it possible +to seize it as you pass by? If you can, seize it. + +Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet with a stone +or a statue: for you saw me and nothing more. But he meets with a man +as a man, who learns his opinions, and in his turn shows his own. Learn +my opinions: show me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let +us examine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it away; if you +have any, show it. This is the meaning of meeting with a philosopher. +Not so (you say): but this is only a passing visit, and while we are +hiring the vessel, we can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says. +Then you go away and say: Epictetus was nothing; he used solecisms and +spoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you come as judges? Well, +but a man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as you do), I +shall have no land as you have none; I shall have no silver cups as you +have none, nor fine beasts as you have none. In answer to tins it is +perhaps sufficient to say: I have no need of such things; but if you +possess many things you have need of others: whether you choose or not, +you are poorer than I am. What then have I need of? Of that which you +have not? of firmness, of a mind which is conformable to nature, of +being free from perturbation. + + +IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS.—When the need of each opinion +comes, we ought to have it in readiness: on the occasion of breakfast, +such opinions as relate to breakfast; in the bath, those that concern +the bath; in bed, those that concern bed. + +Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes +Before each daily action thou hast scann’d; +What’s done amiss, what done, what left undone; +From first to last examine all, and then +Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice. + + +And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we may use them, +not that we may utter them aloud, as when we exclaim, “Paean Apollo.” +Again in fever we should have ready such opinions as concern a fever; +and we ought not, as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all. +A man who has a fever may say: If I philosophize any longer, may I be +hanged: wherever I go, I must take care of the poor body, that a fever +may not come. But what is philosophizing? Is it not a preparation +against events which may happen? Do you not understand that you are +saying something of this kind? “If I shall still prepare myself to bear +with patience what happens, may I be hanged.” But this is just as if a +man after receiving blows should give up the Pancratium. In the +Pancratium it is in our power to desist and not to receive blows. + +But in the other matter if we give up philosophy, what shall we gain? +What then should a man say on the occasion of each painful thing? It +was for this that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. +God says to you: Give me a proof that you have duly practised +athletics, that you have eaten what you ought, that you have been +exercised, that you have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler and rubber). +Then do you show yourself weak when the time for action comes? Now is +the time for the fever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time for +thirst, bear it well. Now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it +not in your power? Who shall hinder you? The physician will hinder you +from drinking; but he cannot prevent you from bearing thirst well: and +he will hinder you from eating; but he cannot prevent you from bearing +hunger well. + +But I cannot attend to my philosophical studies. And for what purpose +do you follow them? Slave, is it not that you may be happy, that you +may be constant, is it not that you may be in a state conformable to +nature and live so? What hinders you when you have a fever from having +your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the +thing, here is the test of the philosopher. For this also is a part of +life, like walking, like sailing, like journeying by land, so also is +fever. Do you read when you are walking? No. Nor do you when you have a +fever. But if you walk about well, you have all that belongs to a man +who walks. If you bear a fever well, you have all that belongs to a man +in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame God or man; +not to be afflicted at that which happens, to expect death well and +nobly, to do what must be done: when the physician comes in, not to be +frightened at what he says; nor if he says you are doing well, to be +overjoyed. For what good has he told you? and when you were in health, +what good was that to you? And even if he says you are in a bad way, do +not despond. For what is it to be ill? is it that you are near the +severance of the soul and the body? what harm is there in this? If you +are not near now, will you not afterwards be near? Is the world going +to be turned upside down when you are dead? Why then do you flatter the +physician? Why do you say if you please, master, I shall be well? Why +do you give him an opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud; or +showing his importance)? Do you not value a physician, as you do a +shoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a carpenter when he is +building your house, and so treat the physician as to the body which is +not yours, but by nature dead? He who has a fever has an opportunity of +doing this: if he does these things, he has what belongs to him. For it +is not the business of a philosopher to look after these externals, +neither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own ruling +power. But as to externals how must he act? so far as not to be +careless about them. Where then is there reason for fear? where is +there then still reason for anger, and of fear about what belongs to +others, about things which are of no value? For we ought to have these +two principles in readiness, that except the will nothing is good nor +bad; and that we ought not to lead events, but to follow them. My +brother ought not to have behaved thus to me. No, but he will see to +that; and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself towards him as +I ought. For this is my own business; that belongs to another: no man +can prevent this, the other thing can be hindered. + + +ABOUT EXERCISE.—We ought not to make our exercises consist in means +contrary to nature and adapted to cause admiration, for if we do so, we +who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers. +For it is difficult even to walk on a rope; and not only difficult, but +it is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to practice walking on a +rope, or setting up a palm-tree, or embracing statues? By no means. +Every thing which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable for +practice; but that is suitable which conduces to the working out of +that which is proposed to us. And what is that which is proposed to us +as a thing to be worked out? To live with desire and aversion +(avoidance of certain things) free from restraint. And what is this? +Neither to be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into +anything which you would avoid. Towards this object then exercise +(practice) ought to tend. For since it is not possible to have your +desire not disappointed and your aversion free from falling into that +which you would avoid, without great and constant practice, you must +know that if you allow your desire and aversion to turn to things which +are not within the power of the will, you will neither have your desire +capable of attaining your object, nor your aversion free from the power +of avoiding that which you would avoid. And since strong habit leads +(prevails), and we are accustomed to employ desire and aversion only to +things which are not within the power of our will, we ought to oppose +to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great slipperiness +in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. Then at +last, if occasion presents itself, for the purpose of trying yourself +at a proper time you will descend into the arena to know if appearances +overpower you as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that +which is stronger than yourself; the contest is unequal between a +charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy. The earthen pitcher, +as the saying is, and the rock do not agree. + + +WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLITARY MAN IS.—Solitude +is a certain condition of a helpless man. For because a man is alone, +he is not for that reason also solitary; just as though a man is among +numbers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost +either a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to +repose, we say that we are left solitary, though we are often in Rome, +though such a crowd meet us, though so many live in the same place, and +sometimes we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is +solitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless person and +exposed to those who wish to harm him. For this reason when we travel, +then especially do we say that we are lonely when we fall among +robbers, for it is not the sight of a human creature which removes us +from solitude, but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and +helpful to us. For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may +say that even Zeus is solitary in the conflagration and bewails himself +saying, Unhappy that I am who have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor +Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor kinsman. This is what +some say that he does when he is alone at the conflagration. For they +do not understand how a man passes his life when he is alone, because +they set out from a certain natural principle, from the natural desire +of community and mutual love and from the pleasure of conversation +among men. But none the less a man ought to be prepared in a manner for +this also (being alone), to be able to be sufficient for himself and to +be his own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is tranquil +by himself, and thinks of his own administration and of its nature, and +is employed in thoughts suitable to himself; so ought we also to be +able to talk with ourselves, not to feel the want of others also, not +to be unprovided with the means of passing our time; to observe the +divine administration, and the relation of ourselves to everything +else; to consider how we formerly were affected towards things that +happened and how at present; what are still the things which give us +pain; how these also can be cured and how removed; if any things +require improvement, to improve them according to reason. + +Well then, if some man should come upon me when I am alone and murder +me? Fool, not murder You, but your poor body. + +What kind of solitude then remains? what want? why do we make ourselves +worse than children; and what do children do when they are left alone? +They take up shells and ashes, and they build something, then pull it +down, and build something else, and so they never want the means of +passing the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and weep, +because I have been left alone and solitary? Shall I then have no +shells, no ashes? But children do what they do through want of thought +(or deficiency in knowledge), and we through knowledge are unhappy. + +Every great power (faculty) is dangerous to beginners. You must then +bear such things as you are able, but conformably to nature: but not +... Practise sometimes a way of living like a person out of health that +you may at some time live like a man in health. + + +CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS.—As bad tragic actors cannot sing alone, +but in company with many, so some persons cannot walk about alone. Man, +if you are anything, both walk alone and talk to yourself, and do not +hide yourself in the chorus. Examine a little at last, look around, +stir yourself up, that you may know who you are. + +You must root out of men these two things, arrogance (pride) and +distrust. Arrogance then is the opinion that you want nothing (are +deficient in nothing); but distrust is the opinion that you cannot be +happy when so many circumstances surround you. Arrogance is removed by +confutation; and Socrates was the first who practised this. And (to +know) that the thing is not impossible inquire and seek. This search +will do you no harm; and in a manner this is philosophizing, to seek +how it is possible to employ desire and aversion ([Greek: echchlisis]) +without impediment. + +I am superior to you, for my father is a man of consular rank. Another +says, I have been a tribune, but you have not. If we were horses, would +you say, My father was swifter? I have much barley and fodder, or +elegant neck ornaments. If then you were saying this, I said, Be it so: +let us run then. Well, is there nothing in a man such as running in a +horse, by which it will be known which is superior and inferior? Is +there not modesty ([Greek: aidos]), fidelity, justice? Show yourself +superior in these, that you may be superior as a man. If you tell me +that you can kick violently, I also will say to you, that you are proud +of that which is the act of an ass. + + +THAT WE OUGHT TO PROCEED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION TO EVERYTHING.[Footnote: +Compare Encheiridion, 29.]—In every act consider what precedes and what +follows, and then proceed to the act. If you do not consider, you will +at first begin with spirit, since you have not thought at all of the +things which follow; but afterwards when some consequences have shown +themselves, you will basely desist (from that which you have begun).—I +wish to conquer at the Olympic games.—(And I too, by the gods; for it +is a fine thing.) But consider here what precedes and what follows; and +then, if it is for your good, undertake the thing. You must act +according to rules, follow strict diet, abstain from delicacies, +exercise yourself by compulsion at fixed times, in heat, in cold; drink +no cold water, nor wine, when there is opportunity of drinking it. In a +word, you must surrender yourself to the trainer, as you do to a +physician. Next in the contest, you must be covered with sand, +sometimes dislocate a hand, sprain an ankle, swallow a quantity of +dust, be scourged with the whip; and after undergoing all this, you +must sometimes be conquered. After reckoning all these things, if you +have still an inclination, go to the athletic practice. If you do not +reckon them, observe you will behave like children who at one time play +as wrestlers, then as gladiators, then blow a trumpet, then act a +tragedy, when they have seen and admired such things. So you also do: +you are at one time a wrestler (athlete), then a gladiator, then a +philosopher, then a rhetorician; but with your whole soul you are +nothing: like the ape you imitate all that you see; and always one +thing after another pleases you, but that which becomes familiar +displeases you. For you have never undertaken anything after +consideration, nor after having explored the whole matter and put it to +a strict examination; but you have undertaken it at hazard and with a +cold desire. Thus some persons having seen a philosopher and having +heard one speak like Euphrates—and yet who can speak like him?—wish to +be philosophers themselves. + +Man, consider first what the matter is (which you propose to do), then +your own nature also, what it is able to bear. If you are a wrestler, +look at your shoulders, your thighs, your loins: for different men are +naturally formed for different things. Do you think that, if you do +(what you are doing daily), you can be a philosopher? Do you think that +you can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same way be +angry and out of humor? You must watch, labor, conquer certain desires, +you must depart from your kinsmen, be despised by your slaves, laughed +at by those who meet you, in everything you must be in an inferior +condition, as to magisterial office, in honors, in courts of justice. +When you have considered all these things completely, then, if you +think proper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in exchange for +these things freedom from perturbations, liberty, tranquillity. If you +have not considered these things, do not approach philosophy: do not +act like children, at one time a philosopher, then a tax collector, +then a rhetorician, then a procurator (officer) of Cæsar. These things +are not consistent. You must be one man either good or bad; you must +either labor at your own ruling faculty or at external things; you must +either labor at things within or at external things; that is, you must +either occupy the place of a philosopher or that of one of the vulgar. + +A person said to Rufus when Galba was murdered: Is the world now +governed by Providence? But Rufus replied: Did I ever incidentally form +an argument from Galba that the world is governed by Providence? + + +THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE WITH +MEN.—If a man has frequent intercourse with others either for talk, or +drinking together, or generally for social purposes, he must either +become like them, or change them to his own fashion. For if a man +places a piece of quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, +either the quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning +charcoal will light that which is quenched. Since then the danger is so +great, we must cautiously enter into such intimacies with those of the +common sort, and remember that it is impossible that a man can keep +company with one who is covered with soot without being partaker of the +soot himself. For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, +about horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men? Such a person +is bad, such a person is good; this was well done, this was done badly. +Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill-natured disposition? +Is any man among us prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, +so that as soon as he has touched the strings, he discovers which are +discordant, and tunes the instrument? Such a power as Socrates had who +in all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his own +purpose? How should you have this power? It is therefore a necessary +consequence that you are carried about by the common kind of people. + +Why then are they more powerful than you? Because they utter these +useless words from their real opinions; but you utter your elegant +words only from your lips; for this reason they are without strength +and dead, and it is nauseous to listen to your exhortations and your +miserable virtue, which is talked of everywhere (up and down). In this +way the vulgar have the advantage over you; for every opinion ([Greek: +dogma]) is strong and invincible. Until then the good ([Greek: +chompsai]) sentiments ([Greek: hupolaepseis]) are fixed in you, and you +shall have acquired a certain power for your security, I advise you to +be careful in your association with common persons; if you are not, +every day like wax in the sun there will be melted away whatever you +inscribe on your minds in the school. Withdraw then yourselves far from +the sun so long as you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason +also philosophers advise men to leave their native country, because +ancient habits distract them and do not allow a beginning to be made of +a different habit; nor can we tolerate those who meet us and say: See +such a one is now a philosopher, who was once so and so. Thus also +physicians send those who have lingering diseases to a different +country and a different air; and they do right. Do you also introduce +other habits than those which you have; fix you opinions and exercise +yourselves in them. But you do not so; you go hence to a spectacle, to +a show of gladiators, to a place of exercise ([Greek: chuston]), to a +circus; then you come back hither, and again from this place you go to +those places, and still the same persons. And there is no pleasing +(good) habit, nor attention, nor care about self and observation of +this kind. How shall I use the appearances presented to me? according +to nature, or contrary to nature? how do I answer to them? as I ought, +or as I ought not? Do I say to those things which are independent of +the will, that they do not concern me? For if you are not yet in this +state, fly from your former habits, fly from the common sort, if you +intend ever to begin to be something. + + +ON PROVIDENCE.