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diff --git a/old/1497.txt b/old/1497.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9348063 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1497.txt @@ -0,0 +1,24693 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Republic, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Republic + +Author: Plato + +Translator: B. Jowett + +Posting Date: August 27, 2008 [EBook #1497] +Release Date: October, 1998 +Last Updated: June 22, 2016 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE REPUBLIC *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +THE REPUBLIC + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +Note: The Republic by Plato, Jowett, etext #150 + + + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +The Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception +of the Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer +approaches to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist; the +Politicus or Statesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of +the State are more clearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the +Symposium and the Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other +Dialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same perfection +of style; no other shows an equal knowledge of the world, or contains +more of those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not of one age +only but of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater +wealth of humour or imagery, or more dramatic power. Nor in any other of +his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and speculation, or +to connect politics with philosophy. The Republic is the centre around +which the other Dialogues may be grouped; here philosophy reaches the +highest point (cp, especially in Books V, VI, VII) to which ancient +thinkers ever attained. Plato among the Greeks, like Bacon among the +moderns, was the first who conceived a method of knowledge, although +neither of them always distinguished the bare outline or form from +the substance of truth; and both of them had to be content with an +abstraction of science which was not yet realized. He was the greatest +metaphysical genius whom the world has seen; and in him, more than in +any other ancient thinker, the germs of future knowledge are contained. +The sciences of logic and psychology, which have supplied so many +instruments of thought to after-ages, are based upon the analyses +of Socrates and Plato. The principles of definition, the law of +contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, the distinction +between the essence and accidents of a thing or notion, between means +and ends, between causes and conditions; also the division of the mind +into the rational, concupiscent, and irascible elements, or of pleasures +and desires into necessary and unnecessary--these and other great +forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic, and were +probably first invented by Plato. The greatest of all logical truths, +and the one of which writers on philosophy are most apt to lose sight, +the difference between words and things, has been most strenuously +insisted on by him (cp. Rep.; Polit.; Cratyl. 435, 436 ff), although he +has not always avoided the confusion of them in his own writings (e.g. +Rep.). But he does not bind up truth in logical formulae,--logic is +still veiled in metaphysics; and the science which he imagines to +'contemplate all truth and all existence' is very unlike the doctrine of +the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered (Soph. Elenchi, +33. 18). + +Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a +still larger design which was to have included an ideal history of +Athens, as well as a political and physical philosophy. The fragment of +the Critias has given birth to a world-famous fiction, second only in +importance to the tale of Troy and the legend of Arthur; and is said as +a fact to have inspired some of the early navigators of the sixteenth +century. This mythical tale, of which the subject was a history of the +wars of the Athenians against the Island of Atlantis, is supposed to be +founded upon an unfinished poem of Solon, to which it would have stood +in the same relation as the writings of the logographers to the poems of +Homer. It would have told of a struggle for Liberty (cp. Tim. 25 C), intended +to represent the conflict of Persia and Hellas. We may judge from the +noble commencement of the Timaeus, from the fragment of the Critias +itself, and from the third book of the Laws, in what manner Plato would +have treated this high argument. We can only guess why the great design +was abandoned; perhaps because Plato became sensible of some incongruity +in a fictitious history, or because he had lost his interest in it, or +because advancing years forbade the completion of it; and we may please +ourselves with the fancy that had this imaginary narrative ever been +finished, we should have found Plato himself sympathising with the +struggle for Hellenic independence (cp. Laws iii. 698 ff.), singing a +hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis, perhaps making the reflection +of Herodotus (v. 78) where he contemplates the growth of the Athenian +empire--'How brave a thing is freedom of speech, which has made the +Athenians so far exceed every other state of Hellas in greatness!' or, +more probably, attributing the victory to the ancient good order of +Athens and to the favor of Apollo and Athene (cp. Introd. to Critias). + +Again, Plato may be regarded as the 'captain' ('arhchegoz') or leader +of a goodly band of followers; for in the Republic is to be found the +original of Cicero's De Republica, of St. Augustine's City of God, +of the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary +States which are framed upon the same model. The extent to which +Aristotle or the Aristotelian school were indebted to him in the +Politics has been little recognised, and the recognition is the +more necessary because it is not made by Aristotle himself. The two +philosophers had more in common than they were conscious of; and +probably some elements of Plato remain still undetected in Aristotle. In +English philosophy too, many affinities may be traced, not only in the +works of the Cambridge Platonists, but in great original writers like +Berkeley or Coleridge, to Plato and his ideas. That there is a truth +higher than experience, of which the mind bears witness to herself, is +a conviction which in our own generation has been enthusiastically +asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the Greek authors who at the +Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato has had the greatest +influence. The Republic of Plato is also the first treatise upon +education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean +Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, +he has a revelation of another life; like Bacon, he is profoundly +impressed with the unity of knowledge; in the early Church he exercised +a real influence on theology, and at the Revival of Literature on +politics. Even the fragments of his words when 'repeated at second-hand' +(Symp. 215 D) have in all ages ravished the hearts of men, who have seen +reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of idealism +in philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many of the latest +conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the unity of +knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality of the sexes, have been +anticipated in a dream by him. + +The argument of the Republic is the search after Justice, the nature +of which is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless old +man--then discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and +Polemarchus--then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained +by Socrates--reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and +having become invisible in the individual reappears at length in the +ideal State which is constructed by Socrates. The first care of the +rulers is to be education, of which an outline is drawn after the old +Hellenic model, providing only for an improved religion and morality, +and more simplicity in music and gymnastic, a manlier strain of poetry, +and greater harmony of the individual and the State. We are thus led on +to the conception of a higher State, in which 'no man calls anything his +own,' and in which there is neither 'marrying nor giving in marriage,' +and 'kings are philosophers' and 'philosophers are kings;' and there +is another and higher education, intellectual as well as moral and +religious, of science as well as of art, and not of youth only but of +the whole of life. Such a State is hardly to be realized in this world +and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal succeeds the government +of the soldier and the lover of honour, this again declining into +democracy, and democracy into tyranny, in an imaginary but regular order +having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When 'the wheel has +come full circle' we do not begin again with a new period of human life; +but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we end. The +subject is then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy +which had been more lightly treated in the earlier books of the Republic +is now resumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is discovered to +be an imitation thrice removed from the truth, and Homer, as well as +the dramatic poets, having been condemned as an imitator, is sent into +banishment along with them. And the idea of the State is supplemented by +the revelation of a future life. + +The division into books, like all similar divisions (Cp. Sir G.C. Lewis +in the Classical Museum, vol. ii. p 1.), is probably later than the age of Plato. The +natural divisions are five in number;--(1) Book I and the first half +of Book II down to the paragraph beginning, 'I had always admired the +genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus,' which is introductory; the first +book containing a refutation of the popular and sophistical notions of +justice, and concluding, like some of the earlier Dialogues, without +arriving at any definite result. To this is appended a restatement of +the nature of justice according to common opinion, and an answer is +demanded to the question--What is justice, stripped of appearances? The +second division (2) includes the remainder of the second and the whole +of the third and fourth books, which are mainly occupied with the +construction of the first State and the first education. The third +division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and seventh books, in which +philosophy rather than justice is the subject of enquiry, and the +second State is constructed on principles of communism and ruled by +philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea of good takes the place +of the social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books (4) +the perversions of States and of the individuals who correspond to them +are reviewed in succession; and the nature of pleasure and the principle +of tyranny are further analysed in the individual man. The tenth book +(5) is the conclusion of the whole, in which the relations of philosophy +to poetry are finally determined, and the happiness of the citizens +in this life, which has now been assured, is crowned by the vision of +another. + +Or a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first +(Books I - IV) containing the description of a State framed generally in +accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the +second (Books V - X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an +ideal kingdom of philosophy, of which all other governments are the +perversions. These two points of view are really opposed, and the +opposition is only veiled by the genius of Plato. The Republic, like +the Phaedrus (see Introduction to Phaedrus), is an imperfect whole; the +higher light of philosophy breaks through the regularity of the +Hellenic temple, which at last fades away into the heavens. Whether this +imperfection of structure arises from an enlargement of the plan; +or from the imperfect reconcilement in the writer's own mind of the +struggling elements of thought which are now first brought together +by him; or, perhaps, from the composition of the work at different +times--are questions, like the similar question about the Iliad and +the Odyssey, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a distinct +answer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of publication, +and an author would have the less scruple in altering or adding to a +work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no absurdity +in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a time, or +turned from one work to another; and such interruptions would be more +likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all +attempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings +on internal evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being +composed at one time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted +to affect longer works, such as the Republic and the Laws, more than +shorter ones. But, on the other hand, the seeming discrepancies of +the Republic may only arise out of the discordant elements which the +philosopher has attempted to unite in a single whole, perhaps without +being himself able to recognise the inconsistency which is obvious to +us. For there is a judgment of after ages which few great writers have +ever been able to anticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the +want of connexion in their own writings, or the gaps in their systems +which are visible enough to those who come after them. In the beginnings +of literature and philosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and +language, more inconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of +speculation are well worn and the meaning of words precisely defined. +For consistency, too, is the growth of time; and some of the greatest +creations of the human mind have been wanting in unity. Tried by this +test, several of the Platonic Dialogues, according to our modern ideas, +appear to be defective, but the deficiency is no proof that they were +composed at different times or by different hands. And the supposition +that the Republic was written uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort +is in some degree confirmed by the numerous references from one part of +the work to another. + +The second title, 'Concerning Justice,' is not the one by which the +Republic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and, +like the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore be +assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked +whether the definition of justice, which is the professed aim, or the +construction of the State is the principal argument of the work. The +answer is, that the two blend in one, and are two faces of the same +truth; for justice is the order of the State, and the State is the +visible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human society. The +one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of the +State, as of the individual, is a fair mind in a fair body. In Hegelian +phraseology the state is the reality of which justice is the idea. Or, +described in Christian language, the kingdom of God is within, and yet +developes into a Church or external kingdom; 'the house not made with +hands, eternal in the heavens,' is reduced to the proportions of an +earthly building. Or, to use a Platonic image, justice and the State are +the warp and the woof which run through the whole texture. And when the +constitution of the State is completed, the conception of justice is not +dismissed, but reappears under the same or different names throughout +the work, both as the inner law of the individual soul, and finally as +the principle of rewards and punishments in another life. The virtues +are based on justice, of which common honesty in buying and selling +is the shadow, and justice is based on the idea of good, which is the +harmony of the world, and is reflected both in the institutions of +states and in motions of the heavenly bodies (cp. Tim. 47). The Timaeus, +which takes up the political rather than the ethical side of the +Republic, and is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning the outward +world, yet contains many indications that the same law is supposed to +reign over the State, over nature, and over man. + +Too much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and +modern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether +of nature or of art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings, +and indeed in literature generally, there remains often a large element +which was not comprehended in the original design. For the plan grows +under the author's hand; new thoughts occur to him in the act of +writing; he has not worked out the argument to the end before he begins. +The reader who seeks to find some one idea under which the whole may be +conceived, must necessarily seize on the vaguest and most general. Thus +Stallbaum, who is dissatisfied with the ordinary explanations of the +argument of the Republic, imagines himself to have found the true +argument 'in the representation of human life in a State perfected by +justice, and governed according to the idea of good.' There may be some +use in such general descriptions, but they can hardly be said to express +the design of the writer. The truth is, that we may as well speak of +many designs as of one; nor need anything be excluded from the plan of +a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of +ideas, and which does not interfere with the general purpose. What kind +or degree of unity is to be sought after in a building, in the plastic +arts, in poetry, in prose, is a problem which has to be determined +relatively to the subject-matter. To Plato himself, the enquiry 'what +was the intention of the writer,' or 'what was the principal argument +of the Republic' would have been hardly intelligible, and therefore had +better be at once dismissed (cp. the Introduction to the Phaedrus). + +Is not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, +to Plato's own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the +State? Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah, or 'the day +of the Lord,' or the suffering Servant or people of God, or the 'Sun of +righteousness with healing in his wings' only convey, to us at least, +their great spiritual ideals, so through the Greek State Plato reveals +to us his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of +good--like the sun in the visible world;--about human perfection, which +is justice--about education beginning in youth and continuing in later +years--about poets and sophists and tyrants who are the false teachers +and evil rulers of mankind--about 'the world' which is the embodiment of +them--about a kingdom which exists nowhere upon earth but is laid up +in heaven to be the pattern and rule of human life. No such inspired +creation is at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of heaven +when the sun pierces through them. Every shade of light and dark, of +truth, and of fiction which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a work +of philosophical imagination. It is not all on the same plane; it easily +passes from ideas to myths and fancies, from facts to figures of speech. +It is not prose but poetry, at least a great part of it, and ought not +to be judged by the rules of logic or the probabilities of history. The +writer is not fashioning his ideas into an artistic whole; they take +possession of him and are too much for him. We have no need therefore +to discuss whether a State such as Plato has conceived is practicable or +not, or whether the outward form or the inward life came first into the +mind of the writer. For the practicability of his ideas has nothing to +do with their truth; and the highest thoughts to which he attains may be +truly said to bear the greatest 'marks of design'--justice more than the +external frame-work of the State, the idea of good more than justice. +The great science of dialectic or the organisation of ideas has no real +content; but is only a type of the method or spirit in which the +higher knowledge is to be pursued by the spectator of all time and +all existence. It is in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books that Plato +reaches the 'summit of speculation,' and these, although they fail to +satisfy the requirements of a modern thinker, may therefore be regarded +as the most important, as they are also the most original, portions of +the work. + +It is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has +been raised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the +conversation was held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will +do as well as any other); for a writer of fiction, and especially a +writer who, like Plato, is notoriously careless of chronology (cp. Rep., +Symp., 193 A, etc.), only aims at general probability. Whether all the persons +mentioned in the Republic could ever have met at any one time is not +a difficulty which would have occurred to an Athenian reading the work +forty years later, or to Plato himself at the time of writing (any more +than to Shakespeare respecting one of his own dramas); and need not +greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a question having no answer +'which is still worth asking,' because the investigation shows that we +cannot argue historically from the dates in Plato; it would be useless +therefore to waste time in inventing far-fetched reconcilements of them +in order to avoid chronological difficulties, such, for example, as +the conjecture of C.F. Hermann, that Glaucon and Adeimantus are not the +brothers but the uncles of Plato (cp. Apol. 34 A), or the fancy of Stallbaum +that Plato intentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which +some of his Dialogues were written. + +The principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polemarchus, +Thrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in the +introduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument, +and Thrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. +The main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. +Among the company are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, the sons of +Cephalus and brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides--these are +mute auditors; also there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts, where, as +in the Dialogue which bears his name, he appears as the friend and ally +of Thrasymachus. + +Cephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged +in offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost +done with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He +feels that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger +around the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come +to visit him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the +consciousness of a well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the +tyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation, his affection, his +indifference to riches, even his garrulity, are interesting traits of +character. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because their +whole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges +that riches have the advantage of placing men above the temptation +to dishonesty or falsehood. The respectful attention shown to him by +Socrates, whose love of conversation, no less than the mission imposed +upon him by the Oracle, leads him to ask questions of all men, young and +old alike, should also be noted. Who better suited to raise the question +of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the expression of +it? The moderation with which old age is pictured by Cephalus as a very +tolerable portion of existence is characteristic, not only of him, +but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the exaggeration of +Cicero in the De Senectute. The evening of life is described by Plato +in the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest possible touches. As +Cicero remarks (Ep. ad Attic. iv. 16), the aged Cephalus would have been out of +place in the discussion which follows, and which he could neither have +understood nor taken part in without a violation of dramatic propriety +(cp. Lysimachus in the Laches). + +His 'son and heir' Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuousness of +youth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, +and will not 'let him off' on the subject of women and children. +Like Cephalus, he is limited in his point of view, and represents +the proverbial stage of morality which has rules of life rather than +principles; and he quotes Simonides (cp. Aristoph. Clouds) as his father +had quoted Pindar. But after this he has no more to say; the answers +which he makes are only elicited from him by the dialectic of Socrates. +He has not yet experienced the influence of the Sophists like Glaucon +and Adeimantus, nor is he sensible of the necessity of refuting them; he +belongs to the pre-Socratic or pre-dialectical age. He is incapable of +arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree that he does not +know what he is saying. He is made to admit that justice is a thief, and +that the virtues follow the analogy of the arts. From his brother Lysias +(contra Eratosth.) we learn that he fell a victim to the Thirty Tyrants, +but no allusion is here made to his fate, nor to the circumstance that +Cephalus and his family were of Syracusan origin, and had migrated from +Thurii to Athens. + +The 'Chalcedonian giant,' Thrasymachus, of whom we have already heard +in the Phaedrus, is the personification of the Sophists, according to +Plato's conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He +is vain and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of +making an oration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates; +but a mere child in argument, and unable to foresee that the next 'move' +(to use a Platonic expression) will 'shut him up.' He has reached the +stage of framing general notions, and in this respect is in advance of +Cephalus and Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them in a +discussion, and vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and +insolence. Whether such doctrines as are attributed to him by Plato were +really held either by him or by any other Sophist is uncertain; in the +infancy of philosophy serious errors about morality might easily grow +up--they are certainly put into the mouths of speakers in Thucydides; +but we are concerned at present with Plato's description of him, and not +with the historical reality. The inequality of the contest adds greatly +to the humour of the scene. The pompous and empty Sophist is utterly +helpless in the hands of the great master of dialectic, who knows how +to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in him. He is greatly +irritated by the irony of Socrates, but his noisy and imbecile rage +only lays him more and more open to the thrusts of his assailant. His +determination to cram down their throats, or put 'bodily into their +souls' his own words, elicits a cry of horror from Socrates. The +state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the process of the +argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete submission when +he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to continue the +discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent good-will, and he +even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two occasional +remarks. When attacked by Glaucon he is humorously protected by Socrates +'as one who has never been his enemy and is now his friend.' From Cicero +and Quintilian and from Aristotle's Rhetoric we learn that the Sophist +whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note whose writings were +preserved in later ages. The play on his name which was made by his +contemporary Herodicus (Aris. Rhet.), 'thou wast ever bold in +battle,' seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of +verisimilitude. + +When Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents, +Glaucon and Adeimantus, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy +(cp. Introd. to Phaedo), three actors are introduced. At first sight +the two sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two +friends Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo. But on a nearer examination +of them the similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be distinct +characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can 'just never have +enough of fechting' (cp. the character of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6); +the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love; the +'juvenis qui gaudet canibus,' and who improves the breed of animals; the +lover of art and music who has all the experiences of youthful life. He +is full of quickness and penetration, piercing easily below the clumsy +platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real difficulty; he turns out to the +light the seamy side of human life, and yet does not lose faith in the +just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may be termed the ludicrous +relation of the philosopher to the world, to whom a state of simplicity +is 'a city of pigs,' who is always prepared with a jest when the +argument offers him an opportunity, and who is ever ready to second +the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the ridiculous, whether in +the connoisseurs of music, or in the lovers of theatricals, or in the +fantastic behaviour of the citizens of democracy. His weaknesses are +several times alluded to by Socrates, who, however, will not allow him +to be attacked by his brother Adeimantus. He is a soldier, and, like +Adeimantus, has been distinguished at the battle of Megara (anno +456?)...The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver, and the +profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more +demonstrative, and generally opens the game. Adeimantus pursues the +argument further. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy +of youth; Adeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of +the world. In the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and +injustice shall be considered without regard to their consequences, +Adeimantus remarks that they are regarded by mankind in general only for +the sake of their consequences; and in a similar vein of reflection he +urges at the beginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making +his citizens happy, and is answered that happiness is not the first but +the second thing, not the direct aim but the indirect consequence of +the good government of a State. In the discussion about religion and +mythology, Adeimantus is the respondent, but Glaucon breaks in with a +slight jest, and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about +music and gymnastic to the end of the book. It is Adeimantus again +who volunteers the criticism of common sense on the Socratic method of +argument, and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question +of women and children. It is Adeimantus who is the respondent in the +more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more imaginative +portions of the Dialogue. For example, throughout the greater part +of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the +conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. Glaucon +resumes his place of principal respondent; but he has a difficulty in +apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some false hits +in the course of the discussion. Once more Adeimantus returns with the +allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious +State; in the next book he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to +the end. + +Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive +stages of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden +time, who is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his +life by proverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of +the Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, +who know the sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them, +and desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These too, like +Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one +another. Neither in the Republic, nor in any other Dialogue of Plato, is +a single character repeated. + +The delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In +the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted +in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, in the earliest Dialogues of Plato, and +in the Apology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy +of the Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue +seriously. But in the sixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates; +he acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the +corrupters of the world. He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, +passing beyond the range either of the political or the speculative +ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage Plato himself seems to +intimate that the time had now come for Socrates, who had passed his +whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be always +repeating the notions of other men. There is no evidence that either the +idea of good or the conception of a perfect state were comprehended in +the Socratic teaching, though he certainly dwelt on the nature of +the universal and of final causes (cp. Xen. Mem.; Phaedo); and a deep +thinker like him, in his thirty or forty years of public teaching, could +hardly have failed to touch on the nature of family relations, for +which there is also some positive evidence in the Memorabilia (Mem.) The +Socratic method is nominally retained; and every inference is either put +into the mouth of the respondent or represented as the common discovery +of him and Socrates. But any one can see that this is a mere form, of +which the affectation grows wearisome as the work advances. The method +of enquiry has passed into a method of teaching in which by the help of +interlocutors the same thesis is looked at from various points of view. +The nature of the process is truly characterized by Glaucon, when +he describes himself as a companion who is not good for much in an +investigation, but can see what he is shown, and may, perhaps, give the +answer to a question more fluently than another. + +Neither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the +immortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the +Republic (cp. Apol.); nor is there any reason to suppose that he used +myths or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction, +or that he would have banished poetry or have denounced the Greek +mythology. His favorite oath is retained, and a slight mention is made +of the daemonium, or internal sign, which is alluded to by Socrates as +a phenomenon peculiar to himself. A real element of Socratic teaching, +which is more prominent in the Republic than in any of the other +Dialogues of Plato, is the use of example and illustration (Greek): +'Let us apply the test of common instances.' 'You,' says Adeimantus, +ironically, in the sixth book, 'are so unaccustomed to speak in images.' +And this use of examples or images, though truly Socratic in origin, is +enlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of an allegory or parable, +which embodies in the concrete what has been already described, or is +about to be described, in the abstract. Thus the figure of the cave in +Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in Book VI. +The composite animal in Book IX is an allegory of the parts of the +soul. The noble captain and the ship and the true pilot in Book VI are +a figure of the relation of the people to the philosophers in the +State which has been described. Other figures, such as the dog, or +the marriage of the portionless maiden, or the drones and wasps in the +eighth and ninth books, also form links of connexion in long passages, +or are used to recall previous discussions. + +Plato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him +as 'not of this world.' And with this representation of him the ideal +state and the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance, +though they cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To +him, as to other great teachers both philosophical and religious, when +they looked upward, the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and +evil. The common sense of mankind has revolted against this view, or +has only partially admitted it. And even in Socrates himself the sterner +judgement of the multitude at times passes into a sort of ironical pity +or love. Men in general are incapable of philosophy, and are therefore +at enmity with the philosopher; but their misunderstanding of him is +unavoidable: for they have never seen him as he truly is in his own +image; they are only acquainted with artificial systems possessing no +native force of truth--words which admit of many applications. Their +leaders have nothing to measure with, and are therefore ignorant of +their own stature. But they are to be pitied or laughed at, not to be +quarrelled with; they mean well with their nostrums, if they could only +learn that they are cutting off a Hydra's head. This moderation towards +those who are in error is one of the most characteristic features +of Socrates in the Republic. In all the different representations of +Socrates, whether of Xenophon or Plato, and amid the differences of +the earlier or later Dialogues, he always retains the character of the +unwearied and disinterested seeker after truth, without which he would +have ceased to be Socrates. + +Leaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic, +and then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic +ideal of the State, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato +may be read. + +BOOK I. The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene--a festival in +honour of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus; to this is +added the promise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole +work is supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival +to a small party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and +another; this we learn from the first words of the Timaeus. + +When the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained, +the attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience; nor +is the reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the +narrative. Of the numerous company, three only take any serious part in +the discussion; nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to +the torch-race, or talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. +The manner in which the conversation has arisen is described as +follows:--Socrates and his companion Glaucon are about to leave the +festival when they are detained by a message from Polemarchus, who +speedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and +with playful violence compels them to remain, promising them not only +the torch-race, but the pleasure of conversation with the young, which +to Socrates is a far greater attraction. They return to the house of +Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, now in extreme old age, who is found +sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. 'You should come +to me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at my time +of life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for conversation.' +Socrates asks him what he thinks of age, to which the old man replies, +that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be attributed to the +tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which the tyranny +of the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies Socrates, but the world +will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old age because you are rich. +'And there is something in what they say, Socrates, but not so much as +they imagine--as Themistocles replied to the Seriphian, "Neither you, if +you had been an Athenian, nor I, if I had been a Seriphian, would ever +have been famous," I might in like manner reply to you, Neither a good +poor man can be happy in age, nor yet a bad rich man.' Socrates remarks +that Cephalus appears not to care about riches, a quality which he +ascribes to his having inherited, not acquired them, and would like +to know what he considers to be the chief advantage of them. Cephalus +answers that when you are old the belief in the world below grows upon +you, and then to have done justice and never to have been compelled to +do injustice through poverty, and never to have deceived anyone, are +felt to be unspeakable blessings. Socrates, who is evidently preparing +for an argument, next asks, What is the meaning of the word justice? To +tell the truth and pay your debts? No more than this? Or must we admit +exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into the hands of my +friend, who has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed of him when he +was in his right mind? 'There must be exceptions.' 'And yet,' says +Polemarchus, 'the definition which has been given has the authority +of Simonides.' Here Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices, +and bequeaths, as Socrates facetiously remarks, the possession of the +argument to his heir, Polemarchus... + +The description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has +touched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of +justice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues +respecting external goods, and preparing for the concluding mythus of +the world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the +just man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse +which follows, and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about +the nature of justice, there is no difficulty in discerning 'who is +a just man.' The first explanation has been supported by a saying of +Simonides; and now Socrates has a mind to show that the resolution of +justice into two unconnected precepts, which have no common principle, +fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic. + +...He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he +mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? 'No, not in that case, +not if the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you +were to do what was proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.' Every +act does something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates +asks, What is this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? +He is answered that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. +But in what way good or harm? 'In making alliances with the one, and +going to war with the other.' Then in time of peace what is the good +of justice? The answer is that justice is of use in contracts, and +contracts are money partnerships. Yes; but how in such partnerships +is the just man of more use than any other man? 'When you want to have +money safely kept and not used.' Then justice will be useful when money +is useless. And there is another difficulty: justice, like the art of +war or any other art, must be of opposites, good at attack as well as +at defence, at stealing as well as at guarding. But then justice is a +thief, though a hero notwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric hero, +who was 'excellent above all men in theft and perjury'--to such a pass +have you and Homer and Simonides brought us; though I do not forget that +the thieving must be for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. +And still there arises another question: Are friends to be interpreted +as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming? And are our friends to +be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer is, that +we must do good to our seeming and real good friends, and evil to our +seeming and real evil enemies--good to the good, evil to the evil. But +ought we to render evil for evil at all, when to do so will only make +men more evil? Can justice produce injustice any more than the art of +horsemanship can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final +conclusion is, that no sage or poet ever said that the just return +evil for evil; this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man, Periander, +Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C. 398-381)... + +Thus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to +be inadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is set +aside, and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach +to the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words +are applied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when the +questioning spirit is stirred within him:--'If because I do evil, Thou +punishest me by evil, what is the difference between Thee and me?' In +this both Plato and Kheyam rise above the level of many Christian (?) +theologians. The first definition of justice easily passes into the +second; for the simple words 'to speak the truth and pay your debts' is +substituted the more abstract 'to do good to your friends and harm to +your enemies.' Either of these explanations gives a sufficient rule +of life for plain men, but they both fall short of the precision of +philosophy. We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry, which not +only arises out of the conflict of established principles in particular +cases, but also out of the effort to attain them, and is prior as well +as posterior to our fundamental notions of morality. The 'interrogation' +of moral ideas; the appeal to the authority of Homer; the conclusion +that the maxim, 'Do good to your friends and harm to your enemies,' +being erroneous, could not have been the word of any great man, are all +of them very characteristic of the Platonic Socrates. + +...Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but +has hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a +pause and rushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a +roar. 'Socrates,' he says, 'what folly is this?--Why do you agree to be +vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?' He then prohibits +all the ordinary definitions of justice; to which Socrates replies that +he cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2 x 6, or +3 x 4, or 6 x 2, or 4 x 3. At first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue; +but at length, with a promise of payment on the part of the company and +of praise from Socrates, he is induced to open the game. 'Listen,' he +says, 'my answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the +stronger: now praise me.' Let me understand you first. Do you mean that +because Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the +eating of beef for his interest, the eating of beef is also for our +interest, who are not so strong? Thrasymachus is indignant at the +illustration, and in pompous words, apparently intended to restore +dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning to be that the rulers +make laws for their own interests. But suppose, says Socrates, that the +ruler or stronger makes a mistake--then the interest of the stronger is +not his interest. Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy downfall by his +disciple Cleitophon, who introduces the word 'thinks;'--not the actual +interest of the ruler, but what he thinks or what seems to be his +interest, is justice. The contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning +evasion: for though his real and apparent interests may differ, what the +ruler thinks to be his interest will always remain what he thinks to be +his interest. + +Of course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new +interpretation accepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not +disposed to quarrel about words, if, as he significantly insinuates, +his adversary has changed his mind. In what follows Thrasymachus does +in fact withdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake, for he +affirms that the ruler as a ruler is infallible. Socrates is quite ready +to accept the new position, which he equally turns against Thrasymachus +by the help of the analogy of the arts. Every art or science has an +interest, but this interest is to be distinguished from the accidental +interest of the artist, and is only concerned with the good of the +things or persons which come under the art. And justice has an interest +which is the interest not of the ruler or judge, but of those who come +under his sway. + +Thrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he makes +a bold diversion. 'Tell me, Socrates,' he says, 'have you a nurse?' What +a question! Why do you ask? 'Because, if you have, she neglects you and +lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to know the +shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never +think of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects, +whereas the truth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and +subjects alike. And experience proves that in every relation of life +the just man is the loser and the unjust the gainer, especially where +injustice is on the grand scale, which is quite another thing from the +petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and robbers of temples. The +language of men proves this--our 'gracious' and 'blessed' tyrant and the +like--all which tends to show (1) that justice is the interest of the +stronger; and (2) that injustice is more profitable and also stronger +than justice.' + +Thrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having +deluged the company with words, has a mind to escape. But the others +will not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that +he will not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. 'And what can I +do more for you?' he says; 'would you have me put the words bodily +into your souls?' God forbid! replies Socrates; but we want you to be +consistent in the use of terms, and not to employ 'physician' in an +exact sense, and then again 'shepherd' or 'ruler' in an inexact,--if the +words are strictly taken, the ruler and the shepherd look only to the +good of their people or flocks and not to their own: whereas you insist +that rulers are solely actuated by love of office. 'No doubt about it,' +replies Thrasymachus. Then why are they paid? Is not the reason, that +their interest is not comprehended in their art, and is therefore the +concern of another art, the art of pay, which is common to the arts in +general, and therefore not identical with any one of them? Nor would any +man be a ruler unless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear +of punishment;--the reward is money or honour, the punishment is the +necessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State (or +Church) were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by +the last motive only; and there would be as much 'nolo episcopari' as +there is at present of the opposite... + +The satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and +apparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. +There is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind +do not like being in office, and that therefore they demand pay. + +...Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far more +important--that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as +you and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must reply to him; but +if we try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge +to decide for us; we had better therefore proceed by making mutual +admissions of the truth to one another. + +Thrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than +perfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates +to admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue and justice +vice. Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of one +whose only wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the +same time he is weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed. +The admission is elicited from him that the just man seeks to gain an +advantage over the unjust only, but not over the just, while the unjust +would gain an advantage over either. Socrates, in order to test this +statement, employs once more the favourite analogy of the arts. The +musician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort, does not seek to gain more +than the skilled, but only more than the unskilled (that is to say, he +works up to a rule, standard, law, and does not exceed it), whereas the +unskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls on the +side of the good, and the unskilled on the side of the evil, and the +just is the skilled, and the unjust is the unskilled. + +There was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the +day was hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first +time in his life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that +injustice was stronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and +Socrates now proceeds to the consideration of this, which, with the +assistance of Thrasymachus, he hopes to clear up; the latter is at first +churlish, but in the judicious hands of Socrates is soon restored to +good-humour: Is there not honour among thieves? Is not the strength of +injustice only a remnant of justice? Is not absolute injustice absolute +weakness also? A house that is divided against itself cannot stand; two +men who quarrel detract from one another's strength, and he who is at +war with himself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not wickedness +therefore, but semi-wickedness flourishes in states,--a remnant of +good is needed in order to make union in action possible,--there is no +kingdom of evil in this world. + +Another question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust the +happier? To this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence +or virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of +the soul happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which +happiness is attained? Justice and happiness being thus shown to be +inseparable, the question whether the just or the unjust is the happier +has disappeared. + +Thrasymachus replies: 'Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the +festival of Bendis.' Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your +kindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet +not a good entertainment--but that was my own fault, for I tasted of too +many things. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our +enquiry, and then whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and +folly; and then the comparative advantages of just and unjust: and the +sum of all is that I know not what justice is; how then shall I know +whether the just is happy or not?... + +Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing +to the analogy of the arts. 'Justice is like the arts (1) in having no +external interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is +to happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work.' At this +the modern reader is apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is +writing in an age when the arts and the virtues, like the moral +and intellectual faculties, were still undistinguished. Among early +enquirers into the nature of human action the arts helped to fill up +the void of speculation; and at first the comparison of the arts and the +virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They only saw the +points of agreement in them and not the points of difference. Virtue, +like art, must take means to an end; good manners are both an art and +a virtue; character is naturally described under the image of a statue; +and there are many other figures of speech which are readily transferred +from art to morals. The next generation cleared up these perplexities; +or at least supplied after ages with a further analysis of them. The +contemporaries of Plato were in a state of transition, and had not yet +fully realized the common-sense distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue +is concerned with action, art with production' (Nic. Eth.), or that +'virtue implies intention and constancy of purpose,' whereas 'art +requires knowledge only'. And yet in the absurdities which follow from +some uses of the analogy, there seems to be an intimation conveyed that +virtue is more than art. This is implied in the reductio ad absurdum +that 'justice is a thief,' and in the dissatisfaction which Socrates +expresses at the final result. + +The expression 'an art of pay' which is described as 'common to all the +arts' is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Nor is it +employed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It is +suggested by the argument, and seems to extend the conception of art to +doing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be +noted in the words 'men who are injured are made more unjust.' For +those who are injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed or +ill-treated. + +The second of the three arguments, 'that the just does not aim at +excess,' has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form. +That the good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic +sentiment, which may be compared with the language of those modern +writers who speak of virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to +law. The mathematical or logical notion of limit easily passes into an +ethical one, and even finds a mythological expression in the conception +of envy (Greek). Ideas of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion, +still linger in the writings of moralists; and the true spirit of the +fine arts is better conveyed by such terms than by superlatives. + + 'When workmen strive to do better than well, + They do confound their skill in covetousness.' (King John.) + +The harmony of the soul and body, and of the parts of the soul with +one another, a harmony 'fairer than that of musical notes,' is the true +Hellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature. + +In what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus, +Plato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord +and dissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated +in modern times by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature +of evil. In the last argument we trace the germ of the Aristotelian +doctrine of an end and a virtue directed towards the end, which again is +suggested by the arts. The final reconcilement of justice and happiness +and the identity of the individual and the State are also intimated. +Socrates reassumes the character of a 'know-nothing;' at the same time +he appears to be not wholly satisfied with the manner in which the +argument has been conducted. Nothing is concluded; but the tendency of +the dialectical process, here as always, is to enlarge our conception of +ideas, and to widen their application to human life. + +BOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on +continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner +in which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the +question 'Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.' He begins +by dividing goods into three classes:--first, goods desirable in +themselves; secondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their +results; thirdly, goods desirable for their results only. He then asks +Socrates in which of the three classes he would place justice. In the +second class, replies Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves and +also for their results. 'Then the world in general are of another mind, +for they say that justice belongs to the troublesome class of goods +which are desirable for their results only. Socrates answers that this +is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that +Thrasymachus was too ready to listen to the voice of the charmer, and +proposes to consider the nature of justice and injustice in themselves +and apart from the results and rewards of them which the world is always +dinning in his ears. He will first of all speak of the nature and origin +of justice; secondly, of the manner in which men view justice as a +necessity and not a good; and thirdly, he will prove the reasonableness +of this view. + +'To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As +the evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the +sufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have +neither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the +impossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact +if he were not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have +two rings, like that of Gyges in the well-known story, which make them +invisible, and then no difference will appear in them, for every one +will do evil if he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the +world as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of +fear for themselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts (Cp. +Gorgias.) + +'And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the +unjust man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily +correcting them; having gifts of money, speech, strength--the greatest +villain bearing the highest character: and at his side let us place the +just in his nobleness and simplicity--being, not seeming--without name +or reward--clothed in his justice only--the best of men who is thought +to be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but +I would rather put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of +injustice--they will tell you) that the just man will be scourged, +racked, bound, will have his eyes put out, and will at last be crucified +(literally impaled)--and all this because he ought to have preferred +seeming to being. How different is the case of the unjust who clings to +appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him a ruler; +he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes, help his friends and +hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty he can worship the gods +better, and will therefore be more loved by them than the just.' + +I was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already +unequal fray. He considered that the most important point of all had +been omitted:--'Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards; +parents and guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other +advantages are promised by them of a more solid kind, such as wealthy +marriages and high offices. There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod +of fat sheep and heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with +fruit, which the gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic +poets add a similar picture of another. The heroes of Musaeus and +Eumolpus lie on couches at a festival, with garlands on their heads, +enjoying as the meed of virtue a paradise of immortal drunkenness. +Some go further, and speak of a fair posterity in the third and fourth +generation. But the wicked they bury in a slough and make them carry +water in a sieve: and in this life they attribute to them the infamy +which Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just who are supposed to +be unjust. + +'Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and +prose:--"Virtue," as Hesiod says, "is honourable but difficult, vice is +easy and profitable." You may often see the wicked in great prosperity +and the righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant +prophets knock at rich men's doors, promising to atone for the sins +of themselves or their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and +festive games, or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy +good or bad by divine help and at a small charge;--they appeal to books +professing to be written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the +minds of whole cities, and promise to "get souls out of purgatory;" and +if we refuse to listen to them, no one knows what will happen to us. + +'When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his +conclusion? "Will he," in the language of Pindar, "make justice his high +tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?" Justice, he reflects, +without the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice has the +promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of +happiness. To appearance then I will turn,--I will put on the show +of virtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one +saying that "wickedness is not easily concealed," to which I reply that +"nothing great is easy." Union and force and rhetoric will do much; and +if men say that they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know +that there are gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may +be appeased by sacrifices. Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out +of your sin? For if the righteous are only unpunished, still they have +no further reward, while the wicked may be unpunished and have the +pleasure of sinning too. But what of the world below? Nay, says the +argument, there are atoning powers who will set that matter right, as +the poets, who are the sons of the gods, tell us; and this is confirmed +by the authority of the State. + +'How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good +manners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both +worlds. Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at +the praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not +be angry with others; for he knows also that more than human virtue is +needed to save a man, and that he only praises justice who is incapable +of injustice. + +'The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, +poets, instructors of youth, have always asserted "the temporal +dispensation," the honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in +early youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and +unseen by any human or divine eye, we should not have needed others to +be our guardians, but every one would have been the guardian of himself. +This is what I want you to show, Socrates;--other men use arguments +which rather tend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that "might +is right;" but from you I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon +said, to exclude reputation; let the just be thought unjust and the +unjust just, and do you still prove to us the superiority of justice'... + +The thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by +Glaucon, is the converse of that of Thrasymachus--not right is the +interest of the stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. +Starting from the same premises he carries the analysis of society a +step further back;--might is still right, but the might is the weakness +of the many combined against the strength of the few. + +There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which +have a family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e.g. that power +is the foundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to +govern well or ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or +that war is the natural state of man; or that private vices are public +benefits. All such theories have a kind of plausibility from their +partial agreement with experience. For human nature oscillates between +good and evil, and the motives of actions and the origin of institutions +may be explained to a certain extent on either hypothesis according to +the character or point of view of a particular thinker. The obligation +of maintaining authority under all circumstances and sometimes by rather +questionable means is felt strongly and has become a sort of instinct +among civilized men. The divine right of kings, or more generally of +governments, is one of the forms under which this natural feeling is +expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not some accompaniment +of good or pleasure; nor any good which is free from some alloy of evil; +nor any noble or generous thought which may not be attended by a shadow +or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of self-love. We know that +all human actions are imperfect; but we do not therefore attribute +them to the worse rather than to the better motive or principle. Such +a philosophy is both foolish and false, like that opinion of the clever +rogue who assumes all other men to be like himself. And theories of this +sort do not represent the real nature of the State, which is based on a +vague sense of right gradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law +(although capable also of perversion), any more than they describe the +origin of society, which is to be sought in the family and in the +social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent the average +character of individuals, which cannot be explained simply on a theory +of evil, but has always a counteracting element of good. And as men +become better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them, +because they are more conscious of their own disinterestedness. A little +experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to +a truer and kindlier view of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow +men. + +The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy +when they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily +supposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt +to frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal +must always be a paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of +human life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as +a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an +ennobling influence. An ideal is none the worse because 'some one has +made the discovery' that no such ideal was ever realized. And in a +few exceptional individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of +humanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery. +This may be the state which the reason deliberately approves, and which +the utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain +cases to prefer. + +Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally +with the view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not +expressing his own final conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize one +of the aspects of ethical truth. He is developing his idea gradually in +a series of positions or situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the +first time undergoing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word +'happiness' involves some degree of confusion because associated in the +language of modern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, +which was not equally present to his mind. + +Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the +happiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is +the answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is +'the homage which vice pays to virtue.' But now Adeimantus, taking up +the hint which had been already given by Glaucon, proceeds to show +that in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of +rewards and reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to +such arguments as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional +morality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the +ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether +the morality of actions is determined by their consequences; and both +of them go beyond the position of Socrates, that justice belongs to +the class of goods not desirable for themselves only, but desirable for +themselves and for their results, to which he recalls them. In +their attempt to view justice as an internal principle, and in their +condemnation of the poets, they anticipate him. The common life of +Greece is not enough for them; they must penetrate deeper into the +nature of things. + +It has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and +Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not +more truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by +Socrates, and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first +in the State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer +to his old question (Protag.), 'whether the virtues are one or many,' +viz. that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking +to establish the purely internal nature of justice, he is met by the +fact that man is a social being, and he tries to harmonise the two +opposite theses as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency in +this than was inevitable in his age and country; there is no use in +turning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy, which, from some +other point of view, would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does not +give the final solution of philosophical questions for us; nor can he be +judged of by our standard. + +The remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of +the sons of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what +immediately follows:--First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether +indirect. He does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation +of the idea of justice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the +Stoical paradox that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he +dwells on the difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to +his natural condition, before he will answer the question at all. He +too will frame an ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract +justice, but the whole relations of man. Under the fanciful illustration +of the large letters he implies that he will only look for justice in +society, and that from the State he will proceed to the individual. His +answer in substance amounts to this,--that under favourable conditions, +i.e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness will coincide, and that +when justice has been once found, happiness may be left to take care +of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency, when in +the tenth book he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honours +of justice, may be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the +perfect State. And the philosopher 'who retires under the shelter of a +wall' can hardly have been esteemed happy by him, at least not in this +world. Still he maintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man +do his duty first, without asking whether he will be happy or not, and +happiness will be the inseparable accident which attends him. 'Seek ye +first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things +shall be added unto you.' + +Secondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character +of Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the +individual. First ethics, then politics--this is the order of ideas to +us; the reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of +thought does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early +ages he is not ONE, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is +prior to him; and he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law +of his country or the creed of his church. And to this type he is +constantly tending to revert, whenever the influence of custom, or of +party spirit, or the recollection of the past becomes too strong for +him. + +Thirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the +individual and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early +Greek speculation, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of +influence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual +action of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are +sometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action, +whenever we either elevate politics into ethics, or lower ethics to the +standard of politics. The good man and the good citizen only coincide in +the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be attained by legislation +acting upon them from without, but, if at all, by education fashioning +them from within. + +...Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, 'inspired offspring of +the renowned hero,' as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not +understand how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while +their character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. +He knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting +justice in the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having +weak eyes he shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then +go on to the smaller, that is, he must look for justice in the State +first, and will then proceed to the individual. Accordingly he begins to +construct the State. + +Society arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his +second a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the +possibility of satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on +the same spot; and this is the beginning of a State, which we take the +liberty to invent, although necessity is the real inventor. There must +be first a husbandman, secondly a builder, thirdly a weaver, to which +may be added a cobbler. Four or five citizens at least are required to +make a city. Now men have different natures, and one man will do one +thing better than many; and business waits for no man. Hence there must +be a division of labour into different employments; into wholesale +and retail trade; into workers, and makers of workmen's tools; into +shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this will have far +exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very large. But then +again imports will be required, and imports necessitate exports, +and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the taste of +purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too we must have a +market and money and retail trades; otherwise buyers and sellers will +never meet, and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted in +vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be +complete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse of the +citizens with one another justice and injustice will appear. + +Here follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their +days in houses which they have built for themselves; they make their +own clothes and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is +meal and flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best +of terms with each other, and take care not to have too many children. +'But,' said Glaucon, interposing, 'are they not to have a relish?' +Certainly; they will have salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and +fruits, and chestnuts to roast at the fire. ''Tis a city of pigs, +Socrates.' Why, I replied, what do you want more? 'Only the comforts of +life,--sofas and tables, also sauces and sweets.' I see; you want not +only a State, but a luxurious State; and possibly in the more complex +frame we may sooner find justice and injustice. Then the fine arts must +go to work--every conceivable instrument and ornament of luxury will be +wanted. There will be dancers, painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks, +barbers, tire-women, nurses, artists; swineherds and neatherds too for +the animals, and physicians to cure the disorders of which luxury is the +source. To feed all these superfluous mouths we shall need a part of +our neighbour's land, and they will want a part of ours. And this is the +origin of war, which may be traced to the same causes as other political +evils. Our city will now require the slight addition of a camp, and +the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then again our old +doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The art of +war cannot be learned in a day, and there must be a natural aptitude +for military duties. There will be some warlike natures who have this +aptitude--dogs keen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and strong of +limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage, such natures, +whether of men or animals, will be full of spirit. But these spirited +natures are apt to bite and devour one another; the union of +gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies appears to be an +impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both qualities. Who +then can be a guardian? The image of the dog suggests an answer. For +dogs are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. Your dog is a +philosopher who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing; and +philosophy, whether in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness. The +human watchdogs must be philosophers or lovers of learning which will +make them gentle. And how are they to be learned without education? + +But what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned +sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music +includes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false. +'What do you mean?' he said. I mean that children hear stories before +they learn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have +at most one or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early +life is very impressible, and children ought not to learn what they will +have to unlearn when they grow up; we must therefore have a censorship +of nursery tales, banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are +very improper, as we may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, +who not only tell lies but bad lies; stories about Uranus and Saturn, +which are immoral as well as false, and which should never be spoken of +to young persons, or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in a mystery, +after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some unprocurable +animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the +example of Zeus, or our citizens be incited to quarrel by hearing or +seeing representations of strife among the gods? Shall they listen to +the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus sending him +flying for helping her when she was beaten? Such tales may possibly have +a mystical interpretation, but the young are incapable of understanding +allegory. If any one asks what tales are to be allowed, we will answer +that we are legislators and not book-makers; we only lay down the +principles according to which books are to be written; to write them is +the duty of others. + +And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not +as the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the +poets to say that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two +casks full of destinies;--or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to +break the treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of +Pelops, or the Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to +destroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was +just, and men were the better for being punished. But that the deed was +evil, and God the author, is a wicked, suicidal fiction which we will +allow no one, old or young, to utter. This is our first and great +principle--God is the author of good only. + +And the second principle is like unto it:--With God is no variableness +or change of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change +in God, he must be changed either by another or by himself. By +another?--but the best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities +of mind are least liable to be changed by any external force. By +himself?--but he cannot change for the better; he will hardly change +for the worse. He remains for ever fairest and best in his own image. +Therefore we refuse to listen to the poets who tell us of Here begging +in the likeness of a priestess or of other deities who prowl about at +night in strange disguises; all that blasphemous nonsense with which +mothers fool the manhood out of their children must be suppressed. But +some one will say that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a form +in relation to us. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie +in the soul, or principle of falsehood; and as for any other form of +lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain +exceptional cases--what need have the gods of this? For they are not +ignorant of antiquity like the poets, nor are they afraid of their +enemies, nor is any madman a friend of theirs. God then is true, he is +absolutely true; he changes not, he deceives not, by day or night, by +word or sign. This is our second great principle--God is true. Away +with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer, and the accusation of Thetis +against Apollo in Aeschylus... + +In order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato +proceeds to trace the first principles of mutual need and of division +of labour in an imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually +this community increases; the division of labour extends to countries; +imports necessitate exports; a medium of exchange is required, and +retailers sit in the market-place to save the time of the producers. +These are the steps by which Plato constructs the first or primitive +State, introducing the elements of political economy by the way. As +he is going to frame a second or civilized State, the simple naturally +comes before the complex. He indulges, like Rousseau, in a picture of +primitive life--an idea which has indeed often had a powerful influence +on the imagination of mankind, but he does not seriously mean to say +that one is better than the other (Politicus); nor can any inference +be drawn from the description of the first state taken apart from the +second, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the Politics. We should not +interpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable in too +literal or matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we compare +the lively fancy of Plato with the dried-up abstractions of modern +treatises on philosophy, we are compelled to say with Protagoras, that +the 'mythus is more interesting' (Protag.) + +Several interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in +a treatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings +of Plato: especially Laws, Population; Free Trade; Adulteration; Wills +and Bequests; Begging; Eryxias, (though not Plato's), Value and Demand; +Republic, Division of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of +Retail Trade, is treated with admirable lucidity in the second book of +the Republic. But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a system, +and never seems to have recognized that Trade is one of the great motive +powers of the State and of the world. He would make retail traders +only of the inferior sort of citizens (Rep., Laws), though he remarks, +quaintly enough (Laws), that 'if only the best men and the best women +everywhere were compelled to keep taverns for a time or to carry on +retail trade, etc., then we should knew how pleasant and agreeable all +these things are.' + +The disappointment of Glaucon at the 'city of pigs,' the ludicrous +description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and +the afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the +nature of the guardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of +offering some almost unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be +celebrated, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to +his mother, are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In +speaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child +must be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. Yet this is +not very different from saying that children must be taught through +the medium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds can only +develope gradually, and that there is much which they must learn without +understanding. This is also the substance of Plato's view, though he +must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from +modern ethical writers, respecting truth and falsehood. To us, economies +or accommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by +the human faculties or necessary for the communication of knowledge to +the simple and ignorant. We should insist that the word was inseparable +from the intention, and that we must not be 'falsely true,' i.e. speak +or act falsely in support of what was right or true. But Plato would +limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a good +moral effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be +employed by the rulers alone and for great objects. + +A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question +whether his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be +conscious that the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond +Homer and Hesiod. Whether their narratives were true or false did not +seriously affect the political or social life of Hellas. Men only began +to suspect that they were fictions when they recognised them to be +immoral. And so in all religions: the consideration of their morality +comes first, afterwards the truth of the documents in which they are +recorded, or of the events natural or supernatural which are told of +them. But in modern times, and in Protestant countries perhaps more than +in Catholic, we have been too much inclined to identify the historical +with the moral; and some have refused to believe in religion at all, +unless a superhuman accuracy was discernible in every part of the +record. The facts of an ancient or religious history are amongst the +most important of all facts; but they are frequently uncertain, and we +only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from them when we +place ourselves above them. These reflections tend to show that the +difference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is not +so great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him +in placing the moral before the historical truth of religion; and, +generally, in disregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which +necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know also +that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day; and +are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism would +condemn. + +We note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology, +said to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before +Christ by Theagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of +Plato, and here, as in the Phaedrus, though for a different reason, was +rejected by him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law, when +men have reached another stage of civilization, should be got rid of by +fictions is in accordance with universal experience. Great is the art of +interpretation; and by a natural process, which when once discovered was +always going on, what could not be altered was explained away. And so +without any palpable inconsistency there existed side by side two forms +of religion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets and +the customary worship of the temple; on the other hand, there was the +religion of the philosopher, who was dwelling in the heaven of ideas, +but did not therefore refuse to offer a cock to Aesculapius, or to +be seen saying his prayers at the rising of the sun. At length the +antagonism between the popular and philosophical religion, never so +great among the Greeks as in our own age, disappeared, and was only felt +like the difference between the religion of the educated and uneducated +among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed into +the 'royal mind' of Plato (Philebus); the giant Heracles became the +knight-errant and benefactor of mankind. These and still more wonderful +transformations were readily effected by the ingenuity of Stoics and +neo-Platonists in the two or three centuries before and after Christ. +The Greek and Roman religions were gradually permeated by the spirit of +philosophy; having lost their ancient meaning, they were resolved into +poetry and morality; and probably were never purer than at the time of +their decay, when their influence over the world was waning. + +A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is +the lie in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic +doctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie +in the soul is a true lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the +deception of the highest part of the soul, from which he who is deceived +has no power of delivering himself. For example, to represent God +as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with +appearances or as the author of evil; or again, to affirm with +Protagoras that 'knowledge is sensation,' or that 'being is becoming,' +or with Thrasymachus 'that might is right,' would have been regarded by +Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness of the +greatest untruth, e.g. if, in the language of the Gospels (John), 'he +who was blind' were to say 'I see,' is another aspect of the state +of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further +compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke), allowing for the +difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is +opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur +in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of +accommodation,--which though useless to the gods may be useful to men +in certain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had +himself raised about the propriety of deceiving a madman; and he is also +contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but mankind can +only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or false. Reserving +for another place the greater questions of religion or education, we +may note further, (1) the approval of the old traditional education +of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on +Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making for the +use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at the same time +euphemistic manner in which here as below he alludes to the 'Chronique +Scandaleuse' of the gods. + +BOOK III. There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to +banish fear; for no man can be courageous who is afraid of death, or who +believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the world +below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell; they may be +reminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging. Nor must +they be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages, such as the depressing +words of Achilles--'I would rather be a serving-man than rule over +all the dead;' and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions, the +senseless shadows, the flitting soul mourning over lost strength and +youth, the soul with a gibber going beneath the earth like smoke, or +the souls of the suitors which flutter about like bats. The terrors and +horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the rest +of their Tartarean nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have their +use; but they are not the proper food for soldiers. As little can we +admit the sorrows and sympathies of the Homeric heroes:--Achilles, the +son of Thetis, in tears, throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up and +down the sea-shore in distraction; or Priam, the cousin of the gods, +crying aloud, rolling in the mire. A good man is not prostrated at +the loss of children or fortune. Neither is death terrible to him; and +therefore lamentations over the dead should not be practised by men of +note; they should be the concern of inferior persons only, whether women +or men. Still worse is the attribution of such weakness to the gods; as +when the goddesses say, 'Alas! my travail!' and worst of all, when the +king of heaven himself laments his inability to save Hector, or sorrows +over the impending doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of God, +if not ridiculed by our young men, is likely to be imitated by them. +Nor should our citizens be given to excess of laughter--'Such violent +delights' are followed by a violent re-action. The description in the +Iliad of the gods shaking their sides at the clumsiness of Hephaestus +will not be admitted by us. 'Certainly not.' + +Truth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as +we were saying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a +medicine. But this employment of falsehood must remain a privilege of +state; the common man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler; any +more than the patient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor +to his captain. + +In the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists +in self-control and obedience to authority. That is a lesson which Homer +teaches in some places: 'The Achaeans marched on breathing prowess, in +silent awe of their leaders;'--but a very different one in other places: +'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, but the heart of a +stag.' Language of the latter kind will not impress self-control on the +minds of youth. The same may be said about his praises of eating and +drinking and his dread of starvation; also about the verses in which he +tells of the rapturous loves of Zeus and Here, or of how Hephaestus once +detained Ares and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a +nobler strain heard in the words:--'Endure, my soul, thou hast endured +worse.' Nor must we allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say, +'Gifts persuade the gods, gifts reverend kings;' or to applaud the +ignoble advice of Phoenix to Achilles that he should get money out of +the Greeks before he assisted them; or the meanness of Achilles himself +in taking gifts from Agamemnon; or his requiring a ransom for the body +of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo; or his insolence to the river-god +Scamander; or his dedication to the dead Patroclus of his own hair which +had been already dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius; or his +cruelty in dragging the body of Hector round the walls, and slaying +the captives at the pyre: such a combination of meanness and cruelty in +Cheiron's pupil is inconceivable. The amatory exploits of Peirithous and +Theseus are equally unworthy. Either these so-called sons of gods were +not the sons of gods, or they were not such as the poets imagine them, +any more than the gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who +believes that such things are done by those who have the blood of heaven +flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate their example. + +Enough of gods and heroes;--what shall we say about men? What the poets +and story-tellers say--that the wicked prosper and the righteous are +afflicted, or that justice is another's gain? Such misrepresentations +cannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition +of justice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry. + +The subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated; next follows +style. Now all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to +come; and narrative is of three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and +a composition of the two. An instance will make my meaning clear. +The first scene in Homer is of the last or mixed kind, being partly +description and partly dialogue. But if you throw the dialogue into the +'oratio obliqua,' the passage will run thus: The priest came and prayed +Apollo that the Achaeans might take Troy and have a safe return if +Agamemnon would only give him back his daughter; and the other Greeks +assented, but Agamemnon was wroth, and so on--The whole then becomes +descriptive, and the poet is the only speaker left; or, if you omit the +narrative, the whole becomes dialogue. These are the three styles--which +of them is to be admitted into our State? 'Do you ask whether tragedy +and comedy are to be admitted?' Yes, but also something more--Is it not +doubtful whether our guardians are to be imitators at all? Or rather, +has not the question been already answered, for we have decided that one +man cannot in his life play many parts, any more than he can act both +tragedy and comedy, or be rhapsodist and actor at once? Human nature +is coined into very small pieces, and as our guardians have their own +business already, which is the care of freedom, they will have enough +to do without imitating. If they imitate they should imitate, not any +meanness or baseness, but the good only; for the mask which the actor +wears is apt to become his face. We cannot allow men to play the parts +of women, quarrelling, weeping, scolding, or boasting against the +gods,--least of all when making love or in labour. They must not +represent slaves, or bullies, or cowards, drunkards, or madmen, or +blacksmiths, or neighing horses, or bellowing bulls, or sounding rivers, +or a raging sea. A good or wise man will be willing to perform good and +wise actions, but he will be ashamed to play an inferior part which he +has never practised; and he will prefer to employ the descriptive style +with as little imitation as possible. The man who has no self-respect, +on the contrary, will imitate anybody and anything; sounds of nature +and cries of animals alike; his whole performance will be imitation of +gesture and voice. Now in the descriptive style there are few changes, +but in the dramatic there are a great many. Poets and musicians use +either, or a compound of both, and this compound is very attractive +to youth and their teachers as well as to the vulgar. But our State in +which one man plays one part only is not adapted for complexity. And +when one of these polyphonous pantomimic gentlemen offers to exhibit +himself and his poetry we will show him every observance of respect, +but at the same time tell him that there is no room for his kind in our +State; we prefer the rough, honest poet, and will not depart from our +original models (Laws). + +Next as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,--the subject, the +harmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the +first. As we banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the +mixed Lydian harmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and +as our citizens are to be temperate, we may also banish convivial +harmonies, such as the Ionian and pure Lydian. Two remain--the +Dorian and Phrygian, the first for war, the second for peace; the +one expressive of courage, the other of obedience or instruction or +religious feeling. And as we reject varieties of harmony, we shall +also reject the many-stringed, variously-shaped instruments which give +utterance to them, and in particular the flute, which is more complex +than any of them. The lyre and the harp may be permitted in the town, +and the Pan's-pipe in the fields. Thus we have made a purgation of +music, and will now make a purgation of metres. These should be like the +harmonies, simple and suitable to the occasion. There are four notes +of the tetrachord, and there are three ratios of metre, 3/2, 2/2, +2/1, which have all their characteristics, and the feet have different +characteristics as well as the rhythms. But about this you and I must +ask Damon, the great musician, who speaks, if I remember rightly, of a +martial measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic, and iambic rhythms, +which he arranges so as to equalize the syllables with one another, +assigning to each the proper quantity. We only venture to affirm the +general principle that the style is to conform to the subject and the +metre to the style; and that the simplicity and harmony of the soul +should be reflected in them all. This principle of simplicity has to +be learnt by every one in the days of his youth, and may be gathered +anywhere, from the creative and constructive arts, as well as from the +forms of plants and animals. + +Other artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or +unseemliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to +the law of simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in +our city, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians +must grow up, not amid images of deformity which will gradually poison +and corrupt their souls, but in a land of health and beauty where they +will drink in from every object sweet and harmonious influences. And of +all these influences the greatest is the education given by music, +which finds a way into the innermost soul and imparts to it the sense +of beauty and of deformity. At first the effect is unconscious; but when +reason arrives, then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as the +friend whom he always knew. As in learning to read, first we acquire the +elements or letters separately, and afterwards their combinations, +and cannot recognize reflections of them until we know the letters +themselves;--in like manner we must first attain the elements or +essential forms of the virtues, and then trace their combinations in +life and experience. There is a music of the soul which answers to the +harmony of the world; and the fairest object of a musical soul is the +fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the latter may be excused, +but not in the former. True love is the daughter of temperance, and +temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of bodily pleasure. Enough +has been said of music, which makes a fair ending with love. + +Next we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the +soul is related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we +educate the mind we may leave the education of the body in her charge, +and need only give a general outline of the course to be pursued. In +the first place the guardians must abstain from strong drink, for they +should be the last persons to lose their wits. Whether the habits of +the palaestra are suitable to them is more doubtful, for the ordinary +gymnastic is a sleepy sort of thing, and if left off suddenly is apt to +endanger health. But our warrior athletes must be wide-awake dogs, and +must also be inured to all changes of food and climate. Hence they will +require a simpler kind of gymnastic, akin to their simple music; and for +their diet a rule may be found in Homer, who feeds his heroes on roast +meat only, and gives them no fish although they are living at the +sea-side, nor boiled meats which involve an apparatus of pots and pans; +and, if I am not mistaken, he nowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian +cookery and Attic confections and Corinthian courtezans, which are +to gymnastic what Lydian and Ionian melodies are to music, must be +forbidden. Where gluttony and intemperance prevail the town quickly +fills with doctors and pleaders; and law and medicine give themselves +airs as soon as the freemen of a State take an interest in them. But +what can show a more disgraceful state of education than to have to go +abroad for justice because you have none of your own at home? And yet +there IS a worse stage of the same disease--when men have learned +to take a pleasure and pride in the twists and turns of the law; not +considering how much better it would be for them so to order their lives +as to have no need of a nodding justice. And there is a like disgrace in +employing a physician, not for the cure of wounds or epidemic disorders, +but because a man has by laziness and luxury contracted diseases +which were unknown in the days of Asclepius. How simple is the Homeric +practice of medicine. Eurypylus after he has been wounded drinks a +posset of Pramnian wine, which is of a heating nature; and yet the +sons of Asclepius blame neither the damsel who gives him the drink, nor +Patroclus who is attending on him. The truth is that this modern system +of nursing diseases was introduced by Herodicus the trainer; who, +being of a sickly constitution, by a compound of training and medicine +tortured first himself and then a good many other people, and lived +a great deal longer than he had any right. But Asclepius would not +practise this art, because he knew that the citizens of a well-ordered +State have no leisure to be ill, and therefore he adopted the 'kill +or cure' method, which artisans and labourers employ. 'They must be +at their business,' they say, 'and have no time for coddling: if they +recover, well; if they don't, there is an end of them.' Whereas the rich +man is supposed to be a gentleman who can afford to be ill. Do you know +a maxim of Phocylides--that 'when a man begins to be rich' (or, perhaps, +a little sooner) 'he should practise virtue'? But how can excessive +care of health be inconsistent with an ordinary occupation, and yet +consistent with that practice of virtue which Phocylides inculcates? +When a student imagines that philosophy gives him a headache, he never +does anything; he is always unwell. This was the reason why Asclepius +and his sons practised no such art. They were acting in the interest of +the public, and did not wish to preserve useless lives, or raise up a +puny offspring to wretched sires. Honest diseases they honestly cured; +and if a man was wounded, they applied the proper remedies, and then let +him eat and drink what he liked. But they declined to treat intemperate +and worthless subjects, even though they might have made large fortunes +out of them. As to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain by a +thunderbolt for restoring a rich man to life, that is a lie--following +our old rule we must say either that he did not take bribes, or that he +was not the son of a god. + +Glaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best +judges will not be those who have had severally the greatest experience +of diseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two +professions. The physician should have had experience of disease in +his own body, for he cures with his mind and not with his body. But +the judge controls mind by mind; and therefore his mind should not be +corrupted by crime. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to be +wise and also innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived by +evil-doers, because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and therefore +the judge should be of a certain age; his youth should have been +innocent, and he should have acquired insight into evil not by the +practice of it, but by the observation of it in others. This is +the ideal of a judge; the criminal turned detective is wonderfully +suspicious, but when in company with good men who have experience, he is +at fault, for he foolishly imagines that every one is as bad as himself. +Vice may be known of virtue, but cannot know virtue. This is the sort of +medicine and this the sort of law which will prevail in our State; they +will be healing arts to better natures; but the evil body will be left +to die by the one, and the evil soul will be put to death by the other. +And the need of either will be greatly diminished by good music which +will give harmony to the soul, and good gymnastic which will give +health to the body. Not that this division of music and gymnastic really +corresponds to soul and body; for they are both equally concerned with +the soul, which is tamed by the one and aroused and sustained by the +other. The two together supply our guardians with their twofold nature. +The passionate disposition when it has too much gymnastic is hardened +and brutalized, the gentle or philosophic temper which has too much +music becomes enervated. While a man is allowing music to pour like +water through the funnel of his ears, the edge of his soul gradually +wears away, and the passionate or spirited element is melted out of +him. Too little spirit is easily exhausted; too much quickly passes into +nervous irritability. So, again, the athlete by feeding and training has +his courage doubled, but he soon grows stupid; he is like a wild beast, +ready to do everything by blows and nothing by counsel or policy. There +are two principles in man, reason and passion, and to these, not to the +soul and body, the two arts of music and gymnastic correspond. He who +mingles them in harmonious concord is the true musician,--he shall be +the presiding genius of our State. + +The next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must +rule the younger; and the best of the elders will be the best guardians. +Now they will be the best who love their subjects most, and think that +they have a common interest with them in the welfare of the state. These +we must select; but they must be watched at every epoch of life to see +whether they have retained the same opinions and held out against force +and enchantment. For time and persuasion and the love of pleasure may +enchant a man into a change of purpose, and the force of grief and pain +may compel him. And therefore our guardians must be men who have been +tried by many tests, like gold in the refiner's fire, and have been +passed first through danger, then through pleasure, and at every age +have come out of such trials victorious and without stain, in full +command of themselves and their principles; having all their faculties +in harmonious exercise for their country's good. These shall receive the +highest honours both in life and death. (It would perhaps be better to +confine the term 'guardians' to this select class: the younger men may +be called 'auxiliaries.') + +And now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which, Oh that we +could train our rulers!--at any rate let us make the attempt with the +rest of the world. What I am going to tell is only another version of +the legend of Cadmus; but our unbelieving generation will be slow to +accept such a story. The tale must be imparted, first to the rulers, +then to the soldiers, lastly to the people. We will inform them that +their youth was a dream, and that during the time when they seemed to +be undergoing their education they were really being fashioned in the +earth, who sent them up when they were ready; and that they must protect +and cherish her whose children they are, and regard each other as +brothers and sisters. 'I do not wonder at your being ashamed to propound +such a fiction.' There is more behind. These brothers and sisters +have different natures, and some of them God framed to rule, whom he +fashioned of gold; others he made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others +again to be husbandmen and craftsmen, and these were formed by him of +brass and iron. But as they are all sprung from a common stock, a golden +parent may have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son, and then +there must be a change of rank; the son of the rich must descend, and +the child of the artisan rise, in the social scale; for an oracle says +'that the State will come to an end if governed by a man of brass or +iron.' Will our citizens ever believe all this? 'Not in the present +generation, but in the next, perhaps, Yes.' + +Now let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers, +and look about and pitch their camp in a high place, which will be safe +against enemies from without, and likewise against insurrections from +within. There let them sacrifice and set up their tents; for soldiers +they are to be and not shopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the +sheep; and luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants. +Their habits and their dwellings should correspond to their education. +They should have no property; their pay should only meet their expenses; +and they should have common meals. Gold and silver we will tell them +that they have from God, and this divine gift in their souls they must +not alloy with that earthly dross which passes under the name of gold. +They only of the citizens may not touch it, or be under the same roof +with it, or drink from it; it is the accursed thing. Should they +ever acquire houses or lands or money of their own, they will become +householders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants +instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and the +rest of the State, will be at hand. + +The religious and ethical aspect of Plato's education will hereafter +be considered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more +conveniently noticed in this place. + +1. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave +irony, Plato, after the manner of his age, summons as a witness about +ethics and psychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting +to distinguish the better lesson from the worse, sometimes altering +the text from design; more than once quoting or alluding to Homer +inaccurately, after the manner of the early logographers turning the +Iliad into prose, and delighting to draw far-fetched inferences from +his words, or to make ludicrous applications of them. He does not, like +Heracleitus, get into a rage with Homer and Archilochus (Heracl.), but +uses their words and expressions as vehicles of a higher truth; not on +a system like Theagenes of Rhegium or Metrodorus, or in later times the +Stoics, but as fancy may dictate. And the conclusions drawn from them +are sound, although the premises are fictitious. These fanciful appeals +to Homer add a charm to Plato's style, and at the same time they have +the effect of a satire on the follies of Homeric interpretation. To us +(and probably to himself), although they take the form of arguments, +they are really figures of speech. They may be compared with modern +citations from Scripture, which have often a great rhetorical power even +when the original meaning of the words is entirely lost sight of. The +real, like the Platonic Socrates, as we gather from the Memorabilia of +Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations. Great in all ages and +countries, in religion as well as in law and literature, has been the +art of interpretation. + +2. 'The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style.' +Notwithstanding the fascination which the word 'classical' exercises +over us, we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the +Greek poetry which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought +often exceeds the power of lucid expression in Aeschylus and Pindar; +or that rhetoric gets the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet +Euripides. Only perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the +two; in him alone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a +Greek statue, in which there is nothing to add or to take away; at +least this is true of single plays or of large portions of them. The +connection in the Tragic Choruses and in the Greek lyric poets is not +unfrequently a tangled thread which in an age before logic the poet was +unable to draw out. Many thoughts and feelings mingled in his mind, and +he had no power of disengaging or arranging them. For there is a subtle +influence of logic which requires to be transferred from prose to +poetry, just as the music and perfection of language are infused by +poetry into prose. In all ages the poet has been a bad judge of his +own meaning (Apol.); for he does not see that the word which is full +of associations to his own mind is difficult and unmeaning to that of +another; or that the sequence which is clear to himself is puzzling to +others. There are many passages in some of our greatest modern poets +which are far too obscure; in which there is no proportion between style +and subject, in which any half-expressed figure, any harsh construction, +any distorted collocation of words, any remote sequence of ideas is +admitted; and there is no voice 'coming sweetly from nature,' or music +adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if there could be poetry +without beauty, or beauty without ease and clearness. The obscurities +of early Greek poets arose necessarily out of the state of language and +logic which existed in their age. They are not examples to be followed +by us; for the use of language ought in every generation to become +clearer and clearer. Like Shakespere, they were great in spite, not +in consequence, of their imperfections of expression. But there is no +reason for returning to the necessary obscurity which prevailed in +the infancy of literature. The English poets of the last century were +certainly not obscure; and we have no excuse for losing what they had +gained, or for going back to the earlier or transitional age which +preceded them. The thought of our own times has not out-stripped +language; a want of Plato's 'art of measuring' is the rule cause of the +disproportion between them. + +3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a +theory of art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up +as follows:--True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and +ideal,--the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or +repose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble +and simple character, or to listen to such strains, is the best of +influences,--the true Greek atmosphere, in which youth should be brought +up. That is the way to create in them a natural good taste, which will +have a feeling of truth and beauty in all things. For though the +poets are to be expelled, still art is recognized as another aspect of +reason--like love in the Symposium, extending over the same sphere, but +confined to the preliminary education, and acting through the power of +habit; and this conception of art is not limited to strains of music or +the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a wide kindred +in the world. The Republic of Plato, like the Athens of Pericles, has an +artistic as well as a political side. + +There is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two +or three passages does he even allude to them (Rep.; Soph.). He is +not lost in rapture at the great works of Phidias, the Parthenon, the +Propylea, the statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably have regarded +any abstract truth of number or figure as higher than the greatest of +them. Yet it is hard to suppose that some influence, such as he hopes to +inspire in youth, did not pass into his own mind from the works of art +which he saw around him. We are living upon the fragments of them, and +find in a few broken stones the standard of truth and beauty. But in +Plato this feeling has no expression; he nowhere says that beauty is the +object of art; he seems to deny that wisdom can take an external form +(Phaedrus); he does not distinguish the fine from the mechanical arts. +Whether or no, like some writers, he felt more than he expressed, it +is at any rate remarkable that the greatest perfection of the fine arts +should coincide with an almost entire silence about them. In one very +striking passage he tells us that a work of art, like the State, is a +whole; and this conception of a whole and the love of the newly-born +mathematical sciences may be regarded, if not as the inspiring, at any +rate as the regulating principles of Greek art (Xen. Mem.; and Sophist). + +4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better +not be in robust health; and should have known what illness is in his +own person. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of +evil; he is to be a good man who, having passed his youth in innocence, +became acquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore, +according to Plato, a judge should not be young, just as a young man +according to Aristotle is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy. +The bad, on the other hand, have a knowledge of vice, but no knowledge +of virtue. It may be doubted, however, whether this train of reflection +is well founded. In a remarkable passage of the Laws it is acknowledged +that the evil may form a correct estimate of the good. The union of +gentleness and courage in Book ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, +yet was afterwards ascertained to be a truth. And Plato might also have +found that the intuition of evil may be consistent with the abhorrence +of it. There is a directness of aim in virtue which gives an insight +into vice. And the knowledge of character is in some degree a natural +sense independent of any special experience of good or evil. + +5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek and +also very different from anything which existed at all in his age of +the world, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had +been enfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under +special circumstances. And in the ancient Greek aristocracies, merit +was certainly recognized as one of the elements on which government was +based. The founders of states were supposed to be their benefactors, who +were raised by their great actions above the ordinary level of humanity; +at a later period, the services of warriors and legislators were held to +entitle them and their descendants to the privileges of citizenship and +to the first rank in the state. And although the existence of an ideal +aristocracy is slenderly proven from the remains of early Greek history, +and we have a difficulty in ascribing such a character, however the idea +may be defined, to any actual Hellenic state--or indeed to any state +which has ever existed in the world--still the rule of the best was +certainly the aspiration of philosophers, who probably accommodated a +good deal their views of primitive history to their own notions of good +government. Plato further insists on applying to the guardians of his +state a series of tests by which all those who fell short of a fixed +standard were either removed from the governing body, or not admitted +to it; and this 'academic' discipline did to a certain extent prevail in +Greek states, especially in Sparta. He also indicates that the system of +caste, which existed in a great part of the ancient, and is by no means +extinct in the modern European world, should be set aside from time +to time in favour of merit. He is aware how deeply the greater part of +mankind resent any interference with the order of society, and therefore +he proposes his novel idea in the form of what he himself calls a +'monstrous fiction.' (Compare the ceremony of preparation for the two +'great waves' in Book v.) Two principles are indicated by him: first, +that there is a distinction of ranks dependent on circumstances prior to +the individual: second, that this distinction is and ought to be broken +through by personal qualities. He adapts mythology like the Homeric +poems to the wants of the state, making 'the Phoenician tale' the +vehicle of his ideas. Every Greek state had a myth respecting its own +origin; the Platonic republic may also have a tale of earthborn men. The +gravity and verisimilitude with which the tale is told, and the analogy +of Greek tradition, are a sufficient verification of the 'monstrous +falsehood.' Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and silver and brass and +iron age succeeding one another, but Plato supposes these differences +in the natures of men to exist together in a single state. Mythology +supplies a figure under which the lesson may be taught (as Protagoras +says, 'the myth is more interesting'), and also enables Plato to touch +lightly on new principles without going into details. In this passage he +shadows forth a general truth, but he does not tell us by what steps the +transposition of ranks is to be effected. Indeed throughout the Republic +he allows the lower ranks to fade into the distance. We do not know +whether they are to carry arms, and whether in the fifth book they are +or are not included in the communistic regulations respecting property +and marriage. Nor is there any use in arguing strictly either from a +few chance words, or from the silence of Plato, or in drawing inferences +which were beyond his vision. Aristotle, in his criticism on the +position of the lower classes, does not perceive that the poetical +creation is 'like the air, invulnerable,' and cannot be penetrated by +the shafts of his logic (Pol.). + +6. Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest degree +fanciful and ideal, and which suggest to him many reflections, are to +be found in the third book of the Republic: first, the great power of +music, so much beyond any influence which is experienced by us in modern +times, when the art or science has been far more developed, and has +found the secret of harmony, as well as of melody; secondly, the +indefinite and almost absolute control which the soul is supposed to +exercise over the body. + +In the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration, such as we may +also observe among certain masters of the art, not unknown to us, at the +present day. With this natural enthusiasm, which is felt by a few only, +there seems to mingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence for +numbers and numerical proportion to which Aristotle is a stranger. +Intervals of sound and number are to him sacred things which have a law +of their own, not dependent on the variations of sense. They rise above +sense, and become a connecting link with the world of ideas. But it is +evident that Plato is describing what to him appears to be also a fact. +The power of a simple and characteristic melody on the impressible +mind of the Greek is more than we can easily appreciate. The effect of +national airs may bear some comparison with it. And, besides all this, +there is a confusion between the harmony of musical notes and the +harmony of soul and body, which is so potently inspired by them. + +The second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting +questions--How far can the mind control the body? Is the relation +between them one of mutual antagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they +two or one, and is either of them the cause of the other? May we not at +times drop the opposition between them, and the mode of describing them, +which is so familiar to us, and yet hardly conveys any precise meaning, +and try to view this composite creature, man, in a more simple manner? +Must we not at any rate admit that there is in human nature a higher +and a lower principle, divided by no distinct line, which at times +break asunder and take up arms against one another? Or again, they are +reconciled and move together, either unconsciously in the ordinary work +of life, or consciously in the pursuit of some noble aim, to be attained +not without an effort, and for which every thought and nerve are +strained. And then the body becomes the good friend or ally, or servant +or instrument of the mind. And the mind has often a wonderful and almost +superhuman power of banishing disease and weakness and calling out a +hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the intellect and the senses +are brought into harmony and obedience so as to form a single human +being. They are ever parting, ever meeting; and the identity or +diversity of their tendencies or operations is for the most part +unnoticed by us. When the mind touches the body through the appetites, +we acknowledge the responsibility of the one to the other. There is a +tendency in us which says 'Drink.' There is another which says, 'Do +not drink; it is not good for you.' And we all of us know which is the +rightful superior. We are also responsible for our health, although into +this sphere there enter some elements of necessity which may be beyond +our control. Still even in the management of health, care and thought, +continued over many years, may make us almost free agents, if we do +not exact too much of ourselves, and if we acknowledge that all human +freedom is limited by the laws of nature and of mind. + +We are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation +which he passes on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day, +depreciates the effects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a +definite character and capable of receiving a definite treatment. He is +afraid of invalidism interfering with the business of life. He does +not recognize that time is the great healer both of mental and bodily +disorders; and that remedies which are gradual and proceed little by +little are safer than those which produce a sudden catastrophe. Neither +does he see that there is no way in which the mind can more surely +influence the body than by the control of eating and drinking; or any +other action or occasion of human life on which the higher freedom of +the will can be more simple or truly asserted. + +7. Lesser matters of style may be remarked. + +(1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato's way of expressing +that he is passing lightly over the subject. + +(2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he +proceeds with the construction of the State. + +(3) The description of the State sometimes as a reality, and then again +as a work of imagination only; these are the arts by which he sustains +the reader's interest. + +(4) Connecting links, or the preparation for the entire expulsion of the +poets in Book X. + +(5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the +valetudinarian, the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides, the +manner in which the image of the gold and silver citizens is taken +up into the subject, and the argument from the practice of Asclepius, +should not escape notice. + +BOOK IV. Adeimantus said: 'Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that you +make your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they are +the lords of the city, and yet instead of having, like other men, lands +and houses and money of their own, they live as mercenaries and are +always mounting guard.' You may add, I replied, that they receive no +pay but only their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or a +mistress. 'Well, and what answer do you give?' My answer is, that +our guardians may or may not be the happiest of men,--I should not be +surprised to find in the long-run that they were,--but this is not the +aim of our constitution, which was designed for the good of the whole +and not of any one part. If I went to a sculptor and blamed him for +having painted the eye, which is the noblest feature of the face, not +purple but black, he would reply: 'The eye must be an eye, and you +should look at the statue as a whole.' 'Now I can well imagine a fool's +paradise, in which everybody is eating and drinking, clothed in purple +and fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and have their wheel at hand, +that they may work a little when they please; and cobblers and all the +other classes of a State lose their distinctive character. And a State +may get on without cobblers; but when the guardians degenerate into boon +companions, then the ruin is complete. Remember that we are not talking +of peasants keeping holiday, but of a State in which every man is +expected to do his own work. The happiness resides not in this or that +class, but in the State as a whole. I have another remark to make:--A +middle condition is best for artisans; they should have money enough to +buy tools, and not enough to be independent of business. And will not +the same condition be best for our citizens? If they are poor, they will +be mean; if rich, luxurious and lazy; and in neither case contented. +'But then how will our poor city be able to go to war against an enemy +who has money?' There may be a difficulty in fighting against one enemy; +against two there will be none. In the first place, the contest will be +carried on by trained warriors against well-to-do citizens: and is not a +regular athlete an easy match for two stout opponents at least? Suppose +also, that before engaging we send ambassadors to one of the two cities, +saying, 'Silver and gold we have not; do you help us and take our share +of the spoil;'--who would fight against the lean, wiry dogs, when they +might join with them in preying upon the fatted sheep? 'But if many +states join their resources, shall we not be in danger?' I am amused +to hear you use the word 'state' of any but our own State. They are +'states,' but not 'a state'--many in one. For in every state there are +two hostile nations, rich and poor, which you may set one against the +other. But our State, while she remains true to her principles, will be +in very deed the mightiest of Hellenic states. + +To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; +it must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter +of secondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was +intimated in the parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied +was that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at +one with himself, and then the whole city would be united. But all these +things are secondary, if education, which is the great matter, be duly +regarded. When the wheel has once been set in motion, the speed is +always increasing; and each generation improves upon the preceding, both +in physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be +directed to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation; alter the +songs of a country, Damon says, and you will soon end by altering its +laws. The change appears innocent at first, and begins in play; but +the evil soon becomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of +individuals, then upon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon +the institutions of a state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. +But if education remains in the established form, there will be no +danger. A restorative process will be always going on; the spirit of law +and order will raise up what has fallen down. Nor will any regulations +be needed for the lesser matters of life--rules of deportment or +fashions of dress. Like invites like for good or for evil. Education +will correct deficiencies and supply the power of self-government. Far +be it from us to enter into the particulars of legislation; let the +guardians take care of education, and education will take care of all +other things. + +But without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will +make no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by +some favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living. +If you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits, then +they grow angry; they are charming people. 'Charming,--nay, the very +reverse.' Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the +state which is like them. And such states there are which first ordain +under penalty of death that no one shall alter the constitution, and +then suffer themselves to be flattered into and out of anything; and +he who indulges them and fawns upon them, is their leader and saviour. +'Yes, the men are as bad as the states.' But do you not admire their +cleverness? 'Nay, some of them are stupid enough to believe what the +people tell them.' And when all the world is telling a man that he is +six feet high, and he has no measure, how can he believe anything +else? But don't get into a passion: to see our statesmen trying their +nostrums, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra-like +rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments are +superfluous in good states, and are useless in bad ones. + +And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to +Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all +things--that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon +the centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any +sense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme +in our realms... + +Here, as Socrates would say, let us 'reflect on' (Greek) what has +preceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens, +but only of the well-being of the State. They may be the happiest of +men, but our principal aim in founding the State was not to make them +happy. They were to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant +manner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and modern +philosophy, touching the relation of duty to happiness, of right to +utility. + +First duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The +utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of error, and shows +to us a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted +further that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who makes +the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and noblest +motives of human action. But utility is not the historical basis of +morality; nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly +occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is, as we believe, the +far-off result of the divine government of the universe. The greatest +happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue +and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we +can be of a divine purpose, that 'all mankind should be saved;' and +we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness of the +individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary +sense of the term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a +voluntary death. Further, the word 'happiness' has several ambiguities; +it may mean either pleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective or +objective, in this world or in another, of ourselves only or of +our neighbours and of all men everywhere. By the modern founder of +Utilitarianism the self-regarding and disinterested motives of action +are included under the same term, although they are commonly opposed +by us as benevolence and self-love. The word happiness has not the +definiteness or the sacredness of 'truth' and 'right'; it does +not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk into the +conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the comforts and +conveniences of life; too little with 'the goods of the soul which we +desire for their own sake.' In a great trial, or danger, or temptation, +or in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of. For these +reasons 'the greatest happiness' principle is not the true foundation of +ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the second, which is +like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the larger part of +human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far as they tend +to the happiness of mankind (Introd. to Gorgias and Philebus). + +The same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient +seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For +concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect +the happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term +expediency is merely the law of right limited by the conditions of human +society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well as +of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we cannot +directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations; and +sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist. +They are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy, +as well as in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said +to depend upon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states +of society the power of ideas remains. And all the higher class of +statesmen have in them something of that idealism which Pericles is said +to have gathered from the teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognise that +the true leader of men must be above the motives of ambition, and +that national character is of greater value than material comfort and +prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato; first, he expects +his citizens to do their duty, and then under favourable circumstances, +that is to say, in a well-ordered State, their happiness is assured. +That he was far from excluding the modern principle of utility in +politics is sufficiently evident from other passages; in which 'the most +beneficial is affirmed to be the most honourable', and also 'the most +sacred'. + +We may note + +(1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, is designed to +draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates. + +(2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of +politics and of art, in the latter supplying the only principle of +criticism, which, under the various names of harmony, symmetry, measure, +proportion, unity, the Greek seems to have applied to works of art. + +(3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size, after the +traditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of Aristotle, the +fact that the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a principle. + +(4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of +the light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the +'charming' patients who are always making themselves worse; or again, +the playful assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave +irony with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is six +feet high because he is told so, and having nothing to measure with +is to be pardoned for his ignorance--he is too amusing for us to be +seriously angry with him. + +(5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over +when provision has been made for two great principles,--first, that +religion shall be based on the highest conception of the gods, secondly, +that the true national or Hellenic type shall be maintained... + +Socrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston, +tell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother +and the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. 