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diff --git a/old/repub11.txt b/old/repub11.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e82295c --- /dev/null +++ b/old/repub11.txt @@ -0,0 +1,23921 @@ +*****The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Republic, by Plato***** +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + +Also see The Republic by Plato, Jowett, Wiretap[repub10x.xxx]150 +We are giving this one a new number so as not to take any credit +away from the wonderful efforts of the Internet Wiretap Etexts. + + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +THE REPUBLIC +by PLATO + + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +The Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of the +Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer approaches +to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist; the Politicus or +Statesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of the State are more +clearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the Symposium and the +Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other Dialogue of Plato has +the same largeness of view and the same perfection of style; no other shows +an equal knowledge of the world, or contains more of those thoughts which +are new as well as old, and not of one age only but of all. Nowhere in +Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater wealth of humour or imagery, or +more dramatic power. Nor in any other of his writings is the attempt made +to interweave life and speculation, or to connect politics with philosophy. +The Republic is the centre around which the other Dialogues may be grouped; +here philosophy reaches the highest point (cp, especially in Books V, VI, +VII) to which ancient thinkers ever attained. Plato among the Greeks, like +Bacon among the moderns, was the first who conceived a method of knowledge, +although neither of them always distinguished the bare outline or form from +the substance of truth; and both of them had to be content with an +abstraction of science which was not yet realized. He was the greatest +metaphysical genius whom the world has seen; and in him, more than in any +other ancient thinker, the germs of future knowledge are contained. The +sciences of logic and psychology, which have supplied so many instruments +of thought to after-ages, are based upon the analyses of Socrates and +Plato. The principles of definition, the law of contradiction, the fallacy +of arguing in a circle, the distinction between the essence and accidents +of a thing or notion, between means and ends, between causes and +conditions; also the division of the mind into the rational, concupiscent, +and irascible elements, or of pleasures and desires into necessary and +unnecessary--these and other great forms of thought are all of them to be +found in the Republic, and were probably first invented by Plato. The +greatest of all logical truths, and the one of which writers on philosophy +are most apt to lose sight, the difference between words and things, has +been most strenuously insisted on by him (cp. Rep.; Polit.; Cratyl), +although he has not always avoided the confusion of them in his own +writings (e.g. Rep.). But he does not bind up truth in logical formulae,-- +logic is still veiled in metaphysics; and the science which he imagines to +'contemplate all truth and all existence' is very unlike the doctrine of +the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered (Soph. Elenchi). + +Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still +larger design which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as +well as a political and physical philosophy. The fragment of the Critias +has given birth to a world-famous fiction, second only in importance to the +tale of Troy and the legend of Arthur; and is said as a fact to have +inspired some of the early navigators of the sixteenth century. This +mythical tale, of which the subject was a history of the wars of the +Athenians against the Island of Atlantis, is supposed to be founded upon an +unfinished poem of Solon, to which it would have stood in the same relation +as the writings of the logographers to the poems of Homer. It would have +told of a struggle for Liberty (cp. Tim.), intended to represent the +conflict of Persia and Hellas. We may judge from the noble commencement of +the Timaeus, from the fragment of the Critias itself, and from the third +book of the Laws, in what manner Plato would have treated this high +argument. We can only guess why the great design was abandoned; perhaps +because Plato became sensible of some incongruity in a fictitious history, +or because he had lost his interest in it, or because advancing years +forbade the completion of it; and we may please ourselves with the fancy +that had this imaginary narrative ever been finished, we should have found +Plato himself sympathising with the struggle for Hellenic independence (cp. +Laws), singing a hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis, perhaps making +the reflection of Herodotus where he contemplates the growth of the +Athenian empire--'How brave a thing is freedom of speech, which has made +the Athenians so far exceed every other state of Hellas in greatness!' or, +more probably, attributing the victory to the ancient good order of Athens +and to the favor of Apollo and Athene (cp. Introd. to Critias). + +Again, Plato may be regarded as the 'captain' ('arhchegoz') or leader of a +goodly band of followers; for in the Republic is to be found the original +of Cicero's De Republica, of St. Augustine's City of God, of the Utopia of +Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary States which are +framed upon the same model. The extent to which Aristotle or the +Aristotelian school were indebted to him in the Politics has been little +recognised, and the recognition is the more necessary because it is not +made by Aristotle himself. The two philosophers had more in common than +they were conscious of; and probably some elements of Plato remain still +undetected in Aristotle. In English philosophy too, many affinities may be +traced, not only in the works of the Cambridge Platonists, but in great +original writers like Berkeley or Coleridge, to Plato and his ideas. That +there is a truth higher than experience, of which the mind bears witness to +herself, is a conviction which in our own generation has been +enthusiastically asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the Greek +authors who at the Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato has +had the greatest influence. The Republic of Plato is also the first +treatise upon education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke, +Rousseau, Jean Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante +or Bunyan, he has a revelation of another life; like Bacon, he is +profoundly impressed with the unity of knowledge; in the early Church he +exercised a real influence on theology, and at the Revival of Literature on +politics. Even the fragments of his words when 'repeated at second-hand' +(Symp.) have in all ages ravished the hearts of men, who have seen +reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of idealism in +philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many of the latest conceptions +of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the unity of knowledge, the reign +of law, and the equality of the sexes, have been anticipated in a dream by +him. + +The argument of the Republic is the search after Justice, the nature of +which is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless old man--then +discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and Polemarchus-- +then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by Socrates-- +reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and having become +invisible in the individual reappears at length in the ideal State which is +constructed by Socrates. The first care of the rulers is to be education, +of which an outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model, providing only +for an improved religion and morality, and more simplicity in music and +gymnastic, a manlier strain of poetry, and greater harmony of the +individual and the State. We are thus led on to the conception of a higher +State, in which 'no man calls anything his own,' and in which there is +neither 'marrying nor giving in marriage,' and 'kings are philosophers' and +'philosophers are kings;' and there is another and higher education, +intellectual as well as moral and religious, of science as well as of art, +and not of youth only but of the whole of life. Such a State is hardly to +be realized in this world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal +succeeds the government of the soldier and the lover of honour, this again +declining into democracy, and democracy into tyranny, in an imaginary but +regular order having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When 'the +wheel has come full circle' we do not begin again with a new period of +human life; but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we +end. The subject is then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and +philosophy which had been more lightly treated in the earlier books of the +Republic is now resumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is +discovered to be an imitation thrice removed from the truth, and Homer, as +well as the dramatic poets, having been condemned as an imitator, is sent +into banishment along with them. And the idea of the State is supplemented +by the revelation of a future life. + +The division into books, like all similar divisions (Cp. Sir G.C. Lewis in +the Classical Museum.), is probably later than the age of Plato. The +natural divisions are five in number;--(1) Book I and the first half of +Book II down to the paragraph beginning, 'I had always admired the genius +of Glaucon and Adeimantus,' which is introductory; the first book +containing a refutation of the popular and sophistical notions of justice, +and concluding, like some of the earlier Dialogues, without arriving at any +definite result. To this is appended a restatement of the nature of +justice according to common opinion, and an answer is demanded to the +question--What is justice, stripped of appearances? The second division +(2) includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and +fourth books, which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first +State and the first education. The third division (3) consists of the +fifth, sixth, and seventh books, in which philosophy rather than justice is +the subject of enquiry, and the second State is constructed on principles +of communism and ruled by philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea +of good takes the place of the social and political virtues. In the eighth +and ninth books (4) the perversions of States and of the individuals who +correspond to them are reviewed in succession; and the nature of pleasure +and the principle of tyranny are further analysed in the individual man. +The tenth book (5) is the conclusion of the whole, in which the relations +of philosophy to poetry are finally determined, and the happiness of the +citizens in this life, which has now been assured, is crowned by the vision +of another. + +Or a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first (Books +I - IV) containing the description of a State framed generally in +accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the +second (Books V - X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an ideal +kingdom of philosophy, of which all other governments are the perversions. +These two points of view are really opposed, and the opposition is only +veiled by the genius of Plato. The Republic, like the Phaedrus (see +Introduction to Phaedrus), is an imperfect whole; the higher light of +philosophy breaks through the regularity of the Hellenic temple, which at +last fades away into the heavens. Whether this imperfection of structure +arises from an enlargement of the plan; or from the imperfect reconcilement +in the writer's own mind of the struggling elements of thought which are +now first brought together by him; or, perhaps, from the composition of the +work at different times--are questions, like the similar question about the +Iliad and the Odyssey, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a +distinct answer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of +publication, and an author would have the less scruple in altering or +adding to a work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no +absurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a time, +or turned from one work to another; and such interruptions would be more +likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all +attempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on +internal evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being +composed at one time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to +affect longer works, such as the Republic and the Laws, more than shorter +ones. But, on the other hand, the seeming discrepancies of the Republic +may only arise out of the discordant elements which the philosopher has +attempted to unite in a single whole, perhaps without being himself able to +recognise the inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a +judgment of after ages which few great writers have ever been able to +anticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the want of connexion in +their own writings, or the gaps in their systems which are visible enough +to those who come after them. In the beginnings of literature and +philosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and language, more +inconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of speculation are well worn +and the meaning of words precisely defined. For consistency, too, is the +growth of time; and some of the greatest creations of the human mind have +been wanting in unity. Tried by this test, several of the Platonic +Dialogues, according to our modern ideas, appear to be defective, but the +deficiency is no proof that they were composed at different times or by +different hands. And the supposition that the Republic was written +uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is in some degree confirmed by +the numerous references from one part of the work to another. + +The second title, 'Concerning Justice,' is not the one by which the +Republic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and, +like the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore be +assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the +definition of justice, which is the professed aim, or the construction of +the State is the principal argument of the work. The answer is, that the +two blend in one, and are two faces of the same truth; for justice is the +order of the State, and the State is the visible embodiment of justice +under the conditions of human society. The one is the soul and the other +is the body, and the Greek ideal of the State, as of the individual, is a +fair mind in a fair body. In Hegelian phraseology the state is the reality +of which justice is the idea. Or, described in Christian language, the +kingdom of God is within, and yet developes into a Church or external +kingdom; 'the house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens,' is +reduced to the proportions of an earthly building. Or, to use a Platonic +image, justice and the State are the warp and the woof which run through +the whole texture. And when the constitution of the State is completed, +the conception of justice is not dismissed, but reappears under the same or +different names throughout the work, both as the inner law of the +individual soul, and finally as the principle of rewards and punishments in +another life. The virtues are based on justice, of which common honesty in +buying and selling is the shadow, and justice is based on the idea of good, +which is the harmony of the world, and is reflected both in the +institutions of states and in motions of the heavenly bodies (cp. Tim.). +The Timaeus, which takes up the political rather than the ethical side of +the Republic, and is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning the +outward world, yet contains many indications that the same law is supposed +to reign over the State, over nature, and over man. + +Too much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and +modern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether of +nature or of art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings, and +indeed in literature generally, there remains often a large element which +was not comprehended in the original design. For the plan grows under the +author's hand; new thoughts occur to him in the act of writing; he has not +worked out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks +to find some one idea under which the whole may be conceived, must +necessarily seize on the vaguest and most general. Thus Stallbaum, who is +dissatisfied with the ordinary explanations of the argument of the +Republic, imagines himself to have found the true argument 'in the +representation of human life in a State perfected by justice, and governed +according to the idea of good.' There may be some use in such general +descriptions, but they can hardly be said to express the design of the +writer. The truth is, that we may as well speak of many designs as of one; +nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the +mind is naturally led by the association of ideas, and which does not +interfere with the general purpose. What kind or degree of unity is to be +sought after in a building, in the plastic arts, in poetry, in prose, is a +problem which has to be determined relatively to the subject-matter. To +Plato himself, the enquiry 'what was the intention of the writer,' or 'what +was the principal argument of the Republic' would have been hardly +intelligible, and therefore had better be at once dismissed (cp. the +Introduction to the Phaedrus). + +Is not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to +Plato's own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the State? +Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah, or 'the day of the +Lord,' or the suffering Servant or people of God, or the 'Sun of +righteousness with healing in his wings' only convey, to us at least, their +great spiritual ideals, so through the Greek State Plato reveals to us his +own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of good--like the +sun in the visible world;--about human perfection, which is justice--about +education beginning in youth and continuing in later years--about poets and +sophists and tyrants who are the false teachers and evil rulers of mankind +--about 'the world' which is the embodiment of them--about a kingdom which +exists nowhere upon earth but is laid up in heaven to be the pattern and +rule of human life. No such inspired creation is at unity with itself, any +more than the clouds of heaven when the sun pierces through them. Every +shade of light and dark, of truth, and of fiction which is the veil of +truth, is allowable in a work of philosophical imagination. It is not all +on the same plane; it easily passes from ideas to myths and fancies, from +facts to figures of speech. It is not prose but poetry, at least a great +part of it, and ought not to be judged by the rules of logic or the +probabilities of history. The writer is not fashioning his ideas into an +artistic whole; they take possession of him and are too much for him. We +have no need therefore to discuss whether a State such as Plato has +conceived is practicable or not, or whether the outward form or the inward +life came first into the mind of the writer. For the practicability of his +ideas has nothing to do with their truth; and the highest thoughts to which +he attains may be truly said to bear the greatest 'marks of design'-- +justice more than the external frame-work of the State, the idea of good +more than justice. The great science of dialectic or the organisation of +ideas has no real content; but is only a type of the method or spirit in +which the higher knowledge is to be pursued by the spectator of all time +and all existence. It is in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books that Plato +reaches the 'summit of speculation,' and these, although they fail to +satisfy the requirements of a modern thinker, may therefore be regarded as +the most important, as they are also the most original, portions of the +work. + +It is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been +raised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation +was held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will do as well as any +other); for a writer of fiction, and especially a writer who, like Plato, +is notoriously careless of chronology (cp. Rep., Symp., etc.), only aims at +general probability. Whether all the persons mentioned in the Republic +could ever have met at any one time is not a difficulty which would have +occurred to an Athenian reading the work forty years later, or to Plato +himself at the time of writing (any more than to Shakespeare respecting one +of his own dramas); and need not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a +question having no answer 'which is still worth asking,' because the +investigation shows that we cannot argue historically from the dates in +Plato; it would be useless therefore to waste time in inventing far-fetched +reconcilements of them in order to avoid chronological difficulties, such, +for example, as the conjecture of C.F. Hermann, that Glaucon and Adeimantus +are not the brothers but the uncles of Plato (cp. Apol.), or the fancy of +Stallbaum that Plato intentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates +at which some of his Dialogues were written. + +The principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polemarchus, +Thrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in the +introduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument, and +Thrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The +main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Among +the company are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, the sons of Cephalus +and brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides--these are mute +auditors; also there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts, where, as in the +Dialogue which bears his name, he appears as the friend and ally of +Thrasymachus. + +Cephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged in +offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost done +with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He feels +that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger around +the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to visit +him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the consciousness +of a well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the tyranny of youthful +lusts. His love of conversation, his affection, his indifference to +riches, even his garrulity, are interesting traits of character. He is not +one of those who have nothing to say, because their whole mind has been +absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges that riches have the +advantage of placing men above the temptation to dishonesty or falsehood. +The respectful attention shown to him by Socrates, whose love of +conversation, no less than the mission imposed upon him by the Oracle, +leads him to ask questions of all men, young and old alike, should also be +noted. Who better suited to raise the question of justice than Cephalus, +whose life might seem to be the expression of it? The moderation with +which old age is pictured by Cephalus as a very tolerable portion of +existence is characteristic, not only of him, but of Greek feeling +generally, and contrasts with the exaggeration of Cicero in the De +Senectute. The evening of life is described by Plato in the most +expressive manner, yet with the fewest possible touches. As Cicero remarks +(Ep. ad Attic.), the aged Cephalus would have been out of place in the +discussion which follows, and which he could neither have understood nor +taken part in without a violation of dramatic propriety (cp. Lysimachus in +the Laches). + +His 'son and heir' Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuousness of +youth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and will +not 'let him off' on the subject of women and children. Like Cephalus, he +is limited in his point of view, and represents the proverbial stage of +morality which has rules of life rather than principles; and he quotes +Simonides (cp. Aristoph. Clouds) as his father had quoted Pindar. But +after this he has no more to say; the answers which he makes are only +elicited from him by the dialectic of Socrates. He has not yet experienced +the influence of the Sophists like Glaucon and Adeimantus, nor is he +sensible of the necessity of refuting them; he belongs to the pre-Socratic +or pre-dialectical age. He is incapable of arguing, and is bewildered by +Socrates to such a degree that he does not know what he is saying. He is +made to admit that justice is a thief, and that the virtues follow the +analogy of the arts. From his brother Lysias (contra Eratosth.) we learn +that he fell a victim to the Thirty Tyrants, but no allusion is here made +to his fate, nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and his family were of +Syracusan origin, and had migrated from Thurii to Athens. + +The 'Chalcedonian giant,' Thrasymachus, of whom we have already heard in +the Phaedrus, is the personification of the Sophists, according to Plato's +conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He is vain and +blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of making an +oration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates; but a mere +child in argument, and unable to foresee that the next 'move' (to use a +Platonic expression) will 'shut him up.' He has reached the stage of +framing general notions, and in this respect is in advance of Cephalus and +Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them in a discussion, and +vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and insolence. Whether +such doctrines as are attributed to him by Plato were really held either by +him or by any other Sophist is uncertain; in the infancy of philosophy +serious errors about morality might easily grow up--they are certainly put +into the mouths of speakers in Thucydides; but we are concerned at present +with Plato's description of him, and not with the historical reality. The +inequality of the contest adds greatly to the humour of the scene. The +pompous and empty Sophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great +master of dialectic, who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and +weakness in him. He is greatly irritated by the irony of Socrates, but his +noisy and imbecile rage only lays him more and more open to the thrusts of +his assailant. His determination to cram down their throats, or put +'bodily into their souls' his own words, elicits a cry of horror from +Socrates. The state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the +process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete +submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to +continue the discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent good-will, +and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two +occasional remarks. When attacked by Glaucon he is humorously protected by +Socrates 'as one who has never been his enemy and is now his friend.' From +Cicero and Quintilian and from Aristotle's Rhetoric we learn that the +Sophist whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note whose writings +were preserved in later ages. The play on his name which was made by his +contemporary Herodicus (Aris. Rhet.), 'thou wast ever bold in battle,' +seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of verisimilitude. + +When Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents, Glaucon +and Adeimantus, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy (cp. +Introd. to Phaedo), three actors are introduced. At first sight the two +sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two friends +Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo. But on a nearer examination of them the +similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be distinct characters. Glaucon +is the impetuous youth who can 'just never have enough of fechting' (cp. +the character of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6); the man of pleasure who is +acquainted with the mysteries of love; the 'juvenis qui gaudet canibus,' +and who improves the breed of animals; the lover of art and music who has +all the experiences of youthful life. He is full of quickness and +penetration, piercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to +the real difficulty; he turns out to the light the seamy side of human +life, and yet does not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who +seizes what may be termed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the +world, to whom a state of simplicity is 'a city of pigs,' who is always +prepared with a jest when the argument offers him an opportunity, and who +is ever ready to second the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the +ridiculous, whether in the connoisseurs of music, or in the lovers of +theatricals, or in the fantastic behaviour of the citizens of democracy. +His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates, who, however, will +not allow him to be attacked by his brother Adeimantus. He is a soldier, +and, like Adeimantus, has been distinguished at the battle of Megara (anno +456?)...The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver, and the +profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more +demonstrative, and generally opens the game. Adeimantus pursues the +argument further. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of +youth; Adeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world. +In the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall +be considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks that +they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their +consequences; and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the beginning +of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens happy, and is +answered that happiness is not the first but the second thing, not the +direct aim but the indirect consequence of the good government of a State. +In the discussion about religion and mythology, Adeimantus is the +respondent, but Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest, and carries on the +conversation in a lighter tone about music and gymnastic to the end of the +book. It is Adeimantus again who volunteers the criticism of common sense +on the Socratic method of argument, and who refuses to let Socrates pass +lightly over the question of women and children. It is Adeimantus who is +the respondent in the more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and +more imaginative portions of the Dialogue. For example, throughout the +greater part of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy +and the conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. +Glaucon resumes his place of principal respondent; but he has a difficulty +in apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some false hits +in the course of the discussion. Once more Adeimantus returns with the +allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious State; +in the next book he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end. + +Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages +of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who +is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by +proverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, +and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, who know the +sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them, and desire to go +deeper into the nature of things. These too, like Cephalus, Polemarchus, +Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one another. Neither in the +Republic, nor in any other Dialogue of Plato, is a single character +repeated. + +The delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In +the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in +the Memorabilia of Xenophon, in the earliest Dialogues of Plato, and in the +Apology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy of the +Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue +seriously. But in the sixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates; +he acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the +corrupters of the world. He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, +passing beyond the range either of the political or the speculative ideas +of the real Socrates. In one passage Plato himself seems to intimate that +the time had now come for Socrates, who had passed his whole life in +philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be always repeating the +notions of other men. There is no evidence that either the idea of good or +the conception of a perfect state were comprehended in the Socratic +teaching, though he certainly dwelt on the nature of the universal and of +final causes (cp. Xen. Mem.; Phaedo); and a deep thinker like him, in his +thirty or forty years of public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch +on the nature of family relations, for which there is also some positive +evidence in the Memorabilia (Mem.) The Socratic method is nominally +retained; and every inference is either put into the mouth of the +respondent or represented as the common discovery of him and Socrates. But +any one can see that this is a mere form, of which the affectation grows +wearisome as the work advances. The method of enquiry has passed into a +method of teaching in which by the help of interlocutors the same thesis is +looked at from various points of view. The nature of the process is truly +characterized by Glaucon, when he describes himself as a companion who is +not good for much in an investigation, but can see what he is shown, and +may, perhaps, give the answer to a question more fluently than another. + +Neither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the +immortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the +Republic (cp. Apol.); nor is there any reason to suppose that he used myths +or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction, or that he +would have banished poetry or have denounced the Greek mythology. His +favorite oath is retained, and a slight mention is made of the daemonium, +or internal sign, which is alluded to by Socrates as a phenomenon peculiar +to himself. A real element of Socratic teaching, which is more prominent +in the Republic than in any of the other Dialogues of Plato, is the use of +example and illustration (Greek): 'Let us apply the test of common +instances.' 'You,' says Adeimantus, ironically, in the sixth book, 'are so +unaccustomed to speak in images.' And this use of examples or images, +though truly Socratic in origin, is enlarged by the genius of Plato into +the form of an allegory or parable, which embodies in the concrete what has +been already described, or is about to be described, in the abstract. Thus +the figure of the cave in Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of +knowledge in Book VI. The composite animal in Book IX is an allegory of +the parts of the soul. The noble captain and the ship and the true pilot +in Book VI are a figure of the relation of the people to the philosophers +in the State which has been described. Other figures, such as the dog, or +the marriage of the portionless maiden, or the drones and wasps in the +eighth and ninth books, also form links of connexion in long passages, or +are used to recall previous discussions. + +Plato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him as +'not of this world.' And with this representation of him the ideal state +and the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance, though +they cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To him, as to +other great teachers both philosophical and religious, when they looked +upward, the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and evil. The +common sense of mankind has revolted against this view, or has only +partially admitted it. And even in Socrates himself the sterner judgement +of the multitude at times passes into a sort of ironical pity or love. Men +in general are incapable of philosophy, and are therefore at enmity with +the philosopher; but their misunderstanding of him is unavoidable: for +they have never seen him as he truly is in his own image; they are only +acquainted with artificial systems possessing no native force of truth-- +words which admit of many applications. Their leaders have nothing to +measure with, and are therefore ignorant of their own stature. But they +are to be pitied or laughed at, not to be quarrelled with; they mean well +with their nostrums, if they could only learn that they are cutting off a +Hydra's head. This moderation towards those who are in error is one of the +most characteristic features of Socrates in the Republic. In all the +different representations of Socrates, whether of Xenophon or Plato, and +amid the differences of the earlier or later Dialogues, he always retains +the character of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after truth, +without which he would have ceased to be Socrates. + +Leaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic, and +then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic ideal of +the State, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato may be +read. + +BOOK I. The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene--a festival in honour +of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus; to this is added the +promise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole work is +supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a small +party, consisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and another; this we +learn from the first words of the Timaeus. + +When the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained, the +attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience; nor is the +reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative. Of +the numerous company, three only take any serious part in the discussion; +nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to the torch-race, or +talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. The manner in which the +conversation has arisen is described as follows:--Socrates and his +companion Glaucon are about to leave the festival when they are detained by +a message from Polemarchus, who speedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus, +the brother of Glaucon, and with playful violence compels them to remain, +promising them not only the torch-race, but the pleasure of conversation +with the young, which to Socrates is a far greater attraction. They return +to the house of Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, now in extreme old age, who +is found sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. 'You +should come to me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at +my time of life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for +conversation.' Socrates asks him what he thinks of age, to which the old +man replies, that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be attributed +to the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which the tyranny +of the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies Socrates, but the world +will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old age because you are rich. +'And there is something in what they say, Socrates, but not so much as they +imagine--as Themistocles replied to the Seriphian, "Neither you, if you had +been an Athenian, nor I, if I had been a Seriphian, would ever have been +famous," I might in like manner reply to you, Neither a good poor man can +be happy in age, nor yet a bad rich man.' Socrates remarks that Cephalus +appears not to care about riches, a quality which he ascribes to his having +inherited, not acquired them, and would like to know what he considers to +be the chief advantage of them. Cephalus answers that when you are old the +belief in the world below grows upon you, and then to have done justice and +never to have been compelled to do injustice through poverty, and never to +have deceived anyone, are felt to be unspeakable blessings. Socrates, who +is evidently preparing for an argument, next asks, What is the meaning of +the word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts? No more than +this? Or must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into +the hands of my friend, who has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed of him +when he was in his right mind? 'There must be exceptions.' 'And yet,' +says Polemarchus, 'the definition which has been given has the authority of +Simonides.' Here Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices, and +bequeaths, as Socrates facetiously remarks, the possession of the argument +to his heir, Polemarchus... + +The description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has +touched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of +justice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues +respecting external goods, and preparing for the concluding mythus of the +world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the just +man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse which +follows, and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the nature +of justice, there is no difficulty in discerning 'who is a just man.' The +first explanation has been supported by a saying of Simonides; and now +Socrates has a mind to show that the resolution of justice into two +unconnected precepts, which have no common principle, fails to satisfy the +demands of dialectic. + +...He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he +mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? 'No, not in that case, not +if the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you were +to do what was proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.' Every act +does something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks, What +is this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? He is +answered that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in +what way good or harm? 'In making alliances with the one, and going to war +with the other.' Then in time of peace what is the good of justice? The +answer is that justice is of use in contracts, and contracts are money +partnerships. Yes; but how in such partnerships is the just man of more +use than any other man? 'When you want to have money safely kept and not +used.' Then justice will be useful when money is useless. And there is +another difficulty: justice, like the art of war or any other art, must be +of opposites, good at attack as well as at defence, at stealing as well as +at guarding. But then justice is a thief, though a hero notwithstanding, +like Autolycus, the Homeric hero, who was 'excellent above all men in theft +and perjury'--to such a pass have you and Homer and Simonides brought us; +though I do not forget that the thieving must be for the good of friends +and the harm of enemies. And still there arises another question: Are +friends to be interpreted as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming? +And are our friends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? +The answer is, that we must do good to our seeming and real good friends, +and evil to our seeming and real evil enemies--good to the good, evil to +the evil. But ought we to render evil for evil at all, when to do so will +only make men more evil? Can justice produce injustice any more than the +art of horsemanship can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final +conclusion is, that no sage or poet ever said that the just return evil for +evil; this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man, Periander, Perdiccas, +or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C. 398-381)... + +Thus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to be +inadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is set +aside, and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to +the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words are +applied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when the questioning +spirit is stirred within him:--'If because I do evil, Thou punishest me by +evil, what is the difference between Thee and me?' In this both Plato and +Kheyam rise above the level of many Christian (?) theologians. The first +definition of justice easily passes into the second; for the simple words +'to speak the truth and pay your debts' is substituted the more abstract +'to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies.' Either of these +explanations gives a sufficient rule of life for plain men, but they both +fall short of the precision of philosophy. We may note in passing the +antiquity of casuistry, which not only arises out of the conflict of +established principles in particular cases, but also out of the effort to +attain them, and is prior as well as posterior to our fundamental notions +of morality. The 'interrogation' of moral ideas; the appeal to the +authority of Homer; the conclusion that the maxim, 'Do good to your friends +and harm to your enemies,' being erroneous, could not have been the word of +any great man, are all of them very characteristic of the Platonic +Socrates. + +...Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but has +hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause and +rushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a roar. +'Socrates,' he says, 'what folly is this?--Why do you agree to be +vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?' He then prohibits all +the ordinary definitions of justice; to which Socrates replies that he +cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2 x 6, or 3 x 4, +or 6 x 2, or 4 x 3. At first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue; but at +length, with a promise of payment on the part of the company and of praise +from Socrates, he is induced to open the game. 'Listen,' he says, 'my +answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger: now +praise me.' Let me understand you first. Do you mean that because +Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the eating of +beef for his interest, the eating of beef is also for our interest, who are +not so strong? Thrasymachus is indignant at the illustration, and in +pompous words, apparently intended to restore dignity to the argument, he +explains his meaning to be that the rulers make laws for their own +interests. But suppose, says Socrates, that the ruler or stronger makes a +mistake--then the interest of the stronger is not his interest. +Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy downfall by his disciple Cleitophon, +who introduces the word 'thinks;'--not the actual interest of the ruler, +but what he thinks or what seems to be his interest, is justice. The +contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning evasion: for though his real and +apparent interests may differ, what the ruler thinks to be his interest +will always remain what he thinks to be his interest. + +Of course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new +interpretation accepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not +disposed to quarrel about words, if, as he significantly insinuates, his +adversary has changed his mind. In what follows Thrasymachus does in fact +withdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake, for he affirms +that the ruler as a ruler is infallible. Socrates is quite ready to accept +the new position, which he equally turns against Thrasymachus by the help +of the analogy of the arts. Every art or science has an interest, but this +interest is to be distinguished from the accidental interest of the artist, +and is only concerned with the good of the things or persons which come +under the art. And justice has an interest which is the interest not of +the ruler or judge, but of those who come under his sway. + +Thrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he makes a +bold diversion. 'Tell me, Socrates,' he says, 'have you a nurse?' What a +question! Why do you ask? 'Because, if you have, she neglects you and +lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to know the +shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never +think of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects, whereas +the truth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and subjects alike. +And experience proves that in every relation of life the just man is the +loser and the unjust the gainer, especially where injustice is on the grand +scale, which is quite another thing from the petty rogueries of swindlers +and burglars and robbers of temples. The language of men proves this--our +'gracious' and 'blessed' tyrant and the like--all which tends to show (1) +that justice is the interest of the stronger; and (2) that injustice is +more profitable and also stronger than justice.' + +Thrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having +deluged the company with words, has a mind to escape. But the others will +not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that he will +not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. 'And what can I do more +for you?' he says; 'would you have me put the words bodily into your +souls?' God forbid! replies Socrates; but we want you to be consistent in +the use of terms, and not to employ 'physician' in an exact sense, and then +again 'shepherd' or 'ruler' in an inexact,--if the words are strictly +taken, the ruler and the shepherd look only to the good of their people or +flocks and not to their own: whereas you insist that rulers are solely +actuated by love of office. 'No doubt about it,' replies Thrasymachus. +Then why are they paid? Is not the reason, that their interest is not +comprehended in their art, and is therefore the concern of another art, the +art of pay, which is common to the arts in general, and therefore not +identical with any one of them? Nor would any man be a ruler unless he +were induced by the hope of reward or the fear of punishment;--the reward +is money or honour, the punishment is the necessity of being ruled by a man +worse than himself. And if a State (or Church) were composed entirely of +good men, they would be affected by the last motive only; and there would +be as much 'nolo episcopari' as there is at present of the opposite... + +The satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and +apparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. There +is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not +like being in office, and that therefore they demand pay. + +...Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far more +important--that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as you +and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must reply to him; but if we +try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to decide for +us; we had better therefore proceed by making mutual admissions of the +truth to one another. + +Thrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than +perfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates to +admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue and justice vice. +Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of one whose only +wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the same time he is +weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed. The admission is +elicited from him that the just man seeks to gain an advantage over the +unjust only, but not over the just, while the unjust would gain an +advantage over either. Socrates, in order to test this statement, employs +once more the favourite analogy of the arts. The musician, doctor, skilled +artist of any sort, does not seek to gain more than the skilled, but only +more than the unskilled (that is to say, he works up to a rule, standard, +law, and does not exceed it), whereas the unskilled makes random efforts at +excess. Thus the skilled falls on the side of the good, and the unskilled +on the side of the evil, and the just is the skilled, and the unjust is the +unskilled. + +There was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the day +was hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first time in +his life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was +stronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds +to the consideration of this, which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus, +he hopes to clear up; the latter is at first churlish, but in the judicious +hands of Socrates is soon restored to good-humour: Is there not honour +among thieves? Is not the strength of injustice only a remnant of justice? +Is not absolute injustice absolute weakness also? A house that is divided +against itself cannot stand; two men who quarrel detract from one another's +strength, and he who is at war with himself is the enemy of himself and the +gods. Not wickedness therefore, but semi-wickedness flourishes in states, +--a remnant of good is needed in order to make union in action possible,-- +there is no kingdom of evil in this world. + +Another question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust the +happier? To this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence or +virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul +happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is +attained? Justice and happiness being thus shown to be inseparable, the +question whether the just or the unjust is the happier has disappeared. + +Thrasymachus replies: 'Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the +festival of Bendis.' Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your +kindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet not +a good entertainment--but that was my own fault, for I tasted of too many +things. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our enquiry, +and then whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and then +the comparative advantages of just and unjust: and the sum of all is that +I know not what justice is; how then shall I know whether the just is happy +or not?... + +Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing to +the analogy of the arts. 'Justice is like the arts (1) in having no +external interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is to +happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work.' At this the +modern reader is apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is writing +in an age when the arts and the virtues, like the moral and intellectual +faculties, were still undistinguished. Among early enquirers into the +nature of human action the arts helped to fill up the void of speculation; +and at first the comparison of the arts and the virtues was not perceived +by them to be fallacious. They only saw the points of agreement in them +and not the points of difference. Virtue, like art, must take means to an +end; good manners are both an art and a virtue; character is naturally +described under the image of a statue; and there are many other figures of +speech which are readily transferred from art to morals. The next +generation cleared up these perplexities; or at least supplied after ages +with a further analysis of them. The contemporaries of Plato were in a +state of transition, and had not yet fully realized the common-sense +distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue is concerned with action, art with +production' (Nic. Eth.), or that 'virtue implies intention and constancy of +purpose,' whereas 'art requires knowledge only'. And yet in the +absurdities which follow from some uses of the analogy, there seems to be +an intimation conveyed that virtue is more than art. This is implied in +the reductio ad absurdum that 'justice is a thief,' and in the +dissatisfaction which Socrates expresses at the final result. + +The expression 'an art of pay' which is described as 'common to all the +arts' is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Nor is it +employed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It is +suggested by the argument, and seems to extend the conception of art to +doing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be +noted in the words 'men who are injured are made more unjust.' For those +who are injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed or ill- +treated. + +The second of the three arguments, 'that the just does not aim at excess,' +has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form. That the +good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic sentiment, +which may be compared with the language of those modern writers who speak +of virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to law. The mathematical +or logical notion of limit easily passes into an ethical one, and even +finds a mythological expression in the conception of envy (Greek). Ideas +of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion, still linger in the +writings of moralists; and the true spirit of the fine arts is better +conveyed by such terms than by superlatives. + +'When workmen strive to do better than well, +They do confound their skill in covetousness.' (King John.) + +The harmony of the soul and body, and of the parts of the soul with one +another, a harmony 'fairer than that of musical notes,' is the true +Hellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature. + +In what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus, +Plato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord and +dissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated in +modern times by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature of +evil. In the last argument we trace the germ of the Aristotelian doctrine +of an end and a virtue directed towards the end, which again is suggested +by the arts. The final reconcilement of justice and happiness and the +identity of the individual and the State are also intimated. Socrates +reassumes the character of a 'know-nothing;' at the same time he appears to +be not wholly satisfied with the manner in which the argument has been +conducted. Nothing is concluded; but the tendency of the dialectical +process, here as always, is to enlarge our conception of ideas, and to +widen their application to human life. + +BOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on +continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner in +which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the question +'Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.' He begins by dividing +goods into three classes:--first, goods desirable in themselves; secondly, +goods desirable in themselves and for their results; thirdly, goods +desirable for their results only. He then asks Socrates in which of the +three classes he would place justice. In the second class, replies +Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves and also for their results. +'Then the world in general are of another mind, for they say that justice +belongs to the troublesome class of goods which are desirable for their +results only. Socrates answers that this is the doctrine of Thrasymachus +which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus was too ready to listen +to the voice of the charmer, and proposes to consider the nature of justice +and injustice in themselves and apart from the results and rewards of them +which the world is always dinning in his ears. He will first of all speak +of the nature and origin of justice; secondly, of the manner in which men +view justice as a necessity and not a good; and thirdly, he will prove the +reasonableness of this view. + +'To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As the +evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the +sufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have +neither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the +impossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if +he were not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have two +rings, like that of Gyges in the well-known story, which make them +invisible, and then no difference will appear in them, for every one will +do evil if he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the world as a +fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of fear for +themselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts (Cp. Gorgias.) + +'And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust +man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily correcting +them; having gifts of money, speech, strength--the greatest villain bearing +the highest character: and at his side let us place the just in his +nobleness and simplicity--being, not seeming--without name or reward-- +clothed in his justice only--the best of men who is thought to be the +worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would rather +put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injustice--they will tell +you) that the just man will be scourged, racked, bound, will have his eyes +put out, and will at last be crucified (literally impaled)--and all this +because he ought to have preferred seeming to being. How different is the +case of the unjust who clings to appearance as the true reality! His high +character makes him a ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he +likes, help his friends and hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty +he can worship the gods better, and will therefore be more loved by them +than the just.' + +I was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already +unequal fray. He considered that the most important point of all had been +omitted:--'Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards; parents and +guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other advantages +are promised by them of a more solid kind, such as wealthy marriages and +high offices. There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of fat sheep and +heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with fruit, which the +gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets add a similar +picture of another. The heroes of Musaeus and Eumolpus lie on couches at a +festival, with garlands on their heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a +paradise of immortal drunkenness. Some go further, and speak of a fair +posterity in the third and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in +a slough and make them carry water in a sieve: and in this life they +attribute to them the infamy which Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of +the just who are supposed to be unjust. + +'Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and prose:-- +"Virtue," as Hesiod says, "is honourable but difficult, vice is easy and +profitable." You may often see the wicked in great prosperity and the +righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant prophets knock at +rich men's doors, promising to atone for the sins of themselves or their +fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and festive games, or with +charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine help +and at a small charge;--they appeal to books professing to be written by +Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the minds of whole cities, and promise +to "get souls out of purgatory;" and if we refuse to listen to them, no one +knows what will happen to us. + +'When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his +conclusion? "Will he," in the language of Pindar, "make justice his high +tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?" Justice, he reflects, +without the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice has the +promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of +happiness. To appearance then I will turn,--I will put on the show of +virtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying +that "wickedness is not easily concealed," to which I reply that "nothing +great is easy." Union and force and rhetoric will do much; and if men say +that they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know that there are +gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may be appeased by +sacrifices. Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For +if the righteous are only unpunished, still they have no further reward, +while the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. +But what of the world below? Nay, says the argument, there are atoning +powers who will set that matter right, as the poets, who are the sons of +the gods, tell us; and this is confirmed by the authority of the State. + +'How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good +manners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both worlds. +Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the +praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be +angry with others; for he knows also that more than human virtue is needed +to save a man, and that he only praises justice who is incapable of +injustice. + +'The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, poets, +instructors of youth, have always asserted "the temporal dispensation," the +honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in early youth the +power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen by any +human or divine eye, we should not have needed others to be our guardians, +but every one would have been the guardian of himself. This is what I want +you to show, Socrates;--other men use arguments which rather tend to +strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that "might is right;" but from you +I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude +reputation; let the just be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you +still prove to us the superiority of justice'... + +The thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon, +is the converse of that of Thrasymachus--not right is the interest of the +stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same +premises he carries the analysis of society a step further back;--might is +still right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against the +strength of the few. + +There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have a +family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e.g. that power is the +foundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to govern well or +ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that war is the +natural state of man; or that private vices are public benefits. All such +theories have a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement with +experience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil, and the +motives of actions and the origin of institutions may be explained to a +certain extent on either hypothesis according to the character or point of +view of a particular thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority +under all circumstances and sometimes by rather questionable means is felt +strongly and has become a sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine +right of kings, or more generally of governments, is one of the forms under +which this natural feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which +has not some accompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good which is free +from some alloy of evil; nor any noble or generous thought which may not be +attended by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of self- +love. We know that all human actions are imperfect; but we do not +therefore attribute them to the worse rather than to the better motive or +principle. Such a philosophy is both foolish and false, like that opinion +of the clever rogue who assumes all other men to be like himself. And +theories of this sort do not represent the real nature of the State, which +is based on a vague sense of right gradually corrected and enlarged by +custom and law (although capable also of perversion), any more than they +describe the origin of society, which is to be sought in the family and in +the social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent the +average character of individuals, which cannot be explained simply on a +theory of evil, but has always a counteracting element of good. And as men +become better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them, +because they are more conscious of their own disinterestedness. A little +experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a +truer and kindlier view of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow men. + +The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when +they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily supposed +to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to frame a +notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must always be a +paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of human life. Neither +the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact, but they may +serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An +ideal is none the worse because 'some one has made the discovery' that no +such ideal was ever realized. And in a few exceptional individuals who are +raised above the ordinary level of humanity, the ideal of happiness may be +realized in death and misery. This may be the state which the reason +deliberately approves, and which the utilitarian as well as every other +moralist may be bound in certain cases to prefer. + +Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with +the view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing his +own final conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of +ethical truth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series of +positions or situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time +undergoing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word 'happiness' +involves some degree of confusion because associated in the language of +modern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not +equally present to his mind. + +Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the +happiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is +the answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is +'the homage which vice pays to virtue.' But now Adeimantus, taking up the +hint which had been already given by Glaucon, proceeds to show that in the +opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and +reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to such arguments +as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional morality of +mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to +man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of +actions is determined by their consequences; and both of them go beyond the +position of Socrates, that justice belongs to the class of goods not +desirable for themselves only, but desirable for themselves and for their +results, to which he recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an +internal principle, and in their condemnation of the poets, they anticipate +him. The common life of Greece is not enough for them; they must penetrate +deeper into the nature of things. + +It has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and +Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more +truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates, +and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first in the +State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his +old question (Protag.), 'whether the virtues are one or many,' viz. that +one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish +the purely internal nature of justice, he is met by the fact that man is a +social being, and he tries to harmonise the two opposite theses as well as +he can. There is no more inconsistency in this than was inevitable in his +age and country; there is no use in turning upon him the cross lights of +modern philosophy, which, from some other point of view, would appear +equally inconsistent. Plato does not give the final solution of +philosophical questions for us; nor can he be judged of by our standard. + +The remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the sons +of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately +follows:--First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He +does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of +justice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox +that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the +difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to his natural +condition, before he will answer the question at all. He too will frame an +ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole +relations of man. Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he +implies that he will only look for justice in society, and that from the +State he will proceed to the individual. His answer in substance amounts +to this,--that under favourable conditions, i.e. in the perfect State, +justice and happiness will coincide, and that when justice has been once +found, happiness may be left to take care of itself. That he falls into +some degree of inconsistency, when in the tenth book he claims to have got +rid of the rewards and honours of justice, may be admitted; for he has left +those which exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher 'who retires +under the shelter of a wall' can hardly have been esteemed happy by him, at +least not in this world. Still he maintains the true attitude of moral +action. Let a man do his duty first, without asking whether he will be +happy or not, and happiness will be the inseparable accident which attends +him. 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all +these things shall be added unto you.' + +Secondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character of +Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the +individual. First ethics, then politics--this is the order of ideas to us; +the reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought +does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is +not ONE, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him; and +he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country or the +creed of his church. And to this type he is constantly tending to revert, +whenever the influence of custom, or of party spirit, or the recollection +of the past becomes too strong for him. + +Thirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual +and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early Greek +speculation, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of +influence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual +action of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are +sometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action, +whenever we either elevate politics into ethics, or lower ethics to the +standard of politics. The good man and the good citizen only coincide in +the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be attained by legislation +acting upon them from without, but, if at all, by education fashioning them +from within. + +...Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, 'inspired offspring of the +renowned hero,' as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not understand +how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their +character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. He +knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in +the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes he +shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to the +smaller, that is, he must look for justice in the State first, and will +then proceed to the individual. Accordingly he begins to construct the +State. + +Society arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second +a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of +satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on the same spot; +and this is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent, +although necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman, +secondly a builder, thirdly a weaver, to which may be added a cobbler. +Four or five citizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have +different natures, and one man will do one thing better than many; and +business waits for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour into +different employments; into wholesale and retail trade; into workers, and +makers of workmen's tools; into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which +includes all this will have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet +not be very large. But then again imports will be required, and imports +necessitate exports, and this implies variety of produce in order to +attract the taste of purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too +we must have a market and money and retail trades; otherwise buyers and +sellers will never meet, and the valuable time of the producers will be +wasted in vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants the State +will be complete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse of +the citizens with one another justice and injustice will appear. + +Here follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their days +in houses which they have built for themselves; they make their own clothes +and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal and +flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms with +each other, and take care not to have too many children. 'But,' said +Glaucon, interposing, 'are they not to have a relish?' Certainly; they +will have salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and fruits, and chestnuts +to roast at the fire. ''Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.' Why, I replied, +what do you want more? 'Only the comforts of life,--sofas and tables, also +sauces and sweets.' I see; you want not only a State, but a luxurious +State; and possibly in the more complex frame we may sooner find justice +and injustice. Then the fine arts must go to work--every conceivable +instrument and ornament of luxury will be wanted. There will be dancers, +painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks, barbers, tire-women, nurses, +artists; swineherds and neatherds too for the animals, and physicians to +cure the disorders of which luxury is the source. To feed all these +superfluous mouths we shall need a part of our neighbour's land, and they +will want a part of ours. And this is the origin of war, which may be +traced to the same causes as other political evils. Our city will now +require the slight addition of a camp, and the citizen will be converted +into a soldier. But then again our old doctrine of the division of labour +must not be forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a day, and +there must be a natural aptitude for military duties. There will be some +warlike natures who have this aptitude--dogs keen of scent, swift of foot +to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of +courage, such natures, whether of men or animals, will be full of spirit. +But these spirited natures are apt to bite and devour one another; the +union of gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies appears to be +an impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both qualities. Who +then can be a guardian? The image of the dog suggests an answer. For dogs +are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. Your dog is a philosopher +who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing; and philosophy, whether +in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must be +philosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how +are they to be learned without education? + +But what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned +sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music +includes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false. 'What +do you mean?' he said. I mean that children hear stories before they learn +gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have at most one or +two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very +impressible, and children ought not to learn what they will have to unlearn +when they grow up; we must therefore have a censorship of nursery tales, +banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper, as we +may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only tell lies +but bad lies; stories about Uranus and Saturn, which are immoral as well as +false, and which should never be spoken of to young persons, or indeed at +all; or, if at all, then in a mystery, after the sacrifice, not of an +Eleusinian pig, but of some unprocurable animal. Shall our youth be +encouraged to beat their fathers by the example of Zeus, or our citizens be +incited to quarrel by hearing or seeing representations of strife among the +gods? Shall they listen to the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, +and of Zeus sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten? Such +tales may possibly have a mystical interpretation, but the young are +incapable of understanding allegory. If any one asks what tales are to be +allowed, we will answer that we are legislators and not book-makers; we +only lay down the principles according to which books are to be written; to +write them is the duty of others. + +And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not as +the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the poets +to say that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two casks +full of destinies;--or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the +treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the +Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them. +Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was just, and men +were the better for being punished. But that the deed was evil, and God +the author, is a wicked, suicidal fiction which we will allow no one, old +or young, to utter. This is our first and great principle--God is the +author of good only. + +And the second principle is like unto it:--With God is no variableness or +change of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God, +he must be changed either by another or by himself. By another?--but the +best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least +liable to be changed by any external force. By himself?--but he cannot +change for the better; he will hardly change for the worse. He remains for +ever fairest and best in his own image. Therefore we refuse to listen to +the poets who tell us of Here begging in the likeness of a priestess or of +other deities who prowl about at night in strange disguises; all that +blasphemous nonsense with which mothers fool the manhood out of their +children must be suppressed. But some one will say that God, who is +himself unchangeable, may take a form in relation to us. Why should he? +For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul, or principle of +falsehood; and as for any other form of lying which is used for a purpose +and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional cases--what need have +the gods of this? For they are not ignorant of antiquity like the poets, +nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor is any madman a friend of theirs. +God then is true, he is absolutely true; he changes not, he deceives not, +by day or night, by word or sign. This is our second great principle--God +is true. Away with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer, and the +accusation of Thetis against Apollo in Aeschylus... + +In order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds +to trace the first principles of mutual need and of division of labour in +an imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this community +increases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports necessitate +exports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers sit in the market- +place to save the time of the producers. These are the steps by which +Plato constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the elements of +political economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second or +civilized State, the simple naturally comes before the complex. He +indulges, like Rousseau, in a picture of primitive life--an idea which has +indeed often had a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind, but he +does not seriously mean to say that one is better than the other +(Politicus); nor can any inference be drawn from the description of the +first state taken apart from the second, such as Aristotle appears to draw +in the Politics. We should not interpret a Platonic dialogue any more than +a poem or a parable in too literal or matter-of-fact a style. On the other +hand, when we compare the lively fancy of Plato with the dried-up +abstractions of modern treatises on philosophy, we are compelled to say +with Protagoras, that the 'mythus is more interesting' (Protag.) + +Several interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in a +treatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings of +Plato: especially Laws, Population; Free Trade; Adulteration; Wills and +Bequests; Begging; Eryxias, (though not Plato's), Value and Demand; +Republic, Division of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of +Retail Trade, is treated with admirable lucidity in the second book of the +Republic. But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a system, and +never seems to have recognized that Trade is one of the great motive powers +of the State and of the world. He would make retail traders only of the +inferior sort of citizens (Rep., Laws), though he remarks, quaintly enough +(Laws), that 'if only the best men and the best women everywhere were +compelled to keep taverns for a time or to carry on retail trade, etc., +then we should knew how pleasant and agreeable all these things are.' + +The disappointment of Glaucon at the 'city of pigs,' the ludicrous +description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the +afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the nature of +the guardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of offering some almost +unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be celebrated, the +behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother, are +touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In speaking of +education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child must be +trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. Yet this is not very +different from saying that children must be taught through the medium of +imagination as well as reason; that their minds can only develope +gradually, and that there is much which they must learn without +understanding. This is also the substance of Plato's view, though he must +be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from modern +ethical writers, respecting truth and falsehood. To us, economies or +accommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by the +human faculties or necessary for the communication of knowledge to the +simple and ignorant. We should insist that the word was inseparable from +the intention, and that we must not be 'falsely true,' i.e. speak or act +falsely in support of what was right or true. But Plato would limit the +use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a good moral +effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by +the rulers alone and for great objects. + +A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether +his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be conscious +that the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond Homer and +Hesiod. Whether their narratives were true or false did not seriously +affect the political or social life of Hellas. Men only began to suspect +that they were fictions when they recognised them to be immoral. And so in +all religions: the consideration of their morality comes first, afterwards +the truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the events +natural or supernatural which are told of them. But in modern times, and +in Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic, we have been too +much inclined to identify the historical with the moral; and some have +refused to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman accuracy was +discernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient or +religious history are amongst the most important of all facts; but they are +frequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be +gathered from them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections +tend to show that the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not +unimportant, is not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should +agree with him in placing the moral before the historical truth of +religion; and, generally, in disregarding those errors or misstatements of +fact which necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know +also that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day; +and are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism would +condemn. + +We note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology, said +to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ +by Theagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of Plato, and +here, as in the Phaedrus, though for a different reason, was rejected by +him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law, when men have reached +another stage of civilization, should be got rid of by fictions is in +accordance with universal experience. Great is the art of interpretation; +and by a natural process, which when once discovered was always going on, +what could not be altered was explained away. And so without any palpable +inconsistency there existed side by side two forms of religion, the +tradition inherited or invented by the poets and the customary worship of +the temple; on the other hand, there was the religion of the philosopher, +who was dwelling in the heaven of ideas, but did not therefore refuse to +offer a cock to Aesculapius, or to be seen saying his prayers at the rising +of the sun. At length the antagonism between the popular and philosophical +religion, never so great among the Greeks as in our own age, disappeared, +and was only felt like the difference between the religion of the educated +and uneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed +into the 'royal mind' of Plato (Philebus); the giant Heracles became the +knight-errant and benefactor of mankind. These and still more wonderful +transformations were readily effected by the ingenuity of Stoics and neo- +Platonists in the two or three centuries before and after Christ. The +Greek and Roman religions were gradually permeated by the spirit of +philosophy; having lost their ancient meaning, they were resolved into +poetry and morality; and probably were never purer than at the time of +their decay, when their influence over the world was waning. + +A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie +in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that +involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul is a +true lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the deception of the highest +part of the soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering +himself. For example, to represent God as false or immoral, or, according +to Plato, as deluding men with appearances or as the author of evil; or +again, to affirm with Protagoras that 'knowledge is sensation,' or that +'being is becoming,' or with Thrasymachus 'that might is right,' would have +been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest +unconsciousness of the greatest untruth, e.g. if, in the language of the +Gospels (John), 'he who was blind' were to say 'I see,' is another aspect +of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be +further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke), allowing for +the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is +opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur in a +play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of +accommodation,--which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in +certain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had +himself raised about the propriety of deceiving a madman; and he is also +contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but mankind can +only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or false. Reserving for +another place the greater questions of religion or education, we may note +further, (1) the approval of the old traditional education of Greece; (2) +the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on Homer and the +poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making for the use of economies +in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner +in which here as below he alludes to the 'Chronique Scandaleuse' of the +gods. + +BOOK III. There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to +banish fear; for no man can be courageous who is afraid of death, or who +believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the world +below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell; they may be +reminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging. Nor must +they be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages, such as the depressing +words of Achilles--'I would rather be a serving-man than rule over all the +dead;' and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions, the senseless +shadows, the flitting soul mourning over lost strength and youth, the soul +with a gibber going beneath the earth like smoke, or the souls of the +suitors which flutter about like bats. The terrors and horrors of Cocytus +and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the rest of their Tartarean +nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have their use; but they are not +the proper food for soldiers. As little can we admit the sorrows and +sympathies of the Homeric heroes:--Achilles, the son of Thetis, in tears, +throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up and down the sea-shore in +distraction; or Priam, the cousin of the gods, crying aloud, rolling in the +mire. A good man is not prostrated at the loss of children or fortune. +Neither is death terrible to him; and therefore lamentations over the dead +should not be practised by men of note; they should be the concern of +inferior persons only, whether women or men. Still worse is the +attribution of such weakness to the gods; as when the goddesses say, 'Alas! +my travail!' and worst of all, when the king of heaven himself laments his +inability to save Hector, or sorrows over the impending doom of his dear +Sarpedon. Such a character of God, if not ridiculed by our young men, is +likely to be imitated by them. Nor should our citizens be given to excess +of laughter--'Such violent delights' are followed by a violent re-action. +The description in the Iliad of the gods shaking their sides at the +clumsiness of Hephaestus will not be admitted by us. 'Certainly not.' + +Truth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as we were +saying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a medicine. But +this employment of falsehood must remain a privilege of state; the common +man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler; any more than the patient +would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain. + +In the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists in +self-control and obedience to authority. That is a lesson which Homer +teaches in some places: 'The Achaeans marched on breathing prowess, in +silent awe of their leaders;'--but a very different one in other places: +'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, but the heart of a stag.' +Language of the latter kind will not impress self-control on the minds of +youth. The same may be said about his praises of eating and drinking and +his dread of starvation; also about the verses in which he tells of the +rapturous loves of Zeus and Here, or of how Hephaestus once detained Ares +and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a nobler strain +heard in the words:--'Endure, my soul, thou hast endured worse.' Nor must +we allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say, 'Gifts persuade the +gods, gifts reverend kings;' or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix to +Achilles that he should get money out of the Greeks before he assisted +them; or the meanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from Agamemnon; +or his requiring a ransom for the body of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo; +or his insolence to the river-god Scamander; or his dedication to the dead +Patroclus of his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other +river-god Spercheius; or his cruelty in dragging the body of Hector round +the walls, and slaying the captives at the pyre: such a combination of +meanness and cruelty in Cheiron's pupil is inconceivable. The amatory +exploits of Peirithous and Theseus are equally unworthy. Either these so- +called sons of gods were not the sons of gods, or they were not such as the +poets imagine them, any more than the gods themselves are the authors of +evil. The youth who believes that such things are done by those who have +the blood of heaven flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate +their example. + +Enough of gods and heroes;--what shall we say about men? What the poets +and story-tellers say--that the wicked prosper and the righteous are +afflicted, or that justice is another's gain? Such misrepresentations +cannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition of +justice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry. + +The subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated; next follows style. +Now all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to come; and +narrative is of three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and a composition +of the two. An instance will make my meaning clear. The first scene in +Homer is of the last or mixed kind, being partly description and partly +dialogue. But if you throw the dialogue into the 'oratio obliqua,' the +passage will run thus: The priest came and prayed Apollo that the Achaeans +might take Troy and have a safe return if Agamemnon would only give him +back his daughter; and the other Greeks assented, but Agamemnon was wroth, +and so on--The whole then becomes descriptive, and the poet is the only +speaker left; or, if you omit the narrative, the whole becomes dialogue. +These are the three styles--which of them is to be admitted into our State? +'Do you ask whether tragedy and comedy are to be admitted?' Yes, but also +something more--Is it not doubtful whether our guardians are to be +imitators at all? Or rather, has not the question been already answered, +for we have decided that one man cannot in his life play many parts, any +more than he can act both tragedy and comedy, or be rhapsodist and actor at +once? Human nature is coined into very small pieces, and as our guardians +have their own business already, which is the care of freedom, they will +have enough to do without imitating. If they imitate they should imitate, +not any meanness or baseness, but the good only; for the mask which the +actor wears is apt to become his face. We cannot allow men to play the +parts of women, quarrelling, weeping, scolding, or boasting against the +gods,--least of all when making love or in labour. They must not represent +slaves, or bullies, or cowards, drunkards, or madmen, or blacksmiths, or +neighing horses, or bellowing bulls, or sounding rivers, or a raging sea. +A good or wise man will be willing to perform good and wise actions, but he +will be ashamed to play an inferior part which he has never practised; and +he will prefer to employ the descriptive style with as little imitation as +possible. The man who has no self-respect, on the contrary, will imitate +anybody and anything; sounds of nature and cries of animals alike; his +whole performance will be imitation of gesture and voice. Now in the +descriptive style there are few changes, but in the dramatic there are a +great many. Poets and musicians use either, or a compound of both, and +this compound is very attractive to youth and their teachers as well as to +the vulgar. But our State in which one man plays one part only is not +adapted for complexity. And when one of these polyphonous pantomimic +gentlemen offers to exhibit himself and his poetry we will show him every +observance of respect, but at the same time tell him that there is no room +for his kind in our State; we prefer the rough, honest poet, and will not +depart from our original models (Laws). + +Next as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,--the subject, the +harmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the +first. As we banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the +mixed Lydian harmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and as our +citizens are to be temperate, we may also banish convivial harmonies, such +as the Ionian and pure Lydian. Two remain--the Dorian and Phrygian, the +first for war, the second for peace; the one expressive of courage, the +other of obedience or instruction or religious feeling. And as we reject +varieties of harmony, we shall also reject the many-stringed, variously- +shaped instruments which give utterance to them, and in particular the +flute, which is more complex than any of them. The lyre and the harp may +be permitted in the town, and the Pan's-pipe in the fields. Thus we have +made a purgation of music, and will now make a purgation of metres. These +should be like the harmonies, simple and suitable to the occasion. There +are four notes of the tetrachord, and there are three ratios of metre, 3/2, +2/2, 2/1, which have all their characteristics, and the feet have different +characteristics as well as the rhythms. But about this you and I must ask +Damon, the great musician, who speaks, if I remember rightly, of a martial +measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic, and iambic rhythms, which he +arranges so as to equalize the syllables with one another, assigning to +each the proper quantity. We only venture to affirm the general principle +that the style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style; and +that the simplicity and harmony of the soul should be reflected in them +all. This principle of simplicity has to be learnt by every one in the +days of his youth, and may be gathered anywhere, from the creative and +constructive arts, as well as from the forms of plants and animals. + +Other artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or +unseemliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to +the law of simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in our +city, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians must +grow up, not amid images of deformity which will gradually poison and +corrupt their souls, but in a land of health and beauty where they will +drink in from every object sweet and harmonious influences. And of all +these influences the greatest is the education given by music, which finds +a way into the innermost soul and imparts to it the sense of beauty and of +deformity. At first the effect is unconscious; but when reason arrives, +then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as the friend whom he always +knew. As in learning to read, first we acquire the elements or letters +separately, and afterwards their combinations, and cannot recognize +reflections of them until we know the letters themselves;--in like manner +we must first attain the elements or essential forms of the virtues, and +then trace their combinations in life and experience. There is a music of +the soul which answers to the harmony of the world; and the fairest object +of a musical soul is the fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the +latter may be excused, but not in the former. True love is the daughter of +temperance, and temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of bodily +pleasure. Enough has been said of music, which makes a fair ending with +love. + +Next we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the soul is +related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we educate +the mind we may leave the education of the body in her charge, and need +only give a general outline of the course to be pursued. In the first +place the guardians must abstain from strong drink, for they should be the +last persons to lose their wits. Whether the habits of the palaestra are +suitable to them is more doubtful, for the ordinary gymnastic is a sleepy +sort of thing, and if left off suddenly is apt to endanger health. But our +warrior athletes must be wide-awake dogs, and must also be inured to all +changes of food and climate. Hence they will require a simpler kind of +gymnastic, akin to their simple music; and for their diet a rule may be +found in Homer, who feeds his heroes on roast meat only, and gives them no +fish although they are living at the sea-side, nor boiled meats which +involve an apparatus of pots and pans; and, if I am not mistaken, he +nowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery and Attic confections and +Corinthian courtezans, which are to gymnastic what Lydian and Ionian +melodies are to music, must be forbidden. Where gluttony and intemperance +prevail the town quickly fills with doctors and pleaders; and law and +medicine give themselves airs as soon as the freemen of a State take an +interest in them. But what can show a more disgraceful state of education +than to have to go abroad for justice because you have none of your own at +home? And yet there IS a worse stage of the same disease--when men have +learned to take a pleasure and pride in the twists and turns of the law; +not considering how much better it would be for them so to order their +lives as to have no need of a nodding justice. And there is a like +disgrace in employing a physician, not for the cure of wounds or epidemic +disorders, but because a man has by laziness and luxury contracted diseases +which were unknown in the days of Asclepius. How simple is the Homeric +practice of medicine. Eurypylus after he has been wounded drinks a posset +of Pramnian wine, which is of a heating nature; and yet the sons of +Asclepius blame neither the damsel who gives him the drink, nor Patroclus +who is attending on him. The truth is that this modern system of nursing +diseases was introduced by Herodicus the trainer; who, being of a sickly +constitution, by a compound of training and medicine tortured first himself +and then a good many other people, and lived a great deal longer than he +had any right. But Asclepius would not practise this art, because he knew +that the citizens of a well-ordered State have no leisure to be ill, and +therefore he adopted the 'kill or cure' method, which artisans and +labourers employ. 'They must be at their business,' they say, 'and have no +time for coddling: if they recover, well; if they don't, there is an end +of them.' Whereas the rich man is supposed to be a gentleman who can +afford to be ill. Do you know a maxim of Phocylides--that 'when a man +begins to be rich' (or, perhaps, a little sooner) 'he should practise +virtue'? But how can excessive care of health be inconsistent with an +ordinary occupation, and yet consistent with that practice of virtue which +Phocylides inculcates? When a student imagines that philosophy gives him a +headache, he never does anything; he is always unwell. This was the reason +why Asclepius and his sons practised no such art. They were acting in the +interest of the public, and did not wish to preserve useless lives, or +raise up a puny offspring to wretched sires. Honest diseases they honestly +cured; and if a man was wounded, they applied the proper remedies, and then +let him eat and drink what he liked. But they declined to treat +intemperate and worthless subjects, even though they might have made large +fortunes out of them. As to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain +by a thunderbolt for restoring a rich man to life, that is a lie--following +our old rule we must say either that he did not take bribes, or that he was +not the son of a god. + +Glaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best judges +will not be those who have had severally the greatest experience of +diseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two +professions. The physician should have had experience of disease in his +own body, for he cures with his mind and not with his body. But the judge +controls mind by mind; and therefore his mind should not be corrupted by +crime. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to be wise and also +innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived by evil-doers, +because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and therefore the judge +should be of a certain age; his youth should have been innocent, and he +should have acquired insight into evil not by the practice of it, but by +the observation of it in others. This is the ideal of a judge; the +criminal turned detective is wonderfully suspicious, but when in company +with good men who have experience, he is at fault, for he foolishly +imagines that every one is as bad as himself. Vice may be known of virtue, +but cannot know virtue. This is the sort of medicine and this the sort of +law which will prevail in our State; they will be healing arts to better +natures; but the evil body will be left to die by the one, and the evil +soul will be put to death by the other. And the need of either will be +greatly diminished by good music which will give harmony to the soul, and +good gymnastic which will give health to the body. Not that this division +of music and gymnastic really corresponds to soul and body; for they are +both equally concerned with the soul, which is tamed by the one and aroused +and sustained by the other. The two together supply our guardians with +their twofold nature. The passionate disposition when it has too much +gymnastic is hardened and brutalized, the gentle or philosophic temper +which has too much music becomes enervated. While a man is allowing music +to pour like water through the funnel of his ears, the edge of his soul +gradually wears away, and the passionate or spirited element is melted out +of him. Too little spirit is easily exhausted; too much quickly passes +into nervous irritability. So, again, the athlete by feeding and training +has his courage doubled, but he soon grows stupid; he is like a wild beast, +ready to do everything by blows and nothing by counsel or policy. There +are two principles in man, reason and passion, and to these, not to the +soul and body, the two arts of music and gymnastic correspond. He who +mingles them in harmonious concord is the true musician,--he shall be the +presiding genius of our State. + +The next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must rule +the younger; and the best of the elders will be the best guardians. Now +they will be the best who love their subjects most, and think that they +have a common interest with them in the welfare of the state. These we +must select; but they must be watched at every epoch of life to see whether +they have retained the same opinions and held out against force and +enchantment. For time and persuasion and the love of pleasure may enchant +a man into a change of purpose, and the force of grief and pain may compel +him. And therefore our guardians must be men who have been tried by many +tests, like gold in the refiner's fire, and have been passed first through +danger, then through pleasure, and at every age have come out of such +trials victorious and without stain, in full command of themselves and +their principles; having all their faculties in harmonious exercise for +their country's good. These shall receive the highest honours both in life +and death. (It would perhaps be better to confine the term 'guardians' to +this select class: the younger men may be called 'auxiliaries.') + +And now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which, Oh that we could +train our rulers!--at any rate let us make the attempt with the rest of the +world. What I am going to tell is only another version of the legend of +Cadmus; but our unbelieving generation will be slow to accept such a story. +The tale must be imparted, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, +lastly to the people. We will inform them that their youth was a dream, +and that during the time when they seemed to be undergoing their education +they were really being fashioned in the earth, who sent them up when they +were ready; and that they must protect and cherish her whose children they +are, and regard each other as brothers and sisters. 'I do not wonder at +your being ashamed to propound such a fiction.' There is more behind. +These brothers and sisters have different natures, and some of them God +framed to rule, whom he fashioned of gold; others he made of silver, to be +auxiliaries; others again to be husbandmen and craftsmen, and these were +formed by him of brass and iron. But as they are all sprung from a common +stock, a golden parent may have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden +son, and then there must be a change of rank; the son of the rich must +descend, and the child of the artisan rise, in the social scale; for an +oracle says 'that the State will come to an end if governed by a man of +brass or iron.' Will our citizens ever believe all this? 'Not in the +present generation, but in the next, perhaps, Yes.' + +Now let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers, and +look about and pitch their camp in a high place, which will be safe against +enemies from without, and likewise against insurrections from within. +There let them sacrifice and set up their tents; for soldiers they are to +be and not shopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the sheep; and +luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants. Their habits +and their dwellings should correspond to their education. They should have +no property; their pay should only meet their expenses; and they should +have common meals. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from +God, and this divine gift in their souls they must not alloy with that +earthly dross which passes under the name of gold. They only of the +citizens may not touch it, or be under the same roof with it, or drink from +it; it is the accursed thing. Should they ever acquire houses or lands or +money of their own, they will become householders and tradesmen instead of +guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, +both to themselves and the rest of the State, will be at hand. + +The religious and ethical aspect of Plato's education will hereafter be +considered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more +conveniently noticed in this place. + +1. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave irony, +Plato, after the manner of his age, summons as a witness about ethics and +psychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting to distinguish +the better lesson from the worse, sometimes altering the text from design; +more than once quoting or alluding to Homer inaccurately, after the manner +of the early logographers turning the Iliad into prose, and delighting to +draw far-fetched inferences from his words, or to make ludicrous +applications of them. He does not, like Heracleitus, get into a rage with +Homer and Archilochus (Heracl.), but uses their words and expressions as +vehicles of a higher truth; not on a system like Theagenes of Rhegium or +Metrodorus, or in later times the Stoics, but as fancy may dictate. And +the conclusions drawn from them are sound, although the premises are +fictitious. These fanciful appeals to Homer add a charm to Plato's style, +and at the same time they have the effect of a satire on the follies of +Homeric interpretation. To us (and probably to himself), although they +take the form of arguments, they are really figures of speech. They may be +compared with modern citations from Scripture, which have often a great +rhetorical power even when the original meaning of the words is entirely +lost sight of. The real, like the Platonic Socrates, as we gather from the +Memorabilia of Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations. Great in +all ages and countries, in religion as well as in law and literature, has +been the art of interpretation. + +2. 'The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style.' +Notwithstanding the fascination which the word 'classical' exercises over +us, we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the Greek +poetry which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought often +exceeds the power of lucid expression in Aeschylus and Pindar; or that +rhetoric gets the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet Euripides. +Only perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the two; in him +alone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a Greek statue, in +which there is nothing to add or to take away; at least this is true of +single plays or of large portions of them. The connection in the Tragic +Choruses and in the Greek lyric poets is not unfrequently a tangled thread +which in an age before logic the poet was unable to draw out. Many +thoughts and feelings mingled in his mind, and he had no power of +disengaging or arranging them. For there is a subtle influence of logic +which requires to be transferred from prose to poetry, just as the music +and perfection of language are infused by poetry into prose. In all ages +the poet has been a bad judge of his own meaning (Apol.); for he does not +see that the word which is full of associations to his own mind is +difficult and unmeaning to that of another; or that the sequence which is +clear to himself is puzzling to others. There are many passages in some of +our greatest modern poets which are far too obscure; in which there is no +proportion between style and subject, in which any half-expressed figure, +any harsh construction, any distorted collocation of words, any remote +sequence of ideas is admitted; and there is no voice 'coming sweetly from +nature,' or music adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if there +could be poetry without beauty, or beauty without ease and clearness. The +obscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily out of the state of +language and logic which existed in their age. They are not examples to be +followed by us; for the use of language ought in every generation to become +clearer and clearer. Like Shakespere, they were great in spite, not in +consequence, of their imperfections of expression. But there is no reason +for returning to the necessary obscurity which prevailed in the infancy of +literature. The English poets of the last century were certainly not +obscure; and we have no excuse for losing what they had gained, or for +going back to the earlier or transitional age which preceded them. The +thought of our own times has not out-stripped language; a want of Plato's +'art of measuring' is the rule cause of the disproportion between them. + +3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a theory +of art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up as +follows:--True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and ideal,-- +the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or repose. +To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and simple +character, or to listen to such strains, is the best of influences,--the +true Greek atmosphere, in which youth should be brought up. That is the +way to create in them a natural good taste, which will have a feeling of +truth and beauty in all things. For though the poets are to be expelled, +still art is recognized as another aspect of reason--like love in the +Symposium, extending over the same sphere, but confined to the preliminary +education, and acting through the power of habit; and this conception of +art is not limited to strains of music or the forms of plastic art, but +pervades all nature and has a wide kindred in the world. The Republic of +Plato, like the Athens of Pericles, has an artistic as well as a political +side. + +There is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two or +three passages does he even allude to them (Rep.; Soph.). He is not lost +in rapture at the great works of Phidias, the Parthenon, the Propylea, the +statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably have regarded any abstract +truth of number or figure as higher than the greatest of them. Yet it is +hard to suppose that some influence, such as he hopes to inspire in youth, +did not pass into his own mind from the works of art which he saw around +him. We are living upon the fragments of them, and find in a few broken +stones the standard of truth and beauty. But in Plato this feeling has no +expression; he nowhere says that beauty is the object of art; he seems to +deny that wisdom can take an external form (Phaedrus); he does not +distinguish the fine from the mechanical arts. Whether or no, like some +writers, he felt more than he expressed, it is at any rate remarkable that +the greatest perfection of the fine arts should coincide with an almost +entire silence about them. In one very striking passage he tells us that a +work of art, like the State, is a whole; and this conception of a whole and +the love of the newly-born mathematical sciences may be regarded, if not as +the inspiring, at any rate as the regulating principles of Greek art (Xen. +Mem.; and Sophist). + +4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better +not be in robust health; and should have known what illness is in his own +person. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of evil; he +is to be a good man who, having passed his youth in innocence, became +acquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore, according +to Plato, a judge should not be young, just as a young man according to +Aristotle is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy. The bad, on the +other hand, have a knowledge of vice, but no knowledge of virtue. It may +be doubted, however, whether this train of reflection is well founded. In +a remarkable passage of the Laws it is acknowledged that the evil may form +a correct estimate of the good. The union of gentleness and courage in +Book ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, yet was afterwards ascertained to +be a truth. And Plato might also have found that the intuition of evil may +be consistent with the abhorrence of it. There is a directness of aim in +virtue which gives an insight into vice. And the knowledge of character is +in some degree a natural sense independent of any special experience of +good or evil. + +5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek and +also very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the +world, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had been +enfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under special +circumstances. And in the ancient Greek aristocracies, merit was certainly +recognized as one of the elements on which government was based. The +founders of states were supposed to be their benefactors, who were raised +by their great actions above the ordinary level of humanity; at a later +period, the services of warriors and legislators were held to entitle them +and their descendants to the privileges of citizenship and to the first +rank in the state. And although the existence of an ideal aristocracy is +slenderly proven from the remains of early Greek history, and we have a +difficulty in ascribing such a character, however the idea may be defined, +to any actual Hellenic state--or indeed to any state which has ever existed +in the world--still the rule of the best was certainly the aspiration of +philosophers, who probably accommodated a good deal their views of +primitive history to their own notions of good government. Plato further +insists on applying to the guardians of his state a series of tests by +which all those who fell short of a fixed standard were either removed from +the governing body, or not admitted to it; and this 'academic' discipline +did to a certain extent prevail in Greek states, especially in Sparta. He +also indicates that the system of caste, which existed in a great part of +the ancient, and is by no means extinct in the modern European world, +should be set aside from time to time in favour of merit. He is aware how +deeply the greater part of mankind resent any interference with the order +of society, and therefore he proposes his novel idea in the form of what he +himself calls a 'monstrous fiction.' (Compare the ceremony of preparation +for the two 'great waves' in Book v.) Two principles are indicated by him: +first, that there is a distinction of ranks dependent on circumstances +prior to the individual: second, that this distinction is and ought to be +broken through by personal qualities. He adapts mythology like the Homeric +poems to the wants of the state, making 'the Phoenician tale' the vehicle +of his ideas. Every Greek state had a myth respecting its own origin; the +Platonic republic may also have a tale of earthborn men. The gravity and +verisimilitude with which the tale is told, and the analogy of Greek +tradition, are a sufficient verification of the 'monstrous falsehood.' +Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and silver and brass and iron age +succeeding one another, but Plato supposes these differences in the natures +of men to exist together in a single state. Mythology supplies a figure +under which the lesson may be taught (as Protagoras says, 'the myth is more +interesting'), and also enables Plato to touch lightly on new principles +without going into details. In this passage he shadows forth a general +truth, but he does not tell us by what steps the transposition of ranks is +to be effected. Indeed throughout the Republic he allows the lower ranks +to fade into the distance. We do not know whether they are to carry arms, +and whether in the fifth book they are or are not included in the +communistic regulations respecting property and marriage. Nor is there any +use in arguing strictly either from a few chance words, or from the silence +of Plato, or in drawing inferences which were beyond his vision. +Aristotle, in his criticism on the position of the lower classes, does not +perceive that the poetical creation is 'like the air, invulnerable,' and +cannot be penetrated by the shafts of his logic (Pol.). + +6. Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest degree +fanciful and ideal, and which suggest to him many reflections, are to be +found in the third book of the Republic: first, the great power of music, +so much beyond any influence which is experienced by us in modern times, +when the art or science has been far more developed, and has found the +secret of harmony, as well as of melody; secondly, the indefinite and +almost absolute control which the soul is supposed to exercise over the +body. + +In the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration, such as we may also +observe among certain masters of the art, not unknown to us, at the present +day. With this natural enthusiasm, which is felt by a few only, there +seems to mingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence for numbers and +numerical proportion to which Aristotle is a stranger. Intervals of sound +and number are to him sacred things which have a law of their own, not +dependent on the variations of sense. They rise above sense, and become a +connecting link with the world of ideas. But it is evident that Plato is +describing what to him appears to be also a fact. The power of a simple +and characteristic melody on the impressible mind of the Greek is more than +we can easily appreciate. The effect of national airs may bear some +comparison with it. And, besides all this, there is a confusion between +the harmony of musical notes and the harmony of soul and body, which is so +potently inspired by them. + +The second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting questions--How +far can the mind control the body? Is the relation between them one of +mutual antagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they two or one, and is either +of them the cause of the other? May we not at times drop the opposition +between them, and the mode of describing them, which is so familiar to us, +and yet hardly conveys any precise meaning, and try to view this composite +creature, man, in a more simple manner? Must we not at any rate admit that +there is in human nature a higher and a lower principle, divided by no +distinct line, which at times break asunder and take up arms against one +another? Or again, they are reconciled and move together, either +unconsciously in the ordinary work of life, or consciously in the pursuit +of some noble aim, to be attained not without an effort, and for which +every thought and nerve are strained. And then the body becomes the good +friend or ally, or servant or instrument of the mind. And the mind has +often a wonderful and almost superhuman power of banishing disease and +weakness and calling out a hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the +intellect and the senses are brought into harmony and obedience so as to +form a single human being. They are ever parting, ever meeting; and the +identity or diversity of their tendencies or operations is for the most +part unnoticed by us. When the mind touches the body through the +appetites, we acknowledge the responsibility of the one to the other. +There is a tendency in us which says 'Drink.' There is another which says, +'Do not drink; it is not good for you.' And we all of us know which is the +rightful superior. We are also responsible for our health, although into +this sphere there enter some elements of necessity which may be beyond our +control. Still even in the management of health, care and thought, +continued over many years, may make us almost free agents, if we do not +exact too much of ourselves, and if we acknowledge that all human freedom +is limited by the laws of nature and of mind. + +We are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation which +he passes on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day, +depreciates the effects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a +definite character and capable of receiving a definite treatment. He is +afraid of invalidism interfering with the business of life. He does not +recognize that time is the great healer both of mental and bodily +disorders; and that remedies which are gradual and proceed little by little +are safer than those which produce a sudden catastrophe. Neither does he +see that there is no way in which the mind can more surely influence the +body than by the control of eating and drinking; or any other action or +occasion of human life on which the higher freedom of the will can be more +simple or truly asserted. + +7. Lesser matters of style may be remarked. + +(1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato's way of expressing +that he is passing lightly over the subject. + +(2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he proceeds +with the construction of the State. + +(3) The description of the State sometimes as a reality, and then again as +a work of imagination only; these are the arts by which he sustains the +reader's interest. + +(4) Connecting links, or the preparation for the entire expulsion of the +poets in Book X. + +(5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the +valetudinarian, the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides, the +manner in which the image of the gold and silver citizens is taken up into +the subject, and the argument from the practice of Asclepius, should not +escape notice. + +BOOK IV. Adeimantus said: 'Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that you +make your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they are the +lords of the city, and yet instead of having, like other men, lands and +houses and money of their own, they live as mercenaries and are always +mounting guard.' You may add, I replied, that they receive no pay but only +their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or a mistress. 'Well, +and what answer do you give?' My answer is, that our guardians may or may +not be the happiest of men,--I should not be surprised to find in the long- +run that they were,--but this is not the aim of our constitution, which was +designed for the good of the whole and not of any one part. If I went to a +sculptor and blamed him for having painted the eye, which is the noblest +feature of the face, not purple but black, he would reply: 'The eye must +be an eye, and you should look at the statue as a whole.' 'Now I can well +imagine a fool's paradise, in which everybody is eating and drinking, +clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and have their +wheel at hand, that they may work a little when they please; and cobblers +and all the other classes of a State lose their distinctive character. And +a State may get on without cobblers; but when the guardians degenerate into +boon companions, then the ruin is complete. Remember that we are not +talking of peasants keeping holiday, but of a State in which every man is +expected to do his own work. The happiness resides not in this or that +class, but in the State as a whole. I have another remark to make:--A +middle condition is best for artisans; they should have money enough to buy +tools, and not enough to be independent of business. And will not the same +condition be best for our citizens? If they are poor, they will be mean; +if rich, luxurious and lazy; and in neither case contented. 'But then how +will our poor city be able to go to war against an enemy who has money?' +There may be a difficulty in fighting against one enemy; against two there +will be none. In the first place, the contest will be carried on by +trained warriors against well-to-do citizens: and is not a regular athlete +an easy match for two stout opponents at least? Suppose also, that before +engaging we send ambassadors to one of the two cities, saying, 'Silver and +gold we have not; do you help us and take our share of the spoil;'--who +would fight against the lean, wiry dogs, when they might join with them in +preying upon the fatted sheep? 'But if many states join their resources, +shall we not be in danger?' I am amused to hear you use the word 'state' +of any but our own State. They are 'states,' but not 'a state'--many in +one. For in every state there are two hostile nations, rich and poor, +which you may set one against the other. But our State, while she remains +true to her principles, will be in very deed the mightiest of Hellenic +states. + +To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; it +must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of +secondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was +intimated in the parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied +was that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at one +with himself, and then the whole city would be united. But all these +things are secondary, if education, which is the great matter, be duly +regarded. When the wheel has once been set in motion, the speed is always +increasing; and each generation improves upon the preceding, both in +physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be directed +to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation; alter the songs of a +country, Damon says, and you will soon end by altering its laws. The +change appears innocent at first, and begins in play; but the evil soon +becomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of individuals, then +upon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon the institutions of a +state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. But if education +remains in the established form, there will be no danger. A restorative +process will be always going on; the spirit of law and order will raise up +what has fallen down. Nor will any regulations be needed for the lesser +matters of life--rules of deportment or fashions of dress. Like invites +like for good or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and supply +the power of self-government. Far be it from us to enter into the +particulars of legislation; let the guardians take care of education, and +education will take care of all other things. + +But without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will +make no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by +some favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living. +If you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits, then they +grow angry; they are charming people. 'Charming,--nay, the very reverse.' +Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the state which +is like them. And such states there are which first ordain under penalty +of death that no one shall alter the constitution, and then suffer +themselves to be flattered into and out of anything; and he who indulges +them and fawns upon them, is their leader and saviour. 'Yes, the men are +as bad as the states.' But do you not admire their cleverness? 