diff options
Diffstat (limited to '14970-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 14970-0.txt | 9914 |
1 files changed, 9914 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/14970-0.txt b/14970-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc182b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/14970-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9914 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Academica + +Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero + +Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970] + +Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient) + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA *** + + + + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team + + + + + +THE + +ACADEMICA OF CICERO. + +_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_ + +BY + +JAMES S. REID, + +M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.) +ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; +ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON. + +LONDON: +MACMILLAN AND CO. +1874 + +[_All Rights reserved_.] + + * * * * * + +TO +THOSE OF HIS PUPILS +WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM +_THE ACADEMICA_, +THIS EDITION +IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED +BY +THE EDITOR. + + * * * * * + +PREFACE. + +Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited +the _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that +of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of +Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of +Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very +deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time. + +This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by +me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its +present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities, +and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the +philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an +attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as +will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final +Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes +have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of +junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the +_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is +scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or +want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such +information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary +history of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books; +next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher +knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to +learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals. + +My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the +edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the +editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition +of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I +have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully +weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original +criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a +text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My +obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my +notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad +Ciceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but +never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of +Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have +introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of +other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any +apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions +of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that +the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical +training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was +better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts +to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The +acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they +are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made +to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the +reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most +important places where the text is doubtful. + +My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students +for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they +ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the +best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best +teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero +must build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material +for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of +the _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in +existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be +done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have +therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other +sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its +appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom +it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to +look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by +means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if +it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that +occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere +reference for an actual quotation. + +As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not +touched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for +an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is +studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable +readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and +have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as +were in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books +chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's +_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any +further description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of +Ritter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition +of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all +teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a +philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have +constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all +of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms. + +Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is +hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing +together much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which +was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the +way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent +hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of +recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with +quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above. +Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan +some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's +writings. + +In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I +cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to +repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than +to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a +great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual +disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University, +and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English +scholarship as compared with that of Germany, + +I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and +omissions from any who are interested in the subject. + +JAMES S. REID. + +CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._ + + * * * * * + +LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK. + +Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica +Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De +Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. = +Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus; +Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De +Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. = +Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad +Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. = +In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. = +In Catilinam. + +Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis; +Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus. + +Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna +Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De +Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. = +Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica. + +Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. = +De Stoicis Repugnantiis. + +Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. = +Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneôn +Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata. + +Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius. + +Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica. + +Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis. + +Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii. + +Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De +Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei. + +Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae. + +Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium. + +Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus. + +Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. = +Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. = +Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar. + +Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. = +Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or +Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg. + +Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung. + +Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie. + +Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. + +Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography. + +Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. = +conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. = +emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. = +especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. = +Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or +omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. = +subjunctive. + +R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis +contexta. + + * * * * * + +THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO. + +INTRODUCTION. + +I. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of +Letters:_ 90--45 B.C. + +It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his +father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent +the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived +that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son +throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young +Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a +corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2] + +Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the +Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens, +whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed +the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the +tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend +of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition +and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception +of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4] +Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius +Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus. +It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend +became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the +Epicurean school.[5] + +At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of +Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively, +the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the +orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of +the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in +the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the +general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till +the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic +circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's +house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not +inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most +accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those +of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8] + +In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the +Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled +from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo, +like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher, +he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory. +Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was +swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to +the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he +abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the +conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever, +and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10] + +We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought +into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent +philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and +important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become +thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each. +His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has +been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later +works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would +be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted +between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there +can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian +ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the +ethical part of Greek philosophy. + +During the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the +study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious +works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this +period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian +party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and +Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of +Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged, +and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually +supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman +Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of +Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence +than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in +defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than +his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of +oratory[13]. + +The whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek +philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and +were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of +Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time +resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero +attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls +him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's +later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and +sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to +Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by +Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18]. +Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all +other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his +instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was +probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated. +Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with +the Epicurean doctrines. + +There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then +at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures +Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic, +was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable +Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who +lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is +probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero +knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently +named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time +unknown to him. + +The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this +period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised +Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later, +when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our +author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in +controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think +with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he +set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially +in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him +as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and +acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a +pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the +philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between +Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many +friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or +less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at +this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in +the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was +unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62. + +The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in +Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the +guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old +friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however, +formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of +philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous +Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than +to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the +Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the +midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a +minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression +of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of +any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and +stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius, +may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers +of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well +acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known +either personally. + +From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins, +Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to +spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to +philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his +letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study +of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period +then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he +kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a +bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time +came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added +such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first +book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C., +afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary +employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus +to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same +time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his +love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the +midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest +for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan +villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be +taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all +things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory +held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed +his intellect, but never his heart. + +The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his +literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which +were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of +his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to +Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his +consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him +reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his +acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure +seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this +time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he +presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes +to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the +endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even +slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find +greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]." +At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates +near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater +emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero +was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore +paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for +every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each +department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his +age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38] +will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied +the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and +Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of +Theopompus[40]. + +The years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares +overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from +exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with +a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that +nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the +year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the +son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace +and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had, +beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the +end of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which +clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the +following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he +therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature, +that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at +those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At +this time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for +evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to +drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at +this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many +distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older +philosophers of the Socratic schools. + +In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much +to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of +Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance +with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate +mention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an +Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at +this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great +Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had +lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state +of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident +there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the +acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the +Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where +Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the +greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and +indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52]. + +The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's +thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He +wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and +anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a προπυλον +at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It +seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient +statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome +inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter +of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in +the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still kept +their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke of +conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show +Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, +who accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56]. +From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with +Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other philosophers, among them +Xeno the friend of Atticus[58]. + +On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical +condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters +which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts +the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De +Republica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant +is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is +himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused +to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious +to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of +Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in +arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about +tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of +books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however, +nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn +became unpleasant[64]. + +As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he +returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter +written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner +returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books." +These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit +than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this +time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to +Sulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_, +and the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were +all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_ +and the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in +the following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace +elsewhere, was written. + +I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as +the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his +life which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I +have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of +philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical +works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he +been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made +by some people on the publication of his first book of the later +period--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the +assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts +throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of +this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a +minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient +authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate +as it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in +my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the +success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the +progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many +feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low +estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of +unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the +present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the +shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise +his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate +his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too +closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance +the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as "an oasis in the +desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship, +and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all +students to free themselves in reading the _Academica_. + +II. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_. + +In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of +philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical +examination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean +and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they +came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age; +Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils +of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but +that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum +by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and +Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put +forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt +to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by +these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning +any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the +assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of +the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that +Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering +opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at +the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free +from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the +_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I +have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the +relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools. + +The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often +insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to +distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical +standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first +problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To +go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_ +as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in +this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and +in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that +absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which +all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most +distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy. + +It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing +was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was +accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both +sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a +conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One +requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this +arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most +opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from +all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most +probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart +from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration, +and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the +diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to +lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In +positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and +disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a +touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar +to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to +Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the +progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to +maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice, +says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a +warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often +depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can +be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of +every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80]. +Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81]. +The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to +defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their +predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom, +that in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view +entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_, +and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former +statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo +hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of +every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic +dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is +only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his +sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of +error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While +professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly +repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth, +has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true. + +Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their +evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that +eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators, +politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the +teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and +Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic +tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most +sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most +respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were +plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was +most estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94]. + +In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we +must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later +philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first. +Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_). +All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as +supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is +equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and +Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or +ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These +were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics +held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many +difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage +in the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much +trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted +the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be +reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the +doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and +Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers, +maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand, +in the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_, +wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The +works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and +Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics +mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase +"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical +resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would +naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so +long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front, +and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a +deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the +fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had +found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero +wrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion +of an exploded and discredited school[96]. + +Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere +of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De +Legibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New +Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be +silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected, +is in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical +systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an +attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the +power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he +calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks +with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands +of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they +should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of +magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a +superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the +barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions, +therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism +than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the +philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The +Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero +agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a +life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be +happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic +and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire) +and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired +even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he +admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104]. +These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but +appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an +ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is +Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt +that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno, +ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however, +regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so +regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference +between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true +and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon +Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in +accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for +while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero +hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were +Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all +emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows, +refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero +was inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between +the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan +Disputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his +works are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_. + +With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively +small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of +philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was, +as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The +religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to +sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of +divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form, +he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It +went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to +oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by +the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the +truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics, +Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose +from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines, +which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious +and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange +oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111]. +Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic +physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of +his notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and +translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that +the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well +aware of the fact. + +Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of +the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully +represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the +author of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112], +and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While +not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for +the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic +family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood +absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they +discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing +but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors +by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely +indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language. + +III. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_. + +It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher, +and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still +absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in +writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The +conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later +philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal +value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it. +Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes +Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps +feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas. +Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have +already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine +which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before +the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This +is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works +(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not +freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time +when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather +than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had +propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been +simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It +would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are +therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of +the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised +no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself. + +When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been +destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to +those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek +speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of +his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time +to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The +doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to +catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean +literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C. +Amafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and +his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large +number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in +Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115]. +Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of +Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various +reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean +physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and +the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in +one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is +exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature +dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the +ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the +Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal +and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of +any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes +of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of +superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a +purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject, +interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has +been, I can treat no farther. + +These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their +uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read +them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question +arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for +omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans. +The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include +the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow +that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to +keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an +obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public. + +In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a +patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach +that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by +the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on +the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was +best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them +of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he +thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to +Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue +than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect +to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only, +he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other +channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman +oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse +were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in +Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory, +which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122]. + +There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he +could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political +inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one +service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise +for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most +prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in +those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125]. +Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and +politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies +as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might +set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such +studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a +life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly, +unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were +ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh +importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were +received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like +the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was +good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that +Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging +the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin. + +Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused +by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder +generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and +many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now +extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to +bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed +to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly +understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then, +which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess, +the _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of +philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an +interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to +present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its +history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at +in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who +contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work +by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek +philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed +worthlessness of the philosophy of his age. + +In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical +and political writings, all or nearly all published before the +_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only +two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded +the _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book, +περι πενθους, and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to philosophy, +or, as it was then called, protreptic. + +For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their +composition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art. +Cicero. + +IV. _History of the Academica_. + +On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C., +Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was +pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134]. +Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book +_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of +composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days +together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the +dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till +nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the +entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A +grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would +crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137]. + +It was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first +trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero +to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his +bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for +historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks +for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the +_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he +had determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would +correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which +Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean +school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι at Athens. The meaning of +the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De Oratore_[140], +where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under +that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the _Academica_ that +in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has +made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder +of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although +he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention in +his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142]. He declares that however +much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not +read the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the +same space of time that he has taken to write them[143]. + +In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near +Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he +afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his +intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the +middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's +death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt +now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum +altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make +the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote +to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ συνταγματα, +words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars, +including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the +_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view +the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the +letters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book +long after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the +hands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it +was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the +_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De +Finibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero +complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the +fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia +having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in +the _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the +_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I +hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having +been finished simultaneously at Astura. + +Another view of the συνταγματα in question is that they are simply the two +books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora Academica_. In my +opinion the word συνταγμα, the use of which to denote a portion of a work +Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural meaning. Cicero uses the +word συνταξις of the whole work[156], while συνταγμα[157], and +συγγραμμα[158], designate definite portions or divisions of a work. I +should be quite content, then, to refer the words of Cicero to the +_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides +that this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_ +(or _de Philosophia_) and the _Priora Academica_ are the compositions in +question. If this conjecture is correct, we have in the disputed passage +the only reference to the _Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters +of Cicero. We are quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and +published before the _Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in +the _Academica Posteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De +Finibus_[160] place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the +_Hortensius_ had been published a sufficiently long time before the _De +Finibus_, to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. +Further, in the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the +_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to +show that the former was finished and given to the world before the latter. +Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the +doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word συνταγμα, which equally +affects the old view maintained by Madvig. + +Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the +_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in +style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the +_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_ +were exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of +Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an +error[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at +Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus +near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there +should be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the +_Lucullus_[163]. + +While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero +sent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De +Finibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to +Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the +_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the +books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant +prooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who +visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity +between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they +were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not +uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity +should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of +statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans +which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I +may note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact +that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one +from Varro[166]. + +On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to +arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of +Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to +go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his +choice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on +his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and +Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter +from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to +Varro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never +been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been +chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw +them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find +room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works +on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with +the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the +_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua +Latino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared +himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise. +From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude +of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years +without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little +of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for +grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since +the _De Finibus_ was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer +to Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of +noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they +possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had +been made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For +them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the +_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the +fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It +happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's +stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his +_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making +the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by +Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased +with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such +minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be +introduced was found impracticable[180]. + +Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had +constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He +frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus, +but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans. +Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work +contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again +before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these +solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to +assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a +letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters. +In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he +wishes it, but you know he is + + δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο. + +So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may +be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a +charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared +Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness. +Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of +the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured +him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how +Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have +repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there +was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance, +and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it +proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that +Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We +find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it +Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not +have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to +have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant +of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being +actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at +Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but +employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187]. + +Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_ +is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole, +to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds, +"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that +the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to +approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and +altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has +all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may +possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what +success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and +adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and +the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after +everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome, +Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro. +He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation +will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to +Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou +wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part +"shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work +had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to +prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another +in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had +just managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated +apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet +Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable +to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take +place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to +approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as +soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time, +then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal +step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my +letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to +hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been +bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them, +but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first +fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan +Disputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into +Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to +ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a +time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From +this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing +the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies +of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of +course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people, +wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every +occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised +edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately +after the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often +subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as +four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is +clear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, Ακαδημικη συνταξις, and +_Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the frequent +appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae Quaestiones_, +found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the _Tusculanae +Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as early as +Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the book was +written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he called +his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that the work +was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum. + +Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the +second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books +are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the +title _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and +his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also +uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_. +Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207]. + +I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the +genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it +was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which +old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A +fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed +to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions. + +a. _The lost dialogue "Catulus."_ + +The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among +those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero +so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was +son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of +father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their +position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of +their connection with Cicero. + +Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the +_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had +received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to +introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in +the _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself +from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of +the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does +nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to +have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be +found in their ατριψια with respect to philosophy[211]. This ατριψια did +not amount to απαιδευσια, or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the +younger the advocate of philosophy in the _Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero +sometimes classes the father and son together as men of literary culture +and perfect masters of Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of +all the passages where the two are mentioned, that no very high value was +placed on the learning of the son[213]. But however slight were the claims +of Catulus the younger to be considered a philosopher, he was closely +linked to Cicero by other ties. During all the most brilliant period of +Cicero's life, Catulus was one of the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his +character, life, and influence are often depicted in even extravagant +language by the orator[214]. He is one of the pillars of the state[215], +Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed with the ancient worthies of +Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law, and asks the people on whom +they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic power concentrated in his +hands, were to die, the people answer with one voice "On you[217]." He +alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the one hand, of the mob, +on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of danger, no favouring +breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or hope, or cause to +swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he be dead, will +ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious in his life, +but fortunate in his death[221]. + +Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were +special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_ +who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the +suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on +Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his +country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to +Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by +bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of +Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so +unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna +held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the +zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224]. +Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of +the two Catuli[225]. + +We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first +edition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each +book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the +passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such +matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of +the contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of +the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The +philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the +younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great +stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the +younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which +Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was +made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had +written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed +date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the +Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60 +B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which +is alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the +arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against +anachronisms. + +The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made +to the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after +more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to +Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between +the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's +views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy. +Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from +indications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the +character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder. + +In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention +his _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was, +says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of +men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second +Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he +appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments. +Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man, +par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any +question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We +are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and +his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from +the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin +historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical +teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234]. +The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his +mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation +in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to +many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his +own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and +was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239]. + +Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the +_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De +Oratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does +not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in +his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular +teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the +poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he +was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero +repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and +the whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no +leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he +had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any +length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and +especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual +communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have +failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and +Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between +Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the +_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation +during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek +literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his +opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus +undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development +of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to +Catulus[248]. + +I now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief +features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced +by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech +must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the +genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with +great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the +older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must +have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic +schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of +the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly +probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic +arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the +πιθανον which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of +Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to +be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the +discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts of +Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of Academicism[253] +seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance of the genuine +Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and ακαταληπτα would be a peculiarly +congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by Lucullus on the way in +which the _probabile_ had been handled appertains to Catulus. The +exposition of the sceptical criticism would naturally be reserved for the +most brilliant and incisive orator of the party--Cicero himself. These +conjectures have the advantage of establishing an intimate connection +between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and the succeeding one of +Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo were mentioned; +Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them, a satisfactory +basis for επιστημη, was already attained by the Carneadean theory of the +πιθανον; whereupon Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus, +that such a basis was provided by the older philosophy, which both +Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central +point or pivot of the discussion. With this arrangement none of the +indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius +upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare statement on the part of the +latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for +the Carneadean πιθανον. One important opinion maintained by Catulus after +Carneades, that the wise man would opine[255] (τον σοφον δοξασειν), seems +another indication of the generally constructive character of his +exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the +dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus. + +Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of +Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it +extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy, +corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica +Posteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of +understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech +could have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica +Posteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as +Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition +of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate +only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the +view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that +Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue +which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and +denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a +historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the +reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to +show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old +Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for +stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We +are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word +_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled +_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from +whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any +allusion. + +The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and +attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been +as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible +for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius +were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of +Antiochus. + +The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the +preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued +the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is +preserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy +by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with +those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore, +reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient +names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to +Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, +Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical +summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη φαντασια and +εννοιαι (which though really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he +found it necessary to "manufacture" (_fabricari_) Latin terms to represent +the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the headlong rashness with +which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a +retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic +schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact that he had not had occasion +to Latinize the terms καταληψις (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the +individual καταληπτικη φαντασια), εναργεια, ‛ορμη, αποδειξις, δογμα, +οικειον, αδηλα, εποχη, nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some +extent in the Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to +translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more +clearly does it appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was +to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy, +and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were +reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly +tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first +day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely introduced in +order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments +must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although +foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary +classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent +to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the +elaborate speech of Cicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or +minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the dogmatic sense +had been attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in +the _Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the +cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and +Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the +discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a +more minute examination in the _Lucullus_. + +One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of +Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point +by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere +as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of +Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by +all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of +dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi +sumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general +New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil +of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's +speech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus. + +In that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus +appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt +that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato +must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus +took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the +Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that +philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius, +however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had +not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an +Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively +secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He +would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276]. +If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the +work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render +it necessary to treat of him farther. + +b. _The "Lucullus."_ + +The day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which +Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa +of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at +Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for +his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little +place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends +lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were +seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the +waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and +quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening +breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia +distant[281]. + +Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly +free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although +when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The +surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom +of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles +which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully +out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and +plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His +intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the +book, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_ +and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of +the _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the +publication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be +seen[285]. + +Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the +conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially +acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly +all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue, +and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have +dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was +directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to +Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the +East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was +found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius +Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several +times mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek +artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters +to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like +Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are +explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard +Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a +reply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its +contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The +same may be said of Cicero's answer. + +In the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no +doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection +with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call +attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in +which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He +was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289]. +Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while +Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the +Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero, +during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both +friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290]. + +c. _The Second Edition._ + +When Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations +were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero +had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of +Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now +laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date +of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is +shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many +allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the +Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the +_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of +the _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not +have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works +an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro, +and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296]. + +For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the +ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact +between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his +philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of +Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his +character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the +two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came +before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in +the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to +read, adding "_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ ελικτα και +ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in +the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks +for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several +passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported +by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in +the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already +seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great +polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to +have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in +the year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this +approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very +different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for +instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all +show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility +in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero. +The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication +of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this +slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301]. + +The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy +from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De +Philosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the +so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288 +philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic +process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on +the _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing +Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition +owes its currency to Müller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua +Latina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that +work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303]. + +The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the +subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more +conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition +preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the +contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition +of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the +historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given +in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an +exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same +as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that +foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had +formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech +of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in +ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1. +Atticus must have been almost a κωφον προσωπον. + +I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old +editions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_. +This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius' +quotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us +nothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth +remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_ +before the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the +subject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the +_Lucullus_. + + * * * * * + +M. TULLII CICERONIS + +ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM + +LIBER PRIMUS. + + * * * * * + +I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a +M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, +continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram +interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et +vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, +paulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus: +atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad +suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis, +ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec +audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse +novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum +cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille: +intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo +opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem +dicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me +politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non +audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti +studium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed +accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante +hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam +sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis +philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, +quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim +cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et +studiis et artibus antecedat. + +II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris. +Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu, +quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam +viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de +nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca +potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis +abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca +intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti +intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim +ipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla +arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil +definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam +denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis +dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri +putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae +docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem +accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si +Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut +Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris, +de corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui? +Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia +ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam +quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit +adducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis +fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum +esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas. +7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid +sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi: +quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum +moventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur, +quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam +argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud +philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum +possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, +maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus +est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a +fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc +docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil +enim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim +peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et +tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, +quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa +dicta dialectice †quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate +quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum +prooemiis †philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus. + +III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe +peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum +deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem +patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu +domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium +divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti, +plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis +attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti +philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum +parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere +malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi +nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca +poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos +Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat +Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum +expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi +Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem, +Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem +sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me +ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed +quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat, +haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo. +Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei +publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii +oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime +aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis +consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si +haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem +noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris +persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem +sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius +tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi +litterarum. + +IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te +ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te +veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho +id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam +nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et +emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu +existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas +Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit, +ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus +scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum +iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus, +inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus. +Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi +vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita +recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum +essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes]. + +15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter +omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes +ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam +communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et +malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione +censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum +_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum +audierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil +adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque +praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil +scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium +sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non +arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea +sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in +hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum +libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem +auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens +duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et +Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum +Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, +duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium +et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti +sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis +instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones +habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis +ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam +quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus +rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. +Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et +rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut +dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem +Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem +videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum +expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio. + +V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non +sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus: +Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque +ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas, +qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus +igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone +philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et +rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid +rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac +primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse +dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum +bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum +expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et +corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in +partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem +sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus +celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam +vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam +ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur. +Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis +esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi +consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione +formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque +absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum, +id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis +ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat +tertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus +animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae +quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem +quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum +hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono +sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum, +ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis +inducitur ratio bonorum. + +VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique +Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum: +illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios +Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum +finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese +expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo +atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia +sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam, +nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad +virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita +et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum +rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae +voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum +magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes +cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque +aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec +quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui, +forma atque descriptio. + +24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in +res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, +ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in +eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque: +neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, +neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse +cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam +nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi +faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum +inauditis. + +VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum +voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine +loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut +physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam +utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas ποιοτητας Graeci +vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum, +atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica: suis +utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut enim nova sunt +rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci +faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis +concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26. Tu vero, +inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos +non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus +ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur +qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius +modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. +Itaque aër--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt: +ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae gignuntur e +terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa dicuntur: e quibus +aër et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi +et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astra +mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi, dissimile +Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine +ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim tractando +usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa +atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari +atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed in suas +partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in +rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur, omnia +intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28. Et +cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro +citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa +effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et +continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla +pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae +insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, +quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29. +quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque +perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, +quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris +ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, +quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem +et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem +fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter +obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. + +VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in +disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, +tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse +iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, +quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi +ιδεαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus +dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec +percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae +essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et +concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia +continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum +opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in +animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa definitiones rerum +probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum +etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita +nominata, quam ετυμολογιαν appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum +notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari +volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis +ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi +adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. +33. Haec erat illis disciplina a Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim +mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico +etiam respondeam. + +IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum +et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo +ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis +quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et +ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, +vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae: +spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in +ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam +fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum +maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et +moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in +ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi +Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates +unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus +acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. +35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret +et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si +videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero, +inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium. + +X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis +inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una +virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret +honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera +autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, +alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. +Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione +dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat, +in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda, +ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea +praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam +rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum, +officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in +bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem +servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non +omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut +more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera +virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo +modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed +ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse +quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non +tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et +efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent, +hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas +perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque +in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem +adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque +iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse +immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus. + +XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis +quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, +non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque +gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo +modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis, +cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero +aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40. +Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de +sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi +impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille φαντασιαν, nos visum appellemus +licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone +saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem +adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et voluntariam. 41. +Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam +haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum +ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos vero, inquit. +Quonam enim modo καταληπτον diceres?--Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum +esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu +prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo +tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova enim +dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum +appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset, +scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam +opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed +inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, +collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli +credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut +supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis +videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia +nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam +scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis +imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad +rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et +ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent +aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat. +Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a +superioribus. + +XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est, +inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse +[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem +veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc +Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis +et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa +discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum +ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen +instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed +earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant +Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis +paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse +dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut +Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis +omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa +esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri +posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia +latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi +posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare +quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu +continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita +res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et +perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod +erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam +plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus +momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio +sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, +si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil +adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, +nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova +nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, +in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae +partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex +Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter +ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate.... + + * * * * * + +ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA. + +EX LIBRO I. + +1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere, +dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur +Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus? + +2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum +similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur. + +EX LIBRO II. + +3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II. +vocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo +etiam aequor illud poetae vocant. + +4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius +honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini +possunt esse. + +5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis +lib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad +imitandum iuventuti. + +6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero +Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere? +cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur +cornua. + +7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare +nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem +aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum.... + +8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ +atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non +regulis. + +9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur +et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_) +adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis, +alius vinulentis ... + +10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim +nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum +cernimus. + +11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam +alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur. + +EX LIBRO III. + +Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_ +prooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._ + +12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper, +depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam +stultissimum dixerit? + +13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib. +III._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus +... + +14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib. +III._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas +ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae. + +15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum +lib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem. + +16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico +tertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent, +sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset +emendatio temeritatis. + +17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem +tertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ §27): †malcho +in opera adfixa. + +18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic. +Academicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, +abesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ §51. + +19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas +alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae +gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ §57. + +EX LIBRO IIII. + +20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis +lib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ §67. + +21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et +columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret, +veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_ +§70. + +22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum +vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non +enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ §100. + +23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia +nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole +conlucet.... = _Lucullus_ §105. + +24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum +lib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem +exanclatum. = _Lucullus_ §108. + +25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic. +Academicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ §109. + +26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc +Anaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ §118. + +27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib. +IIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ §120. + +28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec +ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse +dicat. = _Lucullus_ §121. + +29. Martianus Capella V. §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in +Academicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa +tenebris. = _Lucullus_ §122. + +30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum +lib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in +contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia. += _Lucullus_ §123. + +31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et +confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra +dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ §135. + +Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS. + +32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_): +mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua +ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi. + +33. August. contra Academicos II. §26.: _id probabile vel veri simile +Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ... +Talia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri +similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno. +Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus +haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem +decet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat +Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.] + +34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §15. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius +causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _ +Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes +videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse +sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo, +qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus. + +35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §43. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e. +Academicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi +qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse. + +36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T. +Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi +versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_, +omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo. + + * * * * * + +ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM + +LIBER II. + +I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum +omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus +temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut +enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito +paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor +profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit; +deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis +praemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut +diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad +Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae +de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit +mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui +adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum +in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni +magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter +et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in +rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma +profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum, +verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam +verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in +Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui +quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum +proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere, +credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali +ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles +spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis +mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo +imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus +pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum +maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos +legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis +temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli +institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum +utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque +ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum +victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio +tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in +urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum +in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod +hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio +quam id cum mea laude communicem. + +II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt +et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum +multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim +studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit +quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed +et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei +militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus +otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur +Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et +post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea +saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset. +Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat. + +5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam +etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, +plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum +rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego +autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. +autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante +censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum +Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis +respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari. +Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut +ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro +vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque +amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, +quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis +de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo +operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem +ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non +modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis +prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri +arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus +notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui +in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur, +scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere. + +III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur. +Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret +praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere +quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare: +quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla +contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim +omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis +rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa +antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, +tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati +relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in +utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut +verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se +scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea +vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, +adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod +integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et +quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum +ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde +infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius, +quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad +quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad +saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent +fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare +potuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse +sapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis +etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad +unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare +malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam +sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et +alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa, +quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie +venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus, +quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in +Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in +spatio consedimus. + +IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene +explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea, +quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem, +inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram +servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in +promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille: +Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est +iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde +ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec +ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed +mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata +est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus +agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno +studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei +faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum +animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem, +fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi +Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, +homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus +et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque +leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo +est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: +et homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari +tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti +memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num +vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis +tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei +familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa +audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent +descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus +commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin +contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur +et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item +Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex +eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque +compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et +Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in +ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat, +praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae +sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur, +tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus. + +V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me +autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod +seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt, +quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur. +Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit, +commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum +consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam +aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito +senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi +quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero +sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt +Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam, +alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc +quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum +expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum +perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam +velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem, +Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum +inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec +Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti +physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente +incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa +esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse +reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam +quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi +tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot +saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum +iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut +in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui +constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret, +qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus +est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, +Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a +quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates +autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat +refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus +est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci ειρωνειαν vocant: quam ait etiam in +Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum, +quod idem fuerit in Socrate. + +VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est +igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut +putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores +immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est +clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, +quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, +proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est +quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi +discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit: +nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e +quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo +librorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in +Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus +Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos +dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos +facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e +philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec +vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent, +Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec +definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si +verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam καταληψιν illi vocant, eosque, +qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset, +inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius εναργειαι, +ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus +fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me appellabat iocans--hoc +licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa +evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, definienda +censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam priores fuisse +dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere putabant, ne qui +fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam evidentium +rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et homines dignos, +quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova quaedam commovet, quod +ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, +et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit +Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret, +quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id enim volumus esse ακαταληπτον--, +si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro +φαντασιαι verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum +effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non +esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest +quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod +est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, +iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse +comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis +oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem, +quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse +concedimus. + +VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa +sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat +contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius +aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum +est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum, +qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit +et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et +sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt. +Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur, +et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum +adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in +odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis +iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi +pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in +sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos +non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere +exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut +Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu +et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. +Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris +aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia +sentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter +eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non +apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi +dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed +quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, +hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non +sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde +sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum +comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis +particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec +intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae +notitiae--εννοιας enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur essent +hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non +possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei +consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae +non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime +continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria +falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? +Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis +animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem +ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus, +sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item. +Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, +aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea +potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is, +qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in +similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque +agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem +tractabit, multa perceperit? + +VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi +multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non +comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse +censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat +constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, +quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui +statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam +aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges +imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, +percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam +tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum +supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non +possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo +modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam +rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum +vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia +referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, +constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, +sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter +appetitio--eam enim volumus esse ‛ορμην--, qua ad agendum impellimur, et id +appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud autem, quod movet, +prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id, quod visum +erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri animus ad +appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur accommodatumne +naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo, +nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam +movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum, +quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis +tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate +perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem, +cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio +cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea, +quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi +involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium +quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque +argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece αποδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio, quae +ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.' + +IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel +falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo +quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset +conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi +debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de +se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant +δογματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum +proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum +proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari +quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse +falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla +ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui +illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis +interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id +ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed +Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse +percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia +non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id +consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam +esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum +quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse. +29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id +haberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me δογμα dicere--, +nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus, +fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam +totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam +rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_ accipi oporteret +et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium +esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, +iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, qui aut +cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde +proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere dubia +neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia +plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum +saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia +totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil +approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis. + +X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet +enim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra +dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de +abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat +subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal +omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum +primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut +sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons +est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, +quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia +quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus +construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum εννοιας, +tum προληψεις vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque +innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem +ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur +scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur +maxime cognitionem, et istam καταληψιν, quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo +exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim +ei veritatis luce dulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus +utitur et artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam +ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. +Ergo ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel +instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt +funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate +eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere. + +32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid +velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea, +quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid +ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo +veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius, +qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque +intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur +eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui +omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi +desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos +animadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque +se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo. + +XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, +propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, +interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si +nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique +communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum +dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem +modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt +pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut +si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non +ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed +propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu +probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades +volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo +agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum +falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non +potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod +ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore +versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt +distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud +quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque +comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum +possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo +ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere +inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec +argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud +iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur: +'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur. +Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque +adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et +propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique +occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo +levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod +visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis +visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides: +deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit +diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile +videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent +dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. +Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et +oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam +absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei +signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod +significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione +hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam +absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet. + +XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione +atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκαταθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo +non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim, +quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi +multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde +cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit +aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit--, aut ei +sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda +adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos neque sentire +neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus +impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo non potest +animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat--Graeci +id οικειον appellant--, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non +approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil +attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur +statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse +constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit +aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit. +39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem +absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi +adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et +firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit, +omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum +sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem +actionem tollit e vita. + +XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius +potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt +igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et +genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit, +totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant +omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri +possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia +non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi +sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti +conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic +est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est, +id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut +eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut +in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint, +alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae +autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant +concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint, +ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis +non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:' +reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum: +'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum, +quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo +proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam +adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas: +primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni +consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne +ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa +concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis, +item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt, +volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa, +quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi. + +XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed +ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et +partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines +dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est +hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui +clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum +aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam +rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa +vera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera +definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, +id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus +partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide +perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se +fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui +poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam +concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt, +ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus +comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse +comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque +ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam +quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et +ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse +quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro +congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa +visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter +falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam +interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur. + +45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse +videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis +relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam +habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed +tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus +est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese, +quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit +subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, +dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil +profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit. + +XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus +adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim +primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, +ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod +fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti +quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet +igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, +de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus +interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere +constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam +illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri +esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus +iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa +quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, +auspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra +disputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere +possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non +possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae +perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae +nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea +declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel +furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut +non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis +nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se +motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset, +qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset +inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae +falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile +internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi +dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in +visis distinctio appareat. + +XVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat +et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum +puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod +captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in +philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut +demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano. +Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum +obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri +simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne +internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si +perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse +tua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum +posse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid +cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit? +deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus +similes _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt +quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa: +quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia +quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri +possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil +interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51. +Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive +illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete +sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis +perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim, +cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse +commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et +inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum +Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba +ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit: + + 'visus Homerus adesse poeta.' + +Idemque in Epicharmo: + + 'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.' + +Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus, +ut ea, quae in foro gessimus. + +XVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_, +quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim +dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium +nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione +faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae +videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam +levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes +furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum +relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis: + + 'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum + adspectu' ... + +53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro +veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte +gravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo +temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando +sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset, +aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest +levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus +gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis +somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere +quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos +aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium +visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil +interesse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod +nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae αδηλα Graeci. Si enim res se ita habeant, ut +nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui possit +exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris insaniae +est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum +pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat esse, cum +eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem +similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim +concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum natura non +patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus +aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova +ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in +geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu +autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest. 55. +Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a quibus +ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse +mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis, sed undique +perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos +quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita +sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur +tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil +differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde +omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem +innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed +etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici? + +XVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior +potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis +singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos +Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam +eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a +suis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis +internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti +ne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo: +quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum +ei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum +nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse +non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis +possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater +geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si +adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen +hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere +permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina +peperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis +est ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc +illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam, +ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non +licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri +enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit +quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere, +cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones +nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non +specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi +nota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re +nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non +distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa +necessario nata est εποχη, id est adsensionis retentio, in qua melius sibi +constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. Si +enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus adsensus est. +Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non cognitum? Carneadem +autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi interdum, ut diceret +opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est +esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo, +quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel +incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt, veri inveniendi causa contra +omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. Non +solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? aut cur +celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, +ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est? +Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo +auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista +tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in +Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis +fuisset? + +XIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo +etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus. +Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et +aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus +philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam +philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio, +privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus +adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem +incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat, +isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem +ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis +simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione +omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte +fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam +sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris +in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi +quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae +cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne +illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum +dixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod +quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret, +nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me +quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit +hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli +oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te +quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud +vero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo +monuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, +quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione +quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse +reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De +causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno +opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia +sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset +Catulus, me omnes intueri. + +XX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius +modi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita +movit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum, +quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse +diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses +non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero. +65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad +hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed +etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus +pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu +consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum +alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali +disputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum +solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri +reperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere +verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc +pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa +turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui +numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero +ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas +cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram, + + 'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,' + +ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent, + + 'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,' + +sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore +specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de +me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem +sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio +tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis +cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse +maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil +est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore, +levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis? +quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te +probatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum +conclusio quam habeat vim considera. + +XXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam +opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc +conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. +Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita +sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed +illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse +et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a +veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68. +Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo +adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam +vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, +sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere +processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non +possunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--, +ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem +omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das, +accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus +omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum +esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse +percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia. + +XXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me +defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius +didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non +acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur +fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim +iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse +negitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae +Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime +ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi +poenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. +Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent +habere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis +dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod +erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii, +qui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non +potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt +inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam +reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub +Novis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum, +sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum, +cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille +Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis +oportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro +credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea +defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum: +qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis +nostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_ +quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum +hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt. + +XXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a +nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros +viros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas +tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri, +quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras +nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si +dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur +ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et +gravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo +conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit +ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non +profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum +non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi +cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit, quod +nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum +plane negat esse: sensus quidem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic +enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus +initio libri, qui est de natura: 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne +aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos, +nec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' 74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur: +at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, sonum fundere. Num ergo +is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse +ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus +bonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum +adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire +dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis +certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones +perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum +sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius. +Quid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non +esset, nisi probavisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla +fuit ratio persequi. + +XXIV. 75. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris +homines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam +molestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt +contorta et aculeata quaedam σοφισματα; sic enim appellantur fallaces +conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire +putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam multa +contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi +quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset, +quae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile +posse. 76. Quid Cyrenaici _tibi_ videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui +negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, +quae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid +colore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo. + +Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post +illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque +studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem +iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed +verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non +modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec +solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera +sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid +futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari +sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi +posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita +definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et +effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale +vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi +posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non +est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque +enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum. +Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a +vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una +contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse +sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil +percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem +Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo +disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et +perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero +nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse. + +XXV. 79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera +nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere +posses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram. +Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur? +Nam et in remo sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris +videri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?--Manent +illa omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.--Igitur +semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem +demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam +esse credendum. 80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et +importune insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum +oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse +mendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed +hic quidem maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas +esse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi +nobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et +integris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?--Utinam +quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus, +quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non +cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies +longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at +familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non +videmus. 81. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et +octingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius. +Responderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse +contentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque +videntur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere +possunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis aër crassus offunditur. At amplius +non desideramus. Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam +quererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem +illam? Stare nobis videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa. +Quaere rationem cur ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio +an non possis, non tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum +testimonium dicere ostenderis. + +XXVI. 82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse +quaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti +partibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi +quidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum +quam videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum +esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi +igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri +putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione +fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis +stare videatur. 83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, quam in +parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci, +percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum +est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium, +inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi +possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu +profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit +quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium +omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque +conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. 84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum +videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum, quod +percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso: qua +distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul +fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam +similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario +facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una +fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo, +quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem videris, qui tibi videbitur, +tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem +modi falsa. 85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid +habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam +aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil +esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum +esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.' +Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil +interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non +possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non +potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem +temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem +modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? 86. Quid? si in +eius_dem_ modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in +agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui, +quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret? + +XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos +non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid? +hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae +pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire +possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros +mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! 87. Cur non +extimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse +aliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo +verbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi +adhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur +etiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de +physicis mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo +ante dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam, +res iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris +solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:--de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose +omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem +consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem +fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.--88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a +te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum +visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, sanorum. Quo +modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se vidisse Homerum, +sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem: + + 'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...' + +Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum +somnia re_ri_ et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea vera, quae +essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum videbantur, quo +modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud +audivisse, + + 'O pietas animi ...', + +si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa +visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti +probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo: + + 'Mater, te appello ...' + +nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim +illa: + +'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem +habere visis quam vigilantes fidem? + +XXVIII. 89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus, +Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is +putabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui: + + 'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,' + +nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud +Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis, +cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur +falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi +cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore: + + 'unde haec flamma oritur?' + +et illa deinceps: + + 'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, _adsunt_, me expetunt:' + +Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat: + + 'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam + hanc vim, quae me excruciat! + Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant + cum ardentibus taedis.' + +Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera: + + 'Intendit crinitus Apollo + arcum auratum, luna innixus: + Diana facem iacit a laeva.' + +90. Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur? +Apparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur, +ut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et +falsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa +falsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non +enim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti +sint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut +furentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus. + +91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse +dicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et +falsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus +iudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia +igitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut +queat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera +sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si +haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem pollicebatur. +Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae +atque magnae, non est satis. 92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, +videte ne contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit +elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum +paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod +tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus. + +XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam +nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus. +Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re +minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca, +magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto +certum respondeamus [non] habemus.--93. At vitiosi sunt soritae.--Frangite +igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum +est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, +tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat +quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, ‛ησυχαζειν. Per me vel stertas +licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit? Sequitur +enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in numero +conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt? Progrediere +rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque ultimum te +paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. Cuius generis error ita +manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 94. Nihil me laedit, inquit: +ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam, equos +sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps erit. Sic +me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti respondeo. Si +habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus es: si non habes, ne tu quidem +percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque ad obscura +progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo, ut taceas, +nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te captare volt, utrum tacentem +irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia, sine +dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis: etiam a certis et +illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non sinis. +Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec +minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet. 95. Quid? quod eadem +illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora. +Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est, +quidquid enuntietur--id autem appellant αξιωμα, quod est quasi effatum--, +aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt? Si te +mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris _an_ verum dicis? Haec scilicet +inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos non +comprehensa et non percepta dicimus. + +XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum +ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi +est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit'? Rebus +sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint +in genere contrario. 96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si +dicis _nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem_ nunc lucere et verum +dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis. +Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid +igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo +hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, +mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui +potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec +Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic +conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet +scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius +concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris, +mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec +approbare nec improbare. 97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si +via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc +extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum +aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim +cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non +impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut vivet cras +Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne, quod ita +diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non modo verum esse, sed etiam +necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim, +inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras +Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis +necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici: +totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio--contraria +autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa +potest esse, nulla vera est. 98. Mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum +disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades +solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab +eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces erat dialecticorum. +Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo +iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob eam causam, quod ita didici, omne, +quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris, +mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi +hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo. + +XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi +relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia +Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam +id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum +Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde studiosus ac diligens. +Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae +iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. 99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera +visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia +quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse probabilia; alia non +probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur, +ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra posteriorem nihil dici +oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio +consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si +probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam tu, Luculle, +commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur +modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil +ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si +nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens +ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis +sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque +percepta neque adsensa, sed similia veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita +tollatur. 100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo +habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam +ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo navigio, bono +gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse +salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi, +faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id +non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde +illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri quidem. 101. Et quaecumque +res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum, +movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus, habet corpus, +habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur, +neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam: eoque +sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod, +cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui +multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur. + +XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto +est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno +Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est +caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.' +Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio +ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa +igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem +certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi adsentior. 102. Quamquam nihil +mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant +ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo +reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio +est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse +vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te vel maxime agitata +sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?' +Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret. +Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C. +Lucilium scripsit poëtam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum, +eum, qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis--sunt +enim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima +institutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur--, sed scriptum est +ita: 103. 'Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut +aliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia +posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia +sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait +vehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus +numquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit +disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et +certi notam. 104. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus +sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli +adsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet, +sustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum +placere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem, +ubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere +possit. †Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab +adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, quibus +ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque partem +respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, dum sine +adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, quae nulla re +impedirentur. 105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa +certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos percipi +comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus. + +XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito, +soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam +illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo +loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, isdem +sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod +nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec +tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane +ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et vibrat dissimileque +est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id +eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere. +106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse +visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus +mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam +geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est? +Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet. Si +igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque +meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil +potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc +omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime +vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si +comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne, +quae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae +tantum id, quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera +et falsa diiudicent? + +Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim +negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem +perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum, +ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam +putant, vera esse haruspicum [_responsa_], auspicia, oracula, somnia, +vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de +iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id +sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum +vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis +poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo +insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem +non impeditam sequi? 108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei +posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri +oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus +esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli autem +omnia, si visa tollantur. + +XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed +brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto +repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere, +credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a +Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris +adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea +pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia +sequitur, nulla re impediente? 109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod +statuet, ne id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque +impediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis +procreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter +probabile. + +Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed, +ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum +esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere +posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum +contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si +quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse +Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum, +perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil +posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud +decretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! 