'That won't do,' +replied Glaucon, 'you yourself promised to make the search and talked +about the impiety of deserting justice.' Well, I said, I will lead the +way, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will +contain all the four virtues--wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. If +we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice. + +First then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be +wise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,--not +the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the +husbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the +whole State. Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians, who are a +small class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them +is concentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class +have wisdom, then the whole State will be wise. + +Our second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding +in another class--that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort +of salvation--the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and +education have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which +dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple +or of any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no +soap or lye will ever wash them out. Now the ground is education, and +the laws are the colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither +the soap of pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them +out. This power which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask +you to call 'courage,' adding the epithet 'political' or 'civilized' +in order to distinguish it from mere animal courage and from a higher +courage which may hereafter be discussed. + +Two virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding +virtues temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is thrown +upon the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man as +'master of himself'--which has an absurd sound, because the master is +also the servant. The expression really means that the better principle +in a man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes--women, +slaves and the like--who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the +better; and in our State the former class are held under control by the +latter. Now to which of these classes does temperance belong? 'To both +of them.' And our State if any will be the abode of temperance; and +we were right in describing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused +through the whole, making the dwellers in the city to be of one mind, +and attuning the upper and middle and lower classes like the strings of +an instrument, whether you suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength or +wealth. + +And now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and +watch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell +me, if you see the thicket move first. 'Nay, I would have you lead.' +Well then, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult; +but we must push on. I begin to see a track. 'Good news.' Why, Glaucon, +our dulness of scent is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes +into the distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad +as people looking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have you +forgotten our old principle of the division of labour, or of every man +doing his own business, concerning which we spoke at the foundation +of the State--what but this was justice? Is there any other virtue +remaining which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in +the scale of political virtue? For 'every one having his own' is the +great object of government; and the great object of trade is that +every man should do his own business. Not that there is much harm in a +carpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself into +a carpenter; but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last +and turning into a guardian or legislator, or when a single individual +is trainer, warrior, legislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice, +or every man doing another's business. I do not say that as yet we are +in a condition to arrive at a final conclusion. For the definition +which we believe to hold good in states has still to be tested by the +individual. Having read the large letters we will now come back to the +small. From the two together a brilliant light may be struck out... + +Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of +residues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the +three parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, +although the third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than +the first two. If there be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for +in the relation of the three parts in the soul or classes in the State +to one another. It is obvious and simple, and for that very reason has +not been found out. The modern logician will be inclined to object that +ideas cannot be separated like chemical substances, but that they run +into one another and may be only different aspects or names of the +same thing, and such in this instance appears to be the case. For the +definition here given of justice is verbally the same as one of the +definitions of temperance given by Socrates in the Charmides, which +however is only provisional, and is afterwards rejected. And so far +from justice remaining over when the other virtues are eliminated, +the justice and temperance of the Republic can with difficulty be +distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue of a part only, and +one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole soul. +Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a sort of harmony, +and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to differ from +temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the +harmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by which +all natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the +right place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice, +again, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore, +from Plato's point of view, the foundation of them, to which they +are referred and which in idea precedes them. The proposal to omit +temperance is a mere trick of style intended to avoid monotony. + +There is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of +Plato (Protagoras; Arist. Nic. Ethics), 'Whether the virtues are one +or many?' This receives an answer which is to the effect that there +are four cardinal virtues (now for the first time brought together in +ethical philosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like +Aristotle's conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others, +but the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this universal +conception of justice or order in the first education and in the moral +nature of man, the still more universal conception of the good in the +second education and in the sphere of speculative knowledge seems to +succeed. Both might be equally described by the terms 'law,' 'order,' +'harmony;' but while the idea of good embraces 'all time and all +existence,' the conception of justice is not extended beyond man. + +...Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But +first he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. +His argument is as follows:--Quantity makes no difference in quality. +The word 'just,' whether applied to the individual or to the State, has +the same meaning. And the term 'justice' implied that the same three +principles in the State and in the individual were doing their own +business. But are they really three or one? The question is difficult, +and one which can hardly be solved by the methods which we are now +using; but the truer and longer way would take up too much of our time. +'The shorter will satisfy me.' Well then, you would admit that the +qualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who compose +them? The Scythians and Thracians are passionate, our own race +intellectual, and the Egyptians and Phoenicians covetous, because +the individual members of each have such and such a character; the +difficulty is to determine whether the several principles are one or +three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one part of our nature, +desire with another, are angry with another, or whether the whole soul +comes into play in each sort of action. This enquiry, however, requires +a very exact definition of terms. The same thing in the same relation +cannot be affected in two opposite ways. But there is no impossibility +in a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or in a top which is fixed +on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no necessity to mention +all the possible exceptions; let us provisionally assume that opposites +cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same relation. And to the +class of opposites belong assent and dissent, desire and avoidance. +And one form of desire is thirst and hunger: and here arises a new +point--thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; not of warm +drink or of a particular kind of food, with the single exception of +course that the very fact of our desiring anything implies that it is +good. When relative terms have no attributes, their correlatives have +no attributes; when they have attributes, their correlatives also have +them. For example, the term 'greater' is simply relative to 'less,' and +knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on the other hand, a +particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again, every science +has a distinct character, which is defined by an object; medicine, for +example, is the science of health, although not to be confounded with +health. Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us return to the original +instance of thirst, which has a definite object--drink. Now the thirsty +soul may feel two distinct impulses; the animal one saying 'Drink;' +the rational one, which says 'Do not drink.' The two impulses are +contradictory; and therefore we may assume that they spring from +distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a third principle, or +akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which throws some +light on this question. He was coming up from the Piraeus outside the +north wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying +by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an +abhorrence of them; at first he turned away and shut his eyes, then, +suddenly tearing them open, he said,--'Take your fill, ye wretches, of +the fair sight.' Now is there not here a third principle which is often +found to come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never +of desire against reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate +existence of which we may further convince ourselves by putting the +following case:--When a man suffers justly, if he be of a generous +nature he is not indignant at the hardships which he undergoes: but when +he suffers unjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger and +thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the +voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no +more, is heard within. This shows that passion is the ally of reason. Is +passion then the same with reason? No, for the former exists in children +and brutes; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them +when he says, 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.' + +And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer +that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For +wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and +courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the +three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each +part in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the +inferior, will be harmonized by the influence of music and gymnastic. +The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will act together +in the town of Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper subjection. The +courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion +about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the +counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and +reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the +subject principles, both in the State and in the individual. Of justice +we have already spoken; and the notion already given of it may +be confirmed by common instances. Will the just state or the just +individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of impiety to +gods and men? 'No.' And is not the reason of this that the several +principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their own +business? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just +states. Moreover, our old division of labour, which required that there +should be one man for one use, was a dream or anticipation of what was +to follow; and that dream has now been realized in justice, which +begins by binding together the three chords of the soul, and then acts +harmoniously in every relation of life. And injustice, which is the +insubordination and disobedience of the inferior elements in the soul, +is the opposite of justice, and is inharmonious and unnatural, being to +the soul what disease is to the body; for in the soul as well as in the +body, good or bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the +health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease +and weakness and deformity of the soul. + +Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the +more profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like +mortal disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill +which overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, +and the infinite forms of vice, among which are four special ones, +characteristic both of states and of individuals. And the state which +corresponds to the single form of virtue is that which we have been +describing, wherein reason rules under one of two names--monarchy and +aristocracy. Thus there are five forms in all, both of states and of +souls... + +In attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties, Plato +takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And +the criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the +faculties. The same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But +the path of early reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he +will not proceed a step without first clearing the ground. This leads +him into a tiresome digression, which is intended to explain the nature +of contradiction. First, the contradiction must be at the same time and +in the same relation. Secondly, no extraneous word must be introduced +into either of the terms in which the contradictory proposition is +expressed: for example, thirst is of drink, not of warm drink. He +implies, what he does not say, that if, by the advice of reason, or by +the impulse of anger, a man is restrained from drinking, this proves +that thirst, or desire under which thirst is included, is distinct +from anger and reason. But suppose that we allow the term 'thirst' or +'desire' to be modified, and say an 'angry thirst,' or a 'revengeful +desire,' then the two spheres of desire and anger overlap and become +confused. This case therefore has to be excluded. And still there +remains an exception to the rule in the use of the term 'good,' which is +always implied in the object of desire. These are the discussions of +an age before logic; and any one who is wearied by them should remember +that they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas in the first +development of the human faculties. + +The psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul +into the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far +as we know, was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle +and succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early +analysis of the mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible +faculty (Greek), which may be variously described under the terms +righteous indignation, spirit, passion. It is the foundation of courage, +which includes in Plato moral courage, the courage of enduring pain, and +of surmounting intellectual difficulties, as well as of meeting dangers +in war. Though irrational, it inclines to side with the rational: it +cannot be aroused by punishment when justly inflicted: it sometimes +takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the performance +of great actions. It is the 'lion heart' with which the reason makes +a treaty. On the other hand it is negative rather than positive; it +is indignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like Love in the +Symposium and Phaedrus, aspire to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the +peremptory military spirit which prevails in the government of honour. +It differs from anger (Greek), this latter term having no accessory +notion of righteous indignation. Although Aristotle has retained the +word, yet we may observe that 'passion' (Greek) has with him lost its +affinity to the rational and has become indistinguishable from 'anger' +(Greek). And to this vernacular use Plato himself in the Laws seems to +revert, though not always. By modern philosophy too, as well as in our +ordinary conversation, the words anger or passion are employed almost +exclusively in a bad sense; there is no connotation of a just or +reasonable cause by which they are aroused. The feeling of 'righteous +indignation' is too partial and accidental to admit of our regarding +it as a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted also to doubt whether +Plato is right in supposing that an offender, however justly condemned, +could be expected to acknowledge the justice of his sentence; this is +the spirit of a philosopher or martyr rather than of a criminal. + +We may observe how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle's famous thesis, +that 'good actions produce good habits.' The words 'as healthy practices +(Greek) produce health, so do just practices produce justice,' have +a sound very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note also that an +incidental remark in Plato has become a far-reaching principle in +Aristotle, and an inseparable part of a great Ethical system. + +There is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by 'the longer +way': he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not +be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the +sixth and seventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given +us a sketch of such a metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final +revelation of the idea of good, he is put off with the declaration +that he has not yet studied the preliminary sciences. How he would have +filled up the sketch, or argued about such questions from a higher point +of view, we can only conjecture. Perhaps he hoped to find some a priori +method of developing the parts out of the whole; or he might have asked +which of the ideas contains the other ideas, and possibly have stumbled +on the Hegelian identity of the 'ego' and the 'universal.' Or he may +have imagined that ideas might be constructed in some manner analogous +to the construction of figures and numbers in the mathematical sciences. +The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato the universal; and to +this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or opinion, just as in +modern times we seek to rest them on the opposite pole of induction and +experience. The aspirations of metaphysicians have always tended to +pass beyond the limits of human thought and language: they seem to have +reached a height at which they are 'moving about in worlds unrealized,' +and their conceptions, although profoundly affecting their own minds, +become invisible or unintelligible to others. We are not therefore +surprized to find that Plato himself has nowhere clearly explained his +doctrine of ideas; or that his school in a later generation, like his +contemporaries Glaucon and Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in +this region of speculation. In the Sophist, where he is refuting the +scepticism which maintained either that there was no such thing as +predication, or that all might be predicated of all, he arrives at the +conclusion that some ideas combine with some, but not all with all. But +he makes only one or two steps forward on this path; he nowhere attains +to any connected system of ideas, or even to a knowledge of the most +elementary relations of the sciences to one another. + +BOOK V. I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline in +states, when Polemarchus--he was sitting a little farther from me +than Adeimantus--taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said +something in an undertone, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we +let him off?' 'Certainly not,' said Adeimantus, raising his voice. Whom, +I said, are you not going to let off? 'You,' he said. Why? 'Because +we think that you are not dealing fairly with us in omitting women and +children, of whom you have slily disposed under the general formula +that friends have all things in common.' And was I not right? 'Yes,' +he replied, 'but there are many sorts of communism or community, and +we want to know which of them is right. The company, as you have just +heard, are resolved to have a further explanation.' Thrasymachus said, +'Do you think that we have come hither to dig for gold, or to hear you +discourse?' Yes, I said; but the discourse should be of a reasonable +length. Glaucon added, 'Yes, Socrates, and there is reason in spending +the whole of life in such discussions; but pray, without more ado, tell +us how this community is to be carried out, and how the interval between +birth and education is to be filled up.' Well, I said, the subject has +several difficulties--What is possible? is the first question. What is +desirable? is the second. 'Fear not,' he replied, 'for you are speaking +among friends.' That, I replied, is a sorry consolation; I shall +destroy my friends as well as myself. Not that I mind a little innocent +laughter; but he who kills the truth is a murderer. 'Then,' said +Glaucon, laughing, 'in case you should murder us we will acquit you +beforehand, and you shall be held free from the guilt of deceiving us.' + +Socrates proceeds:--The guardians of our state are to be watch-dogs, as +we have already said. Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes--we do +not take the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home +to look after their puppies. They have the same employments--the only +difference between them is that the one sex is stronger and the other +weaker. But if women are to have the same employments as men, they must +have the same education--they must be taught music and gymnastics, and +the art of war. I know that a great joke will be made of their riding +on horseback and carrying weapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled +women showing their agility in the palaestra will certainly not be a +vision of beauty, and may be expected to become a famous jest. But we +must not mind the wits; there was a time when they might have laughed at +our present gymnastics. All is habit: people have at last found out that +the exposure is better than the concealment of the person, and now they +laugh no more. Evil only should be the subject of ridicule. + +The first question is, whether women are able either wholly or partially +to share in the employments of men. And here we may be charged with +inconsistency in making the proposal at all. For we started originally +with the division of labour; and the diversity of employments was based +on the difference of natures. But is there no difference between men +and women? Nay, are they not wholly different? THERE was the difficulty, +Glaucon, which made me unwilling to speak of family relations. However, +when a man is out of his depth, whether in a pool or in an ocean, he can +only swim for his life; and we must try to find a way of escape, if we +can. + +The argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the +natures of men and women are said to differ. But this is only a verbal +opposition. We do not consider that the difference may be purely nominal +and accidental; for example, a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a +single point of view, but you cannot infer that because a bald man is +a cobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler. Now why is such an +inference erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them is +partial only, like the difference between a male physician and a female +physician, not running through the whole nature, like the difference +between a physician and a carpenter. And if the difference of the sexes +is only that the one beget and the other bear children, this does not +prove that they ought to have distinct educations. Admitting that women +differ from men in capacity, do not men equally differ from one another? +Has not nature scattered all the qualities which our citizens require +indifferently up and down among the two sexes? and even in their +peculiar pursuits, are not women often, though in some cases superior to +men, ridiculously enough surpassed by them? Women are the same in kind +as men, and have the same aptitude or want of aptitude for medicine +or gymnastic or war, but in a less degree. One woman will be a good +guardian, another not; and the good must be chosen to be the colleagues +of our guardians. If however their natures are the same, the inference +is that their education must also be the same; there is no longer +anything unnatural or impossible in a woman learning music and +gymnastic. And the education which we give them will be the very best, +far superior to that of cobblers, and will train up the very best women, +and nothing can be more advantageous to the State than this. Therefore +let them strip, clothed in their chastity, and share in the toils of war +and in the defence of their country; he who laughs at them is a fool for +his pains. + +The first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men +and women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is +rolling in--community of wives and children; is this either expedient +or possible? The expediency I do not doubt; I am not so sure of the +possibility. 'Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be entertained +on both points.' I meant to have escaped the trouble of proving the +first, but as you have detected the little stratagem I must even submit. +Only allow me to feed my fancy like the solitary in his walks, with a +dream of what might be, and then I will return to the question of what +can be. + +In the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones +where they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as +legislator, have already selected the men; and now you shall select +the women. After the selection has been made, they will dwell in common +houses and have their meals in common, and will be brought together by +a necessity more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be +allowed to live in licentiousness; that is an unholy thing, which +the rulers are determined to prevent. For the avoidance of this, holy +marriage festivals will be instituted, and their holiness will be in +proportion to their usefulness. And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask +(as I know that you are a breeder of birds and animals), Do you not take +the greatest care in the mating? 'Certainly.' And there is no reason to +suppose that less care is required in the marriage of human beings. But +then our rulers must be skilful physicians of the State, for they will +often need a strong dose of falsehood in order to bring about desirable +unions between their subjects. The good must be paired with the good, +and the bad with the bad, and the offspring of the one must be reared, +and of the other destroyed; in this way the flock will be preserved in +prime condition. Hymeneal festivals will be celebrated at times fixed +with an eye to population, and the brides and bridegrooms will meet at +them; and by an ingenious system of lots the rulers will contrive that +the brave and the fair come together, and that those of inferior breed +are paired with inferiors--the latter will ascribe to chance what is +really the invention of the rulers. And when children are born, the +offspring of the brave and fair will be carried to an enclosure in a +certain part of the city, and there attended by suitable nurses; the +rest will be hurried away to places unknown. The mothers will be brought +to the fold and will suckle the children; care however must be taken +that none of them recognise their own offspring; and if necessary other +nurses may also be hired. The trouble of watching and getting up +at night will be transferred to attendants. 'Then the wives of our +guardians will have a fine easy time when they are having children.' And +quite right too, I said, that they should. + +The parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be +reckoned at thirty years--from twenty-five, when he has 'passed the +point at which the speed of life is greatest,' to fifty-five; and at +twenty years for a woman--from twenty to forty. Any one above or below +those ages who partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety; +also every one who forms a marriage connexion at other times without the +consent of the rulers. This latter regulation applies to those who are +within the specified ages, after which they may range at will, provided +they avoid the prohibited degrees of parents and children, or +of brothers and sisters, which last, however, are not absolutely +prohibited, if a dispensation be procured. 'But how shall we know the +degrees of affinity, when all things are common?' The answer is, that +brothers and sisters are all such as are born seven or nine months after +the espousals, and their parents those who are then espoused, and every +one will have many children and every child many parents. + +Socrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous +and also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State +is unity; the greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there will be +unity where there are no private pleasures or pains or interests--where +if one member suffers all the members suffer, if one citizen is touched +all are quickly sensitive; and the least hurt to the little finger of +the State runs through the whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the +true State, like an individual, is injured as a whole when any part is +affected. Every State has subjects and rulers, who in a democracy are +called rulers, and in other States masters: but in our State they are +called saviours and allies; and the subjects who in other States are +termed slaves, are by us termed nurturers and paymasters, and those who +are termed comrades and colleagues in other places, are by us called +fathers and brothers. And whereas in other States members of the same +government regard one of their colleagues as a friend and another as an +enemy, in our State no man is a stranger to another; for every citizen +is connected with every other by ties of blood, and these names and +this way of speaking will have a corresponding reality--brother, father, +sister, mother, repeated from infancy in the ears of children, will not +be mere words. Then again the citizens will have all things in common, +in having common property they will have common pleasures and pains. + +Can there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or +lawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which +they call their own; or suits about violence when every one is bound +to defend himself? The permission to strike when insulted will be an +'antidote' to the knife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But +no younger man will strike an elder; reverence will prevent him from +laying hands on his kindred, and he will fear that the rest of the +family may retaliate. Moreover, our citizens will be rid of the +lesser evils of life; there will be no flattery of the rich, no sordid +household cares, no borrowing and not paying. Compared with the +citizens of other States, ours will be Olympic victors, and crowned +with blessings greater still--they and their children having a better +maintenance during life, and after death an honourable burial. Nor has +the happiness of the individual been sacrificed to the happiness of the +State; our Olympic victor has not been turned into a cobbler, but he +has a happiness beyond that of any cobbler. At the same time, if any +conceited youth begins to dream of appropriating the State to himself, +he must be reminded that 'half is better than the whole.' 'I should +certainly advise him to stay where he is when he has the promise of such +a brave life.' + +But is such a community possible?--as among the animals, so also among +men; and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no +difficulty; the principle of communism is adapted to military service. +Parents will take their children to look on at a battle, just as +potters' boys are trained to the business by looking on at the wheel. +And to the parents themselves, as to other animals, the sight of their +young ones will prove a great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must +learn, but they must not run into danger, although a certain degree of +risk is worth incurring when the benefit is great. The young creatures +should be placed under the care of experienced veterans, and they should +have wings--that is to say, swift and tractable steeds on which they may +fly away and escape. One of the first things to be done is to teach a +youth to ride. + +Cowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen; +gentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented +to the enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall +be crowned by all the youths in the army; secondly, he shall receive the +right hand of fellowship; and thirdly, do you think that there is any +harm in his being kissed? We have already determined that he shall have +more wives than others, in order that he may have as many children +as possible. And at a feast he shall have more to eat; we have the +authority of Homer for honouring brave men with 'long chines,' which is +an appropriate compliment, because meat is a very strengthening thing. +Fill the bowl then, and give the best seats and meats to the brave--may +they do them good! And he who dies in battle will be at once declared to +be of the golden race, and will, as we believe, become one of Hesiod's +guardian angels. He shall be worshipped after death in the manner +prescribed by the oracle; and not only he, but all other benefactors +of the State who die in any other way, shall be admitted to the same +honours. + +The next question is, How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be +enslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing +under the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled? +Certainly not; for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and has +been the ruin of many an army. There is meanness and feminine malice in +making an enemy of the dead body, when the soul which was the owner has +fled--like a dog who cannot reach his assailants, and quarrels with +the stones which are thrown at him instead. Again, the arms of Hellenes +should not be offered up in the temples of the Gods; they are a +pollution, for they are taken from brethren. And on similar grounds +there should be a limit to the devastation of Hellenic territory--the +houses should not be burnt, nor more than the annual produce carried +off. For war is of two kinds, civil and foreign; the first of which is +properly termed 'discord,' and only the second 'war;' and war between +Hellenes is in reality civil war--a quarrel in a family, which is ever +to be regarded as unpatriotic and unnatural, and ought to be prosecuted +with a view to reconciliation in a true phil-Hellenic spirit, as of +those who would chasten but not utterly enslave. The war is not against +a whole nation who are a friendly multitude of men, women, and children, +but only against a few guilty persons; when they are punished peace will +be restored. That is the way in which Hellenes should war against one +another--and against barbarians, as they war against one another now. + +'But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a +State possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness +of being one family--fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out +to war together; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal +State.' You are too unmerciful. The first wave and the second wave I +have hardly escaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the third. +When you see the towering crest of the wave, I expect you to take pity. +'Not a whit.' + +Well, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after +justice, and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at +all the worse for being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly +beautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any +reality come up to the idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully +realized; but if I am to try and realize the ideal of the State in a +measure, I think that an approach may be made to the perfection of which +I dream by one or two, I do not say slight, but possible changes in the +present constitution of States. I would reduce them to a single one--the +great wave, as I call it. Until, then, kings are philosophers, or +philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no, nor the +human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being. I know that +this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive. 'Socrates, +all the world will take off his coat and rush upon you with sticks and +stones, and therefore I would advise you to prepare an answer.' You got +me into the scrape, I said. 'And I was right,' he replied; 'however, I +will stand by you as a sort of do-nothing, well-meaning ally.' Having +the help of such a champion, I will do my best to maintain my position. +And first, I must explain of whom I speak and what sort of natures these +are who are to be philosophers and rulers. As you are a man of pleasure, +you will not have forgotten how indiscriminate lovers are in their +attachments; they love all, and turn blemishes into beauties. The +snub-nosed youth is said to have a winning grace; the beak of another +has a royal look; the featureless are faultless; the dark are manly, the +fair angels; the sickly have a new term of endearment invented expressly +for them, which is 'honey-pale.' Lovers of wine and lovers of ambition +also desire the objects of their affection in every form. Now here comes +the point:--The philosopher too is a lover of knowledge in every form; +he has an insatiable curiosity. 'But will curiosity make a philosopher? +Are the lovers of sights and sounds, who let out their ears to every +chorus at the Dionysiac festivals, to be called philosophers?' They +are not true philosophers, but only an imitation. 'Then how are we to +describe the true?' + +You would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, such as justice, +beauty, good, evil, which are severally one, yet in their various +combinations appear to be many. Those who recognize these realities are +philosophers; whereas the other class hear sounds and see colours, +and understand their use in the arts, but cannot attain to the true or +waking vision of absolute justice or beauty or truth; they have not the +light of knowledge, but of opinion, and what they see is a dream only. +Perhaps he of whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we pacify +him without revealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose we say that, +if he has knowledge we rejoice to hear it, but knowledge must be of +something which is, as ignorance is of something which is not; and there +is a third thing, which both is and is not, and is matter of opinion +only. Opinion and knowledge, then, having distinct objects, must also +be distinct faculties. And by faculties I mean powers unseen and +distinguishable only by the difference in their objects, as opinion +and knowledge differ, since the one is liable to err, but the other +is unerring and is the mightiest of all our faculties. If being is +the object of knowledge, and not-being of ignorance, and these are the +extremes, opinion must lie between them, and may be called darker than +the one and brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent +matter is and is not at the same time, and partakes both of existence +and of non-existence. Now I would ask my good friend, who denies +abstract beauty and justice, and affirms a many beautiful and a +many just, whether everything he sees is not in some point of view +different--the beautiful ugly, the pious impious, the just unjust? Is +not the double also the half, and are not heavy and light relative terms +which pass into one another? Everything is and is not, as in the old +riddle--'A man and not a man shot and did not shoot a bird and not a +bird with a stone and not a stone.' The mind cannot be fixed on either +alternative; and these ambiguous, intermediate, erring, half-lighted +objects, which have a disorderly movement in the region between being +and not-being, are the proper matter of opinion, as the immutable +objects are the proper matter of knowledge. And he who grovels in the +world of sense, and has only this uncertain perception of things, is not +a philosopher, but a lover of opinion only... + +The fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the +community of property and of family are first maintained, and the +transition is made to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these +Plato, after his manner, has been preparing in some chance words of Book +IV, which fall unperceived on the reader's mind, as they are supposed +at first to have fallen on the ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus. The +'paradoxes,' as Morgenstern terms them, of this book of the Republic +will be reserved for another place; a few remarks on the style, and some +explanations of difficulties, may be briefly added. + +First, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of +scheme or plan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third +and greatest wave come rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All +that can be said of the extravagance of Plato's proposals is anticipated +by himself. Nothing is more admirable than the hesitation with which he +proposes the solemn text, 'Until kings are philosophers,' etc.; or the +reaction from the sublime to the ridiculous, when Glaucon describes the +manner in which the new truth will be received by mankind. + +Some defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the +communistic plan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism +to the lower classes; nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of +being made out. It is quite possible that a child born at one hymeneal +festival may marry one of its own brothers or sisters, or even one of +its parents, at another. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions, but at +the same time he does not wish to bring before us the fact that the city +would be divided into families of those born seven and nine months after +each hymeneal festival. If it were worth while to argue seriously about +such fancies, we might remark that while all the old affinities are +abolished, the newly prohibited affinity rests not on any natural or +rational principle, but only upon the accident of children having been +born in the same month and year. Nor does he explain how the lots could +be so manipulated by the legislature as to bring together the fairest +and best. The singular expression which is employed to describe the age +of five-and-twenty may perhaps be taken from some poet. + +In the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature +of philosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension +of Glaucon, the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or +feelings. They are partly facetious, but also contain a germ of truth. +That science is a whole, remains a true principle of inductive as well +as of metaphysical philosophy; and the love of universal knowledge is +still the characteristic of the philosopher in modern as well as in +ancient times. + +At the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent +matter, which has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics and +Theology of the modern world, and which occurs here for the first time +in the history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of +knowledge in the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the +object. With him a word must answer to an idea; and he could not +conceive of an opinion which was an opinion about nothing. The influence +of analogy led him to invent 'parallels and conjugates' and to overlook +facts. To us some of his difficulties are puzzling only from their +simplicity: we do not perceive that the answer to them 'is tumbling out +at our feet.' To the mind of early thinkers, the conception of not-being +was dark and mysterious; they did not see that this terrible apparition +which threatened destruction to all knowledge was only a logical +determination. The common term under which, through the accidental use +of language, two entirely different ideas were included was another +source of confusion. Thus through the ambiguity of (Greek) Plato, +attempting to introduce order into the first chaos of human thought, +seems to have confused perception and opinion, and to have failed to +distinguish the contingent from the relative. In the Theaetetus the +first of these difficulties begins to clear up; in the Sophist the +second; and for this, as well as for other reasons, both these dialogues +are probably to be regarded as later than the Republic. + +BOOK VI. Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true +being, and have no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty, +truth, and that philosophers have such patterns, we have now to ask +whether they or the many shall be rulers in our State. But who can doubt +that philosophers should be chosen, if they have the other qualities +which are required in a ruler? For they are lovers of the knowledge of +the eternal and of all truth; they are haters of falsehood; their meaner +desires are absorbed in the interests of knowledge; they are spectators +of all time and all existence; and in the magnificence of their +contemplation the life of man is as nothing to them, nor is death +fearful. Also they are of a social, gracious disposition, equally free +from cowardice and arrogance. They learn and remember easily; they have +harmonious, well-regulated minds; truth flows to them sweetly by nature. +Can the god of Jealousy himself find any fault with such an assemblage +of good qualities? + +Here Adeimantus interposes:--'No man can answer you, Socrates; but every +man feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in argument. He is +driven from one position to another, until he has nothing more to say, +just as an unskilful player at draughts is reduced to his last move by +a more skilled opponent. And yet all the time he may be right. He may +know, in this very instance, that those who make philosophy the business +of their lives, generally turn out rogues if they are bad men, and fools +if they are good. What do you say?' I should say that he is quite right. +'Then how is such an admission reconcileable with the doctrine that +philosophers should be kings?' + +I shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see how poor a +hand I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to +their governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must +take an illustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain +of a ship, taller by a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a +little deaf, a little blind, and rather ignorant of the seaman's art. +The sailors want to steer, although they know nothing of the art; and +they have a theory that it cannot be learned. If the helm is refused +them, they drug the captain's posset, bind him hand and foot, and take +possession of the ship. He who joins in the mutiny is termed a good +pilot and what not; they have no conception that the true pilot must +observe the winds and the stars, and must be their master, whether +they like it or not;--such an one would be called by them fool, prater, +star-gazer. This is my parable; which I will beg you to interpret for +me to those gentlemen who ask why the philosopher has such an evil name, +and to explain to them that not he, but those who will not use him, are +to blame for his uselessness. The philosopher should not beg of mankind +to be put in authority over them. The wise man should not seek the rich, +as the proverb bids, but every man, whether rich or poor, must knock at +the door of the physician when he has need of him. Now the pilot is +the philosopher--he whom in the parable they call star-gazer, and the +mutinous sailors are the mob of politicians by whom he is rendered +useless. Not that these are the worst enemies of philosophy, who is far +more dishonoured by her own professing sons when they are corrupted by +the world. Need I recall the original image of the philosopher? Did we +not say of him just now, that he loved truth and hated falsehood, and +that he could not rest in the multiplicity of phenomena, but was led by +a sympathy in his own nature to the contemplation of the absolute? All +the virtues as well as truth, who is the leader of them, took up their +abode in his soul. But as you were observing, if we turn aside to view +the reality, we see that the persons who were thus described, with the +exception of a small and useless class, are utter rogues. + +The point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption +in nature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our description +of him, is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to destroy +these rare beings! There is no good thing which may not be a cause of +evil--health, wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues themselves, +when placed under unfavourable circumstances. For as in the animal or +vegetable world the strongest seeds most need the accompaniment of good +air and soil, so the best of human characters turn out the worst when +they fall upon an unsuitable soil; whereas weak natures hardly ever +do any considerable good or harm; they are not the stuff out of which +either great criminals or great heroes are made. The philosopher follows +the same analogy: he is either the best or the worst of all men. Some +persons say that the Sophists are the corrupters of youth; but is not +public opinion the real Sophist who is everywhere present--in those very +persons, in the assembly, in the courts, in the camp, in the applauses +and hisses of the theatre re-echoed by the surrounding hills? Will not +a young man's heart leap amid these discordant sounds? and will any +education save him from being carried away by the torrent? Nor is this +all. For if he will not yield to opinion, there follows the gentle +compulsion of exile or death. What principle of rival Sophists or +anybody else can overcome in such an unequal contest? Characters there +may be more than human, who are exceptions--God may save a man, but not +his own strength. Further, I would have you consider that the hireling +Sophist only gives back to the world their own opinions; he is the +keeper of the monster, who knows how to flatter or anger him, and +observes the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good is what pleases +him, evil what he dislikes; truth and beauty are determined only by +the taste of the brute. Such is the Sophist's wisdom, and such is the +condition of those who make public opinion the test of truth, whether in +art or in morals. The curse is laid upon them of being and doing what +it approves, and when they attempt first principles the failure is +ludicrous. Think of all this and ask yourself whether the world is more +likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the multiplicity +of phenomena. And the world if not a believer in the idea cannot be a +philosopher, and must therefore be a persecutor of philosophers. There +is another evil:--the world does not like to lose the gifted nature, and +so they flatter the young (Alcibiades) into a magnificent opinion of his +own capacity; the tall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming +of kingdoms and empires. If at this instant a friend whispers to +him, 'Now the gods lighten thee; thou art a great fool' and must be +educated--do you think that he will listen? Or suppose a better sort of +man who is attracted towards philosophy, will they not make Herculean +efforts to spoil and corrupt him? Are we not right in saying that the +love of knowledge, no less than riches, may divert him? Men of this +class (Critias) often become politicians--they are the authors of +great mischief in states, and sometimes also of great good. And thus +philosophy is deserted by her natural protectors, and others enter in +and dishonour her. Vulgar little minds see the land open and rush from +the prisons of the arts into her temple. A clever mechanic having a +soul coarse as his body, thinks that he will gain caste by becoming her +suitor. For philosophy, even in her fallen estate, has a dignity of her +own--and he, like a bald little blacksmith's apprentice as he is, having +made some money and got out of durance, washes and dresses himself as a +bridegroom and marries his master's daughter. What will be the issue of +such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth +and nature? 'They will.' Small, then, is the remnant of genuine +philosophers; there may be a few who are citizens of small states, in +which politics are not worth thinking of, or who have been detained by +Theages' bridle of ill health; for my own case of the oracular sign is +almost unique, and too rare to be worth mentioning. And these few when +they have tasted the pleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at +that den of thieves and place of wild beasts, which is human life, +will stand aside from the storm under the shelter of a wall, and try to +preserve their own innocence and to depart in peace. 'A great work, too, +will have been accomplished by them.' Great, yes, but not the greatest; +for man is a social being, and can only attain his highest development +in the society which is best suited to him. + +Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name. +Another question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one +of them; at present she is like some exotic seed which degenerates in +a strange soil; only in her proper state will she be shown to be of +heavenly growth. 'And is her proper state ours or some other?' Ours in +all points but one, which was left undetermined. You may remember our +saying that some living mind or witness of the legislator was needed in +states. But we were afraid to enter upon a subject of such difficulty, +and now the question recurs and has not grown easier:--How may +philosophy be safely studied? Let us bring her into the light of day, +and make an end of the inquiry. + +In the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the +present mode of study. Persons usually pick up a little philosophy in +early youth, and in the intervals of business, but they never master the +real difficulty, which is dialectic. Later, perhaps, they occasionally +go to a lecture on philosophy. Years advance, and the sun of philosophy, +unlike that of Heracleitus, sets never to rise again. This order of +education should be reversed; it should begin with gymnastics in youth, +and as the man strengthens, he should increase the gymnastics of +his soul. Then, when active life is over, let him finally return to +philosophy. 'You are in earnest, Socrates, but the world will be equally +earnest in withstanding you--no more than Thrasymachus.' Do not make a +quarrel between Thrasymachus and me, who were never enemies and are +now good friends enough. And I shall do my best to convince him and +all mankind of the truth of my words, or at any rate to prepare for +the future when, in another life, we may again take part in similar +discussions. 'That will be a long time hence.' Not long in comparison +with eternity. The many will probably remain incredulous, for they +have never seen the natural unity of ideas, but only artificial +juxtapositions; not free and generous thoughts, but tricks of +controversy and quips of law;--a perfect man ruling in a perfect state, +even a single one they have not known. And we foresaw that there was no +chance of perfection either in states or individuals until a necessity +was laid upon philosophers--not the rogues, but those whom we called +the useless class--of holding office; or until the sons of kings were +inspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the infinity of +past time there has been, or is in some distant land, or ever will be +hereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain +that there has been, is, and will be such a state whenever the Muse of +philosophy rules. Will you say that the world is of another mind? O, my +friend, do not revile the world! They will soon change their opinion +if they are gently entreated, and are taught the true nature of the +philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves him? Or be jealous of one who +has no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many hate not the true but +the false philosophers--the pretenders who force their way in without +invitation, and are always speaking of persons and not of principles, +which is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher +despises earthly strife; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in +accordance with which he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not +himself only, but other men), and is the creator of the virtues private +as well as public. When mankind see that the happiness of states is only +to be found in that image, will they be angry with us for attempting +to delineate it? 'Certainly not. But what will be the process of +delineation?' The artist will do nothing until he has made a tabula +rasa; on this he will inscribe the constitution of a state, glancing +often at the divine truth of nature, and from that deriving the godlike +among men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out and painting in, +until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of the divine and human. But +perhaps the world will doubt the existence of such an artist. What will +they doubt? That the philosopher is a lover of truth, having a nature +akin to the best?--and if they admit this will they still quarrel with +us for making philosophers our kings? 'They will be less disposed to +quarrel.' Let us assume then that they are pacified. Still, a person may +hesitate about the probability of the son of a king being a philosopher. +And we do not deny that they are very liable to be corrupted; but yet +surely in the course of ages there might be one exception--and one +is enough. If one son of a king were a philosopher, and had obedient +citizens, he might bring the ideal polity into being. Hence we conclude +that our laws are not only the best, but that they are also possible, +though not free from difficulty. + +I gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose +concerning women and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge +that we must go to the bottom of another question: What is to be the +education of our guardians? It was agreed that they were to be lovers of +their country, and were to be tested in the refiner's fire of pleasures +and pains, and those who came forth pure and remained fixed in their +principles were to have honours and rewards in life and after death. +But at this point, the argument put on her veil and turned into another +path. I hesitated to make the assertion which I now hazard,--that our +guardians must be philosophers. You remember all the contradictory +elements, which met in the philosopher--how difficult to find them all +in a single person! Intelligence and spirit are not often combined with +steadiness; the stolid, fearless, nature is averse to intellectual toil. +And yet these opposite elements are all necessary, and therefore, as +we were saying before, the aspirant must be tested in pleasures and +dangers; and also, as we must now further add, in the highest branches +of knowledge. You will remember, that when we spoke of the virtues +mention was made of a longer road, which you were satisfied to leave +unexplored. 'Enough seemed to have been said.' Enough, my friend; but +what is enough while anything remains wanting? Of all men the guardian +must not faint in the search after truth; he must be prepared to take +the longer road, or he will never reach that higher region which is +above the four virtues; and of the virtues too he must not only get an +outline, but a clear and distinct vision. (Strange that we should be so +precise about trifles, so careless about the highest truths!) 'And what +are the highest?' You to pretend unconsciousness, when you have so often +heard me speak of the idea of good, about which we know so little, and +without which though a man gain the world he has no profit of it! Some +people imagine that the good is wisdom; but this involves a circle,--the +good, they say, is wisdom, wisdom has to do with the good. According to +others the good is pleasure; but then comes the absurdity that good is +bad, for there are bad pleasures as well as good. Again, the good must +have reality; a man may desire the appearance of virtue, but he will not +desire the appearance of good. Ought our guardians then to be ignorant +of this supreme principle, of which every man has a presentiment, and +without which no man has any real knowledge of anything? 'But, Socrates, +what is this supreme principle, knowledge or pleasure, or what? You may +think me troublesome, but I say that you have no business to be always +repeating the doctrines of others instead of giving us your own.' Can +I say what I do not know? 'You may offer an opinion.' And will the +blindness and crookedness of opinion content you when you might have +the light and certainty of science? 'I will only ask you to give such +an explanation of the good as you have given already of temperance and +justice.' I wish that I could, but in my present mood I cannot reach to +the height of the knowledge of the good. To the parent or principal I +cannot introduce you, but to the child begotten in his image, which +I may compare with the interest on the principal, I will. (Audit the +account, and do not let me give you a false statement of the debt.) +You remember our old distinction of the many beautiful and the one +beautiful, the particular and the universal, the objects of sight and +the objects of thought? Did you ever consider that the objects of sight +imply a faculty of sight which is the most complex and costly of our +senses, requiring not only objects of sense, but also a medium, which is +light; without which the sight will not distinguish between colours and +all will be a blank? For light is the noble bond between the perceiving +faculty and the thing perceived, and the god who gives us light is the +sun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to be confounded with the eye +of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I call the child of the good, +standing in the same relation to the visible world as the good to the +intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in the intellectual +world where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that which is the +sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause of knowledge +and truth, yet other and fairer than they are, and standing in the +same relation to them in which the sun stands to light. O inconceivable +height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above truth! ('You cannot +surely mean pleasure,' he said. Peace, I replied.) And this idea of +good, like the sun, is also the cause of growth, and the author not of +knowledge only, but of being, yet greater far than either in dignity +and power. 'That is a reach of thought more than human; but, pray, go +on with the image, for I suspect that there is more behind.' There is, +I said; and bearing in mind our two suns or principles, imagine further +their corresponding worlds--one of the visible, the other of the +intelligible; you may assist your fancy by figuring the distinction +under the image of a line divided into two unequal parts, and may again +subdivide each part into two lesser segments representative of the +stages of knowledge in either sphere. The lower portion of the lower or +visible sphere will consist of shadows and reflections, and its upper +and smaller portion will contain real objects in the world of nature +or of art. The sphere of the intelligible will also have two +divisions,--one of mathematics, in which there is no ascent but all is +descent; no inquiring into premises, but only drawing of inferences. +In this division the mind works with figures and numbers, the images of +which are taken not from the shadows, but from the objects, although +the truth of them is seen only with the mind's eye; and they are used as +hypotheses without being analysed. Whereas in the other division reason +uses the hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the idea of +good, to which she fastens them, and then again descends, walking firmly +in the region of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as +descent, and finally resting in them. 'I partly understand,' he replied; +'you mean that the ideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, +metaphorical conceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, +whichever is to be the name of them; and the latter conceptions you +refuse to make subjects of pure intellect, because they have no first +principle, although when resting on a first principle, they pass into +the higher sphere.' You understand me very well, I said. And now to +those four divisions of knowledge you may assign four corresponding +faculties--pure intelligence to the highest sphere; active intelligence +to the second; to the third, faith; to the fourth, the perception of +shadows--and the clearness of the several faculties will be in the same +ratio as the truth of the objects to which they are related... + +Like Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. +In language which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age +and country, he is described as 'the spectator of all time and all +existence.' He has the noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest +use of them. All his desires are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which +is the love of truth. None of the graces of a beautiful soul are wanting +in him; neither can he fear death, or think much of human life. The +ideal of modern times hardly retains the simplicity of the antique; +there is not the same originality either in truth or error which +characterized the Greeks. The philosopher is no longer living in the +unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince mankind of ignorance; +nor does he regard knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by +regular stages to the idea of good. The eagerness of the pursuit has +abated; there is more division of labour and less of comprehensive +reflection upon nature and human life as a whole; more of exact +observation and less of anticipation and inspiration. Still, in the +altered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not wholly lost; and +there may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into the +language of our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who +fixes his mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, +not on fragments or pictures of nature; on history, not on controversy; +on the truths which are acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions +of the many. He is aware of the importance of 'classifying according to +nature,' and will try to 'separate the limbs of science without breaking +them' (Phaedr.). There is no part of truth, whether great or small, +which he will dishonour; and in the least things he will discern the +greatest (Parmen.). Like the ancient philosopher he sees the world +pervaded by analogies, but he can also tell 'why in some cases a single +instance is sufficient for an induction' (Mill's Logic), while in +other cases a thousand examples would prove nothing. He inquires into +a portion of knowledge only, because the whole has grown too vast to be +embraced by a single mind or life. He has a clearer conception of the +divisions of science and of their relation to the mind of man than was +possible to the ancients. Like Plato, he has a vision of the unity of +knowledge, not as the beginning of philosophy to be attained by a study +of elementary mathematics, but as the far-off result of the working +of many minds in many ages. He is aware that mathematical studies are +preliminary to almost every other; at the same time, he will not reduce +all varieties of knowledge to the type of mathematics. He too must have +a nobility of character, without which genius loses the better half +of greatness. Regarding the world as a point in immensity, and each +individual as a link in a never-ending chain of existence, he will not +think much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of death. + +Adeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning, +thus showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method. +He brings the accusation against himself which might be brought against +him by a modern logician--that he extracts the answer because he knows +how to put the question. In a long argument words are apt to change +their meaning slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions +inferred with rather too much certainty or universality; the variation +at each step may be unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes +considerable. Hence the failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or +algebraic formulae to logic. The imperfection, or rather the higher +and more elastic nature of language, does not allow words to have the +precision of numbers or of symbols. And this quality in language impairs +the force of an argument which has many steps. + +The objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular +instance, may be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic +mode of reasoning. And here, as elsewhere, Plato seems to intimate that +the time had come when the negative and interrogative method of Socrates +must be superseded by a positive and constructive one, of which examples +are given in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus further argues +that the ideal is wholly at variance with facts; for experience proves +philosophers to be either useless or rogues. Contrary to all expectation +Socrates has no hesitation in admitting the truth of this, and explains +the anomaly in an allegory, first characteristically depreciating his +own inventive powers. In this allegory the people are distinguished from +the professional politicians, and, as elsewhere, are spoken of in a tone +of pity rather than of censure under the image of 'the noble captain who +is not very quick in his perceptions.' + +The uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that +mankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided +between contempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and +know no other weapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues +that the best is most liable to corruption; and that the finer nature is +more likely to suffer from alien conditions. We too observe that there +are some kinds of excellence which spring from a peculiar delicacy +of constitution; as is evidently true of the poetical and imaginative +temperament, which often seems to depend on impressions, and hence can +only breathe or live in a certain atmosphere. The man of genius +has greater pains and greater pleasures, greater powers and greater +weaknesses, and often a greater play of character than is to be found in +ordinary men. He can assume the disguise of virtue or disinterestedness +without having them, or veil personal enmity in the language of +patriotism and philosophy,--he can say the word which all men are +thinking, he has an insight which is terrible into the follies and +weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a Mirabeau, or a Napoleon +the First, are born either to be the authors of great evils in states, +or 'of great good, when they are drawn in that direction.' + +Yet the thesis, 'corruptio optimi pessima,' cannot be maintained +generally or without regard to the kind of excellence which is +corrupted. The alien conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may +be the elements of culture to another. In general a man can only receive +his highest development in a congenial state or family, among friends +or fellow-workers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by adverse +circumstances to such a degree that he rises up against them and reforms +them. And while weaker or coarser characters will extract good out of +evil, say in a corrupt state of the church or of society, and live on +happily, allowing the evil to remain, the finer or stronger natures may +be crushed or spoiled by surrounding influences--may become misanthrope +and philanthrope by turns; or in a few instances, like the founders +of the monastic orders, or the Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in +themselves or in their age, may break away entirely from the world and +from the church, sometimes into great good, sometimes into great evil, +sometimes into both. And the same holds in the lesser sphere of a +convent, a school, a family. + +Plato would have us consider how easily the best natures are overpowered +by public opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind will make to +get possession of them. The world, the church, their own profession, any +political or party organization, are always carrying them off their legs +and teaching them to apply high and holy names to their own prejudices +and interests. The 'monster' corporation to which they belong judges +right and truth to be the pleasure of the community. The individual +becomes one with his order; or, if he resists, the world is too much for +him, and will sooner or later be revenged on him. This is, perhaps, a +one-sided but not wholly untrue picture of the maxims and practice of +mankind when they 'sit down together at an assembly,' either in ancient +or modern times. + +When the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take +possession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one +of those continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic +expression, 'veils herself,' and which is dropped and reappears at +intervals. The question is asked,--Why are the citizens of states so +hostile to philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And yet +there is also a better mind of the many; they would believe if they were +taught. But hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation of +philosophy, words without thoughts, systems which have no life in them; +a (divine) person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the friend +of man holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame the +state in that image, they have never known. The same double feeling +respecting the mass of mankind has always existed among men. The first +thought is that the people are the enemies of truth and right; the +second, that this only arises out of an accidental error and confusion, +and that they do not really hate those who love them, if they could be +educated to know them. + +In the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be +considered: 1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which +is contrasted with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book IV; +2nd, the heavenly pattern or idea of the state; 3rd, the relation of the +divisions of knowledge to one another and to the corresponding faculties +of the soul: + +1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse. +Neither here nor in the Phaedrus or Symposium, nor yet in the Philebus +or Sophist, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would +probably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a +system of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole +rather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised +by him in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts of +the soul; there, like Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, he argues +from experience and the common use of language. But at the end of the +sixth book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which +all ideas are only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a +connected whole which is self-supporting, and in which consistency is +the test of truth. He does not explain to us in detail the nature of the +process. Like many other thinkers both in ancient and modern times +his mind seems to be filled with a vacant form which he is unable to +realize. He supposes the sciences to have a natural order and connexion +in an age when they can hardly be said to exist. He is hastening on to +the 'end of the intellectual world' without even making a beginning of +them. + +In modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of +acquiring knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute +knowledge. In all science a priori and a posteriori truths mingle in +various proportions. The a priori part is that which is derived from the +most universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by +them; the a posteriori is that which grows up around the more +general principles and becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato +erroneously imagines that the synthesis is separable from the analysis, +and that the method of science can anticipate science. In entertaining +such a vision of a priori knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at +least his meaning may be sufficiently explained by the similar attempts +of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and even of Bacon himself, in modern +philosophy. Anticipations or divinations, or prophetic glimpses of +truths whether concerning man or nature, seem to stand in the same +relation to ancient philosophy which hypotheses bear to modern inductive +science. These 'guesses at truth' were not made at random; they arose +from a superficial impression of uniformities and first principles +in nature which the genius of the Greek, contemplating the expanse of +heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the distance. Nor can we deny +that in ancient times knowledge must have stood still, and the human +mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought, if philosophy had +been strictly confined to the results of experience. + +2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist +will fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid +up in heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with +wondering eye? The answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the +omission of particulars, partly by imagination perfecting the form which +experience supplies (Phaedo). Plato represents these ideals in a +figure as belonging to another world; and in modern times the idea will +sometimes seem to precede, at other times to co-operate with the hand +of the artist. As in science, so also in creative art, there is a +synthetical as well as an analytical method. One man will have the whole +in his mind before he begins; to another the processes of mind and hand +will be simultaneous. + +3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato's divisions of knowledge +are based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and +intellectual which pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which +is implied also the opposition of the permanent and transient, of the +universal and particular. But the age of philosophy in which he lived +seemed to require a further distinction;--numbers and figures were +beginning to separate from ideas. The world could no longer regard +justice as a cube, and was learning to see, though imperfectly, that +the abstractions of sense were distinct from the abstractions of mind. +Between the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of phenomena, the +Pythagorean principle of number found a place, and was, as Aristotle +remarks, a conducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is led +to introduce a third term which had not hitherto entered into the scheme +of his philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in education; +they were the best preparation for higher studies. The subjective +relation between them further suggested an objective one; although +the passage from one to the other is really imaginary (Metaph.). For +metaphysical and moral philosophy has no connexion with mathematics; +number and figure are the abstractions of time and space, not the +expressions of purely intellectual conceptions. When divested of +metaphor, a straight line or a square has no more to do with right and +justice than a crooked line with vice. The figurative association was +mistaken for a real one; and thus the three latter divisions of the +Platonic proportion were constructed. + +There is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the +first term of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no +reference to any other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation +of shadows to objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas. +Probably Plato has been led by the love of analogy (Timaeus) to make +four terms instead of three, although the objects perceived in both +divisions of the lower sphere are equally objects of sense. He is also +preparing the way, as his manner is, for the shadows of images at the +beginning of the seventh book, and the imitation of an imitation in the +tenth. The line may be regarded as reaching from unity to infinity, and +is divided into two unequal parts, and subdivided into two more; +each lower sphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of the four +faculties, faith in the lower division has an intermediate position (cp. +for the use of the word faith or belief, (Greek), Timaeus), contrasting +equally with the vagueness of the perception of shadows (Greek) and the +higher certainty of understanding (Greek) and reason (Greek). + +The difference between understanding and mind or reason (Greek) is +analogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts +and the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is +at rest; consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this +self-evidencing knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed +to correspond. But there is a knowledge of the understanding which +is incomplete and in motion always, because unable to rest in +the subordinate ideas. Those ideas are called both images and +hypotheses--images because they are clothed in sense, hypotheses because +they are assumptions only, until they are brought into connexion with +the idea of good. + +The general meaning of the passage, 'Noble, then, is the bond which +links together sight...And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible...' +so far as the thought contained in it admits of being translated +into the terms of modern philosophy, may be described or explained as +follows:--There is a truth, one and self-existent, to which by the help +of a ladder let down from above, the human intelligence may ascend. This +unity is like the sun in the heavens, the light by which all things are +seen, the being by which they are created and sustained. It is the +IDEA of good. And the steps of the ladder leading up to this highest or +universal existence are the mathematical sciences, which also contain +in themselves an element of the universal. These, too, we see in a new +manner when we connect them with the idea of good. They then cease to +be hypotheses or pictures, and become essential parts of a higher truth +which is at once their first principle and their final cause. + +We cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage, but +we may trace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are +common to us and to Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the +sciences, or rather of science, for in Plato's time they were not yet +parted off or distinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, +or life or idea or cause or reason, not yet conceived or no longer +conceived as in the Timaeus and elsewhere under the form of a person; +(3) the recognition of the hypothetical and conditional character of the +mathematical sciences, and in a measure of every science when isolated +from the rest; (4) the conviction of a truth which is invisible, and of +a law, though hardly a law of nature, which permeates the intellectual +rather than the visible world. + +The method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller +explanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the +seventh book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance +of Socrates to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. +The allusion to Theages' bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic +sign, of Socrates, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory; +the remark that the salvation of any remnant of good in the present evil +state of the world is due to God only; the reference to a future state +of existence, which is unknown to Glaucon in the tenth book, and in +which the discussions of Socrates and his disciples would be resumed; +the surprise in the answers; the fanciful irony of Socrates, where +he pretends that he can only describe the strange position of the +philosopher in a figure of speech; the original observation that the +Sophists, after all, are only the representatives and not the leaders +of public opinion; the picture of the philosopher standing aside in the +shower of sleet under a wall; the figure of 'the great beast' followed +by the expression of good-will towards the common people who would not +have rejected the philosopher if they had known him; the 'right noble +thought' that the highest truths demand the greatest exactness; the +hesitation of Socrates in returning once more to his well-worn theme of +the idea of good; the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon; the comparison +of philosophy to a deserted maiden who marries beneath her--are some of +the most interesting characteristics of the sixth book. + +Yet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so +oft discussed in the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and +Adeimantus, would fain, if possible, have a clearer notion. Like them, +we are dissatisfied when we are told that the idea of good can only be +revealed to a student of the mathematical sciences, and we are inclined +to think that neither we nor they could have been led along that path to +any satisfactory goal. For we have learned that differences of quantity +cannot pass into differences of quality, and that the mathematical +sciences can never rise above themselves into the sphere of our higher +thoughts, although they may sometimes furnish symbols and expressions +of them, and may train the mind in habits of abstraction and +self-concentration. The illusion which was natural to an ancient +philosopher has ceased to be an illusion to us. But if the process by +which we are supposed to arrive at the idea of good be really imaginary, +may not the idea itself be also a mere abstraction? We remark, first, +that in all ages, and especially in primitive philosophy, words such +as being, essence, unity, good, have exerted an extraordinary influence +over the minds of men. The meagreness or negativeness of their content +has been in an inverse ratio to their power. They have become the forms +under which all things were comprehended. There was a need or instinct +in the human soul which they satisfied; they were not ideas, but gods, +and to this new mythology the men of a later generation began to attach +the powers and associations of the elder deities. + +The idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought, which +were beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, +in which all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth +of all things, and also the light in which they shone forth, and became +evident to intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of all +things, the power by which they were brought into being. It was the +universal reason divested of a human personality. It was the life +as well as the light of the world, all knowledge and all power were +comprehended in it. The way to it was through the mathematical sciences, +and these too were dependent on it. To ask whether God was the maker of +it, or made by it, would be like asking whether God could be conceived +apart from goodness, or goodness apart from God. The God of the Timaeus +is not really at variance with the idea of good; they are aspects of +the same, differing only as the personal from the impersonal, or the +masculine from the neuter, the one being the expression or language of +mythology, the other of philosophy. + +This, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as +conceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may +also be said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given +of it goes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at +the stage of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is aiming +at, better than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what he saw +darkly and at a distance. But if he could have been told that this, or +some conception of the same kind, but higher than this, was the truth +at which he was aiming, and the need which he sought to supply, he would +gladly have recognized that more was contained in his own thoughts +than he himself knew. As his words are few and his manner reticent +and tentative, so must the style of his interpreter be. We should not +approach his meaning more nearly by attempting to define it further. In +translating him into the language of modern thought, we might insensibly +lose the spirit of ancient philosophy. It is remarkable that although +Plato speaks of the idea of good as the first principle of truth and +being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings except in this passage. +Nor did it retain any hold upon the minds of his disciples in a later +generation; it was probably unintelligible to them. Nor does the mention +of it in Aristotle appear to have any reference to this or any other +passage in his extant writings. + +BOOK VII. And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or +unenlightenment of our nature:--Imagine human beings living in an +underground den which is open towards the light; they have been there +from childhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see +into the den. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and +the prisoners a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like +the screen over which marionette players show their puppets. Behind the +wall appear moving figures, who hold in their hands various works of +art, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some +of the passers-by are talking and others silent. 'A strange parable,' +he said, 'and strange captives.' They are ourselves, I replied; and they +see only the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of +the den; to these they give names, and if we add an echo which returns +from the wall, the voices of the passengers will seem to proceed from +the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly turn them round and make them +look with pain and grief to themselves at the real images; will they +believe them to be real? Will not their eyes be dazzled, and will they +not try to get away from the light to something which they are able to +behold without blinking? And suppose further, that they are dragged up +a steep and rugged ascent into the presence of the sun himself, will not +their sight be darkened with the excess of light? Some time will pass +before they get the habit of perceiving at all; and at first they will +be able to perceive only shadows and reflections in the water; then they +will recognize the moon and the stars, and will at length behold the sun +in his own proper place as he is. Last of all they will conclude:--This +is he who gives us the year and the seasons, and is the author of all +that we see. How will they rejoice in passing from darkness to light! +How worthless to them will seem the honours and glories of the den! But +now imagine further, that they descend into their old habitations;--in +that underground dwelling they will not see as well as their fellows, +and will not be able to compete with them in the measurement of the +shadows on the wall; there will be many jokes about the man who went on +a visit to the sun and lost his eyes, and if they find anybody trying to +set free and enlighten one of their number, they will put him to death, +if they can catch him. Now the cave or den is the world of sight, the +fire is the sun, the way upwards is the way to knowledge, and in the +world of knowledge the idea of good is last seen and with difficulty, +but when seen is inferred to be the author of good and right--parent of +the lord of light in this world, and of truth and understanding in the +other. He who attains to the beatific vision is always going upwards; he +is unwilling to descend into political assemblies and courts of law; for +his eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of images which they +behold in them--he cannot enter into the ideas of those who have never +in their lives understood the relation of the shadow to the substance. +But blindness is of two kinds, and may be caused either by passing out +of darkness into light or out of light into darkness, and a man of sense +will distinguish between them, and will not laugh equally at both of +them, but the blindness which arises from fulness of light he will deem +blessed, and pity the other; or if he laugh at the puzzled soul looking +at the sun, he will have more reason to laugh than the inhabitants +of the den at those who descend from above. There is a further lesson +taught by this parable of ours. Some persons fancy that instruction is +like giving eyes to the blind, but we say that the faculty of sight was +always there, and that the soul only requires to be turned round towards +the light. And this is conversion; other virtues are almost like bodily +habits, and may be acquired in the same manner, but intelligence has +a diviner life, and is indestructible, turning either to good or evil +according to the direction given. Did you never observe how the mind of +a clever rogue peers out of his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the +more evil he does? Now if you take such an one, and cut away from him +those leaden weights of pleasure and desire which bind his soul to +earth, his intelligence will be turned round, and he will behold the +truth as clearly as he now discerns his meaner ends. And have we not +decided that our rulers must neither be so uneducated as to have no +fixed rule of life, nor so over-educated as to be unwilling to leave +their paradise for the business of the world? We must choose out +therefore the natures who are most likely to ascend to the light and +knowledge of the good; but we must not allow them to remain in the +region of light; they must be forced down again among the captives in +the den to partake of their labours and honours. 'Will they not think +this a hardship?' You should remember that our purpose in framing the +State was not that our citizens should do what they like, but that they +should serve the State for the common good of all. May we not fairly +say to our philosopher,--Friend, we do you no wrong; for in other States +philosophy grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the gardener, +but you have been trained by us to be the rulers and kings of our hive, +and therefore we must insist on your descending into the den. You must, +each of you, take your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the +dark, and with a little practice you will see far better than those who +quarrel about the shadows, whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours +is a waking reality. It may be that the saint or philosopher who is best +fitted, may also be the least inclined to rule, but necessity is laid +upon him, and he must no longer live in the heaven of ideas. And this +will be the salvation of the State. For those who rule must not be those +who are desirous to rule; and, if you can offer to our citizens a better +life than that of rulers generally is, there will be a chance that the +rich, not only in this world's goods, but in virtue and wisdom, may +bear rule. And the only life which is better than the life of political +ambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation for +the government of a State. + +Then now comes the question,--How shall we create our rulers; what way +is there from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy; +it is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a +soul from night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will +draw the soul upwards? Our former education had two branches, gymnastic, +which was occupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which +infused a natural harmony into mind and literature; but neither of these +sciences gave any promise of doing what we want. Nothing remains to us +but that universal or primary science of which all the arts and sciences +are partakers, I mean number or calculation. 'Very true.' Including the +art of war? 'Yes, certainly.' Then there is something ludicrous about +Palamedes in the tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented +number, and had counted the ranks and set them in order. For if +Agamemnon could not count his feet (and without number how could he?) +he must have been a pretty sort of general indeed. No man should be a +soldier who cannot count, and indeed he is hardly to be called a man. +But I am not speaking of these practical applications of arithmetic, for +number, in my view, is rather to be regarded as a conductor to thought +and being. I will explain what I mean by the last expression:--Things +sensible are of two kinds; the one class invite or stimulate the mind, +while in the other the mind acquiesces. Now the stimulating class are +the things which suggest contrast and relation. For example, suppose +that I hold up to the eyes three fingers--a fore finger, a middle +finger, a little finger--the sight equally recognizes all three fingers, +but without number cannot further distinguish them. Or again, suppose +two objects to be relatively great and small, these ideas of greatness +and smallness are supplied not by the sense, but by the mind. And the +perception of their contrast or relation quickens and sets in motion +the mind, which is puzzled by the confused intimations of sense, and has +recourse to number in order to find out whether the things indicated are +one or more than one. Number replies that they are two and not one, and +are to be distinguished from one another. Again, the sight beholds +great and small, but only in a confused chaos, and not until they are +distinguished does the question arise of their respective natures; we +are thus led on to the distinction between the visible and intelligible. +That was what I meant when I spoke of stimulants to the intellect; I was +thinking of the contradictions which arise in perception. The idea +of unity, for example, like that of a finger, does not arouse thought +unless involving some conception of plurality; but when the one is also +the opposite of one, the contradiction gives rise to reflection; an +example of this is afforded by any object of sight. All number has also +an elevating effect; it raises the mind out of the foam and flux of +generation to the contemplation of being, having lesser military and +retail uses also. The retail use is not required by us; but as our +guardian is to be a soldier as well as a philosopher, the military one +may be retained. And to our higher purpose no science can be better +adapted; but it must be pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, not of a +shopkeeper. It is concerned, not with visible objects, but with abstract +truth; for numbers are pure abstractions--the true arithmetician +indignantly denies that his unit is capable of division. When you +divide, he insists that you are only multiplying; his 'one' is not +material or resolvable into fractions, but an unvarying and absolute +equality; and this proves the purely intellectual character of his +study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of sharpening the +wits; no other discipline is equally severe, or an equal test of general +ability, or equally improving to a stupid person. + +Let our second branch of education be geometry. 'I can easily see,' +replied Glaucon, 'that the skill of the general will be doubled by his +knowledge of geometry.' That is a small matter; the use of geometry, to +which I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the +idea of good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being, and not +at generation only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these studies, +as any one who is the least of a mathematician is aware, is mean and +ridiculous; they are made to look downwards to the arts, and not upwards +to eternal existence. The geometer is always talking of squaring, +subtending, apposing, as if he had in view action; whereas knowledge is +the real object of the study. It should elevate the soul, and create +the mind of philosophy; it should raise up what has fallen down, not to +speak of lesser uses in war and military tactics, and in the improvement +of the faculties. + +Shall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy? 'Very +good,' replied Glaucon; 'the knowledge of the heavens is necessary at +once for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.' I like your way of +giving useful reasons for everything in order to make friends of the +world. And there is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education is +not only useful information but a purification of the eye of the soul, +which is better than the bodily eye, for by this alone is truth seen. +Now, will you appeal to mankind in general or to the philosopher? or +would you prefer to look to yourself only? 'Every man is his own best +friend.' Then take a step backward, for we are out of order, and insert +the third dimension which is of solids, after the second which is of +planes, and then you may proceed to solids in motion. But solid geometry +is not popular and has not the patronage of the State, nor is the use +of it fully recognized; the difficulty is great, and the votaries of the +study are conceited and impatient. Still the charm of the pursuit wins +upon men, and, if government would lend a little assistance, there +might be great progress made. 'Very true,' replied Glaucon; 'but do +I understand you now to begin with plane geometry, and to place next +geometry of solids, and thirdly, astronomy, or the motion of solids?' +Yes, I said; my hastiness has only hindered us. + +'Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am +willing to speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the +contemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.' I am an exception, +then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw the soul +not upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the +ceiling--no better; a man may lie on his back on land or on water--he +may look up or look down, but there is no science in that. The vision of +knowledge of which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the mind. +All the magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a copy +which falls far short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing about +the absolute harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like the +beauty of figures drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great +artist, which may be used for illustration, but no mathematician would +seek to obtain from them true conceptions of equality or numerical +relations. How ridiculous then to look for these in the map of the +heavens, in which the imperfection of matter comes in everywhere as a +disturbing element, marring the symmetry of day and night, of months and +years, of the sun and stars in their courses. Only by problems can we +place astronomy on a truly scientific basis. Let the heavens alone, and +exert the intellect. + +Still, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say, +and we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion, adapted to +the ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications +also. Let us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting +that we have an aim higher than theirs, which is the relation of these +sciences to the idea of good. The error which pervades astronomy also +pervades harmonics. The musicians put their ears in the place of their +minds. 'Yes,' replied Glaucon, 'I like to see them laying their ears +alongside of their neighbours' faces--some saying, "That's a new note," +others declaring that the two notes are the same.' Yes, I said; but you +mean the empirics who are always twisting and torturing the strings +of the lyre, and quarrelling about the tempers of the strings; I am +referring rather to the Pythagorean harmonists, who are almost equally +in error. For they investigate only the numbers of the consonances which +are heard, and ascend no higher,--of the true numerical harmony which +is unheard, and is only to be found in problems, they have not even a +conception. 'That last,' he said, 'must be a marvellous thing.' A thing, +I replied, which is only useful if pursued with a view to the good. + +All these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable +if they are regarded in their natural relations to one another. 'I +dare say, Socrates,' said Glaucon; 'but such a study will be an endless +business.' What study do you mean--of the prelude, or what? For all +these things are only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a +mere mathematician is also a dialectician? 'Certainly not. I have hardly +ever known a mathematician who could reason.' And yet, Glaucon, is +not true reasoning that hymn of dialectic which is the music of the +intellectual world, and which was by us compared to the effort of sight, +when from beholding the shadows on the wall we arrived at last at +the images which gave the shadows? Even so the dialectical faculty +withdrawing from sense arrives by the pure intellect at the +contemplation of the idea of good, and never rests but at the very end +of the intellectual world. And the royal road out of the cave into +the light, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun and turning to +contemplate the shadows of reality, not the shadows of an image +only--this progress and gradual acquisition of a new faculty of sight by +the help of the mathematical sciences, is the elevation of the soul to +the contemplation of the highest ideal of being. + +'So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed +to the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the +paths which lead thither?' Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. +There can be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been +disciplined in the previous sciences. But that there is a science of +absolute truth, which is attained in some way very different from +those now practised, I am confident. For all other arts or sciences are +relative to human needs and opinions; and the mathematical sciences are +but a dream or hypothesis of true being, and never analyse their own +principles. Dialectic alone rises to the principle which is above +hypotheses, converting and gently leading the eye of the soul out of the +barbarous slough of ignorance into the light of the upper world, with +the help of the sciences which we have been describing--sciences, as +they are often termed, although they require some other name, implying +greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science, and this +in our previous sketch was understanding. And so we get four names--two +for intellect, and two for opinion,--reason or mind, understanding, +faith, perception of shadows--which make a proportion-- +being:becoming::intellect:opinion--and science:belief::understanding: +perception of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that +science which defines and explains the essence or being of each nature, +which distinguishes and abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle +against all opponents in the cause of good. To him who is not a +dialectician life is but a sleepy dream; and many a man is in his grave +before his is well waked up. And would you have the future rulers of +your ideal State intelligent beings, or stupid as posts? 'Certainly not +the latter.' Then you must train them in dialectic, which will teach +them to ask and answer questions, and is the coping-stone of the +sciences. + +I dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen; and +the process of selection may be carried a step further:--As before, they +must be constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but +now they must also have natural ability which education will improve; +that is to say, they must be quick at learning, capable of mental toil, +retentive, solid, diligent natures, who combine intellectual with +moral virtues; not lame and one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise +and indolent in mind, or conversely; not a maimed soul, which hates +falsehood and yet unintentionally is always wallowing in the mire of +ignorance; not a bastard or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb, +and in perfect condition for the great gymnastic trial of the mind. +Justice herself can find no fault with natures such as these; and they +will be the saviours of our State; disciples of another sort would +only make philosophy more ridiculous than she is at present. Forgive +my enthusiasm; I am becoming excited; but when I see her trampled +underfoot, I am angry at the authors of her disgrace. 'I did not notice +that you were more excited than you ought to have been.' But I felt that +I was. Now do not let us forget another point in the selection of our +disciples--that they must be young and not old. For Solon is mistaken +in saying that an old man can be always learning; youth is the time of +study, and here we must remember that the mind is free and dainty, and, +unlike the body, must not be made to work against the grain. Learning +should be at first a sort of play, in which the natural bent is +detected. As in training them for war, the young dogs should at first +only taste blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over which +during two or three years divide life between sleep and bodily exercise, +then the education of the soul will become a more serious matter. At +twenty years of age, a selection must be made of the more promising +disciples, with whom a new epoch of education will begin. The sciences +which they have hitherto learned in fragments will now be brought into +relation with each other and with true being; for the power of combining +them is the test of speculative and dialectical ability. And afterwards +at thirty a further selection shall be made of those who are able to +withdraw from the world of sense into the abstraction of ideas. But +at this point, judging from present experience, there is a danger that +dialectic may be the source of many evils. The danger may be illustrated +by a parallel case:--Imagine a person who has been brought up in wealth +and luxury amid a crowd of flatterers, and who is suddenly informed that +he is a supposititious son. He has hitherto honoured his reputed parents +and disregarded the flatterers, and now he does the reverse. This is +just what happens with a man's principles. There are certain doctrines +which he learnt at home and which exercised a parental authority +over him. Presently he finds that imputations are cast upon them; a +troublesome querist comes and asks, 'What is the just and good?' +or proves that virtue is vice and vice virtue, and his mind becomes +unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour, and obey them as he has +hitherto done. He is seduced into the life of pleasure, and becomes +a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such speculators is very +pitiable, and, in order that our thirty years' old pupils may not +require this pity, let us take every possible care that young persons do +not study philosophy too early. For a young man is a sort of puppy +who only plays with an argument; and is reasoned into and out of his +opinions every day; he soon begins to believe nothing, and brings +himself and philosophy into discredit. A man of thirty does not run +on in this way; he will argue and not merely contradict, and adds new +honour to philosophy by the sobriety of his conduct. What time shall we +allow for this second gymnastic training of the soul?--say, twice the +time required for the gymnastics of the body; six, or perhaps five +years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen years let the student +go down into the den, and command armies, and gain experience of life. +At fifty let him return to the end of all things, and have his eyes +uplifted to the idea of good, and order his life after that pattern; if +necessary, taking his turn at the helm of State, and training up others +to be his successors. When his time comes he shall depart in peace to +the islands of the blest. He shall be honoured with sacrifices, and +receive such worship as the Pythian oracle approves. + +'You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our +governors.' Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in +all things with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a +mere aspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise +philosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and +will be the servants of justice only. 'And how will they begin their +work?' Their first act will be to send away into the country all those +who are more than ten years of age, and to proceed with those who are +left... + +At the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his explanation +of the relation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory, in +this, as in other passages, following the order which he prescribes +in education, and proceeding from the concrete to the abstract. At the +commencement of Book VII, under the figure of a cave having an opening +towards a fire and a way upwards to the true light, he returns to view +the divisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly, as in a picture, the +result which had been hardly won by a great effort of thought in the +previous discussion; at the same time casting a glance onward at the +dialectical process, which is represented by the way leading from +darkness to light. The shadows, the images, the reflection of the +sun and stars in the water, the stars and sun themselves, severally +correspond,--the first, to the realm of fancy and poetry,--the second, +to the world of sense,--the third, to the abstractions or universals of +sense, of which the mathematical sciences furnish the type,--the fourth +and last to the same abstractions, when seen in the unity of the idea, +from which they derive a new meaning and power. The true dialectical +process begins with the contemplation of the real stars, and not mere +reflections of them, and ends with the recognition of the sun, or idea +of good, as the parent not only of light but of warmth and growth. +To the divisions of knowledge the stages of education partly +answer:--first, there is the early education of childhood and youth +in the fancies of the poets, and in the laws and customs of the +State;--then there is the training of the body to be a warrior athlete, +and a good servant of the mind;--and thirdly, after an interval follows +the education of later life, which begins with mathematics and proceeds +to philosophy in general. + +There seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,--first, to +realize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the +true education is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to +a comprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human +mind the faculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last +the particulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He +then seeks to combine the universals which he has disengaged from sense, +not perceiving that the correlation of them has no other basis but the +common use of language. He never understands that abstractions, as Hegel +says, are 'mere abstractions'--of use when employed in the arrangement +of facts, but adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart +from them, or with reference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the +exercise of the faculty of abstraction apart from facts has enlarged the +mind, and played a great part in the education of the human race. +Plato appreciated the value of this faculty, and saw that it might be +quickened by the study of number and relation. All things in which +there is opposition or proportion are suggestive of reflection. The +mere impression of sense evokes no power of thought or of mind, but when +sensible objects ask to be compared and distinguished, then philosophy +begins. The science of arithmetic first suggests such distinctions. The +follow in order the other sciences of plain and solid geometry, and of +solids in motion, one branch of which is astronomy or the harmony of +the spheres,--to this is appended the sister science of the harmony +of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at the possibility of other +applications of arithmetical or mathematical proportions, such as we +employ in chemistry and natural philosophy, such as the Pythagoreans and +even Aristotle make use of in Ethics and Politics, e.g. his distinction +between arithmetical and geometrical proportion in the Ethics (Book V), +or between numerical and proportional equality in the Politics. + +The modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato's delight +in the properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say +with him:--Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and +figure in themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application +to the arts. He will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, +in which figures are to be dispensed with; thus in a distant and +shadowy way seeming to anticipate the possibility of working geometrical +problems by a more general mode of analysis. He will remark with +interest on the backward state of solid geometry, which, alas! was not +encouraged by the aid of the State in the age of Plato; and he will +recognize the grasp of Plato's mind in his ability to conceive of +one science of solids in motion including the earth as well as the +heavens,--not forgetting to notice the intimation to which allusion has +been already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics the science +of solids in motion may have other applications. Still more will he be +struck with the comprehensiveness of view which led Plato, at a time +when these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must be studied in +relation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common principle +of truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without surprise) +that in that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato has +fallen into the error of supposing that he can construct the heavens a +priori by mathematical problems, and determine the principles of harmony +irrespective of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The illusion +was a natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and certainty +of astronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation and +complexity of the world of sense; hence the circumstance that there was +some elementary basis of fact, some measurement of distance or time or +vibrations on which they must ultimately rest, was overlooked by him. +The modern predecessors of Newton fell into errors equally great; and +Plato can hardly be said to have been very far wrong, or may even claim +a sort of prophetic insight into the subject, when we consider that +the greater part of astronomy at the present day consists of abstract +dynamics, by the help of which most astronomical discoveries have been +made. + +The metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes +mathematics as an instrument of education,--which strengthens the +power of attention, developes the sense of order and the faculty of +construction, and enables the mind to grasp under simple formulae the +quantitative differences of physical phenomena. But while acknowledging +their value in education, he sees also that they have no connexion with +our higher moral and intellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato +makes to connect them, we easily trace the influences of ancient +Pythagorean notions. There is no reason to suppose that he is speaking +of the ideal numbers; but he is describing numbers which are pure +abstractions, to which he assigns a real and separate existence, which, +as 'the teachers of the art' (meaning probably the Pythagoreans) would +have affirmed, repel all attempts at subdivision, and in which unity and +every other number are conceived of as absolute. The truth and certainty +of numbers, when thus disengaged from phenomena, gave them a kind of +sacredness in the eyes of an ancient philosopher. Nor is it easy to say +how far ideas of order and fixedness may have had a moral and elevating +influence on the minds of men, 'who,' in the words of the Timaeus, +'might learn to regulate their erring lives according to them.' It is +worthy of remark that the old Pythagorean ethical symbols still exist as +figures of speech among ourselves. And those who in modern times see the +world pervaded by universal law, may also see an anticipation of this +last word of modern philosophy in the Platonic idea of good, which +is the source and measure of all things, and yet only an abstraction +(Philebus). + +Two passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that +which relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage +may be explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of +conception prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the +perceptions of sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which +accompanies them. The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is +indistinguishable from the simple sensation, which is the medium of +them. Whereas to Plato sense is the Heraclitean flux of sense, not the +vision of objects in the order in which they actually present themselves +to the experienced sight, but as they may be imagined to appear confused +and blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant. The first action of +the mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this chaos, and +the reason is required to frame distinct conceptions under which +the confused impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises +the question, 'What is great, what is small?' and thus begins the +distinction of the visible and the intelligible. + +The second difficulty relates to Plato's conception of harmonics. +Three classes of harmonists are distinguished by him:--first, the +Pythagoreans, whom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion +on music he was to consult Damon--they are acknowledged to be masters +in the art, but are altogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher +import and relation to the good; secondly, the mere empirics, whom +Glaucon appears to confuse with them, and whom both he and Socrates +ludicrously describe as experimenting by mere auscultation on the +intervals of sounds. Both of these fall short in different degrees of +the Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely +abstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part of +universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good. + +The allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The +den or cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (compare the +description of the philosopher and lawyer in the Theaetetus), and +the light of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing +influence on the minds of those who return to this lower world. In other +words, their principles are too wide for practical application; they are +looking far away into the past and future, when their business is with +the present. The ideal is not easily reduced to the conditions of actual +life, and may often be at variance with them. And at first, those who +return are unable to compete with the inhabitants of the den in the +measurement of the shadows, and are derided and persecuted by them; but +after a while they see the things below in far truer proportions than +those who have never ascended into the upper world. The difference +between the politician turned into a philosopher and the philosopher +turned into a politician, is symbolized by the two kinds of disordered +eyesight, the one which is experienced by the captive who is transferred +from darkness to day, the other, of the heavenly messenger who +voluntarily for the good of his fellow-men descends into the den. In +what way the brighter light is to dawn on the inhabitants of the lower +world, or how the idea of good is to become the guiding principle of +politics, is left unexplained by Plato. Like the nature and divisions of +dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently demands to be informed, perhaps +he would have said that the explanation could not be given except to a +disciple of the previous sciences. (Symposium.) + +Many illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern +Politics and in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have +been two sorts of Politicians or Statesmen, whose eyesight has become +disordered in two different ways. First, there have been great men who, +in the language of Burke, 'have been too much given to general +maxims,' who, like J.S. Mill or Burke himself, have been theorists or +philosophers before they were politicians, or who, having been students +of history, have allowed some great historical parallel, such as the +English Revolution of 1688, or possibly Athenian democracy or Roman +Imperialism, to be the medium through which they viewed contemporary +events. Or perhaps the long projecting shadow of some existing +institution may have darkened their vision. The Church of the future, +the Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the future, have +so absorbed their minds, that they are unable to see in their true +proportions the Politics of to-day. They have been intoxicated with +great ideas, such as liberty, or equality, or the greatest happiness of +the greatest number, or the brotherhood of humanity, and they no +longer care to consider how these ideas must be limited in practice or +harmonized with the conditions of human life. They are full of light, +but the light to them has become only a sort of luminous mist or +blindness. Almost every one has known some enthusiastic half-educated +person, who sees everything at false distances, and in erroneous +proportions. + +With this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another--of those who +see not far into the distance, but what is near only; who have been +engaged all their lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to +a set or sect of their own. Men of this kind have no universal except +their own interests or the interests of their class, no principle but +the opinion of persons like themselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond +what they pick up in the streets or at their club. Suppose them to be +sent into a larger world, to undertake some higher calling, from being +tradesmen to turn generals or politicians, from being schoolmasters to +become philosophers:--or imagine them on a sudden to receive an inward +light which reveals to them for the first time in their lives a higher +idea of God and the existence of a spiritual world, by this sudden +conversion or change is not their daily life likely to be upset; and on +the other hand will not many of their old prejudices and narrownesses +still adhere to them long after they have begun to take a more +comprehensive view of human things? From familiar examples like these we +may learn what Plato meant by the eyesight which is liable to two kinds +of disorders. + +Nor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young +Athenian in the fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new +ideas, and the student of a modern University who has been the subject +of a similar 'aufklarung.' We too observe that when young men begin to +criticise customary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human +nature, they are apt to lose hold of solid principle (Greek). They are +like trees which have been frequently transplanted. The earth about them +is loose, and they have no roots reaching far into the soil. They 'light +upon every flower,' following their own wayward wills, or because the +wind blows them. They catch opinions, as diseases are caught--when +they are in the air. Borne hither and thither, 'they speedily fall +into beliefs' the opposite of those in which they were brought up. They +hardly retain the distinction of right and wrong; they seem to think one +thing as good as another. They suppose themselves to be searching after +truth when they are playing the game of 'follow my leader.' They fall +in love 'at first sight' with paradoxes respecting morality, some fancy +about art, some novelty or eccentricity in religion, and like lovers +they are so absorbed for a time in their new notion that they can think +of nothing else. The resolution of some philosophical or theological +question seems to them more interesting and important than any +substantial knowledge of literature or science or even than a good life. +Like the youth in the Philebus, they are ready to discourse to any one +about a new philosophy. They are generally the disciples of some eminent +professor or sophist, whom they rather imitate than understand. They may +be counted happy if in later years they retain some of the simple truths +which they acquired in early education, and which they may, perhaps, +find to be worth all the rest. Such is the picture which Plato draws and +which we only reproduce, partly in his own words, of the dangers which +beset youth in times of transition, when old opinions are fading +away and the new are not yet firmly established. Their condition is +ingeniously compared by him to that of a supposititious son, who has +made the discovery that his reputed parents are not his real ones, and, +in consequence, they have lost their authority over him. + +The distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is +also noticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the +mathematician is quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense +which recognizes and combines first principles. The contempt which +he expresses for distinctions of words, the danger of involuntary +falsehood, the apology which Socrates makes for his earnestness of +speech, are highly characteristic of the Platonic style and mode of +thought. The quaint notion that if Palamedes was the inventor of number +Agamemnon could not have counted his feet; the art by which we are made +to believe that this State of ours is not a dream only; the gravity +with which the first step is taken in the actual creation of the State, +namely, the sending out of the city all who had arrived at ten years of +age, in order to expedite the business of education by a generation, are +also truly Platonic. (For the last, compare the passage at the end of +the third book, in which he expects the lie about the earthborn men to +be believed in the second generation.) + +BOOK VIII. And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the perfect +State wives and children are to be in common; and the education and +pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are to be common, and +kings are to be philosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the State +are to live together, having all things in common; and they are to be +warrior athletes, receiving no pay but only their food, from the other +citizens. Now let us return to the point at which we digressed. 'That is +easily done,' he replied: 'You were speaking of the State which you had +constructed, and of the individual who answered to this, both of whom +you affirmed to be good; and you said that of inferior States there were +four forms and four individuals corresponding to them, which although +deficient in various degrees, were all of them worth inspecting with +a view to determining the relative happiness or misery of the best or +worst man. Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted you, and this led +to another argument,--and so here we are.' Suppose that we put ourselves +again in the same position, and do you repeat your question. 'I should +like to know of what constitutions you were speaking?' Besides the +perfect State there are only four of any note in Hellas:--first, the +famous Lacedaemonian or Cretan commonwealth; secondly, oligarchy, a +State full of evils; thirdly, democracy, which follows next in order; +fourthly, tyranny, which is the disease or death of all government. +Now, States are not made of 'oak and rock,' but of flesh and blood; and +therefore as there are five States there must be five human natures in +individuals, which correspond to them. And first, there is the ambitious +nature, which answers to the Lacedaemonian State; secondly, the +oligarchical nature; thirdly, the democratical; and fourthly, the +tyrannical. This last will have to be compared with the perfectly just, +which is the fifth, that we may know which is the happier, and then we +shall be able to determine whether the argument of Thrasymachus or our +own is the more convincing. And as before we began with the State and +went on to the individual, so now, beginning with timocracy, let us +go on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to the other forms of +government, and the individuals who answer to them. + +But how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like +all changes of government, from division in the rulers. But whence came +division? 'Sing, heavenly Muses,' as Homer says;--let them condescend to +answer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face +in jest. 'And what will they say?' They will say that human things are +fated to decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this +law of destiny, when 'the wheel comes full circle' in a period short or +long. Plants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which the +intelligence of rulers because alloyed by sense will not enable them to +ascertain, and children will be born out of season. For whereas divine +creations are in a perfect cycle or number, the human creation is in +a number which declines from perfection, and has four terms and three +intervals of numbers, increasing, waning, assimilating, dissimilating, +and yet perfectly commensurate with each other. The base of the number +with a fourth added (or which is 3:4), multiplied by five and cubed, +gives two harmonies:--the first a square number, which is a hundred +times the base (or a hundred times a hundred); the second, an oblong, +being a hundred squares of the rational diameter of a figure the side of +which is five, subtracting one from each square or two perfect squares +from all, and adding a hundred cubes of three. This entire number is +geometrical and contains the rule or law of generation. When this law is +neglected marriages will be unpropitious; the inferior offspring who are +then born will in time become the rulers; the State will decline, and +education fall into decay; gymnastic will be preferred to music, and +the gold and silver and brass and iron will form a chaotic mass--thus +division will arise. Such is the Muses' answer to our question. 'And a +true answer, of course:--but what more have they to say?' They say that +the two races, the iron and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw +the State different ways;--the one will take to trade and moneymaking, +and the others, having the true riches and not caring for money, will +resist them: the contest will end in a compromise; they will agree to +have private property, and will enslave their fellow-citizens who were +once their friends and nurturers. But they will retain their warlike +character, and will be chiefly occupied in fighting and exercising rule. +Thus arises timocracy, which is intermediate between aristocracy and +oligarchy. + +The new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers +and contempt for trade, and having common meals, and in devotion +to warlike and gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into +philosophy, and simplicity of character, which was once her note, is now +looked for only in the military class. Arts of war begin to prevail over +arts of peace; the ruler is no longer a philosopher; as in oligarchies, +there springs up among them an extravagant love of gain--get another +man's and save your own, is their principle; and they have dark places +in which they hoard their gold and silver, for the use of their women +and others; they take their pleasures by stealth, like boys who are +running away from their father--the law; and their education is not +inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the strong arm of power. The +leading characteristic of this State is party spirit and ambition. + +And what manner of man answers to such a State? 