'Nay, some +of them are stupid enough to believe what the people tell them.' And when +all the world is telling a man that he is six feet high, and he has no +measure, how can he believe anything else? But don't get into a passion: +to see our statesmen trying their nostrums, and fancying that they can cut +off at a blow the Hydra-like rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. +Minute enactments are superfluous in good states, and are useless in bad +ones. + +And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to +Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all +things--that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon +the centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any +sense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in +our realms... + +Here, as Socrates would say, let us 'reflect on' (Greek) what has preceded: +thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens, but only of +the well-being of the State. They may be the happiest of men, but our +principal aim in founding the State was not to make them happy. They were +to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant manner is presented +to us the famous question both of ancient and modern philosophy, touching +the relation of duty to happiness, of right to utility. + +First duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The +utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of error, and shows to us +a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted further +that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who makes the +happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and noblest motives +of human action. But utility is not the historical basis of morality; nor +the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly occur to the mind. +The greatest happiness of all is, as we believe, the far-off result of the +divine government of the universe. The greatest happiness of the +individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue and goodness. But +we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we can be of a divine +purpose, that 'all mankind should be saved;' and we infer the one from the +other. And the greatest happiness of the individual may be the reverse of +the greatest happiness in the ordinary sense of the term, and may be +realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary death. Further, the word +'happiness' has several ambiguities; it may mean either pleasure or an +ideal life, happiness subjective or objective, in this world or in another, +of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all men everywhere. By the +modern founder of Utilitarianism the self-regarding and disinterested +motives of action are included under the same term, although they are +commonly opposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word happiness +has not the definiteness or the sacredness of 'truth' and 'right'; it does +not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk into the +conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the comforts and +conveniences of life; too little with 'the goods of the soul which we +desire for their own sake.' In a great trial, or danger, or temptation, or +in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of. For these +reasons 'the greatest happiness' principle is not the true foundation of +ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the second, which is +like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the larger part of +human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far as they tend to +the happiness of mankind (Introd. to Gorgias and Philebus). + +The same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient +seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For +concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the +happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term +expediency is merely the law of right limited by the conditions of human +society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well as of +individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we cannot +directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations; and +sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist. They +are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy, as well +as in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said to depend +upon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society the +power of ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in them +something of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered from the +teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognise that the true leader of men must be +above the motives of ambition, and that national character is of greater +value than material comfort and prosperity. And this is the order of +thought in Plato; first, he expects his citizens to do their duty, and then +under favourable circumstances, that is to say, in a well-ordered State, +their happiness is assured. That he was far from excluding the modern +principle of utility in politics is sufficiently evident from other +passages; in which 'the most beneficial is affirmed to be the most +honourable', and also 'the most sacred'. + +We may note + +(1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, is designed to +draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates. + +(2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of politics +and of art, in the latter supplying the only principle of criticism, which, +under the various names of harmony, symmetry, measure, proportion, unity, +the Greek seems to have applied to works of art. + +(3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size, after the +traditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of Aristotle, the +fact that the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a principle. + +(4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of the +light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the +'charming' patients who are always making themselves worse; or again, the +playful assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave irony +with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is six feet high +because he is told so, and having nothing to measure with is to be pardoned +for his ignorance--he is too amusing for us to be seriously angry with him. + +(5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over when +provision has been made for two great principles,--first, that religion +shall be based on the highest conception of the gods, secondly, that the +true national or Hellenic type shall be maintained... + +Socrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston, +tell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother +and the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. 'That won't do,' +replied Glaucon, 'you yourself promised to make the search and talked about +the impiety of deserting justice.' Well, I said, I will lead the way, but +do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will contain all +the four virtues--wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. If we eliminate +the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice. + +First then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be +wise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,--not +the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the +husbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the +whole State. Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians, who are a small +class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them is +concentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class have +wisdom, then the whole State will be wise. + +Our second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in +another class--that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of +salvation--the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and +education have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which +dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or +of any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no soap or +lye will ever wash them out. Now the ground is education, and the laws are +the colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap of +pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out. This power +which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask you to call +'courage,' adding the epithet 'political' or 'civilized' in order to +distinguish it from mere animal courage and from a higher courage which may +hereafter be discussed. + +Two virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding +virtues temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is thrown upon +the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man as 'master of +himself'--which has an absurd sound, because the master is also the +servant. The expression really means that the better principle in a man +masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes--women, slaves and +the like--who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better; and in +our State the former class are held under control by the latter. Now to +which of these classes does temperance belong? 'To both of them.' And our +State if any will be the abode of temperance; and we were right in +describing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused through the whole, +making the dwellers in the city to be of one mind, and attuning the upper +and middle and lower classes like the strings of an instrument, whether you +suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength or wealth. + +And now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and +watch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell +me, if you see the thicket move first. 'Nay, I would have you lead.' Well +then, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult; but we +must push on. I begin to see a track. 'Good news.' Why, Glaucon, our +dulness of scent is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes into +the distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people +looking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our +old principle of the division of labour, or of every man doing his own +business, concerning which we spoke at the foundation of the State--what +but this was justice? Is there any other virtue remaining which can +compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of political +virtue? For 'every one having his own' is the great object of government; +and the great object of trade is that every man should do his own business. +Not that there is much harm in a carpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a +cobbler transforming himself into a carpenter; but great evil may arise +from the cobbler leaving his last and turning into a guardian or +legislator, or when a single individual is trainer, warrior, legislator, +all in one. And this evil is injustice, or every man doing another's +business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to arrive at a +final conclusion. For the definition which we believe to hold good in +states has still to be tested by the individual. Having read the large +letters we will now come back to the small. From the two together a +brilliant light may be struck out... + +Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of +residues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three +parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, although the +third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two. +If there be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for in the relation of +the three parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It is +obvious and simple, and for that very reason has not been found out. The +modern logician will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be separated +like chemical substances, but that they run into one another and may be +only different aspects or names of the same thing, and such in this +instance appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice +is verbally the same as one of the definitions of temperance given by +Socrates in the Charmides, which however is only provisional, and is +afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the other +virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic can with +difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue of a part +only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole +soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a sort of +harmony, and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to differ +from temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the +harmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by which all +natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the right +place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice, again, +is a more abstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore, from +Plato's point of view, the foundation of them, to which they are referred +and which in idea precedes them. The proposal to omit temperance is a mere +trick of style intended to avoid monotony. + +There is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of +Plato (Protagoras; Arist. Nic. Ethics), 'Whether the virtues are one or +many?' This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are four +cardinal virtues (now for the first time brought together in ethical +philosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like Aristotle's +conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others, but the whole +of virtue relative to the parts. To this universal conception of justice +or order in the first education and in the moral nature of man, the still +more universal conception of the good in the second education and in the +sphere of speculative knowledge seems to succeed. Both might be equally +described by the terms 'law,' 'order,' 'harmony;' but while the idea of +good embraces 'all time and all existence,' the conception of justice is +not extended beyond man. + +...Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But +first he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His +argument is as follows:--Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word +'just,' whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same +meaning. And the term 'justice' implied that the same three principles in +the State and in the individual were doing their own business. But are +they really three or one? The question is difficult, and one which can +hardly be solved by the methods which we are now using; but the truer and +longer way would take up too much of our time. 'The shorter will satisfy +me.' Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the +qualities of the individuals who compose them? The Scythians and Thracians +are passionate, our own race intellectual, and the Egyptians and +Phoenicians covetous, because the individual members of each have such and +such a character; the difficulty is to determine whether the several +principles are one or three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one +part of our nature, desire with another, are angry with another, or whether +the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action. This enquiry, +however, requires a very exact definition of terms. The same thing in the +same relation cannot be affected in two opposite ways. But there is no +impossibility in a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or in a top +which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no +necessity to mention all the possible exceptions; let us provisionally +assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same +relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent and dissent, desire +and avoidance. And one form of desire is thirst and hunger: and here +arises a new point--thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; +not of warm drink or of a particular kind of food, with the single +exception of course that the very fact of our desiring anything implies +that it is good. When relative terms have no attributes, their +correlatives have no attributes; when they have attributes, their +correlatives also have them. For example, the term 'greater' is simply +relative to 'less,' and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on +the other hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again, +every science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object; +medicine, for example, is the science of health, although not to be +confounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us return +to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite object--drink. +Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the animal one saying +'Drink;' the rational one, which says 'Do not drink.' The two impulses are +contradictory; and therefore we may assume that they spring from distinct +principles in the soul. But is passion a third principle, or akin to +desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which throws some light on +this question. He was coming up from the Piraeus outside the north wall, +and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying by the executioner. +He felt a longing desire to see them and also an abhorrence of them; at +first he turned away and shut his eyes, then, suddenly tearing them open, +he said,--'Take your fill, ye wretches, of the fair sight.' Now is there +not here a third principle which is often found to come to the assistance +of reason against desire, but never of desire against reason? This is +passion or spirit, of the separate existence of which we may further +convince ourselves by putting the following case:--When a man suffers +justly, if he be of a generous nature he is not indignant at the hardships +which he undergoes: but when he suffers unjustly, his indignation is his +great support; hunger and thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him +must do or die, until the voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, +bidding his dog bark no more, is heard within. This shows that passion is +the ally of reason. Is passion then the same with reason? No, for the +former exists in children and brutes; and Homer affords a proof of the +distinction between them when he says, 'He smote his breast, and thus +rebuked his soul.' + +And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer that +the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For wisdom +and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and courage +and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the three +classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each part in +the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the inferior, will +be harmonized by the influence of music and gymnastic. The counsellor and +the warrior, the head and the arm, will act together in the town of +Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper subjection. The courage of the +warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion about dangers in +spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the counsellor is that small +part of the soul which has authority and reason. The virtue of temperance +is the friendship of the ruling and the subject principles, both in the +State and in the individual. Of justice we have already spoken; and the +notion already given of it may be confirmed by common instances. Will the +just state or the just individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty +of impiety to gods and men? 'No.' And is not the reason of this that the +several principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their own +business? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just states. +Moreover, our old division of labour, which required that there should be +one man for one use, was a dream or anticipation of what was to follow; and +that dream has now been realized in justice, which begins by binding +together the three chords of the soul, and then acts harmoniously in every +relation of life. And injustice, which is the insubordination and +disobedience of the inferior elements in the soul, is the opposite of +justice, and is inharmonious and unnatural, being to the soul what disease +is to the body; for in the soul as well as in the body, good or bad actions +produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the health and beauty and well- +being of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of +the soul. + +Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the more +profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like +mortal disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill +which overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, and +the infinite forms of vice, among which are four special ones, +characteristic both of states and of individuals. And the state which +corresponds to the single form of virtue is that which we have been +describing, wherein reason rules under one of two names--monarchy and +aristocracy. Thus there are five forms in all, both of states and of +souls... + +In attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties, Plato +takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the +criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the faculties. +The same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of +early reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he will not proceed a +step without first clearing the ground. This leads him into a tiresome +digression, which is intended to explain the nature of contradiction. +First, the contradiction must be at the same time and in the same relation. +Secondly, no extraneous word must be introduced into either of the terms in +which the contradictory proposition is expressed: for example, thirst is +of drink, not of warm drink. He implies, what he does not say, that if, by +the advice of reason, or by the impulse of anger, a man is restrained from +drinking, this proves that thirst, or desire under which thirst is +included, is distinct from anger and reason. But suppose that we allow the +term 'thirst' or 'desire' to be modified, and say an 'angry thirst,' or a +'revengeful desire,' then the two spheres of desire and anger overlap and +become confused. This case therefore has to be excluded. And still there +remains an exception to the rule in the use of the term 'good,' which is +always implied in the object of desire. These are the discussions of an +age before logic; and any one who is wearied by them should remember that +they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas in the first development of +the human faculties. + +The psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul +into the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far as +we know, was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and +succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of +the mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible faculty (Greek), +which may be variously described under the terms righteous indignation, +spirit, passion. It is the foundation of courage, which includes in Plato +moral courage, the courage of enduring pain, and of surmounting +intellectual difficulties, as well as of meeting dangers in war. Though +irrational, it inclines to side with the rational: it cannot be aroused by +punishment when justly inflicted: it sometimes takes the form of an +enthusiasm which sustains a man in the performance of great actions. It is +the 'lion heart' with which the reason makes a treaty. On the other hand +it is negative rather than positive; it is indignant at wrong or falsehood, +but does not, like Love in the Symposium and Phaedrus, aspire to the vision +of Truth or Good. It is the peremptory military spirit which prevails in +the government of honour. It differs from anger (Greek), this latter term +having no accessory notion of righteous indignation. Although Aristotle +has retained the word, yet we may observe that 'passion' (Greek) has with +him lost its affinity to the rational and has become indistinguishable from +'anger' (Greek). And to this vernacular use Plato himself in the Laws +seems to revert, though not always. By modern philosophy too, as well as +in our ordinary conversation, the words anger or passion are employed +almost exclusively in a bad sense; there is no connotation of a just or +reasonable cause by which they are aroused. The feeling of 'righteous +indignation' is too partial and accidental to admit of our regarding it as +a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted also to doubt whether Plato is +right in supposing that an offender, however justly condemned, could be +expected to acknowledge the justice of his sentence; this is the spirit of +a philosopher or martyr rather than of a criminal. + +We may observe how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle's famous thesis, that +'good actions produce good habits.' The words 'as healthy practices +(Greek) produce health, so do just practices produce justice,' have a sound +very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note also that an incidental +remark in Plato has become a far-reaching principle in Aristotle, and an +inseparable part of a great Ethical system. + +There is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by 'the longer +way': he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not be +satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the sixth +and seventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given us a sketch +of such a metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final revelation of the +idea of good, he is put off with the declaration that he has not yet +studied the preliminary sciences. How he would have filled up the sketch, +or argued about such questions from a higher point of view, we can only +conjecture. Perhaps he hoped to find some a priori method of developing +the parts out of the whole; or he might have asked which of the ideas +contains the other ideas, and possibly have stumbled on the Hegelian +identity of the 'ego' and the 'universal.' Or he may have imagined that +ideas might be constructed in some manner analogous to the construction of +figures and numbers in the mathematical sciences. The most certain and +necessary truth was to Plato the universal; and to this he was always +seeking to refer all knowledge or opinion, just as in modern times we seek +to rest them on the opposite pole of induction and experience. The +aspirations of metaphysicians have always tended to pass beyond the limits +of human thought and language: they seem to have reached a height at which +they are 'moving about in worlds unrealized,' and their conceptions, +although profoundly affecting their own minds, become invisible or +unintelligible to others. We are not therefore surprized to find that +Plato himself has nowhere clearly explained his doctrine of ideas; or that +his school in a later generation, like his contemporaries Glaucon and +Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in this region of speculation. In +the Sophist, where he is refuting the scepticism which maintained either +that there was no such thing as predication, or that all might be +predicated of all, he arrives at the conclusion that some ideas combine +with some, but not all with all. But he makes only one or two steps +forward on this path; he nowhere attains to any connected system of ideas, +or even to a knowledge of the most elementary relations of the sciences to +one another. + +BOOK V. I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline in +states, when Polemarchus--he was sitting a little farther from me than +Adeimantus--taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said something +in an undertone, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let him off?' +'Certainly not,' said Adeimantus, raising his voice. Whom, I said, are you +not going to let off? 'You,' he said. Why? 'Because we think that you +are not dealing fairly with us in omitting women and children, of whom you +have slily disposed under the general formula that friends have all things +in common.' And was I not right? 'Yes,' he replied, 'but there are many +sorts of communism or community, and we want to know which of them is +right. The company, as you have just heard, are resolved to have a further +explanation.' Thrasymachus said, 'Do you think that we have come hither to +dig for gold, or to hear you discourse?' Yes, I said; but the discourse +should be of a reasonable length. Glaucon added, 'Yes, Socrates, and there +is reason in spending the whole of life in such discussions; but pray, +without more ado, tell us how this community is to be carried out, and how +the interval between birth and education is to be filled up.' Well, I +said, the subject has several difficulties--What is possible? is the first +question. What is desirable? is the second. 'Fear not,' he replied, 'for +you are speaking among friends.' That, I replied, is a sorry consolation; +I shall destroy my friends as well as myself. Not that I mind a little +innocent laughter; but he who kills the truth is a murderer. 'Then,' said +Glaucon, laughing, 'in case you should murder us we will acquit you +beforehand, and you shall be held free from the guilt of deceiving us.' + +Socrates proceeds:--The guardians of our state are to be watch-dogs, as we +have already said. Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes--we do not +take the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home to look +after their puppies. They have the same employments--the only difference +between them is that the one sex is stronger and the other weaker. But if +women are to have the same employments as men, they must have the same +education--they must be taught music and gymnastics, and the art of war. I +know that a great joke will be made of their riding on horseback and +carrying weapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled women showing their +agility in the palaestra will certainly not be a vision of beauty, and may +be expected to become a famous jest. But we must not mind the wits; there +was a time when they might have laughed at our present gymnastics. All is +habit: people have at last found out that the exposure is better than the +concealment of the person, and now they laugh no more. Evil only should be +the subject of ridicule. + +The first question is, whether women are able either wholly or partially to +share in the employments of men. And here we may be charged with +inconsistency in making the proposal at all. For we started originally +with the division of labour; and the diversity of employments was based on +the difference of natures. But is there no difference between men and +women? Nay, are they not wholly different? THERE was the difficulty, +Glaucon, which made me unwilling to speak of family relations. However, +when a man is out of his depth, whether in a pool or in an ocean, he can +only swim for his life; and we must try to find a way of escape, if we can. + +The argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the +natures of men and women are said to differ. But this is only a verbal +opposition. We do not consider that the difference may be purely nominal +and accidental; for example, a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a +single point of view, but you cannot infer that because a bald man is a +cobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler. Now why is such an +inference erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them is partial +only, like the difference between a male physician and a female physician, +not running through the whole nature, like the difference between a +physician and a carpenter. And if the difference of the sexes is only that +the one beget and the other bear children, this does not prove that they +ought to have distinct educations. Admitting that women differ from men in +capacity, do not men equally differ from one another? Has not nature +scattered all the qualities which our citizens require indifferently up and +down among the two sexes? and even in their peculiar pursuits, are not +women often, though in some cases superior to men, ridiculously enough +surpassed by them? Women are the same in kind as men, and have the same +aptitude or want of aptitude for medicine or gymnastic or war, but in a +less degree. One woman will be a good guardian, another not; and the good +must be chosen to be the colleagues of our guardians. If however their +natures are the same, the inference is that their education must also be +the same; there is no longer anything unnatural or impossible in a woman +learning music and gymnastic. And the education which we give them will be +the very best, far superior to that of cobblers, and will train up the very +best women, and nothing can be more advantageous to the State than this. +Therefore let them strip, clothed in their chastity, and share in the toils +of war and in the defence of their country; he who laughs at them is a fool +for his pains. + +The first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men and +women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is +rolling in--community of wives and children; is this either expedient or +possible? The expediency I do not doubt; I am not so sure of the +possibility. 'Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be entertained +on both points.' I meant to have escaped the trouble of proving the first, +but as you have detected the little stratagem I must even submit. Only +allow me to feed my fancy like the solitary in his walks, with a dream of +what might be, and then I will return to the question of what can be. + +In the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones where +they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as +legislator, have already selected the men; and now you shall select the +women. After the selection has been made, they will dwell in common houses +and have their meals in common, and will be brought together by a necessity +more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be allowed to live +in licentiousness; that is an unholy thing, which the rulers are determined +to prevent. For the avoidance of this, holy marriage festivals will be +instituted, and their holiness will be in proportion to their usefulness. +And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask (as I know that you are a breeder +of birds and animals), Do you not take the greatest care in the mating? +'Certainly.' And there is no reason to suppose that less care is required +in the marriage of human beings. But then our rulers must be skilful +physicians of the State, for they will often need a strong dose of +falsehood in order to bring about desirable unions between their subjects. +The good must be paired with the good, and the bad with the bad, and the +offspring of the one must be reared, and of the other destroyed; in this +way the flock will be preserved in prime condition. Hymeneal festivals +will be celebrated at times fixed with an eye to population, and the brides +and bridegrooms will meet at them; and by an ingenious system of lots the +rulers will contrive that the brave and the fair come together, and that +those of inferior breed are paired with inferiors--the latter will ascribe +to chance what is really the invention of the rulers. And when children +are born, the offspring of the brave and fair will be carried to an +enclosure in a certain part of the city, and there attended by suitable +nurses; the rest will be hurried away to places unknown. The mothers will +be brought to the fold and will suckle the children; care however must be +taken that none of them recognise their own offspring; and if necessary +other nurses may also be hired. The trouble of watching and getting up at +night will be transferred to attendants. 'Then the wives of our guardians +will have a fine easy time when they are having children.' And quite right +too, I said, that they should. + +The parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be +reckoned at thirty years--from twenty-five, when he has 'passed the point +at which the speed of life is greatest,' to fifty-five; and at twenty years +for a woman--from twenty to forty. Any one above or below those ages who +partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety; also every one who +forms a marriage connexion at other times without the consent of the +rulers. This latter regulation applies to those who are within the +specified ages, after which they may range at will, provided they avoid the +prohibited degrees of parents and children, or of brothers and sisters, +which last, however, are not absolutely prohibited, if a dispensation be +procured. 'But how shall we know the degrees of affinity, when all things +are common?' The answer is, that brothers and sisters are all such as are +born seven or nine months after the espousals, and their parents those who +are then espoused, and every one will have many children and every child +many parents. + +Socrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous +and also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State +is unity; the greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there will be +unity where there are no private pleasures or pains or interests--where if +one member suffers all the members suffer, if one citizen is touched all +are quickly sensitive; and the least hurt to the little finger of the State +runs through the whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the true State, +like an individual, is injured as a whole when any part is affected. Every +State has subjects and rulers, who in a democracy are called rulers, and in +other States masters: but in our State they are called saviours and +allies; and the subjects who in other States are termed slaves, are by us +termed nurturers and paymasters, and those who are termed comrades and +colleagues in other places, are by us called fathers and brothers. And +whereas in other States members of the same government regard one of their +colleagues as a friend and another as an enemy, in our State no man is a +stranger to another; for every citizen is connected with every other by +ties of blood, and these names and this way of speaking will have a +corresponding reality--brother, father, sister, mother, repeated from +infancy in the ears of children, will not be mere words. Then again the +citizens will have all things in common, in having common property they +will have common pleasures and pains. + +Can there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or +lawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which they +call their own; or suits about violence when every one is bound to defend +himself? The permission to strike when insulted will be an 'antidote' to +the knife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But no younger man +will strike an elder; reverence will prevent him from laying hands on his +kindred, and he will fear that the rest of the family may retaliate. +Moreover, our citizens will be rid of the lesser evils of life; there will +be no flattery of the rich, no sordid household cares, no borrowing and not +paying. Compared with the citizens of other States, ours will be Olympic +victors, and crowned with blessings greater still--they and their children +having a better maintenance during life, and after death an honourable +burial. Nor has the happiness of the individual been sacrificed to the +happiness of the State; our Olympic victor has not been turned into a +cobbler, but he has a happiness beyond that of any cobbler. At the same +time, if any conceited youth begins to dream of appropriating the State to +himself, he must be reminded that 'half is better than the whole.' 'I +should certainly advise him to stay where he is when he has the promise of +such a brave life.' + +But is such a community possible?--as among the animals, so also among men; +and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no difficulty; +the principle of communism is adapted to military service. Parents will +take their children to look on at a battle, just as potters' boys are +trained to the business by looking on at the wheel. And to the parents +themselves, as to other animals, the sight of their young ones will prove a +great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must learn, but they must not +run into danger, although a certain degree of risk is worth incurring when +the benefit is great. The young creatures should be placed under the care +of experienced veterans, and they should have wings--that is to say, swift +and tractable steeds on which they may fly away and escape. One of the +first things to be done is to teach a youth to ride. + +Cowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen; +gentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented to +the enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall be +crowned by all the youths in the army; secondly, he shall receive the right +hand of fellowship; and thirdly, do you think that there is any harm in his +being kissed? We have already determined that he shall have more wives +than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible. And +at a feast he shall have more to eat; we have the authority of Homer for +honouring brave men with 'long chines,' which is an appropriate compliment, +because meat is a very strengthening thing. Fill the bowl then, and give +the best seats and meats to the brave--may they do them good! And he who +dies in battle will be at once declared to be of the golden race, and will, +as we believe, become one of Hesiod's guardian angels. He shall be +worshipped after death in the manner prescribed by the oracle; and not only +he, but all other benefactors of the State who die in any other way, shall +be admitted to the same honours. + +The next question is, How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be +enslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing +under the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled? +Certainly not; for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and has +been the ruin of many an army. There is meanness and feminine malice in +making an enemy of the dead body, when the soul which was the owner has +fled--like a dog who cannot reach his assailants, and quarrels with the +stones which are thrown at him instead. Again, the arms of Hellenes should +not be offered up in the temples of the Gods; they are a pollution, for +they are taken from brethren. And on similar grounds there should be a +limit to the devastation of Hellenic territory--the houses should not be +burnt, nor more than the annual produce carried off. For war is of two +kinds, civil and foreign; the first of which is properly termed 'discord,' +and only the second 'war;' and war between Hellenes is in reality civil +war--a quarrel in a family, which is ever to be regarded as unpatriotic and +unnatural, and ought to be prosecuted with a view to reconciliation in a +true phil-Hellenic spirit, as of those who would chasten but not utterly +enslave. The war is not against a whole nation who are a friendly +multitude of men, women, and children, but only against a few guilty +persons; when they are punished peace will be restored. That is the way in +which Hellenes should war against one another--and against barbarians, as +they war against one another now. + +'But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a +State possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness of +being one family--fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out to war +together; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal State.' +You are too unmerciful. The first wave and the second wave I have hardly +escaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the third. When you see +the towering crest of the wave, I expect you to take pity. 'Not a whit.' + +Well, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after +justice, and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at all +the worse for being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly +beautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any +reality come up to the idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully +realized; but if I am to try and realize the ideal of the State in a +measure, I think that an approach may be made to the perfection of which I +dream by one or two, I do not say slight, but possible changes in the +present constitution of States. I would reduce them to a single one--the +great wave, as I call it. Until, then, kings are philosophers, or +philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no, nor the +human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being. I know that +this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive. 'Socrates, all +the world will take off his coat and rush upon you with sticks and stones, +and therefore I would advise you to prepare an answer.' You got me into +the scrape, I said. 'And I was right,' he replied; 'however, I will stand +by you as a sort of do-nothing, well-meaning ally.' Having the help of +such a champion, I will do my best to maintain my position. And first, I +must explain of whom I speak and what sort of natures these are who are to +be philosophers and rulers. As you are a man of pleasure, you will not +have forgotten how indiscriminate lovers are in their attachments; they +love all, and turn blemishes into beauties. The snub-nosed youth is said +to have a winning grace; the beak of another has a royal look; the +featureless are faultless; the dark are manly, the fair angels; the sickly +have a new term of endearment invented expressly for them, which is 'honey- +pale.' Lovers of wine and lovers of ambition also desire the objects of +their affection in every form. Now here comes the point:--The philosopher +too is a lover of knowledge in every form; he has an insatiable curiosity. +'But will curiosity make a philosopher? Are the lovers of sights and +sounds, who let out their ears to every chorus at the Dionysiac festivals, +to be called philosophers?' They are not true philosophers, but only an +imitation. 'Then how are we to describe the true?' + +You would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, such as justice, +beauty, good, evil, which are severally one, yet in their various +combinations appear to be many. Those who recognize these realities are +philosophers; whereas the other class hear sounds and see colours, and +understand their use in the arts, but cannot attain to the true or waking +vision of absolute justice or beauty or truth; they have not the light of +knowledge, but of opinion, and what they see is a dream only. Perhaps he +of whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we pacify him without +revealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose we say that, if he has +knowledge we rejoice to hear it, but knowledge must be of something which +is, as ignorance is of something which is not; and there is a third thing, +which both is and is not, and is matter of opinion only. Opinion and +knowledge, then, having distinct objects, must also be distinct faculties. +And by faculties I mean powers unseen and distinguishable only by the +difference in their objects, as opinion and knowledge differ, since the one +is liable to err, but the other is unerring and is the mightiest of all our +faculties. If being is the object of knowledge, and not-being of +ignorance, and these are the extremes, opinion must lie between them, and +may be called darker than the one and brighter than the other. This +intermediate or contingent matter is and is not at the same time, and +partakes both of existence and of non-existence. Now I would ask my good +friend, who denies abstract beauty and justice, and affirms a many +beautiful and a many just, whether everything he sees is not in some point +of view different--the beautiful ugly, the pious impious, the just unjust? +Is not the double also the half, and are not heavy and light relative terms +which pass into one another? Everything is and is not, as in the old +riddle--'A man and not a man shot and did not shoot a bird and not a bird +with a stone and not a stone.' The mind cannot be fixed on either +alternative; and these ambiguous, intermediate, erring, half-lighted +objects, which have a disorderly movement in the region between being and +not-being, are the proper matter of opinion, as the immutable objects are +the proper matter of knowledge. And he who grovels in the world of sense, +and has only this uncertain perception of things, is not a philosopher, but +a lover of opinion only... + +The fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the community +of property and of family are first maintained, and the transition is made +to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these Plato, after his manner, +has been preparing in some chance words of Book IV, which fall unperceived +on the reader's mind, as they are supposed at first to have fallen on the +ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus. The 'paradoxes,' as Morgenstern terms them, +of this book of the Republic will be reserved for another place; a few +remarks on the style, and some explanations of difficulties, may be briefly +added. + +First, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of scheme +or plan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third and +greatest wave come rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All that can +be said of the extravagance of Plato's proposals is anticipated by himself. +Nothing is more admirable than the hesitation with which he proposes the +solemn text, 'Until kings are philosophers,' etc.; or the reaction from the +sublime to the ridiculous, when Glaucon describes the manner in which the +new truth will be received by mankind. + +Some defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the +communistic plan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism to +the lower classes; nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of being +made out. It is quite possible that a child born at one hymeneal festival +may marry one of its own brothers or sisters, or even one of its parents, +at another. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions, but at the same time he +does not wish to bring before us the fact that the city would be divided +into families of those born seven and nine months after each hymeneal +festival. If it were worth while to argue seriously about such fancies, we +might remark that while all the old affinities are abolished, the newly +prohibited affinity rests not on any natural or rational principle, but +only upon the accident of children having been born in the same month and +year. Nor does he explain how the lots could be so manipulated by the +legislature as to bring together the fairest and best. The singular +expression which is employed to describe the age of five-and-twenty may +perhaps be taken from some poet. + +In the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature of +philosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of +Glaucon, the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or feelings. +They are partly facetious, but also contain a germ of truth. That science +is a whole, remains a true principle of inductive as well as of +metaphysical philosophy; and the love of universal knowledge is still the +characteristic of the philosopher in modern as well as in ancient times. + +At the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent +matter, which has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics and +Theology of the modern world, and which occurs here for the first time in +the history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of knowledge +in the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the object. With him +a word must answer to an idea; and he could not conceive of an opinion +which was an opinion about nothing. The influence of analogy led him to +invent 'parallels and conjugates' and to overlook facts. To us some of his +difficulties are puzzling only from their simplicity: we do not perceive +that the answer to them 'is tumbling out at our feet.' To the mind of +early thinkers, the conception of not-being was dark and mysterious; they +did not see that this terrible apparition which threatened destruction to +all knowledge was only a logical determination. The common term under +which, through the accidental use of language, two entirely different ideas +were included was another source of confusion. Thus through the ambiguity +of (Greek) Plato, attempting to introduce order into the first chaos of +human thought, seems to have confused perception and opinion, and to have +failed to distinguish the contingent from the relative. In the Theaetetus +the first of these difficulties begins to clear up; in the Sophist the +second; and for this, as well as for other reasons, both these dialogues +are probably to be regarded as later than the Republic. + +BOOK VI. Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true being, +and have no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty, truth, and +that philosophers have such patterns, we have now to ask whether they or +the many shall be rulers in our State. But who can doubt that philosophers +should be chosen, if they have the other qualities which are required in a +ruler? For they are lovers of the knowledge of the eternal and of all +truth; they are haters of falsehood; their meaner desires are absorbed in +the interests of knowledge; they are spectators of all time and all +existence; and in the magnificence of their contemplation the life of man +is as nothing to them, nor is death fearful. Also they are of a social, +gracious disposition, equally free from cowardice and arrogance. They +learn and remember easily; they have harmonious, well-regulated minds; +truth flows to them sweetly by nature. Can the god of Jealousy himself +find any fault with such an assemblage of good qualities? + +Here Adeimantus interposes:--'No man can answer you, Socrates; but every +man feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in argument. He is +driven from one position to another, until he has nothing more to say, just +as an unskilful player at draughts is reduced to his last move by a more +skilled opponent. And yet all the time he may be right. He may know, in +this very instance, that those who make philosophy the business of their +lives, generally turn out rogues if they are bad men, and fools if they are +good. What do you say?' I should say that he is quite right. 'Then how +is such an admission reconcileable with the doctrine that philosophers +should be kings?' + +I shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see how poor a hand +I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to their +governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must take an +illustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain of a ship, +taller by a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a little deaf, a +little blind, and rather ignorant of the seaman's art. The sailors want to +steer, although they know nothing of the art; and they have a theory that +it cannot be learned. If the helm is refused them, they drug the captain's +posset, bind him hand and foot, and take possession of the ship. He who +joins in the mutiny is termed a good pilot and what not; they have no +conception that the true pilot must observe the winds and the stars, and +must be their master, whether they like it or not;--such an one would be +called by them fool, prater, star-gazer. This is my parable; which I will +beg you to interpret for me to those gentlemen who ask why the philosopher +has such an evil name, and to explain to them that not he, but those who +will not use him, are to blame for his uselessness. The philosopher should +not beg of mankind to be put in authority over them. The wise man should +not seek the rich, as the proverb bids, but every man, whether rich or +poor, must knock at the door of the physician when he has need of him. Now +the pilot is the philosopher--he whom in the parable they call star-gazer, +and the mutinous sailors are the mob of politicians by whom he is rendered +useless. Not that these are the worst enemies of philosophy, who is far +more dishonoured by her own professing sons when they are corrupted by the +world. Need I recall the original image of the philosopher? Did we not +say of him just now, that he loved truth and hated falsehood, and that he +could not rest in the multiplicity of phenomena, but was led by a sympathy +in his own nature to the contemplation of the absolute? All the virtues as +well as truth, who is the leader of them, took up their abode in his soul. +But as you were observing, if we turn aside to view the reality, we see +that the persons who were thus described, with the exception of a small and +useless class, are utter rogues. + +The point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption in +nature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our description of +him, is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to destroy these +rare beings! There is no good thing which may not be a cause of evil-- +health, wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues themselves, when placed +under unfavourable circumstances. For as in the animal or vegetable world +the strongest seeds most need the accompaniment of good air and soil, so +the best of human characters turn out the worst when they fall upon an +unsuitable soil; whereas weak natures hardly ever do any considerable good +or harm; they are not the stuff out of which either great criminals or +great heroes are made. The philosopher follows the same analogy: he is +either the best or the worst of all men. Some persons say that the +Sophists are the corrupters of youth; but is not public opinion the real +Sophist who is everywhere present--in those very persons, in the assembly, +in the courts, in the camp, in the applauses and hisses of the theatre re- +echoed by the surrounding hills? Will not a young man's heart leap amid +these discordant sounds? and will any education save him from being carried +away by the torrent? Nor is this all. For if he will not yield to +opinion, there follows the gentle compulsion of exile or death. What +principle of rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in such an unequal +contest? Characters there may be more than human, who are exceptions--God +may save a man, but not his own strength. Further, I would have you +consider that the hireling Sophist only gives back to the world their own +opinions; he is the keeper of the monster, who knows how to flatter or +anger him, and observes the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good is +what pleases him, evil what he dislikes; truth and beauty are determined +only by the taste of the brute. Such is the Sophist's wisdom, and such is +the condition of those who make public opinion the test of truth, whether +in art or in morals. The curse is laid upon them of being and doing what +it approves, and when they attempt first principles the failure is +ludicrous. Think of all this and ask yourself whether the world is more +likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the multiplicity of +phenomena. And the world if not a believer in the idea cannot be a +philosopher, and must therefore be a persecutor of philosophers. There is +another evil:--the world does not like to lose the gifted nature, and so +they flatter the young (Alcibiades) into a magnificent opinion of his own +capacity; the tall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming of +kingdoms and empires. If at this instant a friend whispers to him, 'Now +the gods lighten thee; thou art a great fool' and must be educated--do you +think that he will listen? Or suppose a better sort of man who is +attracted towards philosophy, will they not make Herculean efforts to spoil +and corrupt him? Are we not right in saying that the love of knowledge, no +less than riches, may divert him? Men of this class (Critias) often become +politicians--they are the authors of great mischief in states, and +sometimes also of great good. And thus philosophy is deserted by her +natural protectors, and others enter in and dishonour her. Vulgar little +minds see the land open and rush from the prisons of the arts into her +temple. A clever mechanic having a soul coarse as his body, thinks that he +will gain caste by becoming her suitor. For philosophy, even in her fallen +estate, has a dignity of her own--and he, like a bald little blacksmith's +apprentice as he is, having made some money and got out of durance, washes +and dresses himself as a bridegroom and marries his master's daughter. +What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and +bastard, devoid of truth and nature? 'They will.' Small, then, is the +remnant of genuine philosophers; there may be a few who are citizens of +small states, in which politics are not worth thinking of, or who have been +detained by Theages' bridle of ill health; for my own case of the oracular +sign is almost unique, and too rare to be worth mentioning. And these few +when they have tasted the pleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at +that den of thieves and place of wild beasts, which is human life, will +stand aside from the storm under the shelter of a wall, and try to preserve +their own innocence and to depart in peace. 'A great work, too, will have +been accomplished by them.' Great, yes, but not the greatest; for man is a +social being, and can only attain his highest development in the society +which is best suited to him. + +Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name. Another +question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one of them; +at present she is like some exotic seed which degenerates in a strange +soil; only in her proper state will she be shown to be of heavenly growth. +'And is her proper state ours or some other?' Ours in all points but one, +which was left undetermined. You may remember our saying that some living +mind or witness of the legislator was needed in states. But we were afraid +to enter upon a subject of such difficulty, and now the question recurs and +has not grown easier:--How may philosophy be safely studied? Let us bring +her into the light of day, and make an end of the inquiry. + +In the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the present +mode of study. Persons usually pick up a little philosophy in early youth, +and in the intervals of business, but they never master the real +difficulty, which is dialectic. Later, perhaps, they occasionally go to a +lecture on philosophy. Years advance, and the sun of philosophy, unlike +that of Heracleitus, sets never to rise again. This order of education +should be reversed; it should begin with gymnastics in youth, and as the +man strengthens, he should increase the gymnastics of his soul. Then, when +active life is over, let him finally return to philosophy. 'You are in +earnest, Socrates, but the world will be equally earnest in withstanding +you--no more than Thrasymachus.' Do not make a quarrel between +Thrasymachus and me, who were never enemies and are now good friends +enough. And I shall do my best to convince him and all mankind of the +truth of my words, or at any rate to prepare for the future when, in +another life, we may again take part in similar discussions. 'That will be +a long time hence.' Not long in comparison with eternity. The many will +probably remain incredulous, for they have never seen the natural unity of +ideas, but only artificial juxtapositions; not free and generous thoughts, +but tricks of controversy and quips of law;--a perfect man ruling in a +perfect state, even a single one they have not known. And we foresaw that +there was no chance of perfection either in states or individuals until a +necessity was laid upon philosophers--not the rogues, but those whom we +called the useless class--of holding office; or until the sons of kings +were inspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the infinity of +past time there has been, or is in some distant land, or ever will be +hereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain that +there has been, is, and will be such a state whenever the Muse of +philosophy rules. Will you say that the world is of another mind? O, my +friend, do not revile the world! They will soon change their opinion if +they are gently entreated, and are taught the true nature of the +philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves him? Or be jealous of one who +has no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many hate not the true but the +false philosophers--the pretenders who force their way in without +invitation, and are always speaking of persons and not of principles, which +is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher despises +earthly strife; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in accordance with +which he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not himself only, but +other men), and is the creator of the virtues private as well as public. +When mankind see that the happiness of states is only to be found in that +image, will they be angry with us for attempting to delineate it? +'Certainly not. But what will be the process of delineation?' The artist +will do nothing until he has made a tabula rasa; on this he will inscribe +the constitution of a state, glancing often at the divine truth of nature, +and from that deriving the godlike among men, mingling the two elements, +rubbing out and painting in, until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of +the divine and human. But perhaps the world will doubt the existence of +such an artist. What will they doubt? That the philosopher is a lover of +truth, having a nature akin to the best?--and if they admit this will they +still quarrel with us for making philosophers our kings? 'They will be +less disposed to quarrel.' Let us assume then that they are pacified. +Still, a person may hesitate about the probability of the son of a king +being a philosopher. And we do not deny that they are very liable to be +corrupted; but yet surely in the course of ages there might be one +exception--and one is enough. If one son of a king were a philosopher, and +had obedient citizens, he might bring the ideal polity into being. Hence +we conclude that our laws are not only the best, but that they are also +possible, though not free from difficulty. + +I gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose +concerning women and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge that we +must go to the bottom of another question: What is to be the education of +our guardians? It was agreed that they were to be lovers of their country, +and were to be tested in the refiner's fire of pleasures and pains, and +those who came forth pure and remained fixed in their principles were to +have honours and rewards in life and after death. But at this point, the +argument put on her veil and turned into another path. I hesitated to make +the assertion which I now hazard,--that our guardians must be philosophers. +You remember all the contradictory elements, which met in the philosopher-- +how difficult to find them all in a single person! Intelligence and spirit +are not often combined with steadiness; the stolid, fearless, nature is +averse to intellectual toil. And yet these opposite elements are all +necessary, and therefore, as we were saying before, the aspirant must be +tested in pleasures and dangers; and also, as we must now further add, in +the highest branches of knowledge. You will remember, that when we spoke +of the virtues mention was made of a longer road, which you were satisfied +to leave unexplored. 'Enough seemed to have been said.' Enough, my +friend; but what is enough while anything remains wanting? Of all men the +guardian must not faint in the search after truth; he must be prepared to +take the longer road, or he will never reach that higher region which is +above the four virtues; and of the virtues too he must not only get an +outline, but a clear and distinct vision. (Strange that we should be so +precise about trifles, so careless about the highest truths!) 'And what +are the highest?' You to pretend unconsciousness, when you have so often +heard me speak of the idea of good, about which we know so little, and +without which though a man gain the world he has no profit of it! Some +people imagine that the good is wisdom; but this involves a circle,--the +good, they say, is wisdom, wisdom has to do with the good. According to +others the good is pleasure; but then comes the absurdity that good is bad, +for there are bad pleasures as well as good. Again, the good must have +reality; a man may desire the appearance of virtue, but he will not desire +the appearance of good. Ought our guardians then to be ignorant of this +supreme principle, of which every man has a presentiment, and without which +no man has any real knowledge of anything? 'But, Socrates, what is this +supreme principle, knowledge or pleasure, or what? You may think me +troublesome, but I say that you have no business to be always repeating the +doctrines of others instead of giving us your own.' Can I say what I do +not know? 'You may offer an opinion.' And will the blindness and +crookedness of opinion content you when you might have the light and +certainty of science? 'I will only ask you to give such an explanation of +the good as you have given already of temperance and justice.' I wish that +I could, but in my present mood I cannot reach to the height of the +knowledge of the good. To the parent or principal I cannot introduce you, +but to the child begotten in his image, which I may compare with the +interest on the principal, I will. (Audit the account, and do not let me +give you a false statement of the debt.) You remember our old distinction +of the many beautiful and the one beautiful, the particular and the +universal, the objects of sight and the objects of thought? Did you ever +consider that the objects of sight imply a faculty of sight which is the +most complex and costly of our senses, requiring not only objects of sense, +but also a medium, which is light; without which the sight will not +distinguish between colours and all will be a blank? For light is the +noble bond between the perceiving faculty and the thing perceived, and the +god who gives us light is the sun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to +be confounded with the eye of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I +call the child of the good, standing in the same relation to the visible +world as the good to the intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, +and in the intellectual world where truth is, there is sight and light. +Now that which is the sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the +cause of knowledge and truth, yet other and fairer than they are, and +standing in the same relation to them in which the sun stands to light. O +inconceivable height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above truth! +('You cannot surely mean pleasure,' he said. Peace, I replied.) And this +idea of good, like the sun, is also the cause of growth, and the author not +of knowledge only, but of being, yet greater far than either in dignity and +power. 'That is a reach of thought more than human; but, pray, go on with +the image, for I suspect that there is more behind.' There is, I said; and +bearing in mind our two suns or principles, imagine further their +corresponding worlds--one of the visible, the other of the intelligible; +you may assist your fancy by figuring the distinction under the image of a +line divided into two unequal parts, and may again subdivide each part into +two lesser segments representative of the stages of knowledge in either +sphere. The lower portion of the lower or visible sphere will consist of +shadows and reflections, and its upper and smaller portion will contain +real objects in the world of nature or of art. The sphere of the +intelligible will also have two divisions,--one of mathematics, in which +there is no ascent but all is descent; no inquiring into premises, but only +drawing of inferences. In this division the mind works with figures and +numbers, the images of which are taken not from the shadows, but from the +objects, although the truth of them is seen only with the mind's eye; and +they are used as hypotheses without being analysed. Whereas in the other +division reason uses the hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the +idea of good, to which she fastens them, and then again descends, walking +firmly in the region of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as +descent, and finally resting in them. 'I partly understand,' he replied; +'you mean that the ideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, +metaphorical conceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, +whichever is to be the name of them; and the latter conceptions you refuse +to make subjects of pure intellect, because they have no first principle, +although when resting on a first principle, they pass into the higher +sphere.' You understand me very well, I said. And now to those four +divisions of knowledge you may assign four corresponding faculties--pure +intelligence to the highest sphere; active intelligence to the second; to +the third, faith; to the fourth, the perception of shadows--and the +clearness of the several faculties will be in the same ratio as the truth +of the objects to which they are related... + +Like Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In +language which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and country, +he is described as 'the spectator of all time and all existence.' He has +the noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest use of them. All his +desires are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which is the love of truth. +None of the graces of a beautiful soul are wanting in him; neither can he +fear death, or think much of human life. The ideal of modern times hardly +retains the simplicity of the antique; there is not the same originality +either in truth or error which characterized the Greeks. The philosopher +is no longer living in the unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince +mankind of ignorance; nor does he regard knowledge as a system of ideas +leading upwards by regular stages to the idea of good. The eagerness of +the pursuit has abated; there is more division of labour and less of +comprehensive reflection upon nature and human life as a whole; more of +exact observation and less of anticipation and inspiration. Still, in the +altered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not wholly lost; and there +may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into the language of +our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who fixes his mind on +the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, not on fragments or +pictures of nature; on history, not on controversy; on the truths which are +acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions of the many. He is aware of +the importance of 'classifying according to nature,' and will try to +'separate the limbs of science without breaking them' (Phaedr.). There is +no part of truth, whether great or small, which he will dishonour; and in +the least things he will discern the greatest (Parmen.). Like the ancient +philosopher he sees the world pervaded by analogies, but he can also tell +'why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for an induction' +(Mill's Logic), while in other cases a thousand examples would prove +nothing. He inquires into a portion of knowledge only, because the whole +has grown too vast to be embraced by a single mind or life. He has a +clearer conception of the divisions of science and of their relation to the +mind of man than was possible to the ancients. Like Plato, he has a vision +of the unity of knowledge, not as the beginning of philosophy to be +attained by a study of elementary mathematics, but as the far-off result of +the working of many minds in many ages. He is aware that mathematical +studies are preliminary to almost every other; at the same time, he will +not reduce all varieties of knowledge to the type of mathematics. He too +must have a nobility of character, without which genius loses the better +half of greatness. Regarding the world as a point in immensity, and each +individual as a link in a never-ending chain of existence, he will not +think much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of death. + +Adeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning, thus +showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method. He +brings the accusation against himself which might be brought against him by +a modern logician--that he extracts the answer because he knows how to put +the question. In a long argument words are apt to change their meaning +slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions inferred with rather +too much certainty or universality; the variation at each step may be +unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes considerable. Hence the +failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or algebraic formulae to logic. +The imperfection, or rather the higher and more elastic nature of language, +does not allow words to have the precision of numbers or of symbols. And +this quality in language impairs the force of an argument which has many +steps. + +The objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular instance, +may be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic mode of +reasoning. And here, as elsewhere, Plato seems to intimate that the time +had come when the negative and interrogative method of Socrates must be +superseded by a positive and constructive one, of which examples are given +in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus further argues that the ideal +is wholly at variance with facts; for experience proves philosophers to be +either useless or rogues. Contrary to all expectation Socrates has no +hesitation in admitting the truth of this, and explains the anomaly in an +allegory, first characteristically depreciating his own inventive powers. +In this allegory the people are distinguished from the professional +politicians, and, as elsewhere, are spoken of in a tone of pity rather than +of censure under the image of 'the noble captain who is not very quick in +his perceptions.' + +The uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that +mankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided between +contempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and know no other +weapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues that the best +is most liable to corruption; and that the finer nature is more likely to +suffer from alien conditions. We too observe that there are some kinds of +excellence which spring from a peculiar delicacy of constitution; as is +evidently true of the poetical and imaginative temperament, which often +seems to depend on impressions, and hence can only breathe or live in a +certain atmosphere. The man of genius has greater pains and greater +pleasures, greater powers and greater weaknesses, and often a greater play +of character than is to be found in ordinary men. He can assume the +disguise of virtue or disinterestedness without having them, or veil +personal enmity in the language of patriotism and philosophy,--he can say +the word which all men are thinking, he has an insight which is terrible +into the follies and weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a +Mirabeau, or a Napoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of +great evils in states, or 'of great good, when they are drawn in that +direction.' + +Yet the thesis, 'corruptio optimi pessima,' cannot be maintained generally +or without regard to the kind of excellence which is corrupted. The alien +conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may be the elements of +culture to another. In general a man can only receive his highest +development in a congenial state or family, among friends or fellow- +workers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by adverse circumstances to +such a degree that he rises up against them and reforms them. And while +weaker or coarser characters will extract good out of evil, say in a +corrupt state of the church or of society, and live on happily, allowing +the evil to remain, the finer or stronger natures may be crushed or spoiled +by surrounding influences--may become misanthrope and philanthrope by +turns; or in a few instances, like the founders of the monastic orders, or +the Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in themselves or in their age, may +break away entirely from the world and from the church, sometimes into +great good, sometimes into great evil, sometimes into both. And the same +holds in the lesser sphere of a convent, a school, a family. + +Plato would have us consider how easily the best natures are overpowered by +public opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind will make to get +possession of them. The world, the church, their own profession, any +political or party organization, are always carrying them off their legs +and teaching them to apply high and holy names to their own prejudices and +interests. The 'monster' corporation to which they belong judges right and +truth to be the pleasure of the community. The individual becomes one with +his order; or, if he resists, the world is too much for him, and will +sooner or later be revenged on him. This is, perhaps, a one-sided but not +wholly untrue picture of the maxims and practice of mankind when they 'sit +down together at an assembly,' either in ancient or modern times. + +When the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take +possession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one of +those continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic +expression, 'veils herself,' and which is dropped and reappears at +intervals. The question is asked,--Why are the citizens of states so +hostile to philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And yet +there is also a better mind of the many; they would believe if they were +taught. But hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation of +philosophy, words without thoughts, systems which have no life in them; a +(divine) person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the friend of man +holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame the state in that +image, they have never known. The same double feeling respecting the mass +of mankind has always existed among men. The first thought is that the +people are the enemies of truth and right; the second, that this only +arises out of an accidental error and confusion, and that they do not +really hate those who love them, if they could be educated to know them. + +In the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be +considered: 1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which +is contrasted with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book IV; 2nd, +the heavenly pattern or idea of the state; 3rd, the relation of the +divisions of knowledge to one another and to the corresponding faculties of +the soul + +1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse. +Neither here nor in the Phaedrus or Symposium, nor yet in the Philebus or +Sophist, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would +probably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a +system of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole +rather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised by +him in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts of the +soul; there, like Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, he argues from +experience and the common use of language. But at the end of the sixth +book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which all ideas are +only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a connected whole which +is self-supporting, and in which consistency is the test of truth. He does +not explain to us in detail the nature of the process. Like many other +thinkers both in ancient and modern times his mind seems to be filled with +a vacant form which he is unable to realize. He supposes the sciences to +have a natural order and connexion in an age when they can hardly be said +to exist. He is hastening on to the 'end of the intellectual world' +without even making a beginning of them. + +In modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of acquiring +knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute knowledge. +In all science a priori and a posteriori truths mingle in various +proportions. The a priori part is that which is derived from the most +universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by them; the a +posteriori is that which grows up around the more general principles and +becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato erroneously imagines that +the synthesis is separable from the analysis, and that the method of +science can anticipate science. In entertaining such a vision of a priori +knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at least his meaning may be +sufficiently explained by the similar attempts of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, +and even of Bacon himself, in modern philosophy. Anticipations or +divinations, or prophetic glimpses of truths whether concerning man or +nature, seem to stand in the same relation to ancient philosophy which +hypotheses bear to modern inductive science. These 'guesses at truth' were +not made at random; they arose from a superficial impression of +uniformities and first principles in nature which the genius of the Greek, +contemplating the expanse of heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the +distance. Nor can we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood +still, and the human mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought, +if philosophy had been strictly confined to the results of experience. + +2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist will +fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid up in +heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with wondering eye? +The answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the omission of +particulars, partly by imagination perfecting the form which experience +supplies (Phaedo). Plato represents these ideals in a figure as belonging +to another world; and in modern times the idea will sometimes seem to +precede, at other times to co-operate with the hand of the artist. As in +science, so also in creative art, there is a synthetical as well as an +analytical method. One man will have the whole in his mind before he +begins; to another the processes of mind and hand will be simultaneous. + +3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato's divisions of knowledge +are based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and +intellectual which pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which is +implied also the opposition of the permanent and transient, of the +universal and particular. But the age of philosophy in which he lived +seemed to require a further distinction;--numbers and figures were +beginning to separate from ideas. The world could no longer regard justice +as a cube, and was learning to see, though imperfectly, that the +abstractions of sense were distinct from the abstractions of mind. Between +the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of phenomena, the Pythagorean +principle of number found a place, and was, as Aristotle remarks, a +conducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is led to introduce a +third term which had not hitherto entered into the scheme of his +philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in education; they were +the best preparation for higher studies. The subjective relation between +them further suggested an objective one; although the passage from one to +the other is really imaginary (Metaph.). For metaphysical and moral +philosophy has no connexion with mathematics; number and figure are the +abstractions of time and space, not the expressions of purely intellectual +conceptions. When divested of metaphor, a straight line or a square has no +more to do with right and justice than a crooked line with vice. The +figurative association was mistaken for a real one; and thus the three +latter divisions of the Platonic proportion were constructed. + +There is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the first term +of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no reference to any +other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation of shadows to +objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas. Probably Plato has +been led by the love of analogy (Timaeus) to make four terms instead of +three, although the objects perceived in both divisions of the lower sphere +are equally objects of sense. He is also preparing the way, as his manner +is, for the shadows of images at the beginning of the seventh book, and the +imitation of an imitation in the tenth. The line may be regarded as +reaching from unity to infinity, and is divided into two unequal parts, and +subdivided into two more; each lower sphere is the multiplication of the +preceding. Of the four faculties, faith in the lower division has an +intermediate position (cp. for the use of the word faith or belief, +(Greek), Timaeus), contrasting equally with the vagueness of the perception +of shadows (Greek) and the higher certainty of understanding (Greek) and +reason (Greek). + +The difference between understanding and mind or reason (Greek) is +analogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts and +the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is at rest; +consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this self- +evidencing knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed to +correspond. But there is a knowledge of the understanding which is +incomplete and in motion always, because unable to rest in the subordinate +ideas. Those ideas are called both images and hypotheses--images because +they are clothed in sense, hypotheses because they are assumptions only, +until they are brought into connexion with the idea of good. + +The general meaning of the passage, 'Noble, then, is the bond which links +together sight...And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible...' so far as +the thought contained in it admits of being translated into the terms of +modern philosophy, may be described or explained as follows:--There is a +truth, one and self-existent, to which by the help of a ladder let down +from above, the human intelligence may ascend. This unity is like the sun +in the heavens, the light by which all things are seen, the being by which +they are created and sustained. It is the IDEA of good. And the steps of +the ladder leading up to this highest or universal existence are the +mathematical sciences, which also contain in themselves an element of the +universal. These, too, we see in a new manner when we connect them with +the idea of good. They then cease to be hypotheses or pictures, and become +essential parts of a higher truth which is at once their first principle +and their final cause. + +We cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage, but we +may trace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are common +to us and to Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the sciences, +or rather of science, for in Plato's time they were not yet parted off or +distinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, or life or idea or +cause or reason, not yet conceived or no longer conceived as in the Timaeus +and elsewhere under the form of a person; (3) the recognition of the +hypothetical and conditional character of the mathematical sciences, and in +a measure of every science when isolated from the rest; (4) the conviction +of a truth which is invisible, and of a law, though hardly a law of nature, +which permeates the intellectual rather than the visible world. + +The method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller +explanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the +seventh book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance of +Socrates to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. The +allusion to Theages' bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic sign, +of Socrates, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory; the +remark that the salvation of any remnant of good in the present evil state +of the world is due to God only; the reference to a future state of +existence, which is unknown to Glaucon in the tenth book, and in which the +discussions of Socrates and his disciples would be resumed; the surprise in +the answers; the fanciful irony of Socrates, where he pretends that he can +only describe the strange position of the philosopher in a figure of +speech; the original observation that the Sophists, after all, are only the +representatives and not the leaders of public opinion; the picture of the +philosopher standing aside in the shower of sleet under a wall; the figure +of 'the great beast' followed by the expression of good-will towards the +common people who would not have rejected the philosopher if they had known +him; the 'right noble thought' that the highest truths demand the greatest +exactness; the hesitation of Socrates in returning once more to his well- +worn theme of the idea of good; the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon; the +comparison of philosophy to a deserted maiden who marries beneath her--are +some of the most interesting characteristics of the sixth book. + +Yet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so oft +discussed in the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, +would fain, if possible, have a clearer notion. Like them, we are +dissatisfied when we are told that the idea of good can only be revealed to +a student of the mathematical sciences, and we are inclined to think that +neither we nor they could have been led along that path to any satisfactory +goal. For we have learned that differences of quantity cannot pass into +differences of quality, and that the mathematical sciences can never rise +above themselves into the sphere of our higher thoughts, although they may +sometimes furnish symbols and expressions of them, and may train the mind +in habits of abstraction and self-concentration. The illusion which was +natural to an ancient philosopher has ceased to be an illusion to us. But +if the process by which we are supposed to arrive at the idea of good be +really imaginary, may not the idea itself be also a mere abstraction? We +remark, first, that in all ages, and especially in primitive philosophy, +words such as being, essence, unity, good, have exerted an extraordinary +influence over the minds of men. The meagreness or negativeness of their +content has been in an inverse ratio to their power. They have become the +forms under which all things were comprehended. There was a need or +instinct in the human soul which they satisfied; they were not ideas, but +gods, and to this new mythology the men of a later generation began to +attach the powers and associations of the elder deities. + +The idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought, which +were beginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, in +which all time and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth of all +things, and also the light in which they shone forth, and became evident to +intelligences human and divine. It was the cause of all things, the power +by which they were brought into being. It was the universal reason +divested of a human personality. It was the life as well as the light of +the world, all knowledge and all power were comprehended in it. The way to +it was through the mathematical sciences, and these too were dependent on +it. To ask whether God was the maker of it, or made by it, would be like +asking whether God could be conceived apart from goodness, or goodness +apart from God. The God of the Timaeus is not really at variance with the +idea of good; they are aspects of the same, differing only as the personal +from the impersonal, or the masculine from the neuter, the one being the +expression or language of mythology, the other of philosophy. + +This, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as +conceived by Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may also +be said to enter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given of it +goes beyond the actual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at the +stage of philosophy which enables us to understand what he is aiming at, +better than he did himself. We are beginning to realize what he saw darkly +and at a distance. But if he could have been told that this, or some +conception of the same kind, but higher than this, was the truth at which +he was aiming, and the need which he sought to supply, he would gladly have +recognized that more was contained in his own thoughts than he himself +knew. As his words are few and his manner reticent and tentative, so must +the style of his interpreter be. We should not approach his meaning more +nearly by attempting to define it further. In translating him into the +language of modern thought, we might insensibly lose the spirit of ancient +philosophy. It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of +good as the first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in +his writings except in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon the +minds of his disciples in a later generation; it was probably +unintelligible to them. Nor does the mention of it in Aristotle appear to +have any reference to this or any other passage in his extant writings. + +BOOK VII. And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or +unenlightenment of our nature:--Imagine human beings living in an +underground den which is open towards the light; they have been there from +childhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see into the +den. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners +a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen over +which marionette players show their puppets. Behind the wall appear moving +figures, who hold in their hands various works of art, and among them +images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the passers-by are +talking and others silent. 'A strange parable,' he said, 'and strange +captives.' They are ourselves, I replied; and they see only the shadows of +the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den; to these they give +names, and if we add an echo which returns from the wall, the voices of the +passengers will seem to proceed from the shadows. Suppose now that you +suddenly turn them round and make them look with pain and grief to +themselves at the real images; will they believe them to be real? Will not +their eyes be dazzled, and will they not try to get away from the light to +something which they are able to behold without blinking? And suppose +further, that they are dragged up a steep and rugged ascent into the +presence of the sun himself, will not their sight be darkened with the +excess of light? Some time will pass before they get the habit of +perceiving at all; and at first they will be able to perceive only shadows +and reflections in the water; then they will recognize the moon and the +stars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper place as he is. +Last of all they will conclude:--This is he who gives us the year and the +seasons, and is the author of all that we see. How will they rejoice in +passing from darkness to light! How worthless to them will seem the +honours and glories of the den! But now imagine further, that they descend +into their old habitations;--in that underground dwelling they will not see +as well as their fellows, and will not be able to compete with them in the +measurement of the shadows on the wall; there will be many jokes about the +man who went on a visit to the sun and lost his eyes, and if they find +anybody trying to set free and enlighten one of their number, they will put +him to death, if they can catch him. Now the cave or den is the world of +sight, the fire is the sun, the way upwards is the way to knowledge, and in +the world of knowledge the idea of good is last seen and with difficulty, +but when seen is inferred to be the author of good and right--parent of the +lord of light in this world, and of truth and understanding in the other. +He who attains to the beatific vision is always going upwards; he is +unwilling to descend into political assemblies and courts of law; for his +eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of images which they behold +in them--he cannot enter into the ideas of those who have never in their +lives understood the relation of the shadow to the substance. But +blindness is of two kinds, and may be caused either by passing out of +darkness into light or out of light into darkness, and a man of sense will +distinguish between them, and will not laugh equally at both of them, but +the blindness which arises from fulness of light he will deem blessed, and +pity the other; or if he laugh at the puzzled soul looking at the sun, he +will have more reason to laugh than the inhabitants of the den at those who +descend from above. There is a further lesson taught by this parable of +ours. Some persons fancy that instruction is like giving eyes to the +blind, but we say that the faculty of sight was always there, and that the +soul only requires to be turned round towards the light. And this is +conversion; other virtues are almost like bodily habits, and may be +acquired in the same manner, but intelligence has a diviner life, and is +indestructible, turning either to good or evil according to the direction +given. Did you never observe how the mind of a clever rogue peers out of +his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the more evil he does? Now if you +take such an one, and cut away from him those leaden weights of pleasure +and desire which bind his soul to earth, his intelligence will be turned +round, and he will behold the truth as clearly as he now discerns his +meaner ends. And have we not decided that our rulers must neither be so +uneducated as to have no fixed rule of life, nor so over-educated as to be +unwilling to leave their paradise for the business of the world? We must +choose out therefore the natures who are most likely to ascend to the light +and knowledge of the good; but we must not allow them to remain in the +region of light; they must be forced down again among the captives in the +den to partake of their labours and honours. 'Will they not think this a +hardship?' You should remember that our purpose in framing the State was +not that our citizens should do what they like, but that they should serve +the State for the common good of all. May we not fairly say to our +philosopher,--Friend, we do you no wrong; for in other States philosophy +grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the gardener, but you have +been trained by us to be the rulers and kings of our hive, and therefore we +must insist on your descending into the den. You must, each of you, take +your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the dark, and with a little +practice you will see far better than those who quarrel about the shadows, +whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours is a waking reality. It may +be that the saint or philosopher who is best fitted, may also be the least +inclined to rule, but necessity is laid upon him, and he must no longer +live in the heaven of ideas. And this will be the salvation of the State. +For those who rule must not be those who are desirous to rule; and, if you +can offer to our citizens a better life than that of rulers generally is, +there will be a chance that the rich, not only in this world's goods, but +in virtue and wisdom, may bear rule. And the only life which is better +than the life of political ambition is that of philosophy, which is also +the best preparation for the government of a State. + +Then now comes the question,--How shall we create our rulers; what way is +there from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy; it is +not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul from +night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the soul +upwards? Our former education had two branches, gymnastic, which was +occupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which infused a natural +harmony into mind and literature; but neither of these sciences gave any +promise of doing what we want. Nothing remains to us but that universal or +primary science of which all the arts and sciences are partakers, I mean +number or calculation. 'Very true.' Including the art of war? 'Yes, +certainly.' Then there is something ludicrous about Palamedes in the +tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented number, and had counted +the ranks and set them in order. For if Agamemnon could not count his feet +(and without number how could he?) he must have been a pretty sort of +general indeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and indeed he +is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these practical +applications of arithmetic, for number, in my view, is rather to be +regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain what I mean +by the last expression:--Things sensible are of two kinds; the one class +invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the mind acquiesces. Now +the stimulating class are the things which suggest contrast and relation. +For example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes three fingers--a fore +finger, a middle finger, a little finger--the sight equally recognizes all +three fingers, but without number cannot further distinguish them. Or +again, suppose two objects to be relatively great and small, these ideas of +greatness and smallness are supplied not by the sense, but by the mind. +And the perception of their contrast or relation quickens and sets in +motion the mind, which is puzzled by the confused intimations of sense, and +has recourse to number in order to find out whether the things indicated +are one or more than one. Number replies that they are two and not one, +and are to be distinguished from one another. Again, the sight beholds +great and small, but only in a confused chaos, and not until they are +distinguished does the question arise of their respective natures; we are +thus led on to the distinction between the visible and intelligible. That +was what I meant when I spoke of stimulants to the intellect; I was +thinking of the contradictions which arise in perception. The idea of +unity, for example, like that of a finger, does not arouse thought unless +involving some conception of plurality; but when the one is also the +opposite of one, the contradiction gives rise to reflection; an example of +this is afforded by any object of sight. All number has also an elevating +effect; it raises the mind out of the foam and flux of generation to the +contemplation of being, having lesser military and retail uses also. The +retail use is not required by us; but as our guardian is to be a soldier as +well as a philosopher, the military one may be retained. And to our higher +purpose no science can be better adapted; but it must be pursued in the +spirit of a philosopher, not of a shopkeeper. It is concerned, not with +visible objects, but with abstract truth; for numbers are pure +abstractions--the true arithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is +capable of division. When you divide, he insists that you are only +multiplying; his 'one' is not material or resolvable into fractions, but an +unvarying and absolute equality; and this proves the purely intellectual +character of his study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of +sharpening the wits; no other discipline is equally severe, or an equal +test of general ability, or equally improving to a stupid person. + +Let our second branch of education be geometry. 'I can easily see,' +replied Glaucon, 'that the skill of the general will be doubled by his +knowledge of geometry.' That is a small matter; the use of geometry, to +which I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the +idea of good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being, and not at +generation only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these studies, as any +one who is the least of a mathematician is aware, is mean and ridiculous; +they are made to look downwards to the arts, and not upwards to eternal +existence. The geometer is always talking of squaring, subtending, +apposing, as if he had in view action; whereas knowledge is the real object +of the study. It should elevate the soul, and create the mind of +philosophy; it should raise up what has fallen down, not to speak of lesser +uses in war and military tactics, and in the improvement of the faculties. + +Shall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy? 'Very +good,' replied Glaucon; 'the knowledge of the heavens is necessary at once +for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.' I like your way of giving +useful reasons for everything in order to make friends of the world. And +there is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education is not only +useful information but a purification of the eye of the soul, which is +better than the bodily eye, for by this alone is truth seen. Now, will you +appeal to mankind in general or to the philosopher? or would you prefer to +look to yourself only? 'Every man is his own best friend.' Then take a +step backward, for we are out of order, and insert the third dimension +which is of solids, after the second which is of planes, and then you may +proceed to solids in motion. But solid geometry is not popular and has not +the patronage of the State, nor is the use of it fully recognized; the +difficulty is great, and the votaries of the study are conceited and +impatient. Still the charm of the pursuit wins upon men, and, if +government would lend a little assistance, there might be great progress +made. 'Very true,' replied Glaucon; 'but do I understand you now to begin +with plane geometry, and to place next geometry of solids, and thirdly, +astronomy, or the motion of solids?' Yes, I said; my hastiness has only +hindered us. + +'Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am willing +to speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the +contemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.' I am an exception, +then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw the soul not +upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the ceiling--no +better; a man may lie on his back on land or on water--he may look up or +look down, but there is no science in that. The vision of knowledge of +which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the mind. All the +magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a copy which falls far +short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing about the absolute +harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like the beauty of figures +drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great artist, which may be used +for illustration, but no mathematician would seek to obtain from them true +conceptions of equality or numerical relations. How ridiculous then to +look for these in the map of the heavens, in which the imperfection of +matter comes in everywhere as a disturbing element, marring the symmetry of +day and night, of months and years, of the sun and stars in their courses. +Only by problems can we place astronomy on a truly scientific basis. Let +the heavens alone, and exert the intellect. + +Still, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say, +and we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion, adapted to +the ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications +also. Let us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting that +we have an aim higher than theirs, which is the relation of these sciences +to the idea of good. The error which pervades astronomy also pervades +harmonics. The musicians put their ears in the place of their minds. +'Yes,' replied Glaucon, 'I like to see them laying their ears alongside of +their neighbours' faces--some saying, "That's a new note," others declaring +that the two notes are the same.' Yes, I said; but you mean the empirics +who are always twisting and torturing the strings of the lyre, and +quarrelling about the tempers of the strings; I am referring rather to the +Pythagorean harmonists, who are almost equally in error. For they +investigate only the numbers of the consonances which are heard, and ascend +no higher,--of the true numerical harmony which is unheard, and is only to +be found in problems, they have not even a conception. 'That last,' he +said, 'must be a marvellous thing.' A thing, I replied, which is only +useful if pursued with a view to the good. + +All these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if +they are regarded in their natural relations to one another. 'I dare say, +Socrates,' said Glaucon; 'but such a study will be an endless business.' +What study do you mean--of the prelude, or what? For all these things are +only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere mathematician +is also a dialectician? 'Certainly not. I have hardly ever known a +mathematician who could reason.' And yet, Glaucon, is not true reasoning +that hymn of dialectic which is the music of the intellectual world, and +which was by us compared to the effort of sight, when from beholding the +shadows on the wall we arrived at last at the images which gave the +shadows? Even so the dialectical faculty withdrawing from sense arrives by +the pure intellect at the contemplation of the idea of good, and never +rests but at the very end of the intellectual world. And the royal road +out of the cave into the light, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun and +turning to contemplate the shadows of reality, not the shadows of an image +only--this progress and gradual acquisition of a new faculty of sight by +the help of the mathematical sciences, is the elevation of the soul to the +contemplation of the highest ideal of being. + +'So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed to +the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths +which lead thither?' Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. There can +be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been disciplined +in the previous sciences. But that there is a science of absolute truth, +which is attained in some way very different from those now practised, I am +confident. For all other arts or sciences are relative to human needs and +opinions; and the mathematical sciences are but a dream or hypothesis of +true being, and never analyse their own principles. Dialectic alone rises +to the principle which is above hypotheses, converting and gently leading +the eye of the soul out of the barbarous slough of ignorance into the light +of the upper world, with the help of the sciences which we have been +describing--sciences, as they are often termed, although they require some +other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than +science, and this in our previous sketch was understanding. And so we get +four names--two for intellect, and two for opinion,--reason or mind, +understanding, faith, perception of shadows--which make a proportion-- +being:becoming::intellect:opinion--and science:belief::understanding: +perception of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that science +which defines and explains the essence or being of each nature, which +distinguishes and abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle against all +opponents in the cause of good. To him who is not a dialectician life is +but a sleepy dream; and many a man is in his grave before his is well waked +up. And would you have the future rulers of your ideal State intelligent +beings, or stupid as posts? 'Certainly not the latter.' Then you must +train them in dialectic, which will teach them to ask and answer questions, +and is the coping-stone of the sciences. + +I dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen; and the +process of selection may be carried a step further:--As before, they must +be constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but now they +must also have natural ability which education will improve; that is to +say, they must be quick at learning, capable of mental toil, retentive, +solid, diligent natures, who combine intellectual with moral virtues; not +lame and one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise and indolent in mind, or +conversely; not a maimed soul, which hates falsehood and yet +unintentionally is always wallowing in the mire of ignorance; not a bastard +or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb, and in perfect condition for +the great gymnastic trial of the mind. Justice herself can find no fault +with natures such as these; and they will be the saviours of our State; +disciples of another sort would only make philosophy more ridiculous than +she is at present. Forgive my enthusiasm; I am becoming excited; but when +I see her trampled underfoot, I am angry at the authors of her disgrace. +'I did not notice that you were more excited than you ought to have been.' +But I felt that I was. Now do not let us forget another point in the +selection of our disciples--that they must be young and not old. For Solon +is mistaken in saying that an old man can be always learning; youth is the +time of study, and here we must remember that the mind is free and dainty, +and, unlike the body, must not be made to work against the grain. Learning +should be at first a sort of play, in which the natural bent is detected. +As in training them for war, the young dogs should at first only taste +blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over which during two or three +years divide life between sleep and bodily exercise, then the education of +the soul will become a more serious matter. At twenty years of age, a +selection must be made of the more promising disciples, with whom a new +epoch of education will begin. The sciences which they have hitherto +learned in fragments will now be brought into relation with each other and +with true being; for the power of combining them is the test of speculative +and dialectical ability. And afterwards at thirty a further selection +shall be made of those who are able to withdraw from the world of sense +into the abstraction of ideas. But at this point, judging from present +experience, there is a danger that dialectic may be the source of many +evils. The danger may be illustrated by a parallel case:--Imagine a person +who has been brought up in wealth and luxury amid a crowd of flatterers, +and who is suddenly informed that he is a supposititious son. He has +hitherto honoured his reputed parents and disregarded the flatterers, and +now he does the reverse. This is just what happens with a man's +principles. There are certain doctrines which he learnt at home and which +exercised a parental authority over him. Presently he finds that +imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and asks, 'What +is the just and good?' or proves that virtue is vice and vice virtue, and +his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour, and obey them as +he has hitherto done. He is seduced into the life of pleasure, and becomes +a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such speculators is very +pitiable, and, in order that our thirty years' old pupils may not require +this pity, let us take every possible care that young persons do not study +philosophy too early. For a young man is a sort of puppy who only plays +with an argument; and is reasoned into and out of his opinions every day; +he soon begins to believe nothing, and brings himself and philosophy into +discredit. A man of thirty does not run on in this way; he will argue and +not merely contradict, and adds new honour to philosophy by the sobriety of +his conduct. What time shall we allow for this second gymnastic training +of the soul?--say, twice the time required for the gymnastics of the body; +six, or perhaps five years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen +years let the student go down into the den, and command armies, and gain +experience of life. At fifty let him return to the end of all things, and +have his eyes uplifted to the idea of good, and order his life after that +pattern; if necessary, taking his turn at the helm of State, and training +up others to be his successors. When his time comes he shall depart in +peace to the islands of the blest. He shall be honoured with sacrifices, +and receive such worship as the Pythian oracle approves. + +'You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our +governors.' Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in all +things with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a mere +aspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise +philosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and will +be the servants of justice only. 'And how will they begin their work?' +Their first act will be to send away into the country all those who are +more than ten years of age, and to proceed with those who are left... + +At the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his explanation of +the relation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory, in this, as in +other passages, following the order which he prescribes in education, and +proceeding from the concrete to the abstract. At the commencement of Book +VII, under the figure of a cave having an opening towards a fire and a way +upwards to the true light, he returns to view the divisions of knowledge, +exhibiting familiarly, as in a picture, the result which had been hardly +won by a great effort of thought in the previous discussion; at the same +time casting a glance onward at the dialectical process, which is +represented by the way leading from darkness to light. The shadows, the +images, the reflection of the sun and stars in the water, the stars and sun +themselves, severally correspond,--the first, to the realm of fancy and +poetry,--the second, to the world of sense,--the third, to the abstractions +or universals of sense, of which the mathematical sciences furnish the +type,--the fourth and last to the same abstractions, when seen in the unity +of the idea, from which they derive a new meaning and power. The true +dialectical process begins with the contemplation of the real stars, and +not mere reflections of them, and ends with the recognition of the sun, or +idea of good, as the parent not only of light but of warmth and growth. To +the divisions of knowledge the stages of education partly answer:--first, +there is the early education of childhood and youth in the fancies of the +poets, and in the laws and customs of the State;--then there is the +training of the body to be a warrior athlete, and a good servant of the +mind;--and thirdly, after an interval follows the education of later life, +which begins with mathematics and proceeds to philosophy in general. + +There seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,--first, to +realize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the +true education is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to a +comprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human mind +the faculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last the +particulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He then +seeks to combine the universals which he has disengaged from sense, not +perceiving that the correlation of them has no other basis but the common +use of language. He never understands that abstractions, as Hegel says, +are 'mere abstractions'--of use when employed in the arrangement of facts, +but adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart from them, or +with reference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the exercise of the +faculty of abstraction apart from facts has enlarged the mind, and played a +great part in the education of the human race. Plato appreciated the value +of this faculty, and saw that it might be quickened by the study of number +and relation. All things in which there is opposition or proportion are +suggestive of reflection. The mere impression of sense evokes no power of +thought or of mind, but when sensible objects ask to be compared and +distinguished, then philosophy begins. The science of arithmetic first +suggests such distinctions. The follow in order the other sciences of +plain and solid geometry, and of solids in motion, one branch of which is +astronomy or the harmony of the spheres,--to this is appended the sister +science of the harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at the +possibility of other applications of arithmetical or mathematical +proportions, such as we employ in chemistry and natural philosophy, such as +the Pythagoreans and even Aristotle make use of in Ethics and Politics, +e.g. his distinction between arithmetical and geometrical proportion in the +Ethics (Book V), or between numerical and proportional equality in the +Politics. + +The modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato's delight in +the properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say with +him:--Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and figure in +themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application to the +arts. He will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, in which +figures are to be dispensed with; thus in a distant and shadowy way seeming +to anticipate the possibility of working geometrical problems by a more +general mode of analysis. He will remark with interest on the backward +state of solid geometry, which, alas! was not encouraged by the aid of the +State in the age of Plato; and he will recognize the grasp of Plato's mind +in his ability to conceive of one science of solids in motion including the +earth as well as the heavens,--not forgetting to notice the intimation to +which allusion has been already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics +the science of solids in motion may have other applications. Still more +will he be struck with the comprehensiveness of view which led Plato, at a +time when these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must be studied +in relation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common principle of +truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without surprise) that +in that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato has fallen into +the error of supposing that he can construct the heavens a priori by +mathematical problems, and determine the principles of harmony irrespective +of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The illusion was a natural +one in that age and country. The simplicity and certainty of astronomy and +harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation and complexity of the world +of sense; hence the circumstance that there was some elementary basis of +fact, some measurement of distance or time or vibrations on which they must +ultimately rest, was overlooked by him. The modern predecessors of Newton +fell into errors equally great; and Plato can hardly be said to have been +very far wrong, or may even claim a sort of prophetic insight into the +subject, when we consider that the greater part of astronomy at the present +day consists of abstract dynamics, by the help of which most astronomical +discoveries have been made. + +The metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes mathematics +as an instrument of education,--which strengthens the power of attention, +developes the sense of order and the faculty of construction, and enables +the mind to grasp under simple formulae the quantitative differences of +physical phenomena. But while acknowledging their value in education, he +sees also that they have no connexion with our higher moral and +intellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato makes to connect them, we +easily trace the influences of ancient Pythagorean notions. There is no +reason to suppose that he is speaking of the ideal numbers; but he is +describing numbers which are pure abstractions, to which he assigns a real +and separate existence, which, as 'the teachers of the art' (meaning +probably the Pythagoreans) would have affirmed, repel all attempts at +subdivision, and in which unity and every other number are conceived of as +absolute. The truth and certainty of numbers, when thus disengaged from +phenomena, gave them a kind of sacredness in the eyes of an ancient +philosopher. Nor is it easy to say how far ideas of order and fixedness +may have had a moral and elevating influence on the minds of men, 'who,' in +the words of the Timaeus, 'might learn to regulate their erring lives +according to them.' It is worthy of remark that the old Pythagorean +ethical symbols still exist as figures of speech among ourselves. And +those who in modern times see the world pervaded by universal law, may also +see an anticipation of this last word of modern philosophy in the Platonic +idea of good, which is the source and measure of all things, and yet only +an abstraction (Philebus). + +Two passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that +which relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage +may be explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of +conception prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the +perceptions of sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which +accompanies them. The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is +indistinguishable from the simple sensation, which is the medium of them. +Whereas to Plato sense is the Heraclitean flux of sense, not the vision of +objects in the order in which they actually present themselves to the +experienced sight, but as they may be imagined to appear confused and +blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant. The first action of the +mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this chaos, and the reason +is required to frame distinct conceptions under which the confused +impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises the question, 'What is +great, what is small?' and thus begins the distinction of the visible and +the intelligible. + +The second difficulty relates to Plato's conception of harmonics. Three +classes of harmonists are distinguished by him:--first, the Pythagoreans, +whom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion on music he was +to consult Damon--they are acknowledged to be masters in the art, but are +altogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher import and relation to +the good; secondly, the mere empirics, whom Glaucon appears to confuse with +them, and whom both he and Socrates ludicrously describe as experimenting +by mere auscultation on the intervals of sounds. Both of these fall short +in different degrees of the Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied +in a purely abstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as +a part of universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good. + +The allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The den +or cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (compare the +description of the philosopher and lawyer in the Theaetetus), and the light +of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing influence on the +minds of those who return to this lower world. In other words, their +principles are too wide for practical application; they are looking far +away into the past and future, when their business is with the present. +The ideal is not easily reduced to the conditions of actual life, and may +often be at variance with them. And at first, those who return are unable +to compete with the inhabitants of the den in the measurement of the +shadows, and are derided and persecuted by them; but after a while they see +the things below in far truer proportions than those who have never +ascended into the upper world. The difference between the politician +turned into a philosopher and the philosopher turned into a politician, is +symbolized by the two kinds of disordered eyesight, the one which is +experienced by the captive who is transferred from darkness to day, the +other, of the heavenly messenger who voluntarily for the good of his +fellow-men descends into the den. In what way the brighter light is to +dawn on the inhabitants of the lower world, or how the idea of good is to +become the guiding principle of politics, is left unexplained by Plato. +Like the nature and divisions of dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently +demands to be informed, perhaps he would have said that the explanation +could not be given except to a disciple of the previous sciences. +(Symposium.) + +Many illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern +Politics and in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have been two +sorts of Politicians or Statesmen, whose eyesight has become disordered in +two different ways. First, there have been great men who, in the language +of Burke, 'have been too much given to general maxims,' who, like J.S. Mill +or Burke himself, have been theorists or philosophers before they were +politicians, or who, having been students of history, have allowed some +great historical parallel, such as the English Revolution of 1688, or +possibly Athenian democracy or Roman Imperialism, to be the medium through +which they viewed contemporary events. Or perhaps the long projecting +shadow of some existing institution may have darkened their vision. The +Church of the future, the Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the +future, have so absorbed their minds, that they are unable to see in their +true proportions the Politics of to-day. They have been intoxicated with +great ideas, such as liberty, or equality, or the greatest happiness of the +greatest number, or the brotherhood of humanity, and they no longer care to +consider how these ideas must be limited in practice or harmonized with the +conditions of human life. They are full of light, but the light to them +has become only a sort of luminous mist or blindness. Almost every one has +known some enthusiastic half-educated person, who sees everything at false +distances, and in erroneous proportions. + +With this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another--of those who see +not far into the distance, but what is near only; who have been engaged all +their lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to a set or sect of +their own. Men of this kind have no universal except their own interests +or the interests of their class, no principle but the opinion of persons +like themselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond what they pick up in the +streets or at their club. Suppose them to be sent into a larger world, to +undertake some higher calling, from being tradesmen to turn generals or +politicians, from being schoolmasters to become philosophers:--or imagine +them on a sudden to receive an inward light which reveals to them for the +first time in their lives a higher idea of God and the existence of a +spiritual world, by this sudden conversion or change is not their daily +life likely to be upset; and on the other hand will not many of their old +prejudices and narrownesses still adhere to them long after they have begun +to take a more comprehensive view of human things? From familiar examples +like these we may learn what Plato meant by the eyesight which is liable to +two kinds of disorders. + +Nor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young Athenian +in the fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new ideas, and +the student of a modern University who has been the subject of a similar +'aufklarung.' We too observe that when young men begin to criticise +customary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human nature, they are +apt to lose hold of solid principle (Greek). They are like trees which +have been frequently transplanted. The earth about them is loose, and they +have no roots reaching far into the soil. They 'light upon every flower,' +following their own wayward wills, or because the wind blows them. They +catch opinions, as diseases are caught--when they are in the air. Borne +hither and thither, 'they speedily fall into beliefs' the opposite of those +in which they were brought up. They hardly retain the distinction of right +and wrong; they seem to think one thing as good as another. They suppose +themselves to be searching after truth when they are playing the game of +'follow my leader.' They fall in love 'at first sight' with paradoxes +respecting morality, some fancy about art, some novelty or eccentricity in +religion, and like lovers they are so absorbed for a time in their new +notion that they can think of nothing else. The resolution of some +philosophical or theological question seems to them more interesting and +important than any substantial knowledge of literature or science or even +than a good life. Like the youth in the Philebus, they are ready to +discourse to any one about a new philosophy. They are generally the +disciples of some eminent professor or sophist, whom they rather imitate +than understand. They may be counted happy if in later years they retain +some of the simple truths which they acquired in early education, and which +they may, perhaps, find to be worth all the rest. Such is the picture +which Plato draws and which we only reproduce, partly in his own words, of +the dangers which beset youth in times of transition, when old opinions are +fading away and the new are not yet firmly established. Their condition is +ingeniously compared by him to that of a supposititious son, who has made +the discovery that his reputed parents are not his real ones, and, in +consequence, they have lost their authority over him. + +The distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also +noticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the mathematician +is quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense which recognizes and +combines first principles. The contempt which he expresses for +distinctions of words, the danger of involuntary falsehood, the apology +which Socrates makes for his earnestness of speech, are highly +characteristic of the Platonic style and mode of thought. The quaint +notion that if Palamedes was the inventor of number Agamemnon could not +have counted his feet; the art by which we are made to believe that this +State of ours is not a dream only; the gravity with which the first step is +taken in the actual creation of the State, namely, the sending out of the +city all who had arrived at ten years of age, in order to expedite the +business of education by a generation, are also truly Platonic. (For the +last, compare the passage at the end of the third book, in which he expects +the lie about the earthborn men to be believed in the second generation.) + +BOOK VIII. And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the perfect +State wives and children are to be in common; and the education and +pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are to be common, and +kings are to be philosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the State +are to live together, having all things in common; and they are to be +warrior athletes, receiving no pay but only their food, from the other +citizens. Now let us return to the point at which we digressed. 'That is +easily done,' he replied: 'You were speaking of the State which you had +constructed, and of the individual who answered to this, both of whom you +affirmed to be good; and you said that of inferior States there were four +forms and four individuals corresponding to them, which although deficient +in various degrees, were all of them worth inspecting with a view to +determining the relative happiness or misery of the best or worst man. +Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted you, and this led to another +argument,--and so here we are.' Suppose that we put ourselves again in the +same position, and do you repeat your question. 'I should like to know of +what constitutions you were speaking?' Besides the perfect State there are +only four of any note in Hellas:--first, the famous Lacedaemonian or Cretan +commonwealth; secondly, oligarchy, a State full of evils; thirdly, +democracy, which follows next in order; fourthly, tyranny, which is the +disease or death of all government. Now, States are not made of 'oak and +rock,' but of flesh and blood; and therefore as there are five States there +must be five human natures in individuals, which correspond to them. And +first, there is the ambitious nature, which answers to the Lacedaemonian +State; secondly, the oligarchical nature; thirdly, the democratical; and +fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will have to be compared with the +perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may know which is the happier, +and then we shall be able to determine whether the argument of Thrasymachus +or our own is the more convincing. And as before we began with the State +and went on to the individual, so now, beginning with timocracy, let us go +on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to the other forms of +government, and the individuals who answer to them. + +But how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like all +changes of government, from division in the rulers. But whence came +division? 'Sing, heavenly Muses,' as Homer says;--let them condescend to +answer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face in +jest. 'And what will they say?' They will say that human things are fated +to decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this law of +destiny, when 'the wheel comes full circle' in a period short or long. +Plants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which the +intelligence of rulers because alloyed by sense will not enable them to +ascertain, and children will be born out of season. For whereas divine +creations are in a perfect cycle or number, the human creation is in a +number which declines from perfection, and has four terms and three +intervals of numbers, increasing, waning, assimilating, dissimilating, and +yet perfectly commensurate with each other. The base of the number with a +fourth added (or which is 3:4), multiplied by five and cubed, gives two +harmonies:--the first a square number, which is a hundred times the base +(or a hundred times a hundred); the second, an oblong, being a hundred +squares of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which is five, +subtracting one from each square or two perfect squares from all, and +adding a hundred cubes of three. This entire number is geometrical and +contains the rule or law of generation. When this law is neglected +marriages will be unpropitious; the inferior offspring who are then born +will in time become the rulers; the State will decline, and education fall +into decay; gymnastic will be preferred to music, and the gold and silver +and brass and iron will form a chaotic mass--thus division will arise. +Such is the Muses' answer to our question. 