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diff --git a/14886.txt b/14886.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc5f20d --- /dev/null +++ b/14886.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8959 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, England's Case Against Home Rule, by Albert +Venn Dicey + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: England's Case Against Home Rule + +Author: Albert Venn Dicey + +Release Date: February 3, 2005 [eBook #14886] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE*** + + +E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, Susan Skinner, and the Project +Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + +ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE + +by + +A. V. DICEY + +The Richmond Publishing Co. Ltd. Orchard Road, +Richmond, Surrey, England + +1886 + + + + + + + +PREFACE. + + +An author who publishes a book having any reference to Irish affairs +may, not unnaturally, be supposed either to possess some special +knowledge of Ireland, or else to be the advocate of some new specific +for the cure of Irish discontent. Of neither of these suppositions can I +claim the benefit. My knowledge of Ireland is merely the +knowledge--perhaps it were better to say the ignorance--of an educated +Englishman. It is derived from conversation with better informed +friends, from careful attention to the discussions on Irish policy which +for the last eighteen years have engrossed public attention, and from +books accessible to ordinary readers. If I can claim no special +acquaintance with Ireland, still less have I the presumption or the +folly to come forward as the inventor of any political nostrum. My +justification for publishing my thoughts on Home Rule is that the +movement in favour of the Parliamentary independence of Ireland +constitutes, whether its advocates recognise the fact or not, a demand +for fundamental alterations in the whole Constitution of the United +Kingdom; and while I may without presumption consider myself moderately +acquainted with the principles of Constitutional law, I entertain the +firmest conviction that any scheme for Home Rule in Ireland involves +dangerous if not fatal innovations on the Constitution of Great Britain. + +To set forth the reasons for this opinion is the object of this work. +The opinion itself, whatever its worth, is not the growth of recent +controversy; it has been entertained for years, and has been expressed +by me in various publications. This book is much more than a reprint; +its contents are, however, in part made up of articles which have +already been published. My thanks are due to the owners of the +_Contemporary Review_ and of the New York _Nation_ for their permission +to make free use of my contributions to the pages of their periodicals; +it is a pleasure to acknowledge the exceptional liberality with which my +friend, Mr. E.L. Godkin, has allowed me to publish on my own +responsibility in the columns of the _Nation_, opinions of which he is +himself the strenuous and most able opponent. + +Nor are my acknowledgments due only to the living. Gustave de Beaumont's +'_Irelande sociale et politique_' was placed in my hands by a friend +after the plan of my argument was complete, and the writing of this book +was in fact begun. From De Beaumont I learnt more than from any other +writer on the subject of Ireland with whose works I am acquainted, and I +found to my great satisfaction that his speculations curiously confirm +the objections I was prepared to urge against the policy of Home Rule. +It is a duty to insist upon the debt I owe to De Beaumont, because at +the present moment no greater service can be rendered to Englishmen and +to Irishmen alike than to press upon them the study of an author whose +writings are far better known on the Continent than in England, and +whose thoughts, though they may seem a little out of date, are full not +only of profound wisdom but of practical guidance. + +A.V. DICEY. + +OCTOBER, 1886. + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER I + +NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT + + +CHAPTER II. + +MEANING OF HOME RULE + + +CHAPTER III. + +STRENGTH OF THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND + + +CHAPTER IV. + +ENGLISH ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF HOME RULE. + +Argument I.--From Foreign Experience + " II.--From the Will of the Irish People + " III.--From the Lessons of Irish History + " IV.--From the Virtues of Self-Government + " V.--From the Necessity for Coercion Acts + " VI.--From the Inconvenience to England of Refusing Home Rule + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION + + +CHAPTER VI. + +SEPARATION + + +CHAPTER VII. + +HOME RULE--ITS FORMS. + + I.--Home Rule as Federalism + II.--Home Rule as Colonial Independence + III.--Home Rule as the Revival of Grattan's Constitution + IV.--Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution + + +CHAPTER VIII. + + +CONCLUSION + + +APPENDIX + + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT. + + +[Sidenote: Aim and line of argument] + +My aim is to criticise from a purely English point of view the policy of +Home Rule, or the proposal to create a more or less independent +Parliament in Ireland; and as a result of such criticism to establish +the truth, and develop the consequences, of this proposition--namely, +that any system of Home Rule, whatever be the form it takes, is less +beneficial to Great Britain, or (to use popular language) to England, +than is the maintenance of the Union, and is at least as much opposed to +the vital interests of England as would be the national independence of +Ireland. + +The train of reasoning by which it is sought to establish this +principle, and the consequences which the principle involves, consists +of the following steps: first, an examination into the causes which give +strength to the Home Rule movement in England, and the nature of the +arguments in its support used by English Home Rulers; secondly, a +statement of the advantages and disadvantages, from an English point of +view, on the one hand of maintaining the Union, and on the other of +separation from Ireland; thirdly, a criticism of each of the principal +forms[1] under which Home Rule has been actually presented to the +attention of the public, the aim of such criticism being in each case to +determine how far the particular form of Home Rule can compete as +regards the interests of England with the alternative policies of +Unionism and of Irish independence; and, fourthly, a summary of the +conclusions arrived at by this survey of the policy of Home Rule. My +endeavour will be to make this survey without any appeal to prejudice, +passion, or sentiment, and with the calmness and fairness which a +scientific constitutionalist should display in weighing the merits of +any other proposed alteration in our form of government, such for +example as the introduction of life peers into the House of Lords, or in +estimating the value of some foreign constitutional invention, such for +example as the Swiss Referendum or the Dual system which links together +Hungary and the Austrian Empire. No citizen of the United Kingdom indeed +can pretend to be an impartial critic of a policy which divides the +whole nation into opposing parties. But during a period of revolutionary +excitement it is well to remember that any legislative innovation, +however keen the feelings of partisanship which it may arouse, is always +in itself capable of being looked at from a logical or abstract point of +view, and ought to be so looked at by jurists. To one class indeed among +the advocates of Home Rule the fundamental principle contended for in +these pages will appear irrelevant to the points at issue between such +Home Rulers and their opponents. Nationalists, who still occupy the +position held in 1848 by Sir Gavan Duffy and his friends, and who either +openly contend for the right of Ireland to be an independent nation, or +accept Home Rule (as they may with perfect fairness) simply as a step +towards the independence of their country, are naturally and rightly +unaffected by reasoning which shows, however conclusively, that Home +Rule may be as injurious to England as a complete severance of the +political connection between England and Ireland. A Nationalist may say +with justice that he is no more bound to consider whether England will +or will not be damaged by Ireland's becoming a nation, than an Italian +patriot was bound, in 1859, to show that Austria would not suffer by +being deprived of Lombardy or of Venetia; he accepts Home Rule on the +maxim that half a loaf is better than no bread, but a starving man is +not required to refuse the offer of food because the donor cannot make +the gift without getting into debt; nor does the acceptance of half a +loaf afford the least presumption that the recipient would not prefer a +whole loaf if he could get it. Some indeed of the considerations which +tell in the eyes of an Englishman against Home Rule may indirectly lead +an Irish Nationalist to the belief that the boon of legislative +independence, if granted to Ireland, would prove the present of a stone +in reply to a prayer for bread. But should a Nationalist be convinced +that no form of Home Rule would benefit Ireland, he would cling all the +more firmly to the faith that her salvation depends upon her taking her +place among independent states. To Nationalists, therefore, even though +at present they may be fighting the cause of Irish nationality behind +the vizor of Home Rule, these pages are not addressed; the position they +occupy is one of which no man has any cause to feel ashamed. The opinion +that, considering the misery which has marked the connection between +England and Ireland, the happiest thing for the weaker country would be +complete separation from the United Kingdom, is one which in common with +most Englishmen, and, it may be added, in common with the wisest foreign +observers, I do not share; but fairness requires the admission that it +is an opinion which a man may hold and may act upon, without incurring +the charge either of folly or of wickedness. To Nationalists, however, +these pages, as I have said, are not addressed. The persons for whom +they are intended are either Home Rulers, whether in Great Britain or in +Ireland, who _bona fide_ advocate the policy of Home Rule as a policy +good and wise in itself and for its own sake; or else Unionists, who +firmly believe that the whole State will suffer by any attempt to tear +up the Treaty of Union, but yet are unable to give for the faith that is +in them as strong grounds of reason as they would desire. To such +persons the importance of the principle (if true) which is contended for +throughout these pages must appear undeniable; it strikes at the root of +more than one half of the arguments by which Home Rulers from the time +of Mr. Butt to the days of Mr. Parnell have attempted, fairly enough, +and latterly with great success, to win over English opinion to their +cause, and it undermines the whole position occupied by Mr. Gladstone +and his English followers. They assume with undeniable truth that the +English people will not at the present moment, except under compulsion, +acquiesce in Irish independence; they further assume, and must from the +nature of the case assume, that Home Rule under one shape or another +presents a fair prospect at least of advantages not derivable from the +maintenance of the Union, and is at the very worst so much less +injurious to British interests than would be separation from Ireland, as +to offer to England a reasonable compromise between the just claims of +Englishmen to secure the prosperity of Great Britain and the greatness +of the British Empire, and the legitimate desire of Irishmen for +national independence. If the proposition which it is my object to +maintain turn out to be sound, all these assumptions fall to the ground, +together with a host of fallacies for which these assumptions form the +necessary basis. The principle, in short, which it is my object to +enforce--that Home Rule in Ireland is more dangerous to England than +Irish independence--lies at the bottom of all the rational opposition +made by Unionists to the creation of an Irish Parliament, and, together +with the arguments by which the principle is maintained, and the +conclusions to which it leads, forms the true and just and reasonable +case of England against Home Rule. + +[Sidenote: Possible objections to method.] + +The whole spirit and method of my argument is open to at least three +plausible objections, which deserve examination, both because if left +unnoticed they are certain to occur to and perplex any intelligent +reader, and because their removal brings into relief the strength of my +line of reasoning. + +[Sidenote: 1. Too abstract.] + +_First objection._--To deal with a burning controversy in the abstract +and logical manner suitable to the discussion of the problems of +jurisprudence savours, it may be objected, of theoretic, academic, or +pedantic disquisition more fit for a University class-room than for the +living world of contemporary politics. + +The force of this criticism does not admit of denial. My method of +treating the question of Home Rule is necessarily lifeless when +compared with the vehement rhetoric or heated eloquence which +characterises public or parliamentary discussion; it is also true that +the argumentative treatment of matters affecting actual life always +bears about it a certain air of unreality. + +If, however, systematic argument lacks the animation of political +discussion or dispute, it possesses its own counterbalancing merits, and +the mode of treating Home Rule purposely adopted in these pages has, it +is conceived, two not inconsiderable advantages. The first of these +advantages is that it diverts the mind from a crowd of personal, +temporary, and in themselves trivial considerations, which, though they +possess not only an apparent but also a real significance, are at bottom +irrelevant to the final decision of the true points at issue. Whether, +for example, Mr. Gladstone ought to have proclaimed himself a Home Ruler +before the elections of 1885, whether Lord Salisbury's reference, or +alleged reference, to twenty years of coercion was or was not judicious, +and did or did not receive a fair interpretation from his opponents; +whether Lord Carnarvon misled Mr. Parnell, or whether the Irish leader +was a dupe to his own astuteness; whether Mr. Chamberlain ought to have +joined the late Ministry, or, having gone into the Cabinet, ought never +to have left it; what have been the motives consciously or unconsciously +affecting Mr. Gladstone's course of action--these and a hundred other +enquiries of the like sort, which engage the attention and distract the +judgment of the public, possess, in the eyes of any serious thinker +occupied in estimating the strength of the arguments for and against +Home Rule, no material importance whatever. His concern is the merit or +demerit of a legislative enactment. He is not concerned at all with the +conduct or the character of legislators. Mr. Gladstone's motives may be +the highest which can be ascribed to the Premier by the voice of +admiring friendship, or the basest which can be imputed to him by the +unfairness of political rancour. In any case they are irrelevant to the +matter in hand. An unwise measure will not become a beneficial law +because its author is a saint or a patriot; a statesmanlike law will not +turn out a curse to the country because its defender is an intriguer or +a traitor. We all see that this is so if we carry our view back to the +controversies of the last generation; the personalities of fifty or +sixty years ago are reduced before our eyes into their real pettiness. +The first Reform Bill still retains its importance for as a measure +which for good or bad revolutionised the constitution; its beneficial or +pernicious effects are still traceable in the England of to-day; but its +evils are not lessened by the acknowledged virtues of Lord Althorpe, nor +are its good effects marred by the ambition of Brougham or the violence +of O'Connell. It is no slight recommendation of any mode of reasoning if +it suggests to us the prudence of judging the policy of 1886 in the +spirit and by the standards which every man of sense applies to the +policy of 1832. Academic disquisition has its faults, but ought to +produce academic calmness; a class-room is after all a better place for +quiet reflection than the House of Commons or the hustings. + +The second of the advantages which marks the proposed mode of argument +is that a line of thought which fixes a reader's attention all but +exclusively upon the probable effects of Home Rule is a preservative +against the errors which arise from introducing into a dispute, bitter +enough in itself, all the poisonous venom of historical recrimination, +and all the delusions which are the offspring of the misleading tendency +to personify nations. The massacres of 1641, the sack of Drogheda, the +violated treaty of Limerick, the follies strangely mingled with the +patriotism of Grattan's Parliament, the outrages which discredited the +rebellion of 1798, and the cruelties which disgraced its suppression; +the corruption which carried the Union, and the broken pledges which +turned political union into a source of fresh sectarian discord; the +calamities, the mistakes and the crimes which mark each scene in the +tragedy of Irish history, afford to Protestants and to Catholics alike +an exhaustless supply of recriminatory invective. But to evoke the +spectres of past ages is not the way to assuage the animosities of the +present day. The crimes of bygone generations are subjects for curious +investigation, but the determination of historical problems, even when +conducted in the spirit of the calmest enquiry, never removes the +difficulties of practical statesmanship. Apologies, at any rate, or +diatribes produced by the necessity for palliating or for denouncing +the misdeeds of other times, only add a new element of confusion to the +turmoil of political warfare. Whether the insurgents of 1641 massacred +every Protestant on whom they could lay their hands, or bear only an +indirect responsibility for the death of eight or nine thousand men and +women ruthlessly expelled from the lands of which in Irish eyes they +were wrongful occupiers, is a question to be settled by Mr. Froude, Mr. +Lecky, and Mr. Gardiner; but the barbarities of insurgent Catholics, and +the retaliatory severity of Protestant victors, which mark the fury of +an internecine conflict removed from us by the lapse of more than two +centuries have little to do with the practical question whether it be +expedient at the present day that the local affairs of Ulster should be +dealt with by a Parliament sitting at Dublin, or whether members from +Ireland should have seats at Westminster. Recrimination, while it adds +nothing to knowledge, disturbs the judgment of statesmen and of +electors; but not even the reckless resuscitation of bitter memories, +which ought to be forgotten, adds so much to the confusion of the day as +does the habit fostered by the illusions of language, and by the falsely +applied historical method, of speaking and thinking of England and +Ireland as though they were two human beings, who, on closing a +life-long quarrel, might be expected to entertain towards one another +those sentiments of regret, generosity, or gratitude which are proper to +men and women, but can only by the boldest of fictions be supposed to +enter into the relations between classes or nations. To this delusion of +personification is due the notion that Englishmen of to-day ought to +make compensation and feel personal shame for the cruelties of Cromwell, +or for Pitt's corruption of Irish patriots; that we are in some way +liable and should feel compunction for crimes committed by (possibly) +the ancestors of the very men to whom we are now supposed to owe +reparation. To the same cause is to be attributed the absurd demand that +the Irish Catholics should put on ashes and sackcloth for the massacres +of 1641, or that living Irishmen should be grateful for the well-meant +though most unsuccessful efforts made by the Parliament of the United +Kingdom to govern one-third of the United Kingdom on sound principles of +justice. A Sovereign's plainest duty is to rule his subjects for their +good according to the best of his power and of his knowledge, and the +mere discharge of duty does not entitle a ruler to gratitude from the +persons who are benefited by his justice. A Parliamentary Sovereign +being the representative and agent of its (so-called) subjects, is _a +fortiori_ if there can be degrees in such matters--bound to govern for +the benefit of the people whom it represents and ought to serve; and +there is something strictly preposterous in the idea that Irish +electors, who in common with the rest of the United Kingdom send +representatives to Westminster, should glow with gratitude when the +Parliament of the United Kingdom so far performs its duty as to enact +laws from which Ireland derives benefit No one suggests that Englishmen +or Scotchmen should feel grateful either to Parliament or to their Irish +fellow-citizens for the maintenance of good government throughout +England and Scotland. And it would puzzle the wit of man to show why +one-third of the United Kingdom should be expected to entertain feelings +never demanded from the other two-thirds thereof. + +[Sidenote: 2. Too much reference to interest.] + +_Second objection_.--The habitual reference made throughout these pages +to national interest as the test or standard of national policy has (it +may be suggested) a touch of sordidness and selfishness, and implies +that statesmanship has nothing to do with morality. + +This impression may it is possible be conveyed to a careless reader by +the form in which the case against Home Rule is stated; but no +suggestion can in reality be more unfounded. It will be seen to be +unfounded by any one who notes for a moment the meaning of the term +"interest" as applied to matters of national policy. The interest or the +welfare of a nation comprises many things which have nothing to do with +trade or with wealth, and the value of which does not admit of being +measured in money. The interest, welfare, or prosperity of England +includes the maintenance of her honour, the performance of all her +obligations, and, above all, the strict discharge of every engagement +which she has undertaken towards countries or to individuals. The +protection, for example, of law-abiding citizens in the enjoyment of +rights secured to them by law; the maintenance of peace throughout the +length and breadth of the Empire; the suppression of lawlessness; the +strict performance of every promise which the State has made to every +man or body of men, whether poor or rich, whether belonging to the class +of labourers, of farmers, or even of landlords--the rendering, in short, +to every man of his due--are things which without any improper extension +of the term interest fall under the head of national interests. +Utilitarianism, in truth, being a body of principles applicable +primarily to legislation and only secondarily to ethics, its doctrines +hold far more obviously true in the field of politics than in the field +of morals. On any wide view of large public questions expediency will be +found to be only another name for justice. It can be neither the +interest nor the duty of any nation to legislate in a way which produces +more of suffering than of happiness. A policy opposed to the interests +or the welfare of the United Kingdom as a whole, even though it may +appear for a moment to favour some particular portion of the State, is, +we may be well assured, a policy opposed not only to wisdom, but to +justice. + +[Sidenote: 3. Exclusively English point of view.] + +_Third objection._--To look at Home Rule mainly from an English point of +view, to criticise it because of its bearing on the interests or welfare +of England, is, it may perhaps be thought, to treat the whole matter +from the wrong side, and to betray an indifference to the welfare of +Ireland. Home Rule, the objector may say, is a scheme for the government +of Ireland. It therefore concerns the people of Ireland alone, it should +be subjected to examination from an Irish, not from an English point of +view, and to consider it in any other light is to exhibit in a new form +that callous disregard by England of Ireland's claims which has +prevented the two countries from blending into one community. + +It is of primary importance that this objection should be stated with +all the force which can be given to it, for were it valid it would +assuredly be, in the judgment of all just persons, fatal to the line of +reasoning which my readers are invited to pursue. The objection is, +however, so far from being valid as to present my whole method of +reasoning in a false light. A main reason why an Englishman does well to +look at Home Rule from an English point of view is, that this mode of +dealing with the adjustment of the possibly opposed interests of England +and Ireland is (paradoxical though the assertion may sound) both the +least irritating and in itself the fairest method of meeting the demands +of Irish Home Rulers; though--and this is the one certainly good result +which has arisen from the changed attitude towards Home Rule of Mr. +Gladstone and his followers--these demands may now happily be dealt with +as claims put forward not specially by Irishmen, but by a political +party which includes large numbers of Scotchmen and Englishmen. The +assertion, however, that to look at Home Rule from an English point of +view is the way to minimise irritation, and to deal fairly with a topic +specially requiring fair treatment, requires some explanation. + +Experience of the world teaches every man that in complicated affairs of +private life, involving questions, say, both of money and of sentiment, +nothing so surely prevents quarrels as to separate in the clearest +manner possible matters of business from matters of feeling. In +determining a dispute between _A._ and _B._, a great step is gained when +a friend induces each of the parties first to state clearly his exact +legal rights and his exact pecuniary interest, and only when these facts +are made clear to consider what are the concessions fairly to be +demanded from him as a matter, not of right, but of liberality. Nothing, +again, is plainer in the conduct of controversies between man and man, +than that if _A._ intends to exact his full legal rights from _B._, the +most irritating defence of _A.'s_ conduct is his pretence of acting +solely with a view to _B.'s_ own good; and that, on the other hand, no +manner of enforcing _A.'s_ claims against _B._ causes so little +unnecessary vexation to _B._ as for _A._ to say openly that he demands +his rights because they are his rights, and because to demand them is +his interest. Here, if nowhere else, the rules which apply to private +disputes apply also to political controversies. If millions of +Englishmen refuse a request made by millions of Irishmen, by far the +least irritating form of refusal is open avowal that the reason for +denying a separate Parliament to Ireland is the irreparable injury which +Home Rule will work both to Great Britain and to the British Empire. +This assertion has the merit, which even in politics is not small, of +truth. If the Parliamentary independence of Ireland threatened as little +damage to England as the Parliamentary independence of Victoria, an +Irish legislature would meet in Dublin before the end of the year. +Englishmen, it is true, do not believe that Ireland would in the long +run gain by the possession of legislative independence. It is not, +however, the doubt as to the reality of the blessing to be conferred on +Ireland, but the certainty as to the injury to be done to England, which +causes their opposition to Home Rule. To base this opposition upon the +probable inconsistency between a Home Rule policy and the true interests +of Ireland, involves the assumption that Englishmen are better judges of +what makes for the true interest of Ireland than are the majority of +Irishmen. The soundness of this assumption must seem to any man, who +either recalls the most obvious facts of Irish history, or notes the +depth of ignorance as to all things Irish which prevails even among our +educated classes, to be open to reasonable question. What is not +questionable is that the assertion, in whatever form it be made, that +three millions of Irishmen do not understand what is good for themselves +must arouse in their hearts deep and natural anger. If indeed the claim +of Great Britain to look in this matter of Home Rule solely to the +effect of Home Rule on British interests, were equivalent to the +assertion that because England is strong she ought wherever her own +interests are at stake to reck nothing of justice, such cynical scorn +for all considerations except the possession of superior power would +kindle just resentment in the soul of every man, whether in Ireland or +in England, who believes that national morality is more than a mere +phrase, though even in this case the open cynicism might excite less +disgust than cynicism veiling itself under the mask of benevolence. +Happily, however, there is in the present instance no opposition between +truth and justice. Home Rule is no doubt primarily a scheme for the +government of Ireland, but it is also much more than this: it is a plan +for revolutionising the constitution of the whole United Kingdom. There +is no unfairness, therefore, in insisting that the proposed change must +not take place if it be adverse to the interests of Great Britain. This +is merely to assert that the welfare of thirty millions of citizens +must, if a conflict of interest arise, be preferred to the interest of +five millions of citizens. Home Rulers, it must again and again be +repeated, demand not the national independence of Ireland, but the +maintenance of the connection between England and Ireland on terms +different from the conditions contained in the Act of Union. To keep +one's mind clear on this point is of importance, because the result +follows that, as already intimated, a whole series of arguments or +claims which may fairly be put forward by a Nationalist are not +available to a Home Ruler. A Nationalist, for example, may urge that +the will of the Irish people to be independent is decisive of their +moral right to independence, and that the perils which a free Ireland +may bring upon England need not in any way concern him or his country. +Whether indeed the principle of "nationality," or the contention that +any portion of a State which deems itself conscious of distinct national +sentiment may, as a matter of absolute right, claim to become a separate +nation, can be maintained, is an enquiry not so easily answered in the +affirmative as is often assumed by modern democrats. What, however, is +here insisted upon is not that the principle of nationality is unsound, +but that this principle does not cover the demand for Home Rule. A Home +Ruler asks not for the political separation, but for the political +partnership of England and Ireland. He wishes not that the firm should +be dissolved, but that the Articles of Association should be revised. +There is not then the least unfairness in the answer that no +modification can be allowed which in the judgment of his associates is +fatal to the prosperity of the concern. To crowds excited by pictures of +past greatness or of past struggles, by the hope of future prosperity to +be brought about by miracles wrought by substituting the rule of love +for the rule of law, there may appear to be something prosaic, not to +say repulsive, in the comparison of the relation between Great Britain +and Ireland to the relation between shareholders in a trading company. +But at a period when a fundamental change in the constitution is +advocated on grounds of faith, benevolence, or generosity, a good deal +is gained by bringing into relief the business aspect of constitutional +reforms. It can never be amiss to be reminded that, in the words of one +of the most thoughtful among the advocates of Home Rule, "Government is +a very practical business, and that those succeed best in it who bring +least of sentiment or enthusiasm to the conduct of their affairs." It is +at moments of revolutionary fervour, when men measure proposed policies +rather by their wishes than by their experience, that every citizen +needs to have impressed upon his mind that government and legislation +are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination. Nor let any +one imagine that the expression of the belief constantly avowed or +implied throughout these pages, that Home Rule would be as great an evil +to England as Irish independence, shows a reckless and most +unbusinesslike indifference to the perils and losses of separation. My +conviction is unalterable that separation would be to England, as also +to Ireland, a gigantic evil. This position is fully compatible with the +belief that there are other evils as great, or greater. If a man says +that he prefers the loss of his right hand to the loss of his life, he +cannot reasonably be charged with making light of amputation. It is +however perfectly true that the line of argument pursued in this work +must, if it be sound, drive those to whom it is addressed to a choice +between the maintenance of the Union and the concession to Ireland of +national independence. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] + +These are-- + +i. Home Rule as Federalism. + +ii. Home Rule as Colonial Independence. + +iii. Home Rule as the Restoration of Grattan's Constitution. + +iv. Home Rule under the Government of Ireland Bill, or, to use a +convenient name, under the Gladstonian constitution. Chap. vii. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +MEANING OF HOME RULE. + + +"Home Rule" is a term which, like all current and popular phrases, is, +though intelligible, wanting in precision. Hence it is well, before we +investigate the different forms which schemes of Home Rule may assume, +to fix in our minds precisely what Home Rule does mean and what it does +not mean. + +[Sidenote: What Home Rule means.] + +"Home Rule"--or, to speak more accurately, the policy of Home +Rule--means, if we may use language with which we are all familiar in +relation to the Colonies, the endowment of Ireland with representative +institutions and responsible government. + +It means, therefore, the creation of an Irish Parliament which shall +have legislative authority in matters of Irish concern, and of an Irish +executive responsible (in general) for its acts to the Irish Parliament +or the Irish people. Hence every scheme of Home Rule which merits that +name is marked by three features--_first_, the creation of an Irish +Parliament; _secondly_, the right of the Irish Parliament to legislate +within its own sphere (however that sphere may be defined) with habitual +freedom from the control of the Imperial or British Parliament; and +_thirdly_, the habitual responsibility of the Irish executive for its +acts to the Irish people or to their representatives. + +These three characteristics, which I do not attempt to define with +anything like logical precision, constitute the essence of Home Rule. +Other things, however important in themselves, are matters of +subordinate detail, and open to discussion or compromise. The +limitations to the sphere within which the Irish Parliament is to exert +independent authority, the definition of the term "Irish concerns," the +constitution of the Irish Parliament, the nature and appointment of the +Irish executive (which, though it is no doubt generally assumed to be a +Cabinet chosen in effect like the Victorian Ministry, by the local +Parliament, might well, and indeed far better, be a President or Council +elected, like the Governor of New York, by popular vote), the occasions +on which the British Parliament should retain the legal or moral right +of legislation for Ireland--these and a score of other subjects which at +once suggest themselves to a critic of constitutions are of supreme +importance, but in whatever way they may be determined, they do not +touch the principle of Home Rule. A scheme, on the other hand, however +wise its provisions, which lacked the essential characteristics already +enumerated, would not meet the demand for Home Rule; an Act which did +not constitute a Parliament for Ireland could not possibly satisfy the +sentiment of Irish nationality; an Irish Parliament which did not +habitually, at any rate, legislate with independence of the Parliament +at Westminster could not divest the law in Ireland of its "foreign +garb"; an executive not responsible directly or indirectly to the Irish +people could not give full effect to the legislation of an Irish +Parliament, and the existence of such an executive would (if the true +ground why law is hated in Ireland be its alien character) only divert +popular hostility from the law to the government. + +[Sidenote: What Home Rule does not mean.] + +Home Rule does not mean Local Self-Government; Home Rule does not mean +National Independence. + +Local Self-Government means the delegation by the Sovereign, and in +England therefore by Parliament, to local bodies, say town councils, +county boards, vestries, and the like, of strictly subordinate powers of +legislation for definite localities. The authority possessed by such +local bodies extends over definite and limited areas, (which themselves +are often created by legislation); exists for definite purposes; is +directly conferred or tolerated by Parliament; has no capacity of +indefinite extension; and neither comes into competition with nor +restrains, either legally or morally, the legislative authority of +Parliament. Logically, indeed, there may be difficulty in drawing the +precise line of demarcation between a plan for conferring on Ireland the +minimum of legislative independence which could without absurdity be +dignified with the name of Home Rule, and a plan for giving to the +boroughs and counties of Ireland the maximum of law-making power which +could, without fraud upon the intelligence of the English people, be +comprehended within the elastic phrase "extension of Local +Self-Government." But this logical puzzle need give us no trouble; it is +based on the fact that every non-sovereign law-making body, whether it +be the French National Assembly, the American Congress, or the London, +Chatham and Dover Railway Co., belongs to one and the same genus.[2] The +casuists of jurisprudence may quibble for ever over the confines between +Home Rule and Local Self-Government; men of sense engaged in the +consideration of affairs thrust aside such inopportune logomachy, and +content themselves with the knowledge that were the Town Council, say, +of Birmingham or of Belfast endowed with tenfold its present powers, it +would differ essentially from any Irish Parliament which, even though +denied the Parliamentary title, should represent the people of Ireland, +and should have received the very smallest amount of authority which +could by any possibility satisfy Mr. Parnell. Nor are differences which +may not admit of easy definition difficult for a candid enquirer to +discern. A town council, whatever its powers, does not represent a +nation, and derives no prestige from the principle of nationality; the +feeblest legislative assembly meeting at Dublin would rightly claim to +speak for the Irish people. A town council, whether of Birmingham or of +Belfast, springs from and is kept alive by the will of Parliament, and +cannot pretend that its powers, however extensive, compete with the +authority of its creator. Should a town council use even its strictly +legal rights in a way not conducive to the public interest, Parliament +would without scruple override the bye-laws of the council by the force +of Parliamentary enactment. The authority of an Irish representative +assembly would from the necessity of things be, if not a legal, at any +rate a moral check, I will not say on Parliamentary sovereignty, but +assuredly on Parliamentary legislation. Extended rights of +self-government, though given to every local body in Ireland, would not +affect the relation between the people of Ireland and the Parliament at +Westminster. The very aim of Home Rule, even under its least pretentious +form, is to introduce a new relation between the people of Ireland and +the Parliament at Westminster. The matter may be summed up in one +phrase: Local Self-Government however extended means the delegation, +Home Rule however curtailed means the surrender, of Parliamentary +authority. + +[Sidenote: Local Self-Government.] + +The distinction here insisted upon is of practical importance, for it is +connected with a question so pressing as to excuse an apparent, though +not more than an apparent, digression. + +English Radicals, and many politicians who are not Radicals, hold, +whether rightly or not, that the sphere of Local Self-Government may +with benefit to the nation be greatly extended in England. The soundness +of this view in no way concerns us, and it is a matter upon which there +is no reason, for our present purpose, to form or express an opinion; +they also hope that by a similar extension of Local Self-Government to +Ireland they may satisfy the demand for Home Rule. They conceive, in +short, that it is possible to confer a substantial benefit upon the +Irish people, and to close a dangerous agitation, by giving to Belfast +and to Cork the same municipal privileges which they wish to extend to +Birmingham or to Liverpool. The reasons for this belief are threefold: +that Local Self-Government is itself a benefit; that Ireland ought, as +of right, to have the same institutions as England; that Local or +Municipal Self-Government will meet the real if not the nominal wish of +the Irish people. This hope I believe to be delusive. The reasons on +which it is grounded are--one of them probably, and two of them +certainly--unsound. + +Local Self-Government is one of those arrangements which, like most +political institutions, cannot be called absolutely good or bad. It is a +good thing, I suppose, at Birmingham, and was some fifty years ago a +good thing in Massachusetts, and it may prove (though this is +speculation) a good thing in an English county. Local Self-Government is +not admirable at New York; it works less well than it once did in New +England; it does not produce very happy effects in London parishes; we +may well doubt whether it be really suited for modern France. Local +Self-Government where it flourishes is quite as much a result as a cause +of a happy social condition; the eulogies bestowed upon it contain a +curious mixture of truth and falsehood. What is true is, that where +self-government flourishes, society is in a sound state; what is false +is, that Local Self-Government produces a sound state of society. The +primary condition necessary for the success of self-government is +harmony between different classes. The rich must be the guides of the +poor, the poor must put trust in the rich. Men who are placed above +corruption must interest themselves in the laborious but important +details of local administration; men who might be corrupted themselves, +must desire to place power in the hands of leaders who are as a class +incorruptible. High public spirit, a detestation of jobbery, trust and +goodwill between rich and poor, are the feelings which make good local +or municipal government possible. There are certain parts of England, +there are larger parts of the United States, where these admirable and +rare conditions exist. Do they exist in Ireland? I need not answer the +question, for if they existed our difficulties in Ireland would be at an +end. If, indeed, there were a genuine desire for Local Self-Government, +expressed by Irishmen themselves, every sensible man would at once +surrender _a priori_ theories in favour of the conclusions drawn by +practical experience. But no such wish has been expressed, and until it +is expressed, a thoughtful observer may fairly believe that Local +Self-Government will not flourish in a country where are presented none +of the conditions on which its prosperity depends, and he may conjecture +that in Ireland, as in France, an honest centralised administration of +impartial officials, and not Local Self-Government, would best meet the +real wants of the people.[3] + +The notion that Ireland or any one part of the United Kingdom ought, or +has a claim, to have the same institutions as every other part rests on +a confusion of ideas, and is a false deduction from democratic +principles. It is founded on the feeling which has caused half the +errors of democracy, that a fraction of a nation has a right to speak +with the authority of the whole, and that the right of each portion of +the people to make its wishes heard involves the right to have them +granted. This delusion has once and again made Paris the ruler of +France, and the Parisian mob the master of Paris. The sound principle of +democratic government--and England must, under the present state of +things, be ruled on democratic principles--is, that all parts of the +country must be governed in the way which the whole of the State as +represented by the majority thereof deems expedient for each part, and +that while every part should be allowed a voice to make known its wants, +the decision how these wants are to be met must be given by the whole +State, that is (in the particular instance) by the majority of the +electors of Great Britain and Ireland. From this principle it does not +follow either that every part of the kingdom should have those +institutions which that part prefers, (though in so far as this end can +be attained its attainment is desirable,) or, still less, that every +part of the kingdom should have the same institutions as every other +part. That this is so everybody in a general way admits. No one supposes +that because the people of Leicester abominate vaccination the +Vaccination Acts are not to be extended to that borough, or that the +wish of the people of Birmingham in favour of free schools is decisive +in favour of making education in Birmingham gratuitous. The will of a +locality is admitted not to be the expression of the will of the nation. +No one, again, fancies that the legal institutions of England ought of +necessity to be extended to Scotland, or the law of Scotland to England. +In Ireland recent legislation has, and with general approval, +established institutions which no one alleges must, because they exist +in Ireland, be applied of necessity or as a matter of justice to +England. English tenants might in many cases, it is likely enough, think +the provisions of the Irish Land Acts a boon, but no one would listen to +the argument that simply because under the special circumstances of +Ireland special privileges are given to Irish tenants, similar +privileges ought to be conferred upon every English tenant farmer. The +idea therefore that because English boroughs or counties receive an +increased measure of self-government the same measure ought to be +extended to Ireland, though it sounds plausible, is neither conformable +to democratic principle nor to our habitual practice, grounded as that +practice is on considerations of common sense and expediency. The true +watchwords which should guide English democrats in their dealings with +Ireland, as in truth with every other part of the United Kingdom, are +not "equality," "similarity," and "simultaneity," but "unity of +government," "equality of political rights," "diversity of +institutions." Unless English democrats see this they will commit a +double fault: they will not in reality deal with Ireland as with +England, for to deal with societies in essentially different conditions +in the same manner is in truth to treat them differently; they will +not--and this is of even more importance--perform the true function of +the democracy, which is to remove by special legislation, mainly in a +democratic direction, the peculiar evils which are the result of +Ireland's peculiar and calamitous history. + +Once realise that Local Self-Government is essentially different from +Home Rule, and it becomes patent that the idea of satisfying the wish +for Home Rule by increasing the municipal franchises of every township +in Ireland is a dangerous delusion. Local Self-Government may be an +excellent thing in its way--it is possibly (though I do not say it is) +the thing which the inhabitants of Ireland ought to wish for; but it is +not the thing which they do wish for, and it has not the qualities +which, if Home Rule be really desired by the Irish people, make Home +Rule desirable. It does not meet the feeling of nationality; it does not +give the popular leaders authority to settle the land question; it does +not free the law from its alien aspect. The very reasons which make +English reformers favour the extension of Local Self-Government in +Ireland prove that Local Self-Government, whatever its merits, is no +substitute for Parliamentary independence. Englishmen recommend Local +Self-Government because it does not check on the authority of the +Imperial Parliament; Home Rulers desire Home Rule because it does check +Imperial legislation. Brandy is good, and water is good; but when a +neighbour asks for a glass of spirits, it is mockery to tender a glass +of water on the ground that both spirits and water are drink. The +benevolent person who makes the offer must not wonder if he receives no +thanks. + +[Sidenote: National Independence.] + +Home Rule does not mean National Independence. This proposition needs no +elaboration. Any plan of Home Rule whatever implies that there are +spheres of national life in which Ireland is not to act with the freedom +of an independent State. Mr. Parnell and his followers accept in +principle Mr. Gladstone's proposals, and therefore are willing to accept +for Ireland restrictions on her political liberty absolutely +inconsistent with the principle of nationality. Under the Gladstonian +constitution her foreign policy is to be wholly regulated by a British +Parliament in which sit no Irish representatives; she is not to have the +right either of raising an army or of endowing a church; she is in fact +to surrender any claim to the rights of a nation in consideration of +receiving a certain number of State-rights. In all this there is nothing +unreasonable and nothing blameworthy. One part of the United Kingdom is +prepared to accept new terms of partnership. But this acceptance, +though reasonable and fair enough, is quite inconsistent with any claim +for national independence. A nation is one thing, a state forming part +of a federation is quite another. To ask for the position of a dependent +colony like Victoria, or of a province such as Ontario, is to renounce +the demand to be a nation. A _bona fide_ Home Ruler cannot be a _bona +fide_ Nationalist. This point deserves attention, not for the sake of +the miserable and ruinous advantage which is obtained by taunting an +adversary in controversy with inconsistency till you drive him to +improve his logical position by increasing the exactingness of his +demands, but because the advocates of Home Rule (honestly enough, no +doubt) confuse the matter under discussion by a strange kind of +intellectual shuffle. When they wish to minimise the sacrifice to +England of establishing a Parliament in Ireland, they bring Home Rule +down nearly to the proportions of Local Self-Government; when they wish +to maximise--if the word may be allowed--the blessings to Ireland of a +separate legislature, they all but identify Home Rule with National +Independence. Yet you have no more right to expect from any form of +State-rights the new life which sometimes is roused among a people by +the spirit and the responsibilities of becoming a nation, than you have +to suppose that municipal councils will satisfy the feelings which +demand an Irish Parliament. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] See Dicey, Law of the Constitution (2nd ed.), p. 80. + +[3] De Beaumont's opinions on this point are perfectly clear: they +represent the judgment of an extremely able thinker, who approaches the +problems presented by Irish society with an impartiality which from the +nature of things is unattainable by any Englishman or Irishman. His +utterances will moreover command the more respect from the consideration +that De Beaumont, belonging as he did to the school of his intimate +friend De Tocqueville, was inclined rather to overrate than to underrate +the virtues of self-government; whilst as a Frenchman he possessed a +knowledge which cannot fall to any Englishman of the benefits conferred +upon the people by a good administration of the French type. The +following extracts from a chapter too long for complete citation, which +is written to show that Ireland needs a centralised government, deserve +the most careful attention. The whole chapter, and indeed the whole work +to which it belongs, ought at the present moment to be familiar to every +English Liberal:-- + +"_Pour detruire le pouvoir politique de l'aristocratie, il faudrait lui +oter l'application quotidienne des lois, comme on l'a privee +precedemment adu pouvoir de les faire. Il faudrait, par consequent, +modifier profondement le systeme administratif et judiciaire qui repose +sur l'institution des juges de paix et sur l'organisation des grands +jurys, tels qu'ils sont constitues aujourd'hui. Et d'abord, pour +executer cette reforme, il faudrait centraliser le pouvoir_. + + * * * * * + +"_Plus on considere l'etat de l'Irlande, et plus il semble qu'a tout +prendre un gouvernement central fortement constitue serait, du moins +pour quelque temps, le meilleur que puisse avoir ce pays. Une +aristocratie existe, qu'on veut reformer. Mais a qui remettre le pouvoir +qu'on va retirer de ses mains? Aux classes moyennes?--Elles ne font que +de naitre en Irlande. L'avenir leur appartient; mats ne +compromettront-elles pas cet avenir, si la charge de mener la societe +est confiee des aujourd'hui a leurs mains inhabiles et a leurs ardentes +passions?_ + +_"Telle est aujourd'hui en Irlande la situation des partis, que l'on ne +peut obtenir quelque justice des pouvoirs politiques, si on les laisse a +l'aristocratie protestante, et que l'on ne saurait guere en esperer +davantage, si on les donne aussitot a la classe moyenne catholique qui +s'eleve._ + +_"Ce qu'il faudrait a l'Irlande, ce serait une administration superieure +aux partis, a l'ombre de laquelle les classes moyennes pussent grandir, +se developper et s'instruire, pendant que l'aristocratie perdrait son +pouvoir._ + + * * * * * + +_"Il n'entre, du reste, ni dans mon desir, ni dans mon plan, d'expliquer +la forme et le mecanisme de la centralisation qui conviendrait a +l'Irlande, et dont je me borne a reconnaitre en principe l'utilite +passagere pour ce pays; je ne hasarderai, sur ce sujet, qu'une seule +idee pratique._ + +_"C'est que, pour organiser en Irlande un gouvernement central puissant, +il faudrait de plus en plus resserrer le lien d'union qui attache +l'Irlande a l'Angleterre, rapprocher le plus possible Dublin de Londres, +et faire de l'Irlande un comte anglais._ + + * * * * * + +_"On ne conteste point que l'Irlande ait besoin d'un gouvernement +special; et s'il y a necessite de la soumettre a un regime legislatif +autre que celui de l'Angleterre, il faut bien aussi des agents +particuliers pour appliquer des regles differentes d'administration. +Mais, ceci etant admis, l'on ne voit pas ce qui aujourd'hui empecherait +de placer le siege du gouvernement irlandais dans la premiere ville de +l'empire britannique._ + + * * * * * + +_"La reforme de la vice-royaute et l'abolition des administrations +locales d'Irlande ne sont, sans doute, que des changements de forme. +Mais ce sont des moyens pratiques indispensables pour executer les +reformes politiques dont ce pays a besoin. Il faut que, pendant la +periode de transition ou se trouve l'Irlande, ceux qui la gouvernent +soient places absolument en dehors d'elle, de ses moeurs, de ses +passions; il faut que son gouvernement cesse completement d'etre +irlandais; il faut qu'il soit entierement, non pas anglais, mais remis a +des Anglais."