-When you make any charge against Providence, consider, +and you will learn that the thing has happened according to reason. +Yes, but the unjust man has the advantage. In what? In money. Yes, for +he is superior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, +and is watchful. What is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage +over you in being faithful, in being modest; for you will not find it +to be so; but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you +have the advantage. And I once said to a man who was vexed because +Philostorgus was fortunate: Would you choose to lie with Sura? May it +never happen, he replied, that this day should come? Why then are you +vexed, if he receives something in return for that which he sells; or +how can you consider him happy who acquires those things by such means +as you abominate; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives the better +things to the better men? Is it not better to be modest than to be +rich? He admitted this. Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess +the better thing? Remember then always and have in readiness the truth, +that this is a law of nature, that the superior has an advantage over +the inferior in that in which he is superior; and you will never be +vexed. + +But my wife treats me badly. Well, if any man asks you what this is, +say, my wife treats me badly. Is there then nothing more? Nothing. My +father gives me nothing. (What is this? my father gives me nothing. Is +there nothing else then? Nothing); but to say that this is an evil is +something which must be added to it externally, and falsely added. For +this reason we must not get rid of poverty, but of the opinion about +poverty, and then we shall be happy. + + +ABOUT CYNICISM.—When one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and he +was a person who appeared to be inclined to Cynicism, what kind of +person a Cynic ought to be, and what was the notion ([Greek: +prolaepsis]) of the thing, we will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure; +but I have so much to say to you that he who without God attempts so +great a matter, is hateful to God, and has no other purpose than to act +indecently in public. + +In the first place, in the things which relate to yourself, you must +not be in any respect like what you do now; you must not blame God or +man; you must take away desire altogether, you must transfer avoidance +([Greek: echchlisis]) only to the things which are within the power of +the will; you must not feel anger nor resentment or envy nor pity; a +girl must not appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little +reputation, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to know +that the rest of men throw walls around them and houses and darkness +when they do any such things, and they have many means of concealment. +A man shuts the door, he sets somebody before the chamber; if a person +comes, say that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead +of all these things must use modesty as his protection; if he does not, +he will be indecent in his nakedness and under the open sky. This is +his house, his door; this is the slave before his bedchamber; this is +his darkness. For he ought not to wish to hide anything that he does; +and if he does, he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a +man who lives under the open sky, of a free man; he has begun to fear +some external thing, he has begun to have need of concealment, nor can +he get concealment when he chooses. For where shall he hide himself and +how? And if by chance this public instructor shall be detected, this +pædagogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? when +then a man fears these things, is it possible for him to be bold with +his whole soul to superintend men? It cannot be: it is impossible. + +In the first place then you must make your ruling faculty pure, and +this mode of life also. Now (you should say), to me the matter to work +on is my understanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides to the +shoemaker; and my business is the right use of appearances. But the +body is nothing to me: the parts of it are nothing to me. Death? Let it +come when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a part. Fly, you +say. And whither; can any man eject me out of the world? He cannot. But +wherever I go, there is the sun, there is the moon, there are the +stars, dreams, omens, and the conversation ([Greek: omilia]) with gods. + +Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic cannot be satisfied with +this; but he must know that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to men +about good and bad things, to show them that they have wandered and are +seeking the substance of good and evil where it is not, but where it +is, they never think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was carried off +to Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a Cynic +is a spy of the things which are good for men and which are evil, and +it is his duty to examine carefully and to come and report truly, and +not to be struck with terror so as to point out as enemies those who +are not enemies, nor in any other way to be perturbed by appearances +nor confounded. + +It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion +should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say like Socrates: +Men, whither are you hurrying, what are you doing, wretches? like blind +people you are wandering up and down; you are going by another road, +and have left the true road; you seek for prosperity and happiness +where they are not, and if another shows you where they are, you do not +believe him. Why do you seek it without? In the body? It is not there. +If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophellius. In possessions? It is +not there. But if you do not believe me, look at Croesus: look at those +who are now rich, with what lamentations their life is filled. In +power? It is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been +twice and thrice consuls; but they are not. Whom shall we believe in +these matters? You who from without see their affairs and are dazzled +by an appearance, or the men themselves? What do they say? Hear them +when they groan, when they grieve, when on account of these very +consulships and glory and splendor they think that they are more +wretched and in greater danger. Is it in royal power? It is not: if it +were, Nero would have been happy, and Sardanapalus. But neither was +Agamemnon happy, though he was a better man than Sardanapalus and Nero; +but while others are snoring, what is he doing? + +Much from his head he tore his rooted hair: +Iliad, x., 15. + + +and what does he say himself? + +“I am perplexed,” he says, “and +Disturb’d I am,” and “my heart out of my bosom +Is leaping.” +Iliad, x., 91. + + +Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your possessions? No. Your +body? No. But you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the matter +with you? That part of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by you +and is corrupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid, +with which we move towards and move from things. How neglected? He +knows not the nature of good for which he is made by nature and the +nature of evil; and what is his own, and what belongs to another; and +when anything that belongs to others goes badly, he says, Woe to me, +for the Hellenes are in danger. Wretched is his ruling faculty, and +alone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going to die +destroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do not kill them, will +they not die? Yes; but not all at once. What difference then does it +make? For if death is an evil, whether men die altogether, or if they +die singly, it is equally an evil. Is anything else then going to +happen than the separation of the soul and the body? Nothing. And if +the Hellenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your power to +die? It is. Why then do you lament (and say), Oh, you are a king and +have the sceptre of Zeus? An unhappy king does not exist more than an +unhappy god. What then art thou? In truth a shepherd: for you weep as +shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep: and these +who are governed by you are sheep. And why did you come hither? Was +your desire in any danger? was your aversion ([Greek: echchlisis])? was +your movement (pursuits)? was your avoidance of things? He replies, No; +but the wife of my brother was carried off. Was it not then a great +gain to be deprived of an adulterous wife? Shall we be despised then by +the Trojans? What kind of people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If +they are wise, why do you fight with them? If they are fools, why do +you care about them? + +Do you possess the body then free or is it in servile condition? We do +not know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of gout, +ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of everything +which is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How then is it possible that +anything which belongs to the body can be free from hindrance? and how +is a thing great or valuable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud? +Well then, do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. And +who is able to compel you to assent to that which appears false? No +man. And who can compel you not to assent to that which appears true? +No man. By this then you see that there is something in you naturally +free. But to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object +or to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose to do +anything, which of you can do this, unless he has received an +impression of the appearance of that which is profitable or a duty? No +man. You have then in these things also something which is not hindered +and is free. Wretched men, work out this, take care of this, seek for +good here. + + +THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT +IN OUR POWER.—Let not that which in another is contrary to nature be an +evil to you; for you are not formed by nature to be depressed with +others nor to be unhappy with others, but to be happy with them. If a +man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault; for God +has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturbations. For this +purpose he has given means to them, some things to each person as his +own, and other things not as his own; some things subject to hindrance +and compulsion and deprivation; and these things are not a man’s own; +but the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own; and +the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by him who takes +care of us and protects us like a father, he has made our own. But you +say, I have parted from a certain person, and he is grieved. Why did he +consider as his own that which belongs to another? why, when he looked +on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you are a mortal, +that it is natural for you to part from him for a foreign country? +Therefore he suffers the consequences of his own folly. But why do you +or for what purpose bewail yourself? Is it that you also have not +thought of these things? but like poor women who are good for nothing, +you have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if you would +always enjoy them, both places and men and conversation; and now you +sit and weep because you do not see the same persons and do not live in +the same places. Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than +crows and ravens who have the power of flying where they please and +changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas without +lamenting or regretting their former condition. Yes, but this happens +to them because they are irrational creatures. Was reason then given to +us by the gods for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may +pass our lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons be +immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we ourselves not go +abroad, but remain rooted like plants; and if any of our familiar +friends goes abroad, must we sit and weep; and on the contrary, when he +returns, must we dance and clap our hands like children? + +But my mother laments when she does not see me. Why has she not learned +these principles? and I do not say this, that we should not take care +that she may not lament, but I say that we ought not to desire in every +way what is not our own. And the sorrow of another is another’s sorrow; +but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow by every means, +for it is in my power; and the sorrow of another I will endeavor to +stop as far as I can; but I will not attempt to do it by every means; +for if I do, I shall be fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus +and shall be placing myself against him in the administration of the +universe; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting against God +and of this disobedience not only will the children of my children pay, +but I also shall myself, both by day and by night, startled by dreams, +perturbed, trembling at every piece of news, and having my tranquillity +depending on the letters of others. Some person has arrived from Rome. +I only hope there is no harm. But what harm can happen to you, where +you are not? From Hellas (Greece) some one is come; I hope that there +is no harm. In this way every place may be the cause of misfortune to +you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, +and must you be so even beyond sea, and by the report of letters? Is +this the way in which your affairs are in a state of security? Well +then suppose that my friends have died in the places which are far from +me. What else have they suffered than that which is the condition of +mortals? Or how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age, +and at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you love? +Know you not that in the course of a long time many and various kinds +of things must happen; that a fever shall overpower one, a robber +another, and a third a tyrant? Such is the condition of things around +us, such are those who live with us in the world; cold and heat, and +unsuitable ways of living, and journeys by land, and voyages by sea, +and winds, and various circumstances which surround us, destroy one +man, and banish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into +an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, lamenting, +unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent not on one or +two, but on ten thousands upon ten thousands. + +Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers? did you learn +this? do you not know that human life is a warfare? that one man must +keep watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third must fight? and +it is not possible that all should be in one place, nor is it better +that it should be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the +general complain when anything more hard than usual is imposed on you, +and you do not observe what you make the army become as far as it is in +your power; that if all imitate you, no man will dig a trench, no man +will put a rampart round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, +but will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, in a +vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick to it. And if +you are ordered to climb the mast, refuse; if to run to the head of the +ship, refuse; and what master of a ship will endure you? and will he +not pitch you overboard as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad +example to the other sailors? And so it is here also: every man’s life +is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You must observe +the duty of a soldier and do every thing at the nod of the general; if +it is possible, divining what his wishes are; for there is no +resemblance between that general and this, neither in strength nor in +superiority of character. Know you not that a good man does nothing for +the sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing right? What advantage +is it then to him to have done right? And what advantage is it to a man +who writes the name of Dion to write it as he ought? The advantage is +to have written it. Is there no reward then? Do you seek a reward for a +good man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wish +for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the +games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good +and happy? For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this +city (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a +man, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by +their weeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you thus never +cease to be a foolish child? know you not that he who does the acts of +a child, the older he is, the more ridiculous he is? + +So in this matter also: if you kiss your own child, or your brother or +friend, never give full license to the appearance ([Greek: +phantasian]), and allow not your pleasure to go as far as it chooses; +but check it, and curb it as those who