'And a true answer, of course: +--but what more have they to say?' They say that the two races, the iron +and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State different ways;-- +the one will take to trade and moneymaking, and the others, having the true +riches and not caring for money, will resist them: the contest will end in +a compromise; they will agree to have private property, and will enslave +their fellow-citizens who were once their friends and nurturers. But they +will retain their warlike character, and will be chiefly occupied in +fighting and exercising rule. Thus arises timocracy, which is intermediate +between aristocracy and oligarchy. + +The new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers and +contempt for trade, and having common meals, and in devotion to warlike and +gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into philosophy, and +simplicity of character, which was once her note, is now looked for only in +the military class. Arts of war begin to prevail over arts of peace; the +ruler is no longer a philosopher; as in oligarchies, there springs up among +them an extravagant love of gain--get another man's and save your own, is +their principle; and they have dark places in which they hoard their gold +and silver, for the use of their women and others; they take their +pleasures by stealth, like boys who are running away from their father--the +law; and their education is not inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the +strong arm of power. The leading characteristic of this State is party +spirit and ambition. + +And what manner of man answers to such a State? 'In love of contention,' +replied Adeimantus, 'he will be like our friend Glaucon.' In that respect, +perhaps, but not in others. He is self-asserting and ill-educated, yet +fond of literature, although not himself a speaker,--fierce with slaves, +but obedient to rulers, a lover of power and honour, which he hopes to gain +by deeds of arms,--fond, too, of gymnastics and of hunting. As he advances +in years he grows avaricious, for he has lost philosophy, which is the only +saviour and guardian of men. His origin is as follows:--His father is a +good man dwelling in an ill-ordered State, who has retired from politics in +order that he may lead a quiet life. His mother is angry at her loss of +precedence among other women; she is disgusted at her husband's +selfishness, and she expatiates to her son on the unmanliness and indolence +of his father. The old family servant takes up the tale, and says to the +youth:--'When you grow up you must be more of a man than your father.' All +the world are agreed that he who minds his own business is an idiot, while +a busybody is highly honoured and esteemed. The young man compares this +spirit with his father's words and ways, and as he is naturally well +disposed, although he has suffered from evil influences, he rests at a +middle point and becomes ambitious and a lover of honour. + +And now let us set another city over against another man. The next form of +government is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor is it +difficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with the +possession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are invented; +one draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches outweigh +virtue; lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; misers of +politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined by law to the +rich, who do not shrink from violence in order to effect their purposes. + +Thus much of the origin,--let us next consider the evils of oligarchy. +Would a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because he +was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the +analogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils: +two nations are struggling together in one--the rich and the poor; and the +rich dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling to pay +for defenders out of their own money. And have we not already condemned +that State in which the same persons are warriors as well as shopkeepers? +The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell his property and have no +place in the State; while there is one class which has enormous wealth, the +other is entirely destitute. But observe that these destitutes had not +really any more of the governing nature in them when they were rich than +now that they are poor; they were miserable spendthrifts always. They are +the drones of the hive; only whereas the actual drone is unprovided by +nature with a sting, the two-legged things whom we call drones are some of +them without stings and some of them have dreadful stings; in other words, +there are paupers and there are rogues. These are never far apart; and in +oligarchical cities, where nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler, +you will find abundance of both. And this evil state of society originates +in bad education and bad government. + +Like State, like man,--the change in the latter begins with the +representative of timocracy; he walks at first in the ways of his father, +who may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps; and presently he sees +him 'fallen from his high estate,' the victim of informers, dying in prison +or exile, or by the hand of the executioner. The lesson which he thus +receives, makes him cautious; he leaves politics, represses his pride, and +saves pence. Avarice is enthroned as his bosom's lord, and assumes the +style of the Great King; the rational and spirited elements sit humbly on +the ground at either side, the one immersed in calculation, the other +absorbed in the admiration of wealth. The love of honour turns to love of +money; the conversion is instantaneous. The man is mean, saving, toiling, +the slave of one passion which is the master of the rest: Is he not the +very image of the State? He has had no education, or he would never have +allowed the blind god of riches to lead the dance within him. And being +uneducated he will have many slavish desires, some beggarly, some knavish, +breeding in his soul. If he is the trustee of an orphan, and has the power +to defraud, he will soon prove that he is not without the will, and that +his passions are only restrained by fear and not by reason. Hence he leads +a divided existence; in which the better desires mostly prevail. But when +he is contending for prizes and other distinctions, he is afraid to incur a +loss which is to be repaid only by barren honour; in time of war he fights +with a small part of his resources, and usually keeps his money and loses +the victory. + +Next comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and the +oligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an +oligarchy; and they encourage expensive habits in order that they may gain +by the ruin of extravagant youth. Thus men of family often lose their +property or rights of citizenship; but they remain in the city, full of +hatred against the new owners of their estates and ripe for revolution. +The usurer with stooping walk pretends not to see them; he passes by, and +leaves his sting--that is, his money--in some other victim; and many a man +has to pay the parent or principal sum multiplied into a family of +children, and is reduced into a state of dronage by him. The only way of +diminishing the evil is either to limit a man in his use of his property, +or to insist that he shall lend at his own risk. But the ruling class do +not want remedies; they care only for money, and are as careless of virtue +as the poorest of the citizens. Now there are occasions on which the +governors and the governed meet together,--at festivals, on a journey, +voyaging or fighting. The sturdy pauper finds that in the hour of danger he +is not despised; he sees the rich man puffing and panting, and draws the +conclusion which he privately imparts to his companions,--'that our people +are not good for much;' and as a sickly frame is made ill by a mere touch +from without, or sometimes without external impulse is ready to fall to +pieces of itself, so from the least cause, or with none at all, the city +falls ill and fights a battle for life or death. And democracy comes into +power when the poor are the victors, killing some and exiling some, and +giving equal shares in the government to all the rest. + +The manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom +and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes, +and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of +character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours and +figures are the manners of men, and there are many who, like women and +children, prefer this variety to real beauty and excellence. The State is +not one but many, like a bazaar at which you can buy anything. The great +charm is, that you may do as you like; you may govern if you like, let it +alone if you like; go to war and make peace if you feel disposed, and all +quite irrespective of anybody else. When you condemn men to death they +remain alive all the same; a gentleman is desired to go into exile, and he +stalks about the streets like a hero; and nobody sees him or cares for him. +Observe, too, how grandly Democracy sets her foot upon all our fine +theories of education,--how little she cares for the training of her +statesmen! The only qualification which she demands is the profession of +patriotism. Such is democracy;--a pleasing, lawless, various sort of +government, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike. + +Let us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case of +the State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly +oligarch, and has been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary +pleasures. Perhaps I ought to explain this latter term:--Necessary +pleasures are those which are good, and which we cannot do without; +unnecessary pleasures are those which do no good, and of which the desire +might be eradicated by early training. For example, the pleasures of +eating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to a certain point; +beyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and mind, and the excess +may be avoided. When in excess, they may be rightly called expensive +pleasures, in opposition to the useful ones. And the drone, as we called +him, is the slave of these unnecessary pleasures and desires, whereas the +miserly oligarch is subject only to the necessary. + +The oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:--The youth +who has had a miserly bringing up, gets a taste of the drone's honey; he +meets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new pleasure. As in +the State, so in the individual, there are allies on both sides, +temptations from without and passions from within; there is reason also and +external influences of parents and friends in alliance with the +oligarchical principle; and the two factions are in violent conflict with +one another. Sometimes the party of order prevails, but then again new +desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob of passions gets +possession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the soul, which they find void +and unguarded by true words and works. Falsehoods and illusions ascend to +take their place; the prodigal goes back into the country of the Lotophagi +or drones, and openly dwells there. And if any offer of alliance or parley +of individual elders comes from home, the false spirits shut the gates of +the castle and permit no one to enter,--there is a battle, and they gain +the victory; and straightway making alliance with the desires, they banish +modesty, which they call folly, and send temperance over the border. When +the house has been swept and garnished, they dress up the exiled vices, +and, crowning them with garlands, bring them back under new names. +Insolence they call good breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, +impudence courage. Such is the process by which the youth passes from the +necessary pleasures to the unnecessary. After a while he divides his time +impartially between them; and perhaps, when he gets older and the violence +of passion has abated, he restores some of the exiles and lives in a sort +of equilibrium, indulging first one pleasure and then another; and if +reason comes and tells him that some pleasures are good and honourable, and +others bad and vile, he shakes his head and says that he can make no +distinction between them. Thus he lives in the fancy of the hour; +sometimes he takes to drink, and then he turns abstainer; he practises in +the gymnasium or he does nothing at all; then again he would be a +philosopher or a politician; or again, he would be a warrior or a man of +business; he is + +'Every thing by starts and nothing long.' + +There remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all States-- +tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much as democracy +springs from oligarchy. Both arise from excess; the one from excess of +wealth, the other from excess of freedom. 'The great natural good of +life,' says the democrat, 'is freedom.' And this exclusive love of freedom +and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the change from +democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of freedom, and +unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes and insults them; +equality and fraternity of governors and governed is the approved +principle. Anarchy is the law, not of the State only, but of private +houses, and extends even to the animals. Father and son, citizen and +foreigner, teacher and pupil, old and young, are all on a level; fathers +and teachers fear their sons and pupils, and the wisdom of the young man is +a match for the elder, and the old imitate the jaunty manners of the young +because they are afraid of being thought morose. Slaves are on a level +with their masters and mistresses, and there is no difference between men +and women. Nay, the very animals in a democratic State have a freedom +which is unknown in other places. The she-dogs are as good as their she- +mistresses, and horses and asses march along with dignity and run their +noses against anybody who comes in their way. 'That has often been my +experience.' At last the citizens become so sensitive that they cannot +endure the yoke of laws, written or unwritten; they would have no man call +himself their master. Such is the glorious beginning of things out of +which tyranny springs. 'Glorious, indeed; but what is to follow?' The +ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; for there is a law of +contraries; the excess of freedom passes into the excess of slavery, and +the greater the freedom the greater the slavery. You will remember that in +the oligarchy were found two classes--rogues and paupers, whom we compared +to drones with and without stings. These two classes are to the State what +phlegm and bile are to the human body; and the State-physician, or +legislator, must get rid of them, just as the bee-master keeps the drones +out of the hive. Now in a democracy, too, there are drones, but they are +more numerous and more dangerous than in the oligarchy; there they are +inert and unpractised, here they are full of life and animation; and the +keener sort speak and act, while the others buzz about the bema and prevent +their opponents from being heard. And there is another class in democratic +States, of respectable, thriving individuals, who can be squeezed when the +drones have need of their possessions; there is moreover a third class, who +are the labourers and the artisans, and they make up the mass of the +people. When the people meet, they are omnipotent, but they cannot be +brought together unless they are attracted by a little honey; and the rich +are made to supply the honey, of which the demagogues keep the greater part +themselves, giving a taste only to the mob. Their victims attempt to +resist; they are driven mad by the stings of the drones, and so become +downright oligarchs in self-defence. Then follow informations and +convictions for treason. The people have some protector whom they nurse +into greatness, and from this root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature +of the change is indicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus, +which tells how he who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other +victims will turn into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human +blood, and slays some and exiles others with or without law, who hints at +abolition of debts and division of lands, must either perish or become a +wolf--that is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes back +from exile; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by lawful means, +they plot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the people makes his +well-known request to them for a body-guard, which they readily grant, +thinking only of his danger and not of their own. Now let the rich man +make to himself wings, for he will never run away again if he does not do +so then. And the Great Protector, having crushed all his rivals, stands +proudly erect in the chariot of State, a full-blown tyrant: Let us enquire +into the nature of his happiness. + +In the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody; he is +not a 'dominus,' no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt and +the monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes himself +necessary to the State by always going to war. He is thus enabled to +depress the poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work; and he can get +rid of bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy. Then comes +unpopularity; some of his old associates have the courage to oppose him. +The consequence is, that he has to make a purgation of the State; but, +unlike the physician who purges away the bad, he must get rid of the high- +spirited, the wise and the wealthy; for he has no choice between death and +a life of shame and dishonour. And the more hated he is, the more he will +require trusty guards; but how will he obtain them? 'They will come +flocking like birds--for pay.' Will he not rather obtain them on the spot? +He will take the slaves from their owners and make them his body-guard; +these are his trusted friends, who admire and look up to him. Are not the +tragic poets wise who magnify and exalt the tyrant, and say that he is wise +by association with the wise? And are not their praises of tyranny alone a +sufficient reason why we should exclude them from our State? They may go +to other cities, and gather the mob about them with fine words, and change +commonwealths into tyrannies and democracies, receiving honours and rewards +for their services; but the higher they and their friends ascend +constitution hill, the more their honour will fail and become 'too +asthmatic to mount.' To return to the tyrant--How will he support that +rare army of his? First, by robbing the temples of their treasures, which +will enable him to lighten the taxes; then he will take all his father's +property, and spend it on his companions, male or female. Now his father +is the demus, and if the demus gets angry, and says that a great hulking +son ought not to be a burden on his parents, and bids him and his riotous +crew begone, then will the parent know what a monster he has been +nurturing, and that the son whom he would fain expel is too strong for him. +'You do not mean to say that he will beat his father?' Yes, he will, after +having taken away his arms. 'Then he is a parricide and a cruel, unnatural +son.' And the people have jumped from the fear of slavery into slavery, +out of the smoke into the fire. Thus liberty, when out of all order and +reason, passes into the worst form of servitude... + +In the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he returns +to the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly touched at the +end of Book IV. These he describes in a succession of parallels between +the individuals and the States, tracing the origin of either in the State +or individual which has preceded them. He begins by asking the point at +which he digressed; and is thus led shortly to recapitulate the substance +of the three former books, which also contain a parallel of the philosopher +and the State. + +Of the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have +liked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State, +which to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism or the +natural antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws a veil of +mystery over the origin of the decline, which he attributes to ignorance of +the law of population. Of this law the famous geometrical figure or number +is the expression. Like the ancients in general, he had no idea of the +gradual perfectibility of man or of the education of the human race. His +ideal was not to be attained in the course of ages, but was to spring in +full armour from the head of the legislator. When good laws had been +given, he thought only of the manner in which they were likely to be +corrupted, or of how they might be filled up in detail or restored in +accordance with their original spirit. He appears not to have reflected +upon the full meaning of his own words, 'In the brief space of human life, +nothing great can be accomplished'; or again, as he afterwards says in the +Laws, 'Infinite time is the maker of cities.' The order of constitutions +which is adopted by him represents an order of thought rather than a +succession of time, and may be considered as the first attempt to frame a +philosophy of history. + +The first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of +soldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this is +a government of force, in which education is not inspired by the Muses, but +imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of organization +have disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the love of truth, and +the soldier, who is of a simpler and honester nature, rules in his stead. +The individual who answers to timocracy has some noticeable qualities. He +is described as ill educated, but, like the Spartan, a lover of literature; +and although he is a harsh master to his servants he has no natural +superiority over them. His character is based upon a reaction against the +circumstances of his father, who in a troubled city has retired from +politics; and his mother, who is dissatisfied at her own position, is +always urging him towards the life of political ambition. Such a character +may have had this origin, and indeed Livy attributes the Licinian laws to a +feminine jealousy of a similar kind. But there is obviously no connection +between the manner in which the timocratic State springs out of the ideal, +and the mere accident by which the timocratic man is the son of a retired +statesman. + +The two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less +historical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a polity +like the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, or of the +oligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of history appears +to be different; first, in the Homeric times there is the royal or +patriarchal form of government, which a century or two later was succeeded +by an oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and in which wealth was +only the accident of the hereditary possession of land and power. +Sometimes this oligarchical government gave way to a government based upon +a qualification of property, which, according to Aristotle's mode of using +words, would have been called a timocracy; and this in some cities, as at +Athens, became the conducting medium to democracy. But such was not the +necessary order of succession in States; nor, indeed, can any order be +discerned in the endless fluctuation of Greek history (like the tides in +the Euripus), except, perhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from monarchy +to aristocracy in the earliest times. At first sight there appears to be a +similar inversion in the last step of the Platonic succession; for tyranny, +instead of being the natural end of democracy, in early Greek history +appears rather as a stage leading to democracy; the reign of Peisistratus +and his sons is an episode which comes between the legislation of Solon and +the constitution of Cleisthenes; and some secret cause common to them all +seems to have led the greater part of Hellas at her first appearance in the +dawn of history, e.g. Athens, Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly every +State with the exception of Sparta, through a similar stage of tyranny +which ended either in oligarchy or democracy. But then we must remember +that Plato is describing rather the contemporary governments of the +Sicilian States, which alternated between democracy and tyranny, than the +ancient history of Athens or Corinth. + +The portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek +delighted to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives of +mediaeval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were +attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was no +enormity which the Greek was not today to believe of them; the tyrant was +the negation of government and law; his assassination was glorious; there +was no crime, however unnatural, which might not with probability be +attributed to him. In this, Plato was only following the common thought of +his countrymen, which he embellished and exaggerated with all the power of +his genius. There is no need to suppose that he drew from life; or that +his knowledge of tyrants is derived from a personal acquaintance with +Dionysius. The manner in which he speaks of them would rather tend to +render doubtful his ever having 'consorted' with them, or entertained the +schemes, which are attributed to him in the Epistles, of regenerating +Sicily by their help. + +Plato in a hyperbolical and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of +democracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy is +a state of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing what +is right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit of +liberty, rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the leading +idea of democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to think. +But if he is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover of +tyranny. His deeper and more serious condemnation is reserved for the +tyrant, who is the ideal of wickedness and also of weakness, and who in his +utter helplessness and suspiciousness is leading an almost impossible +existence, without that remnant of good which, in Plato's opinion, was +required to give power to evil (Book I). This ideal of wickedness living +in helpless misery, is the reverse of that other portrait of perfect +injustice ruling in happiness and splendour, which first of all +Thrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had drawn, and is also the +reverse of the king whose rule of life is the good of his subjects. + +Each of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical +gradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not extinguishing +but harmonizing the passions, and training them in virtue; in the timocracy +and the timocratic man the constitution, whether of the State or of the +individual, is based, first, upon courage, and secondly, upon the love of +honour; this latter virtue, which is hardly to be esteemed a virtue, has +superseded all the rest. In the second stage of decline the virtues have +altogether disappeared, and the love of gain has succeeded to them; in the +third stage, or democracy, the various passions are allowed to have free +play, and the virtues and vices are impartially cultivated. But this +freedom, which leads to many curious extravagances of character, is in +reality only a state of weakness and dissipation. At last, one monster +passion takes possession of the whole nature of man--this is tyranny. In +all of them excess--the excess first of wealth and then of freedom, is the +element of decay. + +The eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and fanciful +allusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater extent +than anywhere else in Plato. We may remark, + +(1), the description of the two nations in one, which become more and more +divided in the Greek Republics, as in feudal times, and perhaps also in our +own; + +(2), the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula as +equality among unequals; + +(3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are characteristic of +liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust are of the tyrant; + +(4), the proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a +speculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law in +modern times, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern legislation. +Debt and land were the two great difficulties of the ancient lawgiver: in +modern times we may be said to have almost, if not quite, solved the first +of these difficulties, but hardly the second. + +Still more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals: +there is the family picture of the father and mother and the old servant of +the timocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent meanness +of the oligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of the democrat, +in which the young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing right or wrong as +he pleases, and who at last, like the prodigal, goes into a far country +(note here the play of language by which the democratic man is himself +represented under the image of a State having a citadel and receiving +embassies); and there is the wild-beast nature, which breaks loose in his +successor. The hit about the tyrant being a parricide; the representation +of the tyrant's life as an obscene dream; the rhetorical surprise of a more +miserable than the most miserable of men in Book IX; the hint to the poets +that if they are the friends of tyrants there is no place for them in a +constitutional State, and that they are too clever not to see the propriety +of their own expulsion; the continuous image of the drones who are of two +kinds, swelling at last into the monster drone having wings (Book IX),--are +among Plato's happiest touches. + +There remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the +Republic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as +great as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though +apparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of +obscurity (Ep. ad Att.). And some have imagined that there is no answer to +the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his readers. But such +a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle +speaks of the number (Pol.), and would have been ridiculous to any reader +of the Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics. As little +reason is there for supposing that Plato intentionally used obscure +expressions; the obscurity arises from our want of familiarity with the +subject. On the other hand, Plato himself indicates that he is not +altogether serious, and in describing his number as a solemn jest of the +Muses, he appears to imply some degree of satire on the symbolical use of +number. (Compare Cratylus; Protag.) + +Our hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an accurate +study of the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by the +parallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in +Aristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter part of the +passage (Greek) describes a solid figure. (Pol.--'He only says that +nothing is abiding, but that all things change in a certain cycle; and that +the origin of the change is a base of numbers which are in the ratio of +4:3; and this when combined with a figure of five gives two harmonies; he +means when the number of this figure becomes solid.') Some further clue +may be gathered from the appearance of the Pythagorean triangle, which is +denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in which, as in every right-angled +triangle, the squares of the two lesser sides equal the square of the +hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25). + +Plato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (Tim.), i.e. a +number in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the +divine or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are +complete. He also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four terms +and three intervals of numbers which are related to one another in certain +proportions; these he converts into figures, and finds in them when they +have been raised to the third power certain elements of number, which give +two 'harmonies,' the one square, the other oblong; but he does not say that +the square number answers to the divine, or the oblong number to the human +cycle; nor is any intimation given that the first or divine number +represents the period of the world, the second the period of the state, or +of the human race as Zeller supposes; nor is the divine number afterwards +mentioned (Arist.). The second is the number of generations or births, and +presides over them in the same mysterious manner in which the stars preside +over them, or in which, according to the Pythagoreans, opportunity, +justice, marriage, are represented by some number or figure. This is +probably the number 216. + +The explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up the +number 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from the +circumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens +(Herod.), and would be what Plato might have called 'a number which nearly +concerns the population of a city'; the mysterious disappearance of the +Spartan population may possibly have suggested to him the first cause of +his decline of States. The lesser or square 'harmony,' of 400, might be a +symbol of the guardians,--the larger or oblong 'harmony,' of the people, +and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer respectively to the three orders in the +State or parts of the soul, the four virtues, the five forms of government. +The harmony of the musical scale, which is elsewhere used as a symbol of +the harmony of the state, is also indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, +which represent the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, also denote the +intervals of the scale. + +The terms used in the statement of the problem may be explained as follows. +A perfect number (Greek), as already stated, is one which is equal to the +sum of its divisors. Thus 6, which is the first perfect or cyclical +number, = 1 + 2 + 3. The words (Greek), 'terms' or 'notes,' and (Greek), +'intervals,' are applicable to music as well as to number and figure. +(Greek) is the 'base' on which the whole calculation depends, or the +'lowest term' from which it can be worked out. The words (Greek) have been +variously translated--'squared and cubed' (Donaldson), 'equalling and +equalled in power' (Weber), 'by involution and evolution,' i.e. by raising +the power and extracting the root (as in the translation). Numbers are +called 'like and unlike' (Greek) when the factors or the sides of the +planes and cubes which they represent are or are not in the same ratio: +e.g. 8 and 27 = 2 cubed and 3 cubed; and conversely. 'Waxing' (Greek) +numbers, called also 'increasing' (Greek), are those which are exceeded by +the sum of their divisors: e.g. 12 and 18 are less than 16 and 21. +'Waning' (Greek) numbers, called also 'decreasing' (Greek) are those which +succeed the sum of their divisors: e.g. 8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The +words translated 'commensurable and agreeable to one another' (Greek) seem +to be different ways of describing the same relation, with more or less +precision. They are equivalent to 'expressible in terms having the same +relation to one another,' like the series 8, 12, 18, 27, each of which +numbers is in the relation of (1 and 1/2) to the preceding. The 'base,' or +'fundamental number, which has 1/3 added to it' (1 and 1/3) = 4/3 or a +musical fourth. (Greek) is a 'proportion' of numbers as of musical notes, +applied either to the parts or factors of a single number or to the +relation of one number to another. The first harmony is a 'square' number +(Greek); the second harmony is an 'oblong' number (Greek), i.e. a number +representing a figure of which the opposite sides only are equal. (Greek) += 'numbers squared from' or 'upon diameters'; (Greek) = 'rational,' i.e. +omitting fractions, (Greek), 'irrational,' i.e. including fractions; e.g. +49 is a square of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which = 5: +50, of an irrational diameter of the same. For several of the explanations +here given and for a good deal besides I am indebted to an excellent +article on the Platonic Number by Dr. Donaldson (Proc. of the Philol. +Society). + +The conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by him as +follows. Having assumed that the number of the perfect or divine cycle is +the number of the world, and the number of the imperfect cycle the number +of the state, he proceeds: 'The period of the world is defined by the +perfect number 6, that of the state by the cube of that number or 216, +which is the product of the last pair of terms in the Platonic Tetractys (a +series of seven terms, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27); and if we take this as the +basis of our computation, we shall have two cube numbers (Greek), viz. 8 +and 27; and the mean proportionals between these, viz. 12 and 18, will +furnish three intervals and four terms, and these terms and intervals stand +related to one another in the sesqui-altera ratio, i.e. each term is to the +preceding as 3/2. Now if we remember that the number 216 = 8 x 27 = 3 +cubed + 4 cubed + 5 cubed, and 3 squared + 4 squared = 5 squared, we must +admit that this number implies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to which musicians +attach so much importance. And if we combine the ratio 4/3 with the number +5, or multiply the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse, we shall by first +squaring and then cubing obtain two expressions, which denote the ratio of +the two last pairs of terms in the Platonic Tetractys, the former +multiplied by the square, the latter by the cube of the number 10, the sum +of the first four digits which constitute the Platonic Tetractys.' The two +(Greek) he elsewhere explains as follows: 'The first (Greek) is (Greek), +in other words (4/3 x 5) all squared = 100 x 2 squared over 3 squared. The +second (Greek), a cube of the same root, is described as 100 multiplied +(alpha) by the rational diameter of 5 diminished by unity, i.e., as shown +above, 48: (beta) by two incommensurable diameters, i.e. the two first +irrationals, or 2 and 3: and (gamma) by the cube of 3, or 27. Thus we +have (48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 x 2 cubed. This second harmony is to be the +cube of the number of which the former harmony is the square, and therefore +must be divided by the cube of 3. In other words, the whole expression +will be: (1), for the first harmony, 400/9: (2), for the second harmony, +8000/27.' + +The reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and also +with Schleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of births +are: (1) that it coincides with the description of the number given in the +first part of the passage (Greek...): (2) that the number 216 with its +permutations would have been familiar to a Greek mathematician, though +unfamiliar to us: (3) that 216 is the cube of 6, and also the sum of 3 +cubed, 4 cubed, 5 cubed, the numbers 3, 4, 5 representing the Pythagorean +triangle, of which the sides when squared equal the square of the +hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25): (4) that it is also the period of the +Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5) the three ultimate terms or bases (3, 4, +5) of which 216 is composed answer to the third, fourth, fifth in the +musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the product of the cubes of 2 +and 3, which are the two last terms in the Platonic Tetractys: (7) that +the Pythagorean triangle is said by Plutarch (de Is. et Osir.), Proclus +(super prima Eucl.), and Quintilian (de Musica) to be contained in this +passage, so that the tradition of the school seems to point in the same +direction: (8) that the Pythagorean triangle is called also the figure of +marriage (Greek). + +But though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for +supposing, as he does, that the first or perfect number is the world, the +human or imperfect number the state; nor has he given any proof that the +second harmony is a cube. Nor do I think that (Greek) can mean 'two +incommensurables,' which he arbitrarily assumes to be 2 and 3, but rather, +as the preceding clause implies, (Greek), i.e. two square numbers based +upon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which is 5 = 50 x 2. + +The greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the words +(Greek), 'a base of three with a third added to it, multiplied by 5.' In +this somewhat forced manner Plato introduces once more the numbers of the +Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in the numbers which follow are +in favour of the explanation. The first harmony of 400, as has been +already remarked, probably represents the rulers; the second and oblong +harmony of 7600, the people. + +And here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle +would be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The +point of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and that so +much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His general +meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and is represented or presided +over by a perfect or cyclical number; human generation is imperfect, and +represented or presided over by an imperfect number or series of numbers. +The number 5040, which is the number of the citizens in the Laws, is +expressly based by him on utilitarian grounds, namely, the convenience of +the number for division; it is also made up of the first seven digits +multiplied by one another. The contrast of the perfect and imperfect +number may have been easily suggested by the corrections of the cycle, +which were made first by Meton and secondly by Callippus; (the latter is +said to have been a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance or of +exactness to be attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant in Book +IX (729 = 365 x 2), and the slight correction of the error in the number +5040/12 (Laws), may furnish a criterion. There is nothing surprising in +the circumstance that those who were seeking for order in nature and had +found order in number, should have imagined one to give law to the other. +Plato believes in a power of number far beyond what he could see realized +in the world around him, and he knows the great influence which 'the little +matter of 1, 2, 3' exercises upon education. He may even be thought to +have a prophetic anticipation of the discoveries of Quetelet and others, +that numbers depend upon numbers; e.g.--in population, the numbers of +births and the respective numbers of children born of either sex, on the +respective ages of parents, i.e. on other numbers. + +BOOK IX. Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to +enquire, Whence is he, and how does he live--in happiness or in misery? +There is, however, a previous question of the nature and number of the +appetites, which I should like to consider first. Some of them are +unlawful, and yet admit of being chastened and weakened in various degrees +by the power of reason and law. 'What appetites do you mean?' I mean +those which are awake when the reasoning powers are asleep, which get up +and walk about naked without any self-respect or shame; and there is no +conceivable folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of which, in +imagination, they may not be guilty. 'True,' he said; 'very true.' But +when a man's pulse beats temperately; and he has supped on a feast of +reason and come to a knowledge of himself before going to rest, and has +satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their perturbing his reason, +which remains clear and luminous, and when he is free from quarrel and +heat,--the visions which he has on his bed are least irregular and +abnormal. Even in good men there is such an irregular wild-beast nature, +which peers out in sleep. + +To return:--You remember what was said of the democrat; that he was the son +of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and repressed the +ornamental and expensive ones; presently the youth got into fine company, +and began to entertain a dislike to his father's narrow ways; and being a +better man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a mean, and led a +life, not of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular and successive +indulgence. Now imagine that the youth has become a father, and has a son +who is exposed to the same temptations, and has companions who lead him +into every sort of iniquity, and parents and friends who try to keep him +right. The counsellors of evil find that their only chance of retaining +him is to implant in his soul a monster drone, or love; while other desires +buzz around him and mystify him with sweet sounds and scents, this monster +love takes possession of him, and puts an end to every true or modest +thought or wish. Love, like drunkenness and madness, is a tyranny; and the +tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit, is just a drinking, +lusting, furious sort of animal. + +And how does such an one live? 'Nay, that you must tell me.' Well then, I +fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will be the +lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money, and so he +spends all that he has and borrows more; and when he has nothing the young +ravens are still in the nest in which they were hatched, crying for food. +Love urges them on; and they must be gratified by force or fraud, or if +not, they become painful and troublesome; and as the new pleasures succeed +the old ones, so will the son take possession of the goods of his parents; +if they show signs of refusing, he will defraud and deceive them; and if +they openly resist, what then? 'I can only say, that I should not much +like to be in their place.' But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for +some new-fangled and unnecessary love he will give up his old father and +mother, best and dearest of friends, or enslave them to the fancies of the +hour! Truly a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother! When +there is no more to be got out of them, he turns burglar or pickpocket, or +robs a temple. Love overmasters the thoughts of his youth, and he becomes +in sober reality the monster that he was sometimes in sleep. He waxes +strong in all violence and lawlessness; and is ready for any deed of daring +that will supply the wants of his rabble-rout. In a well-ordered State +there are only a few such, and these in time of war go out and become the +mercenaries of a tyrant. But in time of peace they stay at home and do +mischief; they are the thieves, footpads, cut-purses, man-stealers of the +community; or if they are able to speak, they turn false-witnesses and +informers. 'No small catalogue of crimes truly, even if the perpetrators +are few.' Yes, I said; but small and great are relative terms, and no +crimes which are committed by them approach those of the tyrant, whom this +class, growing strong and numerous, create out of themselves. If the +people yield, well and good, but, if they resist, then, as before he beat +his father and mother, so now he beats his fatherland and motherland, and +places his mercenaries over them. Such men in their early days live with +flatterers, and they themselves flatter others, in order to gain their +ends; but they soon discard their followers when they have no longer any +need of them; they are always either masters or servants,--the joys of +friendship are unknown to them. And they are utterly treacherous and +unjust, if the nature of justice be at all understood by us. They realize +our dream; and he who is the most of a tyrant by nature, and leads the life +of a tyrant for the longest time, will be the worst of them, and being the +worst of them, will also be the most miserable. + +Like man, like State,--the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which is +the extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the best and the other +the worst. But which is the happier? Great and terrible as the tyrant may +appear enthroned amid his satellites, let us not be afraid to go in and +ask; and the answer is, that the monarchical is the happiest, and the +tyrannical the most miserable of States. And may we not ask the same +question about the men themselves, requesting some one to look into them +who is able to penetrate the inner nature of man, and will not be panic- +struck by the vain pomp of tyranny? I will suppose that he is one who has +lived with him, and has seen him in family life, or perhaps in the hour of +trouble and danger. + +Assuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek, let us +begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all, whether +the State is likely to be free or enslaved--Will there not be a little +freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the bad, and +the slavery of the good; and this applies to the man as well as to the +State; for his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and the better part is +enslaved to the worse. He cannot do what he would, and his mind is full of +confusion; he is the very reverse of a freeman. The State will be poor and +full of misery and sorrow; and the man's soul will also be poor and full of +sorrows, and he will be the most miserable of men. No, not the most +miserable, for there is yet a more miserable. 'Who is that?' The +tyrannical man who has the misfortune also to become a public tyrant. +'There I suspect that you are right.' Say rather, 'I am sure;' conjecture +is out of place in an enquiry of this nature. He is like a wealthy owner +of slaves, only he has more of them than any private individual. You will +say, 'The owners of slaves are not generally in any fear of them.' But +why? Because the whole city is in a league which protects the individual. +Suppose however that one of these owners and his household is carried off +by a god into a wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him--will he +not be in an agony of terror?--will he not be compelled to flatter his +slaves and to promise them many things sore against his will? And suppose +the same god who carried him off were to surround him with neighbours who +declare that no man ought to have slaves, and that the owners of them +should be punished with death. 'Still worse and worse! He will be in the +midst of his enemies.' And is not our tyrant such a captive soul, who is +tormented by a swarm of passions which he cannot indulge; living indoors +always like a woman, and jealous of those who can go out and see the world? + +Having so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more +miserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of +himself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the meanest of +slaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and never +able to satisfy his desires; always in fear and distraction, like the State +of which he is the representative. His jealous, hateful, faithless temper +grows worse with command; he is more and more faithless, envious, +unrighteous,--the most wretched of men, a misery to himself and to others. +And so let us have a final trial and proclamation; need we hire a herald, +or shall I proclaim the result? 'Made the proclamation yourself.' The son +of Ariston (the best) is of opinion that the best and justest of men is +also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal master of +himself; and that the unjust man is he who is the greatest tyrant of +himself and of his State. And I add further--'seen or unseen by gods or +men.' + +This is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of +pleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul--reason, passion, +desire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as sensual +appetite, while passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love of +reputation. Reason, again, is solely directed to the attainment of truth, +and careless of money and reputation. In accordance with the difference of +men's natures, one of these three principles is in the ascendant, and they +have their several pleasures corresponding to them. Interrogate now the +three natures, and each one will be found praising his own pleasures and +depreciating those of others. The money-maker will contrast the vanity of +knowledge with the solid advantages of wealth. The ambitious man will +despise knowledge which brings no honour; whereas the philosopher will +regard only the fruition of truth, and will call other pleasures necessary +rather than good. Now, how shall we decide between them? Is there any +better criterion than experience and knowledge? And which of the three has +the truest knowledge and the widest experience? The experience of youth +makes the philosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the +avaricious and the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and +wisdom. Honour he has equally with them; they are 'judged of him,' but he +is 'not judged of them,' for they never attain to the knowledge of true +being. And his instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only wealth +and honour; and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest. +And so we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the rational part of +the soul, and a life passed in such pleasure is the pleasantest. He who +has a right to judge judges thus. Next comes the life of ambition, and, in +the third place, that of money-making. + +Twice has the just man overthrown the unjust--once more, as in an Olympian +contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let him try a +fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise are true +and pure; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine this: Is not +pleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which is neither? +When a man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him than health. But this +he never found out while he was well. In pain he desires only to cease +from pain; on the other hand, when he is in an ecstasy of pleasure, rest is +painful to him. Thus rest or cessation is both pleasure and pain. But can +that which is neither become both? Again, pleasure and pain are motions, +and the absence of them is rest; but if so, how can the absence of either +of them be the other? Thus we are led to infer that the contradiction is +an appearance only, and witchery of the senses. And these are not the only +pleasures, for there are others which have no preceding pains. Pure +pleasure then is not the absence of pain, nor pure pain the absence of +pleasure; although most of the pleasures which reach the mind through the +body are reliefs of pain, and have not only their reactions when they +depart, but their anticipations before they come. They can be best +described in a simile. There is in nature an upper, lower, and middle +region, and he who passes from the lower to the middle imagines that he is +going up and is already in the upper world; and if he were taken back again +would think, and truly think, that he was descending. All this arises out +of his ignorance of the true upper, middle, and lower regions. And a like +confusion happens with pleasure and pain, and with many other things. The +man who compares grey with black, calls grey white; and the man who +compares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of pain pleasure. +Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance and folly of +the soul; and food is the satisfaction of the one, knowledge of the other. +Now which is the purer satisfaction--that of eating and drinking, or that +of knowledge? Consider the matter thus: The satisfaction of that which +has more existence is truer than of that which has less. The invariable +and immortal has a more real existence than the variable and mortal, and +has a corresponding measure of knowledge and truth. The soul, again, has +more existence and truth and knowledge than the body, and is therefore more +really satisfied and has a more natural pleasure. Those who feast only on +earthly food, are always going at random up to the middle and down again; +but they never pass into the true upper world, or have a taste of true +pleasure. They are like fatted beasts, full of gluttony and sensuality, +and ready to kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust; for they +are not filled with true being, and their vessel is leaky (Gorgias). Their +pleasures are mere shadows of pleasure, mixed with pain, coloured and +intensified by contrast, and therefore intensely desired; and men go +fighting about them, as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the +shadow of Helen at Troy, because they know not the truth. + +The same may be said of the passionate element:--the desires of the +ambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior satisfaction. +Only when under the guidance of reason do either of the other principles do +their own business or attain the pleasure which is natural to them. When +not attaining, they compel the other parts of the soul to pursue a shadow +of pleasure which is not theirs. And the more distant they are from +philosophy and reason, the more distant they will be from law and order, +and the more illusive will be their pleasures. The desires of love and +tyranny are the farthest from law, and those of the king are nearest to it. +There is one genuine pleasure, and two spurious ones: the tyrant goes +beyond even the latter; he has run away altogether from law and reason. +Nor can the measure of his inferiority be told, except in a figure. The +tyrant is the third removed from the oligarch, and has therefore, not a +shadow of his pleasure, but the shadow of a shadow only. The oligarch, +again, is thrice removed from the king, and thus we get the formula 3 x 3, +which is the number of a surface, representing the shadow which is the +tyrant's pleasure, and if you like to cube this 'number of the beast,' you +will find that the measure of the difference amounts to 729; the king is +729 times more happy than the tyrant. And this extraordinary number is +NEARLY equal to the number of days and nights in a year (365 x 2 = 730); +and is therefore concerned with human life. This is the interval between a +good and bad man in happiness only: what must be the difference between +them in comeliness of life and virtue! + +Perhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our discussion +that the unjust man was profited if he had the reputation of justice. Now +that we know the nature of justice and injustice, let us make an image of +the soul, which will personify his words. First of all, fashion a +multitudinous beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of animals, tame +and wild, and able to produce and change them at pleasure. Suppose now +another form of a lion, and another of a man; the second smaller than the +first, the third than the second; join them together and cover them with a +human skin, in which they are completely concealed. When this has been +done, let us tell the supporter of injustice that he is feeding up the +beasts and starving the man. The maintainer of justice, on the other hand, +is trying to strengthen the man; he is nourishing the gentle principle +within him, and making an alliance with the lion heart, in order that he +may be able to keep down the many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity +with each other and with themselves. Thus in every point of view, whether +in relation to pleasure, honour, or advantage, the just man is right, and +the unjust wrong. + +But now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. +Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the +God in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast? And if +so, who would receive gold on condition that he was to degrade the noblest +part of himself under the worst?--who would sell his son or daughter into +the hands of brutal and evil men, for any amount of money? And will he +sell his own fairer and diviner part without any compunction to the most +godless and foul? Would he not be worse than Eriphyle, who sold her +husband's life for a necklace? And intemperance is the letting loose of +the multiform monster, and pride and sullenness are the growth and increase +of the lion and serpent element, while luxury and effeminacy are caused by +a too great relaxation of spirit. Flattery and meanness again arise when +the spirited element is subjected to avarice, and the lion is habituated to +become a monkey. The real disgrace of handicraft arts is, that those who +are engaged in them have to flatter, instead of mastering their desires; +therefore we say that they should be placed under the control of the better +principle in another because they have none in themselves; not, as +Thrasymachus imagined, to the injury of the subjects, but for their good. +And our intention in educating the young, is to give them self-control; the +law desires to nurse up in them a higher principle, and when they have +acquired this, they may go their ways. + +'What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world' and become +more and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if +the concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, the +brute within him would have been silenced, and the gentler element +liberated; and he would have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in his +soul--a union better far than any combination of bodily gifts. The man of +understanding will honour knowledge above all; in the next place he will +keep under his body, not only for the sake of health and strength, but in +order to attain the most perfect harmony of body and soul. In the +acquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and harmony; he will not +desire to heap up wealth without measure, but he will fear that the +increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of his own soul. For the +same reason he will only accept such honours as will make him a better man; +any others he will decline. 'In that case,' said he, 'he will never be a +politician.' Yes, but he will, in his own city; though probably not in his +native country, unless by some divine accident. 'You mean that he will be +a citizen of the ideal city, which has no place upon earth.' But in +heaven, I replied, there is a pattern of such a city, and he who wishes may +order his life after that image. Whether such a state is or ever will be +matters not; he will act according to that pattern and no other... + +The most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:--(1) the +account of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the king +from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven. + +1. Plato's account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in this +respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are +attributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed to +all pleasure, but rather desires that the several parts of the soul shall +have their natural satisfaction; he even agrees with the Epicureans in +describing pleasure as something more than the absence of pain. This is +proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which have no +antecedent pains (as he also remarks in the Philebus), such as the +pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and anticipation. In +the previous book he had made the distinction between necessary and +unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he now observes +that there are a further class of 'wild beast' pleasures, corresponding to +Aristotle's (Greek). He dwells upon the relative and unreal character of +sensual pleasures and the illusion which arises out of the contrast of +pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority of the pleasures of reason, +which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures of sense and emotion. The +pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by the fact that reason is able to +form a judgment of the lower pleasures, while the two lower parts of the +soul are incapable of judging the pleasures of reason. Thus, in his +treatment of pleasure, as in many other subjects, the philosophy of Plato +is 'sawn up into quantities' by Aristotle; the analysis which was +originally made by him became in the next generation the foundation of +further technical distinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we note the +illusion under which the ancients fell of regarding the transience of +pleasure as a proof of its unreality, and of confounding the permanence of +the intellectual pleasures with the unchangeableness of the knowledge from +which they are derived. Neither do we like to admit that the pleasures of +knowledge, though more elevating, are not more lasting than other +pleasures, and are almost equally dependent on the accidents of our bodily +state (Introduction to Philebus). + +2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant, +and royal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9. Which Plato +characteristically designates as a number concerned with human life, +because NEARLY equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year. He +is desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is immeasurable, +and invents a formula to give expression to his idea. Those who spoke of +justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring (Prot.), saw no +inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the figure of a line, or the +pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the pleasure of the king by the +numerical interval of 729. And in modern times we sometimes use +metaphorically what Plato employed as a philosophical formula. 'It is not +easy to estimate the loss of the tyrant, except perhaps in this way,' says +Plato. So we might say, that although the life of a good man is not to be +compared to that of a bad man, yet you may measure the difference between +them by valuing one minute of the one at an hour of the other ('One day in +thy courts is better than a thousand'), or you might say that 'there is an +infinite difference.' But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase, +'They are a thousand miles asunder.' And accordingly Plato finds the +natural vehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this +arithmetical formula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both +here and in the number of generation seems to find an additional proof of +the truth of his speculation in forming the number into a geometrical +figure; just as persons in our own day are apt to fancy that a statement is +verified when it has been only thrown into an abstract form. In speaking +of the number 729 as proper to human life, he probably intended to intimate +that one year of the tyrannical = 12 hours of the royal life. + +The simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids is +effected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the mathematical +groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some difficulty in +explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained; the oligarch is +removed in the third degree from the royal and aristocratical, and the +tyrant in the third degree from the oligarchical; but we have to arrange +the terms as the sides of a square and to count the oligarch twice over, +thus reckoning them not as = 5 but as = 9. The square of 9 is passed +lightly over as only a step towards the cube. + +3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more +convinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of +the 9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city of +philosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and substance at +his hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet this distant +kingdom is also the rule of man's life. ('Say not lo! here, or lo! there, +for the kingdom of God is within you.') Thus a note is struck which +prepares for the revelation of a future life in the following Book. But +the future life is present still; the ideal of politics is to be realized +in the individual. + +BOOK X. Many things pleased me in the order of our State, but there was +nothing which I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The +division of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation. I +do not mind telling you in confidence that all poetry is an outrage on the +understanding, unless the hearers have that balm of knowledge which heals +error. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and even now he appears +to me to be the great master of tragic poetry. But much as I love the man, +I love truth more, and therefore I must speak out: and first of all, will +you explain what is imitation, for really I do not understand? 'How likely +then that I should understand!' That might very well be, for the duller +often sees better than the keener eye. 'True, but in your presence I can +hardly venture to say what I think.' Then suppose that we begin in our old +fashion, with the doctrine of universals. Let us assume the existence of +beds and tables. There is one idea of a bed, or of a table, which the +maker of each had in his mind when making them; he did not make the ideas +of beds and tables, but he made beds and tables according to the ideas. +And is there not a maker of the works of all workmen, who makes not only +vessels but plants and animals, himself, the earth and heaven, and things +in heaven and under the earth? He makes the Gods also. 'He must be a +wizard indeed!' But do you not see that there is a sense in which you +could do the same? You have only to take a mirror, and catch the +reflection of the sun, and the earth, or anything else--there now you have +made them. 'Yes, but only in appearance.' Exactly so; and the painter is +such a creator as you are with the mirror, and he is even more unreal than +the carpenter; although neither the carpenter nor any other artist can be +supposed to make the absolute bed. 'Not if philosophers may be believed.' +Nor need we wonder that his bed has but an imperfect relation to the truth. +Reflect:--Here are three beds; one in nature, which is made by God; +another, which is made by the carpenter; and the third, by the painter. +God only made one, nor could he have made more than one; for if there had +been two, there would always have been a third--more absolute and abstract +than either, under which they would have been included. We may therefore +conceive God to be the natural maker of the bed, and in a lower sense the +carpenter is also the maker; but the painter is rather the imitator of what +the other two make; he has to do with a creation which is thrice removed +from reality. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, like every other +imitator, is thrice removed from the king and from the truth. The painter +imitates not the original bed, but the bed made by the carpenter. And +this, without being really different, appears to be different, and has many +points of view, of which only one is caught by the painter, who represents +everything because he represents a piece of everything, and that piece an +image. And he can paint any other artist, although he knows nothing of +their arts; and this with sufficient skill to deceive children or simple +people. Suppose now that somebody came to us and told us, how he had met a +man who knew all that everybody knows, and better than anybody:--should we +not infer him to be a simpleton who, having no discernment of truth and +falsehood, had met with a wizard or enchanter, whom he fancied to be all- +wise? And when we hear persons saying that Homer and the tragedians know +all the arts and all the virtues, must we not infer that they are under a +similar delusion? they do not see that the poets are imitators, and that +their creations are only imitations. 'Very true.' But if a person could +create as well as imitate, he would rather leave some permanent work and +not an imitation only; he would rather be the receiver than the giver of +praise? 'Yes, for then he would have more honour and advantage.' + +Let us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him, I +am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your poems +incidentally refer, but about their main subjects--war, military tactics, +politics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the truth--not +an imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good you have ever +done to mankind? Is there any city which professes to have received laws +from you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta from Lycurgus, +Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever carried on by your counsels? or is +any invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales and Anacharsis? Or +is there any Homeric way of life, such as the Pythagorean was, in which you +instructed men, and which is called after you? 'No, indeed; and Creophylus +(Flesh-child) was even more unfortunate in his breeding than he was in his +name, if, as tradition says, Homer in his lifetime was allowed by him and +his other friends to starve.' Yes, but could this ever have happened if +Homer had really been the educator of Hellas? Would he not have had many +devoted followers? If Protagoras and Prodicus can persuade their +contemporaries that no one can manage house or State without them, is it +likely that Homer and Hesiod would have been allowed to go about as +beggars--I mean if they had really been able to do the world any good?-- +would not men have compelled them to stay where they were, or have followed +them about in order to get education? But they did not; and therefore we +may infer that Homer and all the poets are only imitators, who do but +imitate the appearances of things. For as a painter by a knowledge of +figure and colour can paint a cobbler without any practice in cobbling, so +the poet can delineate any art in the colours of language, and give harmony +and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you know how mere +narration, when deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a face which +has lost the beauty of youth and never had any other. Once more, the +imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The painter +paints, and the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but neither understands +the use of them--the knowledge of this is confined to the horseman; and so +of other things. Thus we have three arts: one of use, another of +invention, a third of imitation; and the user furnishes the rule to the two +others. The flute-player will know the good and bad flute, and the maker +will put faith in him; but the imitator will neither know nor have faith-- +neither science nor true opinion can be ascribed to him. Imitation, then, +is devoid of knowledge, being only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic +and epic poets are imitators in the highest degree. + +And now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to +imitation. Allow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen +when in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a +distance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to impose +upon us. And the art of measuring and weighing and calculating comes in to +save our bewildered minds from the power of appearance; for, as we were +saying, two contrary opinions of the same about the same and at the same +time, cannot both of them be true. But which of them is true is determined +by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the better faculty in the +soul, as the arts of imitation are to the worse. And the same holds of the +ear as well as of the eye, of poetry as well as painting. The imitation is +of actions voluntary or involuntary, in which there is an expectation of a +good or bad result, and present experience of pleasure and pain. But is a +man in harmony with himself when he is the subject of these conflicting +influences? Is there not rather a contradiction in him? Let me further +ask, whether he is more likely to control sorrow when he is alone or when +he is in company. 'In the latter case.' Feeling would lead him to indulge +his sorrow, but reason and law control him and enjoin patience; since he +cannot know whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing is +of any great consequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to good +counsel. For when we stumble, we should not, like children, make an +uproar; we should take the measures which reason prescribes, not raising a +lament, but finding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to follow +reason, while the irrational principle is full of sorrow and distraction at +the recollection of our troubles. Unfortunately, however, this latter +furnishes the chief materials of the imitative arts. Whereas reason is +ever in repose and cannot easily be displayed, especially to a mixed +multitude who have no experience of her. Thus the poet is like the painter +in two ways: first he paints an inferior degree of truth, and secondly, he +is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. He indulges the feelings, +while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse to allow him to have authority +over the mind of man; for he has no measure of greater and less, and is a +maker of images and very far gone from truth. + +But we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment--the +power which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we hear +some passage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious length, you +know that we sympathize with him and praise the poet; and yet in our own +sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as effeminate and unmanly +(Ion). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in seeing another do what he +hates and abominates in himself? Is he not giving way to a sentiment which +in his own case he would control?--he is off his guard because the sorrow +is another's; and he thinks that he may indulge his feelings without +disgrace, and will be the gainer by the pleasure. But the inevitable +consequence is that he who begins by weeping at the sorrows of others, will +end by weeping at his own. The same is true of comedy,--you may often +laugh at buffoonery which you would be ashamed to utter, and the love of +coarse merriment on the stage will at last turn you into a buffoon at home. +Poetry feeds and waters the passions and desires; she lets them rule +instead of ruling them. And therefore, when we hear the encomiasts of +Homer affirming that he is the educator of Hellas, and that all life should +be regulated by his precepts, we may allow the excellence of their +intentions, and agree with them in thinking Homer a great poet and +tragedian. But we shall continue to prohibit all poetry which goes beyond +hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men. Not pleasure and pain, but +law and reason shall rule in our State. + +These are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge us +with discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind her +that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of which +there are many traces in the writings of the poets, such as the saying of +'the she-dog, yelping at her mistress,' and 'the philosophers who are ready +to circumvent Zeus,' and 'the philosophers who are paupers.' Nevertheless +we bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow her to return upon condition +that she makes a defence of herself in verse; and her supporters who are +not poets may speak in prose. We confess her charms; but if she cannot +show that she is useful as well as delightful, like rational lovers, we +must renounce our love, though endeared to us by early associations. +Having come to years of discretion, we know that poetry is not truth, and +that a man should be careful how he introduces her to that state or +constitution which he himself is; for there is a mighty issue at stake--no +less than the good or evil of a human soul. And it is not worth while to +forsake justice and virtue for the attractions of poetry, any more than for +the sake of honour or wealth. 'I agree with you.' + +And yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described. 'And +can we conceive things greater still?' Not, perhaps, in this brief span of +life: but should an immortal being care about anything short of eternity? +'I do not understand what you mean?' Do you not know that the soul is +immortal? 'Surely you are not prepared to prove that?' Indeed I am. +'Then let me hear this argument, of which you make so light.' + +You would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil. In all +things there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy them, +nothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting principles, which +are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of these +destroy the soul in the same sense that disease destroys the body. The +soul may be full of all iniquities, but is not, by reason of them, brought +any nearer to death. Nothing which was not destroyed from within ever +perished by external affection of evil. The body, which is one thing, +cannot be destroyed by food, which is another, unless the badness of the +food is communicated to the body. Neither can the soul, which is one +thing, be corrupted by the body, which is another, unless she herself is +infected. And as no bodily evil can infect the soul, neither can any +bodily evil, whether disease or violence, or any other destroy the soul, +unless it can be shown to render her unholy and unjust. But no one will +ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust when they die. If a +person has the audacity to say the contrary, the answer is--Then why do +criminals require the hand of the executioner, and not die of themselves? +'Truly,' he said, 'injustice would not be very terrible if it brought a +cessation of evil; but I rather believe that the injustice which murders +others may tend to quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.' You are +quite right. If sin which is her own natural and inherent evil cannot +destroy the soul, hardly will anything else destroy her. But the soul +which cannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must be +immortal and everlasting. And if this be true, souls will always exist in +the same number. They cannot diminish, because they cannot be destroyed; +nor yet increase, for the increase of the immortal must come from something +mortal, and so all would end in immortality. Neither is the soul variable +and diverse; for that which is immortal must be of the fairest and simplest +composition. If we would conceive her truly, and so behold justice and +injustice in their own nature, she must be viewed by the light of reason +pure as at birth, or as she is reflected in philosophy when holding +converse with the divine and immortal and eternal. In her present +condition we see her only like the sea-god Glaucus, bruised and maimed in +the sea which is the world, and covered with shells and stones which are +incrusted upon her from the entertainments of earth. + +Thus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards and +honours which the poets attribute to justice; we have contented ourselves +with showing that justice in herself is best for the soul in herself, even +if a man should put on a Gyges' ring and have the helmet of Hades too. And +now you shall repay me what you borrowed; and I will enumerate the rewards +of justice in life and after death. I granted, for the sake of argument, +as you will remember, that evil might perhaps escape the knowledge of Gods +and men, although this was really impossible. And since I have shown that +justice has reality, you must grant me also that she has the palm of +appearance. In the first place, the just man is known to the Gods, and he +is therefore the friend of the Gods, and he will receive at their hands +every good, always excepting such evil as is the necessary consequence of +former sins. All things end in good to him, either in life or after death, +even what appears to be evil; for the Gods have a care of him who desires +to be in their likeness. And what shall we say of men? Is not honesty the +best policy? The clever rogue makes a great start at first, but breaks +down before he reaches the goal, and slinks away in dishonour; whereas the +true runner perseveres to the end, and receives the prize. And you must +allow me to repeat all the blessings which you attributed to the fortunate +unjust--they bear rule in the city, they marry and give in marriage to whom +they will; and the evils which you attributed to the unfortunate just, do +really fall in the end on the unjust, although, as you implied, their +sufferings are better veiled in silence. + +But all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when compared +with those which await good men after death. 'I should like to hear about +them.' Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er, the son of +Armenius, a valiant man. He was supposed to have died in battle, but ten +days afterwards his body was found untouched by corruption and sent home +for burial. On the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral pyre and there +he came to life again, and told what he had seen in the world below. He +said that his soul went with a great company to a place, in which there +were two chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two corresponding +chasms in the heaven above. And there were judges sitting in the +intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by the heavenly way on the +right hand, having the seal of their judgment set upon them before, while +the unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to descend by the way on +the left hand. Him they told to look and listen, as he was to be their +messenger to men from the world below. And he beheld and saw the souls +departing after judgment at either chasm; some who came from earth, were +worn and travel-stained; others, who came from heaven, were clean and +bright. They seemed glad to meet and rest awhile in the meadow; here they +discoursed with one another of what they had seen in the other world. +Those who came from earth wept at the remembrance of their sorrows, but the +spirits from above spoke of glorious sights and heavenly bliss. He said +that for every evil deed they were punished tenfold--now the journey was of +a thousand years' duration, because the life of man was reckoned as a +hundred years--and the rewards of virtue were in the same proportion. He +added something hardly worth repeating about infants dying almost as soon +as they were born. Of parricides and other murderers he had tortures still +more terrible to narrate. He was present when one of the spirits asked-- +Where is Ardiaeus the Great? (This Ardiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who had +murdered his father, and his elder brother, a thousand years before.) +Another spirit answered, 'He comes not hither, and will never come. And I +myself,' he added, 'actually saw this terrible sight. At the entrance of +the chasm, as we were about to reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other +sinners--most of whom had been tyrants, but not all--and just as they +fancied that they were returning to life, the chasm gave a roar, and then +wild, fiery-looking men who knew the meaning of the sound, seized him and +several others, and bound them hand and foot and threw them down, and +dragged them along at the side of the road, lacerating them and carding +them like wool, and explaining to the passers-by, that they were going to +be cast into hell.' The greatest terror of the pilgrims ascending was lest +they should hear the voice, and when there was silence one by one they +passed up with joy. To these sufferings there were corresponding delights. + +On the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and in +four days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of light, in +colour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day more brought +them to the place, and they saw that this was the column of light which +binds together the whole universe. The ends of the column were fastened to +heaven, and from them hung the distaff of Necessity, on which all the +heavenly bodies turned--the hook and spindle were of adamant, and the whorl +of a mixed substance. The whorl was in form like a number of boxes fitting +into one another with their edges turned upwards, making together a single +whorl which was pierced by the spindle. The outermost had the rim +broadest, and the inner whorls were smaller and smaller, and had their rims +narrower. The largest (the fixed stars) was spangled--the seventh (the +sun) was brightest--the eighth (the moon) shone by the light of the +seventh--the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) were most like one +another and yellower than the eighth--the third (Jupiter) had the whitest +light--the fourth (Mars) was red--the sixth (Venus) was in whiteness +second. The whole had one motion, but while this was revolving in one +direction the seven inner circles were moving in the opposite, with various +degrees of swiftness and slowness. The spindle turned on the knees of +Necessity, and a Siren stood hymning upon each circle, while Lachesis, +Clotho, and Atropos, the daughters of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal +intervals, singing of past, present, and future, responsive to the music of +the Sirens; Clotho from time to time guiding the outer circle with a touch +of her right hand; Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the +inner circles; Lachesis in turn putting forth her hand from time to time to +guide both of them. On their arrival the pilgrims went to Lachesis, and +there was an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from her knees lots, +and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and said: 'Mortal souls, hear +the words of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. A new period of mortal +life has begun, and you may choose what divinity you please; the +responsibility of choosing is with you--God is blameless.' After speaking +thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took up the lot which fell +near him. He then placed on the ground before them the samples of lives, +many more than the souls present; and there were all sorts of lives, of men +and of animals. There were tyrannies ending in misery and exile, and lives +of men and women famous for their different qualities; and also mixed +lives, made up of wealth and poverty, sickness and health. Here, Glaucon, +is the great risk of human life, and therefore the whole of education +should be directed to the acquisition of such a knowledge as will teach a +man to refuse the evil and choose the good. He should know all the +combinations which occur in life--of beauty with poverty or with wealth,-- +of knowledge with external goods,--and at last choose with reference to the +nature of the soul, regarding that only as the better life which makes men +better, and leaving the rest. And a man must take with him an iron sense +of truth and right into the world below, that there too he may remain +undazzled by wealth or the allurements of evil, and be determined to avoid +the extremes and choose the mean. For this, as the messenger reported the +interpreter to have said, is the true happiness of man; and any one, as he +proclaimed, may, if he choose with understanding, have a good lot, even +though he come last. 'Let not the first be careless in his choice, nor the +last despair.' He spoke; and when he had spoken, he who had drawn the +first lot chose a tyranny: he did not see that he was fated to devour his +own children--and when he discovered his mistake, he wept and beat his +breast, blaming chance and the Gods and anybody rather than himself. He +was one of those who had come from heaven, and in his previous life had +been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had only habit and no +philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad choice, because he had no +experience of life; whereas those who came from earth and had seen trouble +were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a man had followed philosophy +while upon earth, and had been moderately fortunate in his lot, he might +not only be happy here, but his pilgrimage both from and to this world +would be smooth and heavenly. Nothing was more curious than the spectacle +of the choice, at once sad and laughable and wonderful; most of the souls +only seeking to avoid their own condition in a previous life. He saw the +soul of Orpheus changing into a swan because he would not be born of a +woman; there was Thamyras becoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the +swan, choosing to be men; the twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, +preferring the life of a lion to that of a man, in remembrance of the +injustice which was done to him in the judgment of the arms; and Agamemnon, +from a like enmity to human nature, passing into an eagle. About the +middle was the soul of Atalanta choosing the honours of an athlete, and +next to her Epeus taking the nature of a workwoman; among the last was +Thersites, who was changing himself into a monkey. Thither, the last of +all, came Odysseus, and sought the lot of a private man, which lay +neglected and despised, and when he found it he went away rejoicing, and +said that if he had been first instead of last, his choice would have been +the same. Men, too, were seen passing into animals, and wild and tame +animals changing into one another. + +When all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each of +them their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all +brought them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the revolution +of the spindle impelled by her hand; from her they were carried to Atropos, +who made the threads irreversible; whence, without turning round, they +passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they +moved on in scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness and rested at +evening by the river Unmindful, whose water could not be retained in any +vessel; of this they had all to drink a certain quantity--some of them +drank more than was required, and he who drank forgot all things. Er +himself was prevented from drinking. When they had gone to rest, about the +middle of the night there were thunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly +they were all driven divers ways, shooting like stars to their birth. +Concerning his return to the body, he only knew that awaking suddenly in +the morning he found himself lying on the pyre. + +Thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if we +believe that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the heavenly way of +Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of +Forgetfulness, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a crown +of reward and happiness both in this world and also in the millennial +pilgrimage of the other. + +The Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions: first, +resuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the +poets, who, now that the nature of the soul has been analyzed, are seen to +be very far gone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the reality of +the happiness of the just, he demands that appearance shall be restored to +him, and then proceeds to prove the immortality of the soul. The argument, +as in the Phaedo and Gorgias, is supplemented by the vision of a future +life. + +Why Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and +dramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially to +the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may be embodied +in verse as well as in prose, and that there are some indefinable lights +and shadows of human life which can only be expressed in poetry--some +elements of imagination which always entwine with reason; why he should +have supposed epic verse to be inseparably associated with the impurities +of the old Hellenic mythology; why he should try Homer and Hesiod by the +unfair and prosaic test of utility,--are questions which have always been +debated amongst students of Plato. Though unable to give a complete answer +to them, we may show--first, that his views arose naturally out of the +circumstances of his age; and secondly, we may elicit the truth as well as +the error which is contained in them. + +He is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own +lifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the Laws, had taken the place +of an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last phase of the +tragic drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and apologist of tyrants, and +the Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was almost extinct; the new had not +yet arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry, like every other branch of Greek +literature, was falling under the power of rhetoric. There was no 'second +or third' to Aeschylus and Sophocles in the generation which followed them. +Aristophanes, in one of his later comedies (Frogs), speaks of 'thousands of +tragedy-making prattlers,' whose attempts at poetry he compares to the +chirping of swallows; 'their garrulity went far beyond Euripides,'--'they +appeared once upon the stage, and there was an end of them.' To a man of +genius who had a real appreciation of the godlike Aeschylus and the noble +and gentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their +'theology' (Rep.), these 'minor poets' must have been contemptible and +intolerable. There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato than a +sense of the decline and decay both in literature and in politics which +marked his own age. Nor can he have been expected to look with favour on +the licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of his career, who had begun by +satirizing Socrates in the Clouds, and in a similar spirit forty years +afterwards had satirized the founders of ideal commonwealths in his +Eccleziazusae, or Female Parliament (Laws). + +There were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The +profession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human +nature, for 'one man in his life' cannot 'play many parts;' the characters +which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, and to leave +nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any man live his +life and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not the master of it. +Taking this view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of the dramatic +than of the epic poets, though he must have known that the Greek tragedians +afforded noble lessons and examples of virtue and patriotism, to which +nothing in Homer can be compared. But great dramatic or even great +rhetorical power is hardly consistent with firmness or strength of mind, +and dramatic talent is often incidentally associated with a weak or +dissolute character. + +In the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, he +says that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third degree +removed from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and measure; +they are only appearances. In modern times we should say that art is not +merely imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in forms of sense. +Even adopting the humble image of Plato, from which his argument derives a +colour, we should maintain that the artist may ennoble the bed which he +paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the feeling of home which he +introduces; and there have been modern painters who have imparted such an +ideal interest to a blacksmith's or a carpenter's shop. The eye or mind +which feels as well as sees can give dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, +or a straw-built shed (Rembrandt), to the hull of a vessel 'going to its +last home' (Turner). Still more would this apply to the greatest works of +art, which seem to be the visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been +asked whether the Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an +imitation only, would he not have been compelled to admit that something +more was to be found in them than in the form of any mortal; and that the +rule of proportion to which they conformed was 'higher far than any +geometry or arithmetic could express?' (Statesman.) + +Again, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional +rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit +Aristotle's theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a +purgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to +afford the opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that we +may sometimes cure disordered emotions by giving expression to them; and +that they often gain strength when pent up within our own breast. It is +not every indulgence of the feelings which is to be condemned. For there +may be a gratification of the higher as well as of the lower--thoughts +which are too deep or too sad to be expressed by ourselves, may find an +utterance in the words of poets. Every one would acknowledge that there +have been times when they were consoled and elevated by beautiful music or +by the sublimity of architecture or by the peacefulness of nature. Plato +has himself admitted, in the earlier part of the Republic, that the arts +might have the effect of harmonizing as well as of enervating the mind; but +in the Tenth Book he regards them through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He +asks only 'What good have they done?' and is not satisfied with the reply, +that 'They have given innocent pleasure to mankind.' + +He tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he has +found by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the inferior +faculties. He means to say that the higher faculties have to do with +universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are on a level +with their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato; and he was +well aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of life by any +process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical use of them is in fact a +denial of their authority; he saw, too, that the poets were not critics--as +he says in the Apology, 'Any one was a better interpreter of their writings +than they were themselves. He himself ceased to be a poet when he became a +disciple of Socrates; though, as he tells us of Solon, 'he might have been +one of the greatest of them, if he had not been deterred by other pursuits' +(Tim.) Thus from many points of view there is an antagonism between Plato +and the poets, which was foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel between +philosophy and poetry. The poets, as he says in the Protagoras, were the +Sophists of their day; and his dislike of the one class is reflected on the +other. He regards them both as the enemies of reasoning and abstraction, +though in the case of Euripides more with reference to his immoral +sentiments about tyrants and the like. For Plato is the prophet who 'came +into the world to convince men'--first of the fallibility of sense and +opinion, and secondly of the reality of abstract ideas. Whatever +strangeness there may be in modern times in opposing philosophy to poetry, +which to us seem to have so many elements in common, the strangeness will +disappear if we conceive of poetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as +equivalent to thought and abstraction. Unfortunately the very word 'idea,' +which to Plato is expressive of the most real of all things, is associated +in our minds with an element of subjectiveness and unreality. We may note +also how he differs from Aristotle who declares poetry to be truer than +history, for the opposite reason, because it is concerned with universals, +not like history, with particulars (Poet). + +The things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which are +unseen--they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. To him +all particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; they have +a taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in seeing that +this is an illusion; for there is no more error or variation in an +individual man, horse, bed, etc., than in the class man, horse, bed, etc.; +nor is the truth which is displayed in individual instances less certain +than that which is conveyed through the medium of ideas. But Plato, who is +deeply impressed with the real importance of universals as instruments of +thought, attributes to them an essential truth which is imaginary and +unreal; for universals may be often false and particulars true. Had he +attained to any clear conception of the individual, which is the synthesis +of the universal and the particular; or had he been able to distinguish +between opinion and sensation, which the ambiguity of the words (Greek) and +the like, tended to confuse, he would not have denied truth to the +particulars of sense. + +But the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in all +departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and rhetoricians of +the Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, false prophets, lying +spirits, enchanters of the world. There is another count put into the +indictment against them by Plato, that they are the friends of the tyrant, +and bask in the sunshine of his patronage. Despotism in all ages has had +an apparatus of false ideas and false teachers at its service--in the +history of Modern Europe as well as of Greece and Rome. For no government +of men depends solely upon force; without some corruption of literature and +morals--some appeal to the imagination of the masses--some pretence to the +favour of heaven--some element of good giving power to evil, tyranny, even +for a short time, cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were not +insensible to the importance of awakening in their cause a Pseudo-Hellenic +feeling; they were proud of successes at the Olympic games; they were not +devoid of the love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the first +instance of Greek poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or +Archelaus: and the old spirit of freedom is roused within him at their +prostitution of the Tragic Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his +prophetic eye extends beyond them to the false teachers of other ages who +are the creatures of the government under which they live. He compares the +corruption of his contemporaries with the idea of a perfect society, and +gathers up into one mass of evil the evils and errors of mankind; to him +they are personified in the rhetoricians, sophists, poets, rulers who +deceive and govern the world. + +A further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts is +that they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be disposed to +introduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him. For the +emotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not most likely to +be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by the moderate +indulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present thought in the +form of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of reason, to inspire +even for a moment courage or resignation; perhaps to suggest a sense of +infinity and eternity in a way which mere language is incapable of +attaining. True, the same power which in the purer age of art embodies +gods and heroes only, may be made to express the voluptuous image of a +Corinthian courtezan. But this only shows that art, like other outward +things, may be turned to good and also to evil, and is not more closely +connected with the higher than with the lower part of the soul. All +imitative art is subject to certain limitations, and therefore necessarily +partakes of the nature of a compromise. Something of ideal truth is +sacrificed for the sake of the representation, and something in the +exactness of the representation is sacrificed to the ideal. Still, works +of art have a permanent element; they idealize and detain the passing +thought, and are the intermediates between sense and ideas. + +In the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of fiction +may certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the existence +of an age in which a severer conception of truth has either banished or +transformed them. At any rate we must admit that they hold a different +place at different periods of the world's history. In the infancy of +mankind, poetry, with the exception of proverbs, is the whole of +literature, and the only instrument of intellectual culture; in modern +times she is the shadow or echo of her former self, and appears to have a +precarious existence. Milton in his day doubted whether an epic poem was +any longer possible. At the same time we must remember, that what Plato +would have called the charms of poetry have been partly transferred to +prose; he himself (Statesman) admits rhetoric to be the handmaiden of +Politics, and proposes to find in the strain of law (Laws) a substitute for +the old poets. Among ourselves the creative power seems often to be +growing weaker, and scientific fact to be more engrossing and overpowering +to the mind than formerly. The illusion of the feelings commonly called +love, has hitherto been the inspiring influence of modern poetry and +romance, and has exercised a humanizing if not a strengthening influence on +the world. But may not the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some +day exhausted? The modern English novel which is the most popular of all +forms of reading is not more than a century or two old: will the tale of +love a hundred years hence, after so many thousand variations of the same +theme, be still received with unabated interest? + +Art cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may +often corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which all +artistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect expression, +either of the religious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. The fairest +forms may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as is proved by the fact +that the Mahometans, and many sects of Christians, have renounced the use +of pictures and images. The beginning of a great religion, whether +Christian or Gentile, has not been 'wood or stone,' but a spirit moving in +the hearts of men. The disciples have met in a large upper room or in +'holes and caves of the earth'; in the second or third generation, they +have had mosques, temples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or +reform of religions, like the first revelation of them, has come from +within and has generally disregarded external ceremonies and +accompaniments. + +But poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and the +purest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between two opposite views +--when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be brought up +amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book X, when he banishes the poets +from his Republic. Admitting that the arts, which some of us almost deify, +have fallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on the other hand that +to banish imagination wholly would be suicidal as well as impossible. For +nature too is a form of art; and a breath of the fresh air or a single +glance at the varying landscape would in an instant revive and reillumine +the extinguished spark of poetry in the human breast. In the lower stages +of civilization imagination more than reason distinguishes man from the +animals; and to banish art would be to banish thought, to banish language, +to banish the expression of all truth. No religion is wholly devoid of +external forms; even the Mahometan who renounces the use of pictures and +images has a temple in which he worships the Most High, as solemn and +beautiful as any Greek or Christian building. Feeling too and thought are +not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel before he can execute. And +the highest thoughts, when they become familiarized to us, are always +tending to pass into the form of feeling. + +Plato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society. But +he feels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting against +the degeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest against the +want of serious purpose in modern fiction, against the unseemliness or +extravagance of some of our poets or novelists, against the time-serving of +preachers or public writers, against the regardlessness of truth which to +the eye of the philosopher seems to characterize the greater part of the +world. For we too have reason to complain that our poets and novelists +'paint inferior truth' and 'are concerned with the inferior part of the +soul'; that the readers of them become what they read and are injuriously +affected by them. And we look in vain for that healthy atmosphere of which +Plato speaks,--'the beauty which meets the sense like a breeze and +imperceptibly draws the soul, even in childhood, into harmony with the +beauty of reason.' + +For there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine perfection, +the harmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which should renew +the youth of the world, and bring back the ages in which the poet was man's +only teacher and best friend,--which would find materials in the living +present as well as in the romance of the past, and might subdue to the +fairest forms of speech and verse the intractable materials of modern +civilisation,--which might elicit the simple principles, or, as Plato would +have called them, the essential forms, of truth and justice out of the +variety of opinion and the complexity of modern society,--which would +preserve all the good of each generation and leave the bad unsung,--which +should be based not on vain longings or faint imaginings, but on a clear +insight into the nature of man. Then the tale of love might begin again in +poetry or prose, two in one, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the +service of God and man; and feelings of love might still be the incentive +to great thoughts and heroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; and +many types of manly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above +the ordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems +(Laws), be not only written, but lived by us. A few such strains have been +heard among men in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato +quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and serious +approval,--in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in passages of other +English poets,--first and above all in the Hebrew prophets and psalmists. +Shakespeare has taught us how great men should speak and act; he has drawn +characters of a wonderful purity and depth; he has ennobled the human mind, +but, like Homer (Rep.), he 'has left no way of life.' The next greatest +poet of modern times, Goethe, is concerned with 'a lower degree of truth'; +he paints the world as a stage on which 'all the men and women are merely +players'; he cultivates life as an art, but he furnishes no ideals of truth +and action. The poet may rebel against any attempt to set limits to his +fancy; and he may argue truly that moralizing in verse is not poetry. +Possibly, like Mephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his +adversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking, 'How +may the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?' + +Returning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and +error appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the absurdity +of mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer; just as in the +Phaedrus he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology upon rational +principles; both these were the modern tendencies of his own age, which he +deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument that Homer, if he +had been able to teach mankind anything worth knowing, would not have been +allowed by them to go about begging as a rhapsodist, is both false and +contrary to the spirit of Plato (Rep.). It may be compared with those +other paradoxes of the Gorgias, that 'No statesman was ever unjustly put to +death by the city of which he was the head'; and that 'No Sophist was ever +defrauded by his pupils' (Gorg.)... + +The argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of soul +and body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force which +is able to put an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil; and if she +cannot be destroyed by that, she cannot be destroyed by any other. Yet +Plato has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the +incrustations of earth as to lose her original form; and in the Timaeus he +recognizes more strongly than in the Republic the influence which the body +has over the mind, denying even the voluntariness of human actions, on the +ground that they proceed from physical states (Tim.). In the Republic, as +elsewhere, he wavers between the original soul which has to be restored, +and the character which is developed by training and education... + +The vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who is +said by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has +certainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the pilgrimages +of the soul in the Zend Avesta (Haug, Avesta). But no trace of +acquaintance with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato's writings, and +there is no reason for giving him the name of Er the Pamphylian. The +philosophy of Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from Zoroaster, +and still less the myths of Plato. + +The local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the +Phaedrus and Phaedo. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology; +the great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a cylinder or +box, containing the seven orbits of the planets and the fixed stars; this +is suspended from an axis or spindle which turns on the knees of Necessity; +the revolutions of the seven orbits contained in the cylinder are guided by +the fates, and their harmonious motion produces the music of the spheres. +Through the innermost or eighth of these, which is the moon, is passed the +spindle; but it is doubtful whether this is the continuation of the column +of light, from which the pilgrims contemplate the heavens; the words of +Plato imply that they are connected, but not the same. The column itself +is clearly not of adamant. The spindle (which is of adamant) is fastened +to the ends of the chains which extend to the middle of the column of +light--this column is said to hold together the heaven; but whether it +hangs from the spindle, or is at right angles to it, is not explained. The +cylinder containing the orbits of the stars is almost as much a symbol as +the figure of Necessity turning the spindle;--for the outermost rim is the +sphere of the fixed stars, and nothing is said about the intervals of space +which divide the paths of the stars in the heavens. The description is +both a picture and an orrery, and therefore is necessarily inconsistent +with itself. The column of light is not the Milky Way--which is neither +straight, nor like a rainbow--but the imaginary axis of the earth. This is +compared to the rainbow in respect not of form but of colour, and not to +the undergirders of a trireme, but to the straight rope running from prow +to stern in which the undergirders meet. + +The orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in its +mode of representation from the circles of the same and of the other in the +Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from the planets, and +they move in orbits without them, although in an opposite direction: in +the Republic as in the Timaeus they are all moving round the axis of the +world. But we are not certain that in the former they are moving round the +earth. No distinct mention is made in the Republic of the circles of the +same and other; although both in the Timaeus and in the Republic the motion +of the fixed stars is supposed to coincide with the motion of the whole. +The relative thickness of the rims is perhaps designed to express the +relative distances of the planets. Plato probably intended to represent +the earth, from which Er and his companions are viewing the heavens, as +stationary in place; but whether or not herself revolving, unless this is +implied in the revolution of the axis, is uncertain (Timaeus). The +spectator may be supposed to look at the heavenly bodies, either from above +or below. The earth is a sort of earth and heaven in one, like the heaven +of the Phaedrus, on the back of which the spectator goes out to take a peep +at the stars and is borne round in the revolution. There is no distinction +between the equator and the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine +that the planets have an opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in +order to account for their appearances in the heavens. In the description +of the meadow, and the retribution of the good and evil after death, there +are traces of Homer. + +The description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as +forming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions of +the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or weaving of +the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them, and the making of +them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three Fates--Lachesis, Clotho, +Atropos, are obviously derived from their names. The element of chance in +human life is indicated by the order of the lots. But chance, however +adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom of man, if he knows how to choose +aright; there is a worse enemy to man than chance; this enemy is himself. +He who was moderately fortunate in the number of the lot--even the very +last comer--might have a good life if he chose with wisdom. And as Plato +does not like to make an assertion which is unproven, he more than confirms +this statement a few sentences afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who +chose last. But the virtue which is founded on habit is not sufficient to +enable a man to choose; he must add to virtue knowledge, if he is to act +rightly when placed in new circumstances. The routine of good actions and +good habits is an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge says, +'Common sense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,' so Plato +would have said, 'Habit is worthless which is not based upon philosophy.' + +The freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is +distinctly asserted. 'Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours +her he will have more or less of her.' The life of man is 'rounded' by +necessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him (Pol.). +But within the walls of necessity there is an open space in which he is his +own master, and can study for himself the effects which the variously +compounded gifts of nature or fortune have upon the soul, and act +accordingly. All men cannot have the first choice in everything. But the +lot of all men is good enough, if they choose wisely and will live +diligently. + +The verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years, by +the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; the +coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was supposed +to have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed in the +meadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the column of +light; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who chose the +twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite character +among the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill blamed any one +rather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank more than was +necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself was hindered +from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, unlike the +conception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned ignorance of how Er +returned to the body, when the other souls went shooting like stars to +their birth,--add greatly to the probability of the narrative. They are +such touches of nature as the art of Defoe might have introduced when he +wished to win credibility for marvels and apparitions. + +... + +There still remain to be considered some points which have been +intentionally reserved to the end: (1) the Janus-like character of the +Republic, which presents two faces--one an Hellenic state, the other a +kingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects are +(2) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by Morgenstern: +(a) the community of property ; (b) of families; (c) the rule of +philosophers; (d) the analogy of the individual and the State, which, like +some other analogies in the Republic, is carried too far. We may then +proceed to consider (3) the subject of education as conceived by Plato, +bringing together in a general view the education of youth and the +education of after-life; (4) we may note further some essential differences +between ancient and modern politics which are suggested by the Republic; +(5) we may compare the Politicus and the Laws; (6) we may observe the +influence exercised by Plato on his imitators; and (7) take occasion to +consider the nature and value of political, and (8) of religious ideals. + +1. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State +(Book V). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan; such as +the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men, the +military training of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women. The +life of Sparta was the life of a camp (Laws), enforced even more rigidly in +time of peace than in war; the citizens of Sparta, like Plato's, were +forbidden to trade--they were to be soldiers and not shopkeepers. Nowhere +else in Greece was the individual so completely subjected to the State; the +time when he was to marry, the education of his children, the clothes which +he was to wear, the food which he was to eat, were all prescribed by law. +Some of the best enactments in the Republic, such as the reverence to be +paid to parents and elders, and some of the worst, such as the exposure of +deformed children, are borrowed from the practice of Sparta. The +encouragement of friendships between men and youths, or of men with one +another, as affording incentives to bravery, is also Spartan; in Sparta too +a nearer approach was made than in any other Greek State to equality of the +sexes, and to community of property; and while there was probably less of +licentiousness in the sense of immorality, the tie of marriage was regarded +more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The 'suprema lex' was the +preservation of the family, and the interest of the State. The coarse +strength of a military government was not favourable to purity and +refinement; and the excessive strictness of some regulations seems to have +produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most accessible to +bribery; several of the greatest of them might be described in the words of +Plato as having a 'fierce secret longing after gold and silver.' Though +not in the strict sense communists, the principle of communism was +maintained among them in their division of lands, in their common meals, in +their slaves, and in the free use of one another's goods. Marriage was a +public institution: and the women were educated by the State, and sang and +danced in public with the men. + +Many traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the +magistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry; as in +the Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled. Hymns to +the Gods, which are the only kind of music admitted into the ideal State, +were the only kind which was permitted at Sparta. The Spartans, though an +unpoetical race, were nevertheless lovers of poetry; they had been stirred +by the Elegiac strains of Tyrtaeus, they had crowded around Hippias to hear +his recitals of Homer; but in this they resembled the citizens of the +timocratic rather than of the ideal State. The council of elder men also +corresponds to the Spartan gerousia; and the freedom with which they are +permitted to judge about matters of detail agrees with what we are told of +that institution. Once more, the military rule of not spoiling the dead or +offering arms at the temples; the moderation in the pursuit of enemies; the +importance attached to the physical well-being of the citizens; the use of +warfare for the sake of defence rather than of aggression--are features +probably suggested by the spirit and practice of Sparta. + +To the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and the +character of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan citizen. +The love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, but was shared +by many undistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to find a principle +which was wanting in their own democracy. The (Greek) of the Spartans +attracted them, that is to say, not the goodness of their laws, but the +spirit of order and loyalty which prevailed. Fascinated by the idea, +citizens of Athens would imitate the Lacedaemonians in their dress and +manners; they were known to the contemporaries of Plato as 'the persons who +had their ears bruised,' like the Roundheads of the Commonwealth. The love +of another church or country when seen at a distance only, the longing for +an imaginary simplicity in civilized times, the fond desire of a past which +never has been, or of a future which never will be,--these are aspirations +of the human mind which are often felt among ourselves. Such feelings meet +with a response in the Republic of Plato. + +But there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example, the +literary and philosophical education, and the grace and beauty of life, +which are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his citizens a +taste of Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian discipline. His +individual genius is purely Athenian, although in theory he is a lover of +Sparta; and he is something more than either--he has also a true Hellenic +feeling. He is desirous of humanizing the wars of Hellenes against one +another; he acknowledges that the Delphian God is the grand hereditary +interpreter of all Hellas. The spirit of harmony and the Dorian mode are +to prevail, and the whole State is to have an external beauty which is the +reflex of the harmony within. But he has not yet found out the truth which +he afterwards enunciated in the Laws--that he was a better legislator who +made men to be of one mind, than he who trained them for war. The +citizens, as in other Hellenic States, democratic as well as aristocratic, +are really an upper class; for, although no mention is made of slaves, the +lower classes are allowed to fade away into the distance, and are +represented in the individual by the passions. Plato has no idea either of +a social State in which all classes are harmonized, or of a federation of +Hellas or the world in which different nations or States have a place. His +city is equipped for war rather than for peace, and this would seem to be +justified by the ordinary condition of Hellenic States. The myth of the +earth-born men is an embodiment of the orthodox tradition of Hellas, and +the allusion to the four ages of the world is also sanctioned by the +authority of Hesiod and the poets. Thus we see that the Republic is partly +founded on the ideal of the old Greek polis, partly on the actual +circumstances of Hellas in that age. Plato, like the old painters, retains +the traditional form, and like them he has also a vision of a city in the +clouds. + +There is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the work; +for the Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean league. The +'way of life' which was connected with the name of Pythagoras, like the +Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which the mind of an individual +might exercise over his contemporaries, and may have naturally suggested to +Plato the possibility of reviving such 'mediaeval institutions.' The +Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule of life and a moral and +intellectual training. The influence ascribed to music, which to us seems +exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature; it is not to be regarded as +representing the real influence of music in the Greek world. More nearly +than any other government of Hellas, the Pythagorean league of three +hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For once in the history of mankind +the philosophy of order or (Greek), expressing and consequently enlisting +on its side the combined endeavours of the better part of the people, +obtained the management of public affairs and held possession of it for a +considerable time (until about B.C. 500). Probably only in States prepared +by Dorian institutions would such a league have been possible. The rulers, +like Plato's (Greek), were required to submit to a severe training in order +to prepare the way for the education of the other members of the community. +Long after the dissolution of the Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as +Archytas of Tarentum, retained their political influence over the cities of +Magna Graecia. There was much here that was suggestive to the kindred +spirit of Plato, who had doubtless meditated deeply on the 'way of life of +Pythagoras' (Rep.) and his followers. Slight traces of Pythagoreanism are +to be found in the mystical number of the State, in the number which +expresses the interval between the king and the tyrant, in the doctrine of +transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in the great though +secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in education. + +But as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far +beyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which +is to unite the past of Greek history with the future of philosophy, +analogous to that other impossibility, which has often been the dream of +Christendom, the attempt to unite the past history of Europe with the +kingdom of Christ. Nothing actually existing in the world at all resembles +Plato's ideal State; nor does he himself imagine that such a State is +possible. This he repeats again and again; e.g. in the Republic, or in the +Laws where, casting a glance back on the Republic, he admits that the +perfect state of communism and philosophy was impossible in his own age, +though still to be retained as a pattern. The same doubt is implied in the +earnestness with which he argues in the Republic that ideals are none the +worse because they cannot be realized in fact, and in the chorus of +laughter, which like a breaking wave will, as he anticipates, greet the +mention of his proposals; though like other writers of fiction, he uses all +his art to give reality to his inventions. When asked how the ideal polity +can come into being, he answers ironically, 'When one son of a king becomes +a philosopher'; he designates the fiction of the earth-born men as 'a noble +lie'; and when the structure is finally complete, he fairly tells you that +his Republic is a vision only, which in some sense may have reality, but +not in the vulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon earth. It has been +said that Plato flies as well as walks, but this falls short of the truth; +for he flies and walks at the same time, and is in the air and on firm +ground in successive instants. + +Niebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in this +place--Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal to +Athenian institutions?--he can hardly be said to be the friend of +democracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of +government; all of them he regarded as 'states of faction' (Laws); none +attained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects, which +seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other; and the +worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has hardly any +meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings are not meant +for a particular age and country, but for all time and all mankind. The +decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive which led Plato to +frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be regarded as reflecting the +departing glory of Hellas. As well might we complain of St. Augustine, +whose great work 'The City of God' originated in a similar motive, for not +being loyal to the Roman Empire. Even a nearer parallel might be afforded +by the first Christians, who cannot fairly be charged with being bad +citizens because, though 'subject to the higher powers,' they were looking +forward to a city which is in heaven. + +2. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of +according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age +have been said to become the commonplaces of the next; but the paradoxes of +Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to his contemporaries. +The modern world has either sneered at them as absurd, or denounced them as +unnatural and immoral; men have been pleased to find in Aristotle's +criticisms of them the anticipation of their own good sense. The wealthy +and cultivated classes have disliked and also dreaded them; they have +pointed with satisfaction to the failure of efforts to realize them in +practice. Yet since they are the thoughts of one of the greatest of human +intelligences, and of one who had done most to elevate morality and +religion, they seem to deserve a better treatment at our hands. We may +have to address the public, as Plato does poetry, and assure them that we +mean no harm to existing institutions. There are serious errors which have +a side of truth and which therefore may fairly demand a careful +consideration: there are truths mixed with error of which we may indeed +say, 'The half is better than the whole.' Yet 'the half' may be an +important contribution to the study of human nature. + +(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned +slightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle +observes, is confined to the guardians; at least no mention is made of the +other classes. But the omission is not of any real significance, and +probably arises out of the plan of the work, which prevents the writer from +entering into details. + +Aristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of modern +political economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing away with +the spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to consider the +subject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled by the common +opinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the sacredness of +property is a notion far more fixed in modern than in ancient times. The +world has grown older, and is therefore more conservative. Primitive +society offered many examples of land held in common, either by a tribe or +by a township, and such may probably have been the original form of landed +tenure. Ancient legislators had invented various modes of dividing and +preserving the divisions of land among the citizens; according to Aristotle +there were nations who held the land in common and divided the produce, and +there were others who divided the land and stored the produce in common. +The evils of debt and the inequality of property were far greater in +ancient than in modern times, and the accidents to which property was +subject from war, or revolution, or taxation, or other legislative +interference, were also greater. All these circumstances gave property a +less fixed and sacred character. The early Christians are believed to have +held their property in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words +of Christ himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in +almost all ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of +modern enthusiasts who have made a religion of communism; in every age of +religious excitement notions like Wycliffe's 'inheritance of grace' have +tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent, has +appeared in politics. 