_--2 De Beaumont, _l'Irlande, Sociale, Politique et +Religieuse_, pp. 124-129 + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +STRENGTH OF THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND. + + +[Sidenote: Strength of movement.] + +A dispassionate observer will easily convince himself that in Great +Britain the movement in favour of Home Rule is stronger than is believed +by its opponents. Patent facts show that this is so. In 1880 no single +English statesman had avowed himself its supporter; not fifty English or +Scotch members of Parliament could have been found to vote for an +enquiry into the admissibility of Mr. Parnell's policy. It may well be +doubted whether at that date ten British constituencies would have +returned to Parliament representatives pledged to grant Ireland a +separate legislature. Contrast this state of things with the present +condition of affairs. England has indeed pronounced decisively against +any tampering with the Act of Union, but the leading statesman of the +day has avowed himself a Home Ruler; he is supported by eminent +colleagues, and by nearly two hundred representatives of British +constituencies. Scotland and Wales on the whole favour the policy of +separation, and if, as has been roughly computed, of the electors of +the United Kingdom, 1,316,327 have voted in support of the Union, the +same computation shows that 1,238,342 are, to say the least, indifferent +to its maintenance. These are facts which tell their own tale. The Home +Rule movement has waxed strong. What is in England the source of its +strength, and what are the arguments in its support relied upon by its +English advocates? + +[Sidenote: Source of its strength.] + +Nine persons out of ten will reply that the Home Rule movement in +England owes its origin and force to the patronage of Mr. Gladstone. No +one who has watched the ebb and flow of popular feeling will underrate +that statesman's influence, and few persons, whatever their political +bias, will deny that but for Mr. Gladstone's conversion Mr. Parnell's +teaching would not at this moment have gained for him as many as fifty +disciples among English politicians. It may even be conceded that but +for Mr. Gladstone's action no English party would, during his lifetime, +have adopted the Parliamentary independence of Ireland as a watchword. +But here, as in other instances, there is grave danger of mistaking the +occasion for the cause of events, and if Mr. Gladstone's conversion has +determined the form and increased the momentum of the Home Rule +movement, it would be an error to hold that the prevalence of doctrines +unfavourable to the maintenance of the Union between England and Ireland +were wholly or even in the main due to his conduct. His conversion +itself remains to be accounted for. This would (except to those critics +who ascribe the most important acts of public statesmanship to the +pettiest forms of private selfishness) remain almost unaccountable +unless it were regarded in the light, in which it ought no doubt to be +looked upon, of an example of the facility with which a leader guided by +keen sympathy with the real or supposed opinions or emotions of the +moment follows, while apparently he guides, the phases of public +opinion. Candour moreover compels the admission that, if Mr. Gladstone's +action has led some politicians to "find salvation"--according to the +miserable cant of the day--in the adoption of opinions which cannot be +dignified with the name of convictions, many honest men both within and +without the sphere of public life have under the countenance of a great +name been encouraged to avow publicly sympathies with the demand for +Home Rule which have been slowly matured, and have hitherto scarcely +been acknowledged even in the convert's own mind. To any one who +perceives that the force of a movement opposed to the traditions of +English statesmanship must be attributed to some cause beyond the +personal influence of a leader, the idea naturally suggests itself that +the prevalence of conversions to the policy of Home Rule is due to the +power of argument, and that the English people have been brought to see +the expediency of conceding a legislature to Ireland by the same methods +which induced them to abolish the policy of Protection. This notion does +not correspond with known facts. Till a recent date hardly an argument +was addressed to the English public in favour of Home Rule; no great +writer or speaker even aimed at proving to the nation that a reform or +innovation which has been rejected again and again as repeal had more to +recommend it under a new name. Great changes in our institutions or +policy have hitherto been preceded by lengthy, in general by too +lengthy, discussion. The doctrines of Free Trade were established by +Adam Smith seventy years before the abolition of the Corn Laws, and +Protection was not vanquished till Cobden and Bright had, by laborious +controversy, exposed its fallacies in every corner of Great Britain. The +reasons in favour of Catholic Emancipation were stated in their full +force by Burke more than forty years before a Roman Catholic was +admitted to Parliament, and the whole case in favour of the Catholics +had been argued out in the presence of the nation long before the +passing of the Catholic Relief Bill. No movement ever appealed to keener +popular sympathies than the movement for the abolition of slavery. Yet +the Abolitionists made their case out--proved it, as lawyers say, "up to +the very hilt," before a single slave was released from bondage. The +Irish Church (it may be suggested) was abolished off-hand. This apparent +exception to the regular course of long argumentative controversy which +in England marks all great innovations has misled Home Rulers, yet the +exception is only apparent. Long before 1869 the intelligence of +England--one might say of the civilised world--had been convinced by +the power of reason that the maintenance in a Roman Catholic country, +and at the expense of a Roman Catholic population, of a Protestant +ecclesiastical establishment was an indefensible anomaly. The walls fell +at the first blast which sounded attack, because the foundations had +been argumentatively sapped and undermined for more than a generation. +With the cause of Home Rule it is far otherwise. Its sudden progress has +been characterised by a singular absence of systematic discussion. No +one supposes that its English advocates are deficient in talent or in +zeal. Mr. Gladstone, Mr. John Morley, Mr. Bryce--to name no others--are +as competent apologists for any opinion they entertain as can well be +found. They have been put upon their mettle; they have addressed the +nation in Parliament and out of Parliament; they have produced a certain +number of reasons, which deserve respectful consideration, in support of +their favourite innovation. But no candid critic can feel that these +eminent men, and other less distinguished labourers in the same cause, +have put forward arguments of strength enough to account for the +undoubted conviction of the reasoners. Appeals to trust in the people, +to confidence in human nature, to the strength of love as contrasted +with the weakness of law, to shame for our past misgovernment of the +Irish, to sanguine expectations of terminating a secular feud which has +caused wretchedness to Ireland and has lessened the power of England, +would appear in the judgment of orators addressing English electors +likely to have much more weight with their audience than any attempt to +prove that the establishment of a Parliament at Dublin will be conducive +to the benefit of the Empire. Nor is this wonderful. The plain truth is +that the strength of the Home Rule movement depends, as far as England +is concerned, on a peculiar, though not of necessity a transitory, state +of opinion. The arguments of Home Rulers, whatever their worth (and I +have not the remotest intention of denying that they have weight), +derive at least half their power from their correspondence with dominant +sentiments. That this is so is admitted by the now celebrated appeal +from the classes to the masses. It is in its nature an appeal from a +verdict likely to be pronounced by the understanding or the prejudice of +educated men, to the emotions of the uneducated crowd. The appeal may or +may not be justifiable. This is not the point for discussion; but the +making of such an appeal necessarily implies that the existence of +certain widespread feelings is a condition requisite for full +appreciation of the reasoning in support of Home Rule. The reasons may +be good, but it is faith which gives them convincing power. They derive +their cogency from a favouring atmosphere of opinion or feeling. Two +features of recent controversy suffice of themselves (if proof were +needed) to establish the truth of this assertion. The rhetorical +emphasis laid by Home Rulers on the baseness of the arts which carried +the Act of Union is, as an argument in favour of repealing the Act, +little else than irrational. The assumed infamy of Pitt does not prove +the alleged wisdom of Gladstone; and to urge the repeal of an Act which +has stood for nearly a century, because it was carried by corruption, is +in the eye of reason as absurd as to question the title of modern French +landowners because of the horrors of the Reign of Terror. Even a +Legitimist would not now base a moral claim to an estate on the ground +that his grandfather was deprived of it through confiscation and murder. +But rhetoric is not governed by the laws of logic, and insistence on the +corruption or the criminality by which the Act of Union was carried is +an effective method of conciliating popular sentiment to the cause of +repeal. No notion again has been more widely circulated or put forward +on higher authority than that past reforms have been due in the main to +the enthusiasm of the masses. But no notion is more directly at variance +with the lessons of history. In the eighteenth century the enlightenment +of the Whig aristocracy was England's safeguard against the Jacobitism +and the bigotry of the crowd. Every effort in favour of religious +liberty was till recently the work of an educated minority who opposed +popular prejudice. In the last century popular sentiment would have +denied all rights to Jews; in 1780 Lord George Gordon was the hero of +the people of England, and even more emphatically of the people of +Scotland. And Burke was forced to present an elaborate defence to his +constituents at Bristol for taking part in an attempt to mitigate the +penal laws against the Roman Catholics. There is every reason to suppose +that even in 1829 a _plebiscite_, had one been possible, would have +negatived the Catholic Relief Bill. The mitigation again of the Criminal +Law was the work of thinkers like Romilly and Bentham. These eminent +reformers would have been much surprised to have been told that the +uneducated masses were their staunch supporters. One of the greatest +improvements ever effected by legislation was the reform in the +administration of parochial relief. The new poor law was essentially +unpopular; its principles were established by economists; its enactment +was due to the Whigs, supported, as it should always be remembered to +his credit, by the Duke of Wellington. It may be conjectured from recent +legislation that at this very moment an indiscriminate renewal of +outdoor relief would command the approval of the agricultural voters. +Protection in the form of the corn laws was unpopular in England; this, +however, cannot with fairness be put down to the moral or intellectual +credit of the multitude. The corn laws were disliked because they +enhanced the price of bread. Even as it was, the Chartists used to +interrupt the meetings of the Anti-Corn Law League, and it is an idle +fancy that the dangers of a protective tariff are in themselves more +patent to the electors of England than to the democracy of France or of +America. Trades Unionism is in many of its features a form of +protectionism. If again we turn to foreign policy, we must read history +with a strangely perverted eye if we hold that the people have in +general condemned wars, whether just or unjust. There is hardly to be +named a great war in which England has been engaged which has not +engaged popular support. In the struggle with the American Colonies the +warlike sentiment of the people was undoubtedly opposed to the prudence +and justice of a small body of enlightened men, who found their +representative in Burke. In England, it is true, no great change of law +or of policy can in general be effected until it has in some sort been +sanctioned by popular approval. But to attribute every advance, or even +most advances, along the path of progress to the masses by whom a step +forward is finally sanctioned, is hardly a more patent fallacy than the +notion that because every statute is passed with the assent of the +Crown, to the Queen may be ascribed the glory of every beneficial Act +passed in her name. To maintain, as every man versed in history must +maintain, that ignorance must from the necessity of the case be the ally +of prejudice, is not to deny to the people their merits or virtues. If +ignorance were wisdom as well as bliss, every effort in favour of +popular education were folly. No doubt the rich or educated classes are +slaves to delusions from which the crowd are free. This concession falls +far short of the doctrine that legislative progress is mainly due to the +soundness of popular feeling. That this doctrine should in one shape or +another have been promulgated, and have formed the basis of an argument +for a complicated change in the constitution, is a sign that the +advocates of the innovation or reform feel instinctively that the +strength of their case lies in its coincidence with dominant sentiment. +Nor is it hard to see what is the condition of sentiment or opinion +which favours the doctrine of Home Rule. The matter, however, is of such +importance as well to repay careful examination. + +For the first time in the course of English history, national policy has +passed under the sway, not so much of democratic convictions, but of a +far stronger power--democratic sentiment. Every idea which can rightly +or wrongly be called popular, commands, even among persons who deem +themselves Conservatives, ready assent or superstitious deference. Hence +flow (be it at once conceded) some of the best characteristics of the +age, such as the detestation of inhumanity; the distrust in violent +methods of government; the dislike to anything which savours of +indifference to the wishes, or callousness to the wants, of the people. +Hence the growth of the conviction that property has at least as many +duties as rights, and of the faith inspired, rather by compassion than +by reason, that the toiling multitudes can and must be made to share in +the prosperity and the luxuries created in great part by their ceaseless +labour. From the same source--from the prevalence of the democratic +spirit--arise a crowd of dubious not to say ignoble ideas, as that the +voice of the majority is the voice of God; that it is a folly, if not a +crime, to resist any widespread phase of belief or of passion; that any +body of persons claiming to be united by a sense of nationality +possesses an inherent and divine right to be treated as an independent +community. Many of these notions are radically inconsistent with one +another. The dogma, for example, of the supremacy of the majority, or +the conviction that legislation ought to aim at the greatest happiness +of the greatest number, each belong to a different order of ideas from +the principle of nationality, and may easily come into conflict with it. +This inconsistency does not lessen the influence exerted by the mass of +democratic feeling. We may, however, well note that democratic ideas at +the present day produce their effect far less by exciting enthusiasm +(for they now kindle nothing like the fiery fervour which the doctrines +of popular sovereignty or of human equality excited a century ago +throughout the length and breadth of Europe), than by their singular +capacity for dissolving the convictions which oppose the claims of +revolutionists. Of this solvent power recent events have given us more +than enough examples. One may suffice. The argument that because Irish +householders have received votes therefore the majority of the electors +of the United Kingdom must concede to the majority of Irish householders +anything whatever having reference to Ireland which Irish householders +desire, is logically absurd. But (combined, no doubt, with other causes) +it convinced the Conservative Government of 1885 that the executive in +Ireland was bound to bow to the will of the Irish people, and was +relieved from the obligation of enforcing at all costs the law of the +land. Popular sympathies, moreover, blend in the minds of modern +Englishmen with feelings of a much less generous and much less +respectable order. Dislike of trouble, hatred to the performance of +arduous public duties, a growing indifference to ordinary commonplace +ideas of law and justice, contempt for the legal rights of individuals +whenever these rights clash for a moment with the ease or interest of +the public, exert an incalculable influence on the conduct, and in truth +upon the convictions, both of Members of Parliament and of electors. It +is not too much to say that the favour or acquiescence with which +so-called practical politicians are prepared to accept Home Rule is +grounded to a far greater extent than any one who respects the character +of England likes to confess upon the _naive_ but intense conviction that +it is too much to expect from five hundred and more English gentlemen +that they should take the trouble of withstanding the continuous +pressure exerted by eighty-six Parnellites. Cowardice masks itself under +the show of compromise, and men of eminent respectability yield to the +terror of being bored concessions which their forefathers would have +refused to the threat of armed rebellion. It is unnecessary to explain +how this condition of opinion, under which the best and the lowest +feelings of human nature are blended in a current of democratic +sentiment, predisposes large bodies of Englishmen towards acquiescence +in the Home Rule movement. My aim is not so much to analyse with +precision the mode in which the cause of Home Rule is fostered by the +moral atmosphere of the day, as to insist upon the all-important +consideration that the progress of the Home Rule movement is due rather +to the encouragement it derives from prevailing sentiment than to any +intellectual conviction on the part of Englishmen that it is dictated by +considerations of sound policy. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +ENGLISH ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF HOME RULE. + + +[Sidenote: Arguments by which Home Rule policy defended.] + +To lay stress upon the consideration that the Home Rule movement in +England derives its force from the condition of public feeling is not, +be it remarked, equivalent to showing that the policy of Home Rule is +unwise; still less that the policy of defended. Home Rule is unlikely to +be adopted by the nation. Masses of human beings must generally, as +individuals must often, trust to the guidance of feeling. The difference +between the sentiment which ought and the sentiment which ought not to +determine national conduct is, that the one admits and the other does +not admit of justification on grounds of reason or experience. Reasoning +is the test, not the source of wise action. Slavery was abolished, the +abuses of the _ancien regime_ were destroyed, Italian unity was created +under the stress of emotions which carried away thousands who could not +have logically defended the impulse which governed their acts. But in +these, as in other cases in which humanity has been carried forward +along the path of progress by the force of emotion, the enthusiasm of +the time could, in so far as it worked for good, be justified on +grounds of reason. Man is (difficult though it often be to believe the +fact) a rational being, in so far at least that he is constrained to +defend on argumentative grounds courses of action dictated by feeling. +From this law of human nature Home Rulers have neither the power nor, in +fairness be it added, the wish to escape. Their influence is due to the +condition of public sentiment, but they justify their policy by +arguments which are the intellectual equivalents for the moral feelings +which go to constitute the opinion of the day. Of these arguments, those +which require statement and examination can be conveniently summed up +under six heads--the argument from foreign experience, the argument from +the will of the Irish people, the argument from the lessons of Irish +history, the argument from the virtues of self-government, the argument +from the necessity for Coercion Acts, the argument from the +inconvenience to England of refusing Home Rule to Ireland. + +[Sidenote: Argument 1. Foreign experience.] + +_The argument from foreign experience_.--Home Rule under one shape or +another has been tried in a large number of foreign countries, and has +(it is alleged) been found everywhere to solve the problem of combining +into one State communities which, like England and Ireland, were not +ready to coalesce into one united nation. Each State throughout the +American Union, each Canton of Switzerland, has something like sovereign +independence. Yet the United States are strong and prosperous, and the +Swiss Confederacy, which was a land at one time torn by religious +animosities, and divided by differences of race, is now a country so +completely at harmony with itself that without a regular army it +maintains its independence in the face of the armed powers of Europe. +Canada or Victoria have more complete liberty of action than any one +dreams of claiming for Ireland. Yet Canada and Victoria are loyal, and +under the guidance of men who, it may be, were yesterday rebels in +Ireland, support the supremacy of the British Parliament and contribute +to the splendour of the English Crown. The German Empire contains not +only separate States, but separate kingdoms, such as Bavaria, ruled by +kings or princes who certainly value highly the independence of their +countries and the dignity of their thrones. The despotism of Turkey has +not forbidden the local independence of Crete, and self-government has, +it is hinted, produced acquiescence in Turkish rule. The autocracy of +the Czar is found compatible with Home Rule in Finland, and Finland is +the most contented portion of Russia. Norway and Sweden are united in +feeling because they are not by law a "united kingdom," and act in +harmony just because each country has a different constitution, and each +is governed by its own Parliament. Denmark has, with benefit to herself, +given local independence to Iceland, and Iceland is content. Austria and +Hungary, after centuries of misunderstanding and twenty years of bitter +conflict, have finally composed the feud of ages by a compromise, which +gives to the two parts of the Empire the practical blessings of +Parliamentary independence, and concedes to Hungary at least the +sentimental blessing of acknowledged nationality. The argument, in fact, +from foreign experience, professes to be an induction based upon a +foundation of instances as large as can support any conclusion of social +science. In one land after another the existence of Home Rule, or, to +use the curiously inaccurate phraseology of the day, of "autonomy," in +one part of the State has been found consistent with the unity of the +whole. An experiment which has succeeded in one set of cases ought to +succeed in another, and England has no reason to dread a scheme of +government which has been tried with success in other portions of the +civilized world. Nor does the zealous advocate of Home Rule pause at the +conclusion that the measure he recommends may, on the strength of +foreign experience, be regarded as a tolerable evil or as a probable +cure for a chronic disease. He suggests that it is a good in itself, and +laments that ignorance led our ancestors to fuse Scotland and England +into an United Kingdom, when they might, had they understood the +principles of federalism, have left to each country the blessings of +State sovereignty. + +[Sidenote: Criticism on argument.] + +There is some difficulty in treating with perfect seriousness a line of +reasoning which, proceeding from the quarter whence it comes, holds up +for our admiration the wisdom or lenity of Turkish rule in Crete, and +extols the supreme justice of the system upon which rests the +Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which implies that the arts of government may +be learnt from the Russian administration of Finland, and omits all +reference to the disastrous results of the attempt to endow Poland with +some sort of independence, which bases weighty inferences as to the +proper relation between England and Ireland on the concession by Denmark +to the scanty inhabitants of a desolate island lying 1100 miles from her +coast of as much autonomy (if that be the right term) as under the Crown +of England has been enjoyed for generations by Jersey or Man, and which +suggests lamentations over the splendid triumph of constructive +statesmanship embodied in the treaty of Union with Scotland. _De minimis +non curat lex_ is a maxim of judicial procedure which in spirit applies +to proposals for legislation. Arguments from Iceland and the like may be +set aside as the ornaments or curiosities of debate, and may be allowed +as much weight and no more as would be given to an argument in favour of +petty states from the flourishing condition of Monaco, or to reasonings +in support of Republicanism from the condition of Andorre. Though there +is something slightly ridiculous in the zeal with which the advocates of +Home Rule, using at least as much industry as discrimination, have +scraped together every instance they can lay their hands upon of +constitutions under which something which can be called Home Rule exists +without producing palpable injury to the State, it would be unfair to +deny some real weight to a kind of induction, which, if not convincing +as argument, yet possesses undoubtedly a good deal of rhetorical +effectiveness. Nor ought the concession to be refused that if there be +any man dull or ill-informed enough to suppose that countries cannot be +politically united unless they are subject to a common legislative +power, the slightest knowledge of lands outside England is sufficient to +make manifest his ignorance. When, however, the instances on which the +induction is supposed to be founded are carefully scrutinised, it will +be discovered that those examples which deserve attention are far less +numerous than might be supposed from a glance over the lists now well +known to the public of what may be termed successful experiments in Home +Rule, and, further, that this limited number of instances do not go far +to make out the conclusion in favour of which they are adduced. + +At the present stage of my argument I purposely omit all minute +examination of the applicability to the relations between England and +Ireland, either of the English Colonial system or of federalism as it +exists in the United States or in Switzerland. Any scheme of Home Rule +must follow in some degree one or other of these models. It will, +therefore, be necessary to consider in subsequent chapters how far +either of them may admit with advantage of imitation. Two observations, +however, may even at this point not be out of place. An English colony, +such as Victoria, is a virtually independent country, attached to +England mainly by ties of loyalty or of well-understood interests, but +placed at such a distance from the mother country that England could +without inconvenience, and would without hesitation, concede to it full +national independence when once it was clear that Victoria desired to be +a nation. Victoria, in short, is a land which might at any moment be +independent, but which desires to retain or strengthen the connection +with England. Ireland, on the other hand, is a country lying so near to +the English coast that, according to the views of most statesmen, +England could not with safety tolerate her independence, and also a +country, which, to put the matter in the least exaggerated language, +feels the connection with England so burdensome that the greater part of +her population desire at least the amount of independence conceded to a +self-governing colony. The case of Victoria and the case of Ireland each +constitute, so to speak, the antithesis to the other. There is, +therefore, at any rate no _a priori_ ground for the assumption that the +system which successfully regulates the relation of England to Victoria +is equally adapted for regulating the relation between England and +Ireland. The federalism, again, of America or of Switzerland is the +consequence of the existence of the States which make up the Federation. +The United Kingdom does not consist of States. The world has heard of +the difficulty of forming a republic without republicans: this feat +would appear to be easy of performance in comparison with the +achievement of erecting federation without the States which form its +natural members. In America or in Switzerland federalism has developed +because existing States wished to be combined into some kind of national +unity. Federalism in England would necessarily mean the breaking up of a +nation in order to form a body of States. To the question constantly +raised in one form or another, "Why should not the federalism which +suits the United States suit England?" the true answer is suggested by +the counter-inquiry, "Why should not the constitutionalism of England +suit the United States?" The obvious and conclusive reply to both these +inquiries is, that the circumstances of the two countries are totally +different. There is, in short, no ground in the nature of things to +presume that constitutional arrangements, which are well adapted for the +condition of America, are well adapted for the totally different +condition of the United Kingdom. To say this, be it noted, is not to +prejudge the question reserved for subsequent consideration, whether +some kind of federalism may not supply the solution of the problem how +to adjust the political connection between England and Ireland. It is no +more than noting the often-overlooked fact that the admitted success of +federal government in the United States gives no presumption in favour +of its suitability for Great Britain and Ireland. + +The experience of foreign countries to which Home Rulers confidently +appeal resolves itself, if the matter be carefully sifted, and if the +colonial system of England and the federalism of America be left for the +moment out of account, into the fact that two powerful continental +Empires maintain Imperial unity, and yet (as it is alleged without +lessening their strength) contain within their limits States each of +which enjoys a large amount of independence. That neither the German +Empire nor the Austro-Hungarian monarchy suffer inconvenience from the +looseness of the connection between the States which they each contain +is one of those assertions more easily made than proved to be true; but +supposing its truth to be, for the moment and purely for the sake of +argument, admitted, there will still be found considerable difficulty in +showing that either German Imperialism or the Dual system of +Austria-Hungary contains lessons of practical value for the guidance of +English statesmen. + +What indeed is the precise inference which one is to draw from the fact +that the constitution of the German Empire leaves, for example, to +Bavaria a large amount of independence it is not very easy to +understand. The whole circumstances of the German Empire are as +different from the circumstances of Great Britain as the position of one +civilised European country can well be from the situation of another. +The salient characteristic of German history is that Germany consists of +States which until quite recently have never been politically +consolidated into a nation. The United Kingdom has for nearly a century +formed a political unit, and has now for something nearly approaching +two centuries been subject in reality if not in name to one sovereign +Parliament. The whole scheme of the Empire, with its independent or +semi-independent sovereigns, with its kings, princes, and free towns, is +something to which there is absolutely nothing to correspond in the +present condition or in the historical development of England. The +German Empire is the natural though strange growth of a special and +strange history. The sober English statesmen who advocate Home Rule +assuredly never dreamt any dream so wild as that the Imperial Federalism +of Germany could in any way be reproduced in the United Kingdom. But if +this be so, it is a little difficult to understand references to the +lessons to be drawn from the position of such countries as Bavaria. For +the difficulty of applying German precedents to proposed innovations in +the English constitution lies far deeper than the unsuitability to +England of the forms of German Imperialism. The condition which has +given birth to the present German Empire is that in Germany the +sentiment of nationality has overridden the political divisions which +broke up Germany into almost disconnected and often hostile States. In +Germany the popular passion for unity has compelled the formation of a +United Empire. This sentiment, and not the cumbersome device of an +ill-arranged constitution, prevents Bavaria from using her independence +in a manner inconsistent with the unity of the Empire. The force which +tends towards unity is constantly on the increase. The Empire has the +legal means of diminishing or indeed of destroying the independence of +the States, and should the independence of a State ever come into +conflict with the unity of the nation State rights will not, we may be +sure, win the day. Nor, further, is it any accident that Bismarck whilst +tolerating the existence of Parliaments will not tolerate the +introduction of Parliamentary government. The acquiescence of Liberals +in the evils of personal rule is due to the consciousness that the real +authority of the Emperor is necessary for the unity of the Empire. +Contrast all this with the condition of things under which Englishmen +are adjured to concede a Parliament to Ireland. The leading features of +the case, according at any rate to Home Rulers, are that Parliament is +too weak to withstand the pressure exercised by eighty-six obstructives, +and that Ireland, no less, as we are now at last frankly told, than +Scotland and Wales, desires to relax the bonds of national unity. We are +advised to dissolve the United Kingdom into a confederacy because +Germany, through a clumsy form of confederacy, is growing into a united +empire. This counsel confuses the stages of imperfect development with +the stage of incipient decay; it ascribes to the childishness of +approaching senility the hopes which are proper to the childishness of +early youth. The point is worth pressing. The considerations which +govern a confederacy as it is developing into a nation are very +different from the considerations applicable to a full grown nation +when threatened with dismemberment into a confederacy. + +Deak's statesmanship undoubtedly found at any rate a temporary solution +of the questions which kept Austria and Hungary at variance in a +compromise which bears some analogy to the arrangement by which Home +Rulers propose at once to loosen and to maintain the connection between +England and Ireland. In the case of Austria-Hungary, the union which +exists is not, on the face of it at least, a step towards unity, but +rather the surrender of the endeavour to mould the two parts of the +monarchy into a united empire. The Dual system is therefore the instance +of the blessings attending Home Rule which is most sedulously thrust +upon English attention. Let us see, then, what in outline this system +is, and what are the causes which favour its existence.[4] + +German jurisprudence has taxed hard its boundless stores of ingenuity +and obscurity in the endeavour to find a proper scientific definition of +the nature of the anomalous union which binds together the monarchy of +Austria-Hungary. With the inquiry, however, what may be the precise +class of constitutions under which we ought to bring a political +arrangement which is "singular" in the strictest sense of that word, +English inquirers need not concern themselves. The broad outlines of +the Dual system, invented by the ingenuity of Deak, and accepted under +the stress of necessity by the sagacity of the Emperor, may, for our +present purpose, be roughly sketched in short, and it is hoped in not +unintelligible terms. + +The Dual system is a permanent alliance rather than a union between the +kingdom of Hungary and the countries now represented in the Austrian +Imperial Parliament, or (to use convenient though not quite accurate +terms) between Austria and Hungary. + +The essential features of this alliance or compromise, which is in its +nature a treaty far more than an act of legislation, may be thus summed +up. + +At the head of the whole monarchy stands the Emperor-King. The rules for +the succession to the throne indeed secure that the Imperial and the +Hungarian Crown shall always devolve upon the same person. The Crowns, +however, are distinct, the monarch on whose head they rest governs two +distinctly different peoples, bound to him by different ties of +allegiance. He has Hungarian subjects and Austrian subjects, but he can +claim authority over no man as a subject or citizen of Austria-Hungary. +The monarch (and this is a matter of supreme importance) is not only the +nominal, but the real link connecting the two halves of his dominions. +He is moreover a true ruler. Englishmen hear of a Parliament at Vienna +and of a Diet in Hungary, of Austrian ministers and of Hungarian +ministers, and they fancy that Francis Joseph is a constitutional king +after the type of Queen Victoria of England, or King Humbert of Italy. +No idea is more erroneous. He is the actual head of the State; he is the +real commander of the army. In the Austrian Empire he exercises a +predominant influence on the Government, and observers who look at the +past exertions of Imperial prerogative, and who weigh well the immense +power of temporary legislation reserved under the Imperial constitution +to the Emperor, suspect that in his Austrian dominions, Francis Joseph +might if he chose as easily suspend constitutional government, as he did +in fact suspend it (though for a most legitimate object) in 1886. In +Hungary the parliamentary constitution is a reality, but the King of +Hungary's authority is a good deal more than nominal. The transactions +between Deak and the Emperor become incomprehensible unless you allow +for the influence conferred by Hungarian loyalty upon the King of +Hungary. + +This real monarch rules the monarchy with the co-operation of what might +roughly be called three Parliaments. + +The first Parliament is the Hungarian Diet sitting at Pesth, which +constitutes the real and true legislature for Hungary, and which, in +spite of the powers retained by or conferred upon the local legislature +of Croatia, makes laws for the whole domain of the Hungarian Crown. The +King of Hungary appoints the Hungarian ministers, who are responsible to +the Hungarian Diet, and are kept in office by the Diet's support. + +The second Parliament is the Imperial Parliament, or _Reichsrath_, +sitting at Vienna, legislating for the territories of the Austrian +Empire which do not belong to the Hungarian Crown. The Emperor appoints +the Austrian or Imperial Ministry, who are responsible to the Imperial +Parliament, and need the support of the _Reichsrath_; it may well +however be doubted whether an Austrian Premier does not depend for his +authority far more on the will of the Emperor than on the votes of +_Reichsrath_; the authority of the _Reichsrath_ is, moreover, +considerably restricted by the powers conferred upon the subordinate +assemblies of the different countries, e.g. Bohemia or the Tyrol, which +make up the Empire.[5] + +Englishman should note that the Hungarian Diet has as such no +legislative authority in Austria, and the _Reichsrath_ has no +legislative authority in Hungary. + +The third Parliament consists of the so-called Delegations. + +These Delegations are two committees of sixty members each, elected by +and from the members of the Hungarian Diet and the Imperial Parliament +respectively, but though I have termed them "committees" they are +committees which within their sphere have an authority independent of +the bodies by whom they are appointed. + +The function of the Delegations is to determine the "common affairs" of +the monarchy, that is to say a strictly limited number of matters, +namely, common finance, common military matters, and foreign affairs. On +these three topics, and on these alone, the Hungarian and the Austrian +Delegations are (acting of course with the Emperor) supreme. They +determine the common Budget of the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire; they +determine as far as legislation is required all questions affecting the +Imperial army as a whole; they also determine, as far as their +intervention is required, questions of foreign policy. The function in +short of the Delegations is to deal with matters, and with those matters +only, which affect the Austro-Hungarian State as a united body, and in +its relation to foreigners. Hence three Ministers, the Minister of War, +the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who act +for the whole monarchy, constitute what is called the Common Ministry, +and are appointed by the Emperor-King, and are responsible neither to +the Hungarian Parliament nor to the Imperial Parliament, but simply to +the Delegations. It is natural for Englishman to conclude that the +Delegations regulate matters, such for example as questions regarding +customs, &c., which must affect every portion of the State, and must, if +the two divisions of it are to be united at all, be regulated on common +principles. But this is not so. The economical relations of the two +parts of the Empire are determined by laws identical in substance, +passed by the Hungarian and Imperial Parliaments respectively. These +laws are enacted from ten years to ten years. It is therefore possible +under the present arrangement that in '88 the existing customs union +between Austria and Hungary may come to an end.[6] The position further +of the Delegations is in reality that of two separate committees each +representing a separate Parliament. Infinite pains have been taken to +place the Hungarian and the Austrian Delegations on exactly equal +footing. The Delegations meet alternately at Vienna and at Pesth, they +debate in general separately, and come to an agreement through written +negotiations; they may have a common meeting. In this case the number of +deputies present on each side must be equal, and by a vote of the +majority at such common meeting, any question in dispute is finally +determined. + +The Austro-Hungarian system is therefore briefly this. Two separate +States, each having a separate administration, a separate Parliament, +and separate bodies of subjects or citizens, are each ruled by one and +the same monarch; the two portions of the monarchy are linked together +mainly as regards their relation to foreign powers by an assembly of +delegates from each Parliament and by a Ministry which is responsible to +the Delegations alone, and which acts in regard to a limited number of +matters which are of absolute necessity the common concern of the +monarchy. This is the Dual system held up for our imitation. Picture it +for a moment as actually existing in what is still the United Kingdom. +We should have an English Ministry and an English Parliament at +Westminster which had not the least authority in Ireland; we should have +an Irish Ministry and an Irish Parliament at Dublin which had not the +least authority in England. Each Parliament would in point say of +foreign policy be hampered by the superior authority of a third +Parliament consisting of sixty English and sixty Irish members who sat +alternately at Westminster and at Dublin to transact or perplex or +obstruct the affairs common to the whole Empire. To imagine such an +arrangement, to sketch out in one's fancy, for example, how the common +budget decreed by the Delegations would be provided for by taxation +imposed by the Irish Parliament, is enough to show that the Dual system +is absolutely inapplicable to our circumstances. It could not last for a +year, and if by any miracle it did last for that time, the whole British +Empire would be reduced to confusion or ruin. The advocates of +innovation exhibit the most singular mixture of despair and hopefulness. +The presence in Parliament of eighty-six Parnellites makes them despair +of the British constitution, which has existed for centuries. They hope +or expect that three Parliaments, in two of which these very +Parnellites, or men like them, would reappear, would harmoniously +legislate for England, Ireland, and the British Empire, and this hope is +based on the alleged success of that Dual system which has not without +difficulty been kept going for not quite twenty years. The alliance of +scepticism and credulity, of which we have often heard in the sphere of +theology, is a startling phenomenon in the province of politics. The +Dual system, however, it will be urged by its admirers, has worked +well. Admit the fact, the success is clearly due to circumstances +negative and positive totally absent in the case of England and Ireland. +The bodies united by means of the compromise do not, like the United +Kingdom, constitute the centre of a world-wide Empire. Hungary has taken +up arms against the Austrian Emperor, yet there has never been in +strictness a feud between the Hungarians and the other subjects of the +Emperor. The compromise or alliance manifestly met the interest of both +portions of the monarchy: it restored to Hungary a constitution which +for eighteen years or more had been suppressed, but which had never been +given up; it secured, or went far to secure, the new constitutional +liberties of the Austrian Empire. Hungary could not stand alone, and she +knew it. The compromise was in reality a politic alliance between the +two leading races among the many races governed by Francis Joseph. The +Germans and the Magyars came to terms; the alliance strengthened them +each against other foes. But with every political advantage the Dual +system, of which the permanence is not as yet at all secure, might have +proved as undurable as Grattan's Constitution of 1782 but for one +circumstance, to which I have already directed attention. At the head of +Austria-Hungary stands not an absolute, but a powerful monarch. The +authority of the Emperor is the spring which makes the cumbersome +machinery of a complicated constitution keep going. The matter is worth +attention The power of the Emperor William holds together the States of +the German Empire; the power of Francis Joseph keeps alive the Dual +system; where the Crown has a real authority trial may be made of +experiments in the way of local independence, which are impossible in a +State where, as in England, the true sovereign is an elective assembly. + +Foreign experience then affords but a very tottering foundation on which +to raise pleas for Home Rule in Ireland. It may no doubt be read by +those who are already convinced that Home Rule is desirable in favour of +their views. It may confirm a faith based on other grounds, more it +cannot do. Fairly looked at, foreign experience tells rather against +than for the doctrines of Home Rule. If appealed to at all, it must be +taken as a whole. It then shows that Federalism is when nourishing a +stage towards, not a stage away from, national unity; it shows that a +strong central power above Parliamentary control is almost a condition +to the successful combination in one body of semi-independent States.[7] +It shows that the whole tendency of modern civilization flows towards +the creation of great States; national unity is, so to speak, the +watchword of the age; this is scarcely a reason for breaking up the +United Kingdom. The sagacity of Italian statesmanship rejected the +plausible scheme of an Italian Federation. If Englishmen are to take +lessons from foreigners they need not be ashamed of being instructed by +Cavour. + +[Sidenote: Argument 2. Will of Irish people] + +_The argument from the will of the Irish people_.--Eighty-six +representatives of the Irish people represent the wish of Ireland for +Home Rule. We cannot under a Parliamentary system of government go +behind the result of an election. It must be taken therefore that +Ireland wishes for Home Rule; and since popular government as it exists +in England means nothing else than government in accordance with the +wishes of the people, the wish of the Irish people for the Parliamentary +independence of their country proves their right to an Irish Parliament, +and terminates, or ought to terminate, all opposition to Home Rule. + +[Sidenote: Criticism on argument] + +This simple argument, that because three millions of Irishmen, or for +that matter three millions of Englishmen, wish for a thing, they are +therefore absolutely entitled to have it, is not often put forward in +its naked simplicity, but is constantly presented under various +rhetorical disguises, such for example as the assertion that Irishmen +have a right to manage their own affairs, that Ireland only wants to be +left to herself, and the like; and impresses both the imagination and +the conscience of the masses. There is a good deal to be said about the +truth of the alleged fact on which the argument is based, namely the +wish of the Irish people. It might be worth while to note that the +"people" in this case meant only a majority of the electors, whose wish +is notoriously opposed to the ardent desire of a respectable minority; +and it might be well to suggest that the constitutional pedantry which +refuses to "go behind an electoral return," _i.e._, to see things as +they are, is not the same thing as either good sense or statesmanship. +But for the present purpose it is better to admit that the majority of +the inhabitants of Ireland would, if a fair vote were taken, express +their wish for Home Rule, as they might, probably, under similar +conditions express their wish for separation. The argument in hand, +however, even when its basis is conceded, allows, according to the +different meanings which it may bear, of different answers. If taken in +its most obvious sense, as asserting the absolute right of a majority +among Irish electors to any concession with regard to Ireland which they +are pleased to claim, it may be met by another formula of equal cogency +or of equal weakness. "The vast majority of the United Kingdom, +including by the way a million or more of the inhabitants of Ireland, +have expressed their will to maintain the Union. Popular government +means government in accordance with the will of the majority, and +therefore according to all the principles of popular government the +majority of the United Kingdom have a right to maintain the Union. Their +wish is decisive, and ought to terminate the whole agitation in favour +of Home Rule." To any sensible person who has passed beyond the age of +early manhood (for youths may without blame treat politics as a form of +logic) neither of these formulas can present a sound ground from which +to defend or impugn legislation which involves the welfare of millions. +The contradiction however between two formulas each of which if +propounded alone would command the assent of a democratic audience is +noteworthy. This contradiction brings into prominence the consideration +that the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign +cannot, whether true or false in itself, be invoked to determine a +dispute turning upon the enquiry which of two bodies is the body the +majority of which has a right to sovereignty. The majority of the +citizens of the United States were opposed to Secession, the majority of +the citizens of the Southern States were in favour of Secession; the +attempt to determine which side had right on its side by an appeal to +the "sovereignty of the majority" involved in this case, as it must in +every case, a _petitio principii_, for the very question at issue was +which of two majorities ought, as regarded the matter in hand, to be +considered the majority. + +It would however be doing injustice to the argument from the will of the +people to dispose of it by dwelling upon the logical inconsistencies +inevitably involved in every attempt to determine a question of +practical politics by the application to it of _a priori_ dogmatism. +Formulas such as "the sovereignty of the people" often contain much +solid truth hidden under an inaccurate and a too absolute form of +expression. The assertion that the wish of the Irish people is decisive +as to the form of constitution to be maintained in Ireland covers two +genuine and in themselves rational convictions. The first is, that a +body of human beings who feel themselves, in consequence of their +inhabiting a common country, of their sharing a common history and the +like, inspired with a feeling of common nationality, have, if not a +right, at lowest a strong claim to be governed as a separate nation. +This is the doctrine of nationality which, be it noted, though often +confused with, is at bottom different from, the dogma of the supremacy +of the majority. That the doctrine of nationality is, when reasonably +put, conformable with obvious principles of utility may be readily +admitted; but it is a doctrine which can only be accepted with +considerable qualifications. Its validity was denied both theoretically +and practically, and, in the judgment of most English democrats, not to +say of most European Liberals, denied justly and righteously by the +Northern States of America, when the Southern States claimed the benefit +of its application. The argument moreover from the principle of +nationality in reference to the present controversy proves too much. If +the Irish people are a nation, this may give them a right to +independence, but it can never in itself give them a moral claim to +dictate the particular terms of union with England. The second +conviction which underlies the argument from the will of the people is +of far more serious import than any reasoning drawn from even so +respectable a formula as the doctrine of nationality. The dogma that the +will of the people must be obeyed often expresses the rational belief +that under all polities, and especially under the system of popular +government, institutions derive their life, and laws their constraining +power, not from the will of the law-giver, or from the strength of the +army, but from their correspondence with the permanent wishes and habits +of the people. Home Rule, to put this matter in its strongest form, +means, it may be said, the application to Ireland of the very principle +on which the English constitution rests--that a people must be ruled in +accordance with their own permanent ideas of right and of justice, and +that unless this be done, law, because it commands no loyalty, ensures +no obedience. The whole history of the connection between the two +islands which make up the United Kingdom is a warning of the +wretchedness, the calamities, the wickedness and the ruin which follow +upon the attempt to violate this fundamental principle not only of +popular, but of all good and just government. Home Rule may appear to be +an innovation. It is in this point of view simply a return to the +essential ideas of English constitutionalism, it is an attempt to escape +from the false path which has been pursued for centuries, and to return +to the broad highway of government in accordance with popular sympathy. +At this point, however, the argument from the will of the people merges +in the much stronger and more serious train of reasoning derived from +the teaching of history. + +[Sidenote: 3. Argument from Irish history.] + +_The argument from Irish history._--Appeals to the lessons of the past +are at times in the mouths of Home Rulers, as also of their opponents, a +noxious revival of ancient passions, or (it may be) nothing better than +the use of an unreal form of rhetoric; yet a supporter of Home Rule may +use the argument from Irish history in a way which is at once legitimate +and telling. + +On one point alone (it may be urged) all men of whatever party, or of +whatever nation, who have seriously studied the annals of Ireland are +agreed--the history of the country is a record of incessant failure on +the part of the Government, and of incessant misery on the part of the +people. On this matter, if on no other, De Beaumont, Froude and Lecky +are at one. As to the guilt of the failure or the cause of the misery, +men may and do differ; that England, whether from her own fault or from +the fault of the Irish people, or from the perversity of circumstances, +has failed in Ireland of achieving the elementary results of good +government, is as certain as any fact of history or of experience. Every +scheme has been tried in turn, and no scheme has succeeded, or has even +(it may be suggested) produced its natural effects. Oppression of the +Catholics has increased the adherents and strengthened the hold of +Catholicism. Protestant supremacy while it lasted did not lead even to +Protestant contentment, and the one successful act of resistance to +English dominion was effected by a Protestant Parliament supported by an +army of volunteers led by a body of Protestant officers. The +independence gained by a Protestant Parliament led, after eighteen +years, to a rebellion so reckless and savage, that it caused if it did +not justify the destruction of the Parliament, and the carrying of the +Union. The Act of Union did not lead to national unity, and a measure +which appeared on the face of it (though the appearance it must be +admitted was delusive) to be a copy of the law which turned England and +Scotland into a common country inspired by common patriotism, produced +conspiracy and agitation, and has at last placed England and Ireland +further apart morally than they stood at the beginning of the century. +The Treaty of Union, it was supposed, missed its mark because it was not +combined with Catholic Emancipation. The Catholics were emancipated, but +emancipation instead of producing loyalty brought forth the cry for +repeal. The repeal movement ended in failure, but its death gave birth +to the attempted rebellion of 1848. Suppressed rebellion begot +Fenianism, to be followed in its turn by the agitation for Home Rule. +The movement relies, it is said, and there is truth in the assertion, on +constitutional methods for obtaining redress. But constitutional methods +are supplemented by boycotting, by obstruction, by the use of dynamite. +A century of reform has given us Mr. Parnell instead of Grattan, and it +is more than possible that Mr. Parnell may be succeeded by leaders in +whose eyes Mr. Davitt's policy may appear to be tainted with moderation. +No doubt in each case the failure of good measures admits, like every +calamity either in private or in public life, of explanation, and after +the event it is easy to see why, for example, the Poor Law when extended +to Ireland did not produce even the good effects, such as they are, +which in England are to be set against its numerous evils; or why an +emigration of unparalleled proportions has diminished population without +much diminishing poverty; why the disestablishment of the Anglican +Church has increased rather than diminished the hostility to England of +the Catholic priesthood; or why two Land Acts have not contented Irish +farmers. It is easy enough, in short, and this without having recourse +to any theory of race, and without attributing to Irishmen either more +or less of original sin than falls to the lot of humanity, to see how it +is that imperfect statesmanship--and all statesmanship it should be +remembered is imperfect--has failed of obtaining good results at all +commensurate with its generally good intentions. Failure, however, is +none the less failure because its causes admit of analysis. It is no +defence to bankruptcy that an insolvent can, when brought before the +Court, lucidly explain the errors which resulted in disastrous +speculations. The failure of English statesmanship, explain it as you +will, has produced the one last and greatest evil which misgovernment +can cause. It has created hostility to the law in the minds of the +people. The law cannot work in Ireland, because the classes whose +opinion in other countries supports the action of the Courts are in +Ireland, even when not law-breakers, in full sympathy with law-breakers. +This fact, a Home Ruler may add, is for this purpose all the more +instructive, if it be granted that the errors of British policy do not +arise from injustice or ill-will to Irishmen. The inference, he +insists, to be drawn from the lesson of history is, that it is +impossible for the Parliament of the United Kingdom to understand or to +provide for Irish needs. The law is hated and cannot be executed in +Ireland because, as we are told on high authority, it comes before the +Irish people in a foreign garb. The law is detested, in short, not +because it is unjust, but because it is English. The reason why judges +soldiers or policemen strive in vain to cope with lawlessness is, that +they are in fact trying to enforce not so much the rule of justice as +the supremacy of England. The Austrian administration in Lombardy was +never deemed to be bad--it was very possibly better than any which the +Italian kingdom can supply; the Austrian rule was hated not because the +Austrians were bad rulers, but because they were foreigners. In Ireland, +as in Lombardy, permanent discontent is caused by the outraged sentiment +of nationality. Meet this sentiment, argues the friend of Home Rule, by +the concession to Ireland of an independent Parliament. The law which +comes from Ireland's own legislature will be obeyed because it is her +own law, and will be enforced throughout Ireland by Irish officials +supported by the sympathy of the Irish population. Let Ireland manage +her own affairs, and England will be freed from a task which she ought +never to have taken up because she cannot perform it, and you will lay +upon Ireland duties which she can perform but which she has never yet +been either allowed or compelled to take up. Irishmen for the first +time will feel the full responsibility, because for the first time they +have received the full power, of self-government. The argument, in +short, on the Home Rule view stands thus: the miseries of Ireland flow +historically from political causes, and are to be met by political +changes. At the bottom of Irish disorder lies the sentiment of Irish +nationality. The change, therefore, that is needed is such a concession +to that sentiment as is involved in giving Ireland an Irish legislature. +This is the reform by which the result of curing Irish discontent can be +achieved, and it is a reform not incompatible with the interests of +Great Britain. + +This is (in my judgment) a fair statement of the historical argument +relied upon by the advocates of Home Rule, though, of course, it allows +of infinite variety as to its form of expression. It is a line of +reasoning which rests on premisses many of which (as any candid critic +must admit) contain a large amount of truth. It is logically by far the +strongest of the Home Rule arguments. It is one, moreover, in which +authorities who on other points differ from each other are in agreement. +Mr. Parnell asserts with emphasis that Ireland is a "nation," and +apparently holds that the passing of a good law by the Parliament of the +United Kingdom is less desirable than the existence of an Irish +Parliament, even should that Parliament delay good legislation. Mr. +Gladstone attributes the inefficacity of laws passed by the Imperial +Parliament to their coming before Irishmen in a "foreign garb," and an +author who is not in any way a supporter of the Liberal leader does not +apparently on this point disagree with Mr. Gladstone. "If there was a +hope that anything which we could give would make the Irish contented +and loyal subjects of the British Empire, no sacrifice would be too +great for such an object. But there is no such hope. The land tenure is +not the real grievance: it is merely the pretext. The real grievance is +our presence in Ireland at all. If there was a hope that by buying up +the soil and distributing it among the tenantry we could make them, if +not loyal, yet orderly and prosperous, even so the experiment would be +worth trying; but, again, there is no such hope. The Land Bill of 1870 +gave the tenants a proprietary right in their holdings. They have +borrowed money on the security of that right at ruinous interest, and +the poorest of them are already sinking under their debts to the local +banker or tradesman. If we make them proprietors to-morrow, their farms +in a few years will be sold or mortgaged. We shall have destroyed one +set of landlords to create another who will not be more merciful."[8] + +[Sidenote: Criticism] + +The only way of meeting the historical argument, containing as it does +admitted truth, and supported as it is by high authorities, is to survey +the broad phenomena of Irish history, and see what are the inferences +which they warrant.[9] Whoever wishes to derive instruction from the +melancholy history of the kingdom of Ireland must, as has already been +intimated, rid himself from the delusions caused in the domain of +history by personification. He must dismiss the notion that England and +Ireland are persons to be charged with individual and continuous +responsibility for the crimes or follies of past ages. He must check the +natural but misguiding tendency of the human mind to imagine that in +national affairs when anything goes wrong you can always, or indeed +generally, lay your finger upon some definite assignable wrong-doer, +that is, upon some man or some men who can be held responsible for +political calamities or errors, as a murderer may be held guilty of +murder, or a robber of theft. A calm critic should also reflect on the +profound truth of the dictum (attributed by the way to an Irishman) that +"history is at best but an old almanack," and, while not entertaining +any great hope that antiquarian research can afford much direct guidance +as to the proper mode of arranging the future relations between England +and Ireland, remember that the most salutary function of the study of +the past is to tone down those historical animosities which derive their +bitterness from the ignorant habit of trying the actors in bygone scenes +by moral laws to which they are not justly amenable. The moral function +of an historian is to diminish the hatreds which divide nation from +nation and class from class; such as at the present moment do more to +prevent real unity between the inhabitants of the two islands making up +the United Kingdom than do unjust laws or vicious institutions. To a +student who regards with philosophic calmness a topic which has mainly +been dealt with by politicians or agitators, it easily becomes apparent +that the crimes or failures of England, no less than the vices or +miseries of England, have to a great extent flowed from causes too +general to be identified with the intentional wrong-doing either of +rulers or of subjects. + +One fact thrusts itself upon the attention of any serious student +England and Ireland have from the commencement of their ill-starred +connection been countries standing on different levels or at different +stages of civilization; they have moreover been countries impelled by +the force of circumstances towards a different development. Englishmen +forget, or (more strictly speaking) have never understood, how +exceptional has been the path pursued by English civilization; they do +not realise to themselves that the gradual transformation of an +aristocratic and feudal society into a modern industrial State which +still retains the forms, and in many points of view the spirit of +feudalism is a process which, although owing to the most special +circumstances it has been accomplished with success in England, has +hardly a parallel in any other European country. Ireland on the other +hand has, despite the deviations from her natural course caused by her +connection with a powerful nation, tended to follow the lines of +progress pursued by continental countries, and notably by France. A +foreign critic like De Beaumont finds it far easier than could any +Englishman to enter into the condition of Ireland, and this not only +because he is as a foreigner delivered from the animosities or +partialities which must in one way or another warp every English +judgment, but mainly because the phenomena which puzzle an Englishman, +as for example the passion of Irish peasants for the possession of +land,[10] are from his own experience familiar and appear natural to a +Frenchman. What to the mind of a foreign observer needs explanation is +the social condition of England rather than of Ireland. He at any rate +can see at a glance that the relation between the two countries has +planted and maintained in Ireland an aristocracy, aristocratic +institutions, and above all an aristocratic land law, foreign to the +traditions and opposed to the interests of the mass of the people. Let +an observer for a moment take up the point of view natural to a +continental critic, and admit, in the language of De Beaumont, that the +primary radical and permanent cause of Irish misery has been the +maintenance in Ireland by England of a "bad aristocracy,"[10] or, to put +the same thing more generally, and it may be more fairly that the vice +of the connection between the two countries has consisted in its being a +relation of peoples standing at different stages of civilization and +tending towards different courses of development. Here you find the +original source of a thousand ills, and hence especially have originated +four potent causes of the condition of things which now tries the +patience and overtaxes the resources of English statesmanship. + +First,--The English constitution has both from its form and from its +spirit caused in past times, and even at the present day causes as much +evil to Ireland as it has conferred, or does confer, benefit upon +England.