'In love of contention,' +replied Adeimantus, 'he will be like our friend Glaucon.' In that +respect, perhaps, but not in others. He is self-asserting and +ill-educated, yet fond of literature, although not himself a +speaker,--fierce with slaves, but obedient to rulers, a lover of power +and honour, which he hopes to gain by deeds of arms,--fond, too, of +gymnastics and of hunting. As he advances in years he grows avaricious, +for he has lost philosophy, which is the only saviour and guardian of +men. His origin is as follows:--His father is a good man dwelling in an +ill-ordered State, who has retired from politics in order that he may +lead a quiet life. His mother is angry at her loss of precedence among +other women; she is disgusted at her husband's selfishness, and she +expatiates to her son on the unmanliness and indolence of his father. +The old family servant takes up the tale, and says to the youth:--'When +you grow up you must be more of a man than your father.' All the world +are agreed that he who minds his own business is an idiot, while a +busybody is highly honoured and esteemed. The young man compares this +spirit with his father's words and ways, and as he is naturally well +disposed, although he has suffered from evil influences, he rests at a +middle point and becomes ambitious and a lover of honour. + +And now let us set another city over against another man. The next form +of government is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor +is it difficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with +the possession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are +invented; one draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches +outweigh virtue; lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; +misers of politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined +by law to the rich, who do not shrink from violence in order to effect +their purposes. + +Thus much of the origin,--let us next consider the evils of oligarchy. +Would a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because +he was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the +analogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils: +two nations are struggling together in one--the rich and the poor; and +the rich dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling +to pay for defenders out of their own money. And have we not already +condemned that State in which the same persons are warriors as well +as shopkeepers? The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell his +property and have no place in the State; while there is one class which +has enormous wealth, the other is entirely destitute. But observe that +these destitutes had not really any more of the governing nature in them +when they were rich than now that they are poor; they were miserable +spendthrifts always. They are the drones of the hive; only whereas the +actual drone is unprovided by nature with a sting, the two-legged things +whom we call drones are some of them without stings and some of them +have dreadful stings; in other words, there are paupers and there are +rogues. These are never far apart; and in oligarchical cities, where +nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler, you will find abundance +of both. And this evil state of society originates in bad education and +bad government. + +Like State, like man,--the change in the latter begins with the +representative of timocracy; he walks at first in the ways of his +father, who may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps; and +presently he sees him 'fallen from his high estate,' the victim of +informers, dying in prison or exile, or by the hand of the executioner. +The lesson which he thus receives, makes him cautious; he leaves +politics, represses his pride, and saves pence. Avarice is enthroned as +his bosom's lord, and assumes the style of the Great King; the rational +and spirited elements sit humbly on the ground at either side, the one +immersed in calculation, the other absorbed in the admiration of +wealth. The love of honour turns to love of money; the conversion +is instantaneous. The man is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one +passion which is the master of the rest: Is he not the very image of the +State? He has had no education, or he would never have allowed the blind +god of riches to lead the dance within him. And being uneducated he will +have many slavish desires, some beggarly, some knavish, breeding in his +soul. If he is the trustee of an orphan, and has the power to defraud, +he will soon prove that he is not without the will, and that his +passions are only restrained by fear and not by reason. Hence he leads a +divided existence; in which the better desires mostly prevail. But when +he is contending for prizes and other distinctions, he is afraid to +incur a loss which is to be repaid only by barren honour; in time of +war he fights with a small part of his resources, and usually keeps his +money and loses the victory. + +Next comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and +the oligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an +oligarchy; and they encourage expensive habits in order that they may +gain by the ruin of extravagant youth. Thus men of family often lose +their property or rights of citizenship; but they remain in the city, +full of hatred against the new owners of their estates and ripe for +revolution. The usurer with stooping walk pretends not to see them; +he passes by, and leaves his sting--that is, his money--in some other +victim; and many a man has to pay the parent or principal sum multiplied +into a family of children, and is reduced into a state of dronage by +him. The only way of diminishing the evil is either to limit a man in +his use of his property, or to insist that he shall lend at his own +risk. But the ruling class do not want remedies; they care only for +money, and are as careless of virtue as the poorest of the citizens. +Now there are occasions on which the governors and the governed meet +together,--at festivals, on a journey, voyaging or fighting. The sturdy +pauper finds that in the hour of danger he is not despised; he sees +the rich man puffing and panting, and draws the conclusion which he +privately imparts to his companions,--'that our people are not good for +much;' and as a sickly frame is made ill by a mere touch from without, +or sometimes without external impulse is ready to fall to pieces of +itself, so from the least cause, or with none at all, the city falls ill +and fights a battle for life or death. And democracy comes into power +when the poor are the victors, killing some and exiling some, and giving +equal shares in the government to all the rest. + +The manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is +freedom and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in +his own eyes, and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various +developments of character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of +which the colours and figures are the manners of men, and there are many +who, like women and children, prefer this variety to real beauty and +excellence. The State is not one but many, like a bazaar at which you +can buy anything. The great charm is, that you may do as you like; you +may govern if you like, let it alone if you like; go to war and make +peace if you feel disposed, and all quite irrespective of anybody +else. When you condemn men to death they remain alive all the same; a +gentleman is desired to go into exile, and he stalks about the streets +like a hero; and nobody sees him or cares for him. Observe, too, +how grandly Democracy sets her foot upon all our fine theories of +education,--how little she cares for the training of her statesmen! The +only qualification which she demands is the profession of patriotism. +Such is democracy;--a pleasing, lawless, various sort of government, +distributing equality to equals and unequals alike. + +Let us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case +of the State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly +oligarch, and has been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary +pleasures. Perhaps I ought to explain this latter term:--Necessary +pleasures are those which are good, and which we cannot do without; +unnecessary pleasures are those which do no good, and of which the +desire might be eradicated by early training. For example, the pleasures +of eating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to a certain point; +beyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and mind, and the +excess may be avoided. When in excess, they may be rightly called +expensive pleasures, in opposition to the useful ones. And the drone, as +we called him, is the slave of these unnecessary pleasures and desires, +whereas the miserly oligarch is subject only to the necessary. + +The oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:--The +youth who has had a miserly bringing up, gets a taste of the drone's +honey; he meets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new +pleasure. As in the State, so in the individual, there are allies on +both sides, temptations from without and passions from within; there is +reason also and external influences of parents and friends in alliance +with the oligarchical principle; and the two factions are in violent +conflict with one another. Sometimes the party of order prevails, but +then again new desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob of +passions gets possession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the soul, +which they find void and unguarded by true words and works. Falsehoods +and illusions ascend to take their place; the prodigal goes back into +the country of the Lotophagi or drones, and openly dwells there. And if +any offer of alliance or parley of individual elders comes from home, +the false spirits shut the gates of the castle and permit no one to +enter,--there is a battle, and they gain the victory; and straightway +making alliance with the desires, they banish modesty, which they call +folly, and send temperance over the border. When the house has been +swept and garnished, they dress up the exiled vices, and, crowning them +with garlands, bring them back under new names. Insolence they call good +breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, impudence courage. Such +is the process by which the youth passes from the necessary pleasures to +the unnecessary. After a while he divides his time impartially between +them; and perhaps, when he gets older and the violence of passion +has abated, he restores some of the exiles and lives in a sort of +equilibrium, indulging first one pleasure and then another; and if +reason comes and tells him that some pleasures are good and honourable, +and others bad and vile, he shakes his head and says that he can make +no distinction between them. Thus he lives in the fancy of the hour; +sometimes he takes to drink, and then he turns abstainer; he practises +in the gymnasium or he does nothing at all; then again he would be a +philosopher or a politician; or again, he would be a warrior or a man of +business; he is + + 'Every thing by starts and nothing long.' + +There remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all +States--tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much as +democracy springs from oligarchy. Both arise from excess; the one from +excess of wealth, the other from excess of freedom. 'The great natural +good of life,' says the democrat, 'is freedom.' And this exclusive love +of freedom and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the +change from democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of +freedom, and unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes +and insults them; equality and fraternity of governors and governed is +the approved principle. Anarchy is the law, not of the State only, but +of private houses, and extends even to the animals. Father and son, +citizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil, old and young, are all on a +level; fathers and teachers fear their sons and pupils, and the wisdom +of the young man is a match for the elder, and the old imitate the +jaunty manners of the young because they are afraid of being thought +morose. Slaves are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and +there is no difference between men and women. Nay, the very animals in +a democratic State have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The +she-dogs are as good as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses march +along with dignity and run their noses against anybody who comes in +their way. 'That has often been my experience.' At last the citizens +become so sensitive that they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written or +unwritten; they would have no man call himself their master. Such is the +glorious beginning of things out of which tyranny springs. 'Glorious, +indeed; but what is to follow?' The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of +democracy; for there is a law of contraries; the excess of freedom +passes into the excess of slavery, and the greater the freedom the +greater the slavery. You will remember that in the oligarchy were found +two classes--rogues and paupers, whom we compared to drones with and +without stings. These two classes are to the State what phlegm and bile +are to the human body; and the State-physician, or legislator, must get +rid of them, just as the bee-master keeps the drones out of the hive. +Now in a democracy, too, there are drones, but they are more numerous +and more dangerous than in the oligarchy; there they are inert and +unpractised, here they are full of life and animation; and the keener +sort speak and act, while the others buzz about the bema and prevent +their opponents from being heard. And there is another class in +democratic States, of respectable, thriving individuals, who can be +squeezed when the drones have need of their possessions; there is +moreover a third class, who are the labourers and the artisans, and +they make up the mass of the people. When the people meet, they +are omnipotent, but they cannot be brought together unless they are +attracted by a little honey; and the rich are made to supply the honey, +of which the demagogues keep the greater part themselves, giving a taste +only to the mob. Their victims attempt to resist; they are driven mad +by the stings of the drones, and so become downright oligarchs in +self-defence. Then follow informations and convictions for treason. The +people have some protector whom they nurse into greatness, and from this +root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature of the change is indicated +in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus, which tells how he who +tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other victims will turn +into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human blood, and slays +some and exiles others with or without law, who hints at abolition of +debts and division of lands, must either perish or become a wolf--that +is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes back from +exile; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by lawful means, +they plot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the people makes +his well-known request to them for a body-guard, which they readily +grant, thinking only of his danger and not of their own. Now let the +rich man make to himself wings, for he will never run away again if he +does not do so then. And the Great Protector, having crushed all his +rivals, stands proudly erect in the chariot of State, a full-blown +tyrant: Let us enquire into the nature of his happiness. + +In the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody; he +is not a 'dominus,' no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt +and the monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes +himself necessary to the State by always going to war. He is thus +enabled to depress the poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work; +and he can get rid of bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy. +Then comes unpopularity; some of his old associates have the courage to +oppose him. The consequence is, that he has to make a purgation of the +State; but, unlike the physician who purges away the bad, he must get +rid of the high-spirited, the wise and the wealthy; for he has no choice +between death and a life of shame and dishonour. And the more hated he +is, the more he will require trusty guards; but how will he obtain them? +'They will come flocking like birds--for pay.' Will he not rather obtain +them on the spot? He will take the slaves from their owners and make +them his body-guard; these are his trusted friends, who admire and +look up to him. Are not the tragic poets wise who magnify and exalt the +tyrant, and say that he is wise by association with the wise? And are +not their praises of tyranny alone a sufficient reason why we should +exclude them from our State? They may go to other cities, and gather the +mob about them with fine words, and change commonwealths into tyrannies +and democracies, receiving honours and rewards for their services; but +the higher they and their friends ascend constitution hill, the more +their honour will fail and become 'too asthmatic to mount.' To return to +the tyrant--How will he support that rare army of his? First, by robbing +the temples of their treasures, which will enable him to lighten the +taxes; then he will take all his father's property, and spend it on +his companions, male or female. Now his father is the demus, and if the +demus gets angry, and says that a great hulking son ought not to be a +burden on his parents, and bids him and his riotous crew begone, then +will the parent know what a monster he has been nurturing, and that the +son whom he would fain expel is too strong for him. 'You do not mean to +say that he will beat his father?' Yes, he will, after having taken away +his arms. 'Then he is a parricide and a cruel, unnatural son.' And the +people have jumped from the fear of slavery into slavery, out of the +smoke into the fire. Thus liberty, when out of all order and reason, +passes into the worst form of servitude... + +In the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he +returns to the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly +touched at the end of Book IV. These he describes in a succession of +parallels between the individuals and the States, tracing the origin of +either in the State or individual which has preceded them. He begins +by asking the point at which he digressed; and is thus led shortly to +recapitulate the substance of the three former books, which also contain +a parallel of the philosopher and the State. + +Of the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have +liked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State, +which to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism or the +natural antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws a +veil of mystery over the origin of the decline, which he attributes to +ignorance of the law of population. Of this law the famous geometrical +figure or number is the expression. Like the ancients in general, he had +no idea of the gradual perfectibility of man or of the education of the +human race. His ideal was not to be attained in the course of ages, but +was to spring in full armour from the head of the legislator. When good +laws had been given, he thought only of the manner in which they were +likely to be corrupted, or of how they might be filled up in detail or +restored in accordance with their original spirit. He appears not to +have reflected upon the full meaning of his own words, 'In the brief +space of human life, nothing great can be accomplished'; or again, as he +afterwards says in the Laws, 'Infinite time is the maker of cities.' The +order of constitutions which is adopted by him represents an order of +thought rather than a succession of time, and may be considered as the +first attempt to frame a philosophy of history. + +The first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of +soldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this +is a government of force, in which education is not inspired by the +Muses, but imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of +organization have disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the +love of truth, and the soldier, who is of a simpler and honester nature, +rules in his stead. The individual who answers to timocracy has some +noticeable qualities. He is described as ill educated, but, like the +Spartan, a lover of literature; and although he is a harsh master to his +servants he has no natural superiority over them. His character is +based upon a reaction against the circumstances of his father, who in +a troubled city has retired from politics; and his mother, who is +dissatisfied at her own position, is always urging him towards the life +of political ambition. Such a character may have had this origin, and +indeed Livy attributes the Licinian laws to a feminine jealousy of a +similar kind. But there is obviously no connection between the manner +in which the timocratic State springs out of the ideal, and the mere +accident by which the timocratic man is the son of a retired statesman. + +The two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less +historical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a +polity like the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, +or of the oligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of +history appears to be different; first, in the Homeric times there is +the royal or patriarchal form of government, which a century or two +later was succeeded by an oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and +in which wealth was only the accident of the hereditary possession of +land and power. Sometimes this oligarchical government gave way to a +government based upon a qualification of property, which, according to +Aristotle's mode of using words, would have been called a timocracy; +and this in some cities, as at Athens, became the conducting medium to +democracy. But such was not the necessary order of succession in States; +nor, indeed, can any order be discerned in the endless fluctuation of +Greek history (like the tides in the Euripus), except, perhaps, in the +almost uniform tendency from monarchy to aristocracy in the earliest +times. At first sight there appears to be a similar inversion in the +last step of the Platonic succession; for tyranny, instead of being the +natural end of democracy, in early Greek history appears rather as a +stage leading to democracy; the reign of Peisistratus and his sons is +an episode which comes between the legislation of Solon and the +constitution of Cleisthenes; and some secret cause common to them all +seems to have led the greater part of Hellas at her first appearance +in the dawn of history, e.g. Athens, Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly +every State with the exception of Sparta, through a similar stage of +tyranny which ended either in oligarchy or democracy. But then we must +remember that Plato is describing rather the contemporary governments +of the Sicilian States, which alternated between democracy and tyranny, +than the ancient history of Athens or Corinth. + +The portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek +delighted to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives +of mediaeval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one +were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was +no enormity which the Greek was not today to believe of them; the tyrant +was the negation of government and law; his assassination was glorious; +there was no crime, however unnatural, which might not with probability +be attributed to him. In this, Plato was only following the common +thought of his countrymen, which he embellished and exaggerated with all +the power of his genius. There is no need to suppose that he drew +from life; or that his knowledge of tyrants is derived from a personal +acquaintance with Dionysius. The manner in which he speaks of them would +rather tend to render doubtful his ever having 'consorted' with them, or +entertained the schemes, which are attributed to him in the Epistles, of +regenerating Sicily by their help. + +Plato in a hyperbolical and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of +democracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy +is a state of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing +what is right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit +of liberty, rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the +leading idea of democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to +think. But if he is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover +of tyranny. His deeper and more serious condemnation is reserved for the +tyrant, who is the ideal of wickedness and also of weakness, and who +in his utter helplessness and suspiciousness is leading an almost +impossible existence, without that remnant of good which, in Plato's +opinion, was required to give power to evil (Book I). This ideal of +wickedness living in helpless misery, is the reverse of that other +portrait of perfect injustice ruling in happiness and splendour, which +first of all Thrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had drawn, +and is also the reverse of the king whose rule of life is the good of +his subjects. + +Each of these governments and individuals has a corresponding +ethical gradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not +extinguishing but harmonizing the passions, and training them in virtue; +in the timocracy and the timocratic man the constitution, whether of the +State or of the individual, is based, first, upon courage, and secondly, +upon the love of honour; this latter virtue, which is hardly to be +esteemed a virtue, has superseded all the rest. In the second stage of +decline the virtues have altogether disappeared, and the love of gain +has succeeded to them; in the third stage, or democracy, the various +passions are allowed to have free play, and the virtues and vices are +impartially cultivated. But this freedom, which leads to many curious +extravagances of character, is in reality only a state of weakness and +dissipation. At last, one monster passion takes possession of the whole +nature of man--this is tyranny. In all of them excess--the excess first +of wealth and then of freedom, is the element of decay. + +The eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and fanciful +allusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater +extent than anywhere else in Plato. We may remark, + +(1), the description of the two nations in one, which become more and +more divided in the Greek Republics, as in feudal times, and perhaps +also in our own; + +(2), the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula +as equality among unequals; + +(3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are characteristic +of liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust are of the +tyrant; + +(4), the proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a +speculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law +in modern times, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern +legislation. Debt and land were the two great difficulties of the +ancient lawgiver: in modern times we may be said to have almost, if not +quite, solved the first of these difficulties, but hardly the second. + +Still more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals: +there is the family picture of the father and mother and the old servant +of the timocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent +meanness of the oligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of +the democrat, in which the young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing +right or wrong as he pleases, and who at last, like the prodigal, +goes into a far country (note here the play of language by which the +democratic man is himself represented under the image of a State having +a citadel and receiving embassies); and there is the wild-beast nature, +which breaks loose in his successor. The hit about the tyrant being a +parricide; the representation of the tyrant's life as an obscene dream; +the rhetorical surprise of a more miserable than the most miserable of +men in Book IX; the hint to the poets that if they are the friends of +tyrants there is no place for them in a constitutional State, and that +they are too clever not to see the propriety of their own expulsion; the +continuous image of the drones who are of two kinds, swelling at last +into the monster drone having wings (Book IX),--are among Plato's +happiest touches. + +There remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the +Republic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as +great as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though +apparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of +obscurity (Ep. ad Att.). And some have imagined that there is no answer +to the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his readers. +But such a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which +Aristotle speaks of the number (Pol.), and would have been ridiculous to +any reader of the Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics. +As little reason is there for supposing that Plato intentionally used +obscure expressions; the obscurity arises from our want of familiarity +with the subject. On the other hand, Plato himself indicates that he is +not altogether serious, and in describing his number as a solemn jest of +the Muses, he appears to imply some degree of satire on the symbolical +use of number. (Compare Cratylus; Protag.) + +Our hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an accurate +study of the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by the +parallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in +Aristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter part of the +passage (Greek) describes a solid figure. (Pol.--'He only says that +nothing is abiding, but that all things change in a certain cycle; and +that the origin of the change is a base of numbers which are in the +ratio of 4:3; and this when combined with a figure of five gives two +harmonies; he means when the number of this figure becomes solid.') +Some further clue may be gathered from the appearance of the Pythagorean +triangle, which is denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in which, as in +every right-angled triangle, the squares of the two lesser sides equal +the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25). + +Plato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (Tim.), i.e. +a number in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the +divine or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are +complete. He also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four +terms and three intervals of numbers which are related to one another in +certain proportions; these he converts into figures, and finds in +them when they have been raised to the third power certain elements of +number, which give two 'harmonies,' the one square, the other oblong; +but he does not say that the square number answers to the divine, or the +oblong number to the human cycle; nor is any intimation given that the +first or divine number represents the period of the world, the second +the period of the state, or of the human race as Zeller supposes; nor +is the divine number afterwards mentioned (Arist.). The second is the +number of generations or births, and presides over them in the same +mysterious manner in which the stars preside over them, or in which, +according to the Pythagoreans, opportunity, justice, marriage, are +represented by some number or figure. This is probably the number 216. + +The explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up +the number 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from +the circumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens +(Herod.), and would be what Plato might have called 'a number which +nearly concerns the population of a city'; the mysterious disappearance +of the Spartan population may possibly have suggested to him the first +cause of his decline of States. The lesser or square 'harmony,' of 400, +might be a symbol of the guardians,--the larger or oblong 'harmony,' +of the people, and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer respectively to the +three orders in the State or parts of the soul, the four virtues, the +five forms of government. The harmony of the musical scale, which +is elsewhere used as a symbol of the harmony of the state, is also +indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, which represent the sides of the +Pythagorean triangle, also denote the intervals of the scale. + +The terms used in the statement of the problem may be explained as +follows. A perfect number (Greek), as already stated, is one which is +equal to the sum of its divisors. Thus 6, which is the first perfect or +cyclical number, = 1 + 2 + 3. The words (Greek), 'terms' or 'notes,' and +(Greek), 'intervals,' are applicable to music as well as to number and +figure. (Greek) is the 'base' on which the whole calculation depends, +or the 'lowest term' from which it can be worked out. The words (Greek) +have been variously translated--'squared and cubed' (Donaldson), +'equalling and equalled in power' (Weber), 'by involution and +evolution,' i.e. by raising the power and extracting the root (as in +the translation). Numbers are called 'like and unlike' (Greek) when the +factors or the sides of the planes and cubes which they represent are +or are not in the same ratio: e.g. 8 and 27 = 2 cubed and 3 cubed; and +conversely. 'Waxing' (Greek) numbers, called also 'increasing' (Greek), +are those which are exceeded by the sum of their divisors: e.g. 12 +and 18 are less than 16 and 21. 'Waning' (Greek) numbers, called also +'decreasing' (Greek) are those which succeed the sum of their divisors: +e.g. 8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The words translated 'commensurable +and agreeable to one another' (Greek) seem to be different ways of +describing the same relation, with more or less precision. They are +equivalent to 'expressible in terms having the same relation to one +another,' like the series 8, 12, 18, 27, each of which numbers is in the +relation of (1 and 1/2) to the preceding. The 'base,' or 'fundamental +number, which has 1/3 added to it' (1 and 1/3) = 4/3 or a musical +fourth. (Greek) is a 'proportion' of numbers as of musical notes, +applied either to the parts or factors of a single number or to the +relation of one number to another. The first harmony is a 'square' +number (Greek); the second harmony is an 'oblong' number (Greek), i.e. a +number representing a figure of which the opposite sides only are +equal. (Greek) = 'numbers squared from' or 'upon diameters'; (Greek) += 'rational,' i.e. omitting fractions, (Greek), 'irrational,' i.e. +including fractions; e.g. 49 is a square of the rational diameter of a +figure the side of which = 5: 50, of an irrational diameter of the same. +For several of the explanations here given and for a good deal besides +I am indebted to an excellent article on the Platonic Number by Dr. +Donaldson (Proc. of the Philol. Society). + +The conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by him as +follows. Having assumed that the number of the perfect or divine cycle +is the number of the world, and the number of the imperfect cycle the +number of the state, he proceeds: 'The period of the world is defined +by the perfect number 6, that of the state by the cube of that number +or 216, which is the product of the last pair of terms in the Platonic +Tetractys (a series of seven terms, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27); and if +we take this as the basis of our computation, we shall have two cube +numbers (Greek), viz. 8 and 27; and the mean proportionals between +these, viz. 12 and 18, will furnish three intervals and four terms, +and these terms and intervals stand related to one another in the +sesqui-altera ratio, i.e. each term is to the preceding as 3/2. Now if +we remember that the number 216 = 8 x 27 = 3 cubed + 4 cubed + 5 cubed, +and 3 squared + 4 squared = 5 squared, we must admit that this +number implies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to which musicians attach so much +importance. And if we combine the ratio 4/3 with the number 5, or +multiply the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse, we shall by first +squaring and then cubing obtain two expressions, which denote the ratio +of the two last pairs of terms in the Platonic Tetractys, the former +multiplied by the square, the latter by the cube of the number 10, the +sum of the first four digits which constitute the Platonic Tetractys.' +The two (Greek) he elsewhere explains as follows: 'The first (Greek) is +(Greek), in other words (4/3 x 5) all squared = 100 x 2 squared over 3 +squared. The second (Greek), a cube of the same root, is described +as 100 multiplied (alpha) by the rational diameter of 5 diminished +by unity, i.e., as shown above, 48: (beta) by two incommensurable +diameters, i.e. the two first irrationals, or 2 and 3: and (gamma) by +the cube of 3, or 27. Thus we have (48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 x 2 cubed. +This second harmony is to be the cube of the number of which the former +harmony is the square, and therefore must be divided by the cube of +3. In other words, the whole expression will be: (1), for the first +harmony, 400/9: (2), for the second harmony, 8000/27.' + +The reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and also +with Schleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of +births are: (1) that it coincides with the description of the number +given in the first part of the passage (Greek...): (2) that the +number 216 with its permutations would have been familiar to a Greek +mathematician, though unfamiliar to us: (3) that 216 is the cube of +6, and also the sum of 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5 cubed, the numbers 3, 4, 5 +representing the Pythagorean triangle, of which the sides when squared +equal the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25): (4) that it is also +the period of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5) the three ultimate +terms or bases (3, 4, 5) of which 216 is composed answer to the third, +fourth, fifth in the musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the +product of the cubes of 2 and 3, which are the two last terms in +the Platonic Tetractys: (7) that the Pythagorean triangle is said by +Plutarch (de Is. et Osir.), Proclus (super prima Eucl.), and Quintilian +(de Musica) to be contained in this passage, so that the tradition +of the school seems to point in the same direction: (8) that the +Pythagorean triangle is called also the figure of marriage (Greek). + +But though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for +supposing, as he does, that the first or perfect number is the world, +the human or imperfect number the state; nor has he given any proof that +the second harmony is a cube. Nor do I think that (Greek) can mean +'two incommensurables,' which he arbitrarily assumes to be 2 and 3, +but rather, as the preceding clause implies, (Greek), i.e. two square +numbers based upon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which is +5 = 50 x 2. + +The greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the +words (Greek), 'a base of three with a third added to it, multiplied +by 5.' In this somewhat forced manner Plato introduces once more the +numbers of the Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in the numbers +which follow are in favour of the explanation. The first harmony of 400, +as has been already remarked, probably represents the rulers; the second +and oblong harmony of 7600, the people. + +And here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle +would be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The +point of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and +that so much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His +general meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and is represented +or presided over by a perfect or cyclical number; human generation is +imperfect, and represented or presided over by an imperfect number or +series of numbers. The number 5040, which is the number of the citizens +in the Laws, is expressly based by him on utilitarian grounds, namely, +the convenience of the number for division; it is also made up of +the first seven digits multiplied by one another. The contrast of the +perfect and imperfect number may have been easily suggested by the +corrections of the cycle, which were made first by Meton and secondly +by Callippus; (the latter is said to have been a pupil of Plato). Of the +degree of importance or of exactness to be attributed to the problem, +the number of the tyrant in Book IX (729 = 365 x 2), and the slight +correction of the error in the number 5040/12 (Laws), may furnish a +criterion. There is nothing surprising in the circumstance that those +who were seeking for order in nature and had found order in number, +should have imagined one to give law to the other. Plato believes in +a power of number far beyond what he could see realized in the world +around him, and he knows the great influence which 'the little matter +of 1, 2, 3' exercises upon education. He may even be thought to have a +prophetic anticipation of the discoveries of Quetelet and others, that +numbers depend upon numbers; e.g.--in population, the numbers of births +and the respective numbers of children born of either sex, on the +respective ages of parents, i.e. on other numbers. + +BOOK IX. Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to +enquire, Whence is he, and how does he live--in happiness or in misery? +There is, however, a previous question of the nature and number of +the appetites, which I should like to consider first. Some of them +are unlawful, and yet admit of being chastened and weakened in various +degrees by the power of reason and law. 'What appetites do you mean?' I +mean those which are awake when the reasoning powers are asleep, which +get up and walk about naked without any self-respect or shame; and there +is no conceivable folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of which, +in imagination, they may not be guilty. 'True,' he said; 'very true.' +But when a man's pulse beats temperately; and he has supped on a feast +of reason and come to a knowledge of himself before going to rest, and +has satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their perturbing his +reason, which remains clear and luminous, and when he is free from +quarrel and heat,--the visions which he has on his bed are least +irregular and abnormal. Even in good men there is such an irregular +wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. + +To return:--You remember what was said of the democrat; that he was the +son of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and repressed +the ornamental and expensive ones; presently the youth got into fine +company, and began to entertain a dislike to his father's narrow ways; +and being a better man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a +mean, and led a life, not of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular +and successive indulgence. Now imagine that the youth has become a +father, and has a son who is exposed to the same temptations, and has +companions who lead him into every sort of iniquity, and parents and +friends who try to keep him right. The counsellors of evil find that +their only chance of retaining him is to implant in his soul a monster +drone, or love; while other desires buzz around him and mystify him with +sweet sounds and scents, this monster love takes possession of him, +and puts an end to every true or modest thought or wish. Love, like +drunkenness and madness, is a tyranny; and the tyrannical man, whether +made by nature or habit, is just a drinking, lusting, furious sort of +animal. + +And how does such an one live? 'Nay, that you must tell me.' Well then, +I fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will +be the lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money, +and so he spends all that he has and borrows more; and when he has +nothing the young ravens are still in the nest in which they were +hatched, crying for food. Love urges them on; and they must be gratified +by force or fraud, or if not, they become painful and troublesome; +and as the new pleasures succeed the old ones, so will the son take +possession of the goods of his parents; if they show signs of refusing, +he will defraud and deceive them; and if they openly resist, what then? +'I can only say, that I should not much like to be in their place.' +But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for some new-fangled and +unnecessary love he will give up his old father and mother, best and +dearest of friends, or enslave them to the fancies of the hour! Truly a +tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother! When there is no +more to be got out of them, he turns burglar or pickpocket, or robs a +temple. Love overmasters the thoughts of his youth, and he becomes +in sober reality the monster that he was sometimes in sleep. He waxes +strong in all violence and lawlessness; and is ready for any deed of +daring that will supply the wants of his rabble-rout. In a well-ordered +State there are only a few such, and these in time of war go out and +become the mercenaries of a tyrant. But in time of peace they stay +at home and do mischief; they are the thieves, footpads, cut-purses, +man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak, they turn +false-witnesses and informers. 'No small catalogue of crimes truly, +even if the perpetrators are few.' Yes, I said; but small and great are +relative terms, and no crimes which are committed by them approach those +of the tyrant, whom this class, growing strong and numerous, create out +of themselves. If the people yield, well and good, but, if they resist, +then, as before he beat his father and mother, so now he beats his +fatherland and motherland, and places his mercenaries over them. Such +men in their early days live with flatterers, and they themselves +flatter others, in order to gain their ends; but they soon discard their +followers when they have no longer any need of them; they are always +either masters or servants,--the joys of friendship are unknown to them. +And they are utterly treacherous and unjust, if the nature of justice be +at all understood by us. They realize our dream; and he who is the most +of a tyrant by nature, and leads the life of a tyrant for the longest +time, will be the worst of them, and being the worst of them, will also +be the most miserable. + +Like man, like State,--the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which +is the extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the best and the +other the worst. But which is the happier? Great and terrible as the +tyrant may appear enthroned amid his satellites, let us not be afraid to +go in and ask; and the answer is, that the monarchical is the happiest, +and the tyrannical the most miserable of States. And may we not ask the +same question about the men themselves, requesting some one to look into +them who is able to penetrate the inner nature of man, and will not be +panic-struck by the vain pomp of tyranny? I will suppose that he is one +who has lived with him, and has seen him in family life, or perhaps in +the hour of trouble and danger. + +Assuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek, let +us begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all, +whether the State is likely to be free or enslaved--Will there not be +a little freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the +bad, and the slavery of the good; and this applies to the man as well +as to the State; for his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and the +better part is enslaved to the worse. He cannot do what he would, and +his mind is full of confusion; he is the very reverse of a freeman. The +State will be poor and full of misery and sorrow; and the man's soul +will also be poor and full of sorrows, and he will be the most miserable +of men. No, not the most miserable, for there is yet a more miserable. +'Who is that?' The tyrannical man who has the misfortune also to become +a public tyrant. 'There I suspect that you are right.' Say rather, 'I +am sure;' conjecture is out of place in an enquiry of this nature. He +is like a wealthy owner of slaves, only he has more of them than +any private individual. You will say, 'The owners of slaves are not +generally in any fear of them.' But why? Because the whole city is in a +league which protects the individual. Suppose however that one of these +owners and his household is carried off by a god into a wilderness, +where there are no freemen to help him--will he not be in an agony of +terror?--will he not be compelled to flatter his slaves and to promise +them many things sore against his will? And suppose the same god who +carried him off were to surround him with neighbours who declare that no +man ought to have slaves, and that the owners of them should be punished +with death. 'Still worse and worse! He will be in the midst of his +enemies.' And is not our tyrant such a captive soul, who is tormented by +a swarm of passions which he cannot indulge; living indoors always like +a woman, and jealous of those who can go out and see the world? + +Having so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more +miserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of +himself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the meanest +of slaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and +never able to satisfy his desires; always in fear and distraction, +like the State of which he is the representative. His jealous, +hateful, faithless temper grows worse with command; he is more and more +faithless, envious, unrighteous,--the most wretched of men, a misery +to himself and to others. And so let us have a final trial and +proclamation; need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result? +'Made the proclamation yourself.' The son of Ariston (the best) is of +opinion that the best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that +this is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust +man is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. And I +add further--'seen or unseen by gods or men.' + +This is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds +of pleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul--reason, +passion, desire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as +sensual appetite, while passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love +of reputation. Reason, again, is solely directed to the attainment of +truth, and careless of money and reputation. In accordance with the +difference of men's natures, one of these three principles is in the +ascendant, and they have their several pleasures corresponding to them. +Interrogate now the three natures, and each one will be found praising +his own pleasures and depreciating those of others. The money-maker will +contrast the vanity of knowledge with the solid advantages of wealth. +The ambitious man will despise knowledge which brings no honour; whereas +the philosopher will regard only the fruition of truth, and will call +other pleasures necessary rather than good. Now, how shall we decide +between them? Is there any better criterion than experience and +knowledge? And which of the three has the truest knowledge and the +widest experience? The experience of youth makes the philosopher +acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the avaricious and the +ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and wisdom. Honour he +has equally with them; they are 'judged of him,' but he is 'not judged +of them,' for they never attain to the knowledge of true being. And his +instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only wealth and honour; +and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest. And so we +arrive at the result that the pleasure of the rational part of the soul, +and a life passed in such pleasure is the pleasantest. He who has a +right to judge judges thus. Next comes the life of ambition, and, in the +third place, that of money-making. + +Twice has the just man overthrown the unjust--once more, as in an +Olympian contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let +him try a fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise +are true and pure; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine this: +Is not pleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which +is neither? When a man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him than +health. But this he never found out while he was well. In pain he +desires only to cease from pain; on the other hand, when he is in an +ecstasy of pleasure, rest is painful to him. Thus rest or cessation +is both pleasure and pain. But can that which is neither become both? +Again, pleasure and pain are motions, and the absence of them is rest; +but if so, how can the absence of either of them be the other? Thus +we are led to infer that the contradiction is an appearance only, and +witchery of the senses. And these are not the only pleasures, for there +are others which have no preceding pains. Pure pleasure then is not the +absence of pain, nor pure pain the absence of pleasure; although most of +the pleasures which reach the mind through the body are reliefs of +pain, and have not only their reactions when they depart, but their +anticipations before they come. They can be best described in a simile. +There is in nature an upper, lower, and middle region, and he who passes +from the lower to the middle imagines that he is going up and is already +in the upper world; and if he were taken back again would think, +and truly think, that he was descending. All this arises out of his +ignorance of the true upper, middle, and lower regions. And a like +confusion happens with pleasure and pain, and with many other things. +The man who compares grey with black, calls grey white; and the man who +compares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of pain pleasure. +Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance and folly +of the soul; and food is the satisfaction of the one, knowledge of the +other. Now which is the purer satisfaction--that of eating and drinking, +or that of knowledge? Consider the matter thus: The satisfaction of +that which has more existence is truer than of that which has less. The +invariable and immortal has a more real existence than the variable +and mortal, and has a corresponding measure of knowledge and truth. The +soul, again, has more existence and truth and knowledge than the body, +and is therefore more really satisfied and has a more natural pleasure. +Those who feast only on earthly food, are always going at random up +to the middle and down again; but they never pass into the true upper +world, or have a taste of true pleasure. They are like fatted beasts, +full of gluttony and sensuality, and ready to kill one another by reason +of their insatiable lust; for they are not filled with true being, and +their vessel is leaky (Gorgias). Their pleasures are mere shadows of +pleasure, mixed with pain, coloured and intensified by contrast, +and therefore intensely desired; and men go fighting about them, as +Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at +Troy, because they know not the truth. + +The same may be said of the passionate element:--the desires of +the ambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior +satisfaction. Only when under the guidance of reason do either of the +other principles do their own business or attain the pleasure which is +natural to them. When not attaining, they compel the other parts of the +soul to pursue a shadow of pleasure which is not theirs. And the more +distant they are from philosophy and reason, the more distant they will +be from law and order, and the more illusive will be their pleasures. +The desires of love and tyranny are the farthest from law, and those +of the king are nearest to it. There is one genuine pleasure, and two +spurious ones: the tyrant goes beyond even the latter; he has run away +altogether from law and reason. Nor can the measure of his inferiority +be told, except in a figure. The tyrant is the third removed from the +oligarch, and has therefore, not a shadow of his pleasure, but the +shadow of a shadow only. The oligarch, again, is thrice removed from +the king, and thus we get the formula 3 x 3, which is the number of a +surface, representing the shadow which is the tyrant's pleasure, and +if you like to cube this 'number of the beast,' you will find that the +measure of the difference amounts to 729; the king is 729 times more +happy than the tyrant. And this extraordinary number is NEARLY equal +to the number of days and nights in a year (365 x 2 = 730); and is +therefore concerned with human life. This is the interval between a good +and bad man in happiness only: what must be the difference between them +in comeliness of life and virtue! + +Perhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our +discussion that the unjust man was profited if he had the reputation of +justice. Now that we know the nature of justice and injustice, let us +make an image of the soul, which will personify his words. First of all, +fashion a multitudinous beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of +animals, tame and wild, and able to produce and change them at pleasure. +Suppose now another form of a lion, and another of a man; the second +smaller than the first, the third than the second; join them together +and cover them with a human skin, in which they are completely +concealed. When this has been done, let us tell the supporter of +injustice that he is feeding up the beasts and starving the man. The +maintainer of justice, on the other hand, is trying to strengthen the +man; he is nourishing the gentle principle within him, and making an +alliance with the lion heart, in order that he may be able to keep down +the many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity with each other and +with themselves. Thus in every point of view, whether in relation to +pleasure, honour, or advantage, the just man is right, and the unjust +wrong. + +But now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in +error. Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or +rather to the God in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to +the beast? And if so, who would receive gold on condition that he was to +degrade the noblest part of himself under the worst?--who would sell his +son or daughter into the hands of brutal and evil men, for any amount +of money? And will he sell his own fairer and diviner part without any +compunction to the most godless and foul? Would he not be worse than +Eriphyle, who sold her husband's life for a necklace? And intemperance +is the letting loose of the multiform monster, and pride and sullenness +are the growth and increase of the lion and serpent element, while +luxury and effeminacy are caused by a too great relaxation of spirit. +Flattery and meanness again arise when the spirited element is subjected +to avarice, and the lion is habituated to become a monkey. The real +disgrace of handicraft arts is, that those who are engaged in them have +to flatter, instead of mastering their desires; therefore we say that +they should be placed under the control of the better principle in +another because they have none in themselves; not, as Thrasymachus +imagined, to the injury of the subjects, but for their good. And our +intention in educating the young, is to give them self-control; the +law desires to nurse up in them a higher principle, and when they have +acquired this, they may go their ways. + +'What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world' and become +more and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if +the concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, +the brute within him would have been silenced, and the gentler element +liberated; and he would have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in +his soul--a union better far than any combination of bodily gifts. The +man of understanding will honour knowledge above all; in the next +place he will keep under his body, not only for the sake of health and +strength, but in order to attain the most perfect harmony of body +and soul. In the acquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and +harmony; he will not desire to heap up wealth without measure, but he +will fear that the increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of +his own soul. For the same reason he will only accept such honours as +will make him a better man; any others he will decline. 'In that case,' +said he, 'he will never be a politician.' Yes, but he will, in his own +city; though probably not in his native country, unless by some divine +accident. 'You mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city, which +has no place upon earth.' But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern +of such a city, and he who wishes may order his life after that image. +Whether such a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act +according to that pattern and no other... + +The most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:--(1) the +account of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the +king from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven. + +1. Plato's account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in +this respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are +attributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed +to all pleasure, but rather desires that the several parts of the +soul shall have their natural satisfaction; he even agrees with the +Epicureans in describing pleasure as something more than the absence of +pain. This is proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which +have no antecedent pains (as he also remarks in the Philebus), such as +the pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and anticipation. +In the previous book he had made the distinction between necessary +and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he now +observes that there are a further class of 'wild beast' pleasures, +corresponding to Aristotle's (Greek). He dwells upon the relative and +unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which arises out +of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority of +the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures +of sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by +the fact that reason is able to form a judgment of the lower pleasures, +while the two lower parts of the soul are incapable of judging the +pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of pleasure, as in many +other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is 'sawn up into quantities' by +Aristotle; the analysis which was originally made by him became in the +next generation the foundation of further technical distinctions. Both +in Plato and Aristotle we note the illusion under which the ancients +fell of regarding the transience of pleasure as a proof of its +unreality, and of confounding the permanence of the intellectual +pleasures with the unchangeableness of the knowledge from which they are +derived. Neither do we like to admit that the pleasures of knowledge, +though more elevating, are not more lasting than other pleasures, +and are almost equally dependent on the accidents of our bodily state +(Introduction to Philebus). + +2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant, +and royal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9. Which Plato +characteristically designates as a number concerned with human life, +because NEARLY equivalent to the number of days and nights in the +year. He is desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is +immeasurable, and invents a formula to give expression to his idea. +Those who spoke of justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring +(Prot.), saw no inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the +figure of a line, or the pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the +pleasure of the king by the numerical interval of 729. And in modern +times we sometimes use metaphorically what Plato employed as a +philosophical formula. 'It is not easy to estimate the loss of the +tyrant, except perhaps in this way,' says Plato. So we might say, that +although the life of a good man is not to be compared to that of a bad +man, yet you may measure the difference between them by valuing one +minute of the one at an hour of the other ('One day in thy courts is +better than a thousand'), or you might say that 'there is an infinite +difference.' But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase, 'They +are a thousand miles asunder.' And accordingly Plato finds the natural +vehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this arithmetical +formula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both here and in +the number of generation seems to find an additional proof of the truth +of his speculation in forming the number into a geometrical figure; just +as persons in our own day are apt to fancy that a statement is verified +when it has been only thrown into an abstract form. In speaking of the +number 729 as proper to human life, he probably intended to intimate +that one year of the tyrannical = 12 hours of the royal life. + +The simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids +is effected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the +mathematical groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some +difficulty in explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained; +the oligarch is removed in the third degree from the royal and +aristocratical, and the tyrant in the third degree from the +oligarchical; but we have to arrange the terms as the sides of a square +and to count the oligarch twice over, thus reckoning them not as = 5 but +as = 9. The square of 9 is passed lightly over as only a step towards +the cube. + +3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more +convinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of +the 9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the +city of philosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and +substance at his hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet +this distant kingdom is also the rule of man's life. ('Say not lo! here, +or lo! there, for the kingdom of God is within you.') Thus a note +is struck which prepares for the revelation of a future life in the +following Book. But the future life is present still; the ideal of +politics is to be realized in the individual. + +BOOK X. Many things pleased me in the order of our State, but there +was nothing which I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The +division of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation. +I do not mind telling you in confidence that all poetry is an outrage on +the understanding, unless the hearers have that balm of knowledge which +heals error. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and even now +he appears to me to be the great master of tragic poetry. But much as +I love the man, I love truth more, and therefore I must speak out: and +first of all, will you explain what is imitation, for really I do not +understand? 'How likely then that I should understand!' That might very +well be, for the duller often sees better than the keener eye. 'True, +but in your presence I can hardly venture to say what I think.' +Then suppose that we begin in our old fashion, with the doctrine of +universals. Let us assume the existence of beds and tables. There is one +idea of a bed, or of a table, which the maker of each had in his mind +when making them; he did not make the ideas of beds and tables, but he +made beds and tables according to the ideas. And is there not a maker +of the works of all workmen, who makes not only vessels but plants and +animals, himself, the earth and heaven, and things in heaven and under +the earth? He makes the Gods also. 'He must be a wizard indeed!' But do +you not see that there is a sense in which you could do the same? You +have only to take a mirror, and catch the reflection of the sun, and the +earth, or anything else--there now you have made them. 'Yes, but only +in appearance.' Exactly so; and the painter is such a creator as you are +with the mirror, and he is even more unreal than the carpenter; although +neither the carpenter nor any other artist can be supposed to make the +absolute bed. 'Not if philosophers may be believed.' Nor need we wonder +that his bed has but an imperfect relation to the truth. Reflect:--Here +are three beds; one in nature, which is made by God; another, which is +made by the carpenter; and the third, by the painter. God only made one, +nor could he have made more than one; for if there had been two, there +would always have been a third--more absolute and abstract than either, +under which they would have been included. We may therefore conceive God +to be the natural maker of the bed, and in a lower sense the carpenter +is also the maker; but the painter is rather the imitator of what the +other two make; he has to do with a creation which is thrice removed +from reality. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, like every +other imitator, is thrice removed from the king and from the truth. +The painter imitates not the original bed, but the bed made by the +carpenter. And this, without being really different, appears to be +different, and has many points of view, of which only one is caught by +the painter, who represents everything because he represents a piece of +everything, and that piece an image. And he can paint any other artist, +although he knows nothing of their arts; and this with sufficient skill +to deceive children or simple people. Suppose now that somebody came to +us and told us, how he had met a man who knew all that everybody knows, +and better than anybody:--should we not infer him to be a simpleton who, +having no discernment of truth and falsehood, had met with a wizard +or enchanter, whom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we hear persons +saying that Homer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the +virtues, must we not infer that they are under a similar delusion? they +do not see that the poets are imitators, and that their creations are +only imitations. 'Very true.' But if a person could create as well as +imitate, he would rather leave some permanent work and not an imitation +only; he would rather be the receiver than the giver of praise? 'Yes, +for then he would have more honour and advantage.' + +Let us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him, +I am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your +poems incidentally refer, but about their main subjects--war, military +tactics, politics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the +truth--not an imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good +you have ever done to mankind? Is there any city which professes to have +received laws from you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta +from Lycurgus, Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever carried on by your +counsels? or is any invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales +and Anacharsis? Or is there any Homeric way of life, such as the +Pythagorean was, in which you instructed men, and which is called after +you? 'No, indeed; and Creophylus (Flesh-child) was even more unfortunate +in his breeding than he was in his name, if, as tradition says, Homer in +his lifetime was allowed by him and his other friends to starve.' Yes, +but could this ever have happened if Homer had really been the educator +of Hellas? Would he not have had many devoted followers? If Protagoras +and Prodicus can persuade their contemporaries that no one can manage +house or State without them, is it likely that Homer and Hesiod would +have been allowed to go about as beggars--I mean if they had really been +able to do the world any good?--would not men have compelled them +to stay where they were, or have followed them about in order to get +education? But they did not; and therefore we may infer that Homer and +all the poets are only imitators, who do but imitate the appearances of +things. For as a painter by a knowledge of figure and colour can paint a +cobbler without any practice in cobbling, so the poet can delineate +any art in the colours of language, and give harmony and rhythm to the +cobbler and also to the general; and you know how mere narration, when +deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a face which has lost the +beauty of youth and never had any other. Once more, the imitator has no +knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The painter paints, and +the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but neither understands the use +of them--the knowledge of this is confined to the horseman; and so of +other things. Thus we have three arts: one of use, another of invention, +a third of imitation; and the user furnishes the rule to the two others. +The flute-player will know the good and bad flute, and the maker +will put faith in him; but the imitator will neither know nor have +faith--neither science nor true opinion can be ascribed to him. +Imitation, then, is devoid of knowledge, being only a kind of play +or sport, and the tragic and epic poets are imitators in the highest +degree. + +And now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to +imitation. Allow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen +when in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a +distance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to +impose upon us. And the art of measuring and weighing and calculating +comes in to save our bewildered minds from the power of appearance; for, +as we were saying, two contrary opinions of the same about the same and +at the same time, cannot both of them be true. But which of them is +true is determined by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the +better faculty in the soul, as the arts of imitation are to the worse. +And the same holds of the ear as well as of the eye, of poetry as well +as painting. The imitation is of actions voluntary or involuntary, +in which there is an expectation of a good or bad result, and present +experience of pleasure and pain. But is a man in harmony with himself +when he is the subject of these conflicting influences? Is there not +rather a contradiction in him? Let me further ask, whether he is more +likely to control sorrow when he is alone or when he is in company. +'In the latter case.' Feeling would lead him to indulge his sorrow, but +reason and law control him and enjoin patience; since he cannot know +whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing is of +any great consequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to good +counsel. For when we stumble, we should not, like children, make an +uproar; we should take the measures which reason prescribes, not raising +a lament, but finding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to +follow reason, while the irrational principle is full of sorrow and +distraction at the recollection of our troubles. Unfortunately, however, +this latter furnishes the chief materials of the imitative arts. Whereas +reason is ever in repose and cannot easily be displayed, especially to a +mixed multitude who have no experience of her. Thus the poet is like the +painter in two ways: first he paints an inferior degree of truth, and +secondly, he is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. He indulges +the feelings, while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse to allow him +to have authority over the mind of man; for he has no measure of greater +and less, and is a maker of images and very far gone from truth. + +But we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment--the +power which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we +hear some passage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious +length, you know that we sympathize with him and praise the poet; and +yet in our own sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as +effeminate and unmanly (Ion). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in +seeing another do what he hates and abominates in himself? Is he not +giving way to a sentiment which in his own case he would control?--he is +off his guard because the sorrow is another's; and he thinks that he +may indulge his feelings without disgrace, and will be the gainer by +the pleasure. But the inevitable consequence is that he who begins by +weeping at the sorrows of others, will end by weeping at his own. The +same is true of comedy,--you may often laugh at buffoonery which you +would be ashamed to utter, and the love of coarse merriment on the stage +will at last turn you into a buffoon at home. Poetry feeds and waters +the passions and desires; she lets them rule instead of ruling them. And +therefore, when we hear the encomiasts of Homer affirming that he is +the educator of Hellas, and that all life should be regulated by his +precepts, we may allow the excellence of their intentions, and agree +with them in thinking Homer a great poet and tragedian. But we shall +continue to prohibit all poetry which goes beyond hymns to the Gods and +praises of famous men. Not pleasure and pain, but law and reason shall +rule in our State. + +These are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge +us with discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind +her that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of +which there are many traces in the writings of the poets, such as the +saying of 'the she-dog, yelping at her mistress,' and 'the philosophers +who are ready to circumvent Zeus,' and 'the philosophers who are +paupers.' Nevertheless we bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow +her to return upon condition that she makes a defence of herself in +verse; and her supporters who are not poets may speak in prose. We +confess her charms; but if she cannot show that she is useful as well +as delightful, like rational lovers, we must renounce our love, +though endeared to us by early associations. Having come to years of +discretion, we know that poetry is not truth, and that a man should be +careful how he introduces her to that state or constitution which he +himself is; for there is a mighty issue at stake--no less than the good +or evil of a human soul. And it is not worth while to forsake justice +and virtue for the attractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of +honour or wealth. 'I agree with you.' + +And yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described. +'And can we conceive things greater still?' Not, perhaps, in this brief +span of life: but should an immortal being care about anything short of +eternity? 'I do not understand what you mean?' Do you not know that the +soul is immortal? 'Surely you are not prepared to prove that?' Indeed I +am. 'Then let me hear this argument, of which you make so light.' + +You would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil. In +all things there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy +them, nothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting principles, +which are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of +these destroy the soul in the same sense that disease destroys the body. +The soul may be full of all iniquities, but is not, by reason of them, +brought any nearer to death. Nothing which was not destroyed from within +ever perished by external affection of evil. The body, which is one +thing, cannot be destroyed by food, which is another, unless the badness +of the food is communicated to the body. Neither can the soul, which +is one thing, be corrupted by the body, which is another, unless she +herself is infected. And as no bodily evil can infect the soul, neither +can any bodily evil, whether disease or violence, or any other destroy +the soul, unless it can be shown to render her unholy and unjust. But no +one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust when +they die. If a person has the audacity to say the contrary, the answer +is--Then why do criminals require the hand of the executioner, and +not die of themselves? 'Truly,' he said, 'injustice would not be very +terrible if it brought a cessation of evil; but I rather believe that +the injustice which murders others may tend to quicken and stimulate +the life of the unjust.' You are quite right. If sin which is her own +natural and inherent evil cannot destroy the soul, hardly will anything +else destroy her. But the soul which cannot be destroyed either by +internal or external evil must be immortal and everlasting. And if +this be true, souls will always exist in the same number. They cannot +diminish, because they cannot be destroyed; nor yet increase, for the +increase of the immortal must come from something mortal, and so all +would end in immortality. Neither is the soul variable and diverse; for +that which is immortal must be of the fairest and simplest composition. +If we would conceive her truly, and so behold justice and injustice in +their own nature, she must be viewed by the light of reason pure as at +birth, or as she is reflected in philosophy when holding converse with +the divine and immortal and eternal. In her present condition we see her +only like the sea-god Glaucus, bruised and maimed in the sea which is +the world, and covered with shells and stones which are incrusted upon +her from the entertainments of earth. + +Thus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards +and honours which the poets attribute to justice; we have contented +ourselves with showing that justice in herself is best for the soul in +herself, even if a man should put on a Gyges' ring and have the helmet +of Hades too. And now you shall repay me what you borrowed; and I will +enumerate the rewards of justice in life and after death. I granted, +for the sake of argument, as you will remember, that evil might +perhaps escape the knowledge of Gods and men, although this was really +impossible. And since I have shown that justice has reality, you must +grant me also that she has the palm of appearance. In the first place, +the just man is known to the Gods, and he is therefore the friend of the +Gods, and he will receive at their hands every good, always excepting +such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. All things end +in good to him, either in life or after death, even what appears to +be evil; for the Gods have a care of him who desires to be in their +likeness. And what shall we say of men? Is not honesty the best policy? +The clever rogue makes a great start at first, but breaks down before he +reaches the goal, and slinks away in dishonour; whereas the true runner +perseveres to the end, and receives the prize. And you must allow me +to repeat all the blessings which you attributed to the fortunate +unjust--they bear rule in the city, they marry and give in marriage to +whom they will; and the evils which you attributed to the unfortunate +just, do really fall in the end on the unjust, although, as you implied, +their sufferings are better veiled in silence. + +But all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when compared +with those which await good men after death. 'I should like to hear +about them.' Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er, the son of +Armenius, a valiant man. He was supposed to have died in battle, but ten +days afterwards his body was found untouched by corruption and sent home +for burial. On the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral pyre and +there he came to life again, and told what he had seen in the world +below. He said that his soul went with a great company to a place, in +which there were two chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two +corresponding chasms in the heaven above. And there were judges sitting +in the intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by the heavenly +way on the right hand, having the seal of their judgment set upon them +before, while the unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to descend +by the way on the left hand. Him they told to look and listen, as he was +to be their messenger to men from the world below. And he beheld and saw +the souls departing after judgment at either chasm; some who came from +earth, were worn and travel-stained; others, who came from heaven, +were clean and bright. They seemed glad to meet and rest awhile in the +meadow; here they discoursed with one another of what they had seen in +the other world. Those who came from earth wept at the remembrance of +their sorrows, but the spirits from above spoke of glorious sights and +heavenly bliss. He said that for every evil deed they were punished +tenfold--now the journey was of a thousand years' duration, because the +life of man was reckoned as a hundred years--and the rewards of virtue +were in the same proportion. He added something hardly worth repeating +about infants dying almost as soon as they were born. Of parricides and +other murderers he had tortures still more terrible to narrate. He was +present when one of the spirits asked--Where is Ardiaeus the Great? +(This Ardiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who had murdered his father, and his +elder brother, a thousand years before.) Another spirit answered, +'He comes not hither, and will never come. And I myself,' he added, +'actually saw this terrible sight. At the entrance of the chasm, as we +were about to reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other sinners--most +of whom had been tyrants, but not all--and just as they fancied that +they were returning to life, the chasm gave a roar, and then wild, +fiery-looking men who knew the meaning of the sound, seized him and +several others, and bound them hand and foot and threw them down, and +dragged them along at the side of the road, lacerating them and carding +them like wool, and explaining to the passers-by, that they were going +to be cast into hell.' The greatest terror of the pilgrims ascending was +lest they should hear the voice, and when there was silence one by one +they passed up with joy. To these sufferings there were corresponding +delights. + +On the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, +and in four days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of +light, in colour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day +more brought them to the place, and they saw that this was the column +of light which binds together the whole universe. The ends of the column +were fastened to heaven, and from them hung the distaff of Necessity, +on which all the heavenly bodies turned--the hook and spindle were of +adamant, and the whorl of a mixed substance. The whorl was in form +like a number of boxes fitting into one another with their edges +turned upwards, making together a single whorl which was pierced by the +spindle. The outermost had the rim broadest, and the inner whorls were +smaller and smaller, and had their rims narrower. The largest (the fixed +stars) was spangled--the seventh (the sun) was brightest--the eighth +(the moon) shone by the light of the seventh--the second and fifth +(Saturn and Mercury) were most like one another and yellower than the +eighth--the third (Jupiter) had the whitest light--the fourth (Mars) +was red--the sixth (Venus) was in whiteness second. The whole had one +motion, but while this was revolving in one direction the seven inner +circles were moving in the opposite, with various degrees of swiftness +and slowness. The spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and a Siren +stood hymning upon each circle, while Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, the +daughters of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal intervals, singing of +past, present, and future, responsive to the music of the Sirens; Clotho +from time to time guiding the outer circle with a touch of her right +hand; Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner circles; +Lachesis in turn putting forth her hand from time to time to guide both +of them. On their arrival the pilgrims went to Lachesis, and there was +an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from her knees lots, and +samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and said: 'Mortal souls, hear +the words of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. A new period of +mortal life has begun, and you may choose what divinity you please; +the responsibility of choosing is with you--God is blameless.' After +speaking thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took up the +lot which fell near him. He then placed on the ground before them the +samples of lives, many more than the souls present; and there were all +sorts of lives, of men and of animals. There were tyrannies ending in +misery and exile, and lives of men and women famous for their different +qualities; and also mixed lives, made up of wealth and poverty, +sickness and health. Here, Glaucon, is the great risk of human life, and +therefore the whole of education should be directed to the acquisition +of such a knowledge as will teach a man to refuse the evil and choose +the good. He should know all the combinations which occur in life--of +beauty with poverty or with wealth,--of knowledge with external +goods,--and at last choose with reference to the nature of the soul, +regarding that only as the better life which makes men better, and +leaving the rest. And a man must take with him an iron sense of truth +and right into the world below, that there too he may remain undazzled +by wealth or the allurements of evil, and be determined to avoid the +extremes and choose the mean. For this, as the messenger reported the +interpreter to have said, is the true happiness of man; and any one, as +he proclaimed, may, if he choose with understanding, have a good lot, +even though he come last. 'Let not the first be careless in his choice, +nor the last despair.' He spoke; and when he had spoken, he who had +drawn the first lot chose a tyranny: he did not see that he was fated to +devour his own children--and when he discovered his mistake, he wept +and beat his breast, blaming chance and the Gods and anybody rather +than himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and in his +previous life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had +only habit and no philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad choice, +because he had no experience of life; whereas those who came from earth +and had seen trouble were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a +man had followed philosophy while upon earth, and had been moderately +fortunate in his lot, he might not only be happy here, but his +pilgrimage both from and to this world would be smooth and heavenly. +Nothing was more curious than the spectacle of the choice, at once sad +and laughable and wonderful; most of the souls only seeking to avoid +their own condition in a previous life. He saw the soul of Orpheus +changing into a swan because he would not be born of a woman; there was +Thamyras becoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the swan, choosing +to be men; the twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, preferring the +life of a lion to that of a man, in remembrance of the injustice which +was done to him in the judgment of the arms; and Agamemnon, from a like +enmity to human nature, passing into an eagle. About the middle was the +soul of Atalanta choosing the honours of an athlete, and next to her +Epeus taking the nature of a workwoman; among the last was Thersites, +who was changing himself into a monkey. Thither, the last of all, came +Odysseus, and sought the lot of a private man, which lay neglected and +despised, and when he found it he went away rejoicing, and said that if +he had been first instead of last, his choice would have been the same. +Men, too, were seen passing into animals, and wild and tame animals +changing into one another. + +When all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each +of them their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of +all brought them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the +revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand; from her they were +carried to Atropos, who made the threads irreversible; whence, without +turning round, they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when +they had all passed, they moved on in scorching heat to the plain of +Forgetfulness and rested at evening by the river Unmindful, whose water +could not be retained in any vessel; of this they had all to drink a +certain quantity--some of them drank more than was required, and he who +drank forgot all things. Er himself was prevented from drinking. +When they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were +thunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly they were all driven divers +ways, shooting like stars to their birth. Concerning his return to the +body, he only knew that awaking suddenly in the morning he found himself +lying on the pyre. + +Thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if we +believe that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the heavenly way +of Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river +of Forgetfulness, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have +a crown of reward and happiness both in this world and also in the +millennial pilgrimage of the other. + +The Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions: first, +resuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the +poets, who, now that the nature of the soul has been analyzed, are +seen to be very far gone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the +reality of the happiness of the just, he demands that appearance shall +be restored to him, and then proceeds to prove the immortality of the +soul. The argument, as in the Phaedo and Gorgias, is supplemented by the +vision of a future life. + +Why Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and +dramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially +to the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may +be embodied in verse as well as in prose, and that there are some +indefinable lights and shadows of human life which can only be expressed +in poetry--some elements of imagination which always entwine with +reason; why he should have supposed epic verse to be inseparably +associated with the impurities of the old Hellenic mythology; why +he should try Homer and Hesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of +utility,--are questions which have always been debated amongst students +of Plato. Though unable to give a complete answer to them, we may +show--first, that his views arose naturally out of the circumstances +of his age; and secondly, we may elicit the truth as well as the error +which is contained in them. + +He is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own +lifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the Laws, had taken the +place of an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last phase +of the tragic drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and apologist of +tyrants, and the Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was almost extinct; +the new had not yet arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry, like every other +branch of Greek literature, was falling under the power of rhetoric. +There was no 'second or third' to Aeschylus and Sophocles in the +generation which followed them. Aristophanes, in one of his later +comedies (Frogs), speaks of 'thousands of tragedy-making prattlers,' +whose attempts at poetry he compares to the chirping of swallows; 'their +garrulity went far beyond Euripides,'--'they appeared once upon the +stage, and there was an end of them.' To a man of genius who had a +real appreciation of the godlike Aeschylus and the noble and gentle +Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their 'theology' +(Rep.), these 'minor poets' must have been contemptible and intolerable. +There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato than a sense of +the decline and decay both in literature and in politics which marked +his own age. Nor can he have been expected to look with favour on the +licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of his career, who had begun by +satirizing Socrates in the Clouds, and in a similar spirit forty years +afterwards had satirized the founders of ideal commonwealths in his +Eccleziazusae, or Female Parliament (Laws). + +There were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The +profession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human +nature, for 'one man in his life' cannot 'play many parts;' the +characters which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, +and to leave nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any +man live his life and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not the +master of it. Taking this view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of +the dramatic than of the epic poets, though he must have known that +the Greek tragedians afforded noble lessons and examples of virtue +and patriotism, to which nothing in Homer can be compared. But great +dramatic or even great rhetorical power is hardly consistent with +firmness or strength of mind, and dramatic talent is often incidentally +associated with a weak or dissolute character. + +In the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, +he says that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third +degree removed from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and +measure; they are only appearances. In modern times we should say that +art is not merely imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in +forms of sense. Even adopting the humble image of Plato, from which +his argument derives a colour, we should maintain that the artist may +ennoble the bed which he paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the +feeling of home which he introduces; and there have been modern +painters who have imparted such an ideal interest to a blacksmith's or +a carpenter's shop. The eye or mind which feels as well as sees can give +dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, or a straw-built shed (Rembrandt), +to the hull of a vessel 'going to its last home' (Turner). Still more +would this apply to the greatest works of art, which seem to be the +visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been asked whether the Zeus +or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation only, would he +not have been compelled to admit that something more was to be found in +them than in the form of any mortal; and that the rule of proportion +to which they conformed was 'higher far than any geometry or arithmetic +could express?' (Statesman.) + +Again, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the +emotional rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not +admit Aristotle's theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are +a purgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to +afford the opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that +we may sometimes cure disordered emotions by giving expression to them; +and that they often gain strength when pent up within our own breast. +It is not every indulgence of the feelings which is to be condemned. +For there may be a gratification of the higher as well as of the +lower--thoughts which are too deep or too sad to be expressed by +ourselves, may find an utterance in the words of poets. Every one would +acknowledge that there have been times when they were consoled and +elevated by beautiful music or by the sublimity of architecture or by +the peacefulness of nature. Plato has himself admitted, in the earlier +part of the Republic, that the arts might have the effect of harmonizing +as well as of enervating the mind; but in the Tenth Book he regards them +through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He asks only 'What good have they +done?' and is not satisfied with the reply, that 'They have given +innocent pleasure to mankind.' + +He tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he +has found by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the +inferior faculties. He means to say that the higher faculties have to do +with universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are on +a level with their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato; +and he was well aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of +life by any process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical use of +them is in fact a denial of their authority; he saw, too, that the +poets were not critics--as he says in the Apology, 'Any one was a better +interpreter of their writings than they were themselves. He himself +ceased to be a poet when he became a disciple of Socrates; though, as he +tells us of Solon, 'he might have been one of the greatest of them, if +he had not been deterred by other pursuits' (Tim.) Thus from many points +of view there is an antagonism between Plato and the poets, which was +foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. +The poets, as he says in the Protagoras, were the Sophists of their day; +and his dislike of the one class is reflected on the other. He regards +them both as the enemies of reasoning and abstraction, though in the +case of Euripides more with reference to his immoral sentiments about +tyrants and the like. For Plato is the prophet who 'came into the world +to convince men'--first of the fallibility of sense and opinion, and +secondly of the reality of abstract ideas. Whatever strangeness there +may be in modern times in opposing philosophy to poetry, which to us +seem to have so many elements in common, the strangeness will disappear +if we conceive of poetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as +equivalent to thought and abstraction. Unfortunately the very word +'idea,' which to Plato is expressive of the most real of all things, is +associated in our minds with an element of subjectiveness and unreality. +We may note also how he differs from Aristotle who declares poetry to +be truer than history, for the opposite reason, because it is concerned +with universals, not like history, with particulars (Poet). + +The things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which +are unseen--they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. +To him all particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; +they have a taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in +seeing that this is an illusion; for there is no more error or variation +in an individual man, horse, bed, etc., than in the class man, horse, +bed, etc.; nor is the truth which is displayed in individual instances +less certain than that which is conveyed through the medium of +ideas. But Plato, who is deeply impressed with the real importance of +universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them an essential +truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be often false +and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear conception of the +individual, which is the synthesis of the universal and the particular; +or had he been able to distinguish between opinion and sensation, which +the ambiguity of the words (Greek) and the like, tended to confuse, he +would not have denied truth to the particulars of sense. + +But the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning +in all departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and +rhetoricians of the Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, +false prophets, lying spirits, enchanters of the world. There is another +count put into the indictment against them by Plato, that they are +the friends of the tyrant, and bask in the sunshine of his patronage. +Despotism in all ages has had an apparatus of false ideas and false +teachers at its service--in the history of Modern Europe as well as of +Greece and Rome. For no government of men depends solely upon force; +without some corruption of literature and morals--some appeal to the +imagination of the masses--some pretence to the favour of heaven--some +element of good giving power to evil, tyranny, even for a short time, +cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were not insensible to the +importance of awakening in their cause a Pseudo-Hellenic feeling; they +were proud of successes at the Olympic games; they were not devoid of +the love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the first instance +of Greek poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or Archelaus: and +the old spirit of freedom is roused within him at their prostitution of +the Tragic Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his prophetic eye extends +beyond them to the false teachers of other ages who are the creatures of +the government under which they live. He compares the corruption of his +contemporaries with the idea of a perfect society, and gathers up +into one mass of evil the evils and errors of mankind; to him they are +personified in the rhetoricians, sophists, poets, rulers who deceive and +govern the world. + +A further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative +arts is that they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be +disposed to introduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him. +For the emotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not +most likely to be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by +the moderate indulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present +thought in the form of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of +reason, to inspire even for a moment courage or resignation; perhaps to +suggest a sense of infinity and eternity in a way which mere language is +incapable of attaining. True, the same power which in the purer age of +art embodies gods and heroes only, may be made to express the voluptuous +image of a Corinthian courtezan. But this only shows that art, like +other outward things, may be turned to good and also to evil, and is not +more closely connected with the higher than with the lower part of the +soul. All imitative art is subject to certain limitations, and therefore +necessarily partakes of the nature of a compromise. Something of ideal +truth is sacrificed for the sake of the representation, and something in +the exactness of the representation is sacrificed to the ideal. Still, +works of art have a permanent element; they idealize and detain the +passing thought, and are the intermediates between sense and ideas. + +In the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of +fiction may certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the +existence of an age in which a severer conception of truth has either +banished or transformed them. At any rate we must admit that they hold +a different place at different periods of the world's history. In the +infancy of mankind, poetry, with the exception of proverbs, is the +whole of literature, and the only instrument of intellectual culture; in +modern times she is the shadow or echo of her former self, and appears +to have a precarious existence. Milton in his day doubted whether an +epic poem was any longer possible. At the same time we must remember, +that what Plato would have called the charms of poetry have been partly +transferred to prose; he himself (Statesman) admits rhetoric to be the +handmaiden of Politics, and proposes to find in the strain of law (Laws) +a substitute for the old poets. Among ourselves the creative power seems +often to be growing weaker, and scientific fact to be more engrossing +and overpowering to the mind than formerly. The illusion of the feelings +commonly called love, has hitherto been the inspiring influence of +modern poetry and romance, and has exercised a humanizing if not a +strengthening influence on the world. But may not the stimulus which +love has given to fancy be some day exhausted? The modern English novel +which is the most popular of all forms of reading is not more than a +century or two old: will the tale of love a hundred years hence, after +so many thousand variations of the same theme, be still received with +unabated interest? + +Art cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may +often corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which +all artistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect +expression, either of the religious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. +The fairest forms may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as is +proved by the fact that the Mahometans, and many sects of Christians, +have renounced the use of pictures and images. The beginning of a great +religion, whether Christian or Gentile, has not been 'wood or stone,' +but a spirit moving in the hearts of men. The disciples have met in a +large upper room or in 'holes and caves of the earth'; in the second or +third generation, they have had mosques, temples, churches, monasteries. +And the revival or reform of religions, like the first revelation +of them, has come from within and has generally disregarded external +ceremonies and accompaniments. + +But poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and +the purest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between two opposite +views--when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be +brought up amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book X, when he banishes +the poets from his Republic. Admitting that the arts, which some of us +almost deify, have fallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on +the other hand that to banish imagination wholly would be suicidal as +well as impossible. For nature too is a form of art; and a breath of +the fresh air or a single glance at the varying landscape would in an +instant revive and reillumine the extinguished spark of poetry in the +human breast. In the lower stages of civilization imagination more than +reason distinguishes man from the animals; and to banish art would be +to banish thought, to banish language, to banish the expression of +all truth. No religion is wholly devoid of external forms; even the +Mahometan who renounces the use of pictures and images has a temple in +which he worships the Most High, as solemn and beautiful as any Greek or +Christian building. Feeling too and thought are not really opposed; for +he who thinks must feel before he can execute. And the highest thoughts, +when they become familiarized to us, are always tending to pass into the +form of feeling. + +Plato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society. +But he feels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting +against the degeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest +against the want of serious purpose in modern fiction, against the +unseemliness or extravagance of some of our poets or novelists, +against the time-serving of preachers or public writers, against the +regardlessness of truth which to the eye of the philosopher seems to +characterize the greater part of the world. For we too have reason to +complain that our poets and novelists 'paint inferior truth' and 'are +concerned with the inferior part of the soul'; that the readers of them +become what they read and are injuriously affected by them. And we look +in vain for that healthy atmosphere of which Plato speaks,--'the beauty +which meets the sense like a breeze and imperceptibly draws the soul, +even in childhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.' + +For there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine +perfection, the harmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which +should renew the youth of the world, and bring back the ages in which +the poet was man's only teacher and best friend,--which would find +materials in the living present as well as in the romance of the +past, and might subdue to the fairest forms of speech and verse the +intractable materials of modern civilisation,--which might elicit the +simple principles, or, as Plato would have called them, the essential +forms, of truth and justice out of the variety of opinion and the +complexity of modern society,--which would preserve all the good of each +generation and leave the bad unsung,--which should be based not on vain +longings or faint imaginings, but on a clear insight into the nature of +man. Then the tale of love might begin again in poetry or prose, two in +one, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God and man; +and feelings of love might still be the incentive to great thoughts +and heroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; and many types +of manly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above the +ordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems (Laws), +be not only written, but lived by us. A few such strains have been +heard among men in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato +quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and +serious approval,--in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in +passages of other English poets,--first and above all in the Hebrew +prophets and psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should +speak and act; he has drawn characters of a wonderful purity and depth; +he has ennobled the human mind, but, like Homer (Rep.), he 'has left +no way of life.' The next greatest poet of modern times, Goethe, is +concerned with 'a lower degree of truth'; he paints the world as a stage +on which 'all the men and women are merely players'; he cultivates life +as an art, but he furnishes no ideals of truth and action. The poet may +rebel against any attempt to set limits to his fancy; and he may +argue truly that moralizing in verse is not poetry. Possibly, like +Mephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his adversaries. But the +philosopher will still be justified in asking, 'How may the heavenly +gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?' + +Returning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth +and error appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the +absurdity of mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer; just +as in the Phaedrus he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology +upon rational principles; both these were the modern tendencies of his +own age, which he deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument +that Homer, if he had been able to teach mankind anything worth knowing, +would not have been allowed by them to go about begging as a rhapsodist, +is both false and contrary to the spirit of Plato (Rep.). It may be +compared with those other paradoxes of the Gorgias, that 'No statesman +was ever unjustly put to death by the city of which he was the head'; +and that 'No Sophist was ever defrauded by his pupils' (Gorg.)... + +The argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of +soul and body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force +which is able to put an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil; and if +she cannot be destroyed by that, she cannot be destroyed by any other. +Yet Plato has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the +incrustations of earth as to lose her original form; and in the Timaeus +he recognizes more strongly than in the Republic the influence which the +body has over the mind, denying even the voluntariness of human actions, +on the ground that they proceed from physical states (Tim.). In the +Republic, as elsewhere, he wavers between the original soul which has +to be restored, and the character which is developed by training and +education... + +The vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who +is said by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale +has certainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the +pilgrimages of the soul in the Zend Avesta (Haug, Avesta). But no trace +of acquaintance with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato's writings, +and there is no reason for giving him the name of Er the Pamphylian. The +philosophy of Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from Zoroaster, +and still less the myths of Plato. + +The local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the +Phaedrus and Phaedo. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology; +the great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a cylinder +or box, containing the seven orbits of the planets and the fixed stars; +this is suspended from an axis or spindle which turns on the knees of +Necessity; the revolutions of the seven orbits contained in the cylinder +are guided by the fates, and their harmonious motion produces the music +of the spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of these, which is the +moon, is passed the spindle; but it is doubtful whether this is the +continuation of the column of light, from which the pilgrims contemplate +the heavens; the words of Plato imply that they are connected, but +not the same. The column itself is clearly not of adamant. The spindle +(which is of adamant) is fastened to the ends of the chains which +extend to the middle of the column of light--this column is said to hold +together the heaven; but whether it hangs from the spindle, or is at +right angles to it, is not explained. The cylinder containing the orbits +of the stars is almost as much a symbol as the figure of Necessity +turning the spindle;--for the outermost rim is the sphere of the fixed +stars, and nothing is said about the intervals of space which divide the +paths of the stars in the heavens. The description is both a picture and +an orrery, and therefore is necessarily inconsistent with itself. The +column of light is not the Milky Way--which is neither straight, nor +like a rainbow--but the imaginary axis of the earth. This is compared +to the rainbow in respect not of form but of colour, and not to the +undergirders of a trireme, but to the straight rope running from prow to +stern in which the undergirders meet. + +The orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in +its mode of representation from the circles of the same and of the +other in the Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from the +planets, and they move in orbits without them, although in an opposite +direction: in the Republic as in the Timaeus they are all moving round +the axis of the world. But we are not certain that in the former they +are moving round the earth. No distinct mention is made in the Republic +of the circles of the same and other; although both in the Timaeus and +in the Republic the motion of the fixed stars is supposed to coincide +with the motion of the whole. The relative thickness of the rims is +perhaps designed to express the relative distances of the planets. +Plato probably intended to represent the earth, from which Er and his +companions are viewing the heavens, as stationary in place; but whether +or not herself revolving, unless this is implied in the revolution of +the axis, is uncertain (Timaeus). The spectator may be supposed to look +at the heavenly bodies, either from above or below. The earth is a sort +of earth and heaven in one, like the heaven of the Phaedrus, on the back +of which the spectator goes out to take a peep at the stars and is borne +round in the revolution. There is no distinction between the equator and +the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine that the planets have +an opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in order to account for +their appearances in the heavens. In the description of the meadow, and +the retribution of the good and evil after death, there are traces of +Homer. + +The description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as +forming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions +of the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or +weaving of the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them, +and the making of them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three +Fates--Lachesis, Clotho, Atropos, are obviously derived from their +names. The element of chance in human life is indicated by the order of +the lots. But chance, however adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom +of man, if he knows how to choose aright; there is a worse enemy to man +than chance; this enemy is himself. He who was moderately fortunate in +the number of the lot--even the very last comer--might have a good life +if he chose with wisdom. And as Plato does not like to make an assertion +which is unproven, he more than confirms this statement a few sentences +afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who chose last. But the virtue +which is founded on habit is not sufficient to enable a man to choose; +he must add to virtue knowledge, if he is to act rightly when placed +in new circumstances. The routine of good actions and good habits is +an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge says, 'Common sense +is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,' so Plato would have +said, 'Habit is worthless which is not based upon philosophy.' + +The freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is +distinctly asserted. 'Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours +her he will have more or less of her.' The life of man is 'rounded' +by necessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him +(Pol.). But within the walls of necessity there is an open space in +which he is his own master, and can study for himself the effects which +the variously compounded gifts of nature or fortune have upon the soul, +and act accordingly. All men cannot have the first choice in everything. +But the lot of all men is good enough, if they choose wisely and will +live diligently. + +The verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years, +by the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; +the coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was +supposed to have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed +in the meadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the +column of light; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who +chose the twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite +character among the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill +blamed any one rather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank +more than was necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself +was hindered from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, +unlike the conception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned +ignorance of how Er returned to the body, when the other souls went +shooting like stars to their birth,--add greatly to the probability of +the narrative. They are such touches of nature as the art of Defoe +might have introduced when he wished to win credibility for marvels and +apparitions. + +***** + +There still remain to be considered some points which have been +intentionally reserved to the end: (1) the Janus-like character of the +Republic, which presents two faces--one an Hellenic state, the other a +kingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects +are (2) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by +Morgenstern: (a) the community of property; (b) of families; (c) the +rule of philosophers; (d) the analogy of the individual and the State, +which, like some other analogies in the Republic, is carried too far. We +may then proceed to consider (3) the subject of education as conceived +by Plato, bringing together in a general view the education of youth +and the education of after-life; (4) we may note further some essential +differences between ancient and modern politics which are suggested by +the Republic; (5) we may compare the Politicus and the Laws; (6) we may +observe the influence exercised by Plato on his imitators; and (7) +take occasion to consider the nature and value of political, and (8) of +religious ideals. + +1. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State +(Book V). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan; such +as the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men, the +military training of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women. +The life of Sparta was the life of a camp (Laws), enforced even more +rigidly in time of peace than in war; the citizens of Sparta, like +Plato's, were forbidden to trade--they were to be soldiers and not +shopkeepers. Nowhere else in Greece was the individual so completely +subjected to the State; the time when he was to marry, the education of +his children, the clothes which he was to wear, the food which he was +to eat, were all prescribed by law. Some of the best enactments in the +Republic, such as the reverence to be paid to parents and elders, +and some of the worst, such as the exposure of deformed children, are +borrowed from the practice of Sparta. The encouragement of friendships +between men and youths, or of men with one another, as affording +incentives to bravery, is also Spartan; in Sparta too a nearer approach +was made than in any other Greek State to equality of the sexes, and +to community of property; and while there was probably less of +licentiousness in the sense of immorality, the tie of marriage was +regarded more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The 'suprema lex' +was the preservation of the family, and the interest of the State. The +coarse strength of a military government was not favourable to purity +and refinement; and the excessive strictness of some regulations seems +to have produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most +accessible to bribery; several of the greatest of them might be +described in the words of Plato as having a 'fierce secret longing +after gold and silver.' Though not in the strict sense communists, the +principle of communism was maintained among them in their division of +lands, in their common meals, in their slaves, and in the free use of +one another's goods. Marriage was a public institution: and the women +were educated by the State, and sang and danced in public with the men. + +Many traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the +magistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry; as in +the Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled. Hymns +to the Gods, which are the only kind of music admitted into the ideal +State, were the only kind which was permitted at Sparta. The Spartans, +though an unpoetical race, were nevertheless lovers of poetry; they had +been stirred by the Elegiac strains of Tyrtaeus, they had crowded around +Hippias to hear his recitals of Homer; but in this they resembled the +citizens of the timocratic rather than of the ideal State. The council +of elder men also corresponds to the Spartan gerousia; and the freedom +with which they are permitted to judge about matters of detail agrees +with what we are told of that institution. Once more, the military rule +of not spoiling the dead or offering arms at the temples; the moderation +in the pursuit of enemies; the importance attached to the physical +well-being of the citizens; the use of warfare for the sake of defence +rather than of aggression--are features probably suggested by the spirit +and practice of Sparta. + +To the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and +the character of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan +citizen. The love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, +but was shared by many undistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to +find a principle which was wanting in their own democracy. The (Greek) +of the Spartans attracted them, that is to say, not the goodness +of their laws, but the spirit of order and loyalty which prevailed. +Fascinated by the idea, citizens of Athens would imitate the +Lacedaemonians in their dress and manners; they were known to the +contemporaries of Plato as 'the persons who had their ears bruised,' +like the Roundheads of the Commonwealth. The love of another church +or country when seen at a distance only, the longing for an imaginary +simplicity in civilized times, the fond desire of a past which never has +been, or of a future which never will be,--these are aspirations of the +human mind which are often felt among ourselves. Such feelings meet with +a response in the Republic of Plato. + +But there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example, +the literary and philosophical education, and the grace and beauty +of life, which are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his +citizens a taste of Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian +discipline. His individual genius is purely Athenian, although in theory +he is a lover of Sparta; and he is something more than either--he has +also a true Hellenic feeling. He is desirous of humanizing the wars of +Hellenes against one another; he acknowledges that the Delphian God is +the grand hereditary interpreter of all Hellas. The spirit of harmony +and the Dorian mode are to prevail, and the whole State is to have an +external beauty which is the reflex of the harmony within. But he +has not yet found out the truth which he afterwards enunciated in the +Laws--that he was a better legislator who made men to be of one mind, +than he who trained them for war. The citizens, as in other Hellenic +States, democratic as well as aristocratic, are really an upper class; +for, although no mention is made of slaves, the lower classes are +allowed to fade away into the distance, and are represented in the +individual by the passions. Plato has no idea either of a social State +in which all classes are harmonized, or of a federation of Hellas or +the world in which different nations or States have a place. His city +is equipped for war rather than for peace, and this would seem to be +justified by the ordinary condition of Hellenic States. The myth of the +earth-born men is an embodiment of the orthodox tradition of Hellas, +and the allusion to the four ages of the world is also sanctioned by +the authority of Hesiod and the poets. Thus we see that the Republic is +partly founded on the ideal of the old Greek polis, partly on the actual +circumstances of Hellas in that age. Plato, like the old painters, +retains the traditional form, and like them he has also a vision of a +city in the clouds. + +There is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the +work; for the Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean +league. The 'way of life' which was connected with the name of +Pythagoras, like the Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which +the mind of an individual might exercise over his contemporaries, and +may have naturally suggested to Plato the possibility of reviving such +'mediaeval institutions.' The Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule +of life and a moral and intellectual training. The influence ascribed to +music, which to us seems exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature; it +is not to be regarded as representing the real influence of music in +the Greek world. More nearly than any other government of Hellas, the +Pythagorean league of three hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For +once in the history of mankind the philosophy of order or (Greek), +expressing and consequently enlisting on its side the combined +endeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the management of +public affairs and held possession of it for a considerable time (until +about B.C. 500). Probably only in States prepared by Dorian institutions +would such a league have been possible. The rulers, like Plato's +(Greek), were required to submit to a severe training in order to +prepare the way for the education of the other members of the community. +Long after the dissolution of the Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as +Archytas of Tarentum, retained their political influence over the cities +of Magna Graecia. There was much here that was suggestive to the kindred +spirit of Plato, who had doubtless meditated deeply on the 'way of life +of Pythagoras' (Rep.) and his followers. Slight traces of Pythagoreanism +are to be found in the mystical number of the State, in the number which +expresses the interval between the king and the tyrant, in the doctrine +of transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in the great +though secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in education. + +But as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far +beyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which +is to unite the past of Greek history with the future of philosophy, +analogous to that other impossibility, which has often been the dream +of Christendom, the attempt to unite the past history of Europe with +the kingdom of Christ. Nothing actually existing in the world at all +resembles Plato's ideal State; nor does he himself imagine that such +a State is possible. This he repeats again and again; e.g. in the +Republic, or in the Laws where, casting a glance back on the Republic, +he admits that the perfect state of communism and philosophy was +impossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a pattern. +The same doubt is implied in the earnestness with which he argues in the +Republic that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be realized +in fact, and in the chorus of laughter, which like a breaking wave will, +as he anticipates, greet the mention of his proposals; though like +other writers of fiction, he uses all his art to give reality to his +inventions. When asked how the ideal polity can come into being, he +answers ironically, 'When one son of a king becomes a philosopher'; he +designates the fiction of the earth-born men as 'a noble lie'; and when +the structure is finally complete, he fairly tells you that his Republic +is a vision only, which in some sense may have reality, but not in the +vulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon earth. It has been said that +Plato flies as well as walks, but this falls short of the truth; for he +flies and walks at the same time, and is in the air and on firm ground +in successive instants. + +Niebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in +this place--Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal +to Athenian institutions?--he can hardly be said to be the friend of +democracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of +government; all of them he regarded as 'states of faction' (Laws); none +attained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects, which +seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other; and the +worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has hardly any +meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings are not meant +for a particular age and country, but for all time and all mankind. The +decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive which led Plato to +frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be regarded as reflecting the +departing glory of Hellas. As well might we complain of St. Augustine, +whose great work 'The City of God' originated in a similar motive, for +not being loyal to the Roman Empire. Even a nearer parallel might be +afforded by the first Christians, who cannot fairly be charged with +being bad citizens because, though 'subject to the higher powers,' they +were looking forward to a city which is in heaven. + +2. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of +according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age +have been said to become the commonplaces of the next; but the +paradoxes of Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to his +contemporaries. The modern world has either sneered at them as absurd, +or denounced them as unnatural and immoral; men have been pleased to +find in Aristotle's criticisms of them the anticipation of their own +good sense. The wealthy and cultivated classes have disliked and also +dreaded them; they have pointed with satisfaction to the failure of +efforts to realize them in practice. Yet since they are the thoughts of +one of the greatest of human intelligences, and of one who had done +most to elevate morality and religion, they seem to deserve a better +treatment at our hands. We may have to address the public, as Plato does +poetry, and assure them that we mean no harm to existing institutions. +There are serious errors which have a side of truth and which therefore +may fairly demand a careful consideration: there are truths mixed with +error of which we may indeed say, 'The half is better than the whole.' +Yet 'the half' may be an important contribution to the study of human +nature. + +(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned +slightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle +observes, is confined to the guardians; at least no mention is made of +the other classes. But the omission is not of any real significance, and +probably arises out of the plan of the work, which prevents the writer +from entering into details. + +Aristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of +modern political economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing +away with the spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to +consider the subject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled +by the common opinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the +sacredness of property is a notion far more fixed in modern than +in ancient times. The world has grown older, and is therefore more +conservative. Primitive society offered many examples of land held in +common, either by a tribe or by a township, and such may probably +have been the original form of landed tenure. Ancient legislators had +invented various modes of dividing and preserving the divisions of land +among the citizens; according to Aristotle there were nations who held +the land in common and divided the produce, and there were others who +divided the land and stored the produce in common. The evils of debt and +the inequality of property were far greater in ancient than in modern +times, and the accidents to which property was subject from war, or +revolution, or taxation, or other legislative interference, were also +greater. All these circumstances gave property a less fixed and sacred +character. The early Christians are believed to have held their property +in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words of Christ +himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in almost +all ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of modern +enthusiasts who have made a religion of communism; in every age of +religious excitement notions like Wycliffe's 'inheritance of grace' +have tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent, +has appeared in politics. 'The preparation of the Gospel of peace' soon +becomes the red flag of Republicanism. + +We can hardly judge what effect Plato's views would have upon his +own contemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an +exaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would +acknowledge that the right of private property is based on expediency, +and may be interfered with in a variety of ways for the public good. Any +other mode of vesting property which was found to be more advantageous, +would in time acquire the same basis of right; 'the most useful,' in +Plato's words, 'would be the most sacred.' The lawyers and ecclesiastics +of former ages would have spoken of property as a sacred institution. +But they only meant by such language to oppose the greatest amount +of resistance to any invasion of the rights of individuals and of the +Church. + +When we consider the question, without any fear of immediate application +to practice, in the spirit of Plato's Republic, are we quite sure that +the received notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of +wealth which is customary in civilized countries the most favourable +that can be conceived for the education and development of the mass +of mankind? Can 'the spectator of all time and all existence' be quite +convinced that one or two thousand years hence, great changes will not +have taken place in the rights of property, or even that the very notion +of property, beyond what is necessary for personal maintenance, may not +have disappeared? This was a distinction familiar to Aristotle, though +likely to be laughed at among ourselves. Such a change would not be +greater than some other changes through which the world has passed +in the transition from ancient to modern society, for example, the +emancipation of the serfs in Russia, or the abolition of slavery in +America and the West Indies; and not so great as the difference which +separates the Eastern village community from the Western world. To +accomplish such a revolution in the course of a few centuries, would +imply a rate of progress not more rapid than has actually taken place +during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom of Japan underwent +more change in five or six years than Europe in five or six hundred. +Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished among ourselves +quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have passed away; and +the most untenable propositions respecting the right of bequests or +entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the most moderate. +Some one will be heard to ask whether a state of society can be final in +which the interests of thousands are perilled on the life or character +of a single person. And many will indulge the hope that our present +condition may, after all, be only transitional, and may conduct to a +higher, in which property, besides ministering to the enjoyment of the +few, may also furnish the means of the highest culture to all, and will +be a greater benefit to the public generally, and also more under the +control of public authority. There may come a time when the saying, +'Have I not a right to do what I will with my own?' will appear to be a +barbarous relic of individualism;--when the possession of a part may be +a greater blessing to each and all than the possession of the whole is +now to any one. + +Such reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman, +but they are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can +imagine that in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of +some individual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk +as deep into the heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as +private property is to ourselves. He knows that this latter institution +is not more than four or five thousand years old: may not the end revert +to the beginning? In our own age even Utopias affect the spirit of +legislation, and an abstract idea may exercise a great influence on +practical politics. + +The objections that would be generally urged against Plato's community +of property, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives for exertion +would be taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was +dependent upon all. Every man would produce as little and consume as +much as he liked. The experience of civilized nations has hitherto been +adverse to Socialism. The effort is too great for human nature; men try +to live in common, but the personal feeling is always breaking in. On +the other hand it may be doubted whether our present notions of property +are not conventional, for they differ in different countries and in +different states of society. We boast of an individualism which is not +freedom, but rather an artificial result of the industrial state +of modern Europe. The individual is nominally free, but he is also +powerless in a world bound hand and foot in the chains of economic +necessity. Even if we cannot expect the mass of mankind to become +disinterested, at any rate we observe in them a power of organization +which fifty years ago would never have been suspected. The same forces +which have revolutionized the political system of Europe, may effect a +similar change in the social and industrial relations of mankind. And if +we suppose the influence of some good as well as neutral motives working +in the community, there will be no absurdity in expecting that the +mass of mankind having power, and becoming enlightened about the higher +possibilities of human life, when they learn how much more is attainable +for all than is at present the possession of a favoured few, may pursue +the common interest with an intelligence and persistency which mankind +have hitherto never seen. + +Now that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held +fast under the tyranny of custom and ignorance; now that criticism has +pierced the veil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the +present,--the progress of civilization may be expected to be far greater +and swifter than heretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the point +at which we may arrive in two or three generations is beyond the power +of imagination to foresee. There are forces in the world which work, not +in an arithmetical, but in a geometrical ratio of increase. +Education, to use the expression of Plato, moves like a wheel with +an ever-multiplying rapidity. Nor can we say how great may be its +influence, when it becomes universal,--when it has been inherited by +many generations,--when it is freed from the trammels of superstition +and rightly adapted to the wants and capacities of different classes +of men and women. Neither do we know how much more the co-operation of +minds or of hands may be capable of accomplishing, whether in labour or +in study. The resources of the natural sciences are not half-developed +as yet; the soil of the earth, instead of growing more barren, may +become many times more fertile than hitherto; the uses of machinery far +greater, and also more minute than at present. New secrets of physiology +may be revealed, deeply affecting human nature in its innermost +recesses. The standard of health may be raised and the lives of men +prolonged by sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be peace, there +may be leisure, there may be innocent refreshments of many kinds. The +ever-increasing power of locomotion may join the extremes of earth. +There may be mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur only +at great crises of history. The East and the West may meet together, and +all nations may contribute their thoughts and their experience to the +common stock of humanity. Many other elements enter into a speculation +of this kind. But it is better to make an end of them. For such +reflections appear to the majority far-fetched, and to men of science, +commonplace. + +(b) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the doctrine of +community of property present at all the same difficulty, or appear to +be the same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the community +of wives and children. This paradox he prefaces by another proposal, +that the occupations of men and women shall be the same, and that to +this end they shall have a common training and education. Male and +female animals have the same pursuits--why not also the two sexes of +man? + +But have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we were saying +that different natures should have different pursuits. How then can men +and women have the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our +notion of the division of labour?