stand behind men in their +triumphs and remind them that they are mortal. Do you also remind +yourself in like manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what +you love is nothing of your own; it has been given to you for the +present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it been +given to you for all time, but as a fig is given to you or a bunch of +grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if you wish for these +things in winter, you are a fool. So if you wish for your son or friend +when it is not allowed to you, you must know that you are wishing for a +fig in winter. For such as winter is to a fig, such is every event +which happens from the universe to the things which are taken away +according to its nature. And further, at the times when you are +delighted with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances. +What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with a lisping +voice: To-morrow you will die; and to a friend also: To-morrow you will +go away or I shall, and never shall we see one another again? But these +are words of bad omen—and some incantations also are of bad omen; but +because they are useful, I don’t care for this; only let them be +useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen except those which are +significant of some evil? Cowardice is a word of bad omen, and meanness +of spirit, and sorrow, and grief, and shamelessness. These words are of +bad omen; and yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to +protect ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name which +is significant of any natural thing is of evil omen? say that even for +the ears of corn to be reaped is of bad omen, for it signifies the +destruction of the ears, but not of the world. Say that the falling of +the leaves also is of bad omen, and for the dried fig to take the place +of the green fig, and for raisins to be made from the grapes. For all +these things are changes from a former state into other states; not a +destruction, but a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is +going away from home and a small change: such is death, a greater +change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, but to +that which is not now. Shall I then no longer exist? You will not +exist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need; +for you also came into existence not when you chose, but when the world +had need of you. + +Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day; these you +should write, these you should read; about these you should talk to +yourself and to others. Ask a man: Can you help me at all for this +purpose? and further, go to another and to another. Then if anything +that is said be contrary to your wish, this reflection first will +immediately relieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a great +thing in all cases to say: I knew that I begot a son who is mortal. For +so you also will say: I knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leave +my home, I knew that I may be ejected from it, I knew that I may be led +to prison. Then if you turn round and look to yourself, and seek the +place from which comes that which has happened, you will forthwith +recollect that it comes from the place of things which are out of the +power of the will, and of things which are not my own. What then is it +to me? Then, you will ask, and this is the chief thing: And who is it +that sent it? The leader, or the general, the state, the law of the +state. Give it me then, for I must always obey the law in everything. +Then, when the appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in your +power to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, conquer +it: do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to the +consequences by raising images such as it pleases and as it pleases. If +you be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of living at Rome, and how +many pleasures there were for him who lived there and how many there +would be for him who returned to Rome; but fix your mind on this +matter, how a man who lives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara like a man +of courage. And if you be in Rome, do not imagine what the life in +Athens is, but think only of the life in Rome. + +Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that of being +conscious that you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed you +are performing the acts of a wise and good man. For what a thing it is +for a man to be able to say to himself: Now whatever the rest may say +in solemn manner in the schools and may be judged to be saying in a way +contrary to common opinion (or in a strange way), this I am doing; and +they are sitting and are discoursing of my virtues and inquiring about +me and praising me; and of this Zeus has willed that I shall receive +from myself a demonstration, and shall myself know if he has a soldier +such as he ought to have, a citizen such as he ought to have, and if he +has chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness of the +things which are independent of the will: See that you fear without +reason, that you foolishly desire what you do desire; seek not the good +in things external; seek it in yourselves: if you do not, you will not +find it. For this purpose he leads me at one time hither, at another +time sends me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, and +sick; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because he hates +me—far from him be such a meaning, for who hates the best of his +servants? nor yet because he cares not for me, for he does not neglect +any even of the smallest things; but he does this for the purpose of +exercising me and making use of me as a witness to others. Being +appointed to such a service, do I still care about the place in which I +am, or with whom I am, or what men say about me? and do I not entirely +direct my thoughts to God and to his instructions and commands? + +Having these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and exercising them +by yourself, and keeping them in readiness, you will never be in want +of one to comfort you and strengthen you. For it is not shameful to be +without something to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keeping +away fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained exemption from sorrow +and fear, will there any longer be a tyrant for you, or a tyrant’s +guard, or attendants on Cæsar? Or shall any appointment to offices at +court cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on +the occasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to you who +have received so great authority from Zeus? Only do not make a proud +display of it, nor boast of it; but show it by your acts; and if no man +perceives it, be satisfied that you are yourself in a healthy state and +happy. + + +TO THOSE WHO FALL OFF (DESIST) FROM THEIR PURPOSE.—Consider as to the +things which you proposed to yourself at first, which you have secured, +and which you have not; and how you are pleased when you recall to +memory the one, and are pained about the other; and if it is possible, +recover the things wherein you failed. For we must not shrink when we +are engaged in the greatest combat, but we must even take blows. For +the combat before us is not in wrestling and the Pancration, in which +both the successful and the unsuccessful may have the greatest merit, +or may have little, and in truth may be very fortunate or very +unfortunate; but the combat is for good fortune and happiness +themselves. Well then, even if we have renounced the contest in this +matter (for good fortune and happiness), no man hinders us from +renewing the combat again, and we are not compelled to wait for another +four years that the games at Olympia may come again; but as soon as you +have recovered and restored yourself, and employ the same zeal, you may +renew the combat again; and if again you renounce it, you may again +renew it; and if you once gain the victory, you are like him who has +never renounced the combat. Only do not through a habit of doing the +same thing (renouncing the combat), begin to do it with pleasure, and +then like a bad athlete go about after being conquered in all the +circuit of the games like quails who have run away. + + +TO THOSE WHO FEAR WANT.—Are you not ashamed at being more cowardly and +more mean than fugitive slaves? How do they when they run away leave +their masters? on what estates do they depend, and what domestics do +they rely on? Do they not after stealing a little, which is enough for +the first days, then afterwards move on through land or through sea, +contriving one method after another for maintaining their lives? And +what fugitive slave ever died of hunger? But you are afraid lest +necessary things should fail you, and are sleepless by night. Wretch, +are you so blind, and don’t you see the road to which the want of +necessaries leads?—Well, where does it lead?—to the same place to which +a fever leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have you not +often said this yourself to your companions? have you not read much of +this kind, and written much? and how often have you boasted that you +were easy as to death? + +Learn then first what are the things which are shameful, and then tell +us that you are a philosopher: but at present do not, even if any other +man calls you so, allow it. + +Is that shameful to you which is not your own act, that of which you +are not the cause, that which has come to you by accident, as a +headache, as a fever? If your parents were poor, and left their +property to others, and if while they live, they do not help you at +all, is this shameful to you? Is this what you learned with the +philosophers? Did you never hear that the thing which is shameful ought +to be blamed, and that which is blamable is worthy of blame? Whom do +you blame for an act which is not his own, which he did not do himself? +Did you then make your father such as he is, or is it in your power to +improve him? Is this power given to you? Well then, ought you to wish +the things which are not given to you, or to be ashamed if you do not +obtain them? And have you also been accustomed while you were studying +philosophy to look to others and to hope for nothing from yourself? +Lament then and groan and eat with fear that you may not have food +to-morrow. Tremble about your poor slaves lest they steal, lest they +run away, lest they die. So live, and continue to live, you who in name +only have approached philosophy, and have disgraced its theorems as far +as you can by showing them to be useless and unprofitable to those who +take them up; you, who have never sought constancy, freedom from +perturbation, and from passions; you who have not sought any person for +the sake of this object, but many for the sake of syllogisms; you who +have never thoroughly examined any of these appearances by yourself, Am +I able to bear, or am I not able to bear? What remains for me to do? +But as if all your affairs were well and secure, you have been resting +on the third topic, that of things being unchanged, in order that you +may possess unchanged—what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of +the rich, desire without attaining any end, and avoidance ([Greek: +echchlisin]) which fails in the attempt? About security in these things +you have been anxious. + +Ought you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and +then to have protected this with security? And whom did you ever see +building a battlement all around and encircling it with a wall? And +what doorkeeper is placed with no door to watch? But you practise in +order to be able to prove—what? You practise that you may not be tossed +as on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about from what? Show me +first what you hold, what you measure, or what you weigh; and show me +the scales or the medimnus (the measure); or how long will you go on +measuring the dust? Ought you not to demonstrate those things which +make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they +wish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in +the administration of the universe? + + +ABOUT FREEDOM.—He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is +neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose +movements to action ([Greek: hormai]) are not impeded, whose desires +attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would +avoid ([Greek: echchliseis aperiptotoi]). Who then chooses to live in +error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, +unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives +as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in sorrow, +fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to +avoid something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of +the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that +which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not +one; nor then do we find any bad man free. + +Further, then, answer me this question, also: does freedom seem to you +to be something great and noble and valuable? How should it not seem +so? Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and +valuable and noble to be mean? It is not possible. When then you see +any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own +opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not +only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a +government (province) or a consulship; and call these men little slaves +who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so +for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be. +This is admitted also. Do you think that freedom is a thing independent +and self-governing? Certainly. Whomsoever then it is in the power of +another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. And do not +look, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and great-grandfathers, or +inquire about his being bought or sold, but if you hear him saying from +his heart and with feeling, “Master,” even if the twelve fasces precede +him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, “Wretch +that I am, how much I suffer,” call him a slave. If, finally, you see +him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave, though he wears +a praetexta. If, then, he is doing nothing of this kind do not yet say +that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to +compulsion, or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune, and if you +find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia; +say that his master is from home; he will return soon, and you will +know what he suffers. + +What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him +his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor +provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be +discovered. What then is that which when we write makes us free from +hindrance and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then +is it in playing the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore +in life also it is the science of life. You have then heard in a +general way; but examine the thing also in the several parts. Is it +possible that he who desires any of the things which depend on others +can be free from hindrance? No. Is it possible for him to be unimpeded? +No. Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then, whether we have nothing +which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or +whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of +others. What do you mean? When you wish the body to be entire (sound) +is it in your power or not? It is not in my power. When you wish it to +be healthy? Neither is this in my power. When you wish it to be +handsome? Nor is this. Life or death? Neither is this in my power. Your +body then is another’s, subject to every man who is stronger than +yourself. It is. But your estate is it in your power to have it when +you please, and as long as you please, and such as you please? No. And +your slaves? No. And your clothes? No. And your house? No. And your +horses? Not one of these things. And if you wish by all means your +children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it +in your power? This also is not in my power. + +Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends +on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything of +the kind? I know not. Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is +any man able to make you assent to that which is false? No man. In the +matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and obstruction. +Granted. Well; and can a man force you to desire to move towards that +to which you do not choose? He can, for when he threatens me with death +or bonds he compels me to desire to move towards it. If then you +despise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him? No. Is +then the despising of death an act of your own or is it not yours? It +is my act. + +When you have made this preparation, and have practised this +discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another from that +which is your own, the things which are subject to hindrance from those +which are not, to consider the things free from hindrance to concern +yourself, and those which are not free not to concern yourself, to keep +your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and +turned from the things which do not concern yourself; do you still fear +any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? About the things +which are your own, in which consists the nature of good and evil? and +who has power over these things? who can take them away? who can impede +them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will you be +afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are not +yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you +been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own +and not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your +power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have +you come to the philosophers? was it that you may nevertheless be +unfortunate and unhappy? You will then in this way, as I have supposed +you to have done, be without fear and disturbance. And what is grief to +you? for fear comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is +present. But what further will you desire? For of the things which are +within the power of the will, as being good and present, you have a +proper and regulated desire; but of the things which are not in the +power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow +any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure +hasty. + +Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you +angry and do you blame the giver if he takes anything from you? Who are +you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) +introduce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you +fellow-workers, and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he +introduce you here? did he not introduce you as subject to death, and +as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe his +administration, and to join with him in the spectacle and the festival +for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you have been +permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he leads +you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard +and seen? No; but I would still enjoy the feast. The initiated too +would wish to be longer in the initiation; and perhaps also those at +Olympia to see other athletes. But the solemnity is ended; go away like +a grateful and modest man; make room for others; others also must be +born, as you were, and, being born, they must have a place, and houses, +and necessary things. And if the first do not retire, what remains? Why +are you insatiable? Why are you not content? why do you contract the +world? Yes, but I would have my little children with me and my wife. +What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to him who +made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you +not give way to him who is superior? Why then did he introduce me into +the world on these conditions? And if the conditions do not suit you, +depart. He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants +those who join in the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that +they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate with hymns the +solemnity. But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly, he will +not unwillingly see absent from the great assembly ([Greek: +panaeguris]) for they did not when they were present behave as they +ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they +lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not +seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received +for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind, +manly spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom. For what +purpose then have I received these things? To use them. How long? So +long as he who has lent them chooses. What if they are necessary to me? +Do not attach yourself to them and they will not be necessary; do not +say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not +necessary. + +You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the gods, and pray to +be free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my +poor body, I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do +not possess it entire. But I can point out to you a free man, that you +may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? Not +because he was born of free parents, but because he was himself free, +because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it was not +possible for any man to approach him, nor had any man the means of +laying hold of him to enslave him. He had everything easily loosed, +everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his property, he +would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have followed +you for it; if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his +leg; if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, +country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from +whom, and on what conditions. His true parents indeed, the gods, and +his real country he would never have deserted, nor would he have +yielded to any man in obedience to them and to their orders, nor would +any man have died for his country more readily. For he was not used to +inquire when he should be considered to have done anything on behalf of +the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), but he remembered +that everything which is done comes from thence and is done on behalf +of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore +see what Diogenes himself says and writes: “For this reason,” he says, +“Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the +Persians and with Archidamus the King of the Lacedaemonians, as you +please.” Was it because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the +Athenians and all the Lacedaemonians, because they were born of slaves, +could not talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and +paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his power? +Because I do not consider the poor body to be my own, because I want +nothing, because law is everything to me, and nothing else is. These +were the things which permitted him to be free. + +Think of these things, these opinions, these words; look to these +examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing according to +its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the +price of things so many and so great? For the sake of this which is +called liberty, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down +precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished; and will you +not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give +back to God when he demands them the things which he has given? Will +you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure +torture, and exile, and scourging, and, in a word, to give up all which +is not your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, +even if you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up +to the palace (Cæsar’s residence), you will no less be a slave; and you +will feel that perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to +common opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not words +contrary to reason. For you will know by experience that the words are +true, and that there is no profit from the things which are valued and +eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to those who have +not yet obtained them there is an imagination ([Greek: phantasia]), +that when these things are come, all that is good will come with them; +then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing +to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things, which are +not present; for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the +things which are desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may +know that this is true, as you have labored for those things, so +transfer your labor to these: be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring +an opinion which will make you free; pay court to a philosopher instead +of to a rich old man; be seen about a philosopher’s doors; you will not +disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not go away empty nor without +profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, and if not (if you +do not succeed), try at least; the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful. + + +ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY.—To this matter before all you must attend, that +you be never so closely connected with any of your former intimates or +friends as to come down to the same acts as he does. If you do not +observe this rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought arises in +your mind, “I shall seem disobliging to him and he will not have the +same feeling towards me,” remember that nothing is done without cost, +nor is it possible for a man if he does not do the same things to be +the same man that he was. Choose then which of the two you will have, +to be equally loved by those by whom you were formerly loved, being the +same with your former self; or, being superior, not to obtain from your +friends the same that you did before. + + +WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER THINGS.—Keep this thought in +readiness, when you lose anything external, what you acquire in place +of it; and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss; neither +if you have got a horse in place of an ass, or an ox in place of a +sheep, nor a good action in place of a bit of money, nor in place of +idle talk such tranquillity as befits a man, nor in place of lewd talk +if you have acquired modesty. If you remember this, you will always +maintain your character such as it ought to be. But if you do not, +consider that the times of opportunity are perishing, and that whatever +pains you take about yourself, you are going to waste them all and +overturn them. And it needs only a few things for the loss and +overturning of all—namely, a small deviation from reason. For the +steerer of a ship to upset it, he has no need of the same means as he +has need of for saving it; but if he turns it a little to the wind, it +is lost; and if he does not do this purposely, but has been neglecting +his duty a little, the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in +this case also; if you only fall a nodding a little, all that you have +up to this time collected is gone. Attend therefore to the appearances +of things, and watch over them; for that which you have to preserve is +no small matter, but it is modesty and fidelity and constancy, freedom +from the affects, a state of mind undisturbed, freedom from fear, +tranquillity, in a word liberty. For what will you sell these things? +See what is the value of the things which you will obtain in exchange +for these.—But shall I not obtain any such thing for it?—See, and if +you do in return get that, see what you receive in place of it. I +possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship: he possesses a prætorship, +I possess modesty. But I do not make acclamations where it is not +becoming: I will not stand up where I ought not; for I am free, and a +friend of God. and so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek) +anything else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor good +report, nor in fact anything. For he (God) does not allow me to claim +(seek) them, for if he had chosen, he would have made them good for me; +but he has not done so, and for this reason I cannot transgress his +commands. Preserve that which is your own good in everything; and as to +every other thing, as it is permitted, and so far as to behave +consistently with reason in respect to them, content with this only. If +you do not, you will be unfortunate, you will fail in all things, you +will be hindered, you will be impeded. These are the laws which have +been sent from thence (from God); these are the orders. Of these laws a +man ought to be an expositor, to these he ought to submit, not to those +of Masurius and Cassius. + + +TO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE IN TRANQUILLITY.—Remember +that not only the desire of power and of riches makes us mean and +subject to others, but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, +and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For, to speak plainly, +whatever the external thing may be, the value which we set upon it +places us in subjection to others. What then is the difference between +desiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one; what is the +difference between desiring power or being content with a private +station; what is the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have +nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse; or saying, I am +unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as salutations and power +are things external and independent of the will, so is a book. For what +purpose do you choose to read? Tell me. For if you only direct your +purpose to being amused or learning something, you are a silly fellow +and incapable of enduring labor. But if you refer reading to the proper +end, what else is this than a tranquil and happy life ([Greek: +eusoia])? But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil +life, what is the use of it? But it does secure this, the man replies, +and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it.—And what is +this tranquil and happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say +Cæsar or Cæsar’s friend, but a crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty +thousand other things? But a tranquil and happy life contains nothing +so sure as continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do +something: I will go then with the purpose of observing the measures +(rules) which I must keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, without +desire and aversion to things external; and then that I may attend to +men, what they say, how they are moved; and this not with any bad +disposition, or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule; but +I turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. How then +shall I cease to commit them? Formerly I also acted wrong, but now I do +not: thanks to God. + +What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we have never read +for this purpose, we have never written for this purpose, so that we +may in our actions use in a way conformable to nature the appearances +presented to us; but we terminate in this, in learning what is said, +and in being able to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, +and in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where our +study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would you have by +all means the things which are not in your power? Be prevented then, be +hindered, fail in your purpose. But if we read what is written about +action (efforts, [Greek: hormae]), not that we may see what is said +about action, but that we may act well; if we read what is said about +desire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither +fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we +read what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the +relations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor +contrary to these relations; we should not be vexed, in being hindered +as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts +which are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning +not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon: To-day I have read +so many verses, I have written so many; but (we should say), To-day I +have employed my action as it is taught by the philosophers; I have not +employed my desire; I have used avoidance ([Greek: echchlisei]) only +with respect to things which are within the power of my will; I have +not been afraid of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon by the +entreaties of another; I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my +co-operation with others; and so we should thank God for what we ought +to thank him. + +There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be ready both in +the morning and during the day and by night: the rule is not to look +towards things which are out of the power of our will, to think that +nothing is our own, to give up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune; +to make them the superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has +made so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that which +cannot be hindered; and when we read, to refer our reading to this +only, and our writing and our listening. For this reason I cannot call +the man industrious, if I hear this only, that he reads and writes; and +even if a man adds that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he +knows not to what he should refer his reading. For neither do you say +that a man is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl, nor do I. But +if he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a +lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that he is a +lover of money, not a lover of labor; and if he does it through love of +learning, I say that he is a lover of learning. But if he refers his +labor to his own ruling power that he may keep it in a state +conformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I +say that he is industrious. For never commend a man on account of these +things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions +(principles); for these are the things which belong to each man, which +make his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, rejoice in that +which is present, and be content with the things which come in season. +If you see anything which you have learned and inquired about occurring +to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the +acts of life), be delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have +lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling; if you have done so +with rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness; if you are +not moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you +once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have +behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in +another. How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a +consulship or the government of a province? These things come to you +from yourself and from the gods. Remember this, who gives these things +and to whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these +thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you +shall be happy, where you shall please God? Are not the gods equally +distant from all places? Do they not see from all places alike that +which is going on? + + +AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS.—The wise and good man neither +himself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he +can prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things +is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all +occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to +quarrel. See in Xenophon’s Symposium how many quarrels he settled, how +further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how he +tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son who attempted to +confute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no man +has in his power another man’s ruling principle. He wished therefore +for nothing else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not +that this or that man may act according to nature, for that is a thing +which belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own +acts, as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a condition conformable +to nature and live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that +others also may be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the +object always set before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be +commander (a prætor) of an army? No; but if it is permitted him, his +object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to +marry? No; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object +is to maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he +would have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what +belongs to another not to belong to another: and to be instructed is +this, to learn what things are a man’s own and what belongs to another. + +How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) to a man +who has this opinion (which he ought to have)? Is he surprised at any +thing which happens, and does it appear new to him? Does he not expect +that which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than that +what actually befalls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever +they (the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness? Such a +person has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you. +But he has struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But +he wounded me also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did +he learn or in what school that man is a tame animal, that men love one +another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it. +Since then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why +shall he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your +neighbor has thrown stones. Have you then done anything wrong? But the +things in the house have been broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a +free power of will. What then is given to you (to do) in answer to +this? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more +stones. But, if you consider what is proper for a man, examine your +storehouse, see with what faculties you came into the world. Have you +the disposition of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge +for an injury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived of his +natural faculties, not when he cannot crow like a cock, but when he +cannot run. When is a dog wretched? Not when he cannot fly, but when he +cannot track his game. Is then a man also unhappy in this way, not +because he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues, for he did not +come into the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for +this purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidelity? +People ought to meet and lament such a man for the misfortunes into +which he has fallen; not indeed to lament because a man has been born +or has died, but because it has happened to him in his lifetime to have +lost the things which are his own, not that which he received from his +father, not his land and house, and his inn, and his slaves; for not +one of these things is a man’s own, but all belong to others, are +servile, and subject to account ([Greek: hupeithuna]), at different +times given to different persons by those who have them in their power: +but I mean the things which belong to him as a man, the marks (stamps) +in his mind with which he came into the world, such as we seek also on +coins, and if we find them we approve of the coins, and if we do not +find the marks we reject them. What is the stamp on this sestertius? +The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero. Throw it +away; it cannot be accepted, it is counterfeit. So also in this case: +What is the stamp of his opinions? It is gentleness, a sociable +disposition, a tolerant temper, a disposition to mutual affections. +Produce these qualities. I accept them: I consider this man a citizen, +I accept him as a neighbor, a companion in my voyages. Only see that he +has not Nero’s stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he +fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the heads of those +who come in his way? (If so), why then did you say that he is a man? Is +everything judged (determined) by the bare form? If that is so, say +that the form in wax is an apple and has the smell and the taste of an +apple. But the external figure is not enough: neither then is the nose +enough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the opinions of a +man. Here is a man who does not listen to reason, who does not know +when he is refuted: he is an ass; in another man the sense of shame is +become dead: he is good for nothing, he is anything rather than a man. +This man seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not +even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast. + +What then? would you have me to be despised?—By whom? by those who know +you? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and +modest? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What is that to +you? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not +his art. But they will be more hostile to me for this reason. Why do +you say “me”? Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using +in a natural way the appearances which are presented to you? In no way +can he. Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to show +yourself afraid? And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you +are at peace with all men whatever they may do, and laugh at those +chiefly who think that they can harm you? These slaves, you can say, +know not either who I am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because +they have no access to the things which are mine. + +In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers (and +say): What trouble these men are now taking for nothing; our wall is +secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources. +These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable; but +nothing else than his opinions makes a man’s soul impregnable. For what +wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so +safe, or what honor (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man’s +opinions)? All (other) things everywhere are perishable, easily taken +by assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be +disturbed, except what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires +disappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not +choose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, +and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is +perishable and servile and to labor at the things which are +imperishable and by nature free; and do we not remember that no man +either hurts another or does good to another, but that a man’s opinions +about each thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him; +this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made +Eteocles and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which +they had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is +the extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the +nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider him +who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and +treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father. For +nothing is more akin to us than the good; therefore, if these things +(externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, +nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of +enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants. But if the will ([Greek: +proairesis], the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is +the only good; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the +only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about +what? about the things which do not concern us? and strife with whom? +with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the +chief things? + +Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very +ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son. + + +AGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED.—I am grieved, a man says, +at being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thing +which concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to +stop this pity? It is in my power, if I show them that I do not require +pity. And whether then are you in the condition of not deserving +(requiring) pity, or are you not in that condition? I think that I am +not; but these persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if +they ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my faults; but +they pity me for my poverty, for not possessing honorable offices, for +diseases and deaths and other such things. Whether then are you +prepared to convince the many, that not one of these things is an evil, +but that it is possible for a man who is poor and has no office +([Greek: anarchonti)] and enjoys no honor to be happy; or to show +yourself to them as rich and in power? For the second of these things +belong to a man who is boastful, silly, and good for nothing. And +consider by what means the pretence must be supported. It will be +necessary for you to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, +and to exhibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often +the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the same, +and to have splendid garments, and all other things for display, and to +show that you are a man honored by the great, and to try to sup at +their houses, or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your person to +employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and +nobler than you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to +go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first way is +both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has +not been able to do, to convince all men what things are good and bad. +Is this power given to you? This only is given to you, to convince +yourself; and you have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you +attempt to persuade other men? and who has lived so long with you as +you with yourself? and who has so much power of convincing you as you +have of convincing yourself; and who is better disposed and nearer to +you than you are to yourself? How then have you not yet convinced +yourself in order to learn? At present are not things upside down? Is +this what you have been earnest about doing, to learn to be free from +grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to +be free? Have you not heard then that there is only one way which leads +to this end, to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the +will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others? +For another man then to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it? +It is a thing independent of the will—Then is it nothing to you? It is +nothing. When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you +think that you are convinced about good and evil? + + +ON FREEDOM FROM FEAR.—What makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you +say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber, and those who +exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to +the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it +because the child does not understand these things? If then any man +does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to +the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of +some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he +afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the +guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live +by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant +what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If +then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I +have instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his +wife, and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he +cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are +playing with shells (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble +themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the +materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and +the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him, or what guards +or what swords? + +What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these +things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, +quietly expecting everything which can happen, and enduring that which +has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you +will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the +part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have +power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall +go, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not +because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my +opinions which I shall carry off with me, for neither can any man +deprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be +taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be +and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to +die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is. It is +now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things +out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? +what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what +new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a +tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to +have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have +considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have +been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. +I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I +say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are +you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not +the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and +all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. +Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches. + +Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest +they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, +let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think +it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are +you not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not +choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I +think that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach +myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements +(pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the +same will ([Greek: sunthelo]). There is no shutting out for me, but for +those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? +Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who +enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honored +by Cæsar, I say what does he happen to get? A province (the government +of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The +office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office +well? Why do I still strive to enter (Cæsar’s chamber)? A man scatters +dried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one +another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a +man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. +Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is +distributed; let children look to that. Prætorships, consulships, are +distributed; let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, +beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are +only dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while +Cæsar is scattering them about, do not be troubled; if a dried fig come +into your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. +But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by +another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Cæsar’s) chamber, +neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor anything else of the +things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not +to think good. + + +TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A CHARACTER OF SHAMELESSNESS.—When +you see another man in the possession of power (magistracy), set +against this the fact that you have not the want (desire) of power; +when you see another rich, see what you possess in place of riches: for +if you possess nothing in place of them, you are miserable; but if you +have not the want of riches, know that you possess more than this man +possesses and what is worth much more. + + +WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO DESPISE AND WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO VALUE.—The +difficulties of all men are about external things, their helplessness +is about external. What shall I do? how will it be? how will it turn +out? will this happen? will that? All these are the words of those who +are turning themselves to things which are not within the power of the +will. For who says, How shall I not assent to that which is false? how +shall I not turn away from the truth? If a man be of such a good +disposition as to be anxious about these things I will remind him of +this: Why are you anxious? The thing is in your own power, be assured; +do not be precipitate in assenting before you apply the natural rule. +On the other side, if a man is anxious (uneasy) about desire, lest it +fail in its purpose and miss its end, and with respect to the avoidance +of things, lest he should fall into that which he would avoid, I will +first kiss (love) him, because he throws away the things about which +others are in a flutter (others desire) and their fears, and employs +his thoughts about his own affairs and his own condition. Then I shall +say to him: If you do not choose to desire that which you will fail to +obtain nor to attempt to avoid that into which you will fall, desire +nothing which belongs to (which is in the power of) others, nor try to +avoid any of the things which are not in your power. If you do not +observe this rule, you must of necessity fail in your desires and fall +into that which you would avoid. What is the difficulty here? where is +there room for the words How will it be? and How will it turn out? and +Will this happen or that? + +Now is not that which will happen independent of the will? Yes. And the +nature of good and of evil, is it not in the things which are within +the power of the will? Yes. Is it in your power then to treat according +to nature everything which happens? Can any person hinder you? No man. +No longer then say to me, How will it be? For, however it may be, you +will dispose of it well, and the result to you will be a fortunate one. +What would Hercules have been if he said: How shall a great lion not +appear to me, or a great boar, or savage men? And what do you care for +that? If a great boar appear, you will fight a greater fight; if bad +men appear, you will relieve the earth of the bad. Suppose then that I +lose my life in this way. You will die a good man, doing a noble act. +For since he must certainly die, of necessity a man must be found doing +something, either following the employment of a husbandman, or digging, +or trading, or serving in a consulship, or suffering from indigestion +or from diarrhoea. What then do you wish to be doing when you are found +by death? I, for my part, would wish to be found doing something which +belongs to a man, beneficent, suitable to the general interest, noble. +But if I cannot be found doing things so great, I would be found doing +at least that which I cannot be hindered from doing, that which is +permitted me to do, correcting myself, cultivating the faculty which +makes use of appearances, laboring at freedom from the affects +(laboring at tranquillity of mind); rendering to the relations of life +their due. If I succeed so far, also (I would be found) touching on +(advancing to) the third topic (or head) safety in forming judgments +about things. If death surprises me when I am busy about these things, +it is enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God and say: The +means which I have received from thee for seeing thy administration (of +the world) and following it I have not neglected; I have not dishonored +thee by my acts; see how I have used my perceptions, see how I have +used my preconceptions; have I ever blamed thee? have I been +discontented with anything that happens, or wished it to be otherwise? +have I wished to transgress the (established) relations (of things)? +That thou hast given me life, I thank thee for what thou hast given. So +long as I have used the things which are thine I am content. Take them +back and place them wherever thou mayest choose, for thine were all +things, thou gavest them to me. Is it not enough to depart in this +state of mind? and what life is better and more becoming than that of a +man who is in this state of mind? and what end is more happy? + + +ABOUT PURITY (CLEANLINESS).