[11] + +The assailants of popular government point to the misrule of Ireland as +a proof that the Parliamentary system is radically vicious. They do not +prove their point, because the calamities of Ireland afford no evidence +whatever that England, which has been more prosperous for a greater +length of time than any other nation in Europe, has essentially suffered +from the power of the English Parliament. What these critics do prove is +that a representative assembly is a bad form of government for any +nation or class whom it does not represent, and they establish to +demonstration that a parliamentary despotism may well be a worse +government for a dependency than a royal despotism. This is so for two +reasons. The rule of Parliament has meant in England government by +parties; and whatever be the merits of party spirit in a free, +self-governed country, its calamitous defects, when applied to the +administration of a dependency, are patent. Down to 1782 Ireland was +avowedly subject to the despotism or sovereignty of the British +Parliament, and at every turn the interest of the country was sacrificed +to the exigencies of English politics Between 1782 to 1800 the nominal +independence of Ireland placed a check on the power of the English +Parliament, yet in substance the English executive, controlled as it was +by the Parliament at Westminster, remained the ultimate sovereign of the +kingdom of Ireland. If Pitt could have carried the King and the English +Parliament with him, he would, in spite of any opposition at Dublin by +the adherents of Ascendancy, have emancipated the Catholics, just as, +when backed by the King and the English Parliament, he did, in the face +of strenuous opposition in Ireland, pass the Act of Union. And even at +the present day the most plausible charge which can be brought against +the working of the Act of Union is that Ireland under it fails to obtain +the full benefit of the British constitution, and that in spite of her +hundred representatives she is not for practical purposes represented at +Westminster in the same sense as is Middlesex or Midlothian. A +Parliament again is less capable than a King of compensating for the +evils of tyranny by the benefit of good administration, and here we come +across a matter hardly to be understood by any one who has not with some +care compared the action and the spirit of English and of continental +administrative systems. It is hardly an exaggeration to assert that even +now we have in the United Kingdom nothing like what foreigners mean by +an administration. We know nothing of that official hierarchy which on +the Continent represents the authority of the State.[12] Englishmen are +accustomed to consider that institutions under which the business of the +country is carried on by unconnected local bodies, such as the +magistrates in quarter session, or the corporations of boroughs, +controlled in the last resort only by the law courts, ought to be the +subject of unqualified admiration. Foreign observers might, even as +regards England itself, have something to set off against the merits of +a system which is, if the apparent contradiction of terms may be +excused, no system at all, and might point out that in continental +countries the administration may often be the intelligent guide and +protector of the weak and needy. The system complimented by the name of +self-government, even if as beneficial for England as Englishmen are +inclined without absolute proof to believe, is absolutely unsuitable for +a country harassed by religious and social feuds, where the owners of +land are not and cannot be the trusted guides of the people. An +impartial official is a better ruler than a hostile or distrusted +landowner, and any one who bears in mind the benefits conferred by the +humanity and justice of Turgot on a single province of France may, +without being any friend of despotism, hold that in the last century +Ireland suffered greatly from a scheme of government which did not allow +of administration such as Turgot's. In some respects the virtues of +Englishmen have been singularly unfavourable to their success in +conciliating the goodwill of Ireland. It will always remain a paradox +that the nation which has built up the British Empire (with vast help, +it may be added, from Ireland) has combined extraordinary talent for +legislation with a singular incapacity for consolidating subject races +or nations into one State. The explanation of the paradox lies in the +aristocratic sentiment which has moulded the institutions of England. An +aristocracy respects the rights of individuals, but an aristocracy +identifies right with privilege, and is based on the belief in the +inequality of men and of classes. Privilege is the keynote of English +constitutionalism; the respect for privileges has preserved English +freedom, but it has made England slower than any other civilized country +to adopt ideas of equality. This love of privilege has vitiated the +English administration in Ireland in more ways than one. The whole +administration of the country rested avowedly down to 1829, and +unavowedly to a later period, on the inequality of Catholics and +Protestants, and Protestant supremacy itself meant (except during the +short rule of Cromwell)[13] not Protestant equality, but Anglican +privilege. The spirit which divided Ireland into hostile factions +prevented Englishmen who dwelt in England from treating as equals +Englishmen who settled in Ulster. When the Volunteers claimed Irish +independence, and the American colonists renounced connection with the +mother country, similar effects were produced by the same cause. In each +case English colonists revolted against England's sovereignty, because +it meant the privilege of Englishmen who dwelt in Great Britain to +curtail the rights and hamper the trade of Englishmen who dwelt abroad. +For the iniquitous restrictions on the trade of Ireland, which are +morally by far the most blameworthy of the wrongs inflicted by England +upon Irishmen, were not precisely the acts of deliberate selfishness +which they seem to modern critics. The grievance under which Ireland +suffered was in character the same as the grievances in respect of trade +inflicted on the American colonies. Yet but for the insane attempt to +subject the colonists to direct taxation by the English Parliament the +War of Independence might have been long deferred. Even the sufferers +from a vicious commercial policy did not see its essential iniquity, and +it is hardly a subject for wonder that a generation of Englishmen who +supposed themselves to gain greatly by controlling or extinguishing the +colonial or the Irish trade should not have recognised the full iniquity +of a policy which in itself hardly seemed intolerable to many of those +colonists who endured the wrong. Still less can we be surprised that +Englishmen a century ago, amid a world where the idea of human equality +was not as yet recognised, should have failed to perceive what many +Englishmen it may be suspected will hardly admit at present, that to +most men equality, i.e. the treatment of all subjects by their +government on similar principles, seems a form of justice, and that the +multitude will tolerate restrictions on their freedom far more easily +than offences against their sense of equality. No one will care to deny +that French Governments have at all periods been far more despotic than +the Government of England; but few persons who have given the matter a +thought can deny that France has shown a power quite unknown to +Englishmen of attaching to herself by affection countries which she has +annexed by force. Strasburg was stolen from Germany, yet Strasburg soon +became French in heart. Belgium and the Rhine Provinces would gladly +have remained parts of the Napoleonic Empire. Savoy annexed in 1859 +showed no disposition to separate from France in 1870. The explanation +of these facts is not far to seek. When France annexes a country she may +govern it well or ill, but she governs it on the same principles as the +rest of the French dominions. Englishmen found it for centuries +impossible to govern Englishmen in Ireland or Englishmen in +Massachusetts exactly as if they were Englishmen in Middlesex. It is not +uninstructive that every French Assembly since the Revolution has +included Deputies from the colonies; no colony has ever sent a member to +the Parliament at Westminster. + +Secondly,--The English connection has inevitably, and therefore without +blame to anyone, brought upon Ireland the evils involved in the +artificial suppression of revolution. + +The crises called revolutions are the ultimate and desperate cures for +the fundamental disorganisation of society. The issue of a revolutionary +struggle shows what is the true sovereign power in the revolutionised +state. So strong is the interest of mankind, at least in any European +country, in favour of some sort of settled rule, that civil disturbance +will, if left to itself, in general end in the supremacy of some power +which by securing the safety, at last gains the attachment, of the +people. The Reign of Terror begets the Empire; even wars of religion at +last produce peace, albeit peace may be nothing better than the iron +uniformity of despotism. Could Ireland have been left for any lengthened +period to herself, some form of rule adapted to the needs of the country +would in all probability have been established. Whether Protestants or +Catholics would have been the predominant element in the State; whether +the landlords would have held their own, or whether the English system +of tenure would long ago have made way for one more in conformity with +native traditions; whether hostile classes and races would at last have +established some _modus vivendi_ favourable to individual freedom, or +whether despotism under some of its various forms would have been +sanctioned by the acquiescence of its subjects, are matters of uncertain +speculation. A conclusion which, though speculative, is far less +uncertain is, that Ireland if left absolutely to herself would have +arrived like every other country at some lasting settlement of her +difficulties. To the establishment of such a reign of order the British +connection has been fatal; revolution has been suppressed at the price +of permanent disorganisation, the descendants of colonists and natives +have not coalesced into a nation, and a country which has never known +independence has never borne the burdens or learnt the lessons of +national responsibility. Disastrous as this result has been, it is +impossible to say who it was that at any given point was to blame for +it. Had France been attached to and dependent upon a powerful neighbour, +this sovereign state must have checked the cruelties and the injustice +of the Reign of Terror. But the forcible extinction of Jacobinism by an +external power would, we can hardly doubt, have arrested the progress +and been fatal to the prosperity of France. Ireland, in short, which +under English rule has lacked good administration, has by the same rule +been inevitably prevented from attempting the cure of deeply rooted +evils by the violent though occasionally successful remedy of +revolution. + +Thirdly,--From the original flaw in the connection between the two +countries has resulted, almost as it were of necessity, the religious +oppression, which, recorded as it has been in the penal laws, has become +the opprobrium of English rule in Ireland. + +The monstrosity of imposing Anglican Protestantism upon a people who had +not reached the stage of development which is essential for even the +understanding of Protestant dogma, and who if left to themselves would +have adhered to Catholicism, conceals from us the strength of the pleas +to be urged in excuse of a policy which to critics of the nineteenth +century seems at least as absurd as it was iniquitous. Till towards the +close of the seventeenth century all the best and wisest men of the +most civilised nations in Europe, believed that the religion of a +country was the concern of the Government, and that a king who neglected +to enforce the "truth"--that is, his own theological beliefs--failed in +his obligations to his subjects and incurred the displeasure of Heaven. +From this point of view the policy of the Tudors must appear to us as +natural as to themselves it appeared wise and praiseworthy. That the +people of England should have been ripe for Protestantism at a time when +the people of Ireland had hardly risen to the level of Roman Catholicism +was to each country a grievous misfortune. That English Protestants of +the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries should in common with the whole +Christian world have believed that the toleration of religious error was +a sin, and should have acted on the belief, was a cause of immense +calamities. But inevitable ignorance is not the same thing as +wickedness.[14] + +Fourthly,--To the same source as religious persecution are due the whole +crop of difficulties connected with the tenure of land. + +When James I. determined that the old Brehon law was to be abolished, +and an appeal to the law of England to be brought within the reach of +every Irishman, he and his ministers meant to introduce a beneficial +reform. They hoped that out of the old tribal customs a regular system +of landowning according to the English tenure would be developed. In +forcing on this change, English statesmen felt convinced not only that +they were reformers, but that they were promoters of justice. To a +generation trained under the teaching of lawyers like Coke, and +accustomed to regard the tenure which prevailed in England as good in +itself, it must have appeared that to pass from the irregular dominion +of uncertain customs to the rule of clear, definite law, was little less +than a transition from anarchy and injustice to a condition of order and +equity. They acted in precisely the spirit of their descendants, who are +absolutely assured that the extension of English maxims of government +throughout India must be a blessing to the population of the country, +and shape their Egyptian policy upon their unwavering faith in the +benefits which European control must of necessity confer on Egyptian +fellahs. If, however, it is probable that King James meant well to his +Irish subjects, it is absolutely certain that his policy worked gross +wrong. His scheme only provided for the more powerful members of the +tribes, and took no account of the inferior members, each of whom in +their degree had an undeniable if somewhat indefinite interest in the +tribal land. Sir John Davis, who carried out the plan, seems to have +thought that he had gone quite far enough in erecting the sub-chiefs +into freeholders. It never occurred to him that the humblest member of +the tribe should, if strict justice were done, have received his +allotment out of the common territory; and the result of his settlement +accordingly was that the tribal land was cut up into a number of large +freehold estates which were given to the most important personages among +the native Irish, and the bulk of the people were reduced to the +condition of tenants at will.[15] An intended reform produced injustice, +litigation, misery, and discontent. The case is noticeable, for it is a +type of a thousand subsequent English attempts to reform and improve +Ireland. The rulers of the country were influenced by ideas different +from those of their subjects. Ignorance and want of sympathy produced +all the evils of cruelty and malignity. + +Bad administration, religious persecution, above all a thoroughly +vicious system of land tenure, accompanied by such sweeping +confiscations as to make it at any rate a plausible assertion that all +the land in Ireland has during the course of Irish history been +confiscated at least thrice over,[16] are admittedly some of the causes, +if they do not constitute the whole cause, of the one immediate +difficulty which perplexes the policy of England. This is nothing else +than the admitted disaffection to the law of the land prevailing among +large numbers of the Irish people. The existence of this disaffection, +whatever be the inference to be drawn from it, is undeniable. A series +of so-called Coercion Acts passed both before and since the Act of Union +give undeniable evidence, if evidence were wanted, of the ceaseless, and +as it would appear almost irrepressible, resistance in Ireland offered +by the people to the enforcement of the law. I have not the remotest +inclination to underrate the lasting and formidable character of this +opposition between opinion and law, nor can any jurist who wishes to +deal seriously with a serious and infinitely painful topic question for +a moment that the ultimate strength of law lies in the sympathy, or at +lowest the acquiescence, of the mass of the population. Judges, +constables and troops become almost powerless when the conscience of the +people permanently opposes the execution of the law. Severity produces +either no effect or bad effects, executed criminals are regarded as +heroes or martyrs, and jurymen or witnesses meet with the execration, +and often with the fate, of criminals. On such a point it is best to +take the judgment of a foreigner unaffected by prejudices or passions, +from which no Englishman or Irishman has a right to suppose himself +free: + +"_Quand vous en etes arrives a ce point, croyez bien que dans cette voie +de rigueurs tous vos efforts pour retablir l'ordre et la paix seront +inutiles. En vain, pour reprimer des crimes atroces, vous appellerez a +votre aide toutes les severites du code de Dracon; en vain vous ferez +des lois cruelles pour arreter le cours de revoltantes cruautes; +vainement vous frapperez de mort le moindre delit se rattachant a ces +grands crimes; vainement, dans l'effroi de votre impuissance, vous +suspendrez le cours des lois ordinaires, proclamerez des comtes entiers +en etat de suspicion legale, violerez le principe de la liberte +individuelle, creerez des cours martiales, des commissions +extraordinaires, et pour produire de salutaires impressions de terreur, +multiplierez a l'exces les executions captiales._"[17] + +No advocate of Home Rule can find a clearer statement of the condition +of things with which on his view the Imperial Parliament is morally +incompetent to deal than in these words of De Beaumont's; but before we +hastily draw any inference from an undoubted fact, let us examine into +the exact nature of the fact. The opposition of Irish opinion to the law +of the land is undoubted, but the opposition is not now, and if we +appeal (as under the present argument we are appealing) to the teaching +of history never has been general opposition to law, or even general +opposition to English law. The statistics of ordinary crime are (it is +said) no higher in Ireland than in other parts of the United Kingdom. A +pickpocket or a burglar is as easily convicted in Ireland as elsewhere; +the persons who lamentably enough are either left unpunished, or if +punished may count on popular sympathy, are criminals whose offences, +atrocious and cruel as they constantly are, are connected in popular +opinion with political, and at bottom, it must be added, with agrarian +questions. For more than a century there has existed an hereditary +conspiracy against the rights of the landowners. The White Boys of 1760, +the Steel Boys of 1772, the Right Boys of 1785, the Rockites of a few +years later, the Thrashers of 1806, the White Boys who re-appear in +1811, 1815, 1820, the Terralts of 1831, the White Feet of 1833, the +Black Feet of 1837;[18] later Ribbon men under different names, the +Boycotters or the assassins who have added a terrible sanction to the +commands of the Land League or of the National League, have each and +all been, in most cases avowedly and in every case in fact, the +vindicators or asserters of the just or unjust popular aversion to the +rights of landlords given by the law and enforced by the courts of the +land. It would be folly to assert that all popular opposition to the law +in Ireland had been connected with agrarian questions. But if we look +either to the experience of past generations, or to the transactions +passing before our eyes, we can hardly be mistaken in holding that the +main causes of disaffection have been either questions connected with +religion, or rather with the position of Roman Catholics, or disputes +connected with the possession of land. + +The feeling of nationality has played a very subordinate part in +fomenting or keeping alive Irish discontent. The Repeal agitation, in +spite of O'Connell's legitimate influence, collapsed. No one can read +Sir Gavan Duffy's most interesting account of the Young Ireland movement +without perceiving that just because it was strictly a nationalist +movement it took very little hold upon the people. The Home Rule +movement never showed great strength till it became avowedly a Land +League, of which the ultimate result should be, by whatever means, to +make the tenants of Ireland owners of their land. To this add that in +the judgment of foreign critics, and of thinkers like Mill, the popular +protest against the maintenance in Ireland of a tenure combining the +evils both of large estates and of minute subdivision of farms is +founded upon justice. De Beaumont at any rate teaches that to transform +Irish tenants into peasant proprietors would be the salvation of the +country:-- + +_"Plus on considere l'Irlande, ses besoins et ses difficultes de toutes +sortes, et plus on est porte a penser que ce changement dans l'etat de +sa population agricole serait le vrai remede a ses maux.... + +"J'aurais mille autres raisons pour appuyer cette opinion; je m'arrete +cependant. Un lecteur anglais trouvera mes arguments incomplets. Tout +autre qu'un Anglais les jugera peut-etre surabondants."_[19] + +This opinion may be well-founded or ill-founded; but no wise statesman +will reject it without the maturest consideration. + +History, then, if fairly interrogated, gives this result: Historical +causes have generated in Ireland a condition of opinion which in all +matters regarding the land impedes that enforcement of law which is the +primary duty of every civilized government. + +From this fact Home Rulers draw the inference that the law is hated +because it is foreign, and that England should surrender to Irishmen the +effort to enforce legal rights, since this duty is one which can be +performed by a native and cannot be performed by any English or foreign +authority. + +This conclusion is clearly not supported by the premises. If the source +of popular discontent be agrarian, then the right course is to amend the +land laws while improving the administrative system, and enforcing +justice between man and man. + +A Home Ruler may, however, if hard driven, say that my interpretation of +history is erroneous, and that a hatred to English law, and to all +things English, and not a special dislike to the land law, is the +sentiment which prevails over every other feeling of the Irish people. +It is difficult to me to see how this view can be seriously maintained. +Let us grant however for a moment that Home Rulers are right, and that +millions of Irishmen are inspired with the passion of nationality. Even +on this supposition the Home Rule doctrine stands in a bad way. If the +demand of the Irish people be like that of the Italian people--a demand +for recognised nationality--then the demand must be satisfied, if at +all, not by Home Rule, but by independence. The most eminent among +English Home Rulers believes that the law is hated in Ireland because it +comes before the Irish people in a foreign garb. Mr. Froude in substance +agrees in this matter with Mr. Gladstone, since he holds that "the real +grievance is our presence in Ireland at all." But the eminent statesman +and the distinguished historian draw a different inference from the same +premises. Mr. Gladstone infers that Ireland can be satisfied by +semi-independence. Mr. Froude infers that if we are to meet Irish wishes +we must let Ireland be free. Mr. Froude's logic will be to most persons +far more intelligible than the logic of the Liberal leader. Here, at +any rate, we come to the true issue suggested by the phenomena of Irish +history. Is Irish discontent due in the main to agrarian or to political +causes? On the answer to this enquiry depends, as far as the argument we +have in hand goes, the line of right policy in Ireland. But neither +answer favours the contention of Home Rulers.[20] + +The argument from Irish history gives rise to, or, more properly +speaking, contains in itself two further distinct lines of reasoning in +favour of Home Rule, each of which supplements the other. The first of +these aims at showing that to leave Ireland to herself is the only +method by which to restore order throughout the country. This I have +termed "the argument from the good effects of self-government," the +other deduces from the necessity for Coercion Acts the conclusion that +England cannot maintain order in Ireland: this I have termed "the +argument from the necessity for Coercion Acts." These two lines of +reasoning are simply an amplification of points suggested by the Home +Rule argument from Irish history, and are of necessity therefore open +to the same criticisms to which that argument is obnoxious. They have, +however, each a certain value of their own, and have made an impression +on the English public: they can each also be met by more or less special +replies. The argument, therefore, from the good effects of +self-government and the argument from the necessity for Coercion Acts +each deserve separate statement and consideration. + +[Sidenote: 4. Argument from self-government.] + +_The argument from the virtues of self-government._--Self-dependence is +the source of self-reliance and of self-help. Leave Ireland to herself, +and Ireland will (it is argued) develop the sense of responsibility and +the power of self-government. Mr. Parnell or Mr. Davitt as Irish Prime +Minister will be able to perform with ease feats beyond the reach of any +English Cabinets. He will dare to be strong because he knows he is +popular: he will punish conspirators with a severity unknown to modern +English governments; he will feel that anarchy is the bane of his +country, and he will not tolerate disorder. Boycotters, Moonlighters, +Dynamiters or Assassins will find that they are called upon to meet a +force of which they have had before no experience. They will discover +that they are engaged in a contest with the will of the people, and +deprived, as they will be, of the moral sympathy which has hitherto +given them comfort and encouragement, will yield obedience to a law +which is the expression of the national will. Self-government in +Ireland means strong government, and strong government is the one cure +for Irish misery. + +This train of reflection has, unless I am mistaken, convinced many +English Radicals that the installation of an Irish Ministry at Dublin +will be the dissolution of every secret society throughout Ireland, and +thus gained over to the cause of Home Rule men who detest anarchy even +more than they love liberty. + +This belief in the virtues of self-government is confirmed by the +teaching of American critics, who hold that the recent experience of the +United States presents a clue by which Englishmen may find a path out of +the labyrinth of their present perplexities. Transactions known to every +citizen of the States show conclusively that the hatred of law which in +Ireland fills Englishmen with amazement has arisen among a people who, +whatever their faults, cannot be charged with those inherited vices +which English opinion freely and gratuitously imputes to Irish nature. +In Connecticut, in New York, in Georgia, throughout all the Southern +States, open or secret combinations, supported by public opinion and +enforcing its decrees by violence and murder, have with success defied +the law courts. Social conditions, and not the perversities of Irish +character, are seen to be the true cause of phenomena which, if they are +now a feature of Irish life, have appeared in countries where not an +Irishman was to be found, and where the Irish had no appreciable +influence. To this fact, which appears to me not to admit of question, +Americans add the consideration that lawlessness when supported by +public opinion has in America been successfully met, not by coercion, +but by yielding to public sentiment. Hence they draw the conclusion that +the proper mode of terminating the conflict between law and widespread +sentiment is to yield to opinion, and, by conceding something of the +nature of Home Rule, to turn law-breakers into law-makers. The +application of this dogma to Ireland is obvious: the crucial instance by +which its truth is supposed to be established is the treatment of the +conquered South by the victorious North. From the termination of the War +of Secession up to 1876 the fixed policy of the Northern Republicans was +to maintain order in the South by the use of Federal troops. This policy +began and ended in failure: in 1876 the troops were withdrawn; the +endeavour to enforce law by means of the Federal armies was given up--as +if by magic chaos gave place to order. Local self-government has given +peace to the United States, why should it not restore concord to the +United Kingdom?[21] + +[Sidenote: Criticism.] + +It has been freely admitted in the foregoing pages[22] that the +historical connection between England and Ireland has brought upon the +weaker country the evils involved in the suppression of internal +revolution by external force. This admission contains the main ground +for the argument in favour of Home Rule drawn from the good effects of +self-government, but is not in reality a sound foundation on which to +place the suggested conclusion. + +For the argument under consideration, even after the concession that +Ireland has suffered from not having been left to herself, is vitiated +by more than one flaw. + +Home Rule, as it is again and again necessary to point out, is not +national independence, nor anything like independence. Home Rule gives +Ireland at most semi-independence--that is to say, it leaves Ireland at +least half dependent upon England. It is vain to argue that the position +of the member of a confederacy or of a colonial dependency will give to +Irishmen the sense of independence and responsibility which belongs to a +self-governing nation. + +Grant, however (though the assumption is a hazardous one), that the +creation of an Irish government and an Irish Parliament would of itself +give to Ireland, even though she were still in many respects dependent +on England, such a new sense of power and of responsibility as would +enable her to create for herself a strong executive. This concession is +not enough to make out the argument in favour of Home Rule. Laws ought +to be not only strong but just, and Englishmen must consider whether +rulers who had come to the head of affairs solely because they +represented the strongest among many Irish factions or parties would he +able to rule with justice. The "Jacobin Conquest" installed a strong +executive in power, but England could not be an accomplice in +inaugurating a reign of terror. The connection which under any form of +Home Rule would bind together the parts of the present United Kingdom +would be, it may be suggested, a guarantee against the supremacy of an +Irish Robespierre or Danton. Granted: but if so, Home Rule would +restrain an Irish revolution. The strongest, in other words the most +reckless leaders, would be prevented from coming to the front. Ireland +would not follow her own course, and since she would not be in truth +self-governed, she would not reap the good fruits of self-government. + +Nor in truth does the American version of our argument give much help to +Home Rulers. + +In more than one instance popular sentiment has in the United States +defied the law of the land. Nothing can be a better example of such +defiance than the anti-rent war which raged in New York between 1839 and +1846.[23] The struggle exhibited all the recklessness of a no-rent +agitation in Ireland with none of the excuses which can be urged in +palliation of outrage by half-starving tenants; it produced a "reign of +terror which for ten years practically suspended the operations of law +and the payment of rent throughout the district" which was the field of +the anti-rent movement; it ended in a nominal compromise which was a +real victory for the anti-renters. In this instance, be it remarked, no +sentiment of nationality or State right came into play. The law was +hated, not because it was "foreign," but because it enforced the +obligation of an unpopular contract. Landlords, it is now all but +admitted, are not entitled to the full rights of citizens. The triumph +therefore of the anti-renters at New York may command a certain amount +of sympathy. The popular sentiment which in 1833 induced the people of +Connecticut to boycott Miss Prudence Crandall cannot be brought under +the sanction of any "higher law." Her crime was that she chose, obeying +the dictates of her conscience, to open a school for negro girls in +Connecticut. She was subjected to every annoyance and insult which the +most reckless boycotter could invent. Legislation itself was turned +against her, and the State failed utterly in the duty of protecting one +of the most meritorious, and now, one is happy to think, one of the most +honoured among the women of America. The Lyman Riots at Boston, as +indeed every stage in the noble struggle of the American Abolitionists +against popular injustice, tell the same tale, namely, that law in the +United States has once and again failed to assert its due supremacy over +injustice backed by public approval. This melancholy failure may +possibly support the proposition that England cannot enforce the law in +Ireland. It far more conclusively shows that even in countries deeply +imbued with the spirit of legality self-government has no necessary +tendency to produce just government or just legislation. + +Let us, however, examine with care the lessons to be drawn from the +treatment of the Southern States of America by the North. + +The natural and most obvious moral of modern American history is that +the majority of a nation have both the right and power to coerce a +minority who claim to break up the unity of the State. The most +distinguished English Liberals, such as Bright and Mill, held, and as I +conceive on sound grounds of reason and justice, that the Southern +States were neither legally nor morally justified in their claim to +secede from the Union; but no fair-minded man can deny that a plausible +constitutional case could be made out in favour of Secession, nor that +the citizens of the Southern confederacy demonstrated their wish and +determination to secede by far more cogent evidence than the return of +eighty-six Secessionists to Congress. The prima facie arguments which +may be alleged in favour of Secession were tenfold stronger--unfounded +as I hold them to have been--than the prima facie arguments in favour of +Ireland's right to Home Rule. Moreover, in studying the history of the +United States, an Englishman is at the present moment more concerned +with the results than with the justification of the suppression of the +Southern rebellion. The policy of the North attained its object: the +Union was restored, and its existence is now placed beyond the reach of +peril. The abolition of slavery took away the source of disagreement +between the Northern and Southern States, and the tremendous exhibition +of the power of the Republic has finally, it is supposed, destroyed the +very idea of Secession. There is certainly nothing in all this which +discourages the attempt to maintain the political unity of Great Britain +and Ireland. We are told, however, to forget the force employed to +suppress Secession, and to recollect only the policy of the Republicans +after the close of the Civil War. That policy was a failure as long as +it involved the denial to the Southern States of their State autonomy, +and became a success from the moment when it recognised to the full the +sacredness of State rights. This, or some statement like this, +represents the mode in which the annals of the Union must be read if +they are to be interpreted in favour of Home Rule. The reading is a +strained interpretation of events which are known to every one. The +North, once and for all, settled that the matters which lay at the +bottom of the Civil War should be settled in the manner which conform to +Northern notions of justice and of expediency. The abolition of slavery, +and the final disposal of the alleged right to Secession, gave to the +North, all the requisite securities against attacks on the unity of the +Republic. The Republicans, influenced in part by considerations of +party, but partly (it must in fairness be admitted) by the feeling that +it was a duty to secure for Negro citizens the full enjoyment of the +civil and political rights given them, under the constitutional +amendments supported for years the so-called Carpet Bag Governments, +that is to say, the rule of Northern adventurers who were kept in office +throughout the South by the Negro vote. The Federal Government, in +short, up to 1876 gave by its arms authority in the South to the +unscrupulosity of Northern scoundrelism supported by the votes of Negro +ignorance. Such a policy naturally produced bitter irritation among the +Southern Whites. Its reversal as naturally restored to the Whites at +once power and contentment. Whether this reversal was as satisfactory to +the Blacks is less clear. In any case it is hard to see how the +restoration of the Southern States to their natural place in the Union +tells in favour of giving Ireland a position quite inconsistent with the +existing constitution of the United Kingdom. The case stands thus: +Northern Republicans insisted that every State in the South should +submit to the supremacy of the United States on every point which +directly or indirectly concerned the national and political unity of the +American people. Having secured this submission the Republican party +restored to the Southern States the reality as well as the name of State +rights; and allowed the same and no more than the same independence to +South Carolina as is allowed to New York. No doubt something was +sacrificed; this "something" was a matter which did not greatly concern +the citizens of the North. It was the attempt to secure to the Black +citizens of the South the political rights given them by the +constitution. The sacrifice may have been necessary; many of the wisest +Americans hold that it was so. But we may suspect that even amongst +those who, as a matter of policy, approve the course pursued by the +Federal Government in the South since 1876, qualms are occasionally felt +as to some of its results. The able writer who sets American Home Rule +before Englishmen as an example for imitation says with the candour +which marks his writings: "I do not propose to defend or explain the way +in which" the Native Whites "have since then" (1876) kept the Government +"in their hands by suppressing or controlling the Negro vote. This is +not necessary to my purpose."[24] It is however necessary for the +purpose of weighing the effect of American experience to bear this +"suppression" constantly in mind; it has deprived the Negroes of +political rights which possibly they had better never have received, and +has falsified the result of Presidential elections. When we are told +that the South votes solid for a Democratic President, we must remember +that in the Southern States the Negro vote is "controlled"; and that in +reckoning the number of votes to which a State is entitled in virtue of +its population, the Negro voters of the South are counted for as much as +the uncontrolled White voters of the North. Whether this state of things +will always be contentedly borne by the Northern States is a matter on +which a foreigner can form no opinion. It is a condition of affairs +which does not conduce to respect for law, and the satisfaction with +which thoughtful Americans regard a policy founded on the tolerance of +illegality confirms the belief suggested by other circumstances, that +deference to opinion tends in the United States to undermine respect for +law; it certainly does not tend to show that self-government has much +connection with justice. + +The argument, in short, from the good effects of self-government +appears, when examined, either to be an argument which tells far more +strongly in favour of Separation than of Home Rule, or else to be an +argument which shows only that England might gain some immediate +advantage from shutting her eyes to injustice committed by an Irish +government. + +[Sidenote: 5. Argument from Coercion Acts.] + +_The argument from the necessity for Coercion Acts_.--Coercion Acts are +(according to popular apprehension) enactments suspending the operation +of the ordinary law, and conflicting therefore with the principles of +the English Constitution. Order has been maintained in Ireland since the +Union (we are told) mainly by means of Coercion Acts. The English +democracy, it is argued, cannot acquiesce any longer in these violations +of the Constitution; but since order must somehow be maintained in +Ireland, and Coercion Acts must no longer be passed, the English +democracy must surrender the duty of maintaining the law into the hands +of the Irish people, who, as is assumed by Home Rulers, can exact +obedience to the law of Ireland without the use of exceptional +legislation. + +[Sidenote: Criticism.] + +A lawyer irritated by the folly of popular declamation is tempted to +dismiss all objections to Coercion Acts, together with all arguments +founded upon such objections, with one peremptory remark--namely, that +since a law is merely a rule which men are compelled to obey by the +power of the State, and Coercion is but another name for compulsory +obedience to the law, to object to Coercion is in reality to object to +law itself, or in effect to the existence of political society. The +temptation to cut down a popular delusion by some such summary criticism +as this is great, but it is a temptation which at all costs must be +resisted. Vague ideas, which have obtained general currency, are, in +spite of their inaccuracy, the outgrowth for the most part of reasonable +feeling. Whoever wishes to meet, and, if need be, dispel the antipathy +to Coercion Acts, must try to understand what is the meaning which +sensible men attach to the word "Coercion," what is the conviction +represented by the dislike to Coercion Acts, how this dislike may be +lessened, and, for the purpose with which these pages are written, how +far the disapproval of Coercion Acts provides a reason in favour of Home +Rule. + +Of all the terms which at the present moment confuse public judgment, +none is more vague and misleading than the word "Coercion" when applied +to every stringent attempt to enforce in Ireland obedience to the law of +the land. + +Coercion means and includes two different though closely connected ideas +which the laxity of popular thought fails to distinguish. + +_First_.--Coercion means any attempt to enforce a law among people whose +moral sympathies are at variance with the law itself. In this sense +Coercion is opposed to that enforcement of ordinary law with which we +are all familiar. Thus, to punish a Ritualist for not conforming to the +judgment of the Privy Council, to enforce vaccination at Leicester, to +compel a Quaker to pay tithes, to eject an Irish tenant from the farm he +has occupied, to drag him into Court and seize his goods if he does not +pay his rent, to punish severely resistance to the Sheriff's officer, or +to the bailiff who gives effect to the rights of an Irish landlord, are +in popular estimation proceedings which according to the nature of the +law put in force are stigmatised as persecution or Coercion. They +certainly differ from the compulsion by which common debtors are +compelled to pay their debts, or thieves are prevented from picking +pockets or breaking into houses. The difference lies in this. Where the +enforcement of the law is called "Coercion," not only does the criminal +think himself in the right, or at any rate think the law a wrongful +law, but also the society to which he belongs holds that the law-breaker +is maintaining a moral right against an immoral law. The anti-vaccinator +is deemed a martyr at Leicester, the farmer who will not pay his rent is +thought a patriot at Cork. Where the enforcement of the law is not +popularly deemed coercion the law-breaker does not suppose himself to be +in the right, and still less do his associates think him morally +praiseworthy. A thief does not in general hold any theory about the +rightness of larceny, and there is no society in the United Kingdom at +least who deny the moral validity of the Eighth Commandment. + +_Secondly_.--Coercion means the enforcement of law by arbitrary and +exceptional methods which tend to diminish the securities for freedom +possessed by ordinary citizens. Thus the suspension of the Habeas Corpus +Act, the abolition of trial by jury, the introduction of peculiar rules +of evidence to facilitate convictions for a particular class of crimes, +a suspension (speaking generally) of what would be called in foreign +countries "constitutional guarantees," in order to secure obedience to +particular laws, would be called coercion. + +An enactment, then, which in ordinary language is called a Coercion Act, +has one or both of the two following characteristics.[25] It is an Act +which either enforces some rule of law (e.g., the law that tenants must +pay their rent, or that trades unionists must not molest artisans who +accept lower wages than the scale prescribed by the union), which does +not command the moral assent of the society or people among whom it is +enforced, or else constrains obedience to law by some exceptional and +arbitrary mode of procedure. Now the general prejudice against an Act +which has either or both of these characteristics is within certain +limits justifiable on grounds of good sense. Laws derive three-fourths +of their force not from the fears of law-breakers, but from the assent +of law-keepers; and legislation should, as a rule, correspond with the +moral sentiment of the people. The maxim _quid leges sine moribus_, +though it should always be balanced by the equally important maxim _quid +mores sine legibus_, is one which no legislator dares neglect with +impunity, and a law permanently at variance with wide moral feeling +needs repeal or modification. It is also true that exceptional and +arbitrary legislation is, simply because it is exceptional and +arbitrary, open to suspicion. If it be desirable that personal liberty +should be protected by the writ of Habeas Corpus, a suspension of the +Habeas Corpus Act is on the face of it an evil. If it is not desirable +that officers of the army should suddenly and without legal training +exercise the power of judges, the establishment of martial law is in +itself a great, though it may be a necessary calamity. Legislation, +which has received the odious name of coercion, has frequently (though +not always) exhibited one or both of the characteristics which render it +fairly obnoxious to that designation. The objection, therefore, to +Coercion Acts is on the face of it not unreasonable. What are the +inferences which the objection supports is, of course, quite a different +matter, and shall be considered in its due place. + +It is most important, however, to note that the valid opposition to +so-called Coercion Acts may and ought to be greatly mitigated by careful +adherence to two maxims which are obvious, but are often neglected. + +A Coercion Act in the first place, should be aimed, not at the direct +enforcement of rules opposed to popular opinion, but at the punishment +of offences which, though they may be indirectly connected with dislike +of an unpopular law or with opposition to rights (for instance, of +landowners) not sanctioned by popular opinion, are deeds in themselves +condemned by the human conscience. Deliberate breaches of contract, +insults to women and children, the murder or torture of witnesses who +have given truthful evidence in support of a conviction for crime, +brutal cruelty to cattle, may be methods of popular vengeance, or the +sanctions which enforce an agrarian code; but one may feel certain that +the man who breaks his word, who tortures or murders his neighbour or +who huffs cattle, knows himself to be not only a criminal, but a sinner, +and that the law, which condemns him to punishment, though it may excite +temporary outcry, can rely on the ultimate sanction of the popular +conscience. + +A Coercion Act, in the second place, should as far as possible be +neither a temporary nor an exceptional piece of legislation. + +An Act which increases the efficiency of the criminal law should, like +other statutes, be a permanent enactment. The temporary character of +Coercion Acts has needlessly increased their severity, for members of +Parliament have justified to themselves carelessness in fixing the +limits of powers conferred upon the executive under the insufficient +plea that these powers were intended to last but for a short time. It +has also deprived them of moral weight. An Act which is a law in 1881, +but will cease to be a law in 1882, has neither the impressiveness nor +the certainty which gives dignity to the ordinary law of the land. +Coercion Acts, again, should be general--that is, should apply, not to +one part, but to the whole, of the United Kingdom. Powers needed by the +Government for constant use in Ireland must occasionally be wanted in +England, or, if they do not exist there, in Scotland. It were the +strangest anomaly for the law to sanction a mode of procedure which +convicts a dynamiter in Dublin, and not to give the Government the same +means for the conviction of the same criminal for the same offence if he +has crossed to Liverpool. The principle forbidding exceptional or +extraordinary legislation suggests that Coercion Acts should in the main +give new stringency to the criminal procedure, and should not invade +the liberties of ordinary citizens. The object of a Coercion Act is to +facilitate the punishment of wrongdoers, not to restrict the liberty of +citizens who have not broken the law. This is a point legislators are +apt to neglect. The distinction insisted upon will be understood by any +one who compares the Act for the Better Protection of Person and +Property in Ireland, 44 Vict. c. 4, of 1881, with the Prevention of +Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 25. They were each denounced +as Coercion Acts: the earlier enactment was in many ways the more +lenient of the two; yet in principle the Act of 1881 was thoroughly +vicious, whilst in principle the Act of 1882 was, as regards its most +effective sections, thoroughly sound. The Act of 1881 in effect gave the +Irish executive an unlimited power of arrest: it established in theory +despotic government. The Act of 1882 was in principle an Act for +increasing the stringency of criminal procedure. The one could not be +made permanent, and applied to the whole United Kingdom, without +depriving every citizen of security for his personal freedom. The main +enactments of the other might extend through the whole of Great Britain +and Ireland, and produce only the not undesirable effect of making the +whole United Kingdom a less pleasant residence than at present for +criminals or conspirators. + +An Act which should be permanent, which should apply to the whole United +Kingdom, which should deal, not indeed exclusively but in the main, +with criminal procedure, could hardly contain injudicious, harsh or +tyrannical provisions. The passing of one such good Criminal Law +Amendment Act would, though its discussion occupied a whole Session, +save our representatives in Parliament an infinite waste of time, and +would make unnecessary half-a-dozen Coercion Acts for Ireland. To +enlarge the power of examining persons suspected of connection with a +crime, even though no man is put upon his trial; to get rid of every +difficulty in changing the venue; to give the Courts the right under +certain circumstances of trying criminals without the intervention of a +jury; to organise much more thoroughly than it is organised at present +in England the whole system of criminal prosecutions; to enable the +executive to prohibit public meetings which might provoke a breach of +the peace, would in many cases be an improvement on the criminal law of +England itself, and would in several instances be simply an extension to +the whole United Kingdom of laws which exist without exciting any +disapproval in some one division of it.[26] Without special experience +it would be presumptuous to assert that these or similar changes in +criminal procedure would suffice for the enforcement of the law in +Ireland during a period of disturbance. That such improvements in +procedure would go a good way to make special Coercion Acts unnecessary, +is in the highest degree probable. There is, moreover, nothing +objectionable or anomalous in increasing as time goes on the stringency +of criminal procedure. The law against crimes is the protection of men +who are not criminals. Civilisation raises our estimate of the +protection which good citizens ought to receive from the State; it also +places new means of attack in the hands of cheats and ruffians. An +elaborate criminal code is as necessary for a civilised society as are +elaborately trained armies and scientific arms both of defence and +offence. + +No adherence, however, to sound maxims of criminal jurisprudence would, +it must be frankly admitted, entirely take away, though it might greatly +mitigate, the justifiable distaste for Coercion Acts. The necessity for +these Acts points to discord in Ireland between the law of the land and +the law of the people; they are the outward and visible sign of internal +discontent and disloyalty; they give good ground for supposing that the +law or some part of it requires amendment, and to many persons laws +which admit the existence of a bad social condition will appear to be +themselves odious. But the necessity for amending bad laws or vicious +institutions is no reason why just laws, or any law which cannot rightly +be repealed, should not be enforced. The fallacies of protection +afforded no reason for not punishing smugglers, though the existence of +smuggling gave good ground for considering whether the customs law did +not require revision. There seems to the thoughtless crowd--whether rich +or poor, and all men are thoughtless about most things, and many men +about all things--to be a certain inconsistency between reform and +coercion; there is something absurd in the policy of "cuffs and kisses." +But the inconsistency or absurdity is only apparent. The necessity for +carrying through by legal means an agrarian revolution--and the passing +of the Irish Land Act was in effect an admission by the English +Parliament, that this necessity exists--is a solid reason for the strict +enforcement of justice. Reform tends, as its immediate result, to +produce lawlessness. A wise driver holds his reins all the tighter +because he is compelled to drive along the brink of a precipice. Whether +Coercion Acts, which it must be remembered have been known before now in +England, and were known in Ireland during the era of her Parliamentary +independence, and which are the sign of the difficulty of enforcing the +law, are or are not to be tolerated as a necessary evil, depends on the +answer to the inquiry, whether the Government of the United Kingdom can +by just administration, and by just legislation, remove the source of +Irish opposition to the law? Answer the question affirmatively, and the +outcry against coercion becomes unmeaning; answer the question +negatively, and you produce an argument which tells with crushing power +in favour not of Home Rule, but of Separation. + +[Sidenote: 6. The argument from inconvenience.] + +_The argument from the inconvenience to England._[27]--Apologies for +Home Rule drawn from foreign experience, deference due to the popular +will, from the historical failure of England to govern Ireland with +success and the like, have about them when employed by English members +of Parliament a touch of unreality; they are reasons meant to satisfy +the hearer, but do not convince the speaker. When however we come to the +argument for Home Rule drawn from the inconvenience of the present state +of things to England generally, and to English members of Parliament in +particular, we know at once that we are at any rate dealing with a real +tangible serious plea which has (if anything) only too much weight with +the person who employs it. There is nothing in the whole relation of +England to Ireland about which politicians are so well assured, as that +the presence of a body of Parnellites at Westminster is an unutterable +nuisance, and works intolerable evil. Of the reality of their conviction +we have the strongest proof. The sufferings of Irish tenants, the +difficulties or the wrongs of Irish landlords, the evils of coercion, +the terror of assassination, but slightly ruffled the composure with +which English statesmen faced the perplexities of the Irish problem. +They first began to think that the demand for Home Rule might have +something in it when the refusal to erect a Parliament at Dublin meant +the continuance of obstruction in the Parliament at Westminster. The +terror of obstruction has to speak the plain truth, done more to effect +the _bona fide_ conversion of English M.P.'s into advocates of Home Rule +than any other single influence. + +What then is the harm which a body of eighty or ninety Irish members can +work in Parliament? This is the answer. They may (it is said) in the +first place delay, obstruct, and render impossible the carrying through +of important measures; London may go without a municipality; widowers +may wait for years without being able to marry their deceased wives' +sisters; we may not during this generation get the blessing of a good +criminal code, if Mr. Parnell and his followers sit in Parliament +prepared to practice all the arts of obstruction. The Irish members, in +the second place, perturb and falsify the whole system of party +government. The majority of Great Britain wish to be ruled say by Lord +Salisbury; the Parnellites do not care whether Lord Salisbury or Mr. +Gladstone is Premier, but they do care for making the English executive +feeble, and ridiculous. They can, therefore, by the practice of a very +little art, seize some opportunity of putting Lord Salisbury in a +minority, and turning him out of office. Mr. Gladstone comes back into +what is ironically called power. The same game begins again. The +Parnellites coalesce with the Tories, we have a change of Cabinet, and +possibly a dissolution. Nor are changes of Ministry the whole of the +evil. The high tone of party politics is degraded. English or Scottish +members of Parliament are but men; they are liable to be tempted; the +Parnellites have the means of offering temptation; and temptation, +members of Parliament intimate to us, will in the long run be too great +for their virtue. The presence, in short, at Westminster of eighty-six +gentlemen who do not respect the dignity or care for the efficiency of +Parliament is absolutely fatal to the success of Parliamentary +government, and to the character of Parliamentary statesmanship. We +must, it is inferred, let the Parnellites have a Parliament of their own +in Ireland, or else we shall soon cease to have any Parliament worth +keeping in England. + +[Sidenote: Criticism.] + +The force of this line of argument, as far as it goes, cannot be denied. +The presence in the House of Commons of politicians disloyal to +Parliament causes immense inconvenience; but to anyone not a member of +the House of Commons, it appears singular that men of sense should think +the inconveniences of obstruction a sufficient ground for breaking up +the Constitution. The whole thing is a question of proportion. The +nation suffers a good deal from obstruction, but the suffering is not of +a kind to justify revolution. A toothache is a bad thing, but a severe +toothache hardly suggests suicide; and though life might not be worth +having, if toothache were to last for years, the thoughts of putting an +end to one's existence are removed by the knowledge that an aching tooth +can be drawn by a dentist. Now the more obvious evils of obstruction can +clearly be removed by changes of procedure. Members of Parliament appear +to think that to alter the rules of the House of Commons; to curtail and +limit the power of debate; to confer, if necessary, upon the Speaker, or +upon the bare majority of members present, authority to bring every +debate summarily to a close, is something like overthrowing the +monarchy, a thing not to be dreamt of by the wildest of innovators. +Plain men outside the walls of Parliament can assure our +representatives, that the world would bear with infinite calmness the +imposition of stringent restrictions on the overflow of Parliamentary +eloquence. If even the great debate on Home Rule had been finished say +in a week, the outer world would have been well pleased; and measures +such as the Government of Ireland Bill happily do not come before +Parliament every year. The more subtle evils arising in part at least +from the presence of the Irish members must be met by more searching +remedies. Parnellite obstruction has revealed rather than caused the +weakness of government by Parliament. The experience, not of England +only, but of other countries, shows the great difficulty of working our +present party system of government in a representative assembly which is +divided into more than two parties. The essential difficulty lies in +the immediate dependence of a modern ministry for its existence on every +vote of the House of Commons. If you see the difficulty, you can also +see various means by which it may be removed. In more than one country, +and notably in the United States and in Switzerland--states, be it +remarked, in which popular government flourishes--the executive, though +in the long run amenable to the voice of the people, and though in +Switzerland actually appointed by the legislature, is not like an +English Cabinet dependent on the fluctuating will of a legislative +assembly. If it were necessary to choose between modifications in the +relation of the executive to Parliament, and the repeal of the Act of +Union, most Englishmen would think that to increase the independence of +the executive--a change probably desirable in itself--was a less evil +than a disruption of the United Kingdom, which not only is in itself a +gigantic evil, but may well lead to others. A modification, however, in +the practice would, for the moment at least, save the real principles of +Parliamentary government. Were it once understood that a Ministry would +not retire from office except in consequence of a direct vote of want of +confidence in the House of Commons, the political power of the +Parnellite, or of any other minority, would be greatly diminished. +Meanwhile, members of Parliament may be reminded that it is on them that +the duty lies of removing the obstacles which from time to time impede +the working of Parliamentary machinery, and that the existence of +temptation to political turpitude is not an admitted excuse for yielding +to it. In one way or another a majority of 584 members must, if they +choose, be able to make head against the minority of 86. Their failure +already excites astonishment; the time is coming when it will excite +contempt. The English people, moreover, have the remedy in their own +hands. By giving to either of the great parties an absolute majority +they can terminate all the inconveniences threatened by Parnellite +obstruction. The remedy is in their hands, and recent experience +suggests that they will not be slow to use it. + + * * * * * + +A survey of the arguments in favour of Home Rule suggests the following +reflections: + +The arguments, taken as a whole, do undoubtedly show that the present +state of things is accompanied by considerable evils or inconveniences. +They show what no one who has given a thought to the matter ever +doubted, that the relation between England and Ireland is +unsatisfactory. They are, as far as they go, objections to the +maintenance of the Union, but neither the feelings which favour Home +Rule, nor the reasons by which they are supported, tell in reality in +favour of Home Rule policy. They scarcely tend to show that Home Rule +would cure the evils complained of; they certainly do not show, they +only assume, that Home Rule in Ireland would not be injurious to +England. They are, in short, arguments in favour of Irish independence; +every one of them would be seen in its true character if the Irish +demand should take the form of a claim that Ireland should become +an independent nation. Meanwhile, even on the Home Rule view, the +case stands thus: the present condition of things excites Irish +discontent, and involves great evils. We have before us but three +courses:--Maintenance of the Union; the concession of Irish +independence; the concession of Home Rule to Ireland. The Home Ruler +urges that the last is the best course left open to us. To decide +whether this be so or not requires a fair examination of the +possibilities which each course presents to England. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] For the constitution of Austria-Hungary see Ulbrich's +_Oesterreich-Ungarn_ in Marquardsen's _Handbuch des Oeffentlichen +Rechts_; Francis Deak, with preface by M.E. Grant Duff; Home Rule in +Austria-Hungary, by David King, in the _Nineteenth Century_, January +1886, p. 35. + +[5] Ulbrich, pp. 15, 76, 77. + +[6] See Marquardsen, 28-30. + +[7] This is, in my judgment, true even of such federations as the United +States or the Swiss confederacy. + +[8] Froude's 'English in Ireland,' vol. 3, pp. 581, 582. + +[9] See especially on this subject 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande,' Partie +Historique, pp. 15-207. + +[10] "On ne saurait considerer attentivement l'Irlande, etudier son +histoire et ses revolutions, observer ses moeurs et analyser ses lois, +sans reconnaitre que ses malheurs, auxquels ont concouru tant +d'accidents funestes, ont eu et ont encore de nos jours, pour cause +principale, une cause _premiere_, radicale, permanente; et qui domine +toutes les autres; cette cause, c'est une mauvaise _aristocratie_." 1 De +Beaumont, 'L'Irlande,' deuxieme partie, p. 228. The only objection which +may be fairly taken to De Beaumont's language, though not to his +essential meaning, is, that the words he uses occasionally suggest the +idea that he attributes some special vice of nature, so to speak, to the +landed classes in Ireland, whilst there is, of course, no reason to +suppose that the original Norman invaders of Ireland were a whit worse +than the Normans they left behind them in England, or that the +Cromwellian settlers did not possess the virtues which distinguished +Puritan soldiers. What De Beaumont really means is that the aristocracy, +or landed gentry, have been from first to last placed in a false +position, which has led to their exhibiting the vices, with few of the +virtues, of aristocratic government. + +[11] Compare 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' &c., pp. 253-256. + +[12] See Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution' (Second Edition), pp. 181-210; +and compare 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' &c., pp. 253-299. + +[13] Cromwell's reputation as a statesman suffers even more than that of +most great men from the indiscriminating eulogy of admirers. The merit +of his Irish policy was not his severity to Catholics, but his equity to +Protestants. If he did not acknowledge the equality of man, he at any +rate acknowledged what English statesmanship before and after his time +refused to admit--the equality of Englishmen, at least when Protestants. +His policy handed down to us a legacy of justifiable hatred on the part +of Irish Catholics. But it is the fault not of the Protector, but of his +successors, that his policy did not ensure to England the loyalty of +every Protestant in Ireland. + +[14] The penal laws against the Catholics in England were as severe as +those in Ireland. Their practical effect and working was however very +different in the two countries. See 1 Lecky,'History of England,' pp. +268-310. + +[15] See Walpole, 'Short History of the Kingdom of Ireland,' p. 176. + +[16] See a speech of Lord Clare made in defence of the Bill for +Establishing the Union with England, and republished by the Irish Loyal +and Patriotic Union. + +[17] 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' p. 251. It is of primary +consequence that Englishmen should realise the undoubted fact, that +agrarian conspiracies and agrarian outrages, such as those which baffle +the English Government in Ireland, are known to foreign countries. For +centuries the question of tenant-right, in a form very like that in +which it arises in Ireland, has been known in the parts of France near +Saint-Quentin under the name of the _droit de marche_. In France, as in +Ireland, tenants have claimed a right unknown to the law, and have +enforced the right by outrage, by boycotting, by murder. The +_Depointeur_ is the land grabber, and is treated by French peasants +precisely as the Irish land grabber is treated by Irish peasants. See +Calonne, 'La Vie Agricole, sous l'Ancien Regime,' pp. 66-69. Precisely +the same phenomena have appeared in parts of Belgium, where for +centuries there has been, in respect of land, the conflict to which we +are accustomed in Ireland, between the law of the Courts and the law of +the people. "From the commencement of the year 1836 to the end of 1842 +there had been" [in consequence of this conflict] "forty-three acts of +incendiarism, eleven assassinations, and seven agrarian outrages +entailing capital punishment," all within a limited part of Belgium. See +Parliamentary Reports on Tenure of Land in Countries of Europe, 1869, p. +118-123. In Belgium decisive measures of punishment at last put an end +to agrarian outrages. What should be specially noted is that in France +and Belgium crimes in character exactly resembling the agrarian outrages +which take place in Ireland had, it is admitted, no connection whatever +with national, or even it would seem with general political feeling. + +[18] See 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' &c., p. 251. + +[19] 2 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale, Politique et Religeuse.' +Septieme edition, pp. 135 and 137. + +[20] A Home Ruler may in this matter take up one position which is +consistent. He may say that England can allow to be carried out through +the agency of an Irish Parliament a policy which no English Parliament +could itself adopt. To put the matter plainly, an English Parliament +which cannot for very shame rob Irish landlords of their property may, +it is suggested, create an Irish Parliament with authority to rob them. +This position is consistent, but it is disgraceful. To ascribe it to a +fair opponent would be gross controversial unfairness. + +[21] A reader who wishes to see the American view put in its best and +strongest form should read Mr. E.L. Godkin's article on "American Home +Rule," _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, p. 793. I entirely disagree +with the general conclusion to which the article is intended to lead, +but I am anxious to acknowledge the importance of the information and +the arguments which it contains. + +[22] See pp. 87-89, _ante._ + +[23] See 'American Home Rule,' _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, pp. +793, 803, 804. + +[24] _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, p. 801. + +[25] Contrast the Coercion Acts of 1881 and 1882 respectively. For list +of Coercion Acts see "Federal Union with Ireland," by R.B. O'Brian, +_Nineteenth Century_, No. 107, p. 35. + +[26] In England the Courts can change the venue for the trial of a +criminal. In Scotland the Lord Advocate can always (I am told) bring any +case he chooses to trial before the High Court of Justiciary in +Edinburgh, and the same thing could be done by the Court on the +application of the prisoner. In Scotland, again, any Sheriff or Chief +Magistrate of a Burgh could prohibit a meeting, however lawful, which he +thought likely to endanger the peace. The provisions of the last Irish +Coercion Act, Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. +25, s. 16, giving power to a magistrate where an offence had been +committed to summon and examine witnesses, even though no person is +charged with the offence, formed, I believe, part of the draft criminal +code for England. + +[27] See for an admirable statement of this argument, "Alternative +Policies in Ireland," in the _Nineteenth Century_ for February, 1886. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION. + + +[Sidenote: The failure of the Union; its nature.] + +Eighty-six years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty of +Union between England and Ireland. The two countries do not yet form an +united nation. The Irish people are, if not more wretched (for the whole +European world has made progress, and Ireland with it), yet more +conscious of wretchedness; and Irish disaffection to England is, if not +deeper, more wide-spread than in 1800. An Act meant by its authors to be +the source of the prosperity and concord which, though slowly, followed +upon the union with Scotland, has not made Ireland rich, has not put an +end to Irish lawlessness, has not terminated the feud between +Protestants and Catholics, has not raised the position of Irish tenants, +has not taken away the causes of Irish discontent, and has therefore not +removed Irish disloyalty. This is the indictment which can fairly be +brought against the Act of Union. It is, however, of importance to +notice that the main charges to which the Act of Union is liable are +negative. It has not removed (its foes, say that it has not mitigated) +great evils; but the mass of ills for which the Union is constantly made +chargeable were in existence before the days of Pitt or Cornwallis. +Destitution, sectarian animosities, harsh evictions, met by savage +outrages, the terror of secret societies, the stern enforcement of law +which to the people represented anything but justice, are phenomena of +Irish society, which, as they existed before the Volunteers established +the Parliamentary independence of the country, and continued to exist +when Ireland was subject to no laws but those passed by an Irish +Parliament, cannot be attributed to the Act of Union. That enactment +introduced a purely political change. It could not, except very +indirectly, either increase or remove evils which it did not affect to +touch. To two charges its authors are indeed, with more or less of +justice, liable; they committed the intellectual error of supposing that +a change or improvement in the form of the Constitution would remove +evils due to social and economical causes; they committed the moral +error of thinking that a beneficial enactment might allowably be passed +by means which outraged all the best moral feeling of Ireland. Their +mistakes are worth notice. England is again told that a Constitutional +change is the remedy for Irish misery. Ethical considerations (in this +case the moral rights of a loyal minority and the legal rights of Irish +landlords) are, it is again intimated, to be held of slight account +compared with the benefit to Ireland and to England which is to be +expected from an experiment in Constitution-making. To impartial +observers it may appear that the proposed policy of 1886 threatens to +reproduce in its essence the errors and the vices of the policy of 1800. +Be this as it may, the reflection that the ill results of the Act of +Union are mainly negative suggests the conclusion that the good results +(if any) of its repeal would probably be negative also, and clears the +way for the question with which we are immediately concerned, namely, +What are the actual and undoubted evils to England of maintaining a +legislative union with Ireland? + +[Sidenote: The evils of maintaining the Union] + +The nature and extent of these evils has been considered in criticising +the arguments in favour of Home Rule. A bare enumeration of them +therefore may here suffice. + +[Sidenote: 1. Complication of English policy.] + +_First._--The Union hampers and complicates English policy, and this +even independently of the existing agitation for Home Rule. The tenacity +of England during the war with America, her triumphant energy during the +revolutionary struggle, were due to a unity of feeling on the part, at +any rate, of her governing classes, which even under the most favourable +circumstances can hardly exist in a Parliament containing, as the +Parliament of the United Kingdom always must contain, a large body of +Irish Roman Catholics. If it be urged that the presence of Roman +Catholics is due to the Catholic Emancipation Act, and not to the Act of +Union, the remark is true but irrelevant. No maintainer or assailant of +the Union is insane enough to propose the repeal of the Emancipation +Act. + +[Sidenote: 2. Obstruction] + +_Secondly_.--The refusal of Home Rule involves a long, tedious, and +demoralising contest with opponents will use, and from their own point +of view have a right to use, all the arts of obstruction and of +Parliamentary intrigue. The battle of the Constitution must be fought +out in Parliament, and if it is to be won, Englishmen may be compelled +to forego for a time much useful legislation, to modify the rules of +party government, and, it is possible, even the forms of the +Constitution. + +[Sidenote: 3. Strict government in Ireland.] + +_Thirdly_.--If the Union is to be maintained with advantage to any part +of the United Kingdom, the people of the United Kingdom must make the +most strenuous, firm, and continuous effort, lasting, it may well be, +for twenty years or more, to enforce throughout every part of the United +Kingdom obedience to the law of the land. This effort can only be +justified by the equally strenuous determination (which must involve an +infinity of trouble) to give ear to every Irish complaint, and to see +that the laws which the Irish people obey are laws of justice, and (what +is much the same thing) laws which in the long run the people of Ireland +will feel to be just. To carry out this course of action is difficult +for all governments, is perhaps specially difficult for a democratic +government. To maintain the Union is no easy task, though it has yet to +be proved that any form of Home Rule will give more ease to the people +of England; nor can the difficulty be got rid of, though it may be +somewhat changed, by abolishing the Irish representation in Parliament, +or by treating Ireland as a Crown colony. Such steps, which could hardly +be termed maintenance of the Union, might, as expedients for carrying +through safely a course of reform, be morally and for a time +justifiable. Their adoption is, however, liable to an almost insuperable +objection. Democracy in Great Britain does not comport with official +autocracy in Ireland. Every government must be true to its principles, +and a democracy which played the benevolent despot would suffer +demoralisation. + +[Sidenote: Good results of the Union.] + +The Act of Union has been the aim of so much random invective that its +good fruits (for it has borne good no less than evil fruits) are in +danger of being forgotten. It ended once and for all an intolerable +condition of affairs, and its scope will never be understood unless its +enactments are read in the lurid light cast upon them by the rebellion +of 1798. The hateful means used to obtain an apparently good end have +cast a slur on the reputation of more than one high-toned statesman. +Humanity, in the case of Cornwallis at least, had far more share than +ambition in his determination to abolish the Irish Parliament. His +anxiety in 1798 to save Catholics and rebels from oppression was as keen +and as noble as the anxiety of Canning in 1858 to protect the natives of +India from the resentments excited by the Mutiny. Every reason which in +our own day after the Gordon riots made it necessary to abolish the +ancient constitution of Jamaica told in 1800 in favour of abolishing the +still more ancient Parliament of Ireland. If statesmen, bent on +restoring at least the rule of law and peace in a distracted country, +fancied that the corruption of the legislature might be counted a low +price to pay for protecting the mass of the population from the rule or +the vengeance of a faction, they committed a grave moral error. But +their mistake was more pardonable than it seems to modern critics, and +the lesson which it teaches--that you cannot base a just policy upon a +foundation of iniquity--is one which the modern censors of Pitt may well +lay to heart. However this may be, the transactions which discredited +the passing of the Act of Union give no ground for repealing it, and, +except to a rhetorician in want of an _argumentum ad hominem_, it will +never appear that the philosophic historian who maintains that the +Treaty of Union was ill-conceived and premature, contradicts the +political philosopher who contends that to repeal the Union would be not +to cancel but to aggravate the evils of an historical error. The +considerations which recommend or require the maintenance of the Union +are often forgotten, but are obvious. + +[Sidenote: Reasons for maintaining the Union.] + +The support of the Union is, after all, let controversialists say what +they like, the policy which in fact holds the field, and it is (strange +though the assertion may appear) on the advocates of innovation, not on +the supporters of things as they are, that lies the burden of making out +their case. A fundamental alteration in the constitution of the realm is +in itself no light matter, and any man who has eyes to see or ears to +hear may easily convince himself that the creation of an Irish +Parliament must be the beginning, not the end, of a revolution. Dublin +is not the only city in the United Kingdom which has contained an +Assembly which not only occasionally denied, but during the whole of its +existence never admitted, the sovereignty of the Parliament at +Westminster; and in the present state of the world it is inconceivable +that Irish autonomy--if such be the proper term--should not excite or +justify claims for local independence which would unloose the ties which +bind together the huge fabric of the British Empire. + +[Sidenote: Strengthens the English Crown.] + +The Union again of England and Ireland has increased, as its relaxation +would of necessity diminish, the power of the central government. That +the Treaty of Union has, disappointing and even harmful as some of its +results have been, formed a guarantee against successful rebellion, +hardly admits of question. The difference between the abortive revolt of +1848 or the Fenian disturbances of 1866, and the desperate insurrection +of 1798, affords some measure of the strength which the legislative +unity of the kingdom has added to the English Crown. If it be suggested +that the disloyalty which has prompted sedition during this century was +less deep than the animosities which armed the insurgents of '98, the +suggestion may be true, but it incidentally shows that under the Union +some progress, however slight, has been made towards national harmony, +and recalls the important fact that at the present day the wealth and +the energy of Protestant Ireland firmly support the legislative unity of +the kingdom. Consider again what are the facilities possessed, say, by +the State of New York, by the kingdom of Bavaria, or by the Cape Colony +for interfering with or arresting the action of the central power to +which the State, kingdom, or dependency is subject, and you perceive at +once how ample must, from the very necessity of the case, be the +opportunities possessed by a semi-independent Irish executive +representing a semi-independent Irish Parliament for embarrassing the +action of the Government in London. This will appear more clearly from a +detailed examination of the different forms which may be assumed by Home +Rule. One remark, however, may with advantage be made at this point of +our argument, since it holds good of every possible scheme for repealing +or modifying the Union. Powers conferred upon an executive and a +Parliament at Dublin must from the nature of things be a deduction from +the powers which can be exercised by the Parliament and Ministry at +Westminster. This is a principle the truth of which is independent of +the wishes or fancies either of Englishmen or of Irishmen. "The more you +have of the more," runs a quaint Spanish proverb, "the less you have of +the less." The saying is of mathematical certainty, but the depth and +variety of its application are constantly forgotten in the excitement of +controversy. + +[Sidenote: Enables it to maintain freedom.] + +To the existence of the Union and to the power which it confers upon the +executive, is due the possibility of curbing the violence of religious +and political zealots by the interposition of an authority endowed at +once with overpowering strength and obvious impartiality. In Belfast +even a Nationalist must, if he is a peaceable citizen, feel that the +withdrawal of the Queen's troops would not conduce to his comfort. Under +a system of Home Rule, it will perhaps be said, one body of fanatics or +the other would, with or without the aid of the army, gain the upper +hand and restore order. Grant the truth, which may perhaps be a little +doubtful of this suggestion, it is at best a plea not for Home Rule but +for separation, since no civilised government could, whilst England and +Ireland formed under any terms whatever parts of the same political +community, suffer Belfast to become the scene of a free fight which +should decide by the ordeal of battle whether Protestants should +tyrannise over Catholics, or Catholics coerce Protestants by a reign of +terror. A reign of order moreover is not equivalent to the reign of +justice. Still less is it equivalent to the establishment of that +personal freedom which can only exist under the equal rule of equal +law, and is the blessing which every government worthy the name is bound +to confer upon its subjects. + +An impartial foreigner again would probably hold, as indeed De Beaumont +(unless I misunderstand his teaching) did to the end of his life +actually hold, that the existing connection between England and Ireland +is dictated by the state of the world, by the circumstances of the +times, by the very nature of things. We are living in 1886, not in 1782: +the nineteenth century is not the age for small States or for weak +States. Such an observer, however, would also see much that is hidden by +the dust of battle from the combatants in a desperate political conflict +What is really needed to meet the real wants of which the cry for Home +Rule is a more or less factitious expression is, he would note, much +more a change in the spirit of Englishmen than an alteration in the +constitution of England. If Englishmen could learn to speak and think of +Irishmen with the respect and consideration due to fellow-citizens, if +they could cease to jeer at Irishmen now as not much more than a century +ago they used to jeer at Scotchmen, the Union would soon become +something more than a mere work of legal ingenuity. A change of feeling +would make it easy for English politicians and English voters to +perceive that the local affairs of Ireland ought to be managed in the +Parliament of the United Kingdom in accordance with the opinion of the +Parliamentary representatives of Ireland, just as Scotch affairs are +managed at Westminster in accordance with the opinions of Parliamentary +representatives of Scotland. Towards this reform in the practice which +need not change anything in the law of our constitution, Mr. Bright has +already pointed the way, and Mr. Bright's moral intuitions have more +than once given him a power denied to our other statesmen of prophetic +insight into the future of English policy. Meanwhile those who urge the +maintenance of the Union have a right to insist upon the possibilities +which it contains of reconciling the strength of the Empire with due +regard to the local interests and local sentiment of Ireland. + +[Sidenote: And carry out just reforms.] + +The Union, lastly, whilst it increases the power of the whole United +Kingdom, provides the means of carrying out, and of carrying out with +due regard to justice, any reform, innovation, or if you please +revolution, required for the prosperity of the Irish people. The duty, +it has been laid down, of an English Minister is to effect by his policy +all those changes in Ireland which a revolution would effect by force. +The maxim comes from a strange quarter, but the doctrine of Disraeli +sums up on this matter the teaching of Mill and De Beaumont, and it is +absolutely sound if you add to it the implied condition that an English +Minister, whilst aiming at the ends of a wise revolutionist, must pay a +respect to the demands of justice not always evinced by the +revolutionary spirit. But to put in force a policy of just revolution, +nothing is so necessary as the combination of resistless power with +infinite wealth. This is exactly what the government of the United +Kingdom can, and no Irish government could, supply. Mr. Gladstone and +his followers fully admit this, and the Land Purchase Bill was the sign +of their conviction that the policy of Home Rule itself needs for its +success and justification the power to draw upon the wealth of the +United Kingdom. Let the United Kingdom, it is said in effect, pay fifty +millions, that without any injustice to Irish landlords Irish tenants +may be turned into landowners, and may then enjoy the blessings of Home +Rule, freed from all temptation to use legislative power for purposes of +confiscation. The advice may in one sense be sound, but prudence +suggests that if the fifty millions are to be expended, it were best +first to settle the agrarian feud, and then to see whether the demand +for Home Rule would not die a natural death. French peasants were +Jacobins until the revolution secured to them the soil of France. The +same men when transformed into landed proprietors became the staunch +opponents of Jacobinism. It is in any case the interest of England to +see whether, say in a generation, the existing or further changes in the +tenure of land may not avert all necessity or demand for changes in the +constitution. Interest here coincides with duty. No scheme whether of +Home Rule or of Irish independence has been proposed, nor, it may be +said with confidence, ever can be proposed, which, disguise the matter +as you will, does not savour of treachery to thousands of Irishmen who +have performed the duties and claim to retain the rights of citizens of +the United Kingdom. The worst delusion of the revolutionary spirit is +the notion that justice to the people may be based upon injustice to +individuals. Protestants have not more, but neither have they less, +claim to protection from the State than Catholics. Even landowners are +not of necessity wrong-doers. Rent is a debt, and it may occasionally be +the duty, even of a tenant, to pay his creditor. An insolvent debtor +has, however excusable or pitiable his position, no absolute moral right +to improve his own position by torturing or murdering any solvent +neighbour who may be inclined to pay his own debts. To maintain the +Union is to maintain the effort to perform the obligations of the +country, and to compel all citizens of the country to perform the duties +imposed by law. The effort is an arduous one, the more so since it must +be combined with the equally strenuous endeavour to see that in Ireland, +as in every part of the United Kingdom, the demands of the law be made +to coincide with the demands of morality and of humanity. Still _pactum +serva_ is a good maxim for nations no less than for individuals: there +may be a higher law than the rule of keeping one's promise, but before a +man or a government incurs even the appearance of bad faith, it were +well to see whether the so-called higher law of conscience may not in +reality be the lower dictates of indolence or cowardice. Neither nations +nor individuals are bound in duty to do impossibilities. The limit of +power is the limit of responsibility, but if England can no longer +enforce justice in Ireland, there will still be the grave question +whether this fearful result of past misdoing or error does not suggest +and justify Separation rather than Home Rule. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +SEPARATION. + + +[Sidenote: Evils of Separation] + +Englishmen are so firmly and with such good reason convinced that the +independence of Ireland would be fatal to the greatness and security of +Great Britain, that they rarely attempt to weigh accurately the grounds +of reason which may be adduced in support of a conviction which has +acquired the character of a political instinct. The evils, however, to +England which may be reasonably anticipated from the political +separation of the two countries may be summed up under three heads. + +_First_.--The acquiescence by England in Irish independence would be a +deliberate and complete surrender of the objects at which English +statesmanship has, under one form or another, aimed for centuries. Such +a surrender would, in addition to its material effects, inflict an +amount of moral discredit on England which would itself be the cause of +serious dangers. That a powerful nation should (except under the force +of crushing defeat) assent to an arrangement which would decrease its +resources and authority must inevitably appear to all the world to be, +and probably would be in reality, such a sign either of declining +strength or of declining spirit as would in a short time provoke the +aggression of rivals and enemies. Abdication of royal or imperial +authority is with States no less than with individuals the precursor of +death. Loss of territory, indeed, in consequence of defeat, is in itself +only in so far damaging as defeat may imply a want of capacity to resist +attack, or as the diminution of territory may involve loss of resources. +Thus the surrender of Lombardy by Austria, of Alsace by France, of +Schleswig-Holstein by Denmark, the acquiescence of Holland in the +independence of Belgium; or, to come nearer home, the treaty by which +England acknowledged that the struggle to retain her American colonies +had ended in failure, each and all of them brought only such discredit +upon the defeated country as is the direct consequence of want of +success. None, of these transactions had anything like the disastrous +results which the concession of Irish independence would entail on +England. The Austrians, the French, the Danes, and the Dutch had, as the +whole world admitted, struggled manfully to maintain their power. They +were beaten as one party or other to a fight must be beaten, but they +did not betray any of those failings which encourage further attack. The +close of the conflict with our colonies assuredly did not leave England +disgraced before the world. The obstinacy of George III., the splendid +resistance made by a nation assailed at once by a combination of +enemies, any one of whom alone would have seemed a formidable foe, the +victories of Rodney, the defence of Gibraltar, not only saved but +increased the renown of England, and were warnings which no foreigner +could disregard, that the loss of the American colonies, though it might +diminish the Empire, had not quenched the spirit or undermined the +strength of Great Britain. No one can suppose that a peaceful retreat +from the difficulties and responsibility of providing for the Government +of Ireland would leave to England that reputation for courage and +endurance which, even in the midst of defeat, was retained by the +generation who acknowledged the independence of America. Peaceable +surrender may avert material loss; it cannot maintain moral character. +One thing only would render the concession of Irish independence +compatible with Englishmen's respect for themselves, or with the respect +of other nations for England. This condition would be the obvious, and, +so to speak, patent conviction on the part of the whole English people, +that the grant of independence to Ireland was the fulfilment of a duty +demanded by justice. No such conviction exists, nor is it ever likely to +come into existence. Even were so great a change of English sentiment to +take place that a majority of the people became ready, on grounds of +expediency, to break up the connection between Great Britain and the +neighbouring island, it would still be hard to persuade the nation that +there was not vile treachery in refusing to stand by and support that +part of the Irish people which wished to retain the connection with +England. The treachery would approach to infamy if it should appear that +England, for the sake of her own comfort, left English subjects who had +always obeyed the law and relied on the honourable protection of the +United Kingdom at the mercy of conspirators whose lawlessness had taken +the form of cruelty and tyranny, and whose vindictiveness was certain to +punish as criminality former acts of loyalty or obedience to English +sovereignty. High-toned self-sacrifice which results in breach of faith +to associates is considered by the world at large as a particularly +odious form of hypocrisy. Nothing in the treaty between England and the +American Colonies involved more just bitterness of feeling than the +partial, and probably inevitable, desertion of the Loyalists. The +national conscience would condemn rather than approve the prudential +considerations which might, under certain circumstances, induce +Englishmen to consent to see Ireland an independent nation; such consent +would imply the adoption of views of national interest fundamentally +inconsistent with the maintenance of Imperial power; the damage +resulting from loss of character is difficult to estimate, but is none +the less real because it does not admit of computation in the terms of +the multiplication table. + +_Secondly_, the independence of Ireland means loss to Great Britain both +in money and in men. The pecuniary loss is, indeed, not quite so +serious as might at first sight be looked for.[28] The provisions of the +rejected Government of Ireland Bill imply, it would seem, that the +pecuniary gain of the United Kingdom from Ireland in the way of taxation +may, in Mr. Gladstone's judgment, be estimated at about three and a half +millions per annum, and this may presumably be taken as a not unfair +estimate. The sacrifice of a seventh part of the population of the +United Kingdom is no slight matter. Its importance is enhanced by the +circumstance, never to be forgotten, that Great Britain is the centre of +an Empire. The brutal and stupid jests by which respectable Englishmen +often hint that the bravery, the capacity, and the genius of Irishmen +are of little service to the Empire, and that their value is more than +counterbalanced by the ill results of Irish discontent and sedition, +conceal from unreflecting minds the extent to which every part of the +United Kingdom has severally contributed to the fortune and power of the +country. Irish labourers, Irish soldiers, Irish generals, and Irish +statesmen have assuredly rendered no trifling services to the British +Crown. There is, however, one valid ground for rating the loss in men to +England, which would result from separation from Ireland somewhat lower +than one would on first thoughts be inclined to place it. Even were +Ireland an independent country there is nothing to prevent England from +leaving all the advantages of English citizenship open to the +inhabitants of the Irish State. In this matter much is to be learnt from +Germany. Neither Stein, nor Niebuhr, nor Moltke, were by birth subjects +of Prussia, yet Prussia did not lose the inestimable gains to be derived +from their talents. A generous, a liberal, and a just extension of the +privileges of citizenship might fill the English army and the English +civil service with men drawn from a State independent of Great Britain. +If the independence of Ireland were proclaimed to-morrow, there would +not be a hundred Irish labourers the fewer in Liverpool or in London. +Connections and relations depending upon community of language, +community of interest, community of feeling, the ties of kindred, of +business, of friendship, or of affection cannot, happily, be dissolved, +or to any great extent affected, by political revolutions. In any case, +it would depend on the wisdom of Great Britain whether separation from +Ireland should or should not mean the estrangement of Irishmen. + +_Thirdly_, the independence of Ireland would give England a foreign, and +possibly a hostile, neighbour along the western coast of Great Britain. +We should, for the first time since the accession of the Stuarts, occupy +a position something like that of a Continental nation, and know what it +was to have a foe, or at best a very cold friend, upon our borders. In +time of war Ireland would be the abettor or the open ally of, say, the +United States, or of France; Dublin would, unless reconquered, be the +outpost of the French Republic or of the American Union. In times of +peace things would not stand much better; our diplomacy would be +constantly occupied with the intrigues carried on in Dublin; the +possibility of attack from Ireland would necessitate the increase of our +forces; increased taxation would be drawn from a diminished population; +we should be compelled to double our army when we had lost that part of +the kingdom which used to form our best recruiting-ground. Sooner or +later England would be driven, like every Continental State, to accept +the burden of conscription, and with conscription would come essential +changes in the whole habits of English life. Nor can we count upon this +being the end of our calamities. The burden of conscription would +deprive us of our one great advantage over competitors in the struggle +for trade; an overtaxed and overburdened people could not long maintain +their mercantile pre-eminence. This is the picture which is constantly +drawn, in one shape or another, of the ruinous results to England of the +free development of Irish nationality. No one can undertake to say that +its main features are false. Still, it must be admitted that the +prophets of evil neglect to notice several facts which ought not to be +overlooked. Ireland is a poor country of about the population of +Belgium; it is occupied by a people far less wealthy than the +inhabitants of England; and, moreover, by a people divided among +themselves by marked differences of race, religion, and historical +tradition. Is it really to be feared that such a neighbour could, even +if both independent and hostile, be half the peril to England that +Germany is to France, or France to Italy? Money constitutes now more +truly than ever the sinews of war, and it will be a long time before +Ireland is a country abounding in money. There is, to say the least, +something ignominious in the dread that Englishmen could not hold their +own in the face of an Irish Republic, which would certainly be poor, and +would probably be a prey to violent factions. Grant again--and this is +granting a good deal--that Ireland might become a province of France, +there is still some difficulty in seeing why Englishmen can live without +fear within sight of Boulogne, and yet must tremble at the thought of +French regiments assembling in Dublin. The command of the sea moreover +would, whether Ireland were or were not aided by foreign allies, be a +complete protection for England against invasion. If England's naval +supremacy were lost, the power of the British Empire would in any case +be gone. The vital matter for us is to retain command of the seas. Our +capacity for doing this would not be greatly affected by Irish +independence. America, further, and France are the only allies to whom +Ireland could look for aid. The notion that the United States would +consent to receive Ireland under any terms into the Union must appear to +any one who has studied American politics the wildest of dreams. It +supposes that the Americans would, without any gain to themselves, +disarrange the whole balance of their constitution, and by involving +themselves in all the complexities of European politics depart from the +path which they have continuously pursued, and which is marked out to +them by the plainest rules of common sense, and, it is hardly an +exaggeration to say, by the laws of nature. A people who decline to +annex Cuba, and are fully willing to wait till circumstances bring +Canada into the Union and give America possession of Mexico, are not +likely to incorporate Ireland. The alliance of France is a different +matter. Reflection, however, mitigates the dread of its occurrence. +Active alliance with Ireland would mean war with England, and now for +seventy years France and England have been at peace. This state of +things is the more remarkable because there have during that period +arisen occasions for discord, and because no feeling of sentimental +friendship forbids warfare. The true guarantee for peace between nations +which were long deemed hereditary foes is the immense interest which +each has in abstaining from war. Could the state of things which existed +at the beginning of the century be revived, thousands of Englishmen and +Frenchmen would be ruined. The security for peace depending upon +national interest would not be diminished were Ireland to-morrow +proclaimed an independent republic. That this independence would +facilitate French attack is undeniable, but attack would not be the more +likely to occur. Add to all this that Irish discontent or sedition +would, during a war, help France as much as Irish independence. Ireland +is no doubt the weak point in the defences of Great Britain. This no +one denies. The only question is whether and to what extent the +independence of that country would widen the breach in England's +defensive system. + +[Sidenote: Possible advantages of Separation] + +Any one who attempts to forecast the probable evils to England of Irish +independence should keep one recollection constantly before his mind. +The wisest thinkers of the eighteenth century (including Burke) held +that the independence of the American Colonies meant the irreparable +ruin of Great Britain. There were apparently solid grounds for this +belief; experience has proved it to be without foundation. + +A calm observer can even now see that the complete dissolution of the +connection between Great Britain and Ireland, disastrous as in many +respects such an event would undoubtedly be, holds out to the larger +country the possibility of two advantages. + +Loss of territory might be equivalent in some aspects to increase of +power. + +There exists in Europe no country so completely at unity with itself as +Great Britain. Fifty years of reform have done their work, and have +removed the discontents, the divisions, the disaffection, and the +conspiracies which marked the first quarter or the first half of this +century. Great Britain, if left to herself, could act with all the +force, consistency, and energy given by unity of sentiment and community +of interests. The distraction and the uncertainty of our political +aims, the feebleness and inconsistency with which they are pursued, +arise, in part at least, from the connection with Ireland. Neither +Englishmen nor Irishmen are to blame for the fact that it is difficult +for communities differing in historical associations and in political +conceptions to keep step together in the path of progress. For other +evils arising from the connection the blame must rest on English +Statesmen. All the inherent vices of party government, all the +weaknesses of the Parliamentary system, all the evils arising from the +perverse notion that reform ought always to be preceded by a period of +lengthy and more than half-factitious agitation met by equally +factitious resistance, have been fostered and increased by the +inter-action of Irish and English politics. No one can believe that the +inveterate habit of ruling one part of the United Kingdom on principles +which no one would venture to apply to the government of any other part +of it, can have produced anything but the most injurious effect on the +stability of our Government and the character of our public men. The +advocates of Home Rule find by far their strongest arguments for +influencing English opinion, in the proofs which they produce that +England, no less than Ireland, has suffered from a political arrangement +under which legal union has failed to secure moral unity; these +arguments, whatever their strength, are, however, it must be noted, far +more available to a Nationalist than to an advocate of Federalism. +English authority in Ireland would be increased by the possession of +that freedom of action which every powerful State exercises in its +dealings with a weaker though an independent nation. There is something +so repulsive to the best feelings of citizenship in even the +hypothetical contemplation of the advantages (such as they are) which +would accrue to Great Britain from the transformation of thousands of +our fellow-countrymen into aliens, that it is painful to trace out in +clear language the strength of the position which England would occupy +towards the Irish Republic. But in argument the strict following out of +the conclusions flowing from facts is a form of honesty, and however +repulsive these conclusions may be, their statement is a matter of duty. +Were Ireland independent, England would possess three means far more +effective for enforcing her will upon her weaker neighbour than are +coercion acts, courts, or constables. England could deal not with +individuals, but with the State, and she could compel respect for +treaties or due regard to English interests by invasion, by a pacific +blockade, or by a hostile tariff. There is a special reason for dwelling +on the facility with which England could compel the observance of +engagements. Morally the most serious of all the objections to England's +conceding Irish independence is the indelible disgrace which would +rightly fall upon any country which did not provide for the protection +of men who had been loyal and faithful citizens. Now the point to be +noted is that England's authority, resulting not from law but from +power in an independent Ireland, would greatly enhance her capacity for +ensuring the fair treatment of Irish Protestants. The treaty of +independence would provide guarantees for their rights, and any breach +of these guarantees would be a _casus belli_. The mere threat of a +hostile tariff would of itself be a stronger sanction than the most +strenuous provisions of an Act of Parliament backed only by the very +hypothetical power of compelling a half-independent executive to obey +the judgments of, say, the Privy Council The guarantees of a treaty are, +it may be said, often worthless. This is so; but their worthlessness +arises from the weakness of the country in whose favour they are made. +In any event they may be worth a good deal more than provisions of an +Act of Parliament. The deriders of a paper Union which has lasted for a +century have no right to count on the validity of a paper Federation +which still awaits creation. + +It is, again, possible that the severance of all political connection +might open the way to friendship or alliance. + +This assertion is no unmeaning paradox. If one could anticipate with any +confidence that the acknowledgment of Irish nationality would bring to +Ireland happiness and prosperity, it would not be a very bold conjecture +that as Ireland flourished and prospered, ill-will to England might +rapidly decrease. With nations, as with individuals, to remove all +causes of mutual irritation is much the same thing as removing the +disposition to quarrel. Not twelve years have passed since the last +Austrian soldier marched out of Italy, yet Austria is at this moment +less unpopular with the Italians than France, and Garibaldi's death +evoked tributes of respect at Vienna. For fifteen years the whole force +of European law was employed to keep Belgium united to Holland; the +obvious interests, moreover, of all the inhabitants of the kingdom of +the Netherlands told in favour of union. Yet year by year the two +divisions of one country became more and more hostile to each other. +Fifty years of separation have, as far as appearances go, restored, or +for the first time created, feelings of friendliness between the +Belgians and the Dutch. There are to be found Belgian statesmen who +regret the proclamation of Belgian independence. When in 1881 the +Americans celebrated at Yorktown the centenary of British defeat, they +went out of their way to display their goodwill towards Great Britain. +Plaudits and toasts, it may be said, prove nothing except the existence +of a sentiment which, even if it be genuine, is certain to be +evanescent. This is true; but the matter for consideration is not +whether the feeling of friendliness towards Great Britain which found +expression daring the festivities at Yorktown would survive a conflict +of interest between England and America, but whether a condition of +feeling which allows the two nations to look calmly after their own +interests, unblinded by passion or animosity, could possibly have been +produced by the continuance of that connection between England and +America which was terminated by the surrender of Cornwallis. There is at +least no absurdity in the supposition that this question ought to be +answered in the negative, and that Americans and Englishmen are at any +rate not enemies just because a hundred years ago they ceased to be +fellow-citizens. + +Let not, however, the gist of my argument be misunderstood. The possible +increase of English power, and the possible growth of goodwill between +England and Ireland, are not used as anything like reasons in favour of +Separation. They are set down simply as deductions from the immense +evils of a policy which no Englishman can regard as other than most +injurious to the whole United Kingdom. The reason why it is wise to +dwell on this kind of set-off against the ill effects of Separation is +that Home Rule, while involving almost all the evils of Separation, will +be found on examination not to hold out anything like the same hopes of +compensating advantages. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[28] See 'Economic Value of Ireland to Great Britain,' by Robert Giffen, +_The Nineteenth Century_, March, 1886, p. 229. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +HOME RULE--ITS FORMS. + + +[Sidenote: Forms of Home Rule.] + +The proposals for giving Ireland Home Rule, in so far as they have taken +any definite shape whatever, have assumed four forms:-- + +I. Home Rule as Federalism. + +II. Home Rule as Colonial Independence. + +III. Home Rule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution. + +IV. Home Rule under the proposed Gladstonian Constitution. + +[Sidenote: Conditions to be satisfied by plan of Home Rule.] + +How far Home Rule under these forms, or any one of them, is compatible +with the interests of the English people must be determined by +considering what are the conditions which an acceptable plan of Home +Rule must fulfil, and by then examining how far any given form of Home +Rule satisfies them. + +Any scheme of Home Rule which can conceivably be accepted by England +must, it is admitted, satisfy the following conditions.[29] + +It must in the first place be consistent with the ultimate supremacy of +the British Parliament.[30] + +It must in the second place be just; it must provide that each part of +the United Kingdom take a fair share of Imperial burdens; that the +citizens of each part have equality of rights; that the rights both of +individuals and of minorities be safely guarded.[31] + +It must in the third place promise finality; it must be in the nature of +a final settlement of the demands made on behalf of Ireland, and not be +a mere provocation to the revival of fresh demands. + +It must, in short, to sum up the whole matter, be, as already insisted +upon, a scheme which promises to England at least not greater evils than +the maintenance of the Union or than Irish independence. + +These conditions constitute the touchstone by which any given plan of +Home Rule must be tested. No scheme, however ingenious, can be accepted +which lacks any of these characteristics, namely, the maintenance of +Parliamentary sovereignty--justice--finality. + +[Sidenote: General character of Federalism.] + +I. _Home Rule as Federalism._--Federal government is the latest +invention of constitutional science. Several circumstances confer upon +it at the present moment extraordinary prestige. It is a piece of +political mechanism which has been found to work with success in three +notorious instances. In its favour is engaged the pride--may we not say +vanity?--of one of the leading nations of the earth. Americans regard +Federalism with pardonable partiality. They are the original inventors +of the best Federal system in the world, and Federalism has made them +the greatest of all free communities. A polity under which the United +States has grown up and flourished, and fought the biggest war which has +been fought during the century, and come out of it victorious, and with +renewed strength, must, it is felt, be a constitution suited for all +nations who aspire to freedom. There is nothing therefore surprising in +the fact that Federalism is supposed to be the panacea for all social +evils, and all political perplexities, or that it should be thrust upon +our attention as the device for bringing England and her colonies into +closer connection, and (not perhaps quite consistently) for relaxing the +connection and terminating the feud between England and Ireland. We +should do well, therefore, to recollect what is the true nature of +Federalism. Federal government, whatever be its merits, is a mere +arrangement for the distribution of political power. It is an +arrangement which requires for its application certain well-defined +conditions.[32] + +There must, in the first place, exist a body of countries; such, for +example, as the cantons of Switzerland, or the colonies of America, or +the provinces of Canada, so closely connected by locality, by history, +by race, or the like, as to be capable of bearing in the eyes of their +inhabitants an impress of common nationality. There must, in the second +place, be found among the people of the countries which it is proposed +to unite in Federal union, a very peculiar state of sentiment. They must +desire union; they must not desire unity. Federalism, in short, is in +its nature a scheme for bringing together into closer connection a set +of states, each of which desires, whilst retaining its individuality, to +form together with its neighbours one nation. It is not, at any rate as +it has hitherto been applied, a plan for disuniting the parts of a +united state. It may possibly be capable of this application; +experience, however, gives no guidance on this point,[33] and loyalty to +the central government is to the working of a Federal system as +necessary as loyalty on the part of individual citizens to their own +separate State. When, therefore, it is suggested that Federalism may +establish a satisfactory relation between England and Ireland, a doubt +naturally suggests itself whether the United Kingdom presents the +conditions necessary for the success of the Federal experiment. Whether +in the case of two countries, of which the one has no desire for State +rights and the other has no desire for union, the bases of a Federal +scheme are not wanting, is an inquiry which deserves consideration. +Politicians, however, may reject references to abstract theory, and the +best way of testing the application of Federalism to the relations +between England and Ireland, is to make clear to ourselves what are the +aims proposed to himself by a genuine Home Ruler, and then trace in +outline the characteristics of Federalism, and consider how the Federal +system would work in reference to the interests of England. + +[Sidenote: Aim of Home Rule.] + +"My plan of Home Rule for Ireland," writes an eminent Home Ruler, "would +establish between Ireland and the Imperial Parliament the same relations +in principle that exist between a State of the American Union and the +Federal Government, or between any State of the Dominion of Canada and +that Central Canadian Parliament which meets in Ottawa." + +This statement exhibits both laxity of language and laxity of thought, +but it gives a definition of the objects proposed to himself by a +genuine Home Ruler which is sufficiently definite, for the ends of my +argument. Home Rule is, for our present purpose, Federalism. We may +therefore, assume that it involves the adoption throughout the present +United Kingdom of a constitution in principle, though not in detail, +like that of the United States. The United Kingdom would, if Mr. +McCarthy's proposals were adopted, be transformed into a confederacy; +the different States, say Great Britain and Ireland, or England, +Scotland, and Ireland, would bear to the whole union the same relation +which Virginia and New York bear to the United States; they would bear +towards each other the same relation which Virginia bears to New York, +or which they both bear towards Massachusetts. Such a constitution has, +it must be at once admitted, no necessary connection with Republicanism. +The King or Queen of England for the time being would occupy the +position of a hereditary president; this arrangement would, as Mr. Butt +seems to have perceived, increase rather than diminish the authority of +the Crown. It must, on the other hand, be noted that Federalism +necessarily involves the formation of a new constitution, not for +Ireland only, but for the whole of the United Kingdom. It is necessary +to insist upon this point. For half the fallacies of the arguments for +Home Rule rest upon the idea that Home Rule is a matter affecting +Ireland alone. 