--These objections are no sooner raised +than answered; for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference +between men and women, but only the accidental one that men beget and +women bear children. Following the analogy of the other animals, he +contends that all natural gifts are scattered about indifferently among +both sexes, though there may be a superiority of degree on the part of +the men. The objection on the score of decency to their taking part +in the same gymnastic exercises, is met by Plato's assertion that the +existing feeling is a matter of habit. + +That Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own +country and from the example of the East, shows a wonderful independence +of mind. He is conscious that women are half the human race, in some +respects the more important half (Laws); and for the sake both of men +and women he desires to raise the woman to a higher level of existence. +He brings, not sentiment, but philosophy to bear upon a question which +both in ancient and modern times has been chiefly regarded in the light +of custom or feeling. The Greeks had noble conceptions of womanhood +in the goddesses Athene and Artemis, and in the heroines Antigone and +Andromache. But these ideals had no counterpart in actual life. The +Athenian woman was in no way the equal of her husband; she was not the +entertainer of his guests or the mistress of his house, but only his +housekeeper and the mother of his children. She took no part in military +or political matters; nor is there any instance in the later ages of +Greece of a woman becoming famous in literature. 'Hers is the greatest +glory who has the least renown among men,' is the historian's conception +of feminine excellence. A very different ideal of womanhood is held up +by Plato to the world; she is to be the companion of the man, and to +share with him in the toils of war and in the cares of government. She +is to be similarly trained both in bodily and mental exercises. She +is to lose as far as possible the incidents of maternity and the +characteristics of the female sex. + +The modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the +differences between men and women are not confined to the single point +urged by Plato; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities +of women, while energy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked +for in men. And the criticism is just: the differences affect the whole +nature, and are not, as Plato supposes, confined to a single point. But +neither can we say how far these differences are due to education and +the opinions of mankind, or physically inherited from the habits and +opinions of former generations. Women have been always taught, not +exactly that they are slaves, but that they are in an inferior position, +which is also supposed to have compensating advantages; and to this +position they have conformed. It is also true that the physical form may +easily change in the course of generations through the mode of life; and +the weakness or delicacy, which was once a matter of opinion, may become +a physical fact. The characteristics of sex vary greatly in different +countries and ranks of society, and at different ages in the same +individuals. Plato may have been right in denying that there was any +ultimate difference in the sexes of man other than that which exists in +animals, because all other differences may be conceived to disappear in +other states of society, or under different circumstances of life and +training. + +The first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second--community +of wives and children. 'Is it possible? Is it desirable?' For as Glaucon +intimates, and as we far more strongly insist, 'Great doubts may +be entertained about both these points.' Any free discussion of the +question is impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing +the ultimate bases of social life to be examined. Few of us can safely +enquire into the things which nature hides, any more than we can +dissect our own bodies. Still, the manner in which Plato arrived at his +conclusions should be considered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked, +is a wonderful thing, that one of the wisest and best of men should have +entertained ideas of morality which are wholly at variance with our +own. And if we would do Plato justice, we must examine carefully the +character of his proposals. First, we may observe that the relations of +the sexes supposed by him are the reverse of licentious: he seems rather +to aim at an impossible strictness. Secondly, he conceives the family +to be the natural enemy of the state; and he entertains the serious +hope that an universal brotherhood may take the place of private +interests--an aspiration which, although not justified by experience, +has possessed many noble minds. On the other hand, there is no sentiment +or imagination in the connections which men and women are supposed by +him to form; human beings return to the level of the animals, neither +exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing the natural instincts. All that +world of poetry and fancy which the passion of love has called forth +in modern literature and romance would have been banished by Plato. The +arrangements of marriage in the Republic are directed to one object--the +improvement of the race. In successive generations a great development +both of bodily and mental qualities might be possible. The analogy of +animals tends to show that mankind can within certain limits receive a +change of nature. And as in animals we should commonly choose the best +for breeding, and destroy the others, so there must be a selection made +of the human beings whose lives are worthy to be preserved. + +We start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first, +that the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed +out; secondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we +should be poorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss +of the best things in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and +meanest of human beings--the infant, the criminal, the insane, the +idiot, truly seems to us one of the noblest results of Christianity. We +have learned, though as yet imperfectly, that the individual man has an +endless value in the sight of God, and that we honour Him when we honour +the darkened and disfigured image of Him (Laws). This is the lesson +which Christ taught in a parable when He said, 'Their angels do always +behold the face of My Father which is in heaven.' Such lessons are only +partially realized in any age; they were foreign to the age of Plato, as +they have very different degrees of strength in different countries or +ages of the Christian world. To the Greek the family was a religious and +customary institution binding the members together by a tie inferior +in strength to that of friendship, and having a less solemn and sacred +sound than that of country. The relationship which existed on the lower +level of custom, Plato imagined that he was raising to the higher level +of nature and reason; while from the modern and Christian point of view +we regard him as sanctioning murder and destroying the first principles +of morality. + +The great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference +between man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being +is regarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier, or at best of a +slave-owner; the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder +of animals aims chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at +courage or temper; most often the fitness of the animal for food is the +great desideratum. But mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor yet for +their superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing carts. Neither +does the improvement of the human race consist merely in the increase +of the bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of the mind. +Hence there must be 'a marriage of true minds' as well as of bodies, of +imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts. Men and women +without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes; yet Plato +takes away these qualities and puts nothing in their place, not even +the desire of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know their own +children. The most important transaction of social life, he who is the +idealist philosopher converts into the most brutal. For the pair are to +have no relation to one another, except at the hymeneal festival; their +children are not theirs, but the state's; nor is any tie of affection to +unite them. Yet here the analogy of the animals might have saved +Plato from a gigantic error, if he had 'not lost sight of his own +illustration.' For the 'nobler sort of birds and beasts' nourish and +protect their offspring and are faithful to one another. + +An eminent physiologist thinks it worth while 'to try and place life +on a physical basis.' But should not life rest on the moral rather than +upon the physical? The higher comes first, then the lower, first the +human and rational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely +divided; and in times of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they +seem to be only different aspects of a common human nature which +includes them both. Neither is the moral the limit of the physical, +but the expansion and enlargement of it,--the highest form which the +physical is capable of receiving. As Plato would say, the body does not +take care of the body, and still less of the mind, but the mind takes +care of both. In all human action not that which is common to man and +the animals is the characteristic element, but that which distinguishes +him from them. Even if we admit the physical basis, and resolve all +virtue into health of body 'la facon que notre sang circule,' still on +merely physical grounds we must come back to ideas. Mind and reason and +duty and conscience, under these or other names, are always reappearing. +There cannot be health of body without health of mind; nor health of +mind without the sense of duty and the love of truth (Charm). + +That the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations +about marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, +does indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato +should have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are +revolting, but that he should have contradicted himself to an extent +which is hardly credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of +idealism into the crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift +of reflection, he appears to have thought out a subject about which he +had better have followed the enlightened feeling of his own age. The +general sentiment of Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old +poets, and in later time the tragedians, showed no want of respect for +the family, on which much of their religion was based. But the example +of Sparta, and perhaps in some degree the tendency to defy public +opinion, seems to have misled him. He will make one family out of all +the families of the state. He will select the finest specimens of men +and women and breed from these only. + +Yet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of +human nature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of +philosophy as well as of poetry), and also because any departure from +established morality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be +unsettling, it may be worth while to draw out a little more at length +the objections to the Platonic marriage. In the first place, history +shows that wherever polygamy has been largely allowed the race has +deteriorated. One man to one woman is the law of God and nature. Nearly +all the civilized peoples of the world at some period before the age of +written records, have become monogamists; and the step when once taken +has never been retraced. The exceptions occurring among Brahmins or +Mahometans or the ancient Persians, are of that sort which may be said +to prove the rule. The connexions formed between superior and +inferior races hardly ever produce a noble offspring, because they are +licentious; and because the children in such cases usually despise the +mother and are neglected by the father who is ashamed of them. +Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans to vice die +out; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from other +countries, or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and aristocracies +which have disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in numbers and +degenerated in stature; 'mariages de convenance' leave their enfeebling +stamp on the offspring of them (King Lear). The marriage of near +relations, or the marrying in and in of the same family tends constantly +to weakness or idiocy in the children, sometimes assuming the form as +they grow older of passionate licentiousness. The common prostitute +rarely has any offspring. By such unmistakable evidence is the authority +of morality asserted in the relations of the sexes: and so many more +elements enter into this 'mystery' than are dreamed of by Plato and some +other philosophers. + +Recent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among +primitive tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and +that the captive taken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any +man was permitted to call his own. The partial existence of such customs +among some of the lower races of man, and the survival of peculiar +ceremonies in the marriages of some civilized nations, are thought to +furnish a proof of similar institutions having been once universal. +There can be no question that the study of anthropology has considerably +changed our views respecting the first appearance of man upon the earth. +We know more about the aborigines of the world than formerly, but our +increasing knowledge shows above all things how little we know. With all +the helps which written monuments afford, we do but faintly realize the +condition of man two thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what his +condition was when removed to a distance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when +the majority of mankind were lower and nearer the animals than any tribe +now existing upon the earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato +(Laws) and Aristotle (Metaph.) may have been more right than we imagine +in supposing that some forms of civilisation were discovered and lost +several times over. If we cannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded +civilization, neither can we set any limits to the depth of degradation +to which the human race may sink through war, disease, or isolation. +And if we are to draw inferences about the origin of marriage from +the practice of barbarous nations, we should also consider the +remoter analogy of the animals. Many birds and animals, especially the +carnivorous, have only one mate, and the love and care of offspring +which seems to be natural is inconsistent with the primitive theory of +marriage. If we go back to an imaginary state in which men were almost +animals and the companions of them, we have as much right to argue from +what is animal to what is human as from the barbarous to the civilized +man. The record of animal life on the globe is fragmentary,--the +connecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied; the record of +social life is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we admit +that our first ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still +the stages by which men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative +civilization of China, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient +Germans, are wholly unknown to us. + +Such speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show +that an institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is +only the growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of +marriage, and we are told that like the right of property, after many +wars and contests, it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness of +barbarians. We stand face to face with human nature in its primitive +nakedness. We are compelled to accept, not the highest, but the lowest +account of the origin of human society. But on the other hand we +may truly say that every step in human progress has been in the same +direction, and that in the course of ages the idea of marriage and of +the family has been more and more defined and consecrated. The civilized +East is immeasurably in advance of any savage tribes; the Greeks and +Romans have improved upon the East; the Christian nations have been +stricter in their views of the marriage relation than any of the +ancients. In this as in so many other things, instead of looking back +with regret to the past, we should look forward with hope to the future. +We must consecrate that which we believe to be the most holy, and that +'which is the most holy will be the most useful.' There is more reason +for maintaining the sacredness of the marriage tie, when we see the +benefit of it, than when we only felt a vague religious horror about +the violation of it. But in all times of transition, when established +beliefs are being undermined, there is a danger that in the passage from +the old to the new we may insensibly let go the moral principle, finding +an excuse for listening to the voice of passion in the uncertainty of +knowledge, or the fluctuations of opinion. And there are many persons +in our own day who, enlightened by the study of anthropology, and +fascinated by what is new and strange, some using the language of fear, +others of hope, are inclined to believe that a time will come when +through the self-assertion of women, or the rebellious spirit of +children, by the analysis of human relations, or by the force of outward +circumstances, the ties of family life may be broken or greatly relaxed. +They point to societies in America and elsewhere which tend to show that +the destruction of the family need not necessarily involve the overthrow +of all morality. Wherever we may think of such speculations, we can +hardly deny that they have been more rife in this generation than in any +other; and whither they are tending, who can predict? + +To the doubts and queries raised by these 'social reformers' respecting +the relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a +sufficient answer, if any is needed. The difference about them and us is +really one of fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy him +to be, but we are speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal +part of his nature; we regard him as a creature having many sides, or +aspects, moving between good and evil, striving to rise above himself +and to become 'a little lower than the angels.' We also, to use +a Platonic formula, are not ignorant of the dissatisfactions and +incompatibilities of family life, of the meannesses of trade, of the +flatteries of one class of society by another, of the impediments which +the family throws in the way of lofty aims and aspirations. But we are +conscious that there are evils and dangers in the background greater +still, which are not appreciated, because they are either concealed +or suppressed. What a condition of man would that be, in which human +passions were controlled by no authority, divine or human, in which +there was no shame or decency, no higher affection overcoming or +sanctifying the natural instincts, but simply a rule of health! Is it +for this that we are asked to throw away the civilization which is the +growth of ages? + +For strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there +are the more important considerations of mind and character and soul. We +know how human nature may be degraded; we do not know how by artificial +means any improvement in the breed can be effected. The problem is a +complex one, for if we go back only four steps (and these at least enter +into the composition of a child), there are commonly thirty progenitors +to be taken into account. Many curious facts, rarely admitting of proof, +are told us respecting the inheritance of disease or character from a +remote ancestor. We can trace the physical resemblances of parents and +children in the same family-- + +'Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat'; + +but scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both +from their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental +peculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in +the animals, to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a +difficulty in distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or +other qualities, and what is mere imitation or the result of similar +circumstances. Great men and great women have rarely had great fathers +and mothers. Nothing that we know of in the circumstances of their birth +or lineage will explain their appearance. Of the English poets of the +last and two preceding centuries scarcely a descendant remains,--none +have ever been distinguished. So deeply has nature hidden her secret, +and so ridiculous is the fancy which has been entertained by some that +we might in time by suitable marriage arrangements or, as Plato would +have said, 'by an ingenious system of lots,' produce a Shakespeare or +a Milton. Even supposing that we could breed men having the tenacity +of bulldogs, or, like the Spartans, 'lacking the wit to run away +in battle,' would the world be any the better? Many of the noblest +specimens of the human race have been among the weakest physically. +Tyrtaeus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would have been exposed at Sparta; +and some of the fairest and strongest men and women have been among the +wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device of uniting the strong +and fair with the strong and fair, regardless of sentiment and morality, +nor yet by his other device of combining dissimilar natures (Statesman), +have mankind gradually passed from the brutality and licentiousness of +primitive marriage to marriage Christian and civilized. + +Few persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of +mental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through +them from some remoter ancestor, secondly from our race, thirdly from +the general condition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is +commoner than the remark, that 'So and so is like his father or his +uncle'; and an aged person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in +a youth to a long-forgotten ancestor, observing that 'Nature sometimes +skips a generation.' It may be true also, that if we knew more about +our ancestors, these similarities would be even more striking to us. +Admitting the facts which are thus described in a popular way, we may +however remark that there is no method of difference by which they can +be defined or estimated, and that they constitute only a small part of +each individual. The doctrine of heredity may seem to take out of our +hands the conduct of our own lives, but it is the idea, not the fact, +which is really terrible to us. For what we have received from our +ancestors is only a fraction of what we are, or may become. The +knowledge that drunkenness or insanity has been prevalent in a +family may be the best safeguard against their recurrence in a future +generation. The parent will be most awake to the vices or diseases in +his child of which he is most sensible within himself. The whole of life +may be directed to their prevention or cure. The traces of consumption +may become fainter, or be wholly effaced: the inherent tendency to vice +or crime may be eradicated. And so heredity, from being a curse, may +become a blessing. We acknowledge that in the matter of our birth, as in +our nature generally, there are previous circumstances which affect +us. But upon this platform of circumstances or within this wall of +necessity, we have still the power of creating a life for ourselves by +the informing energy of the human will. + +There is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a +stranger. All the children born in his state are foundlings. It never +occurred to him that the greater part of them, according to universal +experience, would have perished. For children can only be brought up in +families. There is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child +which cannot be supplied by other mothers, or by 'strong nurses one or +more' (Laws). If Plato's 'pen' was as fatal as the Creches of Paris, or +the foundling hospital of Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his children +would have perished. There would have been no need to expose or put +out of the way the weaklier children, for they would have died of +themselves. So emphatically does nature protest against the destruction +of the family. + +What Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken +way to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the +Spartan men and women were superior in form and strength to the other +Greeks; and this superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws +and customs relating to marriage. He did not consider that the desire +of a noble offspring was a passion among the Spartans, or that their +physical superiority was to be attributed chiefly, not to their marriage +customs, but to their temperance and training. He did not reflect that +Sparta was great, not in consequence of the relaxation of morality, but +in spite of it, by virtue of a political principle stronger far than +existed in any other Grecian state. Least of all did he observe that +Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens of the Greek +race. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the love of +liberty--all that has made Greece famous with posterity, were wanting +among the Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or Aeschylus, +or Sophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not allowed to +appear above the state; the laws were fixed, and he had no business to +alter or reform them. Yet whence has the progress of cities and nations +arisen, if not from remarkable individuals, coming into the world we +know not how, and from causes over which we have no control? +Something too much may have been said in modern times of the value of +individuality. But we can hardly condemn too strongly a system which, +instead of fostering the scattered seeds or sparks of genius and +character, tends to smother and extinguish them. + +Still, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither +Christianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto +been able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that +the side from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away. +Population is the most untameable force in the political and social +world. Do we not find, especially in large cities, that the greatest +hindrance to the amelioration of the poor is their improvidence in +marriage?--a small fault truly, if not involving endless consequences. +There are whole countries too, such as India, or, nearer home, Ireland, +in which a right solution of the marriage question seems to lie at the +foundation of the happiness of the community. There are too many people +on a given space, or they marry too early and bring into the world a +sickly and half-developed offspring; or owing to the very conditions +of their existence, they become emaciated and hand on a similar life +to their descendants. But who can oppose the voice of prudence to the +'mightiest passions of mankind' (Laws), especially when they have +been licensed by custom and religion? In addition to the influences of +education, we seem to require some new principles of right and wrong in +these matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be already heard +whispering in private, but has never affected the moral sentiments +of mankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the principle of +utility, just in that action of our lives in which we have the most need +of it. The influences which we can bring to bear upon this question +are chiefly indirect. In a generation or two, education, emigration, +improvements in agriculture and manufactures, may have provided the +solution. The state physician hardly likes to probe the wound: it is +beyond his art; a matter which he cannot safely let alone, but which he +dare not touch: + +'We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.' + +When again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping +into the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents +perhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day +twenty-five or thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices, +amid the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom +joined hands with one another? In making such a reflection we are not +opposing physical considerations to moral, but moral to physical; we are +seeking to make the voice of reason heard, which drives us back from the +extravagance of sentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is +said by his biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage, +because he knew that he was subject to hereditary consumption. One who +deserved to be called a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the +habit of wearing a black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him +that, being liable to outbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the +natural impulses of affection: he died unmarried in a lunatic asylum. +These two little facts suggest the reflection that a very few persons +have done from a sense of duty what the rest of mankind ought to have +done under like circumstances, if they had allowed themselves to think +of all the misery which they were about to bring into the world. If +we could prevent such marriages without any violation of feeling or +propriety, we clearly ought; and the prohibition in the course of time +would be protected by a 'horror naturalis' similar to that which, in +all civilized ages and countries, has prevented the marriage of near +relations by blood. Mankind would have been the happier, if some things +which are now allowed had from the beginning been denied to them; if the +sanction of religion could have prohibited practices inimical to health; +if sanitary principles could in early ages have been invested with a +superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on in the world's history, +we are no longer able to stamp at once with the impress of religion a +new prohibition. A free agent cannot have his fancies regulated by law; +and the execution of the law would be rendered impossible, owing to the +uncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to be forbidden. Who +can weigh virtue, or even fortune against health, or moral and mental +qualities against bodily? Who can measure probabilities against +certainties? There has been some good as well as evil in the discipline +of suffering; and there are diseases, such as consumption, which have +exercised a refining and softening influence on the character. Youth is +too inexperienced to balance such nice considerations; parents do not +often think of them, or think of them too late. They are at a distance +and may probably be averted; change of place, a new state of life, the +interests of a home may be the cure of them. So persons vainly reason +when their minds are already made up and their fortunes irrevocably +linked together. Nor is there any ground for supposing that marriages +are to any great extent influenced by reflections of this sort, which +seem unable to make any head against the irresistible impulse of +individual attachment. + +Lastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions +in youth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the +whole mind and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which +is given to them by the imagination, without feeling that there is +something unsatisfactory in our method of treating them. That the most +important influence on human life should be wholly left to chance or +shrouded in mystery, and instead of being disciplined or understood, +should be required to conform only to an external standard of +propriety--cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a safe or +satisfactory condition of human things. And still those who have the +charge of youth may find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the +manliness and innocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by +general admonitions which every one can apply for himself, to mitigate +this terrible evil which eats out the heart of individuals and corrupts +the moral sentiments of nations. In no duty towards others is there more +need of reticence and self-restraint. So great is the danger lest he who +would be the counsellor of another should reveal the secret prematurely, +lest he should get another too much into his power; or fix the passing +impression of evil by demanding the confession of it. + +Nor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere +with higher aims. If there have been some who 'to party gave up what was +meant for mankind,' there have certainly been others who to family +gave up what was meant for mankind or for their country. The cares +of children, the necessity of procuring money for their support, the +flatteries of the rich by the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the +pride of birth or wealth, the tendency of family life to divert men from +the pursuit of the ideal or the heroic, are as lowering in our own age +as in that of Plato. And if we prefer to look at the gentle influences +of home, the development of the affections, the amenities of society, +the devotion of one member of a family for the good of the others, which +form one side of the picture, we must not quarrel with him, or perhaps +ought rather to be grateful to him, for having presented to us the +reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato on grounds of morality, we +may allow that there is an aspect of the world which has not unnaturally +led him into error. + +We hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all +other abstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State +seems to be built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework +in which family and social life is contained. But to Plato in his +present mood of mind the family is only a disturbing influence which, +instead of filling up, tends to disarrange the higher unity of the +State. No organization is needed except a political, which, +regarded from another point of view, is a military one. The State is +all-sufficing for the wants of man, and, like the idea of the Church in +later ages, absorbs all other desires and affections. In time of war the +thousand citizens are to stand like a rampart impregnable against the +world or the Persian host; in time of peace the preparation for war and +their duties to the State, which are also their duties to one another, +take up their whole life and time. The only other interest which is +allowed to them besides that of war, is the interest of philosophy. When +they are too old to be soldiers they are to retire from active life +and to have a second novitiate of study and contemplation. There is an +element of monasticism even in Plato's communism. If he could have done +without children, he might have converted his Republic into a religious +order. Neither in the Laws, when the daylight of common sense breaks in +upon him, does he retract his error. In the state of which he would be +the founder, there is no marrying or giving in marriage: but because of +the infirmity of mankind, he condescends to allow the law of nature to +prevail. + +(c) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater +paradox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, 'Until kings +are philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease +from ill.' And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who +are capable of apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the +attainment of this higher knowledge the second education is directed. +Through a process of training which has already made them good citizens +they are now to be made good legislators. We find with some surprise +(not unlike the feeling which Aristotle in a well-known passage +describes the hearers of Plato's lectures as experiencing, when they +went to a discourse on the idea of good, expecting to be instructed in +moral truths, and received instead of them arithmetical and mathematical +formulae) that Plato does not propose for his future legislators any +study of finance or law or military tactics, but only of abstract +mathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract conception of +good. We ask, with Aristotle, What is the use of a man knowing the idea +of good, if he does not know what is good for this individual, this +state, this condition of society? We cannot understand how Plato's +legislators or guardians are to be fitted for their work of statesmen by +the study of the five mathematical sciences. We vainly search in Plato's +own writings for any explanation of this seeming absurdity. + +The discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the +mind with a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power +of estimating its value. No metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly +criticised his own speculations; in his own judgment they have been +above criticism; nor has he understood that what to him seemed to be +absolute truth may reappear in the next generation as a form of logic +or an instrument of thought. And posterity have also sometimes equally +misapprehended the real value of his speculations. They appear to them +to have contributed nothing to the stock of human knowledge. The IDEA +of good is apt to be regarded by the modern thinker as an unmeaning +abstraction; but he forgets that this abstraction is waiting ready for +use, and will hereafter be filled up by the divisions of knowledge. +When mankind do not as yet know that the world is subject to law, the +introduction of the mere conception of law or design or final cause, and +the far-off anticipation of the harmony of knowledge, are great steps +onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity of all things leads +men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily affect their +conception of human life and of politics, and also their own conduct and +character (Tim). We can imagine how a great mind like that of Pericles +might derive elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras (Phaedr.). +To be struggling towards a higher but unattainable conception is a more +favourable intellectual condition than to rest satisfied in a narrow +portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier, which have sometimes been +the greater ideas of science, are often lost sight of at a later period. +How rarely can we say of any modern enquirer in the magnificent language +of Plato, that 'He is the spectator of all time and of all existence!' + +Nor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast +metaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first +enthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them everywhere, and to apply +them in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the +experience of ages is required to enable them to fill up 'the +intermediate axioms.' Plato himself seems to have imagined that the +truths of psychology, like those of astronomy and harmonics, would be +arrived at by a process of deduction, and that the method which he has +pursued in the Fourth Book, of inferring them from experience and the +use of language, was imperfect and only provisional. But when, after +having arrived at the idea of good, which is the end of the science of +dialectic, he is asked, What is the nature, and what are the divisions +of the science? He refuses to answer, as if intending by the refusal to +intimate that the state of knowledge which then existed was not such as +would allow the philosopher to enter into his final rest. The previous +sciences must first be studied, and will, we may add, continue to be +studied tell the end of time, although in a sense different from any +which Plato could have conceived. But we may observe, that while he is +aware of the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full of enthusiasm in the +contemplation of it. Looking into the orb of light, he sees nothing, but +he is warmed and elevated. The Hebrew prophet believed that faith in +God would enable him to govern the world; the Greek philosopher imagined +that contemplation of the good would make a legislator. There is as much +to be filled up in the one case as in the other, and the one mode of +conception is to the Israelite what the other is to the Greek. Both find +a repose in a divine perfection, which, whether in a more personal or +impersonal form, exists without them and independently of them, as well +as within them. + +There is no mention of the idea of good in the Timaeus, nor of the +divine Creator of the world in the Republic; and we are naturally led +to ask in what relation they stand to one another. Is God above or below +the idea of good? Or is the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God? +The latter appears to be the truer answer. To the Greek philosopher +the perfection and unity of God was a far higher conception than his +personality, which he hardly found a word to express, and which to him +would have seemed to be borrowed from mythology. To the Christian, on +the other hand, or to the modern thinker in general, it is difficult, +if not impossible, to attach reality to what he terms mere abstraction; +while to Plato this very abstraction is the truest and most real of all +things. Hence, from a difference in forms of thought, Plato appears to +be resting on a creation of his own mind only. But if we may be allowed +to paraphrase the idea of good by the words 'intelligent principle of +law and order in the universe, embracing equally man and nature,' we +begin to find a meeting-point between him and ourselves. + +The question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is +one that has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of +Europe and Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who +has truly united the power of command with the power of thought and +reflection, as there have been also many false combinations of these +qualities. Some kind of speculative power is necessary both in practical +and political life; like the rhetorician in the Phaedrus, men require to +have a conception of the varieties of human character, and to be raised +on great occasions above the commonplaces of ordinary life. Yet the idea +of the philosopher-statesman has never been popular with the mass of +mankind; partly because he cannot take the world into his confidence or +make them understand the motives from which he acts; and also because +they are jealous of a power which they do not understand. The revolution +which human nature desires to effect step by step in many ages is likely +to be precipitated by him in a single year or life. They are afraid that +in the pursuit of his greater aims he may disregard the common feelings +of humanity, he is too apt to be looking into the distant future or back +into the remote past, and unable to see actions or events which, to use +an expression of Plato's 'are tumbling out at his feet.' Besides, as +Plato would say, there are other corruptions of these philosophical +statesmen. Either 'the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with +the pale cast of thought,' and at the moment when action above all +things is required he is undecided, or general principles are enunciated +by him in order to cover some change of policy; or his ignorance of the +world has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of others; or in +some cases he has been converted into a courtier, who enjoys the luxury +of holding liberal opinions, but was never known to perform a liberal +action. No wonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling +statesmen of this class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. +For, as we may be allowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, +'they have seen bad imitations of the philosopher-statesman.' But a man +in whom the power of thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to +the present, reaching forward to the future, 'such a one,' ruling in a +constitutional state, 'they have never seen.' + +But as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life, +so the ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. +When the face of the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard +in the distance, he is still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave +of his inveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the +times; instead of looking forward he looks back; he learns nothing and +forgets nothing; with 'wise saws and modern instances' he would stem the +rising tide of revolution. He lives more and more within the circle of +his own party, as the world without him becomes stronger. This seems to +be the reason why the old order of things makes so poor a figure +when confronted with the new, why churches can never reform, why most +political changes are made blindly and convulsively. The great crises +in the history of nations have often been met by an ecclesiastical +positiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of principles which +have lost their hold upon a nation. The fixed ideas of a reactionary +statesman may be compared to madness; they grow upon him, and he becomes +possessed by them; no judgement of others is ever admitted by him to be +weighed in the balance against his own. + +(d) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to have been +a confusion of ideas, assimilates the state to the individual, and fails +to distinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most of a +state which is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the +greatest uniformity of character. He does not see that the analogy is +partly fallacious, and that the will or character of a state or nation +is really the balance or rather the surplus of individual wills, which +are limited by the condition of having to act in common. The movement +of a body of men can never have the pliancy or facility of a single man; +the freedom of the individual, which is always limited, becomes still +more straitened when transferred to a nation. The powers of action and +feeling are necessarily weaker and more balanced when they are diffused +through a community; whence arises the often discussed question, 'Can a +nation, like an individual, have a conscience?' We hesitate to say +that the characters of nations are nothing more than the sum of the +characters of the individuals who compose them; because there may be +tendencies in individuals which react upon one another. A whole nation +may be wiser than any one man in it; or may be animated by some common +opinion or feeling which could not equally have affected the mind of +a single person, or may have been inspired by a leader of genius to +perform acts more than human. Plato does not appear to have analysed +the complications which arise out of the collective action of mankind. +Neither is he capable of seeing that analogies, though specious as +arguments, may often have no foundation in fact, or of distinguishing +between what is intelligible or vividly present to the mind, and what +is true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle, who is comparatively +seldom imposed upon by false analogies. He cannot disentangle the arts +from the virtues--at least he is always arguing from one to the other. +His notion of music is transferred from harmony of sounds to harmony of +life: in this he is assisted by the ambiguities of language as well as +by the prevalence of Pythagorean notions. And having once assimilated +the state to the individual, he imagines that he will find the +succession of states paralleled in the lives of individuals. + +Still, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is +attained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to +the mind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the +arts; for virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an +inward principle. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the +harmonies of the world and of human life, and may be regarded as a +splendid illustration which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy. +In the same way the identification of ethics with politics has a +tendency to give definiteness to ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble +men's notions of the aims of government and of the duties of citizens; +for ethics from one point of view may be conceived as an idealized law +and politics; and politics, as ethics reduced to the conditions of human +society. There have been evils which have arisen out of the attempt to +identify them, and this has led to the separation or antagonism of +them, which has been introduced by modern political writers. But we may +likewise feel that something has been lost in their separation, and +that the ancient philosophers who estimated the moral and intellectual +wellbeing of mankind first, and the wealth of nations and individuals +second, may have a salutary influence on the speculations of modern +times. Many political maxims originate in a reaction against an opposite +error; and when the errors against which they were directed have passed +away, they in turn become errors. + +3. Plato's views of education are in several respects remarkable; +like the rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, +beginning with the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending +to after-life. Plato is the first writer who distinctly says that +education is to comprehend the whole of life, and to be a preparation +for another in which education begins again. This is the continuous +thread which runs through the Republic, and which more than any other of +his ideas admits of an application to modern life. + +He has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is +disposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are +one and not many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world +into his scheme of truth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the +involuntariness of vice, which is maintained by him in the Timaeus, +Sophist, and Laws (Protag., Apol., Gorg.). Nor do the so-called Platonic +ideas recovered from a former state of existence affect his theory +of mental improvement. Still we observe in him the remains of the old +Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be elicited from within, and +is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of sense. Education, as +he says, will implant a principle of intelligence which is better than +ten thousand eyes. The paradox that the virtues are one, and the kindred +notion that all virtue is knowledge, are not entirely renounced; the +first is seen in the supremacy given to justice over the rest; the +second in the tendency to absorb the moral virtues in the intellectual, +and to centre all goodness in the contemplation of the idea of good. The +world of sense is still depreciated and identified with opinion, though +admitted to be a shadow of the true. In the Republic he is evidently +impressed with the conviction that vice arises chiefly from ignorance +and may be cured by education; the multitude are hardly to be deemed +responsible for what they do. A faint allusion to the doctrine of +reminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book; but Plato's views of education +have no more real connection with a previous state of existence than +our own; he only proposes to elicit from the mind that which is there +already. Education is represented by him, not as the filling of a +vessel, but as the turning the eye of the soul towards the light. + +He treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and +false, and then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he +takes no notice, though in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the +nursing of children and the management of the mothers, and would have +an education which is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he begins +with the age at which the child is capable of receiving ideas, and +boldly asserts, in language which sounds paradoxical to modern ears, +that he must be taught the false before he can learn the true. The +modern and ancient philosophical world are not agreed about truth and +falsehood; the one identifies truth almost exclusively with fact, the +other with ideas. This is the difference between ourselves and Plato, +which is, however, partly a difference of words. For we too should admit +that a child must receive many lessons which he imperfectly understands; +he must be taught some things in a figure only, some too which he can +hardly be expected to believe when he grows older; but we should limit +the use of fiction by the necessity of the case. Plato would draw the +line differently; according to him the aim of early education is not +truth as a matter of fact, but truth as a matter of principle; the child +is to be taught first simple religious truths, and then simple moral +truths, and insensibly to learn the lesson of good manners and good +taste. He would make an entire reformation of the old mythology; like +Xenophanes and Heracleitus he is sensible of the deep chasm which +separates his own age from Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and invests +with an imaginary authority, but only for his own purposes. The lusts +and treacheries of the gods are to be banished; the terrors of the world +below are to be dispelled; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is +not to be a model for youth. But there is another strain heard in Homer +which may teach our youth endurance; and something may be learnt in +medicine from the simple practice of the Homeric age. The principles +on which religion is to be based are two only: first, that God is true; +secondly, that he is good. Modern and Christian writers have often +fallen short of these; they can hardly be said to have gone beyond them. + +The young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of +sights or sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. +They are to live in an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to +be wafting to them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such +an education be realized, or if our modern religious education could +be bound up with truth and virtue and good manners and good taste, that +would be the best hope of human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, +is looking forward to changes in the moral and religious world, and is +preparing for them. He recognizes the danger of unsettling young men's +minds by sudden changes of laws and principles, by destroying the +sacredness of one set of ideas when there is nothing else to take their +place. He is afraid too of the influence of the drama, on the ground +that it encourages false sentiment, and therefore he would not have +his children taken to the theatre; he thinks that the effect on the +spectators is bad, and on the actors still worse. His idea of education +is that of harmonious growth, in which are insensibly learnt the lessons +of temperance and endurance, and the body and mind develope in equal +proportions. The first principle which runs through all art and nature +is simplicity; this also is to be the rule of human life. + +The second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period +of muscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in +music is extended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the +body may be inconsistent with the training of the mind, and that bodily +exercise may be easily overdone. Excessive training of the body is +apt to give men a headache or to render them sleepy at a lecture on +philosophy, and this they attribute not to the true cause, but to the +nature of the subject. Two points are noticeable in Plato's treatment of +gymnastic:--First, that the time of training is entirely separated from +the time of literary education. He seems to have thought that two things +of an opposite and different nature could not be learnt at the same +time. Here we can hardly agree with him; and, if we may judge by +experience, the effect of spending three years between the ages of +fourteen and seventeen in mere bodily exercise would be far from +improving to the intellect. Secondly, he affirms that music and +gymnastic are not, as common opinion is apt to imagine, intended, the +one for the cultivation of the mind and the other of the body, but that +they are both equally designed for the improvement of the mind. The +body, in his view, is the servant of the mind; the subjection of the +lower to the higher is for the advantage of both. And doubtless the +mind may exercise a very great and paramount influence over the body, +if exerted not at particular moments and by fits and starts, but +continuously, in making preparation for the whole of life. Other Greek +writers saw the mischievous tendency of Spartan discipline (Arist. Pol; +Thuc.). But only Plato recognized the fundamental error on which the +practice was based. + +The subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine, +which he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern +disbelief in medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of +knowledge, to a demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming +aware that they often make diseases 'greater and more complicated' by +their treatment of them (Rep.). In two thousand years their art has made +but slender progress; what they have gained in the analysis of the parts +is in a great degree lost by their feebler conception of the human frame +as a whole. They have attended more to the cure of diseases than to the +conditions of health; and the improvements in medicine have been more +than counterbalanced by the disuse of regular training. Until lately +they have hardly thought of air and water, the importance of which was +well understood by the ancients; as Aristotle remarks, 'Air and water, +being the elements which we most use, have the greatest effect upon +health' (Polit.). For ages physicians have been under the dominion of +prejudices which have only recently given way; and now there are as many +opinions in medicine as in theology, and an equal degree of scepticism +and some want of toleration about both. Plato has several good notions +about medicine; according to him, 'the eye cannot be cured without the +rest of the body, nor the body without the mind' (Charm.). No man +of sense, he says in the Timaeus, would take physic; and we heartily +sympathize with him in the Laws when he declares that 'the limbs of the +rustic worn with toil will derive more benefit from warm baths than from +the prescriptions of a not over wise doctor.' But we can hardly praise +him when, in obedience to the authority of Homer, he depreciates diet, +or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he would get rid of invalid +and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does not seem to have +considered that the 'bridle of Theages' might be accompanied by +qualities which were of far more value to the State than the health +or strength of the citizens; or that the duty of taking care of the +helpless might be an important element of education in a State. The +physician himself (this is a delicate and subtle observation) should +not be a man in robust health; he should have, in modern phraseology, +a nervous temperament; he should have experience of disease in his own +person, in order that his powers of observation may be quickened in the +case of others. + +The perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in +which, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity. +Greater matters are to be determined by the legislator or by the oracle +of Delphi, lesser matters are to be left to the temporary regulation +of the citizens themselves. Plato is aware that laissez faire is an +important element of government. The diseases of a State are like the +heads of a hydra; they multiply when they are cut off. The true remedy +for them is not extirpation but prevention. And the way to prevent them +is to take care of education, and education will take care of all the +rest. So in modern times men have often felt that the only political +measure worth having--the only one which would produce any certain or +lasting effect, was a measure of national education. And in our own more +than in any previous age the necessity has been recognized of restoring +the ever-increasing confusion of law to simplicity and common sense. + +When the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the +first stage of active and public life. But soon education is to begin +again from a new point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and +Seventh Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence +been led to form a higher conception of what was required of us. For +true knowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and has to do, +not with particulars or individuals, but with universals only; not with +the beauties of poetry, but with the ideas of philosophy. And the great +aim of education is the cultivation of the habit of abstraction. This +is to be acquired through the study of the mathematical sciences. They +alone are capable of giving ideas of relation, and of arousing the +dormant energies of thought. + +Mathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that +which is now included in them; but they bore a much larger proportion to +the sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought which +the human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by which +the chaos of particulars could be reduced to rule and order. The +faculty which they trained was naturally at war with the poetical +or imaginative; and hence to Plato, who is everywhere seeking for +abstractions and trying to get rid of the illusions of sense, nearly +the whole of education is contained in them. They seemed to have an +inexhaustible application, partly because their true limits were not yet +understood. These Plato himself is beginning to investigate; though +not aware that number and figure are mere abstractions of sense, +he recognizes that the forms used by geometry are borrowed from the +sensible world. He seeks to find the ultimate ground of mathematical +ideas in the idea of good, though he does not satisfactorily explain the +connexion between them; and in his conception of the relation of ideas +to numbers, he falls very far short of the definiteness attributed to +him by Aristotle (Met.). But if he fails to recognize the true limits of +mathematics, he also reaches a point beyond them; in his view, ideas +of number become secondary to a higher conception of knowledge. The +dialectician is as much above the mathematician as the mathematician is +above the ordinary man. The one, the self-proving, the good which is +the higher sphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to which all things +ascend, and in which they finally repose. + +This self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no +distinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage +in Greek philosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals +are comprehended, a whole which has no parts (Arist., Nic. Eth.). The +vacancy of such a form was perceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato. +Nor did he recognize that in the dialectical process are included two or +more methods of investigation which are at variance with each other. +He did not see that whether he took the longer or the shorter road, no +advance could be made in this way. And yet such visions often have an +immense effect; for although the method of science cannot anticipate +science, the idea of science, not as it is, but as it will be in the +future, is a great and inspiring principle. In the pursuit of knowledge +we are always pressing forward to something beyond us; and as a false +conception of knowledge, for example the scholastic philosophy, may lead +men astray during many ages, so the true ideal, though vacant, may draw +all their thoughts in a right direction. It makes a great difference +whether the general expectation of knowledge, as this indefinite feeling +may be termed, is based upon a sound judgment. For mankind may often +entertain a true conception of what knowledge ought to be when they have +but a slender experience of facts. The correlation of the sciences, the +consciousness of the unity of nature, the idea of classification, the +sense of proportion, the unwillingness to stop short of certainty or to +confound probability with truth, are important principles of the higher +education. Although Plato could tell us nothing, and perhaps knew that +he could tell us nothing, of the absolute truth, he has exercised +an influence on the human mind which even at the present day is not +exhausted; and political and social questions may yet arise in which the +thoughts of Plato may be read anew and receive a fresh meaning. + +The Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces +of it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and +from this point of view may be compared with the creator of the Timaeus, +who out of his goodness created all things. It corresponds to a certain +extent with the modern conception of a law of nature, or of a final +cause, or of both in one, and in this regard may be connected with the +measure and symmetry of the Philebus. It is represented in the Symposium +under the aspect of beauty, and is supposed to be attained there by +stages of initiation, as here by regular gradations of knowledge. Viewed +subjectively, it is the process or science of dialectic. This is the +science which, according to the Phaedrus, is the true basis of rhetoric, +which alone is able to distinguish the natures and classes of men and +things; which divides a whole into the natural parts, and reunites the +scattered parts into a natural or organized whole; which defines the +abstract essences or universal ideas of all things, and connects them; +which pierces the veil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or +first principle of all; which regards the sciences in relation to the +idea of good. This ideal science is the highest process of thought, +and may be described as the soul conversing with herself or holding +communion with eternal truth and beauty, and in another form is +the everlasting question and answer--the ceaseless interrogative of +Socrates. The dialogues of Plato are themselves examples of the nature +and method of dialectic. Viewed objectively, the idea of good is a power +or cause which makes the world without us correspond with the world +within. Yet this world without us is still a world of ideas. With Plato +the investigation of nature is another department of knowledge, and in +this he seeks to attain only probable conclusions (Timaeus). + +If we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half +explains to us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is +that in his mind the two sciences are not as yet distinguished, any more +than the subjective and objective aspects of the world and of man, which +German philosophy has revealed to us. Nor has he determined whether +his science of dialectic is at rest or in motion, concerned with the +contemplation of absolute being, or with a process of development +and evolution. Modern metaphysics may be described as the science of +abstractions, or as the science of the evolution of thought; modern +logic, when passing beyond the bounds of mere Aristotelian forms, may be +defined as the science of method. The germ of both of them is contained +in the Platonic dialectic; all metaphysicians have something in common +with the ideas of Plato; all logicians have derived something from +the method of Plato. The nearest approach in modern philosophy to the +universal science of Plato, is to be found in the Hegelian 'succession +of moments in the unity of the idea.' Plato and Hegel alike seem to +have conceived the world as the correlation of abstractions; and not +impossibly they would have understood one another better than any of +their commentators understand them (Swift's Voyage to Laputa. 'Having +a desire to see those ancients who were most renowned for wit and +learning, I set apart one day on purpose. I proposed that Homer and +Aristotle might appear at the head of all their commentators; but these +were so numerous that some hundreds were forced to attend in the court +and outward rooms of the palace. I knew, and could distinguish these two +heroes, at first sight, not only from the crowd, but from each other. +Homer was the taller and comelier person of the two, walked very erect +for one of his age, and his eyes were the most quick and piercing I ever +beheld. Aristotle stooped much, and made use of a staff. His visage was +meagre, his hair lank and thin, and his voice hollow. I soon discovered +that both of them were perfect strangers to the rest of the company, +and had never seen or heard of them before. And I had a whisper from a +ghost, who shall be nameless, "That these commentators always kept in +the most distant quarters from their principals, in the lower world, +through a consciousness of shame and guilt, because they had so horribly +misrepresented the meaning of these authors to posterity." I introduced +Didymus and Eustathius to Homer, and prevailed on him to treat them +better than perhaps they deserved, for he soon found they wanted a +genius to enter into the spirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of all +patience with the account I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented +them to him; and he asked them "whether the rest of the tribe were as +great dunces as themselves?"'). There is, however, a difference between +them: for whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, +which developes the stages of the idea in different countries or at +different times in the same country, with Plato these gradations are +regarded only as an order of thought or ideas; the history of the human +mind had not yet dawned upon him. + +Many criticisms may be made on Plato's theory of education. While in +some respects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others +he is in advance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which +prevailed in his own time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered +new ones. He does not see that education is relative to the characters +of individuals; he only desires to impress the same form of the state on +the minds of all. He has no sufficient idea of the effect of literature +on the formation of the mind, and greatly exaggerates that of +mathematics. His aim is above all things to train the reasoning +faculties; to implant in the mind the spirit and power of abstraction; +to explain and define general notions, and, if possible, to connect +them. No wonder that in the vacancy of actual knowledge his followers, +and at times even he himself, should have fallen away from the doctrine +of ideas, and have returned to that branch of knowledge in which alone +the relation of the one and many can be truly seen--the science of +number. In his views both of teaching and training he might be styled, +in modern language, a doctrinaire; after the Spartan fashion he would +have his citizens cast in one mould; he does not seem to consider that +some degree of freedom, 'a little wholesome neglect,' is necessary to +strengthen and develope the character and to give play to the individual +nature. His citizens would not have acquired that knowledge which in +the vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the pilgrims from their +experience of evil. + +On the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and +theologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through +life and will begin again in another. He would never allow education of +some kind to cease; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of +Solon, 'I grow old learning many things,' cannot be applied literally. +Himself ravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and +delighting in solid geometry (Rep.), he has no difficulty in imagining +that a lifetime might be passed happily in such pursuits. We who know +how many more men of business there are in the world than real students +or thinkers, are not equally sanguine. The education which he proposes +for his citizens is really the ideal life of the philosopher or man of +genius, interrupted, but only for a time, by practical duties,--a life +not for the many, but for the few. + +Yet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to +our own times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be realized, +it may have a great effect in elevating the characters of mankind, +and raising them above the routine of their ordinary occupation or +profession. It is the best form under which we can conceive the whole +of life. Nevertheless the idea of Plato is not easily put into practice. +For the education of after life is necessarily the education which each +one gives himself. Men and women cannot be brought together in schools +or colleges at forty or fifty years of age; and if they could the result +would be disappointing. The destination of most men is what Plato would +call 'the Den' for the whole of life, and with that they are content. +Neither have they teachers or advisers with whom they can take counsel +in riper years. There is no 'schoolmaster abroad' who will tell them of +their faults, or inspire them with the higher sense of duty, or with the +ambition of a true success in life; no Socrates who will convict them +of ignorance; no Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them +of sin. Hence they have a difficulty in receiving the first element of +improvement, which is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir +them; they rather wish to rest than to pursue high objects. A few +only who have come across great men and women, or eminent teachers of +religion and morality, have received a second life from them, and have +lighted a candle from the fire of their genius. + +The want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons +continue to improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not +know the way. They 'never try an experiment,' or look up a point +of interest for themselves; they make no sacrifices for the sake of +knowledge; their minds, like their bodies, at a certain age become +fixed. Genius has been defined as 'the power of taking pains'; but +hardly any one keeps up his interest in knowledge throughout a whole +life. The troubles of a family, the business of making money, the +demands of a profession destroy the elasticity of the mind. The waxen +tablet of the memory which was once capable of receiving 'true thoughts +and clear impressions' becomes hard and crowded; there is not room +for the accumulations of a long life (Theaet.). The student, as years +advance, rather makes an exchange of knowledge than adds to his stores. +There is no pressing necessity to learn; the stock of Classics or +History or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is +enough for him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer to +any one who asks how he is to improve. For self-education consists in a +thousand things, commonplace in themselves,--in adding to what we are +by nature something of what we are not; in learning to see ourselves as +others see us; in judging, not by opinion, but by the evidence of facts; +in seeking out the society of superior minds; in a study of lives and +writings of great men; in observation of the world and character; in +receiving kindly the natural influence of different times of life; in +any act or thought which is raised above the practice or opinions of +mankind; in the pursuit of some new or original enquiry; in any effort +of mind which calls forth some latent power. + +If any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education +of after-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to +him:--That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind +most distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight, +either one which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or, +perhaps, furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the +speculative side the profession or business in which he is practically +engaged. He may make Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Plato, Bacon the friends +and companions of his life. He may find opportunities of hearing the +living voice of a great teacher. He may select for enquiry some point of +history or some unexplained phenomenon of nature. An hour a day passed +in such scientific or literary pursuits will furnish as many facts as +the memory can retain, and will give him 'a pleasure not to be repented +of' (Timaeus). Only let him beware of being the slave of crotchets, or +of running after a Will o' the Wisp in his ignorance, or in his vanity +of attributing to himself the gifts of a poet or assuming the air of +a philosopher. He should know the limits of his own powers. Better to +build up the mind by slow additions, to creep on quietly from one +thing to another, to gain insensibly new powers and new interests in +knowledge, than to form vast schemes which are never destined to be +realized. But perhaps, as Plato would say, 'This is part of another +subject' (Tim.); though we may also defend our digression by his example +(Theaet.). + +4. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or the natural +growth of institutions which fill modern treatises on political +philosophy seem hardly ever to have attracted the attention of Plato +and Aristotle. The ancients were familiar with the mutability of human +affairs; they could moralize over the ruins of cities and the fall of +empires (Plato, Statesman, and Sulpicius' Letter to Cicero); by them +fate and chance were deemed to be real powers, almost persons, and +to have had a great share in political events. The wiser of them like +Thucydides believed that 'what had been would be again,' and that a +tolerable idea of the future could be gathered from the past. Also they +had dreams of a Golden Age which existed once upon a time and might +still exist in some unknown land, or might return again in the remote +future. But the regular growth of a state enlightened by experience, +progressing in knowledge, improving in the arts, of which the citizens +were educated by the fulfilment of political duties, appears never to +have come within the range of their hopes and aspirations. Such a state +had never been seen, and therefore could not be conceived by them. Their +experience (Aristot. Metaph.; Plato, Laws) led them to conclude that +there had been cycles of civilization in which the arts had been +discovered and lost many times over, and cities had been overthrown and +rebuilt again and again, and deluges and volcanoes and other natural +convulsions had altered the face of the earth. Tradition told them of +many destructions of mankind and of the preservation of a remnant. +The world began again after a deluge and was reconstructed out of the +fragments of itself. Also they were acquainted with empires of unknown +antiquity, like the Egyptian or Assyrian; but they had never seen them +grow, and could not imagine, any more than we can, the state of man +which preceded them. They were puzzled and awestricken by the Egyptian +monuments, of which the forms, as Plato says, not in a figure, but +literally, were ten thousand years old (Laws), and they contrasted the +antiquity of Egypt with their own short memories. + +The early legends of Hellas have no real connection with the later +history: they are at a distance, and the intermediate region is +concealed from view; there is no road or path which leads from one to +the other. At the beginning of Greek history, in the vestibule of the +temple, is seen standing first of all the figure of the legislator, +himself the interpreter and servant of the God. The fundamental laws +which he gives are not supposed to change with time and circumstances. +The salvation of the state is held rather to depend on the inviolable +maintenance of them. They were sanctioned by the authority of heaven, +and it was deemed impiety to alter them. The desire to maintain +them unaltered seems to be the origin of what at first sight is very +surprising to us--the intolerant zeal of Plato against innovators in +religion or politics (Laws); although with a happy inconsistency he +is also willing that the laws of other countries should be studied and +improvements in legislation privately communicated to the Nocturnal +Council (Laws). The additions which were made to them in later ages in +order to meet the increasing complexity of affairs were still ascribed +by a fiction to the original legislator; and the words of such +enactments at Athens were disputed over as if they had been the words of +Solon himself. Plato hopes to preserve in a later generation the mind of +the legislator; he would have his citizens remain within the lines +which he has laid down for them. He would not harass them with minute +regulations, he would have allowed some changes in the laws: but not +changes which would affect the fundamental institutions of the state, +such for example as would convert an aristocracy into a timocracy, or a +timocracy into a popular form of government. + +Passing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been +the exception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we are +not surprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather than +of ancient date; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is +not more than a century or two old. It seems to have arisen out of the +impression left on the human mind by the growth of the Roman Empire +and of the Christian Church, and to be due to the political and social +improvements which they introduced into the world; and still more in +our own century to the idealism of the first French Revolution and the +triumph of American Independence; and in a yet greater degree to the +vast material prosperity and growth of population in England and her +colonies and in America. It is also to be ascribed in a measure to the +greater study of the philosophy of history. The optimist temperament of +some great writers has assisted the creation of it, while the opposite +character has led a few to regard the future of the world as dark. +The 'spectator of all time and of all existence' sees more of 'the +increasing purpose which through the ages ran' than formerly: but to the +inhabitant of a small state of Hellas the vision was necessarily limited +like the valley in which he dwelt. There was no remote past on which his +eye could rest, nor any future from which the veil was partly lifted up +by the analogy of history. The narrowness of view, which to ourselves +appears so singular, was to him natural, if not unavoidable. + +5. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, and +the two other works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the +Introductions to the two latter; a few general points of comparison may +be touched upon in this place. + +And first of the Laws. + +(1) The Republic, though probably written at intervals, yet speaking +generally and judging by the indications of thought and style, may be +reasonably ascribed to the middle period of Plato's life: the Laws are +certainly the work of his declining years, and some portions of them at +any rate seem to have been written in extreme old age. + +(2) The Republic is full of hope and aspiration: the Laws bear the stamp +of failure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which received +the last touches of the author: the other is imperfectly executed, and +apparently unfinished. The one has the grace and beauty of youth: the +other has lost the poetical form, but has more of the severity and +knowledge of life which is characteristic of old age. + +(3) The most conspicuous defect of the Laws is the failure of dramatic +power, whereas the Republic is full of striking contrasts of ideas and +oppositions of character. + +(4) The Laws may be said to have more the nature of a sermon, +the Republic of a poem; the one is more religious, the other more +intellectual. + +(5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas, the +government of the world by philosophers, are not found in the Laws; +the immortality of the soul is first mentioned in xii; the person of +Socrates has altogether disappeared. The community of women and children +is renounced; the institution of common or public meals for women (Laws) +is for the first time introduced (Ar. Pol.). + +(6) There remains in the Laws the old enmity to the poets, who are +ironically saluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are +peremptorily ordered out of the city, if they are not willing to submit +their poems to the censorship of the magistrates (Rep.). + +(7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few +passages in the Laws, such as the honour due to the soul, the evils +of licentious or unnatural love, the whole of Book x. (religion), the +dishonesty of retail trade, and bequests, which come more home to us, +and contain more of what may be termed the modern element in Plato than +almost anything in the Republic. + +The relation of the two works to one another is very well given: + +(1) by Aristotle in the Politics from the side of the Laws:-- + +'The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, +the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution +which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely +settled in all a few questions only; such as the community of women and +children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state. +The population is divided into two classes--one of husbandmen, and +the other of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of +counsellors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined +whether the husbandmen and artists are to have a share in the +government, and whether they too are to carry arms and share in military +service or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the +education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of +the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and +with discussions about the education of the guardians. In the Laws there +is hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution. +This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he +gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the +exception of the community of women and property, he supposes everything +to be the same in both states; there is to be the same education; the +citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there +are to be common meals in both. The only difference is that in the Laws +the common meals are extended to women, and the warriors number about +5000, but in the Republic only 1000.' + +(2) by Plato in the Laws (Book v.), from the side of the Republic:-- + +'The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of +the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying +that "Friends have all things in common." Whether there is now, or ever +will be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which +the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things +which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have +become common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy +and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the +utmost,--whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting +upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state more exalted in +virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a state, whether inhabited +by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and +therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to +cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is like +this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest +to immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by the +grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by +speaking of the nature and origin of the second.' + +The comparatively short work called the Statesman or Politicus in its +style and manner is more akin to the Laws, while in its idealism +it rather resembles the Republic. As far as we can judge by various +indications of language and thought, it must be later than the one and +of course earlier than the other. In both the Republic and Statesman a +close connection is maintained between Politics and Dialectic. In the +Statesman, enquiries into the principles of Method are interspersed with +discussions about Politics. The comparative advantages of the rule of +law and of a person are considered, and the decision given in favour of +a person (Arist. Pol.). But much may be said on the other side, nor is +the opposition necessary; for a person may rule by law, and law may +be so applied as to be the living voice of the legislator. As in the +Republic, there is a myth, describing, however, not a future, but a +former existence of mankind. The question is asked, 'Whether the state +of innocence which is described in the myth, or a state like our own +which possesses art and science and distinguishes good from evil, is +the preferable condition of man.' To this question of the comparative +happiness of civilized and primitive life, which was so often discussed +in the last century and in our own, no answer is given. The Statesman, +though less perfect in style than the Republic and of far less range, +may justly be regarded as one of the greatest of Plato's dialogues. + +6. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the +vehicle of thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which +went beyond their own age. The classical writing which approaches most +nearly to the Republic of Plato is the 'De Republica' of Cicero; but +neither in this nor in any other of his dialogues does he rival the +art of Plato. The manners are clumsy and inferior; the hand of the +rhetorician is apparent at every turn. Yet noble sentiments are +constantly recurring: the true note of Roman patriotism--'We Romans are +a great people'--resounds through the whole work. Like Socrates, Cicero +turns away from the phenomena of the heavens to civil and political +life. He would rather not discuss the 'two Suns' of which all Rome was +talking, when he can converse about 'the two nations in one' which had +divided Rome ever since the days of the Gracchi. Like Socrates again, +speaking in the person of Scipio, he is afraid lest he should assume +too much the character of a teacher, rather than of an equal who is +discussing among friends the two sides of a question. He would confine +the terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice, and he will +not concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But under +the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the natural +superior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to the soul +ruling over the body. He prefers a mixture of forms of government to any +single one. The two portraits of the just and the unjust, which occur in +the second book of the Republic, are transferred to the state--Philus, +one of the interlocutors, maintaining against his will the necessity +of injustice as a principle of government, while the other, Laelius, +supports the opposite thesis. His views of language and number are +derived from Plato; like him he denounces the drama. He also declares +that if his life were to be twice as long he would have no time to read +the lyric poets. The picture of democracy is translated by him word for +word, though he had hardly shown himself able to 'carry the jest' of +Plato. He converts into a stately sentence the humorous fancy about the +animals, who 'are so imbued with the spirit of democracy that they make +the passers-by get out of their way.' His description of the tyrant is +imitated from Plato, but is far inferior. The second book is historical, +and claims for the Roman constitution (which is to him the ideal) a +foundation of fact such as Plato probably intended to have given to the +Republic in the Critias. His most remarkable imitation of Plato is the +adaptation of the vision of Er, which is converted by Cicero into the +'Somnium Scipionis'; he has 'romanized' the myth of the Republic, adding +an argument for the immortality of the soul taken from the Phaedrus, +and some other touches derived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus. Though a +beautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the 'Somnium Scipionis; +is very inferior to the vision of Er; it is only a dream, and hardly +allows the reader to suppose that the writer believes in his own +creation. Whether his dialogues were framed on the model of the lost +dialogues of Aristotle, as he himself tells us, or of Plato, to which +they bear many superficial resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; +he is not conversing, but making speeches, and is never able to mould +the intractable Latin to the grace and ease of the Greek Platonic +dialogue. But if he is defective in form, much more is he inferior to +the Greek in matter; he nowhere in his philosophical writings leaves +upon our minds the impression of an original thinker. + +Plato's Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such +an ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian +world, and is embodied in St. Augustine's 'De Civitate Dei,' which is +suggested by the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same +manner in which we may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been +influenced by the decline of Greek politics in the writer's own age. The +difference is that in the time of Plato the degeneracy, though certain, +was gradual and insensible: whereas the taking of Rome by the Goths +stirred like an earthquake the age of St. Augustine. Men were inclined +to believe that the overthrow of the city was to be ascribed to the +anger felt by the old Roman deities at the neglect of their worship. St. +Augustine maintains the opposite thesis; he argues that the destruction +of the Roman Empire is due, not to the rise of Christianity, but to +the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman history, and over Greek +philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere crime, impiety and +falsehood. He compares the worst parts of the Gentile religions with +the best elements of the faith of Christ. He shows nothing of the spirit +which led others of the early Christian Fathers to recognize in the +writings of the Greek philosophers the power of the divine truth. He +traces the parallel of the kingdom of God, that is, the history of the +Jews, contained in their scriptures, and of the kingdoms of the world, +which are found in gentile writers, and pursues them both into an ideal +future. It need hardly be remarked that his use both of Greek and +of Roman historians and of the sacred writings of the Jews is wholly +uncritical. The heathen mythology, the Sybilline oracles, the myths +of Plato, the dreams of Neo-Platonists are equally regarded by him as +matter of fact. He must be acknowledged to be a strictly polemical or +controversial writer who makes the best of everything on one side and +the worst of everything on the other. He has no sympathy with the old +Roman life as Plato has with Greek life, nor has he any idea of the +ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise out of the ruins of the Roman +empire. He is not blind to the defects of the Christian Church, and +looks forward to a time when Christian and Pagan shall be alike brought +before the judgment-seat, and the true City of God shall appear...The +work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of antiquarian learning and +quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian ethics, but showing little +power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge of the Greek literature +and language. He was a great genius, and a noble character, yet hardly +capable of feeling or understanding anything external to his own +theology. Of all the ancient philosophers he is most attracted by Plato, +though he is very slightly acquainted with his writings. He is inclined +to believe that the idea of creation in the Timaeus is derived from the +narrative in Genesis; and he is strangely taken with the coincidence (?) +of Plato's saying that 'the philosopher is the lover of God,' and +the words of the Book of Exodus in which God reveals himself to Moses +(Exod.) He dwells at length on miracles performed in his own day, of +which the evidence is regarded by him as irresistible. He speaks in a +very interesting manner of the beauty and utility of nature and of the +human frame, which he conceives to afford a foretaste of the heavenly +state and of the resurrection of the body. The book is not really what +to most persons the title of it would imply, and belongs to an age which +has passed away. But it contains many fine passages and thoughts which +are for all time. + +The short treatise de Monarchia of Dante is by far the most remarkable +of mediaeval ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom +Italy and the Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of +an Universal Empire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary +government of the world, having a divine authority distinct from the +Papacy, yet coextensive with it. It is not 'the ghost of the dead Roman +Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof,' but the legitimate heir +and successor of it, justified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and +the beneficence of their rule. Their right to be the governors of the +world is also confirmed by the testimony of miracles, and acknowledged +by St. Paul when he appealed to Caesar, and even more emphatically by +Christ Himself, Who could not have made atonement for the sins of men +if He had not been condemned by a divinely authorized tribunal. The +necessity for the establishment of an Universal Empire is proved partly +by a priori arguments such as the unity of God and the unity of the +family or nation; partly by perversions of Scripture and history, by +false analogies of nature, by misapplied quotations from the classics, +and by odd scraps and commonplaces of logic, showing a familiar but by +no means exact knowledge of Aristotle (of Plato there is none). But +a more convincing argument still is the miserable state of the world, +which he touchingly describes. He sees no hope of happiness or peace +for mankind until all nations of the earth are comprehended in a single +empire. The whole treatise shows how deeply the idea of the Roman Empire +was fixed in the minds of his contemporaries. Not much argument was +needed to maintain the truth of a theory which to his own contemporaries +seemed so natural and congenial. He speaks, or rather preaches, from the +point of view, not of the ecclesiastic, but of the layman, although, as +a good Catholic, he is willing to acknowledge that in certain respects +the Empire must submit to the Church. The beginning and end of all his +noble reflections and of his arguments, good and bad, is the aspiration +'that in this little plot of earth belonging to mortal man life may pass +in freedom and peace.' So inextricably is his vision of the future bound +up with the beliefs and circumstances of his own age. + +The 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his genius, +and shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book was +written by him at the age of about 34 or 35, and is full of the generous +sentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the +miserable state of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of +the Roses, and in the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is +indignant at the corruption of the clergy, at the luxury of the nobility +and gentry, at the sufferings of the poor, at the calamities caused by +war. To the eye of More the whole world was in dissolution and decay; +and side by side with the misery and oppression which he has described +in the First Book of the Utopia, he places in the Second Book the ideal +state which by the help of Plato he had constructed. The times were full +of stir and intellectual interest. The distant murmur of the Reformation +was beginning to be heard. To minds like More's, Greek literature was +a revelation: there had arisen an art of interpretation, and the New +Testament was beginning to be understood as it had never been before, +and has not often been since, in its natural sense. The life there +depicted appeared to him wholly unlike that of Christian commonwealths, +in which 'he saw nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich men procuring +their own commodities under the name and title of the Commonwealth.' +He thought that Christ, like Plato, 'instituted all things common,' for +which reason, he tells us, the citizens of Utopia were the more willing +to receive his doctrines ('Howbeit, I think this was no small help and +furtherance in the matter, that they heard us say that Christ instituted +among his, all things common, and that the same community doth yet +remain in the rightest Christian communities' (Utopia).). The community +of property is a fixed idea with him, though he is aware of the +arguments which may be urged on the other side ('These things (I say), +when I consider with myself, I hold well with Plato, and do nothing +marvel that he would make no laws for them that refused those laws, +whereby all men should have and enjoy equal portions of riches and +commodities. For the wise men did easily foresee this to be the one and +only way to the wealth of a community, if equality of all things should +be brought in and established' (Utopia).). We wonder how in the reign of +Henry VIII, though veiled in another language and published in a foreign +country, such speculations could have been endured. + +He is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who +succeeded him, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he is +a worthy disciple of Plato. Like him, starting from a small portion +of fact, he founds his tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the +Latin narrative of the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise +about dates and facts, and has the power of making us believe that the +narrator of the tale must have been an eyewitness. We are fairly puzzled +by his manner of mixing up real and imaginary persons; his boy John +Clement and Peter Giles, citizen of Antwerp, with whom he disputes +about the precise words which are supposed to have been used by the +(imaginary) Portuguese traveller, Raphael Hythloday. 'I have the more +cause,' says Hythloday, 'to fear that my words shall not be believed, +for that I know how difficultly and hardly I myself would have believed +another man telling the same, if I had not myself seen it with mine own +eyes.' Or again: 'If you had been with me in Utopia, and had presently +seen their fashions and laws as I did which lived there five years and +more, and would never have come thence, but only to make the new land +known here,' etc. More greatly regrets that he forgot to ask Hythloday +in what part of the world Utopia is situated; he 'would have spent no +small sum of money rather than it should have escaped him,' and he begs +Peter Giles to see Hythloday or write to him and obtain an answer to the +question. After this we are not surprised to hear that a Professor of +Divinity (perhaps 'a late famous vicar of Croydon in Surrey,' as the +translator thinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a missionary by +the High Bishop, 'yea, and that he may himself be made Bishop of Utopia, +nothing doubting that he must obtain this Bishopric with suit; and he +counteth that a godly suit which proceedeth not of the desire of honour +or lucre, but only of a godly zeal.' The design may have failed through +the disappearance of Hythloday, concerning whom we have 'very uncertain +news' after his departure. There is no doubt, however, that he had told +More and Giles the exact situation of the island, but unfortunately at +the same moment More's attention, as he is reminded in a letter from +Giles, was drawn off by a servant, and one of the company from a cold +caught on shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles from hearing. +And 'the secret has perished' with him; to this day the place of Utopia +remains unknown. + +The words of Phaedrus, 'O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or +anything,' are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction. +Yet the greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the +originality of thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices +of his age, and far more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him +who believes not in the immortality of the soul to share in the +administration of the state (Laws), 'howbeit they put him to no +punishment, because they be persuaded that it is in no man's power to +believe what he list'; and 'no man is to be blamed for reasoning in +support of his own religion ('One of our company in my presence was +sharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began, against our +wills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of Christ's +religion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not only +prefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn +all other, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and +devilish, and the children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus +long reasoned the matter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and +condemned him into exile, not as a despiser of religion, but as a +seditious person and a raiser up of dissension among the people').' +In the public services 'no prayers be used, but such as every man +may boldly pronounce without giving offence to any sect.' He says +significantly, 'There be that give worship to a man that was once of +excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as God, but also the +chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest part, rejecting +all these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, far +above the capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed throughout all the +world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the Father +of all. To Him alone they attribute the beginnings, the increasings, the +proceedings, the changes, and the ends of all things. Neither give they +any divine honours to any other than him.' So far was More from sharing +the popular beliefs of his time. Yet at the end he reminds us that he +does not in all respects agree with the customs and opinions of the +Utopians which he describes. And we should let him have the benefit of +this saving clause, and not rudely withdraw the veil behind which he has +been pleased to conceal himself. + +Nor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral +speculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he +would set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including +in the same class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and 'sturdy and +valiant beggars,' that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a +day. His dislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of +offenders; his detestation of priests and lawyers (Compare his satirical +observation: 'They (the Utopians) have priests of exceeding holiness, +and therefore very few.); his remark that 'although every one may hear +of ravenous dogs and wolves and cruel man-eaters, it is not easy to find +states that are well and wisely governed,' are curiously at variance +with the notions of his age and indeed with his own life. There are many +points in which he shows a modern feeling and a prophetic insight like +Plato. He is a sanitary reformer; he maintains that civilized states +have a right to the soil of waste countries; he is inclined to the +opinion which places happiness in virtuous pleasures, but herein, as he +thinks, not disagreeing from those other philosophers who define virtue +to be a life according to nature. He extends the idea of happiness so as +to include the happiness of others; and he argues ingeniously, 'All men +agree that we ought to make others happy; but if others, how much more +ourselves!' And still he thinks that there may be a more excellent way, +but to this no man's reason can attain unless heaven should inspire him +with a higher truth. His ceremonies before marriage; his humane proposal +that war should be carried on by assassinating the leaders of the enemy, +may be compared to some of the paradoxes of Plato. He has a charming +fancy, like the affinities of Greeks and barbarians in the Timaeus, that +the Utopians learnt the language of the Greeks with the more readiness +because they were originally of the same race with them. He is +penetrated with the spirit of Plato, and quotes or adapts many thoughts +both from the Republic and from the Timaeus. He prefers public duties to +private, and is somewhat impatient of the importunity of relations. His +citizens have no silver or gold of their own, but are ready enough to +pay them to their mercenaries. There is nothing of which he is more +contemptuous than the love of money. Gold is used for fetters of +criminals, and diamonds and pearls for children's necklaces (When the +ambassadors came arrayed in gold and peacocks' feathers 'to the eyes of +all the Utopians except very few, which had been in other countries for +some reasonable cause, all that gorgeousness of apparel seemed shameful +and reproachful. In so much that they most reverently saluted the +vilest and most abject of them for lords--passing over the ambassadors +themselves without any honour, judging them by their wearing of golden +chains to be bondmen. You should have seen children also, that had cast +away their pearls and precious stones, when they saw the like sticking +upon the ambassadors' caps, dig and push their mothers under the sides, +saying thus to them--"Look, though he were a little child still." But +the mother; yea and that also in good earnest: "Peace, son," saith she, +"I think he be some of the ambassadors' fools."') + +Like Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and +princes; on the state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his +discourse (Hythloday) is very unwilling to become a minister of state, +considering that he would lose his independence and his advice would +never be heeded (Compare an exquisite passage, of which the conclusion +is as follows: 'And verily it is naturally given...suppressed and +ended.') He ridicules the new logic of his time; the Utopians could +never be made to understand the doctrine of Second Intentions ('For they +have not devised one of all those rules of restrictions, amplifications, +and suppositions, very wittily invented in the small Logicals, which +here our children in every place do learn. Furthermore, they were never +yet able to find out the second intentions; insomuch that none of them +all could ever see man himself in common, as they call him, though he be +(as you know) bigger than was ever any giant, yea, and pointed to of us +even with our finger.') He is very severe on the sports of the gentry; +the Utopians count 'hunting the lowest, the vilest, and the most abject +part of butchery.' He quotes the words of the Republic in which the +philosopher is described 'standing out of the way under a wall until the +driving storm of sleet and rain be overpast,' which admit of a singular +application to More's own fate; although, writing twenty years before +(about the year 1514), he can hardly be supposed to have foreseen this. +There is no touch of satire which strikes deeper than his quiet remark +that the greater part of the precepts of Christ are more at variance +with the lives of ordinary Christians than the discourse of Utopia ('And +yet the most part of them is more dissident from the manners of the +world now a days, than my communication was. But preachers, sly and +wily men, following your counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men +evil-willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule, they have wrested +and wried his doctrine, and, like a rule of lead, have applied it to +men's manners, that by some means at the least way, they might agree +together.') + +The 'New Atlantis' is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the +'Utopia.' The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy, +and by no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In +some places Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas +More, as, for example, in the external state which he attributes to the +governor of Solomon's House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to +Sir Thomas More such trappings appear simple ridiculous. Yet, after this +programme of dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, 'that he had a look +as though he pitied men.' Several things are borrowed by him from the +Timaeus; but he has injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and +passages which are taken from the Hebrew Scriptures. + +The 'City of the Sun' written by Campanella (1568-1639), a Dominican +friar, several years after the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, has many +resemblances to the Republic of Plato. The citizens have wives and +children in common; their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and +are arranged by the magistrates from time to time. They do not, however, +adopt his system of lots, but bring together the best natures, male and +female, 'according to philosophical rules.' The infants until two years +of age are brought up by their mothers in public temples; and since +individuals for the most part educate their children badly, at the +beginning of their third year they are committed to the care of the +State, and are taught at first, not out of books, but from paintings of +all kinds, which are emblazoned on the walls of the city. The city has +six interior circuits of walls, and an outer wall which is the +seventh. On this outer wall are painted the figures of legislators and +philosophers, and on each of the interior walls the symbols or forms +of some one of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for the most +part, trained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises; but they +have two special occupations of their own. After a battle, they and the +boys soothe and relieve the wounded warriors; also they encourage them +with embraces and pleasant words. Some elements of the Christian or +Catholic religion are preserved among them. The life of the Apostles is +greatly admired by this people because they had all things in common; +and the short prayer which Jesus Christ taught men is used in their +worship. It is a duty of the chief magistrates to pardon sins, and +therefore the whole people make secret confession of them to the +magistrates, and they to their chief, who is a sort of Rector +Metaphysicus; and by this means he is well informed of all that is going +on in the minds of men. After confession, absolution is granted to +the citizens collectively, but no one is mentioned by name. There +also exists among them a practice of perpetual prayer, performed by +a succession of priests, who change every hour. Their religion is +a worship of God in Trinity, that is of Wisdom, Love and Power, +but without any distinction of persons. They behold in the sun the +reflection of His glory; mere graven images they reject, refusing to +fall under the 'tyranny' of idolatry. + +Many details are given about their customs of eating and drinking, about +their mode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella looks +forward to a new mode of education, which is to be a study of nature, +and not of Aristotle. He would not have his citizens waste their time +in the consideration of what he calls 'the dead signs of things.' He +remarks that he who knows one science only, does not really know that +one any more than the rest, and insists strongly on the necessity of a +variety of knowledge. More scholars are turned out in the City of the +Sun in one year than by contemporary methods in ten or fifteen. He +evidently believes, like Bacon, that henceforward natural science will +play a great part in education, a hope which seems hardly to have +been realized, either in our own or in any former age; at any rate the +fulfilment of it has been long deferred. + +There is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this work, and +a most enlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no charm +of style, and falls very far short of the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, +and still more of the 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More. It is full of +inconsistencies, and though borrowed from Plato, shows but a superficial +acquaintance with his writings. It is a work such as one might expect +to have been written by a philosopher and man of genius who was also a +friar, and who had spent twenty-seven years of his life in a prison of +the Inquisition. The most interesting feature of the book, common to +Plato and Sir Thomas More, is the deep feeling which is shown by the +writer, of the misery and ignorance prevailing among the lower classes +in his own time. Campanella takes note of Aristotle's answer to Plato's +community of property, that in a society where all things are common, no +individual would have any motive to work (Arist. Pol.): he replies, that +his citizens being happy and contented in themselves (they are required +to work only four hours a day), will have greater regard for their +fellows than exists among men at present. He thinks, like Plato, that if +he abolishes private feelings and interests, a great public feeling will +take their place. + +Other writings on ideal states, such as the 'Oceana' of Harrington, in +which the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was, +but as he ought to have been; or the 'Argenis' of Barclay, which is an +historical allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth +mentioning. More interesting than either of these, and far more Platonic +in style and thought, is Sir John Eliot's 'Monarchy of Man,' in which +the prisoner of the Tower, no longer able 'to be a politician in the +land of his birth,' turns away from politics to view 'that other city +which is within him,' and finds on the very threshold of the grave that +the secret of human happiness is the mastery of self. The change of +government in the time of the English Commonwealth set men thinking +about first principles, and gave rise to many works of this class...The +great original genius of Swift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there +any trace in the conversation or in the works of Dr. Johnson of any +acquaintance with his writings. He probably would have refuted Plato +without reading him, in the same fashion in which he supposed himself to +have refuted Bishop Berkeley's theory of the non-existence of matter. +If we except the so-called English Platonists, or rather Neo-Platonists, +who never understood their master, and the writings of Coleridge, +who was to some extent a kindred spirit, Plato has left no permanent +impression on English literature. + +7. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that +they are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor +the other are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue +flowing from them which tends to raise individuals above the common +routine of society or trade, and to elevate States above the mere +interests of commerce or the necessities of self-defence. Like the +ideals of art they are partly framed by the omission of particulars; +they require to be viewed at a certain distance, and are apt to fade +away if we attempt to approach them. They gain an imaginary distinctness +when embodied in a State or in a system of philosophy, but they still +remain the visions of 'a world unrealized.' More striking and obvious to +the ordinary mind are the examples of great men, who have served their +own generation and are remembered in another. Even in our own family +circle there may have been some one, a woman, or even a child, in +whose face has shone forth a goodness more than human. The ideal then +approaches nearer to us, and we fondly cling to it. The ideal of the +past, whether of our own past lives or of former states of society, has +a singular fascination for the minds of many. Too late we learn that +such ideals cannot be recalled, though the recollection of them may +have a humanizing influence on other times. But the abstractions of +philosophy are to most persons cold and vacant; they give light without +warmth; they are like the full moon in the heavens when there are no +stars appearing. Men cannot live by thought alone; the world of sense is +always breaking in upon them. They are for the most part confined to a +corner of earth, and see but a little way beyond their own home or place +of abode; they 'do not lift up their eyes to the hills'; they are not +awake when the dawn appears. But in Plato we have reached a height from +which a man may look into the distance and behold the future of the +world and of philosophy. The ideal of the State and of the life of +the philosopher; the ideal of an education continuing through life and +extending equally to both sexes; the ideal of the unity and correlation +of knowledge; the faith in good and immortality--are the vacant forms of +light on which Plato is seeking to fix the eye of mankind. + +8. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek +Philosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more +clearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought +us nearer to some great change; the other almost in the same degree +retiring from view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, +but still remaining a silent hope of we know not what hidden in the +heart of man. The first ideal is the future of the human race in this +world; the second the future of the individual in another. The first is +the more perfect realization of our own present life; the second, +the abnegation of it: the one, limited by experience, the other, +transcending it. Both of them have been and are powerful motives of +action; there are a few in whom they have taken the place of all earthly +interests. The hope of a future for the human race at first sight seems +to be the more disinterested, the hope of individual existence the more +egotistical, of the two motives. But when men have learned to resolve +their hope of a future either for themselves or for the world into the +will of God--'not my will but Thine,' the difference between them falls +away; and they may be allowed to make either of them the basis of their +lives, according to their own individual character or temperament. There +is as much faith in the willingness to work for an unseen future in this +world as in another. Neither is it inconceivable that some rare nature +may feel his duty to another generation, or to another century, almost +as strongly as to his own, or that living always in the presence of God, +he may realize another world as vividly as he does this. + +The greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under +similitudes derived from human qualities; although sometimes, like the +Jewish prophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe +the nature of God only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a +positive meaning. It would be well, if when meditating on the higher +truths either of philosophy or religion, we sometimes substituted one +form of expression for another, lest through the necessities of language +we should become the slaves of mere words. + +There is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a +place in the home and heart of every believer in the religion of Christ, +and in which men seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth, +the Divine man, the Son of Man, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the +first-born and head of the whole family in heaven and earth, in Whom +the Divine and human, that which is without and that which is within the +range of our earthly faculties, are indissolubly united. Neither is this +divine form of goodness wholly separable from the ideal of the Christian +Church, which is said in the New Testament to be 'His body,' or at +variance with those other images of good which Plato sets before us. We +see Him in a figure only, and of figures of speech we select but a few, +and those the simplest, to be the expression of Him. We behold Him in +a picture, but He is not there. We gather up the fragments of His +discourses, but neither do they represent Him as He truly was. His +dwelling is neither in heaven nor earth, but in the heart of man. +This is that image which Plato saw dimly in the distance, which, when +existing among men, he called, in the language of Homer, 'the likeness +of God,' the likeness of a nature which in all ages men have felt to be +greater and better than themselves, and which in endless forms, whether +derived from Scripture or nature, from the witness of history or from +the human heart, regarded as a person or not as a person, with or +without parts or passions, existing in space or not in space, is and +will always continue to be to mankind the Idea of Good. + + + + + +THE REPUBLIC. + + + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE. + +Socrates, who is the narrator. + +Glaucon. + +Adeimantus. + +Polemarchus. + +Cephalus. + +Thrasymachus. + +Cleitophon. + +And others who are mute auditors. + +The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole +dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to +Timaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced +in the Timaeus. + + + + +BOOK I. + +I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, +that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess (Bendis, the Thracian +Artemis.); and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would +celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the +procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, +if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the +spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant +Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a +distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to +run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak +behind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait. + +I turned round, and asked him where his master was. + +There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait. + +Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus +appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus the son +of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession. + +Polemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your +companion are already on your way to the city. + +You are not far wrong, I said. + +But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are? + +Of course. + +And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain +where you are. + +May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to +let us go? + +But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said. + +Certainly not, replied Glaucon. + +Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured. + +Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in +honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening? + +With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches +and pass them one to another during the race? + +Yes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be +celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon +after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young +men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse. + +Glaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must. + +Very good, I replied. + +Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found +his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the +Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of +Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I +had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was +seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had +been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the +room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted +me eagerly, and then he said:-- + +You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were +still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But +at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come +oftener to the Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures +of the body fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm +of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your +resort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and +you will be quite at home with us. + +I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, +than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who +have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to +enquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. +And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have +arrived at that time which the poets call the 'threshold of old age'--Is +life harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it? + +I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my +age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; +and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is--I cannot +eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: +there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer +life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, +and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the +cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which +is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, +and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not +my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I +remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How +does love suit with age, Sophocles,--are you still the man you were? +Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you +speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His +words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to +me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has +a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, +then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad +master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, +and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the +same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for +he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of +age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are +equally a burden. + +I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go +on--Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in general +are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old +age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but +because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter. + +You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is +something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I +might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing +him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he +was an Athenian: 'If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, +neither of us would have been famous.' And to those who are not rich and +are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good +poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever +have peace with himself. + +May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part +inherited or acquired by you? + +Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art +of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: +for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of +his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; +but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: +and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a +little more than I received. + +That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you +are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those +who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; +the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of +their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or +of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the +sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence +they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the +praises of wealth. + +That is true, he said. + +Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?--What do you +consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your +wealth? + +One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. +For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near +death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; +the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there +of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he +is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the +weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other +place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms +crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what +wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his +transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his +sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who +is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the +kind nurse of his age: + +'Hope,' he says, 'cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice +and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his +journey;--hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.' + +How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not +say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to +deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; +and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension +about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to +this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and +therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many +advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my +opinion the greatest. + +Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is +it?