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diff --git a/132-h/132-h.htm b/132-h/132-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13b3c7f --- /dev/null +++ b/132-h/132-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8456 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Art of War | Project Gutenberg</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify;} + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 175%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} +h3 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +.p1 {margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p2 {margin-top: 0em; + margin-bottom: 0em; + font-size: 90%;} + +.p3 {margin-top: 2em;} + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +p.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + +</head> + +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 ***</div> + +<h1>Sun Tzŭ<br/> +on<br/> +The Art of War</h1> + +<h4>THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD</h4> +<h4>Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes</h4> + +<h5>BY</h5> + +<h3>LIONEL GILES, M.A.</h3> + +<p class="center"> +Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. +in the British Museum +</p> + +<p class="center"> +1910 +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p class="center"> +To my brother<br/> +Captain Valentine Giles, R.G.<br/> +in the hope that<br/> +a work 2400 years old<br/> +may yet contain lessons worth consideration<br/> +by the soldier of today<br/> +this translation<br/> +is affectionately dedicated. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref01">Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">Preface by Lionel Giles</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">Sun Wu and his Book</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">The Text of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">The Commentators</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">Apologies for War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">Bibliography</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">Chapter I. Laying plans</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">Chapter II. Waging War</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">Chapter III. Attack by Stratagem</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">Chapter IV. Tactical Dispositions</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">Chapter V. Energy</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">Chapter VI. Weak Points and Strong</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">Chapter VII Manœuvring</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">Chapter VIII. Variation of Tactics</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap17">Chapter IX. The Army on the March</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap18">Chapter X. Terrain</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap19">Chapter XI. The Nine Situations</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap20">Chapter XII. The Attack by Fire</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap21">Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref01"></a>Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext</h2> + +<p> +When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i>, the +work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe began in 1782 +when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of +it, and translated it into French. It was not a good translation because, +according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzŭ did not write, +and very little indeed of what he did." +</p> + +<p> +The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by Capt. E. +F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words of Dr. Giles, +"excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It is not merely a +question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly exempt. +Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully distorted or slurred +over. Such offenses are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any +edition of a Latin or Greek classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to +be insisted upon in translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt. +Calthrop’s translation was published in London. It was an improvement on the +first—omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected—but new +errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his translation, +wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors." +</p> + +<p> +Clearly, Dr. Giles’ work established much of the groundwork for the work of +later translators who published their own editions. Of the later editions of +the <i>Art of War</i> I have examined; two feature Giles’ edited translation +and notes, the other two present the same basic information from the ancient +Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, Giles’ 1910 +edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader an incredible amount of +information concerning Sun Tzŭ’s text, much more than any other translation. +</p> + +<p> +The Giles’ edition of the <i>Art of War</i>, as stated above, was a scholarly +work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time and an assistant in the +Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts in the British Museum. +Apparently he wanted to produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else +that existed and perhaps something that would become a standard translation. It +was the best translation available for 50 years. But apparently there was not +much interest in Sun Tzŭ in English-speaking countries since it took the start +of the Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people published +unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzŭ. In 1944, Dr. Giles’ translation +was edited and published in the United States in a series of military science +books. But it wasn’t until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B. +Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to Giles’ +translation. While this translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles’ translation, +it lacks his copious notes that make his so interesting. +</p> + +<p> +Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the Chinese +civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun Tzŭ, the English +translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, +some of his notes and footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely +Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the +conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while +doing the conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it +while retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase +represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text as +possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, I was able to +transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the risk of making the text +more obscure. However, the text, on the whole, is quite satisfactory for the +casual reader, a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext. +However, I come away from this task with the feeling of loss because I know +that someone with a background in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any +such attempt would be welcomed. +</p> + +<p> +Bob Sutton +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>Preface by Lionel Giles</h2> + +<p> +The seventh volume of <i>Mémoires concernant l’histoire, les sciences, les +arts, les mœurs, les usages, &c., des Chinois</i> is devoted to the Art of +War, and contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles de +Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph Amiot. +Père Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small reputation as a sinologue in his +day, and the field of his labours was certainly extensive. But his so-called +translation of the Sun Tzŭ, if placed side by side with the original, is seen +at once to be little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal that +Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair +specimen, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +<i>De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes.</i> Sun-tse dit : Ayez +les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que subalternes; inscrivez-les +dans un catalogue à part, avec la note des talents & de la capacité de +chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque +l’occasion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez +commander soient persuadés que votre principale attention est de les préserver +de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer contre l’ennemi +doivent être comme des pierres que vous lanceriez contre des œufs. De vous à +l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir d’autre différence que celle du fort au +faible, du vide au plein. Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. +Voilà en peu de mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la +perfection même du gouvernement des troupes. +</p> + +<p> +Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonderful development in the +study of Chinese literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzŭ, although +his work was known to be highly valued in China as by far the oldest and best +compendium of military science. It was not until the year 1905 that the first +English translation, by Capt. E.F. Calthrop. R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under +the title “Sonshi”(the Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ). Unfortunately, it +was evident that the translator’s knowledge of Chinese was far too scanty +to fit him to grapple with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself +plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the +accompanying translation would have been impossible.” We can only wonder, +then, that with their help it should have been so excessively bad. It is not +merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly +exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were wilfully distorted or +slurred over. Such offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerated in +any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a similar standard of honesty +ought to be insisted upon in translations from Chinese. +</p> + +<p> +From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present translation +is free. It was not undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; +but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ deserved a better fate than had +befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on +the work of my predecessors. Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised edition +of Capt. Calthrop’s translation was published in London, this time, +however, without any allusion to his Japanese collaborators. My first three +chapters were then already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms +of Capt. Calthrop therein contained must be understood as referring to his +earlier edition. This is on the whole an improvement on the other, thought +there still remains much that cannot pass muster. Some of the grosser blunders +have been rectified and lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain +number of new mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the introduction is +startlingly inaccurate; and later on, while mention is made of “an army +of Japanese commentators” on Sun Tzŭ (who are these, by the way?), not a +word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators, who nevertheless, I venture +to assert, form a much more numerous and infinitely more important +“army.” +</p> + +<p> +A few special features of the present volume may now be noticed. In the first +place, the text has been cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in order to +facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of students generally. The +division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s edition; but I have +sometimes found it desirable to join two or more of his paragraphs into one. In +quoting from other works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title +by way of reference, and the task of research is apt to be seriously hampered +in consequence. With a view to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is +concerned, I have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese characters, +following in this the admirable example of Legge, though an alphabetical +arrangement has been preferred to the distribution under radicals which he +adopted. Another feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is +the printing of text, translation and notes on the same page; the notes, +however, are inserted, according to the Chinese method, immediately after the +passages to which they refer. From the mass of native commentary my aim has +been to extract the cream only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it +seemed to present points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself an +important branch of Chinese literature, very little commentary of this kind has +hitherto been made directly accessible by translation. +</p> + +<p> +I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off of my sheets as they +were completed, the work has not had the benefit of a final revision. On a +review of the whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms, I might +have been inclined in a few instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen +to wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited +with more than a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to +put a sword into the hands of future opponents by scrupulously giving either +text or reference for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from +the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere translations,” +would not, I must confess, be altogether unwelcome. For, after all, the worst +fate I shall have to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes of +George in <i>The Vicar of Wakefield</i>. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>Sun Wu and his Book</h2> + +<p> +Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1]<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His <i>Art of War</i> brought +him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of +managing soldiers to a slight test?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 +ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two companies, and placed +one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them +all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know +the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?" +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The girls replied: Yes. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I +say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," +you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face +right round towards your back." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus explained, he +set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. Then, to the +sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out +laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if +orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn," +whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzŭ: "If words +of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, +the general is to blame. But if his orders <i>are</i> clear, and the soldiers +nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the +king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when +he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly +alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We are now quite +satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of +these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish +that they shall not be beheaded." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be the +general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting +in that capacity, I am unable to accept." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the +pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum +was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the +evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling +back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing +to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your +soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your +majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may +desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As +for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate +them into deeds." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was +one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the +west, he defeated the Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the +capital; to the north he put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and +spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the +might of the King. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in +this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, Sun Pin, +born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, and also the +outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun +Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet +continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was +a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was invented +in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the +crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found +briefly related in Chapter V. § 19, note. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages of the +<i>Shih Chi:</i>— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the field +with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He +captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had formerly been +generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the +general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must +wait"…. [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], +King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared +that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The +two men replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and +covetous, and the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge +against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win +over T’ang and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed +this advice, [beat Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] +[5] +</p> + +<p> +This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not +appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in +496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other: +Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service +of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw +light upon the principles of war. +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the +reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, to be +noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in +question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, which is supposed to have been +written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat +doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, +based as it is on the <i>Shih Chi</i> and expanded with romantic details. The story of +Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points +in it worth noting are: (1) Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu +Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired +life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. +</p> + +<p> +The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and ministers +show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ to encounter the +foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast +upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan +Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years before the <i>Shih Chi</i> was given to the world. +</p> + +<p> +Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of 30,000 men +beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined." +</p> + +<p> +Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun Wu’s +grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father Sun +P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, +whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the +rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had +three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. +According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering +that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as +chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I +do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them. +</p> + +<p> +An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is +the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu Ti, +for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. [10] +The <i>Lun Yu</i> says: “There must be a sufficiency of military +strength.” The <i>Shu Ching</i> mentions "the army" among the "eight +objects of government." The <i>I Ching</i> says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and +justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The <i>Shih Ching</i> +says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops." The +Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and +battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i> says: "If +one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He +who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies +solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai +[11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the +Sage’s rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when +occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work +composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a native of the +Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the <i>Art of War</i> in +13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he +was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the +Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch’i +and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was +a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the +importance of rapidity in taking the field, [14] clearness of conception, and +depth of design, Sun Tzŭ stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My +contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his +instructions, and while putting into practice the smaller details in which his +work abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive +which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13 +chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the +internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is +addressed. +</p> + +<p> +In the bibliographic section of the <i>Han Shu</i>, there is an entry which has given +rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 <i>p’ien</i> (or +chapters), with diagrams in 9 <i>chuan</i>." It is evident that this cannot be merely +the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those we possess today. Chang +Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> of which the "13 +chapters" formed the first <i>chuan</i>, adding that there were two other <i>chuan</i> +besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters +consisted of other writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them +apocryphal—similar to the <i>Wen Ta</i>, of which a specimen dealing with the +Nine Situations [15] is preserved in the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, and another in Ho +Shin’s commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun +Tzŭ had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of +exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi +I-hsun, the author of the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, backs this up with a quotation from +the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:</i> "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzŭ, and +asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of +his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him." As he points +out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the +above-mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be +considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be +included. The fact that the <i>Han Chih</i> mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 +<i>p’ien</i>, whereas the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of +others in addition to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that +all of these were contained in the 82 <i>p’ien</i>. Without pinning our faith to +the accuracy of details supplied by the <i>Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu</i>, or +admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may +see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma +Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of +forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 +<i>p’ien</i> may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped +together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, that +some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely +ignored by him. [16] +</p> + +<p> +Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu Ti +strung together Sun Wu’s <i>Art of War</i>," which in turn may have resulted from a +misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s preface. This, as Sun +Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an +explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the +whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the <i>Ssu K’u +Ch’uan Shu</i> says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in the <i>Shih Chi</i> shows +that they were in existence before the <i>Han Chih</i>, and that latter accretions are +not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly +not be taken as proof." +</p> + +<p> +There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the +time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the work was +then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s <i>13 Chapters</i> and Wu +Ch’i’s <i>Art of War</i> are the two books that people commonly refer to on the +subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will not +discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to +arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, the +greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as +a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, +that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given +in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence +of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to +be found in the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the +Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he crushed +Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s Commentary no +Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary need not contain +absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to +mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, +[18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of +Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much +more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his +contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that +Sun Wu alone should have been passed over? +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school as <i>Kuan +Tzŭ</i>, [22] <i>Liu T’ao</i>, [23] and the <i>Yüeh Yu</i> [24] and may have been the +production of some private scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and +Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The story that +his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of +big talk on the part of his followers. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time of the +"Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the +class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did not then +exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States" [27] that this custom +changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso +should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet +held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun +Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing +pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, is +utterly preposterous and incredible. +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu crushed +Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression +left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The +fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the +<i>Shih Chi</i> either that Sun Tzŭ was general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, +or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po +P’ei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was +largely due to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it +is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent +part in the same campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact that +he does not appear in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, although he is said to have served under +Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. +</p> + +<p> +He also says:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. +</p> + +<p> +It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while +rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s +history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work +which passes under his name. The author of the <i>Hsu Lu</i> fails to appreciate this +distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Ch’en Chen-sun really +misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in +favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must +have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently +plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." +The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan +Tzŭ, both of them important historical personages in their day. The former +lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known +to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that +Tseng Shen delivered the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, which had been entrusted to him by its +author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the <i>Art of War</i>, +acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different +epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in other words, +that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th +century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is furnished by the archaic +or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list +of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the <i>Hsu Lu;</i> and though +some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected +thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and +critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters +to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually +engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be +sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he +not honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that +the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal +evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable +allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by +the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form. [30] +The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between the various feudal +princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have +entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, +a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch +presently. +</p> + +<p> +But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its +being other than a <i>bonâ fide</i> production are sensibly diminished. The +great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should have been +forged in the period immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no +one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh +Shui-hsin’s theory, that the author was a literary recluse, that seems to me +quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading the +maxims of Sun Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large +store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of +a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a +practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time. +To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed +by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of +freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the +idea that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, +that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living +towards the end of the "<i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i>" period, are we not bound, in +spite of the silence of the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account +in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not +hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s biography were +false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is +still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the +story as told in the <i>Shih Chi</i>, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet +pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to +contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. § 21:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in number, +that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that +victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p> +The other is in XI. § 30:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, I should answer, +Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if they are +crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to +each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. +</p> + +<p> +These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of +composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and +Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped +notice is that they also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma +Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given +in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting +as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that +monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been +written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to +the capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary +enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war for +over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh was waged +only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched +in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now Ch’u is not +mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were +written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, +after Ch’u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a +table of dates may be found useful.