'Irish Federalism,' the title of a pamphlet by Mr. Butt, +is a term involving something like self-contradiction. The misnomer is +curious and full of instruction. + +Whoever wishes to understand the relation of Federalism to the English +Constitution and to English interests must give some attention to the +nature of a Federal Union. + +[Sidenote: Characteristics of Federalism.] + +A Federal constitution must, from its very nature, be marked by the +following characteristics. + +It must, at any rate in modern days, be a written constitution, for its +very foundation is the "Federal pact" or contract; the constitution must +define with more or less precision the respective powers of the central +government, and of the State governments of the central legislature and +of the local legislatures; it must provide some means (e.g., reference +to a popular vote) for bringing into play that ultimate sovereign power +which is able to modify or reform the constitution itself; it must +provide some arbiter, be it Council, Court, or Crown, with authority to +decide whether the Federal pact has been observed; it must institute +some means by which the principles of the constitution may be upheld, +and the decrees of the arbiter or Court be enforced against the +resistance (if need be) of one or more of the separate States. These are +not the accidents but the essential features of any Federal +constitution; and are found under the constitution of the Canadian +Dominion and of the Swiss Confederacy, no less than under the +constitution of the United States. They all depend on the simple, but +often neglected fact, that a Federal constitution implies an elaborate +distribution and definition of political powers; that it is from its +very nature a compromise between the claims of rival authorities, the +Confederacy and the States, and that behind all the mechanism and +artifices of the constitution there lies, however artfully concealed, +some sovereign power which must have the means both to support the +principles of the constitution and, when occasion requires, to modify +its terms. Hence almost of necessity flow some further results. Under a +federation the law of the land must be divided into constitutional laws +(or, in other words, articles of the constitution), which can be +changed, if at all, only with special difficulty, say by an appeal to +the popular vote or by a constituent assembly, and ordinary laws which +may be changed by the central Congress or by the separate assemblies of +the States. The powers both of the central Parliament and of the local +parliaments, depending as they do upon the constitutional compact, must +be limited. Neither the National Assembly of Switzerland nor the +Congress of the United States have anything like the sovereign power of +the British Parliament: the same thing is obviously true of the Cantonal +or State Assemblies. Such are, under one form or another, the essential +characteristics of a Federal Government. A confederation of which +England and Ireland formed a part would further of necessity exhibit a +feature not to be found in the United States. The authority of the +Confederacy would in reality mean the power of one State--namely, Great +Britain. No artificial distribution of the whole country into separate +States would get rid of a fact depending upon laws or facts of nature +beyond the reach of constitutional arrangements. + +[Sidenote: Advantages of Federalism to England.] + +It is now possible to perceive pretty clearly the relation of Federalism +to British or English interests. It would, as compared with the +independence of Ireland, present three advantages. There would not be +the same obvious and patent failure in the efforts of British +statesmanship to unite all the British isles into one country; the +continuity of English history would be to a certain extent preserved; +the break with the past would be lessened. The Federal Union might, in +the eyes of foreign powers, be simply the United Kingdom under another +form. The loss, again, to England in material resources would be +somewhat less than that involved in separation. Ireland might possibly +continue to contribute her share to the Federal Exchequer, though a +critic who reflects upon the expectations expressed by Home Rulers of +benefit to Ireland from the expenditure of Irish taxes on Irish objects, +will wonder how, unless the taxation of a poverty-stricken country is to +be greatly increased, the Irish people could support the expense both of +the central and of the local governments. American experience hardly +justifies the notion that Federalism is an economical form of +Government. It would, and this is no small advantage, make it possible +to guarantee, at any-rate in appearance, that the executive and +legislative authority of the Irish Government should be exercised with +due regard to justice. The Federal compact might, and probably would, +contain articles which forbade any State Government or legislature to +suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, to bestow political privileges upon any +church, to pass laws which infringe the obligation of contracts, to +deprive any man of his property without due compensation. The Ten +Commandments, in short, and the obvious applications thereof, might be +embodied in the fundamental law of the land. Federalism would at lowest +preserve a formal respect for justice, and if the system worked +efficiently, would protect individuals and minorities from gross +oppression at the hands of the Irish State Government. + +These are the benefits of Home Rule to Great Britain. Let us now examine +what are the evils to Great Britain of the proposed constitutional +revolution. For whoever either will meditate for a short time on the +nature of Federalism, or will examine the mode in which the constitution +of the United States--the most successful federation which the world has +seen--actually works, will soon perceive that what is miscalled "Irish +Federalism" is in reality "British Federalism," and amounts, as I am +forced to reiterate again and again, to a proposal for changing the +whole constitution of the United Kingdom It is, in fact, the most +"revolutionary" proposal, if the word "revolutionary" be used in its +strict sense, which has ever been submitted to an English Parliament, +the abolition of the House of Lords, the disestablishment of the +Church, the abolition of the monarchy, might leave the English +constitution far less essentially changed than would the adoption of +Federalism even in that apparently moderate form in which it was +presented by Mr. Butt to the consideration of the English public. + +[Sidenote: Disadvantages of Federalism to England.] + +The definite disadvantages to England of the proposed revolution may be +summed up under three heads:--First, the sovereignty of the Imperial +Parliament would be destroyed and all English constitutional +arrangements would be dislocated; secondly, the power of Great Britain +would be diminished; thirdly, the chance of further disagreement with +Ireland would certainly not be diminished, and would probably be +increased. + +_First._--Under all the formality, the antiquarianism, the shams of the +British constitution, there lies latent an element of power which has +been the true source of its life and growth. This secret source of +strength is the absolute omnipotence,[34] the sovereignty, of +Parliament. As to the mode in which King, Lords, and Commons were to +divide the sovereign power between themselves there have been at +different times disputes leading to civil war; but that Parliament--that +is, the Crown, the Peers, and the Commons acting together--is absolutely +supreme, has never been doubted. Here constitutional theory and +constitutional practice are for once at one. Hence, it has been well +said by the acutest of foreign critics that the merit of the English +constitution is that it is no constitution at all. The distinction +between fundamental articles of the constitution and laws, between +statutes which can only be touched (if at all) by a constituent +assembly, and statutes which can be repealed by an ordinary +Parliament--the whole apparatus, in short, of artificial +constitutionalism--is utterly unknown to Englishmen. Thus freedom has in +England been found compatible at crises of danger with an energy of +action generally supposed to be peculiar to despotism. The source of +strength is, in fact, in each case the same. The sovereignty of +Parliament is like the sovereignty of the Czar. It is like all +sovereignty at bottom, nothing else but unlimited power; and, unlike +some other forms of sovereignty, can be at once put in force by the +ordinary means of law. This is the one great advantage of our +constitution over that of the United States. In America, every ordinary +authority throughout the Union is hampered by constitutional +restrictions; legislation must be slow, because the change of any +constitutional rule is impeded by endless difficulties. The vigour which +is wanting to Congress, is indeed to a certain extent to be found in the +extensive executive power left in the hands of the President; but it +takes little acuteness to perceive that in point of pliability, power of +development, freedom of action, English constitutionalism far excels +the Federalism of the United States. Nor is it less obvious that the +very qualities in which the English constitution excels that of the +United States are essential to the maintenance by England of the British +Empire. Home Rulers, whether they know it or not, touch the mainspring +of the British constitution. For from the moment that Great Britain +becomes part of a federation, the omnipotence of Parliament is gone. The +Federal Congress might be called by the name of the Imperial Parliament. +It might possibly be made up of the same elements, be elected by the +same electors, and even in the main consist of the very same persons as +the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom; but its nature would be +changed, and its power would be limited on all sides. It might deal with +Imperial expenditure, with foreign affairs, with peace and war, with +other matters placed within its competence; on every other point the +British Congress would, like the American Congress, be powerless. Nor +would all the powers taken from the Congress be necessarily given to the +local assemblies. Every analogy points the other way. If the example of +the United States is to be followed, articles of the constitution would +limit the power both of the Imperial Congress and of the local +representative assemblies. This limitation of authority could not be +measured by what appears on the face of the constitution. Some council, +tribunal, or other arbiter--let us, for the sake of simplicity, call it +the Federal Court--would have authority to determine whether a law was +or was not constitutional, or, in other words, whether it was or was +not a law. Let no one fancy that the restraint placed on the power of +ordinary legislation by the authority of a Federal Court; which alone +can interpret the constitution, is a mere form which has no practical +effect. The history of the United States is on this point decisive. De +Tocqueville, Story, and Kent are far safer and better instructed guides +than authors who "cannot conceive how any conflict of authority could +arise which could not be easily settled by argument, by conference, by +gradual experience;" and who seem to hold that to deny the existence of +a difficulty is the same thing as providing for its removal The +following are a few of the instances in which the American judiciary +have in fact determined the limits which bound the powers, either of +Congress or of the State legislatures. The judiciary have ruled that a +State is liable to be sued in the Federal Courts; that Congress has +authority to incorporate a bank; that a tax imposed by Congress was an +indirect tax, and therefore valid; that the control of the militia +really and truly belongs to Congress, and not, as in effect contended by +Connecticut and Massachusetts, to the governors of the separate States. +The Federal judiciary have determined the limits to their own +jurisdiction and to that of the State Courts. The judiciary have +pronounced one law after another invalid, as contrary to some article of +the constitution--e.g., either by being tainted with the vice of _ex +post facto_ legislation, or by impairing the obligation of contracts. +These are a few samples of the mode in which a Federal Court limits all +legislative authority. If any one wishes to see the extent to which the +power of such a Court has gone in fact, he should study the decisions on +the Legal Tender Act, which all but overset or nullified the financial +legislation of Congress during the War of Secession. If he wishes to see +the effect of applying the constitution of the United States, or +anything like that constitution, to Great Britain and Ireland, he should +consider what is implied in the undoubted fact that the Land Act of 1870 +and the Land Act of 1881 would, whether passed by the central or by any +local legislature under such a constitution, be at once treated as void, +as impairing the obligation of contracts. If I am told that we might +adopt Federalism without adopting the details of the American +constitution, my reply is, not only that the remark comes awkwardly from +innovators who wish to place Ireland in the position of Massachusetts, +but that the very gist of my argument is that the existence of some +arbiter (whether it be named Crown, Council, or Court), who may decide +whether the constitution has or has not been violated, is of the essence +of Federalism, while the existence of such an arbiter absolutely +destroys the sovereignty of Parliament. Nor do the inferences to be +drawn from the action of the Federal Court, and a study of the American +constitution as it actually exists, end here. In the decisions of the +Court we may trace the rise of question after question--that is, of +conflict after conflict--as to the respective rights of the Federation +and the individual States. From the history and from the immobility of +the constitution, we may perceive the extent to which the existence of a +Federal pact checks change, or, in other words, reform. Every +institution which can lay claim to be based upon an organic law acquires +a sort of sacredness. Under a system of Federalism, the Crown, the House +of Peers, the Imperial Parliament itself, when transformed into a +Federal Assembly, would be almost beyond the reach of change, reform, or +abolition. Nor is it the Legislature of Great Britain alone which would +suffer a fundamental change. The relations between the Executive and the +country would undergo immense modification. The authority of the Crown +might be enhanced by the establishment of a Federal Union. The King +would become, in a very special sense, the representative of national or +Imperial unity, and the weakening of Parliament might lead to the +strengthening of the monarch. However this might be, it has, it is +submitted, been now shown that Federalism would dislocate every English +constitutional arrangement. + +_Secondly._--The changes necessitated by Federalism would all tend to +weaken the power of Great Britain. That this is so has been already to a +great degree established, in considering the mode in which Federalism +destroys the sovereignty of Parliament. But a system of Federalism would +assuredly weaken the Government quite as much as the Legislature. The +Executive, as the organ of the Federal Union, would be hampered by new +conditions utterly unknown to an English Ministry. The language of +Federalists exhibits a curious and ominous silence or ambiguity as to +the disposal of the armed forces. Is the army to be a British army, with +authority at the will of the Federal Government to enter every part of +the new Union, or is Ireland to have an independent force of her own? +This, again--and every specific criticism is open to the same +retort--may be called a detail, but it is a detail which touches the +root of the whole matter. If the Federal, that is in effect the English, +Government is to retain the same control over the whole army as at +present--if Ireland is not to have a local force under the control of +local authorities--then the language as to Irish independence used by +Irish Nationalists is singularly misleading. If, on the other hand, +order is to be maintained, or not maintained, by a native army under the +guidance of Irish commanders, then it passes the wit of man to see by +what means the rights of the central government are to be enforced in +any case of disagreement between the Imperial and the Irish Parliament. +With the memory of the Irish volunteers before his mind, an historian, +such, for example, as Mr. McCarthy, will hardly assert that the +difficulty raised is one of which he cannot conceive the existence. For +my part, I heartily join in the admiration he, no doubt, feels for the +patriots of 1782, but no man in his senses will maintain that the moral +of that year is that a local Irish army can, under no circumstances, +prove an embarrassment to the central Government. The general tone, +even more than the precise language of Irish Federalists, all but +forbids the supposition that they are prepared to secure the supremacy +of the Federal Government by giving it the sole control of the only +armed force which is to exist in any part of the Union. They probably +hope that some sort of compromise may be found with regard to a matter +in which, as theory and experience alike prove, compromise is all but +impossible. Under certain circumstances, and in certain cases, and +subject to certain conditions, the use of the armed force throughout +Great Britain and Ireland is, we may suppose, to be left in the hands of +the Federal Executive; under other circumstances, and under other +conditions, the local forces are probably to be controlled by the local +or State Government. Whether such an arrangement would continue in +working order for a year, is more than doubtful. Assume, however, that +somehow it could be got to work, the fact still remains that a scheme, +intended to secure local liberty, would certainly ensure Imperial +weakness. The need, moreover, for bestowing some element of strength on +a Federal Executive as a counterpoise to its many elements of weakness +leads almost of necessity to a result which has scarcely received due +notice. The executive authority must be placed beyond the control of a +representative assembly. Neither in the United States, nor in +Switzerland, nor in the German Empire, can the Federal administration be +displaced by the vote of an assembly. Federalism is in effect +incompatible with Parliamentary government as practised in England. The +Canadian Ministry, it may be urged, can be changed at the will of the +Dominion Parliament, and the common Ministry of Austria-Hungary is +responsible to the Delegations. This is true; but these exceptions are +precisely of the class which prove the rule which they are cited to +invalidate. The Cabinet system of the Dominion is a defect in the +Canadian Constitution, and could not work were not Canada, by its +position as a dependency, under the guidance of a power beyond the reach +of the Dominion Parliament. What may be the real responsibility to the +Delegations of the common ministry of Austria-Hungary, admits of a good +deal of doubt. No one, who will not be deceived by words, believes the +responsibility to be at all like the liability of Mr. Gladstone or Lord +Salisbury to be dismissed from office by a vote of the House of Commons. +The Emperor-King is, as regards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the +permanent and unchangeable head of the State. Turn the United Kingdom +into a Federal State, and Parliamentary Government, as Englishmen now +know it, is at an end. This may or may not be an evil, but it is a +revolution which ought to give pause to innovators who deem it a +slighter danger to innovate on the Act of Union than to remodel the +procedure of the House of Commons. + +The central Government would again, merely from that division of powers +which is of the essence of Federalism, be as feeble against foreign +aggression as against local resistance. Home Rule, it is constantly +said, has at least this advantage, as compared with Irish independence, +that it prevents any alliance between Ireland and a foreign enemy. This +gain might turn out rather nominal than real. Neither the United States +nor France could, of course, send an Embassy to any State comprised +within the British Union; but, if war impended, they might and would +attempt to gain the favour of the Irish Ministry, or the Irish party who +controlled the Irish Parliament, or exercised the authority of the local +Government of Ireland. Suppose that when war was about to be proclaimed +between the British Federation and France, the Irish Parliament objected +to hostilities with the French Republic. Can it be denied that the local +Parliament and the local executive could, by protests, by action, or +even by inaction, give aid or comfort to the foreign enemy? The local +legislature would, in the supposed case, be aided by a minority of the +central Parliament or Congress. Obstruction would go hand in hand with +sedition. Loyalty to the Union was strong throughout the Northern States +during the War of Secession; but the tale used certainly to be told that +had Meade been defeated at Gettysburg, the leaders of the New York +democracy would have attempted "to carry the State out of the Union." +Moreover, Great Britain would perhaps find it easier to control the +action of an independent than of a confederated Ireland. Blockades and +embargoes are, as already pointed out, modes of persuasion applicable +to foreigners, but inapplicable to citizens; the Government of the Union +found it harder to check the latent disloyalty of South Carolina than it +would have found it to deal with the open enmity of Canada. This topic +is too odious and too far removed from the realm of practical politics, +to need more than the allusion required for the completeness of my +argument. + +Federalism, in short, would mean the weakness of Great Britain, both at +home and abroad. As the head of a Confederacy, England, as the head also +of the British Empire, would meet undiminished responsibilities with +greatly diminished power. + +_Thirdly._--Federalism is at least as likely to stereotype and increase +the causes of division between England and Ireland as to remove them. + +A Federal Government is, of all constitutions, the most artificial. If +such a government is to be worked with anything like success, there must +exist among the citizens of the confederacy a spirit of genuine loyalty +to the Union. The "Unitarian" feeling of the people must distinctly +predominate over the sentiment in favour of "State rights." To require +this is to require a good deal more than the mere general submission to +the Government which is requisite for the prosperity of every State, +whatever be the nature of its polity. In a Federation every citizen is +influenced by a double allegiance. He owes fealty to the central +Government; he owes fealty also to his Canton or State. National +allegiance and local allegiance divide and perplex the feelings even of +loyal citizens. Unless the national sentiment predominate, the +Federation will go to pieces at any of those crises when the interest or +wishes of any of the States conflict with the interest or wishes of the +Union. So keen an observer and profound a critic as De Tocqueville +believed that both the American and the Swiss Federations would make +shipwreck on this rock. He was mistaken; he did not allow for the rapid +development of national sentiment. But his error was pardonable. The +leaders of the Sonderbund did prefer the interest of Lucerne to the +unity of Switzerland. Lee and Jackson were disloyal to the Union, +because they were loyal to Virginia. Leading officers of the United +States army, soldiers educated at Westpoint, trained the armies of the +Confederates. They were men of unblemished honour; they were, some of +them, not originally zealous in the cause of secession, but they +believed that their duty to their State--to Virginia, to South Carolina, +or to Georgia--was paramount over their duty to the Government at +Washington. If Virginia had stood by the Union, General Lee might, in +all probability, have been the conqueror of the Confederate States, of +which he was the hero. Ireland has had far graver causes for +disaffection towards the English Government than any of the reasons +alleged for the secession of Virginia; but Irish officers and Irish +soldiers have always been perfectly loyal to England. The reason of the +difference is obvious; the officers of the English army have never been +distracted by the difficulties of divided allegiance. Make Ireland one +of the States of a Confederacy, and these difficulties will at once +arise. Irish officers and Irish soldiers, members of the Irish +State--paid by and to a certain extent under the command of the Irish +Government--can hardly be blamed if in times of civil differences, +leading it may be to civil war, they should feel more loyalty to their +State than to the Union. This Union, be it remembered, would in such a +case be nothing but Great Britain under a new and less impressive title. + +The existence and nature of the Federal bond is calculated to supply +both the causes and occasions of such differences. + +Home Rulers, it is clear, form already most exaggerated hopes of the +benefits to be conferred on Ireland by Home Rule; and, further, in their +own minds (naturally enough) confound Federalism with national +independence. + +"Give Ireland," writes Mr. Finch,[35] "the management of her own +affairs, and you will see called into her service the ablest and most +capable of her sons; while, as things now stand, the intellect of +Ireland is shut out from all share in the administration. With careers +at home worthy of the best and ablest of the people, much of the wealth +which is now drained off from Ireland without any return, will be +expended in developing the industrial resources of the country; +industry will revive, and with the revival of industry will come +employment for the people. 'It is the difficulty of living by wages in +Ireland,' says Sir G.C. Lewis, 'which makes every man look to the land +for maintenance.' With employment for the people, half the difficulty of +the land question will be solved. If, then, we wish to promote the moral +and material welfare of the Irish people, let us make them masters of +their own affairs." + +"I have indicated what I believe," writes Mr. O'Neill Daunt,[36] "to be +the radical disease of Ireland: the want of a domestic legislature racy +of the soil, and acting in harmony with the national sentiment. God has +created Ireland with the needs of a separate nation, and with the needs +are associated the rights. 'Our patent to be a State, not a shire,' said +Goold in 1799, 'comes direct from Heaven. The Almighty has in majestic +characters signed the great charter of our independence. The great +Creator of the world has given our beloved country the gigantic outlines +of a kingdom.' + +"If Ireland had been left the unfettered use of the natural materials of +wealth in her soil and in her people, and of the facilities of internal +and external commerce supplied by her physical configuration and her +geographical position--if her interests were protected by a Parliament +sitting in her capital, securing the expenditure at home of her annual +revenue, both public and private, rendering impossible that destructive +haemorrhage of her income by which she is impoverished, aiding the +development of her industries, and resisting all aggression on her +commercial and political rights--in a word, if the Irish Constitution +had not been treacherously undermined and overthrown, we should now have +been the best support of the Empire, instead of being its scandal and +its weakness." + +Politicians who write thus expect far more from national independence +than nationality itself can give. More than fifty years have elapsed +since Spain expelled the foreign invader; but Spain has not yet +succeeded in expelling ignorance, prejudice, superstition, or +oppression. But whatever be the miracles of nationality, Ireland would +not, under Federalism, be a nation. Rhode Island has all the freedom +demanded for his country by an eminent Home Ruler, whose expressions I +have cited. He surely does not consider the inhabitants of Rhode Island +to be a nation. + +Whatever else Home Rule might give to Ireland, one gift it assuredly +would not bring with it. It would not endow the country with wealth. To +Irish enthusiasm and patriotism illusions on this matter are pardonable. +In the English advocate of Home Rule they are unpardonable. Ireland is, +and must, under any form of government conceivable, for a length of time +remain a poor country. Capital knows nothing of patriotism or sentiment. +Commerce has no partiality for the masses. Credit cherishes no trust +towards the people. The one prediction which we may make with confidence +is that a measure of Home Rule would not increase Irish capital, and +would shake Irish credit. The rumour of Home Rule has already, it is +said, disturbed the course of business in Ireland. From the nature of +things, then, the establishment of Federalism would lead to bitter +disappointment. The country would not enjoy the dignity of independence; +it would not enjoy the comfort of wealth. Every Irishman would feel that +he had been cheated of his hopes, and this not because he is an +Irishman, but because he is a man. It is human to expect far more from +even the most beneficial of revolutions than any political change can +bring. The unity of Italy was well worth all the price it cost. The +unity of Germany gave intense gratification to natural feelings of +national pride. Yet there are probably many even in the Italian Kingdom +who sigh for the light taxes of the Bourbon or Papal rule, and Germans +who glory in the greatness of the Empire flee by thousands to the United +States that they may escape the burden of conscription. The +disappointment which naturally attends a great change would in the case +of Ireland be specially bitter. To what cause would the disappointment +be attributed? The answer is easy to find. If taxation increased--as it +probably would; if wealth did not increase--as it certainly would not; +if the sense of semi-independence did not produce the hope, the energy, +the new life, the regeneration which enthusiasts consider to be the +natural result of nationality--if anything, in short, failed to go +according to the hopes of men who had formed hopes which a miracle +itself could hardly satisfy--the blame for the non-fulfilment of +groundless anticipations would rest upon the Confederacy--that is in +other words, upon England. To suppose this, is not to attribute special +unreasonableness to Irishmen. If Italy had been forced to accept, +instead of her longed-for independence, the local self-government which +might be conceded to the State of an Austrian Federation, we may be +quite sure that the Grist Tax, the Sicilian Banditti, the intrigues of +France in Tunis, the perversity of the Pope, the poverty of Italian +workmen, the factiousness of Italian politicians, every evil, in short, +real or imaginary, under which Italy now suffers, or has suffered since +1870--would have been attributed to her connection with a Union presided +over by the Austrian Emperor. National independence, like every other +form of independence, has at least this merit, that it compels men to +take their fate into their own hands, and to feel that they themselves +or the circumstances of the world are the causes of their misfortunes. +Semi-independence makes it easy for men to attribute every mishap to the +absence of absolute freedom. + +If the existence of a Federal constitution would of itself supply the +cause for discontent, it is of the very nature of such a constitution to +supply the occasions of dispute. Nothing can prevent the rise of burning +questions about Federal and State rights. Is nullification or secession, +or the refusal to pay Federal taxes a State right? If these questions +arise, by whom are they to be settled? Suppose they are referred to a +Federal Court, say the Privy Council, is it reasonable to fancy that +Irishmen or Englishmen, for that matter, will acquiesce in the decision +of grave political issues (say the right of the Federal Government to +proclaim martial law at Dublin, or the validity of the Land Act) by any +tribunal? For when political issues are referred to the decision of a +Court the difficulty is great of enlisting public opinion in favour of +its decrees. The theory of the constitution and the expectation of the +people is that references to the judges will be events of rare +occurrence, and that the Bench, when it acts at all, will act only as +interpreter of the constitutional pact. Things are certain to turn out +far otherwise. The intervention of the tribunals will in one form or +another be constantly evoked, and will be evoked to determine the most +burning questions of the day. The Constitution of the United States +would be unintelligible without reference to a long line of determined +cases; its principles are to be found quite as much in the decisions of +the Supreme Court as in its Articles. Swiss Constitutionalists have +greatly increased as years have gone on the originally limited powers of +the Federal tribunal. The statesmen who drafted the Act constituting the +Canadian Dominion fancied they could in effect avoid the necessity for +judicial interpretation, but a long series of reports proves the +futility of their expectation. Each day increases the mass, and it must +be added the importance, of the judgments by which the Privy Council +determines questions of constitutional law for the Colonies. Moreover, +even laymen soon perceive that interpretation means legislation. It is +technically correct to say that the Supreme Court of the United States +acts only as interpreter of the Constitution, but we must not be +deceived by fictions. The Supreme Court has legislated as truly, and +perhaps more effectively than Congress. It has achieved, and from the +nature of things was compelled to achieve, a feat forbidden to Congress; +it has added to or enlarged the Articles of the Constitution. The good +fortune of the United States gave to them in Judge Marshall a profound +and statesmanlike lawyer, and the judgments of the great Chief Justice +have built up the existing Constitution. He may be counted, if not among +its founders, at any rate as its main architect. In this instance +judicial authority was combined with political wisdom, and Marshall's +opinion was, it is said, rejected by the Court in but two cases, and had +it in these instances been followed, would have improved the +Constitution. Unfortunately, while one may often secure the fairness one +cannot ensure the wisdom of the Bench. Judges err; a final Court of +Appeal must often give decisions which are or are supposed to be +erroneous, i.e., not a just deduction from the facts and principles +which the Court is called upon to consider. No historian will, it is +likely, now defend the doctrine of the House of Lords about marriage +laid down in _Reg._ v. _Millis_. Competent authorities question some of +the most important ecclesiastical judgments given by the Judicial +Committee of the Privy Council. The decision in the _Dred Scott Case_, +whether right or wrong, did not approve itself to eminent lawyers in the +United States. One of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the _Legal +Tender Cases_ must have been wrong; whether the last was sound is open +to debate. It is when a Court gives what is thought to be an erroneous +decision on matters exciting the feelings of large classes that the +difficulty of obtaining acquiescence in its judgments is palpable. The +judges decided, and it is quite possible decided rightly, that Ship +Money was a legal exaction, and that the Crown's dispensing power was +authorized by law. Popular opinion branded the judges as sycophants and +traitors. Chief Justice Taney and his colleagues decided in effect, and +from a legal point of view may have been right in deciding, that slavery +was recognised by the Constitution of the United States. Their decision +was denounced by the best men in the Union as infamous. The Privy +Council have laid down doctrines on matters of ritual which are held to +be erroneous by a large body of the clergy, and Ritualists have gone to +prison rather than treat the judgment of the Privy Council as of moral +validity. Clergymen are not perhaps the most reasonable of mankind, but +they are not more unreasonable than political enthusiasts. How then is +it possible to expect that a Federal tribunal would command an obedience +not yielded willingly to the laws of the Imperial Parliament? +Englishmen, indeed, might, it is possible, acquiesce in the ruling of +Federal judges, and this for two reasons: they are a legally-minded +nation; and (what is of far more consequence) a Federal Court must +represent in the main the opinions of the Federal Government--that is, +of Great Britain. But it is idle to suppose that Mr. Parnell and Mr. +Parnell's followers would find it easier to respect an Imperial or +Federal tribunal than to bow to the will of the Imperial Parliament. + +Home Rulers would, moreover, soon discover a reason for resistance to +the Federal Court or the Federal Government, which from their point of +view would be a perfectly valid reason. The Federal Government would, in +effect, be the Government of England; the Federal Court would in effect +be a Court appointed by the English Government. In a Confederacy where +there are many States, the Government of the Federation cannot be +identified with even the most powerful of the States; it were ridiculous +to assert that the Government at Washington is only the Government of +New York under another name. Where a Confederacy consists in reality, if +not in name, of two States only, of which the one has at least four or +five times the power of the other, the authority of the Confederacy +means the authority of the powerful State. "Irish Federalism," if in +reality established, would soon generate a demand from Ireland, not +unreasonable in itself, under the circumstances of the case, that the +whole British Empire should be turned into a Confederacy, under the +guidance of a general Congress. Thus alone could Ireland become a real +State, the member of a genuine Confederation. Hence arises a new danger. +Apply Federalism to Ireland and you immediately provoke demands for +autonomy in other parts of the United Kingdom, and for constitutional +changes in other parts of the British Empire. Federalism, which in other +lands has been a step towards Union, would, it is likely enough, be in +our case the first stage towards a dissolution of the United Kingdom +into separate States, and hence towards the breaking-up of the British +Empire. This is no future or imaginary peril; the mere proposal of Home +Rule, under something like a Federal form, has already made it an +immediate and pressing danger. Sir Gavan Duffy, by far the ablest among +the Irish advocates of Home Rule, predicts that before ten years have +elapsed there will be a Federation of the Empire.[37] A majority of +Scotch electors support the policy of Mr. Gladstone, and forthwith a +most respectable Scotch periodical puts forward a plan of Home Rule for +Scotland. Canon MacColl already suggests that we should make tentatively +an experiment capable of development into a permanent system on the +lines of the American Constitution, and make it not only in Ireland, but +also perhaps gradually in Scotland, and even in Wales.[38] It is +unnecessary to discuss Canon MacColl's argument at length. When he +tells his readers that "the Constitution which Mr. Gladstone desires to +create in Ireland is modelled on the system existing in the great +colonies of the Empire; there are certain variations and some novelties +in the Irish scheme, but these are the lines on which it is drawn;" he +ventures a statement on which, as a lawyer, I need make but one comment. +It is a statement as erroneous and misleading as can be any assertion +made in good faith by a writer who must be presumed to have studied the +measure of which he is speaking. When the same authority asks why should +a system which imparts strength to America, to Austria, and to Germany, +disintegrate and ruin the British Empire, he raises an inquiry which +does not admit of an answer, since it assumes the identity of things +which are radically different. The system which may or may not impart +strength to Austria is no more the system which imparts strength to +America, than the system which imparts strength to England is the same +as the system which does or does not impart strength to Russia. To lump +under one head every policy which can by any straining of the terms be +brought under the heads of "Federalism" or "Home Rule," is neither more +nor less absurd than to classify together every Constitution which can +be called a monarchy. + +But while I write these pages a more significant indication of this +danger has appeared. Mr. Gladstone's own method of interpreting his own +past utterances makes it the duty of his critics to weigh well not only +his direct statements, but his suggestions; and there is, I think, no +possible unfairness in construing the language of his pamphlet on the +Irish Question as an intimation that he already entertains, if he does +not favour, the idea of applying the Federal principle to Scotland and +to Wales.[39] Federalism is the solvent which, if applied to one part of +the United Kingdom, will undo the work not only of Pitt, but of Somers, +of Henry VIII., and of Edward I. Meanwhile, the one prediction which may +be made with absolute confidence is that Federalism would not generate +that goodwill between England and Ireland which, could it be produced, +would, in my judgment at least, be an adequate compensation even for the +evils and the inconveniences of the Federal system. + +To the view of Federalism here maintained there exist one or two +objections, so obvious that without some reference to them my argument +would lack completeness. + +Federalism, it is urged, has succeeded in Switzerland and in America; it +may, therefore, succeed in the United Kingdom. + +If the general drift of my argument does not sufficiently answer this +objection, two special replies lie near at hand. In the case both of +Switzerland and of America, a Federal Constitution supplied the means by +which States, conscious of a common national feeling, have approached to +political unity. It were a rash inference from this fact, that when two +parts of one nation are found (as must be asserted by any Home Ruler) +not to be animated by a common feeling of nationality, a Federal +Constitution is the proper means by which to keep them in union. The +more natural deduction from the general history of Federalism is, that a +confederation is an imperfect political union, transitory in its nature, +and tending either to pass into one really united State, or to break up +into the different States which compose the Federation. + +If, again, the example either of America or of Switzerland is to teach +us anything worth knowing, the history of those countries must be read +as a whole. It will then be seen that the two most successful +confederacies in the world have been kept together only by the decisive +triumph through force of arms of the central power over real or alleged +State rights. General Dufour in Switzerland, General Grant and General +Sherman in America, were the true interpreters and preservers of the +constitutional pact. This undoubted fact hardly suits the theories of +Irish Federalists. + +Nor ought we to stop at this point. Citizens of the Union filled with +justifiable pride at the success of the American Constitution assume +that a Federal Government is in itself absolutely the best form of +government, that in any country where it can be adopted it must be an +improvement on the existing institutions of the land, and that as +compared with the constitutional monarchy of England federalism +exhibits no special faults from which English constitutionalism is free. +This assumption is perfectly natural; it resembles that absolute faith +in the virtues of the British Constitution which reached its culminating +point when Burke's intimate friend and pupil, Gilbert Elliott, himself +no mean statesman, went to Corsica to establish a miniature copy of +English Parliamentary institutions. But in each case a faith which is +natural will also be pronounced by any candid judge to be unfounded. +Federalism has in its very essence, and even as it exists in America, at +least two special faults. It distracts the allegiance of citizens, and +what is even more to the present point, it does not provide sufficient +protection for the legal rights of unpopular minorities. There is not, +and never was, a word in the Articles of the Constitution forbidding +American citizens to criticise the institutions of the State. An +American Abolitionist had as much right to denounce slavery at Boston, +or for that matter at Charlestown, as an English Abolitionist had to +denounce slavery in London or Liverpool. It were ridiculous to maintain +that the right was one which either Lloyd Garrison or his disciples were +able to exercise. Mr. Godkin[40] has repeated with perfect fairness the +tale of the persecutions suffered by Prudence Crandall in Connecticut +because she chose in exercise of her legal and moral rights to educate +young women of colour. Mr. Godkin apparently draws, as I have already +pointed out, from the fact an inference--which I confess myself not well +able to follow--against all attempts to enforce an unpopular law. The +more natural conclusion is that the Federal Government was not able to +protect the rights of individuals against strong local sentiment. This +moral at any rate has an obvious application to any scheme of Federalism +for Ireland. + +The experience of Canada, again, is adduced to prove that a Federal +constitution is compatible with loyalty to the British Crown. Why should +an arrangement which produces peace, prosperity, and loyalty across the +Atlantic not be applied to Ireland? + +The answer is, that the case of Canada is as regards Federalism +irrelevant. Canada is not part of a British Federation. The Dominion as +a whole is simply a colony, standing essentially in the same relation to +England as Victoria or New South Wales. The laws of the Parliament that +meets at Ottawa need the Royal sanction, or, in other words, may be +vetoed, or rather not approved, by the English Ministry of the day. The +Act itself on which the existence of the Canadian constitution depends +is an Act of the British Parliament, and cannot be modified by any other +authority. The British Parliament is supreme in Canada as throughout the +British dominions; and Canada sends no representatives to the British +Parliament. The provinces, no doubt, which compose the Dominion are +under an Act of Parliament a Federation; but the dangers and +difficulties of Federalism are to a great extent avoided by the +supremacy of the British Crown. These difficulties, however, do arise. +If any one will study the "Letellier case," he will soon perceive that +Canada has exhibited the germ of the conflict between the central +authority of the Dominion and the "State right" of the provinces; he +will also perceive that the conflict was determined by a reference to +the English Ministry, who in effect gave judgment in favour of the +Dominion. The example of Canada suggests, if anything, that Irish +difficulties might be solved by turning Ireland into a colony without +representatives in the Imperial Parliament. + +We have now the materials for comparing, as regards the interests of +England, the effects of Irish independence with the effects of Home Rule +as Federalism. The case as between the two stands thus:-- + +The national independence of Ireland entails on England three great +evils--the deliberate surrender of the main object at which English +statesmanship has aimed for centuries, together with all the moral loss +and disgrace which such surrender entails; the loss of considerable +material resources in money, and still more in men; the incalculable +evil of the existence in the neighbourhood of Great Britain of a new, a +foreign, and, possibly, a hostile State. For these evils there are, +indeed, to be found two real though inadequate compensations--namely, +the probability that loss of territory might restore to England a unity +and consistency of action equivalent to an increase of strength, and the +possibility that separation might be the first step towards gaining the +goodwill, and ultimately the alliance of Ireland. It is, however, hardly +worth while to calculate what might be the extent of the possible +deductions from evils which no English statesman would knowingly bring +on Great Britain. By men of all parties and of all views it is +practically conceded that England neither will nor can, except under +compulsion, assent to Irish independence. + +Federalism, on the other hand, has the appearance of a compromise. It +does not avowedly break up the unity of Great Britain and Ireland; it +does not wholly deprive England of Irish resources; it does not, +directly at least, lay Great Britain open to foreign attack. Federalism +has, however, special evils of its own. It revolutionizes the whole +Constitution of the United Kingdom; by undermining the sovereignty of +Parliament, it deprives English institutions of their elasticity, their +strength, and their life; it weakens the Executive at home, and lessens +the power of the country to resist foreign attack. The revolution which +works these changes holds out no hope of reconciliation with Ireland. An +attempt, in short, to impose on England and Scotland a constitution +which they do not want, and which is quite unsuited to the historical +traditions and to the genius of Great Britain, offers to Ireland a +constitution which Ireland is certain to dislike, which has none of the +real or imaginary charms of independence, and ensures none of the solid +benefits to be hoped for from a genuine union with England. + +If this be the true state of the case, thus much at least is +argumentatively made out: Federalism offers to England not a +constitutional compromise, but a fundamental revolution, and this +revolution, however moderate in its form or in the intention of its +advocates, does not offer that reasonable chance of reconciliation with +the mass of the Irish people which might be a compensation for a repeal +of the Union, and is as much opposed to the interests of Great Britain +as would be the national independence of Ireland. This conclusion is a +purely negative one, but it is, as far as English statesmen are +concerned, the _reductio ad impossibile_ of the case in favour of Home +Rule in so far as Home Rule takes the form of Federalism. + + * * * * * + +II. _Home Rule as Colonial Independence._--The modern Colonial policy of +England has, or is thought to have, achieved two results which impress +popular imagination:--it has relieved English statesmanship from an +unbearable burden of worry and anxiety; it has (as most people believe) +changed Colonial unfriendliness or discontent into enthusiastic or +ostentatious loyalty. Some politicians, therefore, who are anxious to +terminate the secular feud between England and Ireland, and to free +Parliament from the presence, and therefore from the obstructiveness, of +the Home Rulers, readily assume that the formula of "Colonial +independence" contains the solution of the problem how to satisfy at +once the demand of Ireland for independence and the resolution of Great +Britain to maintain the integrity of the Empire. This assumption rests +on no sure foundation, but derives such plausibility as it possesses +from the gross ignorance of the public as to the principles and habits +which govern the English State system. A mere account of the +constitutional relations existing between England and a self-governed +colony is almost equivalent to a suggestion of the reasons which forbid +the hope that the true answer to the agitation for Home Rule is to be +found in conceding to Ireland institutions like those which satisfy the +inhabitants of New South Wales or Victoria. To render such a statement +at once brief and intelligible is no easy matter, for, among all the +political arrangements devised by the ingenuity of statesmen, none can +be found more singular, more complicated, or more anomalous than the +position of combined independence and subordination occupied by the +large number of self-governing colonies which are scattered throughout +the British Empire. Victoria, which may be taken as a type of the whole +class, is, for most purposes of local and internal administration, and +for some purposes which go beyond the sphere usually assigned to local +government, an independent, self-governing community. Victoria is at the +same time, for all purposes in theory and for many purposes in fact, a +merely subordinate portion of the British Empire, and as truly subject +to the British Parliament as is Middlesex or the Isle of Wight. + +Let us try in the first place to realize--for this is the essential +matter as regards my present argument--the full extent of Victorian +independence. + +Victoria enjoys a Constitution after the British model. The Governor, +the two Houses, the Ministry, reproduce the well-known features of our +limited monarchy. The Victorian Parliament further possesses in Victoria +that character of sovereignty which the British Parliament possesses +throughout the dominions of the Crown, and is (subject, of course, to +the authority of the British Parliament itself) as supreme at Melbourne +as are Queen, Lords, and Commons at Westminster. It makes and unmakes +Cabinets; it controls the executive action of the Ministry; who, in +their turn, are the authorized advisers of that sham constitutional +monarch, the Colonial Governor. The Parliament, moreover, recognizes no +restrictions on its legislative powers; it is not, as is the Congress of +the United States, restrained within a very limited sphere of action; it +is not, as are both the Congress and the State Legislatures of the +Union, bound hand and foot by the articles of a rigid Constitution; it +is not compelled to respect any immutable maxims of legislation. Hence +the Victorian Parliament--in this resembling its creator, the British +Parliament--exercises an amount of legislative freedom unknown to most +foreign representative assemblies. It can, and does, legislate on +education, on ecclesiastical topics, on the tenure of land, on finance, +on every subject, in short, which can interest the Colony. It provides +for the raising of Colonial forces; it may levy taxes or impose duties +for the support of the Victorian administration, or for the protection +of Colonial manufactures. It is not forbidden to tax goods imported from +other parts of the Empire; it is not bound to abstain from passing _ex +post facto_ laws, to respect the sanctity of contracts, or to pay any +regard to the commercial interests of the United Kingdom. It may alter +the Constitution on which its own powers depend, and, for example, +extend the franchise or remodel the Upper House. To understand the full +extent of the authority possessed by the Victorian Parliament and the +Victorian Ministry--which is, in fact, appointed by the Parliament--it +should be noted that, while every branch of the administration (the +courts, the police, and the Colonial forces) is, as in England, more or +less directly under the influence or the control of the Cabinet, the +Colonies have, since 1862, provided for their own defence, and, except +in time of war, or peril of war, are not garrisoned by British +troops.[41] It is, therefore, no practical exaggeration to assert that +Victoria is governed by its own Executive, which is appointed by its own +Parliament, and which maintains order by means of the Victorian police, +supported, in case of need, by Victorian soldiers. An intelligent +foreigner, therefore, might reside for years in Melbourne, and conceive +that the supremacy of the British Government was little more than +nominal. In this he would be mistaken. But should he assert that, as to +all merely Colonial matters, Victoria was in practice a self-governed +and independent country, his language would not be accurate, yet his +assertion would not go very wide of the truth. + +The local independence, however, of an English colony is hardly more +noteworthy than are the devices by which a colony is retained in its +place as a subordinate portion of the British Empire, and anyone who +would understand the English Colonial system must pay hardly less +attention to the subordination than to the independence of a country +like Victoria. + +The foundation of the whole scheme is the admission of the complete and +unquestioned supremacy of the British Parliament throughout every +portion of the royal dominions. No Colonial statesman, judge, or lawyer +ever dreams of denying that Crown, Lords, and Commons can legislate for +Victoria, and that a statute of the Imperial Parliament overrides every +law or custom repugnant thereto, by whomsoever enacted, in every part of +the Crown dominions. The right, moreover, of Imperial legislation has +not fallen into disuse. Mr. Tarring[42] enumerates from sixty to seventy +Imperial statutes, extending from 7 Geo. III. c. 50 to 44 & 45 Vict. c. +69, which apply to the Colonies generally, and to this list, which might +now be lengthened, must be added a large number of statutes applying to +particular colonies. The sovereignty of Parliament, moreover, is +formally recorded in the Colonial Laws Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. cap. +63), which itself may well be termed the charter of Colonial legislative +authority. This essential dogma of parliamentary sovereignty, moreover, +is not proclaimed as a merely abstract principle--it is enforced by two +different methods. Every court, in the first place, as well in Victoria +as elsewhere throughout the British dominions, is bound to hold void, +and in fact does hold void, enactments which contravene an Imperial +statute, and from Colonial courts there is an appeal to the Privy +Council. The Colonial Governor, in the second place, though from one +point of view he is a constitutional monarch acting under the advice +given him by his Ministers, bears also another and a different +character. He is an Imperial official appointed by the Crown--that is, +by the English Cabinet, which represents the wishes of the Imperial +Parliament--and he is, as such representative of the Imperial power, +bound if possible to avert the passing of any Bill, and when he cannot +avert the passing, then to veto any Act of the Colonial Legislature, +which is disapproved of by the Home Government as opposed either to +Imperial law or to Imperial policy. Thus, a Victorian Act, even when +sanctioned by the Governor, must pass through another stage before it +finally becomes law. It must receive the assent of the Crown, or, in +other words, the assent of the English Secretary of State for the +Colonies, and unless this assent be either actually or constructively +given it does not come into force.[43] The matter to be carefully noted +is that the Crown, or in other words the English Ministry, which +represents the House of Commons, has, as far as law goes, complete +power of controlling the legislation even of colonies like Victoria. +This power is both positive and negative. If the Victorian Parliament +fails to pass some enactment necessary in the opinion of the British +Parliament for the safety of the Empire, then the Parliament at +Westminster can pass an Act for Victoria supplying the needful +provisions. If on the other hand the Victorian Legislature passes a +bill, (e.g. expelling Chinese from the Colony,) which the Home +Government representing the British Parliament deems opposed to Imperial +interests, then the Government can either direct the Governor to refuse +his assent to the law, or cause the Crown to disallow it, and thus in +any case make it void. When we add to all this that there are many +occasions, which we can here only allude to, on which a Colonial +Governor can, and does, act so as to hinder courses of action which +conflict with English interests or policy, it becomes clear enough that, +as far as constitutional arrangements can secure the reality of +sovereignty, the Imperial Parliament maintains its supremacy throughout +the length and breadth of the British Empire. It is of course perfectly +true that Parliament having once given representative institutions to a +colony, does not dream of habitually overriding or thwarting Colonial +legislation. But it were a gross error to suppose that Colonial +recognition of British sovereignty is a mere form. It is in the main +cheerfully acquiesced in by the people of Victoria, because they gain +considerable prestige and no small material advantage from forming part +of the Empire. They have no traditional hostility with the mother +country; they have every reason to deprecate separation, and--a matter +of equal consequence--they believe that if they wished for independence +it would not be refused them. England stands, in short, as regards +Victoria, in a position of singular advantage. She could suppress local +riot, or cause it to be suppressed, and she would not try to oppose a +national demand for separation. Hence a complicated political +arrangement is kept in tolerable working order by a series of +understandings and of mutual concessions. If either England or Victoria +were not willing to give and take, the connection between England and +the Colony could not last a month. The policy, in short, of Colonial +independence is, like most of our constitutional arrangements, based on +the assumption that the parties to it are willing to act towards one +another in a spirit of compromise and good-will, and though at the +present moment the pride of England in her Colonial empire, and the +appreciation on the part of our colonies of the benefits, moral and +material, of the supremacy of Great Britain, keep our scheme of Colonial +government in working order, it is well to realize that this system is +not so invariably successful as might be inferred from the optimism +which naturally colours official utterances. The names of Sir Charles +Darling and Sir George Bowen recall transactions which show that a +community as loyal as Victoria may adopt a course of policy which meets +with the disapproval of English statesmen. The recent and deliberate +refusal of the citizens of Melbourne to endure the landing on their +shores of informers whose evidence had procured the punishment of an +outrageous crime, combined with the fact that the populace of Melbourne +were abetted in a gross, indubitable, patent breach of law by Colonial +Ministers who were after all, technically speaking, servants of the +Crown, gives rise to serious reflection, and suggests that, even under +favourable circumstances, Colonial independence is hardly consistent +with that enforcement throughout the Crown's dominions of due respect +for law which is the main justification for the existence of the British +Empire.[44] A student, moreover, who turns his eyes towards dependencies +less favourably situated than Victoria soon perceives how great may at +any moment become the difficulty of working an artificial and +complicated system of double sovereignty. In Jamaica the hostility of +the whites and blacks led to riot on the part of the blacks, followed by +lawless suppression of riot on the part of the Governor, who represented +the feelings of the whites, and the restoration of peace and order +ultimately entailed the abolition of representative government. At the +Cape the pressure of war at once exposed the weak part of the +constitutional machine. The pretensions of the Cape Ministry to snatch +from the hands of the Governor the control of the armed forces met with +successful resistance; but the question then raised as to the proper +relation between the Colonial Ministry and the army, though for a time +evaded, is certain sooner or later to re-appear, and will not always +admit of an easy or peaceable answer.[45] + +Any reader interested in my argument should supplement this brief +statement of the relation actually existing between England and her +self-governing colonies by a perusal of Mr. Todd's most instructive +'Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies.' But the statement, +brief and colourless though it be, is sufficient for its purpose; it +shows that the proposal to give to Ireland the institutions of a colony +is open to two fatal objections. + +1st.--The concession to Ireland of Colonial independence would entail +upon England probable peril and certain disgrace. + +The peril is obvious. An Irish Cabinet armed with the authority +possessed by a Victorian Ministry would at once provide for the +self-defence of Ireland, and an Irish army, obeying an Irish Executive +and commanded by Irish officers, would be none the less formidable +because it might in name be identified with an armed police, or, like +the troops raised at the Cape or in Victoria, enjoy the ominous title of +Volunteers. If the Colonial precedent were strictly carried out, British +troops ought, from the time Ireland obtained an independent Parliament, +to be withdrawn from the country. The acknowledged danger of foreign +invasion, and the unavowed probability of Irish insurrection, would make +the retirement of the English army impossible. But the presence of +British forces--and forces, be it remarked, intended in reality as a +check on the action of the local Government--would of itself place +Ireland in a position utterly unlike the situation of Victoria, and +would also involve both the Imperial and the local Government in endless +difficulties and controversies. If any one doubts this, let him read the +correspondence between Mr. Molteno[46] and Sir Bartle Frere, and +substitute for the Premier of the Cape Colony the name of Mr. Parnell, +and for Sir Bartle Frere the name of any Lord-Lieutenant who might be +unfortunate enough to hold office in Ireland after Mr. Parnell became +Premier of an Irish Cabinet. Suppose, however, that by some miracle of +management or good luck the Irish and English forces acted well +together, and that the satisfaction given by a state of things +approaching to independence prevented for the moment all attempts at +separation, England might escape peril, but she would assuredly not +avoid deserved disgrace. An Irish Parliament, returned in the main by +the very men who support the National League, would assuredly pass laws +which every man in England, and many men throughout Ireland, would hold +to be unjust, and which, whether in themselves unjust or not, would +certainly set aside Imperial legislation, which England is bound by +every consideration of honour and justice to uphold. There is no need to +demonstrate here what has been demonstrated by one writer after another, +and, indeed, hardly needs proof, that at the present day an Irish +Parliament would certainly deprive Irish landlords, and possibly deprive +Irish Protestants, of rights which the Imperial Parliament would never +take away, and which the Imperial Government is absolutely bound to +protect.