--to speak the truth and to pay your debts--no more than this? And +even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his +right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is +not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would +say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than +they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in +his condition. + +You are quite right, he replied. + +But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a +correct definition of justice. + +Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said +Polemarchus interposing. + +I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the +sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company. + +Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said. + +To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices. + +Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and +according to you truly say, about justice? + +He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he +appears to me to be right. + +I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but +his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to +me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I +ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks +for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be +denied to be a debt. + +True. + +Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no +means to make the return? + +Certainly not. + +When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not +mean to include that case? + +Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a +friend and never evil. + +You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of +the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a +debt,--that is what you would imagine him to say? + +Yes. + +And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them? + +To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, +as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him--that +is to say, evil. + +Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken +darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice +is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a +debt. + +That must have been his meaning, he said. + +By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is +given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would +make to us? + +He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to +human bodies. + +And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what? + +Seasoning to food. + +And what is that which justice gives, and to whom? + +If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding +instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil +to enemies. + +That is his meaning then? + +I think so. + +And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies +in time of sickness? + +The physician. + +Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea? + +The pilot. + +And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just +man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend? + +In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other. + +But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a +physician? + +No. + +And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot? + +No. + +Then in time of peace justice will be of no use? + +I am very far from thinking so. + +You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war? + +Yes. + +Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn? + +Yes. + +Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,--that is what you mean? + +Yes. + +And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of +peace? + +In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. + +And by contracts you mean partnerships? + +Exactly. + +But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better +partner at a game of draughts? + +The skilful player. + +And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or +better partner than the builder? + +Quite the reverse. + +Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than +the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a +better partner than the just man? + +In a money partnership. + +Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not +want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a +horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would +he not? + +Certainly. + +And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be +better? + +True. + +Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is +to be preferred? + +When you want a deposit to be kept safely. + +You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie? + +Precisely. + +That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless? + +That is the inference. + +And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to +the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the +art of the vine-dresser? + +Clearly. + +And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you +would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then +the art of the soldier or of the musician? + +Certainly. + +And so of all other things;--justice is useful when they are useless, +and useless when they are useful? + +That is the inference. + +Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further +point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any +kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow? + +Certainly. + +And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is +best able to create one? + +True. + +And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march +upon the enemy? + +Certainly. + +Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief? + +That, I suppose, is to be inferred. + +Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing +it. + +That is implied in the argument. + +Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is +a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, +speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a +favourite of his, affirms that + +'He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.' + +And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of +theft; to be practised however 'for the good of friends and for the harm +of enemies,'--that was what you were saying? + +No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I +still stand by the latter words. + +Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those +who are so really, or only in seeming? + +Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks +good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. + +Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not +good seem to be so, and conversely? + +That is true. + +Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their +friends? True. + +And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil +to the good? + +Clearly. + +But the good are just and would not do an injustice? + +True. + +Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no +wrong? + +Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral. + +Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the +unjust? + +I like that better. + +But see the consequence:--Many a man who is ignorant of human nature +has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to +them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we +shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the +meaning of Simonides. + +Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error +into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and +'enemy.' + +What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked. + +We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good. + +And how is the error to be corrected? + +We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; +and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not +a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said. + +You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies? + +Yes. + +And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do +good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It +is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our +enemies when they are evil? + +Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. + +But ought the just to injure any one at all? + +Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his +enemies. + +When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated? + +The latter. + +Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of +dogs? + +Yes, of horses. + +And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of +horses? + +Of course. + +And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the +proper virtue of man? + +Certainly. + +And that human virtue is justice? + +To be sure. + +Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust? + +That is the result. + +But can the musician by his art make men unmusical? + +Certainly not. + +Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen? + +Impossible. + +And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can +the good by virtue make them bad? + +Assuredly not. + +Any more than heat can produce cold? + +It cannot. + +Or drought moisture? + +Clearly not. + +Nor can the good harm any one? + +Impossible. + +And the just is the good? + +Certainly. + +Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, +but of the opposite, who is the unjust? + +I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates. + +Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and +that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the +debt which he owes to his enemies,--to say this is not wise; for it is +not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be +in no case just. + +I agree with you, said Polemarchus. + +Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who +attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other +wise man or seer? + +I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said. + +Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be? + +Whose? + +I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, +or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own +power, was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends +and harm to your enemies.' + +Most true, he said. + +Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what +other can be offered? + +Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an +attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down +by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when +Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no +longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a +wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the +sight of him. + +He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken +possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to +one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, +you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to +yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; +for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will +not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain +or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have +clearness and accuracy. + +I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without +trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I +should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked +at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him. + +Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus +and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I +can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking +for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under +to one another,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when +we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of +gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not +doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most +willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, +you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us. + +How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;--that's +your ironical style! Did I not foresee--have I not already told you, +that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or +any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering? + +You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if +you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit +him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six +times two, or four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do +for me,'--then obviously, if that is your way of putting the +question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, +'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you +interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some +other number which is not the right one?--is that your meaning?'--How +would you answer him? + +Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said. + +Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only +appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he +thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not? + +I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted +answers? + +I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I +approve of any of them. + +But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he +said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you? + +Done to me!--as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise--that +is what I deserve to have done to me. + +What, and no payment! a pleasant notion! + +I will pay when I have the money, I replied. + +But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be +under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for +Socrates. + +Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does--refuse to +answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else. + +Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says +that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions +of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The +natural thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself +who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly +answer, for the edification of the company and of myself? + +Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and +Thrasymachus, as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; +for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish +himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length +he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he +refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he +never even says Thank you. + +That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am +ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in +praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise any one who +appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; +for I expect that you will answer well. + +Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than +the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of +course you won't. + +Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the +interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? +You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is +stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his +bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who +are weaker than he is, and right and just for us? + +That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense +which is most damaging to the argument. + +Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I +wish that you would be a little clearer. + +Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; +there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are +aristocracies? + +Yes, I know. + +And the government is the ruling power in each state? + +Certainly. + +And the different forms of government make laws democratical, +aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; +and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the +justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses +them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what +I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of +justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government +must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that +everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of +the stronger. + +Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will +try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have +yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is +true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are +added. + +A small addition, you must allow, he said. + +Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether +what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice +is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about +this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further. + +Proceed. + +I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to +obey their rulers? + +I do. + +But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they +sometimes liable to err? + +To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err. + +Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and +sometimes not? + +True. + +When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; +when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that? + +Yes. + +And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,--and that +is what you call justice? + +Doubtless. + +Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the +interest of the stronger but the reverse? + +What is that you are saying? he asked. + +I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: +Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own +interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? +Has not that been admitted? + +Yes. + +Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest +of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be +done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the +obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O +wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker +are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the +injury of the stronger? + +Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. + +Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness. + +But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus +himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for +their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice. + +Yes, Polemarchus,--Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was +commanded by their rulers is just. + +Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the +stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further +acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his +subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that +justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger. + +But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the +stronger thought to be his interest,--this was what the weaker had to +do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice. + +Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus. + +Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his +statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what +the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? + +Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken +the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? + +Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that +the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken. + +You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he +who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? +or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or +grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the +mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian +has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is +that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a +mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them +err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled +artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what +his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the +common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are +such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he +is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which +is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his +commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is +the interest of the stronger. + +Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an +informer? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of +injuring you in the argument? + +Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word--I know it; but you will be +found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail. + +I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any +misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what +sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were +saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should +execute--is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the +term? + +In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the +informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will +be able, never. + +And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat, +Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion. + +Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed. + +Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask +you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which +you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember +that I am now speaking of the true physician. + +A healer of the sick, he replied. + +And the pilot--that is to say, the true pilot--is he a captain of +sailors or a mere sailor? + +A captain of sailors. + +The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into +account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he +is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of +his skill and of his authority over the sailors. + +Very true, he said. + +Now, I said, every art has an interest? + +Certainly. + +For which the art has to consider and provide? + +Yes, that is the aim of art. + +And the interest of any art is the perfection of it--this and nothing +else? + +What do you mean? + +I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. +Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has +wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may +be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which +the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of +medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right? + +Quite right, he replied. + +But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any +quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the +ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide +for the interests of seeing and hearing--has art in itself, I say, any +similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another +supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and +another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their +own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of +another?--having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct +them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have +only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art +remains pure and faultless while remaining true--that is to say, while +perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell +me whether I am not right. + +Yes, clearly. + +Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the +interest of the body? + +True, he said. + +Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of +horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts +care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that +which is the subject of their art? + +True, he said. + +But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their +own subjects? + +To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance. + +Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the +stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker? + +He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally +acquiesced. + +Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, +considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his +patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as +a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted? + +Yes. + +And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of +sailors and not a mere sailor? + +That has been admitted. + +And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest +of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's +interest? + +He gave a reluctant 'Yes.' + +Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far +as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but +always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; +to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he +says and does. + +When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that +the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, +instead of replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a +nurse? + +Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be +answering? + +Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not +even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. + +What makes you say that? I replied. + +Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the +sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of +himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of +states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, +and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, +no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and +unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality +another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, +and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for +the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, +and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his +happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, +most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison +with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust +is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is +dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, +in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax, the just +man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; +and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the +other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is +the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, +and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he +is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in +unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. +I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the +advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most +clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the +criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse +to do injustice are the most miserable--that is to say tyranny, which by +fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little +but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, +private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected +perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur +great disgrace--they who do such wrong in particular cases are called +robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and +thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens +has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is +termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who +hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind +censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not +because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, +Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and +freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is +the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit +and interest. + +Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man, deluged +our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company +would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his +position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not +leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive +are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly +taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to +determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes--to +determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest +advantage? + +And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry? + +You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, +Thrasymachus--whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you +say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, +do not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any +benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own +part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe +injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and +allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust +man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this +does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there +may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we +may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are +mistaken in preferring justice to injustice. + +And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced +by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me +put the proof bodily into your souls? + +Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you +change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, +Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although +you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not +observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that +the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own +good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures +of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as +a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with +the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, +since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the +requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just +now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered +as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the +good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers +in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority. + +Think! Nay, I am sure of it. + +Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly +without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the +advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: +Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a +separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you +think, that we may make a little progress. + +Yes, that is the difference, he replied. + +And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general +one--medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, +and so on? + +Yes, he said. + +And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do +not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is +to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot +may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would +you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt +your exact use of language? + +Certainly not. + +Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not +say that the art of payment is medicine? + +I should not. + +Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a +man takes fees when he is engaged in healing? + +Certainly not. + +And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially +confined to the art? + +Yes. + +Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to +be attributed to something of which they all have the common use? + +True, he replied. + +And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is +gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art +professed by him? + +He gave a reluctant assent to this. + +Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective +arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and +the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which +is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and +benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive +any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well? + +I suppose not. + +But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing? + +Certainly, he confers a benefit. + +Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts +nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before +saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who +are the weaker and not the stronger--to their good they attend and +not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear +Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to +govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils +which are not his concern without remuneration. For, in the execution of +his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not +regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore +in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of +three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing. + +What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment +are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or +how a penalty can be a payment. + +You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to +the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that +ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace? + +Very true. + +And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for +them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing +and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves +out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being +ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be +laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of +punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness +to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed +dishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who +refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. +And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, +not because they would, but because they cannot help--not under the idea +that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as +a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling +to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there +is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, +then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to +obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the +true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that +of his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose rather to +receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring +one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the +interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further +discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the +unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement +appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has +spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer? + +I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he +answered. + +Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was +rehearsing? + +Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me. + +Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he +is saying what is not true? + +Most certainly, he replied. + +If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the +advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a +numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, +and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our +enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall +unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons. + +Very good, he said. + +And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said. + +That which you propose. + +Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and +answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect +justice? + +Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons. + +And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and +the other vice? + +Certainly. + +I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice? + +What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to +be profitable and justice not. + +What else then would you say? + +The opposite, he replied. + +And would you call justice vice? + +No, I would rather say sublime simplicity. + +Then would you call injustice malignity? + +No; I would rather say discretion. + +And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good? + +Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly +unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but +perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession +if undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with +those of which I was just now speaking. + +I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I +replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class +injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite. + +Certainly I do so class them. + +Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; +for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had +been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer +might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive +that you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust +you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before +to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with +wisdom and virtue. + +You have guessed most infallibly, he replied. + +Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the +argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are +speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest +and are not amusing yourself at our expense. + +I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?--to refute the +argument is your business. + +Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good +as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any +advantage over the just? + +Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature +which he is. + +And would he try to go beyond just action? + +He would not. + +And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the +unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust? + +He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he +would not be able. + +Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My +question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than +another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust? + +Yes, he would. + +And what of the unjust--does he claim to have more than the just man and +to do more than is just? + +Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men. + +And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the +unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all? + +True. + +We may put the matter thus, I said--the just does not desire more than +his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than +both his like and his unlike? + +Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement. + +And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither? + +Good again, he said. + +And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them? + +Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are +of a certain nature; he who is not, not. + +Each of them, I said, is such as his like is? + +Certainly, he replied. + +Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: +you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician? + +Yes. + +And which is wise and which is foolish? + +Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish. + +And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is +foolish? + +Yes. + +And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician? + +Yes. + +And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts +the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the +tightening and loosening the strings? + +I do not think that he would. + +But he would claim to exceed the non-musician? + +Of course. + +And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks +would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of +medicine? + +He would not. + +But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician? + +Yes. + +And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that +any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying +or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather +say or do the same as his like in the same case? + +That, I suppose, can hardly be denied. + +And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either +the knowing or the ignorant? + +I dare say. + +And the knowing is wise? + +Yes. + +And the wise is good? + +True. + +Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but +more than his unlike and opposite? + +I suppose so. + +Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both? + +Yes. + +But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his +like and unlike? Were not these your words? + +They were. + +And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his +unlike? + +Yes. + +Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil +and ignorant? + +That is the inference. + +And each of them is such as his like is? + +That was admitted. + +Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and +ignorant. + +Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat +them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the +perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had +never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that +justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I +proceeded to another point: + +Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not +also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember? + +Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you +are saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be +quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to +have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer +'Very good,' as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod 'Yes' +and 'No.' + +Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion. + +Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. +What else would you have? + +Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and +you shall answer. + +Proceed. + +Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that +our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be +carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger +and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified +with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, +if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. +But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You +would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting +to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be +holding many of them in subjection? + +True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust +state will be most likely to do so. + +I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further +consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state +can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice. + +If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with +justice; but if I am right, then without justice. + +I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and +dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent. + +That is out of civility to you, he replied. + +You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to +inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of +robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if +they injured one another? + +No indeed, he said, they could not. + +But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act +together better? + +Yes. + +And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and +fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, +Thrasymachus? + +I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you. + +How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether +injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, +among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and +set them at variance and render them incapable of common action? + +Certainly. + +And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and +fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just? + +They will. + +And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say +that she loses or that she retains her natural power? + +Let us assume that she retains her power. + +Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that +wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a +family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered +incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and +does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes +it, and with the just? Is not this the case? + +Yes, certainly. + +And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in +the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not +at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to +himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus? + +Yes. + +And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just? + +Granted that they are. + +But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will +be their friend? + +Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not +oppose you, lest I should displease the company. + +Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of +my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and +better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of +common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil +acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for +if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one +another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of +justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been +they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they +were but half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been whole +villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of +action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you +said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than +the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I +think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still +I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, +nothing less than the rule of human life. + +Proceed. + +I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has +some end? + +I should. + +And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could +not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing? + +I do not understand, he said. + +Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye? + +Certainly not. + +Or hear, except with the ear? + +No. + +These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs? + +They may. + +But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in +many other ways? + +Of course. + +And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose? + +True. + +May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook? + +We may. + +Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning +when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that +which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any +other thing? + +I understand your meaning, he said, and assent. + +And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask +again whether the eye has an end? + +It has. + +And has not the eye an excellence? + +Yes. + +And the ear has an end and an excellence also? + +True. + +And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end +and a special excellence? + +That is so. + +Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own +proper excellence and have a defect instead? + +How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see? + +You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is +sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask +the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which +fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail +of fulfilling them by their own defect? + +Certainly, he replied. + +I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper +excellence they cannot fulfil their end? + +True. + +And the same observation will apply to all other things? + +I agree. + +Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for +example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not +these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to +any other? + +To no other. + +And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul? + +Assuredly, he said. + +And has not the soul an excellence also? + +Yes. + +And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that +excellence? + +She cannot. + +Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, +and the good soul a good ruler? + +Yes, necessarily. + +And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and +injustice the defect of the soul? + +That has been admitted. + +Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man +will live ill? + +That is what your argument proves. + +And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the +reverse of happy? + +Certainly. + +Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable? + +So be it. + +But happiness and not misery is profitable. + +Of course. + +Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable +than justice. + +Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea. + +For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle +towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been +well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure +snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, +he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I +gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought +at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away +to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and +when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of +justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And +the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. +For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know +whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is +happy or unhappy. + + + + +BOOK II. + +With these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the +discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For +Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at +Thrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said +to me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to +have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust? + +I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could. + +Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:--How would +you arrange goods--are there not some which we welcome for their +own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, +harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, +although nothing follows from them? + +I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied. + +Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, +health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their +results? + +Certainly, I said. + +And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the +care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of +money-making--these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and +no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of +some reward or result which flows from them? + +There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask? + +Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place +justice? + +In the highest class, I replied,--among those goods which he who would +be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their +results. + +Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be +reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued +for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are +disagreeable and rather to be avoided. + +I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was +the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured +justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by +him. + +I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall +see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, +to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; +but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been +made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what +they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you, +please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I +will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common +view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do +so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I +will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust +is after all better far than the life of the just--if what they say +is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I +acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus +and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have +never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by +any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect +of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom +I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise +the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking +will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising +justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my +proposal? + +Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense +would oftener wish to converse. + +I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by +speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice. + +They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, +evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have +both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not +being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they +had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise +laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed +by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of +justice;--it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is +to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to +suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at +a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as +the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men to do +injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit +to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he +did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of +justice. + +Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they +have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something +of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do +what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; +then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be +proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all +natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of +justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be +most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said +to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. +According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of +the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an +opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed +at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, +he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and +looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than +human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the +finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, +according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the +flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his +finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet +of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the +rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no +longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring +he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials +of the ring, and always with the same result--when he turned the collet +inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he +contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; +whereas soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help +conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose +now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of +them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an +iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his +hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he +liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at +his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all +respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be +as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same +point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is +just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him +individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he +can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their +hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than +justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they +are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming +invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he +would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although +they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances +with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. +Enough of this. + +Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and +unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the +isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely +unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from +either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work +of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other +distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician, who +knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, +if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust +make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means +to be great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for +the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. +Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most +perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow +him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest +reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to +recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his +deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required +by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at +his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, +wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no +seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and +then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or +for the sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in +justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a +state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, +and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the +proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of +infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of +death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the +uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let +judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two. + +Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them +up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two +statues. + +I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there +is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either +of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the +description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that +the words which follow are not mine.--Let me put them into the mouths of +the eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is +thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound--will have his eyes +burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be +impaled: Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to +be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust +than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live +with a view to appearances--he wants to be really unjust and not to seem +only:-- + +'His mind has a soil deep and fertile, Out of which spring his prudent +counsels.' + +In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the +city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he +will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own +advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every +contest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his +antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his +gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he +can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and +magnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to +honour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely +to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men +are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life +of the just. + +I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his +brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is +nothing more to be urged? + +Why, what else is there? I answered. + +The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied. + +Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother'--if +he fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that +Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take +from me the power of helping justice. + +Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another +side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice +and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I +believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their +sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake +of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of +obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, +and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing +to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of +appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they +throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of +benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this +accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of +whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just-- + + 'To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle; + And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,' + +and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer +has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is-- + +'As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice; +to whom the black earth brings forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are +bowed with fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives +him fish.' + +Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son +vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below, where +they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, +crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of +drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards +yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall +survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which +they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they +bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; +also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict +upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the +just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention +supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the +other. + +Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking +about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but +is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always +declaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and +toilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of +attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that +honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they +are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both in +public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, +while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even +though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most +extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the +gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good +men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to +rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed +to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his +ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and +they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; +with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute +their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now +smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod;-- + +'Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her +dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,' + +and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the +gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:-- + +'The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them +and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by +libations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed.' + +And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, +who were children of the Moon and the Muses--that is what they +say--according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only +individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin +may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and +are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort +they call mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if +we neglect them no one knows what awaits us. + +He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and +vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds +likely to be affected, my dear Socrates,--those of them, I mean, who are +quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from +all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of +persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would +make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the +words of Pindar-- + +'Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower +which may be a fortress to me all my days?' + +For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought +just profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand +are unmistakeable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of +justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers +prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to +appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and +shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I +will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, +recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of +wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. +Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be +the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we +will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there +are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and +assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall +make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying +that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But +what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human +things--why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if +there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only +from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very +persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by 'sacrifices +and soothing entreaties and by offerings.' Let us be consistent then, +and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had +better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are +just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the +gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and +by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be +propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world below +in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.' +Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and +atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty +cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and +prophets, bear a like testimony. + +On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than +the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful +regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and +men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest +authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who +has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to +honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice +praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to disprove +the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still +he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, +because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; +unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him may +have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge +of the truth--but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to +cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. +And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he +immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be. + +The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of +the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to +find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice--beginning with +the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and +ending with the men of our own time--no one has ever blamed injustice or +praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits +which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in +verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in +the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of +all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is +the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the +universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth +upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from +doing wrong, but every one would have been his own watchman, because +afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of +evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the +language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger +than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, +perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as +I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the +opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority +which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the +possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil +to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations; +for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and +add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the +appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep +injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking +that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and +that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to +the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest +class of goods which are desired indeed for their results, but in a far +greater degree for their own sakes--like sight or hearing or knowledge +or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional +good--I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point +only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice +work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure +injustice, magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the +other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am +ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the +consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own +lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to +us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of +them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and +the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. + +I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on +hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an +illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses +which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had +distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:-- + +'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero.' + +The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in +being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, +and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that +you are not convinced--this I infer from your general character, for had +I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But +now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in +knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I +feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home to +me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made +to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice +has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and +speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being +present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her +defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can. + +Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question +drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the +truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, +about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, +that the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very +good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that +we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that +a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters +from a distance; and it occurred to some one else that they might be +found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were +larger--if they were the same and he could read the larger letters +first, and then proceed to the lesser--this would have been thought a +rare piece of good fortune. + +Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our +enquiry? + +I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our +enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an +individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State. + +True, he replied. + +And is not a State larger than an individual? + +It is. + +Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and +more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the +nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and +secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser +and comparing them. + +That, he said, is an excellent proposal. + +And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the +justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also. + +I dare say. + +When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our +search will be more easily discovered. + +Yes, far more easily. + +But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am +inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore. + +I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should +proceed. + +A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; +no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other +origin of a State be imagined? + +There can be no other. + +Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, +one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when +these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the +body of inhabitants is termed a State. + +True, he said. + +And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, +under the idea that the exchange will be for their good. + +Very true. + +Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true +creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention. + +Of course, he replied. + +Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the +condition of life and existence. + +Certainly. + +The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like. + +True. + +And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great +demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, +some one else a weaver--shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps +some other purveyor to our bodily wants? + +Quite right. + +The barest notion of a State must include four or five men. + +Clearly. + +And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours +into a common stock?--the individual husbandman, for example, producing +for four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the +provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; +or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of +producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food +in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time +be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no +partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants? + +Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at +producing everything. + +Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you +say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there +are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different +occupations. + +Very true. + +And will you have a work better done when the workman has many +occupations, or when he has only one? + +When he has only one. + +Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at +the right time? + +No doubt. + +For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is +at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the +business his first object. + +He must. + +And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully +and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is +natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things. + +Undoubtedly. + +Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will +not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, +if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make +his tools--and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and +shoemaker. + +True. + +Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in +our little State, which is already beginning to grow? + +True. + +Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order +that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well +as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces +and hides,--still our State will not be very large. + +That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains +all these. + +Then, again, there is the situation of the city--to find a place where +nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible. + +Impossible. + +Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required +supply from another city? + +There must. + +But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require +who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed. + +That is certain. + +And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for +themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate +those from whom their wants are supplied. + +Very true. + +Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required? + +They will. + +Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants? + +Yes. + +Then we shall want merchants? + +We shall. + +And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will +also be needed, and in considerable numbers? + +Yes, in considerable numbers. + +Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? +To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our +principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a +State. + +Clearly they will buy and sell. + +Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of +exchange. + +Certainly. + +Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production +to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with +him,--is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place? + +Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake +the office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those +who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for +any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money +in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from +those who desire to buy. + +This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is +not 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the +market-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from +one city to another are called merchants? + +Yes, he said. + +And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly +on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength +for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not +mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of +their labour. + +True. + +Then hirelings will help to make up our population? + +Yes. + +And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected? + +I think so. + +Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the +State did they spring up? + +Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot +imagine that they are more likely to be found any where else. + +I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better +think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry. + +Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, +now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and +wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And +when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and +barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed +on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making +noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on +clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew +or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine +which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the +praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will +take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye +to poverty or war. + +But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to +their meal. + +True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a +relish--salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs +such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, +and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns +at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be +expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a +similar life to their children after them. + +Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, +how else would you feed the beasts? + +But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied. + +Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. +People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and +dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern +style. + +Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me +consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; +and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be +more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion +the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have +described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have +no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the +simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, +and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and +courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every +variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first +speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the +painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and +ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured. + +True, he said. + +Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is +no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a +multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such +as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class +have to do with forms and colours; another will be the votaries of +music--poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, +contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's +dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in +request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as +confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and +therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are +needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of +many other kinds, if people eat them. + +Certainly. + +And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians +than before? + +Much greater. + +And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants +will be too small now, and not enough? + +Quite true. + +Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture +and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, +they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the +unlimited accumulation of wealth? + +That, Socrates, will be inevitable. + +And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not? + +Most certainly, he replied. + +Then without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much +we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes +which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as +well as public. + +Undoubtedly. + +And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will +be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight +with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and +persons whom we were describing above. + +Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves? + +No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged +by all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will +remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success. + +Very true, he said. + +But is not war an art? + +Certainly. + +And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking? + +Quite true. + +And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, +or a builder--in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to +him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by +nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long +and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would +become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that +the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily +acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or +shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a +good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, +and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing +else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, +nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has +never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up +a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, +whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops? + +Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be +beyond price. + +And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and +skill, and art, and application will be needed by him? + +No doubt, he replied. + +Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling? + +Certainly. + +Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted +for the task of guarding the city? + +It will. + +And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave +and do our best. + +We must. + +Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding +and watching? + +What do you mean? + +I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake +the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught +him, they have to fight with him. + +All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them. + +Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well? + +Certainly. + +And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog +or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and +unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any +creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable? + +I have. + +Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are +required in the guardian. + +True. + +And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit? + +Yes. + +But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, +and with everybody else? + +A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied. + +Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle +to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting +for their enemies to destroy them. + +True, he said. + +What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which +has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other? + +True. + +He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two +qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and +hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible. + +I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied. + +Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.--My +friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost +sight of the image which we had before us. + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite +qualities. + +And where do you find them? + +Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog +is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to +their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers. + +Yes, I know. + +Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our +finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities? + +Certainly not. + +Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited +nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher? + +I do not apprehend your meaning. + +The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the +dog, and is remarkable in the animal. + +What trait? + +Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, +he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the +other any good. Did this never strike you as curious? + +The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of +your remark. + +And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;--your dog is a +true philosopher. + +Why? + +Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only +by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a +lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test +of knowledge and ignorance? + +Most assuredly. + +And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy? + +They are the same, he replied. + +And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be +gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of +wisdom and knowledge? + +That we may safely affirm. + +Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will +require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and +strength? + +Undoubtedly. + +Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, +how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which +may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final +end--How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want +either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an +inconvenient length. + +Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us. + +Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if +somewhat long. + +Certainly not. + +Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our +story shall be the education of our heroes. + +By all means. + +And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the +traditional sort?--and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, +and music for the soul. + +True. + +Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards? + +By all means. + +And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not? + +I do. + +And literature may be either true or false? + +Yes. + +And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the +false? + +I do not understand your meaning, he said. + +You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, +though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; +and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn +gymnastics. + +Very true. + +That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before +gymnastics. + +Quite right, he said. + +You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, +especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time +at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is +more readily taken. + +Quite true. + +And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales +which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds +ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish +them to have when they are grown up? + +We cannot. + +Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of +fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, +and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their +children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such +tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but +most of those which are now in use must be discarded. + +Of what tales are you speaking? he said. + +You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are +necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of +them. + +Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term +the greater. + +Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of +the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind. + +But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with +them? + +A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, +what is more, a bad lie. + +But when is this fault committed? + +Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and +heroes,--as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a +likeness to the original. + +Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what +are the stories which you mean? + +First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high +places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie +too,--I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated +on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son +inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be +lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had +better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity +for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and +they should sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) pig, but some huge and +unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few +indeed. + +Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable. + +Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the +young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he +is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his +father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following +the example of the first and greatest among the gods. + +I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are +quite unfit to be repeated. + +Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of +quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should +any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and +fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, +we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be +embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable +other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. +If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling +is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel +between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by +telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told +to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus +binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying +for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of +the gods in Homer--these tales must not be admitted into our State, +whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For +a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; +anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become +indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the +tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts. + +There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such +models to be found and of what tales are you speaking--how shall we +answer him? + +I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, +but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the +general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits +which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their +business. + +Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean? + +Something of this kind, I replied:--God is always to be represented as +he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in +which the representation is given. + +Right. + +And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such? + +Certainly. + +And no good thing is hurtful? + +No, indeed. + +And that which is not hurtful hurts not? + +Certainly not. + +And that which hurts not does no evil? + +No. + +And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil? + +Impossible. + +And the good is advantageous? + +Yes. + +And therefore the cause of well-being? + +Yes. + +It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but +of the good only? + +Assuredly. + +Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many +assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things +that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the +evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the +causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him. + +That appears to me to be most true, he said. + +Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of +the folly of saying that two casks + +'Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of +evil lots,' + +and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two + +'Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;' + +but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, + +'Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth.' + +And again-- + +'Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.' + +And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which +was really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, +or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis +and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our +young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that + +'God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.' + +And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe--the subject of the +tragedy in which these iambic verses occur--or of the house of Pelops, +or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit +him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he +must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say +that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being +punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God +is the author of their misery--the poet is not to be permitted to say; +though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require +to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; +but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be +strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or +prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. +Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious. + +I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law. + +Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to +which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform,--that God is +not the author of all things, but of good only. + +That will do, he said. + +And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God +is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, +and now in another--sometimes himself changing and passing into +many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such +transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own +proper image? + +I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought. + +Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must +be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing? + +Most certainly. + +And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered +or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human +frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant +which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat +of the sun or any similar causes. + +Of course. + +And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged +by any external influence? + +True. + +And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite +things--furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are +least altered by time and circumstances. + +Very true. + +Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, +is least liable to suffer change from without? + +True. + +But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect? + +Of course they are. + +Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many +shapes? + +He cannot. + +But may he not change and transform himself? + +Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all. + +And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the +worse and more unsightly? + +If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot +suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty. + +Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, +desire to make himself worse? + +Impossible. + +Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, +as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God +remains absolutely and for ever in his own form. + +That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment. + +Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that + +'The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up +and down cities in all sorts of forms;' + +and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either +in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in +the likeness of a priestess asking an alms + +'For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;' + +--let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers +under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad +version of these myths--telling how certain gods, as they say, 'Go about +by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;' but +let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the +same time speak blasphemy against the gods. + +Heaven forbid, he said. + +But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft +and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms? + +Perhaps, he replied. + +Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in +word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself? + +I cannot say, he replied. + +Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be +allowed, is hated of gods and men? + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and +highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, +above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him. + +Still, he said, I do not comprehend you. + +The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to +my words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived +or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of +themselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to +hold the lie, is what mankind least like;--that, I say, is what they +utterly detest. + +There is nothing more hateful to them. + +And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who +is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a +kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, +not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right? + +Perfectly right. + +The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men? + +Yes. + +Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in +dealing with enemies--that would be an instance; or again, when those +whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to +do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or +preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now +speaking--because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make +falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account. + +Very true, he said. + +But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is +ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention? + +That would be ridiculous, he said. + +Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God? + +I should say not. + +Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies? + +That is inconceivable. + +But he may have friends who are senseless or mad? + +But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God. + +Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie? + +None whatever. + +Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood? + +Yes. + +Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes +not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision. + +Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own. + +You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in +which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not +magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in +any way. + +I grant that. + +Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying +dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses +of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials + +'Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, +and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all +things blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my +soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of +prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, +he who was present at the banquet, and who said this--he it is who has +slain my son.' + +These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our +anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall +we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, +meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be +true worshippers of the gods and like them. + +I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them +my laws. + + + + +BOOK III. + +Such then, I said, are our principles of theology--some tales are to be +told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth +upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to +value friendship with one another. + +Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said. + +But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons +besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of +death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him? + +Certainly not, he said. + +And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle +rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real +and terrible? + +Impossible. + +Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales +as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile but rather +to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions +are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors. + +That will be our duty, he said. + +Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, +beginning with the verses, + +'I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than +rule over all the dead who have come to nought.' + +We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared, + +'Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen +both of mortals and immortals.' + +And again:-- + +'O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form +but no mind at all!' + +Again of Tiresias:-- + +'(To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,) that he alone +should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades.' + +Again:-- + +'The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, +leaving manhood and youth.' + +Again:-- + +'And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth.' + +And,-- + +'As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped +out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling +to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they +moved.' + +And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike +out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or +unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical +charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who +are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death. + +Undoubtedly. + +Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which +describe the world below--Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and +sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a +shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not +say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but +there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too +excitable and effeminate by them. + +There is a real danger, he said. + +Then we must have no more of them. + +True. + +Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us. + +Clearly. + +And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous +men? + +They will go with the rest. + +But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is +that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man +who is his comrade. + +Yes; that is our principle. + +And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he +had suffered anything terrible? + +He will not. + +Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his +own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. + +True, he said. + +And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of +fortune, is to him of all men least terrible. + +Assuredly. + +And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the +greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him. + +Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another. + +Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, +and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for +anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being educated +by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like. + +That will be very right. + +Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict +Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on +his back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy +along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both +his hands and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the +various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam +the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching, + +'Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.' + +Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce +the gods lamenting and saying, + +'Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.' + +But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so +completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him +say-- + +'O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased +round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.' + +Or again:-- + +Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, +subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius.' + +For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy +representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, +hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be +dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination +which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead +of having any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and +lamenting on slight occasions. + +Yes, he said, that is most true. + +Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument +has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is +disproved by a better. + +It ought not to be. + +Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of +laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a +violent reaction. + +So I believe. + +Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented +as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of +the gods be allowed. + +Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied. + +Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as +that of Homer when he describes how + +'Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw +Hephaestus bustling about the mansion.' + +On your views, we must not admit them. + +On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit +them is certain. + +Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is +useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the +use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private +individuals have no business with them. + +Clearly not, he said. + +Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of +the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with +enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public +good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and +although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to +them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient +or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily +illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to +tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the +crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors. + +Most true, he said. + +If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State, + +'Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter,' + +he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally +subversive and destructive of ship or State. + +Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out. + +In the next place our youth must be temperate? + +Certainly. + +Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience +to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures? + +True. + +Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer, + +'Friend, sit still and obey my word,' + +and the verses which follow, + +'The Greeks marched breathing prowess, ...in silent awe of their +leaders,' + +and other sentiments of the same kind. + +We shall. + +What of this line, + +'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,' + +and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar +impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their +rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken? + +They are ill spoken. + +They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce +to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young +men--you would agree with me there? + +Yes. + +And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his +opinion is more glorious than + +'When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries +round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups,' + +is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? +Or the verse + +'The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?' + +What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and +men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but +forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely +overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, +but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never +been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one +another + +'Without the knowledge of their parents;' + +or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast +a chain around Ares and Aphrodite? + +Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear +that sort of thing. + +But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these +they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses, + +'He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart; +far worse hast thou endured!' + +Certainly, he said. + +In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers +of money. + +Certainly not. + +Neither must we sing to them of + +'Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.' + +Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to +have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take +the gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he +should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge +Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took +Agamemnon's gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the +dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do so. + +Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved. + +Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these +feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed +to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the +narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says, + +'Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily +I would be even with thee, if I had only the power;' + +or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready +to lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, +which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, +and that he actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round +the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all +this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow +our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a +goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent +from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave +of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by +avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men. + +You are quite right, he replied. + +And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale +of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as +they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of +a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely +ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to +declare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they +were not the sons of gods;--both in the same breath they shall not be +permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth +that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better +than men--sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor +true, for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods. + +Assuredly not. + +And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; +for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced +that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by-- + +'The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, +the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,' + +and who have + +'the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.' + +And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity +of morals among the young. + +By all means, he replied. + +But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not +to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The +manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should +be treated has been already laid down. + +Very true. + +And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion +of our subject. + +Clearly so. + +But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my +friend. + +Why not? + +Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets +and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when +they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; +and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a +man's own loss and another's gain--these things we shall forbid them to +utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite. + +To be sure we shall, he replied. + +But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you +have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending. + +I grant the truth of your inference. + +That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which +we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how +naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or +not. + +Most true, he said. + +Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and +when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been +completely treated. + +I do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus. + +Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible +if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all +mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or +to come? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union +of the two? + +That again, he said, I do not quite understand. + +I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much +difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, +I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in +illustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, +in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his +daughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon +Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against the +Achaeans. Now as far as these lines, + +'And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, +the chiefs of the people,' + +the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose +that he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of +Chryses, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the +speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double +form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at +Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey. + +Yes. + +And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites +from time to time and in the intermediate passages? + +Quite true. + +But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that +he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, +is going to speak? + +Certainly. + +And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice +or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes? + +Of course. + +Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by +way of imitation? + +Very true. + +Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then +again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. +However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you +may no more say, 'I don't understand,' I will show how the change might +be effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his daughter's +ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the +kings;' and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, +he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not +imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows +(I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre), 'The priest came and +prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy +and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his +daughter, and take the ransom which he brought, and respect the God. +Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But +Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the +staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him--the daughter +of Chryses should not be released, he said--she should grow old with him +in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he +intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and +silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his +many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to +him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and +praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the +Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,'--and so on. +In this way the whole becomes simple narrative. + +I understand, he said. + +Or you may suppose the opposite case--that the intermediate passages are +omitted, and the dialogue only left. + +That also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy. + +You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you +failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and +mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative--instances of this are +supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, +in which the poet is the only speaker--of this the dithyramb affords +the best example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in +several other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me? + +Yes, he said; I see now what you meant. + +I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done +with the subject and might proceed to the style. + +Yes, I remember. + +In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an +understanding about the mimetic art,--whether the poets, in narrating +their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether +in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all +imitation be prohibited? + +You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted +into our State? + +Yes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do +not know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go. + +And go we will, he said. + +Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be +imitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule +already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many; +and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much +reputation in any? + +Certainly. + +And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many +things as well as he would imitate a single one? + +He cannot. + +Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, +and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as +well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same +persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy +and comedy--did you not just now call them imitations? + +Yes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot +succeed in both. + +Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once? + +True. + +Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are +but imitations. + +They are so. + +And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet +smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as +of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies. + +Quite true, he replied. + +If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that +our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate +themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making +this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this +end, they ought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they +imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those +characters which are suitable to their profession--the courageous, +temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or be +skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from +imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never +observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into +life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting +body, voice, and mind? + +Yes, certainly, he said. + +Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of +whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether +young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting +against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in +affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in +sickness, love, or labour. + +Very right, he said. + +Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the +offices of slaves? + +They must not. + +And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the +reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or +revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner +sin against themselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the +manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action +or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is +to be known but not to be practised or imitated. + +Very true, he replied. + +Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or +boatswains, or the like? + +How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to +the callings of any of these? + +Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the +murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of +thing? + +Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the +behaviour of madmen. + +You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of +narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has +anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an +opposite character and education. + +And which are these two sorts? he asked. + +Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a +narration comes on some saying or action of another good man,--I should +imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of +this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the +good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when +he is overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other +disaster. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he +will not make a study of that; he will disdain such a person, and will +assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing +some good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which +he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself +after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art, unless +in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it. + +So I should expect, he replied. + +Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated +out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and +narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal +of the latter. Do you agree? + +Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must +necessarily take. + +But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, +the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too +bad for him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, +but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now +saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of +wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various +sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will +bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art +will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very +little narration. + +That, he said, will be his mode of speaking. + +These, then, are the two kinds of style? + +Yes. + +And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has +but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen +for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks +correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep +within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), +and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm? + +That is quite true, he said. + +Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of +rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style +has all sorts of changes. + +That is also perfectly true, he replied. + +And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all +poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything +except in one or other of them or in both together. + +They include all, he said. + +And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of +the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed? + +I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue. + +Yes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming: and +indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, +is the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with +the world in general. + +I do not deny it. + +But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our +State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man +plays one part only? + +Yes; quite unsuitable. + +And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we +shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a +husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a +soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout? + +True, he said. + +And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so +clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal +to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as +a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that +in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not +allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a +garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. +For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet +or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and +will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the +education of our soldiers. + +We certainly will, he said, if we have the power. + +Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education +which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for +the matter and manner have both been discussed. + +I think so too, he said. + +Next in order will follow melody and song. + +That is obvious. + +Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to +be consistent with ourselves. + +I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word 'every one' hardly +includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though +I may guess. + +At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts--the words, +the melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose? + +Yes, he said; so much as that you may. + +And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words +which are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same +laws, and these have been already determined by us? + +Yes. + +And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words? + +Certainly. + +We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need +of lamentation and strains of sorrow? + +True. + +And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and +can tell me. + +The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the +full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like. + +These then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a character +to maintain they are of no use, and much less to men. + +Certainly. + +In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly +unbecoming the character of our guardians. + +Utterly unbecoming. + +And which are the soft or drinking harmonies? + +The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed 'relaxed.' + +Well, and are these of any military use? + +Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are +the only ones which you have left. + +I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one +warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the +hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he +is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and +at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a +determination to endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace +and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is +seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition, +or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to +persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when +by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his +success, but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and +acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; +the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the +unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and +the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave. + +And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I +was just now speaking. + +Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and +melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic +scale? + +I suppose not. + +Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three +corners and complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed +curiously-harmonised instruments? + +Certainly not. + +But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit +them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of +harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put +together; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute? + +Clearly not. + +There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and +the shepherds may have a pipe in the country. + +That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument. + +The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his +instruments is not at all strange, I said. + +Not at all, he replied. + +And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the +State, which not long ago we termed luxurious. + +And we have done wisely, he replied. + +Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to +harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to +the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, +or metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the +expressions of a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found +them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like +spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms +are will be your duty--you must teach me them, as you have already +taught me the harmonies. + +But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there +are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are +framed, just as in sounds there are four notes (i.e. the four notes of +the tetrachord.) out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is +an observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are +severally the imitations I am unable to say. + +Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us +what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other +unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite +feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his +mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he +arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making +the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short +alternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well +as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities. +Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the +foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; +for I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as I was +saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis of +the subject would be difficult, you know? (Socrates expresses himself +carelessly in accordance with his assumed ignorance of the details of +the subject. In the first part of the sentence he appears to be speaking +of paeonic rhythms which are in the ratio of 3/2; in the second part, of +dactylic and anapaestic rhythms, which are in the ratio of 1/1; in the +last clause, of iambic and trochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio of +1/2 or 2/1.) + +Rather so, I should say. + +But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace +is an effect of good or bad rhythm. + +None at all. + +And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad +style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our +principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not +the words by them. + +Just so, he said, they should follow the words. + +And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the +temper of the soul? + +Yes. + +And everything else on the style? + +Yes. + +Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on +simplicity,--I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered +mind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism +for folly? + +Very true, he replied. + +And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these +graces and harmonies their perpetual aim? + +They must. + +And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and +constructive art are full of them,--weaving, embroidery, architecture, +and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,--in +all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and +discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill +nature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue +and bear their likeness. + +That is quite true, he said. + +But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to +be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on +pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the +same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be +prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance +and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other +creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be +prevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our +citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up +amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there +browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little +by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption +in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to +discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our +youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and +receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, +shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a +purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into +likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason. + +There can be no nobler training than that, he replied. + +And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent +instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way +into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, +imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated +graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because +he who has received this true education of the inner being will most +shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true +taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the +good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, +now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason +why; and when reason comes he will recognise and salute the friend with +whom his education has made him long familiar. + +Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should +be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention. + +Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew +the letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring +sizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they +occupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; +and not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we +recognise them wherever they are found: + +True-- + +Or, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a +mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study +giving us the knowledge of both: + +Exactly-- + +Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to +educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential +forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their +kindred, as well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, +and can recognise them and their images wherever they are found, not +slighting them either in small things or great, but believing them all +to be within the sphere of one art and study. + +Most assuredly. + +And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two +are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has +an eye to see it? + +The fairest indeed. + +And the fairest is also the loveliest? + +That may be assumed. + +And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the +loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul? + +That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there +be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and +will love all the same. + +I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, +and I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure +any affinity to temperance? + +How can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his +faculties quite as much as pain. + +Or any affinity to virtue in general? + +None whatever. + +Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance? + +Yes, the greatest. + +And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love? + +No, nor a madder. + +Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order--temperate and +harmonious? + +Quite true, he said. + +Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love? + +Certainly not. + +Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the +lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their +love is of the right sort? + +No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them. + +Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a +law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to +his love than a father would use to his son, and then only for a noble +purpose, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is +to limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going +further, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and +bad taste. + +I quite agree, he said. + +Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the +end of music if not the love of beauty? + +I agree, he said. + +After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained. + +Certainly. + +Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training +in it should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief +is,--and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion +in confirmation of my own, but my own belief is,--not that the good body +by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that +the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this +may be possible. What do you say? + +Yes, I agree. + +Then, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing +over the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid +prolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject. + +Very good. + +That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by +us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and +not know where in the world he is. + +Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take +care of him is ridiculous indeed. + +But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training +for the great contest of all--are they not? + +Yes, he said. + +And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them? + +Why not? + +I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a +sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe +that these athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most +dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from +their customary regimen? + +Yes, I do. + +Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior +athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the +utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of +summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a +campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health. + +That is my view. + +The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which +we were just now describing. + +How so? + +Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is +simple and good; and especially the military gymnastic. + +What do you mean? + +My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at +their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have +no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they +are not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most +convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, +and not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans. + +True. + +And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere +mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; +all professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good +condition should take nothing of the kind. + +Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them. + +Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of +Sicilian cookery? + +I think not. + +Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a +Corinthian girl as his fair friend? + +Certainly not. + +Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of +Athenian confectionary? + +Certainly not. + +All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and +song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms. + +Exactly. + +There complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas +simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and +simplicity in gymnastic of health in the body. + +Most true, he said. + +But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice +and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the +lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not +only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them. + +Of course. + +And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state +of education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of +people need the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also +those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not +disgraceful, and a great sign of want of good-breeding, that a man +should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of +his own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of +other men whom he makes lords and judges over him? + +Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful. + +Would you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider that there is +a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long +litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or +defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his +litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to +take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, +bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice: and all +for what?