—Some persons raise a question whether the +social feeling is contained in the nature of man; and yet I think that +these same persons would have no doubt that love of purity is certainly +contained in it, and that if man is distinguished from other animals by +anything, he is distinguished by this. When then we see any other +animal cleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with +surprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man; and on the +other hand, if a man blames an animal for being dirty, straightway, as +if we were making an excuse for it, we say that of course the animal is +not a human creature. So we suppose that there is something superior in +man, and that we first receive it from the gods. For since the gods by +their nature are pure and free from corruption, so far as men approach +them by reason, so far do they cling to purity and to a love (habit) of +purity. But since it is impossible that man’s nature ([Greek: ousia]) +can be altogether pure, being mixed (composed) of such materials, +reason is applied, as far as it is possible, and reason endeavors to +make human nature love purity. + +The first then and highest purity is that which is in the soul; and we +say the same of impurity. Now you could not discover the impurity of +the soul as you could discover that of the body; but as to the soul, +what else could you find in it than that which makes it filthy in +respect to the acts which are her own? Now the acts of the soul are +movement towards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, +preparation, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in these +acts makes the soul filthy and impure? Nothing else than her own bad +judgments ([Greek: chrimata]). Consequently the impurity of the soul is +the soul’s bad opinions; and the purification of the soul is the +planting in it of proper opinions; and the soul is pure which has +proper opinions, for the soul alone in her own acts is free from +perturbation and pollution. + +For we ought not even by the appearance of the body to deter the +multitude from philosophy; but as in other things, a philosopher should +show himself cheerful and tranquil, so also he should in the things +that relate to the body. See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I want +nothing; see how I am without a house, and without a city, and an +exile, if it happens to be so, and without a hearth I live more free +from trouble and more happily than all of noble birth and than the +rich. But look at my poor body also and observe that it is not injured +by my hard way of living. But if a man says this to me, who has the +appearance (dress) and face of a condemned man, what god shall persuade +me to approach philosophy, if it makes men such persons? Far from it; I +would not choose to do so, even if I were going to become a wise man. I +indeed would rather that a young man, who is making his first movements +towards philosophy, should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed +than with it dirty and rough, for there is seen in him a certain notion +(appearance) of beauty and a desire of (attempt at) that which is +becoming; and where he supposes it to be, there also he strives that it +shall be. It is only necessary to show him (what it is), and to say: +Young man, you seek beauty, and you do well; you must know then that it +(is produced) grows in that part of you where you have the rational +faculty; seek it there where you have the movements towards and +movements from things, where you have the desires towards and the +aversion from things; for this is what you have in yourself of a +superior kind; but the poor body is naturally only earth; why do you +labor about it to no purpose? if you shall learn nothing else, you will +learn from time that the body is nothing. But if a man comes to me +daubed with filth, dirty, with a moustache down to his knees, what can +I say to him, by what kind of resemblance can I lead him on? For about +what has he busied himself which resembles beauty, that I may be able +to change him and say, Beauty is not in this, but in that? Would you +have me to tell him, that beauty consists not in being daubed with +muck, but that it lies in the rational part? Has he any desire of +beauty? has he any form of it in his mind? Go and talk to a hog, and +tell him not to roll in the mud. + + +ON ATTENTION.—When you have remitted your attention for a short time, +do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose; but let +this thought be present to you, that in consequence of the fault +committed today your affairs must be in a worse condition for all that +follows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a habit of not +attending is formed in you; then a habit of deferring your attention. +And continually from time to time you drive away by deferring it the +happiness of life, proper behavior, the being and living conformably to +nature. If then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the +complete omission of attention is more profitable; but if it is not +profitable, why do you not maintain your attention constant? Today I +choose to play. Well then, ought you not to play with attention? I +choose to sing. What then hinders you from doing so with attention? Is +there any part of life excepted, to which attention does not extend? +For will you do it (anything in life) worse by using attention, and +better by not attending at all? And what else of the things in life is +done better by those who do not use attention? Does he who works in +wood work better by not attending to it? Does the captain of a ship +manage it better by not attending? and are any of the smaller acts done +better by inattention? Do you not see that when you have let your mind +loose, it is no longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety, +or to modesty, or to moderation; but you do everything that comes into +your mind in obedience to your inclinations. + +First then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, and to do +nothing without them, and we ought to keep the soul directed to this +mark, to pursue nothing external, and nothing which belongs to others +(or is in the power of others), but to do as he has appointed who has +the power; we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the +power of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. Next to +this we ought to remember who we are, and what is our name, and to +endeavor to direct our duties towards the character (nature) of our +several relations (in life) in this manner: what is the season for +singing, what is the season for play, and in whose presence; what will +be the consequence of the act; whether our associates will despise us, +whether we shall despise them; when to jeer ([Greek: schopsai]), and +whom to ridicule; and on what occasion to comply and with whom; and +finally, in complying how to maintain our own character. But wherever +you have deviated from any of these rules, there is damage immediately, +not from anything external, but from the action itself. + +What then? is it possible to be free from faults (if you do all this)? +It is not possible; but this is possible, to direct your efforts +incessantly to being faultless. For we must be content if by never +remitting this attention we shall escape at least a few errors. But now +when you have said, Tomorrow I will begin to attend, you must be told +that you are saying this, Today I will be shameless, disregardful of +time and place, mean; it will be in the power of others to give me +pain; today I will be passionate and envious. See how many evil things +you are permitting yourself to do. If it is good to use attention +tomorrow, how much better is it to do so today? if tomorrow it is in +your interest to attend, much more is it today, that you may be able to +do so tomorrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day. + + +AGAINST OR TO THOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR OWN AFFAIRS.—When a man has +seemed to us to have talked with simplicity (candor) about his own +affairs, how is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to +discover to him our own secrets and we think this to be candid +behavior? In the first place, because it seems unfair for a man to have +listened to the affairs of his neighbor, and not to communicate to him +also in turn our own affairs; next, because we think that we shall not +present to them the appearance of candid men when we are silent about +our own affairs. Indeed, men are often accustomed to say, I have told +you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing of your own? where is this +done? Besides, we have also this opinion that we can safely trust him +who has already told us his own affairs; for the notion rises in our +mind that this man could never divulge our affairs because he would be +cautious that we also should not divulge his. In this way also the +incautious are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in +a common dress and begins to speak ill of Cæsar; then you, as if you +had received a pledge of his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, +utter yourself also what you think, and then you are carried off in +chains. + +Something of this kind happens to us also generally. Now as this man +has confidently intrusted his affairs to me, shall I also do so to any +man whom I meet? (No), for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am +of such a disposition; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has +heard. Then, if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I +resolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I both disturb +others, and am disturbed myself. But if I remember that one man does +not injure another, and that every man’s acts injure and profit him, I +secure this, that I do not anything like him, but still I suffer what I +do suffer through my own silly talk. + +True, but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of your neighbor +for you in your turn to communicate nothing to him. Did I ask you for +your secrets, my man? did you communicate your affairs on certain +terms, that you should in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler +and think that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be +like you? But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs to me, +and it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be +so rash? It is just the same as if I had a cask which is water-tight, +and you one with a hole in it, and you should come and deposit with me +your wine that I might put it into my cask, and then should complain +that I also did not intrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a +hole in it. How then is there any equality here? You intrusted your +affairs to a man who is faithful and modest, to a man who thinks that +his own actions alone are injurious and (or) useful, and that nothing +external is. Would you have me intrust mine to you, a man who has +dishonored his own faculty of will, and who wishes to gain some small +bit of money or some office or promotion in the court (emperor’s +palace), even if you should be going to murder your own children, like +Medea? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness)? But show yourself +to me to be faithful, modest, and steady; show me that you have +friendly opinions; show that your cask has no hole in it; and you will +see how I shall not wait for you to trust me with your own affairs, but +I myself shall come to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not +choose to make use of a good vessel? Who does not value a benevolent +and faithful adviser? Who will not willingly receive a man who is ready +to bear a share, as we may say, of the difficulty of his circumstances, +and by this very act to ease the burden, by taking a part of it. + + + + +THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. + + +I. + +Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are +opinion ([Greek: hupolaepsis]), movement towards a thing ([Greek: +hormae]), desire, aversion ([Greek: echchlisis]), turning from a thing; +and in a word, whatever are our acts. Not in our power are the body, +property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, +whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by +nature free, not subject to restraint or hindrance; but the things not +in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of +others. Remember then, that if you think the things which are by nature +slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to +be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be +disturbed, you will blame both gods and men; but if you think that only +which is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is +another’s, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel +you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will +accuse no man, you will do nothing involuntarily (against your will), +no man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer +any harm. + +If then you desire (aim at) such great things remember that you must +not (attempt to) lay hold of them with a small effort; but you must +leave alone some things entirely, and postpone others for the present. +But if you wish for these things also (such great things), and power +(office) and wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very things +(power and wealth) because you aim also at those former things (such +great things); certainly you will fail in those things through which +alone happiness and freedom are secured. Straightway then practise +saying to every harsh appearance: You are an appearance, and in no +manner what you appear to be. Then examine it by the rules which you +possess, and by this first and chiefly, whether it relates to the +things which are in our power or to things which are not in our power; +and if it relates to anything which is not in our power, be ready to +say that it does not concern you. + +II. + +Remember that desire contains in it the profession (hope) of obtaining +that which you desire; and the profession (hope) in aversion (turning +from a thing) is that you will not fall into that which you attempt to +avoid; and he who fails in his desire is unfortunate; and he who falls +into that which he would avoid is unhappy. If then you attempt to avoid +only the things contrary to nature which are within your power you will +not be involved in any of the things which you would avoid. But if you +attempt to avoid disease, or death, or poverty, you will be unhappy. +Take away then aversion from all things which are not in our power, and +transfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power. +But destroy desire completely for the present. For if you desire +anything which is not in our power, you must be unfortunate; but of the +things in our power, and which it would be good to desire, nothing yet +is before you. But employ only the power of moving towards an object +and retiring from it; and these powers indeed only slightly and with +exceptions and with remission. + +III. + +In everything which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, +remember to add this to the (description, notion): What is the nature +of each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen +vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has +been broken you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or +wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the +wife or child dies you will not be disturbed. + +IV. + +When you are going to take in hand any act remind yourself what kind of +an act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself what +happens in the bath; some splashing the water, others pushing against +one another, others abusing one another, and some stealing; and thus +with more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself, +I now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner conformable +to nature. And so you will do in every act; for thus if any hindrance +to bathing shall happen let this thought be ready. It was not this only +that I intended, but I intended also to maintain my will in a way +conformable to nature; but I shall not maintain it so if I am vexed at +what happens. + +V. + +Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions +about the things; for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it +were it would have seemed so to Socrates; for the opinion about death +that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded, +or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves—that +is, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame +others for his own bad condition; it is the act of one who has begun to +be instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose +instruction is completed, neither to blame another, nor himself. + +VI. + +Be not elated at any advantage (excellence) which belongs to another. +If a horse when he is elated should say, I am beautiful, one might +endure it. But when you are elated, and say, I have a beautiful horse, +you must know that you are elated at having a good horse. What then is +your own? The use of appearances. Consequently when in the use of +appearances you are conformable to nature, then be elated, for then you +will be elated at something good which is your own. + +VII. + +As on a voyage when the vessel has reached a port, if you go out to get +water it is an amusement by the way to pick up a shellfish or some +bulb, but your thoughts ought to be directed to the ship, and you ought +to be constantly watching if the captain should call, and then you must +throw away all those things, that you may not be bound and pitched into +the ship like sheep. So in life also, if there be given to you instead +of a little bulb and a shell a wife and child, there will be nothing to +prevent (you from taking them). But if the captain should call, run to +the ship and leave all those things without regard to them. But if you +are old, do not even go far from the ship, lest when you are called you +make default. + +VIII. + +Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but +wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a +tranquil flow of life. + +IX. + +Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the +will itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to +the will. And add this reflection on the occasion of everything that +happens; for you will find it an impediment to something else, but not +to yourself. + +X. + +On the occasion of every accident (event) that befalls you, remember to +turn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use. +If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power to +resist is temperance (continence). If labor (pain) be presented to you, +you will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you will +find it to be patience. And if you have been thus formed to the +(proper) habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them. + +XI. + +Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say I have restored it. +Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has +been restored. Has your estate been taken from you? Has not then this +also been restored? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But +what is it to you, by whose hands the giver demanded it back? So long +as he may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to +another, as travellers do with their inn. + +XII. + +If you intend to improve, throw away such thoughts as these: if I +neglect my affairs, I shall not have the means of living: unless I +chastise my slave, he will be bad. For it is better to die of hunger +and so to be released from grief and fear than to live in abundance +with perturbation; and it is better for your slave to be bad than for +you to be unhappy. Begin then from little things. Is the oil spilled? +Is a little wine stolen? Say on the occasion, at such price is sold +freedom from perturbation; at such price is sold tranquillity, but +nothing is got for nothing. And when you call your slave, consider that +it is possible that he does not hear; and if he does hear, that he will +do nothing which you wish. But matters are not so well with him, but +altogether well with you, that it should be in his power for you to be +not disturbed. + +XIII. + +If you would improve, submit to be considered without sense and foolish +with respect to externals. Wish to be considered to know nothing; and +if you shall seem to some to be a person of importance, distrust +yourself. For you should know that it is not easy both to keep your +will in a condition conformable to nature and (to secure) external +things: but if a man is careful about the one, it is an absolute +necessity that he will neglect the other. + +XIV. + +If you would have your children and your wife and your friends to live +for ever, you are silly; for you would have the things which are not in +your power to be in your power, and the things which belong to others +to be yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from faults, +you are a fool; for you would have badness not to be badness, but +something else. But if you wish not to fail in your desires, you are +able to do that. Practise then this which you are able to do. He is the +master of every man who has the power over the things which another +person wishes or does not wish, the power to confer them on him or to +take them away. Whoever then wishes to be free let him neither wish for +anything nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does not +observe this rule, he must be a slave. + +XV. + +Remember that in life you ought to behave as at a banquet. Suppose that +something is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your +hand and take a portion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. Do +not detain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your +desire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so with +respect to children, so with respect to a wife, so with respect to +magisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be some +time a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. But if you take none +of the things which are set before you, and even despise them, then you +will be not only a fellow banqueter with the gods, but also a partner +with them in power. For by acting thus Diogenes and Heracleitus and +those like them were deservedly divine, and were so called. + +XVI. + +When you see a person weeping in sorrow either when a child goes abroad +or when he is dead, or when the man has lost his property, take care +that the appearance do not hurry you away with it, as if he were +suffering in external things. But straightway make a distinction in +your own mind, and be in readiness to say, it is not that which has +happened that afflicts this man, for it does not afflict another, but +it is the opinion about this thing which afflicts the man. So far as +words then do not be unwilling to show him sympathy, and even if it +happens so, to lament with him. But take care that you do not lament +internally also. + +XVII. + +Remember that thou art an actor in a play, of such a kind as the +teacher (author) may choose; if short, of a short one; if long, of a +long one: if he wishes you to act the part of a poor man, see that you +act the part naturally; if the part of a lame man, of a magistrate, of +a private person, (do the same). For this is your duty, to act well the +part that is given to you; but to select the part, belongs to another. + +XVIII. + +When a raven has croaked inauspiciously, let not the appearance hurry +you away with it; but straightway make a distinction in your mind and +say, None of these things is signified to me, but either to my poor +body, or to my small property, or to my reputation, or to my children, +or to my wife: but to me all significations are auspicious if I choose. +For whatever of these things results, it is in my power to derive +benefit from it. + +XIX. + +You can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in which it is not +in your power to conquer. Take care then when you observe a man honored +before others or possessed of great power or highly esteemed for any +reason, not to suppose him happy, and be not carried away by the +appearance. For if the nature of the good is in our power, neither envy +nor jealousy will have a place in us. But you yourself will not wish to +be a general or senator ([Greek: prutanis]) or consul, but a free man: +and there is only one way to this, to despise (care not for) the things +which are not in our power. + +XX. + +Remember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults +you, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. When +then a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinion +which has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be carried +away by the appearance. For if you once gain time and delay, you will +more easily master yourself. + +XXI. + +Let death and exile and every other thing which appears dreadful be +daily before your eyes; but most of all death: and you will never think +of anything mean nor will you desire anything extravagantly. + +XXII. + +If you desire philosophy, prepare yourself from the beginning to be +ridiculed, to expect that many will sneer at you, and say, He has all +at once returned to us as a philosopher; and whence does he get this +supercilious look for us? Do you not show a supercilious look; but hold +on to the things which seem to you best as one appointed by God to this +station. And remember that if you abide in the same principles, these +men who first ridiculed will afterwards admire you; but if you shall +have been overpowered by them, you will bring on yourself double +ridicule. + +XXIII. + +If it should ever happen to you to be turned to externals in order to +please some person, you must know that you have lost your purpose in +life. Be satisfied then in everything with being a philosopher; and if +you wish to seem also to any person to be a philosopher, appear so to +yourself, and you will be able to do this. + +XXIV. + +Let not these thoughts afflict you, I shall live unhonored and be +nobody nowhere. For if want of honor ([Greek: atimia]) is an evil, you +cannot be in evil through the means (fault) of another any more than +you can be involved in anything base. Is it then your business to +obtain the rank of a magistrate, or to be received at a banquet? By no +means. How then can this be want of honor (dishonor)? And how will you +be nobody nowhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only +which are in your power, in which indeed it is permitted to you to be a +man of the greatest worth? But your friends will be without assistance! +What do you mean by being without assistance? They will not receive +money from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who then told +you that these are among the things which are in our power, and not in +the power of others? And who can give to another what he has not +himself? Acquire money then, your friends say, that we also may have +something. If I can acquire money and also keep myself modest and +faithful and magnanimous, point out the way, and I will acquire it. But +if you ask me to lose the things which are good and my own, in order +that you may gain the things which are not good, see how unfair and +silly you are. Besides, which would you rather have, money or a +faithful and modest friend? For this end then rather help me to be such +a man, and do not ask me to do this by which I shall lose that +character. But my country, you say, as far as it depends on me, will be +without my help. I ask again, what help do you mean? It will not have +porticos or baths through you. And what does this mean? For it is not +furnished with shoes by means of a smith, nor with arms by means of a +shoemaker. But it is enough if every man fully discharges the work that +is his own: and if you provided it with another citizen faithful and +modest, would you not be useful to it? Yes. Then you also cannot be +useless to it. What place then, you say, shall I hold in the city? +Whatever you can, if you maintain at the same time your fidelity and +modesty. But if when you wish to be useful to the state, you shall lose +these qualities, what profit could you be to it, if you were made +shameless and faithless? + +XXV. + +Has any man been preferred before you at a banquet, or in being +saluted, or in being invited to a consultation? If these things are +good, you ought to rejoice that he has obtained them; but if bad, be +not grieved because you have not obtained them. And remember that you +cannot, if you do not the same things in order to obtain what is not in +our own power, be considered worthy of the same (equal) things. For how +can a man obtain an equal share with another when he does not visit a +man’s doors as that other man does; when he does not attend him when he +goes abroad, as the other man does; when he does not praise (flatter) +him as another does? You will be unjust then and insatiable, if you do +not part with the price, in return for which those things are sold, and +if you wish to obtain them for nothing. Well, what is the price of +lettuces? An obolus perhaps. If then a man gives up the obolus, and +receives the lettuces, and if you do not give up the obolus and do not +obtain the lettuces, do not suppose that you receive less than he who +has got the lettuces; for as he has the lettuces, so you have the +obolus which you did not give. In the same way then in the other matter +also you have not been invited to a man’s feast, for you did not give +to the host the price at which the supper is sold; but he sells it for +praise (flattery), he sells it for personal attention. Give then the +price, if it is for your interest, for which it is sold. But if you +wish both not to give the price and to obtain the things, you are +insatiable and silly. Have you nothing then in place of the supper? You +have indeed, you have the not flattering of him, whom you did not +choose to flatter; you have the not enduring of the man when he enters +the room. + +XXVI. + +We may learn the wish (will) of nature from the things in which we do +not differ from one another: for instance, when your neighbor’s slave +has broken his cup, or anything else, we are ready to say forthwith, +that it is one of the things which happen. You must know then that when +your cup also is broken, you ought to think as you did when your +neighbor’s cup was broken. Transfer this reflection to greater things +also. Is another man’s child or wife dead? There is no one who would +not say, This is an event incident to man. But when a man’s own child +or wife is dead, forthwith he calls out, Woe to me, how wretched I am! +But we ought to remember how we feel when we hear that it has happened +to others. + +XXVII. + +As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither +does the nature of evil exist in the world. + +XXVIII. + +If any person was intending to put your body in the power of any man +whom you fell in with on the way, you would be vexed; but that you put +your understanding in the power of any man whom you meet, so that if he +should revile you, it is disturbed and troubled, are you not ashamed at +this? + +XXIX. + +In every act observe the things which come first, and those which +follow it; and so proceed to the act. If you do not, at first you will +approach it with alacrity, without having thought of the things which +will follow; but afterwards, when certain base (ugly) things have shown +themselves, you will be ashamed. A man wishes to conquer at the Olympic +games. I also wish indeed, for it is a fine thing. But observe both the +things which come first, and the things which follow; and then begin +the act. You must do everything according to rule, eat according to +strict orders, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself as you are +bid at appointed times, in heat, in cold, you must not drink cold +water, nor wine as you choose; in a word, you must deliver yourself up +to the exercise master as you do to the physician, and then proceed to +the contest. And sometimes you will strain the hand, put the ankle out +of joint, swallow much dust, sometimes be flogged, and after all this +be defeated. When you have considered all this, if you still choose, go +to the contest: if you do not you will behave like children, who at one +time play at wrestlers, another time as flute players, again as +gladiators, then as trumpeters, then as tragic actors. So you also will +be at one time an athlete, at another a gladiator, then a rhetorician, +then a philosopher, but with your whole soul you will be nothing at +all; but like an ape you imitate everything that you see, and one thing +after another pleases you. For you have not undertaken anything with +consideration, nor have you surveyed it well; but carelessly and with +cold desire. Thus some who have seen a philosopher and having heard one +speak, as Euphrates speaks—and who can speak as he does?—they wish to +be philosophers themselves also. My man, first of all consider what +kind of thing it is; and then examine your own nature, if you are able +to sustain the character. Do you wish to be a pentathlete or a +wrestler? Look at your arms, your thighs, examine your loins. For +different men are formed by nature for different things. Do you think +that if you do these things, you can eat in the same manner, drink in +the same manner, and in the same manner loathe certain things? You must +pass sleepless nights, endure toil, go away from your kinsmen, be +despised by a slave, in everything have the inferior part, in honor, in +office, in the courts of justice, in every little matter. Consider +these things, if you would exchange for them, freedom from passions, +liberty, tranquillity. If not, take care that, like little children, +you be not now a philosopher, then a servant of the publicani, then a +rhetorician, then a procurator (manager) for Cæsar. These things are +not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must +either cultivate your own ruling faculty, or external things. You must +either exercise your skill on internal things or on external things; +that is you must either maintain the position of a philosopher or that +of a common person. + +XXX. + +Duties are universally measured by relations ([Greek: tais schsesi]). +Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him +in all things, to submit when he is reproachful, when he inflicts +blows. But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature +made akin to a good father? No; but to a father. Does a brother wrong +you? Maintain then your own position towards him, and do not examine +what he is doing, but what you must do that your will shall be +conformable to nature. For another will not damage you, unless you +choose: but you will be damaged then when you shall think that you are +damaged. In this way then you will discover your duty from the relation +of a neighbor, from that of a citizen, from that of a general, if you +are accustomed to contemplate the relations. + +XXXI. + +As to piety towards the gods you must know that this is the chief +thing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and +that they administer the All well and justly; and you must fix yourself +in this principle (duty), to obey them, and to yield to them in +everything which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being +accomplished by the wisest intelligence. For if you do so, you will +never either blame the gods, nor will you accuse them of neglecting +you. And it is not possible for this to be done in any other way than +by withdrawing from the things which are not in our power, and by +placing the good and the evil only in those things which are in our +power. For if you think that any of the things which are not in our +power is good or bad, it is absolutely necessary that, when you do not +obtain what you wish, and when you fall into those things which you do +not wish, you will find fault and hate those who are the cause of them; +for every animal is formed by nature to this, to fly from and to turn +from the things which appear harmful and the things which are the cause +of the harm, but to follow and admire the things which are useful and +the causes of the useful. It is impossible then for a person who thinks +that he is harmed to be delighted with that which he thinks to be the +cause of the harm, as it is also impossible to be pleased with the harm +itself. For this reason also a father is reviled by his son, when he +gives no part to his son of the things which are considered to be good; +and it was this which made Polynices and Eteocles enemies, the opinion +that royal power was a good. It is for this reason that the cultivator +of the earth reviles