[47] If the English Government were to be base enough to +acquiesce in legislation which the Imperial Parliament would never +itself have countenanced, then England would be dishonoured; if Bill +after Bill passed by the Irish Legislature were prevented from becoming +law by veto after veto, then English honour might be saved, but the +self-government of Ireland would be at an end, nor would England gain +much in credit. The English Ministry can, as long as the connection with +a colony endures, arrest Colonial legislation. But the Home Government +cannot for any effective purpose interfere with the administrative +action of a Colonial Executive. Given courts, an army, and a police +controlled by the leaders of the Land League, and it is easy to see how +rents might be abolished and landlords driven into exile without the +passing by the Irish Parliament of a single Act which a Colonial +Secretary could reasonably veto, or which even an English court could +hold void under the provisions of the Colonial Laws Act. It is indeed +probable that wild legislation at Dublin might provoke armed resistance +in Ulster. But a movement which, were Ireland an independent nation, +might ensure just government for all classes of Irishmen would, if +Ireland were a colony, only add a new element of confusion to an already +intolerable state of affairs. Imagine for a moment what would have been +the position of England if Englishmen had been convinced that Riel, +though technically a rebel, was in reality a patriot, resisting the +intolerable oppression of the Dominion Parliament, and you may form some +slight idea of the feeling of shame and disgrace with which Englishmen +would see British soldiers employed to suppress the revolt of Ulster +against a Government which, without English aid, would find it difficult +to resist or punish the insurgents. The most painful and least +creditable feature in the history of the United States is the apathy +with which for thirty years the Northern States tolerated Southern +lawlessness, and even now indirectly support Southern oppression. + +2nd.--If Colonial independence would be found in Ireland inconsistent +with the protection of England's interests and with the discharge of +England's duties, it would also fail to produce the one result which +would be an adequate compensation for many probable or certain +evils--namely, the extinction of Irish discontent. + +It is by no means certain, indeed, that Colonial independence would be +accepted with genuine acquiescence by any class of Irishmen. Certainly +the demand for Grattan's Parliament lends no countenance to the +supposition that the people of Ireland would accept with satisfaction a +political arrangement which is absolutely opposed in its character to +the Constitution of 1782.[48] Suppose, however, for the sake of +argument, that the Irish leaders and the Irish people accepted the offer +of Colonial independence; we may be well assured that this acceptance +would not produce good-will towards England, and this not from the +perversity of the Irish nature, of which we hear a great deal too much, +but from difficulties in the nature of things, of which we hear a great +deal too little. The restrictions on the authority of the Irish +Parliament would, one cannot doubt, be, as safeguards for the authority +of the Imperial Government, absolutely illusory. But they would be +intensely irritating. Irish leaders would wish, and from their own point +of view rightly wish, to carry through a revolutionary policy. The +Imperial Government would attempt, and from an English point of view +rightly attempt, to arrest revolution. Every considerable legislative +measure would give ground for negotiation and for understandings--that +is, for dissatisfaction and for misunderstanding. There would be +disputes about the land laws, disputes about the army, disputes about +the police, disputes about the authority of Imperial legislation, +disputes about the validity of Irish enactments, disputes about appeals +to the Privy Council. To say that all these sources of irritation might +embitter the relation between England and Victoria, and that, as they do +not habitually do so, one may infer that they will not embitter the +relation between England and Ireland, is to argue that institutions +nominally the same will work in the same way when applied to totally +different circumstances. Victoria is prosperous; Ireland is in distress. +Victoria takes pride in the Imperial connection; the difficulty in +dealing with Ireland consists in the fact that large bodies of Irishmen +detest the British Empire. Victoria has never aspired to be a nation; +the best side of Irish discontent consists in enthusiasm for Irish +nationality. Above all this, there has never been any lasting feud +between England and her Australian dependencies; the main ground in +favour of a fundamental change in the constitutional relations of +Ireland and England is the necessity of putting an end at almost any +cost to traditional hatred and misunderstanding generated by centuries +of misgovernment and misery. If, as already pointed out, the source of +this misery, so far as it can be touched by law at all, is a vicious +system of land tenure, it is in vain to imagine that the misfortunes of +Ireland can be cured by any mere change of constitutional forms. Grant, +however, for the sake of argument, that the passion of nationality is +the true ground of the demand for Home Rule; grant, also, in defiance of +patent facts, that the autonomy of a dependency satisfies the +sensibilities of a nation; still it is idle to fancy that a system +based, like our scheme of Colonial government, on friendly +understandings and the habitual practice of compromise, can regulate the +relations of two countries which are kept apart mainly because they +cannot understand one another, and can neither of them admit the +necessity of mutual concessions. Moreover, a scheme of nominal +subjection combined with real independence has the one great defect that +it does not teach the lessons which men and nations learn by depending +on their own unassisted and uncontrolled efforts. No one learns +self-control who fancies he is controlled by a master.[49] + +The scheme, in short, of Colonial independence, though less absolutely +impracticable than any form of Federalism,[50] has, as a solution of our +Irish difficulties, two fatal defects: it gives Ireland a degree of +independence more dangerous to England than would be the existence of +Ireland as a separate nation; it bestows on Ireland a kind of +self-government which presents neither the material advantages derived +from the Union, nor the possible, though hypothetical, gains which might +accrue to her from the self-control and energy supposed to flow from the +inspiring sentiment of nationality. Still the Colonial system is, in +spite of its immense defects as a scheme of Home Rule for Ireland, out +and out the least objectionable of the models which have been proposed +to us for our imitation, and this for several reasons. To grant to +Ireland, if she be prepared to accept it, the position of Victoria is +not to impair the supremacy of Parliament; if we copied faithfully the +Victorian polity, every Irish member of Parliament would permanently +depart from Westminster; there would be no more need for having at +Westminster a representative of Dublin than there is for having a +representative of Melbourne; the Irish Parliament would depend for its +very existence on an Act of the Imperial Parliament, and the British +Parliament would be able without consulting any Irish representative to +modify, override, or abolish all or any part of the Act constituting the +Irish Parliament. In this there would be no breach of faith, for the +Constitution would bear on its face that the Act of Parliament on which +it depended could be changed by the British Parliament as lawfully as +can the Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 55, which calls into existence the +Victorian legislature. The undoubted legal authority and ease with which +the British Parliament could suspend or abolish the Irish Constitution +would have two good results: the one that Great Britain would have a +sanction by which to enforce the adherence of the Irish government to +just principles of legislation and of administration; the other that the +readiness with which this sanction could be applied would, it is not +unlikely, make its application needless. England, again, would not by +the concession of Colonial independence dislocate her own Constitution: +she would only be extending to Ireland a scheme of government already +existing in other parts of the Empire, and would find herself possessed +of officials accustomed to make a Colonial Constitution work. Nothing +would be changed: there would only be one Colony the more, and the +Colonial Office would find no insuperable difficulty in undertaking the +government of Ireland in the same sense in which the Office undertakes +the government of Victoria. The position, it may be objected, would be a +very poor one for Ireland. With this objection I entirely agree: my very +contention is that for Ireland, no less than for England, it is best +that Ireland shall form part of the United Kingdom. Home Rulers think +otherwise: they prefer the local autonomy of Victoria to a share in the +United Kingdom. They may probably, however, say that taxation involves +representation, and that if Ireland is to take the disadvantages she +must also have the immunities of a colony. Here fair-minded men will +hold that the Home Rulers are right. The maxim, indeed, that taxation +involves representation need not deeply impress any one who remembers +that throughout the United Kingdom the property of every woman is taxed, +and that no woman has a share in Parliamentary representation. But a +formula which is not logically defensible may yet be the embodiment of a +just claim. If the very hazardous experiment of placing Ireland in the +position of Victoria is to be tried, it must be tried fairly and with +every circumstance which may increase its chances of success. Ireland on +assuming the position of a colony should, like other colonies, be freed +from Imperial taxation. England can afford the sacrifice of three or +four millions a year, and she would obtain a valuable _quid pro quo_ in +the increased homogeneity of the British Parliament. Ireland too would +gain something. A country impoverished, in part at least through bad +government, might think it no hard bargain to gain at once local +independence and exemption from a heavy weight of taxation. The absence +of anything like a tribute to Great Britain would be an immense +advantage, for it would remove one cause of certain discontent, and +would for once place England before the Irish people at any rate in the +light of a liberal ally. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not recommend +Home Rule under any form whatever: what I do assert is that of all its +forms the Colonial form is the least injurious to British interests, and +that the experiment of placing Ireland in the situation of Victoria can +be carried out neither with fairness nor with any chance of success, +unless Englishmen let Ireland, like Victoria, be exempt from Imperial +taxation. If any English taxpayer says that the price is too high to pay +for the success of an experiment of which I do not myself recommend the +trial, I am not concerned to consider whether he is right. My only +concern is to insist that the sacrifice of three or four millions per +annum is an essential feature of this particular scheme of Home Rule, +and that persons who say the sacrifice is too great have only added one +to the many arguments which lead to the conclusion that under no form +whatever can Irish Home Rule be accepted by England. + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: Objection to Constitution of 1782, not faults of Irish +Parliament.] + +III. _Home Rule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution._--The cry for +Home Rule sometimes takes the form of a demand that Ireland should +reacquire the Constitution of 1782. The true answer to this demand is +not to be found where Englishmen often seek for it, in attacks on +Grattan's Parliament. That body exhibited some grave defects common to +the English Parliament of the day; it had also many faults of its own to +answer for; but it had with all its demerits virtues which still cast a +halo round its memory in the eyes of Irish patriotism, and which serve +to redeem many of its admitted faults in the judgment of impartial +history. It produced great men. Flood, Grattan, Curran, and Fitzgibbon +were none of them faultless statesmen, but they were leaders of whom any +people have a right to be proud. Grattan's Parliament, moreover, though +it represented a class, represented a class of Irishmen, and we may even +say the best class of Irishmen. It was lastly, with all its defects, a +Parliament of men who knew and belonged to Ireland, and after its +lights cared for the country. It was in a true sense a national +Parliament. When we consider further that the Parliament was abolished +against the wish of the best men in Ireland, that it was abolished by +arts which have brought lasting and just discredit on the men who +carried through the Act of Union, we can well understand why as calm and +as well-informed judges as Mr. Lecky hold to the belief--certainly in +nowise in itself unreasonable--that the Treaty of Union was, to say the +least, premature, and that England and Ireland would have gained much if +for a generation or two more the interest and repute of Ireland had been +guarded by an Irish Parliament. The argument that the Irish Parliament +because it was corrupt, or because it represented a class, was rightly +abolished, proves too much. The English Parliament under Walpole was at +least as open as the Irish Parliament in the time of Grattan to each of +these charges, yet long before legislation had removed the flagrant +anomalies of the unreformed House of Commons the English Parliament had +cast off its worst vices, and few persons will maintain that England +would have gained if during the time of Walpole Parliamentary government +had been abolished. Be this as it may, vituperation of Grattan's +Parliament is for our present purpose as irrelevant as it is unjust and +injudicious. + +[Sidenote: True objection, restoration impossible.] + +The true reason for declining to consider the demand for the +Constitution of 1782 is, that to concede it is in the strictest sense of +the word an impossibility. Grattan's Constitution not only is dead, but +can look for no resurrection. The social, the political, the religious, +we might almost say the physical conditions under which Grattan's +Parliament existed have vanished, never to return. "It cannot be too +clearly understood," writes Mr. Lecky, "that the real meaning of the +separate Irish Parliament of the eighteenth century was that the +efficient government of the country was placed in the hands of its +Protestant gentry, qualified by the fact that the English Government +possessed a sufficient number of nomination boroughs to exercise a +constant controlling influence over their proceedings. The existing +Grand Juries and the Synod of the disestablished Church are the bodies +which now represent most faithfully the independent elements in +Grattan's Parliament. That Parliament consisted exclusively of men who +were bound to the English connection by the closest ties of interest and +sentiment [and] who were pre-eminently the representatives of +property."[51] We may deplore that such a Parliament was doomed to +destruction when it might possibly have been saved by reform. But to any +one who has eyes to see it is as clear as day that with Protestant +ascendancy, with the prestige of the Established Church, with the +leading position of Irish landlords, with the submission of Irish +tenants, with the power of control exercised by the English Government, +with the necessary dependence of the English Colony upon the connection +with England, Grattan's Constitution with all its possibilities or +impossibilities has vanished for ever. You can no more restore the +Parliament of 1782 in Ireland than you can restore the unreformed +Parliament of 1832 in England. In either case to reproduce the form +would not renew the spirit, and the attempted revival of an anomaly +would turn out the creation of a monstrosity. + +One consideration suggested by the memory of Grattan's Parliament is +well worth attention. With the curious laxity of thought about +constitutional changes which marks modern British statesmanship, +language is often used which implies that to ask for Grattan's +Parliament is equivalent to asking for Colonial self-government as in +Victoria. No two things are in reality more different. It is no +exaggeration to say that the Constitution of 1782 presented in its +principles the exact antithesis to the modern Constitution of Victoria. +Grattan's Constitution rested on the absolute denial of British +Parliamentary sovereignty. The keynote of his policy was the +Parliamentary independence of Ireland; its aim was to make Ireland an +independent nation connected with England only by goodwill, by common +interest, and by what has been called the "golden link" of the Crown. +The statement indeed that between the date of Irish Parliamentary +independence and the date of the Union England and Ireland were governed +under two crowns, is not much better than a piece of rhetorical +antiquarianism.[52] It is, however, undoubtedly true that from 1782 to +1800 the British Parliament had no more right to legislate for Ireland +than at the present day it has to legislate for New York, and no appeal +lay from any Irish Court to any English tribunal. But if under the +Constitution of 1782 Ireland was in one sense an independent nation, she +could not under that Constitution be called a self-governed country. The +Irish Executive was controlled by George the Third and his English +Ministers, and the passing of the Act of Union was proof, if evidence +were needed, that England possessed potent though unavowed means for +controlling the decision of the Irish Legislature. The Constitution, it +may be added, bore exactly the fruit to be expected from its anomalous +character. It stimulated national feeling; this was its saving merit. It +did not secure supremacy to the will of the Irish nation; this, as +appeared in 1800, was its fatal flaw. Compare with this the +Constitution of Victoria. The Victorian Constitution is based on +complete acknowledgment of English Parliamentary sovereignty. But the +amplest recognition of British authority is balanced by the unrestricted +enjoyment of local self-government. Hence Victoria manages her own +affairs, but Victorians are not inspired with the sense of constituting +a nation. + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: Gladstonian Constitution--its character.] + +IV. _Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution_[53]--No legislative +proposal submitted to Parliament has ever received harder measure than +the Government of Ireland Bill. Its introduction aroused the keenest +political battle which during half a century has been fought in England. +The Bill therefore became at once the mark of hostile and (what is +nearly the same thing) of unfair criticism at the hands of opponents. +This was to be expected; it is the necessary result of the system which +makes tenure of office depend on success in carrying through or +resisting proposed legislation. What did take place but was not to be +expected was, that the Government of Ireland Bill met with harsh +criticism at the hands of its friends. The Opposition wished to prove +that the principle of the Bill was bad, by showing that it led to +disastrous and absurd results. They therefore directed their assaults +upon the details of a measure which they disliked in reality not because +of the special provisions which they attacked, but because of the +principle to which these provisions gave effect. Ministeralists on the +other hand were only too ready to surrender any clause in the Bill as a +matter of detail, provided only they could persuade Parliament to +sanction the principle of the measure, and thereby affirm the policy of +giving Ireland an Irish Executive and an Irish Parliament. Nor was this +course of action dictated solely by the exigencies of Parliamentary +strategy. Ministerialists saw the flaws in the Bill as plainly as did +the Opposition, and no man (it may be conjectured), from the Premier who +devised, down to the draughtsman who drew, the Government of Ireland +Bill, would have wished it to become an Act in the form in which it +stood on the 7th day of June, 1886. The supporters, moreover, of the +Government emphasized their dislike to the details of the particular +measure, because to attack a detail of the machinery by which it was +proposed to give Ireland Home Rule countenanced in the critic's own mind +the assumption that some mechanism could be invented which might carry +out the principle of creating an Irish Parliament without violating the +conditions on which alone the idea of any such measure could be +entertained by any English statesman. Opponents, in short, of the +Government of Ireland Bill attacked its details out of hostility to its +principle; its defenders tried to win approval for its principle by +conceding or insisting upon the defects of its details.[54] The result +was unfortunate. The Bill was never either by its opponents or its +friends regarded in the light in which it ought to be viewed by a +constitutional lawyer. It was never criticised as a whole; it never +therefore received full justice. Whoever examines the now celebrated +Bill in the spirit of a jurist will see that it constitutes, in spite of +many obvious blots both in its special provisions and in its language, a +most ingenious attempt to solve the problem of giving to Ireland a +legislature which shall be at once practically independent, and +theoretically dependent, upon the Parliament of Great Britain; which +shall have full power to make laws and appoint an executive for Ireland, +and yet shall not use that power in a way opposed to English interests +or sense of justice. The problem (it may be said) admits of no solution. +This may be so, and is indeed my own conviction. But this conviction +ought not to prevent the acknowledgment that the Bill is the rough +outline of an ingeniously attempted solution. If the Bill fails in +achieving its object, the failure arises not from mistakes of detail, +but from the unsoundness of the principle on which the Bill rests, and +shows that the conditions on which Englishmen can wisely give Home Rule +to Ireland are conditions which no scheme of Home Rule can satisfy. The +idea which lies at the basis of the plan sketched out in the Government +of Ireland Bill is the combination of the Federal system and the +Colonial system of Home Rule. The right mode of criticising this +combination is first to trace in the barest outline the leading features +of the Bill, treating it much as if it had become an Act, and had given +to Ireland an actual Constitution; and next to examine how far this +Constitution, which may with no unfairness be called the "Gladstonian +Constitution," satisfies the conditions which a scheme of Home Rule is +bound to fulfil. + +The Gladstonian Constitution establishes a new form of government in +Ireland; it also modifies, or, to use plain and accurate language, +repeals the main provisions of the Act of Union, and thus introduces a +fundamental change into the existing Constitution of England.[55] + +The following are for our present purpose its principal features. + +[Sidenote: Its features as regards government of Ireland.] + +As regards the government of Ireland-- + +The Executive Government of Ireland is vested in the Queen, but is +carried on by the Lord-Lieutenant and a Council.[56] Though the +formation and powers of the Executive are under the Constitution left +very much at large, we may fairly assume that the authors of the +Constitution intend that the Lord-Lieutenant should occupy the position +in substance of Colonial Governor, and rule Ireland through a ministry +appointed nominally by the Lord-Lieutenant, but in reality selected by +the Irish legislative body. In this manner the Irish Constitution is, +like that of Victoria, a copy of the English original. + +There is created--and this, of course, is the vital provision of the +Constitution--an Irish legislature, which I shall take leave hereafter +to call by its proper name, the "Irish Parliament," consisting of the +Queen and an Irish legislative body, which we may call a House of +Parliament or a Chamber, made up itself of two orders.[57] + +The Irish Parliament, subject to certain restrictions, has authority to +make or repeal any laws for the peace, order, and good government of +Ireland; it is in fact in the strictest sense what I have termed it, an +Irish Parliament. It is the body which indirectly appoints and controls +the Executive, and directly legislates for Ireland. It can repeal laws +which have been passed by the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom +in so far as they are in force in Ireland. + +The powers of the Irish Parliament are, it should be noted, indefinite. +The Parliament, that is to say, may pass any law which it is not, under +the Constitution, forbidden to pass. In this respect it stands in the +position not like that of the American Congress, which can legislate +only on certain topics, which are expressly placed within the competence +of Congress, but in a position like that occupied by the Parliament of +the Canadian 1 Dominion, which can legislate on all topics not expressly +excepted from its competence. The difference between a legislature of +definite and a legislature of indefinite powers is important. In the one +case changes of circumstances may diminish but cannot increase the +authority of the legislature; in the other case changes of circumstances +may increase but cannot diminish that authority. The Irish Parliament is +a body whose authority will, from the necessity of things, tend +constantly to increase. + +If the authority given to the Irish Parliament is indefinite, it is not +unlimited. A large number of exceptions and restrictions are imposed +upon its freedom of action. It is hard to point to any clear principle +on which they rest. Their object undoubtedly is to guard against +legislation about subjects such as the armed forces, the coinage, and +the like, which are of Imperial rather than of local concern. But we +can hardly say that the line between the things which the Irish +Parliament can do, and the things which it cannot do, exactly coincides +with the line which divides Imperial from local legislation. The Irish +Parliament might lawfully pass laws opposed to the whole tenour of +British legislation, such, for instance, as an Act preventing particular +classes of foreigners, or even of Englishmen, from settling in Ireland. +The Irish Parliament could not, on the other hand, pass any law for the +establishment or the endowment of religion. Hence Ireland could not, in +imitation of England and Scotland, provide herself with an established +Church, nor could she again pass any law relating to volunteers. She +could not therefore take steps for the defence of the country, which are +permissible to Victoria or Canada. + +The observance of these limitations on the Parliament's power of +legislation is enforced by a twofold method: first, by the veto of the +Lord-Lieutenant;[58] secondly, by the special authority given to the +Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council.[59] + +The Lord-Lieutenant can, after the manner of a Colonial Governor, refuse +the Royal assent to any bill passed by the Irish House of +Parliament.[60] It would rather appear (though this is by no means +certain) that a Bill passed by the Irish Parliament might, even though +the Lord-Lieutenant assented thereto, be like the Bill of a Colonial +legislature, disallowed by the Crown, or in effect by the English +Ministry.[61] + +The Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council, with the addition +of certain members, who must be, or have been, Irish Judges, exercises +under the Gladstonian Constitution a very peculiar authority in respect +of Irish legislation. It becomes both an administrative and a judicial +body. + +As an administrative body it can give a decision as to the +constitutional validity of any Bill brought before or Act passed by, the +Irish Parliament. In its judicial character it is a court of final +appeal, with exclusive power to pronounce a decision upon the validity +of an Act of the Irish Parliament whenever the validity thereof comes in +question in the course of an action.[62] The decisions of the Privy +Council are final; their twofold character as opinions and judgments +deserve special attention. The result is that the Judicial Committee of +the English Privy Council can always in one way or another pronounce +void the proposed or actual legislation of the Irish Parliament if it is +in the judgment of the Privy Council unconstitutional. + +Ireland in return for the advantages gained by her under the Gladstonian +Constitution gives up the representation which she now has in each of +the two Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. No Irish +representative, either Peer or Commoner, sits under that Constitution at +Westminster.[63] The present Parliament of the United Kingdom under +whatever name it be described, and whatever be its powers, becomes +therefore on the withdrawal of the Irish representatives a British +Parliament, and is hereinafter termed by me, for the sake of +distinction, the British Parliament. Ireland also contributes annually +to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom a sum of over four +millions. The Irish customs and excise are made the security for the +payment of this contribution; they are, if I understand the Government +of Ireland Bill rightly, to be collected by British officials and paid +into the British Treasury, but the details of the financial arrangements +intended to exist under the Gladstonian Constitution are not within the +scope of this work. + +The Irish Parliament has no power to modify or alter the provisions of +the Constitution under which it exists,[64] except in one or two cases +provided for by the Constitution itself. The Constitution is alterable +in a particular manner therein pointed out, namely by the co-operation +of the British Parliament and the Irish Parliament. If we omit certain +complications of detail, this co-operation takes place by the Irish +representatives being summoned back, and thus added to the British +Parliament. The body thus constituted for the alteration of the +Gladstonian Constitution is formed of much the same elements as the +existing Parliament of the United Kingdom, and is hereinafter called the +Imperial Parliament.[65] + +[Sidenote: As regards the English Constitution.] + +As regards the Constitution of England-- + +The Gladstonian Constitution, as it will now be seen, does, whatever the +intention of its authors, as a matter of fact seriously affect the +Constitution of England, and this in more points than one. + +_First._--The withdrawal of the Irish representation from the Parliament +of the United Kingdom constitutes in effect a new body, which in its +composition is different from the present Parliament of the United +Kingdom, and which since (allowing for changes introduced by the +different Reform Acts which have been passed during the century) it +corresponds with the Parliament of Great Britain as it existed before +the Union with Ireland, may be rightly described by the name I have +applied to it, of the British Parliament. This British Parliament has +admittedly authority to legislate on every matter which comes within the +competence neither of the Irish Parliament, nor of the body which I have +distinguished as the Imperial Parliament, which, it will be remembered, +consists of the British Parliament with the Irish representatives +summoned thereto. Whether the British Parliament has or has not any +further powers is a moot question which I purposely leave for the moment +untouched. What is admitted on all hands is that a Parliament in which +Irish representatives have no voice whatever can legislate on every +matter affecting England, Scotland, or the British Empire, and also on +the topics specially excluded from the competence of the Irish +Parliament unless they belong to the one topic, namely, the alteration +of the Gladstonian Constitution, reserved for the Imperial Parliament. + +_Secondly._--The British Parliament, whatever be its theoretical +authority, will cease under the Gladstonian Constitution to pass laws +for Ireland, and will not impose any taxation on Ireland in addition to +the contribution which Ireland is compelled to pay under the +Constitution. + +Hence, _Thirdly_,--and as a result of the various features in the +Gladstonian Constitution which have been already noted, there exist +under it three bodies with different functions which, by whatever name +they may be each called, ought to be carefully distinguished. They are-- + +(i.) The British Parliament at Westminster, in which sit no Irish +members, which legislates for Great Britain, and for the whole of the +British Empire, except Ireland, but which does not in general at any +rate legislate for Ireland. + +(ii.) The Irish Parliament at Dublin, in which sit no British +representatives, which legislates for Ireland, but does not legislate +for England, Scotland, or for any other part of the British Empire, and +does not have any voice whatever in the general policy of the Empire. + +(iii.) The Imperial Parliament also sitting at Westminster, and +comprising both the British and the Irish Parliament. This body, which +in composition corresponds nearly if not exactly with the existing +Parliament of the United Kingdom, comes together only on special +occasions and only for a special purpose, namely the revision or +alteration of the Gladstonian Constitution. + +That the existence of these three bodies, each normally exercising the +different functions or powers I have attributed to them, constitutes an +unmistakable, and I should myself say a fundamental, change in the +existing English Constitution with its one sovereign Parliament of the +United Kingdom, hardly in my judgment requires or admits of proof. If +the change be denied, I have no course but to leave the decision of the +question whether such a change can be fairly ignored to the intelligence +of my readers.[66] + +The Gladstonian Constitution, if it worked in the way contemplated by +its authors--if everything, that is to say, went exactly as it was +wished, and everybody acted exactly in the manner in which +constitutionally they ought to act--would provide a complicated but, as +I have already said, most ingenious solution of the problem before us. +The British Parliament would sit at Westminster undisturbed by any Irish +obstructives, and legislate for Great Britain and the whole British +Empire in accordance with the wishes of the people of England and +Scotland. Not only would Irish obstruction vanish, but what is even +better, the necessity of considering Irish questions at all would +disappear. English legislators would not be called upon to pay more +attention to the affairs of Ireland than to the affairs of Canada or of +New Zealand. The Irish Parliament would take the whole burden of +legislation for Ireland off our hands, and Irishmen if they did not like +Irish laws would have nobody to complain of but Irish legislators. But +the Irish Parliament whilst it saved England from all trouble would, if +the Constitution worked properly, give England no trouble whatever. If +Bills were proposed or Acts passed at Dublin in violation of the +Constitution they would be pronounced void by the Privy Council, and all +Ireland would at once acquiesce in the final decisions of that exalted +tribunal. If on the other hand the Irish House of Parliament were to +pass enactments which though not unconstitutional were inexpedient, then +foolish proposals would be nullified by the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant. +The contribution from Ireland would be duly collected and be paid up to +the day, since its collection would lie in the hands of British +officials; and should any difficulty arise, the collectors would be +aided by the Irish Court of Exchequer, the Judges of which would be +appointed by the English Government, and the judgments of the Court of +Exchequer could, if need were, be enforced by the British Army. This +paper federation, in short, looks as promising as paper Constitutions +generally do. It appears at first sight to combine the merits of +American Federalism and of Colonial independence. To see, however, +whether the Gladstonian Constitution gives any real promise of +fulfilling the hopes which it seems to hold out, let us examine how far +it really fulfils the conditions on which alone, as we have already +pointed out, Home Rule can possibly be accepted by the people of Great +Britain. + +[Sidenote: 1st Question.--Is sovereignty of Parliament preserved?] + +_1st Question._--Is the Gladstonian Constitution consistent with the +sovereignty or ultimate legislative supremacy of the British +Parliament?[67] + +It is well to make clear to ourselves the precise meaning of this +enquiry. It is nothing else than this: Do or do not the provisions of +the Gladstonian Constitution either legally or morally impair the right +of the British Parliament when sitting at Westminster without having +summoned a single representative from Ireland to legislate (e.g. pass a +Coercion Act) for Ireland, and if need be to repeal of its own authority +all or any of the provisions of the Gladstonian Constitution, including +the very provision under which it is declared in substance that the +Constitution shall not be alterable except by the Imperial Parliament, +which consists, as already noted, of the British Parliament and the +Irish Parliament? To put the same matter in another shape, the enquiry +is whether, under the Gladstonian Constitution, the British Parliament +does or does not retain the sovereignty now admittedly possessed by the +Parliament of the United Kingdom.[68] + +Let us first consider the matter as a pure question of constitutional +law. + +[Sidenote: As a question of constitutional law.] + +The inquiry then is whether a Judge in England or Ireland resolved to do +his duty would or would not be bound to treat as invalid an Act passed +by the British Parliament either inconsistent with or, to put the matter +more strongly, actually repealing of such Parliament's own authority the +provisions of the Gladstonian Constitution, or in other words of the +Government of Ireland Bill, which would then, as we are assuming the +Gladstonian Constitution to be in existence, have become the Irish +Government Act. + +Such a Judge would have to consider a question to which English Courts +are now quite unaccustomed as regards Acts passed by the Parliament of +the United Kingdom. The reason why they are unused to solve the +particular kind of question supposed to arise under the new Irish +Constitution is, that as the Parliament of the United Kingdom is +undoubtedly a sovereign body, the validity of its enactments is in any +British Court beyond dispute. The reason why the problem might under the +Gladstonian Constitution require an answer is, that the question might +arise whether the British Parliament were or were not a sovereign body. + +Our Judge would find the question more difficult to answer than is +readily admitted by English lawyers not versed in any constitution +except their own. He would have to consider the language and effect of +the Irish Government Act in the light of certain propositions which are +now, and at the supposed passing of that Act must have been, true of the +Parliament of the United Kingdom. + +These propositions may be thus stated, roughly indeed, but with +sufficient accuracy for our purpose:-- + +The Parliament of the United Kingdom is admittedly the sovereign of the +whole British Empire. + +The Parliament of the United Kingdom because it is a sovereign body can +make laws for every part of the British Empire, and can legally make or +unmake any law, and establish, alter, or abolish any institution +(including in that term the Constitution of the Canadian Dominion or of +Victoria) existing within the limits of any country subject to the +British Crown. + +The Parliament of the United Kingdom just because it is a sovereign body +cannot, whilst retaining its position as sovereign of the British +Empire, be itself bound by any Act of Parliament whatever. + +To recur to an instance which is pre-eminently instructive, Parliament +conferred in 1867 upon the Dominion of Canada as large a measure of +independence as is compatible with a colony's maintaining its position +as part of the British Empire. Yet the Parliament of the United Kingdom +retains now, as ever, the indisputable legal power to change or abolish +the Constitution of the Dominion. + +The Parliament of the United Kingdom, just because it is a sovereign +body, though it cannot remain a sovereign and place a legal limit on its +own powers, can, like any other sovereign, e.g. the Czar of Russia, +abdicate its sovereignty in reference to the whole, or it may be to +part of the Crown's dominions; and the Parliament of the United Kingdom +can, just because it is a sovereign body, do what is at bottom the same +thing as abdicate, namely, merge its own powers in those of another +sovereign body, or, in other words, form, or aid in forming, a new +sovereign for the British Empire. + +This proposition has during the Home Rule controversy been occasionally, +in words at least, disputed or questioned by the supporters of Mr. +Gladstone's policy, and language has been used which seems to imply that +a sovereign power such as the Parliament of the United Kingdom can never +by its own act divest itself of sovereignty. I can hardly think that the +able controversialists who seem to maintain this doctrine really meant +to contend for more than the admitted principle that a sovereign cannot +while remaining a sovereign limit his sovereign powers. If, however, it +be seriously suggested that the Parliament of the United Kingdom cannot +divest itself of sovereignty, the suggestion is as a matter of argument +untenable, and this for more than one reason. + +An autocrat, such as the Russian Czar, can undoubtedly abdicate; but +sovereignty, whether it be the sovereignty of the Czar or of Parliament, +is always one and the same quality. If the Czar can abdicate, so can +Parliament. The Czar again could, instead of abdicating in the ordinary +sense of the term, constitute a new sovereign body for the government of +Russia, of which he might himself be a part. Thus he may undoubtedly +give Russia a constitution like that of England, under which the Czar +and two Houses of Parliament might together become the sovereign of the +Russian State, and no constitutionalist would dream of maintaining that +the new power thus constituted was the less supreme owing to the fact +that one of its members, namely the Czar, had at one time been himself +the real sovereign of Russia. Here again what is true of the Czar is +true of Parliament. The Parliament of the United Kingdom certainly might +become a part of another sovereign body, or might join in constituting a +sovereign power supreme throughout the British Empire of which +Parliament itself did not form a part. There is nothing in the theory of +sovereignty to prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom from forming +a constitution for the whole British Empire under which the Parliament +of the United Kingdom, the Victorian Parliament, the Parliament of the +Canadian Dominion and so forth should become simply State Parliaments, +whilst the whole British Empire was ruled by some Imperial Congress +sitting, say, either in London or in Victoria. Nor need we in this +matter have recourse to theory. The present Parliament of the United +Kingdom is itself a monument of the historical fact that sovereign +Parliaments can divest themselves of sovereignty. For the Parliament of +the United Kingdom is itself the result of the abdication of supreme +power by sovereign Parliaments. The Union with Scotland was not, as +Englishmen often, I suspect, fancy, the absorption of the Parliament of +Scotland in the Parliament of England. The transaction bears, when +carefully looked at, a quite different character. Up to the year 1707 +there existed an English Parliament sovereign in England, and there +existed a Scotch Parliament sovereign in Scotland. These two sovereign +bodies in negotiating the Treaty of Union acted with scrupulous, and on +the Scotch side with punctilious, independence. Neither sovereign body +would consent to be absorbed in the other. What they did agree to was to +constitute a new State, namely, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and +each to surrender their separate sovereignty in favour of a new +sovereign, namely, the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. The +English Parliament no more became supreme in Scotland than the Scotch +Parliament became supreme in England. The old Parliament of each country +abdicated and lost its identity in the New Parliament of Great Britain. +In theory the Treaty of Union between Great Britain and Ireland bore +exactly the same character as the Treaty of Union between England and +Scotland. But on this point I do not care strongly to insist, because at +the present moment every part of Irish history excites controversy. +When, however, the excitement of the day has passed by, no one will +dispute that 22 Geo. III. c. 53 and 23 Geo. III. c. 28 constituted the +renunciation by the British Parliament of sovereignty over Ireland. The +difference between the limitation of sovereignty and the surrender of +sovereignty has been pressed far enough for my present purpose; no +principle of jurisprudence is more certain than that sovereignty +implies the power of abdication, and no fact of history is more certain +than that a sovereign Parliament has more than once abdicated or shared +its powers. To argue or imply that because sovereignty is not limitable +(which is true), it cannot be surrendered (which is palpably untrue) is +to confuse together two distinct ideas, and is like arguing that because +no man can while he lives give up, do what he will, his freedom of +volition, therefore no man can commit suicide. + +The Parliament of the United Kingdom, further, whilst because it is a +sovereign body it cannot impose any legal limit to the exercise of its +own power, may so express an intention to use or not to use its power in +a particular way as to excite expectations which it will be extremely +difficult or hazardous to disappoint, and so may find itself morally +fettered as to its subsequent legislative action. + +A notorious instance, taken from our constitutional history, illustrates +this proposition. The statute 18 Geo. III. c. 12 declares in substance +that Parliament will not impose any tax on any colony in North America +or in the West Indies. The history of the statute is told by its +date--1778. Now no constitutional lawyer will contend that the +Parliament of the United Kingdom is legally bound by this Act. If +Parliament were to impose an income tax on Jamaica to-morrow the impost +would be legal, and could, no doubt, be enforced. But the Declaratory +Act of 1778 makes it morally impossible for Parliament to tax any +colony. That the impossibility does not arise from a law is clear, +because it applies with as much strength to colonies which do not fall +as to colonies which do fall within the terms of 18 Geo. III. c. 12. +Victoria is not a colony in North America or in the West Indies, but +Victoria is at least as well protected from Imperial taxation as is +Barbadoes. The so-called Act establishes not a rule of law, but a +precept of constitutional morality. It does not theoretically limit, but +it practically impedes and interferes with the legislative sovereignty +of Parliament. + +Our Judge with these propositions fully before his mind would scan the +terms of the Gladstonian Constitution, or in other words of the Irish +Government Act. He would certainly come to the conclusion that the point +for his decision was one of great nicety. Against the validity of any +Act passed by the British Parliament in contravention of the provisions +of the Constitution could be adduced the precise and formal enactment, +passed, be it noted, by the undoubtedly sovereign Parliament of the +United Kingdom, that the Constitution should be alterable in one way, +and in one way only;[69] and if it were said that the body which passed +this enactment could also repeal it, then the Judge might consider that +that body, namely the Parliament of the United Kingdom, had in effect +ceased to exist, and that the successor to its sovereign powers, if any, +was not the British Parliament, but the Imperial Parliament, the body +which, under any view, had legal authority to alter the Constitution. +No doubt there would be a great deal to be urged on the other side. The +attention of the Judge would be called to the singular and ambiguous use +throughout the Constitution of the term Imperial Parliament, which it +might be argued was meant to show that what I have called the British +Parliament was to be identified with the Parliament of the United +Kingdom. Reference would also be made to the ambiguous saving of powers +contained in the 37th section of the Irish Government Act. The high and +all-important enquiry as to the authority of the British Parliament +sitting at Westminster would come to turn upon the studied ambiguities +of one ill-drawn section of an Act of Parliament. There the legal +question of the sovereignty of the British Parliament under the +Gladstonian Constitution may well be left. It is not within the scope of +this work to deal with the draughtsmanship of the Government of Ireland +Bill. It is easy to anticipate what would be the practical result of +that Bill's ambiguities if it passed into an Act. Irish Judges would +honestly take one view, English Judges would as honestly take another. +The Courts of Ireland would maintain that the Constitution could be +altered only in the method provided by the Constitution, namely, by the +Imperial Parliament. The English Courts would maintain that the +Constitution could also be altered by the British Parliament, which was +itself the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and possessed the +sovereignty inherent in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. No Court +in either country could satisfactorily terminate the dispute. Force +would no doubt settle what law had left undecided, but to interpret a +Constitution by power of arms is in reality to substitute revolutionary +violence for constitutional discussion.[70] + +Let us next consider the matter before us, not as a question of +constitutional law, but as a question of public morality. + +[Sidenote: As question of public morality.] + +The enquiry then is whether under the Gladstonian Constitution the +legislative supremacy of the British Parliament is or is not morally and +in fact impaired? It is extremely difficult to see how any candid person +can answer this question except by the admission that for all practical +purposes, and except on possible but very extreme occasions, the right +of the British Parliament to legislate for Ireland is morally not only +impaired but destroyed. The supporters of the Government of Ireland Bill +have admitted again and again that it constitutes what they term a +Parliamentary compact; it embodies, in other words, a solemn contract +between Great Britain and the people of Ireland that the British +Parliament, whatever be its legal power, shall not legislate about Irish +affairs without summoning Irish representatives to share in its +deliberations. This covenant is made for great and valuable +consideration, namely, the withdrawal of the Irish representatives from +the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the consequent acquisition by +the British Parliament of power to legislate not only on every British +but on every Imperial concern without consulting the wishes of the Irish +people. This is in a moral point of view little less than a treaty; it +is an engagement which England could not break, or incur the imputation +of breaking, without dishonour. With all this every man of sense and of +honour agrees; but if this be so, it is impossible to see how any one +can maintain that this Parliamentary compact does not morally impair, as +far as Ireland is concerned, the sovereignty or legislative supremacy of +the British Parliament. It may be doubted whether the most earnest +Gladstonian really and seriously maintains that under the Gladstonian +Constitution the British Parliament sitting at Westminster could or ever +would legislate for Ireland in contravention at any rate of the patent +and apparent meaning of the Constitution. All that is really maintained +is that the British Parliament would retain a legal power of doing that +which would never be done by it. There is, however, it is suggested, +convenience in retaining a nominal sovereignty which is not intended for +real use. Convenience there may be, but there is also immense danger. +The Irish Parliament we will suppose acts in a way which is most +annoying to England, but the Irish Parliament at the same time takes +care not to violate a line of the Constitution. The temptation to use +our sovereign authority is great, and likely enough may prove +irresistible; yet if we use it every Irishman, and many Englishmen for +that matter, will accuse England of bad faith. No doubt a breach of the +Constitution by the Irish Parliament might be remedied by the use of the +sovereignty reserved to the British Parliament. But it is difficult even +then to see the great advantage of this reservation. In any case in +which England would be morally justified in setting aside the terms of +the high Parliamentary contract, she would be equally justified in +suspending the Constitution by the use of force. The employment of power +becomes the more not the less odious because it is allied, or seems to +be allied, with fraud. The miserable tale of the transactions which +carried the Treaty of Union teaches at least one indisputable +lesson--the due observance of legal formalities will not induce a people +to pardon what they deem to be acts of tyranny, made all the more +hateful by their combination with deceit. For the British Parliament to +renounce the exercise whilst retaining the name of sovereignty is the +very course by which to run a great risk of damaging the character +without any certainty of increasing the power of Parliament. + +The plain answer then to the enquiry on which we have been engaged is +this:-- + +Under the Gladstonian Constitution, as foreshadowed in the Government of +Ireland Bill, the sovereignty of the British Parliament is legally +rendered doubtful, and is morally reduced to nothing. + +[Sidenote: Does Constitution secure justice?] + +_2nd Question._--Does the Gladstonian Constitution secure justice? + +The justice which the Constitution ought to secure is twofold--justice +to Great Britain, and justice to all classes, including minorities, of +Irishmen. + +The just claims of Great Britain may roughly be summed up under the one +claim, that Ireland should contribute her fair share to Imperial +expenditure. + +The Gladstonian Constitution, nominally at least, makes fair provision +that this claim should be satisfied. But any one who looks into the +matter with care will find reason to think that as regards the exaction +of payments from Ireland, which are already known by the hateful name of +"tribute," Great Britain will find herself involved in this dilemma. +Either she must surrender the tribute, or else surrender all hope of +attaining the main object for the sake of which it is proposed to grant +Home Rule to Ireland. If the tribute is exacted, we may be sure that it +will have to be exacted in the long run by British officials supported +by a British army. Laws, we are told, which are otherwise just are hated +in Ireland because they bear a foreign aspect, and come before the Irish +people in a foreign garb. If this assertion be not true, then the whole +case for Home Rule falls to the ground. If this assertion possess even +partial truth, then it applies with far greater force to tribute than +to law. It is almost an absurdity to suppose that people who hate good +laws because they may be termed English will not detest a heavy tax +which not only may be called, but in reality is, a tribute to England. +It is well to remember that a "publican" was a tax-gatherer, and that +Roman publicans were far more hated than Roman Judges or Roman law. If +England gives Ireland semi-independence, and at the same time makes +Ireland pay tribute, all the conciliatory effects of Home Rule will be +lost. If Home Rule is to have even a bare chance of producing in Ireland +the contentment of Victoria, Ireland, the poorest of all civilized +countries, must be freed from Imperial taxation, which would not be +tolerated by the richest of our colonies. To this conclusion the +advocates and the opponents of Home Rule may, I think, both come without +grave dissatisfaction. Of all the sacrifices by which Ireland might be +benefited, that sacrifice which England should make with the least +regret is sacrifice of revenue. If, however, it be assumed, as the +supporters of the Government of Ireland Bill must assume, that justice +requires the contribution by Ireland of three or four millions annually +to Imperial expenditure, then the Gladstonian Constitution, if it +provides for the satisfaction of the claims of Great Britain, does so at +the cost of keeping alive Irish discontent. Nor is it at all certain +that the payment of the tribute could in effect be easily secured. The +practical working of the Constitution might well be that Great Britain +were impoverished and Ireland were angered. + +Justice to individuals and to unpopular minorities is a matter of far +greater importance and far more difficult to secure than the regular +payment of Ireland's contribution to Imperial expenditure. + +The Gladstonian Constitution ought to provide securities against +executive and legislative oppression. + +To provide however against the possible oppression of classes or +individuals by an Irish Ministry and Irish officials is all but an +impossibility, though, as every one knows, the grossest oppression may +in any country arise from the wrongful action or inaction of the +executive power. The assumption, indeed, is constantly made, though its +truth is very hard to prove, that if Ireland were self-governed the law +of the land would be enforced. In one sense this assumption may perhaps +be well founded. A strong government, or, to put matters plainly, a +popular despotism when installed in office at Dublin would, it may be +suspected, stringently compel obedience to such laws as the Government +approved. The Jacobin Club was no friend to anarchy when anarchy meant +defiance of the mandates issued by the Club. But the energy of a strong +Government in carrying out laws which it approves is a different matter +from the zealous maintenance of even-handed justice. An Irish executive +will immediately on coming into existence be called upon to deal with +cases which will severely test its sense of justice. Landlords cannot +at once be banished like vermin from Ireland; landlords, as long as +they exist, must, I presume, have some rights. Is there any security +under the Gladstonian Constitution, that the rights--rights, be it +remembered, of British subjects, which ought to be neither more nor less +sacred than the rights of a British subject in London or Calcutta--will +be protected by an executive of Land Leaguers? There is, I answer, none +whatever. To distrust the justice of an Irish Government is not, be it +remarked, to show any special distrust of Irish nature. The Irish +leaders are of necessity revolutionists, and, it must be added, +revolutionists of no high character. Revolutionists on accession to +power do not lay aside the revolutionary temperament, and this +temperament may have every other virtue, but it knows nothing of the +virtue of justice. The Gladstonian Constitution withdraws Ireland from +the control of the Government of the United Kingdom, which with all its +faults must of necessity possess more impartiality than can a Ministry +formed out of the leaders of any Irish faction. The Gladstonian +Constitution therefore does leave unpopular classes or individuals +exposed to considerable risks of injustice at the hands of the Irish +Government. + +[Sidenote: Methods for securing just government.] + +Though it is from the nature of things almost impossible to take +effective steps for ensuring that an Irish executive shall make a right +use of its powers, it is an essential feature of the Gladstonian +Constitution that the Irish Parliament shall so far at least use its +authority justly as to keep within the limits placed upon its +competence. Whether these limitations have been wisely drawn, and +whether they may not be in some respects too wide and in others too +narrow, are inquiries which, though important in themselves, need hardly +detain us. The question in comparison with which all matters of detail +sink into insignificance is not what are the limitations which the +Constitution imposes on the competence of the Irish Parliament, but what +is the efficacity of the means provided by the Constitution for +compelling the Irish Parliament to respect these limitations? This is +the one vital inquiry, for upon the answer to it depends the reality of +the constitutional provisions for the maintenance of just legislation. +These methods are, as already pointed out, twofold. + +[Sidenote: 1. Veto of Lord-Lieutenant.] + +The first is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant. Let us assume, though the +truth of the assumption is not quite clear, that this veto is combined, +as in the case of the colonies, with a further power of disallowance on +the part of the Crown, or in effect of the British Ministry. The result +is that the British Ministry, or, to put the thing plainly, the British +House of Commons, can put a check on such Irish legislation as may be +opposed to the letter or to the spirit of the Constitution. The check is +in one sense real, but it must, as in the case of the colonies, be but +rarely employed. Its constant use, or its use on occasions of great +importance, would seem to Irishmen, and with good reason, to nullify +the concession of Home Rule. Suppose, for example, the Irish Ministry +carry a measure for artificially stimulating Irish commerce, and the +Crown disallows it on the ground that it is contrary to the provision of +the Constitution forbidding the Irish Parliament to make any law +relating to trade. The Irish Cabinet thereupon resigns. What course is +the Lord-Lieutenant to take? If he uses the veto he reintroduces in the +most awkward form the interference of the British Parliament with Irish +legislation. If he does not use the veto, or, what is in its effect the +same thing, if the Act is not disallowed, then the right of veto comes +to little or nothing. We may be quite sure that in general neither the +Lord-Lieutenant nor the Crown will refuse assent to Bills approved of by +the Irish Parliament. The veto in its different forms will, in short, be +but a very slight check on unconstitutional or unjust legislation. + +[Sidenote: 2. Action of Privy Council.] + +The second method by which it is endeavoured to check unconstitutional +legislation is the use of the authority vested in the English Privy +Council. Privy This method is borrowed from Federalism, as the +Lord-Lieutenant's veto is borrowed from the Colonial system. The Privy +Council, it should be remembered, may nullify the effect of Irish +legislation in two ways:--It may as an administrative body give a +decision that a Bill or Act is void. It must, however, be hoped and +expected that the Privy Council will rarely adopt this mode of +exercising its powers, for such exercise would at once give rise to a +direct conflict between the Irish Parliament and the English Privy +Council. That body may, however, act simply as a Court of final appeal, +and as a tribunal decide whether an enactment Of the Irish Parliament is +or is not void. This, we may suppose, is the mode in which the Privy +Council will usually put forth its authority. It is easy, bearing the +experience of America and Canada in mind, to see how the whole +arrangement will, in theory at least, work. _A._ sues _X._ in an Irish +Court, _X._ bases his defence on some Act passed by the Irish +Parliament. The Privy Council pronounce the Act void, as being opposed +to some provision of the Constitution, and give a judgment in favour of +_A._, under which he has a right to recover L10,000 against _X._ Here it +will be said the whole matter is settled. The law was unconstitutional; +the law has been treated as void; _A._ has obtained judgment; _A.'s_ +rights are secured. This would be all that was required, but for one +consideration. The object of the plaintiff in an action is to obtain not +judgment, but payment or execution. What are the means by which +judgments of the Privy Council may be put in force where they happen not +to be supported by Irish opinion, and are opposed, it may be, to the +decisions of the Irish Courts? The answer is simple: the Constitution +provides no means whatever. The Federal tribunals of America possess in +every State officials of their own, and are supported in the main by +American opinion. The Americans are, moreover, to use their own +expression, "a law-abiding people." Yet for all this the judgment of +the Supreme Court may be worth little if it runs across State sentiment, +and if the President should happen to sympathise with State rights. A +citizen of colour was unlawfully imprisoned in Georgia; he applied for a +habeas corpus. The application ultimately came before Chief Justice +Marshall, and the writ was granted. The traditional comment of President +Jackson is noteworthy: "John Marshall has given his judgment, let him +enforce it if he can." The Executive would not assist the Court, and the +Supreme Court was powerless. Switzerland, again, has a Federal tribunal: +it is a Court, as would be the Privy Council, which cannot command +officials of its own to execute its process; it depends for aid on the +Cantonal authorities. This state of things, I am told on good authority, +produces its natural result. The judgments of the Federal tribunal can +be rendered almost ineffective by the opposition of a Canton. + +At this moment the statutes of the Imperial Parliament bind every man +throughout the United Kingdom. The Courts in Ireland are bound to give +effect to every statute, and the Irish Courts are supported by the +Sheriff and his officers, and in the last resort by the power of the +United Kingdom. Yet the very difficulty of the day is enforcing +judgments which run against Irish popular opinion. Is it common sense to +imagine that opposition which defies, often with success, the authority +of the Irish Queen's Bench Division, or ultimately of the House of +Lords, would not easily nullify the judgments of the Privy Council when +not only unpopular in Ireland, but in contradiction to a law devised by +the Irish Executive, passed by the Irish Parliament, supported by the +Irish Judges? The truth must be spoken: the Gladstonian Constitution +will, as regards the restrictions placed under it on the powers of the +Irish Parliament, inevitably turn out a mere paper Constitution. The +methods for compelling the observance of these limitations have neither +of them any real efficacity. The veto can with difficulty and but rarely +be used; the judgments or opinions of the Privy Council may have a +speculative interest, but will possess no coercive power. + +If this be so the guarantees afforded by the Constitution for just +legislation are nugatory; they are worth neither more nor less than the +pompous securities for every kind of inalienable right which have +adorned the most splendid and the most transitory among the +Constitutions which have during a century been in turn created and +destroyed in France--that is, they are worth nothing; nor is it unfair +to conjecture that on this point my opinion agrees with the opinion of +many English Home Rulers. They think the limitations on the independence +of the Irish Parliament useless and destined to disappear; for their +avowed belief is that legislation by an Irish Parliament will in the +main be just, and that the laws of the Irish Parliament, because they +represent the wishes of the Irish people, will obtain easy obedience in +Ireland. If this conviction be sound--and it is the almost necessary +basis for a policy of Home Rule--let us act upon it, and not impose +restrictions which, if needless, must certainly be noxious. Meanwhile in +any case let us dismiss the delusion that restrictions which cannot be +enforced are any guarantee for justice. The Gladstonian Constitution +admits on the face of it that guarantees are wanted. Most Englishmen +agree in the opinion implied in this admission. But if I am right in +asserting that the guarantees for justice are illusory, then the +Gladstonian Constitution does not secure justice, and is therefore not +just. + +[Sidenote: Does Constitution possess finality?] + +_3rd Question_.