--in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not +knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping +judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more +disgraceful? + +Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful. + +Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound +has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by +indolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men +fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, +compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for +diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace? + +Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names +to diseases. + +Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in +the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the +hero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of +Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which +are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were +at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or +rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case. + +Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a +person in his condition. + +Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former +days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of +Asclepius did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be +said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of +a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found +out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest +of the world. + +How was that? he said. + +By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which +he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he +passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but +attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed +in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of +science he struggled on to old age. + +A rare reward of his skill! + +Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never +understood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants +in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or +inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in +all well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he +must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being +ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, +do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort. + +How do you mean? he said. + +I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough +and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,--these +are his remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of +dietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and +all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be +ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing +his disease to the neglect of his customary employment; and therefore +bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary +habits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his +constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble. + +Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of +medicine thus far only. + +Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his +life if he were deprived of his occupation? + +Quite true, he said. + +But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he +has any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would +live. + +He is generally supposed to have nothing to do. + +Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man +has a livelihood he should practise virtue? + +Nay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner. + +Let us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask +ourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or +can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise +a further question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an +impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the +mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of +Phocylides? + +Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the +body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to +the practice of virtue. + +Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of +a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important +of all, irreconcileable with any kind of study or thought or +self-reflection--there is a constant suspicion that headache and +giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or +making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for +a man is always fancying that he is being made ill, and is in constant +anxiety about the state of his body. + +Yes, likely enough. + +And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited +the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy +constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these +he cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein +consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had +penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure +by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to +lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting +weaker sons;--if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he +had no business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use +either to himself, or to the State. + +Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman. + +Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that +they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which +I am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus +wounded Menelaus, they + +'Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies,' + +but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or +drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; +the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before +he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he +did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the +same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate +subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the +art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as +rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them. + +They were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius. + +Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar +disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the +son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man +who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by +lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by +us, will not believe them when they tell us both;--if he was the son of +a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, +he was not the son of a god. + +All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to +you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the +best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good +and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are +acquainted with all sorts of moral natures? + +Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do +you know whom I think good? + +Will you tell me? + +I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join +two things which are not the same. + +How so? he asked. + +Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful +physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with +the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they +had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of +diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the +instrument with which they cure the body; in that case we could not +allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body +with the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick can cure +nothing. + +That is very true, he said. + +But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he +ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to +have associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through +the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer +the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own +self-consciousness; the honourable mind which is to form a healthy +judgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits +when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to +be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because they +have no examples of what evil is in their own souls. + +Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived. + +Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned +to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation +of the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not +personal experience. + +Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge. + +Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your +question); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and +suspicious nature of which we spoke,--he who has committed many crimes, +and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst +his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he +judges of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of +virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, +owing to his unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognise an honest man, +because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as +the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, +he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than +foolish. + +Most true, he said. + +Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but +the other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, +educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the +virtuous, and not the vicious, man has wisdom--in my opinion. + +And in mine also. + +This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you +will sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, +giving health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in +their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls +they will put an end to themselves. + +That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State. + +And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music +which, as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law. + +Clearly. + +And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise +the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in +some extreme case. + +That I quite believe. + +The very exercises and tolls which he undergoes are intended to +stimulate the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his +strength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to +develope his muscles. + +Very right, he said. + +Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is +often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the +training of the body. + +What then is the real object of them? + +I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the +improvement of the soul. + +How can that be? he asked. + +Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of +exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive +devotion to music? + +In what way shown? he said. + +The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of +softness and effeminacy, I replied. + +Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of +a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what +is good for him. + +Yet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if +rightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is +liable to become hard and brutal. + +That I quite think. + +On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. +And this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if +educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate. + +True. + +And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities? + +Assuredly. + +And both should be in harmony? + +Beyond question. + +And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous? + +Yes. + +And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish? + +Very true. + +And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul +through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs +of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in +warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process +the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made +useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the +softening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and +waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his +soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior. + +Very true. + +If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily +accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music +weakening the spirit renders him excitable;--on the least provocation +he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having +spirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable. + +Exactly. + +And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great +feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at +first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, +and he becomes twice the man that he was. + +Certainly. + +And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the +Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having +no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture, +grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving +nourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists? + +True, he said. + +And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using +the weapon of persuasion,--he is like a wild beast, all violence and +fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all +ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace. + +That is quite true, he said. + +And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited +and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given +mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul +and body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of +an instrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly +harmonized. + +That appears to be the intention. + +And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and +best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician +and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings. + +You are quite right, Socrates. + +And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the +government is to last. + +Yes, he will be absolutely necessary. + +Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be +the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, +or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian +contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found +that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them. + +I dare say that there will be no difficulty. + +Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who +are to be rulers and who subjects? + +Certainly. + +There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger. + +Clearly. + +And that the best of these must rule. + +That is also clear. + +Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to +husbandry? + +Yes. + +And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not +be those who have most the character of guardians? + +Yes. + +And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a +special care of the State? + +True. + +And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves? + +To be sure. + +And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the +same interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune +is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own? + +Very true, he replied. + +Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those +who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for +the good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is +against her interests. + +Those are the right men. + +And they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see +whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence +either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty +to the State. + +How cast off? he said. + +I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's +mind either with his will or against his will; with his will when he +gets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he +is deprived of a truth. + +I understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of +the unwilling I have yet to learn. + +Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, +and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to +possess the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as +they are is to possess the truth? + +Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived +of truth against their will. + +And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or +force, or enchantment? + +Still, he replied, I do not understand you. + +I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only +mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget; +argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and +this I call theft. Now you understand me? + +Yes. + +Those again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or +grief compels to change their opinion. + +I understand, he said, and you are quite right. + +And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change +their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the +sterner influence of fear? + +Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant. + +Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best +guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest +of the State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from +their youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are +most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is +not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be +rejected. That will be the way? + +Yes. + +And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for +them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same +qualities. + +Very right, he replied. + +And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments--that is the third +sort of test--and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take +colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so +must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them +into pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in +the furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against +all enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of +themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under +all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be +most serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every +age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial +victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the +State; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive +sepulture and other memorials of honour, the greatest that we have to +give. But him who fails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that +this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be +chosen and appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to +exactness. + +And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said. + +And perhaps the word 'guardian' in the fullest sense ought to be applied +to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and +maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the +will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we +before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and +supporters of the principles of the rulers. + +I agree with you, he said. + +How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we +lately spoke--just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that +be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city? + +What sort of lie? he said. + +Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale (Laws) of what has +often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have +made the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know +whether such an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made +probable, if it did. + +How your words seem to hesitate on your lips! + +You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard. + +Speak, he said, and fear not. + +Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you +in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which +I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the +soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth +was a dream, and the education and training which they received from +us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were being +formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their +arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were completed, the +earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country being their +mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and +to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as +children of the earth and their own brothers. + +You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were +going to tell. + +True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half. +Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God +has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and +in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also +they have the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be +auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has +composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved +in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden +parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden +son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all +else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of +which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. +They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the +son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, +then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler +must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the +scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of +artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised +to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that +when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such +is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in +it? + +Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of +accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, +and their sons' sons, and posterity after them. + +I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will +make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, +of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while +we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of +their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best +suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend +themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold +from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let +them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings. + +Just so, he said. + +And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of +winter and the heat of summer. + +I suppose that you mean houses, he replied. + +Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of +shop-keepers. + +What is the difference? he said. + +That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, +from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would +turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, +would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd? + +Truly monstrous, he said. + +And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being +stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and +become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies? + +Yes, great care should be taken. + +And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard? + +But they are well-educated already, he replied. + +I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more +certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that +may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them +in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their +protection. + +Very true, he replied. + +And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that +belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as +guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of +sense must acknowledge that. + +He must. + +Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to +realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have +any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither +should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has +a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required +by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should +agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet +the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live +together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them +that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have +therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not +to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner +metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is +undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle +silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or +drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the +saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands +or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen +instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other +citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, +they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than +of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the +rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not +say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the +regulations appointed by us for guardians concerning their houses and +all other matters? + +Yes, said Glaucon. + + + + +BOOK IV. + +Here Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer, Socrates, +said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people +miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the +city in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; +whereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, +and have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods +on their own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were +saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among +the favourites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than +mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard? + +Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in +addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if +they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on +a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is +thought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature +might be added. + +But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge. + +You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer? + +Yes. + +If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall +find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our +guardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in +founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one +class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a +State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should +be most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice: +and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the +happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, +not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a +whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. +Suppose that we were painting a statue, and some one came up to us +and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colours on the most +beautiful parts of the body--the eyes ought to be purple, but you have +made them black--to him we might fairly answer, Sir, you would not +surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no +longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other +features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say +to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness +which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our +husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and +bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters +also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, +passing round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, +and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might +make every class happy--and then, as you imagine, the whole State would +be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen +to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will +cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct +class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the +corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, is +confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the +government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they +turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the +power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians +to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our +opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life +of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, +if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which +is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing +our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or +whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State +as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and +auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or +induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State +will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the +proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them. + +I think that you are quite right. + +I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me. + +What may that be? + +There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts. + +What are they? + +Wealth, I said, and poverty. + +How do they act? + +The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think +you, any longer take the same pains with his art? + +Certainly not. + +He will grow more and more indolent and careless? + +Very true. + +And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter? + +Yes; he greatly deteriorates. + +But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself +with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor +will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well. + +Certainly not. + +Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and +their work are equally liable to degenerate? + +That is evident. + +Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which +the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city +unobserved. + +What evils? + +Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and +indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of +discontent. + +That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, +Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an +enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war. + +There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with +one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them. + +How so? he asked. + +In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be +trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men. + +That is true, he said. + +And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was +perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do +gentlemen who were not boxers? + +Hardly, if they came upon him at once. + +What, now, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike +at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several +times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, +overturn more than one stout personage? + +Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that. + +And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and +practise of boxing than they have in military qualities. + +Likely enough. + +Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or +three times their own number? + +I agree with you, for I think you right. + +And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one +of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we +neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore +come and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, +on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, +rather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep? + +That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if +the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one. + +But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own! + +Why so? + +You ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of +them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any +city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the +poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in +either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether +beside the mark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you +deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the +one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not +many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been +prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States, +I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and truth, +though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A single State +which is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or +barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times +greater. + +That is most true, he said. + +And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they +are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which +they are to include, and beyond which they will not go? + +What limit would you propose? + +I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; +that, I think, is the proper limit. + +Very good, he said. + +Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to +our guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but +one and self-sufficing. + +And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose +upon them. + +And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter +still,--I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when +inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of +the lower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in +the case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the +use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man +would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole +city would be one and not many. + +Yes, he said; that is not so difficult. + +The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, +as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, +if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,--a thing, +however, which I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for our +purpose. + +What may that be? he asked. + +Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, +and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all +these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as +marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which +will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in +common, as the proverb says. + +That will be the best way of settling them. + +Also, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating +force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good +constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good +education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed +in man as in other animals. + +Very possibly, he said. + +Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of +our rulers should be directed,--that music and gymnastic be preserved in +their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost +to maintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard + +'The newest song which the singers have,' + +they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new +kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the +meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the +whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I +can quite believe him;--he says that when modes of music change, the +fundamental laws of the State always change with them. + +Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your +own. + +Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress +in music? + +Yes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in. + +Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears +harmless. + +Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by +little this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates +into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades +contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and +constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an +overthrow of all rights, private as well as public. + +Is that true? I said. + +That is my belief, he replied. + +Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in +a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths +themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted +and virtuous citizens. + +Very true, he said. + +And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of +music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in +a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them +in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there +be any fallen places in the State will raise them up again. + +Very true, he said. + +Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which +their predecessors have altogether neglected. + +What do you mean? + +I mean such things as these:--when the young are to be silent before +their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and +making them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes +are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in +general. You would agree with me? + +Yes. + +But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such +matters,--I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written +enactments about them likely to be lasting. + +Impossible. + +It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts +a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract +like? + +To be sure. + +Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and +may be the reverse of good? + +That is not to be denied. + +And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further +about them. + +Naturally enough, he replied. + +Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings +between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about +insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment +of juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about +any impositions and exactions of market and harbour dues which may +be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, +harbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to +legislate on any of these particulars? + +I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on +good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough +for themselves. + +Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which +we have given them. + +And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever +making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining +perfection. + +You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no +self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance? + +Exactly. + +Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always +doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always +fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises +them to try. + +Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort. + +Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst +enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give +up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery +nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail. + +Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion +with a man who tells you what is right. + +These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces. + +Assuredly not. + +Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom +I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in +which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the +constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under +this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in +anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and +good statesman--do not these States resemble the persons whom I was +describing? + +Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from +praising them. + +But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready +ministers of political corruption? + +Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom +the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are +really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired. + +What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a +man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare +that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say? + +Nay, he said, certainly not in that case. + +Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a +play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they +are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds +in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not +knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra? + +Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing. + +I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble +himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the +constitution either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for +in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no +difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally flow out of +our previous regulations. + +What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of +legislation? + +Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the God of Delphi, there +remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of +all. + +Which are they? he said. + +The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of +gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of +the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would +propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of +which we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be +unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He +is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is +the interpreter of religion to all mankind. + +You are right, and we will do as you propose. + +But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now +that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and +get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, +and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, +and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man who +would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by +gods and men. + +Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying +that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety? + +I do not deny that I said so, and as you remind me, I will be as good as +my word; but you must join. + +We will, he replied. + +Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin +with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect. + +That is most certain. + +And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just. + +That is likewise clear. + +And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is +not found will be the residue? + +Very good. + +If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, +wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the +first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other +three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left. + +Very true, he said. + +And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are +also four in number? + +Clearly. + +First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and +in this I detect a certain peculiarity. + +What is that? + +The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good +in counsel? + +Very true. + +And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, +but by knowledge, do men counsel well? + +Clearly. + +And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse? + +Of course. + +There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of +knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel? + +Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in +carpentering. + +Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge +which counsels for the best about wooden implements? + +Certainly not. + +Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said, +nor as possessing any other similar knowledge? + +Not by reason of any of them, he said. + +Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would +give the city the name of agricultural? + +Yes. + +Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State +among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing +in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best +deal with itself and with other States? + +There certainly is. + +And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked. + +It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among +those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians. + +And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this +sort of knowledge? + +The name of good in counsel and truly wise. + +And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more +smiths? + +The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous. + +Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a +name from the profession of some kind of knowledge? + +Much the smallest. + +And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge +which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole +State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and +this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been +ordained by nature to be of all classes the least. + +Most true. + +Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four +virtues has somehow or other been discovered. + +And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied. + +Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, +and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous +to the State. + +How do you mean? + +Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will +be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's +behalf. + +No one, he replied, would ever think of any other. + +The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their +courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making +the city either the one or the other. + +Certainly not. + +The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which +preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of +things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator +educated them; and this is what you term courage. + +I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think +that I perfectly understand you. + +I mean that courage is a kind of salvation. + +Salvation of what? + +Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of +what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the +words 'under all circumstances' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, +or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not +lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration? + +If you please. + +You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the +true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they +prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white +ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then +proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, +and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. +But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed +how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour. + +Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous +appearance. + +Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting +our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were +contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the +laws in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and +of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture +and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as +pleasure--mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; +or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And +this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with +law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, +unless you disagree. + +But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere +uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave--this, +in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to +have another name. + +Most certainly. + +Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe? + +Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen,' +you will not be far wrong;--hereafter, if you like, we will carry the +examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but +justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough. + +You are right, he replied. + +Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State--first, temperance, and +then justice which is the end of our search. + +Very true. + +Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance? + +I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire +that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; +and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering +temperance first. + +Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your +request. + +Then consider, he said. + +Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue +of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the +preceding. + +How so? he asked. + +Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain +pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of +'a man being his own master;' and other traces of the same notion may be +found in language. + +No doubt, he said. + +There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself;' for +the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all +these modes of speaking the same person is denoted. + +Certainly. + +The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and +also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, +then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of +praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better +principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass +of the worse--in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self +and unprincipled. + +Yes, there is reason in that. + +And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will +find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you +will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words +'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better +part over the worse. + +Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true. + +Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires +and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in +the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class. + +Certainly, he said. + +Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are +under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a +few, and those the best born and best educated. + +Very true. + +These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the +meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and +wisdom of the few. + +That I perceive, he said. + +Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own +pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a +designation? + +Certainly, he replied. + +It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons? + +Yes. + +And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as +to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State? + +Undoubtedly. + +And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will +temperance be found--in the rulers or in the subjects? + +In both, as I should imagine, he replied. + +Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance +was a sort of harmony? + +Why so? + +Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which +resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other +valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through +all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the +stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger +or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. +Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the +naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both +in states and individuals. + +I entirely agree with you. + +And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have +been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a +state virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was. + +The inference is obvious. + +The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should +surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and +pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in +this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if +you see her first, let me know. + +Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who +has just eyes enough to see what you show him--that is about as much as +I am good for. + +Offer up a prayer with me and follow. + +I will, but you must show me the way. + +Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we +must push on. + +Let us push on. + +Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I +believe that the quarry will not escape. + +Good news, he said. + +Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows. + +Why so? + +Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was +justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be +more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have +in their hands--that was the way with us--we looked not at what we +were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I +suppose, we missed her. + +What do you mean? + +I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking +of justice, and have failed to recognise her. + +I grow impatient at the length of your exordium. + +Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the +original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation +of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to +which his nature was best adapted;--now justice is this principle or a +part of it. + +Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only. + +Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not +being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said +the same to us. + +Yes, we said so. + +Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be +justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference? + +I cannot, but I should like to be told. + +Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the +State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are +abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the +existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their +preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by +us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one. + +That follows of necessity. + +If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its +presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the +agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of +the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or +wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am +mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, +artisan, ruler, subject,--the quality, I mean, of every one doing his +own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm--the question +is not so easily answered. + +Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which. + +Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work +appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, +courage. + +Yes, he said. + +And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice? + +Exactly. + +Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not +the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of +determining suits at law? + +Certainly. + +And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither +take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own? + +Yes; that is their principle. + +Which is a just principle? + +Yes. + +Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and +doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him? + +Very true. + +Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a +carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a +carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their +duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be +the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State? + +Not much. + +But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a +trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number +of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way +into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and +guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements +or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and +warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that +this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of +the State. + +Most true. + +Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling +of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest +harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing? + +Precisely. + +And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed +by you injustice? + +Certainly. + +This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the +auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, +and will make the city just. + +I agree with you. + +We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this +conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in +the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not +verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old +investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression +that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there +would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That +larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed +as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice +would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the +individual--if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a +difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and +have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed +together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, +and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls. + +That will be in regular course; let us do as you say. + +I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by +the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the +same? + +Like, he replied. + +The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like +the just State? + +He will. + +And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the +State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate +and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities +of these same classes? + +True, he said. + +And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three +principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be +rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same +manner? + +Certainly, he said. + +Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy +question--whether the soul has these three principles or not? + +An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is +the good. + +Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are +employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; +the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a +solution not below the level of the previous enquiry. + +May we not be satisfied with that? he said;--under the circumstances, I +am quite content. + +I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied. + +Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said. + +Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same +principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the +individual they pass into the State?--how else can they come there? Take +the quality of passion or spirit;--it would be ridiculous to imagine +that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the +individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, +Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said +of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our +part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, +be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. + +Exactly so, he said. + +There is no difficulty in understanding this. + +None whatever. + +But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether +these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn +with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third +part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the +whole soul comes into play in each sort of action--to determine that is +the difficulty. + +Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty. + +Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or +different. + +How can we? he asked. + +I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon +in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, +in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in +things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, +but different. + +Good. + +For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the +same time in the same part? + +Impossible. + +Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we +should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is +standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person +to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same +moment--to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say +that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest. + +Very true. + +And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice +distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin +round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at +the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the +same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in +such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of +themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a +circumference, and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation +from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, +while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards +or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest. + +That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied. + +Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe +that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to +the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways. + +Certainly not, according to my way of thinking. + +Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such +objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume +their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if +this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow +shall be withdrawn. + +Yes, he said, that will be the best way. + +Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and +aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether +they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in +the fact of their opposition)? + +Yes, he said, they are opposites. + +Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and +again willing and wishing,--all these you would refer to the classes +already mentioned. You would say--would you not?--that the soul of him +who desires is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is +drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, +when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the +realization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of +assent, as if he had been asked a question? + +Very true. + +And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of +desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion +and rejection? + +Certainly. + +Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a +particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and +thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them? + +Let us take that class, he said. + +The object of one is food, and of the other drink? + +Yes. + +And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of +drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for +example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any +particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the +desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; +or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be +excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: +but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is +the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger? + +Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the +simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object. + +But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an +opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good +drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of +desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good +drink; and the same is true of every other desire. + +Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say. + +Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a +quality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and +have their correlatives simple. + +I do not know what you mean. + +Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less? + +Certainly. + +And the much greater to the much less? + +Yes. + +And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is +to be to the less that is to be? + +Certainly, he said. + +And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the +double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter +and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;--is not +this true of all of them? + +Yes. + +And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of +science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but +the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; +I mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of +knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is +therefore termed architecture. + +Certainly. + +Because it has a particular quality which no other has? + +Yes. + +And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a +particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences? + +Yes. + +Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original +meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term +of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term +is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that +relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is +healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of +good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term +science is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which +in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, +and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine. + +I quite understand, and I think as you do. + +Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative +terms, having clearly a relation-- + +Yes, thirst is relative to drink. + +And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but +thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, +nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only? + +Certainly. + +Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires +only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it? + +That is plain. + +And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, +that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like +a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the +same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the +same. + +Impossible. + +No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the +bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the +other pulls. + +Exactly so, he replied. + +And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink? + +Yes, he said, it constantly happens. + +And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there +was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else +forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which +bids him? + +I should say so. + +And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids +and attracts proceeds from passion and disease? + +Clearly. + +Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from +one another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational +principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and +thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed +the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and +satisfactions? + +Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different. + +Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in +the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one +of the preceding? + +I should be inclined to say--akin to desire. + +Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in +which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, +coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, +observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. +He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; +for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire +got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead +bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight. + +I have heard the story myself, he said. + +The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, +as though they were two distinct things. + +Yes; that is the meaning, he said. + +And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's +desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is +angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is +like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of +his reason;--but for the passionate or spirited element to take part +with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, +is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in +yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else? + +Certainly not. + +Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler +he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as +hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict +upon him--these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to +be excited by them. + +True, he said. + +But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils +and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and +because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more +determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be +quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice +of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more. + +The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were +saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the +rulers, who are their shepherds. + +I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a +further point which I wish you to consider. + +What point? + +You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind +of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict +of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle. + +Most assuredly. + +But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or +only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles +in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; +or rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, +auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a +third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad +education is the natural auxiliary of reason? + +Yes, he said, there must be a third. + +Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different +from desire, turn out also to be different from reason. + +But that is easily proved:--We may observe even in young children that +they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some +of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late +enough. + +Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, +which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may +once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted +by us, + +'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul,' + +for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons +about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger +which is rebuked by it. + +Very true, he said. + +And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed +that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the +individual, and that they are three in number. + +Exactly. + +Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and +in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise? + +Certainly. + +Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State +constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the +individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues? + +Assuredly. + +And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way +in which the State is just? + +That follows, of course. + +We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each +of the three classes doing the work of its own class? + +We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said. + +We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of +his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work? + +Yes, he said, we must remember that too. + +And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of +the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be +the subject and ally? + +Certainly. + +And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will +bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble +words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the +wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm? + +Quite true, he said. + +And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to +know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each +of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of +gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with +the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent +soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave +and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the +whole life of man? + +Very true, he said. + +Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and +the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and +the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his +commands and counsels? + +True. + +And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and +in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear? + +Right, he replied. + +And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and +which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a +knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of +the whole? + +Assuredly. + +And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements +in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and +the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason +ought to rule, and do not rebel? + +Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in +the State or individual. + +And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue +of what quality a man will be just. + +That is very certain. + +And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or +is she the same which we found her to be in the State? + +There is no difference in my opinion, he said. + +Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace +instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying. + +What sort of instances do you mean? + +If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or +the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less +likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? +Would any one deny this? + +No one, he replied. + +Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or +treachery either to his friends or to his country? + +Never. + +Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or +agreements? + +Impossible. + +No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his +father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties? + +No one. + +And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, +whether in ruling or being ruled? + +Exactly so. + +Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such +states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other? + +Not I, indeed. + +Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained +at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power +must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been +verified? + +Yes, certainly. + +And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the +shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own +business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that +reason it was of use? + +Clearly. + +But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned +however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the +true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the +several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of +them to do the work of others,--he sets in order his own inner life, and +is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when +he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be +compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the +intermediate intervals--when he has bound all these together, and is +no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly +adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in +a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair +of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which +preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good +action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which +at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the +opinion which presides over it ignorance. + +You have said the exact truth, Socrates. + +Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man +and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should +not be telling a falsehood? + +Most certainly not. + +May we say so, then? + +Let us say so. + +And now, I said, injustice has to be considered. + +Clearly. + +Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three +principles--a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part +of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which +is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the +natural vassal,--what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, +and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice? + +Exactly so. + +And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of +acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also +be perfectly clear? + +What do you mean? he said. + +Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just +what disease and health are in the body. + +How so? he said. + +Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is +unhealthy causes disease. + +Yes. + +And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice? + +That is certain. + +And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and +government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation +of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this +natural order? + +True. + +And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order +and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the +creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance +with the natural order? + +Exactly so, he said. + +Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and +vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same? + +True. + +And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice? + +Assuredly. + +Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and +injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be +just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of +gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and +unreformed? + +In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We +know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer +endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and +having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the +very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life +is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he +likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and +virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be +such as we have described? + +Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are +near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with +our own eyes, let us not faint by the way. + +Certainly not, he replied. + +Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of +them, I mean, which are worth looking at. + +I am following you, he replied: proceed. + +I said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from +some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue +is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four +special ones which are deserving of note. + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as +there are distinct forms of the State. + +How many? + +There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said. + +What are they? + +The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may +be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule +is exercised by one distinguished man or by many. + +True, he replied. + +But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the +government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been +trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of +the State will be maintained. + +That is true, he replied. + + + + +BOOK V. + +Such is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is +of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the +evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also +the regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms. + +What are they? he said. + +I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared +to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little +way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching +forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the +shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to be +quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the +words, 'Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?' + +Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice. + +Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off? + +You, he said. + +I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off? + +Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a +whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy +that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were +self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children +'friends have all things in common.' + +And was I not right, Adeimantus? + +Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything +else, requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. +Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been +long expecting that you would tell us something about the family life +of your citizens--how they will bring children into the world, and rear +them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this +community of women and children--for we are of opinion that the right +or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount +influence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question +is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have +resolved, as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account of +all this. + +To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed. + +And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be +equally agreed. + +I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an +argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had +finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, +and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then +said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what +a hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering +trouble, and avoided it. + +For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said +Thrasymachus,--to look for gold, or to hear discourse? + +Yes, but discourse should have a limit. + +Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit +which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind +about us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: +What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail +among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth +and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how +these things will be. + +Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more +doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the +practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another +point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for +the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the +subject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a +dream only. + +Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they +are not sceptical or hostile. + +I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these +words. + +Yes, he said. + +Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the +encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself +believed that I knew what I was talking about: to declare the truth +about matters of high interest which a man honours and loves among wise +men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to +carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer, +which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger +is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), +but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my +footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not +to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed +believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a +deceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of laws. +And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among +friends, and therefore you do well to encourage me. + +Glaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your +argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of +the homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then +and speak. + +Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from +guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument. + +Then why should you mind? + +Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I +perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the +men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the +women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am +invited by you. + +For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my +opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and +use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally +started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and +watchdogs of the herd. + +True. + +Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be +subject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see +whether the result accords with our design. + +What do you mean? + +What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs +divided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and +in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to +the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave +the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their +puppies is labour enough for them? + +No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that +the males are stronger and the females weaker. + +But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are +bred and fed in the same way? + +You cannot. + +Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the +same nurture and education? + +Yes. + +The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic. + +Yes. + +Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, +which they must practise like the men? + +That is the inference, I suppose. + +I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they +are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous. + +No doubt of it. + +Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women +naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they +are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any +more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness +continue to frequent the gymnasia. + +Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be +thought ridiculous. + +But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not +fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of +innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments both in music +and gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon +horseback! + +Very true, he replied. + +Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at +the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be +serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the +opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that +the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the +Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom, the wits of +that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation. + +No doubt. + +But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far +better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward +eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the +man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule +at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to +weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good. + +Very true, he replied. + +First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, +let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she +capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or +not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or +can not share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and +will probably lead to the fairest conclusion. + +That will be much the best way. + +Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against +ourselves; in this manner the adversary's position will not be +undefended. + +Why not? he said. + +Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will +say: 'Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you +yourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle +that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature.' And +certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. 'And +do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?' And we +shall reply: Of course they do. Then we shall be asked, 'Whether the +tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different, and such as +are agreeable to their different natures?' Certainly they should. 'But +if so, have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that +men and women, whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform +the same actions?'--What defence will you make for us, my good Sir, +against any one who offers these objections? + +That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall +and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side. + +These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like +kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to +take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and +children. + +By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy. + +Why yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, +whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he +has to swim all the same. + +Very true. + +And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that +Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us? + +I suppose so, he said. + +Well then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We +acknowledged--did we not? that different natures ought to have different +pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now +what are we saying?--that different natures ought to have the same +pursuits,--this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us. + +Precisely. + +Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of +contradiction! + +Why do you say so? + +Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his +will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just +because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is +speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of +contention and not of fair discussion. + +Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do +with us and our argument? + +A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting +unintentionally into a verbal opposition. + +In what way? + +Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that +different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never +considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of +nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits +to different natures and the same to the same natures. + +Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us. + +I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question +whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy +men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we +should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely? + +That would be a jest, he said. + +Yes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed +the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every +difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit +in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, +that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have +the same nature. + +True. + +Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures? + +Certainly. + +And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their +fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art +ought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference +consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not +amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the +sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue +to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same +pursuits. + +Very true, he said. + +Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits +or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man? + +That will be quite fair. + +And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient +answer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there +is no difficulty. + +Yes, perhaps. + +Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and +then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the +constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of +the State. + +By all means. + +Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:--when you +spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to +say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a +little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas +the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he +forgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a +good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to +him?--would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the +man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted? + +No one will deny that. + +And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not +all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need +I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of +pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be +great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the +most absurd? + +You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority +of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to +many men, yet on the whole what you say is true. + +And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of +administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or +which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike +diffused in both; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women +also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man. + +Very true. + +Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on +women? + +That will never do. + +One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and +another has no music in her nature? + +Very true. + +And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and +another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics? + +Certainly. + +And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; +one has spirit, and another is without spirit? + +That is also true. + +Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was +not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of +this sort? + +Yes. + +Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they +differ only in their comparative strength or weakness. + +Obviously. + +And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the +companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom +they resemble in capacity and in character? + +Very true. + +And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits? + +They ought. + +Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning +music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians--to that point we come +round again. + +Certainly not. + +The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not +an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which +prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature. + +That appears to be true. + +We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and +secondly whether they were the most beneficial? + +Yes. + +And the possibility has been acknowledged? + +Yes. + +The very great benefit has next to be established? + +Quite so. + +You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian +will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the +same? + +Yes. + +I should like to ask you a question. + +What is it? + +Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better +than another? + +The latter. + +And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the +guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more +perfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling? + +What a ridiculous question! + +You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that +our guardians are the best of our citizens? + +By far the best. + +And will not their wives be the best women? + +Yes, by far the best. + +And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than +that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible? + +There can be nothing better. + +And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such +manner as we have described, will accomplish? + +Certainly. + +Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest +degree beneficial to the State? + +True. + +Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be +their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of +their country; only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be +assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects +their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked +women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter +he is plucking + +'A fruit of unripe wisdom,' + +and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is +about;--for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, That the +useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base. + +Very true. + +Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say +that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for +enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their +pursuits in common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this +arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness. + +Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped. + +Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this +when you see the next. + +Go on; let me see. + +The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has +preceded, is to the following effect,--'that the wives of our guardians +are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is +to know his own child, nor any child his parent.' + +Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and +the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more +questionable. + +I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very +great utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is +quite another matter, and will be very much disputed. + +I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both. + +You imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I +meant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, +I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the +possibility. + +But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to +give a defence of both. + +Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour: let +me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of +feasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have +discovered any means of effecting their wishes--that is a matter which +never troubles them--they would rather not tire themselves by thinking +about possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already +granted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing +what they mean to do when their wish has come true--that is a way which +they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for +much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with +your permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. +Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed +to enquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall +demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest benefit +to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no +objection, I will endeavour with your help to consider the advantages of +the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility. + +I have no objection; proceed. + +First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy +of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the +one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves +obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any +details which are entrusted to their care. + +That is right, he said. + +You, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now +select the women and give them to them;--they must be as far as possible +of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet +at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her +own; they will be together, and will be brought up together, and +will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by +a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each +other--necessity is not too strong a word, I think? + +Yes, he said;--necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity +which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to +the mass of mankind. + +True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after +an orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an +unholy thing which the rulers will forbid. + +Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted. + +Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the +highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred? + +Exactly. + +And how can marriages be made most beneficial?--that is a question which +I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the +nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you +ever attended to their pairing and breeding? + +In what particulars? + +Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not +some better than others? + +True. + +And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to +breed from the best only? + +From the best. + +And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age? + +I choose only those of ripe age. + +And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would +greatly deteriorate? + +Certainly. + +And the same of horses and animals in general? + +Undoubtedly. + +Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our +rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species! + +Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any +particular skill? + +Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body +corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require +medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort +of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be +given, then the doctor should be more of a man. + +That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding? + +I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of +falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were +saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be +of advantage. + +And we were very right. + +And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the +regulations of marriages and births. + +How so? + +Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of +either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior +with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the +offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock +is to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be +a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further +danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into +rebellion. + +Very true. + +Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring +together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and +suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is +a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim +will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other +things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and +diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible +to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small. + +Certainly, he replied. + +We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less +worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then +they will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers. + +To be sure, he said. + +And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other +honours and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with +women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought +to have as many sons as possible. + +True. + +And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are +to be held by women as well as by men-- + +Yes-- + +The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the +pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who +dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of +the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some +mysterious, unknown place, as they should be. + +Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be +kept pure. + +They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the +fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that +no mother recognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged +if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of +suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no +getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort +of thing to the nurses and attendants. + +You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it +when they are having children. + +Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our +scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life? + +Very true. + +And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of +about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's? + +Which years do you mean to include? + +A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to +the State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at +five-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life +beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five. + +Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of +physical as well as of intellectual vigour. + +Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public +hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; +the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have +been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, +which at each hymeneal priestesses and priest and the whole city will +offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their +good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of +darkness and strange lust. + +Very true, he replied. + +And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed +age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without +the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a +bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated. + +Very true, he replied. + +This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: +after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not +marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his +mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from +marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and +so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the +permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into +being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the +parents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be +maintained, and arrange accordingly. + +That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know +who are fathers and daughters, and so on? + +They will never know. The way will be this:--dating from the day of the +hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male +children who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his +sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him +father, and he will call their children his grandchildren, and they will +call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were +begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will +be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will +be forbidden to inter-marry. This, however, is not to be understood as +an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the +lot favours them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, +the law will allow them. + +Quite right, he replied. + +Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our +State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would +have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest +of our polity, and also that nothing can be better--would you not? + +Yes, certainly. + +Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought +to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the +organization of a State,--what is the greatest good, and what is the +greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has +the stamp of the good or of the evil? + +By all means. + +Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality +where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity? + +There cannot. + +And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and +pains--where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions +of joy and sorrow? + +No doubt. + +Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is +disorganized--when you have one half of the world triumphing and the +other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the +citizens? + +Certainly. + +Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of +the terms 'mine' and 'not mine,' 'his' and 'not his.' + +Exactly so. + +And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of +persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the +same thing? + +Quite true. + +Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the +individual--as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the +whole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom +under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all +together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in +his finger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the +body, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the +alleviation of suffering. + +Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered +State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you +describe. + +Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the +whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or +sorrow with him? + +Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State. + +It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see +whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these +fundamental principles. + +Very good. + +Our State like every other has rulers and subjects? + +True. + +All of whom will call one another citizens? + +Of course. + +But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other +States? + +Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply +call them rulers. + +And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people +give the rulers? + +They are called saviours and helpers, he replied. + +And what do the rulers call the people? + +Their maintainers and foster-fathers. + +And what do they call them in other States? + +Slaves. + +And what do the rulers call one another in other States? + +Fellow-rulers. + +And what in ours? + +Fellow-guardians. + +Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would +speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being +his friend? + +Yes, very often. + +And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an +interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest? + +Exactly. + +But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as +a stranger? + +Certainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded +by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or +daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with +him. + +Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in +name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For +example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a father be +implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the +law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an +impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good +either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the +strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the +citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and +the rest of their kinsfolk? + +These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for +them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act +in the spirit of them? + +Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often +heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is +well or ill, the universal word will be 'with me it is well' or 'it is +ill.' + +Most true. + +And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying +that they will have their pleasures and pains in common? + +Yes, and so they will. + +And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will +alike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a +common feeling of pleasure and pain? + +Yes, far more so than in other States. + +And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the +State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and +children? + +That will be the chief reason. + +And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was +implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of +the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain? + +That we acknowledged, and very rightly. + +Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly +the source of the greatest good to the State? + +Certainly. + +And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,--that +the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; +their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the +other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we +intended them to preserve their true character of guardians. + +Right, he replied. + +Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am +saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear +the city in pieces by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine;' each man +dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his +own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and +pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures +and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and +dear to them, and therefore they all tend towards a common end. + +Certainly, he replied. + +And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their +own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will +be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or +relations are the occasion. + +Of course they will. + +Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among +them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall +maintain to be honourable and right; we shall make the protection of the +person a matter of necessity. + +That is good, he said. + +Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a +quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and +not proceed to more dangerous lengths. + +Certainly. + +To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the +younger. + +Clearly. + +Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any +other violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will +he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, +mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands +on those who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the +injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, +fathers. + +That is true, he replied. + +Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with +one another? + +Yes, there will be no want of peace. + +And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be +no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or +against one another. + +None whatever. + +I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will +be rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the +flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which +men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy +necessaries for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting +how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves +to keep--the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way +are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of. + +Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that. + +And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be +blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed. + +How so? + +The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of +the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more +glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public +cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole +State; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is +the fulness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the +hands of their country while living, and after death have an honourable +burial. + +Yes, he said, and glorious rewards they are. + +Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion +some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians +unhappy--they had nothing and might have possessed all things--to whom +we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter +consider this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make +our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State +with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but +of the whole? + +Yes, I remember. + +And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to +be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors--is the life of +shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with +it? + +Certainly not. + +At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that +if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that +he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and +harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but +infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his +head shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself, then he will +have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is more than +the whole.' + +If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when +you have the offer of such a life. + +You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of +life such as we have described--common education, common children; and +they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the +city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt +together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are +able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what +is best, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the +sexes. + +I agree with you, he replied. + +The enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community +be found possible--as among other animals, so also among men--and if +possible, in what way possible? + +You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest. + +There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by +them. + +How? + +Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with +them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner +of the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will +have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will +have to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and +mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on +and help, long before they touch the wheel? + +Yes, I have. + +And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in +giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than +our guardians will be? + +The idea is ridiculous, he said. + +There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other +animals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive +to valour. + +That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may +often happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost +as well as their parents, and the State will never recover. + +True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk? + +I am far from saying that. + +Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some +occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it? + +Clearly. + +Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their +youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may +fairly be incurred. + +Yes, very important. + +This then must be our first step,--to make our children spectators +of war; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against +danger; then all will be well. + +True. + +Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but +to know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and +what dangerous? + +That may be assumed. + +And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about +the dangerous ones? + +True. + +And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who +will be their leaders and teachers? + +Very properly. + +Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good +deal of chance about them? + +True. + +Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with +wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape. + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and +when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the +horses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet +the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent +view of what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is +danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape. + +I believe that you are right, he said. + +Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one +another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the +soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any +other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman +or artisan. What do you think? + +By all means, I should say. + +And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a +present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what +they like with him. + +Certainly. + +But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to +him? In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his +youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What +do you say? + +I approve. + +And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship? + +To that too, I agree. + +But you will hardly agree to my next proposal. + +What is your proposal? + +That he should kiss and be kissed by them. + +Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let +no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the +expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether +his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of +valour. + +Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others +has been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such +matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as +possible? + +Agreed. + +Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave +youths should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax, after he had +distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which +seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, +being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing. + +Most true, he said. + +Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at +sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according to +the measure of their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and those +other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with + +'seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;' + +and in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them. + +That, he replied, is excellent. + +Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in +the first place, that he is of the golden race? + +To be sure. + +Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they +are dead + +'They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, +the guardians of speech-gifted men'? + +Yes; and we accept his authority. + +We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and +heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we +must do as he bids? + +By all means. + +And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their +sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are +deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other +way, shall be admitted to the same honours. + +That is very right, he said. + +Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this? + +In what respect do you mean? + +First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes +should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if +they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering +the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the +yoke of the barbarians? + +To spare them is infinitely better. + +Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which +they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe. + +Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the +barbarians and will keep their hands off one another. + +Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything +but their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford +an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, +pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now +has been lost from this love of plunder. + +Very true. + +And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also +a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead +body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting +gear behind him,--is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his +assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead? + +Very like a dog, he said. + +Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial? + +Yes, he replied, we most certainly must. + +Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all +the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other +Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of +spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god +himself? + +Very true. + +Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of +houses, what is to be the practice? + +May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion? + +Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual +produce and no more. Shall I tell you why? + +Pray do. + +Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' +and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one +is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is +external and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and +only the second, war. + +That is a very proper distinction, he replied. + +And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all +united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange +to the barbarians? + +Very good, he said. + +And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with +Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, +and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; +but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is +then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; +and such enmity is to be called discord. + +I agree. + +Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be +discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands +and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! +No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his +own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving +the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of +peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever. + +Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other. + +And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city? + +It ought to be, he replied. + +Then will not the citizens be good and civilized? + +Yes, very civilized. + +And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own +land, and share in the common temples? + +Most certainly. + +And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as +discord only--a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war? + +Certainly not. + +Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled? + +Certainly. + +They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their +opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies? + +Just so. + +And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor +will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a +city--men, women, and children--are equally their enemies, for they know +that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the +many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling +to waste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them will +only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty +few to give satisfaction? + +I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic +enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another. + +Then let us enact this law also for our guardians:--that they are +neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses. + +Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our +previous enactments, are very good. + +But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in +this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the +commencement of this discussion you thrust aside:--Is such an order of +things possible, and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge +that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of +good to the State. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens +will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for +they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, +brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether +in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as +auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely +invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also be +mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these +advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours +were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming +then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of +possibility and ways and means--the rest may be left. + +If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and +have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you +seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which +is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third +wave, I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge +that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so +extraordinary as that which I have now to state and investigate. + +The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more +determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: +speak out and at once. + +Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search +after justice and injustice. + +True, he replied; but what of that? + +I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to +require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or +may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of +a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men? + +The approximation will be enough. + +We were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the +character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly +unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order +that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to +the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled +them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact. + +True, he said. + +Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with +consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to +show that any such man could ever have existed? + +He would be none the worse. + +Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State? + +To be sure. + +And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the +possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described? + +Surely not, he replied. + +That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show +how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask +you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions. + +What admissions? + +I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? +Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, +whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of +the truth? What do you say? + +I agree. + +Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in +every respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover +how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we +have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. +I am sure that I should be contented--will not you? + +Yes, I will. + +Let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the +cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change +which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the +change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any +rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible. + +Certainly, he replied. + +I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one +change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible +one. + +What is it? he said. + +Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of +the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and +drown me in laughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words. + +Proceed. + +I said: 'Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this +world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness +and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either +to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities +will never have rest from their evils,--nor the human race, as I +believe,--and then only will this our State have a possibility of life +and behold the light of day.' Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, +which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; +for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness +private or public is indeed a hard thing. + +Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word +which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very +respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a +moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might +and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows +what; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, +you will be 'pared by their fine wits,' and no mistake. + +You got me into the scrape, I said. + +And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of +it; but I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I +may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another--that +is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show +the unbelievers that you are right. + +I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. +And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must +explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule +in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be +discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be +leaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, +and are meant to be followers rather than leaders. + +Then now for a definition, he said. + +Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to +give you a satisfactory explanation. + +Proceed. + +I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that +a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to +some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole. + +I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my +memory. + +Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of +pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of +youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, +and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not +this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you +praise his charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a +royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of +regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; +and as to the sweet 'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very +name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not +averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there +is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not +say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-time +of youth. + +If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the +argument, I assent. + +And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the +same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine. + +Very good. + +And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, +they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by +really great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by +lesser and meaner people,--but honour of some kind they must have. + +Exactly. + +Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the +whole class or a part only? + +The whole. + +And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part +of wisdom only, but of the whole? + +Yes, of the whole. + +And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power +of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not +to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his +food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a +good one? + +Very true, he said. + +Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is +curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a +philosopher? Am I not right? + +Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a +strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights +have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical +amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for +they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like +a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at +the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every +chorus; whether the performance is in town or country--that makes no +difference--they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and +any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor +arts, are philosophers? + +Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation. + +He said: Who then are the true philosophers? + +Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth. + +That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean? + +To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am +sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make. + +What is the proposition? + +That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two? + +Certainly. + +And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one? + +True again. + +And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the +same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the +various combinations of them with actions and things and with one +another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many? + +Very true. + +And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, +art-loving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are +alone worthy of the name of philosophers. + +How do you distinguish them? he said. + +The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of +fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that +are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving +absolute beauty. + +True, he replied. + +Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this. + +Very true. + +And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute +beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is +unable to follow--of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream +only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens +dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object? + +I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming. + +But take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute +beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which +participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the +idea nor the idea in the place of the objects--is he a dreamer, or is he +awake? + +He is wide awake. + +And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and +that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion? + +Certainly. + +But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our +statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, +without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits? + +We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied. + +Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin +by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, +and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him +a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You +must answer for him.) + +I answer that he knows something. + +Something that is or is not? + +Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known? + +And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of +view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the +utterly non-existent is utterly unknown? + +Nothing can be more certain. + +Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and +not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and +the absolute negation of being? + +Yes, between them. + +And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to +not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has +to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and +knowledge, if there be such? + +Certainly. + +Do we admit the existence of opinion? + +Undoubtedly. + +As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty? + +Another faculty. + +Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter +corresponding to this difference of faculties? + +Yes. + +And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed +further I will make a division. + +What division? + +I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are +powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight +and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly +explained the class which I mean? + +Yes, I quite understand. + +Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and +therefore the distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable +me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In +speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and +that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same +faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call +different. Would that be your way of speaking? + +Yes. + +And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you +say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it? + +Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties. + +And is opinion also a faculty? + +Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form +an opinion. + +And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not +the same as opinion? + +Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which +is infallible with that which errs? + +An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a +distinction between them. + +Yes. + +Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct +spheres or subject-matters? + +That is certain. + +Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to +know the nature of being? + +Yes. + +And opinion is to have an opinion? + +Yes. + +And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the +same as the subject-matter of knowledge? + +Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in +faculty implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as +we were saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the +sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same. + +Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be +the subject-matter of opinion? + +Yes, something else. + +Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how +can there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man +has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an +opinion which is an opinion about nothing? + +Impossible. + +He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing? + +Yes. + +And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing? + +True. + +Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of +being, knowledge? + +True, he said. + +Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being? + +Not with either. + +And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge? + +That seems to be true. + +But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in +a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than +ignorance? + +In neither. + +Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, +but lighter than ignorance? + +Both; and in no small degree. + +And also to be within and between them? + +Yes. + +Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate? + +No question. + +But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort +which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear +also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being; +and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, +but will be found in the interval between them? + +True. + +And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we +call opinion? + +There has. + +Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally +of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed +either, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may +truly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper +faculty,--the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to +the faculty of the mean. + +True. + +This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that +there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty--in whose opinion +the beautiful is the manifold--he, I say, your lover of beautiful +sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the +just is one, or that anything is one--to him I would appeal, saying, +Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these +beautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly; or of the +just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not +also be unholy? + +No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; +and the same is true of the rest. + +And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?--doubles, that +is, of one thing, and halves of another? + +Quite true. + +And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will +not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names? + +True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of +them. + +And can any one of those many things which are called by particular +names be said to be this rather than not to be this? + +He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts +or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with +what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat +was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also +a riddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, +either as being or not-being, or both, or neither. + +Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place +than between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater +darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence +than being. + +That is quite true, he said. + +Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the +multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are +tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and +pure not-being? + +We have. + +Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might +find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of +knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by +the intermediate faculty. + +Quite true. + +Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute +beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the +many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,--such persons may be +said to have opinion but not knowledge? + +That is certain. + +But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to +know, and not to have opinion only? + +Neither can that be denied. + +The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of +opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who +listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not +tolerate the existence of absolute beauty. + +Yes, I remember. + +Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of +opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with +us for thus describing them? + +I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is +true. + +But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of +wisdom and not lovers of opinion. + +Assuredly. + + + + +BOOK VI. + +And thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and +the false philosophers have at length appeared in view. + +I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened. + +I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better +view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this +one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, +which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs +from that of the unjust must consider. + +And what is the next question? he asked. + +Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as +philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, +and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not +philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the +rulers of our State? + +And how can we rightly answer that question? + +Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of +our State--let them be our guardians. + +Very good. + +Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to +keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes? + +There can be no question of that. + +And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge +of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear +pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute +truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the +other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, +if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them--are +not such persons, I ask, simply blind? + +Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition. + +And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being +their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of +virtue, also know the very truth of each thing? + +There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this +greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place +unless they fail in some other respect. + +Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and +the other excellences. + +By all means. + +In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the +philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding +about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we +shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and +that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in +the State. + +What do you mean? + +Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort +which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and +corruption. + +Agreed. + +And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true +being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less +honourable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the +lover and the man of ambition. + +True. + +And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another +quality which they should also possess? + +What quality? + +Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind +falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth. + +Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them. + +'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather 'must be +affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving +all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections. + +Right, he said. + +And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth? + +How can there be? + +Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood? + +Never. + +The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as +in him lies, desire all truth? + +Assuredly. + +But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong +in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a +stream which has been drawn off into another channel. + +True. + +He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be +absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily +pleasure--I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one. + +That is most certain. + +Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the +motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no +place in his character. + +Very true. + +Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered. + +What is that? + +There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more +antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the +whole of things both divine and human. + +Most true, he replied. + +Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all +time and all existence, think much of human life? + +He cannot. + +Or can such an one account death fearful? + +No indeed. + +Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy? + +Certainly not. + +Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or +mean, or a boaster, or a coward--can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard +in his dealings? + +Impossible. + +Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude +and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the +philosophical nature from the unphilosophical. + +True. + +There is another point which should be remarked. + +What point? + +Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love +that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little +progress. + +Certainly not. + +And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, +will he not be an empty vessel? + +That is certain. + +Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless +occupation? Yes. + +Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic +natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory? + +Certainly. + +And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to +disproportion? + +Undoubtedly. + +And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion? + +To proportion. + +Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally +well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously +towards the true being of everything. + +Certainly. + +Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go +together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is +to have a full and perfect participation of being? + +They are absolutely necessary, he replied. + +And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has +the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,--noble, gracious, the +friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred? + +The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a +study. + +And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and +to these only you will entrust the State. + +Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no +one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling +passes over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led +astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of +skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and +at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty +overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. +And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up by their +more skilful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find +themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new +game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in +the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. +For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not able +to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the +votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth +as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most +of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those +who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by +the very study which you extol. + +Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong? + +I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your +opinion. + +Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right. + +Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from +evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged +by us to be of no use to them? + +You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a +parable. + +Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all +accustomed, I suppose. + +I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into +such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will +be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner +in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous +that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if +I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put +together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of +goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a +ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of +the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, +and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are +quarrelling with one another about the steering--every one is of opinion +that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of +navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will +further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in +pieces any one who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, +begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time +they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the +others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble +captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take +possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating +and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be +expected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in +their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their +own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of +sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they +call a good-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention +to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else +belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command +of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other +people like or not--the possibility of this union of authority with the +steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been +made part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of +mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be +regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a +good-for-nothing? + +Of course, said Adeimantus. + +Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the +figure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the +State; for you understand already. + +Certainly. + +Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised +at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities; explain +it to him and try to convince him that their having honour would be far +more extraordinary. + +I will. + +Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be +useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to +attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, +and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be +commanded by him--that is not the order of nature; neither are 'the wise +to go to the doors of the rich'--the ingenious author of this saying +told a lie--but the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he +be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and he who wants to +be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for +anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him; although +the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be +justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those +who are called by them good-for-nothings and star-gazers. + +Precisely so, he said. + +For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest +pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the +opposite faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done +to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same +of whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them +are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed. + +Yes. + +And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained? + +True. + +Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is +also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of +philosophy any more than the other? + +By all means. + +And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description +of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his +leader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he +was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy. + +Yes, that was said. + +Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at +variance with present notions of him? + +Certainly, he said. + +And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of +knowledge is always striving after being--that is his nature; he will +not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, +but will go on--the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his +desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature +of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by +that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very +being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will +live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his +travail. + +Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him. + +And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will +he not utterly hate a lie? + +He will. + +And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band +which he leads? + +Impossible. + +Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will +follow after? + +True, he replied. + +Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the +philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, +magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you +objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if +you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described +are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly +depraved; we were then led to enquire into the grounds of these +accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are +the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the +examination and definition of the true philosopher. + +Exactly. + +And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, +why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling--I am speaking of +those who were said to be useless but not wicked--and, when we have done +with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of +men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of +which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, +bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal +reprobation of which we speak. + +What are these corruptions? he said. + +I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a +nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a +philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men. + +Rare indeed. + +And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare +natures! + +What causes? + +In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, +temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy +qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and +distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them. + +That is very singular, he replied. + +Then there are all the ordinary goods of life--beauty, wealth, strength, +rank, and great connections in the State--you understand the sort of +things--these also have a corrupting and distracting effect. + +I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean +about them. + +Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then +have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will +no longer appear strange to you. + +And how am I to do so? he asked. + +Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or +animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, +in proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of +a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than +to what is not. + +Very true. + +There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien +conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast +is greater. + +Certainly. + +And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they +are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and +the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by +education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are +scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil? + +There I think that you are right. + +And our philosopher follows the same analogy--he is like a plant which, +having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, +but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of +all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really +think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, +or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth +speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all +Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and +women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts? + +When is this accomplished? he said. + +When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in +a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, +and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are +being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, +shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the +place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or +blame--at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap +within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against +the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away +by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the +public in general have--he will do as they do, and as they are, such +will he be? + +Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him. + +And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been +mentioned. + +What is that? + +The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you +are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply +when their words are powerless. + +Indeed they do; and in right good earnest. + +Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be +expected to overcome in such an unequal contest? + +None, he replied. + +No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; +there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different +type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that +which is supplied by public opinion--I speak, my friend, of human virtue +only; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: +for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of +governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power +of God, as we may truly say. + +I quite assent, he replied. + +Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation. + +What are you going to say? + +Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists +and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing +but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their +assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who +should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is +fed by him--he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what +times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what +is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another +utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, +that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in +all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or +art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what +he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but +calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just +or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great +brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and +evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account +of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never +himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature +of either, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven, +would not such an one be a rare educator? + +Indeed he would. + +And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of +the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting +or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been +describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to +them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done +the State, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the so-called +necessity of Diomede will oblige him to produce whatever they +praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in +confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good. Did you +ever hear any of them which were not? + +No, nor am I likely to hear. + +You recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you +to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in +the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or +of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind? + +Certainly not. + +Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher? + +Impossible. + +And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the +world? + +They must. + +And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them? + +That is evident. + +Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in +his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that +he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence--these +were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts. + +Yes. + +Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first +among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones? + +Certainly, he said. + +And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets +older for their own purposes? + +No question. + +Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour +and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the +power which he will one day possess. + +That often happens, he said. + +And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such +circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich +and noble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless +aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes +and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he +not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless +pride? + +To be sure he will. + +Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him +and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can +only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse +circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen? + +Far otherwise. + +And even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural +reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken +captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that +they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap +from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him +from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, +using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions? + +There can be no doubt of it. + +And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher? + +Impossible. + +Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which +make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from +philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other +so-called goods of life? + +We were quite right. + +Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure +which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of +all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; +this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of +the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest +good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never +was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States. + +That is most true, he said. + +And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: +for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are +leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that +she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and +fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, +who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the +greater number deserve the severest punishment. + +That is certainly what people say. + +Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny +creatures who, seeing this land open to them--a land well stocked with +fair names and showy titles--like prisoners running out of prison into a +sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who +do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? +For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a +dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are +thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are +maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their +trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable? + +Yes. + +Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of +durance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, +and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, +who is left poor and desolate? + +A most exact parallel. + +What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and +bastard? + +There can be no question of it. + +And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and +make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them what sort of +ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms +captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or +akin to true wisdom? + +No doubt, he said. + +Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but +a small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person, detained +by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences +remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the +politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted +few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her;--or +peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' +bridle; for everything in the life of Theages conspired to divert him +from philosophy; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case +of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, +has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this +small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy +is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they +know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice +at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be compared +to a man who has fallen among wild beasts--he will not join in the +wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all +their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to +the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw +away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he +holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm +of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires +under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of +wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure +from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with +bright hopes. + +Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs. + +A great work--yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable +to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger +growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself. + +The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been +sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has +been shown--is there anything more which you wish to say? + +Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know +which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted +to her. + +Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I +bring against them--not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, +and hence that nature is warped and estranged;--as the exotic seed +which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be +overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth +of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another +character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection +which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and +that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but +human;--and now, I know, that you are going to ask, What that State is: + +No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another +question--whether it is the State of which we are the founders and +inventors, or some other? + +Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying +before, that some living authority would always be required in the +State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as +legislator you were laying down the laws. + +That was said, he replied. + +Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing +objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and +difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy. + +What is there remaining? + +The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be +the ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard +is the good,' as men say. + +Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then +be complete. + +I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, +by a want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to +remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare +that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a +different spirit. + +In what manner? + +At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young; +beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time +saved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those +of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when +they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean +dialectic, take themselves off. In after life when invited by some one +else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make +much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their +proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are +extinguished more truly than Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never +light up again. (Heraclitus said that the sun was extinguished every +evening and relighted every morning.) + +But what ought to be their course? + +Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what +philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during +this period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and +special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them +to use in the service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect +begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but +when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military +duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour, +as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a +similar happiness in another. + +How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and +yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still +more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; +Thrasymachus least of all. + +Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have +recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I +shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other +men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they +live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence. + +You are speaking of a time which is not very near. + +Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with +eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; +for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; +they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting +of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having +a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly +moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of +virtue--such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they +have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them--do you think that +they ever did? + +No indeed. + +No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble +sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means +in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while +they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is +opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or +in society. + +They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak. + +And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced +us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor +States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small +class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are +providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the +State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them; or +until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely +inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of +these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if +they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and +visionaries. Am I not right? + +Quite right. + +If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in +some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected +philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior +power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the +death, that this our constitution has been, and is--yea, and will be +whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in +all this; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves. + +My opinion agrees with yours, he said. + +But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude? + +I should imagine not, he replied. + +O my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their +minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view +of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show +them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just +now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that +he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed--if they view +him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and +answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, +who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one +in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few +this harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of mankind. + +I quite agree with you, he said. + +And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the +many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush +in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, +who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and +nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this. + +It is most unbecoming. + +For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no +time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice +and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards +things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured +by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he +imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a +man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse? + +Impossible. + +And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes +orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every +one else, he will suffer from detraction. + +Of course. + +And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, +but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into +that which he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful +artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue? + +Anything but unskilful. + +And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the +truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when +we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists +who imitate the heavenly pattern? + +They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they +draw out the plan of which you are speaking? + +They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, +as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean +surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie +the difference between them and every other legislator,--they will have +nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no +laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface. + +They will be very right, he said. + +Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the +constitution? + +No doubt. + +And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often +turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look +at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human +copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the +image of a man; and this they will conceive according to that other +image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness +of God. + +Very true, he said. + +And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until +they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the +ways of God? + +Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture. + +And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described +as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions +is such an one as we are praising; at whom they were so very indignant +because to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a +little calmer at what they have just heard? + +Much calmer, if there is any sense in them. + +Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt +that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being? + +They would not be so unreasonable. + +Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the +highest good? + +Neither can they doubt this. + +But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable +circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or +will they prefer those whom we have rejected? + +Surely not. + +Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers +bear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will +this our imaginary State ever be realized? + +I think that they will be less angry. + +Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, +and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other +reason, cannot refuse to come to terms? + +By all means, he said. + +Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any +one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who +are by nature philosophers? + +Surely no man, he said. + +And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of +necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even +by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can +escape--who will venture to affirm this? + +Who indeed! + +But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient +to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about +which the world is so incredulous. + +Yes, one is enough. + +The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been +describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them? + +Certainly. + +And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or +impossibility? + +I think not. + +But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if +only possible, is assuredly for the best. + +We have. + +And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would +be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, +is not impossible. + +Very good. + +And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but +more remains to be discussed;--how and by what studies and pursuits will +the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they +to apply themselves to their several studies? + +Certainly. + +I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the +procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because +I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was +difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much +service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and +children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must +be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will +remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the +test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, +nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism--he was +to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold +tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive +honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing +which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her +face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen. + +I perfectly remember, he said. + +Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold +word; but now let me dare to say--that the perfect guardian must be a +philosopher. + +Yes, he said, let that be affirmed. + +And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which +were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly +found in shreds and patches. + +What do you mean? he said. + +You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, +cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that +persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and +magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a +peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, +and all solid principle goes out of them. + +Very true, he said. + +On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended +upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are +equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are +always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any +intellectual toil. + +Quite true. + +And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to +whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any +office or command. + +Certainly, he said. + +And will they be a class which is rarely found? + +Yes, indeed. + +Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers +and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of +probation which we did not mention--he must be exercised also in many +kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the +highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and +exercises. + +Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean +by the highest of all knowledge? + +You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and +distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and +wisdom? + +Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more. + +And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of +them? + +To what do you refer? + +We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in +their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at +the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular +exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. +And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so +the enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate +manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say. + +Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair +measure of truth. + +But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree +falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing +imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be +contented and think that they need search no further. + +Not an uncommon case when people are indolent. + +Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the +State and of the laws. + +True. + +The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, +and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach +the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his +proper calling. + +What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this--higher than +justice and the other virtues? + +Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the +outline merely, as at present--nothing short of the most finished +picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an +infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty +and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the +highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy! + +A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from +asking you what is this highest knowledge? + +Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the +answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I +rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often +been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all +other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. +You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning +which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without +which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us +nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of +any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other +things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness? + +Assuredly not. + +You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, +but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge? + +Yes. + +And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by +knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good? + +How ridiculous! + +Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance +of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it--for the good they +define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when +they use the term 'good'--this is of course ridiculous. + +Most true, he said. + +And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they +are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good. + +Certainly. + +And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same? + +True. + +There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this +question is involved. + +There can be none. + +Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem +to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is +satisfied with the appearance of good--the reality is what they seek; in +the case of the good, appearance is despised by every one. + +Very true, he said. + +Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all +his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and +yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same +assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever +good there is in other things,--of a principle such and so great as this +ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be +in the darkness of ignorance? + +Certainly not, he said. + +I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and +the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and +I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true +knowledge of them. + +That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours. + +And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be +perfectly ordered? + +Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you +conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, +or different from either? + +Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would +not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters. + +True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a +lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the +opinions of others, and never telling his own. + +Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know? + +Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right +to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion. + +And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the +best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true +notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way +along the road? + +Very true. + +And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when +others will tell you of brightness and beauty? + +Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just +as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation +of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the +other virtues, we shall be satisfied. + +Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot +help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring +ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the +actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts +would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who +is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to +hear--otherwise, not. + +By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in +our debt for the account of the parent. + +I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the +account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, +however, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a +care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention +of deceiving you. + +Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed. + +Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and +remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, +and at many other times. + +What? + +The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so +of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term +'many' is applied. + +True, he said. + +And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other +things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for +they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of +each. + +Very true. + +The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but +not seen. + +Exactly. + +And what is the organ with which we see the visible things? + +The sight, he said. + +And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses +perceive the other objects of sense? + +True. + +But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex +piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived? + +No, I never have, he said. + +Then reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional +nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be +heard? + +Nothing of the sort. + +No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the +other senses--you would not say that any of them requires such an +addition? + +Certainly not. + +But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no +seeing or being seen? + +How do you mean? + +Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to +see; colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third +nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see +nothing and the colours will be invisible. + +Of what nature are you speaking? + +Of that which you term light, I replied. + +True, he said. + +Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and +great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is +their bond, and light is no ignoble thing? + +Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble. + +And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of +this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly +and the visible to appear? + +You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say. + +May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows? + +How? + +Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun? + +No. + +Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun? + +By far the most like. + +And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is +dispensed from the sun? + +Exactly. + +Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by +sight? + +True, he said. + +And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in +his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight +and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in +relation to mind and the things of mind: + +Will you be a little more explicit? he said. + +Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards +objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon +and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no +clearness of vision in them? + +Very true. + +But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they +see clearly and there is sight in them? + +Certainly. + +And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and +being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with +intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and +perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and +is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no +intelligence? + +Just so. + +Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to +the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this +you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as +the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both +truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as +more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and +sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, +so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the +good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher. + +What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of +science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely +cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good? + +God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in +another point of view? + +In what point of view? + +You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of +visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and +growth, though he himself is not generation? + +Certainly. + +In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of +knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet +the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power. + +Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how +amazing! + +Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made +me utter my fancies. + +And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is +anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun. + +Yes, I said, there is a great deal more. + +Then omit nothing, however slight. + +I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will +have to be omitted. + +I hope not, he said. + +You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that +one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the +visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing +upon the name ('ourhanoz, orhatoz'). May I suppose that you have this +distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind? + +I have. + +Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide +each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two +main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the +intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their +clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first +section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I +mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections +in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you +understand? + +Yes, I understand. + +Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, +to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is +made. + +Very good. + +Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have +different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the +sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge? + +Most undoubtedly. + +Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the +intellectual is to be divided. + +In what manner? + +Thus:--There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses +the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only +be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends +to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of +hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making +no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and +through the ideas themselves. + +I do not quite understand your meaning, he said. + +Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made +some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, +arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the +figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches +of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and every body are +supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of +them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go +on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their +conclusion? + +Yes, he said, I know. + +And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible +forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the +ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but +of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on--the forms +which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water +of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really +seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the +eye of the mind? + +That is true. + +And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search +after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to +a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of +hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are +resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the +shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a +higher value. + +I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry +and the sister arts. + +And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will +understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason +herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as +first principles, but only as hypotheses--that is to say, as steps and +points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order +that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and +clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive +steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from +ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends. + +I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to +be describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I +understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of +dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as +they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also +contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because +they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who +contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason +upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are +cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned +with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term +understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and +reason. + +You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to +these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul--reason +answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or +conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last--and let +there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties +have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth. + +I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your +arrangement. + + + + +BOOK VII. + +And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is +enlightened or unenlightened:--Behold! human beings living in a +underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching +all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have +their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only +see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round +their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and +between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will +see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which +marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the +puppets. + +I see. + +And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of +vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and +various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, +others silent. + +You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners. + +Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the +shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of +the cave? + +True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were +never allowed to move their heads? + +And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would +only see the shadows? + +Yes, he said. + +And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not +suppose that they were naming what was actually before them? + +Very true. + +And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the +other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by +spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow? + +No question, he replied. + +To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of +the images. + +That is certain. + +And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners +are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is +liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and +walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare +will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which +in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one +saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, +when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards +more real existence, he has a clearer vision,--what will be his reply? +And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the +objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,--will he not be +perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are +truer than the objects which are now shown to him? + +Far truer. + +And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have +a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the +objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in +reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him? + +True, he said. + +And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and +rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of +the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he +approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able +to see anything at all of what are now called realities. + +Not all in a moment, he said. + +He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. +And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and +other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he +will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled +heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the +sun or the light of the sun by day? + +Certainly. + +Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of +him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not +in another; and he will contemplate him as he is. + +Certainly. + +He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and +the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and +in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have +been accustomed to behold? + +Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him. + +And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den +and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate +himself on the change, and pity them? + +Certainly, he would. + +And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves +on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark +which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were +together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the +future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or +envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, + +'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,' + +and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after +their manner? + +Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than +entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner. + +Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun +to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his +eyes full of darkness? + +To be sure, he said. + +And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the +shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while +his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the +time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be +very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him +that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was +better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose +another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, +and they would put him to death. + +No question, he said. + +This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the +previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of +the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret +the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual +world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have +expressed--whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or +false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good +appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, +is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and +right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, +and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and +that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in +public or private life must have his eye fixed. + +I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you. + +Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this +beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their +souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to +dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be +trusted. + +Yes, very natural. + +And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine +contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a +ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has +become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight +in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of +images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those +who have never yet seen absolute justice? + +Anything but surprising, he replied. + +Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the +eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out +of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's +eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when +he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too +ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out +of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the +dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess +of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of +being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the +soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason +in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of +the light into the den. + +That, he said, is a very just distinction. + +But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong +when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not +there before, like sight into blind eyes. + +They undoubtedly say this, he replied. + +Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning +exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn +from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of +knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the +world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure +the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other +words, of the good. + +Very true. + +And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the +easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for +that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is +looking away from the truth? + +Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed. + +And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to +bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can +be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than +anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by +this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other +hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence +flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue--how eager he is, how +clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of +blind, but his keen eye-sight is forced into the service of evil, and he +is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness? + +Very true, he said. + +But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days +of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, +such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached +to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision +of their souls upon the things that are below--if, I say, they had been +released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, +the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as +they see what their eyes are turned to now. + +Very likely. + +Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a +necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated +and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of +their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, +because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their +actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will +not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already +dwelling apart in the islands of the blest. + +Very true, he replied. + +Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State +will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have +already shown to be the greatest of all--they must continue to ascend +until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen +enough we must not allow them to do as they do now. + +What do you mean? + +I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be +allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the +den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth +having or not. + +But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, +when they might have a better? + +You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the +legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy +above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he +held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them +benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; +to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his +instruments in binding up the State. + +True, he said, I had forgotten. + +Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our +philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain +to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to +share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up +at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. +Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a +culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into +the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other +citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they +have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. +Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general +underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you +have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the +inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, +and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just +and good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will +be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit +unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about +shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in +their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which +the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most +quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst. + +Quite true, he replied. + +And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at +the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of +their time with one another in the heavenly light? + +Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which +we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of +them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of +our present rulers of State. + +Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for +your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and +then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which +offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, +but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas +if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering +after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to +snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be +fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus +arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State. + +Most true, he replied. + +And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition +is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other? + +Indeed, I do not, he said. + +And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they +are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight. + +No question. + +Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they +will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the +State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours +and another and a better life than that of politics? + +They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied. + +And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, +and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,--as some are said +to have ascended from the world below to the gods? + +By all means, he replied. + +The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell (In +allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an +oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light +side uppermost.), but the turning round of a soul passing from a day +which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the +ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy? + +Quite so. + +And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of +effecting such a change? + +Certainly. + +What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming +to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will +remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes? + +Yes, that was said. + +Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality? + +What quality? + +Usefulness in war. + +Yes, if possible. + +There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not? + +Just so. + +There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the +body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and +corruption? + +True. + +Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover? + +No. + +But what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent +into our former scheme? + +Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, +and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making +them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and +the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of +rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended +to that good which you are now seeking. + +You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there +certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is +there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the +useful arts were reckoned mean by us? + +Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts +are also excluded, what remains? + +Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and +then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of +universal application. + +What may that be? + +A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, +and which every one first has to learn among the elements of education. + +What is that? + +The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three--in a word, +number and calculation:--do not all arts and sciences necessarily +partake of them? + +Yes. + +Then the art of war partakes of them? + +To be sure. + +Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon +ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares +that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array +the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been +numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been +incapable of counting his own feet--how could he if he was ignorant of +number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been? + +I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say. + +Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic? + +Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of +military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man +at all. + +I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of +this study? + +What is your notion? + +It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and +which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly +used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being. + +Will you explain your meaning? he said. + +I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, +and say 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what +branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may +have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them. + +Explain, he said. + +I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do +not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while +in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further +enquiry is imperatively demanded. + +You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses +are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade. + +No, I said, that is not at all my meaning. + +Then what is your meaning? + +When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from +one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in +this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance +or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its +opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer:--here are three +fingers--a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger. + +Very good. + +You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the +point. + +What is it? + +Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or +at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin--it makes no +difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is +not compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the +sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger. + +True. + +And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which +invites or excites intelligence. + +There is not, he said. + +But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? +Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the +circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at +the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the +qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of +the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is +not their mode of operation on this wise--the sense which is concerned +with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the +quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing +is felt to be both hard and soft? + +You are quite right, he said. + +And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense +gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of +light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is +heavy, light? + +Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious +and require to be explained. + +Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her +aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several +objects announced to her are one or two. + +True. + +And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different? + +Certainly. + +And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in +a state of division, for if there were undivided they could only be +conceived of as one? + +True. + +The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused +manner; they were not distinguished. + +Yes. + +Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was +compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as +separate and not confused. + +Very true. + +Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is +small?' + +Exactly so. + +And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible. + +Most true. + +This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the +intellect, or the reverse--those which are simultaneous with opposite +impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not. + +I understand, he said, and agree with you. + +And to which class do unity and number belong? + +I do not know, he replied. + +Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the +answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight +or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the +finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there +is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and +involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused +within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision +asks 'What is absolute unity?' This is the way in which the study of the +one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation +of true being. + +And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see +the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude? + +Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all +number? + +Certainly. + +And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number? + +Yes. + +And they appear to lead the mind towards truth? + +Yes, in a very remarkable manner. + +Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a +double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn +the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the +philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and +lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician. + +That is true. + +And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher? + +Certainly. + +Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; +and we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men +of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must +carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind +only; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying +or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul +herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from +becoming to truth and being. + +That is excellent, he said. + +Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the +science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if +pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper! + +How do you mean? + +I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating +effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and +rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into +the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and +ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is +calculating, and if you divide, they multiply (Meaning either (1) +that they integrate the number because they deny the possibility of +fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of +multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units.), taking +care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions. + +That is very true. + +Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these +wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, +there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, +indivisible,--what would they answer? + +They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of +those numbers which can only be realized in thought. + +Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, +necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the +attainment of pure truth? + +Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it. + +And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for +calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and +even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they +may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than +they would otherwise have been. + +Very true, he said. + +And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not +many as difficult. + +You will not. + +And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which +the best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up. + +I agree. + +Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall +we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us? + +You mean geometry? + +Exactly so. + +Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which +relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, +or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military +manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the +difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician. + +Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or +calculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater +and more advanced part of geometry--whether that tends in any degree +to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was +saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards +that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by +all means, to behold. + +True, he said. + +Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming +only, it does not concern us? + +Yes, that is what we assert. + +Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny +that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the +ordinary language of geometricians. + +How so? + +They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow +and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the +like--they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; +whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science. + +Certainly, he said. + +Then must not a further admission be made? + +What admission? + +That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, +and not of aught perishing and transient. + +That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true. + +Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, +and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now +unhappily allowed to fall down. + +Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect. + +Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants +of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the +science has indirect effects, which are not small. + +Of what kind? he said. + +There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all +departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied +geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not. + +Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them. + +Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our +youth will study? + +Let us do so, he replied. + +And suppose we make astronomy the third--what do you say? + +I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons +and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the +farmer or sailor. + +I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard +against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite +admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye +of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these +purified and re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand +bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of +persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take +your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly +unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they +see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore +you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to +argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in +carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you +do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive. + +I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own +behalf. + +Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the +sciences. + +What was the mistake? he said. + +After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in +revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the +second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions +of depth, ought to have followed. + +That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about +these subjects. + +Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:--in the first place, no +government patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the +pursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students +cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director +can hardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, +the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That, +however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of +these studies and gave honour to them; then disciples would want to +come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries +would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and +maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries +can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their +natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they +would some day emerge into light. + +Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly +understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of +plane surfaces? + +Yes, I said. + +And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward? + +Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid +geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass +over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids. + +True, he said. + +Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence +if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be +fourth. + +The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the +vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall +be given in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that +astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world +to another. + +Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but +not to me. + +And what then would you say? + +I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy +appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards. + +What do you mean? he asked. + +You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our +knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to +throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think +that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very +likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that +knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul +look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the +ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he +can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is +looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water +or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back. + +I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like +to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive +to that knowledge of which we are speaking? + +I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought +upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most +perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to +the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are +relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in +them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be +apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight. + +True, he replied. + +The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that +higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures +excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, +which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would +appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never +dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true +double, or the truth of any other proportion. + +No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous. + +And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at +the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things +in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? +But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of +both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these +and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible +can also be eternal and subject to no deviation--that would be absurd; +and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their +exact truth. + +I quite agree, though I never thought of this before. + +Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, +and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right +way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use. + +That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers. + +Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a +similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any +value. But can you tell me of any other suitable study? + +No, he said, not without thinking. + +Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are +obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, +as I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons. + +But where are the two? + +There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already +named. + +And what may that be? + +The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the +first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to +look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and +these are sister sciences--as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, +agree with them? + +Yes, he replied. + +But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go +and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other +applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight +of our own higher object. + +What is that? + +There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our +pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying +that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you +probably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare +the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like +that of the astronomers, is in vain. + +Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking +about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears +close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their +neighbour's wall--one set of them declaring that they distinguish an +intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be +the unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have +passed into the same--either party setting their ears before their +understanding. + +You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and +rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor +and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, +and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and +forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will +only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the +Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about harmony. +For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate the +numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to +problems--that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of +number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not. + +That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge. + +A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought +after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other +spirit, useless. + +Very true, he said. + +Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and +connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual +affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them +have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them. + +I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work. + +What do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all +this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For +you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician? + +Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was +capable of reasoning. + +But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason +will have the knowledge which we require of them? + +Neither can this be supposed. + +And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of +dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which +the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, +as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the +real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with +dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by +the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and +perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception +of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the +intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible. + +Exactly, he said. + +Then this is the progress which you call dialectic? + +True. + +But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation +from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the +underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying +to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to +perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water (which are +divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images +cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an +image)--this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to +the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may +compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body +to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible +world--this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and +pursuit of the arts which has been described. + +I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to +believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, +however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have +to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true +or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude +or preamble to the chief strain (A play upon the Greek word, which means +both 'law' and 'strain.'), and describe that in like manner. Say, then, +what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what +are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our +final rest. + +Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though +I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the +absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would +or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would +have seen something like reality; of that I am confident. + +Doubtless, he replied. + +But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal +this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences. + +Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last. + +And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method +of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of +ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in +general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are +cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the +preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the +mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension +of true being--geometry and the like--they only dream about being, +but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the +hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account +of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the +conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows +not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever +become science? + +Impossible, he said. + +Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first +principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in +order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally +buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; +and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the +sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, +but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness +than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our previous +sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names +when we have realities of such importance to consider? + +Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought +of the mind with clearness? + +At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; +two for intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division +science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth +perception of shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and +intellect with being; and so to make a proportion:-- + +As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as +intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to +the perception of shadows. + +But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects +of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times +longer than this has been. + +As far as I understand, he said, I agree. + +And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who +attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not +possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in +whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in +intelligence? Will you admit so much? + +Yes, he said; how can I deny it? + +And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the +person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, +and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to +disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never +faltering at any step of the argument--unless he can do all this, you +would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he +apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion +and not by science;--dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he +is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final +quietus. + +In all that I should most certainly agree with you. + +And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you +are nurturing and educating--if the ideal ever becomes a reality--you +would not allow the future rulers to be like posts (Literally 'lines,' +probably the starting-point of a race-course.), having no reason in +them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters? + +Certainly not. + +Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as +will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering +questions? + +Yes, he said, you and I together will make it. + +Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, +and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher--the nature +of knowledge can no further go? + +I agree, he said. + +But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to +be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered. + +Yes, clearly. + +You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before? + +Certainly, he said. + +The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given +to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, +having noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural +gifts which will facilitate their education. + +And what are these? + +Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind +more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of +gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared +with the body. + +Very true, he replied. + +Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be +an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will +never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go +through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of +him. + +Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts. + +The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no +vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has +fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not +bastards. + +What do you mean? + +In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting +industry--I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: +as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all +other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour +of learning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he +devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other +sort of lameness. + +Certainly, he said. + +And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and +lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at +herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary +falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire +of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected? + +To be sure. + +And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every +other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son +and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities +states and individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, +and the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of +virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard. + +That is very true, he said. + +All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and +if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and +training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing +to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and +of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse +will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on +philosophy than she has to endure at present. + +That would not be creditable. + +Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into +earnest I am equally ridiculous. + +In what respect? + +I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too +much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled +under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the +authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement. + +Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so. + +But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you +that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do +so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he +grows old may learn many things--for he can no more learn much than he +can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil. + +Of course. + +And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of +instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented +to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our +system of education. + +Why not? + +Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of +knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm +to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no +hold on the mind. + +Very true. + +Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early +education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find +out the natural bent. + +That is a very rational notion, he said. + +Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the +battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be +brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given +them? + +Yes, I remember. + +The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things--labours, +lessons, dangers--and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be +enrolled in a select number. + +At what age? + +At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of +two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for +any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; +and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most +important tests to which our youth are subjected. + +Certainly, he replied. + +After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years +old will be promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they +learned without any order in their early education will now be brought +together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them +to one another and to true being. + +Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting +root. + +Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion +of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical. + +I agree with you, he said. + +These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who +have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their +learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they +have arrived at the age of thirty have to be chosen by you out of the +select class, and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove +them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able +to give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with +truth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is +required. + +Why great caution? + +Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has +introduced? + +What evil? he said. + +The students of the art are filled with lawlessness. + +Quite true, he said. + +Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in +their case? or will you make allowance for them? + +In what way make allowance? + +I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son +who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous +family, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns +that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he +is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave +towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the +period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he +knows? Or shall I guess for you? + +If you please. + +Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be +likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations +more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when +in need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less +willing to disobey them in any important matter. + +He will. + +But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would +diminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted +to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he +would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, +unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble +himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations. + +Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the +disciples of philosophy? + +In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice +and honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental +authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them. + +That is true. + +There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and +attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of +right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers. + +True. + +Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what +is fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, +and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven +into believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, +or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions +which he most valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey +them as before? + +Impossible. + +And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore, +and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life +other than that which flatters his desires? + +He cannot. + +And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it? + +Unquestionably. + +Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have +described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable. + +Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable. + +Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our +citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in +introducing them to dialectic. + +Certainly. + +There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for +youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste +in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and +refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, +they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them. + +Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better. + +And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands +of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing +anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but +philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the +rest of the world. + +Too true, he said. + +But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such +insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and +not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the +greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing +the honour of the pursuit. + +Very true, he said. + +And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the +disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, +any chance aspirant or intruder? + +Very true. + +Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics +and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice +the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise--will that be +enough? + +Would you say six or four years? he asked. + +Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down +again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office +which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their +experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, +when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand +firm or flinch. + +And how long is this stage of their lives to last? + +Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of +age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves +in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at +last to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must +raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all +things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according +to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and +the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief +pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling +for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic +action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in +each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to +be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the +Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and +sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, +but if not, as in any case blessed and divine. + +You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors +faultless in beauty. + +Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not +suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to +women as far as their natures can go. + +There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all +things like the men. + +Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has +been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and +although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which +has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are +born in a State, one or more of them, despising the honours of this +present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all +things right and the honour that springs from right, and regarding +justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose +ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when +they set in order their own city? + +How will they proceed? + +They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of +the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of +their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; +these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws +which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of +which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, +and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most. + +Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have +very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into +being. + +Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its +image--there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him. + +There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking +that nothing more need be said. + + + + +BOOK VIII. + +And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect +State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education +and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best +philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings? + +That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged. + +Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when +appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses +such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing +private, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we +agreed? + +Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions +of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving +from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their +maintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole +State. + +True, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let +us find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old +path. + +There is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you +had finished the description of the State: you said that such a State +was good, and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as now +appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man. +And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others +were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there +were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of +the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had +seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and +who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the best was not +also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you +what were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then +Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and +have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived. + +Your recollection, I said, is most exact. + +Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the +same position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the +same answer which you were about to give me then. + +Yes, if I can, I will, I said. + +I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of +which you were speaking. + +That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which +I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete +and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy +comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government +which teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows +oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great +and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst +disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution +which can be said to have a distinct character. There are lordships and +principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate +forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally +among Hellenes and among barbarians. + +Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government +which exist among them. + +Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men +vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the +other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock,' and +not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure +turn the scale and draw other things after them? + +Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human +characters. + +Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of +individual minds will also be five? + +Certainly. + +Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, +we have already described. + +We have. + +Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being +the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also +the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most +just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be +able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads +a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be +completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, +as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the +argument to prefer justice. + +Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say. + +Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, +of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and +begin with the government of honour?--I know of no name for such a +government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare +with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, +consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn +our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we +will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the +tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision. + +That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable. + +First, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of +honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, +all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing +power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved. + +Very true, he said. + +In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the +two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with +one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell +us 'how discord first arose'? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, +to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a +lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest? + +How would they address us? + +After this manner:--A city which is thus constituted can hardly be +shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an +end, even a constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will +in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution:--In plants that grow +in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, +fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences +of the circles of each are completed, which in short-lived existences +pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But +to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and +education of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them +will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, +but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when +they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is +contained in a perfect number (i.e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which +is equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle +or time represented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations +represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.), but the period of +human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments +by involution and evolution (or squared and cubed) obtaining three +intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, +make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another. (Probably +the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first = the sides of the +Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5 cubed, +which together = 6 cubed = 216.) The base of these (3) with a third +added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power +furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is a hundred times +as great (400 = 4 x 100) (Or the first a square which is 100 x 100 = +10,000. The whole number will then be 17,500 = a square of 100, and an +oblong of 100 by 75.), and the other a figure having one side equal to +the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon +rational diameters of a square (i.e. omitting fractions), the side of +which is five (7 x 7 = 49 x 100 = 4900), each of them being less by one +(than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less +by (Or, 'consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational diameters,' +etc. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see Introduction.) two +perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which +is five = 50 + 50 = 100); and a hundred cubes of three (27 x 100 = 2700 ++ 4900 + 400 = 8000). Now this number represents a geometrical figure +which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your +guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and +bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or +fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their +predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, +and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found +to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by under-valuing music; +which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men of +your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers +will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal +of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver +and brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass +with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and +irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred +and war. This the Muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has +sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us. + +Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly. + +Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak +falsely? + +And what do the Muses say next? + +When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the +iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and +silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the +true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient +order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they +agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; +and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly +protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and +servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch +against them. + +I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change. + +And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate +between oligarchy and aristocracy? + +Very true. + +Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will +they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy +and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and +will also have some peculiarities. + +True, he said. + +In the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class +from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution +of common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military +training--in all these respects this State will resemble the former. + +True. + +But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no +longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; +and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who +are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set +by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of +everlasting wars--this State will be for the most part peculiar. + +Yes. + +Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those +who live in oligarchies; they will have, a fierce secret longing after +gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines +and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; +also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will +spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please. + +That is most true, he said. + +And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the +money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on +the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running +away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled +not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her +who is the true Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have +honoured gymnastic more than music. + +Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a +mixture of good and evil. + +Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is +predominantly seen,--the spirit of contention and ambition; and these +are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element. + +Assuredly, he said. + +Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been +described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, +for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and +most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the +characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable +labour. + +Very true, he replied. + +Now what man answers to this form of government-how did he come into +being, and what is he like? + +I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which +characterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon. + +Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are +other respects in which he is very different. + +In what respects? + +He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet +a friend of culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. +Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, +who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and +remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of +honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any +ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats +of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase. + +Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy. + +Such an one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets +older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a +piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards +virtue, having lost his best guardian. + +Who was that? said Adeimantus. + +Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her +abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life. + +Good, he said. + +Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical +State. + +Exactly. + +His origin is as follows:--He is often the young son of a brave father, +who dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours +and offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is +ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble. + +And how does the son come into being? + +The character of the son begins to develope when he hears his mother +complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which +the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. +Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and +instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking +whatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts +always centre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable +indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is +only half a man and far too easy-going: adding all the other complaints +about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing. + +Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints +are so like themselves. + +And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to +be attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same +strain to the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father, +or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell +the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this +sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad +and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own +business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while +the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The result is that the young +man, hearing and seeing all these things--hearing, too, the words of +his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and making +comparisons of him and others--is drawn opposite ways: while his father +is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul, the +others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not +originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last +brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the +kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness +and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious. + +You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly. + +Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second +type of character? + +We have. + +Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says, + +'Is set over against another State;' + +or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State. + +By all means. + +I believe that oligarchy follows next in order. + +And what manner of government do you term oligarchy? + +A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have +power and the poor man is deprived of it. + +I understand, he replied. + +Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to +oligarchy arises? + +Yes. + +Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes +into the other. + +How? + +The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the +ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do +they or their wives care about the law? + +Yes, indeed. + +And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the +great mass of the citizens become lovers of money. + +Likely enough. + +And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making +a fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are +placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as +the other falls. + +True. + +And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, +virtue and the virtuous are dishonoured. + +Clearly. + +And what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is +neglected. + +That is obvious. + +And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become +lovers of trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and +make a ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man. + +They do so. + +They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the +qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower +in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow +no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in +the government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force +of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work. + +Very true. + +And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is +established. + +Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of +government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking? + +First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just +think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their +property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though +he were a better pilot? + +You mean that they would shipwreck? + +Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything? + +I should imagine so. + +Except a city?