'The preparation of the Gospel of peace' soon +becomes the red flag of Republicanism. + +We can hardly judge what effect Plato's views would have upon his own +contemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an exaggeration +of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would acknowledge that +the right of private property is based on expediency, and may be interfered +with in a variety of ways for the public good. Any other mode of vesting +property which was found to be more advantageous, would in time acquire the +same basis of right; 'the most useful,' in Plato's words, 'would be the +most sacred.' The lawyers and ecclesiastics of former ages would have +spoken of property as a sacred institution. But they only meant by such +language to oppose the greatest amount of resistance to any invasion of the +rights of individuals and of the Church. + +When we consider the question, without any fear of immediate application to +practice, in the spirit of Plato's Republic, are we quite sure that the +received notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of wealth +which is customary in civilized countries the most favourable that can be +conceived for the education and development of the mass of mankind? Can +'the spectator of all time and all existence' be quite convinced that one +or two thousand years hence, great changes will not have taken place in the +rights of property, or even that the very notion of property, beyond what +is necessary for personal maintenance, may not have disappeared? This was +a distinction familiar to Aristotle, though likely to be laughed at among +ourselves. Such a change would not be greater than some other changes +through which the world has passed in the transition from ancient to modern +society, for example, the emancipation of the serfs in Russia, or the +abolition of slavery in America and the West Indies; and not so great as +the difference which separates the Eastern village community from the +Western world. To accomplish such a revolution in the course of a few +centuries, would imply a rate of progress not more rapid than has actually +taken place during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom of Japan +underwent more change in five or six years than Europe in five or six +hundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished among +ourselves quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have passed away; +and the most untenable propositions respecting the right of bequests or +entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the most moderate. +Some one will be heard to ask whether a state of society can be final in +which the interests of thousands are perilled on the life or character of a +single person. And many will indulge the hope that our present condition +may, after all, be only transitional, and may conduct to a higher, in which +property, besides ministering to the enjoyment of the few, may also furnish +the means of the highest culture to all, and will be a greater benefit to +the public generally, and also more under the control of public authority. +There may come a time when the saying, 'Have I not a right to do what I +will with my own?' will appear to be a barbarous relic of individualism;-- +when the possession of a part may be a greater blessing to each and all +than the possession of the whole is now to any one. + +Such reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman, +but they are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can +imagine that in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of +some individual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk as +deep into the heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as private +property is to ourselves. He knows that this latter institution is not +more than four or five thousand years old: may not the end revert to the +beginning? In our own age even Utopias affect the spirit of legislation, +and an abstract idea may exercise a great influence on practical politics. + +The objections that would be generally urged against Plato's community of +property, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives for exertion would be +taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was dependent upon all. +Every man would produce as little and consume as much as he liked. The +experience of civilized nations has hitherto been adverse to Socialism. +The effort is too great for human nature; men try to live in common, but +the personal feeling is always breaking in. On the other hand it may be +doubted whether our present notions of property are not conventional, for +they differ in different countries and in different states of society. We +boast of an individualism which is not freedom, but rather an artificial +result of the industrial state of modern Europe. The individual is +nominally free, but he is also powerless in a world bound hand and foot in +the chains of economic necessity. Even if we cannot expect the mass of +mankind to become disinterested, at any rate we observe in them a power of +organization which fifty years ago would never have been suspected. The +same forces which have revolutionized the political system of Europe, may +effect a similar change in the social and industrial relations of mankind. +And if we suppose the influence of some good as well as neutral motives +working in the community, there will be no absurdity in expecting that the +mass of mankind having power, and becoming enlightened about the higher +possibilities of human life, when they learn how much more is attainable +for all than is at present the possession of a favoured few, may pursue the +common interest with an intelligence and persistency which mankind have +hitherto never seen. + +Now that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held fast +under the tyranny of custom and ignorance; now that criticism has pierced +the veil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the present,--the +progress of civilization may be expected to be far greater and swifter than +heretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the point at which we may +arrive in two or three generations is beyond the power of imagination to +foresee. There are forces in the world which work, not in an arithmetical, +but in a geometrical ratio of increase. Education, to use the expression +of Plato, moves like a wheel with an ever-multiplying rapidity. Nor can we +say how great may be its influence, when it becomes universal,--when it has +been inherited by many generations,--when it is freed from the trammels of +superstition and rightly adapted to the wants and capacities of different +classes of men and women. Neither do we know how much more the co- +operation of minds or of hands may be capable of accomplishing, whether in +labour or in study. The resources of the natural sciences are not half- +developed as yet; the soil of the earth, instead of growing more barren, +may become many times more fertile than hitherto; the uses of machinery far +greater, and also more minute than at present. New secrets of physiology +may be revealed, deeply affecting human nature in its innermost recesses. +The standard of health may be raised and the lives of men prolonged by +sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be peace, there may be leisure, +there may be innocent refreshments of many kinds. The ever-increasing +power of locomotion may join the extremes of earth. There may be +mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur only at great crises +of history. The East and the West may meet together, and all nations may +contribute their thoughts and their experience to the common stock of +humanity. Many other elements enter into a speculation of this kind. But +it is better to make an end of them. For such reflections appear to the +majority far-fetched, and to men of science, commonplace. + +(b) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the doctrine of +community of property present at all the same difficulty, or appear to be +the same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the community of +wives and children. This paradox he prefaces by another proposal, that the +occupations of men and women shall be the same, and that to this end they +shall have a common training and education. Male and female animals have +the same pursuits--why not also the two sexes of man? + +But have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we were saying that +different natures should have different pursuits. How then can men and +women have the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our notion +of the division of labour?--These objections are no sooner raised than +answered; for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference between +men and women, but only the accidental one that men beget and women bear +children. Following the analogy of the other animals, he contends that all +natural gifts are scattered about indifferently among both sexes, though +there may be a superiority of degree on the part of the men. The objection +on the score of decency to their taking part in the same gymnastic +exercises, is met by Plato's assertion that the existing feeling is a +matter of habit. + +That Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own +country and from the example of the East, shows a wonderful independence of +mind. He is conscious that women are half the human race, in some respects +the more important half (Laws); and for the sake both of men and women he +desires to raise the woman to a higher level of existence. He brings, not +sentiment, but philosophy to bear upon a question which both in ancient and +modern times has been chiefly regarded in the light of custom or feeling. +The Greeks had noble conceptions of womanhood in the goddesses Athene and +Artemis, and in the heroines Antigone and Andromache. But these ideals had +no counterpart in actual life. The Athenian woman was in no way the equal +of her husband; she was not the entertainer of his guests or the mistress +of his house, but only his housekeeper and the mother of his children. She +took no part in military or political matters; nor is there any instance in +the later ages of Greece of a woman becoming famous in literature. 'Hers +is the greatest glory who has the least renown among men,' is the +historian's conception of feminine excellence. A very different ideal of +womanhood is held up by Plato to the world; she is to be the companion of +the man, and to share with him in the toils of war and in the cares of +government. She is to be similarly trained both in bodily and mental +exercises. She is to lose as far as possible the incidents of maternity +and the characteristics of the female sex. + +The modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the +differences between men and women are not confined to the single point +urged by Plato; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities of +women, while energy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked for in +men. And the criticism is just: the differences affect the whole nature, +and are not, as Plato supposes, confined to a single point. But neither +can we say how far these differences are due to education and the opinions +of mankind, or physically inherited from the habits and opinions of former +generations. Women have been always taught, not exactly that they are +slaves, but that they are in an inferior position, which is also supposed +to have compensating advantages; and to this position they have conformed. +It is also true that the physical form may easily change in the course of +generations through the mode of life; and the weakness or delicacy, which +was once a matter of opinion, may become a physical fact. The +characteristics of sex vary greatly in different countries and ranks of +society, and at different ages in the same individuals. Plato may have +been right in denying that there was any ultimate difference in the sexes +of man other than that which exists in animals, because all other +differences may be conceived to disappear in other states of society, or +under different circumstances of life and training. + +The first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second--community of +wives and children. 'Is it possible? Is it desirable?' For as Glaucon +intimates, and as we far more strongly insist, 'Great doubts may be +entertained about both these points.' Any free discussion of the question +is impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing the ultimate +bases of social life to be examined. Few of us can safely enquire into the +things which nature hides, any more than we can dissect our own bodies. +Still, the manner in which Plato arrived at his conclusions should be +considered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked, is a wonderful thing, +that one of the wisest and best of men should have entertained ideas of +morality which are wholly at variance with our own. And if we would do +Plato justice, we must examine carefully the character of his proposals. +First, we may observe that the relations of the sexes supposed by him are +the reverse of licentious: he seems rather to aim at an impossible +strictness. Secondly, he conceives the family to be the natural enemy of +the state; and he entertains the serious hope that an universal brotherhood +may take the place of private interests--an aspiration which, although not +justified by experience, has possessed many noble minds. On the other +hand, there is no sentiment or imagination in the connections which men and +women are supposed by him to form; human beings return to the level of the +animals, neither exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing the natural instincts. +All that world of poetry and fancy which the passion of love has called +forth in modern literature and romance would have been banished by Plato. +The arrangements of marriage in the Republic are directed to one object-- +the improvement of the race. In successive generations a great development +both of bodily and mental qualities might be possible. The analogy of +animals tends to show that mankind can within certain limits receive a +change of nature. And as in animals we should commonly choose the best for +breeding, and destroy the others, so there must be a selection made of the +human beings whose lives are worthy to be preserved. + +We start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first, +that the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed out; +secondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we should be +poorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss of the best +things in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and meanest of human +beings--the infant, the criminal, the insane, the idiot, truly seems to us +one of the noblest results of Christianity. We have learned, though as yet +imperfectly, that the individual man has an endless value in the sight of +God, and that we honour Him when we honour the darkened and disfigured +image of Him (Laws). This is the lesson which Christ taught in a parable +when He said, 'Their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is +in heaven.' Such lessons are only partially realized in any age; they were +foreign to the age of Plato, as they have very different degrees of +strength in different countries or ages of the Christian world. To the +Greek the family was a religious and customary institution binding the +members together by a tie inferior in strength to that of friendship, and +having a less solemn and sacred sound than that of country. The +relationship which existed on the lower level of custom, Plato imagined +that he was raising to the higher level of nature and reason; while from +the modern and Christian point of view we regard him as sanctioning murder +and destroying the first principles of morality. + +The great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference +between man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being is +regarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier, or at best of a slave- +owner; the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder of animals +aims chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at courage or +temper; most often the fitness of the animal for food is the great +desideratum. But mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor yet for their +superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing carts. Neither does +the improvement of the human race consist merely in the increase of the +bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of the mind. Hence +there must be 'a marriage of true minds' as well as of bodies, of +imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts. Men and women +without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes; yet Plato takes +away these qualities and puts nothing in their place, not even the desire +of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know their own children. +The most important transaction of social life, he who is the idealist +philosopher converts into the most brutal. For the pair are to have no +relation to one another, except at the hymeneal festival; their children +are not theirs, but the state's; nor is any tie of affection to unite them. +Yet here the analogy of the animals might have saved Plato from a gigantic +error, if he had 'not lost sight of his own illustration.' For the 'nobler +sort of birds and beasts' nourish and protect their offspring and are +faithful to one another. + +An eminent physiologist thinks it worth while 'to try and place life on a +physical basis.' But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon +the physical? The higher comes first, then the lower, first the human and +rational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely divided; and +in times of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they seem to be only +different aspects of a common human nature which includes them both. +Neither is the moral the limit of the physical, but the expansion and +enlargement of it,--the highest form which the physical is capable of +receiving. As Plato would say, the body does not take care of the body, +and still less of the mind, but the mind takes care of both. In all human +action not that which is common to man and the animals is the +characteristic element, but that which distinguishes him from them. Even +if we admit the physical basis, and resolve all virtue into health of body +'la facon que notre sang circule,' still on merely physical grounds we must +come back to ideas. Mind and reason and duty and conscience, under these +or other names, are always reappearing. There cannot be health of body +without health of mind; nor health of mind without the sense of duty and +the love of truth (Charm). + +That the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations about +marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, does +indeed appear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato should +have entertained ideas of morality which to our own age are revolting, but +that he should have contradicted himself to an extent which is hardly +credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of idealism into the +crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift of reflection, he +appears to have thought out a subject about which he had better have +followed the enlightened feeling of his own age. The general sentiment of +Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old poets, and in later +time the tragedians, showed no want of respect for the family, on which +much of their religion was based. But the example of Sparta, and perhaps +in some degree the tendency to defy public opinion, seems to have misled +him. He will make one family out of all the families of the state. He +will select the finest specimens of men and women and breed from these +only. + +Yet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of human +nature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of philosophy +as well as of poetry), and also because any departure from established +morality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be unsettling, it may +be worth while to draw out a little more at length the objections to the +Platonic marriage. In the first place, history shows that wherever +polygamy has been largely allowed the race has deteriorated. One man to +one woman is the law of God and nature. Nearly all the civilized peoples +of the world at some period before the age of written records, have become +monogamists; and the step when once taken has never been retraced. The +exceptions occurring among Brahmins or Mahometans or the ancient Persians, +are of that sort which may be said to prove the rule. The connexions +formed between superior and inferior races hardly ever produce a noble +offspring, because they are licentious; and because the children in such +cases usually despise the mother and are neglected by the father who is +ashamed of them. Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans +to vice die out; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from +other countries, or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and +aristocracies which have disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in +numbers and degenerated in stature; 'mariages de convenance' leave their +enfeebling stamp on the offspring of them (King Lear). The marriage of +near relations, or the marrying in and in of the same family tends +constantly to weakness or idiocy in the children, sometimes assuming the +form as they grow older of passionate licentiousness. The common +prostitute rarely has any offspring. By such unmistakable evidence is the +authority of morality asserted in the relations of the sexes: and so many +more elements enter into this 'mystery' than are dreamed of by Plato and +some other philosophers. + +Recent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among primitive +tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and that the +captive taken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any man was +permitted to call his own. The partial existence of such customs among +some of the lower races of man, and the survival of peculiar ceremonies in +the marriages of some civilized nations, are thought to furnish a proof of +similar institutions having been once universal. There can be no question +that the study of anthropology has considerably changed our views +respecting the first appearance of man upon the earth. We know more about +the aborigines of the world than formerly, but our increasing knowledge +shows above all things how little we know. With all the helps which +written monuments afford, we do but faintly realize the condition of man +two thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what his condition was when +removed to a distance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when the majority of +mankind were lower and nearer the animals than any tribe now existing upon +the earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato (Laws) and Aristotle +(Metaph.) may have been more right than we imagine in supposing that some +forms of civilisation were discovered and lost several times over. If we +cannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded civilization, neither can we +set any limits to the depth of degradation to which the human race may sink +through war, disease, or isolation. And if we are to draw inferences about +the origin of marriage from the practice of barbarous nations, we should +also consider the remoter analogy of the animals. Many birds and animals, +especially the carnivorous, have only one mate, and the love and care of +offspring which seems to be natural is inconsistent with the primitive +theory of marriage. If we go back to an imaginary state in which men were +almost animals and the companions of them, we have as much right to argue +from what is animal to what is human as from the barbarous to the civilized +man. The record of animal life on the globe is fragmentary,--the +connecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied; the record of social +life is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we admit that our +first ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still the stages by +which men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative civilization of +China, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly +unknown to us. + +Such speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show that +an institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is only +the growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of +marriage, and we are told that like the right of property, after many wars +and contests, it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness of barbarians. +We stand face to face with human nature in its primitive nakedness. We are +compelled to accept, not the highest, but the lowest account of the origin +of human society. But on the other hand we may truly say that every step +in human progress has been in the same direction, and that in the course of +ages the idea of marriage and of the family has been more and more defined +and consecrated. The civilized East is immeasurably in advance of any +savage tribes; the Greeks and Romans have improved upon the East; the +Christian nations have been stricter in their views of the marriage +relation than any of the ancients. In this as in so many other things, +instead of looking back with regret to the past, we should look forward +with hope to the future. We must consecrate that which we believe to be +the most holy, and that 'which is the most holy will be the most useful.' +There is more reason for maintaining the sacredness of the marriage tie, +when we see the benefit of it, than when we only felt a vague religious +horror about the violation of it. But in all times of transition, when +established beliefs are being undermined, there is a danger that in the +passage from the old to the new we may insensibly let go the moral +principle, finding an excuse for listening to the voice of passion in the +uncertainty of knowledge, or the fluctuations of opinion. And there are +many persons in our own day who, enlightened by the study of anthropology, +and fascinated by what is new and strange, some using the language of fear, +others of hope, are inclined to believe that a time will come when through +the self-assertion of women, or the rebellious spirit of children, by the +analysis of human relations, or by the force of outward circumstances, the +ties of family life may be broken or greatly relaxed. They point to +societies in America and elsewhere which tend to show that the destruction +of the family need not necessarily involve the overthrow of all morality. +Wherever we may think of such speculations, we can hardly deny that they +have been more rife in this generation than in any other; and whither they +are tending, who can predict? + +To the doubts and queries raised by these 'social reformers' respecting the +relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a sufficient +answer, if any is needed. The difference about them and us is really one +of fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy him to be, but we +are speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal part of his nature; +we regard him as a creature having many sides, or aspects, moving between +good and evil, striving to rise above himself and to become 'a little lower +than the angels.' We also, to use a Platonic formula, are not ignorant of +the dissatisfactions and incompatibilities of family life, of the +meannesses of trade, of the flatteries of one class of society by another, +of the impediments which the family throws in the way of lofty aims and +aspirations. But we are conscious that there are evils and dangers in the +background greater still, which are not appreciated, because they are +either concealed or suppressed. What a condition of man would that be, in +which human passions were controlled by no authority, divine or human, in +which there was no shame or decency, no higher affection overcoming or +sanctifying the natural instincts, but simply a rule of health! Is it for +this that we are asked to throw away the civilization which is the growth +of ages? + +For strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there are +the more important considerations of mind and character and soul. We know +how human nature may be degraded; we do not know how by artificial means +any improvement in the breed can be effected. The problem is a complex +one, for if we go back only four steps (and these at least enter into the +composition of a child), there are commonly thirty progenitors to be taken +into account. Many curious facts, rarely admitting of proof, are told us +respecting the inheritance of disease or character from a remote ancestor. +We can trace the physical resemblances of parents and children in the same +family-- + +'Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat'; + +but scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both +from their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental +peculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in the +animals, to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a difficulty +in distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or other qualities, +and what is mere imitation or the result of similar circumstances. Great +men and great women have rarely had great fathers and mothers. Nothing +that we know of in the circumstances of their birth or lineage will explain +their appearance. Of the English poets of the last and two preceding +centuries scarcely a descendant remains,--none have ever been +distinguished. So deeply has nature hidden her secret, and so ridiculous +is the fancy which has been entertained by some that we might in time by +suitable marriage arrangements or, as Plato would have said, 'by an +ingenious system of lots,' produce a Shakespeare or a Milton. Even +supposing that we could breed men having the tenacity of bulldogs, or, like +the Spartans, 'lacking the wit to run away in battle,' would the world be +any the better? Many of the noblest specimens of the human race have been +among the weakest physically. Tyrtaeus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would +have been exposed at Sparta; and some of the fairest and strongest men and +women have been among the wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device +of uniting the strong and fair with the strong and fair, regardless of +sentiment and morality, nor yet by his other device of combining dissimilar +natures (Statesman), have mankind gradually passed from the brutality and +licentiousness of primitive marriage to marriage Christian and civilized. + +Few persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of +mental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through +them from some remoter ancestor, secondly from our race, thirdly from the +general condition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is commoner +than the remark, that 'So and so is like his father or his uncle'; and an +aged person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in a youth to a long- +forgotten ancestor, observing that 'Nature sometimes skips a generation.' +It may be true also, that if we knew more about our ancestors, these +similarities would be even more striking to us. Admitting the facts which +are thus described in a popular way, we may however remark that there is no +method of difference by which they can be defined or estimated, and that +they constitute only a small part of each individual. The doctrine of +heredity may seem to take out of our hands the conduct of our own lives, +but it is the idea, not the fact, which is really terrible to us. For what +we have received from our ancestors is only a fraction of what we are, or +may become. The knowledge that drunkenness or insanity has been prevalent +in a family may be the best safeguard against their recurrence in a future +generation. The parent will be most awake to the vices or diseases in his +child of which he is most sensible within himself. The whole of life may +be directed to their prevention or cure. The traces of consumption may +become fainter, or be wholly effaced: the inherent tendency to vice or +crime may be eradicated. And so heredity, from being a curse, may become a +blessing. We acknowledge that in the matter of our birth, as in our nature +generally, there are previous circumstances which affect us. But upon this +platform of circumstances or within this wall of necessity, we have still +the power of creating a life for ourselves by the informing energy of the +human will. + +There is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a +stranger. All the children born in his state are foundlings. It never +occurred to him that the greater part of them, according to universal +experience, would have perished. For children can only be brought up in +families. There is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child +which cannot be supplied by other mothers, or by 'strong nurses one or +more' (Laws). If Plato's 'pen' was as fatal as the Creches of Paris, or +the foundling hospital of Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his children +would have perished. There would have been no need to expose or put out of +the way the weaklier children, for they would have died of themselves. So +emphatically does nature protest against the destruction of the family. + +What Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken way +to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the Spartan men +and women were superior in form and strength to the other Greeks; and this +superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws and customs relating +to marriage. He did not consider that the desire of a noble offspring was +a passion among the Spartans, or that their physical superiority was to be +attributed chiefly, not to their marriage customs, but to their temperance +and training. He did not reflect that Sparta was great, not in consequence +of the relaxation of morality, but in spite of it, by virtue of a political +principle stronger far than existed in any other Grecian state. Least of +all did he observe that Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens +of the Greek race. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the +love of liberty--all that has made Greece famous with posterity, were +wanting among the Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or +Aeschylus, or Sophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not +allowed to appear above the state; the laws were fixed, and he had no +business to alter or reform them. Yet whence has the progress of cities +and nations arisen, if not from remarkable individuals, coming into the +world we know not how, and from causes over which we have no control? +Something too much may have been said in modern times of the value of +individuality. But we can hardly condemn too strongly a system which, +instead of fostering the scattered seeds or sparks of genius and character, +tends to smother and extinguish them. + +Still, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither +Christianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto been +able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that the side +from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away. Population +is the most untameable force in the political and social world. Do we not +find, especially in large cities, that the greatest hindrance to the +amelioration of the poor is their improvidence in marriage?--a small fault +truly, if not involving endless consequences. There are whole countries +too, such as India, or, nearer home, Ireland, in which a right solution of +the marriage question seems to lie at the foundation of the happiness of +the community. There are too many people on a given space, or they marry +too early and bring into the world a sickly and half-developed offspring; +or owing to the very conditions of their existence, they become emaciated +and hand on a similar life to their descendants. But who can oppose the +voice of prudence to the 'mightiest passions of mankind' (Laws), especially +when they have been licensed by custom and religion? In addition to the +influences of education, we seem to require some new principles of right +and wrong in these matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be +already heard whispering in private, but has never affected the moral +sentiments of mankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the +principle of utility, just in that action of our lives in which we have the +most need of it. The influences which we can bring to bear upon this +question are chiefly indirect. In a generation or two, education, +emigration, improvements in agriculture and manufactures, may have provided +the solution. The state physician hardly likes to probe the wound: it is +beyond his art; a matter which he cannot safely let alone, but which he +dare not touch: + +'We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.' + +When again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into +the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps +surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day twenty-five +or thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices, amid the +rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined +hands with one another? In making such a reflection we are not opposing +physical considerations to moral, but moral to physical; we are seeking to +make the voice of reason heard, which drives us back from the extravagance +of sentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is said by his +biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage, because he knew +that he was subject to hereditary consumption. One who deserved to be +called a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing a +black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him that, being liable to +outbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the natural impulses of +affection: he died unmarried in a lunatic asylum. These two little facts +suggest the reflection that a very few persons have done from a sense of +duty what the rest of mankind ought to have done under like circumstances, +if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were +about to bring into the world. If we could prevent such marriages without +any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought; and the +prohibition in the course of time would be protected by a 'horror +naturalis' similar to that which, in all civilized ages and countries, has +prevented the marriage of near relations by blood. Mankind would have been +the happier, if some things which are now allowed had from the beginning +been denied to them; if the sanction of religion could have prohibited +practices inimical to health; if sanitary principles could in early ages +have been invested with a superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on +in the world's history, we are no longer able to stamp at once with the +impress of religion a new prohibition. A free agent cannot have his +fancies regulated by law; and the execution of the law would be rendered +impossible, owing to the uncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to +be forbidden. Who can weigh virtue, or even fortune against health, or +moral and mental qualities against bodily? Who can measure probabilities +against certainties? There has been some good as well as evil in the +discipline of suffering; and there are diseases, such as consumption, which +have exercised a refining and softening influence on the character. Youth +is too inexperienced to balance such nice considerations; parents do not +often think of them, or think of them too late. They are at a distance and +may probably be averted; change of place, a new state of life, the +interests of a home may be the cure of them. So persons vainly reason when +their minds are already made up and their fortunes irrevocably linked +together. Nor is there any ground for supposing that marriages are to any +great extent influenced by reflections of this sort, which seem unable to +make any head against the irresistible impulse of individual attachment. + +Lastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions in +youth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the whole mind +and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which is given to them by +the imagination, without feeling that there is something unsatisfactory in +our method of treating them. That the most important influence on human +life should be wholly left to chance or shrouded in mystery, and instead of +being disciplined or understood, should be required to conform only to an +external standard of propriety--cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a +safe or satisfactory condition of human things. And still those who have +the charge of youth may find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the +manliness and innocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by general +admonitions which every one can apply for himself, to mitigate this +terrible evil which eats out the heart of individuals and corrupts the +moral sentiments of nations. In no duty towards others is there more need +of reticence and self-restraint. So great is the danger lest he who would +be the counsellor of another should reveal the secret prematurely, lest he +should get another too much into his power; or fix the passing impression +of evil by demanding the confession of it. + +Nor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere with +higher aims. If there have been some who 'to party gave up what was meant +for mankind,' there have certainly been others who to family gave up what +was meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of children, the +necessity of procuring money for their support, the flatteries of the rich +by the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the pride of birth or wealth, the +tendency of family life to divert men from the pursuit of the ideal or the +heroic, are as lowering in our own age as in that of Plato. And if we +prefer to look at the gentle influences of home, the development of the +affections, the amenities of society, the devotion of one member of a +family for the good of the others, which form one side of the picture, we +must not quarrel with him, or perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him, +for having presented to us the reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato +on grounds of morality, we may allow that there is an aspect of the world +which has not unnaturally led him into error. + +We hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all other +abstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State seems to +be built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework in which +family and social life is contained. But to Plato in his present mood of +mind the family is only a disturbing influence which, instead of filling +up, tends to disarrange the higher unity of the State. No organization is +needed except a political, which, regarded from another point of view, is a +military one. The State is all-sufficing for the wants of man, and, like +the idea of the Church in later ages, absorbs all other desires and +affections. In time of war the thousand citizens are to stand like a +rampart impregnable against the world or the Persian host; in time of peace +the preparation for war and their duties to the State, which are also their +duties to one another, take up their whole life and time. The only other +interest which is allowed to them besides that of war, is the interest of +philosophy. When they are too old to be soldiers they are to retire from +active life and to have a second novitiate of study and contemplation. +There is an element of monasticism even in Plato's communism. If he could +have done without children, he might have converted his Republic into a +religious order. Neither in the Laws, when the daylight of common sense +breaks in upon him, does he retract his error. In the state of which he +would be the founder, there is no marrying or giving in marriage: but +because of the infirmity of mankind, he condescends to allow the law of +nature to prevail. + +(c) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater +paradox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, 'Until kings are +philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill.' +And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who are capable of +apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the attainment of this +higher knowledge the second education is directed. Through a process of +training which has already made them good citizens they are now to be made +good legislators. We find with some surprise (not unlike the feeling which +Aristotle in a well-known passage describes the hearers of Plato's lectures +as experiencing, when they went to a discourse on the idea of good, +expecting to be instructed in moral truths, and received instead of them +arithmetical and mathematical formulae) that Plato does not propose for his +future legislators any study of finance or law or military tactics, but +only of abstract mathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract +conception of good. We ask, with Aristotle, What is the use of a man +knowing the idea of good, if he does not know what is good for this +individual, this state, this condition of society? We cannot understand +how Plato's legislators or guardians are to be fitted for their work of +statesmen by the study of the five mathematical sciences. We vainly search +in Plato's own writings for any explanation of this seeming absurdity. + +The discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the mind +with a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of estimating its +value. No metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly criticised his own +speculations; in his own judgment they have been above criticism; nor has +he understood that what to him seemed to be absolute truth may reappear in +the next generation as a form of logic or an instrument of thought. And +posterity have also sometimes equally misapprehended the real value of his +speculations. They appear to them to have contributed nothing to the stock +of human knowledge. The IDEA of good is apt to be regarded by the modern +thinker as an unmeaning abstraction; but he forgets that this abstraction +is waiting ready for use, and will hereafter be filled up by the divisions +of knowledge. When mankind do not as yet know that the world is subject to +law, the introduction of the mere conception of law or design or final +cause, and the far-off anticipation of the harmony of knowledge, are great +steps onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity of all things +leads men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily affect +their conception of human life and of politics, and also their own conduct +and character (Tim). We can imagine how a great mind like that of Pericles +might derive elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras (Phaedr.). To +be struggling towards a higher but unattainable conception is a more +favourable intellectual condition than to rest satisfied in a narrow +portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier, which have sometimes been +the greater ideas of science, are often lost sight of at a later period. +How rarely can we say of any modern enquirer in the magnificent language of +Plato, that 'He is the spectator of all time and of all existence!' + +Nor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast +metaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first +enthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them everywhere, and to apply them +in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the experience of +ages is required to enable them to fill up 'the intermediate axioms.' +Plato himself seems to have imagined that the truths of psychology, like +those of astronomy and harmonics, would be arrived at by a process of +deduction, and that the method which he has pursued in the Fourth Book, of +inferring them from experience and the use of language, was imperfect and +only provisional. But when, after having arrived at the idea of good, +which is the end of the science of dialectic, he is asked, What is the +nature, and what are the divisions of the science? He refuses to answer, +as if intending by the refusal to intimate that the state of knowledge +which then existed was not such as would allow the philosopher to enter +into his final rest. The previous sciences must first be studied, and +will, we may add, continue to be studied tell the end of time, although in +a sense different from any which Plato could have conceived. But we may +observe, that while he is aware of the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full +of enthusiasm in the contemplation of it. Looking into the orb of light, +he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated. The Hebrew prophet +believed that faith in God would enable him to govern the world; the Greek +philosopher imagined that contemplation of the good would make a +legislator. There is as much to be filled up in the one case as in the +other, and the one mode of conception is to the Israelite what the other is +to the Greek. Both find a repose in a divine perfection, which, whether in +a more personal or impersonal form, exists without them and independently +of them, as well as within them. + +There is no mention of the idea of good in the Timaeus, nor of the divine +Creator of the world in the Republic; and we are naturally led to ask in +what relation they stand to one another. Is God above or below the idea of +good? Or is the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God? The latter +appears to be the truer answer. To the Greek philosopher the perfection +and unity of God was a far higher conception than his personality, which he +hardly found a word to express, and which to him would have seemed to be +borrowed from mythology. To the Christian, on the other hand, or to the +modern thinker in general, it is difficult, if not impossible, to attach +reality to what he terms mere abstraction; while to Plato this very +abstraction is the truest and most real of all things. Hence, from a +difference in forms of thought, Plato appears to be resting on a creation +of his own mind only. But if we may be allowed to paraphrase the idea of +good by the words 'intelligent principle of law and order in the universe, +embracing equally man and nature,' we begin to find a meeting-point between +him and ourselves. + +The question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is one +that has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of Europe +and Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who has truly united +the power of command with the power of thought and reflection, as there +have been also many false combinations of these qualities. Some kind of +speculative power is necessary both in practical and political life; like +the rhetorician in the Phaedrus, men require to have a conception of the +varieties of human character, and to be raised on great occasions above the +commonplaces of ordinary life. Yet the idea of the philosopher-statesman +has never been popular with the mass of mankind; partly because he cannot +take the world into his confidence or make them understand the motives from +which he acts; and also because they are jealous of a power which they do +not understand. The revolution which human nature desires to effect step +by step in many ages is likely to be precipitated by him in a single year +or life. They are afraid that in the pursuit of his greater aims he may +disregard the common feelings of humanity, he is too apt to be looking into +the distant future or back into the remote past, and unable to see actions +or events which, to use an expression of Plato's 'are tumbling out at his +feet.' Besides, as Plato would say, there are other corruptions of these +philosophical statesmen. Either 'the native hue of resolution is sicklied +o'er with the pale cast of thought,' and at the moment when action above +all things is required he is undecided, or general principles are +enunciated by him in order to cover some change of policy; or his ignorance +of the world has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of others; or +in some cases he has been converted into a courtier, who enjoys the luxury +of holding liberal opinions, but was never known to perform a liberal +action. No wonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen +of this class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we +may be allowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, 'they have +seen bad imitations of the philosopher-statesman.' But a man in whom the +power of thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present, +reaching forward to the future, 'such a one,' ruling in a constitutional +state, 'they have never seen.' + +But as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life, so +the ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. When +the face of the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard in the +distance, he is still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave of his +inveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the times; +instead of looking forward he looks back; he learns nothing and forgets +nothing; with 'wise saws and modern instances' he would stem the rising +tide of revolution. He lives more and more within the circle of his own +party, as the world without him becomes stronger. This seems to be the +reason why the old order of things makes so poor a figure when confronted +with the new, why churches can never reform, why most political changes are +made blindly and convulsively. The great crises in the history of nations +have often been met by an ecclesiastical positiveness, and a more obstinate +reassertion of principles which have lost their hold upon a nation. The +fixed ideas of a reactionary statesman may be compared to madness; they +grow upon him, and he becomes possessed by them; no judgement of others is +ever admitted by him to be weighed in the balance against his own. + +(d) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to have been a +confusion of ideas, assimilates the state to the individual, and fails to +distinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most of a state +which is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the greatest +uniformity of character. He does not see that the analogy is partly +fallacious, and that the will or character of a state or nation is really +the balance or rather the surplus of individual wills, which are limited by +the condition of having to act in common. The movement of a body of men +can never have the pliancy or facility of a single man; the freedom of the +individual, which is always limited, becomes still more straitened when +transferred to a nation. The powers of action and feeling are necessarily +weaker and more balanced when they are diffused through a community; whence +arises the often discussed question, 'Can a nation, like an individual, +have a conscience?' We hesitate to say that the characters of nations are +nothing more than the sum of the characters of the individuals who compose +them; because there may be tendencies in individuals which react upon one +another. A whole nation may be wiser than any one man in it; or may be +animated by some common opinion or feeling which could not equally have +affected the mind of a single person, or may have been inspired by a leader +of genius to perform acts more than human. Plato does not appear to have +analysed the complications which arise out of the collective action of +mankind. Neither is he capable of seeing that analogies, though specious +as arguments, may often have no foundation in fact, or of distinguishing +between what is intelligible or vividly present to the mind, and what is +true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle, who is comparatively +seldom imposed upon by false analogies. He cannot disentangle the arts +from the virtues--at least he is always arguing from one to the other. His +notion of music is transferred from harmony of sounds to harmony of life: +in this he is assisted by the ambiguities of language as well as by the +prevalence of Pythagorean notions. And having once assimilated the state +to the individual, he imagines that he will find the succession of states +paralleled in the lives of individuals. + +Still, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is +attained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to the +mind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the arts; for +virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an inward +principle. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the harmonies of +the world and of human life, and may be regarded as a splendid illustration +which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy. In the same way the +identification of ethics with politics has a tendency to give definiteness +to ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble men's notions of the aims of +government and of the duties of citizens; for ethics from one point of view +may be conceived as an idealized law and politics; and politics, as ethics +reduced to the conditions of human society. There have been evils which +have arisen out of the attempt to identify them, and this has led to the +separation or antagonism of them, which has been introduced by modern +political writers. But we may likewise feel that something has been lost +in their separation, and that the ancient philosophers who estimated the +moral and intellectual wellbeing of mankind first, and the wealth of +nations and individuals second, may have a salutary influence on the +speculations of modern times. Many political maxims originate in a +reaction against an opposite error; and when the errors against which they +were directed have passed away, they in turn become errors. + +3. Plato's views of education are in several respects remarkable; like the +rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, beginning with +the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending to after-life. +Plato is the first writer who distinctly says that education is to +comprehend the whole of life, and to be a preparation for another in which +education begins again. This is the continuous thread which runs through +the Republic, and which more than any other of his ideas admits of an +application to modern life. + +He has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is +disposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are one +and not many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world into his +scheme of truth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the involuntariness of +vice, which is maintained by him in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Laws +(Protag., Apol., Gorg.). Nor do the so-called Platonic ideas recovered +from a former state of existence affect his theory of mental improvement. +Still we observe in him the remains of the old Socratic doctrine, that true +knowledge must be elicited from within, and is to be sought for in ideas, +not in particulars of sense. Education, as he says, will implant a +principle of intelligence which is better than ten thousand eyes. The +paradox that the virtues are one, and the kindred notion that all virtue is +knowledge, are not entirely renounced; the first is seen in the supremacy +given to justice over the rest; the second in the tendency to absorb the +moral virtues in the intellectual, and to centre all goodness in the +contemplation of the idea of good. The world of sense is still depreciated +and identified with opinion, though admitted to be a shadow of the true. +In the Republic he is evidently impressed with the conviction that vice +arises chiefly from ignorance and may be cured by education; the multitude +are hardly to be deemed responsible for what they do. A faint allusion to +the doctrine of reminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book; but Plato's views of +education have no more real connection with a previous state of existence +than our own; he only proposes to elicit from the mind that which is there +already. Education is represented by him, not as the filling of a vessel, +but as the turning the eye of the soul towards the light. + +He treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and +false, and then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he takes +no notice, though in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the nursing of +children and the management of the mothers, and would have an education +which is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he begins with the age +at which the child is capable of receiving ideas, and boldly asserts, in +language which sounds paradoxical to modern ears, that he must be taught +the false before he can learn the true. The modern and ancient +philosophical world are not agreed about truth and falsehood; the one +identifies truth almost exclusively with fact, the other with ideas. This +is the difference between ourselves and Plato, which is, however, partly a +difference of words. For we too should admit that a child must receive +many lessons which he imperfectly understands; he must be taught some +things in a figure only, some too which he can hardly be expected to +believe when he grows older; but we should limit the use of fiction by the +necessity of the case. Plato would draw the line differently; according to +him the aim of early education is not truth as a matter of fact, but truth +as a matter of principle; the child is to be taught first simple religious +truths, and then simple moral truths, and insensibly to learn the lesson of +good manners and good taste. He would make an entire reformation of the +old mythology; like Xenophanes and Heracleitus he is sensible of the deep +chasm which separates his own age from Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and +invests with an imaginary authority, but only for his own purposes. The +lusts and treacheries of the gods are to be banished; the terrors of the +world below are to be dispelled; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is +not to be a model for youth. But there is another strain heard in Homer +which may teach our youth endurance; and something may be learnt in +medicine from the simple practice of the Homeric age. The principles on +which religion is to be based are two only: first, that God is true; +secondly, that he is good. Modern and Christian writers have often fallen +short of these; they can hardly be said to have gone beyond them. + +The young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of +sights or sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They +are to live in an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to be wafting +to them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such an education be +realized, or if our modern religious education could be bound up with truth +and virtue and good manners and good taste, that would be the best hope of +human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, is looking forward to changes in +the moral and religious world, and is preparing for them. He recognizes +the danger of unsettling young men's minds by sudden changes of laws and +principles, by destroying the sacredness of one set of ideas when there is +nothing else to take their place. He is afraid too of the influence of the +drama, on the ground that it encourages false sentiment, and therefore he +would not have his children taken to the theatre; he thinks that the effect +on the spectators is bad, and on the actors still worse. His idea of +education is that of harmonious growth, in which are insensibly learnt the +lessons of temperance and endurance, and the body and mind develope in +equal proportions. The first principle which runs through all art and +nature is simplicity; this also is to be the rule of human life. + +The second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period of +muscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in music +is extended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the body may +be inconsistent with the training of the mind, and that bodily exercise may +be easily overdone. Excessive training of the body is apt to give men a +headache or to render them sleepy at a lecture on philosophy, and this they +attribute not to the true cause, but to the nature of the subject. Two +points are noticeable in Plato's treatment of gymnastic:--First, that the +time of training is entirely separated from the time of literary education. +He seems to have thought that two things of an opposite and different +nature could not be learnt at the same time. Here we can hardly agree with +him; and, if we may judge by experience, the effect of spending three years +between the ages of fourteen and seventeen in mere bodily exercise would be +far from improving to the intellect. Secondly, he affirms that music and +gymnastic are not, as common opinion is apt to imagine, intended, the one +for the cultivation of the mind and the other of the body, but that they +are both equally designed for the improvement of the mind. The body, in +his view, is the servant of the mind; the subjection of the lower to the +higher is for the advantage of both. And doubtless the mind may exercise a +very great and paramount influence over the body, if exerted not at +particular moments and by fits and starts, but continuously, in making +preparation for the whole of life. Other Greek writers saw the mischievous +tendency of Spartan discipline (Arist. Pol; Thuc.). But only Plato +recognized the fundamental error on which the practice was based. + +The subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine, +which he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern disbelief +in medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of knowledge, to +a demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming aware that they +often make diseases 'greater and more complicated' by their treatment of +them (Rep.). In two thousand years their art has made but slender +progress; what they have gained in the analysis of the parts is in a great +degree lost by their feebler conception of the human frame as a whole. +They have attended more to the cure of diseases than to the conditions of +health; and the improvements in medicine have been more than +counterbalanced by the disuse of regular training. Until lately they have +hardly thought of air and water, the importance of which was well +understood by the ancients; as Aristotle remarks, 'Air and water, being the +elements which we most use, have the greatest effect upon health' (Polit.). +For ages physicians have been under the dominion of prejudices which have +only recently given way; and now there are as many opinions in medicine as +in theology, and an equal degree of scepticism and some want of toleration +about both. Plato has several good notions about medicine; according to +him, 'the eye cannot be cured without the rest of the body, nor the body +without the mind' (Charm.). No man of sense, he says in the Timaeus, would +take physic; and we heartily sympathize with him in the Laws when he +declares that 'the limbs of the rustic worn with toil will derive more +benefit from warm baths than from the prescriptions of a not over wise +doctor.' But we can hardly praise him when, in obedience to the authority +of Homer, he depreciates diet, or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he +would get rid of invalid and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does +not seem to have considered that the 'bridle of Theages' might be +accompanied by qualities which were of far more value to the State than the +health or strength of the citizens; or that the duty of taking care of the +helpless might be an important element of education in a State. The +physician himself (this is a delicate and subtle observation) should not be +a man in robust health; he should have, in modern phraseology, a nervous +temperament; he should have experience of disease in his own person, in +order that his powers of observation may be quickened in the case of +others. + +The perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in +which, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity. +Greater matters are to be determined by the legislator or by the oracle of +Delphi, lesser matters are to be left to the temporary regulation of the +citizens themselves. Plato is aware that laissez faire is an important +element of government. The diseases of a State are like the heads of a +hydra; they multiply when they are cut off. The true remedy for them is +not extirpation but prevention. And the way to prevent them is to take +care of education, and education will take care of all the rest. So in +modern times men have often felt that the only political measure worth +having--the only one which would produce any certain or lasting effect, was +a measure of national education. And in our own more than in any previous +age the necessity has been recognized of restoring the ever-increasing +confusion of law to simplicity and common sense. + +When the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the +first stage of active and public life. But soon education is to begin +again from a new point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and +Seventh Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence +been led to form a higher conception of what was required of us. For true +knowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and has to do, not with +particulars or individuals, but with universals only; not with the beauties +of poetry, but with the ideas of philosophy. And the great aim of +education is the cultivation of the habit of abstraction. This is to be +acquired through the study of the mathematical sciences. They alone are +capable of giving ideas of relation, and of arousing the dormant energies +of thought. + +Mathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that +which is now included in them; but they bore a much larger proportion to +the sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought which +the human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by which the +chaos of particulars could be reduced to rule and order. The faculty which +they trained was naturally at war with the poetical or imaginative; and +hence to Plato, who is everywhere seeking for abstractions and trying to +get rid of the illusions of sense, nearly the whole of education is +contained in them. They seemed to have an inexhaustible application, +partly because their true limits were not yet understood. These Plato +himself is beginning to investigate; though not aware that number and +figure are mere abstractions of sense, he recognizes that the forms used by +geometry are borrowed from the sensible world. He seeks to find the +ultimate ground of mathematical ideas in the idea of good, though he does +not satisfactorily explain the connexion between them; and in his +conception of the relation of ideas to numbers, he falls very far short of +the definiteness attributed to him by Aristotle (Met.). But if he fails to +recognize the true limits of mathematics, he also reaches a point beyond +them; in his view, ideas of number become secondary to a higher conception +of knowledge. The dialectician is as much above the mathematician as the +mathematician is above the ordinary man. The one, the self-proving, the +good which is the higher sphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to which +all things ascend, and in which they finally repose. + +This self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no +distinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage in +Greek philosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals are +comprehended, a whole which has no parts (Arist., Nic. Eth.). The vacancy +of such a form was perceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato. Nor did he +recognize that in the dialectical process are included two or more methods +of investigation which are at variance with each other. He did not see +that whether he took the longer or the shorter road, no advance could be +made in this way. And yet such visions often have an immense effect; for +although the method of science cannot anticipate science, the idea of +science, not as it is, but as it will be in the future, is a great and +inspiring principle. In the pursuit of knowledge we are always pressing +forward to something beyond us; and as a false conception of knowledge, for +example the scholastic philosophy, may lead men astray during many ages, so +the true ideal, though vacant, may draw all their thoughts in a right +direction. It makes a great difference whether the general expectation of +knowledge, as this indefinite feeling may be termed, is based upon a sound +judgment. For mankind may often entertain a true conception of what +knowledge ought to be when they have but a slender experience of facts. +The correlation of the sciences, the consciousness of the unity of nature, +the idea of classification, the sense of proportion, the unwillingness to +stop short of certainty or to confound probability with truth, are +important principles of the higher education. Although Plato could tell us +nothing, and perhaps knew that he could tell us nothing, of the absolute +truth, he has exercised an influence on the human mind which even at the +present day is not exhausted; and political and social questions may yet +arise in which the thoughts of Plato may be read anew and receive a fresh +meaning. + +The Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces of +it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and from +this point of view may be compared with the creator of the Timaeus, who out +of his goodness created all things. It corresponds to a certain extent +with the modern conception of a law of nature, or of a final cause, or of +both in one, and in this regard may be connected with the measure and +symmetry of the Philebus. It is represented in the Symposium under the +aspect of beauty, and is supposed to be attained there by stages of +initiation, as here by regular gradations of knowledge. Viewed +subjectively, it is the process or science of dialectic. This is the +science which, according to the Phaedrus, is the true basis of rhetoric, +which alone is able to distinguish the natures and classes of men and +things; which divides a whole into the natural parts, and reunites the +scattered parts into a natural or organized whole; which defines the +abstract essences or universal ideas of all things, and connects them; +which pierces the veil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or first +principle of all; which regards the sciences in relation to the idea of +good. This ideal science is the highest process of thought, and may be +described as the soul conversing with herself or holding communion with +eternal truth and beauty, and in another form is the everlasting question +and answer--the ceaseless interrogative of Socrates. The dialogues of +Plato are themselves examples of the nature and method of dialectic. +Viewed objectively, the idea of good is a power or cause which makes the +world without us correspond with the world within. Yet this world without +us is still a world of ideas. With Plato the investigation of nature is +another department of knowledge, and in this he seeks to attain only +probable conclusions (Timaeus). + +If we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half explains +to us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is that in his +mind the two sciences are not as yet distinguished, any more than the +subjective and objective aspects of the world and of man, which German +philosophy has revealed to us. Nor has he determined whether his science +of dialectic is at rest or in motion, concerned with the contemplation of +absolute being, or with a process of development and evolution. Modern +metaphysics may be described as the science of abstractions, or as the +science of the evolution of thought; modern logic, when passing beyond the +bounds of mere Aristotelian forms, may be defined as the science of method. +The germ of both of them is contained in the Platonic dialectic; all +metaphysicians have something in common with the ideas of Plato; all +logicians have derived something from the method of Plato. The nearest +approach in modern philosophy to the universal science of Plato, is to be +found in the Hegelian 'succession of moments in the unity of the idea.' +Plato and Hegel alike seem to have conceived the world as the correlation +of abstractions; and not impossibly they would have understood one another +better than any of their commentators understand them (Swift's Voyage to +Laputa. 'Having a desire to see those ancients who were most renowned for +wit and learning, I set apart one day on purpose. I proposed that Homer +and Aristotle might appear at the head of all their commentators; but these +were so numerous that some hundreds were forced to attend in the court and +outward rooms of the palace. I knew, and could distinguish these two +heroes, at first sight, not only from the crowd, but from each other. +Homer was the taller and comelier person of the two, walked very erect for +one of his age, and his eyes were the most quick and piercing I ever +beheld. Aristotle stooped much, and made use of a staff. His visage was +meagre, his hair lank and thin, and his voice hollow. I soon discovered +that both of them were perfect strangers to the rest of the company, and +had never seen or heard of them before. And I had a whisper from a ghost, +who shall be nameless, "That these commentators always kept in the most +distant quarters from their principals, in the lower world, through a +consciousness of shame and guilt, because they had so horribly +misrepresented the meaning of these authors to posterity." I introduced +Didymus and Eustathius to Homer, and prevailed on him to treat them better +than perhaps they deserved, for he soon found they wanted a genius to enter +into the spirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of all patience with the +account I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented them to him; and he +asked them "whether the rest of the tribe were as great dunces as +themselves?"'). There is, however, a difference between them: for whereas +Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which developes the +stages of the idea in different countries or at different times in the same +country, with Plato these gradations are regarded only as an order of +thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had not yet dawned upon +him. + +Many criticisms may be made on Plato's theory of education. While in some +respects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others he is in +advance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which prevailed +in his own time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered new ones. He +does not see that education is relative to the characters of individuals; +he only desires to impress the same form of the state on the minds of all. +He has no sufficient idea of the effect of literature on the formation of +the mind, and greatly exaggerates that of mathematics. His aim is above +all things to train the reasoning faculties; to implant in the mind the +spirit and power of abstraction; to explain and define general notions, +and, if possible, to connect them. No wonder that in the vacancy of actual +knowledge his followers, and at times even he himself, should have fallen +away from the doctrine of ideas, and have returned to that branch of +knowledge in which alone the relation of the one and many can be truly +seen--the science of number. In his views both of teaching and training he +might be styled, in modern language, a doctrinaire; after the Spartan +fashion he would have his citizens cast in one mould; he does not seem to +consider that some degree of freedom, 'a little wholesome neglect,' is +necessary to strengthen and develope the character and to give play to the +individual nature. His citizens would not have acquired that knowledge +which in the vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the pilgrims from +their experience of evil. + +On the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and +theologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through life +and will begin again in another. He would never allow education of some +kind to cease; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of Solon, +'I grow old learning many things,' cannot be applied literally. Himself +ravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and delighting in +solid geometry (Rep.), he has no difficulty in imagining that a lifetime +might be passed happily in such pursuits. We who know how many more men of +business there are in the world than real students or thinkers, are not +equally sanguine. The education which he proposes for his citizens is +really the ideal life of the philosopher or man of genius, interrupted, but +only for a time, by practical duties,--a life not for the many, but for the +few. + +Yet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to our +own times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be realized, it +may have a great effect in elevating the characters of mankind, and raising +them above the routine of their ordinary occupation or profession. It is +the best form under which we can conceive the whole of life. Nevertheless +the idea of Plato is not easily put into practice. For the education of +after life is necessarily the education which each one gives himself. Men +and women cannot be brought together in schools or colleges at forty or +fifty years of age; and if they could the result would be disappointing. +The destination of most men is what Plato would call 'the Den' for the +whole of life, and with that they are content. Neither have they teachers +or advisers with whom they can take counsel in riper years. There is no +'schoolmaster abroad' who will tell them of their faults, or inspire them +with the higher sense of duty, or with the ambition of a true success in +life; no Socrates who will convict them of ignorance; no Christ, or +follower of Christ, who will reprove them of sin. Hence they have a +difficulty in receiving the first element of improvement, which is self- +knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir them; they rather wish to +rest than to pursue high objects. A few only who have come across great +men and women, or eminent teachers of religion and morality, have received +a second life from them, and have lighted a candle from the fire of their +genius. + +The want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons continue +to improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not know the +way. They 'never try an experiment,' or look up a point of interest for +themselves; they make no sacrifices for the sake of knowledge; their minds, +like their bodies, at a certain age become fixed. Genius has been defined +as 'the power of taking pains'; but hardly any one keeps up his interest in +knowledge throughout a whole life. The troubles of a family, the business +of making money, the demands of a profession destroy the elasticity of the +mind. The waxen tablet of the memory which was once capable of receiving +'true thoughts and clear impressions' becomes hard and crowded; there is +not room for the accumulations of a long life (Theaet.). The student, as +years advance, rather makes an exchange of knowledge than adds to his +stores. There is no pressing necessity to learn; the stock of Classics or +History or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is +enough for him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer to +any one who asks how he is to improve. For self-education consists in a +thousand things, commonplace in themselves,--in adding to what we are by +nature something of what we are not; in learning to see ourselves as others +see us; in judging, not by opinion, but by the evidence of facts; in +seeking out the society of superior minds; in a study of lives and writings +of great men; in observation of the world and character; in receiving +kindly the natural influence of different times of life; in any act or +thought which is raised above the practice or opinions of mankind; in the +pursuit of some new or original enquiry; in any effort of mind which calls +forth some latent power. + +If any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education of +after-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to him:-- +That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind most +distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight, either one +which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or, perhaps, +furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the speculative +side the profession or business in which he is practically engaged. He may +make Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Plato, Bacon the friends and companions of +his life. He may find opportunities of hearing the living voice of a great +teacher. He may select for enquiry some point of history or some +unexplained phenomenon of nature. An hour a day passed in such scientific +or literary pursuits will furnish as many facts as the memory can retain, +and will give him 'a pleasure not to be repented of' (Timaeus). Only let +him beware of being the slave of crotchets, or of running after a Will o' +the Wisp in his ignorance, or in his vanity of attributing to himself the +gifts of a poet or assuming the air of a philosopher. He should know the +limits of his own powers. Better to build up the mind by slow additions, +to creep on quietly from one thing to another, to gain insensibly new +powers and new interests in knowledge, than to form vast schemes which are +never destined to be realized. But perhaps, as Plato would say, 'This is +part of another subject' (Tim.); though we may also defend our digression +by his example (Theaet.). + +4. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or the natural +growth of institutions which fill modern treatises on political philosophy +seem hardly ever to have attracted the attention of Plato and Aristotle. +The ancients were familiar with the mutability of human affairs; they could +moralize over the ruins of cities and the fall of empires (Plato, +Statesman, and Sulpicius' Letter to Cicero); by them fate and chance were +deemed to be real powers, almost persons, and to have had a great share in +political events. The wiser of them like Thucydides believed that 'what +had been would be again,' and that a tolerable idea of the future could be +gathered from the past. Also they had dreams of a Golden Age which existed +once upon a time and might still exist in some unknown land, or might +return again in the remote future. But the regular growth of a state +enlightened by experience, progressing in knowledge, improving in the arts, +of which the citizens were educated by the fulfilment of political duties, +appears never to have come within the range of their hopes and aspirations. +Such a state had never been seen, and therefore could not be conceived by +them. Their experience (Aristot. Metaph.; Plato, Laws) led them to +conclude that there had been cycles of civilization in which the arts had +been discovered and lost many times over, and cities had been overthrown +and rebuilt again and again, and deluges and volcanoes and other natural +convulsions had altered the face of the earth. Tradition told them of many +destructions of mankind and of the preservation of a remnant. The world +began again after a deluge and was reconstructed out of the fragments of +itself. Also they were acquainted with empires of unknown antiquity, like +the Egyptian or Assyrian; but they had never seen them grow, and could not +imagine, any more than we can, the state of man which preceded them. They +were puzzled and awestricken by the Egyptian monuments, of which the forms, +as Plato says, not in a figure, but literally, were ten thousand years old +(Laws), and they contrasted the antiquity of Egypt with their own short +memories. + +The early legends of Hellas have no real connection with the later history: +they are at a distance, and the intermediate region is concealed from view; +there is no road or path which leads from one to the other. At the +beginning of Greek history, in the vestibule of the temple, is seen +standing first of all the figure of the legislator, himself the interpreter +and servant of the God. The fundamental laws which he gives are not +supposed to change with time and circumstances. The salvation of the state +is held rather to depend on the inviolable maintenance of them. They were +sanctioned by the authority of heaven, and it was deemed impiety to alter +them. The desire to maintain them unaltered seems to be the origin of what +at first sight is very surprising to us--the intolerant zeal of Plato +against innovators in religion or politics (Laws); although with a happy +inconsistency he is also willing that the laws of other countries should be +studied and improvements in legislation privately communicated to the +Nocturnal Council (Laws). The additions which were made to them in later +ages in order to meet the increasing complexity of affairs were still +ascribed by a fiction to the original legislator; and the words of such +enactments at Athens were disputed over as if they had been the words of +Solon himself. Plato hopes to preserve in a later generation the mind of +the legislator; he would have his citizens remain within the lines which he +has laid down for them. He would not harass them with minute regulations, +he would have allowed some changes in the laws: but not changes which +would affect the fundamental institutions of the state, such for example as +would convert an aristocracy into a timocracy, or a timocracy into a +popular form of government. + +Passing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been the +exception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we are not +surprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather than of +ancient date; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is not more +than a century or two old. It seems to have arisen out of the impression +left on the human mind by the growth of the Roman Empire and of the +Christian Church, and to be due to the political and social improvements +which they introduced into the world; and still more in our own century to +the idealism of the first French Revolution and the triumph of American +Independence; and in a yet greater degree to the vast material prosperity +and growth of population in England and her colonies and in America. It is +also to be ascribed in a measure to the greater study of the philosophy of +history. The optimist temperament of some great writers has assisted the +creation of it, while the opposite character has led a few to regard the +future of the world as dark. The 'spectator of all time and of all +existence' sees more of 'the increasing purpose which through the ages ran' +than formerly: but to the inhabitant of a small state of Hellas the vision +was necessarily limited like the valley in which he dwelt. There was no +remote past on which his eye could rest, nor any future from which the veil +was partly lifted up by the analogy of history. The narrowness of view, +which to ourselves appears so singular, was to him natural, if not +unavoidable. + +5. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, and the +two other works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the +Introductions to the two latter; a few general points of comparison may be +touched upon in this place. + +And first of the Laws. + +(1) The Republic, though probably written at intervals, yet speaking +generally and judging by the indications of thought and style, may be +reasonably ascribed to the middle period of Plato's life: the Laws are +certainly the work of his declining years, and some portions of them at any +rate seem to have been written in extreme old age. + +(2) The Republic is full of hope and aspiration: the Laws bear the stamp +of failure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which received +the last touches of the author: the other is imperfectly executed, and +apparently unfinished. The one has the grace and beauty of youth: the +other has lost the poetical form, but has more of the severity and +knowledge of life which is characteristic of old age. + +(3) The most conspicuous defect of the Laws is the failure of dramatic +power, whereas the Republic is full of striking contrasts of ideas and +oppositions of character. + +(4) The Laws may be said to have more the nature of a sermon, the Republic +of a poem; the one is more religious, the other more intellectual. + +(5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas, the government +of the world by philosophers, are not found in the Laws; the immortality of +the soul is first mentioned in xii; the person of Socrates has altogether +disappeared. The community of women and children is renounced; the +institution of common or public meals for women (Laws) is for the first +time introduced (Ar. Pol.). + +(6) There remains in the Laws the old enmity to the poets, who are +ironically saluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are +peremptorily ordered out of the city, if they are not willing to submit +their poems to the censorship of the magistrates (Rep.). + +(7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few passages +in the Laws, such as the honour due to the soul, the evils of licentious or +unnatural love, the whole of Book x. (religion), the dishonesty of retail +trade, and bequests, which come more home to us, and contain more of what +may be termed the modern element in Plato than almost anything in the +Republic. + +The relation of the two works to one another is very well given: + +(1) by Aristotle in the Politics from the side of the Laws:-- + +'The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the +Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is +therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all +a few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the +community of property, and the constitution of the state. The population +is divided into two classes--one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; +from this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the +state. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artists +are to have a share in the government, and whether they too are to carry +arms and share in military service or not. He certainly thinks that the +women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by +their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions +foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the education of +the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is +said about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of +the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. +For with the exception of the community of women and property, he supposes +everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same +education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, +and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is that in +the Laws the common meals are extended to women, and the warriors number +about 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.' + +(2) by Plato in the Laws (Book v.), from the side of the Republic:-- + +'The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the +law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that +"Friends have all things in common." Whether there is now, or ever will +be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the +private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which +are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, +and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same +occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,--whether all this is +possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will +ever constitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than +this. Such a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make +them blessed who dwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for +the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to +seek for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when +created, will be nearest to immortality and unity in the next degree; and +after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we +will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.' + +The comparatively short work called the Statesman or Politicus in its style +and manner is more akin to the Laws, while in its idealism it rather +resembles the Republic. As far as we can judge by various indications of +language and thought, it must be later than the one and of course earlier +than the other. In both the Republic and Statesman a close connection is +maintained between Politics and Dialectic. In the Statesman, enquiries +into the principles of Method are interspersed with discussions about +Politics. The comparative advantages of the rule of law and of a person +are considered, and the decision given in favour of a person (Arist. Pol.). +But much may be said on the other side, nor is the opposition necessary; +for a person may rule by law, and law may be so applied as to be the living +voice of the legislator. As in the Republic, there is a myth, describing, +however, not a future, but a former existence of mankind. The question is +asked, 'Whether the state of innocence which is described in the myth, or a +state like our own which possesses art and science and distinguishes good +from evil, is the preferable condition of man.' To this question of the +comparative happiness of civilized and primitive life, which was so often +discussed in the last century and in our own, no answer is given. The +Statesman, though less perfect in style than the Republic and of far less +range, may justly be regarded as one of the greatest of Plato's dialogues. + +6. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the vehicle +of thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which went beyond +their own age. The classical writing which approaches most nearly to the +Republic of Plato is the 'De Republica' of Cicero; but neither in this nor +in any other of his dialogues does he rival the art of Plato. The manners +are clumsy and inferior; the hand of the rhetorician is apparent at every +turn. Yet noble sentiments are constantly recurring: the true note of +Roman patriotism--'We Romans are a great people'--resounds through the +whole work. Like Socrates, Cicero turns away from the phenomena of the +heavens to civil and political life. He would rather not discuss the 'two +Suns' of which all Rome was talking, when he can converse about 'the two +nations in one' which had divided Rome ever since the days of the Gracchi. +Like Socrates again, speaking in the person of Scipio, he is afraid lest he +should assume too much the character of a teacher, rather than of an equal +who is discussing among friends the two sides of a question. He would +confine the terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice, and he +will not concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But +under the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the natural +superior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to the soul +ruling over the body. He prefers a mixture of forms of government to any +single one. The two portraits of the just and the unjust, which occur in +the second book of the Republic, are transferred to the state--Philus, one +of the interlocutors, maintaining against his will the necessity of +injustice as a principle of government, while the other, Laelius, supports +the opposite thesis. His views of language and number are derived from +Plato; like him he denounces the drama. He also declares that if his life +were to be twice as long he would have no time to read the lyric poets. +The picture of democracy is translated by him word for word, though he had +hardly shown himself able to 'carry the jest' of Plato. He converts into a +stately sentence the humorous fancy about the animals, who 'are so imbued +with the spirit of democracy that they make the passers-by get out of their +way.' His description of the tyrant is imitated from Plato, but is far +inferior. The second book is historical, and claims for the Roman +constitution (which is to him the ideal) a foundation of fact such as Plato +probably intended to have given to the Republic in the Critias. His most +remarkable imitation of Plato is the adaptation of the vision of Er, which +is converted by Cicero into the 'Somnium Scipionis'; he has 'romanized' the +myth of the Republic, adding an argument for the immortality of the soul +taken from the Phaedrus, and some other touches derived from the Phaedo and +the Timaeus. Though a beautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the +'Somnium Scipionis; is very inferior to the vision of Er; it is only a +dream, and hardly allows the reader to suppose that the writer believes in +his own creation. Whether his dialogues were framed on the model of the +lost dialogues of Aristotle, as he himself tells us, or of Plato, to which +they bear many superficial resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; he +is not conversing, but making speeches, and is never able to mould the +intractable Latin to the grace and ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue. +But if he is defective in form, much more is he inferior to the Greek in +matter; he nowhere in his philosophical writings leaves upon our minds the +impression of an original thinker. + +Plato's Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such an +ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian world, +and is embodied in St. Augustine's 'De Civitate Dei,' which is suggested by +the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same manner in which we +may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been influenced by the decline of +Greek politics in the writer's own age. The difference is that in the time +of Plato the degeneracy, though certain, was gradual and insensible: +whereas the taking of Rome by the Goths stirred like an earthquake the age +of St. Augustine. Men were inclined to believe that the overthrow of the +city was to be ascribed to the anger felt by the old Roman deities at the +neglect of their worship. St. Augustine maintains the opposite thesis; he +argues that the destruction of the Roman Empire is due, not to the rise of +Christianity, but to the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman history, +and over Greek philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere crime, +impiety and falsehood. He compares the worst parts of the Gentile +religions with the best elements of the faith of Christ. He shows nothing +of the spirit which led others of the early Christian Fathers to recognize +in the writings of the Greek philosophers the power of the divine truth. +He traces the parallel of the kingdom of God, that is, the history of the +Jews, contained in their scriptures, and of the kingdoms of the world, +which are found in gentile writers, and pursues them both into an ideal +future. It need hardly be remarked that his use both of Greek and of Roman +historians and of the sacred writings of the Jews is wholly uncritical. +The heathen mythology, the Sybilline oracles, the myths of Plato, the +dreams of Neo-Platonists are equally regarded by him as matter of fact. He +must be acknowledged to be a strictly polemical or controversial writer who +makes the best of everything on one side and the worst of everything on the +other. He has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek +life, nor has he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise +out of the ruins of the Roman empire. He is not blind to the defects of +the Christian Church, and looks forward to a time when Christian and Pagan +shall be alike brought before the judgment-seat, and the true City of God +shall appear...The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of +antiquarian learning and quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian +ethics, but showing little power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge of +the Greek literature and language. He was a great genius, and a noble +character, yet hardly capable of feeling or understanding anything external +to his own theology. Of all the ancient philosophers he is most attracted +by Plato, though he is very slightly acquainted with his writings. He is +inclined to believe that the idea of creation in the Timaeus is derived +from the narrative in Genesis; and he is strangely taken with the +coincidence (?) of Plato's saying that 'the philosopher is the lover of +God,' and the words of the Book of Exodus in which God reveals himself to +Moses (Exod.) He dwells at length on miracles performed in his own day, of +which the evidence is regarded by him as irresistible. He speaks in a very +interesting manner of the beauty and utility of nature and of the human +frame, which he conceives to afford a foretaste of the heavenly state and +of the resurrection of the body. The book is not really what to most +persons the title of it would imply, and belongs to an age which has passed +away. But it contains many fine passages and thoughts which are for all +time. + +The short treatise de Monarchia of Dante is by far the most remarkable of +mediaeval ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom Italy +and the Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of an +Universal Empire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary +government of the world, having a divine authority distinct from the +Papacy, yet coextensive with it. It is not 'the ghost of the dead Roman +Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof,' but the legitimate heir and +successor of it, justified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and the +beneficence of their rule. Their right to be the governors of the world is +also confirmed by the testimony of miracles, and acknowledged by St. Paul +when he appealed to Caesar, and even more emphatically by Christ Himself, +Who could not have made atonement for the sins of men if He had not been +condemned by a divinely authorized tribunal. The necessity for the +establishment of an Universal Empire is proved partly by a priori arguments +such as the unity of God and the unity of the family or nation; partly by +perversions of Scripture and history, by false analogies of nature, by +misapplied quotations from the classics, and by odd scraps and commonplaces +of logic, showing a familiar but by no means exact knowledge of Aristotle +(of Plato there is none). But a more convincing argument still is the +miserable state of the world, which he touchingly describes. He sees no +hope of happiness or peace for mankind until all nations of the earth are +comprehended in a single empire. The whole treatise shows how deeply the +idea of the Roman Empire was fixed in the minds of his contemporaries. Not +much argument was needed to maintain the truth of a theory which to his own +contemporaries seemed so natural and congenial. He speaks, or rather +preaches, from the point of view, not of the ecclesiastic, but of the +layman, although, as a good Catholic, he is willing to acknowledge that in +certain respects the Empire must submit to the Church. The beginning and +end of all his noble reflections and of his arguments, good and bad, is the +aspiration 'that in this little plot of earth belonging to mortal man life +may pass in freedom and peace.' So inextricably is his vision of the +future bound up with the beliefs and circumstances of his own age. + +The 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his genius, and +shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book was +written by him at the age of about 34 or 35, and is full of the generous +sentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the +miserable state of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of the +Roses, and in the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is indignant +at the corruption of the clergy, at the luxury of the nobility and gentry, +at the sufferings of the poor, at the calamities caused by war. To the eye +of More the whole world was in dissolution and decay; and side by side with +the misery and oppression which he has described in the First Book of the +Utopia, he places in the Second Book the ideal state which by the help of +Plato he had constructed. The times were full of stir and intellectual +interest. The distant murmur of the Reformation was beginning to be heard. +To minds like More's, Greek literature was a revelation: there had arisen +an art of interpretation, and the New Testament was beginning to be +understood as it had never been before, and has not often been since, in +its natural sense. The life there depicted appeared to him wholly unlike +that of Christian commonwealths, in which 'he saw nothing but a certain +conspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name and +title of the Commonwealth.' He thought that Christ, like Plato, +'instituted all things common,' for which reason, he tells us, the citizens +of Utopia were the more willing to receive his doctrines ('Howbeit, I think +this was no small help and furtherance in the matter, that they heard us +say that Christ instituted among his, all things common, and that the same +community doth yet remain in the rightest Christian communities' +(Utopia).). The community of property is a fixed idea with him, though he +is aware of the arguments which may be urged on the other side ('These +things (I say), when I consider with myself, I hold well with Plato, and do +nothing marvel that he would make no laws for them that refused those laws, +whereby all men should have and enjoy equal portions of riches and +commodities. For the wise men did easily foresee this to be the one and +only way to the wealth of a community, if equality of all things should be +brought in and established' (Utopia).). We wonder how in the reign of +Henry VIII, though veiled in another language and published in a foreign +country, such speculations could have been endured. + +He is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who succeeded +him, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he is a worthy +disciple of Plato. Like him, starting from a small portion of fact, he +founds his tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the Latin narrative +of the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise about dates and +facts, and has the power of making us believe that the narrator of the tale +must have been an eyewitness. We are fairly puzzled by his manner of +mixing up real and imaginary persons; his boy John Clement and Peter Giles, +citizen of Antwerp, with whom he disputes about the precise words which are +supposed to have been used by the (imaginary) Portuguese traveller, Raphael +Hythloday. 'I have the more cause,' says Hythloday, 'to fear that my words +shall not be believed, for that I know how difficultly and hardly I myself +would have believed another man telling the same, if I had not myself seen +it with mine own eyes.' Or again: 'If you had been with me in Utopia, and +had presently seen their fashions and laws as I did which lived there five +years and more, and would never have come thence, but only to make the new +land known here,' etc. More greatly regrets that he forgot to ask +Hythloday in what part of the world Utopia is situated; he 'would have +spent no small sum of money rather than it should have escaped him,' and he +begs Peter Giles to see Hythloday or write to him and obtain an answer to +the question. After this we are not surprised to hear that a Professor of +Divinity (perhaps 'a late famous vicar of Croydon in Surrey,' as the +translator thinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a missionary by the +High Bishop, 'yea, and that he may himself be made Bishop of Utopia, +nothing doubting that he must obtain this Bishopric with suit; and he +counteth that a godly suit which proceedeth not of the desire of honour or +lucre, but only of a godly zeal.' The design may have failed through the +disappearance of Hythloday, concerning whom we have 'very uncertain news' +after his departure. There is no doubt, however, that he had told More and +Giles the exact situation of the island, but unfortunately at the same +moment More's attention, as he is reminded in a letter from Giles, was +drawn off by a servant, and one of the company from a cold caught on +shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles from hearing. And 'the +secret has perished' with him; to this day the place of Utopia remains +unknown. + +The words of Phaedrus, 'O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or +anything,' are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction. Yet +the greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the originality +of thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices of his age, and +far more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who believes not in the +immortality of the soul to share in the administration of the state (Laws), +'howbeit they put him to no punishment, because they be persuaded that it +is in no man's power to believe what he list'; and 'no man is to be blamed +for reasoning in support of his own religion ('One of our company in my +presence was sharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began, +against our wills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of +Christ's religion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not +only prefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn +all other, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and +devilish, and the children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus long +reasoned the matter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and condemned him +into exile, not as a despiser of religion, but as a seditious person and a +raiser up of dissension among the people').' In the public services 'no +prayers be used, but such as every man may boldly pronounce without giving +offence to any sect.' He says significantly, 'There be that give worship +to a man that was once of excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as +God, but also the chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest +part, rejecting all these, believe that there is a certain godly power +unknown, far above the capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed +throughout all the world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him +they call the Father of all. To Him alone they attribute the beginnings, +the increasings, the proceedings, the changes, and the ends of all things. +Neither give they any divine honours to any other than him.' So far was +More from sharing the popular beliefs of his time. Yet at the end he +reminds us that he does not in all respects agree with the customs and +opinions of the Utopians which he describes. And we should let him have +the benefit of this saving clause, and not rudely withdraw the veil behind +which he has been pleased to conceal himself. + +Nor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral +speculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he +would set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including in +the same class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and 'sturdy and +valiant beggars,' that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a day. +His dislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of +offenders; his detestation of priests and lawyers (Compare his satirical +observation: 'They (the Utopians) have priests of exceeding holiness, and +therefore very few.); his remark that 'although every one may hear of +ravenous dogs and wolves and cruel man-eaters, it is not easy to find +states that are well and wisely governed,' are curiously at variance with +the notions of his age and indeed with his own life. There are many points +in which he shows a modern feeling and a prophetic insight like Plato. He +is a sanitary reformer; he maintains that civilized states have a right to +the soil of waste countries; he is inclined to the opinion which places +happiness in virtuous pleasures, but herein, as he thinks, not disagreeing +from those other philosophers who define virtue to be a life according to +nature. He extends the idea of happiness so as to include the happiness of +others; and he argues ingeniously, 'All men agree that we ought to make +others happy; but if others, how much more ourselves!' And still he thinks +that there may be a more excellent way, but to this no man's reason can +attain unless heaven should inspire him with a higher truth. His +ceremonies before marriage; his humane proposal that war should be carried +on by assassinating the leaders of the enemy, may be compared to some of +the paradoxes of Plato. He has a charming fancy, like the affinities of +Greeks and barbarians in the Timaeus, that the Utopians learnt the language +of the Greeks with the more readiness because they were originally of the +same race with them. He is penetrated with the spirit of Plato, and quotes +or adapts many thoughts both from the Republic and from the Timaeus. He +prefers public duties to private, and is somewhat impatient of the +importunity of relations. His citizens have no silver or gold of their +own, but are ready enough to pay them to their mercenaries. There is +nothing of which he is more contemptuous than the love of money. Gold is +used for fetters of criminals, and diamonds and pearls for children's +necklaces (When the ambassadors came arrayed in gold and peacocks' feathers +'to the eyes of all the Utopians except very few, which had been in other +countries for some reasonable cause, all that gorgeousness of apparel +seemed shameful and reproachful. In so much that they most reverently +saluted the vilest and most abject of them for lords--passing over the +ambassadors themselves without any honour, judging them by their wearing of +golden chains to be bondmen. You should have seen children also, that had +cast away their pearls and precious stones, when they saw the like sticking +upon the ambassadors' caps, dig and push their mothers under the sides, +saying thus to them--"Look, though he were a little child still." But the +mother; yea and that also in good earnest: "Peace, son," saith she, "I +think he be some of the ambassadors' fools."') + +Like Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and princes; +on the state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his discourse +(Hythloday) is very unwilling to become a minister of state, considering +that he would lose his independence and his advice would never be heeded +(Compare an exquisite passage, of which the conclusion is as follows: 'And +verily it is naturally given...suppressed and ended.') He ridicules the +new logic of his time; the Utopians could never be made to understand the +doctrine of Second Intentions ('For they have not devised one of all those +rules of restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions, very wittily +invented in the small Logicals, which here our children in every place do +learn. Furthermore, they were never yet able to find out the second +intentions; insomuch that none of them all could ever see man himself in +common, as they call him, though he be (as you know) bigger than was ever +any giant, yea, and pointed to of us even with our finger.') He is very +severe on the sports of the gentry; the Utopians count 'hunting the lowest, +the vilest, and the most abject part of butchery.' He quotes the words of +the Republic in which the philosopher is described 'standing out of the way +under a wall until the driving storm of sleet and rain be overpast,' which +admit of a singular application to More's own fate; although, writing +twenty years before (about the year 1514), he can hardly be supposed to +have foreseen this. There is no touch of satire which strikes deeper than +his quiet remark that the greater part of the precepts of Christ are more +at variance with the lives of ordinary Christians than the discourse of +Utopia ('And yet the most part of them is more dissident from the manners +of the world now a days, than my communication was. But preachers, sly and +wily men, following your counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil- +willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule, they have wrested and +wried his doctrine, and, like a rule of lead, have applied it to men's +manners, that by some means at the least way, they might agree together.') + +The 'New Atlantis' is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the +'Utopia.' The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy, +and by no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In some +places Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas More, as, +for example, in the external state which he attributes to the governor of +Solomon's House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to Sir Thomas +More such trappings appear simple ridiculous. Yet, after this programme of +dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, 'that he had a look as though he +pitied men.' Several things are borrowed by him from the Timaeus; but he +has injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and passages which are +taken from the Hebrew Scriptures. + +The 'City of the Sun' written by Campanella (1568-1639), a Dominican friar, +several years after the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, has many resemblances to +the Republic of Plato. The citizens have wives and children in common; +their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and are arranged by the +magistrates from time to time. They do not, however, adopt his system of +lots, but bring together the best natures, male and female, 'according to +philosophical rules.' The infants until two years of age are brought up by +their mothers in public temples; and since individuals for the most part +educate their children badly, at the beginning of their third year they are +committed to the care of the State, and are taught at first, not out of +books, but from paintings of all kinds, which are emblazoned on the walls +of the city. The city has six interior circuits of walls, and an outer +wall which is the seventh. On this outer wall are painted the figures of +legislators and philosophers, and on each of the interior walls the symbols +or forms of some one of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for +the most part, trained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises; but +they have two special occupations of their own. After a battle, they and +the boys soothe and relieve the wounded warriors; also they encourage them +with embraces and pleasant words. Some elements of the Christian or +Catholic religion are preserved among them. The life of the Apostles is +greatly admired by this people because they had all things in common; and +the short prayer which Jesus Christ taught men is used in their worship. +It is a duty of the chief magistrates to pardon sins, and therefore the +whole people make secret confession of them to the magistrates, and they to +their chief, who is a sort of Rector Metaphysicus; and by this means he is +well informed of all that is going on in the minds of men. After +confession, absolution is granted to the citizens collectively, but no one +is mentioned by name. There also exists among them a practice of perpetual +prayer, performed by a succession of priests, who change every hour. Their +religion is a worship of God in Trinity, that is of Wisdom, Love and Power, +but without any distinction of persons. They behold in the sun the +reflection of His glory; mere graven images they reject, refusing to fall +under the 'tyranny' of idolatry. + +Many details are given about their customs of eating and drinking, about +their mode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella looks +forward to a new mode of education, which is to be a study of nature, and +not of Aristotle. He would not have his citizens waste their time in the +consideration of what he calls 'the dead signs of things.' He remarks that +he who knows one science only, does not really know that one any more than +the rest, and insists strongly on the necessity of a variety of knowledge. +More scholars are turned out in the City of the Sun in one year than by +contemporary methods in ten or fifteen. He evidently believes, like Bacon, +that henceforward natural science will play a great part in education, a +hope which seems hardly to have been realized, either in our own or in any +former age; at any rate the fulfilment of it has been long deferred. + +There is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this work, and a +most enlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no charm of +style, and falls very far short of the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon, and still +more of the 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More. It is full of inconsistencies, +and though borrowed from Plato, shows but a superficial acquaintance with +his writings. It is a work such as one might expect to have been written +by a philosopher and man of genius who was also a friar, and who had spent +twenty-seven years of his life in a prison of the Inquisition. The most +interesting feature of the book, common to Plato and Sir Thomas More, is +the deep feeling which is shown by the writer, of the misery and ignorance +prevailing among the lower classes in his own time. Campanella takes note +of Aristotle's answer to Plato's community of property, that in a society +where all things are common, no individual would have any motive to work +(Arist. Pol.): he replies, that his citizens being happy and contented in +themselves (they are required to work only four hours a day), will have +greater regard for their fellows than exists among men at present. He +thinks, like Plato, that if he abolishes private feelings and interests, a +great public feeling will take their place. + +Other writings on ideal states, such as the 'Oceana' of Harrington, in +which the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was, but +as he ought to have been; or the 'Argenis' of Barclay, which is an +historical allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth +mentioning. More interesting than either of these, and far more Platonic +in style and thought, is Sir John Eliot's 'Monarchy of Man,' in which the +prisoner of the Tower, no longer able 'to be a politician in the land of +his birth,' turns away from politics to view 'that other city which is +within him,' and finds on the very threshold of the grave that the secret +of human happiness is the mastery of self. The change of government in the +time of the English Commonwealth set men thinking about first principles, +and gave rise to many works of this class...The great original genius of +Swift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there any trace in the conversation or +in the works of Dr. Johnson of any acquaintance with his writings. He +probably would have refuted Plato without reading him, in the same fashion +in which he supposed himself to have refuted Bishop Berkeley's theory of +the non-existence of matter. If we except the so-called English +Platonists, or rather Neo-Platonists, who never understood their master, +and the writings of Coleridge, who was to some extent a kindred spirit, +Plato has left no permanent impression on English literature. + +7. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that they +are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor the other +are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue flowing from +them which tends to raise individuals above the common routine of society +or trade, and to elevate States above the mere interests of commerce or the +necessities of self-defence. Like the ideals of art they are partly framed +by the omission of particulars; they require to be viewed at a certain +distance, and are apt to fade away if we attempt to approach them. They +gain an imaginary distinctness when embodied in a State or in a system of +philosophy, but they still remain the visions of 'a world unrealized.' +More striking and obvious to the ordinary mind are the examples of great +men, who have served their own generation and are remembered in another. +Even in our own family circle there may have been some one, a woman, or +even a child, in whose face has shone forth a goodness more than human. +The ideal then approaches nearer to us, and we fondly cling to it. The +ideal of the past, whether of our own past lives or of former states of +society, has a singular fascination for the minds of many. Too late we +learn that such ideals cannot be recalled, though the recollection of them +may have a humanizing influence on other times. But the abstractions of +philosophy are to most persons cold and vacant; they give light without +warmth; they are like the full moon in the heavens when there are no stars +appearing. Men cannot live by thought alone; the world of sense is always +breaking in upon them. They are for the most part confined to a corner of +earth, and see but a little way beyond their own home or place of abode; +they 'do not lift up their eyes to the hills'; they are not awake when the +dawn appears. But in Plato we have reached a height from which a man may +look into the distance and behold the future of the world and of +philosophy. The ideal of the State and of the life of the philosopher; the +ideal of an education continuing through life and extending equally to both +sexes; the ideal of the unity and correlation of knowledge; the faith in +good and immortality--are the vacant forms of light on which Plato is +seeking to fix the eye of mankind. + +8. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek +Philosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more +clearly than formerly, as though each year and each generation brought us +nearer to some great change; the other almost in the same degree retiring +from view behind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, but still +remaining a silent hope of we know not what hidden in the heart of man. +The first ideal is the future of the human race in this world; the second +the future of the individual in another. The first is the more perfect +realization of our own present life; the second, the abnegation of it: the +one, limited by experience, the other, transcending it. Both of them have +been and are powerful motives of action; there are a few in whom they have +taken the place of all earthly interests. The hope of a future for the +human race at first sight seems to be the more disinterested, the hope of +individual existence the more egotistical, of the two motives. But when +men have learned to resolve their hope of a future either for themselves or +for the world into the will of God--'not my will but Thine,' the difference +between them falls away; and they may be allowed to make either of them the +basis of their lives, according to their own individual character or +temperament. There is as much faith in the willingness to work for an +unseen future in this world as in another. Neither is it inconceivable +that some rare nature may feel his duty to another generation, or to +another century, almost as strongly as to his own, or that living always in +the presence of God, he may realize another world as vividly as he does +this. + +The greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under +similitudes derived from human qualities; although sometimes, like the +Jewish prophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe the +nature of God only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a positive +meaning. It would be well, if when meditating on the higher truths either +of philosophy or religion, we sometimes substituted one form of expression +for another, lest through the necessities of language we should become the +slaves of mere words. + +There is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a place +in the home and heart of every believer in the religion of Christ, and in +which men seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth, the Divine man, +the Son of Man, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the first-born and head of +the whole family in heaven and earth, in Whom the Divine and human, that +which is without and that which is within the range of our earthly +faculties, are indissolubly united. Neither is this divine form of +goodness wholly separable from the ideal of the Christian Church, which is +said in the New Testament to be 'His body,' or at variance with those other +images of good which Plato sets before us. We see Him in a figure only, +and of figures of speech we select but a few, and those the simplest, to be +the expression of Him. We behold Him in a picture, but He is not there. +We gather up the fragments of His discourses, but neither do they represent +Him as He truly was. His dwelling is neither in heaven nor earth, but in +the heart of man. This is that image which Plato saw dimly in the +distance, which, when existing among men, he called, in the language of +Homer, 'the likeness of God,' the likeness of a nature which in all ages +men have felt to be greater and better than themselves, and which in +endless forms, whether derived from Scripture or nature, from the witness +of history or from the human heart, regarded as a person or not as a +person, with or without parts or passions, existing in space or not in +space, is and will always continue to be to mankind the Idea of Good. + + + + +THE REPUBLIC. + + +BOOK I. + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE. + +Socrates, who is the narrator. + +Glaucon. + +Adeimantus. + +Polemarchus. + +Cephalus. + +Thrasymachus. + +Cleitophon. + +And others who are mute auditors. + +The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole +dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to +Timaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced in +the Timaeus. + + +I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that +I might offer up my prayers to the goddess (Bendis, the Thracian Artemis.); +and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the +festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of +the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, +beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we +turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus the +son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were +starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for +him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said: +Polemarchus desires you to wait. + +I turned round, and asked him where his master was. + +There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait. + +Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, +and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, +and several others who had been at the procession. + +Polemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion +are already on your way to the city. + +You are not far wrong, I said. + +But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are? + +Of course. + +And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain +where you are. + +May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let +us go? + +But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said. + +Certainly not, replied Glaucon. + +Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured. + +Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in +honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening? + +With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches +and pass them one to another during the race? + +Yes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated +at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper +and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will +have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse. + +Glaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must. + +Very good, I replied. + +Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his +brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the +Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of +Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I had +not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated +on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been +sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room +arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me +eagerly, and then he said:-- + +You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still +able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I +can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the +Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade +away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not +then deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with +these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us. + +I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, +than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have +gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire, +whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a +question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time +which the poets call the 'threshold of old age'--Is life harder towards the +end, or what report do you give of it? + +I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age +flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at +our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is --I cannot eat, I +cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a +good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some +complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will +tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, +Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in +fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old +man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor +that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet +Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, +Sophocles,--are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly +have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped +from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind +since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. +For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the +passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the +grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, +that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be +attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters +and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the +pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age +are equally a burden. + +I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on +--Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in general are +not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits +lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you +are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter. + +You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something +in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer +them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying +that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: +'If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would +have been famous.' And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old +age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be +a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself. + +May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited +or acquired by you? + +Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art +of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for +my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his +patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my +father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: and I +shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more +than I received. + +That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you +are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who +have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the +makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, +resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for +their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and +profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad +company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth. + +That is true, he said. + +Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?