--Does the Gladstonian Constitution hold out fair hopes +of finality? + +This is an enquiry which may be answered with some confidence. + +To any one who surveys the Constitution, not as a politician, but as a +legist; to any one moderately versed in the study of comparative +constitutionalism, few statements which savour of prediction will appear +more certain than the assertion that the Gladstonian Constitution cannot +be a final or even a lasting settlement of the constitutional relations +between England and Ireland. + +The grounds of this opinion are, briefly, that the proposed Constitution +will, while leaving alive elements of discord, cause disappointment and +inconvenience to both countries, and that the mechanism of the +Constitution, framed as it is upon a combination of Federalism and of +Colonialism, has some of the defects of each system, and promises in +its working to produce something like the maximum of irritation and +friction. + +The two grounds for believing that the Gladstonian Constitution bears no +promise of finality run into one another, but they admit of separate +examination, and each requires explanation or justification. + +[Sidenote: Constitution will cause disappointment to England.] + +The Constitution will cause disappointment and inconvenience both to +England and to Ireland, Englishmen will on the Gladstonian Constitution +coming into operation find to their great disappointment that they have +not attained the object which from an English point of view was the +principal inducement to grant Home Rule to the Irish people, that is, +freedom from the difficulty of governing Ireland. The difficulty no +doubt will be diminished, or rather shifted; but the dream is vain that +under the new Constitution Englishmen would be able to trouble +themselves no more about the concerns of Ireland than they do about the +affairs of Canada. Ireland would still be our immediate neighbour. +Irishmen would still be divided by differences of class and religion, +and England would still, disguise the fact as you may, be ultimately +responsible for good government in Ireland. Home Rule is not Separation, +and nothing short of Irish independence would greatly lessen English +responsibility. This would be true under whatever form Home Rule were +established, but it is emphatically true of Home Rule under the +particular form contemplated by the Gladstonian Constitution. The army +in Ireland--and no one supposes that England can withdraw her soldiers +from the country--will be the British Army under the control of the +British Government. But the power of the sword is, though we often +forget the fact, the sanction by which law is maintained. Hence it +follows that the British Ministry remains at bottom responsible for the +maintenance of peace and order throughout Ireland. Note the results. If +there are riots at Belfast; if unpopular officials are assassinated in +Dublin; if evictions give rise to murder in Kerry, the British Army must +in the last resort be called in to restore peace or punish crime. If the +army are not under the control of the Irish Executive, then the English +Cabinet become directly responsible for the government of Ireland. If +British soldiers are placed at the disposal of the Irish Ministry, still +the English Government must, shift the thing as you will, share the +responsibility of the Irish Cabinet. During a riot at Belfast a hundred +Protestants or Catholics are shot by British soldiers whilst restoring +order. If any one fancies that such slaughter can take place without the +English Ministry being called upon in the British Parliament for +explanation and defence, he shows utter ignorance of English, or indeed +of human nature. Nor is it for the action only of the troops that the +English Executive will incur liability. If British subjects are killed +by a mob in Belfast or in Dublin whilst British troops stand quietly by +and under the direction of an Irish Home Secretary take no steps to +prevent murder, we may rest assured that the Queen's Government in +England will be asked whether it is decent that the Queen's forces +should be trained to stand as indifferent spectators of outrageous +breaches of the Queen's peace. + +Take again the question of pardoning crime. Suppose that the first Irish +Ministry on their accession to power propose to inaugurate the new era +by a free pardon of all the political offenders, dynamiters and others, +whose misguided zeal placed them within the gripe of the law, but also +in no small measure contributed to achieve the Parliamentary +independence of Ireland. If the request is not granted, then the Irish +Administration are refused the means of carrying on the government of +the country after their own notions of sound polity. If the request is +granted, can the English Government be held entirely irresponsible for +the mode in which the Crown exercises its prerogative? Let it be settled +that the prerogative of mercy must in Ireland be exercised in accordance +with the wishes of the Irish Ministry. Even then the English Government +will not really escape responsibility. British soldiers put down a riot +at Belfast; they are indicted for the murder of a Catholic rioter, +before a Catholic grand jury, convicted by a Catholic jury under the +direction of a Catholic judge who has just been appointed by the new +Irish Ministry. Popular opinion demands the execution of the convicted +murderers, the Irish Ministry advise that the law should take its +course. The general belief in England, shared we will suppose by the +English Home Office, is that the convicted soldiers are about to be +capitally punished for having simply discharged their duty. Is an +English Minister to abstain from advising a pardon? The dilemma is +difficult. If he recommends a pardon, the Irish Government are prevented +by England from governing Ireland. If the soldiers are hanged, the +English Ministry will not keep long in office, the British Army will +hardly maintain its habit of absolute obedience to the civil power. + +Englishmen, in the next place, will soon discover that the creation of a +statutory constitution for Ireland curiously hampers the working of our +own institutions. Questions must arise whether Acts of the British +Parliament do or do not trench upon the provisions of the Irish +Constitution. Few persons are aware of the number of Imperial Acts which +touch the Colonies. To such statutes there is no legal or moral +objection, because the principle embodied in the Colonial Laws Act, +1865, that enactments passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom +override any Colonial law with which they conflict, is universally +admitted; but, as already pointed out, it is questionable as a matter of +law whether the statutes of the British Parliament can repeal Acts duly +passed by the Irish Parliament, and it is quite beyond question that for +the British Parliament to infringe upon the province of the Irish +legislature would involve a breach of good faith. Changes again in the +formation of the British Parliament might under the Gladstonian +Constitution become difficult. The abolition of the House of Lords would +be hard to reconcile with the right of the Irish Peers to be summoned on +occasion to the Imperial Parliament. An increase in the number of +British representatives in the House of Commons would be objected to by +Irishmen because it diminished the relative importance of the members +from Ireland when recalled to take part in the deliberations of the +Imperial Parliament. The reduction of the number of members of the House +of Commons, though one of the most salutary reforms which could be +carried out, would be opposed by every person interested in maintaining +the present excessive number of the Lower House, on the ground that to +reduce the numbers of the House of Commons, to say 400, would involve an +increase in the authority of the Irish members whenever they reappeared +on the scene. The moot question whether the British Parliament could on +an emergency repeal of its own authority the articles of the Irish +Constitution; the extent to which Ireland should be represented on the +Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; above all, the vital question +whether the reassembled Imperial Parliament were not the true +representative of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the ultimate +sovereign power in the State, would in periods of excitement give rise +to disputes hitherto quite alien to English politics, and involving +elements of unknown danger. + +Ambiguity and obscurity, since they help to pass Bills, are in the +judgment of Parliamentary draughtsmen and Parliamentary statesmen +characteristics which promote the easy working of Acts. Knives which are +made to sell are not knives which are made to cut. No delusion is more +dangerous. The founders of the American Union knew their own minds, and +were not well acquainted with the advantages to be derived from the +obscurities of modern draughtsmanship. But on two points they tried the +experiment of keeping real perils out of sight by omitting to refer to +them. "Slave" and "slavery" are words not to be found in the +Constitution of the United States. What (if any) was the right of a +State to retire from the Union, was a matter purposely left open for the +interpretation of future generations. The Abolition movement, the +Fugitive Slave Law, the War of Secession tell the result of trying to +ignore perils or problems which it is not easy to face or to solve. + +[Sidenote: And to Ireland.] + +The last disappointment of Englishmen would be to find that Home Rule +had not satisfied Ireland. For to Irishmen no less than to Englishmen +the Constitution must bring disappointment and inconvenience. + +That the Gladstonian Constitution cannot satisfy Ireland is all but +certain. + +To say this is not to imply that its acceptance by Irish Home Rulers is +dishonest. In their eyes it is a move in the right direction; they +exaggerate, as their English allies underrate, the freedom of action +which the Constitution offers to Ireland. It cannot, as already pointed +out, by any possibility remove the admitted causes of Irish discontent. +It cannot tempt capital towards Ireland, but it may easily drive capital +away from her shores; it cannot diminish poverty; it cannot in its +direct effect assuage religious bigotry; it cannot of itself remove +agrarian discontent. The Land Purchase Bill, even when discarded, +remains an involuntary exposure of the futility of the Gladstonian +Constitution, and of the unsoundness of the principle on which the +demand for Home Rule rests. No friend of Italy ever suggested that +Italian independence should be accompanied by a loan from Austria to the +Italian Kingdom. For the principle of nationality was the true source of +Italian disaffection. If in dealing with Ireland we must calm agrarian +misery before satisfying national aspirations, this necessity is all but +a confession that Irish unrest is due far more to desire for a change in +the land laws than to passionate longing for national independence. I do +not doubt that the spirit of nationality has some, though probably a +small, part in the production of Irish discontent. But the Gladstonian +Constitution is unfortunately so devised as to outrage quite as much as +it soothes national sentiment. The tribute will affect every Irishman in +his pride no less than in his purse. Can any one suppose that +Northerners indignant at recent treachery, and Catholics mindful of +ancient oppression, will not join, and justly join, in denouncing as at +once ignominious and ruinous the payment of a tribute raised for +Imperial purposes at the moment when Ireland ceases to have any voice in +the direction of Imperial policy? Irishmen again will find to their +surprise that the Constitution intended to give them independence +imposes annoying fetters on their freedom of action. They wish for a +protective tariff, and they come across the prohibition to make laws +affecting trade; they desire that the country shall defend herself, and +they discover that they cannot raise even a body of volunteers; they +wish to try the plan of concurrent endowment, and they are thwarted by +the article of the Constitution prohibiting the endowment of religion. +These restrictions are the more annoying because none of them are +imposed upon the Colonies. Irishmen will further discover that great +achievements of constructive legislation require for their success the +command of large pecuniary resources, and that exemption from British +control involves the withdrawal of all assistance from the British +Treasury. + +[Sidenote: Constitution will cause friction.] + +The Constitution will produce irritation and friction. + +Every scheme for uniting into a political whole States which are +intended to retain, even when connected together, a certain amount of +independence, aims at minimising the opportunities for constitutional +collision, or for friction between the different States which are +connected together, and also between any State and the Central power. +If we compare the mode in which this end is attained, either under the +Federal system or under the Colonial system, with the arrangements of +the Gladstonian Constitution, we shall easily see how little its authors +have attended to the necessity for avoiding occasions of constitutional +friction. + +Where Federalism, as in America, appears in its best form, the skill +with which opportunities for collision or friction have been minimised +is almost above praise. The Federal or Central power is so constructed +as to represent the whole nation; its authority cannot by any +misrepresentation be identified with the power of one State more than +another. The Federal Government acts through its own officers, is +represented by its own Judiciary, and levies its own taxes without +recourse to State authorities. Every device which could be thought of +has been taken to make it unnecessary for the National Government to +come into direct collision with any State. It deals in general with the +individual citizens of the United States; it does not deal with the +particular States. The result is that on the one hand, whatever may be +said against the taxes imposed by Congress, they cannot by any stretch +of imagination be looked upon as tribute paid by one State to another, +say by Massachusetts to New York, or by New York to Massachusetts. It is +again unnecessary for the Federal Government to issue commands to a +State. There is, therefore, little opportunity for a contest between a +State and the National Executive. Whoever wishes to understand the +elaborate devices necessary to make Federalism work smoothly should +compare the clumsiness of the arrangements by which the Swiss +Confederacy has at times been compelled to enforce obedience of the +Cantons to the will of the Confederation, with the ingenuity of the +methods by which the Federal authorities of the United States exert +their authority over American citizens. + +The English Colonial system on the other hand, though far less elaborate +than any form of Federalism, does, as a matter of fact, reduce within +very narrow limits the chances of collision between England and her +colonies. The system, however, succeeds, not because it is a model of +constructive art, but because it attempts very little, and can, owing to +favourable circumstances, leave to nominal dependencies something little +short of complete self-government. Where collisions do arise they are +disposed of by the habit of the Imperial Government always to give way. + +The Gladstonian Constitution is, as we have already pointed out, a +combination between Federalism and Colonialism; it may possess some of +the merits, but it much more certainly displays some of the demerits of +each system. From Federalism is borrowed the idea of leaving the +settlement of constitutional questions to a Court. But the conception is +spoilt in the borrowing. All the difficulties which under a Federal +system beset the enforcement of judgments pronounced by a Federal Court +affect in an aggravated form the attempt to enforce in Ireland +judgments affecting the validity of Irish Acts, which judgments are +pronounced by a Committee of the English Privy Council sitting in +England. The Privy Council, moreover, while it has every weakness of the +Supreme Court of America, has more than one special weakness of its own. +It lacks moral authority, for it is an English Court sitting in England +and representing English opinion; it lacks jurisdiction, because while +it can pronounce on the validity of Irish, it cannot pronounce on the +validity of British Acts of Parliament; it does not possess a strictly +judicial character, because it is not only a Court called upon to give +judgments, but is also an administrative body called upon to deliver +opinions upon the validity of Irish Bills and of Irish Acts. Hence its +decrees come into direct collision with the proposals or enactments of +the Irish Parliament, and the Privy Council is made to appear not as a +body of Judges deciding cases between man and man, but as a body of +officials whose duty it is to oppose any unconstitutional action on the +part of the Irish Parliament. From Federalism again is borrowed the +contribution by Ireland towards meeting the expenses of the Empire. But +imposts which under a Federal system are a tax towards the payment of +common expenditure are under the Gladstonian Constitution a tribute to a +foreign power. From the Federal system again is taken that restriction +of legislative authority which hardly affects Parliaments such as that +of Victoria, and which under any circumstances is a source of +irritation. From the Colonial system, on the other hand, is derived the +theoretical supremacy of the British Parliament, the right of veto, and +the fatal dependence of the Irish executive on every vote of the Irish +legislature. From the colonies we therefore bring to Ireland sources of +dispute, of friction, and of irritation, which are unknown to a true +system of Federalism, whilst we do not give Ireland that practical +independence, and that immunity from taxation, which prevent our +ill-arranged connection with the colonies from causing real +dissatisfaction. Federalism has its merits and its defects; English +Colonialism works well enough; the sham Federalism and the sham +Colonialism of the Gladstonian Constitution must create between Great +Britain and Ireland all the causes of discontent which have from time to +time tried the strength of the American Union, and all the causes of +disturbance which from time to time reveal the weakness of the tie which +binds together our Colonial Empire. + +Among the hypothetical virtues of the Gladstonian Constitution cannot +assuredly be numbered the merit of finality. + +The Gladstonian Constitution therefore fails entirely to fulfil for any +practical purpose the conditions it is meant to satisfy. It neither +maintains the sovereignty of Parliament, nor makes adequate securities +for justice, nor offers a prospect of finality. + +A criticism of Home Rule in its four forms gives then this result:-- + +[Sidenote: Result of criticism. 1. Home Rule as Federalism.] + +Home Rule as Federalism means the immediate dislocation and the ultimate +rebuilding of the whole English Constitution; it involves the +transformation of an old and tried polity which centuries of experience +have admirably adapted to the wants of the English people, and which has +fostered the growth of the British Empire, into a form of government in +itself not free from defects, and successful where it has succeeded only +under conditions which the United Kingdom does not present. + +[Sidenote: 2. Home Rule as Colonial independence.] + +Home Rule in the form of Colonial independence involves far less change +in the institutions of Great Britain or in the complex arrangements of +the British Empire than does Federalism. It appears at first sight to be +an application to Ireland of institutions which, as they have been found +to answer their purpose in such countries as Canada and Victoria, may +also prove successful in Ireland. The appearance is delusive. The true +reasons why the Colonial system, self-contradictory as it is in theory +and unsatisfactory as it sometimes is in practice, has produced harmony +between England and her dependencies, are that the colonies are far +distant and are prosperous, that they feel pride in their relation to +the mother-country, that whilst contributing not a penny towards meeting +Imperial burdens they derive valuable and valued benefits from the +connection with the Empire, and lastly that they are not in reality +dependencies; the colonies willingly acquiesce in the supremacy of +England, because England protects them gratis and does not govern them +at all. It is not the Colonial system, but the conditions which make +that system succeed, which ought to engross our attention. These +conditions will not be found in any arrangement whatever between England +and Ireland. It is in the strictest sense impossible that Ireland whilst +forming part of the United Kingdom, or even of the British Empire, +should enjoy or endure the independence of Victoria. If the Act which +gives Victoria her constitution were reenacted with the necessary verbal +changes for Ireland, the constitution which satisfies the Victorians +would not satisfy the Irish, and for a good reason: the form would be +the same, but the effect would be different. A suffering and +discontented people will not accept words for facts. + +One condition indeed, which more perhaps than any other ensures the +success of our Colonial system, Great Britain has in the case of Ireland +the power to reproduce. Immunity from Imperial taxation is one source of +Colonial loyalty to the Empire. If Ireland is to accept or to receive +the mixed independence and subordination of a colony, she ought to enjoy +the substantial advantage of a theoretically inferior position. The +Colonial system, as I have already insisted, involves the renunciation +of Imperial taxation. + +[Sidenote: 3. Home Rule as Constitution of 1782.] + +Home Rule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution is an impossibility. +The Constitution of 1782 belongs to a past age, and cannot by any +miracle of political art be at the present day restored to life. + +[Sidenote: 4. Home Rule as Gladstonian Constitution.] + +Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution means an artificial +combination of Federalism and Colonialism. Its aim is to secure the +advantages of two opposite systems; its result is to combine and +intensify the disadvantages of both systems. It inevitably tends towards +the dissolution of the United Kingdom into a Federation; it immediately +disturbs the bases of the Constitution by creating the artificial bond +of something like a Federal legislature between England and Ireland; it +introduces into the relations between each of the different divisions of +the United Kingdom elements of conflict which are all but inherent in +Federalism; it requires that absolute deference for the judicial +decisions of a Federal Court which if it exist anywhere can exist only +among a people like the Americans, imbued with legal notions, and as it +were born with innate respect for law. That this sentiment cannot exist +in Ireland is certain; whether it exist in the required intensity even +in England is problematical. The Gladstonian Constitution, again, +because it contains some institutions borrowed from the Colonial system +without the conditions requisite for their proper working so to speak +falsifies them. The Imperial supremacy of Great Britain, the Imperial +control over the army, the occasional interference with the Irish +executive and the veto of the Crown on Irish legislation, are each and +all of them under the Gladstonian Constitution certain to be the source +of justifiable dissatisfaction. To the ingenuity of the plan proposed by +Mr. Gladstone's Ministry hostile critics have given insufficient praise. +But the essential unreality which this ingenuity has concealed has not +even yet met with due condemnation. Since the day when the National +Assembly of France presented the brand-new French Constitution to the +acceptance of Louis XVI. no form of government has ever been seriously +proposed for adoption by an intelligent people so radically unworkable +as that Gladstonian Constitution which has been instinctively rejected +by the good sense of the British Parliament. The Constitution of France +lasted out two years; to a jurist it may appear conceivable, though +hardly probable, that by the vigorous aid of the British Parliament the +new Constitution for the United Kingdom might have lasted for as long a +period. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[29] Compare Mr. Gladstone's speech of 8th April, 1886, '_The Times_ +Parliamentary Debates,' pp. 130, 131; and Mr. Gladstone's speech of 13th +April, _ibid._, pp. 255, 256. + +[30] Compare _ibid._, pp. 130, 132. + +[31] Compare the following expressions in Mr. Gladstone's +speeches:--"The essential conditions of any plan that Parliament can be +asked or could be expected to entertain are, in my opinion, these:--The +unity of the Empire must not be placed in jeopardy; the safety and +welfare of the whole--if there is an unfortunate conflict, which I do +not believe--the welfare and security of the whole must be preferred to +the security and advantage of the part. The political equality of the +three countries must be maintained. They stand by statute on a footing +of absolute equality, and that footing ought not to be altered or +brought into question. There should be what I will at present term an +equitable distribution of Imperial burdens. Next I introduce a provision +which may seem to be exceptional, but which in the peculiar +circumstances of Ireland, whose history unhappily has been one long +chain of internal controversies as well as of difficulties external, is +necessary in order that there may be reasonable safeguards for the +minority. I am asked why there should be safeguards for the minority. + + * * * * * + +"I have spoken now of the essential conditions of a good plan for +Ireland, and I add only this--that in order to be a good plan it must be +a plan promising to be a real settlement of Ireland. (Speech of Mr. +Gladstone, 8th April, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary Debates,' pp. +130, 131.) + +"I laid down, I say, five essential conditions, from which it appeared +to me we could under no circumstances depart. These were the essential +conditions under which in our opinion the granting of a domestic +Legislature to Ireland would be justifiable and wise--first, that it +must be consistent with Imperial unity; secondly, that it must be +founded upon the political equality of the three nations; thirdly, that +there must be an equitable distribution of Imperial burdens; fourthly, +that there should be safeguards for the minority; and, fifthly, that it +should be in the nature of a settlement, and not of a mere provocation +to the revival of fresh demands, which, according to the right hon. +gentleman, exceeded all reasonable expectation and calculation." (Speech +of Mr. Gladstone, 13th April, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary Debates,' +p. 256.) Let it be observed that when Mr. Gladstone speaks of the unity +of the Empire he means the sovereignty of Parliament, for in the same +speech from which these extracts are taken he says, "The unity of the +Empire rests upon the supremacy of Parliament and on considerations much +higher than considerations merely fiscal." ('_The Times_ Parliamentary +Debates,' p. 132.) + +[32] Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution,' lecture iv. Parliamentary +Sovereignty and Federalism. + +[33] A singular instance of the attempt to dissolve a country into +States deserves notice. In 1852 a constitution was devised for New +Zealand, under which the country was to be governed by a central +legislature and subordinate provincial governments and councils. This +artificial federation was of short duration; the provincial governments +were in 1875 abolished by an Act of the General Assembly.--Todd, +'Parliamentary Government,' pp. 320-322. + +[34] See Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution,' 2nd ed., pp. 35-79. + +[35] _Contemporary Review_, vol. xii., p. 908. + +[36] _Contemporary Review_, vol. xli., p. 921. + +[37] 'Mr. Gladstone's Irish Constitution,' _Contemporary Review_, May, +1886, p. 616. + +[38] 'Arguments for and against Home Rule,' by the Rev. Malcolm MacColl, +M.A., p. 71. + +[39] 'The Irish Question,' by the Right Hon. W.E. Gladstone, pp. 36, 37. + +[40] 'American Home Rule,' by E.L. Godkin, _Nineteenth Century_, June, +1886, pp. 793, 802. + +[41] See Todd, 'Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies,' pp. +274-303, and especially p. 281, as to the position of the colonial +troops in Victoria. + +[42] See Tarring, 'Chapters on the Law relating to the Colonies,' pp. +79-85. + +[43] See Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution,' pp. 105, 106. + +The somewhat complicated principles which govern what is popularly +called the right of veto on Bills passed by Colonial Legislatures, are +thus stated in the 'Rules and Regulations' published for the use of the +Colonial Office, Chapter III., Legislative Councils and Assemblies, +Rules 48-55:-- + +"48. In every Colony the Governor has authority either to give or to +withhold his assent to laws passed by the other branches or members of +the Legislature, and until that assent is given no such law is valid or +binding. + +"49. Laws are in some cases passed with suspending clauses; that is, +although assented to by the Governor they do not come into operation or +take effect in the Colony until they shall have been specially confirmed +by Her Majesty, and in other cases Parliament has for the same purpose +empowered the Governor to reserve Laws for the Crown's assent, instead +of himself assenting or refusing his assent to them. + +"50. Every Law which has received the Governor's assent (unless it +contains a suspending clause) comes into operation immediately or at the +time specified in the Law itself. But the Crown retains power to +disallow the Law; and if such power be exercised at any time afterwards, +the Law ceases to have operation from the date at which such +disallowance is published in the Colony. + +"51. In Colonies having Representative Assemblies the disallowance of +any Law, or the Crown's assent to a reserved Bill, is signified by Order +in Council. The confirmation of an Act passed with a suspending clause +is not signified by Order in Council unless this mode of confirmation is +required by the terms of the suspending clause itself, or by some +special provision in the constitution of the Colony. + +"52. In Crown Colonies the allowance or disallowance of any Law is +generally signified by despatch. + +"53. In some cases a period is limited, after the expiration of which +Local Enactments, though not actually disallowed, cease to have the +authority of Law in the Colony, unless before the lapse of that time Her +Majesty's confirmation of them shall have been signified there; but the +general rule is otherwise. + +"54. In Colonies possessing Representative Assemblies, Laws purport to +be made by the Queen or by the Governor on Her Majesty's behalf or +sometimes by the Governor alone, omitting any express reference to Her +Majesty, with the advice and consent of the Council and Assembly. They +are almost invariably designated as Acts. In Colonies not having such +Assemblies, Laws are designated as Ordinances, and purport to be made by +the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council (or +in British Guiana of the Court of Policy). + +"55. In West Indian Islands or African Settlements which form part of +any general Government, every Bill or Draft Ordinance must be submitted +to the Governor-in-Chief before it receives the assent of the +Lieutenant-Governor or Administrator. If the Governor-in-Chief shall +consider any amendment indispensable, he may either require that +amendment to be made before the Law is brought into operation, or he may +authorize the officer administering to assent to the Bill or Draft on +the express engagement of the Legislature to give effect to the +Governor-in-Chief's recommendation by a supplementary Enactment." + +The effect of these Regulations may be best understood by taking the +following supposed case as an example of their operation. + +The Houses of the Victorian Parliament pass a Bill legalising the +marriage of a widower with his deceased wife's sister. + +i. The Governor refuses his assent. The Bill is lost and never becomes +law. + +ii. The Governor assents to the Bill on the 1st of January. It thereupon +becomes an Act, and law in Victoria. + +iii. The Crown disallows the Act on the 1st of April. The disallowance +is published in Victoria on the 1st of May. From the 1st of May the Act +ceases to be law in any part of the British Dominions, but marriages +made under it between the 1st of January and the 1st of May are valid. + +iv. The Crown allows the Bill. It thereupon becomes an Act which +continues in force in Victoria until it be repealed either by the +British Parliament or by the Victorian Parliament. + +v. The Bill contains a clause that it shall not come into force unless +and until allowed by the Crown within two years of its passing. It is +not so allowed, it never comes into force, or in other words never +becomes law. + +The point to be noted is that the Crown, or in reality the Colonial +Office, has and often exercises the power of placing a veto upon any +Colonial law whatever. + +[44] Compare 'Victorian Parliamentary Paper,' 1883, 2 S., No. 22, and +the _Times_ of September 27, October 2, 5, 10, 12, 15 and 18, 1883. + +[45] See Todd, 'Parliamentary Government in the Colonies,' p. 283. + +[46] Todd, p. 283. + +[47] See, e.g., a letter by Mr. Lecky in the _Times_ of January 13, +1886. + +[48] See pp. 221, 222, _post._ + +[49] See a letter in the _Spectator_ of January 2, 1886, on 'Home Rule +or Separation,' by Mr. J. Cotter Morison. + +[50] See p. 197, _ante._ + +[51] _The Times_, May 5, 1886. + +[52] Under the political arrangements connecting the two countries, it +was practically impossible that the two crowns could by legal means be +separated without the assent of the English Parliament. George III. was +necessarily a member both of the English and of the Irish Parliaments; +and it is inconceivable that as King of Ireland he should have assented +to a bill passed by the Irish Houses of Parliament which was strenuously +opposed by the English Houses of Parliament. The madness of the King +raised a case not provided for by the Constitution, and the accidental +difference of opinion between the English and Irish Houses of +Parliament, as to the Regency, has been treated as possessing more +importance than from a constitutional point of view belonged to it. + +[53] See Appendix for the Government of Ireland Bill. It is there +printed in extenso. The clauses which mainly concern the points +discussed in the following pages are printed in italics. Readers who +wish to understand my comments on the Gladstonian Constitution, should +study the Bill itself. I am anxious to call attention to its words, +because I am quite aware that on more than one point the interpretation +put by me upon its provisions will be disputed by supporters of Mr. +Gladstone's policy. My interpretation is, I believe, sound, but it would +be unfair not to give my readers the opportunity of judging for +themselves as to its soundness. + +[54] Criticism of particular provisions was made the easier by the fact +that hesitations of statesmanship betrayed themselves throughout the +Bill in blunders of draughtsmanship. The very heading of the Bill is a +misdescription, and involves confusion of ideas. The expressions "status +of the Crown," "Executive Government," "Imperial Parliament," are from a +legal point of view open to severe criticism; and the substitution of +the name "Irish legislature" or "Legislature of Ireland" for the plain +intelligible term Irish Parliament, involves something like political +cowardice. For errors of this kind, though in one sense errors of +draughtsmanship, official draughtsmen are, it must in fairness be +remembered, no more responsible than is an amanuensis for the erasures +and blots which mar a letter written or re-written to suit the +contradictory views of a writer who does not quite know his own meaning +and is not anxious to put his meaning into plain words. (See for some +excellent criticisms on the Government of Ireland Bill two letters in +the _St. James's Gazette_ of 20th and 22nd April, 1880 signed II.) + +[55] My statement that the Government of Ireland Bill repeals the main +provisions of the Act of Union is made, not because I anticipate that +the Bill if passed would lead to a repeal of the Union, but because it +is my opinion that the Bill if passed would, as a matter of law, repeal +the provisions of that Act, under which the United Kingdom is +represented in one and the same Parliament to be styled the Parliament +of Great Britain and Ireland. The effect of the Bill would be in very +general terms that Ireland would be represented in a Parliament which +contained no English or Scotch representatives, and Great Britain would +be represented in a Parliament which contained no Irish representatives. +Occasionally and for one definite purpose, and no other, namely for the +purpose of modifying the terms of the Gladstonian Constitution, a +Parliament might be convened which contained representatives from +England, Scotland, and Ireland. By what name any one of these assemblies +might be called is a matter of indifference; but that either the British +Parliament which contained no Irish representatives, or the Irish +Parliament which contained no English or Scotch representatives, or the +exceptional and only occasionally convoked body whose one function is to +modify a single Act of Parliament, could be considered by any lawyer the +"one and the same Parliament" in which the United Kingdom is now +represented, is in my judgment all but incredible. If, however, the term +"repeal" causes offence or misunderstanding, let us substitute the word +"modify," which, however, I believe to be less accurate. The lay reader +ought to be reminded that "Statutes may be repealed either by express +words contained in later Acts of Parliament, or by implication," and +that "a repeal by implication is effected when the provisions of a later +enactment are so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the provisions of +an earlier enactment that the two cannot stand together" (Wilberforce, +'Statute Law,' p. 310). My contention is that the Government of Ireland +Bill would on becoming law be so inconsistent with portions of 39 & 40 +Geo. III. cap. 67, as to amount to a repeal thereof. (For a statement of +an opposite opinion, see Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet on the Irish Question +pp. 38, 39.) + +[56] The Government of Ireland Bill, clause 7. + +[57] See the Government of Ireland Bill, clauses 1, 9. + +[58] See the Government of Ireland Bill, clause 7. + +[59] _Ibid_., clause 25. + +[60] _Ibid_., clause 7. + +[61] As to the disallowance of Colonial bills, see pp. 202-5, _ante_. + +[62] See the Government of Ireland Bill, clause 25, sub-clause (_a), +(b_) and (_c_). + +[63] Government of Ireland Bill, clause 24. + +[64] Government of Ireland Bill, clauses 37, 39. On the whole question +as to the mode in which the Gladstonian Constitution, or in other words +the Government of Ireland Bill, is intended to be altered, readers are +specially referred to the terms of the Bill itself. The whole matter is +involved in so much controversy that one can hardly make any statement +about it which an opponent will not question. The parts of the Bill to +be studied are clauses 37 and 39. + +[65] See Government of Ireland Bill, clause 39. + +[66] I am quite aware that the account I have given of the proposed +Gladstonian Constitution is likely not to be accepted as correct by some +of the supporters of the Government of Ireland Bill. That measure by +designating both what I have termed the British Parliament and the +Imperial Parliament by the one name Imperial Parliament, conceals in my +judgment the extent of the alteration which the Bill contemplates. For +the sake of clearness of thought I must request my readers to +distinguish carefully four different bodies:-- + +1. The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. +This is the actually existing Parliament constituted by the Act of Union +with Ireland. + +2. The British Parliament; that is, the Parliament of the United Kingdom +with the Irish representatives removed from it. This body is called +under the Government of Ireland Bill the Imperial Parliament. It is a +distinctly different body from the Parliament of the United Kingdom. +Whether it does or does not inherit the legal powers of the Parliament +of the United Kingdom is a separate question afterwards to be +considered. All that I now insist upon is that it is a different body. + +3. The Irish Parliament, a body admittedly constituted or to be +constituted under the Government of Ireland Bill, and therein called the +Irish Legislature. + +4. The Imperial Parliament, a body in effect consisting of the British +Parliament with the addition of the Irish representatives, or in other +words of the British Parliament combined with the Irish Parliament. This +body is convoked, as I have pointed out, only for the special purpose of +altering the Gladstonian Constitution. It is termed in the Government of +Ireland Bill the Imperial Parliament. + +What I am most anxious my readers should note is that the bodies 2 and 4 +are each termed in the Bill the Imperial Parliament, and thereby not +only confused together, but as far as possible each identified with the +existing Parliament of the United Kingdom, with which neither really +corresponds. The British Parliament differs from the Parliament of the +United Kingdom certainly in constitution, if not also in authority. + +The so-called Imperial Parliament nearly corresponds with the Parliament +of the United Kingdom in constitution, but differs from it in function +and authority. + +[67] In reference to the legal effect of the Government of Ireland Bill +on the sovereignty of Parliament, see on the one side the speeches of +Sir Henry James of 13th May, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary Debates,' +p. 468; of Mr. Finlay, 21st May, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary +Debates,' p. 614; and an article by Sir William Anson on the Government +of Ireland Bill and the Sovereignty of Parliament in the _Law Quarterly +Review_ for October, 1886. See on the other side Mr. Gladstone's +speeches in Parliament of 8th April, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary +Debates,' p. 125; of 13th April, 1886, _ibid._ 255; of 10th May, 1886, +_ibid._ 404; and of 7th June, 1886, _ibid._ p. 861; of Mr. Parnell of +7th June, _ibid._ p. 847; and 'The Government of Ireland Bill,' being a +speech delivered by Mr. James Bryce, M.P., on 17th May, 1886, and +published as a pamphlet. My disagreement with Mr. Bryce's conclusions +makes me anxious to express my great admiration for his speech, which is +by far the best statement I have read of the view undoubtedly held by +Mr. Gladstone and his followers, that the Bill did not affect the +sovereignty of Parliament. The reader should notice that the question +throughout between the late Government and its opponents was as to the +effect of the Bill on the sovereignty of what I have called the "British +Parliament," _i.e._ the body, by whatever name it be called, which +consists of the representatives of England and Scotland only, and does +not include representatives of Ireland. + +[68] As to the sovereignty of Parliament, see Dicey, 'Law of the +Constitution,' pp. 35-79. + +[69] Government of Ireland Bill, clause 39. + +[70] I do not, of course, deny for a moment that an Act could be so +drawn as to give Ireland an Irish Parliament, to remove the Irish +members from the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and at the same time +to reserve to the residue of the United Parliament, or Rump, the full +sovereignty now possessed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. What +I do insist upon is, that it is open to question whether the Government +of Ireland Bill was so drawn as to achieve these results. Nor is the +question unimportant. The fundamental ambiguity of the Bill obviously +arose from the fact that its authors, whilst wishing to promise in +appearance to Ireland that the new Irish constitution should not be +changed by a body in which Ireland had no representatives, also wished +to soothe the apprehensions of England by tacitly reserving to the +British Parliament the power of altering or repealing the Irish +constitution without recalling the representatives of Ireland. The +consequence is that the Bill proclaims in so many words that its +provisions shall be altered in one way only, but by implication, as its +authors suppose, provides that its provisions may be altered in another +and quite different way. If this is the intended effect of the Bill it +ought to have been made patent on its face. In constitutional matters, +as indeed in all the serious concerns of life, ambiguity and uncertainty +of expression is the source both of misunderstanding and of danger. + +The question of the sovereignty of the British Parliament might, it +should be noted, arise in another and more perplexing form, which +received, unless I am mistaken, no attention during the debates on the +Irish Government Bill. Admit for the sake of argument that the British +Parliament can legislate for Ireland; is it equally certain that the +Imperial Parliament (i.e. the British Parliament with the addition of +Irish representatives) cannot claim to legislate for England or for the +whole British Empire? No doubt the Gladstonian Constitution proposes +that the Imperial Parliament should be convened only for a limited +definite purpose; but is it certain that the Imperial Parliament, which +would in its constituent parts be in effect the reunited Parliament of +the United Kingdom, might not when convened claim to reassume sovereign +power? The addition of a hundred Irish members might turn a minority in +the British Parliament into a majority in the Imperial Parliament; can +we feel sure that the English minority in the British Parliament would +resist the temptation to exalt the authority of a body in which they +would be supreme? The enquiry sounds to Englishmen a strange one; but +the annals of foreign constitutions suggest that an assembly which, +though convoked for a particular purpose, is able from any point of view +to consider itself sovereign is with difficulty restrained from +asserting supreme power. From this side the Gladstonian Constitution +might prove a menace to the supremacy of the British Parliament. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +CONCLUSION. + + +[Sidenote: Survey of argument.] + +Let us here review and summarise our argument. The demand for Home Rule +is a demand for a change in the Constitution so fundamental as to amount +to a legal and pacific revolution; such a demand requires for its +support cogent, we may almost say conclusive, reasons. + +The positive arguments in favour of Home Rule are not easy to grasp. +Their strength lies in their correspondence with the prevailing opinions +of the day. But though public opinion under any form of government, and +especially under the system of what is called popular government, +deserves great consideration, still the value of a prevailing belief or +conviction cannot be determined without examining the elements which +have gone to its production. The state of opinion which favours Home +Rule is found to result from various and even self-contradictory +feelings, some of which belong to the highest and some to the lowest +parts of human nature; humanity and a sense of justice are in this +instance curiously combined with indolence and impatience. The +arguments again for Home Rule rest upon one dubious assumption and one +undoubted fact. The dubious assumption is that the root of Irish +discontent is the outraged feeling of nationality. The undoubted fact is +that in Ireland, on all matters either directly or even remotely +connected with the tenure of land, the law of the Courts is opposed to +the customs, to the moral sentiment, we may say to the law of the +people; hence the Queen's tribunals are weak because they are not +supported by that popular assent whence judges derive half their +authority; the tribunals of the League are strong because their +decisions commend themselves to the traditional feeling of the people. +But the doubtful hypothesis and the undoubted fact, though one or other +of them lies at the basis of all the strongest arguments in favour of +Home Rule, each invalidate almost as much as they support the contention +that an Irish Parliament will prove the specific for the diseases (due +in the first instance to the original vice of the connection between +England and Ireland) under which Irish society now suffers. If the +passion of nationality is the cause of the malady, then the proposed +cure is useless, for Home Rule will not turn the people of Ireland into +a nation. If a vicious system of land tenure is the cause of +lawlessness, then the restoration or re-creation of an Irish Parliament +is needless, for the Parliament of the United Kingdom can reform, and +ought to reform, the land system of Ireland, and ought to be able to +carry through a final settlement of agrarian disputes with less +injustice to individuals than could any Parliament sitting at Dublin. + +Reasoning, however, which fails to establish the expediency of creating +an Irish Parliament may prove, and in fact does amply prove, that the +task of maintaining peace order and freedom in Ireland is at the present +juncture a matter of supreme difficulty. Any possible course, moreover, +open to English statesmanship involves gigantic inconvenience, not to +say tremendous perils. A man involved practically in the conduct of +public affairs may easily bring himself to believe that the policy which +he recommends is not only the best possible under the circumstances, but +is also open to no serious objection. Outsiders, who in this matter are +better because more impartial judges than the ablest of politicians, +know that this is not so. We have nothing before us but a choice of +difficulties or of evils. Every course is open to valid criticism. + +The maintenance of the Union must necessarily turn out as severe a task +as ever taxed a nation's energies, for to maintain the Treaty of Union +with any good effect means that while refusing to accede to the wishes +of millions of Irishmen, we must sedulously do justice to every fair +demand from Ireland, must strenuously and without either fear or favour +assert the equal rights of landlords and tenants, of Protestants and +Catholics, and must at the same time put down every outrage and reform +every abuse. + +To carry out by peaceful means the political separation of countries +which for good and for evil have for centuries been bound together by +position and by history, is an operation so critical that in the +judgment of statesmen it involves dangers too vast for serious +contemplation. + +How, lastly, to devise a scheme of Home Rule which, while giving to +Ireland as much of legislative independence as may satisfy her wants or +wishes, shall leave to England as much supremacy as may be necessary for +the prosperity of the United Kingdom, or for the continued existence of +the British Empire, is a problem which jurists would find it hard to +solve as a matter of speculative science, and which politicians may not +without reason hold to admit of no practical solution. + +Yet Maintenance of the Union, Separation, Home Rule, are names which +designate the only paths open to us. To one of these three courses we +are absolutely tied down. Each path is arduous. To complain about the +nature of things is childish. The course of wisdom is obvious. We must +all of us look facts in the face. "Things and actions are what they are, +and the consequences of them will be what they will be. Why then should +we desire to be deceived?"