--or would you include a city? + +Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as +the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all. + +This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy? + +Clearly. + +And here is another defect which is quite as bad. + +What defect? + +The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the +one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot +and always conspiring against one another. + +That, surely, is at least as bad. + +Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are +incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and +then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not +call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to +fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for +money makes them unwilling to pay taxes. + +How discreditable! + +And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have +too many callings--they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. +Does that look well? + +Anything but well. + +There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to +which this State first begins to be liable. + +What evil? + +A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; +yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a +part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but +only a poor, helpless creature. + +Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State. + +The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the +extremes of great wealth and utter poverty. + +True. + +But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, +was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes +of citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling +body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a +spendthrift? + +As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift. + +May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone +in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the +other is of the hive? + +Just so, Socrates. + +And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, +whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others +have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old +age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they +are termed. + +Most true, he said. + +Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that +neighborhood there are hidden away thieves, and cut-purses and robbers +of temples, and all sorts of malefactors. + +Clearly. + +Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers? + +Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler. + +And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to +be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are +careful to restrain by force? + +Certainly, we may be so bold. + +The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, +ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State? + +True. + +Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there +may be many other evils. + +Very likely. + +Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are +elected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to +consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this +State. + +By all means. + +Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise? + +How? + +A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first +he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but +presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon +a sunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been +a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a +prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or +deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from +him. + +Nothing more likely. + +And the son has seen and known all this--he is a ruined man, and his +fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his +bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean +and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such +an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the +vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt +with tiara and chain and scimitar? + +Most true, he replied. + +And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently +on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, +he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into +larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything +but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the +acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it. + +Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the +conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one. + +And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth? + +Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the +State out of which oligarchy came. + +Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them. + +Very good. + +First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon +wealth? + +Certainly. + +Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only +satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; +his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable. + +True. + +He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a +purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. +Is he not a true image of the State which he represents? + +He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as +well as by the State. + +You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said. + +I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a +blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour. + +Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to +this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as +of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit +of life? + +True. + +Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his +rogueries? + +Where must I look? + +You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting +dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan. + +Aye. + +It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give +him a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced +virtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by +reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he +trembles for his possessions. + +To be sure. + +Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires +of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend +what is not his own. + +Yes, and they will be strong in him too. + +The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not +one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over +his inferior ones. + +True. + +For these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people; +yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far +away and never come near him. + +I should expect so. + +And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a +State for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition; +he will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of +awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in +the struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part +only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the +prize and saves his money. + +Very true. + +Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to +the oligarchical State? + +There can be no doubt. + +Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to +be considered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the +democratic man, and bring him up for judgment. + +That, he said, is our method. + +Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy +arise? Is it not on this wise?--The good at which such a State aims is +to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable? + +What then? + +The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse +to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because +they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their +estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance? + +To be sure. + +There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of +moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any +considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded. + +That is tolerably clear. + +And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and +extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary? + +Yes, often. + +And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and +fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their +citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate +and conspire against those who have got their property, and against +everybody else, and are eager for revolution. + +That is true. + +On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and +pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert +their sting--that is, their money--into some one else who is not on +his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over +multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper +to abound in the State. + +Yes, he said, there are plenty of them--that is certain. + +The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either +by restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy: + +What other? + +One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the +citizens to look to their characters:--Let there be a general rule that +every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and +there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of +which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State. + +Yes, they will be greatly lessened. + +At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, +treat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially +the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life +of luxury and idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are +incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain. + +Very true. + +They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as +the pauper to the cultivation of virtue. + +Yes, quite as indifferent. + +Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers +and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey +or on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, +as fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe the +behaviour of each other in the very moment of danger--for where danger +is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich--and +very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the +side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has +plenty of superfluous flesh--when he sees such an one puffing and at his +wits'-end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are +only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they +meet in private will not people be saying to one another 'Our warriors +are not good for much'? + +Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking. + +And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without +may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external +provocation a commotion may arise within--in the same way wherever there +is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which +the occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without +their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then +the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times +distracted, even when there is no external cause. + +Yes, surely. + +And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their +opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder +they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of +government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot. + +Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution +has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party +to withdraw. + +And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have +they? for as the government is, such will be the man. + +Clearly, he said. + +In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of +freedom and frankness--a man may say and do what he likes? + +'Tis said so, he replied. + +And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for +himself his own life as he pleases? + +Clearly. + +Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human +natures? + +There will. + +This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an +embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just +as women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things +most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is +spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be +the fairest of States. + +Yes. + +Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a +government. + +Why? + +Because of the liberty which reigns there--they have a complete +assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, +as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at +which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he +has made his choice, he may found his State. + +He will be sure to have patterns enough. + +And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, +even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or +go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are +at peace, unless you are so disposed--there being no necessity also, +because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you +should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy--is not this +a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful? + +For the moment, yes. + +And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? +Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they +have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk +about the world--the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or +cares? + +Yes, he replied, many and many a one. + +See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't +care' about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine +principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city--as +when we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, +there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used +to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study--how +grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, +never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and +promoting to honour any one who professes to be the people's friend. + +Yes, she is of a noble spirit. + +These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which +is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and +dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike. + +We know her well. + +Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather +consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being. + +Very good, he said. + +Is not this the way--he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical +father who has trained him in his own habits? + +Exactly. + +And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of +the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called +unnecessary? + +Obviously. + +Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the +necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures? + +I should. + +Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of +which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called +so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial +and what is necessary, and cannot help it. + +True. + +We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary? + +We are not. + +And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his +youth upwards--of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in +some cases the reverse of good--shall we not be right in saying that all +these are unnecessary? + +Yes, certainly. + +Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a +general notion of them? + +Very good. + +Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, +in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the +necessary class? + +That is what I should suppose. + +The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it +is essential to the continuance of life? + +Yes. + +But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for +health? + +Certainly. + +And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other +luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained +in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the +pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary? + +Very true. + +May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money +because they conduce to production? + +Certainly. + +And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds +good? + +True. + +And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures +and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, +whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and +oligarchical? + +Very true. + +Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the +oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process. + +What is the process? + +When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, +in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to +associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for +him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure--then, as you may +imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him +into the democratical? + +Inevitably. + +And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by +an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too +the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without +to assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again +helping that which is akin and alike? + +Certainly. + +And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within +him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or +rebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite +faction, and he goes to war with himself. + +It must be so. + +And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the +oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; +a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is +restored. + +Yes, he said, that sometimes happens. + +And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones +spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not +know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous. + +Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way. + +They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with +them, breed and multiply in him. + +Very true. + +At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which +they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and +true words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to +the gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels. + +None better. + +False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their +place. + +They are certain to do so. + +And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and +takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be +sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain +conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither +allow the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the +fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. +There is a battle and they gain the day, and then modesty, which +they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and +temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and +cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure +are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil +appetites, they drive them beyond the border. + +Yes, with a will. + +And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in +their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the +next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and +waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and +a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by +sweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and +waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man +passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of +necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary +pleasures. + +Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough. + +After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on +unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be +fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have +elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over--supposing that he then +re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not +wholly give himself up to their successors--in that case he balances his +pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of +himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; +and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he +despises none of them but encourages them all equally. + +Very true, he said. + +Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of +advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions +of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought +to use and honour some and chastise and master the others--whenever this +is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, +and that one is as good as another. + +Yes, he said; that is the way with him. + +Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the +hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then +he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn +at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once +more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, +and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; +and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that +direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has +neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and +bliss and freedom; and so he goes on. + +Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality. + +Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the +lives of many;--he answers to the State which we described as fair +and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their +pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is +contained in him. + +Just so. + +Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the +democratic man. + +Let that be his place, he said. + +Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, +tyranny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider. + +Quite true, he said. + +Say then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?--that it has a +democratic origin is evident. + +Clearly. + +And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as +democracy from oligarchy--I mean, after a sort? + +How? + +The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it +was maintained was excess of wealth--am I not right? + +Yes. + +And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things +for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy? + +True. + +And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings +her to dissolution? + +What good? + +Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory +of the State--and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman +of nature deign to dwell. + +Yes; the saying is in every body's mouth. + +I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the +neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy, which +occasions a demand for tyranny. + +How so? + +When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers +presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of +freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful +draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they +are cursed oligarchs. + +Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence. + +Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who +hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like +rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own +heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now, in +such a State, can liberty have any limit? + +Certainly not. + +By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by +getting among the animals and infecting them. + +How do you mean? + +I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his +sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he +having no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is +his freedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen +with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either. + +Yes, he said, that is the way. + +And these are not the only evils, I said--there are several lesser ones: +In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, +and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are +all alike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready +to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the +young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be thought +morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the +young. + +Quite true, he said. + +The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, +whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor +must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in +relation to each other. + +Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips? + +That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who +does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the +animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in +any other State: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as +good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of +marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they +will run at any body who comes in their way if he does not leave +the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with +liberty. + +When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you +describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing. + +And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the +citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, +and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, +written or unwritten; they will have no one over them. + +Yes, he said, I know it too well. + +Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which +springs tyranny. + +Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step? + +The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease +magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy--the truth +being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in +the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and +in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government. + +True. + +The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to +pass into excess of slavery. + +Yes, the natural order. + +And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most +aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of +liberty? + +As we might expect. + +That, however, was not, as I believe, your question--you rather desired +to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and +democracy, and is the ruin of both? + +Just so, he replied. + +Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, +of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the +followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, +and others having stings. + +A very just comparison. + +These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are +generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good +physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to +keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; +and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and +their cells cut out as speedily as possible. + +Yes, by all means, he said. + +Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine +democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the +first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than +there were in the oligarchical State. + +That is true. + +And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified. + +How so? + +Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from +office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a +democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener +sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not +suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost +everything is managed by the drones. + +Very true, he said. + +Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass. + +What is that? + +They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be +the richest. + +Naturally so. + +They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of +honey to the drones. + +Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have +little. + +And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them. + +That is pretty much the case, he said. + +The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their +own hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. +This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a +democracy. + +True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate +unless they get a little honey. + +And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich +of their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time +taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves? + +Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share. + +And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to +defend themselves before the people as they best can? + +What else can they do? + +And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge +them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy? + +True. + +And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, +but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, +seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become +oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the +drones torments them and breeds revolution in them. + +That is exactly the truth. + +Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another. + +True. + +The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse +into greatness. + +Yes, that is their way. + +This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first +appears above ground he is a protector. + +Yes, that is quite clear. + +How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when +he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of +Lycaean Zeus. + +What tale? + +The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim +minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a +wolf. Did you never hear it? + +Oh, yes. + +And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at +his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; +by the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court +and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy +tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills +and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of +debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? +Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a +man become a wolf--that is, a tyrant? + +Inevitably. + +This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich? + +The same. + +After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, +a tyrant full grown. + +That is clear. + +And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by +a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him. + +Yes, he said, that is their usual way. + +Then comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of +all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career--'Let not the +people's friend,' as they say, 'be lost to them.' + +Exactly. + +The people readily assent; all their fears are for him--they have none +for themselves. + +Very true. + +And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of +the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus, + +'By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to +be a coward.' + +And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed +again. + +But if he is caught he dies. + +Of course. + +And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not 'larding the +plain' with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up +in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, +but tyrant absolute. + +No doubt, he said. + +And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State +in which a creature like him is generated. + +Yes, he said, let us consider that. + +At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and +he salutes every one whom he meets;--he to be called a tyrant, who is +making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and +distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so +kind and good to every one! + +Of course, he said. + +But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and +there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some +war or other, in order that the people may require a leader. + +To be sure. + +Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished +by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their +daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him? + +Clearly. + +And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, +and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for +destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all +these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war. + +He must. + +Now he begins to grow unpopular. + +A necessary result. + +Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, +speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of +them cast in his teeth what is being done. + +Yes, that may be expected. + +And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot +stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything. + +He cannot. + +And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is +high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy +of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, +until he has made a purgation of the State. + +Yes, he said, and a rare purgation. + +Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the +body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he +does the reverse. + +If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself. + +What a blessed alternative, I said:--to be compelled to dwell only with +the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all! + +Yes, that is the alternative. + +And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more +satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require? + +Certainly. + +And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them? + +They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them. + +By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every +land. + +Yes, he said, there are. + +But will he not desire to get them on the spot? + +How do you mean? + +He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and +enrol them in his body-guard. + +To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all. + +What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to +death the others and has these for his trusted friends. + +Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort. + +Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into +existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate +and avoid him. + +Of course. + +Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian. + +Why so? + +Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying, + +'Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;' + +and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes +his companions. + +Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other +things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets. + +And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us +and any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into +our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny. + +Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us. + +But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and +hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to +tyrannies and democracies. + +Very true. + +Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honour--the greatest +honour, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from +democracies; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more +their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to +proceed further. + +True. + +But we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and +enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various +and ever-changing army of his. + +If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate +and spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may +suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise +have to impose upon the people. + +And when these fail? + +Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or +female, will be maintained out of his father's estate. + +You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, +will maintain him and his companions? + +Yes, he said; they cannot help themselves. + +But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son +ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be +supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle +him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself +be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble +of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that +by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and +aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions +depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous +son and his undesirable associates. + +By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has +been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he +will find that he is weak and his son strong. + +Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! +beat his father if he opposes him? + +Yes, he will, having first disarmed him. + +Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this +is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the +saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of +freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus +liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest +and bitterest form of slavery. + +True, he said. + +Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently +discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from +democracy to tyranny? + +Yes, quite enough, he said. + + + + +BOOK IX. + +Last of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to +ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in +happiness or in misery? + +Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining. + +There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered. + +What question? + +I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number +of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always +be confused. + +Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission. + +Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand: +Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be +unlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are +controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail +over them--either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; +while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of +them. + +Which appetites do you mean? + +I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling +power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or +drink, starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy +his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime--not excepting +incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of +forbidden food--which at such a time, when he has parted company with +all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit. + +Most true, he said. + +But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going +to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble +thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having +first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just +enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and +pains from interfering with the higher principle--which he leaves in +the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to +the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when +again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against +any one--I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he +rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, +as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the +sport of fantastic and lawless visions. + +I quite agree. + +In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point +which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is +a lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider +whether I am right, and you agree with me. + +Yes, I agree. + +And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic +man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under +a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but +discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and +ornament? + +True. + +And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of +people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite +extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a +better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he +halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but +of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this +manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch? + +Yes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still. + +And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this +man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's +principles. + +I can imagine him. + +Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son +which has already happened to the father:--he is drawn into a perfectly +lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his +father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite +party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and +tyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive +to implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and +spendthrift lusts--a sort of monstrous winged drone--that is the only +image which will adequately describe him. + +Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him. + +And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and +garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let +loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of +desire which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this +lord of the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks +out into a frenzy: and if he finds in himself any good opinions or +appetites in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of +shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts +them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to +the full. + +Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated. + +And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant? + +I should not wonder. + +Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant? + +He has. + +And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will +fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the +gods? + +That he will. + +And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being +when, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he +becomes drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so? + +Assuredly. + +Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live? + +Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me. + +I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be +feasts and carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort +of thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the +concerns of his soul. + +That is certain. + +Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, +and their demands are many. + +They are indeed, he said. + +His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent. + +True. + +Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property. + +Of course. + +When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest +like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, +and especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, +is in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil +of his property, in order that he may gratify them? + +Yes, that is sure to be the case. + +He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and +pangs. + +He must. + +And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got +the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger +will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has +spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs. + +No doubt he will. + +And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to +cheat and deceive them. + +Very true. + +And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them. + +Yes, probably. + +And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? +Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them? + +Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents. + +But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a +harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that +he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary +to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the +other, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under +like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, +first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some +newly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable? + +Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would. + +Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and +mother. + +He is indeed, he replied. + +He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are +beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, +or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to +clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, +and which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those +others which have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of +love and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was +still subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in +the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of love, he +becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in +a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, +or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives +lordly in him and lawlessly, and being himself a king, leads him on, as +a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which +he can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those +whom evil communications have brought in from without, or those whom +he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar +evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life? + +Yes, indeed, he said. + +And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the +people are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or +mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a +war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces +of mischief in the city. + +What sort of mischief? + +For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, +robbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able +to speak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes. + +A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in +number. + +Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these +things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not +come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and +their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, +assisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among +themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him +they create their tyrant. + +Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant. + +If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began +by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he +beats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the +Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced +to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and +desires. + +Exactly. + +When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, +this is their character; they associate entirely with their own +flatterers or ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they +in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess +every sort of affection for them; but when they have gained their point +they know them no more. + +Yes, truly. + +They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of +anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship. + +Certainly not. + +And may we not rightly call such men treacherous? + +No question. + +Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice? + +Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right. + +Let us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he +is the waking reality of what we dreamed. + +Most true. + +And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the +longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes. + +That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer. + +And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most +miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually +and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in +general? + +Yes, he said, inevitably. + +And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and +the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the +others? + +Certainly. + +And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation +to man? + +To be sure. + +Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city +which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue? + +They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and +the other is the very worst. + +There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore +I will at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision +about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow +ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is +only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us +go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and +then we will give our opinion. + +A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a +tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king +the happiest. + +And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request, +that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through +human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and +is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to +the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose +that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able +to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at +his dally life and known him in his family relations, where he may be +seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public +danger--he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant +when compared with other men? + +That again, he said, is a very fair proposal. + +Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and +have before now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who +will answer our enquiries. + +By all means. + +Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the +State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other +of them, will you tell me their respective conditions? + +What do you mean? he asked. + +Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is +governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved? + +No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved. + +And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a +State? + +Yes, he said, I see that there are--a few; but the people, speaking +generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved. + +Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule +prevail? his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity--the best elements +in him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the +worst and maddest. + +Inevitably. + +And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman, +or of a slave? + +He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion. + +And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of +acting voluntarily? + +Utterly incapable. + +And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul +taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a +gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse? + +Certainly. + +And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor? + +Poor. + +And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable? + +True. + +And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear? + +Yes, indeed. + +Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow +and groaning and pain? + +Certainly not. + +And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery +than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires? + +Impossible. + +Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State +to be the most miserable of States? + +And I was right, he said. + +Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical +man, what do you say of him? + +I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men. + +There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong. + +What do you mean? + +I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery. + +Then who is more miserable? + +One of whom I am about to speak. + +Who is that? + +He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life +has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant. + +From what has been said, I gather that you are right. + +Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more +certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this +respecting good and evil is the greatest. + +Very true, he said. + +Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light +upon this subject. + +What is your illustration? + +The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from +them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have +slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves. + +Yes, that is the difference. + +You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from +their servants? + +What should they fear? + +Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this? + +Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the +protection of each individual. + +Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of +some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, +carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to +help him--will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and +children should be put to death by his slaves? + +Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear. + +The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his +slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much +against his will--he will have to cajole his own servants. + +Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself. + +And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with +neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and +who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life? + +His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere +surrounded and watched by enemies. + +And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound--he +who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of +fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all +men in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the +things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like +a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who +goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest. + +Very true, he said. + +And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own +person--the tyrannical man, I mean--whom you just now decided to be the +most miserable of all--will not he be yet more miserable when, instead +of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public +tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: +he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his +life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men. + +Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact. + +Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a +worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst? + +Certainly. + +He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, +and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to +be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is +utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly +poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life +long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, +even as the State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds? + +Very true, he said. + +Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he +becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, +more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor +and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is +supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as +himself. + +No man of any sense will dispute your words. + +Come then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests +proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first +in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others +follow: there are five of them in all--they are the royal, timocratical, +oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical. + +The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses +coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they +enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery. + +Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston (the +best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and +that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and +that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that +this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest +tyrant of his State? + +Make the proclamation yourself, he said. + +And shall I add, 'whether seen or unseen by gods and men'? + +Let the words be added. + +Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which +may also have some weight. + +What is that? + +The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that +the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three +principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration. + +Of what nature? + +It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures +correspond; also three desires and governing powers. + +How do you mean? he said. + +There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, +another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no +special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from +the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and +drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of +it; also money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by +the help of money. + +That is true, he said. + +If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were +concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single +notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul +as loving gain or money. + +I agree with you. + +Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering +and getting fame? + +True. + +Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious--would the term be +suitable? + +Extremely suitable. + +On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is +wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others +for gain or fame. + +Far less. + +'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which we may fitly +apply to that part of the soul? + +Certainly. + +One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in +others, as may happen? + +Yes. + +Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of +men--lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain? + +Exactly. + +And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects? + +Very true. + +Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn +which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his +own and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the +vanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid +advantages of gold and silver? + +True, he said. + +And the lover of honour--what will be his opinion? Will he not think +that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, +if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him? + +Very true. + +And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on +other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, +and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the +heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, +under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather +not have them? + +There can be no doubt of that, he replied. + +Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in +dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, +or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless--how +shall we know who speaks truly? + +I cannot myself tell, he said. + +Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience +and wisdom and reason? + +There cannot be a better, he said. + +Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest +experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of +gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of +the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of +gain? + +The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has +of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his +childhood upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not +of necessity tasted--or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could +hardly have tasted--the sweetness of learning and knowing truth. + +Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, +for he has a double experience? + +Yes, very great. + +Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the +lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom? + +Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their +object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have +their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have +experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be +found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only. + +His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one? + +Far better. + +And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience? + +Certainly. + +Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not +possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher? + +What faculty? + +Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest. + +Yes. + +And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument? + +Certainly. + +If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the +lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy? + +Assuredly. + +Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the +ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest? + +Clearly. + +But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges-- + +The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are +approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest. + +And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent +part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in +whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life. + +Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he +approves of his own life. + +And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the +pleasure which is next? + +Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to +himself than the money-maker. + +Last comes the lover of gain? + +Very true, he said. + +Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in +this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to +Olympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure +except that of the wise is quite true and pure--all others are a shadow +only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of +falls? + +Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself? + +I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions. + +Proceed. + +Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain? + +True. + +And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain? + +There is. + +A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about +either--that is what you mean? + +Yes. + +You remember what people say when they are sick? + +What do they say? + +That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never +knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill. + +Yes, I know, he said. + +And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them +say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain? + +I have. + +And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and +cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them +as the greatest pleasure? + +Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at +rest. + +Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be +painful? + +Doubtless, he said. + +Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be +pain? + +So it would seem. + +But can that which is neither become both? + +I should say not. + +And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not? + +Yes. + +But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, +and in a mean between them? + +Yes. + +How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is +pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain? + +Impossible. + +This then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the +rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, +and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these +representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real +but a sort of imposition? + +That is the inference. + +Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and +you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure +is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure. + +What are they, he said, and where shall I find them? + +There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell, which +are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and +when they depart leave no pain behind them. + +Most true, he said. + +Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the +cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure. + +No. + +Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul +through the body are generally of this sort--they are reliefs of pain. + +That is true. + +And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like +nature? + +Yes. + +Shall I give you an illustration of them? + +Let me hear. + +You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and +middle region? + +I should. + +And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would +he not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle +and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the +upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world? + +To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise? + +But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, +that he was descending? + +No doubt. + +All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle +and lower regions? + +Yes. + +Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as +they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong +ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when +they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think +the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when +drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly +believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, +not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, +which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white--can you +wonder, I say, at this? + +No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite. + +Look at the matter thus:--Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions +of the bodily state? + +Yes. + +And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul? + +True. + +And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either? + +Certainly. + +And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that +which has more existence the truer? + +Clearly, from that which has more. + +What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your +judgment--those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of +sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion +and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put +the question in this way:--Which has a more pure being--that which is +concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of +such a nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned +with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and +mortal? + +Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the +invariable. + +And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same +degree as of essence? + +Yes, of knowledge in the same degree. + +And of truth in the same degree? + +Yes. + +And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of +essence? + +Necessarily. + +Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the +body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service +of the soul? + +Far less. + +And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul? + +Yes. + +What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real +existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less +real existence and is less real? + +Of course. + +And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according +to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being +will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which +participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, +and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure? + +Unquestionably. + +Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with +gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and +in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass +into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever +find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do +they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes +always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, +to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their +excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with +horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by +reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that +which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is +also unsubstantial and incontinent. + +Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like +an oracle. + +Their pleasures are mixed with pains--how can they be otherwise? For +they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by +contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant +in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought +about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of +Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth. + +Something of that sort must inevitably happen. + +And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element +of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into +action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or +violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking +to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without +reason or sense? + +Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also. + +Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, +when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company +of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which +wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest +degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and +they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is +best for each one is also most natural to him? + +Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural. + +And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there +is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their +own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which +they are capable? + +Exactly. + +But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in +attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a +pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own? + +True. + +And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and +reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure? + +Yes. + +And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance +from law and order? + +Clearly. + +And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest +distance? Yes. + +And the royal and orderly desires are nearest? + +Yes. + +Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural +pleasure, and the king at the least? + +Certainly. + +But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most +pleasantly? + +Inevitably. + +Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them? + +Will you tell me? + +There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now +the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he +has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode +with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure +of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure. + +How do you mean? + +I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the +oligarch; the democrat was in the middle? + +Yes. + +And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an +image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure +of the oligarch? + +He will. + +And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal +and aristocratical? + +Yes, he is third. + +Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number +which is three times three? + +Manifestly. + +The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of +length will be a plane figure. + +Certainly. + +And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no +difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is +parted from the king. + +Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum. + +Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by +which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will +find him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more +pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval. + +What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which +separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain! + +Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human +life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and +years. (729 NEARLY equals the number of days and nights in the year.) + +Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them. + +Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil +and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of +life and in beauty and virtue? + +Immeasurably greater. + +Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we +may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one saying +that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be +just? + +Yes, that was said. + +Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and +injustice, let us have a little conversation with him. + +What shall we say to him? + +Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words +presented before his eyes. + +Of what sort? + +An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient +mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many +others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one. + +There are said of have been such unions. + +Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, +having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he +is able to generate and metamorphose at will. + +You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more +pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as +you propose. + +Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a +man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the +second. + +That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say. + +And now join them, and let the three grow into one. + +That has been accomplished. + +Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so +that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, +may believe the beast to be a single human creature. + +I have done so, he said. + +And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human +creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply +that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast +the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like +qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable +to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is +not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another--he +ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another. + +Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says. + +To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so +speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the +most complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch +over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and +cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from +growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care +of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and +with himself. + +Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say. + +And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or +advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and +the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant? + +Yes, from every point of view. + +Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not +intentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir,' we will say to him, 'what think +you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which +subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the +ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid +saying Yes--can he now? + +Not if he has any regard for my opinion. + +But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: +'Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the +condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? +Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for +money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, +would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he +received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who +remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless +and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's +life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.' + +Yes, said Glaucon, far worse--I will answer for him. + +Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge +multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large? + +Clearly. + +And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent +element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength? + +Yes. + +And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this +same creature, and make a coward of him? + +Very true. + +And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates +the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, +of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his +youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a +monkey? + +True, he said. + +And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because +they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is +unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and +his great study is how to flatter them. + +Such appears to be the reason. + +And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of +the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom +the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the +servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom +dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external +authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the +same government, friends and equals. + +True, he said. + +And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the +ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we +exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we +have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of +a state, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their +hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may +go their ways. + +Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest. + +From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man +is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will +make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his +wickedness? + +From no point of view at all. + +What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? +He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and +punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the +gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and +ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more +than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, +in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body. + +Certainly, he said. + +To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies +of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which +impress these qualities on his soul and will disregard others? + +Clearly, he said. + +In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and +so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that +he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object +will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely +thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the +body as to preserve the harmony of the soul? + +Certainly he will, if he has true music in him. + +And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and +harmony which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be +dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his +own infinite harm? + +Certainly not, he said. + +He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no +disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or +from want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and +gain or spend according to his means. + +Very true. + +And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours +as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private +or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid? + +Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman. + +By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly +will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a +divine call. + +I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we +are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe +that there is such an one anywhere on earth? + +In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which +he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in +order. But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no +matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing +to do with any other. + +I think so, he said. + + + + +BOOK X. + +Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, +there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule +about poetry. + +To what do you refer? + +To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be +received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have +been distinguished. + +What do you mean? + +Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated +to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe--but I do not +mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the +understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true +nature is the only antidote to them. + +Explain the purport of your remark. + +Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had +an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on +my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that +charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the +truth, and therefore I will speak out. + +Very good, he said. + +Listen to me then, or rather, answer me. + +Put your question. + +Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know. + +A likely thing, then, that I should know. + +Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the +keener. + +Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint +notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire +yourself? + +Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a +number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a +corresponding idea or form:--do you understand me? + +I do. + +Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the +world--plenty of them, are there not? + +Yes. + +But there are only two ideas or forms of them--one the idea of a bed, +the other of a table. + +True. + +And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our +use, in accordance with the idea--that is our way of speaking in this +and similar instances--but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how +could he? + +Impossible. + +And there is another artist,--I should like to know what you would say +of him. + +Who is he? + +One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen. + +What an extraordinary man! + +Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For +this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but +plants and animals, himself and all other things--the earth and heaven, +and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods +also. + +He must be a wizard and no mistake. + +Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such +maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all +these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which +you could make them all yourself? + +What way? + +An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat +might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of +turning a mirror round and round--you would soon enough make the sun and +the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, +and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the +mirror. + +Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only. + +Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too +is, as I conceive, just such another--a creator of appearances, is he +not? + +Of course. + +But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet +there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed? + +Yes, he said, but not a real bed. + +And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, +not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, +but only a particular bed? + +Yes, I did. + +Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true +existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to +say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has +real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth. + +At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking +the truth. + +No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth. + +No wonder. + +Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire +who this imitator is? + +If you please. + +Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by +God, as I think that we may say--for no one else can be the maker? + +No. + +There is another which is the work of the carpenter? + +Yes. + +And the work of the painter is a third? + +Yes. + +Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who +superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter? + +Yes, there are three of them. + +God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and +one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever +will be made by God. + +Why is that? + +Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind +them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the +ideal bed and not the two others. + +Very true, he said. + +God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not +a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed +which is essentially and by nature one only. + +So we believe. + +Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed? + +Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is +the author of this and of all other things. + +And what shall we say of the carpenter--is not he also the maker of the +bed? + +Yes. + +But would you call the painter a creator and maker? + +Certainly not. + +Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed? + +I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of +that which the others make. + +Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature +an imitator? + +Certainly, he said. + +And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other +imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth? + +That appears to be so. + +Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?--I +would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which +originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists? + +The latter. + +As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this. + +What do you mean? + +I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, +obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will +appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of +all things. + +Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent. + +Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting +designed to be--an imitation of things as they are, or as they +appear--of appearance or of reality? + +Of appearance. + +Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all +things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part +an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or +any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is +a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows +them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy +that they are looking at a real carpenter. + +Certainly. + +And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all +the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing +with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man--whoever tells us +this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who +is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and +whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse +the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation. + +Most true. + +And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who +is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well +as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose +well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge +can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may +not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators +and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw +their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the +truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, +because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they +may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which +they seem to the many to speak so well? + +The question, he said, should by all means be considered. + +Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as +well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making +branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, +as if he had nothing higher in him? + +I should say not. + +The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in +realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials +of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of +encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them. + +Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and +profit. + +Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or +any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not +going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients +like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the +Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts +at second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, +politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his +poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we say +to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say +of virtue, and not in the third--not an image maker or imitator--and +if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in +private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by +your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many +other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; +but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done +them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon +who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?' +Is there any city which he might name? + +I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that +he was a legislator. + +Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully +by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive? + +There is not. + +Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human +life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other +ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him? + +There is absolutely nothing of the kind. + +But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or +teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate +with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such +as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his +wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the +order which was named after him? + +Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, +Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name +always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, +if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own +day when he was alive? + +Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, +that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind--if he +had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator--can you imagine, +I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and +loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of +others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries: 'You will never be +able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint +us to be your ministers of education'--and this ingenious device of +theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions +all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that +the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed +either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able +to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part +with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with +them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have +followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough? + +Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true. + +Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning +with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, +but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as +we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he +understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for +those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and +figures. + +Quite so. + +In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on +the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only +enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, +and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, +or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and +rhythm, he speaks very well--such is the sweet influence which melody +and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again +and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped +of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose. + +Yes, he said. + +They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only +blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them? + +Exactly. + +Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing +of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right? + +Yes. + +Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half +an explanation. + +Proceed. + +Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit? + +Yes. + +And the worker in leather and brass will make them? + +Certainly. + +But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, +hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the +horseman who knows how to use them--he knows their right form. + +Most true. + +And may we not say the same of all things? + +What? + +That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which +uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them? + +Yes. + +And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or +inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which +nature or the artist has intended them. + +True. + +Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and +he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop +themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the +flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he +will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to +his instructions? + +Of course. + +The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and +badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is +told by him? + +True. + +The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it +the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain +from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what +he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge? + +True. + +But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no +his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion +from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him +instructions about what he should draw? + +Neither. + +Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about +the goodness or badness of his imitations? + +I suppose not. + +The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about +his own creations? + +Nay, very much the reverse. + +And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing +good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which +appears to be good to the ignorant multitude? + +Just so. + +Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no +knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind +of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or +in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree? + +Very true. + +And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be +concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth? + +Certainly. + +And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed? + +What do you mean? + +I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small +when seen at a distance? + +True. + +And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, +and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to +the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort +of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the +human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and +shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us +like magic. + +True. + +And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the +rescue of the human understanding--there is the beauty of them--and the +apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery +over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight? + +Most true. + +And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational +principle in the soul? + +To be sure. + +And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are +equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an +apparent contradiction? + +True. + +But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible--the same +faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same +thing? + +Very true. + +Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is +not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure? + +True. + +And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to +measure and calculation? + +Certainly. + +And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of +the soul? + +No doubt. + +This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said +that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own +proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends +and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from +reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim. + +Exactly. + +The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has +inferior offspring. + +Very true. + +And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing +also, relating in fact to what we term poetry? + +Probably the same would be true of poetry. + +Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of +painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with +which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad. + +By all means. + +We may state the question thus:--Imitation imitates the actions of men, +whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or +bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there +anything more? + +No, there is nothing else. + +But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with +himself--or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and +opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there +not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the +question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; +and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten +thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment? + +And we were right, he said. + +Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which +must now be supplied. + +What was the omission? + +Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his +son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with +more equanimity than another? + +Yes. + +But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help +sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow? + +The latter, he said, is the truer statement. + +Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his +sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone? + +It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not. + +When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which +he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do? + +True. + +There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as +well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his +sorrow? + +True. + +But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same +object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles +in him? + +Certainly. + +One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law? + +How do you mean? + +The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that +we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether +such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, +because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the +way of that which at the moment is most required. + +What is most required? he asked. + +That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice +have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; +not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck +and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul +forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, +banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art. + +Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune. + +Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion +of reason? + +Clearly. + +And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our +troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may +call irrational, useless, and cowardly? + +Indeed, we may. + +And does not the latter--I mean the rebellious principle--furnish a +great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm +temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or +to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a +promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented +is one to which they are strangers. + +Certainly. + +Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, +nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle +in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which +is easily imitated? + +Clearly. + +And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, +for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an +inferior degree of truth--in this, I say, he is like him; and he is +also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and +therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered +State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings +and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have +authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, +as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he +indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater +and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another +small--he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the +truth. + +Exactly. + +But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our +accusation:--the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and +there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing? + +Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say. + +Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a +passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents +some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or +weeping, and smiting his breast--the best of us, you know, delight in +giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the +poet who stirs our feelings most. + +Yes, of course I know. + +But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that +we pride ourselves on the opposite quality--we would fain be quiet and +patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the +recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman. + +Very true, he said. + +Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that +which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person? + +No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable. + +Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view. + +What point of view? + +If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural +hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and +that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is +satisfied and delighted by the poets;--the better nature in each of +us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the +sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; +and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in +praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he +is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure +is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem +too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil +of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so +the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the +misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own. + +How very true! + +And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which +you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or +indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, +and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;--the case of pity +is repeated;--there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to +raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you +were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and +having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed +unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home. + +Quite true, he said. + +And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, +of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable +from every action--in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions +instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be +controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue. + +I cannot deny it. + +Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists +of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he +is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and +that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and +regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those +who say these things--they are excellent people, as far as their lights +extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest +of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our +conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only +poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond +this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, +not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever +been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. + +That is most true, he said. + +And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our +defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in +sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have +described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us +any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an +ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many +proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' +or of one 'mighty in the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages +circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after +all'; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between +them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the +sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist +in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her--we are +very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the +truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, +especially when she appears in Homer? + +Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. + +Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but +upon this condition only--that she make a defence of herself in lyrical +or some other metre? + +Certainly. + +And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of +poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: +let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States +and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this +can be proved we shall surely be the gainers--I mean, if there is a use +in poetry as well as a delight? + +Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. + +If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are +enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they +think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after +the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too +are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States +has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best +and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, +this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to +ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into +the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we +are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be +regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, +fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his +guard against her seductions and make our words his law. + +Yes, he said, I quite agree with you. + +Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater +than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one +be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or +under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? + +Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that +any one else would have been. + +And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards +which await virtue. + +What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an +inconceivable greatness. + +Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of +three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison +with eternity? + +Say rather 'nothing,' he replied. + +And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather +than of the whole? + +Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask? + +Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and +imperishable? + +He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you +really prepared to maintain this? + +Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too--there is no difficulty in +proving it. + +I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this +argument of which you make so light. + +Listen then. + +I am attending. + +There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil? + +Yes, he replied. + +Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying +element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good? + +Yes. + +And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as +ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as +mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in +everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and +disease? + +Yes, he said. + +And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and +at last wholly dissolves and dies? + +True. + +The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; +and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for +good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither +good nor evil. + +Certainly not. + +If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption +cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a +nature there is no destruction? + +That may be assumed. + +Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul? + +Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in +review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. + +But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?--and here do not let us +fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when +he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil +of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a +disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the +things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through +their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so +destroying them. Is not this true? + +Yes. + +Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which +exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the +soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her +from the body? + +Certainly not. + +And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish +from without through affection of external evil which could not be +destroyed from within by a corruption of its own? + +It is, he replied. + +Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether +staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to +the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the +badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say +that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is +disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be +destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not +engender any natural infection--this we shall absolutely deny? + +Very true. + +And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil +of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can +be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another? + +Yes, he said, there is reason in that. + +Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains +unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the +knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into +the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved +to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things +being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not +destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is +not to be affirmed by any man. + +And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men +become more unjust in consequence of death. + +But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul +boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more +evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that +injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and +that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of +destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but +in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive +death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds? + +Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not +be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I +rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, +if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive--aye, +and well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a +house of death. + +True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable +to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the +destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except +that of which it was appointed to be the destruction. + +Yes, that can hardly be. + +But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent +or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be +immortal? + +Certainly. + +That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the +souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not +diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the +immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would +thus end in immortality. + +Very true. + +But this we cannot believe--reason will not allow us--any more than we +can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and +difference and dissimilarity. + +What do you mean? he said. + +The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest +of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements? + +Certainly not. + +Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are +many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold +her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must +contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and +then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the +things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus +far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, +but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition +which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original +image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken +off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and +incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so +that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. +And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by +ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look. + +Where then? + +At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and +converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal +and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly +following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of +the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells +and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her +because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of +this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know +whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her +affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think +that we have now said enough. + +True, he replied. + +And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we +have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you +were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own +nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a +man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even +if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades. + +Very true. + +And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how +many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues +procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death. + +Certainly not, he said. + +Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument? + +What did I borrow? + +The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust +just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case +could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission +ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure +justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember? + +I should be much to blame if I had forgotten. + +Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the +estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge +to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been +shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, +let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that +palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own. + +The demand, he said, is just. + +In the first place, I said--and this is the first thing which you will +have to give back--the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known +to the gods. + +Granted. + +And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other +the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning? + +True. + +And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all +things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary +consequence of former sins? + +Certainly. + +Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in +poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will +in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods +have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like +God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of +virtue? + +Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him. + +And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed? + +Certainly. + +Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just? + +That is my conviction. + +And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and +you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run +well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the +goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, +slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without +a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize +and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the +end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report +and carries off the prize which men have to bestow. + +True. + +And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you +were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you +were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers +in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give +in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say +of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater +number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last +and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be +old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are +beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly +term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you +were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of +your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, +that these things are true? + +Certainly, he said, what you say is true. + +These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed +upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the +other good things which justice of herself provides. + +Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting. + +And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness +in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and +unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and +unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the +argument owes to them. + +Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear. + +Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which +Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, +Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, +and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up +already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by +decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he +was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he +had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body +he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a +mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they +were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the +heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who +commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound +their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the +right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend +by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their +deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that +he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world +to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen +in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at +either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; +and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the +earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean +and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a +long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where +they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced +and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about +the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things +beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, +those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things +which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth +(now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were +describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The +story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:--He +said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered +tenfold; or once in a hundred years--such being reckoned to be the +length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a +thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause +of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been +guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of their offences +they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence +and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly +repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon +as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of +murderers, there were retributions other and greater far which he +described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits +asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeus lived +a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of +some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder +brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) +The answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not hither and will never +come. And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful sights which we +ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having +completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden +Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and +there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been +great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into +the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, +whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been +sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery +aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried +them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and +threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along +the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring +to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were being taken +away to be cast into hell.' And of all the many terrors which they had +endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them +felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was +silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, +were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. + +Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, +on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the +fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could +see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right +through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the +rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to +the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of +the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt +of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the +under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of +Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this +spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and +also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl +used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large +hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another +lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight +in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their +edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one +continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home +through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the +rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following +proportions--the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next +to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth +is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. +The largest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh (or sun) is +brightest; the eighth (or moon) coloured by the reflected light of the +seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in colour like +one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third (Venus) has the +whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in +whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the +whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in +the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness +are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in +swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion +the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle +turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle +is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The +eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, +there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: +these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white +robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho +and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the +sirens--Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of +the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right +hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and +Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and +Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then +with the other. + +When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to +Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in +order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of +lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the +word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new +cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, +but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot +have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his +destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will +have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser--God +is justified.' When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots +indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which +fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as +he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the +Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and +there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all +sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. +And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, +others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and +exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were +famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and +success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their +ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite +qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite +character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of +necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and +the all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and +poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And +here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and +therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave +every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if +peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make +him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose +always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should +consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned +severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect +of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, +and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, +of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness +and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and +the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of +the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be +able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so +he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his +soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more +just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is +the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him +into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there +too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements +of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do +irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him +know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as +far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. +For this is the way of happiness. + +And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this +was what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he +chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and +not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, +and let not the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the +first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; +his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not +thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first +sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own +children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, +he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the +proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his +misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything +rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and +in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was +a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of +others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them +came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, +whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and +seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this +inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of +the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. +For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself +from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate +in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy +here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead +of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most +curious, he said, was the spectacle--sad and laughable and strange; for +the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of +a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus +choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating +to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld +also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on +the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. +The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and +this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, +remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the +arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, +like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About +the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of +an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there +followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature +of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, +the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. +There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and +his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of +former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for +a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no +cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and +had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that +he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, +and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into +animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild +who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures--the +good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of +combinations. + +All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of +their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had +severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller +of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew +them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus +ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to +this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them +irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the +throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a +scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste +destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped +by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this +they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were +not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he +drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the +middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then +in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their +birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the +water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he +could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself +lying on the pyre. + +And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and +will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass +safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. +Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and +follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is +immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. +Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while +remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to +gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both +in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have +been describing. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Republic, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE REPUBLIC *** + +***** This file should be named 1497.txt or 1497.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/1497/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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