--What do you +consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your +wealth? + +One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For +let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, +fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of +a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here +were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the +thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because +he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of +these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins +to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he +finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like +a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark +forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar +charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age: + +'Hope,' he says, 'cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and +holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey;-- +hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.' + +How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not +say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to +deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and +when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about +offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace +of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, +that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which +wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest. + +Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?--to +speak the truth and to pay your debts--no more than this? And even to this +are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has +deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right +mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or +that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I +ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. + +You are quite right, he replied. + +But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct +definition of justice. + +Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus +interposing. + +I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the +sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company. + +Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said. + +To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices. + +Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and +according to you truly say, about justice? + +He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears +to me to be right. + +I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but +his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. +For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to +return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he +is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a +debt. + +True. + +Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means +to make the return? + +Certainly not. + +When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not +mean to include that case? + +Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a +friend and never evil. + +You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the +receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt,-- +that is what you would imagine him to say? + +Yes. + +And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them? + +To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as +I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him--that is to +say, evil. + +Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken +darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is +the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt. + +That must have been his meaning, he said. + +By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given +by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to +us? + +He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human +bodies. + +And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what? + +Seasoning to food. + +And what is that which justice gives, and to whom? + +If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding +instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to +enemies. + +That is his meaning then? + +I think so. + +And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in +time of sickness? + +The physician. + +Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea? + +The pilot. + +And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man +most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend? + +In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other. + +But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a +physician? + +No. + +And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot? + +No. + +Then in time of peace justice will be of no use? + +I am very far from thinking so. + +You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war? + +Yes. + +Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn? + +Yes. + +Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,--that is what you mean? + +Yes. + +And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace? + +In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. + +And by contracts you mean partnerships? + +Exactly. + +But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner +at a game of draughts? + +The skilful player. + +And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or +better partner than the builder? + +Quite the reverse. + +Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the +harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better +partner than the just man? + +In a money partnership. + +Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a +just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man +who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not? + +Certainly. + +And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be +better? + +True. + +Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to +be preferred? + +When you want a deposit to be kept safely. + +You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie? + +Precisely. + +That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless? + +That is the inference. + +And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to +the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art +of the vine-dresser? + +Clearly. + +And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you +would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the +art of the soldier or of the musician? + +Certainly. + +And so of all other things;--justice is useful when they are useless, and +useless when they are useful? + +That is the inference. + +Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: +Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of +fighting best able to ward off a blow? + +Certainly. + +And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best +able to create one? + +True. + +And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon +the enemy? + +Certainly. + +Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief? + +That, I suppose, is to be inferred. + +Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it. + +That is implied in the argument. + +Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a +lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking +of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of +his, affirms that + +'He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.' + +And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of +theft; to be practised however 'for the good of friends and for the harm of +enemies,'--that was what you were saying? + +No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I +still stand by the latter words. + +Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those +who are so really, or only in seeming? + +Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, +and to hate those whom he thinks evil. + +Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not +good seem to be so, and conversely? + +That is true. + +Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends? +True. + +And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to +the good? + +Clearly. + +But the good are just and would not do an injustice? + +True. + +Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong? + +Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral. + +Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust? + +I like that better. + +But see the consequence:--Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has +friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; +and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be +saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of +Simonides. + +Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into +which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.' + +What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked. + +We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good. + +And how is the error to be corrected? + +We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; +and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a +friend; and of an enemy the same may be said. + +You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies? + +Yes. + +And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good +to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just +to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when +they are evil? + +Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. + +But ought the just to injure any one at all? + +Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies. + +When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated? + +The latter. + +Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs? + +Yes, of horses. + +And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses? + +Of course. + +And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the +proper virtue of man? + +Certainly. + +And that human virtue is justice? + +To be sure. + +Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust? + +That is the result. + +But can the musician by his art make men unmusical? + +Certainly not. + +Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen? + +Impossible. + +And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the +good by virtue make them bad? + +Assuredly not. + +Any more than heat can produce cold? + +It cannot. + +Or drought moisture? + +Clearly not. + +Nor can the good harm any one? + +Impossible. + +And the just is the good? + +Certainly. + +Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but +of the opposite, who is the unjust? + +I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates. + +Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and +that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the +debt which he owes to his enemies,--to say this is not wise; for it is not +true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no +case just. + +I agree with you, said Polemarchus. + +Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes +such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or +seer? + +I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said. + +Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be? + +Whose? + +I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or +some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, +was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and harm +to your enemies.' + +Most true, he said. + +Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other +can be offered? + +Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an +attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by +the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus +and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his +peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking +to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him. + +He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken +possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one +another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should +not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from +the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many +a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that +justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort +of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy. + +I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without +trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I +should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at +him first, and was therefore able to reply to him. + +Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus +and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can +assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a +piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one +another,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are +seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you +say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to +get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to +do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all +things should pity us and not be angry with us. + +How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;--that's +your ironical style! Did I not foresee--have I not already told you, that +whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other +shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering? + +You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you +ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom +you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or +four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do for me,'--then +obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer +you. But suppose that he were to retort, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? +If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the +question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right +one?--is that your meaning?'--How would you answer him? + +Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said. + +Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only +appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he +thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not? + +I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers? + +I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I +approve of any of them. + +But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, +than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you? + +Done to me!--as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise--that is +what I deserve to have done to me. + +What, and no payment! a pleasant notion! + +I will pay when I have the money, I replied. + +But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under +no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates. + +Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does--refuse to +answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else. + +Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says +that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of +his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural +thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes +to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the +edification of the company and of myself? + +Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, +as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he +had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he +affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. +Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and +goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says Thank you. + +That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful +I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is +all I have; and how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak +well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you +will answer well. + +Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the +interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course +you won't. + +Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the +interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You +cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger +than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, +that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he +is, and right and just for us? + +That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which +is most damaging to the argument. + +Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish +that you would be a little clearer. + +Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there +are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies? + +Yes, I know. + +And the government is the ruling power in each state? + +Certainly. + +And the different forms of government make laws democratical, +aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and +these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice +which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they +punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I +say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the +interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have +power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one +principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger. + +Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try +to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself +used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, +that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added. + +A small addition, you must allow, he said. + +Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what +you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is +interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this +addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further. + +Proceed. + +I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to +obey their rulers? + +I do. + +But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes +liable to err? + +To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err. + +Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and +sometimes not? + +True. + +When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; +when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that? + +Yes. + +And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,--and that is +what you call justice? + +Doubtless. + +Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the +interest of the stronger but the reverse? + +What is that you are saying? he asked. + +I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: +Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own +interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has +not that been admitted? + +Yes. + +Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of +the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done +which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the +obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O +wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are +commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury +of the stronger? + +Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. + +Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness. + +But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus +himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for +their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice. + +Yes, Polemarchus,--Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was +commanded by their rulers is just. + +Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the +stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further +acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects +to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the +injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger. + +But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the +stronger thought to be his interest,--this was what the weaker had to do; +and this was affirmed by him to be justice. + +Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus. + +Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his +statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the +stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? + +Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the +stronger at the time when he is mistaken? + +Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the +ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken. + +You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he +who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or +that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian +at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? +True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a +mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither +the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far +as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill +fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage +or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is +commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be +perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say +that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being +unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the +subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at +first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger. + +Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an +informer? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring +you in the argument? + +Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word--I know it; but you will be +found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail. + +I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any +misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense +do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he +being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute--is he a +ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term? + +In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the +informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be +able, never. + +And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat, +Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion. + +Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed. + +Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask +you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you +are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that +I am now speaking of the true physician. + +A healer of the sick, he replied. + +And the pilot--that is to say, the true pilot--is he a captain of sailors +or a mere sailor? + +A captain of sailors. + +The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; +neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is +distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his +skill and of his authority over the sailors. + +Very true, he said. + +Now, I said, every art has an interest? + +Certainly. + +For which the art has to consider and provide? + +Yes, that is the aim of art. + +And the interest of any art is the perfection of it--this and nothing else? + +What do you mean? + +I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. +Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, +I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and +require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of +medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as +you will acknowledge. Am I not right? + +Quite right, he replied. + +But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any +quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear +fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the +interests of seeing and hearing--has art in itself, I say, any similar +liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another +supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and +another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own +interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another?-- +having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by +the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider +the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure and +faultless while remaining true--that is to say, while perfect and +unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am +not right. + +Yes, clearly. + +Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest +of the body? + +True, he said. + +Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of +horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts +care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which +is the subject of their art? + +True, he said. + +But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their +own subjects? + +To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance. + +Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the +stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker? + +He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally +acquiesced. + +Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers +his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the +true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is +not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted? + +Yes. + +And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of +sailors and not a mere sailor? + +That has been admitted. + +And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of +the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest? + +He gave a reluctant 'Yes.' + +Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as +he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but +always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to +that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and +does. + +When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that the +definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of +replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse? + +Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be +answering? + +Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not +even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. + +What makes you say that? I replied. + +Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep +or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his +master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true +rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not +studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray +are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that +justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the +interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and +servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly +simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his +interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their +own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a +loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: +wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the +partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. +Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax, +the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of +income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and +the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there +is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, +and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is +hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in +unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I +am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the +advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most +clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the +criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to +do injustice are the most miserable--that is to say tyranny, which by fraud +and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but +wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private +and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any +one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace--they who +do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and +man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man +besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, +then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, +not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the +consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that +they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing +it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient +scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I +said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice +is a man's own profit and interest. + +Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man, deluged our +ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let +him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I +myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. +Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your +remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or +learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way +of man's life so small a matter in your eyes--to determine how life may be +passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage? + +And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry? + +You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, +Thrasymachus--whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say +you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep +your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you +confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare +that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more +gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. +For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit +injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the +superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the +same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your +wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to +injustice. + +And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by +what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put +the proof bodily into your souls? + +Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you +change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, +Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although +you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not +observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that +the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own +good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures of +the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a +shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the +good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the +perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of +it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. +I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a +state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or +subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to +say, the true rulers, like being in authority. + +Think! Nay, I am sure of it. + +Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly +without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage +not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the +several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? +And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a +little progress. + +Yes, that is the difference, he replied. + +And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one-- +medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so +on? + +Yes, he said. + +And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do +not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to +be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may +be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, +that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your +exact use of language? + +Certainly not. + +Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say +that the art of payment is medicine? + +I should not. + +Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man +takes fees when he is engaged in healing? + +Certainly not. + +And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially +confined to the art? + +Yes. + +Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be +attributed to something of which they all have the common use? + +True, he replied. + +And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained +by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by +him? + +He gave a reluctant assent to this. + +Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective +arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and +the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is +the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and +benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any +benefit from his art unless he were paid as well? + +I suppose not. + +But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing? + +Certainly, he confers a benefit. + +Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor +governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, +they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the +weaker and not the stronger--to their good they attend and not to the good +of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I +was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to +take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without +remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders +to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always +that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to +rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honour, +or a penalty for refusing. + +What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment +are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or +how a penalty can be a payment. + +You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the +best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition +and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace? + +Very true. + +And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them; +good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to +get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the +public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they +do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and +they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I +imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of +waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable. Now the worst part +of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by +one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, +induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they +cannot help--not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or +enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to +commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or +indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed +entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of +contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain +proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own +interest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this would +choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of +conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice +is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further +discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the +unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement +appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has +spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer? + +I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he +answered. + +Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was +rehearsing? + +Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me. + +Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is +saying what is not true? + +Most certainly, he replied. + +If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the +advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a +numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and +in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our enquiry +as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the +offices of judge and advocate in our own persons. + +Very good, he said. + +And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said. + +That which you propose. + +Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and +answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect +justice? + +Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons. + +And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and +the other vice? + +Certainly. + +I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice? + +What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to +be profitable and justice not. + +What else then would you say? + +The opposite, he replied. + +And would you call justice vice? + +No, I would rather say sublime simplicity. + +Then would you call injustice malignity? + +No; I would rather say discretion. + +And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good? + +Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly +unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps +you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if +undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of +which I was just now speaking. + +I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; +but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with +wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite. + +Certainly I do so class them. + +Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; +for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been +admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have +been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will +call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute +all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing +that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue. + +You have guessed most infallibly, he replied. + +Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument +so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your +real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing +yourself at our expense. + +I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?--to refute the +argument is your business. + +Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as +answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage +over the just? + +Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which +he is. + +And would he try to go beyond just action? + +He would not. + +And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; +would that be considered by him as just or unjust? + +He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would +not be able. + +Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My +question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than +another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust? + +Yes, he would. + +And what of the unjust--does he claim to have more than the just man and to +do more than is just? + +Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men. + +And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust +man or action, in order that he may have more than all? + +True. + +We may put the matter thus, I said--the just does not desire more than his +like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both +his like and his unlike? + +Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement. + +And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither? + +Good again, he said. + +And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them? + +Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of +a certain nature; he who is not, not. + +Each of them, I said, is such as his like is? + +Certainly, he replied. + +Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you +would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician? + +Yes. + +And which is wise and which is foolish? + +Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish. + +And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish? + +Yes. + +And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician? + +Yes. + +And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the +lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the +tightening and loosening the strings? + +I do not think that he would. + +But he would claim to exceed the non-musician? + +Of course. + +And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks +would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of +medicine? + +He would not. + +But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician? + +Yes. + +And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that +any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or +doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or +do the same as his like in the same case? + +That, I suppose, can hardly be denied. + +And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the +knowing or the ignorant? + +I dare say. + +And the knowing is wise? + +Yes. + +And the wise is good? + +True. + +Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more +than his unlike and opposite? + +I suppose so. + +Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both? + +Yes. + +But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like +and unlike? Were not these your words? + +They were. + +And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike? + +Yes. + +Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and +ignorant? + +That is the inference. + +And each of them is such as his like is? + +That was admitted. + +Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and +ignorant. + +Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but +with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration +poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, +Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and +wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point: + +Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not +also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember? + +Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are +saying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be quite +certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my +say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer 'Very good,' +as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod 'Yes' and 'No.' + +Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion. + +Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What +else would you have? + +Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you +shall answer. + +Proceed. + +Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our +examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried +on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more +powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom +and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is +ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by any one. But I want to view +the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a +state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, +or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in +subjection? + +True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust +state will be most likely to do so. + +I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further +consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state +can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice. + +If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with +justice; but if I am right, then without justice. + +I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and +dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent. + +That is out of civility to you, he replied. + +You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform +me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and +thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured +one another? + +No indeed, he said, they could not. + +But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act +together better? + +Yes. + +And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, +and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus? + +I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you. + +How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, +having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or +among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance +and render them incapable of common action? + +Certainly. + +And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and +fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just? + +They will. + +And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say +that she loses or that she retains her natural power? + +Let us assume that she retains her power. + +Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that +wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a +family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered +incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does +it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and +with the just? Is not this the case? + +Yes, certainly. + +And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the +first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity +with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and +the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus? + +Yes. + +And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just? + +Granted that they are. + +But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be +their friend? + +Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not +oppose you, lest I should displease the company. + +Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my +repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and +better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of +common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting +at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been +perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is +evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which +enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one +another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their +enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they +would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the +truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just +have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which +we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons +which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no +light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life. + +Proceed. + +I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has +some end? + +I should. + +And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not +be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing? + +I do not understand, he said. + +Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye? + +Certainly not. + +Or hear, except with the ear? + +No. + +These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs? + +They may. + +But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in +many other ways? + +Of course. + +And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose? + +True. + +May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook? + +We may. + +Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning +when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which +could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing? + +I understand your meaning, he said, and assent. + +And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask +again whether the eye has an end? + +It has. + +And has not the eye an excellence? + +Yes. + +And the ear has an end and an excellence also? + +True. + +And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and +a special excellence? + +That is so. + +Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own +proper excellence and have a defect instead? + +How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see? + +You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; +but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question +more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends +fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by +their own defect? + +Certainly, he replied. + +I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper +excellence they cannot fulfil their end? + +True. + +And the same observation will apply to all other things? + +I agree. + +Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for +example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not +these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any +other? + +To no other. + +And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul? + +Assuredly, he said. + +And has not the soul an excellence also? + +Yes. + +And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that +excellence? + +She cannot. + +Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and +the good soul a good ruler? + +Yes, necessarily. + +And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and +injustice the defect of the soul? + +That has been admitted. + +Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will +live ill? + +That is what your argument proves. + +And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the +reverse of happy? + +Certainly. + +Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable? + +So be it. + +But happiness and not misery is profitable. + +Of course. + +Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than +justice. + +Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea. + +For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle +towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well +entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure +snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he +not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone +from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at +first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to +consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when +there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice +and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result +of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know +not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or +is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy. + + +BOOK II. + +With these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; +but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is +always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' +retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, +do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, +that to be just is always better than to be unjust? + +I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could. + +Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:--How would you +arrange goods--are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and +independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures +and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from +them? + +I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied. + +Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, +health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their +results? + +Certainly, I said. + +And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care +of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of +money-making--these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no +one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some +reward or result which flows from them? + +There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask? + +Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place +justice? + +In the highest class, I replied,--among those goods which he who would be +happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results. + +Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be +reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for +the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable +and rather to be avoided. + +I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was +the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured +justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him. + +I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall +see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, +to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but +to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made +clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they +are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you, please, +then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak +of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. +Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their +will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that +there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all +better far than the life of the just--if what they say is true, Socrates, +since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am +perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others +dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the +superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory +way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be +satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely +to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of +my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I +desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you +say whether you approve of my proposal? + +Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would +oftener wish to converse. + +I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by +speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice. + +They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, +evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have +both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being +able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better +agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual +covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and +just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice;--it is a +mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and +not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without +the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the +two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by +reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy +to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able +to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, +Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice. + +Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they +have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of +this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what +they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we +shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding +along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be +their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of +law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to +them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by +Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, +Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great +storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he +was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, +where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, +at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared +to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he +took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met +together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report +about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring +on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the +collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to +the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no +longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he +turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the +ring, and always with the same result--when he turned the collet inwards he +became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to +be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; whereas soon as +he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the +king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two +such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; +no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand +fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when +he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and +lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he +would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of +the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at +last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof +that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any +good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks +that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in +their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than +justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are +right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming +invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he +would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although +they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with +one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of +this. + +Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, +we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be +effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just +man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and +both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. +First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like +the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and +keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to +recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right +way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice: (he who is +found out is nobody:) for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed +just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we +must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we +must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the +greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be +able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any +of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is +required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. +And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, +wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no +seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and +then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for +the sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice +only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of +life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him +be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall +see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. +And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to +be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of +justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is +the happier of the two. + +Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for +the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues. + +I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no +difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. +This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a +little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which +follow are not mine.--Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of +injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will +be scourged, racked, bound--will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, +after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will +understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of +Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the +unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances-- +he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only:-- + +'His mind has a soil deep and fertile, +Out of which spring his prudent counsels.' + +In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the +city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also +he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, +because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether +in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at +their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his +friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and +dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honour the +gods or any man whom he wants to honour in a far better style than the +just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. +And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of +the unjust better than the life of the just. + +I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his +brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is +nothing more to be urged? + +Why, what else is there? I answered. + +The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied. + +Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother'--if he +fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon +has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the +power of helping justice. + +Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another +side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and +injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe +to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and +their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, +but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for +him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like +which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust +from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by +this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good +opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the +heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the +testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that the +gods make the oaks of the just-- + +'To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle; +And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,' + +and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer +has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is-- + +'As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, +Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings forth +Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit, +And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish.' + +Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe +to the just; they take them down into the world below, where they have the +saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with +garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the +highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the +posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third +and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. +But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in +Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living +they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which +Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust; +nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising +the one and censuring the other. + +Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking +about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is +found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring +that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome; and that +the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only +censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most +part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call +wicked men happy, and to honour them both in public and private when they +are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook +those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better +than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking +about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and +misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And +mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have +a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's +own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and +feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a +small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, +to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they +appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod;-- + +'Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her +dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,' + +and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the +gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:-- + +'The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and +avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations +and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed.' + +And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were +children of the Moon and the Muses--that is what they say--according to +which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but +whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by +sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the +service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, +and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no one +knows what awaits us. + +He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and +vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds +likely to be affected, my dear Socrates,--those of them, I mean, who are +quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from +all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of +persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would make +the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of +Pindar-- + +'Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which +may be a fortress to me all my days?' + +For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just +profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are +unmistakeable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, +a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, +appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I +must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of +virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail +the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. +But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often +difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the +argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which +we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret +brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who +teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by +persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be +punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, +neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose +them to have no care of human things--why in either case should we mind +about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, +yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; +and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and +turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.' Let us be +consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, +why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for +if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall +lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the +gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods +will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world +below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust +deeds.' Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries +and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty +cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and +prophets, bear a like testimony. + +On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the +worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard +to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life +and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. +Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind +or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to +refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there +should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who +is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, +but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not +just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom +the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or +who has attained knowledge of the truth--but no other man. He only blames +injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the +power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains +the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be. + +The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of +the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find +that of all the professing panegyrists of justice--beginning with the +ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending +with the men of our own time--no one has ever blamed injustice or praised +justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow +from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose +the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and +invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a +man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and +injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you +sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have +been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but every one would +have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring +in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others +would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and +words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I +conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement +manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you +the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority +which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the +possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to +him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations; for +unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the +false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of +it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, +and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is +another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a +man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you +have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are +desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own +sakes--like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and +natural and not merely conventional good--I would ask you in your praise of +justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which +justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise +justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honours of the +one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from +them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life +in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your +own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove +to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of +them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the +other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. + +I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing +these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious +father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the +admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished +yourselves at the battle of Megara:-- + +'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero.' + +The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in +being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and +remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are +not convinced--this I infer from your general character, for had I judged +only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater +my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. +For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal +to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you +were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, +as I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I +cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid +that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken +of and not lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give +such help as I can. + +Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question +drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the +truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, +about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that +the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. +Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better +adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted +person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance; +and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place +which was larger and in which the letters were larger--if they were the +same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the +lesser--this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune. + +Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our +enquiry? + +I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, +is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and +sometimes as the virtue of a State. + +True, he replied. + +And is not a State larger than an individual? + +It is. + +Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more +easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of +justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in +the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing +them. + +That, he said, is an excellent proposal. + +And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the +justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also. + +I dare say. + +When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our +search will be more easily discovered. + +Yes, far more easily. + +But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am +inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore. + +I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed. + +A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one +is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of +a State be imagined? + +There can be no other. + +Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, +one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these +partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of +inhabitants is termed a State. + +True, he said. + +And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, +under the idea that the exchange will be for their good. + +Very true. + +Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true +creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention. + +Of course, he replied. + +Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition +of life and existence. + +Certainly. + +The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like. + +True. + +And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: +We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one +else a weaver--shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other +purveyor to our bodily wants? + +Quite right. + +The barest notion of a State must include four or five men. + +Clearly. + +And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into +a common stock?--the individual husbandman, for example, producing for +four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the +provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will +he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing +for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of +the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in +making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with +others, but supplying himself all his own wants? + +Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at +producing everything. + +Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say +this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities +of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations. + +Very true. + +And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, +or when he has only one? + +When he has only one. + +Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the +right time? + +No doubt. + +For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at +leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the +business his first object. + +He must. + +And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and +easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural +to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things. + +Undoubtedly. + +Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not +make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they +are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools--and +he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker. + +True. + +Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in +our little State, which is already beginning to grow? + +True. + +Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that +our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as +husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and +hides,--still our State will not be very large. + +That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all +these. + +Then, again, there is the situation of the city--to find a place where +nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible. + +Impossible. + +Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required +supply from another city? + +There must. + +But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require who +would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed. + +That is certain. + +And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for +themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those +from whom their wants are supplied. + +Very true. + +Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required? + +They will. + +Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants? + +Yes. + +Then we shall want merchants? + +We shall. + +And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also +be needed, and in considerable numbers? + +Yes, in considerable numbers. + +Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To +secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal +objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State. + +Clearly they will buy and sell. + +Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of +exchange. + +Certainly. + +Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to +market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,-- +is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place? + +Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the +office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are +the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other +purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange +for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who +desire to buy. + +This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not +'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place +engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to +another are called merchants? + +Yes, he said. + +And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on +the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for +labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, +hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour. + +True. + +Then hirelings will help to make up our population? + +Yes. + +And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected? + +I think so. + +Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the +State did they spring up? + +Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot +imagine that they are more likely to be found any where else. + +I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better +think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry. + +Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now +that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, +and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are +housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in +winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and +flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; +these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves +reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and +their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, +wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in +happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their +families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war. + +But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their +meal. + +True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish--salt, +and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country +people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; +and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in +moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and +health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children +after them. + +Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how +else would you feed the beasts? + +But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied. + +Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. +People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine +off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style. + +Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me +consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; +and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more +likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true +and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. +But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection. +For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. +They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also +dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these +not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the +necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, +and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set +in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured. + +True, he said. + +Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no +longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a +multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as +the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do +with forms and colours; another will be the votaries of music--poets and +their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also +makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we +shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses +wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and +swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the +former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be +forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat +them. + +Certainly. + +And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than +before? + +Much greater. + +And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will +be too small now, and not enough? + +Quite true. + +Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and +tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they +exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited +accumulation of wealth? + +That, Socrates, will be inevitable. + +And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not? + +Most certainly, he replied. + +Then without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we +may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which +are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as +public. + +Undoubtedly. + +And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be +nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the +invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom +we were describing above. + +Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves? + +No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by +all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will +remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success. + +Very true, he said. + +But is not war an art? + +Certainly. + +And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking? + +Quite true. + +And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or +a builder--in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and +to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature +fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no +other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a +good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a +soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a +man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other +artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught +player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his +earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will +make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to +him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any +attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other +implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with +heavy-armed or any other kind of troops? + +Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond +price. + +And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and +skill, and art, and application will be needed by him? + +No doubt, he replied. + +Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling? + +Certainly. + +Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for +the task of guarding the city? + +It will. + +And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and +do our best. + +We must. + +Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and +watching? + +What do you mean? + +I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake +the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, +they have to fight with him. + +All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them. + +Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well? + +Certainly. + +And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any +other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is +spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be +absolutely fearless and indomitable? + +I have. + +Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required +in the guardian. + +True. + +And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit? + +Yes. + +But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and +with everybody else? + +A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied. + +Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to +their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for +their enemies to destroy them. + +True, he said. + +What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which +has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other? + +True. + +He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two +qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and +hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible. + +I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied. + +Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.--My friend, +I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of +the image which we had before us. + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite +qualities. + +And where do you find them? + +Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a +very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their +familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers. + +Yes, I know. + +Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our +finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities? + +Certainly not. + +Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, +need to have the qualities of a philosopher? + +I do not apprehend your meaning. + +The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, +and is remarkable in the animal. + +What trait? + +Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he +welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other +any good. Did this never strike you as curious? + +The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your +remark. + +And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;--your dog is a true +philosopher. + +Why? + +Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by +the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a +lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of +knowledge and ignorance? + +Most assuredly. + +And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy? + +They are the same, he replied. + +And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be +gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of +wisdom and knowledge? + +That we may safely affirm. + +Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will +require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and +strength? + +Undoubtedly. + +Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, +how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may +be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end-- +How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either +to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient +length. + +Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us. + +Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if +somewhat long. + +Certainly not. + +Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story +shall be the education of our heroes. + +By all means. + +And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the +traditional sort?--and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and +music for the soul. + +True. + +Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards? + +By all means. + +And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not? + +I do. + +And literature may be either true or false? + +Yes. + +And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false? + +I do not understand your meaning, he said. + +You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though +not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these +stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics. + +Very true. + +That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics. + +Quite right, he said. + +You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, +especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at +which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more +readily taken. + +Quite true. + +And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which +may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for +the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have +when they are grown up? + +We cannot. + +Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of +fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and +reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their +children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such +tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most +of those which are now in use must be discarded. + +Of what tales are you speaking? he said. + +You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are +necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them. + +Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the +greater. + +Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the +poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind. + +But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with +them? + +A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, +what is more, a bad lie. + +But when is this fault committed? + +Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and +heroes,--as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a +likeness to the original. + +Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are +the stories which you mean? + +First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, +which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,--I mean what +Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings +of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, +even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and +thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. +But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might +hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) +pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the +hearers will be very few indeed. + +Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable. + +Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the +young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is +far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his +father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following +the example of the first and greatest among the gods. + +I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite +unfit to be repeated. + +Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling +among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to +them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods +against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the +battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall +be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with +their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell +them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there +been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women +should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also +should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative +of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent +him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the +battles of the gods in Homer--these tales must not be admitted into our +State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. +For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; +anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become +indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the +tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts. + +There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models +to be found and of what tales are you speaking--how shall we answer him? + +I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but +founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general +forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be +observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business. + +Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean? + +Something of this kind, I replied:--God is always to be represented as he +truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which +the representation is given. + +Right. + +And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such? + +Certainly. + +And no good thing is hurtful? + +No, indeed. + +And that which is not hurtful hurts not? + +Certainly not. + +And that which hurts not does no evil? + +No. + +And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil? + +Impossible. + +And the good is advantageous? + +Yes. + +And therefore the cause of well-being? + +Yes. + +It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of +the good only? + +Assuredly. + +Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many +assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things +that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the +evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the +causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him. + +That appears to me to be most true, he said. + +Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the +folly of saying that two casks + +'Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil +lots,' + +and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two + +'Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;' + +but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, + +'Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth.' + +And again-- + +'Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.' + +And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was +really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that +the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he +shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear +the words of Aeschylus, that + +'God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.' + +And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe--the subject of the tragedy +in which these iambic verses occur--or of the house of Pelops, or of the +Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say +that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some +explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say that God did what +was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that +those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their +misery--the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the +wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited +by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of +evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or +heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered +commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious. + +I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law. + +Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to +which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform,--that God is not +the author of all things, but of good only. + +That will do, he said. + +And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God +is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and +now in another--sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, +sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he +one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image? + +I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought. + +Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be +effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing? + +Most certainly. + +And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or +discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is +least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in +the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or +any similar causes. + +Of course. + +And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by +any external influence? + +True. + +And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite +things--furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are +least altered by time and circumstances. + +Very true. + +Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is +least liable to suffer change from without? + +True. + +But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect? + +Of course they are. + +Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes? + +He cannot. + +But may he not change and transform himself? + +Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all. + +And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse +and more unsightly? + +If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose +him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty. + +Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire +to make himself worse? + +Impossible. + +Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as +is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains +absolutely and for ever in his own form. + +That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment. + +Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that + +'The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and +down cities in all sorts of forms;' + +and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in +tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the +likeness of a priestess asking an alms + +'For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;' + +--let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers +under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version +of these myths--telling how certain gods, as they say, 'Go about by night +in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;' but let them +take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time +speak blasphemy against the gods. + +Heaven forbid, he said. + +But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and +deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms? + +Perhaps, he replied. + +Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word +or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself? + +I cannot say, he replied. + +Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be +allowed, is hated of gods and men? + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and +highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, +above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him. + +Still, he said, I do not comprehend you. + +The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my +words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed +about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the +soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind +least like;--that, I say, is what they utterly detest. + +There is nothing more hateful to them. + +And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is +deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of +imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure +unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right? + +Perfectly right. + +The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men? + +Yes. + +Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in +dealing with enemies--that would be an instance; or again, when those whom +we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some +harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in +the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking--because we do +not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like +truth as we can, and so turn it to account. + +Very true, he said. + +But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is +ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention? + +That would be ridiculous, he said. + +Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God? + +I should say not. + +Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies? + +That is inconceivable. + +But he may have friends who are senseless or mad? + +But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God. + +Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie? + +None whatever. + +Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood? + +Yes. + +Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes +not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision. + +Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own. + +You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in +which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not +magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any +way. + +I grant that. + +Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream +which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of +Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials + +'Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and +to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things +blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I +thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would +not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at +the banquet, and who said this--he it is who has slain my son.' + +These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our +anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we +allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, +meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true +worshippers of the gods and like them. + +I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my +laws. + + +BOOK III. + +Such then, I said, are our principles of theology--some tales are to be +told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth +upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to value +friendship with one another. + +Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said. + +But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides +these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can +any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him? + +Certainly not, he said. + +And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather +than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and +terrible? + +Impossible. + +Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as +well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile but rather to +commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are +untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors. + +That will be our duty, he said. + +Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, +beginning with the verses, + +'I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than +rule over all the dead who have come to nought.' + +We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared, + +'Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen +both of mortals and immortals.' + +And again:-- + +'O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but +no mind at all!' + +Again of Tiresias:-- + +'(To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,) that he alone should +be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades.' + +Again:-- + +'The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, +leaving manhood and youth.' + +Again:-- + +'And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth.' + +And,-- + +'As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out +of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one +another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved.' + +And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out +these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or +unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical charm +of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant +to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death. + +Undoubtedly. + +Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which +describe the world below--Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and +sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a +shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not +say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there +is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable +and effeminate by them. + +There is a real danger, he said. + +Then we must have no more of them. + +True. + +Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us. + +Clearly. + +And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men? + +They will go with the rest. + +But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is +that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man +who is his comrade. + +Yes; that is our principle. + +And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had +suffered anything terrible? + +He will not. + +Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own +happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. + +True, he said. + +And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of +fortune, is to him of all men least terrible. + +Assuredly. + +And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the +greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him. + +Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another. + +Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, +and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for +anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being educated by +us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like. + +That will be very right. + +Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict +Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his +back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along +the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands +and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes +which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of +the gods as praying and beseeching, + +'Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.' + +Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the +gods lamenting and saying, + +'Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.' + +But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so +completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say-- + +'O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round +and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.' + +Or again:-- + +Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued +at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius.' + +For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy +representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, +hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be +dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination +which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having +any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on +slight occasions. + +Yes, he said, that is most true. + +Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument +has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is +disproved by a better. + +It ought not to be. + +Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter +which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent +reaction. + +So I believe. + +Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as +overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods +be allowed. + +Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied. + +Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as +that of Homer when he describes how + +'Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw +Hephaestus bustling about the mansion.' + +On your views, we must not admit them. + +On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them +is certain. + +Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is +useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of +such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have +no business with them. + +Clearly not, he said. + +Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the +State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with +enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public +good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and +although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them +in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the +pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses +to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain +what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things +are going with himself or his fellow sailors. + +Most true, he said. + +If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State, + +'Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter,' + +he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive +and destructive of ship or State. + +Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out. + +In the next place our youth must be temperate? + +Certainly. + +Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to +commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures? + +True. + +Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer, + +'Friend, sit still and obey my word,' + +and the verses which follow, + +'The Greeks marched breathing prowess, +...in silent awe of their leaders,' + +and other sentiments of the same kind. + +We shall. + +What of this line, + +'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,' + +and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar +impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their +rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken? + +They are ill spoken. + +They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to +temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men--you +would agree with me there? + +Yes. + +And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion +is more glorious than + +'When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries +round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups,' + +is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such +words? Or the verse + +'The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?' + +What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men +were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot +them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at +the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie +with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of +rapture before, even when they first met one another + +'Without the knowledge of their parents;' + +or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a +chain around Ares and Aphrodite? + +Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that +sort of thing. + +But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they +ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses, + +'He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, +Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!' + +Certainly, he said. + +In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of +money. + +Certainly not. + +Neither must we sing to them of + +'Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.' + +Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have +given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts +of the Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he should not lay +aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself +to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or that +when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that +without payment he was unwilling to do so. + +Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved. + +Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these +feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to +him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the +narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says, + +'Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I +would be even with thee, if I had only the power;' + +or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to +lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had +been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he +actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of +Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all this I cannot +believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to +believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of +Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so +disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly +inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with +overweening contempt of gods and men. + +You are quite right, he replied. + +And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of +Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they +did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god +daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to +them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either +that these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of +gods;--both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We +will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the +authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men--sentiments which, +as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already proved +that evil cannot come from the gods. + +Assuredly not. + +And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; +for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that +similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by-- + +'The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the +altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,' + +and who have + +'the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.' + +And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of +morals among the young. + +By all means, he replied. + +But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to +be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner +in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated +has been already laid down. + +Very true. + +And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of +our subject. + +Clearly so. + +But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my +friend. + +Why not? + +Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets +and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they +tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that +injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own +loss and another's gain--these things we shall forbid them to utter, and +command them to sing and say the opposite. + +To be sure we shall, he replied. + +But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you +have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending. + +I grant the truth of your inference. + +That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we +cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how +naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or not. + +Most true, he said. + +Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when +this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely +treated. + +I do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus. + +Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible if +I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology +and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of +the two? + +That again, he said, I do not quite understand. + +I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty +in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not +take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration +of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet +says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that +Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his +object, invoked the anger of the God against the Achaeans. Now as far as +these lines, + +'And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the +chiefs of the people,' + +the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that +he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, +and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not +Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast +the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and +throughout the Odyssey. + +Yes. + +And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from +time to time and in the intermediate passages? + +Quite true. + +But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he +assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is +going to speak? + +Certainly. + +And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or +gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes? + +Of course. + +Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way +of imitation? + +Very true. + +Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again +the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. +However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you may +no more say, 'I don't understand,' I will show how the change might be +effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his daughter's +ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings;' +and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued +in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple +narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and +therefore I drop the metre), 'The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf +of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but +begged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom +which he brought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks +revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him +depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be +of no avail to him--the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he +said--she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go +away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the +old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he +called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he +had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering +sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and +that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,'--and +so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative. + +I understand, he said. + +Or you may suppose the opposite case--that the intermediate passages are +omitted, and the dialogue only left. + +That also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy. + +You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you +failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and +mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative--instances of this are +supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in +which the poet is the only speaker--of this the dithyramb affords the best +example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several other +styles of poetry. Do I take you with me? + +Yes, he said; I see now what you meant. + +I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done +with the subject and might proceed to the style. + +Yes, I remember. + +In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding +about the mimetic art,--whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are +to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and +if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited? + +You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted +into our State? + +Yes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do not +know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go. + +And go we will, he said. + +Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be +imitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule +already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many; +and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much +reputation in any? + +Certainly. + +And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things +as well as he would imitate a single one? + +He cannot. + +Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, +and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as +well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same +persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and +comedy--did you not just now call them imitations? + +Yes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot +succeed in both. + +Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once? + +True. + +Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but +imitations. + +They are so. + +And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller +pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of +performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies. + +Quite true, he replied. + +If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our +guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves +wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft, +and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to +practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should +imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their +profession--the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they +should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or +baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. +Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and +continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second +nature, affecting body, voice, and mind? + +Yes, certainly, he said. + +Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of +whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether +young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting +against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, +or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or +labour. + +Very right, he said. + +Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices +of slaves? + +They must not. + +And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse +of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one +another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against +themselves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is. +Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or +women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to +be practised or imitated. + +Very true, he replied. + +Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or +boatswains, or the like? + +How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to +the callings of any of these? + +Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the +murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of +thing? + +Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behaviour +of madmen. + +You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of +narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has +anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite +character and education. + +And which are these two sorts? he asked. + +Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration +comes on some saying or action of another good man,--I should imagine that +he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of +imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he +is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken by +illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he +comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of +that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at +all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other +times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor +will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels +the employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his +mind revolts at it. + +So I should expect, he replied. + +Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of +Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but +there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. +Do you agree? + +Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily +take. + +But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the +worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for +him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right +good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he +will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, +or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, +pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, +bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in +imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration. + +That, he said, will be his mode of speaking. + +These, then, are the two kinds of style? + +Yes. + +And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has +but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their +simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is +always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of +a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he +will make use of nearly the same rhythm? + +That is quite true, he said. + +Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, +if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style has all +sorts of changes. + +That is also perfectly true, he replied. + +And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all +poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything +except in one or other of them or in both together. + +They include all, he said. + +And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of +the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed? + +I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue. + +Yes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming: and +indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is +the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the +world in general. + +I do not deny it. + +But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, +in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one +part only? + +Yes; quite unsuitable. + +And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall +find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman +to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a +trader also, and the same throughout? + +True, he said. + +And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever +that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to +exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a +sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our +State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. +And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon +his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ +for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller, who +will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models +which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers. + +We certainly will, he said, if we have the power. + +Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which +relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for the +matter and manner have both been discussed. + +I think so too, he said. + +Next in order will follow melody and song. + +That is obvious. + +Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be +consistent with ourselves. + +I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word 'every one' hardly includes +me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may guess. + +At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts--the words, the +melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose? + +Yes, he said; so much as that you may. + +And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words +which are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same +laws, and these have been already determined by us? + +Yes. + +And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words? + +Certainly. + +We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of +lamentation and strains of sorrow? + +True. + +And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can +tell me. + +The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the +full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like. + +These then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a character to +maintain they are of no use, and much less to men. + +Certainly. + +In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly +unbecoming the character of our guardians. + +Utterly unbecoming. + +And which are the soft or drinking harmonies? + +The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed 'relaxed.' + +Well, and are these of any military use? + +Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are +the only ones which you have left. + +I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one +warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour +of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going +to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such +crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to +endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of +action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to +persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition, or on the +other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or +entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he +has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting +moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the +event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and +the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the +fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I +say, leave. + +And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was +just now speaking. + +Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and +melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale? + +I suppose not. + +Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and +complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed curiously- +harmonised instruments? + +Certainly not. + +But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit +them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony +the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the +panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute? + +Clearly not. + +There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the +shepherds may have a pipe in the country. + +That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument. + +The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments +is not at all strange, I said. + +Not at all, he replied. + +And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State, +which not long ago we termed luxurious. + +And we have done wisely, he replied. + +Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies, +rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same +rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of +every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a +courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, we shall adapt +the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the +foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty--you must +teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies. + +But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are +some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, +just as in sounds there are four notes (i.e. the four notes of the +tetrachord.) out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is an +observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are +severally the imitations I am unable to say. + +Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us +what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other +unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite +feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his +mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he +arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making the +rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; +and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic +rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities. Also in some cases +he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as +the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what +he meant. These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred +to Damon himself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you +know? (Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his +assumed ignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the +sentence he appears to be speaking of paeonic rhythms which are in the +ratio of 3/2; in the second part, of dactylic and anapaestic rhythms, which +are in the ratio of 1/1; in the last clause, of iambic and trochaic +rhythms, which are in the ratio of 1/2 or 2/1.) + +Rather so, I should say. + +But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is +an effect of good or bad rhythm. + +None at all. + +And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad +style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our +principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not +the words by them. + +Just so, he said, they should follow the words. + +And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper +of the soul? + +Yes. + +And everything else on the style? + +Yes. + +Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on +simplicity,--I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind +and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for +folly? + +Very true, he replied. + +And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these +graces and harmonies their perpetual aim? + +They must. + +And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive +art are full of them,--weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of +manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,--in all of them there is +grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious +motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony +are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness. + +That is quite true, he said. + +But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be +required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if +they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control +to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from +exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and +indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he +who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his +art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We +would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in +some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb +and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a +festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be +those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and +graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights +and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence +of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze +from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into +likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason. + +There can be no nobler training than that, he replied. + +And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent +instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into +the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting +grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of +him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received +this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive +omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he +praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes +noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of +his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason +comes he will recognise and salute the friend with whom his education has +made him long familiar. + +Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be +trained in music and on the grounds which you mention. + +Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the +letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes +and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a +space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not +thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognise them +wherever they are found: + +True-- + +Or, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, +only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study giving us +the knowledge of both: + +Exactly-- + +Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to +educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms +of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as +well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can recognise +them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting them either in +small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of +one art and study. + +Most assuredly. + +And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are +cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye +to see it? + +The fairest indeed. + +And the fairest is also the loveliest? + +That may be assumed. + +And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the +loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul? + +That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be +any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and will love +all the same. + +I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and +I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any +affinity to temperance? + +How can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his +faculties quite as much as pain. + +Or any affinity to virtue in general? + +None whatever. + +Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance? + +Yes, the greatest. + +And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love? + +No, nor a madder. + +Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order--temperate and harmonious? + +Quite true, he said. + +Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love? + +Certainly not. + +Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the +lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their +love is of the right sort? + +No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them. + +Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law +to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love +than a father would use to his son, and then only for a noble purpose, and +he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in +all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he +exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste. + +I quite agree, he said. + +Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end +of music if not the love of beauty? + +I agree, he said. + +After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained. + +Certainly. + +Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it +should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is,--and +this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in +confirmation of my own, but my own belief is,--not that the good body by +any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the +good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be +possible. What do you say? + +Yes, I agree. + +Then, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing +over the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity +we will now only give the general outlines of the subject. + +Very good. + +That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; +for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know +where in the world he is. + +Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care +of him is ridiculous indeed. + +But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for +the great contest of all--are they not? + +Yes, he said. + +And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them? + +Why not? + +I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy +sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that +these athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous +illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary +regimen? + +Yes, I do. + +Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior +athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the +utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer +heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, +they must not be liable to break down in health. + +That is my view. + +The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we +were just now describing. + +How so? + +Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple +and good; and especially the military gymnastic. + +What do you mean? + +My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at +their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no +fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not +allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for +soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving +the trouble of carrying about pots and pans. + +True. + +And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere +mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all +professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good +condition should take nothing of the kind. + +Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them. + +Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of +Sicilian cookery? + +I think not. + +Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a +Corinthian girl as his fair friend? + +Certainly not. + +Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of +Athenian confectionary? + +Certainly not. + +All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and +song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms. + +Exactly. + +There complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas simplicity +in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity in +gymnastic of health in the body. + +Most true, he said. + +But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice +and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the +lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not +only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them. + +Of course. + +And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of +education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people +need the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who +would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and +a great sign of want of good-breeding, that a man should have to go abroad +for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must +therefore surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords +and judges over him? + +Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful. + +Would you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider that there is a further +stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing +all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is +actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he +imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked +turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and +getting out of the way of justice: and all for what?