[71] We must calmly compare the advantages of +the three steep roads which lie open to the nation, and then on the +strength of this comparison determine the course which the nation is +bound to follow by motives of expediency and of justice. + +Such a comparison we have already instituted:[72] its results to any +reader who assents to my train of reasoning must be obvious. + +The maintenance of the Union involves at the outset a strenuous and most +regrettable conflict with the will of the majority of the Irish people. +It necessitates at once the strict enforcement of law, combined with the +resolute effort to strip law of all injustice. It may require large +pecuniary sacrifices, and it certainly will require a constancy in just +purpose which is supposed, and not without reason, to be specially +difficult to a democracy. The difficulties on the other hand which meet +us are not unprecedented, though some of them have assumed a new form. +We have some advantages unknown to our forefathers: we can, more easily +than they could, remodel the practices of the Constitution, modify the +rules of party government, or, incredible as it may seem to members of +Parliament, touch with profane hands the venerable procedure of the +House of Commons. The English democracy, further, just because it is a +democracy, may, like the democracy of America, enforce with unflinching +firmness laws which, representing the deliberate will of the people, are +supported by the vast majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom. +The English democracy, because it is a democracy, may also with a good +conscience destroy the remnants of feudal institutions, and all systems +of land tenure found unsuitable to the wants of the Irish people. Nor, +though the crisis be difficult, are there features lacking in the +tendencies of the modern world which in the United Kingdom as in the +United States and in the Swiss Confederacy favour every effort to uphold +the political unity of the State. Whatever be the difficulties (and they +are many) of maintaining the Union, not in form only but in reality, the +policy is favoured no less by the current of English history, than by +the tendencies of modern civilization. It preserves that unity of the +State which is essential to the authority of England and to the +maintenance of the Empire. It provides, as matters now stand, the only +means of giving legal protection to a large body of loyal British +subjects. It is the refusal not only to abdicate legitimate power, but +(what is of far more consequence) to renounce the fulfilment of +imperative duties. Nor does Union imply uniformity. Unity of +Government--equality of rights--diversity of institutions,--these are +the watchwords for all Unionists. To attain these objects may be beyond +our power, and the limit to power is the limit to responsibility. Still, +whatever may be the difficulties, or even the disadvantages, of +maintaining the Union, it undoubtedly has in its favour not only all the +recommendations which must belong to a policy of rational conservatism, +but also these two decisive advantages--that it does sustain the +strength of the United Kingdom, and that it does not call for any +dereliction of duty. + +Separation, or in other words the national independence of Ireland, is +an idea which has not entered into the practical consideration of +Englishmen. The evils which it threatens are patent: it at the same +moment diminishes the means of Great Britain and increases the calls +upon her resources. It lowers the fame of the country, and plants by the +side of England a foreign, it may be a hostile, neighbour; it involves +the desertion of loyal fellow-citizens who have trusted in the good +faith of England. Yet, on the other hand, the material losses and +perhaps the dangers involved in the independence of Ireland are liable +to exaggeration. Great Britain might find in her complete freedom of +action and in restored unity of national sentiment elements of power +which might balance the obvious damage resulting from Separation; she +might also find it possible to make for the protection of Loyalists +terms more efficacious than any guarantees contained in the articles of +a statutory constitution. If, further, the spirit of nationality has the +vivifying power ascribed to it by its votaries, then Ireland might gain +from it blessings which cannot be conferred by any scheme of merely +Parliamentary independence, since no form of Home Rule can transform +Ireland into a nation. + +For Home Rule it may be pleaded that it offers two obvious advantages: +it satisfies the immediate wish of millions of Irishmen, and it +facilitates the adaptation of Irish institutions to Irish wants. These +advantageous results are the best that can be hoped for from Home Rule. +They are real, and to underrate them is folly; the moral gain indeed of +meeting the wishes of the body of the Irish people is so incalculable, +that did Home Rule involve no intolerable evils a rational man might +think it wise to venture on the experiment. Home Rule, it may be +suggested, has the further gain of lessening English responsibility for +the government of Ireland. What it really might effect is to lighten +England's sense of responsibility for misrule in Ireland. But this, so +far from being a blessing, would in truth be one of the greatest of +evils. The distinguished author of the Gladstonian Constitution denies +in his recent pamphlet that the Government of Ireland Bill would, if +passed, repeal the Act of Union. To follow the reasoning by which this +denial is made good is beyond my powers. But there is one aspect in +which the statement, paradoxical though it be, that the Union is not +dissolved by the existence of an Irish Parliament, has a most serious +meaning, which ought to command hearty and general assent. Under the +Gladstonian Constitution, as under any form of Home Rule, the Government +of the United Kingdom must still remain in the last resort responsible +for the administration of justice throughout the whole realm. Admit for +the sake of argument that the Act of Union, though affected in every +section, is not repealed, then assuredly if men be wrongfully deprived +of their property, if they be denied their lawful freedom, if they +suffer unlawful injury to life or limb in any part of the United +Kingdom, the responsibility for seeing that right be done falls on the +executive, and in the last resort on the Parliament, of the United +Kingdom. The delegated authority of a subordinate legislature will not +free the principal from the liability inherent in the delegation of +power; and if Home Rule in Ireland fosters, as it must foster, the +notion that the United Kingdom is not as a whole responsible for +misdeeds done in Ireland, this is one of the worst results of the +proposed constitutional change. + +But putting this matter aside, an examination into the various forms +which Home Rule may assume leads to the conclusion that whatever be its +hypothetical benefits it threatens more than countervailing loss to +England. There is no need to do more than refer in most general terms to +evils which have already been set forth in detail. Home Rule under two +of its three possible forms dislocates and weakens the whole English +Constitution. Under its least objectionable form--that of Colonial +independence--it brings upon England many of the perils which would +follow upon the national independence of Ireland; it involves, if the +experiment is to have a fair chance of success, large pecuniary +sacrifice, and it does not present a reasonable hope of creating real +harmony of feeling between Great Britain and Ireland. Home Rule, lastly, +under whatever form, whilst not freeing England from moral +responsibility for protecting the rights of every British subject, does +virtually give up the attempt to ensure to these rights more than a +nominal existence, and thus gives up the endeavour to enforce legal and +equal justice between man and man. It must also be considered that an +examination into the different forms of Home Rule, while it shows that +no scheme of legislative independence for Ireland offers any promise of +finality, also suggests that the form of Home Rule least injurious to +England is the form which gives Ireland most independence. The inference +from these facts cannot be missed. Home Rule is the half-way house to +Separation. Grant it, and in a short time Irish independence will become +the wish of England. If any thorough-paced Home Ruler admit this +conclusion, and suggest that Home Rule is a desirable transition towards +Separation, the answer is that Home Rule is such a transition, but +assuredly that such a transition is not to be desired. If one country is +destined to become independent of another it is better for each not to +experience the disappointment and the heartburning which accompany a +period of unwilling connection. + +This is the result of the comparison we have instituted between the +three possible courses open to England. If the comparison be just the +conclusion to which its leads is obvious. The maintenance of the Union +is at this moment to England a matter of duty even more than of +interest. If the time should come when the effort to maintain the unity +of the State is too great for the power of Great Britain, or the only +means by which it is found maintainable are measures clearly repugnant +to the humanity or the justice or the democratic principles of the +English people,--if it should turn out that after every effort to +enforce just laws by just methods our justice itself, from whatever +cause, remains hateful to the mass of the Irish people,--then it will be +clear that the Union must for the sake of England, no less than of +Ireland, come to an end. The alternative policy will then be not Home +Rule but Separation. We shall save the unity at the expense of lessening +the territory of the State; we shall escape self-reproach because having +reached the limit of our powers we shall also have filled up the measure +of our obligations. But if (as there is every reason to suppose) +agrarian misery is the source of Irish discontent, and agrarian misery +springs in part from bad administration, and in part from the law +governing the tenure of land; if, in general terms, the undoubted ills +of Ireland are curable by justice, even though justice proceed from the +Parliament of the United Kingdom--an assembly, be it noted, in which the +voice of Ireland is freely heard--then there is no need to indulge in +speculations, always dangerous, upon a possible remedy which may never +be necessary, and which, while the inhabitants of England and Ireland +are still fellow-citizens of one State, it is painful even to +contemplate. On the whole, then, it appears that whatever changes or +calamities the future may have in store, the maintenance of the Union is +at this day the one sound policy for England to pursue. It is sound +because it is expedient; it is sound because it is just. + +[Sidenote: Character of England's case] + +This is the case of England against Home Rule; it is a case which, +however feebly stated--and I may well have failed to state it with +force--is founded on argument. It is a case which makes and need make no +appeal to rhetoric; it is a case which indeed, like all sound views of +national policy, is grounded on the interest of the greater number of +the citizens of the State, but it is a case not grounded on any mere +pride of power, a case not based on any disregard of justice, a case +which above all involves no unfriendliness to Irishmen, and no +assumption, either tacit or express, that there has fallen to Irishmen a +greater amount of either original or acquired sin than falls to other +human beings, it is a case which does not assume that real or supposed +differences of race are a legitimate ground for inequality of rights. +Any one, indeed, after having to the best of his power tried to state +what can be said with fairness on one side of a question such as that +now at issue between the majority and the minority of the citizens of +the United Kingdom, may well call to mind the conclusion of the noblest +statement ever made by genius of a case involving momentous national +interests:-- + +"It would be presumption in me to do more than to make a case. Many +things occur. But as they, like all political measures, depend on +dispositions, tempers, means, and external circumstances for all their +effect, not being well assured of these, I do not know how to let loose +any speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated in my +opinion as it exists. The remedy must be where power, wisdom, and +information, I hope, are more united with good intentions than they can +be with me. I have done with this subject, I believe for ever. It has +given me many anxious moments for the two last years. If a great change +is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; +the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every +hope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty +current in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees of +Providence itself, than the mere designs of men. They will not be +resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate."[73] + +The sentiment of these words is one of eternal application. Still at +this great crisis in the fortunes of our country, when every course is +involved in undeniable perplexity, and surrounded by admitted danger, +there are two principles to which we may confidently appeal; for it is +by habitual adherence to them that England has grown to greatness. These +two principles are the maintenance of the supremacy of the whole State, +and the use of that supremacy for the purpose of securing to every +citizen, whether rich or poor, the rights of liberty and of property +conferred upon him by law. To maintain that any policy, however +plausible, by which these principles are violated, must undermine the +moral basis of the Constitution, and must therefore lead the nation to +calamity and to disgrace, is at any rate to plead a cause which rests +upon a firm foundation of plain morality. The case may be ill-stated, +the arguments by which it is defended may admit of reply, but it is a +case which a just man may put forward without shame, and a humane man +may support without compunction. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[71] Butler's Sermons; vii., p. 136, ed. 1726. + +[72] See Chapters V., VI., & VII., _ante._ + +[73] Burke's Works, vol. vii., pp. 84, 85. + + + + +APPENDIX. + + +GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL.[74] + + +ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES. + +PART I. + + +_Legislative Authority_. + +CLAUSE. + +1. Establishment of Irish Legislature. + +2. Powers of Irish Legislature. + +3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature. + +4. Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature. + +5. Prerogatives of Her Majesty as to Irish Legislative Body. + +6. Duration of the Irish Legislative Body. + + +_Executive Authority_. + +7. Constitution of the Executive Authority. + +8. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government. + + +_Constitution of Legislative Body_. + +9. Constitution of Irish Legislative Body. + +10. First order. + +11. Second order. + + +_Finance_. + +12. Taxes and separate Consolidated Fund. + +13. Annual contributions from Ireland to Consolidated Fund of United +Kingdom. + +14. Collection and application of customs and excise duties in Ireland. + +15. Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund. + +16. Irish Church Fund. + +17. Public loans. + +18. Additional aid in case of war. + +19. Money bills and votes. + +20. Exchequer divisions and revenue actions. + + +_Police_. + +21. Police. + + + * * * * * + + +PART II. + +SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS. + + +_Powers of Her Majesty_. + +22. Powers over certain lands reserved to Her Majesty. + + +_Legislative Body_. + +23. Veto by first order of Legislative Body, how over-ruled. + +24. Cesser of power of Ireland to return members to Parliament. + + +_Decision of Constitutional Questions_. + +25. _Constitutional questions to be submitted to Judicial Committee_. + + +_Lord-Lieutenant._ + +26. Office of Lord-Lieutenant. + + +_Judges and Civil Servants_. + +27. Judges to be removable only on address. + +28. Provision as to judges and other persons having salaries charged on +the Consolidated Fund. + +29. As to persons holding civil service appointments. + +30. Provision for existing pensions and superannuation allowances. + + +_Transitory Provisions_. + +31. Transitory provisions in Schedule. + + +_Miscellaneous_. + +32. Post Office and savings banks. + +33. Audit. + +34. Application of parliamentary law. + +35. Regulations for carrying Act into effect. + +36. Saving of powers of House of Lords. + +37. Saving of Rights of Parliament. + +38. Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, &c. + +39. Mode of alteration of Act. + +40. Definitions. + +41. Short title of Act. + +SCHEDULES. + + + * * * * * + + +_A Bill to amend the provision for the future Government of Ireland_. + +[Sidenote: A.D. 1886] + +Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the +advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in +this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as +follows: + + +PART I. + +_Legislative Authority_. + +[Sidenote: Establishment of Irish Legislature.] + +1. _On and after the appointed day there shall be established in +Ireland a Legislature consisting of Her Majesty the Queen and an Irish +Legislative Body._ + +[Sidenote: Powers of Irish Legislature.] + +2. _With the exceptions and subject to the restrictions in this Act +mentioned, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen, by and with the +advice of the Irish Legislative Body, to make laws for the peace, order, +and good government of Ireland, and by any such law to alter and repeal +any law in Ireland._ + +[Sidenote: Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature.] + +3. _The Legislature of Ireland shall not make laws relating to the +following matters or any of them:--_ + + (1.) _The status or dignity of the Crown, or the succession to the + Crown, or a Regency;_ + + (2.) _The making of peace or war;_ + + (3.) _The army, navy, militia, volunteers, or other military or + naval forces, or the defence of the realm;_ + + (4.) _Treaties and other relations with foreign States, or the + relations between the various parts of Her Majesty's dominions;_ + + (5.) _Dignities or titles of honour;_ + + (6.) _Prize or booty of war;_ + + (7.) _Offences against the law of nations; or offences committed in + violation of any treaty made, or hereafter to be made, between Her + Majesty and any foreign State; or offences committed on the high + seas;_ + + (8.) _Treason, alienage, or naturalization;_ + + (9.) _Trade, navigation, or quarantine;_ + + (10.) _The postal and telegraph service, except as hereafter in + this Act mentioned with respect to the transmission of letters and + telegrams in Ireland;_ + + (11.) _Beacons, lighthouses, or sea marks;_ + + (12.) _The coinage; the value of foreign money; legal tender; or + weights and measures; or_ + + (13.) _Copyright, patent rights, or other exclusive rights to the + use or profits of any works or inventions._ + +Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void. + +[Sidenote: Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature.] + +4. _The Irish Legislature shall not make any law--_ + + (1.) _Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or + prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or_ + + (2.) _Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, on + account of religious belief; or_ + + (3.) _Abrogating or derogating from the right to establish or + maintain any place of denominational education or any + denominational institution or charity; or_ + + (4.) _Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a + school receiving public money without attending the religious + instruction at that school; or_ + + (5.) _Impairing, without either the leave of Her Majesty in Council + first obtained on an address presented by the Legislative Body of + Ireland, or the consent of the corporation interested, the rights, + property, or privileges of any existing corporation incorporated by + royal charter or local and general Act of Parliament; or_ + + (6.) _Imposing or relating to duties of customs and duties of + excise, as defined by this Act, or either of such duties, or + affecting any Act relating to such duties or either of them; or_ + + (7.) _Affecting this Act, except in so far as it is declared to be + alterable by the Irish Legislature._ + +[Sidenote: Prerogatives of Her Majesty as to Irish Legislative Body.] + +5. _Her Majesty the Queen shall have the same prerogatives with +respect to summoning, proroguing, and dissolving the Irish Legislative +Body as Her Majesty has with respect to summoning, proroguing, and +dissolving the Imperial Parliament._ + +[Sidenote: Duration of the Irish Legislative Body.] + +6. _The Irish Legislative Body whenever summoned may have continuance +for five years and no longer, to be reckoned from the day on which any +such Legislative Body is appointed to meet._ + + +_Executive Authority_. + +[Sidenote: Constitution of the Executive Authority.] + +7.--(1.) _The Executive Government of Ireland shall continue vested in +Her Majesty, and shall be carried on by the Lord-Lieutenant on behalf of +Her Majesty with the aid of such officers and such Council as to Her +Majesty may from time to time seem fit._ + +(2.) _Subject to any instructions which may from time to time be given +by Her Majesty, the Lord-Lieutenant shall give or withhold the assent of +Her Majesty to Bills passed by the Irish Legislative Body, and shall +exercise the prerogatives of Her Majesty in respect of the summoning, +proroguing, and dissolving of the Irish Legislative Body, and any +prerogatives the exercise of which may be delegated to him by Her +Majesty._ + +[Sidenote: Use of Crown lands by Irish Government.] + +8. _Her Majesty may, by Order in Council, from time to time place +under the control of the Irish Government, for the purposes of that +Government, any such lands and buildings in Ireland as may be vested in +or held in trust for Her Majesty._ + + +_Constitution of Legislative Body._ + +[Sidenote: Constitution of Irish Legislative Body.] + +9.--(1.) _The Irish Legislative Body shall consist of a first and +second order._ + +(2.) _The two orders shall deliberate together, and shall vote together, +except that, if any question arises in relation to legislation or to the +Standing Orders or Rules of Procedure or to any other matter in that +behalf in this Act specified, and such question is to be determined by +vote, each order shall, if a majority of the members present of either +order demand a separate vote, give their votes in like manner as if they +were separate Legislative Bodies; and if the result of the voting of the +two orders does not agree the question shall be resolved in the +negative._ + +[Sidenote: First order.] + +10.--(1.) The first order of the Irish Legislative Body shall consist +of one hundred and three members, of whom seventy-five shall be elective +members and twenty-eight peerage members. + +(2.) Each elective member shall at the date of his election and during +his period of membership be bona fide possessed of property which-- + + (_a._) if realty, or partly realty and partly personalty, yields + two hundred pounds a year or upwards, free of all charges; or + + (_b._) if personalty yields the same income, or is of the capital + value of four thousand pounds or upwards, free of all charges. + +(2.) For the purpose of electing the elective members of the first order +of the Legislative Body, Ireland shall be divided into the electoral +districts specified in the First Schedule to this Act, and each such +district shall return the number of members in that behalf specified in +that Schedule. + +(3.) The elective members shall be elected by the registered electors of +each electoral district, and for that purpose a register of electors +shall be made annually. + +(4.) An elector in each electoral district shall be qualified as +follows, that is to say, he shall be of full age, and not subject to any +legal incapacity, and shall have been during the twelve months next +preceding the _twentieth day of July_ in any year the owner or occupier +of some land or tenement within the district of a net annual value of +twenty-five pounds or upwards. + +(5.) The term of office of an elective member shall be _ten years_. + +(6.) In every fifth year thirty-seven or thirty-eight of the elective +members, as the case requires, shall retire from office, and their +places shall be filled by election; the members to retire shall be those +who have been members for the longest time without re-election. + +(7.) The offices of the peerage members shall be filled as follows; that +is to say,-- + + (_a._) Each of the Irish peers who on the appointed day is one of + the twenty-eight Irish representative peers, shall, on giving his + written assent to the Lord-Lieutenant, become a peerage member of + the first order of the Irish Legislative Body; and if at any time + within _thirty years_ after the appointed day any such peer vacates + his office by death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled by + the election to that office by the Irish peers of one of their + number in manner heretofore in use respecting the election of Irish + representative peers, subject to adaptation as provided by this + Act, and if the vacancy is not so filled within the proper time it + shall be filled by the election of an elective member. + + (_b._) If any of the twenty-eight peers aforesaid does not within + _one month_ after the appointed day give such assent to be a + peerage member of the first order, the vacancy so created shall be + filled up as if he had assented and vacated his office by + resignation. + +(8.) A peerage member shall be entitled to hold office during his life, +or until the expiration of _thirty years_ from the appointed day, +whichever period is the shortest. At the expiration of such _thirty +years_ the offices of all the peerage members shall be vacated as if +they were dead, and their places shall be filled by elective members +qualified and elected in manner provided by this Act with respect to +elective members of the first order, and such elective members may be +distributed by the Irish Legislature among the electoral districts, so, +however, that care shall be taken to give additional members to the most +populous places. + +(9.) The offices of members of the first order shall not be vacated by +the dissolution of the Legislative Body. + +(10.) The provisions in the Second Schedule to this Act relating to +members of the first order of the Legislative Body shall be of the same +force as if they were enacted in the body of this Act. + +[Sidenote: Second order.] + +11.--(1.) Subject as in this section hereafter mentioned, the second +order of the Legislative body shall consist of two hundred and four +members. + +(2.) The members of the second order shall be chosen by the existing +constituencies of Ireland, two by each constituency, with the exception +of the city of Cork, which shall be divided into two divisions in manner +set forth in the Third Schedule to this Act, and two members shall be +chosen by each of such divisions. + +(3.) Any person who, on the appointed day, is a member representing an +existing Irish constituency in the House of Commons shall, on giving his +written assent to the Lord-Lieutenant, become a member of the second +order of the Irish Legislative Body as if he had been elected by the +constituency which he was representing in the House of Commons. Each of +the members for the city of Cork, on the said day, may elect for which +of the divisions of that city he wishes to be deemed to have been +elected. + +(4.) If any member does not give such written assent within _one month_ +after the appointed day, his place shall be filled by election in the +same manner and at the same time as if he had assented and vacated his +office by death. + +(5.) If the same person is elected to both orders, he shall, within +_seven days_ after the meeting of the Legislative Body, or if the Body +is sitting at the time of the election, within _seven days_ after the +election, elect in which order he will serve, and his membership of the +other order shall be void and be filled by a fresh election. + +(6.) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, it shall be lawful for the +Legislature of Ireland at any time to pass an Act enabling the Royal +University of Ireland to return not more than two members to the second +order of the Irish Legislative Body in addition to the number of members +above mentioned. + +(7.) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, it shall be lawful for the +Irish Legislature, after the first dissolution of the Legislative Body +which occurs, to alter the constitution or election of the second order +of that body, due regard being had in the distribution of members to the +population of the constituencies; provided that no alteration shall be +made in the number of such order. + + +_Finance._ + +[Sidenote: Taxes and separate Consolidated Fund.] + +12.--(1.) For the purpose of providing for the public service of +Ireland the Irish Legislature may impose taxes, other than duties of +customs or excise as defined by this Act, which duties shall continue to +be imposed and levied by and under the direction of the Imperial +Parliament only. + +(2.) On and after the appointed day there shall be an Irish Consolidated +Fund separate from the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. + +(3.) All taxes imposed by the Legislature of Ireland and all other +public revenues under the control of the Government of Ireland shall, +subject to any provisions touching the disposal thereof contained in any +Act passed in the present session respecting the sale and purchase of +land in Ireland, be paid into the Irish Consolidated Fund, and be +appropriated to the public service of Ireland according to law. + +[Sidenote: Annual contributions from Ireland to Consolidated Fund of +United Kingdom.] + +13.--(1.) Subject to the provisions for the reduction or cesser +thereof in this section mentioned, there shall be made on the part of +Ireland to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom the following +annual contributions in every financial year; that is to say,-- + + (_a._) The sum of _one million four hundred and sixty-six, thousand + pounds_ on account of the interest on and management of the Irish + share of the National Debt: + + (_b._) The sum of _one million six hundred and sixty-six thousand + pounds_ on account of the expenditure on the army and navy of the + United Kingdom: + + (_c._) The sum _of one hundred and ten thousand pounds_ on account + of the Imperial civil expenditure of the United Kingdom: + + (_d._) The sum of _one million pounds_ on account of the Royal + Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police. + +(2.) During the period of _thirty_ years from this section taking; +effect the said annual contributions shall not be increased, but may be +reduced or cease as hereinafter mentioned. After the expiration of the +said _thirty years_ the said contributions shall, save as otherwise +provided by this section, continue until altered in manner provided with +respect to the alteration of this Act. + +(3.) The Irish share of the National Debt shall be reckoned at +_forty-eight million pounds_ Bank annuities, and there shall be paid in +every financial year on behalf of Ireland to the Commissioners for the +Reduction of the National Debt an annual sum of _three hundred and sixty +thousand pounds_, and the permanent annual charge for the National Debt +on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom shall be reduced by that +amount, and the said annual sum shall be applied by the said +Commissioners as a sinking fund for the redemption of the National Debt, +and the Irish share of the National Debt shall be reduced by the amount +of the National Debt so redeemed, and the said annual contribution on +account of the interest on and management of the Irish share of the +National Debt shall from time to time be reduced by a sum equal to the +interest upon the amount of the National Debt from time to time so +redeemed, but that last-mentioned sum shall be paid annually to the +Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in addition to the +above-mentioned annual sinking fund, and shall be so paid and be applied +as if it were part of that sinking fund. + +(4.) As soon as an amount of the National Debt equal to the said Irish +share thereof has been redeemed under the provisions of this section, +the said annual contribution on account of the interest on and +management of the Irish share of the National Debt, and the said annual +sum for a sinking fund shall cease. + +(5.) If it appears to Her Majesty that the expenditure in respect of the +army and navy of the United Kingdom, or in respect of Imperial civil +expenditure of the United Kingdom, for any financial year has been less +than _fifteen_ times the amount of the contributions above-named on +account of the same matter, a sum equal to _one fifteenth_ part of the +diminution shall be deducted from the current annual contribution for +the same matter. + +(6.) The sum paid from time to time by the Commissioners of Her +Majesty's Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues to the Consolidated Fund of +the United Kingdom on account of the hereditary revenues of the Crown in +Ireland shall be credited to the Irish Government, and go in reduction +of the said annual contribution payable on account of the Imperial civil +expenditure of the United Kingdom, but shall not be taken into account +in calculating whether such diminution as above mentioned has or has not +taken place in such expenditure. + +(7.) If it appears to Her Majesty that the expenditure in respect of the +Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police for any +financial year has been less than the contribution above named on +account of such constabulary and police, the current contribution shall +be diminished by the amount of such difference. + +(8.) This section shall take effect from and after the _thirty-first day +of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven_. + +[Sidenote: Collection and application of customs and excise duties in +Ireland.] + +14.--(1.) On and after such day as the Treasury may direct all moneys +from time to time collected in Ireland on account of the duties of +customs or the duties of excise as defined by this Act shall, under such +regulations as the Treasury from time to time make, be carried to a +separate account (in this Act referred to as the customs and excise +account) and applied in the payment of the following sums in priority as +mentioned in this section; that is to say,-- + + First, of such sum as is from time to time directed by the Treasury + in respect of the costs, charges, and expenses of and incident to + the collection and management of the said duties in Ireland not + exceeding four per cent. of the amount collected there; + + Secondly, of the annual contributions required by this Act to be + made to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom; + + Thirdly, of the annual sums required by this Act to be paid to the + Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt; + + Fourthly, of all sums by this Act declared to be payable out of the + moneys carried to the customs and excise account; + + Fifthly, of all sums due to the Consolidated Fund of the United + Kingdom for interest or sinking fund, in respect of any loans made + by the issue of bank annuities or otherwise to the Government of + Ireland under any Act passed in the present session relating to the + purchase and sale of land in Ireland, so far as such sums are not + defrayed out of the moneys received under such Act; + +(2.) So much of the moneys carried to a separate account under this +section as the Treasury consider are not, and are not likely to be, +required to meet the above-mentioned payments, shall from time to time +be paid over and applied as part of the public revenues under the +control of the Irish Government. + +[Sidenote: Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund.] + +15.--(1.) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund in +priority as mentioned in this section:-- + + First, such portion of the sums directed by this Act to be paid out + of the moneys carried to the customs and excise account in priority + to any payment for the public revenues of Ireland, as those moneys + are insufficient to pay; + + Secondly, all sums due in respect of any debt incurred by the + Government of Ireland, whether for interest, management, or sinking + fund; + + Thirdly, all sums which at the passing of this Act are charged on + the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in respect of Irish + services other than the salary of the Lord-Lieutenant; + + Fourthly, the salaries of all judges of the Supreme Court of + Judicature or other superior court in Ireland, or of any county or + other like court, who are appointed after the passing of this Act, + and the pensions of such judges; + + Fifthly, any other sums charged by this Act on the Irish + Consolidated Fund. + +(2.) It shall be the duty of the Legislature of Ireland to impose all +such taxes, duties, or imposts as will raise a sufficient revenue to +meet all sums charged for the time being on the Irish Consolidated Fund. + +[Sidenote: Irish Church Fund.] + +16.--(1.) Until all charges which are payable out of the Church +property in Ireland, and are guaranteed by the Treasury, have been fully +paid, the Irish Land Commission shall continue as heretofore to exist, +with such Commissioners and officers receiving such salaries as the +Treasury may from time to time appoint, and to administer the Church +property and apply the income and other moneys receivable therefrom; and +so much of the salaries of such Commissioners and officers and expenses +of the office as is not paid out of the Church property shall be paid +out of moneys carried to the customs and excise account under this Act, +and if those moneys are insufficient, out of the Consolidated Fund of +Ireland, and if not so paid, shall be paid out of moneys provided by +Parliament. + +Provided as follows:-- + + (_a._) All charges on the Church property for which a guarantee has + been given by the Treasury before the passing of this Act shall, so + far as they are not paid out of such property, be paid out of the + moneys carried to the Customs and Excise account under this Act, + and if such moneys are insufficient, the Consolidated Fund of + Ireland, without prejudice nevertheless to the guarantee of the + Treasury; + + (_b._) All charges on the Church property, for which no guarantee + has been given by the Treasury before the passing of this Act shall + be charged on the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, but shall not be + guaranteed by the Treasury nor charged on the Consolidated Fund of + the United Kingdom. + +(2.) Subject to any existing charges on the Church property, such +property shall belong to the Irish Government and any portion of the +annual revenue thereof which the Treasury, on the application of the +Irish Government, certify at the end of any financial year not to be +required for meeting charges, shall be paid over and applied as part of +the public revenues under the control of the Irish Government. + +(3.) As soon as all charges on the Church property guaranteed by the +Treasury have been paid, such property may be managed and administered, +and subject to existing charges thereon disposed of, and the income or +proceeds thereof applied, in such manner as the Irish Legislature may +from time to time direct. + +[Sidenote: 32 & 33 Vict. c. 42, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 71.] + +(4.) "Church property" in this section means all property accruing under +the Irish Church Act, 1869, and transferred to the Irish Land Commission +by the Irish Church Act Amendment Act, 1881. + +[Sidenote: Public loans.] + +17.--(1.) All sums due for principal or interest to the Public Works +Loan Commissioners or to the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland in +respect of existing loans advanced on any security in Ireland shall on +and after the appointed day be due to the Government of Ireland instead +of the said Commissioners, and such body of persons as the Government of +Ireland may appoint for the purpose shall have all the powers of the +said Commissioners or their secretary for enforcing payment of such +sums, and all securities for such sums given to such Commissioners or +their secretary shall have effect as if the said body were therein +substituted for those Commissioners or their secretary. + +(2.) For the repayment of the said loans to the Consolidated Fund of the +United Kingdom, the Irish Government shall pay annually into that fund +by half-yearly payments on the _first day of January_ and _the first day +of July_, or on such other days as may be agreed on, such instalments of +the principal of the said loans as will discharge all the loans within +_thirty years_ from the appointed day, and shall also pay interest +half-yearly on so much of the said principal as from time to time +remains unpaid at the rate of _three_ per cent. per annum, and such +instalments of principal and interest shall be paid out of the moneys +carried to the customs and excise account under this Act, and if those +are insufficient, out of the Consolidated Fund of Ireland. + +[Sidenote: Additional aid in case of war.] + +18. If Her Majesty declares that a state of war exists and is pleased +to signify such declaration to the Irish Legislative Body by speech or +message, it shall be lawful for the Irish Legislature to appropriate a +further sum out of the Consolidated Fund of Ireland in aid of the army +or navy, or other measures which Her Majesty may take for the +prosecution of the war and defence of the realm, and to provide and +raise money for that purpose; and all moneys so provided and raised, +whether by loan, taxation, or otherwise, shall be paid into the +Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. + +[Sidenote: Money bills and votes.] + +19.--(1.) It shall not be lawful for the Irish Legislative Body to +adopt or pass any vote, resolution, address, or Bill for the raising or +appropriation for any purpose of any part of the public revenue of +Ireland, or of any tax, duty, or impost, except in pursuance of a +recommendation from Her Majesty signified through the Lord-Lieutenant in +the session in which such vote, resolution, address, or Bill is +proposed. + +(2.) Notwithstanding that the Irish Legislature is prohibited by this +Act from making laws relating to certain subjects, that Legislature may, +with the assent of Her Majesty in Council first obtained, appropriate +any part of the Irish public revenue, or any tax, duty, or impost +imposed by such Legislature, for the purpose of, or in connection with, +such subjects. + +[Sidenote: Exchequer Division and revenue actions.] + +20.--(1.) On and after the appointed day, the Exchequer Division of +the High Court of Justice shall continue to be a Court of Exchequer for +revenue purposes under this Act, and whenever any vacancy occurs in the +office of any judge of such Exchequer Division, his successor shall be +appointed by Her Majesty on the joint recommendation of the +Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and the Lord High Chancellor of Great +Britain. + +(2.) The judges of such Exchequer Division appointed after the passing +of this Act shall be removable only by Her Majesty on address from the +two Houses of the Imperial Parliament, and shall receive the same +salaries and pensions as those payable at the passing of this Act to the +existing judges of such division, unless with the assent of Her Majesty +in Council first obtained, the Irish Legislature alters such salaries or +pensions, and such salaries and pensions shall be paid out of the moneys +carried to the customs and excise account in pursuance of this Act, and +if the same are insufficient shall be paid out of the Irish Consolidated +Fund, and if not so paid shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of +the United Kingdom. + +(3.) An alteration of any rules relating to the procedure in such legal +proceedings as are mentioned in this section shall not be made except +with the approval of the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, and the +sittings of the Exchequer division and the judges thereof shall be +regulated with the like approval. + +(4.) All legal proceedings instituted in Ireland by or against the +Commissioners or any officers of customs or excise, or the Treasury, +shall, if so required by any party to such proceedings, be heard and +determined before the judges of such Exchequer division, or some or one +of them, and any appeal from the decision in any such legal proceeding, +if by a judge, shall lie to the said division, and if by the Exchequer +division, shall lie to the House of Lords, and not to any other +tribunal; and if it is made to appear to such judges, or any of them, +that any decree or judgment in any such proceeding as aforesaid, has not +been duly enforced by the sheriff or other officer whose duty it is to +enforce the same, such judges or judge shall appoint some officer to +enforce such judgment or decree; and it shall be the duty of such +officer to take proper steps to enforce the same, and for that purpose +such officer and all persons employed by him shall be entitled to the +same immunities, powers, and privileges as are by law conferred on a +sheriff and his officers. + +(5.) All sums recovered in respect of duties of Customs and Excise, or +under any Act relating thereto, or by an officer of Customs or Excise, +shall, notwithstanding anything in any other Act, be paid to the +Treasury, and carried to the Customs and Excise account under this Act. + + +_Police_. + +21. The following regulations shall be made with respect to Police, +police in Ireland; + +(_a._) The Dublin Metropolitan Police shall continue and be subject as +heretofore to the control of the Lord-Lieutenant as representing Her +Majesty for a period of _two years_ from the passing of this Act, and +thereafter until any alteration is made by Act of the Legislature of +Ireland, but such Act shall provide for the proper saving of all then +existing interests, whether as regards pay, pensions, superannuation +allowances, or otherwise. + +(_b._) The Royal Irish Constabulary shall, while that force subsists, +continue and be subject as heretofore to the control of the +Lord-Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty. + +(_c._) The Irish Legislature may provide for the establishment and +maintenance of a police force in counties and boroughs in Ireland under +the control of local authorities, and arrangements may be made between +the Treasury and the Irish Government for the establishment and +maintenance of police reserves. + + * * * * * + + +PART II. + +SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS. + +_Powers of Her Majesty_. + +[Sidenote: Power over certain lands reserved to Her Majesty.] + +22. On and after the appointed day there shall be reserved to Her +Majesty-- + +(1.) The power of erecting forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and +other buildings for military or naval purposes; + +(2.) The power of taking waste land, and, on making due compensation, +any other land, for the purpose of erecting such forts, magazines, +arsenals, dockyards, or other buildings as aforesaid, and for any other +military or naval purpose, or the defence of the realm. + + +_Legislative Body._ + +[Sidenote: Veto by first order of Legislative Body, how over-ruled.] + +23. If a Bill or any provision of a Bill is lost by disagreement +between the two orders of the Legislative Body, and after a period +ending with a dissolution of the Legislative Body, or the period of +_three years_, whichever period is longest, such Bill, or a Bill +containing the said provision, is again considered by the Legislative +Body, and such Bill or provision is adopted by the second order and +negatived by the first order, the same shall be submitted to the whole +Legislative Body, both orders of which shall vote together on the Bill +or provision, and the same shall be adopted or rejected according to the +decision of the majority of the members so voting together. + +[Sidenote: Cesser of power of Ireland to return members to Parliament.] + +24. On and after the appointed day Ireland shall cease, except in the +event hereafter in this Act mentioned, to return representative peers to +the House of Lords or members to the House of Commons, and the persons +who on the said day are such representative peers and members shall +cease as such to be members of the House of Lords and House of Commons +respectively. + + +_Decision of Constitutional Questions._ + +[Sidenote: Constitutional questions to be submitted to Judicial +Committee.] + +25. _Questions arising as to the powers conferred on the Legislature +of Ireland under this Act shall be determined as follows_:-- + + (a.) _If any such question arises on any Bill passed by the + Legislative Body, the Lord-Lieutenant may refer such question to + Her Majesty in Council;_ + + (b.) _If, in the course of any action or other legal proceeding, + such question arises on any Act of the Irish Legislature, any party + to such action or other legal proceeding may, subject to the rules + in this section mentioned, appeal from a decision on such question + to Her Majesty in Council;_ + + (c.) _If any such question arises otherwise than as aforesaid on + any Act of the Irish Legislature, the Lord-Lieutenant or one of Her + Majesty's principal Secretaries of State may refer such question to + Her Majesty in Council;_ + + (d.) _Any question referred or appeal brought under this section to + Her Majesty in Council shall be referred for the consideration of + the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council;_ + + (e.) _The decision of Her Majesty in Council on any question + referred or appeal brought under this section shall be final, and a + Bill which may be so decided to be, or contain a provision, in + excess of the powers of the Irish Legislature shall not be assented + to by the Lord-Lieutenant; and a provision of any Act which is so + decided to be in excess of the powers of the Irish Legislature + shall be void;_ + + (f.) _There shall be added to the Judicial Committee when sitting + for the purpose of considering questions under this section, such + members of Her Majesty's Privy Council, being or having been Irish + judges, as to Her Majesty may seem, meet._ + + (g.) _Her Majesty may, by Order in Council from time to time, make + rules as to the cases and mode in which and the conditions under + which, in pursuance of this section, questions may be referred and + appeals brought to Her Majesty in Council, and as to the + consideration thereof by the Judicial Committee of the Privy + Council, and any rules so made shall be of the same force as if + they were enacted in this Act._ + + (h.) _An appeal shall not lie to the House of Lords in respect of + any question in respect of which an appeal can be had to Her + Majesty in Council in pursuance of this section_. + + +_Lord-Lieutenant._ + +[Sidenote: Office of Lord-Lieutenant.] + +26.--(1.) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any +Act of Parliament, every subject of Her Majesty shall be eligible to +hold and enjoy the office of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, without +reference to his religious belief. + +(2.) The salary of the Lord-Lieutenant shall continue to be charged on +the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and the expenses of his +household and establishment shall continue to be defrayed out of moneys +to be provided by Parliament. + +(3.) All existing powers vested by Act of Parliament or otherwise in the +Chief Secretary for Ireland may, if no such officer is appointed, be +exercised by the Lord-Lieutenant until other provision is made by Act of +the Irish Legislature. + +(4.) The Legislature of Ireland shall not pass any Act relating to the +office or functions of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. + + +_Judges and Civil Servants_. + +[Sidenote: Judges to be removable only on address.] + +27. A Judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature or other superior court +of Ireland, or of any county court or other court with a like +jurisdiction in Ireland, appointed after the passing of this Act, shall +not be removed from his office except in pursuance of an address to Her +Majesty from both orders of the Legislative Body voting separately, nor +shall his salary be diminished or right to pension altered during his +continuance in office. + +[Sidenote: Provisions as to judges and other persons having salaries +charged on the Consolidated Fund.] + +28.--(1.) All persons who at the passing of this Act are judges of the +Supreme Court of Judicature or county court judges, or hold any other +judicial position in Ireland, shall, if they are removable at present on +address to Her Majesty of both Houses of Parliament, continue to be +removable only upon such address from both Houses of the Imperial +Parliament, and if removable in any other manner shall continue to be +removable in like manner as heretofore; and such persons, and also all +persons at the passing of this Act in the permanent civil service of the +Crown in Ireland whose salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund of +the United Kingdom, shall continue to hold office and to be entitled to +the same salaries, pensions, and superannuation allowances as +heretofore, and to be liable to perform the same or analogous duties as +heretofore; and the salaries of such persons shall be paid out of the +moneys carried to the customs and excise account under this Act, or if +these moneys are insufficient, out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, and +if the same are not so paid, shall continue charged on the Consolidated +Fund of the United Kingdom. + +(2.) _If any of these said persons retires from office with the +approbation of Her Majesty before he has completed the period of service +entitling him to a pension, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty, if she +thinks fit, to grant to that person such pension, not exceeding the +pension to which he would have been entitled if he had completed the +said period of service, as to Her Majesty seems meet._ + +[Sidenote: As to persons holding civil service appointments.] + +29.--(1.) All persons not above provided for and at the passing of +this Act serving in Ireland in the permanent civil service of the Crown +shall continue to hold their offices and receive the same salaries, and +to be entitled to the same gratuities and superannuation allowances as +heretofore, and shall be liable to perform the same duties as heretofore +or duties of similar rank, but any of such persons shall be entitled at +the expiration of _two years_ after the passing of this Act to retire +from office, and at any time if required by the Irish Government shall +retire from office, and on any such retirement shall be entitled to +receive such payment as the Treasury may award to him in accordance with +the provisions contained in the Fourth Schedule to this Act. + +(2.) The amount of such payment shall be paid to him out of the moneys +carried to the customs and excise account under this Act, or, if those +moneys are insufficient, out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, _and so far +as the same are not so paid shall be paid out of moneys provided by +Parliament_. + +[Sidenote: 34 & 35 Vict. c. 36.] + +(3.) The Pensions Commutation Act, 1871, shall apply to all persons who, +having retired from office, are entitled to any annual payment under +this section in like manner as if they had retired in consequence of the +abolition of their offices. + +(4.) This section shall not apply to persons who are retained in the +service of the Imperial Government. + +[Sidenote: Provision for existing pensions and superannuation +allowances.] + +30. Where before the passing of this Act any pension or superannuation +allowance has been granted to any person on account of service as a +judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Ireland or of any court +consolidated into that court, or as a county court judge, or in any +other judicial position, or on account of service in the permanent civil +service of the Crown in Ireland otherwise than in some office, the +holder of which is, after the passing of this Act, retained in the +service of the Imperial Government, such pension or allowance, whether +payable out of the Consolidated Fund or out of moneys provided by +Parliament, shall continue to be paid to such person, and shall be so +paid out of the moneys carried to the customs and excise account under +this Act, or, if such moneys are insufficient, out of the Irish +Consolidated Fund, and so far as the same is not so paid, shall be paid +as heretofore out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom or +moneys provided by Parliament. + + +_Transitory Provisions._ + +[Sidenote: Transitory provisions in schedule.] + +31. The provisions contained in the Fifth Schedule to this Act +relating to the mode in which arrangements are to be made for setting in +motion the Irish Legislative Body and Government and for the transfer to +the Irish Government of the powers and duties to be transferred to them +under this Act, or for otherwise bringing this Act into operation, shall +be of the same effect as if they were enacted in the body of this Act. + + +_Miscellaneous._ + +[Sidenote: Post Office and savings banks.] + +32. Whenever an Act of the Legislature of Ireland has provided for +carrying on the postal and telegraphic service with respect to the +transmission of letters and telegrams in Ireland, and the post-office +and other savings banks in Ireland, and for protecting the officers then +in such service, and the existing depositors in such post-office savings +banks, the Treasury shall make arrangements for the transfer of the said +service and banks, in accordance with the said Act, and shall give +public notice of the transfer, and shall pay all depositors in such post +office savings bank who request payment within _six months_ after the +date fixed for such transfer, and after the expiration of such _six +months_ the said depositors shall cease to have any claim against the +Postmaster-General or the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, but +shall have the like claim against the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, and +the Treasury shall cause to be transferred in accordance with the said +Act the securities representing the sums due to the said depositors in +post office savings banks and the securities held for other savings +banks. + +[Sidenote: Audit.] + +33. Save as otherwise provided by the Irish Legislature,-- + + (_a._) The existing law relating to the Exchequer and the + Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom shall apply to the Irish + Exchequer and Consolidated Fund, and an officer shall from time to + time be appointed by the Lord-Lieutenant to fill the office of the + Comptroller General of the receipt and issue of Her Majesty's + Exchequer and Auditor-General of public accounts so far as respects + Ireland; and + +[Sidenote: 29 & 30 Vict. c. 39.] + + + (_b._) The accounts of the Irish Consolidated Fund shall be audited + as appropriation accounts in manner provided by the Exchequer and + Audit Departments Act, 1866, by or under the direction of the + holder of such office. + +[Sidenote: Application of parliamentary law.] + +34.--(1.) The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, +and exercised by the Irish Legislative Body, and the members thereof, +shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Irish +Legislature, but so that the same shall never exceed those at the +passing of this Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the House of +Commons, and by the members thereof. + +(2.) Subject as in this Act mentioned, all existing laws and customs +relating to the members of the House of Commons and their election, +including the enactments respecting the questioning of elections, +corrupt and illegal practices, and registration of electors, shall, so +far as applicable, extend to elective members of the first order and to +members of the second order of the Irish Legislative Body. + +Provided that-- + + (_a._) The law relating to the offices of profit enumerated in + Schedule H. to the Representation of the People Act, 1867, shall + apply to such offices of profit in the government of Ireland not + exceeding ten, as the Legislature of Ireland may from time to time + direct; + + (_b._) After the first dissolution of the Legislative Body, the + Legislature of Ireland may, subject to the restrictions in this Act + mentioned, alter the laws and customs in this section mentioned. + +[Sidenote: Regulations for carrying Act into effect.] + +35.--(1.) The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland may make regulations for the +following purposes:-- + + (_a._) The summoning of the Legislative Body and the election of a + Speaker, and such adaptation to the proceedings of the Legislative + Body of the procedure of the House of Commons as appears to him + expedient for facilitating the conduct of business by that body on + their first meeting; + + (_b._) The adaptation of any law relating to the election of + representative peers; + + (_c._) The adaptation of any laws and customs relating to the House + of Commons or the members thereof to the elective members of the + first order and to members of the second order of the Legislative + Body; and + + (_d._) The mode of signifying their assent or election under this + Act by representative peers or Irish members of the House of + Commons as regards becoming members of the Irish Legislative Body + in pursuance of this Act. + +(2.) Any regulations so made shall, in so far as they concern the +procedure of the Legislative Body, be subject to alteration by Standing +Orders of that Body, and so far as they concern other matters, be +subject to alteration by the Legislature of Ireland, but shall, until +alteration, have the same effect as if they were inserted in this Act. + +[Sidenote: Saving of powers of House of Lords.] + +36. Save as is in this Act provided with respect to matters to be +decided by Her Majesty in Council, nothing in this Act shall affect the +appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords in respect of actions and +suits in Ireland, or the jurisdiction of the House of Lords to determine +the claims to Irish peerages. + +[Sidenote: Saving of rights of Parliament.] + +37. _Save as herein expressly provided all matters in relation to +which it is not competent for the Irish Legislative Body to make or +repeal laws shall remain and be within the exclusive authority of the +Imperial Parliament, whose power and authority in relation thereto, save +as aforesaid, shall in nowise be diminished or restrained by anything +herein contained._[75] + +[Sidenote: Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, &c.] + +38.--(1.) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all existing laws +in force in Ireland, and all existing courts of civil and criminal +jurisdiction, and all existing legal commissions, powers, and +authorities, and all existing officers, judicial, administrative, and +ministerial and all existing taxes, licence, and other duties, fees, and +other receipts in Ireland shall continue as if this Act had not been +passed; subject, nevertheless, to be repealed, abolished, or altered in +manner and to the extent provided by this Act; provided that, subject to +the provisions of this Act, such taxes, duties, fees, and other receipts +shall, after the appointed day, form part of the public revenues of +Ireland. + +(2.) The Commissioners of Inland Revenue and the Commissioners of +Customs, and the officers of such Commissioners respectively, shall have +the same powers in relation to any articles subject to any duty of +excise or customs, manufactured, imported, kept for sale, or sold, and +any premises where the same may be, and to any machinery, apparatus, +vessels, utensils, or conveyance used in connexion therewith, or the +removal thereof, and in relation to the person manufacturing, importing, +keeping for sale, selling, or having the custody or possession of the +same as they would have had if this Act had not been passed. + +[Sidenote: Mode of alteration of Act.] + +39.--(1.) _On and after the appointed day this Act shall not, except +such provisions thereof as are declared to be alterable by the +Legislature of Ireland, be altered except--_ + + (a.) _by Act of the Imperial Parliament and with the consent of the + Irish Legislative Body testified by an address to Her Majesty, or_ + + (b.) _by an Act of the Imperial Parliament, for the passing of + which there shall be summoned to the House of Lords the peerage + members of the first order of the Irish Legislative Body, and if + there are no such members then twenty-eight Irish representative + peers elected by the Irish peers in manner heretofore in use, + subject to adaptation as provided by this Act; and there shall be + summoned to the House of Commons such one of the members of each + constituency, or in the case of a constituency returning four + members such two of those members, as the Legislative Body of + Ireland may select, and such peers and members shall respectively + be deemed, for the purpose of passing any such Act, to be members + of the said Houses of Parliament respectively._ + +(2.) _For the purposes of this section it shall be lawful for Her +Majesty by Order in Council to make such provisions for summoning the +said peers of Ireland to the House of Lords and the said members from +Ireland to the House of Commons as to Her Majesty may seem necessary or +proper, and any provisions contained in such Order in Council shall have +the same effect as if they had been enacted by Parliament._ + +[Sidenote: Definitions.] + +40. In this Act-- + +The expression "the appointed day" shall mean such day after the +_thirty-first day of March in the year one thousand eight hundred and +eighty-seven_ as may be determined by order of Her Majesty in Council. + +The expression "Lord-Lieutenant" includes the lords justices or any +other chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being. + +The expression "Her Majesty the Queen," or "Her Majesty" or "the Queen," +includes the heirs and successors of Her Majesty the Queen. + +The expression "Treasury," means the Commissioners of Her Majesty's +Treasury. + +The expression "Treaty" includes any convention or arrangement. + +The expression "existing" means existing at the passing of this Act. + +The expression "existing constituency" means any county or borough, or +division of a county or borough, or a University returning at the +passing of this Act a member or members to serve in Parliament. + +The expression "duties of excise" does not include a duty received in +respect of any license whether for the sale of intoxicating liquors or +otherwise. + +The expression "financial year" means the twelve months ending on the +_thirty-first day of March_. + +[Sidenote: Short title of Act.] + +41. This Act may be cited for all purposes as the Irish Government +Act, 1886. + + * * * * * + +FIRST SCHEDULE. + + * * * * * + +FIRST ORDER OF THE IRISH LEGISLATIVE BODY. + +----------------------+---------------------+------------ +Electoral Districts. | Number of Members. | Rotation. +----------------------+---------------------+------------ + | | + | | + | | + | | +----------------------+---------------------+------------ + + * * * * * + + +SECOND SCHEDULE. + + * * * * * + +PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FIRST ORDER OF THE IRISH +LEGISLATIVE BODY. + + * * * * * + + +THIRD SCHEDULE. + + * * * * * + +BOUNDARIES OF DIVISIONS OF THE CITY OF CORK FOR THE PURPOSE OF +RETURNING MEMBERS TO THE SECOND ORDER OF THE LEGISLATIVE +BODY. + + * * * * * + + +FOURTH SCHEDULE. + + * * * * * + +PROVISIONS AS TO SUPERANNUATION ALLOWANCES OF PERSONS IN THE +PERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE. + + * * * * * + + +FIFTH SCHEDULE. + + * * * * * + +TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[74] The clauses printed in italics are the clauses of the Bill which +are specially referred to in the foregoing pages. + +[75] This clause is printed as I am informed that it ought to have been +originally printed in the Bill. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE*** + + +******* This file should be named 14886.txt or 14886.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/4/8/8/14886 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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