<br/><br/> +</p> + +<table summary="" > + +<tr> <td>B.C.</td><td></td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>514</td><td>Accession of Ho Lu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>512</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering +Ying,<br/> +the capital. <i>Shih Chi</i> mentions Sun Wu as general.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>511</td><td>Another attack on Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>510</td><td>Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the +first<br/> +war between the two states.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>509 or 508</td><td>Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at +Yu-chang.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>506</td><td>Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and +Ts’ai.<br/> +Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last<br/> +mention of Sun Wu in <i>Shih Chi</i>.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>505</td><td>Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. +Wu<br/> +is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>504</td><td>Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>497</td><td>Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>496</td><td>Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at +Tsui-li.<br/> +Ho Lu is killed.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>494</td><td>Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of +Fu-<br/> +chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>485 or 484</td><td>Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu +Tzŭ-hsu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>482</td><td>Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu +Ch’ai.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>478 to 476</td><td>Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>475</td><td>Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td>473</td><td>Final defeat and extinction of Wu.</td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p3"> +The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that could +have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, +for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was +getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was +not in existence in 505, before which date Yüeh does not appear to have scored +any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was +written for him, it must have been during the period 505-496, when there was a +lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort +against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition +connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light +between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473, when Yüeh was once +again becoming a very serious menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the +author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his +own day. On this point the negative testimony of the <i>Tso Chuan</i> far outweighs +any shred of authority still attaching to the <i>Shih Chi</i>, if once its other facts +are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the +omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who +got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because the latter (being an alien) +was not rewarded with an office in the State. +</p> + +<p> +How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity +of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It +was felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of +war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of +Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep +and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the +short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, +than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly +identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his +brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by +him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? +</p> + +<p> +It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzŭ’s +life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I +should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s +accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a +subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which marked the +first half of the prince’s reign. [35] If he rose to be a general at all, he +certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was +doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s +sudden collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical juncture, +when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that +this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would +henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he +sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have +appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story +of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about +the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is +hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the +death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. +</p> + +<p> +If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the +fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace should be +contemporary with her greatest writer on war. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>The Text of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s text. +The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of +which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. +We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can +only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. Sun +Hsing-yen says in his preface:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s <i>Art of War</i> was in +general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated it as a +work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the benefit of +posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary +on it. +</p> + +<p> +As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that +Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so +obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time onward so +great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be +surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the +middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzŭ +were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao published a work in 15 +<i>chuan</i> entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected commentaries of ten writers." +There was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of +Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in +the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason +or other no longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th +century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi +T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was +known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which appears +in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i>. Another copy at my disposal of +what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in +the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" [1758]. And the +Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is evidently a similar +version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until +Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, +who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered +a copy of Chi T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library +of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the <i>I Shuo</i> of Cheng +Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, and also believed to have +perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or +text)"—a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set +before us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a +careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat +debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the +earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzŭ, even +older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the +<i>T’ung Tien</i>, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution, the other +similarly enshrined in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> encyclopedia. +In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, +intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of +different sections. Considering that the <i>Yu Lan</i> takes us back to the +year 983, and the <i>T’ung Tien</i> about 200 years further still, to the +middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun +Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem +to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government +instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own +account:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his editors had +handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of Chi +T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and +corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and +Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, +probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on +blocks as a textbook for military men. +</p> + +<p> +The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text +of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are left in doubt as to +the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when +ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one +co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their basis, and by +careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and +other sources of information such as the <i>I Shuo</i>, succeeded in restoring a very +large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be +accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s +original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text." +</p> + +<p> +The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 <i>pen</i>, +forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 <i>pen</i>. +[38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this +introduction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and +performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its +favour. This is followed by Ts’ao Kung’s preface to his edition, and the +biography of Sun Tzŭ from the <i>Shih Chi</i>, both translated above. Then come, +firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s <i>I Shuo</i>, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short +miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu +Lu</i>, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate +sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the +various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These +we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>The Commentators</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of commentators, +which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though +he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by +saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be +susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. +</p> + +<p> +1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti +[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary +on Sun Tzŭ actually came from the pen of this extraordinary man, whose +biography in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i> reads like a romance. One of the greatest +military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his +operations, he was especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, +which has found expression in the line "Talk of Ts’ao Ts’ao, and +Ts’ao Ts’ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a +great captain who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two +Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire +of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a +council of war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had +all his calculations ready; those generals who made use of them did not lose +one battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their +armies incontinently beaten and put to flight." Ts’ao Kung’s notes on Sun +Tzŭ, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern +commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as the +work of a mere <i>littérateur</i>. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, +they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than +the text itself. [40] +</p> + +<p> +2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name is +comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even his personal +name has not been recorded. Chi T’ien-pao’s edition places him after Chia +Lin, and Ch’ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T’ang dynasty, [41] +but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen’s preface, he appears as Meng Shih of +the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng K’ang of +the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of the "Five +Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao and Chia Lin. +</p> + +<p> +3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military +tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present day. The +<i>T’ung Chih</i> mentions "Lives of famous generals from the Chou to the +T’ang dynasty" as written by him. [42] According to Ch’ao Kung-wu +and the <i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, he followed a variant of the text of Sun +Tzŭ which differs considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly +short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes +from Chinese history. +</p> + +<p> +4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, his notes +being taken from the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, the encyclopedic treatise on the +Constitution which was his life-work. They are largely repetitions of +Ts’ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed that he drew on +the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar +arrangement of <i>T’ung Tien</i>, he has to explain each passage on its merits, +apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree with +that of Ts’ao Kung, whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to +be reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was added to their number by +Chi T’ien-pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. +</p> + +<p> +5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star even +in the glorious galaxy of the T’ang period. We learn from Ch’ao +Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely +fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well read in the military +history of the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> and <i>Chan Kuo</i> eras. His notes, therefore, +are well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with historical +parallels. The gist of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus summarized by him: "Practice +benevolence and justice, but on the other hand make full use of artifice and +measures of expediency." He further declared that all the military triumphs and +disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzŭ’s death would, +upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular, the +maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against +Ts’ao Kung has already been considered elsewhere. +</p> + +<p> +6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao +Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ because +Ts’ao Kung’s on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu +Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the +middle of the 11th century, calls Ts’ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch’en Hao +the three chief commentators on Sun Tzŭ, and observes that Ch’en Hao is +continually attacking Tu Mu’s shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking +in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors. +</p> + +<p> +7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his +commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the <i>T’ang Shu</i> and was afterwards +republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Shih +and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, +perhaps the least valuable of the eleven. +</p> + +<p> +8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei +Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published +with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the +following:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and trying to make +them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though commentators have not +been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has +not fallen into this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary +for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were +intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not +concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the +three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to +the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his +meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling +soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is +always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical +sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably +failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu has brushed +aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out +the true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have +been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the present work +deserves to be handed down side by side with the three great commentaries; and +for a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have +constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. +</p> + +<p> +Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to +endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above +Ch’en Hao in order of merit. +</p> + +<p> +9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his +interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch’en, and on the +whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary +with that of Ts’ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to +him. We learn from Ch’ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text +of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45] +</p> + +<p> +10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is +given as above by Cheng Ch’iao in the <i>Tung Chih</i>, written about the middle +of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as Ho Shih in the <i>Yu Hai</i>, and Ma +Tuan-lin quotes Ch’ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is +unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch’iao’s statement, +otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with +one Ho Ch’u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the +latter part of the 11th century. Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the +<i>T’ien-i-ko</i> catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is +chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the +dynastic histories and other sources. +</p> + +<p> +11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great originality +perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator +is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to +expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say +that much of Ts’ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its +pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the +Sung history, the <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, or the <i>Yu Hai</i>, but it finds a niche +in the <i>T’ung Chih</i>, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of +Famous Generals." [46] +</p> + +<p> +It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished +within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: +"During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of +peace, and men ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s +rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after +time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military +topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the +commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47] +</p> + +<p> +Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not +come down to us. The <i>Sui Shu</i> mentions four, namely Wang Ling (often quoted by +Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. +The <i>T’ang Shu</i> adds Sun Hao, and the <i>T’ung Chih</i> Hsiao Chi, while the +<i>T’u Shu</i> mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that +some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other +commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ</h2> + +<p> +Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China’s +greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages +with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (<i>d</i>. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (<i>d</i>. 34 +A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (<i>d</i>. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of +Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese +military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one +way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su +Tung-p’o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe +their chief inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is +preserved in the <i>Yu Hai:</i> [54]— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, [55] is +very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu Ch’i was a +man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are +linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch’i’s remarks +on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and +there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is +terse, but the meaning fully brought out. +</p> + +<p> +The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden of +Literature" by Cheng Hou:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men’s +training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of +letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous +and eminently practical. Such works as the <i>Lun Yu</i>, the <i>I Ching</i> +and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun +K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, +although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical +works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler’s bent towards +unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>Apologies for War</h2> + +<p> +Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on +earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all +its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long +military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of +time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army +along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the +Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the +grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of +government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many +dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have +flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that +the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the +Empire. +</p> + +<p> +No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can +point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the +most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i stands out conspicuous +in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her final struggle with the +remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of +the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. +When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful +figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao dominates the scene. And in the establishment +of the T’ang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the +superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was +seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need +fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. +</p> + +<p> +In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ +downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of +Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism +in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending +warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and +translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, +by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, +he was yet no advocate of peace at any price:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and cruelty, +to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to +succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns +on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who +carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he +is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when angry, his +poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his +being…. What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all +great issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only +bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the +use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and +dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they +will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general +enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have +taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare +the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military +chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one +can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by +others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others +rebellious. [58] +</p> + +<p> +The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun +Tzŭ:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government. +It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both disciples of +Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the +imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-place, +are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down +of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into captivity, and the +beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The +objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is +no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off +heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, +only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of military +weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is +to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good…. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military aptitude +by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been acquired by study." +[59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of +Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by Confucius. It is +fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions, +though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very +far." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" and the +"military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in +what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. +But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are +quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced +manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set +down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an +extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily +lose sight of fundamental principles. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated +ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning; +yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and +chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting +was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific negotiations are in +progress, warlike preparations should have been made beforehand." He rebuked +and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who cowered under him and dared not +proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no +knowledge of military matters? +</p> + +<p class="p3"> +We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He also +appeals to the authority of the Classics:— +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never studied +matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to K’ung +Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But +if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force against +the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i was overawed. Again, when the +inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon +they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I +fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil +and military functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or +received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not +specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject +of his teaching. +</p> + +<p> +Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:—<br/><br/> +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: "If I +fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war +constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must not be +treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in" +must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does +not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the +art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, +who was employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the +remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of +Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of +war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the example of +Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that +all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with +such things as opportunism in designing plans, and the conversion of spies, +they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore +the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our +officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is +reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch +their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless +unless a general is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men’s +lives in battle. [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should +be studied. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. Chi got a +rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies +to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated and +overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond +verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to +destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature +of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. +There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted +oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can we +then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and honesty? +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>Bibliography</h2> + +<p> +The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes +on each have been drawn principally from the <i>Ssu k’u ch’uan shu +chien ming mu lu</i>, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq. +</p> + +<p> +1. <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (<i>d</i>. 381 B.C.). A genuine +work. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i> or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to Ssu-ma Jang-chu +of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the +three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met within its pages. See <i>Shih +Chi</i>, ch. 64. +</p> + +<p> +The <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu</i> (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three +treatises on war, <i>Sun Tzŭ</i>, <i>Wu Tzŭ</i> and <i>Ssu-ma Fa</i>, are, generally speaking, only +concerned with things strictly military—the art of producing, collecting, +training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of +expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of +soldiers—in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war +is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Liu T’ao</i>, in 6 <i>chuan</i>, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or Lu +Shang, also known as T’ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But its +style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 +A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the six sections so +that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui dynasty. +</p> + +<p> +4. <i>Wei Liao Tzŭ</i>, in 5 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who +studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The work appears to have been originally +in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is +sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably +from those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a commentary +by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>San Lueh</i> in 3 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage +who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (<i>d</i>. 