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diff --git a/132-0.txt b/132-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd840c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/132-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6761 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 *** +Sun Tzŭ +on +The Art of War + +THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD +Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes + +BY +LIONEL GILES, M.A. + +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum + + + + +1910 + + + +To my brother +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. +in the hope that +a work 2400 years old +may yet contain lessons worth consideration +by the soldier of today +this translation +is affectionately dedicated. + + + +Contents + + + Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + Preface by Lionel Giles + INTRODUCTION + Sun Wu and his Book + The Text of Sun Tzŭ + The Commentators + Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + Apologies for War + Bibliography + Chapter I. Laying plans + Chapter II. Waging War + Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem + Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions + Chapter V. Energy + Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong + Chapter VII Manœuvring + Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics + Chapter IX. The Army on the March + Chapter X. Terrain + Chapter XI. The Nine Situations + Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire + Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies + + + +Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext + +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began +in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, +acquired a copy of it, and translated it into French. It was not a good +translation because, according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great +deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he +did." + +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by +Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words +of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It +is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can +hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were +willfully distorted or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. +They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic, +and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in +translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his +translation, wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors." + +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the +work of later translators who published their own editions. Of the +later editions of the _Art of War_ I have examined; two feature Giles’ +edited translation and notes, the other two present the same basic +information from the ancient Chinese commentators found in the Giles +edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 edition is the most scholarly and +presents the reader an incredible amount of information concerning Sun +Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. + +The Giles’ edition of the _Art of War_, as stated above, was a +scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an +assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts +in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive +edition, superior to anything else that existed and perhaps something +that would become a standard translation. It was the best translation +available for 50 years. But apparently there was not much interest in +Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start of the +Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people +published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. +Giles’ translation was edited and published in the United States in a +series of military science books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good +English translation (by Samuel B. Griffith and still in print) was +published that was an equal to Giles’ translation. While this +translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, it lacks his +copious notes that make his so interesting. + +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the +Chinese civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun +Tzŭ, the English translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous +footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes and footnotes contain +Chinese characters; some are completely Chinese. Thus, a conversion to +a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the conversion in complete +ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while doing the +conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while +retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the +text as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, +I was able to transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the +risk of making the text more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, +is quite satisfactory for the casual reader, a transformation made +possible by conversion to an etext. However, I come away from this task +with the feeling of loss because I know that someone with a background +in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any such attempt would be +welcomed. + +Bob Sutton + + + +Preface by Lionel Giles + +The seventh volume of _Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, +les arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois_ is devoted to the +Art of War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles +de Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph +Amiot. Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a +sinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly +extensive. But his so-called translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side +by side with the original, is seen at once to be little better than an +imposture. It contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and +very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair specimen, taken from +the opening sentences of chapter 5:— + +_De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes._ Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; +inscrivez-les dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de +la capacité de chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage +lorsque l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que +vous devez commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention +est de les préserver de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez +avancer contre l’ennemi doivent être comme des pierres que vous +lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir +d’autre différence que celle du fort au faible, du vide au plein. +Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. Voilà en peu de +mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la perfection même du +gouvernement des troupes. + + +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in +the study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun +Tzŭ, although his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far +the oldest and best compendium of military science. It was not until +the year 1905 that the first English translation, by Capt. E.F. +Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title “Sonshi”(the +Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it was evident that the +translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to +grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself plainly +acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only +wonder, then, that with their help it should have been so excessively +bad. It is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none +can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages +were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Such offences are less +pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Greek or +Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted +upon in translations from Chinese. + +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present +translation is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate +of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a +better fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I +could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predecessors. Towards +the end of 1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop’s +translation was published in London, this time, however, without any +allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three chapters were +then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms of Capt. +Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, +thought there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the +grosser blunders have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the +other hand a certain number of new mistakes appear. The very first +sentence of the introduction is startlingly inaccurate; and later on, +while mention is made of “an army of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ +(who are these, by the way?), not a word is vouchsafed about the +Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture to assert, form a +much more numerous and infinitely more important “army.” + +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the +first place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in +order to facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students +generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s +edition; but I have sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of +his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works, Chinese writers +seldom give more than the bare title by way of reference, and the task +of research is apt to be seriously hampered in consequence. With a view +to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is concerned, I have +also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, following +in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which +he adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is the +printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately +after the passages to which they refer. From the mass of native +commentary my aim has been to extract the cream only, adding the +Chinese text here and there when it seemed to present points of +literary interest. Though constituting in itself an important branch of +Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has hitherto +been made directly accessible by translation. + +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as +they were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final +revision. On a review of the whole, without modifying the substance of +my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few instances to temper +their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not +cry out if in return I am visited with more than a rap over the +knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a sword into the +hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either text or +reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” would +not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes +of George in _The Vicar of Wakefield_. + + + +INTRODUCTION + +Sun Wu and his Book + +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1] + + +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His _Art of War_ brought him +to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: + +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." + +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" + +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to +bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two +companies, and placed one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head +of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and +addressed them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front +and back, right hand and left hand?" + +The girls replied: Yes. + +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight +ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. +When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I +say "About turn," you must face right round towards your back." + +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus +explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the +drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But +the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command +are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +then the general is to blame." + +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left +turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun +Tzŭ: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not +thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders _are_ +clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of +their officers." + +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. +Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised +pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be +executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following +message: "We are now quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to +handle troops. If we are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and +drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be +beheaded." + +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be +the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty +which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept." + +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed +the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been +done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went +through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, +marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect +accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ +sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire, are now +properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty’s +inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; +bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." + +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to +camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." + +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot +translate them into deeds." + +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how to handle an +army, and finally appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the +Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the capital; to the north he +put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad +amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the might of the +King. + +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, +Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, +and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The historian +speaks of him too as Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had +his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It +seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his +mutilation, unless the story was invented in order to account for the +name. The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his +treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in Chapter +V. § 19, note. + +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages +of the _Shih Chi:_— + +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the +field with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had +formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying +[the capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It +is not yet possible. We must wait"…. [After further successful +fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu addressed Wu +Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet +possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men +replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and +the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge against him. If Your +Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over T’ang +and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat +Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] [5] + + +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He +does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects +of a wound in 496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] + +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the +other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] +in the service of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men +developed and threw light upon the principles of war. + + +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, +to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on +the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say +much of such a work as the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, which is supposed to +have been written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution +is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would +be of little value, based as it is on the _Shih Chi_ and expanded with +romantic details. The story of Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is +worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are: (1) +Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called +a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired life, and his +contemporaries were unaware of his ability. + +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and +ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ +to encounter the foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto +no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct +reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years +before the _Shih Chi_ was given to the world. + +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of +30,000 men beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were +undisciplined." + +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun +Wu’s grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father +Sun P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion +which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had three +sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, +considering that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may +be dismissed as chronologically impossible. Whence these data were +obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance +whatever can be placed in them. + +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han +period is the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu +Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:— + + +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. +[10] The _Lun Yu_ says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The _Shu Ching_ mentions "the army" among the "eight objects +of government." The _I Ching_ says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The _Shih +Ching_ says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his +troops." The Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used +spears and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The _Ssu-ma +Fa_ says: "If one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may +rightfully be slain." He who relies solely on warlike measures shall be +exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. +Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai [11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the +other. [12] In military matters, the Sage’s rule is normally to keep +the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion requires. He will +not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. + +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a +native of the Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the _Art +of War_ in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were +tested on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army +westwards, crushed the Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the +north, he kept Ch’i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his +time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment +of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the +field, [14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzŭ +stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, +however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and +while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work +abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. + +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the +13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported +by the internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some +ruler is addressed. + +In the bibliographic section of the _Han Shu_, there is an entry which +has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 +_p’ien_ (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 _chuan_." It is evident that +this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those +we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s +_Art of War_ of which the "13 chapters" formed the first _chuan_, +adding that there were two other _chuan_ besides. This has brought +forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other +writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them apocryphal—similar to the _Wen +Ta_, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is +preserved in the _T’ung Tien_, and another in Ho Shin’s commentary. It +is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only +written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in +the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, backs this up with a +quotation from the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:_ "The King of Wu summoned Sun +Tzŭ, and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set +forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to +praise him." As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the +same scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of +chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the numerous other +treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be included. The fact that the +_Han Chih_ mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 _p’ien_, whereas +the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition +to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of +these were contained in the 82 _p’ien_. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, +we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between +Ssu-ma Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop +of forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the +82 _p’ien_ may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less +likely, that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian +and were purposely ignored by him. [16] + +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu +Ti strung together Sun Wu’s _Art of War_," which in turn may have +resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s +preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of +saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote +a commentary on it. On the whole, this theory has met with very little +acceptance. Thus, the _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ says: "The mention of the 13 +chapters in the _Shih Chi_ shows that they were in existence before the +_Han Chih_, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of +the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly not be taken as +proof." + +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in +the time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the +work was then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s _13 +Chapters_ and Wu Ch’i’s _Art of War_ are the two books that people +commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of them are +widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here." But as we go +further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact +which has to be faced is that the _Tso Chuan_, the greatest +contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a +general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward +circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the +story of Sun Wu as given in the _Shih Chi_, but even show themselves +frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most +powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the +following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]— + + +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he +crushed Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s +Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary +need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain. +But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling +ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, [18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and +Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements +were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details +are given, in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the +Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been +passed over? + +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school +as _Kuan Tzŭ_, [22] _Liu T’ao_, [23] and the _Yüeh Yu_ [24] and may +have been the production of some private scholar living towards the end +of the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" +period. [25] The story that his precepts were actually applied by the +Wu State, is merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his +followers. + +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time +of the "Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as +well, and the class of professional generals, for conducting external +campaigns, did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six +States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was an +uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have left +unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet held no +civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, +is utterly preposterous and incredible. + +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu +crushed Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the +impression left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in +these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant; but it is +nowhere explicitly stated in the _Shih Chi_ either that Sun Tzŭ was +general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went +there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po P’ei both took +part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due to +the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it is not +easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. + +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— + +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the +fact that he does not appear in the _Tso Chuan_, although he is said to +have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he +really belonged to. + + +He also says:— + +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. + + +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the +work which passes under his name. The author of the _Hsu Lu_ fails to +appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on +Ch’en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one of two points, +however, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of our "13 +chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching +Wang [519-476], because he is frequently plagiarized in subsequent +works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." The two most shameless +offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan Tzŭ, both of them +important historical personages in their day. The former lived only a +century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known to +have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, +that Tseng Shen delivered the _Tso Chuan_, which had been entrusted to +him by its author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the _Art of +War_, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of +different epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in +other words, that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards +the end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is +furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a +number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be +extended, is given in the _Hsu Lu;_ and though some of the +interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar +and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the +13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing +that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of +Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to +assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the +contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an +educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is +not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable allusion +to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified +form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between +the various feudal princes, in which armored chariots play a large +part. Their use seems to have entirely died out before the end of the +Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist +as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch presently. + +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances +of its being other than a _bonâ fide_ production are sensibly +diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after. +That it should have been forged in the period immediately following 473 +is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify +himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory, that the +author was a literary recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one +thing is more apparent than another after reading the maxims of Sun +Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large store of +personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but +also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the military +conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that these sayings +have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese +history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness +and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were +artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 +chapters were the genuine production of a military man living towards +the end of the "_Ch’un Ch’iu_" period, are we not bound, in spite of +the silence of the _Tso Chuan_, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account in +its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we +not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s +biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in +the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the +chronology involved in the story as told in the _Shih Chi_, which, so +far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages +in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in in +VI. § 21:— + +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I +say then that victory can be achieved. + + +The other is in XI. § 30:— + +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, I should +answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if +they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps +the right. + + +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between +Wu and Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has +hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the +credibility of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the +first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is +then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, +so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken +place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier +still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the +capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war +for over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh +was waged only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short +interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now +Ch’u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference +is that they were written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime +antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch’u had suffered the great +humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found +useful. + + +B.C. +514 Accession of Ho Lu. +512 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, +the capital. Shih Chi mentions Sun Wu as general. +511 Another attack on Ch’u. +510 Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the first +war between the two states. +509 or 508 Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang. +506 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and Ts’ai. +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last +mention of Sun Wu in Shih Chi. +505 Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying. +504 Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u. +497 Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh. +496 Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. +Ho Lu is killed. +494 Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu- +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh. +485 or 484 Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzŭ-hsu. +482 Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch’ai. +478 to 476 Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu. +475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. +473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu. + + +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that +could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather +to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, +and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may +conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which +date Yüeh does not appear to have scored any notable success against +Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must +have been during the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the +hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the +tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well +have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period +482-473, when Yüeh was once again becoming a very serious menace. [33] +We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, +was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point the +negative testimony of the _Tso Chuan_ far outweighs any shred of +authority still attaching to the _Shih Chi_, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to +explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu +Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because +the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the +State. + +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing +celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown +to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so well +versed in the science of war should have solid achievements to his +credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest +feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on +all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of +her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that the +acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified +with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his brain +conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out +by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? + +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun +Tzŭ’s life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this +necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service of +Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s accession, and gathered experience, though +only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense +military activity which marked the first half of the prince’s reign. +[35] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an +equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present +at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s sudden +collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical +juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have +convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against +whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus +a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, +which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end, +rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story of the women may +possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about the same +time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. + +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony +in the fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace +should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war. + + + +The Text of Sun Tzŭ + +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s +text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the +"13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same +as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely +circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from +discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:— + +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_ was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated +it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for +the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first +to write a commentary on it. + + +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time +onward so great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that +it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep +in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief +commentaries on Sun Tzŭ were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao +published a work in 15 _chuan_ entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected +commentaries of ten writers." There was another text, with variant +readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had supporters +among the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions, Sun +Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no +longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th century, +the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which +appears in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed +in 1726, the _Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_. Another copy at my disposal +of what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that +contained in the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" +[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is +evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese +channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a +distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to be an +actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi +T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the +Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the _I Shuo_ of Cheng Yu-Hsien, +mentioned in the _T’ung Chih_, and also believed to have perished. This +is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or text)"—a +rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set before +us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the +somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to +collate it with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two +versions of Sun Tzŭ, even older than the newly discovered work, were +still extant, one buried in the _T’ung Tien_, Tu Yu’s great treatise on +the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the _T’ai P’ing Yu +Lan_ encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though +split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered +piecemeal over a number of different sections. Considering that the _Yu +Lan_ takes us back to the year 983, and the _T’ung Tien_ about 200 +years further still, to the middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of +these early transcripts of Sun Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the +idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until +Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, undertook a +thorough recension of the text. This is his own account:— + +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his +editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient +edition [of Chi T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be +revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the +Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all +devoted themselves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. +Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for +military men. + + +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on +the text of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are +left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the +new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun +Hsing-yen and only one co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original +edition" as their basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, +as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information +such as the _I Shuo_, succeeded in restoring a very large number of +doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be accepted +as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard +text." + +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 +_pen_, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical +works in 83 _pen_. [38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen +(largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the traditional view +of Sun Tzŭ’s life and performances, and summing up in remarkably +concise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts’ao +Kung’s preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzŭ from the +_Shih Chi_, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s +_I Shuo_, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short miscellany of +historical and bibliographical information entitled _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, +compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by +the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological +order. These we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. + + + +The Commentators + +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of +commentators, which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks +on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather +ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being +inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great +variety of ways. + +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti [A.D. +155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest +commentary on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary +man, whose biography in the _San Kuo Chih_ reads like a romance. One of +the greatest military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic +in the scale of his operations, he was especially famed for the +marvelous rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the +line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu +says of him that he was a great captain who "measured his strength +against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son, and +vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and +Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a council of +war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all +his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not +lose one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular +saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s +notes on Sun Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly +characteristic of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard +indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere _littérateur_. +Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely +intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than the text +itself. [40] + +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name +is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even +his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places +him after Chia Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang +dynasty, [41] but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he +appears as Meng Shih of the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would +identify him with Meng K’ang of the 3rd century. He is named in one +work as the last of the "Five Commentators," the others being Wei Wu +Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. + +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present +day. The _T’ung Chih_ mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou +to the T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao +Kung-wu and the _T’ien-i-ko_ catalogue, he followed a variant of the +text of Sun Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His +notes are mostly short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates +his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history. + +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, +his notes being taken from the _T’ung Tien_, the encyclopedic treatise +on the Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely +repetitions of Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed +that he drew on the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing +to the peculiar arrangement of _T’ung Tien_, he has to explain each +passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own +explanation does not agree with that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always +quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten +Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi T’ien-pao, being +wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. + +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star +even in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was +extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in +the military history of the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ and _Chan Kuo_ eras. His +notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious, and +replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus +summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, but on the other +hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency." He further +declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of the thousand +years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, upon examination, +be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the maxims +contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against Ts’ao +Kung has already been considered elsewhere. + +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ +because Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and +that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, +writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and +Ch’en Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that +Ch’en Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His +commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his +predecessors. + +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the _T’ang Shu_ and was +afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with +those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in +point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. + +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was +published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from +which we may cull the following:— + +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to +make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though +commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the +task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In +attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does +not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states +engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned with +the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three +ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed +to the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, +but his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an +army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the +forces of victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are +bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been +obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their +meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the +obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the +true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion +have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the +present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the three +great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in the sayings, +coming generations will have constant reason to thank my friend +Sheng-yu. + + +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined +to endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. + +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of +his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on +the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own +commentary with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often +flattering to him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised +the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting +mistakes. [45] + +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this +commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the _Tung Chih_, +written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply +as Ho Shih in the _Yu Hai_, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as +saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no reason +to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, otherwise I should have been +inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one Ho Ch’u-fei, the +author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the latter part of the +11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the _T’ien-i-ko_ +catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly +remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. + +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great +originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid +exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse +sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion. +Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Ts’ao Kung’s +commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and +therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the +_T’ung K’ao_, or the _Yu Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T’ung +Chih_, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of Famous +Generals." [46] + +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have +flourished within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for +it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire +enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practice the art of +war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s rebellion came [1038-42] and the +frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made +strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became +the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. +[47] + +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work +has not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely Wang Ling +(often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; +[48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The _T’ang Shu_ adds Sun Hao, and the _T’ung +Chih_ Hsiao Chi, while the _T’u Shu_ mentions a Ming commentator, Huang +Jun-yu. It is possible that some of these may have been merely +collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and +Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. + + + +Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ + +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of +China’s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have +studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (_d_. 196 +B.C.), [49] Feng I (_d_. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (_d_. 219), [51] and Yo +Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han +Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been +recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of +purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p’o), who +wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief +inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is preserved +in the _Yu Hai:_ [54]— + +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, +[55] is very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu +Ch’i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on +war, and they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." +But Wu Ch’i’s remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher +and more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in +Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought +out. + + +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden +of Literature" by Cheng Hou:— + +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military +men’s training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars +and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet +profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the _Lun +Yu_, the _I Ching_ and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the +writings of Mencius, Hsun K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level +of Sun Tzŭ. + + +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the +criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the +venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages +a ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." + + + +Apologies for War + +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving +nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her +experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern +State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at +which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall +and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries +before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the +perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts +with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of +so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor +disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it +is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to +resound in one portion or another of the Empire. + +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom +China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond +of emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i +stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her +final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years +which followed the break-up of the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the +transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is +tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao +dominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T’ang dynasty, one +of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li +Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was seconded by the +brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear +comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. + +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to +militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the +literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth +while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox +view is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his +ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any +price:— + +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and +cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and +dangers, and to succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood +in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How +much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love +and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection +springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into +play. That is the natural law which governs his being…. What then shall +be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and +without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out +their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to +impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at +the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice +of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to +modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in +the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot +be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement can never be +allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that +this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and +that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] + + +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:— + + +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of +government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both +disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of +litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by +flogging in the market-place, are all done by officials. But the +wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the +hauling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of +traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of +the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is no +intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt +with, only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of +military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, +the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and +relief to the good…. + +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military +aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been +acquired by study." [59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing +that you are a disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; +"I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should +exercise both civil and military functions, though to be sure my +instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far." + +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" +and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of +action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is +more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the +members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on +military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold +enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric +individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary +instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose +sight of fundamental principles. + +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and +learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he +sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the +Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If +pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have +been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who +cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said +that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? + +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He +also appeals to the authority of the Classics:— + +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never +studied matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to +K’ung Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and +weapons." But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he +used armed force against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i +was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered +his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in +confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And +Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military +functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the +subject of his teaching. + + +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:— + + +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: +"If I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated +music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, +[66] and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, +the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are +things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to +lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if +one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who was +employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." + +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on +the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they +adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no +purpose, [67] as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, +seeing that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in +designing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is +immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the +studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials +also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices +to botch their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting +perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant practice, he +ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle. [70] Hence it is +essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied. + +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. +Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not +pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that +he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realize that the +tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang +of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by their +misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war +necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an +extorted oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in +disguise. [73] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding +truth and honesty? + + + +Bibliography + +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. +The notes on each have been drawn principally from the _Ssu k’u ch’uan +shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. + +1. _Wu Tzŭ_, in 1 _chuan_ or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (_d_. 381 B.C.). A +genuine work. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. _Ssu-ma Fa_, in 1 _chuan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to +Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be +early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to +be met within its pages. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64. + +The _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, _Sun Tzŭ_, _Wu Tzŭ_ and _Ssu-ma Fa_, are, generally +speaking, only concerned with things strictly military—the art of +producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct +theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport +of goods and the handling of soldiers—in strong contrast to later +works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, +divination and magical arts in general. + +3. _Liu T’ao_, in 6 _chuan_, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or +Lu Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But +its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming +(550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the +six sections so that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui +dynasty. + +4. _Wei Liao Tzŭ_, in 5 _chuan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. +B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to +have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess +contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the +strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring +States period. It is been furnished with a commentary by the well-known +Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. + +5. _San Lueh_ in 3 _chuan_. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary +personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (_d_. 187 +B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again, the style is not +that of works dating from the Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor +Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes from it in one of his +proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later +on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far +out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or +somewhat earlier. + +6. _Li Wei Kung Wen Tui_, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a +dialogue between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is +usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a +forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war. + +7. _Li Ching Ping Fa_ (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a +short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not +published separately. This fact explains its omission from the _Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu_. + +8. _Wu Ch’i Ching_, in 1 _chuan_. Attributed to the legendary minister +Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty +(_d_. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated +general Ma Lung (_d_. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in +the _Sung Chih_. Although a forgery, the work is well put together. + +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has +always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on +war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the _Shih Liu Ts’e_ (1 _chuan_), +preserved in the _Yung Lo Ta Tien;_ (2) _Chiang Yuan_ (1 _chuan_); and +(3) _Hsin Shu_ (1 _chuan_), which steals wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None +of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine. + +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections +devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be found +useful:— + +_T’ung Tien_ (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162. +_T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_ (983), ch. 270-359. +_Wen Hsien Tung K’ao_ (13th cent.), ch. 221. +_Yu Hai_ (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141. +_San Ts’ai T’u Hui_ (16th cent). +_Kuang Po Wu Chih_ (1607), ch. 31, 32. +_Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu_ (1632), ch. 75. +_Yuan Chien Lei Han_ (1710), ch. 206-229. +_Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_ (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81-90. +_Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_ (1784), ch. 121-134. +_Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien_ (1826), ch. 76, 77. + +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— + +_Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 30. +_Sui Shu_, ch. 32-35. +_Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 46, 47. +_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 57,60. +_Sung Shih_, ch. 202-209. +_T’ung Chih_ (circa 1150), ch. 68. + +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— + +_Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao_ (1790), ch. 99, 100. + +Footnotes + +1. _Shih Chi_, ch. 65. + +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. + +3. _Shih Chi_, ch. 130. + +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. + +5. _Shih Chi_, ch. 31. + +6. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25. + +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. + +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. + +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the +Han dynasty, which says: "Ten _li_ outside the _Wu_ gate [of the city +of Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to +commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the +art of war, by the King of Wu." + +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to +make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." + +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and +overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. + +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in +his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." + +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T’u Shu_, and +may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of +the T’ang dynasty, and appears in the _T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_. + +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. + +15. See chap. XI. + +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that _Wu Tzŭ_, which is not in +6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the _Han Chih_. Likewise, the +_Chung Yung_ is credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. +In the case of very short works, one is tempted to think that _p’ien_ +might simply mean "leaves." + +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. + +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. + +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. + +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his +name. + +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. + +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large +additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. + +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. + +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of +another work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not +clear. + +25. About 480 B.C. + +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. + +27. In the 3rd century B.C. + +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a +work on war. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the +INTRODUCTION. + +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that +the _Tso Chuan_ must have been written in the 5th century, but not +before 424 B.C. + +30. See _Mencius_ III. 1. iii. 13-20. + +31. When Wu first appears in the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ in 584, it is already at +variance with its powerful neighbour. The _Ch’un Ch’iu_ first mentions +Yüeh in 537, the _Tso Chuan_ in 601. + +32. This is explicitly stated in the _Tso Chuan_, XXXII, 2. + +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would +tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully +justify the language used in XI. § 30. + +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great +general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the +other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. + +35. From _Tso Chuan:_ "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] +there was no year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." + +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really +descended from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my +ancestor’s work from a literary point of view, without comprehending +the military technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of +peace!" + +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the +ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as +being "situated five _li_ east of the district city of Hua-yin. The +temple contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor +Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." + +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. + +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. + +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His +commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not +fully develop the meaning." + +41. _Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered +chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand +Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. + +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was +nominally existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of +power, and the old military organization had practically gone by the +board. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage. + +44. See _Chou Li_, xxix. 6-10. + +45. _T’ung K’ao_, ch. 221. + +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new +edition). + +47. _T’ung K’ao_, loc. cit. + +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the _San Kuo +Chih_, ch. 10. + +49. See XI. § 58, note. + +50. _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 17 ad init. + +51. _San Kuo Chih_, ch. 54. + +52. _Sung Shih_, ch. 365 ad init. + +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting +themselves with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this +connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from +Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted +previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu’s maxims are perfectly +applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter VIII] is one that +the people of this country would do well to take to heart." + +54. Ch. 140. + +55. See IV. § 3. + +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. + +57. The _Tso Chuan_. + +58. _Shih Chi_, ch. 25, fol. I. + +59. Cf. _Shih Chi_, ch 47. + +60. See _Shu Ching_, preface § 55. + +61. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +62. _Lun Yu_, XV. 1. + +63. I failed to trace this utterance. + +64. Supra. + +65. Supra. + +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, +and festive rites. See _Shu Ching_, ii. 1. III. 8, and _Chou Li_, IX. +fol. 49. + +67. See XIII. § 11, note. + +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the _Tso Chuan_, where +Tzŭ-ch’an says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not +employ a mere learner to make it up." + +69. Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 31. + +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Yu_, +XIII. 29, 30. + +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. + +72. _Shih Chi_, ch. 47. + +73. _Shih Chi_, ch. 38. + +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the _Shih Chi_, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a +former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there +given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised +from a humble private station by Wen Wang. + + + +Chapter I. LAYING PLANS + +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of +this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple +selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in +his tent. See. § 26.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. + +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to +ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be +neglected. + +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be +taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine +the conditions obtaining in the field. + +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The +Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a +principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral +aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not +considered as an attribute of the _ruler_ in § 13.] + + +5, 6. _The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with +their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, +undismayed by any danger. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +7. _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. + +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words +here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of +Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is +"the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four +seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.] + + +8. _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; +open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. + +9. _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, +benevolence, courage and strictness. + +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or +benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, +or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here +"wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence," and +the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for +"uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, self-control, or ‘proper +feeling.’"] + + +10. By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of +the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the +officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the +army, and the control of military expenditure. + +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows +them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. + +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the +military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in +this wise:— + +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? + + +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.] + + + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? + +[See §§ 7, 8] + + +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. 155-220), +who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his +own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of +corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy +his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment +on the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a +law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must +be put to death."] + + +(5) Which army is the stronger? + +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "_esprit de corps_ and ‘big battalions.’"] + + +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the +officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; +without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute +when the crisis is at hand."] + + +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and +punishment? + +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be +properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] + + +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or +defeat. + +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that +hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let +such a one be dismissed! + +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was +composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu +State.] + + +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any +helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. + +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s +plans. + +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish +theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract +principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of +strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and +sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to +secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the +battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the +Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations +were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find +himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a +critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will +attack the first tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord +Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any +idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you +expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ] + + +18. All warfare is based on deception. + +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every +soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many +military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary +skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend +and foe."] + + +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our +forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy +believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are +near. + +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. + +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush +him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating +the uses of deception in war.] + + +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in +superior strength, evade him. + +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. +Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and +immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] + + +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The +_Yu Lan_ has "Lure him on and tire him out."] + + +If his forces are united, separate them. + +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the +commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division +between them."] + + +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not +expected. + +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. + +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his +temple ere the battle is fought. + +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple +to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the +field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] + + +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. +Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to +defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this +point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. + +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. + + + +Chapter II. WAGING WAR + +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the +chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a +consideration of ways and means.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field +a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred +thousand mail-clad soldiers, + +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, +used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed +for purposes of defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter +were light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note +the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric +Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming +as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of +foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed +that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy +chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into +a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred +men.] + + +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_, + +[2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly +since Sun Tzŭ’s time.] + + +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of +guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots +and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per +day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. + +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, +the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If +you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. + +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State +will not be equal to the strain. + +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to +take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be +able to avert the consequences that must ensue. + +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has +never been seen associated with long delays. + +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of +the commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho +Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure +of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but +they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by +remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being +expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true +cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu +says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable +to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except +possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much +more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, +tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only because it means +impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised here by +Sun Tzŭ, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur +to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome +against that of Hannibals’s isolated army, because it seemed to him +that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a +strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics +would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is +true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption +in their favour.] + + +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged +warfare. + +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war +that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. + +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a +long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it +to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, +but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, +"He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," +is distinctly pointless.] + + +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. + +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, +but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an +audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from +Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a +little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either +numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to +commissariat.] + + +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus +the army will have food enough for its needs. + +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means +"things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all +the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.] + + +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a +distance causes the people to be impoverished. + +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the +next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is +so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. +It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may +be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The +Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the cause of the people’s +impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by which the +husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why +should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because +the State or Government is too poor to do so?] + + +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; +and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. + +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own +territory. Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already +crossed the frontier.] + + +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be +afflicted by heavy exactions. + +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the +homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their +incomes will be dissipated; + +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, +but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from +our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The _people_ being +regarded as the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people’s +heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be +careful of both?"] + + +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, +breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, +protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to +four-tenths of its total revenue. + +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One +cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s +own, and likewise a single _picul_ of his provender is equivalent to +twenty from one’s own store. + +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of +transporting one cartload to the front. A _picul_ is a unit of measure +equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).] + + +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; +that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have +their rewards. + +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see +the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from +the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have +a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."] + + +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been +taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags +should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled +and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be +kindly treated and kept. + +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own +strength. + +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy +campaigns. + +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ +here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to +enforce."] + + +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of +the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall +be in peace or in peril. + + + +Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is +to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it +is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than +to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire +than to destroy them. + +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted +nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a +regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists +from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company +contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives +the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.] + + +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme +excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s +resistance without fighting. + +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old +Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the +huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] + + +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; + +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of +the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one +might be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but +an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in +his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must +anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."] + + +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; + +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in +speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or +principalities into which the China of his day was split up.] + + +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; + +[When he is already at full strength.] + + +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be +avoided. + +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in +1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, +Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would +have been masters of the situation before the British were ready +seriously to oppose them.] + + +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements +of war, will take up three whole months; + +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as +"mantlets", described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large +shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says +they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city +walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman +_testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used in +repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See _supra_ II. 14. +The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable +shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled +from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey +parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the +encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden +donkeys."] + + +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three +months more. + +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of +the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, +and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding +note.] + + +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men +to the assault like swarming ants, + +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing +patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the +place before his engines of war are ready.] + + +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town +still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. + +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port +Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.] + + +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he +overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. + +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no +harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after +having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother +of the people."] + + +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, +and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. + +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of +the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, +the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] + + +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to +surround him; if five to one, to attack him; + +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] + + +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. + +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it +appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, +gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we +may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some +special diversion." Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If our +force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up +into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall +upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed +from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front." +This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too +hasty in calling this a mistake."] + + +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able +general will fight."] + + +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + +[The meaning, "we can _watch_ the enemy," is certainly a great +improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very +good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying +only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in +numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and +discipline.] + + +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in +the end it must be captured by the larger force. + +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is +complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is +defective, the State will be weak. + +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed +in his profession), his army will lack strength."] + + +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— + +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant +of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. + +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally +think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to +direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators +understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A +kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not be +directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, +or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the +thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he +will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong +orders.] + + +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he +administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in +an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid +gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on +which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, +on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate +the governing of an army"—to that of a State, understood.] + + +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, + +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] + + +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to +circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu +says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he +must not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The +skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the +covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in +establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in +action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid +man has no fear of death."] + + +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to +come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy +into the army, and flinging victory away. + +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He +will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. + +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; +if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will +invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive +or the defensive.] + + +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior +forces. + +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers +correctly, as Li Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the +saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible +with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice versa_. The secret +lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. +Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an +inferior one, make for difficult ground.’"] + + +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout +all its ranks. + +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy +unprepared. + +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by +the sovereign. + +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to +give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of +the general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which +have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on +the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his +extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central +authority.] + +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. + +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] + +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need +not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not +the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. + +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 A.D. +marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An +and Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one +million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely +throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" +Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei +River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.] + + +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every +battle. + +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, +knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: +"Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an +attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the +root-principle of war.] + + + +Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two +armies with a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: +"It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be +discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain +secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your +condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks +that the good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to +meet those of the enemy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond +the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of +defeating the enemy. + +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. + +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] + + +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, + +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his +troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] + + +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + +4. Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able +to _do_ it. + +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat +the enemy means taking the offensive. + +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of +the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they +give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible +enough.] + + +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; +attacking, a superabundance of strength. + +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth; + +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor +indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may +not know his whereabouts."] + + +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of +heaven. + +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a +thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the +opinion of most of the commentators.] + + +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the +other, a victory that is complete. + +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is +not the acme of excellence. + +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li +Ch’uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the +vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city +of Ch’eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to +annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers +hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But +Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever +stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and +inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] + + +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and +the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, +so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." +Sun Tzŭ reserves his approbation for things that + + +"the world’s coarse thumb +And finger fail to plumb." + + +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in +autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one +in Chinese writers.] + + +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of +thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick +hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, +who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a +mustard seed; and Shih K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the +footsteps of a mosquito.] + + +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, +but excels in winning with ease. + +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy +conquering." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins +his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, +wins with ease."] + + +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor +credit for courage. + +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained +over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large +knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch +as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he +receives no credit for courage."] + + +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One +who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at +winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; +whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are +not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably +win."] + + +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it +means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. + +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes +defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the +enemy. + +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not +be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes +all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to +increase the safety of his army.] + + +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle +after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat +first fights and afterwards looks for victory. + +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which +will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not +begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no +longer be assured."] + + +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly +adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control +success. + +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; +secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, +Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. + +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of +chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. + +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the +Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, +which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to +make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to a +general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with our own; +if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty +lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a +calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly synonymous with the +second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a +consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other +hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength having been +settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho +Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to +the third term as being a calculation of numbers.] + + +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight +placed in the scale against a single grain. + +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an _i_ (20 oz.) weighed against +a _shu_ (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a _shu_ weighed against an _i_." +The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, +flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his +note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the _i_ to be 24 Chinese ounces, +and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li +Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] + + +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up +waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical +dispositions. + + + + +Chapter V. ENERGY + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as +the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their +numbers. + +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with +subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s +famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large +an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your +Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more +the better."] + + +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different +from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting +signs and signals. + +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the +enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct +and indirect. + +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s +treatise, the discussion of the _cheng_ and the _ch’i_." As it is by no +means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to +render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well +to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject before +proceeding further. Li Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is _cheng_, making +lateral diversion is _ch’i_. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your +troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure +victory abnormal manœuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "_Ch’i_ is +active, _cheng_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, +activity brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy +to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, +and vice versa; thus _cheng_ may also be _ch’i_, and _ch’i_ may also be +_cheng_." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when +marching ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly +threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly +disconcerting his opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, +the march on Lin-chin was _cheng_, and the surprise manœuver was +_ch’i_." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: +"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; +appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung +[6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is +_cheng_; turning movements, on the other hand, are _ch’i_.’ These +writers simply regard _cheng_ as _cheng_, and _ch’i_ as _ch’i_; they do +not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each +other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on +the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch’i_ +manœuver may be _cheng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as _cheng_; +then our real attack will be _ch’i_, and vice versa. The whole secret +lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is _cheng_, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is _ch’i_," which takes him by surprise or comes from an +unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to +be _ch’i_," it immediately becomes _cheng_."] + + +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against +an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. + +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, +but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. + +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding +the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of +"indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord +Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. +[1] + + +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven +and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and +moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away +but to return once more. + +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of _ch’i_ and +_cheng_. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of _cheng_ at all, +unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating +to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been +pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military +operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply +have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite +resource of a great leader.] + + +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of +these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. + +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, +white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can +ever be seen. + +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, +sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can +ever be tasted. + +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless +series of manœuvers. + +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is +like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? + +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even +roll stones along in its course. + +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon +which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. + +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is +used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word +as "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does +not quite fit the illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this +definition to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of +_self-restraint_ which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until +the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right +moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly +important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went +into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for +several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying +with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close +range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on +the enemy’s nearest ships.] + + +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and +prompt in his decision. + +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of +distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. +But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a +figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. +Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing the falcon’s mode of attack, +proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized +in war."] + + +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to +the releasing of the trigger. + +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of +energy and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by +the finger on the trigger.] + + +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming +disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, +your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against +defeat. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been +previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating +and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the +course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real +disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your +dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out +of the question."] + + +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear +postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. + +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone +down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws +out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to +destroy formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first +to put it quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to +lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish +to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme +courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy +over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."] + + +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; + +[See _supra_, § 1.] + + +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of +latent energy; + +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here +differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: +"seeing that we are favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the +enemy will believe that we are really afraid."] + + +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical +dispositions. + +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han +Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report +on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed +all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm +soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one +and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone +opposed them, saying: ‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally +inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our +spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some +_ruse_ on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to +attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the +trap and found himself surrounded at Po-teng.”] + + +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu +says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may +be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led +to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, +all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs that we +choose to give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a +descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the Ch’i State being at war with +Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P’ang Chuan, who +happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The +Ch’i State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary +despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly, +when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders +to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the +night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to +himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: their numbers have +already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to +a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon +it the words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night +began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, +with orders to shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang +Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in +order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled +by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The +above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the _Shih Chi_, less +dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P’ang Chuan +cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of +his army.] ] + + +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. + +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body +of picked men he lies in wait for him. + +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in +wait with the main body of his troops."] + + +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and +does not require too much from individuals. + +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the +bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each +men according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from +the untalented."] + + +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined +energy. + +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it +were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or +stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a +slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, +to go rolling down. + +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] + + +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum +of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So +much on the subject of energy. + +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great +results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] + + +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. + + + +Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: +"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the +defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect +methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of +attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect +methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods +before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use +of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the +perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above +methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter +on Energy."] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of +the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field +and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. + +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but +does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. + +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or +fights not at all. [1] ] + + +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach +of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible +for the enemy to draw near. + +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he +will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to +defend.] + + +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] + + +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, +he can force him to move. + +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march +swiftly to places where you are not expected. + +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches +through country where the enemy is not. + +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are +defended, attack in unexpected quarters."] + + +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack +places which are undefended. + +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, +where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; +where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict +enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or +the defenders are variance amongst themselves."] + + +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions +that cannot be attacked. + +[_I.e._, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There +is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later +clause. Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: +"In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend _even_ those +places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much +more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the +clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration in +the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang +Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is +skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see +IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This +being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most +secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to +estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold +are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] + + +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not +know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does +not know what to attack. + +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] + + +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be +invisible, through you inaudible; + +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with +reference to the enemy.] + + +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. + +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the +enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your +movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. + +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even +though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we +need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line +of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; +if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign +himself." It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late +Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] + + +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging +us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the +ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in +his way. + +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia +Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li +Ch’uan says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and +Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one +of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked +by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the +drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in +sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the +intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off +his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here, therefore, is +nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] + + +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible +ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must +be divided. + +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions +being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in +order to guard against attack from every quarter."] + + +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up +into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate +parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. + +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior +one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then +the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several +different points; + +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by +saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering +what he was going to do, _he_ was thinking most of what he was going to +do himself."] + + +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers +we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. + +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; +should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he +strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his +right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, +he will everywhere be weak. + +[In Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals_ we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those +generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every +point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, +having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, +and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater."] + + +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible +attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make +these preparations against us. + +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the +enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force +against each fraction in turn."] + + +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may +concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. + +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of +distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a +general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, +and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the +right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. +Among many such successful junctions which military history records, +one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blucher +just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] + + +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be +impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the +left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the +van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything +under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are separated by +several _li_! + +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, +but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an +army advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of +which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the +various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise +instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be +able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be worth +quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will +be forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we +hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall +be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support +will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there +is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of +the army."] + + +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own +in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. +I say then that victory can be achieved. + +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended +in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its +incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. +With his present assertion compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to +point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: +"In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, ‘One may _know_ +how to conquer without being able to _do_ it,’ whereas here we have the +statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in +the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot +make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers +particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s +calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the +impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be +achieved."] + + +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from +fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of +their success. + +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all +plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." + + +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. + +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy +on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his +policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku +Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma +I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.] + + +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. + +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may +know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. + +[Cf. IV. § 6.] + + +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain +is to conceal them; + +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is +perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see _supra_ § 9) as "showing +no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your +brain.] + + +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the +subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. + +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable +officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."] + + +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can +see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. + +[_I.e._, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has +preceded the battle.] + + +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but +let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. + +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle +underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in +number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are +few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by +familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no +more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of +grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] + + +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural +course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what +is weak. + +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] + + +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over +which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the +foe whom he is facing. + +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare +there are no constant conditions. + +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and +thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. + +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always +equally predominant; + +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] + + +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. + +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] + + +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and +waxing. + +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the +want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. +The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of +the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] + + +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. +II, p. 490. + + + +Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign. + +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend +and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. + +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between +the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he +quotes a saying of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the +State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the +army, no battle array can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ +is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are +waging war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before +proceeding to attack the external foe."] + + +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing +more difficult. + +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s +instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics +to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or +manœuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth +and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s note gives color to this view: "For +levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are +plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when we +engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great +difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favourable +position."] + + +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious +into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat +enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is +explained by Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, +then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your +opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss +and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih +gives a slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult +ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a +drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of +movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at +his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which +resulted in the great victory of Marengo.] + + +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy +out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the +goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_. + +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the +town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of +Chao first consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a +relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the +intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned +to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but +finally said: "We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole—and the +pluckier one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had +only gone a distance of 30 _li_ when he stopped and began throwing up +entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his +fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence +to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and attributed his +adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the +Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for +two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such +astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position +on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A +crushing defeat followed for the Ch’in forces, who were obliged to +raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across the border.] + + +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined +multitude, most dangerous. + +[I adopt the reading of the _T’ung Tien_, Cheng Yu-hsien and the _T’u +Shu_, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to +make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to +mean that manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all +depends on the ability of the general.] + + +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an +advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other +hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice +of its baggage and stores. + +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese +commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering +without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated +corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not +approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf. +infra, § 11.] + + +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make +forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual +distance at a stretch, + +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 _li_; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have covered +the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.] + + +doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. + +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, +and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its +destination. + +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a +hundred _li_ to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without +impedimenta. Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short +distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are +often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did not often call +upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he +intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he +sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] + + +9. If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will +reach the goal. + +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be _torn away_."] + + +10. If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your +army will arrive. + +[In the _T’ung Tien_ is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] + + +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; +without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. + +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says +"fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi +says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."] + + +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the +designs of our neighbours. + +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar +with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls +and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we +make use of local guides. + +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] + + +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. + +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to +the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. +[2] ] + +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. + +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. + +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift +but, as Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] + + +your compactness that of the forest. + +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, +order and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise +attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do +generally possess the quality of density or compactness.] + + +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + +[Cf. _Shih Ching_, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] + + +in immovability like a mountain. + +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to +dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice +you into a trap.] + + +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you +move, fall like a thunderbolt. + +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: +"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the +lighting—so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so +quickly that it cannot be parried.] + + +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst +your men; + +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by +insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may +afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.] + + +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the +benefit of the soldiery. + +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow +and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the +lands they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out +some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that +of Pan Ch’ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, +those of Fu-k’ang-an and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] + + +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp +until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the +cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § +13.] + + +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. + +[See _supra_, §§ 3, 4.] + + +Such is the art of manœuvering. + +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But +there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an +earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when +Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different +from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to +its genuineness.] + + +23. The Book of Army Management says: + +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give +us any information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient +military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the +enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun +Tzŭ’s time between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it +is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should +have been made and written down at some earlier period.] + + +On the field of battle, + +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] + + +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of +gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence +the institution of banners and flags. + +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and +eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point. + +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the +same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be +like those of a single man."!] + + +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either +for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. + +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance +against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a +story in this connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the +Ch’in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of +matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the +enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, +whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a +good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I +fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he +acted without orders."] + + +This is the art of handling large masses of men. + +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, +and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing +the ears and eyes of your army. + +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head +of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, +that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not +dare to dispute their passage.] + + +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade +all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be +irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest +when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue +not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have +worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of +their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found +in the _Tso Chuan_, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao Kuei, a protege of Duke +Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch’i, and the duke was +about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s +drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had +beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they +fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. Questioned +afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao Kuei +replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first +roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is +already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I +attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence +our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four +important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a whole +army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such +is the influence of spirit!"] + + +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important +asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and +to inspire courage into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching +(A.D. 571-649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in +assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it +must include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium."] + + +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; + +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle +of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, +whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, +liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] + + +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent +only on returning to camp. + +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is +keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This +is the art of studying moods. + +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and +hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. + +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait +at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while +the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. + +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect +order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. + +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor +to oppose him when he comes downhill. + +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers +whose temper is keen. + +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. + +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been +poisoned by the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that +the saying has a wider application.] + + +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by +saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to +the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too +dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han +Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth +homewards." A marvelous tale is told of Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and +resource in ch. 1 of the _San Kuo Chi_, In 198 A.D., he was besieging +Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to +cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his +troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were +guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. +In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a +tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while +Ts’ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were +thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: +"The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to +battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] + + +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The +object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road +to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." +Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."] + + +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay +will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has +burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake +all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho +Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of +Yen-ch’ing. That general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was +surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. +The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was +soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, +and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the +moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch’ing +exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country +than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense +clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had +abated before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, +Li Shou-cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: +"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our +numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the strenuous +fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, Fu +Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to +safety.] + + +37. Such is the art of warfare. + +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. + +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" +(Longmans, 1907), p. 29. + + + +Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS + +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does +not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us +(V §§ 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are +practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, +who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it +means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost +degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out +to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine +Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The +only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a +supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some +weight.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the +sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. + +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may +have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to +the chapter.] + + +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high +roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in +dangerously isolated positions. + +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the +beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu +defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in +hostile territory. Li Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no +springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, +"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to +advance."] + + +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate +position, you must fight. + +3. There are roads which must not be followed, + +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] + + +armies which must be not attacked, + +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be +attacked." Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival +advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from +attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength."] + + +towns which must not be besieged, + +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the +city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the +heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the +subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. +Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be +held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when +urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and +well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat +of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In +the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. +It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, +countermarches and manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste +men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a +province." [1] ] + + +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which +must not be obeyed. + +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for +authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: +"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a +military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable +fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated +to military necessity.] + + +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. + +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted +with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn +his knowledge to practical account. + +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only +securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in +every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is +characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a +certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural +features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by +versatility of mind?"] + + +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying +his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will +fail to make the best use of his men. + +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally +advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it +must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a +town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can +be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military +operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But there are +circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. +For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if +he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has +laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may +be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely +to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] + + +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. + +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your +mind."] + + +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may +succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. + +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must +not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the +enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into +our calculations."] + + +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always +ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from +misfortune. + +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, +I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my +own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels +these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in +liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and +only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will +incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to +encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the +advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] + + +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; + +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of +which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s +best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. +Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be +rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension +between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful +contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his +treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely +women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of +Sun Tzŭ here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer +injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] + + +and make trouble for them, + +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble +should be made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we +might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich +exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of +commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.] + + +and keep them constantly engaged; + +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from +having any rest."] + + +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. + +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use +of: "cause them to forget _pien_ (the reasons for acting otherwise than +on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."] + + +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the +enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the +chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made +our position unassailable. + +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes +a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an +opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but +may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: +"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay +exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one +out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave +man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without +any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, +too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s death does not +bring about victory."] + + +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an +advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of +danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on +returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as +Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing +to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will +subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu +pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle +with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a +few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be +overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so +that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural +result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly +quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with +fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray, +Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled +for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat +similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who during +a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness +for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get +across.] + + +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, +Teng Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to +fight. Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and +easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, +then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to +battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao +Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s +pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.] + + +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; + +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect +in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated +sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung +by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though +somewhat paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of +public opinion."] + + +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and +trouble. + +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless +of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger +of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate +comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long +run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the +prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken +feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered +city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated +efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many +strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, +relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct +resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to +sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who +failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to +defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men." +By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of +Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.] + + +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the +conduct of war. + +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will +surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a +subject of meditation. + +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. + + + +Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 +than by this heading.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in +the neighbourhood of valleys. + +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to +supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural +ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following +anecdote: Wu-tu Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later +Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found +a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but +seized all the favourable positions commanding supplies of water and +forage. Ch’iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of +provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not +know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys."] + + +2. Camp in high places, + +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the +surrounding country.] + + +facing the sun. + +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. + + +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. + +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. + +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your +evolutions." The _T’ung Tien_ reads, "If _the enemy_ crosses a river," +etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an +interpolation.] + + +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not +advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army +get across, and then deliver your attack. + +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu +at the Wei River. Turning to the _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, fol. 6 +verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were +drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered +his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct +a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung +Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he +hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this +unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was +really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus +releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the +greater portion of Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned +upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu +himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further +bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.] + + +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader +near a river which he has to cross. + +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] + + +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. + +[See _supra_, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with +water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops +marshalled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; +in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing +the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.] + + +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on +the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the +sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that +‘in river warfare we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as +much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the +enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and +make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other +commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] + + +So much for river warfare. + +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over +them quickly, without any delay. + +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, +and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to +attack.] + + +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass +near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. + +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous +where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect +the rear.] + + +So much for operations in salt-marshes. + +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with +rising ground to your right and on your rear, + +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] + + +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. + +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge + +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, +and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] + + +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. + +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known +of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The _Shih Chi_ (ch. 1 +ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the +_Liu T’ao_ it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified +the Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was +the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of +whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li +Ch’uan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who +received it from his Minister Feng Hou.] + + +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, + +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low +ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for +fighting."] + + +and sunny places to dark. + +12. If you are careful of your men, + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] + + +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every +kind, + +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak +of illness."] + + +and this will spell victory. + +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the +slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of +your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground. + +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you +wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it +subsides. + +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, + +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, +with pools of water at the bottom."] + + +confined places, + +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by +precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] + + +tangled thickets, + +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears +cannot be used."] + + +quagmires + +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable +for chariots and horsemen."] + + +and crevasses, + +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and +intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but +Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and +Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the +commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the +ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure" +and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence +indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] + + +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to +approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on +his rear. + +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly +country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with +reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed +out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious +spies are likely to be lurking. + +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors +who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and +overhearing our instructions."] + + +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on +the natural strength of his position. + +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is +so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. +Baden-Powell’s "Aids to Scouting."] + + +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious +for the other side to advance. + +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to +dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to +force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less +probability of our responding to the challenge."] + + +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a +bait. + +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is +advancing. + +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and +observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are +moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a +passage for the enemy’s march."] + + +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means +that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. + +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick +vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, +has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an +ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted together +out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come +across.] + + +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. + +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying +along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers +are in ambush at the spot beneath."] + + +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. + +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of +chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, +it betokens the approach of infantry. + +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat +exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon +by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more +dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas +foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to +Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have scouts some way in +advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and +report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you +move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting +up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] + + +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties +have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and +fro signify that the army is encamping. + +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light +horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak +and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity +of dust and its motion."] + + +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is +about to advance. + +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object +is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack +us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against +the Yen forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the _Shih Chi_ we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other +side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; +but those within the city were enraged at seeing their +fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should +fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend themselves more +obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back converted spies +who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is that the +men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become +faint-hearted.’ Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and +burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, +witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were +all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. +T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. +But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and +ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the +ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The +regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were +manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys +were dispatched to the enemy’s camp to arrange terms of surrender, +whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T’ien Tan also collected +20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens +of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the +town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be plundered or +their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good humor, granted +their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and careless. +Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with +pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased +rushes on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the +rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had +pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked +warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the +enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for +their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their +bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up +with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At +the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those +that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums +and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed +by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly +pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch’i +Chien…. The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some +seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i State."] + + +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that +he will retreat. + +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on +the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. + +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. + +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, +simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] + + +27. When there is much running about + +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental +banner.] + + +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has +come. + +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. + +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint +from want of food. + +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, +the army is suffering from thirst. + +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] + + +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to +secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, +the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] + + +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. + +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is +weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If +the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. + +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an +army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with +fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] + + +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for +food, + +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and +the horses chiefly on grass.] + + +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, +showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that +they are determined to fight to the death. + +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. +71, given in abbreviated form by the _P’ei Wen Yun Fu:_ "The rebel Wang +Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu +Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against +him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear +to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to +throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to +the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war not to pursue +desperate men and not to press a retreating host.’ Sung answered: ‘That +does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a +retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized +multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to the +attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo +being slain."] + + +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in +subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. + +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his +resources; + +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always +a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good +temper.] + + +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. + +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity +is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] + + +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s +numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li Ch’uan, +Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, Chia +Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, +etc." This would connect the sentence with what went before about +rewards and punishments.] + + +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign +that the enemy wishes for a truce. + +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, +it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because +their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly +needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such an obvious inference.] + + +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a +long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, +the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. + +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain +time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] + + +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. + +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, _cheng_ tactics and +frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] + + +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, +keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. + +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in +squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to +offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will +win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in +language which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are even, and no +favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough +to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst +our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and +keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But +we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes +from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may +be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] + + +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is +sure to be captured by them. + +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the _Tso Chuan_, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, +then, should not be treated with contempt."] + + +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, +they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be +practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, +punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. + +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with +humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. + +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues +endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in +awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with +a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of +hardness and tenderness."] + + +This is a certain road to victory. + +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army +will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. + +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his +orders being obeyed, + +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly +confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that +when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline +maintained, because they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ +has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something +like this: "If a general is always confident that his orders will be +carried out," etc."] + + +the gain will be mutual. + +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his +command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the +gain is mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. +4: "The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders +and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are +the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. + + + +Chapter X. TERRAIN + +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with +"terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six +calamities" are discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is +again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, +perhaps, on that account.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] + + +(2) entangling ground; + +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you +become entangled."] + + +(3) temporising ground; + +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] + + +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great +distance from the enemy. + +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this +classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the +Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as +the above.] + + +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +_accessible_. + +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in +occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of +supplies. + +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, +"not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of +Napoleon’s dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," [1] +we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than skirt the edge of this +important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: +"The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an +army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who +finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his +own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander +whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false +position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his +plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, +and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time +to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will +entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army." [2] + + +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. + +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called +_entangling_. + +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may +sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your +coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, +disaster will ensue. + +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the +first move, it is called _temporising_ ground. + +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the +situation remains at a deadlock."] + + +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, + +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But +this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our +position.] + + +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus +enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come +out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + +8. With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let +them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. + +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and +by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our +mercy."] + + +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after +him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly +garrisoned. + +10. With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with +your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there +wait for him to come up. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." +[For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. +Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. +619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic +tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been +completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders +that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was +highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the +extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as +quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which +flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve +feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned +that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to +happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward +be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From +this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places +are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are +immune from disastrous floods."] + + +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but +retreat and try to entice him away. + +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the +two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou +Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was +defeated and taken prisoner. See _Chiu T’ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, +and also ch. 54.] + + +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the +strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a +battle, + +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and +wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be +exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."] + + +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. + +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § +8.] + + +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to +study them. + +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from +natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. +These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) +disorganisation; (6) rout. + +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against +another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the +former. + +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too +weak, the result is _insubordination_. + +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [_Hsin T’ang Shu_, ch. 148], +who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against +Wang T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority +by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien +Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some +months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops +turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the +unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.] + + +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the +result is _collapse_. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] + + +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on +meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of +resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is +in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_. + +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, +and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate +officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of +ruin upon his head."] + + +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are +not clear and distinct; + +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with +decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves +are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds +about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the +words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men +lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they +receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a +military leader is difference; the worst calamities that befall an army +arise from hesitation."] + + +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, + +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] + + +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is +utter _disorganisation_. + +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an +inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment +against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the +front rank, the result must be a _rout_. + +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: +"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be +appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the +resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi +ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] + + +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully +noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. + +[See _supra_, § 13.] + + +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; + +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] + + +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of +victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and +distances, constitutes the test of a great general. + +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises +them, will surely be defeated. + +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even +though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, +then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding. + +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said +to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the _San +Lueh_, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of +setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance +and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will +hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened +monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country’s +cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military +commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees +from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] + + +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without +fearing disgrace, + +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for +a soldier is to retreat.] + + +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for +his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." +Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would +not regret his conduct."] + + +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you +into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and +they will stand by you even unto death. + +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture +of the famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have +frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the +same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a +horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations +wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his +soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch’i himself sucked out +the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing and +lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is +only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has +sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, +Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him +afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And +now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I +know not where.’" Li Ch’uan mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded +the small state of Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to +him: "Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he +made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and +straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with +floss silk.] + + +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority +felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, +moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to +spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. + +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, +they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of +stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was +occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his +army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by +force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who +happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat +belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation +helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that the +fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to +palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his +summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did +so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from +that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked +up.] + + +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are +unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] + + +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that +our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway +towards victory. + +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] + + +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our +men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of +the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only +halfway towards victory. + +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; +once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. + +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures +so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move +recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no +mistakes."] + + +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your +victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you +may make your victory complete. + +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—the +affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of +earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] + + +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. + +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. + +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. + + + +Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: +(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) +open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; +(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. + +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive +ground. + +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious +to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity +afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their +advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation, and +when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."] + + +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great +distance, it is facile ground. + +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," +and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: +"When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and +bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no +hankering after home."] + + +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either +side, is contentious ground. + +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, +even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in +check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: +"For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is +nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from +his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far +as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, +taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted +against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and +mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we +shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. +Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, +thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are +prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or +if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a +stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and +resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the +enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act +on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] + + +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. + +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this +type of ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network +of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] + + +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] + + +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, + +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most +of them to become his allies.] + + +is ground of intersecting highways. + +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, +leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. + +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached +such a point, its situation is serious."] + + +8. Mountain forests, + +[Or simply "forests."] + + +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. + +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can +only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy +would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in +ground. + +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting +without delay, is desperate ground. + +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A +lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, +retreat blocked." Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like +sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu +quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus +entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid +of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s +mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so +perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots +carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no +choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to +range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming +strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take +a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a +pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us +has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days +and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain +the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute +of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, +the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of +strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man +defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense +in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by +ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant +soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with +the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of the +awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians +under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].] + + +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt +not. On contentious ground, attack not. + +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, suppose +the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, when the +King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: +"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession +have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is +secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by +pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash +for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and +raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best +troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will +sally forth to the rescue."] + + +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. + +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking +force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available +here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s +brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own +army is not cut off.] + + +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. + +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] + + +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to +alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han +Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no +violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 +B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that +entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the +present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not +‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this instance +the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, +has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility +of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by +bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the +enemy."] + + +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] + + +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be +devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in +deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what +happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the +mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by +the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his +foes was remarkably like that which T’ien Tan had also employed with +success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came +on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and +set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the +mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and +discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and +Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. +93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] + + +On desperate ground, fight. + +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is +a chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your +corner."] + + +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a +wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; + +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each +other."] + + +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to +hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from +rallying their men. + +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep +them in disorder. + +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when +otherwise, they stopped still. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure +any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, +they would remain where they were."] + + +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly +array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin +by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be +amenable to your will." + +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it +is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu +says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the +accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our +favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard +his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart his plans in +these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By +boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other +side on the defensive.] + + +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: + +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in +warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military +science, and the chief business of the general." The following +anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the importance attached to speed by +two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of +Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to +the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko +Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then +military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he +at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having +previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. +Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself +with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we +make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we +ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and +before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced +marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with in a +space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to +Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of my revolt +reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it +will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time +my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come +himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth +troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with +consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my +allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous +rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen and Meng +Ta had lost his head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful +rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou +Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao +Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down +through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching +embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start +when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until +the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching +replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount +importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to +strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army +together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we +shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the +thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against +it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if +he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in +such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full +fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, and +Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] + + +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected +routes, and attack unguarded spots. + +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading +force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be +the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail +against you. + +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with +food. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] + + +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them +plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."] + + +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your +strength. + +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the +success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a +universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the +temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained +strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch’u general try to force a +battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not +come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the +affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be +well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for +bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told +off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. +The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting +the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were +engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been +strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for +fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, after repeating their challenge +again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch’in +general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the +battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly +afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and the king +Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] + + +Keep your army continually on the move, + +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has +struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army +together."] + + +and devise unfathomable plans. + +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and +they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is +nothing they may not achieve. + +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to +run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to +get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage +and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a +desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even +terms."] + + +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. + +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will +surely exert their united strength to get out of it."] + + +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there +is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart +of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no +help for it, they will fight hard. + +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be +constantly on the _qui vive;_ without waiting to be asked, they will do +your will; + +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] + + +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, +they can be trusted. + +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious +doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. + +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate +into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes +Huang Shih-kung: "‘Spells and incantations should be strictly +forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the +fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ minds should be seriously +perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and +scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution +until they die."] + + +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because +they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it +is not because they are disinclined to longevity. + +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are +things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they +burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not +that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ +is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the +general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not +thrown in their way.] + + +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, + +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more +genuine grief than tears alone.] + + +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting +the tears run down their cheeks. + +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all +have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that +the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their +emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River +between Ching K’o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt +the life of the King of Ch’in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. +The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and +uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the +burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] + + +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage +of a Chu or a Kuei. + +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, +better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with +a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a +banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to +pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero +referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), performed the exploit which has +made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice +defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering +a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, +the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger +against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared to move a muscle, +and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu +was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker +state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his +place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed +color. As was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate +the bargain, but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him +the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold +stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched +battles.] + + +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the +_shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. + +["_Shuai-jan_" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question +was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through +this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the +sense of "military manœuvers."] + + +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its +tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and +you will be attacked by head and tail both. + +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, + +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as +though they were part of a single living body?"] + + +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are +enemies; + +[Cf. VI. § 21.] + + +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a +storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand +helps the right. + +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of +common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound +together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet +it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of +cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.] + + +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of +horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. + +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall +the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the +battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one +spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to +render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed +unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a +spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be +learned from the _shuai-jan_.] + + +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard +of courage which all must reach. + +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] +one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it +follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be +of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain +standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at +Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that +it was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and +courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept +those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the +day.] + + +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences +of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize +accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in +strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more +exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority +in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the +text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to +think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… +and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are +defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural +features." [2] ] + + +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were +leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. + +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does +it."] + + +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure +secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports +and appearances, + +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] + + +and thus keep them in total ignorance. + +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only +rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and +surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been +frequently pointed out. But how about the other process—the +mystification of one’s own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is +over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson’s +remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," +he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most +trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his +thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. +etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou Han +Shu_, "Pan Ch’ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other +Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of +Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place +with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, +totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao summoned his officers and also the King +of Khotan to a council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now +outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, +then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different +direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the +evening drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly +released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha +was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set +off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat +in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in +order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that +the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them +well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, +as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, +and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were brought +back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, +Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From +that time forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the +countries of the west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general +not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but +actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive +the enemy.] + + +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, + +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] + + +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war +is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. +You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but +without letting them know why."] + + +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the +enemy from anticipating his purpose. + +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has +climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He +carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. + +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some +decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like +Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, +followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth +every artifice at his command."] + + +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd +driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and +none knows whither he is going. + +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or +retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and +conquering."] + + +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. + +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in +aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again +to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was +no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the +armies of today.] + + +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; + +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules +for the nine varieties of ground."] + + +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental +laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be +studied. + +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that +penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means +dispersion. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 20.] + + +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. + +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not +figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. +One’s first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this, +if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. +Mei Yao-ch’en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be +called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but +something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from +home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in +order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business +there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which +is the reason why it is not included among the Nine Situations.] + + +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is +one of intersecting highways. + +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. +When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. + +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow +passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of +refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity +of purpose. + +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the +defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. _supra_, § 11.] + + +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between +all parts of my army. + +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible +contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden +attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: +"On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an +encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications."] + + +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach +the goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way +apart. Mei Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: +"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we +are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute +its possession." Ch’en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy +has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ +warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the +situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a favourable +position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make +a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, +and victory will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat +the army of Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] + + +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On +ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. + +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of +supplies. + +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as +one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] + + +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. + +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. + +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, +whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s +lines." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with +desperation." Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run +away." Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where +it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards +Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under +Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, +consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The +lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to +escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets +himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped +together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing +for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary +pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that +the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.] + + +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness +of saving their lives. + +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores +and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and +make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to +the death." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving +up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about +"grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the +passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be +struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is +treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate "variations" +before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely +nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included +in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion +of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though +the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next +chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par +excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down +to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, +8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed +in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once +more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, +being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts +maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, +should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is +an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. +Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two +distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the +chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. +I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the +general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us in +the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective +and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has +either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.] + + +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate +resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, +and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. + +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at +first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his +behavior underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. +Pan Ch’ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you +noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? +This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, +and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with +which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly +wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to +pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon +he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and +set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu +who arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between +surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, +keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a +general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began +drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a +little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them +thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, +anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it +happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom +only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy +extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this +envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the +Hsiung-no, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. +What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers replied: ‘Standing as +we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life +and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] + + +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the +march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains +and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We +shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make +use of local guides. + +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to +regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the +following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added +that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their +treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): +Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the +neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be +occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of +Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of +Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost +arrived.] + + +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles +does not befit a warlike prince. + +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship +shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He +overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining +against him. + +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so +much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you +can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you +have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you +overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if +the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be +prevented from joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: +"If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to +summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain +from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in +quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may be, +if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, +and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with +this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries +to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his +view thus: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will +be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our +display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the +other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."] + + +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor +does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret +designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. + +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject +entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his +prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships."] + + +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. + +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State +became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which +the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final +triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his previous note, +thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded +selfishness and haughty isolation.] + + +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and +retreat be heavily punished."] + + +issue orders + +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] + + +without regard to previous arrangements; + +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is +made clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the _Ssu-ma Fa:_ "Give +instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see +deserving deeds." Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you +give to your army should not correspond with those that have been +previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements +should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be +no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger in +letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire +reversal of them at the last moment.] + + +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do +with but a single man. + +[Cf. _supra_, § 34.] + + +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know +your design. + +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for +any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no +reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a +general than to a judge.] + + +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them +nothing when the situation is gloomy. + +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it +into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. + +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of +the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already +alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, +and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the +enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body +of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red +flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles +and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in +full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortifications +and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down +the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a +strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he +sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I +should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first +of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them +to form in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this +manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time +it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s +flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately +engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time; +until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where +another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them +and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but +the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was +fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the +2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao +following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, +tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags +struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and +overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of +their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on +them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a number and +capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Ya himself…. After the +battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: "In the _Art +of War_ we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a +river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun +Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered +us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general +replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with +sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into +desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly +peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should +never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the +Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off +to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were +obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow +his own discretion, there would have been a general _débandade_, and it +would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers +admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher tactics +than we should have been capable of." [See _Ch’ien Han Shu_, ch. 34, +ff. 4, 5.] ] + + +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is +capable of striking a blow for victory. + +[Danger has a bracing effect.] + + +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves +to the enemy’s purpose. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding and +falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do +so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out +his intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous +before we deliver our attack.] + + +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, + +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in +one direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the +enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters is quite +indefensible.] + + +we shall succeed in the long run + +[Literally, "after a thousand _li_."] + + +in killing the commander-in-chief. + +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] + + +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. + +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier +passes, destroy the official tallies, + +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as +a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the +"border-warden" of _Lun Yu_ III. 24, who may have had similar duties. +When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was +authorized to open the gate and let the traveler through.] + + +and stop the passage of all emissaries. + +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] + + +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, + +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the +sovereign.] + + +so that you may control the situation. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the +strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] + + +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + +[Cf. _supra_, § 18.] + + +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable position, +but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained +cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, to +occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an +artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him +into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful +appointment" is to be made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, +who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to +give them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must +manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. § +4). We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we +must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble. +Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch’en’s +interpretation of § 47.] + + +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, + +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this +cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is +unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the +sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we +know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won +his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.] + + +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive +battle. + +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable +opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall +prove decisive."] + + +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy +gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running +hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. + +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly +appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its +speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy +as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] + + +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. + +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. + +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. + + + +Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject +of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.] + + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first +is to burn soldiers in their camp; + +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the +soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on +a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], +found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an +envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In +consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never +win! [1] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire +on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to +discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate +them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with +glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum +civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and +everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy +fate for valiant warriors.’ All then agreed to do as he wished. +Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly +made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the +time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind +the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot +up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The +rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade +at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the +windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose +on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in +frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while +his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. +The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On +the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted +hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, +Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsun, +and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the +head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to +make his report to Tou Ku." _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] + + +the second is to burn stores; + +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the +rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the +Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a +policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.] + + +the third is to burn baggage-trains; + +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] + + +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are +the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and +clothing. Cf. VII. § 11.] + + +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + +[Tu Yu says in the _T’ung Tien:_ "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. +The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows +alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from +powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines."] + + +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. + +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." +Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] + + +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. + +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, +reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material +cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting +fires."] + + +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special +days for starting a conflagration. + +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days +are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the +Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; + +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the +Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, +Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.] + + +for these four are all days of rising wind. + +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: + +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once +with an attack from without. + +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain +quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into +confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is +ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.] + + +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it +up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. + +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] + + +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do +not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a +favourable moment. + +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire +breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of +incendiaries) inside the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the +enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or +if he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we +must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not +await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our +opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and +thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once +baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese +general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in +the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand, +Po-ts’ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in +184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of +a large army he was besieging Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu +Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness +pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and +said: "In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and +numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun +Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the +midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can +make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the +achievement of T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong +breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind +reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after +which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way +through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. +Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and +Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [_Hou Han Shu_, +ch. 71.] +] +] +] +] +] +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from +the leeward. + +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will +retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he +will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A +rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in +the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the +attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, +and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your +enemy."] + + +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze +soon falls. + +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a +morning." (_Tao Te Ching_, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: +"A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. +This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be +correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] + + +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be +known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the +proper days. + +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, +and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our +attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: +"We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also +be on our guard against similar attacks from them."] + + +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; +those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of +strength. + +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of +all his belongings. + +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or +divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water +can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of +fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is +dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is +discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: +"If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground, from which the +water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be +submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent +gales, it may be exterminated by fire."] + + +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed +in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the +result is waste of time and general stagnation. + +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung +says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." +And Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the +deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and +disaster will ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the +formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the +interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en alone, whose words I will +quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and +assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and not shrink +on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to +such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not +do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the +advantages they have got."] + + +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; +the good general cultivates his resources. + +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the _San Lueh_, ch. 2: "The warlike +prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by +good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, +there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not +be respected."] + + +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless +there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is +critical. + +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so +far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the _Tao Te Ching_, +ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the +defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] + + +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own +spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. + +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where +you are. + +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately +on § 18.] + + +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by +content. + +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again +into being; + +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] + + +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. + +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full +of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army +intact. + +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the +tiger’s cubs." + + + +Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching +them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on +the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a +thousand ounces of silver. + +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] + + +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down +exhausted on the highways. + +[Cf. _Tao Te Ching_, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, +brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be +reminded of the saying: ‘On serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why +then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the +highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of +munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is +deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided +against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, +we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of +supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where +provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed +with."] + + +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their +labor. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each +consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated +on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here +also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well +sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II. § 12, note.] In time of +war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other +seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men +(reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of +700,000 families would be affected.] + + +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the +victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in +ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the +outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments, + +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect +of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned +at this point.] + + +is the height of inhumanity. + +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to +the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which +war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of +the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a +war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to +employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless +they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false +economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, +when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. +This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun +Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a +crime against humanity.] + + +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his +sovereign, no master of victory. + +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the +national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., +these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: +"The [Chinese] character for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters +for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military +prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of +weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm +establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, +putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] + + +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike +and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is +_foreknowledge_. + +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to +do.] + + +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, + +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by +reasoning from other analogous cases."] + + +nor by any deductive calculation. + +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human +actions cannot be so calculated."] + + +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from +other men. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural +science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe +can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an +enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."] + + +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local +spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) +surviving spies. + +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the +secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It +is the sovereign’s most precious faculty. + +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry +leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to +collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts +and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the +previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus gained." [1] ] + + +9. Having _local spies_ means employing the services of the inhabitants +of a district. + +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind +treatment, and use them as spies."] + + +10. Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy. + +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in +this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals +who have undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy +for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or +who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are +anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have +a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who +always want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several +kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one’s +interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to +find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain the +plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." +The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward +spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo +Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel +Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P’i. After each side had +experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse +to the services of a certain P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to +have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo +Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from +inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for +making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march +out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head +with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s +general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the +signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while +others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred +of Lo Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom +was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, +both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely." +[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story +from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his +father Li T’e, _Chin Shu_, ch. 120, 121.] + + +11. Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and +using them for our own purposes. + +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the +enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false information as +well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, +Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected him, but +contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. +Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition; +but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively proved by his +subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ 21 +sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used +with conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo +(see _supra_, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); +and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a +defensive campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved +of Lien P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to +avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to +the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and +were already in Fan Chu’s pay. They said: "The only thing which causes +Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they +consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long +run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao She. From his +boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military +matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander +in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he +spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if +ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of +Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own +mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed +Lien P’o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po +Ch’i and the great military power of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by +which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and +after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished +soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and +his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put +to the sword.] + + +12. Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them +to the enemy. + +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do +things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe +that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are +captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely false report, +and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do +something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." +As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released +by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also +refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T’ai Tsung to lull +the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was +able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the +Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but this is a +mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History (ch. 58, +fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when +sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has +certainly more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of +Ch’i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and +infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the +unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.] + + +13. _Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. + +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a +regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man +of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby +exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed +with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts +of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame +and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the +Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i +made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] +sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other +men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it +was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp +and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the +passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and +boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and +more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing +some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a +sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm +commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was +able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."] + + +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate +relations to be maintained than with spies. + +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] + + +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should +greater secrecy be preserved. + +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be +carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted +from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous +commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who pays +them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor +should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, +secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and +children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to +them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ] + + +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive +sagacity. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and +double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more +along the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." +Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves: +"Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of +character and the extent of their experience and skill." But he +continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous +than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." +So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] + + +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. + +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, +you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for +you with all their might."] + + +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the +truth of their reports. + +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] + + +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of +business. + +[Cf. VI. § 9.] + + +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is +ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret +was told. + +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard +before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this +passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for +letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, +as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any +further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would +not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of +inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man +deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told +the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."] + + +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to +assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding +out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp, + +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose +duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which +naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him.] + + +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must +be commissioned to ascertain these. + +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these +important functionaries can be won over by bribery.] + + +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, +tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will +become converted spies and available for our service. + +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we +are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. + +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the +enemy’s condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy +into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local +inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to +corruption."] + + +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed +spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best +be deceived."] + + +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used +on appointed occasions. + +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of +the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first +instance, from the converted spy. + +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but +makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] + + +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. + +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty + +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was +changed to Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. + + +was due to I Chih + +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part +in Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] + + +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty +was due to Lü Ya + +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he +afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title +bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on +war, erroneously identified with the _Liu T’ao_.] + + +who had served under the Yin. + +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are +by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly +doubt that Sun Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious +examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His +suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the +intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcoming which these +former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch’en +appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin +and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia +could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not +employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements +were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How +should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common +spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of them simply means that the proper use of +the five classes of spies is a matter which requires men of the highest +mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them +for the task. The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih +believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their +supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] + + +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who +will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying +and thereby they achieve great results. + +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a +boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so +reliance on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the +cause of utter destruction."] + + +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an +army’s ability to move. + +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or +eyes.] + + +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. + +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 *** |