the gods, for this reason the sailor does, and the +merchant, and for this reason those who lose their wives and their +children. For where the useful (your interest) is, there also piety is. +Consequently he who takes care to desire as he ought and to avoid +([Greek: echchlinein]) as he ought, at the same time also cares after +piety. But to make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits +according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor +carelessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs +to all to do. + +XXXII. + +When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know how +it will turn out, but that you are come to inquire from the diviner. +But of what kind it is, you know when you come, if indeed you are a +philosopher. For if it is any of the things which are not in our power, +it is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad. Do not +then bring to the diviner desire or aversion ([Greek: echchlinein]): if +you do, you will approach him with fear. But having determined in your +mind that everything which shall turn out (result) is indifferent, and +does not concern you, and whatever it may be, for it will be in your +power to use it well, and no man will hinder this, come then with +confidence to the gods as your advisers. And then when any advice shall +have been given, remember whom you have taken as advisers, and whom you +will have neglected, if you do not obey them. And go to divination, as +Socrates said that you ought, about those matters in which all the +inquiry has reference to the result, and in which means are not given +either by reason nor by any other art for knowing the thing which is +the subject of the inquiry. Wherefore when we ought to share a friend’s +danger, or that of our country, you must not consult the diviner +whether you ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you +that the signs of the victims are unlucky, it is plain that this is a +token of death, or mutilation of part of the body, or of exile. But +reason prevails, that even with these risks, we should share the +dangers of our friend, and of our country. Therefore attend to the +greater diviner, the Pythian god, who ejected from the temple him who +did not assist his friend, when he was being murdered. + +XXXIII. + +Immediately prescribe some character and some form to yourself, which +you shall observe both when you are alone and when you meet with men. + +And let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be +said, and in few words. And rarely, and when the occasion calls, we +shall say something; but about none of the common subjects, not about +gladiators, nor horse-races, nor about athletes, nor about eating or +drinking, which are the usual subjects; and especially not about men, +as blaming them or praising them, or comparing them. If then you are +able, bring over by your conversation, the conversation of your +associates, to that which is proper; but if you should happen to be +confined to the company of strangers, be silent. + +Let not your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor excessive. + +Refuse altogether to take an oath, if it is possible; if it is not, +refuse as far as you are able. + +Avoid banquets which are given by strangers and by ignorant persons. +But if ever there is occasion to join in them, let your attention be +carefully fixed, that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar (the +uninstructed). For you must know, that if your companion be impure, he +also who keeps company with him must become impure, though he should +happen to be pure. + +Take (apply) the things which relate to the body as far as the bare +use, as food, drink, clothing, house, and slaves; but exclude +everything which is for show or luxury. + +As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage; +but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to +custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these +pleasures, or reprove them; and do not often boast that you do not +indulge in them yourself. + +If a man has reported to you, that a certain person speaks ill of you, +do not make any defence (answer) to what has been told you; but reply, +The man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not have +mentioned these only. + +It is not necessary to go to the theatres often: but if there is ever a +proper occasion for going, do not show yourself as being a partisan of +any man except yourself, that is, desire only that to be done which is +done, and for him only to gain the prize who gains the prize; for in +this way you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from +shouts and laughter at any (thing or person), or violent emotions. And +when you are come away, do not talk much about what has passed on the +stage, except about that which may lead to your own improvement. For it +is plain, if you do talk much, that you admired the spectacle (more +than you ought). + +Do not go to the hearing of certain persons’ recitations, nor visit +them readily. But if you do attend, observe gravity and sedateness, and +also avoid making yourself disagreeable. + +When you are going to meet with any person, and particularly one of +those who are considered to be in a superior condition, place before +yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances, +and you will have no difficulty in making a proper use of the occasion. + +When you are going to any of those who are in great power, place before +yourself that you will not find the man at home, that you will be +excluded, that the door will not be opened to you, that the man will +not care about you. And if with all this it is your duty to visit him, +bear what happens, and never say to yourself that it was not worth the +trouble. For this is silly, and marks the character of a man who is +offended by externals. + +In company take care not to speak much and excessively about your own +acts or dangers; for as it is pleasant to you to make mention of your +own dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what has happened +to you. Take care also not to provoke laughter; for this is a slippery +way towards vulgar habits, and is also adapted to diminish the respect +of your neighbors. It is a dangerous habit also to approach obscene +talk. When then, anything of this kind happens, if there is a good +opportunity, rebuke the man who has proceeded to this talk; but if +there is not an opportunity, by your silence at least, and blushing and +expression of dissatisfaction by your countenance, show plainly that +you are displeased at such talk. + +XXXIV. + +If you have received the impression ([Greek: phantasion]) of any +pleasure, guard yourself against being carried away by it; but let the +thing wait for you, and allow yourself a certain delay on your own +part. Then think of both times, of the time when you will enjoy the +pleasure, and of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure, when you +will repent and will reproach yourself. And set against these things +how you will rejoice, if you have abstained from the pleasure, and how +you will commend yourself. But if it seem to you seasonable to +undertake (do) the thing, take care that the charm of it, and the +pleasure, and the attraction of it shall not conquer you; but set on +the other side the consideration, how much better it is to be conscious +that you have gained this victory. + +XXXV. + +When you have decided that a thing ought to be done, and are doing it, +never avoid being seen doing it, though the many shall form an +unfavorable opinion about it. For if it is not right to do it, avoid +doing the thing; but if it is right, why are you afraid of those who +shall find fault wrongly? + +XXXVI. + +As the proposition, it is either day, or it is night, is of great +importance for the disjunctive argument, but for the conjunctive, is of +no value, so in a symposium (entertainment) to select the larger share +is of great value for the body, but for the maintenance of the social +feeling is worth nothing. When, then, you are eating with another, +remember, to look not only to the value for the body of the things set +before you, but also to the value of the behavior towards the host +which ought to be observed. + +XXXVII. + +If you have assumed a character above your strength, you have both +acted in this manner in an unbecoming way, and you have neglected that +which you might have fulfilled. + +XXXVIII. + +In walking about, as you take care not to step on a nail, or to sprain +your foot, so take care not to damage your own ruling faculty; and if +we observe this rule in every act, we shall undertake this act with +more security. + +XXXIX. + +The measure of possession (property) is to every man the body, as the +foot is of the shoe. If then you stand on this rule (the demands of the +body), you will maintain the measure; but if you pass beyond it, you +must then of necessity be hurried as it were down a precipice. As also +in the matter of the shoe, if you go beyond the (necessities of the) +foot, the shoe is gilded, then of a purple color, then embroidered; for +there is no limit to that which has once passed the true measure. + +XL. + +Women forthwith from the age of fourteen are called by the men +mistresses ([Greek: churiai], dominæ). Therefore, since they see that +there is nothing else that they can obtain, but only the power of lying +with men, they begin to decorate themselves, and to place all their +hopes in this. It is worth our while then to take care that they may +know that they are valued (by men) for nothing else than appearing +(being) decent and modest and discreet. + +XLI. + +It is a mark of a mean capacity to spend much time on the things which +concern the body, such as much exercise, much eating, much drinking, +much easing of the body, much copulation. But these things should be +done as subordinate things; and let all your care be directed to the +mind. + +XLII. + +When any person treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that he +does this or says this because he thinks that it is his duty. It is not +possible then for him to follow that which seems right to you, but that +which seems right to himself. Accordingly if he is wrong in his +opinion, he is the person who is hurt, for he is the person who has +been deceived; for if a man shall suppose the true conjunction to be +false, it is not the conjunction which is hindered, but the man who has +been deceived about it. If you proceed then from these opinions, you +will be mild in temper to him who reviles you; for say on each +occasion, It seemed so to him. + +XLIII. + +Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the other +by which it may not. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold of +the act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this is the handle +which cannot be borne; but lay hold of the other, that he is your +brother, that he was nurtured with you, and you will lay hold of the +thing by that handle by which it can be borne. + +XLIV. + +These reasonings do not cohere: I am richer than you, therefore I am +better than you; I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better +than you. On the contrary, these rather cohere: I am richer than you, +therefore my possessions are greater than yours; I am more eloquent +than you, therefore my speech is superior to yours. But you are neither +possession nor speech. + +XLV. + +Does a man bathe quickly (early)? do not say that he bathes badly, but +that he bathes quickly. Does a man drink much wine? do not say that he +does this badly, but say that he drinks much. For before you shall have +determined the opinion how do you know whether he is acting wrong? Thus +it will not happen to you to comprehend some appearances which are +capable of being comprehended, but to assent to others. + +XLVI. + +On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not speak much among +the uninstructed about theorems (philosophical rules, precepts); but do +that which follows from them. For example, at a banquet do not say how +a man ought to eat, but eat as you ought to eat. For remember that in +this way Socrates also altogether avoided ostentation. Persons used to +come to him and ask to be recommended by him to philosophers, and he +used to take them to philosophers, so easily did he submit to being +overlooked. Accordingly, if any conversation should arise among +uninstructed persons about any theorem, generally be silent; for there +is great danger that you will immediately vomit up what you have not +digested. And when a man shall say to you that you know nothing, and +you are not vexed, then be sure that you have begun the work (of +philosophy). For even sheep do not vomit up their grass and show to the +shepherds how much they have eaten; but when they have internally +digested the pasture, they produce externally wool and milk. Do you +also show not your theorems to the uninstructed, but show the acts +which come from their digestion. + +XLVII. + +When at a small cost you are supplied with everything for the body, do +not be proud of this; nor, if you drink water, say on every occasion, I +drink water. But consider first how much more frugal the poor are than +we, and how much more enduring of labor. And if you ever wish to +exercise yourself in labor and endurance, do it for yourself, and not +for others. Do not embrace statues; but if you are ever very thirsty, +take a draught of cold water and spit it out, and tell no man. + +XLVIII. + +The condition and characteristic of an uninstructed person is this: he +never expects from himself profit (advantage) nor harm, but from +externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is this: +he expects all advantage and all harm from himself. The signs (marks) +of one who is making progress are these: he censures no man, he praises +no man, he blames no man, he accuses no man, he says nothing about +himself as if he were somebody or knew something; when he is impeded at +all or hindered, he blames himself; if a man praises him he ridicules +the praiser to himself; if a man censures him he makes no defence; he +goes about like weak persons, being careful not to move any of the +things which are placed, before they are firmly fixed; he removes all +desire from himself, and he transfers aversion ([Greek: echchlisin]) to +those things only of the things within our power which are contrary to +nature; he employs a moderate movement towards everything; whether he +is considered foolish or ignorant he cares not; and in a word he +watches himself as if he were an enemy and lying in ambush. + +XLIX. + +When a man is proud because he can understand and explain the writings +of Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written +obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of. But what is +it that I wish? To understand nature and to follow it. I inquire +therefore who is the interpreter? and when I have heard that it is +Chrysippus, I come to him (the interpreter). But I do not understand +what is written, and therefore I seek the interpreter. And so far there +is yet nothing to be proud of. But when I shall have found the +interpreter, the thing that remains is to use the precepts (the +lessons). This itself is the only thing to be proud of. But if I shall +admire the exposition, what else have I been made unless a grammarian +instead of a philosopher? except in one thing, that I am explaining +Chrysippus instead of Homer. When, then, any man says to me, Read +Chrysippus to me, I rather blush, when I cannot show my acts like to +and consistent with his words. + +L. + +Whatever things (rules) are proposed to you (for the conduct of life) +abide by them, as if they were laws, as if you would be guilty of +impiety if you transgressed any of them. And whatever any man shall say +about you, do not attend to it; for this is no affair of yours. How +long will you then still defer thinking yourself worthy of the best +things, and in no matter transgressing the distinctive reason? Have you +accepted the theorems (rules), which it was your duty to agree to, and +have you agreed to them? what teacher then do you still expect that you +defer to him the correction of yourself? You are no longer a youth, but +already a full-grown man. If, then, you are negligent and slothful, and +are continually making procrastination after procrastination, and +proposal (intention) after proposal, and fixing day after day, after +which you will attend to yourself, you will not know that you are not +making improvement, but you will continue ignorant (uninstructed) both +while you live and till you die. Immediately then think it right to +live as a full-grown man, and one who is making proficiency, and let +everything which appears to you to be the best be to you a law which +must not be transgressed. And if anything laborious or pleasant or +glorious or inglorious be presented to you, remember that now is the +contest, now are the Olympic games, and they cannot be deferred; and +that it depends on one defeat and one giving way that progress is +either lost or maintained. Socrates in this way became perfect, in all +things improving himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But +you, though you are not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes +to be a Socrates. + +LI. + +The first and most necessary place (part, [Greek: topos]) in philosophy +is the use of theorems (precepts, [Greek: theoraemata]), for instance, +that we must not lie; the second part is that of demonstrations, for +instance, How is it proved that we ought not to lie? The third is that +which is confirmatory of these two, and explanatory, for example, How +is this a demonstration? For what is demonstration, what is +consequence, what is contradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood? +The third part (topic) is necessary on account of the second, and the +second on account of the first; but the most necessary and that on +which we ought to rest is the first. But we do the contrary. For we +spend our time on the third topic, and all our earnestness is about it; +but we entirely neglect the first. Therefore we lie; but the +demonstration that we ought not to lie we have ready to hand. + +LII. + +In every thing (circumstance) we should hold these maxims ready to +hand: + +Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny, +The way that I am bid by you to go: +To follow I am ready. If I choose not, +I make myself a wretch, and still must follow. + +But whoso nobly yields unto necessity, +We hold him wise, and skill’d in things divine. + + +And the third also: O Crito, if so it pleases the gods, so let it be; +Anytus and Melitus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SELECTIONS FROM EPICTETUS *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part +of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project +Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ +concept and trademark. 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