187 B.C.) in an interview on +a bridge. But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the +Ch’in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently +quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may +have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We +shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], +or somewhat earlier. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Li Wei Kung Wen Tui</i>, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue +between T’ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is usually ascribed +to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author +was evidently well versed in the art of war. +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Li Ching Ping Fa</i> (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short +treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T’ung Tien, but not published +separately. This fact explains its omission from the <i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan +Shu</i>. +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Wu Ch’i Ching</i>, in 1 <i>chuan</i>. Attributed to the legendary minister Feng +Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (<i>d</i>. 121 B.C.), +and said to have been eulogized by the celebrated general Ma Lung (<i>d</i>. 300 +A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the <i>Sung Chih</i>. Although a forgery, +the work is well put together. +</p> + +<p> +Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has always been +held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his +pen. Such are (1) the <i>Shih Liu Ts’e</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), preserved in the <i>Yung Lo +Ta Tien;</i> (2) <i>Chiang Yuan</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>); and (3) <i>Hsin Shu</i> (1 <i>chuan</i>), which steals +wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered +genuine. +</p> + +<p> +Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections devoted to +the literature of war. The following references may be found useful:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>T’ung Tien</i> (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.<br/> +<i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i> (983), ch. 270-359.<br/> +<i>Wen Hsien Tung K’ao</i> (13th cent.), ch. 221.<br/> +<i>Yu Hai</i> (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.<br/> +<i>San Ts’ai T’u Hui</i> (16th cent).<br/> +<i>Kuang Po Wu Chih</i> (1607), ch. 31, 32.<br/> +<i>Ch’ien Ch’io Lei Shu</i> (1632), ch. 75.<br/> +<i>Yuan Chien Lei Han</i> (1710), ch. 206-229.<br/> +<i>Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng</i> (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. +81-90.<br/> +<i>Hsu Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i> (1784), ch. 121-134.<br/> +<i>Huang Ch’ao Ching Shih Wen Pien</i> (1826), ch. 76, 77.<br/></p> + +<p> +The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve +mention:— +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +<i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 30.<br/> +<i>Sui Shu</i>, ch. 32-35.<br/> +<i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 46, 47.<br/> +<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 57,60.<br/> +<i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 202-209.<br/> +<i>T’ung Chih</i> (circa 1150), ch. 68.<br/></p> + +<p> +To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial +Library:— +</p> + +<p> +<i>Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu Tsung Mu T’i Yao</i> (1790), ch. 99, 100. +</p> + +<h2>Footnotes</h2> + +<p> +1. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 65. +</p> + +<p> +2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 130. +</p> + +<p> +4. The appellation of Nang Wa. +</p> + +<p> +5. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +6. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25. +</p> + +<p> +7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year 637. +</p> + +<p> +8. Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607. +</p> + +<p> +9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the Han +dynasty, which says: "Ten <i>li</i> outside the <i>Wu</i> gate [of the city of +Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to commemorate the +entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch’i, who excelled in the art of war, by the +King of Wu." +</p> + +<p> +10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to make +arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the Empire in awe." +</p> + +<p> +11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by +Kou chien, King of Yüeh, in 473 B.C. See post. +</p> + +<p> +12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in his +preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction." +</p> + +<p> +13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the <i>T’u Shu</i>, and may +be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang Shou-chieh of the +T’ang dynasty, and appears in the <i>T’ai P’ing Yu Lan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, +perhaps especially of § 8. +</p> + +<p> +15. See chap. XI. +</p> + +<p> +16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that <i>Wu Tzŭ</i>, which is not in 6 +chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the <i>Han Chih</i>. Likewise, the <i>Chung Yung</i> is +credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one only. In the case of very +short works, one is tempted to think that <i>p’ien</i> might simply mean +"leaves." +</p> + +<p> +17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223]. +</p> + +<p> +18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. +</p> + +<p> +19. See Chapter 7, § 27 and Chapter 11, § 28. +</p> + +<p> +20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name. +</p> + +<p> +21. I.e. Po P’ei. See ante. +</p> + +<p> +22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have +been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of another +work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear. +</p> + +<p> +25. About 480 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung. +</p> + +<p> +27. In the 3rd century B.C. +</p> + +<p> +28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter +half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written a work on +war. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of the INTRODUCTION. +</p> + +<p> +29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the +<i>Tso Chuan</i> must have been written in the 5th century, but not before 424 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +30. See <i>Mencius</i> III. 1. iii. 13-20. +</p> + +<p> +31. When Wu first appears in the <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> in 584, it is already +at variance with its powerful neighbour. The <i>Ch’un Ch’iu</i> first +mentions Yüeh in 537, the <i>Tso Chuan</i> in 601. +</p> + +<p> +32. This is explicitly stated in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, XXXII, 2. +</p> + +<p> +33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to +grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language +used in XI. § 30. +</p> + +<p> +34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious +treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. +Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, +cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. +</p> + +<p> +35. From <i>Tso Chuan:</i> "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] there was no +year in which Ch’u was not attacked by Wu." +</p> + +<p> +36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended +from Sun Tzŭ. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor’s work from a +literary point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long +have we been enjoying the blessings of peace!" +</p> + +<p> +37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of +Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the ascent of +the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as being "situated five +<i>li</i> east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the +Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the T’ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]." +</p> + +<p> +38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40. +</p> + +<p> +39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzŭ. +</p> + +<p> +40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His commentary is +frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the +meaning." +</p> + +<p> +41. <i>Wen Hsien T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters +1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See +B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525. +</p> + +<p> +43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally +existent in Sun Tzŭ’s day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old +military organization had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other +explanation of the passage. +</p> + +<p> +44. See <i>Chou Li</i>, xxix. 6-10. +</p> + +<p> +45. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, ch. 221. +</p> + +<p> +46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new edition). +</p> + +<p> +47. <i>T’ung K’ao</i>, loc. cit. +</p> + +<p> +48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, +ch. 10. +</p> + +<p> +49. See XI. § 58, note. +</p> + +<p> +50. <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 17 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +51. <i>San Kuo Chih</i>, ch. 54. +</p> + +<p> +52. <i>Sung Shih</i>, ch. 365 ad init. +</p> + +<p> +53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves +with Sun Tzŭ are not behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may +perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the +sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun +Wu’s maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter +VIII] is one that the people of this country would do well to take to heart." +</p> + +<p> +54. Ch. 140. +</p> + +<p> +55. See IV. § 3. +</p> + +<p> +56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2. +</p> + +<p> +57. The <i>Tso Chuan</i>. +</p> + +<p> +58. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 25, fol. I. +</p> + +<p> +59. Cf. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch 47. +</p> + +<p> +60. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, preface § 55. +</p> + +<p> +61. See <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +62. <i>Lun Yu</i>, XV. 1. +</p> + +<p> +63. I failed to trace this utterance. +</p> + +<p> +64. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +65. Supra. +</p> + +<p> +66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, and +festive rites. See <i>Shu Ching</i>, ii. 1. III. 8, and <i>Chou Li</i>, IX. fol. 49. +</p> + +<p> +67. See XIII. § 11, note. +</p> + +<p> +68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, where Tzŭ-ch’an +says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere +learner to make it up." +</p> + +<p> +69. Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 31. +</p> + +<p> +70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See <i>Lun Yu</i>, XIII. 29, 30. +</p> + +<p> +71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.]. +</p> + +<p> +72. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 47. +</p> + +<p> +73. <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 38. +</p> + +<p> +74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in +the <i>Shih Chi</i>, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former +minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to +which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station +by Wen Wang. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>Chapter I. LAYING PLANS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this +chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the +general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See. § 26.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence +it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. +</p> + +<p> +3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into +account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions +obtaining in the field. +</p> + +<p> +4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) +Method and discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a principle of +harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One might be +tempted to render it by "morale," were it not considered as an attribute of the +<i>ruler</i> in § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +5, 6. <i>The Moral Law</i> causes the people to be in complete accord with their +ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by +any danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +7. <i>Heaven</i> signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here. Meng +Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, +however, may be right in saying that what is meant is "the general economy of +Heaven," including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and +other phenomena.] +</p> + +<p> +8. <i>Earth</i> comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground +and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. +</p> + +<p> +9. <i>The Commander</i> stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, +courage and strictness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or benevolence; (2) +uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, or "proper feeling;" (4) +wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put +before "humanity or benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and +"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, +self-control, or ‘proper feeling.’"] +</p> + +<p> +10. By <i>Method and discipline</i> are to be understood the marshalling of the +army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, +the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control +of military expenditure. +</p> + +<p> +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them +will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. +</p> + +<p> +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military +conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?<br/> +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.]<br/> +</p> + +<p> + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?<br/> + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See §§ 7, 8] +</p> + +<p> +(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. +155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with +his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned +himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn! +However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of +justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment on the +present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a law, see that +it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be put to death."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) Which army is the stronger? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely +rendered, "<i>esprit de corps</i> and ‘big battalions.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the officers will +be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, +the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] +</p> + +<p> +(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly +rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. +</p> + +<p> +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will +conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens +not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be +dismissed! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was composed +expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu State.] +</p> + +<p> +16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful +circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. +</p> + +<p> +17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." He +cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as Chang +Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for +the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy +in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of +the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke +of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the +morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself +Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. +The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first +tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," +continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and +as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine +are?" [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +18. All warfare is based on deception. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. +Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, +was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he +concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we +must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far +away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. +</p> + +<p> +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush him." +It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the uses of +deception in war.] +</p> + +<p> +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior +strength, evade him. +</p> + +<p> +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be +weak, that he may grow arrogant. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his +adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, +and then suddenly pouncing upon him.] +</p> + +<p> +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while +we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The <i>Yu Lan</i> has +"Lure him on and tire him out."] +</p> + +<p> +If his forces are united, separate them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commentators: "If +sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged +beforehand. +</p> + +<p> +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere +the battle is fought. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be +set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order +that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do +many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much +more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee +who is likely to win or lose. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>Chapter II. WAGING WAR</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the +cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is +not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of +ways and means.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a +thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand +mail-clad soldiers, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for +the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for purposes of +defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this +seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between early +Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot +was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped +a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we +are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each +heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a +thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.] +</p> + +<p> +with provisions enough to carry them a thousand <i>li</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[2.78 modern <i>li</i> go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since +Sun Tzŭ’s time.] +</p> + +<p> +the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, +small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will +reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of +raising an army of 100,000 men. +</p> + +<p> +2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s +weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a +town, you will exhaust your strength. +</p> + +<p> +3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be +equal to the strain. +</p> + +<p> +4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength +exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take +advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert +the consequences that must ensue. +</p> + +<p> +5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been +seen associated with long delays. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the +commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and +Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally +stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: +"Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and +treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in +their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: "Lengthy operations +mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and +distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of +such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid +haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, +except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than +ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more +guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can +never be anything but foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to +the nation. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the classic +example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general +deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals’s +isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to +suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot +question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. +Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative +presumption in their favour.] +</p> + +<p> +6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can +thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long +war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. +Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but it fits well into +the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the +evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly pointless.] +</p> + +<p> +8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his +supply-waggons loaded more than twice. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for +reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but +crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy +to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon +Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your +opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the +nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.] +</p> + +<p> +9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the +army will have food enough for its needs. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things to +be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of +an army, apart from provisions.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by +contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance +causes the people to be impoverished. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though +obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I +cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to +Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we +get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the +cause of the people’s impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by +which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But +why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the +State or Government is too poor to do so?] +</p> + +<p> +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and +high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory. +Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the +frontier.] +</p> + +<p> +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by +heavy exactions. +</p> + +<p> +13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of +the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be +dissipated; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of +7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho +Shih has a characteristic tag: "The <i>people</i> being regarded as the essential part +of the State, and <i>food</i> as the people’s heaven, is it not right that those in +authority should value and be careful of both?"] +</p> + +<p> +while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates +and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, +draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. +</p> + +<p> +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload +of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a +single <i>picul</i> of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one +cartload to the front. A <i>picul</i> is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 +kilograms).] +</p> + +<p> +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there +may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the +advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, +they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to +fight, each on his own account."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, +those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be +substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in +conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. +</p> + +<p> +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength. +</p> + +<p> +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ here +reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the +people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace +or in peril. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take +the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. +So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to +capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally +of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a regiment +contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists from any number +between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 +men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 +respectively.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; +supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without +fighting. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese +general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at +Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the +Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be +content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but an active policy +of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the enemy +has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our +own attack first."] +</p> + +<p> +the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in speaking of +hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into +which the China of his day was split up.] +</p> + +<p> +the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[When he is already at full strength.] +</p> + +<p> +and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. +</p> + +<p> +4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, +and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or +even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of +the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.] +</p> + +<p> +The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, +will take up three whole months; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", +described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but we get +a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says they were to protect the +heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems +to suggest a sort of Roman <i>testudo</i>, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled +vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See +<i>supra</i> II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the +"movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. +They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from +within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of +men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat +with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden donkeys."] +</p> + +<p> +and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the +enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to +destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.] +</p> + +<p> +5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the +assault like swarming ants, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army +of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at +the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his +engines of war are ready.] +</p> + +<p> +with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still +remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in +the most recent siege which history has to record.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any +fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows +their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no harm to +individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to +the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother of the people."] +</p> + +<p> +7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, +without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of the +sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, the weapon not +being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the method of attacking by stratagem. +</p> + +<p> +8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround +him; if five to one, to attack him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to +violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, gives a clue to +Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our +army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu +thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as numerous as that +of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy +in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, +he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in +front." This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the +regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not +understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as +concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in +calling this a mistake."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If +attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general +will fight."] +</p> + +<p> +if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning, "we can <i>watch</i> the enemy," is certainly a great improvement +on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for +the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other +factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than +counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.] +</p> + +<p> +if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. +</p> + +<p> +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end +it must be captured by the larger force. +</p> + +<p> +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at +all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State +will be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the +general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his +profession), his army will lack strength."] +</p> + +<p> +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his +army:— +</p> + +<p> +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the +fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a +thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think of +"the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the +movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the +reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be +governed from without, and army should not be directed from within." Of course +it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, +the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance +apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and +give wrong orders.] +</p> + +<p> +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a +kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes +restlessness in the soldier’s minds. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the +civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves." And +Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a +state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are +military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an +army"—to that of a State, understood.] +</p> + +<p> +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] +</p> + +<p> +through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. +This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the +ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a +general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted +with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skilful employer of men will +employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For +the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show +his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the +stupid man has no fear of death."] +</p> + +<p> +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from +the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and +flinging victory away. +</p> + +<p> +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will +win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he +cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably +conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly, as Li +Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying more +satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force +to defeat a greater, and <i>vice versa</i>. The secret lies in an eye for locality, +and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior +force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult +ground.’"] +</p> + +<p> +(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its +ranks. +</p> + +<p> +(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. +</p> + +<p> +(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the +sovereign. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to give broad +instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the general." It is +needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue +interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. +Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he +was not hampered by central authority.] +</p> + +<p> +Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of +victory.”] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not +fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, +for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 +A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to +despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An and +Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight +provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, +they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into +the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon +after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty +retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing +yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret +of defence; defence is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a +better epitome of the root-principle of war.] +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of +this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two armies with +a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the +dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your +dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory; +show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads to +defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can "secure success by +modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the +possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the +enemy. +</p> + +<p> +2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the +opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] +</p> + +<p> +3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his troops, +covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] +</p> + +<p> +but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +4. Hence the saying: One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to +<i>do</i> it. +</p> + +<p> +5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the +enemy means taking the offensive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of the fact +that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, "He who cannot +conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a +superabundance of strength. +</p> + +<p> +7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of +the earth; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the +utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his +whereabouts."] +</p> + +<p> +he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, +against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the +commentators.] +</p> + +<p> +Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a +victory that is complete. +</p> + +<p> +8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the +acme of excellence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has +germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch’uan +alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior +army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch’eng-an, +said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and +shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously, and +gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the +details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture +the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole +Empire says, "Well done!" +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move +surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, so that +at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzŭ reserves +his approbation for things that +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +"the world’s coarse thumb<br/> +And finger fail to plumb." +</p> + +<p> +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, +when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese +writers.] +</p> + +<p> +to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is +no sign of a quick ear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing: Wu +Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a +hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih +K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.] +</p> + +<p> +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but +excels in winning with ease. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering." +Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with +difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."] +</p> + +<p> +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for +courage. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained over +circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large knows nothing of +them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state +submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for +courage."] +</p> + +<p> +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile +attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks +to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched +battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look +into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never +make a blunder and therefore invariably win."] +</p> + +<p> +Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means +conquering an enemy that is already defeated. +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat +impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not be +confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the +arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the +safety of his army.] +</p> + +<p> +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after +the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and +afterwards looks for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will +ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with +stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be +assured."] +</p> + +<p> +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to +method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. +</p> + +<p> +17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, +Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; +fifthly, Victory. +</p> + +<p> +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to +Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to +Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese. The +first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to +form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to make calculations based on the +data thus obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison of +the enemy’s chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then victory +ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third term, which in the Chinese some +commentators take as a calculation of <i>numbers</i>, thereby making it nearly +synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of +as a consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the +third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu +says: "The question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the +varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, +but weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a calculation of +numbers.] +</p> + +<p> +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in +the scale against a single grain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "a victorious army is like an <i>i</i> (20 oz.) weighed against a <i>shu</i> +(1/24 oz.); a routed army is a <i>shu</i> weighed against an <i>i</i>." The point is simply +the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has +over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, +makes the <i>i</i> to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it +equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives +the same figure as Chu Hsi.] +</p> + +<p> +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters +into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>Chapter V. ENERGY</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the +control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate +officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous reply to the +first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I +could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the +Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from +fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and +signals. +</p> + +<p> +3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack +and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct and indirect. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the +discussion of the <i>cheng</i> and the <i>ch’i</i>." As it is by no means +easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them +consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of +the commentators’ remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li +Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is <i>cheng</i>, making lateral diversion is +<i>ch’i</i>. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops should be +arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvers +must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "<i>Ch’i</i> is active, +<i>cheng</i> is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity +brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our +straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus +<i>cheng</i> may also be <i>ch’i</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> may also be +<i>cheng</i>." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching +ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large +force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his +opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march on +Lin-chin was <i>cheng</i>, and the surprise manœuver was <i>ch’i</i>." +Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: "Military +writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of <i>ch’i</i> and +<i>cheng</i>. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours +frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung +says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on +the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] +says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is <i>cheng</i>; turning movements, on +the other hand, are <i>ch’i</i>.’ These writers simply regard +<i>cheng</i> as <i>cheng</i>, and <i>ch’i</i> as <i>ch’i</i>; they +do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other +like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on the T’ang +Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A <i>ch’i</i> +manœuver may be <i>cheng</i>, if we make the enemy look upon it as +<i>cheng</i>; then our real attack will be <i>ch’i</i>, and vice versa. +The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real +intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other +operation is <i>cheng</i>, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; +whereas that is <i>ch’i</i>," which takes him by surprise or comes from +an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be +<i>ch’i</i>," it immediately becomes <i>cheng</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an +egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. +</p> + +<p> +5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but +indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the +enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect +tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march +round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1] +</p> + +<p> +6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, +unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but +to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of <i>ch’i</i> +and <i>cheng</i>. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of <i>cheng</i> at +all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to +it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the +two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot +really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative +language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.] +</p> + +<p> +7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these +five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. +</p> + +<p> +8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, white, and +black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen. +</p> + +<p> +9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, +bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted. +</p> + +<p> +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct +and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series +of manœuvers. +</p> + +<p> +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like +moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the +possibilities of their combination? +</p> + +<p> +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll +stones along in its course. +</p> + +<p> +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which +enables it to strike and destroy its victim. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is used +defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word as "the +measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the +illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it seems +to me to denote that instinct of <i>self-restraint</i> which keeps the bird +from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of +judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is +the highly important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very +instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action +at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes +exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson +coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to +bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.] +</p> + +<p> +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his +decision. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of distance +mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot help +thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to +our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing +the falcon’s mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological +moment’ should be seized in war."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the +releasing of the trigger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of energy +and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on +the trigger.] +</p> + +<p> +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and +yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be +without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been previously +fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the +dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may +give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your +formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and +yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates +courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone down +the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws out a +hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to destroy +formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite +plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you +must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to +entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your +weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding +strength."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of +subdivision; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 1.] +</p> + +<p> +concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent +energy; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here differently +than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: "seeing that we are +favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we +are really afraid."] +</p> + +<p> +masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: +“Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their +condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their +able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and +emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all recommended +the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying: +‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an +ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old +age and infirmity. This is surely some <i>ruse</i> on the part of the enemy, and it +would be unwise for us to attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding +this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at +Po-teng.”] +</p> + +<p> +19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains +deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu says: +"If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may be simulated +in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are +strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements +should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the +following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the +Ch’i State being at war with Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin +against the general P’ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal +enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch’i State has a reputation for +cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this +circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border +into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, +50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued +them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: +their numbers have already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun +Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach +after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the +words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to +fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to +shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang Chuan arrived at the +spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written +on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his whole +army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the +<i>Shih Chi</i>, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes +P’ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the +rout of his army.] ] +</p> + +<p> +He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. +</p> + +<p> +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked +men he lies in wait for him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in wait +with the main body of his troops."] +</p> + +<p> +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not +require too much from individuals. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; +afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each men according +to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented."] +</p> + +<p> +Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined energy. +</p> + +<p> +22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like +unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain +motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to +come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] +</p> + +<p> +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a +round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the +subject of energy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount +importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great results," he +adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, +on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter +V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general +acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and defence, and then turns +his attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and +combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong +points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and +defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on the +above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on +Energy."] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the +enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to +hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not +allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights not at +all. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his +own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy +to draw near. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will +strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.] +</p> + +<p> +4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s +interpretation of I. § 23.] +</p> + +<p> +if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can +force him to move. +</p> + +<p> +5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to +places where you are not expected. +</p> + +<p> +6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through +country where the enemy is not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt +from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, +attack in unexpected quarters."] +</p> + +<p> +7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places +which are undefended. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, where +the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls +are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes +too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst +themselves."] +</p> + +<p> +You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions that +cannot be attacked. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is +rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, +Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be: "In order to +make your defence quite safe, you must defend <i>even</i> those places that are not +likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will +be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the +preceding—always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which +is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark +in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights +of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against +him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the +enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret +recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his +whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those +that the enemy cannot attack."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what +to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to +attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] +</p> + +<p> +9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, +through you inaudible; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference to +the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. +</p> + +<p> +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s +weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more +rapid than those of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though +he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is +attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of +communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; if we are +the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself." It is +clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no +believer in frontal attacks.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even +though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we +need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin: +"even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch’uan says: +"we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches +the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one of Chu-ko Liang, who when +occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, suddenly +struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung open the city +gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground. +This unexpected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an +ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating +here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."] +</p> + +<p> +13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, +we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei +Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are +visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being +kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard +against attack from every quarter."] +</p> + +<p> +14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into +fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a +whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. +</p> + +<p> +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, +our opponents will be in dire straits. +</p> + +<p> +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the +enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different +points; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by saying that +"while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to +do, <i>he</i> was thinking most of what he was going to do himself."] +</p> + +<p> +and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall +have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. +</p> + +<p> +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he +strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he +will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. +If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In Frederick the Great’s <i>Instructions to his Generals</i> we read: "A +defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals +who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those +who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object +in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to +avoid greater."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; +numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations +against us. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the enemy to +disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction +in turn."] +</p> + +<p> +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate +from the greatest distances in order to fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and +that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army +for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction +at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy +in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions which military +history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of +Blucher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.] +</p> + +<p> +20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent +to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van +unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if +the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred <i>li</i> apart, +and even the nearest are separated by several <i>li</i>! +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the +mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army advancing +towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of which has orders to be +there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed +at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting, +the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be +worth quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to +concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be +forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will +be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to +battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between +wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between the +foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."] +</p> + +<p> +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in +number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then +that victory can be achieved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended in 473 +B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its incorporation in Yüeh. +This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death. With his present assertion +compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, +which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it +is said, ‘One may <i>know</i> how to conquer without being able to <i>do</i> it,’ whereas +here we have the statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, +that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under +discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make +certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the +soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s calculations, will be kept in +ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is why he says +here that victory can be achieved."] +</p> + +<p> +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. +Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all plans +conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure." +</p> + +<p> +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being +thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low +or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful +present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his +Fabian tactics.] +</p> + +<p> +Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. +</p> + +<p> +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know +where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. IV. § 6.] +</p> + +<p> +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to +conceal them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is perhaps +not so much actual invisibility (see <i>supra</i> § 9) as "showing no sign" of +what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.] +</p> + +<p> +conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest +spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable officers, they +will not be able to lay any plans against us."] +</p> + +<p> +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own +tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. +</p> + +<p> +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the +strategy out of which victory is evolved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[<i>I.e.</i>, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they +cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the +battle.] +</p> + +<p> +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your +methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle underlying +victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number." With this +compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be +learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen +diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like +Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."] +</p> + +<p> +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs +away from high places and hastens downwards. +</p> + +<p> +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is +weak. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it +flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is +facing. +</p> + +<p> +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are +no constant conditions. +</p> + +<p> +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby +succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. +</p> + +<p> +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally +predominant; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."] +</p> + +<p> +the four seasons make way for each other in turn. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] +</p> + +<p> +There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of +fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The comparison +is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun +Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. +490. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. +</p> + +<p> +2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and +harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between the +higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying +of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military +expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array can +be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ is represented as saying to Wu +Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all the +domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."] +</p> + +<p> +3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing more +difficult. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao +Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s instructions until +our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most +difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or manœuvers can hardly be said to +begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s +note gives color to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonizing and +entrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve. The real +difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes +that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing +favourable position."] +</p> + +<p> +The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious into the +direct, and misfortune into gain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical +expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is explained by +Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off, then cover the +distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: +"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are +dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn: +"Although you may have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to +encounter this is a drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by +celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two +famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his +mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which resulted in the +great victory of Marengo.] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of +the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before +him, shows knowledge of the artifice of <i>deviation</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of +O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of Chao first +consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a relief, but the +latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged +and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully admitted the +hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: "We shall be like two rats +fighting in a whole—and the pluckier one will win!" So he left the +capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 <i>li</i> when he +stopped and began throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued +strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the +intelligence to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and +attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was +in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies +had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days +and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity +that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the "North hill" before the +enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the +Ch’in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste +and retreat across the border.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, +most dangerous. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I adopt the reading of the <i>T’ung Tien</i>, Cheng Yu-hsien and the <i>T’u +Shu</i>, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to make +sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to mean that +manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all depends on the +ability of the general.] +</p> + +<p> +6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, +the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a +flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who +paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm, +being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the +whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not approve of a lengthy march being +undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced +marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a +stretch, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 <i>li</i>; but on one +occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have +covered the incredible distance of 300 <i>li</i> within twenty-four hours.] +</p> + +<p> +doing a hundred <i>li</i> in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all +your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on +this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a hundred +<i>li</i> to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. +Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall +Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the +dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary +exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was +imperative, that he sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. If you march fifty <i>li</i> in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will +lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the +goal. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be <i>torn away</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +10. If you march thirty <i>li</i> with the same object, two-thirds of your army +will arrive. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the <i>T’ung Tien</i> is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of +manœuvering."] +</p> + +<p> +11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without +provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says "fodder +and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, +foodstuffs, etc."] +</p> + +<p> +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of +our neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the +face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and +precipices, its marshes and swamps. +</p> + +<p> +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use +of local guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.] +</p> + +<p> +15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the +numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained. +</p> + +<p> +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by +circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift but, as +Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."] +</p> + +<p> +your compactness that of the forest. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching, order +and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But +natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the +quality of density or compactness.] +</p> + +<p> +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Shih Ching</i>, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man +can check."] +</p> + +<p> +in immovability like a mountain. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dislodge +you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into a trap.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall +like a thunderbolt. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: "You +cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting—so +rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot +be parried.] +</p> + +<p> +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting +that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards be +fairly divided amongst all.] +</p> + +<p> +when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of +the soldiery. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and +plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they +invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most +memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch’ao who +penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k’ang-an +and Tso Tsung-t’ang.] +</p> + +<p> +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp until we +have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of the opposing +general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, §§ 3, 4.] +</p> + +<p> +Such is the art of manœuvering. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But there now +follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on War, +now lost, but apparently extant at the time when Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of +this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no +commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.] +</p> + +<p> +23. The Book of Army Management says: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any +information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient military +classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the enormous amount +of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time between the +various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable +that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written down at +some earlier period.] +</p> + +<p> +On the field of battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and +drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution +of banners and flags. +</p> + +<p> +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of +the host may be focussed on one particular point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same +object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a +single man."!] +</p> + +<p> +25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the +brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance against +orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in this +connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the Ch’in +State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless +daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and +returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an +officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, and +ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I fully believe he +was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."] +</p> + +<p> +This is the art of handling large masses of men. +</p> + +<p> +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in +fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and +eyes of your army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head of +500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches, that though +the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute +their passage.] +</p> + +<p> +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all +ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now +the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived +on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait +until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in this +way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others +tell an anecdote (to be found in the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao +Kuei, a protege of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by +Ch’i, and the duke was about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after +the first roll of the enemy’s drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." +Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for +attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. +Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao +Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll +of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on +the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their +spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. +4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, and +continues: "The value of a whole army—a mighty host of a million +men—is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"] +</p> + +<p> +a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is +the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage +into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a +saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or +striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing the +enemy’s mental equilibrium."] +</p> + +<p> +28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the +Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas Hannibal’s +men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.] +</p> + +<p> +by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on +returning to camp. +</p> + +<p> +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but +attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of +studying moods. +</p> + +<p> +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub +amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. +</p> + +<p> +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease +while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is +famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. +</p> + +<p> +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, +to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident +array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to +oppose him when he comes downhill. +</p> + +<p> +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose +temper is keen. +</p> + +<p> +35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, +take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by +the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that the saying has +a wider application.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a +man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any +attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be +tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who +hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is told of +Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the <i>San Kuo Chi</i>, In +198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent +reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was +obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two +enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged +himself. In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he +bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the +whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while Ts’ao +himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into +confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards: "The +brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a +desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."] +</p> + +<p> +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as +Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus +prevent his fighting with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: +"After that, you may crush him."] +</p> + +<p> +Do not press a desperate foe too hard. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will +use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his +boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of +a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the +meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch’ing. That general, +together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded by a vastly superior +army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-like, and +the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells +they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and +sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu +Yen-ch’ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our +country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened +to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of +sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding +on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-cheng by name, was +quicker to see an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in +the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will +go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, +Fu Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his +cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.] +</p> + +<p> +37. Such is the art of warfare. +</p> + +<p> +[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426. +</p> + +<p> +[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, +1907), p. 29. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does not +appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V §§ 6-11) +that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we +have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an +indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary +our tactics to the utmost degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes +these Nine Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are +connected with the Nine Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by +Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been +lost—a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends +some weight.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, +collects his army and concentrates his forces. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been +interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.] +</p> + +<p> +2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads +intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated +positions. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning +of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this +situation as being situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li +Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks +or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and +precipices, without a road by which to advance."] +</p> + +<p> +In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position, +you must fight. +</p> + +<p> +3. There are roads which must not be followed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan, +"where an ambush is to be feared."] +</p> + +<p> +armies which must be not attacked, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be attacked." +Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival advantage, but +are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of +overtaxing your men’s strength."] +</p> + +<p> +towns which must not be besieged, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own +experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of +Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the +country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no +fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should +be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause +any trouble." Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is +small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great +feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the +seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was +Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and +manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when +the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not +be obeyed. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and +Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: "Weapons are baleful +instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the +negation of civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even +Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.] +</p> + +<p> +4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany +variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. +</p> + +<p> +5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the +configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to +practical account. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only securing +good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible +way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is characterized by certain natural +features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is +possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical +knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"] +</p> + +<p> +6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his +plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make +the best use of his men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous +lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if +an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, +it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and if +consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But +there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these +advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but +if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an +ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to +attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with +desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of +disadvantage will be blended together. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says +Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."] +</p> + +<p> +8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in +accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix +our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing +some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations."] +</p> + +<p> +9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to +seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must +consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my own ability to +gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations +are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself…. For instance; if I +am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the +nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it +would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and +use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the +story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.] +</p> + +<p> +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which +would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s best and +wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into +his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue +and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By +means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and +waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into +excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." +Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun Tzŭ here: +"Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit +of his own accord."] +</p> + +<p> +and make trouble for them, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be +made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we might say, +"assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony +amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a +whip-hand over the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +and keep them constantly engaged; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from having any +rest."] +</p> + +<p> +hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: "cause +them to forget <i>pien</i> (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first +impulse), and hasten in our direction."] +</p> + +<p> +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not +coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not +attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. +</p> + +<p> +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) +Recklessness, which leads to destruction; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes a +man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says +Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an +ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character +of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, +forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general +should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who +fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be +condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s +death does not bring about victory."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) cowardice, which leads to capture; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as +being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage," +and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih +gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the +man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved +in war unless you are willing to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets +an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 +A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval +battle with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered +only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan +Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be overcome, had a +light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if +necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting +spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an +attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be +first in the fray, Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their +baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a +somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who +during a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in +readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to +get across.] +</p> + +<p> +(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Teng +Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. +Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily +provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will +grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to +be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured +as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and +slain.] +</p> + +<p> +(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a +general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to +slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however +undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: +"The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."] +</p> + +<p> +(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless of the +welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sacrificing +any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a +shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from +the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the +consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve +a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his +military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to +relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders +which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very +man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the +interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one +of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I +remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his +men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun +Tzŭ’s mouth.] +</p> + +<p> +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of +war. +</p> + +<p> +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be +found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap17"></a>Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 than by +this heading.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and +observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the +neighbourhood of valleys. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies +of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the +openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu +Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan +was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found a refuge in the +hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable +positions commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch’iang was soon in +such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a +total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood +of valleys."] +</p> + +<p> +2. Camp in high places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding +country.] +</p> + +<p> +facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east." +Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13. +</p> + +<p> +Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. +</p> + +<p> +3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao +Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your evolutions." +The <i>T’ung Tien</i> reads, "If <i>the enemy</i> crosses a river," etc. But in view of +the next sentence, this is almost certainly an interpolation.] +</p> + +<p> +4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance +to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and +then deliver your attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu at +the Wei River. Turning to the <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, we +find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were drawn up on opposite +sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten +thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading +half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, pretending to +have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was +much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han +Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his +turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a +great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of +Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which had +been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The +rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all +directions.] +</p> + +<p> +5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a +river which he has to cross. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For fear of preventing his crossing.] +</p> + +<p> +6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water is very +awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops marshalled on the +river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is +essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other +commentators are not at all explicit.] +</p> + +<p> +Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower +reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us +away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that ‘in river warfare we must not +advance against the stream,’ which is as much as to say that our fleet must not +be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to take +advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is also the danger, +noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be +carried down to us.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for river warfare. +</p> + +<p> +7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them +quickly, without any delay. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last +but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.] +</p> + +<p> +8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near +you, and get your back to a clump of trees. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where +there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect the rear.] +</p> + +<p> +So much for operations in salt-marshes. +</p> + +<p> +9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising +ground to your right and on your rear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a +marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."] +</p> + +<p> +so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for +campaigning in flat country. +</p> + +<p> +10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) +plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.] +</p> + +<p> +which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some +plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of +Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The <i>Shih Chi</i> (ch. 1 ad init.) +speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the <i>Liu +T’ao</i> it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the +Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the +first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of whom (to the +number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch’uan tells us +that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his +Minister Feng Hou.] +</p> + +<p> +11. All armies prefer high ground to low, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and +salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is +not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fighting."] +</p> + +<p> +and sunny places to dark. +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are careful of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn +out your animals to graze."] +</p> + +<p> +and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of +illness."] +</p> + +<p> +and this will spell victory. +</p> + +<p> +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on +your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and +utilise the natural advantages of the ground. +</p> + +<p> +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to +ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. +</p> + +<p> +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running +between, deep natural hollows, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools +of water at the bottom."] +</p> + +<p> +confined places, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by precipices on +three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."] +</p> + +<p> +tangled thickets, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be +used."] +</p> + +<p> +quagmires +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable for +chariots and horsemen."] +</p> + +<p> +and crevasses, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling +cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and intersected +by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it +clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same +view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the +rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a +crack or fissure" and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the +sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun +Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.] +</p> + +<p> +should be left with all possible speed and not approached. +</p> + +<p> +16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach +them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. +</p> + +<p> +17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, +ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods +with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for +these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be +lurking. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors who may +lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our +instructions."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the +natural strength of his position. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is so good +that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. Baden-Powell’s +"Aids to Scouting."] +</p> + +<p> +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the +other side to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge +us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a battle, he +would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of our responding +to the challenge."] +</p> + +<p> +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. +</p> + +<p> +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and +Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the +enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he +may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy’s +march."] +</p> + +<p> +The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that +the enemy wants to make us suspicious. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The +presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a +sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these +hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these +"screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the +retreating enemy happened to come across.] +</p> + +<p> +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying along +in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush +at the spot beneath."] +</p> + +<p> +Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. +</p> + +<p> +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots +advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the +approach of infantry. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated as +applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying that horses +and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one +another in the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in +ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have +scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will +gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: +"As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar +for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, +glitter of arms, etc." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been +sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that +the army is encamping. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light horse +will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and strong +points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its +motion."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about +to advance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is to +make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack us." Chang Yu +alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against the Yen +forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the <i>Shih Chi</i> we read: +"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off +the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to +fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other side being +informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those within the +city were enraged at seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing +only lest they should fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend +themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back +converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is +that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by +inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.’ +Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in +them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the +city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their +fury being increased tenfold. T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were +ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in +his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, +while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served +out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular +soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old +and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy’s +camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for +joy. T’ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, +and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the +prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be +plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good +humor, granted their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and +careless. Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them +with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored +stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on +their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove +the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing +them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, +dashed furiously into the enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion +and dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on +their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom +they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with +gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment +a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind making +as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, +until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen +army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in +slaying their general Ch’i Chien…. The result of the battle was the +ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i +State."] +</p> + +<p> +Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will +retreat. +</p> + +<p> +25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, +it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. +</p> + +<p> +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed +by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand, simply say +"without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."] +</p> + +<p> +27. When there is much running about +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner.] +</p> + +<p> +and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. +</p> + +<p> +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. +</p> + +<p> +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want +of food. +</p> + +<p> +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army +is suffering from thirst. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the +behavior of a single man."] +</p> + +<p> +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure +it, the soldiers are exhausted. +</p> + +<p> +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says, the +enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] +</p> + +<p> +Clamour by night betokens nervousness. +</p> + +<p> +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak. If +the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are +angry, it means that the men are weary. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an army +are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" owing +to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] +</p> + +<p> +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the horses +chiefly on grass.] +</p> + +<p> +and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing +that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined +to fight to the death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71, given +in abbreviated form by the <i>P’ei Wen Yun Fu:</i> "The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang +was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was +in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed +for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the +rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their weapons of their +own accord. Sung was not advancing to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a +principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating +host.’ Sung answered: ‘That does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a +jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a +disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to +the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being +slain."] +</p> + +<p> +35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued +tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. +</p> + +<p> +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear +of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.] +</p> + +<p> +too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is +necessary to keep the men to their duty.] +</p> + +<p> +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, +shows a supreme lack of intelligence. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li +Ch’uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, +Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first +tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." +This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and +punishments.] +</p> + +<p> +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that +the enemy wishes for a truce. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages, it is a +sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is +exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such +an obvious inference.] +</p> + +<p> +39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long +time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the +situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time +for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.] +</p> + +<p> +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply +sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, <i>cheng</i> tactics and frontal +attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.] +</p> + +<p> +What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a +close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing +very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to offer the +simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will win." Fortunately +we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity +itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, +although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find +additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, +concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to +snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." +He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary +troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that +figure."] +</p> + +<p> +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to +be captured by them. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the <i>Tso Chuan</i>, says: "If bees and scorpions +carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, then, +should not be treated with contempt."] +</p> + +<p> +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will +not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. +If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not +enforced, they will still be useless. +</p> + +<p> +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but +kept under control by means of iron discipline. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues endeared him to +the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 +init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the +profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."] +</p> + +<p> +This is a certain road to victory. +</p> + +<p> +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be +well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. +</p> + +<p> +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders +being obeyed, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his +men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the +enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust +and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ has said in § 44, however, would lead one +rather to expect something like this: "If a general is always confident that +his orders will be carried out," etc."] +</p> + +<p> +the gain will be mutual. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his command, and +the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual." He +quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders +is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts." +Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an +army.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap18"></a>Chapter X. TERRAIN</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with "terrain," +the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six calamities" are +discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of +desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) +Accessible ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of +communications."] +</p> + +<p> +(2) entangling ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you become +entangled."] +</p> + +<p> +(3) temporising ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."] +</p> + +<p> +(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance +from the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A +strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s unquestioning +acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called +<i>accessible</i>. +</p> + +<p> +3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the +raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, "not to +allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of Napoleon’s dictum, "the +secret of war lies in the communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had +done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, +VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital +to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as +the duelist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, +and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, +and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose +communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and +he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his +force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior +numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will +not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole +army." [2] +</p> + +<p> +Then you will be able to fight with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called <i>entangling</i>. +</p> + +<p> +5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally +forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you +fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. +</p> + +<p> +6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first +move, it is called <i>temporising</i> ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation +remains at a deadlock."] +</p> + +<p> +7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an +attractive bait, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But this is +only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position.] +</p> + +<p> +it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing +the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver +our attack with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +8. With regard to <i>narrow passes</i>, if you can occupy them first, let them be +strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and by +making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy."] +</p> + +<p> +9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if +the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. +</p> + +<p> +10. With regard to <i>precipitous heights</i>, if you are beforehand with your +adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him +to come up. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and +defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy." [For the +enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the +following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a +punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as +usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when +suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near +by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against +the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, +however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly +as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their +former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant +officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. +‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien +replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking +unnecessary questions.’ From this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that +high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because +they are immune from disastrous floods."] +</p> + +<p> +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat +and try to entice him away. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the two +rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of +Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te +persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken +prisoner. See <i>Chiu T’ang Shu</i>, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.] +</p> + +<p> +12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of +the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, +at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be exhausted and our adversary +fresh and keen."] +</p> + +<p> +and fighting will be to your disadvantage. +</p> + +<p> +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § 8.] +</p> + +<p> +The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. +</p> + +<p> +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural +causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) +Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) +rout. +</p> + +<p> +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten +times its size, the result will be the <i>flight</i> of the former. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the +result is <i>insubordination</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [<i>Hsin T’ang Shu</i>, ch. +148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang +T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers +treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by +riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien Pu +was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had +passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and +dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide +by cutting his throat.] +</p> + +<p> +When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result +is <i>collapse</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the +common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."] +</p> + +<p> +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the +enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the +commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the +result is <i>ruin</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause, and +at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; +thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his +head."] +</p> + +<p> +18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not +clear and distinct; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with decision, +the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without +vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty." +General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting +successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the +clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the +most fatal defect in a military leader is difference; the worst calamities that +befall an army arise from hesitation."] +</p> + +<p> +when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."] +</p> + +<p> +and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter +<i>disorganisation</i>. +</p> + +<p> +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior +force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful +one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must +be a <i>rout</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: "Whenever +there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve +in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men +and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello +Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).] +</p> + +<p> +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the +general who has attained a responsible post. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[See <i>supra</i>, § 13.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to +those connected with ground."] +</p> + +<p> +but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, +and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes +the test of a great general. +</p> + +<p> +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into +practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will +surely be defeated. +</p> + +<p> +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though +the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not +fight even at the ruler’s bidding. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said to +have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the <i>San Lueh</i>, has these +words attributed to him: "The responsibility of setting an army in motion must +devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the +Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and +the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their +country’s cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that +"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander +must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the Son of +Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."] +</p> + +<p> +24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing +disgrace, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a +soldier is to retreat.] +</p> + +<p> +whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his +sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior." Such a +man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his +conduct."] +</p> + +<p> +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the +deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand +by you even unto death. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of the +famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had +occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the +meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to +sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every +hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and +Wu Ch’i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, +began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your +son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked +the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu +performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and +finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the +same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.’" Li Ch’uan +mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao +during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are +suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole army, +comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they were +clothed in garments lined with floss silk.] +</p> + +<p> +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; +kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of +quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they +are useless for any practical purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they +would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military +discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of +Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the +inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain +officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-townsman, +ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order +to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng +considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be +allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered +his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. +This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time +forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up.] +</p> + +<p> +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware +that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."] +</p> + +<p> +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own +men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards +victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. III. § 13 (1).] +</p> + +<p> +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are +in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes +fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. +</p> + +<p> +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he +has broken camp, he is never at a loss. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so +thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move recklessly," says +Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes."] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory +will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your +victory complete. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three +things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural +advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."] +</p> + +<p> +[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap19"></a>Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) +Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; +(5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; +(8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see +their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a +battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, +"they will lack the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find +harbors of refuge."] +</p> + +<p> +3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it +is facile ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating," and +the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your +army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order +to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is +contentious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung +says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the +strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus, +Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even for a +few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining +invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in +the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu +Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., +and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of +Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, +plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, +governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from +his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we +oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, +and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile +at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, +and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms +without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we +could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning +and resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous +strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, +was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of +ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network of +roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which +intercommunication is easy."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a +third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small +principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on +the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.] +</p> + +<p> +so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them +to become his allies.] +</p> + +<p> +is ground of intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a +number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached such a +point, its situation is serious."] +</p> + +<p> +8. Mountain forests, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or simply "forests."] +</p> + +<p> +rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: +this is difficult ground. +</p> + +<p> +9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only +retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to +crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. +</p> + +<p> +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without +delay, is desperate ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the +"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A lofty +mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." +Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking +boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid +description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an army invading +hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal +snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the +right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the +chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, +no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to range +our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly +appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; +retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; +yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite. If we simply +maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a +move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is +wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of +life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of strength +and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can +check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the +enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this +terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest +of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of +Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, +and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, +VII. 78 sqq.].] +</p> + +<p> +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On +contentious ground, attack not. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous +position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, +suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that +it would be sheer madness to attack. In the <i>Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu</i>, when the King of Wu +inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: "The rule with +regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage +over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, +beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your +banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot +afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears +and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in +ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."] +</p> + +<p> +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force +itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available here. I follow +that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s brief note: +"Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not +cut off.] +</p> + +<p> +On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."] +</p> + +<p> +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army +penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to alienate the +people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, +whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no violation of women or +looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us +to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won +the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading +must be, not ‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this +instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at +least, has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ +there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of +retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in +provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.] +</p> + +<p> +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu +amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be devised +which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, +the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion +when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and +to all appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which +Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T’ien +Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, +note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some +2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven +along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The +strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the +Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed +safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, fight. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is a chance +of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your corner."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge +between the enemy’s front and rear; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."] +</p> + +<p> +to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the +good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. +</p> + +<p> +16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from +concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in +disorder. +</p> + +<p> +17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, +they stopped still. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in +thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any +advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would +remain where they were."] +</p> + +<p> +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on +the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something +which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it is +"some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu says: "The +three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of +which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our favourable positions; (2) to +ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." Our object +then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him +helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at +once throw the other side on the defensive.] +</p> + +<p> +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in warfare," and +he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military science, and the chief +business of the general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the +importance attached to speed by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., +Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was +meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence +with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was +then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he at +once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled +him by a specious message of friendly import. Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and +said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be +thoroughly investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is +an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is +still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of +forced marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with +in a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko +Liang: "Wan is 1200 <i>li</i> from here. When the news of my revolt reaches +Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will be a whole +month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well +fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that +will be sent against us are not worth troubling about." The next letter, +however, was filled with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed +since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What +miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen +and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li +Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the +successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern +Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, +Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through +the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his +army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals +implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous +state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is +of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time +to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If +we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before +his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before +you have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the +great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have +to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. +Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, +and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people +should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.] +</p> + +<p> +take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, +and attack unguarded spots. +</p> + +<p> +20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The +further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of +your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. +</p> + +<p> +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.] +</p> + +<p> +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them plenty of +food and drink, and look after them generally."] +</p> + +<p> +and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous +general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of +the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a universal levy +was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he +declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In +vain did the Ch’u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien +kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and +energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that +they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities +for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them +into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told off +certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. The answer +was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and +long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic +pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch +and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, +after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in +disgust. The Ch’in general immediately broke up his camp and followed +them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. +Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and +the king Fu-ch’u led into captivity.] +</p> + +<p> +Keep your army continually on the move, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has struck +me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army together."] +</p> + +<p> +and devise unfathomable plans. +</p> + +<p> +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will +prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not +achieve. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to run +amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to get our of +his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the +rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who +sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."] +</p> + +<p> +Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will surely +exert their united strength to get out of it."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no +place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile +country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will +fight hard. +</p> + +<p> +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on +the <i>qui vive;</i> without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "without asking, you will get."] +</p> + +<p> +without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be +trusted. +</p> + +<p> +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, +until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate into +cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: +"‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed +to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ +minds should be seriously perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if +all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their +resolution until they die."] +</p> + +<p> +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they +have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not +because they are disinclined to longevity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are things +for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away +valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but +simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ is slyly insinuating that, as +soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk +fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way.] +</p> + +<p> +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more genuine +grief than tears alone.] +</p> + +<p> +those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the +tears run down their cheeks. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all have +embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that the heroes of +the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to +the mournful parting at the I River between Ching K’o and his friends, +when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch’in +(afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain +as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is +blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu +or a Kuei. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and +contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang, better +known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which +he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his +attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was +in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), +performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 +B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude +a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei +suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar +steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared +to move a muscle, and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, +declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a +weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, +whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place +amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was +to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his +wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his +word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of +what she had lost in three pitched battles.] +</p> + +<p> +29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the <i>shuai-jan</i>. Now the <i>shuai-jan</i> +is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["<i>Shuai-jan</i>" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was +doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through this +passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of +"military manœuvers."] +</p> + +<p> +Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, +and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be +attacked by head and tail both. +</p> + +<p> +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the <i>shuai-jan</i>, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and +rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though +they were part of a single living body?"] +</p> + +<p> +I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 21.] +</p> + +<p> +yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, +they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the +right. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, +how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by +every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a +campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case of +allied armies.] +</p> + +<p> +31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, and +the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall the +Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the battle of +Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See +Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to render flight impossible +by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity +and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This +is the lesson which can be learned from the <i>shuai-jan</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of +courage which all must reach. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If +the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the +resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at +any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington’s seemingly +ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever +commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important +particular—unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian +defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost +certainly have lost the day.] +</p> + +<p> +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question +involving the proper use of ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences of +strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental features +of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold +out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position +neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With +all respect to the text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am +inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no +means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… and to +the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or +attacking, from the proper utilization of natural features." [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading +a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does it."] +</p> + +<p> +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; +upright and just, and thus maintain order. +</p> + +<p> +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and +appearances, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."] +</p> + +<p> +and thus keep them in total ignorance. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must +not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice +with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the +enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed +out. But how about the other process—the mystification of one’s own men? +Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is over-emphatic on this point would do well +to read Col. Henderson’s remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The +infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his +most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a +commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc. etc. [3] In +the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, "Pan Ch’ao +took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with +the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his +chief commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of +Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao +summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and +said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the +enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a +different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, +and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening +drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly released the +prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of +his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of +10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat in the west, while the King of +Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. +As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his +divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against +the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled +in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were +brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and +cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha +and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time +forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the countries of the +west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own +officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of +dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.] +</p> + +<p> +37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.] +</p> + +<p> +he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war is +based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must +deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting them +know why."] +</p> + +<p> +By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from +anticipating his purpose. +</p> + +<p> +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed +up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep +into hostile territory before he shows his hand. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some decisive +step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like Hsiang Yu, who +sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, +understands the words less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."] +</p> + +<p> +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a +flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none knows whither he +is going. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or retreat; it is +ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering."] +</p> + +<p> +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the +business of the general. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming a +blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again to this point. +Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more +present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.] +</p> + +<p> +41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the +nine varieties of ground."] +</p> + +<p> +the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of +human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. +</p> + +<p> +42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating +deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 20.] +</p> + +<p> +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across +neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not figure +among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X. One’s first impulse +would be to translate it distant ground," but this, if we can trust the +commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch’en says it +is "a position not far enough advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near +enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two." Wang Hsi +says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, whose +territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on +us to settle our business there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare +occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine +Situations.] +</p> + +<p> +When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of +intersecting highways. +</p> + +<p> +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you +penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. +</p> + +<p> +45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in +front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is +desperate ground. +</p> + +<p> +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of +purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive, +and avoiding battle. Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 11.] +</p> + +<p> +On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts +of my army. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies: "(1) +the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the enemy." +Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says: "On the march, the regiments should be +in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the +fortifications."] +</p> + +<p> +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We +must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal." +That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei +Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the +enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we +should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." Ch’en +Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own +ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ warns us against coming exhausted to the +attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is +a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to +occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight +for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and victory +will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of +Ch’in. (See p. 57.)] +</p> + +<p> +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On ground of +intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. +</p> + +<p> +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one +might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.] +</p> + +<p> +On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. +</p> + +<p> +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position, whereas +my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s lines." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation." +Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out +that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the enemy who is +surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, +was surrounded by a great army under Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was +comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 +foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps +being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, +actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving +into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers +and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits +rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such +desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their +onslaught.] +</p> + +<p> +On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving +their lives. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and +provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain +to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death." Mei +Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of +it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about "grounds" and the +"variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this +important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and +unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § +2 to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but only +mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that +is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier +portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six +variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first +is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, +in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed +by the variations. This takes us down to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions +are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the +tenth ground noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are +enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and +7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to +account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts maybe +brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal +with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short +chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are +defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the +corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, +being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any +inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work +cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII +is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain +matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear +elsewhere.] +</p> + +<p> +51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when +surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly +when he has fallen into danger. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73 +A.D. The story runs thus in the <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao +arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first +with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behavior +underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch’ao +spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you noticed,’ he said, +‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys +have come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state +of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is +the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they +have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ +Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, +and set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who +arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between surprise and +fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao, keeping his +informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of +his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine +had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still +further by addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an +isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now +it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom only a +few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards +us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to +seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will become food +for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers +replied: ‘Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander +through life and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, +note.] +</p> + +<p> +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are +acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march +unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and +forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be +unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local +guides. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to +emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard +them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following +words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added that there is +always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some +misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, +ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was +an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the +pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead +of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that +direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.] +</p> + +<p> +53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not +befit a warlike prince. +</p> + +<p> +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows +itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his +opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much +affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her +forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in +strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the neighbouring +states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the +enemy’s allies will be prevented from joining her." The following gives a +stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been defeated (before she has +had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and +refrain from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the +sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may +be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and +must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with +overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the +enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: "If we +recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang +back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military force is +inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright +and refuse to join us."] +</p> + +<p> +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he +foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, +keeping his antagonists in awe. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure +against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject entangling +alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enable him to +dispense with external friendships."] +</p> + +<p> +Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State became +a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six +Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. +Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning +this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.] +</p> + +<p> +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat +be heavily punished."] +</p> + +<p> +issue orders +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "hang" or post up."] +</p> + +<p> +without regard to previous arrangements; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made +clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the <i>Ssu-ma Fa:</i> "Give instructions +only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see deserving deeds." +Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you give to your army +should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up." Chang Yu +simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand." And +Chia Lin says: "there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not +only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates +the entire reversal of them at the last moment.] +</p> + +<p> +and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a +single man. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 34.] +</p> + +<p> +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your +design. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any +order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons" for his +decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.] +</p> + +<p> +When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing +when the situation is gloomy. +</p> + +<p> +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into +desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the +tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded to on +p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles +from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full +force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man +of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their +way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men +of Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their +fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck +down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead." +Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong +position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the +standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and +escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a division +consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their +backs to the River Ti. Seeing this manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into +loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the +generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was +immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some +time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and +banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another +fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the +trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded +in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The +time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw +the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted +walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the +Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck +them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and overpowered their +king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the +panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and +completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was +King Ya himself…. After the battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and +said: "In the <i>Art of War</i> we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the +right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend +of Sun Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, +ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these +conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general replied: "I +fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it +not written there: ‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come +off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the +usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleague round. What +says the Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the +men off to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun +Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to +fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, +there would have been a general <i>débandade</i>, and it would have been +impossible to do anything with them." The officers admitted the force of his +argument, and said: "These are higher tactics than we should have been capable +of." [See <i>Ch’ien Han Shu</i>, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ] +</p> + +<p> +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is capable +of striking a blow for victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Danger has a bracing effect.] +</p> + +<p> +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the +enemy’s purpose. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding +and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning +clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do so; if +he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his +intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver +our attack.] +</p> + +<p> +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in one +direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the enemy." +But such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible.] +</p> + +<p> +we shall succeed in the long run +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally, "after a thousand <i>li</i>."] +</p> + +<p> +in killing the commander-in-chief. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Always a great point with the Chinese.] +</p> + +<p> +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. +</p> + +<p> +63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, +destroy the official tallies, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit +or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of <i>Lun +Yu</i> III. 24, who may have had similar duties. When this half was returned to +him, within a fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the +traveler through.] +</p> + +<p> +and stop the passage of all emissaries. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Either to or from the enemy’s country.] +</p> + +<p> +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sovereign.] +</p> + +<p> +so that you may control the situation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the strictest +precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.] +</p> + +<p> +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. +</p> + +<p> +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>supra</i>, § 18.] +</p> + +<p> +and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable +position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus +obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, +to occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful +appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there +as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful appointment" is to be +made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies, who will carry back just the +amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly +disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to +arrive before him (VII. § 4). We must start after him in order to ensure his +marching thither; we must arrive before him in order to capture the place +without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei +Yao-ch’en’s interpretation of § 47.] +</p> + +<p> +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be +achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that this +variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much +more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of the old +school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every accepted canon of +warfare.] +</p> + +<p> +and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable opportunity +offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive."] +</p> + +<p> +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you +an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be +too late for the enemy to oppose you. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly appears +felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its speed. The words +have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping +hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "The Science of War," p. 333. +</p> + +<p> +[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap20"></a>Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE</h2> + +<p class="p1"> +[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, +after which the author branches off into other topics.] +</p> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to +burn soldiers in their camp; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers" +(when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on a +diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], found himself +placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the +Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his +officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The only course open to +us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, +when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we +shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover +us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all +replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the +Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, +‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, +who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be +brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors.’ +All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he +and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale +was blowing at the time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums +and hide behind the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw +flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. +The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at +the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, +whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front and rear +of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao +slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of +the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, +perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his +thoughts, said with uplifted hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, +I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied +Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed +him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and +trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public +proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to make his +report to Tou Ku." <i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ] +</p> + +<p> +the second is to burn stores; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the rebellious +population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make +periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run +proved entirely successful.] +</p> + +<p> +the third is to burn baggage-trains; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and +impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.] +</p> + +<p> +the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are the +same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. +§ 11.] +</p> + +<p> +the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says in the <i>T’ung Tien:</i> "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The +method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping +them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the +enemy’s lines."] +</p> + +<p> +2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to. +But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have +favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us." Chia Lin +says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."] +</p> + +<p> +the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter, reeds, +brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material cause. Chang Yu +says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires."] +</p> + +<p> +3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for +starting a conflagration. +</p> + +<p> +4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are +those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing +or the Cross-bar; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight +Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and +Corvus.] +</p> + +<p> +for these four are all days of rising wind. +</p> + +<p> +5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible +developments: +</p> + +<p> +6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an +attack from without. +</p> + +<p> +7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, +bide your time and do not attack. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. +If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. +Hence the necessity for caution.] +</p> + +<p> +8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with +an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find +the difficulties too great, retire."] +</p> + +<p> +9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait +for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire breaking out +(either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of incendiaries) inside +the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste +place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a +position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any +seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring +within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding +vegetation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling +once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking +advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general’s camp, +but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had +already been burnt down. On the other hand, Po-ts’ai, a general of the +Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of +this simple precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging +Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, +and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung +called his officers together and said: "In war, there are various indirect +methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator +here quotes Sun Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp +in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we +set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a +sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of +T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so +Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and +mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, +who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud +shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, +and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the +rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [<i>Hou Han Shu</i>, ch. 71.] +] +</p> + +<p> +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the +leeward. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat +away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight +desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A rather more obvious +explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to +the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you +start the fire on the east side, and then attack from the west, you will suffer +in the same way as your enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a morning." +(<i>Tao Te Ching</i>, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze +dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as +a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this +sense is to be obtained is not apparent.] +</p> + +<p> +12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the +movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch +for the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with fire." +Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently: "We must not only know how to +assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar +attacks from them."] +</p> + +<p> +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those +who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. +</p> + +<p> +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his +belongings. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or divide +his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can do useful +service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the +reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of +sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) +speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy +ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, +it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands +thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it +may be exterminated by fire."] +</p> + +<p> +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his +attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste +of time and general stagnation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung says: +"Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If +you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your +subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue." For +several reasons, however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on +the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en +alone, whose words I will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in +their battles and assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and +not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort +to such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and +what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they +have got."] +</p> + +<p> +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good +general cultivates his resources. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu quotes the following from the <i>San Lueh</i>, ch. 2: "The warlike prince +controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by good faith, and +by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be disruption; +if rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is +something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so far in +that direction as the remarkable passage in the <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 69. "I dare +not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance +an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."] +</p> + +<p> +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; +no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. +</p> + +<p> +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you +are. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an +interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately on § +18.] +</p> + +<p> +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. +</p> + +<p> +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.] +</p> + +<p> +nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. +</p> + +<p> +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of +caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger’s +cubs." +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap21"></a>Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES</h2> + +<p> +1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them +great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources +of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.] +</p> + +<p> +There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on +the highways. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. <i>Tao Te Ching</i>, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, brambles and +thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded of the saying: ‘On +serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why then should carriage and transportation +cause exhaustion on the highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, +but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the +injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is deeply +engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, +without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order +that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again, there are +places like salt deserts where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from +home cannot be dispensed with."] +</p> + +<p> +As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The +allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each consisting of +about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the State +by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that +their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See +II. § 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army, +while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 +men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 +families would be affected.] +</p> + +<p> +2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which +is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the +enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of +silver in honours and emoluments, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this +curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this point.] +</p> + +<p> +is the height of inhumanity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the +frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war always +brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy’s +condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for +years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is +impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their +services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling +amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an +incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the +poor, and hence Sun Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing +less than a crime against humanity.] +</p> + +<p> +3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no +master of victory. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the national +temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these memorable words +were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State: "The [Chinese] character +for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ +(cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of +cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of +Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the +people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."] +</p> + +<p> +4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and +conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is <i>foreknowledge</i>. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to do.] +</p> + +<p> +5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be +obtained inductively from experience, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from +other analogous cases."] +</p> + +<p> +nor by any deductive calculation. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and +magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions +cannot be so calculated."] +</p> + +<p> +6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the +spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science +may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified +by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable +through spies and spies alone."] +</p> + +<p> +7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) +inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. +</p> + +<p> +8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret +system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the +sovereign’s most precious faculty. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had +officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to collect all possible +information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of +his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves +thus gained." [1] ] +</p> + +<p> +9. Having <i>local spies</i> means employing the services of the inhabitants of a +district. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind treatment, and +use them as spies."] +</p> + +<p> +10. Having <i>inward spies</i>, making use of officials of the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this +respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have +undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men +who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed +over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side +should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their +ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each +boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly +approached and bound to one’s interests by means of rich presents. In this way +you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, +ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the +harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." The +necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears +from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, +sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold +at P’i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and +defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain +P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him whipped until the +blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by +offering to cooperate with him from inside the city, and to give a fire signal +at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these +promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their +head with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li +Hsiung’s general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; +and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city +walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the signal +and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn +up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang’s soldiers +entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li +Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and +routed the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho +Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that +of his father Li T’e, <i>Chin Shu</i>, ch. 120, 121.] +</p> + +<p> +11. Having <i>converted spies</i>, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them +for our own purposes. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy’s +service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in +turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we +pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false +impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an +alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively +proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ +21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with +conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see +<i>supra</i>, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the +wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a defensive +campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien +P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a +series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his +spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chu’s +pay. They said: "The only thing which causes Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao +Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they consider an easy opponent, who +is sure to be vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the +famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of +war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no +commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much +disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke +of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was +appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man +who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman +Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P’o. Needless to say, he +proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch’i and the great military power +of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and +his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, +during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed +by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, +ruthlessly put to the sword.] +</p> + +<p> +12. Having <i>doomed spies</i>, doing certain things openly for purposes of +deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the +enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things +calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have +been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy’s +lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take +measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The +spies will thereupon be put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih +mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against +Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was +sent by T’ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied +security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang +Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but +this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History +(ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on +until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by +the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has certainly +more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch’i, being +subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he +considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be +boiled alive.] +</p> + +<p> +13. <i>Surviving spies</i>, finally, are those who bring back news from the +enemy’s camp. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular +part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen +intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a +will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and +courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure +hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the +following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of +Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i made a hostile movement upon +Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the +enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and +wore the enemy’s uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet +away from the enemy’s camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they +succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their +horses again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of +night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was +committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit +a sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible +information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm commendation from +the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a severe +defeat on his adversary."] +</p> + +<p> +14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations +to be maintained than with spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter +even the general’s private sleeping-tent.] +</p> + +<p> +None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater +secrecy be preserved. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be carried +"mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who +made perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: "Spies are +attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. +They should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When +they propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your +possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never +communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should +know. [2] ] +</p> + +<p> +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from +falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing." +Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the lines of +"intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers +these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must assure +ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of their experience +and skill." But he continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more +dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate +such." So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the +passage."] +</p> + +<p> +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and +straightforwardness. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you must +treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their +might."] +</p> + +<p> +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of +their reports. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies +going over to the service of the enemy."] +</p> + +<p> +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Cf. VI. § 9.] +</p> + +<p> +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he +must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard before [our +plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this passage is: Whereas +you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for letting out the secret," the +object of killing the other man is only, as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop +his mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already been +repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays +himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by +saying that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly +not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of +him."] +</p> + +<p> +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate +an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the +attendants, the aides-de- camp, +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is +to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally necessitates +frequent interviews with him.] +</p> + +<p> +the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be +commissioned to ascertain these. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these important +functionaries can be won over by bribery.] +</p> + +<p> +21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted +with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted +spies and available for our service. +</p> + +<p> +22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able +to acquire and employ local and inward spies. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the enemy’s +condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy into our +service, because it is he that knows which of the local inhabitants are greedy +of gain, and which of the officials are open to corruption."] +</p> + +<p> +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to +carry false tidings to the enemy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be +deceived."] +</p> + +<p> +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on +appointed occasions. +</p> + +<p> +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the +enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the +converted spy. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but makes it +possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.] +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost +liberality. +</p> + +<p> +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was changed to +Yin by P’an Keng in 1401. +</p> + +<p> +was due to I Chih +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part in +Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due +to Lü Ya +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards +helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title bestowed on +him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously +identified with the <i>Liu T’ao</i>.] +</p> + +<p> +who had served under the Yin. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to +introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by no +means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt that Sun +Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted +spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin +dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and +shortcoming which these former ministers were able to impart to the other side. +Mei Yao-ch’en appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic +names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. +Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not employ +the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements were all for the +good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How should two divinely +inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of +them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter +which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom +and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only emphasize this +point." Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of +their supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.] +</p> + +<p> +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use +the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they +achieve great results. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a boat from +bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while +production of great results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."] +</p> + +<p> +Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s +ability to move. +</p> + +<p class="p1"> +[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or eyes.] +</p> + +<p> +[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 2. +</p> + +<p> +[2] "Marshal Turenne," p. 311. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 132 ***</div> +</body> + +</html> + |