--in order to gain +small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life +as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort +of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful? + +Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful. + +Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to +be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by indolence and +a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with +waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious +sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and +catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace? + +Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to +diseases. + +Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the +days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero +Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian +wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which are +certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the +Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke +Patroclus, who is treating his case. + +Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a +person in his condition. + +Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, +as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius +did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to +educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly +constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of +torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world. + +How was that? he said. + +By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he +perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his +entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon +himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything +from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he +struggled on to old age. + +A rare reward of his skill! + +Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood +that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, +the omission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of +medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every +individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no +leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of +the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people +of the richer sort. + +How do you mean? he said. + +I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and +ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,--these are his +remedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and +tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of +thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees +no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of +his customary employment; and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of +physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives +and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no +more trouble. + +Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of +medicine thus far only. + +Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his +life if he were deprived of his occupation? + +Quite true, he said. + +But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has +any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live. + +He is generally supposed to have nothing to do. + +Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has +a livelihood he should practise virtue? + +Nay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner. + +Let us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask +ourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he +live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further +question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the +application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not +equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides? + +Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the +body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the +practice of virtue. + +Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a +house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all, +irreconcileable with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection--there +is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to +philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the +higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is +being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body. + +Yes, likely enough. + +And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the +power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy +constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he +cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein +consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had +penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by +gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen +out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons; +--if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to +cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself, or +to the State. + +Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman. + +Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that +they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which I +am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus +wounded Menelaus, they + +'Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies,' + +but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink +in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the +remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was +wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did +happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. +But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, +whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the art of +medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as +Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them. + +They were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius. + +Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar +disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the +son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was +at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But +we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not +believe them when they tell us both;--if he was the son of a god, we +maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not +the son of a god. + +All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to +you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the +best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and +bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted +with all sorts of moral natures? + +Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you +know whom I think good? + +Will you tell me? + +I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join +two things which are not the same. + +How so? he asked. + +Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful +physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the +knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had better +not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in +their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with +which they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be +or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind +which has become and is sick can cure nothing. + +That is very true, he said. + +But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he ought +not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have +associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole +calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of +others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness; +the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no +experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the +reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily +practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil +is in their own souls. + +Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived. + +Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned to +know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the +nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal +experience. + +Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge. + +Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your +question); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and +suspicious nature of which we spoke,--he who has committed many crimes, and +fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his +fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges +of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, +who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his +unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognise an honest man, because he has +no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad are more +numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, +and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish. + +Most true, he said. + +Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the +other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by +time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and +not the vicious, man has wisdom--in my opinion. + +And in mine also. + +This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will +sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, giving +health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies +they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put +an end to themselves. + +That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State. + +And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which, +as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law. + +Clearly. + +And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise +the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some +extreme case. + +That I quite believe. + +The very exercises and tolls which he undergoes are intended to stimulate +the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he +will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develope his +muscles. + +Very right, he said. + +Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is +often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the +training of the body. + +What then is the real object of them? + +I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the +improvement of the soul. + +How can that be? he asked. + +Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive +devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to +music? + +In what way shown? he said. + +The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness +and effeminacy, I replied. + +Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a +savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is +good for him. + +Yet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly +educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to +become hard and brutal. + +That I quite think. + +On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And +this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if educated +rightly, will be gentle and moderate. + +True. + +And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities? + +Assuredly. + +And both should be in harmony? + +Beyond question. + +And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous? + +Yes. + +And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish? + +Very true. + +And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul +through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of +which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling +and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or +spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of +brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing +process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted +away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble +warrior. + +Very true. + +If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily +accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening +the spirit renders him excitable;--on the least provocation he flames up at +once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he grows +irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable. + +Exactly. + +And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great +feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at +first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and +he becomes twice the man that he was. + +Certainly. + +And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the +Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having no +taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture, grow feeble +and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and +his senses not being purged of their mists? + +True, he said. + +And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the +weapon of persuasion,--he is like a wild beast, all violence and +fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all +ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace. + +That is quite true, he said. + +And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the +other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two +arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order +that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be +relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized. + +That appears to be the intention. + +And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and +best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician +and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings. + +You are quite right, Socrates. + +And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the +government is to last. + +Yes, he will be absolutely necessary. + +Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be +the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or +about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? +For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall +have no difficulty in discovering them. + +I dare say that there will be no difficulty. + +Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are +to be rulers and who subjects? + +Certainly. + +There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger. + +Clearly. + +And that the best of these must rule. + +That is also clear. + +Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry? + +Yes. + +And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be +those who have most the character of guardians? + +Yes. + +And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special +care of the State? + +True. + +And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves? + +To be sure. + +And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same +interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is +supposed by him at any time most to affect his own? + +Very true, he replied. + +Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who +in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good +of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her +interests. + +Those are the right men. + +And they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see +whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence +either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to +the State. + +How cast off? he said. + +I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind +either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of +a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of +a truth. + +I understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the +unwilling I have yet to learn. + +Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and +willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess +the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are +is to possess the truth? + +Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of +truth against their will. + +And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, +or enchantment? + +Still, he replied, I do not understand you. + +I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only +mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget; +argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and +this I call theft. Now you understand me? + +Yes. + +Those again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or +grief compels to change their opinion. + +I understand, he said, and you are quite right. + +And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change +their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner +influence of fear? + +Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant. + +Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best +guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the +State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their +youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely +to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to +be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be +the way? + +Yes. + +And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, +in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities. + +Very right, he replied. + +And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments--that is the third +sort of test--and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take +colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must +we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into +pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the +furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against all +enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves +and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all +circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most +serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every age, +as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious +and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be +honoured in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials +of honour, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails, we must +reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our +rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally, +and not with any pretension to exactness. + +And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said. + +And perhaps the word 'guardian' in the fullest sense ought to be applied to +this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain +peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, or +the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we before called +guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the +principles of the rulers. + +I agree with you, he said. + +How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately +spoke--just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be +possible, and at any rate the rest of the city? + +What sort of lie? he said. + +Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale (Laws) of what has +often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made +the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such +an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable, if it +did. + +How your words seem to hesitate on your lips! + +You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard. + +Speak, he said, and fear not. + +Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the +face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to +communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and +lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, +and the education and training which they received from us, an appearance +only; in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the +womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances +were manufactured; when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent +them up; and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse, +they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, +and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own +brothers. + +You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were going +to tell. + +True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half. +Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has +framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the +composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the +greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others +again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and +iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as +all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a +silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first +principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which +they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good +guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements +mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has +an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of +ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child +because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, +just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or +silver in them are raised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. +For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it +will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making +our citizens believe in it? + +Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing +this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' +sons, and posterity after them. + +I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will +make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of +the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while we +arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their +rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best +suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend +themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from +without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them +sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings. + +Just so, he said. + +And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of +winter and the heat of summer. + +I suppose that you mean houses, he replied. + +Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shop- +keepers. + +What is the difference? he said. + +That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, from +want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn upon +the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a +foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd? + +Truly monstrous, he said. + +And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being stronger +than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage +tyrants instead of friends and allies? + +Yes, great care should be taken. + +And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard? + +But they are well-educated already, he replied. + +I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain +that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will +have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations +to one another, and to those who are under their protection. + +Very true, he replied. + +And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs +to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, +nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must +acknowledge that. + +He must. + +Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to +realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any +property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should +they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to +enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained +warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to +receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses +of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like +soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from +God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of +the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine +by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source +of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all +the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same +roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their +salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they +ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become +housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants +instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting +and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater +terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to +themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which +reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these +shall be the regulations appointed by us for guardians concerning their +houses and all other matters? + +Yes, said Glaucon. + + +BOOK IV. + +Here Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer, Socrates, +said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people +miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city +in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other +men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything +handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account, +and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they +have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favourites of +fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are +quartered in the city and are always mounting guard? + +Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in +addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they +would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a +mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought +to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be +added. + +But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge. + +You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer? + +Yes. + +If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find +the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians +may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the +State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the +greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is +ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to +find justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice: and, having found +them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I +take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view +of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will +proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting +a statue, and some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most +beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body--the eyes ought +to be purple, but you have made them black--to him we might fairly answer, +Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that +they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the +other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I +say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness +which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our +husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid +them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also +might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing +round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working +at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class +happy--and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do +not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman +will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and +no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now +this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and +pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the +guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real +guardians, then see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other +hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. +We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the +State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are +enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the +State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of +something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in +appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness +individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside +in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the +guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be +compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the +whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will +receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them. + +I think that you are quite right. + +I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me. + +What may that be? + +There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts. + +What are they? + +Wealth, I said, and poverty. + +How do they act? + +The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, +any longer take the same pains with his art? + +Certainly not. + +He will grow more and more indolent and careless? + +Very true. + +And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter? + +Yes; he greatly deteriorates. + +But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with +tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he +teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well. + +Certainly not. + +Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their +work are equally liable to degenerate? + +That is evident. + +Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the +guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved. + +What evils? + +Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, +and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent. + +That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, +how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is +rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war. + +There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one +such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them. + +How so? he asked. + +In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained +warriors fighting against an army of rich men. + +That is true, he said. + +And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in +his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who +were not boxers? + +Hardly, if they came upon him at once. + +What, now, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at +the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times +under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn +more than one stout personage? + +Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that. + +And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and +practise of boxing than they have in military qualities. + +Likely enough. + +Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or +three times their own number? + +I agree with you, for I think you right. + +And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of +the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither +have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help +us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these +words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the +dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep? + +That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if +the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one. + +But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own! + +Why so? + +You ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them is +a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, +however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the +other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there +are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if +you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many, +and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will +always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, +while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in +her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or +appearance, but in deed and truth, though she number not more than a +thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly +find, either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as +great and many times greater. + +That is most true, he said. + +And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they +are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which +they are to include, and beyond which they will not go? + +What limit would you propose? + +I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; +that, I think, is the proper limit. + +Very good, he said. + +Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our +guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and +self-sufficing. + +And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon +them. + +And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still,-- +I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, +and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower +classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case of +the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which +nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own +business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and +not many. + +Yes, he said; that is not so difficult. + +The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as +might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care +be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,--a thing, however, +which I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for our purpose. + +What may that be? he asked. + +Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and +grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, +as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the +possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow +the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the +proverb says. + +That will be the best way of settling them. + +Also, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating +force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good +constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education +improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in +other animals. + +Very possibly, he said. + +Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of +our rulers should be directed,--that music and gymnastic be preserved in +their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to +maintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard + +'The newest song which the singers have,' + +they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind +of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning +of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole +State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite +believe him;--he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws +of the State always change with them. + +Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own. + +Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in +music? + +Yes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in. + +Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears +harmless. + +Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little +this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into +manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades +contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and +constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an +overthrow of all rights, private as well as public. + +Is that true? I said. + +That is my belief, he replied. + +Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a +stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths +themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted and +virtuous citizens. + +Very true, he said. + +And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music +have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner +how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their +actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen +places in the State will raise them up again. + +Very true, he said. + +Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their +predecessors have altogether neglected. + +What do you mean? + +I mean such things as these:--when the young are to be silent before their +elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them +sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; +the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You +would agree with me? + +Yes. + +But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters,--I +doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them +likely to be lasting. + +Impossible. + +It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a +man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like? + +To be sure. + +Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may +be the reverse of good? + +That is not to be denied. + +And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about +them. + +Naturally enough, he replied. + +Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings +between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about insult +and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, +what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions +and exactions of market and harbour dues which may be required, and in +general about the regulations of markets, police, harbours, and the like. +But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these +particulars? + +I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good +men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for +themselves. + +Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we +have given them. + +And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever making +and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection. + +You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no self- +restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance? + +Exactly. + +Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always +doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always +fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them +to try. + +Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort. + +Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst +enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up +eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor +spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail. + +Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with +a man who tells you what is right. + +These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces. + +Assuredly not. + +Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom I +was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which the +citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and +yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and +indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and +gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman--do not +these States resemble the persons whom I was describing? + +Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from +praising them. + +But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready +ministers of political corruption? + +Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the +applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really +statesmen, and these are not much to be admired. + +What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a +man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that +he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say? + +Nay, he said, certainly not in that case. + +Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play, +trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are +always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in +contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing +that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra? + +Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing. + +I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with +this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either +in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for in the former they are +quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising +them; and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations. + +What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation? + +Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the God of Delphi, there remains +the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all. + +Which are they? he said. + +The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, +demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, +and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the +inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant +ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them +to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the +centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to +all mankind. + +You are right, and we will do as you propose. + +But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now +that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get +your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let +us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what +they differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy +should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. + +Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying +that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety? + +I do not deny that I said so, and as you remind me, I will be as good as my +word; but you must join. + +We will, he replied. + +Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with +the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect. + +That is most certain. + +And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just. + +That is likewise clear. + +And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not +found will be the residue? + +Very good. + +If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever +it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and +there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, +and then the fourth would clearly be the one left. + +Very true, he said. + +And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also +four in number? + +Clearly. + +First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in +this I detect a certain peculiarity. + +What is that? + +The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in +counsel? + +Very true. + +And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but +by knowledge, do men counsel well? + +Clearly. + +And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse? + +Of course. + +There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge +which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel? + +Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in +carpentering. + +Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which +counsels for the best about wooden implements? + +Certainly not. + +Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said, nor +as possessing any other similar knowledge? + +Not by reason of any of them, he said. + +Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would +give the city the name of agricultural? + +Yes. + +Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State +among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in +the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal +with itself and with other States? + +There certainly is. + +And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked. + +It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those +whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians. + +And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this +sort of knowledge? + +The name of good in counsel and truly wise. + +And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths? + +The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous. + +Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a +name from the profession of some kind of knowledge? + +Much the smallest. + +And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which +resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being +thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the +only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to +be of all classes the least. + +Most true. + +Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four +virtues has somehow or other been discovered. + +And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied. + +Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and +in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the +State. + +How do you mean? + +Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be +thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's +behalf. + +No one, he replied, would ever think of any other. + +The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their +courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the +city either the one or the other. + +Certainly not. + +The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which +preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things +to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; +and this is what you term courage. + +I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think +that I perfectly understand you. + +I mean that courage is a kind of salvation. + +Salvation of what? + +Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what +nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words +'under all circumstances' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under +the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this +opinion. Shall I give you an illustration? + +If you please. + +You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the +true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they +prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground +may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and +whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing +either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the +ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the +look either of purple or of any other colour. + +Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance. + +Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our +soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were contriving +influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in +perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every +other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not +to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure--mightier agent far in +washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the +mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power +of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call +and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree. + +But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere +uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave--this, in +your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have +another name. + +Most certainly. + +Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe? + +Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen,' you +will not be far wrong;--hereafter, if you like, we will carry the +examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but +justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough. + +You are right, he replied. + +Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State--first, temperance, and +then justice which is the end of our search. + +Very true. + +Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance? + +I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that +justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and +therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance +first. + +Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request. + +Then consider, he said. + +Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of +temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the +preceding. + +How so? he asked. + +Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures +and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man being +his own master;' and other traces of the same notion may be found in +language. + +No doubt, he said. + +There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself;' for +the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these +modes of speaking the same person is denoted. + +Certainly. + +The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and +also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, +then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: +but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, +which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse +--in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and +unprincipled. + +Yes, there is reason in that. + +And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find +one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will +acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words +'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better part +over the worse. + +Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true. + +Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and +pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the +freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class. + +Certainly, he said. + +Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under +the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and +those the best born and best educated. + +Very true. + +These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner +desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the +few. + +That I perceive, he said. + +Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own +pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a +designation? + +Certainly, he replied. + +It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons? + +Yes. + +And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to +the question who are to rule, that again will be our State? + +Undoubtedly. + +And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will +temperance be found--in the rulers or in the subjects? + +In both, as I should imagine, he replied. + +Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was +a sort of harmony? + +Why so? + +Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides +in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so +temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of +the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the +middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom +or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we +deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, +as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals. + +I entirely agree with you. + +And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been +discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state +virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was. + +The inference is obvious. + +The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround +the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of +sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: +watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her +first, let me know. + +Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has +just eyes enough to see what you show him--that is about as much as I am +good for. + +Offer up a prayer with me and follow. + +I will, but you must show me the way. + +Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must +push on. + +Let us push on. + +Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I +believe that the quarry will not escape. + +Good news, he said. + +Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows. + +Why so? + +Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was +justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be +more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in +their hands--that was the way with us--we looked not at what we were +seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, +we missed her. + +What do you mean? + +I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of +justice, and have failed to recognise her. + +I grow impatient at the length of your exordium. + +Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the +original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of +the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which +his nature was best adapted;--now justice is this principle or a part of +it. + +Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only. + +Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not +being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the +same to us. + +Yes, we said so. + +Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be +justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference? + +I cannot, but I should like to be told. + +Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State +when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; +and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all +of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we +were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the +fourth or remaining one. + +That follows of necessity. + +If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence +contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of +rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion +which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and +watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, +and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, +ruler, subject,--the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and +not being a busybody, would claim the palm--the question is not so easily +answered. + +Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which. + +Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears +to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage. + +Yes, he said. + +And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice? + +Exactly. + +Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers +in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits +at law? + +Certainly. + +And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take +what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own? + +Yes; that is their principle. + +Which is a just principle? + +Yes. + +Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing +what is a man's own, and belongs to him? + +Very true. + +Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter +to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and +suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same +person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you +think that any great harm would result to the State? + +Not much. + +But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, +having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his +followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class +of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which +he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the +other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then +I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this +meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State. + +Most true. + +Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of +one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm +to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing? + +Precisely. + +And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by +you injustice? + +Certainly. + +This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the +auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, +and will make the city just. + +I agree with you. + +We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this +conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the +State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, +we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, +which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could +previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less +difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example +appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as +we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let +the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual--if they +agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the +individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the +theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a +light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then +revealed we will fix in our souls. + +That will be in regular course; let us do as you say. + +I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the +same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same? + +Like, he replied. + +The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the +just State? + +He will. + +And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the +State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate +and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of +these same classes? + +True, he said. + +And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three +principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be +rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same +manner? + +Certainly, he said. + +Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question-- +whether the soul has these three principles or not? + +An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is +the good. + +Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are +employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the +true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution +not below the level of the previous enquiry. + +May we not be satisfied with that? he said;--under the circumstances, I am +quite content. + +I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied. + +Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said. + +Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same +principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the +individual they pass into the State?--how else can they come there? Take +the quality of passion or spirit;--it would be ridiculous to imagine that +this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who +are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general +the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, +which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the +love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the +Phoenicians and Egyptians. + +Exactly so, he said. + +There is no difficulty in understanding this. + +None whatever. + +But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these +principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one +part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire +the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes +into play in each sort of action--to determine that is the difficulty. + +Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty. + +Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different. + +How can we? he asked. + +I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon +in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in +contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things +apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but +different. + +Good. + +For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the +same time in the same part? + +Impossible. + +Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we +should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is +standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to +say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same +moment--to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say +that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest. + +Very true. + +And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice +distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin +round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the +same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same +spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases +things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we +should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference, and that +the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; +and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis +inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no +point of view can they be at rest. + +That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied. + +Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe +that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to +the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways. + +Certainly not, according to my way of thinking. + +Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, +and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, +and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn +out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn. + +Yes, he said, that will be the best way. + +Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and +aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they +are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact +of their opposition)? + +Yes, he said, they are opposites. + +Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again +willing and wishing,--all these you would refer to the classes already +mentioned. You would say--would you not?--that the soul of him who desires +is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to himself +the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants +anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his +desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been +asked a question? + +Very true. + +And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of +desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and +rejection? + +Certainly. + +Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular +class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as +they are termed, which are the most obvious of them? + +Let us take that class, he said. + +The object of one is food, and of the other drink? + +Yes. + +And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of +drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for +example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any +particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire +is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if +the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; +or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst +pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural +satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger? + +Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple +object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object. + +But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an +opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good +drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of +desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good +drink; and the same is true of every other desire. + +Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say. + +Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality +attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their +correlatives simple. + +I do not know what you mean. + +Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less? + +Certainly. + +And the much greater to the much less? + +Yes. + +And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to +be to the less that is to be? + +Certainly, he said. + +And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double +and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the +slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;--is not this true +of all of them? + +Yes. + +And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of +science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the +object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, +for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge +which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed +architecture. + +Certainly. + +Because it has a particular quality which no other has? + +Yes. + +And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular +kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences? + +Yes. + +Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original +meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term +of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is +qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that +relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, +or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil +are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term science is no +longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is +the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called +not merely science, but the science of medicine. + +I quite understand, and I think as you do. + +Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, +having clearly a relation-- + +Yes, thirst is relative to drink. + +And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but +thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor +of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only? + +Certainly. + +Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only +drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it? + +That is plain. + +And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, +that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a +beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same +time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same. + +Impossible. + +No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow +at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other +pulls. + +Exactly so, he replied. + +And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink? + +Yes, he said, it constantly happens. + +And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was +something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding +him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him? + +I should say so. + +And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids +and attracts proceeds from passion and disease? + +Clearly. + +Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one +another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational +principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and +thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the +irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions? + +Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different. + +Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the +soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of +the preceding? + +I should be inclined to say--akin to desire. + +Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which +I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up +one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed +some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a +desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he +struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of +him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye +wretches, take your fill of the fair sight. + +I have heard the story myself, he said. + +The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as +though they were two distinct things. + +Yes; that is the meaning, he said. + +And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's +desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry +at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the +struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason;-- +but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires +when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing +which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I +should imagine, in any one else? + +Certainly not. + +Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is +the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or +cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him-- +these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited +by them. + +True, he said. + +But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and +chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because +he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to +persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he +either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that +is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more. + +The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were +saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the +rulers, who are their shepherds. + +I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a +further point which I wish you to consider. + +What point? + +You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of +desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of +the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle. + +Most assuredly. + +But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or +only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in +the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; or +rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, +counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element +which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the +natural auxiliary of reason? + +Yes, he said, there must be a third. + +Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different +from desire, turn out also to be different from reason. + +But that is easily proved:--We may observe even in young children that they +are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them +never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough. + +Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which +is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once +more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us, + +'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul,' + +for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about +the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is +rebuked by it. + +Very true, he said. + +And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed +that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the +individual, and that they are three in number. + +Exactly. + +Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in +virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise? + +Certainly. + +Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State +constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the +individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues? + +Assuredly. + +And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in +which the State is just? + +That follows, of course. + +We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of +the three classes doing the work of its own class? + +We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said. + +We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his +nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work? + +Yes, he said, we must remember that too. + +And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of +the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the +subject and ally? + +Certainly. + +And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will +bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words +and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of +passion by harmony and rhythm? + +Quite true, he said. + +And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know +their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us +is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over +this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness +of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer +confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who +are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man? + +Very true, he said. + +Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the +whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other +fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and +counsels? + +True. + +And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in +pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear? + +Right, he replied. + +And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which +proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge +of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole? + +Assuredly. + +And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in +friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two +subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to +rule, and do not rebel? + +Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the +State or individual. + +And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of +what quality a man will be just. + +That is very certain. + +And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is +she the same which we found her to be in the State? + +There is no difference in my opinion, he said. + +Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace +instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying. + +What sort of instances do you mean? + +If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man +who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than +the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one +deny this? + +No one, he replied. + +Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or +treachery either to his friends or to his country? + +Never. + +Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements? + +Impossible. + +No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father +and mother, or to fail in his religious duties? + +No one. + +And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether +in ruling or being ruled? + +Exactly so. + +Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such +states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other? + +Not I, indeed. + +Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at +the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have +conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified? + +Yes, certainly. + +And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker +and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not +another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use? + +Clearly. + +But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned +however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true +self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several +elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the +work of others,--he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master +and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together +the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, +lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals--when +he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one +entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, +if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of +the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always +thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this +harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which +presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this +condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over +it ignorance. + +You have said the exact truth, Socrates. + +Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and +the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be +telling a falsehood? + +Most certainly not. + +May we say so, then? + +Let us say so. + +And now, I said, injustice has to be considered. + +Clearly. + +Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles--a +meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul +against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a +rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural +vassal,--what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and +intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice? + +Exactly so. + +And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of +acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be +perfectly clear? + +What do you mean? he said. + +Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what +disease and health are in the body. + +How so? he said. + +Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is +unhealthy causes disease. + +Yes. + +And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice? + +That is certain. + +And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and +government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of +disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this +natural order? + +True. + +And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and +government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of +injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural +order? + +Exactly so, he said. + +Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice +the disease and weakness and deformity of the same? + +True. + +And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice? + +Assuredly. + +Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and +injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just +and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, +or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed? + +In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know +that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, +though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth +and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital +principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, +if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception +that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice +and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described? + +Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are +near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our +own eyes, let us not faint by the way. + +Certainly not, he replied. + +Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of +them, I mean, which are worth looking at. + +I am following you, he replied: proceed. + +I said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from +some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one, +but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones +which are deserving of note. + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as +there are distinct forms of the State. + +How many? + +There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said. + +What are they? + +The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be +said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is +exercised by one distinguished man or by many. + +True, he replied. + +But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the +government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been +trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the +State will be maintained. + +That is true, he replied. + + +BOOK V. + +Such is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of +the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil +is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the +regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms. + +What are they? he said. + +I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to +me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way +off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his +hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew +him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying +something in his ear, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let him +off, or what shall we do?' + +Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice. + +Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off? + +You, he said. + +I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off? + +Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a +whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy +that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were +self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children +'friends have all things in common.' + +And was I not right, Adeimantus? + +Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything +else, requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. +Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been +long expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of +your citizens--how they will bring children into the world, and rear them +when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this +community of women and children--for we are of opinion that the right or +wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence +on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still +undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, +as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account of all this. + +To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed. + +And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be +equally agreed. + +I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an +argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had +finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and +was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, +you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a +hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering +trouble, and avoided it. + +For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus, +--to look for gold, or to hear discourse? + +Yes, but discourse should have a limit. + +Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which +wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about +us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort +of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our +guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, +which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will +be. + +Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more +doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the +practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another +point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the +best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject, +lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only. + +Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are +not sceptical or hostile. + +I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these +words. + +Yes, he said. + +Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement +which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I +knew what I was talking about: to declare the truth about matters of high +interest which a man honours and loves among wise men who love him need +occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to carry on an argument when +you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer, which is my condition, is a +dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed +at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth +where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after +me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I +am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary +homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness or +justice in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run +among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well to encourage +me. + +Glaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your +argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the +homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and +speak. + +Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from +guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument. + +Then why should you mind? + +Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I +perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men +has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. +Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by +you. + +For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, +of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and +children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said +that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd. + +True. + +Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject +to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the +result accords with our design. + +What do you mean? + +What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs +divided into hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and in +keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the +males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the +females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies +is labour enough for them? + +No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the +males are stronger and the females weaker. + +But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are +bred and fed in the same way? + +You cannot. + +Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same +nurture and education? + +Yes. + +The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic. + +Yes. + +Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, +which they must practise like the men? + +That is the inference, I suppose. + +I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are +carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous. + +No doubt of it. + +Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked +in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no +longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than +the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to +frequent the gymnasia. + +Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be +thought ridiculous. + +But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not +fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of +innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and +gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon +horseback! + +Very true, he replied. + +Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the +same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. +Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion, +which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a +naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans and then +the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom, the wits of that day might +equally have ridiculed the innovation. + +No doubt. + +But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far +better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye +vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man +was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any +other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the +beautiful by any other standard but that of the good. + +Very true, he replied. + +First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let +us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of +sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? +And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share? +That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead +to the fairest conclusion. + +That will be much the best way. + +Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves; +in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended. + +Why not? he said. + +Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: +'Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves, +at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody +was to do the one work suited to his own nature.' And certainly, if I am +not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. 'And do not the natures of +men and women differ very much indeed?' And we shall reply: Of course +they do. Then we shall be asked, 'Whether the tasks assigned to men and to +women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different +natures?' Certainly they should. 'But if so, have you not fallen into a +serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so +entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?'--What defence will +you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections? + +That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and +I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side. + +These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like +kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take +in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children. + +By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy. + +Why yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, +whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he has +to swim all the same. + +Very true. + +And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that Arion's +dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us? + +I suppose so, he said. + +Well then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We acknowledged-- +did we not? that different natures ought to have different pursuits, and +that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying? +--that different natures ought to have the same pursuits,--this is the +inconsistency which is charged upon us. + +Precisely. + +Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction! + +Why do you say so? + +Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. +When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he +cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he +will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not +of fair discussion. + +Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with +us and our argument? + +A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting +unintentionally into a verbal opposition. + +In what way? + +Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that +different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered +at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we +distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures +and the same to the same natures. + +Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us. + +I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question +whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy +men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we +should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely? + +That would be a jest, he said. + +Yes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed +the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every +difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in +which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a +physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same +nature. + +True. + +Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures? + +Certainly. + +And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness +for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be +assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only +in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a +proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education +she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our +guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits. + +Very true, he said. + +Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or +arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man? + +That will be quite fair. + +And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer +on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no +difficulty. + +Yes, perhaps. + +Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then +we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution +of women which would affect them in the administration of the State. + +By all means. + +Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:--when you +spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say +that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little +learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, +after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or +again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his +mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to him?--would not these +be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from +the one who is ungifted? + +No one will deny that. + +And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not +all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I +waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of +pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, +and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most +absurd? + +You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of +the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many +men, yet on the whole what you say is true. + +And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration +in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by +virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all +the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a +woman is inferior to a man. + +Very true. + +Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women? + +That will never do. + +One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and +another has no music in her nature? + +Very true. + +And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another +is unwarlike and hates gymnastics? + +Certainly. + +And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one +has spirit, and another is without spirit? + +That is also true. + +Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was +not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this +sort? + +Yes. + +Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they +differ only in their comparative strength or weakness. + +Obviously. + +And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the +companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they +resemble in capacity and in character? + +Very true. + +And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits? + +They ought. + +Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning +music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians--to that point we come +round again. + +Certainly not. + +The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an +impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails +at present, is in reality a violation of nature. + +That appears to be true. + +We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and +secondly whether they were the most beneficial? + +Yes. + +And the possibility has been acknowledged? + +Yes. + +The very great benefit has next to be established? + +Quite so. + +You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian +will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same? + +Yes. + +I should like to ask you a question. + +What is it? + +Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better +than another? + +The latter. + +And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the +guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect +men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling? + +What a ridiculous question! + +You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our +guardians are the best of our citizens? + +By far the best. + +And will not their wives be the best women? + +Yes, by far the best. + +And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that +the men and women of a State should be as good as possible? + +There can be nothing better. + +And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such +manner as we have described, will accomplish? + +Certainly. + +Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree +beneficial to the State? + +True. + +Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their +robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their +country; only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be assigned +to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their +duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women +exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is +plucking + +'A fruit of unripe wisdom,' + +and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about; +--for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, That the useful is +the noble and the hurtful is the base. + +Very true. + +Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that +we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting +that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; +to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the +consistency of the argument with itself bears witness. + +Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped. + +Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when +you see the next. + +Go on; let me see. + +The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, +is to the following effect,--'that the wives of our guardians are to be +common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his +own child, nor any child his parent.' + +Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the +possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable. + +I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great +utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite +another matter, and will be very much disputed. + +I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both. + +You imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I meant +that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should +escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility. + +But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give +a defence of both. + +Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour: let me +feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting +themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any +means of effecting their wishes--that is a matter which never troubles +them--they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about +possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to +them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean +to do when their wish has come true--that is a way which they have of not +doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself +am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to +pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the +possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers +will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, +if executed, will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the +guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavour +with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and hereafter the +question of possibility. + +I have no objection; proceed. + +First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of +the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and +the power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the +laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which +are entrusted to their care. + +That is right, he said. + +You, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now +select the women and give them to them;--they must be as far as possible of +like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at +common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; +they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate +at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their +natures to have intercourse with each other--necessity is not too strong a +word, I think? + +Yes, he said;--necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity +which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the +mass of mankind. + +True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an +orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy +thing which the rulers will forbid. + +Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted. + +Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest +degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred? + +Exactly. + +And how can marriages be made most beneficial?--that is a question which I +put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler +sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever +attended to their pairing and breeding? + +In what particulars? + +Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some +better than others? + +True. + +And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed +from the best only? + +From the best. + +And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age? + +I choose only those of ripe age. + +And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would +greatly deteriorate? + +Certainly. + +And the same of horses and animals in general? + +Undoubtedly. + +Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers +need if the same principle holds of the human species! + +Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any +particular skill? + +Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body +corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require +medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of +practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be +given, then the doctor should be more of a man. + +That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding? + +I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of +falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were +saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of +advantage. + +And we were very right. + +And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the +regulations of marriages and births. + +How so? + +Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of +either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with +the inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the +offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is +to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a +secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our +herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion. + +Very true. + +Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together +the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable +hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter +which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to +preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they +will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any +similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State +from becoming either too large or too small. + +Certainly, he replied. + +We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy +may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will +accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers. + +To be sure, he said. + +And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honours +and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given +them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as +many sons as possible. + +True. + +And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to +be held by women as well as by men-- + +Yes-- + +The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen +or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in +a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better +when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, +unknown place, as they should be. + +Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept +pure. + +They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold +when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no +mother recognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if +more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling +shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up +at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the +nurses and attendants. + +You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when +they are having children. + +Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. +We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life? + +Very true. + +And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about +twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's? + +Which years do you mean to include? + +A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the +State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at five-and- +twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats +quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five. + +Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of +physical as well as of intellectual vigour. + +Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public +hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the +child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been +conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at +each hymeneal priestesses and priest and the whole city will offer, that +the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful +parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange +lust. + +Very true, he replied. + +And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age +who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the +sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to +the State, uncertified and unconsecrated. + +Very true, he replied. + +This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: +after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry +his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's +mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their +sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either +direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict +orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the +light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand +that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange +accordingly. + +That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know +who are fathers and daughters, and so on? + +They will never know. The way will be this:--dating from the day of the +hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male +children who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons, +and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and +he will call their children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder +generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the +time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their +brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to +inter-marry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute +prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favours +them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will +allow them. + +Quite right, he replied. + +Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State +are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the +argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our +polity, and also that nothing can be better--would you not? + +Yes, certainly. + +Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be +the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a +State,--what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then +consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of +the evil? + +By all means. + +Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality +where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity? + +There cannot. + +And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains--where +all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and +sorrow? + +No doubt. + +Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is +disorganized--when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other +plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens? + +Certainly. + +Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the +terms 'mine' and 'not mine,' 'his' and 'not his.' + +Exactly so. + +And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of +persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same +thing? + +Quite true. + +Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the +individual--as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the +whole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom +under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together +with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; +and the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has +a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of +suffering. + +Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State +there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe. + +Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole +State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with +him? + +Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State. + +It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether +this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental +principles. + +Very good. + +Our State like every other has rulers and subjects? + +True. + +All of whom will call one another citizens? + +Of course. + +But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other +States? + +Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call +them rulers. + +And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people +give the rulers? + +They are called saviours and helpers, he replied. + +And what do the rulers call the people? + +Their maintainers and foster-fathers. + +And what do they call them in other States? + +Slaves. + +And what do the rulers call one another in other States? + +Fellow-rulers. + +And what in ours? + +Fellow-guardians. + +Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak +of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his +friend? + +Yes, very often. + +And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, +and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest? + +Exactly. + +But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a +stranger? + +Certainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded by +them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or +daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with +him. + +Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in +name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For +example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a father be +implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the +law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an +impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good +either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the +strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the +citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the +rest of their kinsfolk? + +These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for +them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in +the spirit of them? + +Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often +heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well +or ill, the universal word will be 'with me it is well' or 'it is ill.' + +Most true. + +And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying +that they will have their pleasures and pains in common? + +Yes, and so they will. + +And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will +alike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a +common feeling of pleasure and pain? + +Yes, far more so than in other States. + +And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the +State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and +children? + +That will be the chief reason. + +And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was +implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of +the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain? + +That we acknowledged, and very rightly. + +Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the +source of the greatest good to the State? + +Certainly. + +And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,--that the +guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay +was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, +and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve +their true character of guardians. + +Right, he replied. + +Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am +saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city +in pieces by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine;' each man dragging any +acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he +has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but all +will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because +they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and +therefore they all tend towards a common end. + +Certainly, he replied. + +And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, +suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be +delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations +are the occasion. + +Of course they will. + +Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among +them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall +maintain to be honourable and right; we shall make the protection of the +person a matter of necessity. + +That is good, he said. + +Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a +quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not +proceed to more dangerous lengths. + +Certainly. + +To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the +younger. + +Clearly. + +Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other +violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he +slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty +to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those +who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will +be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers. + +That is true, he replied. + +Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with +one another? + +Yes, there will be no want of peace. + +And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no +danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against +one another. + +None whatever. + +I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be +rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of +the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in +bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their +household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving +the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep--the many evils of so +many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious +enough, and not worth speaking of. + +Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that. + +And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be +blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed. + +How so? + +The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the +blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious +victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the +victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the +crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all +that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while +living, and after death have an honourable burial. + +Yes, he said, and glorious rewards they are. + +Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion some +one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy--they +had nothing and might have possessed all things--to whom we replied that, +if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, +but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly +guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the +greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole? + +Yes, I remember. + +And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be +far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors--is the life of +shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with +it? + +Certainly not. + +At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if +any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will +cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious +life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by +some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek +to appropriate the whole state to himself, then he will have to learn how +wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is more than the whole.' + +If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when +you have the offer of such a life. + +You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life +such as we have described--common education, common children; and they are +to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going +out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt together like +dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to +share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will +not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes. + +I agree with you, he replied. + +The enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community be found +possible--as among other animals, so also among men--and if possible, in +what way possible? + +You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest. + +There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by +them. + +How? + +Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with +them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of +the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have to +do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to help +and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you +never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long +before they touch the wheel? + +Yes, I have. + +And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving +them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our +guardians will be? + +The idea is ridiculous, he said. + +There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, +the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valour. + +That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often +happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well +as their parents, and the State will never recover. + +True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk? + +I am far from saying that. + +Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some +occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it? + +Clearly. + +Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth +is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be +incurred. + +Yes, very important. + +This then must be our first step,--to make our children spectators of war; +but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then +all will be well. + +True. + +Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to +know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what +dangerous? + +That may be assumed. + +And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the +dangerous ones? + +True. + +And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will +be their leaders and teachers? + +Very properly. + +Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal +of chance about them? + +True. + +Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with +wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape. + +What do you mean? he said. + +I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when +they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses +must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the +swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of +what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger they +have only to follow their elder leaders and escape. + +I believe that you are right, he said. + +Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one +another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the +soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any +other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or +artisan. What do you think? + +By all means, I should say. + +And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a +present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what +they like with him. + +Certainly. + +But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In +the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful +comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you +say? + +I approve. + +And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship? + +To that too, I agree. + +But you will hardly agree to my next proposal. + +What is your proposal? + +That he should kiss and be kissed by them. + +Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no +one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the +expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his +love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour. + +Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has +been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters +more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible? + +Agreed. + +Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths +should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished +himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which seems to be a +compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a +tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing. + +Most true, he said. + +Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices +and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according to the measure +of their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and those other +distinctions which we were mentioning; also with + +'seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;' + +and in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them. + +That, he replied, is excellent. + +Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the +first place, that he is of the golden race? + +To be sure. + +Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are +dead + +'They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, +the guardians of speech-gifted men'? + +Yes; and we accept his authority. + +We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and +heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must +do as he bids? + +By all means. + +And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their +sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are +deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other way, +shall be admitted to the same honours. + +That is very right, he said. + +Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this? + +In what respect do you mean? + +First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes +should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they +can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger +which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the +barbarians? + +To spare them is infinitely better. + +Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which +they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe. + +Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians +and will keep their hands off one another. + +Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but +their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an +excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending +that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost +from this love of plunder. + +Very true. + +And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a +degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body +when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind +him,--is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, +quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead? + +Very like a dog, he said. + +Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial? + +Yes, he replied, we most certainly must. + +Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the +arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes; +and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from +kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself? + +Very true. + +Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of +houses, what is to be the practice? + +May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion? + +Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce +and no more. Shall I tell you why? + +Pray do. + +Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I +imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is +expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external +and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the +second, war. + +That is a very proper distinction, he replied. + +And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all +united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to +the barbarians? + +Very good, he said. + +And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with +Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and +by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but +when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a +state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such +enmity is to be called discord. + +I agree. + +Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord +occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn +the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true +lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse +and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered +of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their +hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever. + +Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other. + +And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city? + +It ought to be, he replied. + +Then will not the citizens be good and civilized? + +Yes, very civilized. + +And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own +land, and share in the common temples? + +Most certainly. + +And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as +discord only--a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war? + +Certainly not. + +Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled? + +Certainly. + +They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their +opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies? + +Just so. + +And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor +will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a +city--men, women, and children--are equally their enemies, for they know +that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many +are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to +waste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them will only +last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to +give satisfaction? + +I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic +enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another. + +Then let us enact this law also for our guardians:--that they are neither +to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses. + +Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous +enactments, are very good. + +But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this +way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement +of this discussion you thrust aside:--Is such an order of things possible, +and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan +which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the +State. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the +bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all +know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if +you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in +the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of +need, I know that they will then be absolutely invincible; and there are +many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also +fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these advantages and as many more +as you please, if only this State of yours were to come into existence, we +need say no more about them; assuming then the existence of the State, let +us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means--the rest may +be left. + +If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and +have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you +seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is +the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I +think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and +hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which +I have now to state and investigate. + +The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined +are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and +at once. + +Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search +after justice and injustice. + +True, he replied; but what of that? + +I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to +require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or +may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a +higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men? + +The approximation will be enough. + +We were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the +character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly +unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order +that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the +standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, +but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact. + +True, he said. + +Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with +consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show +that any such man could ever have existed? + +He would be none the worse. + +Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State? + +To be sure. + +And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the +possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described? + +Surely not, he replied. + +That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show +how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, +having this in view, to repeat your former admissions. + +What admissions? + +I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does +not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever +a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? +What do you say? + +I agree. + +Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every +respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a +city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have +discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am +sure that I should be contented--will not you? + +Yes, I will. + +Let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the +cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change +which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, +if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the +changes be as few and slight as possible. + +Certainly, he replied. + +I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one +change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible +one. + +What is it? he said. + +Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the +waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown +me in laughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words. + +Proceed. + +I said: 'Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this +world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and +wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the +exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have +rest from their evils,--nor the human race, as I believe,--and then only +will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of +day.' Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have +uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in +no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard +thing. + +Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which +you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable +persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and +seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, +before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if +you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be 'pared +by their fine wits,' and no mistake. + +You got me into the scrape, I said. + +And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; +but I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be +able to fit answers to your questions better than another--that is all. +And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the +unbelievers that you are right. + +I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And +I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain +to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the +State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered +to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the +State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be +followers rather than leaders. + +Then now for a definition, he said. + +Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to +give you a satisfactory explanation. + +Proceed. + +I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a +lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one +part of that which he loves, but to the whole. + +I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory. + +Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure +like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do +somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are +thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way +which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his +charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while +he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark +visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet +'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very name but the invention +of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if +appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you +will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a +single flower that blooms in the spring-time of youth. + +If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the +argument, I assent. + +And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? +They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine. + +Very good. + +And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they +are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by really +great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by lesser and +meaner people,--but honour of some kind they must have. + +Exactly. + +Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the +whole class or a part only? + +The whole. + +And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of +wisdom only, but of the whole? + +Yes, of the whole. + +And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of +judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a +philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not +hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one? + +Very true, he said. + +Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious +to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I +not right? + +Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a +strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have +a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, +too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the +last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical +discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac +festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether +the performance is in town or country--that makes no difference--they are +there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar +tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers? + +Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation. + +He said: Who then are the true philosophers? + +Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth. + +That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean? + +To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am +sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make. + +What is the proposition? + +That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two? + +Certainly. + +And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one? + +True again. + +And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same +remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various +combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are +seen in all sorts of lights and appear many? + +Very true. + +And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, +art-loving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are +alone worthy of the name of philosophers. + +How do you distinguish them? he said. + +The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of +fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are +made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute +beauty. + +True, he replied. + +Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this. + +Very true. + +And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute +beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable +to follow--of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: +is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, +who puts the copy in the place of the real object? + +I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming. + +But take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute +beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which +participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the +idea nor the idea in the place of the objects--is he a dreamer, or is he +awake? + +He is wide awake. + +And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and +that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion? + +Certainly. + +But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our +statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without +revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits? + +We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied. + +Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by +assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and +that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a +question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must +answer for him.) + +I answer that he knows something. + +Something that is or is not? + +Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known? + +And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, +that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly +non-existent is utterly unknown? + +Nothing can be more certain. + +Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not +to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the +absolute negation of being? + +Yes, between them. + +And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to +not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to +be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, +if there be such? + +Certainly. + +Do we admit the existence of opinion? + +Undoubtedly. + +As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty? + +Another faculty. + +Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter +corresponding to this difference of faculties? + +Yes. + +And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed +further I will make a division. + +What division? + +I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are +powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and +hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained +the class which I mean? + +Yes, I quite understand. + +Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore +the distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to +discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking +of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has +the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which +has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your +way of speaking? + +Yes. + +And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say +that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it? + +Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties. + +And is opinion also a faculty? + +Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an +opinion. + +And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the +same as opinion? + +Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which +is infallible with that which errs? + +An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a +distinction between them. + +Yes. + +Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct +spheres or subject-matters? + +That is certain. + +Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to +know the nature of being? + +Yes. + +And opinion is to have an opinion? + +Yes. + +And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the same +as the subject-matter of knowledge? + +Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty +implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were +saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of +knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same. + +Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be +the subject-matter of opinion? + +Yes, something else. + +Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can +there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an +opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion +which is an opinion about nothing? + +Impossible. + +He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing? + +Yes. + +And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing? + +True. + +Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of +being, knowledge? + +True, he said. + +Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being? + +Not with either. + +And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge? + +That seems to be true. + +But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater +clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance? + +In neither. + +Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but +lighter than ignorance? + +Both; and in no small degree. + +And also to be within and between them? + +Yes. + +Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate? + +No question. + +But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort +which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also +to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being; and that +the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be +found in the interval between them? + +True. + +And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call +opinion? + +There has. + +Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of +the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either, +pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the +subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty,--the extremes +to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean. + +True. + +This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there +is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty--in whose opinion the +beautiful is the manifold--he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who +cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or +that anything is one--to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very +kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is +one which will not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found +unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy? + +No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and +the same is true of the rest. + +And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?--doubles, that is, +of one thing, and halves of another? + +Quite true. + +And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not +be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names? + +True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them. + +And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names +be said to be this rather than not to be this? + +He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or +the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit +him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The +individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a +double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or +not-being, or both, or neither. + +Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than +between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness +or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being. + +That is quite true, he said. + +Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the +multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are +tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure +not-being? + +We have. + +Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might +find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of +knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the +intermediate faculty. + +Quite true. + +Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute +beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the +many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,--such persons may be +said to have opinion but not knowledge? + +That is certain. + +But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to +know, and not to have opinion only? + +Neither can that be denied. + +The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of +opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who +listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not +tolerate the existence of absolute beauty. + +Yes, I remember. + +Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of +opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us +for thus describing them? + +I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true. + +But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of +wisdom and not lovers of opinion. + +Assuredly. + + +BOOK VI. + +And thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and +the false philosophers have at length appeared in view. + +I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened. + +I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better +view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one +subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he +who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that +of the unjust must consider. + +And what is the next question? he asked. + +Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as +philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those +who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I +must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State? + +And how can we rightly answer that question? + +Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of +our State--let them be our guardians. + +Very good. + +Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep +anything should have eyes rather than no eyes? + +There can be no question of that. + +And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the +true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and +are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to +that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to +order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already +ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them--are not such persons, +I ask, simply blind? + +Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition. + +And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being +their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of +virtue, also know the very truth of each thing? + +There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest +of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they +fail in some other respect. + +Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the +other excellences. + +By all means. + +In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher +has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, +when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge +that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they +are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State. + +What do you mean? + +Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort +which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and +corruption. + +Agreed. + +And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; +there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which +they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of +ambition. + +True. + +And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality +which they should also possess? + +What quality? + +Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind +falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth. + +Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them. + +'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather 'must be +affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving +all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections. + +Right, he said. + +And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth? + +How can there be? + +Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood? + +Never. + +The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in +him lies, desire all truth? + +Assuredly. + +But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in +one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream +which has been drawn off into another channel. + +True. + +He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed +in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure--I mean, +if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one. + +That is most certain. + +Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the +motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no +place in his character. + +Very true. + +Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered. + +What is that? + +There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more +antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole +of things both divine and human. + +Most true, he replied. + +Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all +time and all existence, think much of human life? + +He cannot. + +Or can such an one account death fearful? + +No indeed. + +Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy? + +Certainly not. + +Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or +mean, or a boaster, or a coward--can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in +his dealings? + +Impossible. + +Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and +unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the +philosophical nature from the unphilosophical. + +True. + +There is another point which should be remarked. + +What point? + +Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that +which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little +progress. + +Certainly not. + +And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will +he not be an empty vessel? + +That is certain. + +Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless +occupation? Yes. + +Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic +natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory? + +Certainly. + +And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to +disproportion? + +Undoubtedly. + +And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion? + +To proportion. + +Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally +well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards +the true being of everything. + +Certainly. + +Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go +together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to +have a full and perfect participation of being? + +They are absolutely necessary, he replied. + +And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the +gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,--noble, gracious, the friend +of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred? + +The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a +study. + +And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to +these only you will entrust the State. + +Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no one +can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes +over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a +little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in +asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of +the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all +their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful +players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries +and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for +they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; +and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested +to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although +in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees +as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, +not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their +maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter +rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made +useless to the world by the very study which you extol. + +Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong? + +I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion. + +Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right. + +Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from +evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by +us to be of no use to them? + +You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a +parable. + +Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all +accustomed, I suppose. + +I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into +such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be +still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner in +which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no +single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead +their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure +made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which +are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a +captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little +deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation +is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the +steering--every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he +has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or +when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they +are ready to cut in pieces any one who says the contrary. They throng +about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and +if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they +kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the +noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and +take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and +drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected +of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot +for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by +force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able +seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing; +but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky +and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to +be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be +the steerer, whether other people like or not--the possibility of this +union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into +their thoughts or been made part of their calling. Now in vessels which +are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the +true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a +star-gazer, a good-for-nothing? + +Of course, said Adeimantus. + +Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the +figure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State; +for you understand already. + +Certainly. + +Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at +finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities; explain it to him +and try to convince him that their having honour would be far more +extraordinary. + +I will. + +Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless +to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their +uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to +themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by +him--that is not the order of nature; neither are 'the wise to go to the +doors of the rich'--the ingenious author of this saying told a lie--but the +truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the +physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able +to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his +subjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are +of a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, +and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and +star-gazers. + +Precisely so, he said. + +For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest +pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite +faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by +her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you +suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant +rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed. + +Yes. + +And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained? + +True. + +Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also +unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy +any more than the other? + +By all means. + +And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of +the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, +whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an +impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy. + +Yes, that was said. + +Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at +variance with present notions of him? + +Certainly, he said. + +And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of +knowledge is always striving after being--that is his nature; he will not +rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but +will go on--the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire +abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every +essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power +drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having +begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow +truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail. + +Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him. + +And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he +not utterly hate a lie? + +He will. + +And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which +he leads? + +Impossible. + +Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will +follow after? + +True, he replied. + +Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the +philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, +magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you +objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you +leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some +of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved; we +were then led to enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have +now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question +of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true +philosopher. + +Exactly. + +And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why +so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling--I am speaking of those who +were said to be useless but not wicked--and, when we have done with them, +we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they +who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are +unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon +philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which +we speak. + +What are these corruptions? he said. + +I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a +nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a +philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men. + +Rare indeed. + +And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures! + +What causes? + +In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, +and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this +is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the +soul which is the possessor of them. + +That is very singular, he replied. + +Then there are all the ordinary goods of life--beauty, wealth, strength, +rank, and great connections in the State--you understand the sort of +things--these also have a corrupting and distracting effect. + +I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about +them. + +Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then +have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no +longer appear strange to you. + +And how am I to do so? he asked. + +Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, +when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in +proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a +suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to +what is not. + +Very true. + +There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien +conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is +greater. + +Certainly. + +And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are +ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit +of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather +than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any +very great good or very great evil? + +There I think that you are right. + +And our philosopher follows the same analogy--he is like a plant which, +having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, +but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all +weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, +as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that +private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? +Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And +do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and +fashion them after their own hearts? + +When is this accomplished? he said. + +When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a +court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and +there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said +or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and +clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they +are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame--at such a time +will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any +private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of +popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not +have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have--he will +do as they do, and as they are, such will he be? + +Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him. + +And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been +mentioned. + +What is that? + +The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are +aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when +their words are powerless. + +Indeed they do; and in right good earnest. + +Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be +expected to overcome in such an unequal contest? + +None, he replied. + +No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; +there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different +type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which +is supplied by public opinion--I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; +what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would +not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, +whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may +truly say. + +I quite assent, he replied. + +Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation. + +What are you going to say? + +Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and +whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the +opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and +this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the +tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him--he would +learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what +causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his +several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed +or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually +attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his +knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to +teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or +passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that +dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with +the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that +in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he +can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the +necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to +others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is +immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator? + +Indeed he would. + +And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the +tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, +or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For +when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other +work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his +judges when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomede will +oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are +utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions +about the honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were +not? + +No, nor am I likely to hear. + +You recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to +consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the +existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the +absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind? + +Certainly not. + +Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher? + +Impossible. + +And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the +world? + +They must. + +And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them? + +That is evident. + +Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his +calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to +have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence--these were admitted +by us to be the true philosopher's gifts. + +Yes. + +Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among +all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones? + +Certainly, he said. + +And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older +for their own purposes? + +No question. + +Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour and +flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which +he will one day possess. + +That often happens, he said. + +And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, +especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall +proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy +himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and +having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate +himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride? + +To be sure he will. + +Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and +tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be +got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, +he will be easily induced to listen? + +Far otherwise. + +And even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural +reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken +captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that +they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from +his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from +yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to +this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions? + +There can be no doubt of it. + +And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher? + +Impossible. + +Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a +man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy, +no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods +of life? + +We were quite right. + +Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which +I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all +pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this +being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the +greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when +the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer +of any great thing either to individuals or to States. + +That is most true, he said. + +And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for +her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a +false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no +kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon +her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of +her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number +deserve the severest punishment. + +That is certainly what people say. + +Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny +creatures who, seeing this land open to them--a land well stocked with fair +names and showy titles--like prisoners running out of prison into a +sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so +being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, +although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity +about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus +attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and +disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and +crafts. Is not this unavoidable? + +Yes. + +Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of +durance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, +and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who +is left poor and desolate? + +A most exact parallel. + +What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and +bastard? + +There can be no question of it. + +And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make +an alliance with her who is in a rank above them what sort of ideas and +opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating +to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true +wisdom? + +No doubt, he said. + +Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a +small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person, detained by +exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains +devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of +which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the +arts, which they justly despise, and come to her;--or peradventure there +are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle; for everything +in the life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy; but +ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign +is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been +given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted +how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough +of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is +honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight +and be saved. Such an one may be compared to a man who has fallen among +wild beasts--he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither +is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing +that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting +that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to +himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like +one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries +along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind +full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be +pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with +bright hopes. + +Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs. + +A great work--yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to +him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth +and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself. + +The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been +sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has been +shown--is there anything more which you wish to say? + +Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which +of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her. + +Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring +against them--not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and +hence that nature is warped and estranged;--as the exotic seed which is +sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered +and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, +instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if +philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, +then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, +whether natures of men or institutions, are but human;--and now, I know, +that you are going to ask, What that State is: + +No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question-- +whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some +other? + +Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying +before, that some living authority would always be required in the State +having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as +legislator you were laying down the laws. + +That was said, he replied. + +Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing +objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and +difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy. + +What is there remaining? + +The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the +ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard is the +good,' as men say. + +Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be +complete. + +I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a +want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in +what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States +should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit. + +In what manner? + +At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young; beginning +when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from +moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who +are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within +sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take +themselves off. In after life when invited by some one else, they may, +perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for +philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last, +when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than +Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never light up again. (Heraclitus said +that the sun was extinguished every evening and relighted every morning.) + +But what ought to be their course? + +Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy +they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period +while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care +should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the +service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, +let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our +citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range +at will and engage in no serious labour, as we intend them to live happily +here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another. + +How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet +most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more +earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; +Thrasymachus least of all. + +Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have +recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I +shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other +men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live +again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence. + +You are speaking of a time which is not very near. + +Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with +eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; +for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they +have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words +artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural +unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far +as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue--such a man ruling +in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one +nor many of them--do you think that they ever did? + +No indeed. + +No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble +sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in +their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look +coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and +strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society. + +They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak. + +And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us +to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States +nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of +philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially +compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a +like necessity be laid on the State to obey them; or until kings, or if not +kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love +of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are +impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be +justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right? + +Quite right. + +If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some +foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected +philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior +power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, +that this our constitution has been, and is--yea, and will be whenever the +Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that +there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves. + +My opinion agrees with yours, he said. + +But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude? + +I should imagine not, he replied. + +O my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their +minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of +soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show them +your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now +doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of +whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed--if they view him in +this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in +another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is +himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is +no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper +may be found but not in the majority of mankind. + +I quite agree with you, he said. + +And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many +entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in +uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who +make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing +can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this. + +It is most unbecoming. + +For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time +to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and +envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed +and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, +but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to +these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating +that with which he holds reverential converse? + +Impossible. + +And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly +and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every one else, he +will suffer from detraction. + +Of course. + +And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but +human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which +he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful artificer of +justice, temperance, and every civil virtue? + +Anything but unskilful. + +And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, +will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell +them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who +imitate the heavenly pattern? + +They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they draw +out the plan of which you are speaking? + +They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as +from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. +This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the +difference between them and every other legislator,--they will have nothing +to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until +they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface. + +They will be very right, he said. + +Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the +constitution? + +No doubt. + +And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn +their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at +absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; +and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a +man; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when +existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God. + +Very true, he said. + +And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they +have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of +God? + +Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture. + +And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as +rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is +such an one as we are praising; at whom they were so very indignant because +to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a little calmer +at what they have just heard? + +Much calmer, if there is any sense in them. + +Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt +that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being? + +They would not be so unreasonable. + +Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the +highest good? + +Neither can they doubt this. + +But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable +circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or +will they prefer those whom we have rejected? + +Surely not. + +Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear +rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our +imaginary State ever be realized? + +I think that they will be less angry. + +Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and +that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, +cannot refuse to come to terms? + +By all means, he said. + +Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any +one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who +are by nature philosophers? + +Surely no man, he said. + +And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of +necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by +us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape-- +who will venture to affirm this? + +Who indeed! + +But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to +his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which +the world is so incredulous. + +Yes, one is enough. + +The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been +describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them? + +Certainly. + +And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or +impossibility? + +I think not. + +But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if +only possible, is assuredly for the best. + +We have. + +And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be +for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not +impossible. + +Very good. + +And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more +remains to be discussed;--how and by what studies and pursuits will the +saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply +themselves to their several studies? + +Certainly. + +I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the +procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew +that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of +attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for +I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now +disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from +the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were +to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, +and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment +were to lose their patriotism--he was to be rejected who failed, but he who +always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be +made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. +This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument +turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has +now arisen. + +I perfectly remember, he said. + +Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word; but +now let me dare to say--that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher. + +Yes, he said, let that be affirmed. + +And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which +were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly +found in shreds and patches. + +What do you mean? he said. + +You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, +cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that +persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and +magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a +peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and +all solid principle goes out of them. + +Very true, he said. + +On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended +upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally +immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid +state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil. + +Quite true. + +And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom +the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office +or command. + +Certainly, he said. + +And will they be a class which is rarely found? + +Yes, indeed. + +Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and +pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation +which we did not mention--he must be exercised also in many kinds of +knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of +all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises. + +Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by +the highest of all knowledge? + +You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and +distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and +wisdom? + +Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more. + +And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of +them? + +To what do you refer? + +We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in +their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end +of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition +of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied +that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was +continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you +were satisfied or not, it is for you to say. + +Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair +measure of truth. + +But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls +short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the +measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think +that they need search no further. + +Not an uncommon case when people are indolent. + +Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State +and of the laws. + +True. + +The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and +toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the +highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper +calling. + +What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this--higher than +justice and the other virtues? + +Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the +outline merely, as at present--nothing short of the most finished picture +should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of +pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost +clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths +worthy of attaining the highest accuracy! + +A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking +you what is this highest knowledge? + +Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the +answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather +think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told +that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things +become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly +be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you +have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other +knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think +that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not +possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no +knowledge of beauty and goodness? + +Assuredly not. + +You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but +the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge? + +Yes. + +And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by +knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good? + +How ridiculous! + +Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of +the good, and then presume our knowledge of it--for the good they define to +be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the +term 'good'--this is of course ridiculous. + +Most true, he said. + +And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they +are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good. + +Certainly. + +And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same? + +True. + +There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this +question is involved. + +There can be none. + +Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to +be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied +with the appearance of good--the reality is what they seek; in the case of +the good, appearance is despised by every one. + +Very true, he said. + +Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his +actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet +hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance +of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in +other things,--of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men +in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of +ignorance? + +Certainly not, he said. + +I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just +are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that +no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them. + +That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours. + +And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be +perfectly ordered? + +Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you +conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or +different from either? + +Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would +not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters. + +True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime +in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of +others, and never telling his own. + +Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know? + +Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to +do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion. + +And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best +of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion +without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the +road? + +Very true. + +And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others +will tell you of brightness and beauty? + +Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as +you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the +good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other +virtues, we shall be satisfied. + +Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot +help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring +ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the +actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be +an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest +him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear-- +otherwise, not. + +By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our +debt for the account of the parent. + +I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account +of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this +latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not +render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you. + +Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed. + +Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind +you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many +other times. + +What? + +The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of +other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many' +is applied. + +True, he said. + +And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things +to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be +brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each. + +Very true. + +The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but +not seen. + +Exactly. + +And what is the organ with which we see the visible things? + +The sight, he said. + +And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive +the other objects of sense? + +True. + +But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex +piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived? + +No, I never have, he said. + +Then reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature +in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard? + +Nothing of the sort. + +No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other +senses--you would not say that any of them requires such an addition? + +Certainly not. + +But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no +seeing or being seen? + +How do you mean? + +Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to +see; colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third +nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see +nothing and the colours will be invisible. + +Of what nature are you speaking? + +Of that which you term light, I replied. + +True, he said. + +Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and +great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is +their bond, and light is no ignoble thing? + +Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble. + +And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this +element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the +visible to appear? + +You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say. + +May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows? + +How? + +Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun? + +No. + +Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun? + +By far the most like. + +And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is +dispensed from the sun? + +Exactly. + +Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by +sight? + +True, he said. + +And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in +his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the +things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to +mind and the things of mind: + +Will you be a little more explicit? he said. + +Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards +objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and +stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness +of vision in them? + +Very true. + +But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they +see clearly and there is sight in them? + +Certainly. + +And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and +being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with +intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and +perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first +of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence? + +Just so. + +Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the +knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will +deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter +becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and +knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more +beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight +may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this +other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not +the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher. + +What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of +science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot +mean to say that pleasure is the good? + +God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another +point of view? + +In what point of view? + +You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of +visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and +growth, though he himself is not generation? + +Certainly. + +In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge +to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is +not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power. + +Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how +amazing! + +Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me +utter my fancies. + +And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is +anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun. + +Yes, I said, there is a great deal more. + +Then omit nothing, however slight. + +I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have +to be omitted. + +I hope not, he said. + +You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one +of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I +do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name +('ourhanoz, orhatoz'). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the +visible and intelligible fixed in your mind? + +I have. + +Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each +of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to +answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then +compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of +clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the +visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, +shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth +and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand? + +Yes, I understand. + +Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to +include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made. + +Very good. + +Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different +degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of +opinion is to the sphere of knowledge? + +Most undoubtedly. + +Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual +is to be divided. + +In what manner? + +Thus:--There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the +figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be +hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the +other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and +goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images +as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas +themselves. + +I do not quite understand your meaning, he said. + +Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some +preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, +and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and +three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; +these are their hypotheses, which they and every body are supposed to know, +and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to +themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive +at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion? + +Yes, he said, I know. + +And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms +and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals +which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the +absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on--the forms which they +draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, +are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold +the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind? + +That is true. + +And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after +it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first +principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, +but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in +their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and +reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value. + +I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry +and the sister arts. + +And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will +understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself +attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first +principles, but only as hypotheses--that is to say, as steps and points of +departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may +soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this +and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends +again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, +and in ideas she ends. + +I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be +describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I +understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of +dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they +are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also +contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because +they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who +contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, +although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the +higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the +cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not +reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason. + +You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to +these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul--reason +answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or +conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last--and let +there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties +have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth. + +I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement. + + +BOOK VII. + +And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened +or unenlightened:--Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which +has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here +they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained +so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by +the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is +blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a +raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, +like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which +they show the puppets. + +I see. + +And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of +vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and +various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, +others silent. + +You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners. + +Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the +shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the +cave? + +True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were +never allowed to move their heads? + +And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only +see the shadows? + +Yes, he said. + +And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose +that they were naming what was actually before them? + +Very true. + +And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other +side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that +the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow? + +No question, he replied. + +To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of +the images. + +That is certain. + +And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are +released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is +liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and +walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will +distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his +former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to +him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is +approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real +existence, he has a clearer vision,--what will be his reply? And you may +further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass +and requiring him to name them,--will he not be perplexed? Will he not +fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects +which are now shown to him? + +Far truer. + +And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a +pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the +objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in +reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him? + +True, he said. + +And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged +ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun +himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches +the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything +at all of what are now called realities. + +Not all in a moment, he said. + +He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And +first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other +objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze +upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he +will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of +the sun by day? + +Certainly. + +Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him +in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in +another; and he will contemplate him as he is. + +Certainly. + +He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the +years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a +certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been +accustomed to behold? + +Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him. + +And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and +his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself +on the change, and pity them? + +Certainly, he would. + +And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on +those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which +of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and +who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you +think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the +possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, + +'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,' + +and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their +manner? + +Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain +these false notions and live in this miserable manner. + +Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be +replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes +full of darkness? + +To be sure, he said. + +And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows +with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was +still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would +be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), +would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down +he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of +ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the +light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death. + +No question, he said. + +This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the +previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the +fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the +journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world +according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed-- +whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my +opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of +all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to +be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light +and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of +reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which +he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his +eye fixed. + +I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you. + +Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this +beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls +are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which +desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted. + +Yes, very natural. + +And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine +contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a +ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become +accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts +of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of +justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have +never yet seen absolute justice? + +Anything but surprising, he replied. + +Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the +eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of +the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, +quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees +any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; +he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter +life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having +turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will +count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity +the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from +below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh +which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den. + +That, he said, is a very just distinction. + +But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when +they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there +before, like sight into blind eyes. + +They undoubtedly say this, he replied. + +Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists +in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from +darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of +knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the +world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the +sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, +of the good. + +Very true. + +And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest +and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists +already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away +from the truth? + +Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed. + +And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to +bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be +implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than +anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this +conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, +hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence +flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue--how eager he is, how clearly +his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but +his keen eye-sight is forced into the service of evil, and he is +mischievous in proportion to his cleverness? + +Very true, he said. + +But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of +their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such +as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them +at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls +upon the things that are below--if, I say, they had been released from +these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same +faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their +eyes are turned to now. + +Very likely. + +Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a +necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and +uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their +education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they +have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private +as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except +upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the +islands of the blest. + +Very true, he replied. + +Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be +to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already +shown to be the greatest of all--they must continue to ascend until they +arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not +allow them to do as they do now. + +What do you mean? + +I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; +they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and +partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not. + +But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when +they might have a better? + +You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the +legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy +above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the +citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of +the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created +them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the +State. + +True, he said, I had forgotten. + +Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our +philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to +them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in +the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their +own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being +self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture +which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to +be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and +have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been +educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore +each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground +abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the +habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the +den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they +represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their +truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a reality, and not +a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other +States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are +distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. +Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant +to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in +which they are most eager, the worst. + +Quite true, he replied. + +And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the +toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their +time with one another in the heavenly light? + +Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we +impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them +will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our +present rulers of State. + +Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for +your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then +you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, +will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue +and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to +the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own +private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, +order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the +civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers +themselves and of the whole State. + +Most true, he replied. + +And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is +that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other? + +Indeed, I do not, he said. + +And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, +there will be rival lovers, and they will fight. + +No question. + +Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will +be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is +best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another +and a better life than that of politics? + +They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied. + +And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and +how they are to be brought from darkness to light,--as some are said to +have ascended from the world below to the gods? + +By all means, he replied. + +The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell (In +allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an +oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side +uppermost.), but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is +little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from +below, which we affirm to be true philosophy? + +Quite so. + +And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting +such a change? + +Certainly. + +What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to +being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will +remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes? + +Yes, that was said. + +Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality? + +What quality? + +Usefulness in war. + +Yes, if possible. + +There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not? + +Just so. + +There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, +and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and +corruption? + +True. + +Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover? + +No. + +But what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent into +our former scheme? + +Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, and +trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them +harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the +words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm +and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that +good which you are now seeking. + +You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there +certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, +my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts +were reckoned mean by us? + +Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are +also excluded, what remains? + +Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then +we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal +application. + +What may that be? + +A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, +and which every one first has to learn among the elements of education. + +What is that? + +The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three--in a word, number +and calculation:--do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them? + +Yes. + +Then the art of war partakes of them? + +To be sure. + +Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon +ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares +that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array +the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been +numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been +incapable of counting his own feet--how could he if he was ignorant of +number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been? + +I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say. + +Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic? + +Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of +military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at +all. + +I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this +study? + +What is your notion? + +It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which +leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the +true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being. + +Will you explain your meaning? he said. + +I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and say +'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of +knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer +proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them. + +Explain, he said. + +I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not +invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the +case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is +imperatively demanded. + +You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are +imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade. + +No, I said, that is not at all my meaning. + +Then what is your meaning? + +When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from +one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this +latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or +near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its +opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer:--here are three +fingers--a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger. + +Very good. + +You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point. + +What is it? + +Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the +extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin--it makes no +difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not +compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight +never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger. + +True. + +And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which +invites or excites intelligence. + +There is not, he said. + +But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? +Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the +circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the +extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the +qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the +other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not +their mode of operation on this wise--the sense which is concerned with the +quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of +softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be +both hard and soft? + +You are quite right, he said. + +And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives +of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and +heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, +light? + +Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious +and require to be explained. + +Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her +aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several +objects announced to her are one or two. + +True. + +And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different? + +Certainly. + +And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a +state of division, for if there were undivided they could only be conceived +of as one? + +True. + +The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused +manner; they were not distinguished. + +Yes. + +Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled +to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not +confused. + +Very true. + +Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is +small?' + +Exactly so. + +And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible. + +Most true. + +This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the +intellect, or the reverse--those which are simultaneous with opposite +impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not. + +I understand, he said, and agree with you. + +And to which class do unity and number belong? + +I do not know, he replied. + +Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the +answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or +by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, +there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there is some +contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves +the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, +and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks 'What is +absolute unity?' This is the way in which the study of the one has a power +of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being. + +And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the +same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude? + +Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number? + +Certainly. + +And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number? + +Yes. + +And they appear to lead the mind towards truth? + +Yes, in a very remarkable manner. + +Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a +double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the +art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the +philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay +hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician. + +That is true. + +And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher? + +Certainly. + +Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and +we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our +State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on +the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor +again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, +but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and +because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth +and being. + +That is excellent, he said. + +Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the +science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued +in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper! + +How do you mean? + +I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating +effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling +against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. +You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who +attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you +divide, they multiply (Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number +because they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is +regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one +continue to be units.), taking care that one shall continue one and not +become lost in fractions. + +That is very true. + +Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these +wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, +there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, +indivisible,--what would they answer? + +They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those +numbers which can only be realized in thought. + +Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, +necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the +attainment of pure truth? + +Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it. + +And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for +calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even +the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may +derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they +would otherwise have been. + +Very true, he said. + +And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many +as difficult. + +You will not. + +And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the +best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up. + +I agree. + +Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we +enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us? + +You mean geometry? + +Exactly so. + +Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates +to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or +extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in +actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a +general is or is not a geometrician. + +Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or +calculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater and +more advanced part of geometry--whether that tends in any degree to make +more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all +things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, +where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to +behold. + +True, he said. + +Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming +only, it does not concern us? + +Yes, that is what we assert. + +Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that +such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary +language of geometricians. + +How so? + +They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and +ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like-- +they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas +knowledge is the real object of the whole science. + +Certainly, he said. + +Then must not a further admission be made? + +What admission? + +That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and +not of aught perishing and transient. + +That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true. + +Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and +create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily +allowed to fall down. + +Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect. + +Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of +your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science +has indirect effects, which are not small. + +Of what kind? he said. + +There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all +departments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied +geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not. + +Yes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them. + +Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth +will study? + +Let us do so, he replied. + +And suppose we make astronomy the third--what do you say? + +I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and +of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer +or sailor. + +I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard +against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit +the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul +which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and +re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for +by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one +class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a +revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who +will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit +which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at +once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very +likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the +argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to +others any benefit which they may receive. + +I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own +behalf. + +Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the +sciences. + +What was the mistake? he said. + +After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, +instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension +the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to +have followed. + +That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these +subjects. + +Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:--in the first place, no government +patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and +they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless +they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if +he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would +not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State +became the director of these studies and gave honour to them; then +disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest +search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they +are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none +of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their +way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the +State, they would some day emerge into light. + +Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly +understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of +plane surfaces? + +Yes, I said. + +And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward? + +Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid +geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over +this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids. + +True, he said. + +Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if +encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth. + +The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar +manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in +your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy +compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another. + +Every one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not +to me. + +And what then would you say? + +I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear +to me to make us look downwards and not upwards. + +What do you mean? he asked. + +You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our +knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to +throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think +that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very +likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge +only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, +and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to +learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing +of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not +upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he +floats, or only lies on his back. + +I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like +to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to +that knowledge of which we are speaking? + +I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon +a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of +visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions +of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each +other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true +number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by +reason and intelligence, but not by sight. + +True, he replied. + +The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that +higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures +excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, +which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would +appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream +of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, +or the truth of any other proportion. + +No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous. + +And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the +movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in +heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But +he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to +the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one +another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be +eternal and subject to no deviation--that would be absurd; and it is +equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth. + +I quite agree, though I never thought of this before. + +Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and +let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and +so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use. + +That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers. + +Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar +extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But can +you tell me of any other suitable study? + +No, he said, not without thinking. + +Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious +enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I +imagine, which may be left to wiser persons. + +But where are the two? + +There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already +named. + +And what may that be? + +The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first +is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at +the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister +sciences--as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them? + +Yes, he replied. + +But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and +learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other +applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight +of our own higher object. + +What is that? + +There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our +pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that +they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably +know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds +and consonances which are heard only, and their labour, like that of the +astronomers, is in vain. + +Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking +about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close +alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their +neighbour's wall--one set of them declaring that they distinguish an +intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the +unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed +into the same--either party setting their ears before their understanding. + +You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and +rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and +speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make +accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to +sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these +are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was +just now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in error, +like the astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which +are heard, but they never attain to problems--that is to say, they never +reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are +harmonious and others not. + +That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge. + +A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought +after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other +spirit, useless. + +Very true, he said. + +Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and +connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual +affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have +a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them. + +I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work. + +What do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all +this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For +you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician? + +Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was +capable of reasoning. + +But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will +have the knowledge which we require of them? + +Neither can this be supposed. + +And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. +This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty +of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may +remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and +stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a +person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, +and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure +intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last +finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight +at the end of the visible. + +Exactly, he said. + +Then this is the progress which you call dialectic? + +True. + +But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from +the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the +underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to +look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to +perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water (which are +divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast +by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image)--this +power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation +of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising +of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that +which is brightest in the material and visible world--this power is given, +as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been +described. + +I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, +yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, +is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be +discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or +false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or +preamble to the chief strain (A play upon the Greek word, which means both +'law' and 'strain.'), and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is +the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths +which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest. + +Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I +would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute +truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not +have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen +something like reality; of that I am confident. + +Doubtless, he replied. + +But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal +this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences. + +Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last. + +And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of +comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining +what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned +with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to +production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions +and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were +saying, have some apprehension of true being--geometry and the like--they +only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so +long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable +to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first +principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also +constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric +of convention can ever become science? + +Impossible, he said. + +Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle +and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make +her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an +outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as +handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have +been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some +other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than +science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But +why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance +to consider? + +Why indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of +the mind with clearness? + +At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for +intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the +second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of +shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; +and so to make a proportion:-- + +As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. +And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding +to the perception of shadows. + +But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of +opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times longer +than this has been. + +As far as I understand, he said, I agree. + +And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who +attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not +possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever +degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? +Will you admit so much? + +Yes, he said; how can I deny it? + +And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person +is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless he +can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not +by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step +of the argument--unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows +neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, +if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science;--dreaming +and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at +the world below, and has his final quietus. + +In all that I should most certainly agree with you. + +And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you +are nurturing and educating--if the ideal ever becomes a reality--you would +not allow the future rulers to be like posts (Literally 'lines,' probably +the starting-point of a race-course.), having no reason in them, and yet to +be set in authority over the highest matters? + +Certainly not. + +Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will +enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions? + +Yes, he said, you and I together will make it. + +Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, +and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher--the nature of +knowledge can no further go? + +I agree, he said. + +But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be +assigned, are questions which remain to be considered. + +Yes, clearly. + +You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before? + +Certainly, he said. + +The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to +the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having +noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which +will facilitate their education. + +And what are these? + +Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more +often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of +gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared +with the body. + +Very true, he replied. + +Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an +unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will never +be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all +the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him. + +Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts. + +The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no +vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has +fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not +bastards. + +What do you mean? + +In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry-- +I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for +example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other +bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning +or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself +may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness. + +Certainly, he said. + +And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame +which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and +others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and +does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and +has no shame at being detected? + +To be sure. + +And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every +other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and +the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities states and +individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, and the +individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is +in a figure lame or a bastard. + +That is very true, he said. + +All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if +only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training +are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say +against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the +State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will +happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy +than she has to endure at present. + +That would not be creditable. + +Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I +am equally ridiculous. + +In what respect? + +I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much +excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot +of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her +disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement. + +Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so. + +But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you +that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so +in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows +old may learn many things--for he can no more learn much than he can run +much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil. + +Of course. + +And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of +instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to +the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system +of education. + +Why not? + +Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge +of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; +but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the +mind. + +Very true. + +Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early +education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out +the natural bent. + +That is a very rational notion, he said. + +Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle +on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought +close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them? + +Yes, I remember. + +The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things--labours, +lessons, dangers--and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be +enrolled in a select number. + +At what age? + +At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of +two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any +other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the +trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important +tests to which our youth are subjected. + +Certainly, he replied. + +After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old +will be promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they learned +without any order in their early education will now be brought together, +and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one +another and to true being. + +Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root. + +Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of +dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical. + +I agree with you, he said. + +These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who have +most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their learning, +and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at +the age of thirty have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and +elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove them by the help of +dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of +sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute +being: And here, my friend, great caution is required. + +Why great caution? + +Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has +introduced? + +What evil? he said. + +The students of the art are filled with lawlessness. + +Quite true, he said. + +Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in +their case? or will you make allowance for them? + +In what way make allowance? + +I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who +is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, +and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his +alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to +discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his +flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he +is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall +I guess for you? + +If you please. + +Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely +to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than +the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or +to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey +them in any important matter. + +He will. + +But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish +his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the +flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now +live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were +of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more about +his supposed parents or other relations. + +Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the +disciples of philosophy? + +In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and +honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental +authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them. + +That is true. + +There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and +attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of +right, and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers. + +True. + +Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is +fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and +then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into +believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or just +and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most +valued, do you think that he will still honour and obey them as before? + +Impossible. + +And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore, and +he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other +than that which flatters his desires? + +He cannot. + +And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it? + +Unquestionably. + +Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have +described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable. + +Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable. + +Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens +who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing +them to dialectic. + +Certainly. + +There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for +youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in +their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and +refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, +they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them. + +Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better. + +And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of +many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything +which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and +all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the +world. + +Too true, he said. + +But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such +insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and +not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the +greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing +the honour of the pursuit. + +Very true, he said. + +And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the +disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any +chance aspirant or intruder? + +Very true. + +Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics +and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the +number of years which were passed in bodily exercise--will that be enough? + +Would you say six or four years? he asked. + +Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down +again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which +young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their +experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, +when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm +or flinch. + +And how long is this stage of their lives to last? + +Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, +then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every +action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to +their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the +eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and +behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they +are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of +their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when +their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, +not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a +matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each generation others +like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, +then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the +city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the +Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and +divine. + +You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors +faultless in beauty. + +Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose +that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as +their natures can go. + +There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all +things like the men. + +Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said +about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although +difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been +supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a +State, one or more of them, despising the honours of this present world +which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and +the honour that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest +and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose +principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city? + +How will they proceed? + +They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the +city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their +children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; these they +will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have +given them: and in this way the State and constitution of which we were +speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation +which has such a constitution will gain most. + +Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very +well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being. + +Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image--there +is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him. + +There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that +nothing more need be said. + + +BOOK VIII. + +And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect +State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and +the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best +philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings? + +That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged. + +Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when +appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses +such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing +private, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we +agreed? + +Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of +mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the +other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they +were to take care of themselves and of the whole State. + +True, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us +find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path. + +There is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you had +finished the description of the State: you said that such a State was +good, and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as now +appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man. +And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others were +false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were +four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of the +individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had seen +all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was +the worst of them, we were to consider whether the best was not also the +happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what were the four +forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus +put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way to the +point at which we have now arrived. + +Your recollection, I said, is most exact. + +Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same +position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same +answer which you were about to give me then. + +Yes, if I can, I will, I said. + +I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which +you were speaking. + +That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I +spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and +Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next; +this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with +evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although +very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs +from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not +know, do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a +distinct character. There are lordships and principalities which are +bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of government. But +these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among +barbarians. + +Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government +which exist among them. + +Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, +and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For +we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock,' and not out of +the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale +and draw other things after them? + +Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human +characters. + +Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of +individual minds will also be five? + +Certainly. + +Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we +have already described. + +We have. + +Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the +contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the +oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by +the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to +compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of +pure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And +we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus +advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer +justice. + +Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say. + +Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of +taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin +with the government of honour?--I know of no name for such a government +other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the +like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and +the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to +democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the +city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try +to arrive at a satisfactory decision. + +That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable. + +First, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of +honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, +all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; +a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved. + +Very true, he said. + +In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two +classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one +another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us +'how discord first arose'? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to +play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty +tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest? + +How would they address us? + +After this manner:--A city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken; +but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a +constitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will in time be +dissolved. And this is the dissolution:--In plants that grow in the earth, +as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and +sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of +each are completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short +space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of +human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers +will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an +intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they +will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is +of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number (i.e. a +cyclical number, such as 6, which is equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, +3, so that when the circle or time represented by 6 is completed, the +lesser times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.), but +the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first +increments by involution and evolution (or squared and cubed) obtaining +three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning +numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another. +(Probably the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first = the sides of +the Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5 +cubed, which together = 6 cubed = 216.) The base of these (3) with a third +added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power +furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is a hundred times as +great (400 = 4 x 100) (Or the first a square which is 100 x 100 = 10,000. +The whole number will then be 17,500 = a square of 100, and an oblong of +100 by 75.), and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, +but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters +of a square (i.e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five (7 x 7 = +49 x 100 = 4900), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square +which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by (Or, 'consisting of two +numbers squared upon irrational diameters,' etc. = 100. For other +explanations of the passage see Introduction.) two perfect squares of +irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five = 50 + 50 = +100); and a hundred cubes of three (27 x 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000). +Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the +good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law +of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will +not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be +appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their +fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon +be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by under-valuing +music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men +of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers +will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of +your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and +brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass with +gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and +irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. +This the Muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung, +wherever arising; and this is their answer to us. + +Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly. + +Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak +falsely? + +And what do the Muses say next? + +When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron +and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; +but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches +in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of +things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to +distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved +their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the +condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and they +themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them. + +I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change. + +And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate +between oligarchy and aristocracy? + +Very true. + +Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they +proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the +perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also +have some peculiarities. + +True, he said. + +In the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from +agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of +common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military +training--in all these respects this State will resemble the former. + +True. + +But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no +longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and +in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by +nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon +military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting +wars--this State will be for the most part peculiar. + +Yes. + +Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those +who live in oligarchies; they will have, a fierce secret longing after gold +and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and +treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also +castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend +large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please. + +That is most true, he said. + +And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the +money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the +gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away +like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by +gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true +Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have honoured gymnastic +more than music. + +Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a +mixture of good and evil. + +Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is +predominantly seen,--the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are +due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element. + +Assuredly, he said. + +Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been +described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for +a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most +perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters +of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labour. + +Very true, he replied. + +Now what man answers to this form of government-how did he come into being, +and what is he like? + +I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which +characterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon. + +Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other +respects in which he is very different. + +In what respects? + +He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a +friend of culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such +a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is +too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and +remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of +honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any +ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of +arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase. + +Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy. + +Such an one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets older +he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the +avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having +lost his best guardian. + +Who was that? said Adeimantus. + +Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode +in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life. + +Good, he said. + +Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical +State. + +Exactly. + +His origin is as follows:--He is often the young son of a brave father, who +dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and +offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready +to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble. + +And how does the son come into being? + +The character of the son begins to develope when he hears his mother +complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the +consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when +she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling +and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him +quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, +while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, +and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too +easy-going: adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment +which women are so fond of rehearsing. + +Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are +so like themselves. + +And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be +attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain +to the son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father, or is +wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the +youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and +be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears +and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the +city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies +are honoured and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and +seeing all these things--hearing, too, the words of his father, and having +a nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others +--is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the +rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate +and appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having +kept bad company, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle +point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle +of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious. + +You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly. + +Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type +of character? + +We have. + +Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says, + +'Is set over against another State;' + +or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State. + +By all means. + +I believe that oligarchy follows next in order. + +And what manner of government do you term oligarchy? + +A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have +power and the poor man is deprived of it. + +I understand, he replied. + +Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to +oligarchy arises? + +Yes. + +Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into +the other. + +How? + +The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin +of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or +their wives care about the law? + +Yes, indeed. + +And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the +great mass of the citizens become lovers of money. + +Likely enough. + +And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a +fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are +placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the +other falls. + +True. + +And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, virtue +and the virtuous are dishonoured. + +Clearly. + +And what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is +neglected. + +That is obvious. + +And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers +of trade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and make a +ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man. + +They do so. + +They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the +qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in +another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one +whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the +government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of +arms, if intimidation has not already done their work. + +Very true. + +And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established. + +Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, +and what are the defects of which we were speaking? + +First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think +what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, +and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a +better pilot? + +You mean that they would shipwreck? + +Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything? + +I should imagine so. + +Except a city?--or would you include a city? + +Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the +rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all. + +This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy? + +Clearly. + +And here is another defect which is quite as bad. + +What defect? + +The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one +of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and +always conspiring against one another. + +That, surely, is at least as bad. + +Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are +incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then +they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call +them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as +they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes +them unwilling to pay taxes. + +How discreditable! + +And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too +many callings--they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does +that look well? + +Anything but well. + +There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which +this State first begins to be liable. + +What evil? + +A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet +after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, +being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a +poor, helpless creature. + +Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State. + +The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the +extremes of great wealth and utter poverty. + +True. + +But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was +a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of +citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, +although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift? + +As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift. + +May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in +the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is +of the hive? + +Just so, Socrates. + +And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas +of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others have +dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end +as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are +termed. + +Most true, he said. + +Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that +neighborhood there are hidden away thieves, and cut-purses and robbers of +temples, and all sorts of malefactors. + +Clearly. + +Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers? + +Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler. + +And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be +found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful +to restrain by force? + +Certainly, we may be so bold. + +The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, +ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State? + +True. + +Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may +be many other evils. + +Very likely. + +Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are elected +for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider +the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State. + +By all means. + +Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise? + +How? + +A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he +begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently +he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, +and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been a general or some +other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by +informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the +privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him. + +Nothing more likely. + +And the son has seen and known all this--he is a ruined man, and his fear +has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's +throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean and miserly +savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one likely +to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to +suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and +scimitar? + +Most true, he replied. + +And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on +either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he +compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger +ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but +riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the +acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it. + +Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the +conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one. + +And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth? + +Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the +State out of which oligarchy came. + +Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them. + +Very good. + +First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon +wealth? + +Certainly. + +Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies +his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other +desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable. + +True. + +He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a +purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is +he not a true image of the State which he represents? + +He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as +well as by the State. + +You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said. + +I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a +blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour. + +Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to +this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as of +pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of +life? + +True. + +Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his +rogueries? + +Where must I look? + +You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting +dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan. + +Aye. + +It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a +reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; +not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by +necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his +possessions. + +To be sure. + +Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of +the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what +is not his own. + +Yes, and they will be strong in him too. + +The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not +one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his +inferior ones. + +True. + +For these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people; +yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away +and never come near him. + +I should expect so. + +And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State +for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition; he will +not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening +his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle; +in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his +resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his +money. + +Very true. + +Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to +the oligarchical State? + +There can be no doubt. + +Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be +considered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic +man, and bring him up for judgment. + +That, he said, is our method. + +Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? +Is it not on this wise?--The good at which such a State aims is to become +as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable? + +What then? + +The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to +curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain +by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and +thus increase their own wealth and importance? + +To be sure. + +There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation +cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable +extent; one or the other will be disregarded. + +That is tolerably clear. + +And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and +extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary? + +Yes, often. + +And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully +armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a +third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against +those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are +eager for revolution. + +That is true. + +On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and +pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert +their sting--that is, their money--into some one else who is not on his +guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied +into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in +the State. + +Yes, he said, there are plenty of them--that is certain. + +The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by +restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy: + +What other? + +One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the +citizens to look to their characters:--Let there be a general rule that +every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there +will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we +were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State. + +Yes, they will be greatly lessened. + +At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat +their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young +men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and +idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of +resisting either pleasure or pain. + +Very true. + +They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the +pauper to the cultivation of virtue. + +Yes, quite as indifferent. + +Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers +and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or +on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as +fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe the behaviour +of each other in the very moment of danger--for where danger is, there is +no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich--and very likely the +wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one +who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh-- +when he sees such an one puffing and at his wits'-end, how can he avoid +drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has +the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people +be saying to one another 'Our warriors are not good for much'? + +Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking. + +And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without +may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external +provocation a commotion may arise within--in the same way wherever there is +weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the +occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their +oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls +sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when +there is no external cause. + +Yes, surely. + +And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their +opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder +they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of +government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot. + +Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has +been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to +withdraw. + +And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have +they? for as the government is, such will be the man. + +Clearly, he said. + +In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom +and frankness--a man may say and do what he likes? + +'Tis said so, he replied. + +And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself +his own life as he pleases? + +Clearly. + +Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human +natures? + +There will. + +This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an +embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as +women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most +charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with +the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of +States. + +Yes. + +Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a +government. + +Why? + +Because of the liberty which reigns there--they have a complete assortment +of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have +been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they +sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his +choice, he may found his State. + +He will be sure to have patterns enough. + +And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even +if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or go to war +when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless +you are so disposed--there being no necessity also, because some law +forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office +or be a dicast, if you have a fancy--is not this a way of life which for +the moment is supremely delightful? + +For the moment, yes. + +And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? +Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have +been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about +the world--the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares? + +Yes, he replied, many and many a one. + +See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't care' +about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles +which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city--as when we said +that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never will be +a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of +beauty and make of them a joy and a study--how grandly does she trample all +these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the +pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one who +professes to be the people's friend. + +Yes, she is of a noble spirit. + +These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a +charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a +sort of equality to equals and unequals alike. + +We know her well. + +Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather +consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being. + +Very good, he said. + +Is not this the way--he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father +who has trained him in his own habits? + +Exactly. + +And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of +the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called +unnecessary? + +Obviously. + +Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the +necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures? + +I should. + +Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which +the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, +because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what +is necessary, and cannot help it. + +True. + +We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary? + +We are not. + +And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his +youth upwards--of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some +cases the reverse of good--shall we not be right in saying that all these +are unnecessary? + +Yes, certainly. + +Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a +general notion of them? + +Very good. + +Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in +so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary +class? + +That is what I should suppose. + +The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is +essential to the continuance of life? + +Yes. + +But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for +health? + +Certainly. + +And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other +luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in +youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit +of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary? + +Very true. + +May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money +because they conduce to production? + +Certainly. + +And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good? + +True. + +And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and +desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas +he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical? + +Very true. + +Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical: +the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process. + +What is the process? + +When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in +a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to +associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him +all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure--then, as you may +imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him +into the democratical? + +Inevitably. + +And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an +alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the +young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist +the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that +which is akin and alike? + +Certainly. + +And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, +whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, +then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he +goes to war with himself. + +It must be so. + +And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the +oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a +spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored. + +Yes, he said, that sometimes happens. + +And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones +spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not +know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous. + +Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way. + +They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with +them, breed and multiply in him. + +Very true. + +At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they +perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true +words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, +and are their best guardians and sentinels. + +None better. + +False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their place. + +They are certain to do so. + +And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and +takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent +by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits +shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither allow the +embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel +of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle +and they gain the day, and then modesty, which they call silliness, is +ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they +nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade +men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and +so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the +border. + +Yes, with a will. + +And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in +their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next +thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and +impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and a great +company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; +insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, +and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of his original +nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and +libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures. + +Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough. + +After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on +unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be +fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have +elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over--supposing that he then +re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not +wholly give himself up to their successors--in that case he balances his +pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of +himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and +when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises +none of them but encourages them all equally. + +Very true, he said. + +Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of +advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of +good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to +use and honour some and chastise and master the others--whenever this is +repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and +that one is as good as another. + +Yes, he said; that is the way with him. + +Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; +and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he +becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at +gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more +living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and +starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if +he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or +of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; +and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he +goes on. + +Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality. + +Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of +many;--he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. +And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a +constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him. + +Just so. + +Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the +democratic man. + +Let that be his place, he said. + +Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny +and the tyrant; these we have now to consider. + +Quite true, he said. + +Say then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?--that it has a +democratic origin is evident. + +Clearly. + +And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy +from oligarchy--I mean, after a sort? + +How? + +The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was +maintained was excess of wealth--am I not right? + +Yes. + +And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for +the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy? + +True. + +And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her +to dissolution? + +What good? + +Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of +the State--and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of +nature deign to dwell. + +Yes; the saying is in every body's mouth. + +I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect +of other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a +demand for tyranny. + +How so? + +When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers +presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of +freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful +draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they +are cursed oligarchs. + +Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence. + +Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who +hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like +rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own +heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now, in +such a State, can liberty have any limit? + +Certainly not. + +By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting +among the animals and infecting them. + +How do you mean? + +I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons +and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no +respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, +and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and +the stranger is quite as good as either. + +Yes, he said, that is the way. + +And these are not the only evils, I said--there are several lesser ones: +In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and +the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; +and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with +him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of +pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to be thought morose and +authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young. + +Quite true, he said. + +The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, +whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I +forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to +each other. + +Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips? + +That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does not +know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who +are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State: +for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their +she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with +all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at any body who +comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all +things are just ready to burst with liberty. + +When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. +You and I have dreamed the same thing. + +And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the +citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, +and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written +or unwritten; they will have no one over them. + +Yes, he said, I know it too well. + +Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which +springs tyranny. + +Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step? + +The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified +and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy--the truth being that the +excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite +direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable +and animal life, but above all in forms of government. + +True. + +The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass +into excess of slavery. + +Yes, the natural order. + +And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated +form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty? + +As we might expect. + +That, however, was not, as I believe, your question--you rather desired to +know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and +democracy, and is the ruin of both? + +Just so, he replied. + +Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom +the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the +same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having +stings. + +A very just comparison. + +These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are +generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good +physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to +keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and +if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their +cells cut out as speedily as possible. + +Yes, by all means, he said. + +Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine +democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the +first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there +were in the oligarchical State. + +That is true. + +And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified. + +How so? + +Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from +office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a +democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener +sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer +a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost everything +is managed by the drones. + +Very true, he said. + +Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass. + +What is that? + +They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the +richest. + +Naturally so. + +They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey +to the drones. + +Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little. + +And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them. + +That is pretty much the case, he said. + +The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own +hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, +when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy. + +True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate +unless they get a little honey. + +And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of +their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking +care to reserve the larger part for themselves? + +Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share. + +And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend +themselves before the people as they best can? + +What else can they do? + +And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge +them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy? + +True. + +And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but +through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to +do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; +they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and +breeds revolution in them. + +That is exactly the truth. + +Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another. + +True. + +The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into +greatness. + +Yes, that is their way. + +This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first +appears above ground he is a protector. + +Yes, that is quite clear. + +How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he +does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of +Lycaean Zeus. + +What tale? + +The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim +minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. +Did you never hear it? + +Oh, yes. + +And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his +disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the +favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders +them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips +tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills and others he +banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition +of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either +perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf--that +is, a tyrant? + +Inevitably. + +This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich? + +The same. + +After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a +tyrant full grown. + +That is clear. + +And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a +public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him. + +Yes, he said, that is their usual way. + +Then comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of all +those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career--'Let not the +people's friend,' as they say, 'be lost to them.' + +Exactly. + +The people readily assent; all their fears are for him--they have none for +themselves. + +Very true. + +And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the +people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus, + +'By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a +coward.' + +And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed +again. + +But if he is caught he dies. + +Of course. + +And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not 'larding the +plain' with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in +the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but +tyrant absolute. + +No doubt, he said. + +And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in +which a creature like him is generated. + +Yes, he said, let us consider that. + +At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he +salutes every one whom he meets;--he to be called a tyrant, who is making +promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and +distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so +kind and good to every one! + +Of course, he said. + +But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and +there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war +or other, in order that the people may require a leader. + +To be sure. + +Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by +payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily +wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him? + +Clearly. + +And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and +of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying +them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons +the tyrant must be always getting up a war. + +He must. + +Now he begins to grow unpopular. + +A necessary result. + +Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, +speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of +them cast in his teeth what is being done. + +Yes, that may be expected. + +And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop +while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything. + +He cannot. + +And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is +high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of +them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until +he has made a purgation of the State. + +Yes, he said, and a rare purgation. + +Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the +body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does +the reverse. + +If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself. + +What a blessed alternative, I said:--to be compelled to dwell only with the +many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all! + +Yes, that is the alternative. + +And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites +and the greater devotion in them will he require? + +Certainly. + +And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them? + +They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them. + +By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every +land. + +Yes, he said, there are. + +But will he not desire to get them on the spot? + +How do you mean? + +He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and +enrol them in his body-guard. + +To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all. + +What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death +the others and has these for his trusted friends. + +Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort. + +Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into +existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and +avoid him. + +Of course. + +Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian. + +Why so? + +Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying, + +'Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;' + +and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes +his companions. + +Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other things +of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets. + +And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and +any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our +State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny. + +Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us. + +But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire +voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies +and democracies. + +Very true. + +Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honour--the greatest honour, +as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies; +but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation +fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further. + +True. + +But we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and enquire +how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and +ever-changing army of his. + +If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and +spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, +he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to +impose upon the people. + +And when these fail? + +Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or +female, will be maintained out of his father's estate. + +You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will +maintain him and his companions? + +Yes, he said; they cannot help themselves. + +But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son +ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be +supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle +him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be +the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of +slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that by his +help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and +aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions +depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son +and his undesirable associates. + +By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has +been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will +find that he is weak and his son strong. + +Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat +his father if he opposes him? + +Yes, he will, having first disarmed him. + +Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is +real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying +is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, +has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, +getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest +form of slavery. + +True, he said. + +Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed +the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to +tyranny? + +Yes, quite enough, he said. + + +BOOK IX. + +Last of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, +how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in +happiness or in misery? + +Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining. + +There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered. + +What question? + +I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of +the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be +confused. + +Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission. + +Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand: +Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be +unlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are +controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over +them--either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while in +the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them. + +Which appetites do you mean? + +I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power +is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts +up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and +there is no conceivable folly or crime--not excepting incest or any other +unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food--which at +such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may +not be ready to commit. + +Most true, he said. + +But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to +sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts +and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first +indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to +lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from +interfering with the higher principle--which he leaves in the solitude of +pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the +unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed +the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against any one--I say, when, +after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, +which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains +truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and +lawless visions. + +I quite agree. + +In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I +desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless +wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am +right, and you agree with me. + +Yes, I agree. + +And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. +He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly +parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the +unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament? + +True. + +And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of +people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite +extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a +better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he +halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of +what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner +the democrat was generated out of the oligarch? + +Yes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still. + +And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this +man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's +principles. + +I can imagine him. + +Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has +already happened to the father:--he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life, +which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and friends +take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the +opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-makers find that +they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a master +passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts--a sort of +monstrous winged drone--that is the only image which will adequately +describe him. + +Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him. + +And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands +and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come +buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they +implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul, +having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy: and +if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of +formation, and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these +better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged +away temperance and brought in madness to the full. + +Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated. + +And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant? + +I should not wonder. + +Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant? + +He has. + +And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will +fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods? + +That he will. + +And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when, +either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes +drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so? + +Assuredly. + +Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live? + +Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me. + +I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be +feasts and carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort of +thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the +concerns of his soul. + +That is certain. + +Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and +their demands are many. + +They are indeed, he said. + +His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent. + +True. + +Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property. + +Of course. + +When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like +young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and +especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a +frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his +property, in order that he may gratify them? + +Yes, that is sure to be the case. + +He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and +pangs. + +He must. + +And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the +better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will +claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his +own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs. + +No doubt he will. + +And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to +cheat and deceive them. + +Very true. + +And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them. + +Yes, probably. + +And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? +Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them? + +Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents. + +But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a +harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he +would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very +existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she +is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, +he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most +indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth +who is the reverse of indispensable? + +Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would. + +Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and +mother. + +He is indeed, he replied. + +He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are +beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or +steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a +temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which +gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which +have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of love and share +his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the +laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But +now that he is under the dominion of love, he becomes always and in waking +reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit +the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid +act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, and being +himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance +of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his +associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from +without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by +reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of +his way of life? + +Yes, indeed, he said. + +And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the +people are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or +mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a +war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of +mischief in the city. + +What sort of mischief? + +For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, robbers +of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak +they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes. + +A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in +number. + +Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these +things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come +within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their +followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by +the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the one +who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their +tyrant. + +Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant. + +If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by +beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats +them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans +say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be +their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires. + +Exactly. + +When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this +is their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or +ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are +equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of +affection for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no +more. + +Yes, truly. + +They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of +anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship. + +Certainly not. + +And may we not rightly call such men treacherous? + +No question. + +Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice? + +Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right. + +Let us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he +is the waking reality of what we dreamed. + +Most true. + +And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the +longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes. + +That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer. + +And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most +miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and +truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general? + +Yes, he said, inevitably. + +And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the +democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others? + +Certainly. + +And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to +man? + +To be sure. + +Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city +which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue? + +They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the +other is the very worst. + +There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will +at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their +relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be +panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may +perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into +every corner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our +opinion. + +A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a tyranny +is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest. + +And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I +should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature? +he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the +pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let +him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is +given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt +in the same place with him, and been present at his dally life and known +him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy +attire, and again in the hour of public danger--he shall tell us about the +happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men? + +That again, he said, is a very fair proposal. + +Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have +before now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who will +answer our enquiries. + +By all means. + +Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State; +bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, +will you tell me their respective conditions? + +What do you mean? he asked. + +Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is +governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved? + +No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved. + +And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State? + +Yes, he said, I see that there are--a few; but the people, speaking +generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved. + +Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail? +his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity--the best elements in him are +enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and +maddest. + +Inevitably. + +And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman, or +of a slave? + +He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion. + +And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of +acting voluntarily? + +Utterly incapable. + +And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken +as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly +which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse? + +Certainly. + +And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor? + +Poor. + +And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable? + +True. + +And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear? + +Yes, indeed. + +Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow +and groaning and pain? + +Certainly not. + +And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than +in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires? + +Impossible. + +Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to +be the most miserable of States? + +And I was right, he said. + +Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, +what do you say of him? + +I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men. + +There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong. + +What do you mean? + +I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery. + +Then who is more miserable? + +One of whom I am about to speak. + +Who is that? + +He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has +been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant. + +From what has been said, I gather that you are right. + +Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more +certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this +respecting good and evil is the greatest. + +Very true, he said. + +Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light +upon this subject. + +What is your illustration? + +The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them +you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; +the only difference is that he has more slaves. + +Yes, that is the difference. + +You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their +servants? + +What should they fear? + +Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this? + +Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the +protection of each individual. + +Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some +fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off +by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him--will +he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be +put to death by his slaves? + +Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear. + +The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his +slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much +against his will--he will have to cajole his own servants. + +Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself. + +And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with +neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and +who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life? + +His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere +surrounded and watched by enemies. + +And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound--he +who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of +fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men +in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things +which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman +hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into +foreign parts and sees anything of interest. + +Very true, he said. + +And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own +person--the tyrannical man, I mean--whom you just now decided to be the +most miserable of all--will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of +leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? +He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like +a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in +retirement, but fighting and combating with other men. + +Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact. + +Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a +worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst? + +Certainly. + +He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and +is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the +flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly +unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if +you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is +beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the +State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds? + +Very true, he said. + +Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he +becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more +friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and +cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is +supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as +himself. + +No man of any sense will dispute your words. + +Come then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests +proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in +the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others +follow: there are five of them in all--they are the royal, timocratical, +oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical. + +The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses +coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they +enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery. + +Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston (the +best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that +this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the +worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he +who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his +State? + +Make the proclamation yourself, he said. + +And shall I add, 'whether seen or unseen by gods and men'? + +Let the words be added. + +Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may +also have some weight. + +What is that? + +The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the +individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three +principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration. + +Of what nature? + +It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond; +also three desires and governing powers. + +How do you mean? he said. + +There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another +with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no special name, +but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the extraordinary +strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other +sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also money-loving, +because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money. + +That is true, he said. + +If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were +concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single +notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as +loving gain or money. + +I agree with you. + +Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering +and getting fame? + +True. + +Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious--would the term be +suitable? + +Extremely suitable. + +On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly +directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or +fame. + +Far less. + +'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which we may fitly +apply to that part of the soul? + +Certainly. + +One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, +as may happen? + +Yes. + +Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men--lovers +of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain? + +Exactly. + +And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects? + +Very true. + +Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which +of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and +depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of +honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of +gold and silver? + +True, he said. + +And the lover of honour--what will be his opinion? Will he not think that +the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it +brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him? + +Very true. + +And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other +pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that +pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of +pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea +that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them? + +There can be no doubt of that, he replied. + +Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in +dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or +better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless--how shall we +know who speaks truly? + +I cannot myself tell, he said. + +Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience +and wisdom and reason? + +There cannot be a better, he said. + +Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest +experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of +gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the +pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain? + +The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of +necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood +upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity +tasted--or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have +tasted--the sweetness of learning and knowing truth. + +Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for +he has a double experience? + +Yes, very great. + +Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover +of honour of the pleasures of wisdom? + +Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their +object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have +their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour they all have +experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found +in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only. + +His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one? + +Far better. + +And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience? + +Certainly. + +Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not +possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher? + +What faculty? + +Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest. + +Yes. + +And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument? + +Certainly. + +If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the +lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy? + +Assuredly. + +Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the +ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest? + +Clearly. + +But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges-- + +The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are +approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest. + +And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part +of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this +is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life. + +Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he +approves of his own life. + +And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the +pleasure which is next? + +Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to himself +than the money-maker. + +Last comes the lover of gain? + +Very true, he said. + +Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this +conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian +Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that +of the wise is quite true and pure--all others are a shadow only; and +surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls? + +Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself? + +I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions. + +Proceed. + +Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain? + +True. + +And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain? + +There is. + +A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about +either--that is what you mean? + +Yes. + +You remember what people say when they are sick? + +What do they say? + +That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew +this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill. + +Yes, I know, he said. + +And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them +say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain? + +I have. + +And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and +cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as +the greatest pleasure? + +Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest. + +Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be +painful? + +Doubtless, he said. + +Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain? + +So it would seem. + +But can that which is neither become both? + +I should say not. + +And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not? + +Yes. + +But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, and +in a mean between them? + +Yes. + +How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is +pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain? + +Impossible. + +This then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest +is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful +in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when +tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition? + +That is the inference. + +Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you +will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is +only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure. + +What are they, he said, and where shall I find them? + +There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell, which +are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and +when they depart leave no pain behind them. + +Most true, he said. + +Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation +of pain, or pain of pleasure. + +No. + +Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through +the body are generally of this sort--they are reliefs of pain. + +That is true. + +And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature? + +Yes. + +Shall I give you an illustration of them? + +Let me hear. + +You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and +middle region? + +I should. + +And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he +not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and +sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper +region, if he has never seen the true upper world? + +To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise? + +But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that +he was descending? + +No doubt. + +All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and +lower regions? + +Yes. + +Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as +they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas +about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are +only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain +which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away from +pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they +have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, +err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting +black with grey instead of white--can you wonder, I say, at this? + +No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite. + +Look at the matter thus:--Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of +the bodily state? + +Yes. + +And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul? + +True. + +And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either? + +Certainly. + +And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which +has more existence the truer? + +Clearly, from that which has more. + +What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your +judgment--those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of +sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and +knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question +in this way:--Which has a more pure being--that which is concerned with the +invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is +found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the +variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal? + +Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the +invariable. + +And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same +degree as of essence? + +Yes, of knowledge in the same degree. + +And of truth in the same degree? + +Yes. + +And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of +essence? + +Necessarily. + +Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the +body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of +the soul? + +Far less. + +And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul? + +Yes. + +What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real +existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real +existence and is less real? + +Of course. + +And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to +nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more +really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in +less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will +participate in an illusory and less real pleasure? + +Unquestionably. + +Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with +gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in +this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into +the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find +their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste +of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking +down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, +they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these +delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are +made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. +For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part +of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent. + +Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an +oracle. + +Their pleasures are mixed with pains--how can they be otherwise? For they +are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, +which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of +fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as +Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy +in ignorance of the truth. + +Something of that sort must inevitably happen. + +And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the +soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be +in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and +contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour +and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense? + +Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also. + +Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, +when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of +reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom +shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which +is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have +the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one +is also most natural to him? + +Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural. + +And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is +no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own +business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they +are capable? + +Exactly. + +But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining +its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is +a shadow only and which is not their own? + +True. + +And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and +reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure? + +Yes. + +And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from +law and order? + +Clearly. + +And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest +distance? Yes. + +And the royal and orderly desires are nearest? + +Yes. + +Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural +pleasure, and the king at the least? + +Certainly. + +But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most +pleasantly? + +Inevitably. + +Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them? + +Will you tell me? + +There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the +transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run +away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain +slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his +inferiority can only be expressed in a figure. + +How do you mean? + +I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; +the democrat was in the middle? + +Yes. + +And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image +of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the +oligarch? + +He will. + +And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and +aristocratical? + +Yes, he is third. + +Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number +which is three times three? + +Manifestly. + +The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length +will be a plane figure. + +Certainly. + +And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no +difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted +from the king. + +Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum. + +Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by +which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find +him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more +pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval. + +What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which +separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain! + +Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human +life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and +years. (729 NEARLY equals the number of days and nights in the year.) + +Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them. + +Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and +unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and +in beauty and virtue? + +Immeasurably greater. + +Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may +revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one saying that +injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just? + +Yes, that was said. + +Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, +let us have a little conversation with him. + +What shall we say to him? + +Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented +before his eyes. + +Of what sort? + +An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient +mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many +others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one. + +There are said of have been such unions. + +Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, +having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is +able to generate and metamorphose at will. + +You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more +pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you +propose. + +Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, +the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second. + +That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say. + +And now join them, and let the three grow into one. + +That has been accomplished. + +Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that +he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may +believe the beast to be a single human creature. + +I have done so, he said. + +And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature +to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be +right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous +monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve +and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the +mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize +or harmonize them with one another--he ought rather to suffer them to fight +and bite and devour one another. + +Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says. + +To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak +and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most +complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the +many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the +gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be +making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be +uniting the several parts with one another and with himself. + +Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say. + +And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or advantage, +the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover +is wrong and false and ignorant? + +Yes, from every point of view. + +Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not +intentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir,' we will say to him, 'what think you +of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects +the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that +which subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid saying Yes--can +he now? + +Not if he has any regard for my opinion. + +But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: 'Then +how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that +he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine +that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially +if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, +however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say +that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine +being to that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the +necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in +order to compass a worse ruin.' + +Yes, said Glaucon, far worse--I will answer for him. + +Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge +multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large? + +Clearly. + +And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent +element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength? + +Yes. + +And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same +creature, and make a coward of him? + +Very true. + +And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the +spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which +he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be +trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey? + +True, he said. + +And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they +imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable +to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great +study is how to flatter them. + +Such appears to be the reason. + +And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the +best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the +Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, +but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within +him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order +that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends +and equals. + +True, he said. + +And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally +of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over +children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in +them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by +cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian +and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways. + +Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest. + +From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is +profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make +him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness? + +From no point of view at all. + +What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He +who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished +has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler +element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled +by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body +ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as +the soul is more honourable than the body. + +Certainly, he said. + +To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of +his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress +these qualities on his soul and will disregard others? + +Clearly, he said. + +In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so +far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he +will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will +be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby +to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to +preserve the harmony of the soul? + +Certainly he will, if he has true music in him. + +And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony +which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the +foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm? + +Certainly not, he said. + +He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no +disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from +want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or +spend according to his means. + +Very true. + +And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours as +he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or +public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid? + +Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman. + +By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly +will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine +call. + +I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are +the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that +there is such an one anywhere on earth? + +In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he +who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But +whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for +he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any +other. + +I think so, he said. + + +BOOK X. + +Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there +is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry. + +To what do you refer? + +To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be +received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have +been distinguished. + +What do you mean? + +Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to +the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe--but I do not mind +saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the +understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature +is the only antidote to them. + +Explain the purport of your remark. + +Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an +awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, +for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming +tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and +therefore I will speak out. + +Very good, he said. + +Listen to me then, or rather, answer me. + +Put your question. + +Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know. + +A likely thing, then, that I should know. + +Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener. + +Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I +could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself? + +Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a +number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a +corresponding idea or form:--do you understand me? + +I do. + +Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world-- +plenty of them, are there not? + +Yes. + +But there are only two ideas or forms of them--one the idea of a bed, the +other of a table. + +True. + +And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our +use, in accordance with the idea--that is our way of speaking in this and +similar instances--but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could +he? + +Impossible. + +And there is another artist,--I should like to know what you would say of +him. + +Who is he? + +One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen. + +What an extraordinary man! + +Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this +is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and +animals, himself and all other things--the earth and heaven, and the things +which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also. + +He must be a wizard and no mistake. + +Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker +or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things +but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make +them all yourself? + +What way? + +An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might +be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a +mirror round and round--you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, +and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other +things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror. + +Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only. + +Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too +is, as I conceive, just such another--a creator of appearances, is he not? + +Of course. + +But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet +there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed? + +Yes, he said, but not a real bed. + +And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, +not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but +only a particular bed? + +Yes, I did. + +Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, +but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the +work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, +he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth. + +At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking +the truth. + +No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth. + +No wonder. + +Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who +this imitator is? + +If you please. + +Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by +God, as I think that we may say--for no one else can be the maker? + +No. + +There is another which is the work of the carpenter? + +Yes. + +And the work of the painter is a third? + +Yes. + +Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend +them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter? + +Yes, there are three of them. + +God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one +only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be +made by God. + +Why is that? + +Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them +which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal +bed and not the two others. + +Very true, he said. + +God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a +particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which +is essentially and by nature one only. + +So we believe. + +Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed? + +Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the +author of this and of all other things. + +And what shall we say of the carpenter--is not he also the maker of the +bed? + +Yes. + +But would you call the painter a creator and maker? + +Certainly not. + +Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed? + +I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that +which the others make. + +Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an +imitator? + +Certainly, he said. + +And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other +imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth? + +That appears to be so. + +Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?--I +would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which +originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists? + +The latter. + +As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this. + +What do you mean? + +I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely +or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear +different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all +things. + +Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent. + +Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed +to be--an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear--of appearance +or of reality? + +Of appearance. + +Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all +things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an +image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any +other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good +artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his +picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are +looking at a real carpenter. + +Certainly. + +And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the +arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a +higher degree of accuracy than any other man--whoever tells us this, I +think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to +have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought +all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of +knowledge and ignorance and imitation. + +Most true. + +And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is +at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as +vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well +unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can +never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a +similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been +deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works +that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could +easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are +appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the +right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the +many to speak so well? + +The question, he said, should by all means be considered. + +Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well +as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? +Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he +had nothing higher in him? + +I should say not. + +The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in +realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of +himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, +he would prefer to be the theme of them. + +Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and +profit. + +Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any +of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going +to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like +Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads +were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second- +hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, +education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we +may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we say to him, 'if you +are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not +in the third--not an image maker or imitator--and if you are able to +discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, +tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order +of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small +have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a +good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily +boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what +city has anything to say about you?' Is there any city which he might +name? + +I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he +was a legislator. + +Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by +him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive? + +There is not. + +Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, +such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious +men have conceived, which is attributed to him? + +There is absolutely nothing of the kind. + +But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or +teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with +him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was +established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and +whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was +named after him? + +Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, +the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us +laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, +Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was +alive? + +Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that +if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind--if he had +possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator--can you imagine, I say, +that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by +them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, +have only to whisper to their contemporaries: 'You will never be able to +manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be +your ministers of education'--and this ingenious device of theirs has such +an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them +about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of +Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as +rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would +they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have +compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not +stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until +they had got education enough? + +Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true. + +Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with +Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the +truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already +observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing +of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than +he does, and judge only by colours and figures. + +Quite so. + +In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on +the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only +enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and +judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of +military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he +speaks very well--such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by +nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what +a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours +which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose. + +Yes, he said. + +They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; +and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them? + +Exactly. + +Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of +true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right? + +Yes. + +Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an +explanation. + +Proceed. + +Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit? + +Yes. + +And the worker in leather and brass will make them? + +Certainly. + +But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly +even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who +knows how to use them--he knows their right form. + +Most true. + +And may we not say the same of all things? + +What? + +That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which +uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them? + +Yes. + +And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or +inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which +nature or the artist has intended them. + +True. + +Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he +must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop +themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker +which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how +he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions? + +Of course. + +The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and +badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is +told by him? + +True. + +The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the +maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him +who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to +say, whereas the user will have knowledge? + +True. + +But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his +drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being +compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions +about what he should draw? + +Neither. + +Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about +the goodness or badness of his imitations? + +I suppose not. + +The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his +own creations? + +Nay, very much the reverse. + +And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good +or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to +be good to the ignorant multitude? + +Just so. + +Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge +worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or +sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic +verse, are imitators in the highest degree? + +Very true. + +And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be +concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth? + +Certainly. + +And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed? + +What do you mean? + +I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when +seen at a distance? + +True. + +And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and +crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the +illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of +confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human +mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and +other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic. + +True. + +And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of +the human understanding--there is the beauty of them--and the apparent +greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, +but give way before calculation and measure and weight? + +Most true. + +And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational +principle in the soul? + +To be sure. + +And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, +or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent +contradiction? + +True. + +But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible--the same +faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same +thing? + +Very true. + +Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not +the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure? + +True. + +And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to +measure and calculation? + +Certainly. + +And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the +soul? + +No doubt. + +This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that +painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper +work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and +associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, +and that they have no true or healthy aim. + +Exactly. + +The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior +offspring. + +Very true. + +And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing +also, relating in fact to what we term poetry? + +Probably the same would be true of poetry. + +Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; +but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical +imitation is concerned is good or bad. + +By all means. + +We may state the question thus:--Imitation imitates the actions of men, +whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad +result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there +anything more? + +No, there is nothing else. + +But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself-- +or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition +in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and +inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, +for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has +been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar +oppositions occurring at the same moment? + +And we were right, he said. + +Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must +now be supplied. + +What was the omission? + +Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son +or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more +equanimity than another? + +Yes. + +But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help +sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow? + +The latter, he said, is the truer statement. + +Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his +sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone? + +It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not. + +When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he +would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do? + +True. + +There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as +well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his +sorrow? + +True. + +But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same +object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in +him? + +Certainly. + +One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law? + +How do you mean? + +The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we +should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such +things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because +no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of +that which at the moment is most required. + +What is most required? he asked. + +That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have +been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like +children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting +time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to +apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the +cry of sorrow by the healing art. + +Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune. + +Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of +reason? + +Clearly. + +And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles +and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call +irrational, useless, and cowardly? + +Indeed, we may. + +And does not the latter--I mean the rebellious principle--furnish a great +variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, +being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when +imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is +assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they +are strangers. + +Certainly. + +Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, +nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in +the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is +easily imitated? + +Clearly. + +And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, +for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an +inferior degree of truth--in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also +like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and +therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered +State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and +impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have +authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we +maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges +the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but +thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small--he is a +manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth. + +Exactly. + +But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation:-- +the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few +who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing? + +Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say. + +Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage +of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful +hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and +smiting his breast--the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to +sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our +feelings most. + +Yes, of course I know. + +But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we +pride ourselves on the opposite quality--we would fain be quiet and +patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the +recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman. + +Very true, he said. + +Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that +which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person? + +No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable. + +Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view. + +What point of view? + +If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger +and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this +feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and +delighted by the poets;--the better nature in each of us, not having been +sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to +break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that +there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who +comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his +troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be +supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as +I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is +communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has +gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with +difficulty repressed in our own. + +How very true! + +And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which +you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or +indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and +are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;--the case of pity is +repeated;--there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise +a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were +afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having +stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed +unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home. + +Quite true, he said. + +And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of +desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every +action--in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of +drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, +if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue. + +I cannot deny it. + +Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of +Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is +profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you +should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your +whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these +things--they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we +are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of +tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to +the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be +admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed +muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of +mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure +and pain will be the rulers in our State. + +That is most true, he said. + +And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our +defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending +away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; +for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness +or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel +between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the +saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty in the +vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the +'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all'; and there are innumerable +other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us +assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will +only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted +to receive her--we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that +account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much +charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer? + +Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. + +Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon +this condition only--that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some +other metre? + +Certainly. + +And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry +and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them +show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human +life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we +shall surely be the gainers--I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as +a delight? + +Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. + +If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are +enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think +their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the +manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are +inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has +implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and +truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this +argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves +while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish +love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware +that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously +as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the +safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her +seductions and make our words his law. + +Yes, he said, I quite agree with you. + +Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than +appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be +profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under +the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? + +Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any +one else would have been. + +And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which +await virtue. + +What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an +inconceivable greatness. + +Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of +three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with +eternity? + +Say rather 'nothing,' he replied. + +And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather +than of the whole? + +Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask? + +Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and +imperishable? + +He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you +really prepared to maintain this? + +Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too--there is no difficulty in proving +it. + +I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument +of which you make so light. + +Listen then. + +I am attending. + +There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil? + +Yes, he replied. + +Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying +element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good? + +Yes. + +And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia +is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of +corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in +almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease? + +Yes, he said. + +And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at +last wholly dissolves and dies? + +True. + +The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and +if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good +certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor +evil. + +Certainly not. + +If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot +be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is +no destruction? + +That may be assumed. + +Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul? + +Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in +review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. + +But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?--and here do not let us fall +into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is +detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. +Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which +wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we +were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption +attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this +true? + +Yes. + +Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which +exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul +and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from +the body? + +Certainly not. + +And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish +from without through affection of external evil which could not be +destroyed from within by a corruption of its own? + +It is, he replied. + +Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether +staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the +actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness +of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the +body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, +brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by +the badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any +natural infection--this we shall absolutely deny? + +Very true. + +And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of +the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be +dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another? + +Yes, he said, there is reason in that. + +Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains +unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife +put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the +minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to +become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done +to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an +internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed +by any man. + +And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become +more unjust in consequence of death. + +But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul +boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and +unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like +disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take +this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil +has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from +that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others +as the penalty of their deeds? + +Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be +so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather +suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have +the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive--aye, and well +awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of +death. + +True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to +kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the +destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that +of which it was appointed to be the destruction. + +Yes, that can hardly be. + +But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or +external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal? + +Certainly. + +That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls +must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in +number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal +natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in +immortality. + +Very true. + +But this we cannot believe--reason will not allow us--any more than we can +believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and +difference and dissimilarity. + +What do you mean? he said. + +The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of +compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements? + +Certainly not. + +Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are +many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold +her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must +contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then +her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things +which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have +spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must +remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be +compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be +discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and +damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown +over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some +monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold +is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, +Glaucon, not there must we look. + +Where then? + +At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and +converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and +eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly following +this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in +which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of +earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds +upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of this life as they are +termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one +shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the +forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said +enough. + +True, he replied. + +And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have +not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were +saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature +has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do +what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in +addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades. + +Very true. + +And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and +how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to +the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death. + +Certainly not, he said. + +Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument? + +What did I borrow? + +The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: +for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not +possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be +made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be +weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember? + +I should be much to blame if I had forgotten. + +Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the +estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to +be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to +confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what +has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of +appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own. + +The demand, he said, is just. + +In the first place, I said--and this is the first thing which you will have +to give back--the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the +gods. + +Granted. + +And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other +the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning? + +True. + +And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things +at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of +former sins? + +Certainly. + +Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in +poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in +the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have +a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far +as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue? + +Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him. + +And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed? + +Certainly. + +Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just? + +That is my conviction. + +And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and +you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run +well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: +they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking +away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but +the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. +And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every +action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off +the prize which men have to bestow. + +True. + +And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you +were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you +were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in +their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in +marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of +these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater +number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and +look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and +miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and +then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they +will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you +may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. +But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are +true? + +Certainly, he said, what you say is true. + +These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon +the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other +good things which justice of herself provides. + +Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting. + +And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in +comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust +after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust +will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument +owes to them. + +Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear. + +Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus +tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of +Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days +afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of +corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home +to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, +he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He +said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great +company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two +openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were +two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there +were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment +on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the +heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden +by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the +symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and +they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of +the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be +heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls +departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been +given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending +out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven +clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from +a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where +they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and +conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the +things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things +beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those +from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which +they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the +journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing +heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, +would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:--He said that for every +wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a +hundred years--such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the +penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, +there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or +enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for +each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and +the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same +proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children +dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and +parents, and of murderers, there were retributions other and greater far +which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the +spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeus +lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of +some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder +brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The +answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not hither and will never come. +And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves +witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all +our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared +and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides +the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals: they were +just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, +instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable +sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; +and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the +sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head +and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and +dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, +and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were +being taken away to be cast into hell.' And of all the many terrors which +they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of +them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there +was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, +were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. + +Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on +the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the +fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see +from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through +the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, +only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, +and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of +heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and +holds together the circle of the universe, like the under-girders of a +trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which +all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of +steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other +materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the +description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is +quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, +and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit +into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on +their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced +by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The +first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls +are narrower, in the following proportions--the sixth is next to the first +in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh +is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes +the second. The largest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh (or +sun) is brightest; the eighth (or moon) coloured by the reflected light of +the seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in colour like +one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third (Venus) has the +whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in +whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the +whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the +other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the +seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared +to move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third +appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of +Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes +round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form +one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, +three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, +daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets +upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their +voices the harmony of the sirens--Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of +the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with +a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl +or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner +ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and +then with the other. + +When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; +but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he +took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having +mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the +daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and +mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose +your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and +the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a +man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the +responsibility is with the chooser--God is justified.' When the +Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, +and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself +(he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number +which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before +them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls +present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and +of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some +lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and +came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of +famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for +their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the +qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for +the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any +definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, +must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and +the all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and +poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And +here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and +therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every +other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure +he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to +learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and +everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the +bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and +collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when +combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good +and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public +station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all +the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when +conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the +consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is +the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name +of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the +life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For +we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after +death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith +in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of +wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and +similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet +worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the +extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in +all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness. + +And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was +what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses +wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not +undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let +not the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice +came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having +been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole +matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was +fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time +to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and +lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, +instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused +chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of +those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a +well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had +no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, +that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had +never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth +having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to +choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot +was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an +evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world +dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been +moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger +reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to +this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. +Most curious, he said, was the spectacle--sad and laughable and strange; +for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of +a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus +choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to +be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the +soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other +hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which +obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul +of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the +injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was +Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated +human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of +Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist +the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of +Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far +away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting +on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet +to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the +recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went +about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who +had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about +and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that +he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and +that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, +but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed +into one another and into corresponding human natures--the good into the +gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations. + +All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of +their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had +severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of +the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them +within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying +the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried +them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence +without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when +they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of +Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and +then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose +water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain +quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was +necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had +gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and +earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner +of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from +drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the +body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found +himself lying on the pyre. + +And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will +save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely +over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. +Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and +follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is +immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. +Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while +remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to +gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in +this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been +describing. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of The Republic by Plato + +Also see The Republic by Plato, Jowett, Wiretap[repub10x.xxx]150 +We are giving this one a new number so as not to take any credit +away from the wonderful efforts of the Internet Wiretap Etexts. + |