110. Sed ut illa habet +probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc +haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non +habet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur +et incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit, +stellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de +rebus, in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis +enim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti +nec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. 111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti, +Luculle, reprehensionem Antiochi--nec mirum: in primis enim est nobilis--, +qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim +sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea differre a +veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod +videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget +visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos +verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed +probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum habemus. + +XXXV. 112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim +campus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in +Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui +id percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet +illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum +simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam, +si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem +interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco +valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? 113. Quaero enim quid sit quod +comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne +Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale +falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito nimirum +adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia +concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod +amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et +acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo +tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam alia, +haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut +Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, quale +falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum +neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum +puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo. + +XXXVI. 114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes +idque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi +adroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, +mores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam +vitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium +dicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia +complectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad +quam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si +dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. 115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad +suam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus +cognationem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam +saepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam +inter se amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi? +qui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo? +qui ista Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola, +si vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos +impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint +scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire. +Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale +est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis, +de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est. + +116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa +sapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita, +videamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se +illa scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura +pendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent +persuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non +persuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non +quaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum +progredi non possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat: +extremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit: +liniamentum sine ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero, +si adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante +rationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem +maiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem +deum censet esse, contempserit. 117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est +crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille +longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus, +quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est: +quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum +esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget _et_ disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque +eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis +potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones +infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, videamus +quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio. + +XXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse +primas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari +et sodali suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua +omnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aëra, sed ea, +quae ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex +his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis +inter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente +divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse +mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata +figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur: +Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in +ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem: +Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore. +Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo +sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci +volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem +sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent. +119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam +habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam, +quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se +et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum +etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam +animalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen +aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret. + +XXXVIII. Sint ista vera--vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri--, +comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens +syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens +Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum, +quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita +esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque +moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus +umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut +caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem +relinquatur. 120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, quanti +libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Cur deus, +omnia nostra causa cum faceret--sic enim voltis--, tantam vim natricum +viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa _ac_ perniciosa terra marique +disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine +divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad +apium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis +minutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. 121. Negas sine deo posse +quicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo +immunitatem magni quidem muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem +habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad +fabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec, +ut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta +haec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non +docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens, +quidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet +ponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. +Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes +divinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit--quod cui non +accidit?--extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior, +nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur. + +XXXIX. 122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa +tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum, +terram intrare possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium, +quam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum +intererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici +notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed +ecquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus, +ut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an +media pendeat? 123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram +multarum urbium et montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui +dixit, iurare posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam +dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis +vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos αντιποδας vocatis: cur mihi +magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, qui, cum audiunt, +desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum, +solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter +terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate +convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra caelum +moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbitrantur, +sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum? +Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum +vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo +Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat posse. 124. Sed redeo ad animum et +corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit, quae +venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut +Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut +Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si +simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus +nullo corpore--quod intellegi quale sit vix potest--et, quidquid est, +mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum +aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem +probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria +momenta. + +XL. 125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non +adsentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem +potissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis +fui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes +esse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur +corporum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos +ullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine +aliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus +hic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante +post, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc +simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis +isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus, +isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid +animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus +irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus +adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. 126. Non ergo id +agitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam +postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia +quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse +arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne +exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud scio +an ita sit. + +XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an +Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis +fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia +regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis +auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione +sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri +serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem--ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri +videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui--vos ergo huius +magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis +architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum +sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? 127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones +physicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale +quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur, +elatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque +caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum +cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero +aliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus +voluptate. 128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed +vester, ut adsentiatur, credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere +opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile +quod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum +ante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde +adfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur, +amittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam, +cum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis +adfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem +metiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam +terram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non +potest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas +res non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id +approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi +quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi +comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve +comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi. + +XLII. 129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis +explorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum +summa referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio? +Omitto illa, quae relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et +scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum +ab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis +disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo +nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici +philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a +quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset +unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo +autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in +mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli similia, sed, +opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. 130. Hos si contemnimus et iam +abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum +Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum +nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea +momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his +rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae αδιαφορια ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho +autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae απαθεια nominatur. Has igitur +tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu multumque defensa +sunt. 131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum princeps +Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post Epicurus, cuius est +disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa voluptate +consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse Callipho censuit: +vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate Diodorus: ambo hi +Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini +natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant scripta Polemonis, +quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles eiusque amici nunc proxime +videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut +opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas primas natura +conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, +Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit. + +XLIII. 132. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos +exposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar: +modo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo +aliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos. +Licetne--omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope +singularem--per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, +si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in +discrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae. +Utrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota +possessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni +continetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non +potest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed +alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens--nam vos quidem +nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum--: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem +in veteres Academicos _et_ Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri +adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? 133. Quid? cum ipse +Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne +indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata +esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi +considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando +quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque +partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse, +Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar: quod +mihi tecum est dogma commune. 134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno +in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit, +beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti, +homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse, +partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam +natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente. +Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et +fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si +sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, et +tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his +discrepant. + +XLIV. 135. Quid? illa, in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare +possumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia +efferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere, +numquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si +deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est +in bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, +praeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens +necesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint _ab_ Academia +vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent? +Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse +quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim +non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum +ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant +permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam +aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse +dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. 136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo +modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non +quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum, +quae παραδοξα nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? +hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos +reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis +esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum +quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum? +insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta +Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis quidem +aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? 137. Haec tibi, Luculle, si es +adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia: mihi +autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur. + +XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in +Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss. +praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane +hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse +Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia sapiens non +sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.' +Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset +quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille +noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. 138. Vos +autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem +incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe +Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus +bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse +finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si +vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in +vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate +coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda +adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse +defendi. 139. Sit sane ita--quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et +Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc +probabilius--, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris +blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus +vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit +deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum +habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum +solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam +Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur. +Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid +Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et +gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, cum honestas in voluptate +contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua +copulabis? + +XLVI. 140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum +honestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio. +Alteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, +caritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest, +nisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium +impellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis. +Audi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant, +nisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere: +fontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc +praescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in +vita sequeretur habiturum. 141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia +innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me +minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus, +adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum, +perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque +pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si +adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo +discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint. + +142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium +Protagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud +Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii: +aliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in +voluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque +ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis +esse voluit. 143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne +maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt +de ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo +profecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam. + +XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur +cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis +dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid +ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter +Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe +doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes +dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis +in rebus dissentiunt? 144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam +in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi +tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a +nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint, +facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos +omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis: +deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos, +qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire +quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa +comprehendere. 145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et +hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum +ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum +digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat +pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine +etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, καταληψιν imposuit. Cum autem +laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, +scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem. +Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent dicere. Ita tu +nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse. 146. +Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis eleganter: illa +subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset, artificia +concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset, satis magnam +vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non +posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire, +cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos docuisset aliquis quam vim +habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne nobis quidem suscenserent, +cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset +ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui +primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri +'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui +testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset, +quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri' +pronuntiarentur. + +XLVIII. 147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius +ipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis +multa dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius +de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate +naturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus +tanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere +necesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque +reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra +se Stoici texuerunt. 148. Tum Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec +contulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis +nostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus +sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor +sententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil +putem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem +existimem, sed ita, ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod +comprehendi et percipi possit: qua re εποχην illam omnium rerum non +probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, vehementer +adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum aspernor. Sed +tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens: Tollendum. Teneo te, +inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. Ita sermone confecto +Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus. + + * * * * * + +NOTES. + +BOOK I. + + §§1--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic., + after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De + Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards + philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2, + 3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful + purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He + greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to + Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks + have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the + theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely + imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives + reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the + success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12). + Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the + Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for + the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro + refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a + proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference + between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition + of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14). + +§1. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus +than of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a +mistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's +house_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such +subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like +_audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form +of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius +villa_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic. +Epistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse +Roma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse +officio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum +longo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se +visentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_ +(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition +of pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is +often repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V. +22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word +_eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_). +Some editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance +in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_, +which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." The words _satis +longo intervallo_ simply = "after a tolerably long halt." For the clause +_ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13. + +§2. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar +passages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm +brackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid +forte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_ +is omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is +clearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false +derivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The +MSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd. +_ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is +present. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads +_velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._ +I. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in +the place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav. +gave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_, +after Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's +G). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for +expressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point. +Of course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether. +_Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12. + +§3. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cæsar _B. Civ._ +III. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have +_eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ... +requirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum +simul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare +monumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1, +_T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_ +(Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314. +_Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V. +69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean +"department of literature." _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter +has _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in +Davies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight +variation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves. +_Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss. +I. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf. +_De Off._ I. 105 + +§4. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge +possessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._ +II. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who +half a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself +scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet +they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and +moreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and +clauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense +desire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really +no conditional force, _si qui_ like ειτινες merely means "all who," for a +strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi sunt, si +qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar expressions +occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared with this +prologue throughout. + +§5. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti +enim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ, +has _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_: +Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately +in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus, +I believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to +say that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances +have written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf. +Introd. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_: +Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g. +Bentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has +exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure. +_Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of +questions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that +_interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See +also _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of +denoting the Greek ‛ρητορικη and διαλεκτικη; note on 32. _Et oratorum +etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX. 25, 3, the +two words even occur without any other word to separate them. For +_oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used in +Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp. +after Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for +_virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, δυναμις) may be called in Gk. αρετη, +in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._ III. 65, will +remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_: MSS. have +_quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf. +_M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli (after +Ernesti) thinking the phrase "_arrogantius dictum_" places _quidem_ after +_accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks, implies +no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. ουδε. _Suscipiatur +labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G. + +§6. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV. +13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which +intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._ +I. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the +same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many +editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then +govern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. ποιητικος). But +the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are the _res +efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus est rerum +efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less fully. +_Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated ατομος. _Quae cum +contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must be +kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig (_Emendationes ad +Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108) tacitly reads +_continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to +prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_: Durand's em. for +_quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv. +(_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking a rapid +transition from one subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like +the Gk. επει, only one parallel instance, however, was adduced (_T.D._ III. +14) and the usage probably is not Latin. _Adducere?_: The note of +interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence, so far, explains the +difficulty of setting forth the true system of physics. If _quoniam_ is +read and no break made at _adducere_, all after _quoniam_ will refer to +ethics, in that case there will be a strange change of subject in passing +from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which expressions will be nominatives +to _poterit_, further, there will be the almost impossible ellipse of +_ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind after _haec ipsa_. On every +ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable. _Quid, haec ipsa_: I have +added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to +have fallen out. [The technical philosophical terms contained in this +section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry +see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_: "frankly," cf. _Ad Fam._ +VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139. + +§7. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum +est_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod +bonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp +_T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek +preserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by +Athenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this +MSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has +conclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin. +Christ supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec +suspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II. +20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus +is dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere +quidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp +frequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind +(_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of +sentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_ +without _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous +passages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_, +but _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the +infinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in +_Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure +from Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not +_si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in +Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and +exhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with +other instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read +_sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_: +cf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by +other words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am +surprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical +objection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the +MSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied +from it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam +obscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply +_clearness_, it means merely "acutely". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have +_quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only +follows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an +infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good +instance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions +of firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word, +cf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by +Cic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64. + +§8. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss. +But Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight +variations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of +slightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I +therefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_: +Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read +_e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow +_haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, "to +hunt the waterfalls". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often +applied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus +in _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written +in two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio +opere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_: +MSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the +master of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See +Quintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3. +_Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict. +Biogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and +have often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner). +_Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the +right use to be made of Greek models. _†Quae quo_: these words are +evidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter. +Varro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in +order that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault +lies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_, +which would be written _quō_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be +"Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the +unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned +read." _Laudationibus_: λογοις επιταφιοις, cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48 where +Varro's are mentioned. _†Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give +_philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong, +_physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_, +_musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the +phrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V. +121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his +explanation is, as Orelli gently says, "vix Latina." I can scarcely think +Halm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic. +almost condemns it by his use of the Greek φιλοσοφως (_Ad Att._ XIII. 20). +In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is φιλοσοφος used as an +adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_ adjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121, +_Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he uses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III. +45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57) Might we not read _philosophis_, in +the dative, which only requires the alteration of a single letter from the +MSS. reading? The meaning would then be "to write _for_ philosophers," +which would agree with my emendation _cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_ +would be a tempting alteration, but that the word φιλοσοφικος is not Greek, +nor do _philosophicus_, _philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times. +_Si modo id consecuti sumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316. + +§9. _Sunt ista_: = εστι ταυτα, so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd. have +_sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De Civ. +Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for _deduxerunt_, +which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's +remark, "_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus humanitatis_." The +words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._ 63. In _Lael._ 12, +_Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule requires _deducere_, on +the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites domum deducere. Aetatem +patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3) describes Varro's "_Libri +Antiquitatum_" (referred to in 8), in which most of the subjects here +mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_: lists of dates, so +χρονοι is technically used for dates, Thuc. V. 20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_: +after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the balance of the clauses. Cic. +however is quite as fond of variety as of formal accuracy. +_Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf. _Brut._ 49, _De +Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to have been quoting +from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd. here give +_sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making the three +genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the accusatives, +_nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using _sedes_, +_locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_, 171, +quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the frequent +references of Aug. it appears that the "_Libri Antiquitatum_" were divided +into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res divinae_ +(_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for _luminis_, +cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26. Varro's +researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis incohasti_: +Varro's book "_De Philosophia_" had apparently not yet been written. + +§10. _Causa_: = προφασις. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_: Halm with +his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives _nescient_ to +suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to +force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm himself +allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed da mihi +nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj. +_sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while Halm +after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far from +the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though _da +mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut., Goer., +Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported by 12, +_Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the old +spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation, and +cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section +throughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II. + +§11. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_ +see Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the +conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac +refertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so και in Greek. _Inclusa habebam_: +cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is +noteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant +_perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of +Tullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and +Introd. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an +excuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See +Introd. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the +exordium of _N.D._ I. + +§12. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus +Graecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm +(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca +desideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483, +approves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to +satisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans +to have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for +Greece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if +she is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6, +_D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a +Graecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem +sententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8. + +§13. _Sine te_: = σου διχα. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits _esse_, see +note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p. 20. +_Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_ would +be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_ 16, +Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can +scarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The +reading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam +veterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and +similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises +the last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et +emendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words +often occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of +expression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37. +_Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after +_quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some +conditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70. +Nothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for +the pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_: +see II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy +refer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_ +merely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom. +(1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex +Apollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied +from _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ περι ψυχης +_utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the preceding letter, +cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's _Philonia_ is +improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective +_Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a heroic remedy. To +make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_ together, supplying +_auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who probably only exist +in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by _D.F._ V. 13. + +§14. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_, +changed by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of +oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he +gave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's "_praestantissima +recensio_," and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's +crushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads +_revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536. +From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it. +_Renovare_ in Cic. often means "to refresh the memory," e.g. 11, _Brut._ +315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the +common _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_, +which would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for +the late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for +_quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in +conspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without +_essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse +so commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if +not familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly, +most MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable +therefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the +hexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often +occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and +Augustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also +_consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De +Or._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to +Goer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of +_laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81. + + §§15--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of + Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made + ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one + doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance. + Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the + teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the + negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained + in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the + Academic (17, 18). + +§15. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in +these words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10, +_N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of +_ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is +personified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear. +_Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the +metaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_: +this, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's +time, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De +Civ. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were +curiously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ. +Dei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the +passages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult +question the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of +Socrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates +and the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his +view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it +relates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_: +_valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes +it more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius +vainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39, +_T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in +_De Leg._ I. 6. + +§16. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43. +_Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic. +would let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf. +II. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is +left out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad +Fam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted +in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on +_T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the +omission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle +often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of +Socratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99. +"_Eoque praestare ceteris_" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as +to the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_, +Plato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_: +Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four +passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7, +9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter +also. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic +he gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is +due to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often +confused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78, +where see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum +... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ... +tum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad +virtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue; +see Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote. + +§17. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to +account for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For +_multiplex_ "many sided," cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is +an opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in +_D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers +are generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic +school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf. +_D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have +been first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in +Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his +theory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In +_D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also +in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole +of philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light +of such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about +ιδεαι, which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p. 51, has +some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic. does +not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines _nomen_ +to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not use +_vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66, +etc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus "_ex asse +heredem, secundos autem_" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is +difficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely +have been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and +Halm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the +_Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of +Cic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably +wrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not +_Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. Χαλκηδονιον. _Praestantissimos_: Halm +wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for +Cic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down +from antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in -ης into Latin nouns in _-a_. +See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis ubertate_: cf. +Quintilian's "_illa Livii lactea ubertas_." _Plenum ac refertam_: n. on 11. +_Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives _dubitantem_, Baiter +_dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_: before these words all +Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably from the line above, +Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while Lamb., Day read +_philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy +became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and +Peripatetics. _Ars_ = τεχνη, a set of definite rules, so Varro in Aug. (as +above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this old school as opposed to the +incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_: so Halm here, but often +_discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198 and 200, has thrice +_discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never. + +§18. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in +44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see +_M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum +fugiendarumque_: ‛αιρετων και φευκτων, about which more in n. on 36. The +Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but +the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of +the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would have considered most +valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct +in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools +seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus Minervam_: a Greek proverb, cf. +Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad Fam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his +German translation of the _Academica_, also quotes Plutarch _Præc. Polit._ +7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte docet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra +atque nostros_: few of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects +everything Athenian, and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s +letters to him the words "_tui cives_," meaning the Athenians, often occur. +_Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_. _Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this +from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist. For the omission +of _me_, cf. note on 7. + + §§19--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary. + The threefold division of philosophy into ηθικη, φυσικη, διαλεκτικη. + Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of + natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and + external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental, which fall + into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of + the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the bodily + advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The ethical + standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief part, and + is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the greatest + happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three classes + of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible to give + an intelligent account of action and duty (23). + +§19. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or +unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time, +so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by +Diog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be +traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics, +to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably +first brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more +sharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf. +esp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have +_et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the +awkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes +to read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V. +68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II. +22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et +moribus_ for ηθικη, etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as we shall +see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30. _A natura +petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and Aristotle is +difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see _D.F._ V. +24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro in +Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the ιδεα of the Good, while so +far is Aristotle from founding his system on the abstract φυσις, that he +scarcely appeals even incidentally to φυσις in his ethical works. The +abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly +apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into +those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse omnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._ +V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33, 34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore +et vita_: this is the τριας or τριλογια των αγαθων, which belongs in this +form to late Peripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a +development from the βιος τελειος of Aristotle. The τριας in this distinct +shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus, _Ethica_ II. 6, +4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to merge the two last +divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This agrees better with +_D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the Antiochean _finis_ see more +in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of _bona_, see n. on 13. +_Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the same distinction is +in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35. _Pulchritudinem_: Cic. +_Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a doubt; it often appears +in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only _pulcrai_, _pulcrum_, +etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found once (_Corp. Inscr._ +I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an early time. On the +tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher in Curtius' +_Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false derivation from +πολυχροος may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C. +Scaliger derived it from πολυ χειρ (Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For +_valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf. the ‛υγιεια ισχυς καλλος of Stob. +_Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V. 22. _Sensus integros_ ευαισθησια in Stob., +cf. also _D.F._ V. 36 (_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_). +_Celeritatem_: so ποδωκεια in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3. +_Claritatem in voce_: cf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al. +_expressionem_. For the former cf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the +meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._ +III. 41, which will disprove Klotz's remark "_imprimit lingua voces, non +exprimit_." See also _De Off._ I. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which, +though not itself Ciceronian, recalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149. +Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has _expressit explanavitque verba_; he and +Quintilian often so use _exprimere_. + +§20. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and +_animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae +natura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in +II. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs αρεται into +διανοητικαι and ηθικαι (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13, _Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In +_D.F._ V. 38 the διανοητικαι are called _non voluntariae_, the ηθικαι +_voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam_: cf. the ευμαθεια, +μνημη of Arist. (who adds αγχινοια σοφια φρονησις), and the _docilitas, +memoria_ of _D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a +translation from the Greek, as frequently, here probably of εθισμος (_Nic. +Eth._ II. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason +bears to virtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in +moribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate +aim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to +_recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like +the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the +Stoic προκορη, προκοπτειν εις αρετην, cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R. and P. +392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be +Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised +Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_: +cf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as +the perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and +Madvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et +Plat._ c. 5, ‛η αρετη τελειοτης εστι της ‛εκαστου φυσεος. _Una res optima_: +the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX. 3, cf. also +_D.F._ V. 36, 38. + +§21. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their αδιαφορα as the +practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in Aug. +XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place here. +_Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_ between +_cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_ and also +before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may be seen +from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus +negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also _T.D._ V. 22. +In Stob. II. 6, 8, the τελος of the Peripatetics is stated to be το κατ' +αρετην ζην εν τοις περι σωμα και τοις εξωθεν αγαθοις, here _quibusdam quae_ +etc., denote the εξωθεν or εκτος αγαθα, the third class in 19. _Hominem ... +societate_: all this is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the +Peripatetics by Stob. II. 6, 7 (κοινη φιλανθρωπια), etc., doubtless the +humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the φυσει ανθρωπος +πολιτικον ζωον theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66, _De Leg._ +I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions _hominem_, +_humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e. +Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V. 108, Varro, +however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_: what are +these _cetera?_ They form portion of the εκτος αγαθα, and although not +strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary to enrich it and +preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8, 13, φιλια, φιλοι +would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while πλουτος αρχη ευτυχια +ευγενεια δυναστεια would be included in _cetera_. The same distinction is +drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most MSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_ +corresponds best with the division of αγαθα into ποιητικα and φυλακτικα, +Stob. II. 6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54. + +§22. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum +appellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by +the writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and +Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of +the Gr. εδοκει, "it was their dogma," so often. _Adipisci_: cf. _adeptum +esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For the +various modes of denoting the πρωτα κατα φυσιν in Latin see Madvig's +_Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s philosophy ought +to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could not stand alone, +for τα πρωτα τη φυσει is one of Goerenz's numerous forgeries. The ablative +is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A comparison of this +statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19 and the passages quoted in +my note there, will show that Cic. drew little distinction between the +Stoic τα πρωτα κατα φυσιν and the Peripatetic τριλογια. That this is +historically absurd Madvig shows in his _Excursus_, but he does not +sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly correctly +reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. +3) coincides with Cic.'s in every particular. Even the _inexplicabilis +perversitas_ of which Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, +who, as will be seen from Augustine XIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among +the _prima naturae_. A little reflection will show that in no other way +could Antiochus have maintained the practical identity of the Stoic and +Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I regret that my space does not allow me +to pursue this difficult subject farther. For the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν +see Zeller, chap XI. _Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. ‛αιρετα, which is +applied to all things contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic +_finis_ was αρετη only, that alone to them was ‛αιρετον, their πρωτα κατα +φυσιν were not ‛αιρετα, (cf. _D.F._ III. 21). Antiochus' _prima naturae_ +were ‛αιρετα to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3, _prima illa naturae propter se ipsa +existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6, 7, demonstrates each branch of the +τριλογια to be καθ' ‛αυτο ‛αιρετον. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently +in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, τα πλειστα και κυριωτατα. +_Ea sunt maxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much +misunderstood by edd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._ +II. 6. _Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen +beatissimam_: the question whether αρετη was αυταρκες προς ευδαιμονιαν was +one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to Antiochus, +consult _M.D.F._ V. 67. + +§23. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. πραξεως, the usual translation, cf. II. 24, 37. +_Officii ipsius initium_: του καθηκοντος αρχην, Stob. II. 6, 7. This +sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose scepticism, +according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action and duty, see +II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the Stoa. _Earum +rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out, _susceptio_ +however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is +found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS. (G) +gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_ +above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._ +IV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of +επιεικεια. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of course +_haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian. _Voluptatibus_: +a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33. + + §§24--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_. + Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never + actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When + force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity + (ποιον τι or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either _primary_ + or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two first + having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle added a + fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless matter, + matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or form acts + on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside + which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it + eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind, + Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the + same thing (28, 29). + +§24. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a +translation both of φυσις and ουσια. Here it is ουσια in the broadest +sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the distinction between Force and +Matter, the active and passive agencies in the universe, is of course +Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however probably apprehended the +distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this read carefully Zeller, 135 +sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of Aristotle's doctrine is to be +got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be +consulted for the important coincidence of Force with logical _genus_ +(ειδος), and of Matter (‛υλη) with logical _differentia_ (διαφορα). For the +_duae res_, cf. _D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt +to translate το ποιουν and το πασχον of the _Theaetetus_, το οθεν and το +δεχομενον of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._ has _efficere_ and +_pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea quae_: so Gruter, Halm +for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by +an active generative form results in an _aliquid_, a τοδε τι as Aristotle +calls it. Passive matter ‛υλη is only potentially τοδε τι, passing into +actual τοδε τι, when affected by the form. (Cf. τοδε, τουτο, Plato _Tim._ +49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A figurative +description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo quod +efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii sermonis +egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by laboured +periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but _equivalent_ to +_vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam quandam_: it is +extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over _quandam_ +and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below) +simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use, +in the Greek ‛υλη the strangeness had had time to wear off. _In utroque_: +for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et materia_) _fit_, the meaning is +clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot +actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed +entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above. +_Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the meaning of this is +clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space _(alicubi)_, it is more +difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless _est_ be taken of +merely phenomenal existence (the only existence the Stoics and Antiochus +would allow), the sentence does not represent the belief of Aristotle and +Plato. The ιδεαι for instance, though to Plato in the highest sense +existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle explicitly says this, _Phys._ +III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in +space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P. 289). Cic. perhaps translates +here from _Tim._ 52 B, φαμεν αναγκαιον ειναι που το ‛ον ‛απαν εν τινι τοπω. +For ancient theories about space the student must be referred to the +histories of philosophy. A fair summary is given by Stob. _Phys._ περι +κενου και τοπου και χωρας, ch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note +that _corpus_ is _formed_, as contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter. +_Qualitas_ is here wrongly used for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force +only, not of the product of Force and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves +sometimes confuse ποιοτης and ποιον, the confusion is aided by the +ambiguity of the phrase το ποιον in Greek, which may either denote the τοδε +τι as ποιον, or the Force which makes it ποιον, hence Arist. calls one of +his categories το ποιον and ποιοτης indifferently For the Stoic view of +ποιοτης, see Zeller, 96--103, with footnotes. + +§25. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._ +III. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_: +Hülsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no +philosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once +foreign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make +it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension +nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi +verbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called αλλοκοτον +ονομα. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5. _Suis utuntur_: +so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = μεταφερειν, which is +technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor, _De Or._ III. +153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as +here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the spelling _secula_ is +wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from +_secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is exceedingly fond of +separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from the words with which +they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. _Lael._ 53 +_quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_, II. 68 _tam in +praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui +ea nunc primum audemus attingere_. + +§26. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken +thread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his +ortae_: the Greek terms are ‛απλα and συνθετα, see Arist. _De Coelo_, I. 2 +(R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P. +382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.) +followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle +which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi multiformes_: evidently a +trans. of πολυειδεις, which is opposed to ‛απλους in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A, +and often. Plato uses also μονοειδης for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch. +VII., a transl. of Plat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc. +_qualitates_) is the needless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ = +_genera_, ειδη. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._ +I. 19; cf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of +the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the +section of Stob. _Phys._, entitled περι αρχων και στοιχειων και του παντος. +It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and _elementa_ +here and in 39 (αρχαι and στοιχεια) convertible terms. The Greeks would +call the four elements στοιχεια but _not_ αρχαι, which term would be +reserved for the primary Matter and Force. _Aër et ignis_: this is Stoic +but _not_ Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary +properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two +former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these +properties, _one_ active and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements; +each therefore is to him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only +_one_ property to each element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II. +26), moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows +at once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq. +_Accipiendi ... patiendi_: δεχεσθαι often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum +genus_: the note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39. +_Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli +gives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153; +cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26. + +§27. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the ‛υποκειμενη ‛υλη of Aristotle, from +which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_: _species_ +here = _forma_ above, the ειδος or μορφη of Arist. _Omnibus_ without +_rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes avoided by the immediate +succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21 in _quibusdam_, _quae_. +_Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. _expressa effigies_ _De Off_. +III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter (see II. 77); the word was +given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter is called an εκμαγειον in +Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these words have given rise to needless +doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. _Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf. +_materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; "which matter throughout its whole extent can +suffer all changes." For the word _omnia_ cf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50 +B (δεχεται γαρ ηι τα παντα), 51 A (ειδος πανδεχες). The word πανδεχες is +also quoted from Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in +taking _tota_ and _omnia_ both as neut.--"_alles und jedes_." Cic. knew the +_Tim._ well and imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments +on the passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between +Plato's ‛υλη and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.; Halm after +Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said loosely of +the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of course the +προτε ‛υλη, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is imperishable (cf. _Tim._ +52 A. φθοραν ου προσδεχομενον). _Non in nihilum_: this is aimed at the +Atomists, who maintained that infinite subdivision logically led to the +passing of things into nothing and their reparation out of nothing again. +See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere. _Infinite secari_: through the +authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the infinite subdivisibility of +matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox one that the Atom was scouted +as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne illud quidem physici credere +esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 ουκ εστιν ελαχιστον μεγεθος. The +history of ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie +close enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn +Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates, +tripping over the old αντιφασις of the One and the Many, denied παν μεγεθος +διαιρετον ειναι και μερος εχειν (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed +Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is +the theory of motion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where +see Munro. Cf. also Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the +existence of void either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its +possibility within, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1), +the Stoics did the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and +denying it within the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae +intervalla ... possint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is +no matter atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed +Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and +especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_. + +§28. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its +correctness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has +_ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and +that _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be "since +force plays this part in the compound," _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo +quod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this +motion and is ever thus on the move." _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression +to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_. +Indeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_ +is also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm +included) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as ουσια = +existence substance. The meaning is "out of which _qualia_, themselves +existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. _totam +commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was formed." +For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est absolvi +aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in +utroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast, +substance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente +et continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any +other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II. +19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and +Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at +second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes +mundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._ +II. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum +esse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura +sentiente_: a clumsy trans. of αισθητη ουσια = substance which can affect +the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should not be +forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself sentient, +cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf. _N.D._ II. +29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough going +Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms with the +Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while believing +that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being _in_ the +Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34) In a curious +passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same inconsistency. +For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life, extends through +all extent". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119 and _N.D._ II. +118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be +destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378, Stob. I. 20, 1) +regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the Universal World +God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he is beyond the +reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some +Stoics however denied the εκπυρωσις. _Nihil enim valentius_: this is an +argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid potest esse mundo +valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo intereat_: _interire_ +here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. αναστηναι, εκπιπτειν ‛υπο τινος. + +§29. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do. +The Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the +names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance, +Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_. +Nearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is +undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it +all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics. +_Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the +Stoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks +that Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi +prudentium quandam_: the Greek προνοια is translated both by _prudentia_ +and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in _N.D._ II. +77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World God is +perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160 (where there +is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. _Necessitatem_: αναγκην, +which is ειρμος αιτιων, _causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf. +_N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I. 125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before). +This is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence +of cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is +expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. Τυχη therefore +is defined as αιτια αδηλος ανθρωπινωι λογισμωι (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the +same definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This +identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites +his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by +Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on +_posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the +sense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), ουδε τι +γιγνεται εργον επι χθονι σου διχα δαιμον. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a trans. +of the Gk. κατηναγκασμενον. I see no reason for suspecting _inter_, as Halm +does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De Div._ II. 49; cf. +also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to studying the reff. +given above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's _Physica_ +II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation, for the views of +Aristotle about τυχη and το αυτοματον, also ch. 8--9 for αναγκη. Plato's +doctrine of αναγκη, which is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, +is to be found in _Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59. + + §§30--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary. + Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the + senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the + mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The + senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of + such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense, + or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained + constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous + flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31). + Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they + _defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal + explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes + consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric + (32). + +§30. _Quae erat_: the Platonic ην, = was, as we said. _In ratione et +disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._ I. +22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is inexact, +it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the criterion of +truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n. _Iudicium_: the +constant translation of κριτηριον, a word foreign to the older philosophy. +_Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with his pet MS. writes _esse +rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before +and after, so that there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I +venture to say that no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it +stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in +prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam censebant ... tale +quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus translated by Cic., +_Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius modi_ (αει κατα +ταυτα εχουσης cf. 28 A. το κατα ταυτα εχον) _et sui simile_, cf. also +_T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper tale sit quale sit, quam_ ιδεαν +_appellat ille, nos speciem_, and _Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ ιδεαν, etc.: there +is more than one difficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to +exclude Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may +be an oversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic +tractabatur ab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of +ιδεαι, and next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears +very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's +ιδεαι and Aristotle's τα καθαλου would naturally seem microscopic to +Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his time as those of +Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at Cicero's door, for +Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's must have been +driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato has, however, +probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in Antiochus, +who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more cautious step. + +§31. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole +Antiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita +clara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his +agreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull, +reason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae +essent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the +meaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He +reads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert +that _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall +see in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I +believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's +reminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec +percipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod +perceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton +corruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse +sensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu +comprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ +VIII. 9, τα ‛υποπιπτοντα τη αισθησει. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.: this +strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For _constans_ cf. +εστηκος, which so often occurs there and in the _Sophistes_. _Ne idem_: +Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_, Heraclitus' theory of flux is +carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even +the word εμε is stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent +subject, whereas the subject is changing from moment to moment; the +expression therefore ought to be τους εμε. _Continenter_: ουνεχως; cf. +Simplicius quoted in Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, εν μεταβολη +γαρ συνεχει τα οντα. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases ‛ροη, παντα +‛ρει, ‛οιον ‛ρευματα κινεισθαι τα παντα, etc., which are scattered thickly +over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a very +similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: δοξαστην, so _opinabile_ = +δοξαστον in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely used by Xenocrates (R. +and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between the δοξαστον and the +επιστητον, e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33 (qu. R. and P. 264). + +§32. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for +_motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation +for εννοια, which is Stoic. This statement might have been made both by +Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on the word +_notio_. Επιστημη in Plato is of the ιδεαι only, while in Aristotle it is +τον καθολου; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R. and P. 264), λεγω νουν αρχην +επιστημης. _Definitiones rerum_: these must be carefully distinguished fiom +_definitiones nominum_, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and +P. 265, note b. The _definitio rei_ really involves the whole of philosophy +with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with moderns too). Its +importance to Plato may be seen from the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to +Aristotle from the passages quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes +will make the subject as clear as it can be made to any one who has not a +knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy. _Verborum explicatio_: +this is quite a different thing from those _definitiones nominum_ just +referred to; it is _derivation_, which does not necessitate definition. +ετυμολογιαν: this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the +Classic Greek Prose, as are ετυμος and all its derivatives. (Ετυμως means +"etymologically" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The +word ετυμολογια is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather +ονοματων ορθοτης (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of their books on the +subject preserved by Diog. is generally "περι των ετυμολογικων" The +systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when it +became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had given +the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic etymology are given +in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62 _in enodandis +nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis et quasi rerum +notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove +something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in +_Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation +_veriloquium_ of ετυμολογια and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_ (Greek +συμβολον) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro translated +ετυμολογια by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28). Aristotle had already laid +down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology, and Plato also +incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to belong to the old +Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of authorities would +have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for _notas ducibus_, +the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of etymology, and not for +particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74) +describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum notae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for +_notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_ in _N.D._ III. 62 is quite +different). One more remark, and I conclude this wearisome note. The +_quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of συμβολον. Davies +therefore ought not to have placed it before _ducibus_, which word, strong +as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance in +_T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so Halm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for +_in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to 30 +_pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in ea parte in qua_) is violent, while +Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum opinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj. +_in quo_, Cic. does often use the neut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not +quite thus. I have sometimes thought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf. +_huic_ below). _Dialecticae_: as λογικη had not been Latinised, Cic. is +obliged to use this word to denote λογικη, of which διαλεκτικη is really +one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, ‛ρητορικη which is mentioned +in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70. _Orationis ratione +conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which becomes _oratio +perpetua_ under the influence of ‛ρητορικη. _Quasi ex altera parte_: a +trans. of Aristotle's αντιστροφος in the beginning of the _Rhetoric_. +_Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf. however a close parallel in +_Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The construction is simply a +variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive (_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_ +being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_: το πιθανον is with Arist. and +all ancient authorities the one aim of ‛ρητορικη. + + §§33--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old + Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the ιδεαι of + Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned + ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor + faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils + of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but + virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_ to + nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes, some + were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some + were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and + called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them + _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on + the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_ + belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate + action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things + _preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in + the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_ + of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not + but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and + immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and + believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow + the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed + sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding + judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40). + Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the + examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a + sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41). + _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor + wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving + assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them + of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect + wisdom (42). + +§33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_, +comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to +which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the +MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is +unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved +in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for +_disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase +_disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost +certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's +odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's +_Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the +one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf. +_et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_: +"system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the +omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin +here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno +opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. +feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is +copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and +evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's +resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought +to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded. +_Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the +supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact +that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the +strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi +nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of +the relation in which Plato's ιδεαι stand to his notion of the deity. +_Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real +name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi +nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._ +161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq., +_T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very +widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him +transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of +him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in +22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of +ευδαιμονιαν. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does +not elsewhere employ them. + +§34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for +Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while +Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the αγαθον. _Diligenter ... +tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, cf. +Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P. +_Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut +ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ... +Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many +teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among +the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which +accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two +fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, συμφοιτωντες +παρα Πολεμωνι εφιλο τιμηθησαν. Dates are against the theory, see Zeller +500. + +§35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, +though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl. +missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl. +_partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in +emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the +words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's +nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close +parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in +_Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III. +83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._ +135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right). +Plato uses νευρα εκτεμνειν metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but +_poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the +sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS. +_quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's +statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_" +with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum +et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. +and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved +in the special difficulties of the _Academica_. + +§36. _Cetera_: Stoic αδιαφορα, the presence or absence of which cannot +affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being called +either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great battle +grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ... contraria_: +Gr. κατα φυσιν, παρα φυσιν. _His ipsis ... numerabat_: I see no reason for +placing this sentence after the words _quae minoris_ below (with Christ) or +for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm). The word _media_ is the Gk. +μεσα, which word however is not usually applied to _things_, but to +_actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. ληπτα. _Aestimatione_: αξια, positive value. +_Contraque contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a +word to express απαξια (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that passage +coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V. 73. + +§37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section +the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller +and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it +would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general +acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic. +appears at first sight to have made the αποπροηγμενα a subdivision of the +ληπτα (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. +(_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be +corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads _media_ in the +place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for +Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's +consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly +misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as +to think even for a moment that the αποπροηγμενα formed a branch of the +ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in +36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα, +nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the +theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with +the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his +thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly +dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding +sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the +present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but +with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae +secundum locum obtinent_, προηγμενα _id est producta nominentur, quae vel +ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely +pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα, +though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So +if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include +both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes +_fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly +introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and +_ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's +thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these +virtues. + +I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_ +Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to +talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and +_minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek, +_not_ different degrees of αξια (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_ +should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the +excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value +in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong +negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. +means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing +απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια +equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly +defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (_Adv. Math._ XI. +62--64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (_Pyrrhon. +Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I +contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a +negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα. I +therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language +allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have +αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his +words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_" +(_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and +Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. +There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη +απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of +information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation +of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the +passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: +Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the +clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly +belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. +speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict +his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ, +which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., +however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P. +393.) _Recte factum_ = κατορθωμα, _peccatum_ = ‛αμαρτημα, _officium_ = +καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata +praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since +Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always +an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, +adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the +conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ +V. 64. + +§38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful +construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse +dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes +natura perfectae_, the διανοητικαι αρεται of Arist., could be said to +belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are Aristotle's +ηθικαι αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the +reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both +Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the +intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter +to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and Arist. το μεν ‛ως λογον εχον, το δε +επιπειθες λογωι); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and +indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name +‛ηγεμονικον (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and +indivisible (Zeller 248, _D.F._ III. _passim_). When the ‛ηγεμονικον was in +a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice +or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a +war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war +carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the +description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the +mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use +which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the +_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the +Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes +speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with +footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 +δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το +μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των +φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the +fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which +Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural +_perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the +abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the +same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while +_perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other +passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a +trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit +carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the +reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic +sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless; +‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and +IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the +_T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri +libidine_. + +§39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De +Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the +Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of +the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general +Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion +arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object; +cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233. +For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18. +_Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232. +_Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who +proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite +fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from +this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances. +He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic. +repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last +passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the +essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics +of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the +very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the +_De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error +once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at +work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange +oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but +will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully +influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch, +qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The +notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language +of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were +well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the +_Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ +VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is +αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular +motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that +fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and +with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's +works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the +αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that +the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of +knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls +at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to +their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who +will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power +this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its +origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. +_Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither +Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could +have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of +Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we +seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between +animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων +στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made +no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189, +190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and +is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from +air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is +λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it +all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who +was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view +of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R. +and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. +"Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic +materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between +the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical +principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και +διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, +by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι, +(Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν +γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though +in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of +thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed +old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no +ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see +Zeller, pp. 134, 135. + +§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion +that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely +agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an +anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu +animorum_, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and +resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very +similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis +Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44 +_e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav. +_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say. +Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given +by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn +of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_ +probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = συγκαταθεσιν. _In nobis +positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De +Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is +involuntary (ακουσιον Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I +note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as +_involuntary,_ while the καταληπτικη φαντασια _compels_ assent (see II. +38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may +refuse assent. + +§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all +sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to +the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. _Declarationem_: εναργειαν, +a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum +rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the +_things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own +εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_: +this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_. +Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity +_Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus +answers as in 14, 25, 33. Καταληπτον: strictly the _thing_ which emits the +_visum_ is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, +the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. +_Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in +the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however, +themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. _Quae manu +prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often +made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely +renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the +term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in +two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or +systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes +also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα +εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which +use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller +80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To +Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου. +Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to +logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every +καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to +pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed. +This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable +in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like +this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: +δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26. + +§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην +και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. _Soli_: Halm, I know not +why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the +meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and +combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will +appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to +take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this +in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk. +word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic +εννοιαι; Zeller 81--84, R. and P. 367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission +of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms +εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but +generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. _Non principia solum_: +there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which, +induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof. +(See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's +_Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's _Aristotle._) +Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the +edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has +repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see +_M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me +sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant. +_Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._ III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque +removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The +_firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the +_sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this +section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In +his constitit_: cf. II. 134. + + §§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy. + Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory + in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the + ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet + held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of + equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of + phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely + (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were + carried on by Carneades (46). + +§43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a +consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in +deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading +defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_. +Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc. +The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_. +This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15, +_aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from +Cic. + +§44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II. +14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a +side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates +was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam +ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.) +was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty +years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously +inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for +Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras +on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all +equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ... +idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the +famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107. +_Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is +there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada vitai tradunt_, +etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. 32. The common trans. "well" is +weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_: νομω of Democritus, see R. +and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance. +_Deinceps omnia_: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read _denique_ for +_deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm. _Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the +σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this +because of _dixerunt_ above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often +thus repeated by Cic. + +§45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_ +though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II. +122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. επεχειν, which we shall have to explain in the +_Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see II. 66, +note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria momenta_: +this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility of the +_probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II. 124, for +the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of +Arcesilas, ειναι γαρ παντα ακαταληπτα και τους εις εκατερα λογους +ισοκρατεις αλληλοις, Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 ισοσθενεις λογοι; in the +latter writer the word ισοσθενεια very frequently occurs in the same sense, +e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10, _rationis momenta_) + +§46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus +_Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 τον Πλατωνα οιν ‛οι μεν δογματικον εφασαν ειναι, ‛οι +δε απο ητικον, ‛οι δε κατα μεν τι απορητικον, κατα δε τι δογματικον. +Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; Πλατων πολυφωνος ων, +ουχ ‛ως τινες οιονται πολυδοξος. _Exposuisti_: Durand's necessary em., +approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_. _Zenone_: see Introd. +p. 5. + + * * * * * + +NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS. + +BOOK I. + +1. _Mnesarchus_: see II. 69, _De Or._ I. 45, and _Dict. Biogr._ +'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment +belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I +suppose Cicero to have concluded the first book. + +2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which +places it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis +discrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had +already mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische +remarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated +that part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic. +must have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order +to excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58). + +BOOK II. + +3. This fragm. clearly forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments +which Cic. in the first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius, +see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so level as +the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not level. + +4. On this I have nothing to remark. + +5. There is nothing distinctive about this which might enable us to +determine its connection with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who +_serius adamavit honores_. + +6. The changing aspects of the same thing are pointed to here as +invalidating the evidence of the senses. + +7. This passage has the same aim as the last and closely resembles +_Lucullus_ 105. + +8. The fact that the eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy +the senses are. A similar argument occurs in _Luc._ 86. _Perpendiculum_ is +a plumb line, _norma_ a mason's square, the word being probably a +corruption of the Greek γνωμων (Curt. _Grundz_ p. 169, ed. 3), _regula_, a +rule. + +9. The different colours which the same persons show in different +conditions, when young and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober +and when drunken, are brought forward to prove how little of permanence +there is even in the least fleeting of the objects of sense. + +10. _Urinari_ is to dive; for the derivation see Curt. _Grundz_ p. 326. A +diver would be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in _Luc._ 81, +which are unable to see that which lies immediately above them and so +illustrate the narrow limits of the power of vision. + +11. Evidently an attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy. +Different people pass different judgments on one and the same odour. The +student will observe that the above extracts formed part of an argument +intended to show the deceptive character of the senses. To these should +probably be added fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that the impossibility of +distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been brought forward in the +_Catulus_, was allowed to stand in the second edition, other difficulties +of the kind, such as those connected with the bent oar, the pigeon's neck, +the twins, the impressions of seals (_Luc._ 19, 54), would also appear in +both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses must have been +summed up in the phrase _cuncta dubitanda esse_ which Augustine quotes from +the _Academica Posteriora_ (see fragm. 36). + +BOOK III. + +12. This forms part of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in +substance to Lucullus' speech in the _Academica Priora_ The drift of this +extract was most likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the +battle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we +must cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own +way. See another view in Krische, p. 62. + +13. Krische believes that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show +that the senses were trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with +which the fishes were seen leaping from the water was brought up as +evidence. (In _Luc._ 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an argument hostile +to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The explanation seems to +me very improbable. The words bear such a striking resemblance to those in +_Luc._ 125 (_ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic +innumerabilis paribus in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis_) that I am +inclined to think that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and +not Book III., and that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the +Lucrine lake, also changed _Puteolosque_ into _pisciculosque exultantes_ +for the sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa +on the Lucrine. + +14. The passion for knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by +Varro as an argument in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be +attainable. The same line is taken in _Luc._ 31, _D.F._ III. 17, and +elsewhere. + +15. It is so much easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than +in that of Lucullus in the _Academica Priora_ that I think the reference in +Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than a +dogmatist (see _Luc._ 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of the same). If my +conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a +different opinion, but very hesitatingly, p. 63. + +16. This may well have formed part of Varro's explanation of the καταληψις, +_temeritas_ being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics as by +the Academics cf. I. 42. + +17. I conjecture _malleo_ (a hammer) for the corrupt _malcho_, and think +that in the second ed. some comparison from building operations to +illustrate the fixity of knowledge gained through the καταληψεις was added +to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the _Lucullus_. +I note in Vitruvius, quoted by Forc. s.v. _malleolus_, a similar expression +(_naves malleolis confixae_) and in Pliny _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV. 14 _navis +fixa malleo_. _Adfixa_ therefore in this passage must have agreed with some +lost noun either in the neut. plur. or fem. sing. + +18. This and fragm. 19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische +notes, the Stoic εναργεια had evidently been translated earlier in the book +by _perspicuitas_ as in _Luc._ 17. + +19. See on _Luc._ 57. + +BOOK IV. + +Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on the +parallel passages of the _Lucullus_. + +21. _Viam_ evidently a mistake for the _umbram_ of _Luc._ 70. + +23. The best MS. of Nonius points to _flavum_ for _ravum_ (_Luc._ 105). +Most likely an alteration was made in the second edition, as Krische +supposes, p. 64. + +28. _Corpusculis_: _Luc._ 121 has _corporibus_. Krische's opinion that this +latter word was in the second edition changed into the former may be +supported from I. 6, which he does not notice. The conj. is confirmed by +Aug. _Contr. Ac._ III. 23. + +29. _Magnis obscurata_: in _Luc._ 122 it is _crassis occultata_, so that we +have another alteration, see Krische, p. 64. + +30. Only slight differences appear in the MSS. of the _Luc._ 123, viz. +_contraria_, for _in c._, _ad vestigia_ for _contra v._ + +31. _Luc._ 137 has _dixi_ for _dictus_. As Cic. does not often leave out +_est_ with the passive verb, Nonius has probably quoted wrongly. It will be +noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the +_Luc._, those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic. therefore divided the +_Luc._ into two portions at or about 63. + +UNCERTAIN BOOKS. + +32. I have already said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary +assault on the senses made by Cic. in the second book. + +33. In the Introd. p. 55 I have given my opinion that the substance of +Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the _probabile_ was +incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To +that part this fragment must probably be referred. + +34. This important fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a jocular +application of the Carneadean _probabile_, as may be seen from the words +_probabiliter posse confici_. + +35. Krische assigns this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book. +With this opinion I find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the +_Lucullus_ (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition this +allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have occurred +either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no reason whatever +appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer to regard it as +belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of Academic doctrine in +the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the Academic school must not +be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see _Luc._ 119, also 66 and +_N.D._ I. 12. Also Aug. _Contra. Ac._ II. 29. + +36. It is difficult to see where this passage could have been included if +not in that prooemium to the third book which is mentioned _Ad. Att._ XVI. +6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me wrong in holding that the +whole four books formed one discussion, finished within the limits of a +single day. Why interrupt the discussion by the insertion of a prologue of +so general a nature as to be taken from a stock which Cic. kept on hand +ready made? (Cf. _Ad Att._ as above.) + + * * * * * + +Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its +contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled _Contra +Academicos_, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions, +imitated throughout the second edition of the _Academica_ of Cic. No +writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture +and opinions of Augustine as the _Academica_ and the lost _Hortensius_. I +give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the +former which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. _Contr. +Ac._ II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of +Book I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as +having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to discuss that new +doctrine of καταληψις advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of ακαταληψια though +present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct shape, +because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather enriched +than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under the name of +the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife between it and the +New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic. must have ended. From +this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his opinion (_Contra. Ac._ II. +1) that New Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in +which it appeared. Indications of Book II. in Aug. are scarce, but to it I +refer _Contra. Ac._ I. 7 _placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum +investigat etiam si ad eius inventionem non valeat pervenire_, also _ibid._ +III. 10 _illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse hominem sapientem, et tamen +in hominem scientiam cadere non posse_. These I refer to Cicero's +development of the _probabile_ in Book II., although I ought to say that +Krische, p. 65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the +_Ac. Priora_ transferred to Book IV. of the _Ac. Posteriora_. As this would +leave very meagre material for Book II., nothing indeed excepting the +provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to +his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from +the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in +Book II. are difficult to fix, as they apply equally well to the later +attack in Book IV. As to Books III. and IV., I do not think it necessary +here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement between them and the +_Lucullus_, which will find a better place in my notes on the latter, but +merely give the divergences which appear from other sources. These are the +translation of σοφισματα by _cavillationes_ in _Luc._ 75 (Seneca _Ep._ +III.), and the insertion in 118 of _essentia_ as a translation of ουσια. + +BOOK II. + +ENTITLED _LUCULLUS_. + + §§1--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was + absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to + attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great + general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory + (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander + and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my + consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now + tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher, + having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those + enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know + philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5). + Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of + the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about + trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public + duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but + enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who + hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge + show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics + do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic. + This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to + inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools + are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the + authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without + hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus, + Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the + _Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of + Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the + doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He + spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius + the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time + the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of + Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old + teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes + between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the + latter against Philo (12). + +§1. _Luculli_: see Introd. p. 58, and _Dict. Biog._ _Digna homini nobili_: +a good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like +Lucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: "gained," "won;" cf. _percipere +fruges_, "to reap," _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: "was cut off from;" _carere_ +comes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the +three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the +usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading +_dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold. +_Admodum_: "to a degree." _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M. +Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._ +_Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair +was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained +greater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him +chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any +interval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special +law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in +all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation. +_Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II. +16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in +the East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla. + +§2. _Laus_: "merit," as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means +a deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that +Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first +Mithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter +ejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures, +though he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_ +is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether. +In addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in +_T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants. +_Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_. +_Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12, +Ov. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making +it active. _Factus_: = _perfectus_; cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 5, 33 _homo factus +ad unguem_, Cic. _De Or._ III. 184, _In Verr._ IV. 126. So _effectus_ in +silver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam +memoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same +distinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is +told _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun +by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by +Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf. +_consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an +ablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare +in the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45. + +§3. _Genere_: "department" cf. I. 3. _Navalibus pugnis_: ναυμαχιαις. +_Instrumento et adparatu_: κατασκευη και παρασκευη. _Rex_: Mithridates. +_Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the passive verb so +common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course _rex_ to be nom. +to _legisset_, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and that +_quos legisset_ = _quorum commentarios legisset_ I think improbable. +_Hodie_: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read _hodieque_, which however, +is not Ciceronian. In passages like _De Or._ I. 103 and _Verr._ V. 64, the +_que_ connects clauses and does not modify _hodie_. On this subject see +Madv. _Opuscula_ I. 390. _Etsi_: _M.D.F._ V. 68, shows that in Cic. a +parenthetic clause with _etsi_ always has a common verb with its principal +clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same holds of +_quamquam_, see n. on I. 5. _Calumnia_: properly a fraudulent use of +litigation, συκοφαντια. The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who +prosecuted him. _In urbem_: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the +city. _Profuisset_: this ought properly to be _profuerit_, but the +conditional _dicerem_ changes it. _Potius ... quam ... communicem_: n. on +23. + +§4. _Sunt ... celebrata_: cf. I. 11, 17 for the collocation of the words. +_Externa ... interiora_: cf. _De Div._ II. 124 _sed haec quoque in promptu, +nunc interiora videamus_. _Pro quaestore_: for this Faber wrote _quaestor_, +arguing that as Luc. was Sulla's _quaestor_ and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he +could not be _pro quaestor_. But surely after the first year he would be +_pro quaestor_. Dav. reads _quaestor_ here and 11, saying "_veterem +lectionem iugulavit Faber_". _Ea memoria ... quam_: Bentl., Halm, Baiter +give _qua_, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. _Sat._ I. 6, 15. A passage like +ours is _D.F._ I. 29, _ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis_, where one MS. +has _qua_. Read Madvig's lucid note there. _De quibus audiebat_: Madv. +_Em._ 121 makes this equivalent to _de eis rebus de quibus_, the necessity +of which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of +expression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an +actually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. _Cat. Mai._ 83. I take _quibus_ as +simply = _libris_. + +§5. _Ac_: strong, as often, = και μην. _Personarum_: public characters, +προσωπων πολεως (_Ad. Fam._ XV. 17, 2), so _personas_ 6. _Multi ... +plures_: cf. Introd. p. 30. _Reliqui_: many MSS. insert _qui_ by +_dittographia_, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it. On +the retention or omission of this _qui_ will depend the choice of _putant_ +or _putent_ below. _Earum rerum disputationem_: for _disp._ followed by +genitive see n. on I. 33. _Non ita decoram_: for this feeling see Introd. +p. 30. For _non ita_ cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae". _Historiae +loquantur_: _hist._ means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than "history," which is +better expressed by _res gestae_. Note that the verb _loqui_ not _dicere_ +is used, and cf. n. on 101. _Legatione_: to the kings in Egypt and the East +in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the embassy see +_Dict. Biogr._ art. 'Panactius'. _Auctorem_: one would think this simple +and sound enough, Bentl. however read _fautorem_, Dav. _auditorem_. + +§6. _Illigari_: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use Forc. +qu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. _Ann._ XIII. 40. _Aut ludicros sermones_: = _aut +clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat_. _Rerum leviorum_: a similar +argument in _D.F._ I. 12. _Quodam in libro_: the _Hortensius_. _Gradu_: so +the word "degree" was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the +ballad. _De opera publica detrahamus_: the dative often follows this verb, +as in _D.F._ III. 7 _nihil operae reipublicae detrahens_, a passage often +wrongly taken. _Operae_ is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after +_nihil_, _reip._ the gen. after _operae_, like _opera publica_ here, not +the dat. after _detrahens_. _Nisi forensem_: the early oratorical works may +fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the _De +Republica_ or the _De Leg._ both of which fall within the period spoken of. +_Ut plurimis prosimus_: cf. Introd. p. 29. _Non modo non minui, sed_: +notice _non modo ... sed_ thrice over in two sentences. + +§7. _Sunt ... qui negent_: and truly, see Introd. p. 38. In _Cat. Mai._ §3 +Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was. +_Mortuis_: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. _Contra +omnis dicere quae videntur_: MSS. mostly insert _qui_ between _dicere_ and +_quae_, one of the best however has _dicere quae aliis_ as a correction, +while another has the marginal reading _qui scire sibi videntur_. The +omission of _qui_, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal. +2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. _Verum invenire_: cf. 60. +_Contentione_: = φιλονεικια as usual. _In ... rebus obscuritas_: cf. I. 44 +_rerum obscuritate_. _Infirmitas_: cf. I. 44 _imbecillos animos_. +_Antiquissimi et doctissimi_: on the other hand _recentissima quaeque sunt +correcta et emendata maxime_ I. 13. _Diffisi_: one of the best MSS. has +_diffissi_, which reminds one of the spelling _divisssiones_, asserted to +be Ciceronian in Quint. _Inst. Or_. I. 7, 20. _In utramque partem_: επ' +αμφοτερα, cf. I. 45. _Exprimant_: "embody," cf. n. on I. 19. + +§8. _Probabilia_: πιθανα, for which see 33. _Sequi_: "act upon," cf. +99-101. _Liberiores et solutiores_: these two words frequently occur +together in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see 105, +also _T.D._ V. 43, _De Div._ I. 4, _De Rep._ IV. 4, _N.D._ I. 56, _Orat._ +64. _Integra_: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "_non mihi integrum est_"--"I +have committed my self." _Et quasi_: MSS. have _et quibus et quasi_. +_Cogimur_: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. 18. _Amico cuidam_: +Orelli after Lamb. _cuipiam;_ for the difference see Madv. _Gram._ 493 _b_, +c. + +§9. _Ut potuerint, potuerunt_: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which +was simply _ut potuerunt_, "granting that they had the ability, they gained +it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they _did_ decide on a +single hearing," etc. _Iudicaverunt autem_: so Lamb. for MSS. _aut_. +Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "_arguta hariolatio_," read _an_ for _aut_ +and put a note of interrogation at _contulerunt_. C.F. Hermann +(Schneidewin's _Philologus_ VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion +into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in _Em._ 125 +has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful +Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of _aut_ between _sed_ and +_ut_ at the beginning; of this Madv. says "_non solum Latina non est, sed +sanae menti repugnat_." For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf. +_N.D._ I. 10, _De Leg._ I. 36. _Quam adamaverunt_: "which they have learned +to love;" the _ad_ has the same force as προ in προμανθανειν, which means +"to learn _on and on_, to learn by degrees" (cf. προυμαθον στεργειν +κακοις), not, as the lexica absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to +learn thoroughly." _Constantissime_: "most consistently". _Quae est ad +Baulos_: cf. Introd. p. 57. _In spatio_: this _xystus_ was a colonnade with +one side open to the sea, called ξυστος from its polished floor and +pillars. _Consedimus_: n. on I. 14. + +§10. _Servatam oportuit_: a construction very characteristic of Terence, +found, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. _In promptu ... reconditiora_: cf. _in +promptu ... interiora_ in _De Div._ II. 124, also _Ac._ I. 4. _Quae dico_: +Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read +_dixero_. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough +in all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. _Si non +fuerint_: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have _si vera_ +etc. In support of the text, see I. 9 (_sunt ista_) and note. +_Labefactata_: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in +_Ed. Rom._ (1471); the others have _labefacta_. Orelli's statement (note to +his separate text of the _Academica_ 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the +perfect _labefeci_ and the part, _labefactus_ is quite wrong. The former is +indeed the vulg. reading in _Pro Sestio_ 101, the latter in _De Haruspicum +Responsis_ 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a +rule prefers long forms like _sustentatus_, which occurs with +_labefactatus_ in _Cat. Mai._ 20. For the perfect _labefactavit_ cf. I. 33. +_Agam igitur_: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a +belief in the learning of Lucullus. + +§11. _Pro quaestore_: cf. 4. _Essem_: MSS. _issem_, whence Goer. conj. +_Alexandriam issem_. _Heraclitus Tyrius_: scarcely known except from this +passage. _Clitomachum_: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. _Quae nunc +prope dimissa revocatur_: sc. _a Cicerone_. Philo's only notable pupils had +combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the +_Academica_ the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative +for many years. Cf. Introd. p. 21. _Libri duo_: cf. I. 13. _Heri_ for this +indication of the contents of the lost _Catulus_, see Introd. p. 50. +_Implorans_: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to with +tears," see Corss. I. 361. _Philonis_: sc. _esse_. _Scriptum agnoscebat_: +i.e. it was an actual work of Ph. _Tetrilius_: some MSS. are said to have +Tetrinius, and the name _Tertinius_ is found on Inscr. One good MS. has +_Tretilius_, which may be a mistake for _Tertilius_, a name formed like +_Pompilius_, _Quintilius_, _Sextilius_. Qy, should _Petrilius_, a +derivative from the word for four, be read? _Petrilius_ and _Pompilius_ +would then agree like _Petronius_ and _Pomponius_, _Petreius_ and +_Pompeius_. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. _Rogus_: an +ill omened and unknown name. _Rocus_, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on +_denarii_ of the _gens Creperia_. _De Philone ... ab eo ipso_: note the +change of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." _De_ and _ex_ are +common in Cic. after _audire_, while _ab_ is rather rarer. See _M.D.F._ I. +39, and for _describere ab aliquo_ cf. _a te_ in _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, 3. + +§12. _Dicta Philoni_: for this see Introd. p. 50. It cannot mean what Goer. +makes it mean, "_coram Philone_." I think it probable that _Philoni_ is a +marginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus +the elder, they are made clear by 18. _Academicos_: i.e. _novos_, who are +here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the +title. _Aristo_: see Introd. p. 11. _Aristone_: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an +Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems +unknown. _Negat_: see n. on 18. _Lenior_: some MSS. _levior_, as is usual +with these two words. In 11 one of the earliest editions has _leviter_ for +_leniter_. + + §§13--18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious + tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of + scepticism (13), Those very philosophers, with the exception of + Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they + were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made + during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of + ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. + Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really + been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty, + though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no + argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add + nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however + do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was + induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to + avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the καταληπτικη φαντασια + really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. + We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the + sceptics (18). + +§13. _Rursus exorsus est_: cf. _exorsus_ in 10. _Popularis_: δημοτικους. +_Ii a_: so Dav. for MSS. _iam_. _Tum ad hos_: so MSS., Dav. _aut hos_. The +omission of the verb _venire_ is very common in Cic.'s letters. _C. +Flaminium_: the general at lake Trasimene. _Aliquot annis_: one good MS. +has _annos_, cf. _T.D._ I. 4, where all the best MSS. have _annos_. The +ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed it may be +doubted whether the best writers _ever_ use any accusative in that sense, +though they do occasionally use the ablative to express duration (cf. Prop. +I. 6, 7 and Madv. _Gram._ 235, 2). _L. Cassium_: this is L. Cassius +Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (_De +Leg._ III. 35), he was the author of the _cui bono_ principle and so severe +a judge as to be called _scopulus reorum_. Pompeium: apparently the man who +made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C. +_P. Africanum_: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius, +but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. _Fratres_: Lamb. +_viros_, but cf. _Brut._ 98. _P. Scaevolam_: the pontifex, consul in the +year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against the +tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of +Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the +legal effect the bills would have. _Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur_: Halm +with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about +Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need +not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency. + +§14. _Similiter_: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have _simile_. +_Xenophanem_: so Victorius for the MSS. _Xenoplatonem_. _Ed. Rom._ (1471) +has _Cenonem_, which would point to _Zenonem_, but Cic. does not often name +Zeno of Elea. _Saturninus_: of the question why he was an enemy of +Lucullus, Goer. says _frustra quaeritur_. Saturninus was the persistent +enemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage. +_Arcesilae calumnia_: this was a common charge, cf. _Academicorum calumnia_ +in _N.D._ II. 20 and _calumnia_ in 18 and 65 of this book. So August. +_Contra Acad._ II. 1 speaks of _Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia +vel pericacia_. _Democriti verecundia_: Cic. always has a kind of +tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on _D.F._ I. 20 remarks, cf. _De Div._ +II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general _arrogantia_ of +the _physici_. _Empedocles quidem ... videatur_: cf. 74. The exordium of +his poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of +the text, see R. and P. 108. _Quale sit_: the emphasis is on _sit_, the +sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. _Quasi modo +nascentes_: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however _T.D._ II. 5 _ut +oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur_. + +§15. _haesitaverunt_: Goer. cf. _De Or._ I. 40. _Constitutam_: so in 14. +_Delitisceret_: this is the right spelling, not _delitesceret_, which one +good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. _Negavissent_: "had denied, as they +said." _Tollendus est_: a statement which is criticised in 74. _Nominibus +differentis ... dissenserunt_: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the +_Academica Posteriora_ 17, 43. _De se ipse_: very frequent in Cic. (cf. +Madv. _Gram._ 487 _b_). _Diceret_: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has +_agnosceret_ on the margin; see n. on 88. _Fannius_: in his "Annals." The +same statement is quoted in _De Or._ II. 270, _Brutus_ 299. Brutus had +written an epitome of this work of Fannius (_Ad Att._ XII. 5, 3). + +§16. _Veteribus_: Bentley's em. of MSS. _vetera_: C.F. Hermann (Schneid +_Philol._ VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps +_vetera_ and changes _incognita_ into _incondita_, comparing _De Or._ I. +197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the +word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here +is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no +knowledge, so that _incognita_ is far better. I am not at all certain that +the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us +suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not +_knowledge_, but mere _opinion_." The conj. of Kayser _veri nota_ for +_vetera_ (cf. 76) and _investigatum_ below, is fanciful and improbable. +_Quod investigata sunt_: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again +disturbs the text which since Madv. _Em._ 127 supported it (quoting _T.D._ +V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that _illa_ in the former +sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects _nihilne est +igitur actum_ as a dittographia (!) from 15 _nihilne explicatum_, and reads +_quot_ for _quod_ with Bentl. For the meaning cf. _T.D._ III. 69 and Arist. +on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. _Arcesilas Zenoni ... +obtrectans_: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school +against the other. In Plutarch _Adv. Colotem_ p. 1121 F, want of novelty is +charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by +Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno +gave, see Aug. _Contra Acad._ II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of +the _Academica Posteriora_. _Immutatione verborum_: n. on I. 33. This +phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek τροποι (_Brut._ +69) and αλληγορια in _De Or._ II. 261, where an ex. is given. +_Definitiones_: n. on 18. _Tenebras obducere_: such expressions abound in +Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (_lucem eripere_), _N.D._ +I. 6 (_noctem obfundere_) Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14 (_quasdam nebulas +obfundere_), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 _tenebrae quae patronae +Academicorum solent esse_. _Non admodum probata_: cf. the passage of +Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. _Lacyde_: the most important passages in +ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is +important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became +the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. _Tenuit_: cf. the +use of _obtinere_ in _De Or._ I. 45. _In Aeschine_: so Dav. for the +confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS. +have _hac nonne_ Christ conj. _Hagnone_ which Halm, as well as Baiter +takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed +philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is +not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known +at all, from these two passages only. + +§17. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such +patronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino +non putabant_: "Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a +sceptic by saying ουκ αγω σχολην προς ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another +passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic +than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr. occurs in +74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf. fragm. 1 of +Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7, not _verbum +de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. _Comprehensio_: cf. I. +41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. 44 _ut Democritus_. +_Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were _illustratio_ +(Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15). _Fabricemur_: cf. +87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great advocate for the +Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_: this often +resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa evidentia_: +note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin. + +§18. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be +seen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot +recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an +opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf. +n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of +which passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita +negaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of +particles in Cic., cf. 19. Ακαταληπτον: the conj. of Turnebus καταληπτον is +unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in _negaret_. _Visum_: +cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the Greek of this +definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum effictumque_ +are equivalent to εναπεσφραγισμενη και εναπομεμαγμενη in the Gk. It must +not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration +(‛ετεροιωσις) of the material substance of the soul through the action of +some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does +on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non +esset_: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by +Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv. +Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh. Hypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and +in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in +the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus +Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic. +omits to represent the words κατ' αυτο το ‛υπαρχον. Sextus _Adv. Math._ +VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes +who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The φαντασια therefore +which he had although απο ‛υπαρχοντος (proceeding from an actually existent +thing) was not κατα το ‛υπαρχον, i.e. did not truly represent that existent +thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses +it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere +quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: κριτηριον, a test to distinguish between the +unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime volt_: several things are clear, (1) +that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the +possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the καταληπτικη +φαντασια, which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views +of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. +11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans +believed all things to be ακαταληπτα, Philo held them to be καταληπτα, and +Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout +his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from +Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted +is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things +to be _in their own nature_ καταληπτα (‛οσον δε επι τη φυσει των πραγματων +αυτων καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to +disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in themselves_ were +incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to give information +about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was +nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their καταληπτικη +φαντασια professed to be able to get at _the thing in itself_, in its real +being, if then Philo did away with the καταλ. φαντ. and substituted no +other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to +reside in sense, he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the +text. Numenius treats his polemic against the καταλ. φαντ. as a mere feint +intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position +is afforded in 112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing +the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It +would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to be "_quod +impressum esset e vero_" (φαντασια απο ‛υπαρχοντος εναπομεμαγμενη), +refusing to add "_quo modo imprimi non posset a falso_ (‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο +απο μη ‛υπαρχοντος), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely +tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the δηλον or πιθανον of +Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter +that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite +judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The scarcity of references +to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his +doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or nothing to the +elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book entitled +_Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it +it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the +popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles of doubt, +to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical +works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have +afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important +for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the +new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as +genuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this +book. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the +sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single +sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these +sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_ +knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on +the truth of the individual perception of sense. + + §§19--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give + perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain + the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which + impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we + always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated + senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! + (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions + of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since + they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at + definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic + memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22). + That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would + act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false? + (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her? + There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence + must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action + is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end + to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be + discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should + be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy + too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the + Academics have been urged to allow their _dogma_ that perception is + impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades + said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the + supposition that there can be _any_ true perception (28). Antiochus + declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if + they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29). + +§19. _Sensibus_: it is important to observe that the word _sensus_ like +αισθησις means two things, (1) one of the _five_ senses, (2) an individual +act of sensation. _Deus_: for the supposed god cf. _T.D._ II. 67. _Non +videam_: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. _De remo inflexo et de +collo columbae_: cf. 79, 82. The κωπη εναλος κεκλασμενη and περιστερας +τραχηλος are frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of +the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. _Pyrrhon. Hypot._ I. +119-121, _Adv. Math._ VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day +before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 27. +_Epicurus hoc viderit_: see 79, 80. Epic. held all sensation, _per se_, to +be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343, +344, Zeller 403, footnote. _Lumen mutari_: cf. _Brut._ 261. _Intervalla ... +diducimus_: for this cf. Sext. _Pyrrh_. I. 118 πεμπτος εστι λογος (i.e. the +5th sceptic τροπος for showing sense to be untrustworthy) ‛ο παρα τας +θεσεις (_situs_) και τα διαστηματα (_intervalla_) και τους τοπους. +_Multaque facimus usque eo_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 258 παντα ποιει μεχρις +αν τρανην και πληκτικην σπαση φαντασιαν. _Sui iudicii_: see for the gen. +_M.D.F._ II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. _Persa_ V. 2, +8, quoted by Goer. _Sui cuiusque_: for this use of _suus quisque_ as a +single word see _M.D.F._ V. 46. + +§20. _Ut oculi ... cantibus_: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on +the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. _Quis est quin +cernat_: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (_D.F._ II. +27). _Umbris ... eminentia_: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses _umbra_ and +_lumen_, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. σκια and σκιασμα +are opposed to λαμπρα; cf. also σκιαγραφειν, _adumbrare_, and Aesch. +_Agam_. 1328. Cic. often applies metaphorically to oratory the two words +here used, e.g. _De Or._ III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, +21. _Inflatu_: cf. 86 (where an answer is given) and αναβολη. _Antiopam_: +of Pacuvius. _Andromacham_: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as _De Div._ +I. 23. _Interiorem_: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's _Socrates and the +Socratic Schools_, 296. _Quia sentiatur_: αισθησις being their only +κριτηριον. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to +in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. _cui adsentiatur_, comparing 39, +58; cf. also 76. _Inter eum ... et inter_: for the repetition of _inter_ +cf. _T.D._ IV. 32 and Madv. _Gram._ 470. _Nihil interesse_: if the doctrine +of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied +himself in pleasure, and _vice versa_; thus the distinction between +pleasure and pain would be obscured. _Sentiet ... insaniat_: For the +sequence cf. _D.F._ I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on _T.D._ V. 102. + +§21. _Illud est album_: these are αξιωματα, judgments of the mind, in which +alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in +Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too +long to quote entire: αισθησεσι μεν ουν μοναις λαβειν ταληθες (which +resides only in the αξιωμα) ου δυναται ανθρωπος. ... φυσει γαρ εισιν αλογοι +... δει δε εις φαντασιαν αχθηναι του τοιουτου πραγματος "τουτο λευκον εστι +και τουτο γλυκυ εστιν." τωι δε τοιουτωι πραγματι ουκετι της αισθησεως εργον +εστιν επιβαλλειν ... συνεσεως τε δει και μνημης. _Ille deinceps_: +_deinceps_ is really out of place; cf. 24 _quomodo primum_ for _pr. quom._ +_Ille equus est_: Cic. seems to consider that the αξιωμα, which affirms the +existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the +existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from +the Greek texts. _Expletam comprehensionem_: full knowledge. Here we rise +to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. _Adv. Math._ VII. +ανθρωπος εστι ζωον λογικον θνητον, νου και επιστημης δεκτικον. The Stoic +‛οροι, and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II. +208--211. _Notitiae_: this Cic. uses as a translation both of προληψις and +εννοια, for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40 _notiones rerum_ is given. +_Sine quibus_: δια γαρ των εννοιων τα πραγματα λαμβανεται Diog. VII. 42. + +§22. _Igitur_: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Consentaneum_: +so Sextus constantly uses ακολουθον. _Repugnaret_: cf. I. 19 and n. +_Memoriae certe_: n. on 106. _Continet_: cf. _contineant_ in 40. _Quae +potest esse_: Cic. nearly always writes _putat esse_, _potest esse_ and the +like, not _esse putat_ etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a +clause. _Memoria falsorum_: this difficulty is discussed in Plato +_Sophist._ 238--239. _Ex multis animi perceptionibus_: the same definition +of an art occurs in _N.D._ II. 148, _D.F._ III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II. +17, 41, Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεον +συγγεγυμνασμενων _ib._ III. 250. _Quam_: for the change from plural to +singular (_perceptio in universum_) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. _D.F._ II. 61, +_Em._ 139. _Qui distingues_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 280 ου διοισει της +ατεχνιας ‛η τεχνη. Sextus often comments on similar complaints of the +Stoics. _Aliud eiusmodi genus sit_: this distinction is as old as Plato and +Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext. +_Adv. Math._ XI. 197 who adds a third class of τεχναι called +αποτελεσματικαι to the usual θεωρητικαι and πρακτικαι, also Quint. II. 18, +1 and 2, where ποιητικη corresponds to the αποτ. of Sext. _Continget_: +"will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb _contingit_ +denotes necessarily _good_ fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on +_T.D._ III. 4. _Tractabit_: μελλει μεταχειριζεσθαι. + +§23. _Cognitio_: like Germ. _lehre_, the branch of learning which concerns +the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of καταληψις +here. _In quibus_: the antecedent is not _virtutum_, as Petrus Valentia (p. +292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but _multa_. +This is shown by _etiam_; not _merely_ the virtues but _also_ all επιστημη +depends on καταληψεις; cf. I. 40, 41, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. +_Stabilem_: βεβαιον και αμεταπτωτου. _Artem vivendi_: "_tralaticium hoc +apud omnes philosophos_" _M.D.F._ I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about ‛η +ονειροπολουμενη περι τον βιον τεχνη (_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 250) the existence +of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (_Adv. Math._ XI. 168 sq). +_Ille vir bonus_: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness +of the _sapiens_ must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. _D.F._ III. 29, +75, _T.D._ V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the σοφος in +Plato's _Gorgias_. _Potius quam aut_: Lamb. _ut_; but I think C.F. Hermann +is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. _never_ inserts _ut_ after +_potius quam_ with the subj. Tischer on _T.D._ II. 52 affirms that _ut_ is +frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. _De Off._ I. 86, +Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12 who says the _sapiens_ of the Academy must be +_desertor officiorum omnium_. _Comprehensi ... constituti_: cf. the famous +_abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit_. _Iis rebus_: note the assumption that +the _sensation_ corresponds to the _thing_ which causes it. _Adsensus sit +... possint_: nearly all edd. before Halm read _possunt_, but the subj. +expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed _vir +bonus_. Cf. Madv. _Gram._ 368. + +§24. _Primum_: out of place, see on 21. _Agere_: the dogmatist always held +that the sceptic must, if consistent, be ανενεργητος εν βιωι (Sext. _Pyrrh. +Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate τελος are made in +D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. _Cum quid agere_: cf. I. 23 for the phrase _Naturae +accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression, ‛ωμοιωμενον τη φυσει; cf. 38 and +_D.F._ V. 17, also III. 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390. +_Impellimur_: κινουμεθα, Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often. + +§25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122 +of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to +seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I. +262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42. +_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses +this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I +doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can +be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non +occurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127. + +§26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_. +_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as +αναιρειν does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The expression _dux +vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5 and Lucretius), +but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural light, _lumen_ +artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus, nec satis +lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is the same +difference between φως and φεγγος, the latter is used for the former +(φεγγος ‛ηλιου) just as _lumen_ is for _lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his +offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not often _vice versa_. Trans. "the +luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where +the φαντασια is called φεγγος. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom. +Eth._ Aristot. assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a +sufficient proof that there is a τελος. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the +frequently recurring Greek terms εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος etc., cf. Sextus +_passim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = αρχη ... τελος. +_Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be _ratio_ +above. Αποδειξις: cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. _Pyrrh. +Hyp._ II. 143 λογος δι' ‛ομολογουμενων λημματων (premisses) κατα συναγωγην +επιφοραν (conclusion) εκκαλυπτων αδηλον, also Diog. VII. 45, λογον δια των +μαλλον καταλαμβανομενων το ‛ηττον καταλαμβανομενον περαινοντα (if the +reading be right). + +§27. _Notio_: another trans. of εννοια. _Conclusisse_: although the Greeks +used συμπερασμα instead of επιφορα sometimes for the conclusion of the +syllogism, they did not use the verb συμπεραινειν which has been supposed +to correspond to _concludere_. It is more likely to be a trans. of +συναγειν, and _conclusum argumentum_ of συνακτικος λογος, which terms are +of frequent occurrence. _Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus +answers, ουκ εστιν αναγκαιον τας εκεινον (the dogmatists) δογματολογιας +προβαινειν, πλασματωδεις ‛υπαρχουσας (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367). _Sapientiae +... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv. _Gram._ +241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this book. _Lex +veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the determination of +what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy. +_Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque sit_ of the +MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which I think is +wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run _neque +dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of the +sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141. + +§28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very +frequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues +that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to +show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of +this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De +Leg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: ακολουθον ειναι. _Ut alia_: _although_ +others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a. + +§29. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14, +_Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of +course the Academics would say they did not hold this δογμα as _stabile +fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 226 +(and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they +professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_ in +_D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the +deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa +philosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so +Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_. +_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the +Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by +the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly +true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense +arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, ψιλη φασει ισον φερεται +ψιλη φασις (_A.M._ VII. 315), φασει μεν φασις επισχεθησεται (_ib._ 337). +_Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in +my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a rather unusual phrase for the +ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so κινεισθαι is perpetually used +in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I +think it very likely that the MSS. reading is right, and that the whole +expression is an imitation of the Greek ‛ικανος ειοησθω and the like. The +subj. is supported by _D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14, +3, where _ut opinor_ is thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III. +21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109, where _si placet_ is appended in a similar way. + + §§30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that + nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed + for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses + the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection + of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained + through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some + sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the + absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence. + Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on + the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the + other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between + true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be + known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. + How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility + remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be + "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is + no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known. + Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they + only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we + reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36). + +§30. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_: +_et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = παρρησια as often in Tacitus. _Abditis +rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word συνεσκιασμενος Sext. +_Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_ (n. on 26), cf. 38, +103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also 61. _Artificio_: this +word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all its senses, cf. 114 and +_De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression is sneered at in 87. +_Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS. _prima_ or _primo_, which +latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in Cicero. _Primum_ is out of +position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_, set in motion. For ‛ορμη +see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx. given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir," +rather than "source" here. It will be noted that συγκαταθεσις must take +place before the ‛ορμη is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this +theory is made in Plat. _Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv. +Math._ VII. 350 και ‛οι μεν διαφερειν αυτην των αισθησεων, ‛ως ‛οι πλειους, +‛οι δε αυτην ειναι τας αισθησεις ... ‛ης στασεως ηρξε Στρατον. All powers +of sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included +in the ‛ηγεμονικον, cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_. +"_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius +dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other +hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to +produce them. _Recondit_: so the εννοιαι are called αποκειμεναι νοησεις +(Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 373 μνημη is +called θησαυρισμος φαντασιων. _Similitudinibus_: καθ' ‛ομοιωσιν Sext. +_Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic. uses this word as including all processes by +which the mind gets to know things not immediately perceived by sense. In +_D.F._ III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, +and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best translate the word, +which, is used in the same wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so +MSS. Orelli gave _constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to +distinguish between the φυσικαι εννοιαι or κοιναι which are the προληψεις, +and those εννοιαι which are the conscious product of the reason, in the +Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and other inaccuracies +of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79. _Rerumque_: +"facts". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_, are almost +convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. I. +20. + +§31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23. +_Cognitionem_: επιστημην. _Cognitio_ is used to translate καταληψις in +_D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ... dicemus_: For the +repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future tense is odd and +unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read _dicamus_; cf. n. on +29. _Per se_: καθ' αυτην, there is no need to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut +virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is throughout this exposition treated +as the result of the exercise of the _reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in +99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows _animus_ to all animals, not merely +_anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is +therefore wrong. _Temeritate_: προπετεια, which occurs _passim_ in Sext. +The word, which is constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is +here put by way of retort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic +is called εμβροντητος for rejecting the καταληπτικη φαντασια. + +§32. _Incerta_: αδηλα. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ... abstruserit_: +"_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of the verb, and +cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far as to +complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7, 12, +διαφοραν ειναι αδηλου και ακαταληπτου, και παντα μεν ειναι ακαταληπτα ου +παντα δε αδηλα (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this book. _Docere_: +"to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the followers of +Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45. _Stellarum +numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext. e.g. +_P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is reckoned +among things αιωνιον εχοντα αγνωσιαν. So in the Psalms, God only "telleth +the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_: contemptuous; απονενοημενους +τινας. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers +to the speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15 +refers to this passage, which must have been preserved in the second +edition. + +§33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first +clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and +appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and +the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether." +The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use +the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open +to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_. +_Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute +certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the +απαραλλακτος of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf. +κοινη φαντασια αληθους και ψευδους Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410), +also 175. _Notam_: the σημειον of Sextus; cf. esp. _P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem +modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) ουδεμια εστιν αληθης +φαντασια ‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο ψευδης. _Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n. +on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus; _ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, +possit dicere_. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he +quotes, and still prefer to construe _quem_ as a strong relative, making a +pause between _quis_ and _quem_. _Visionem_: Simply another trans. of +φαντασια. _Ut Carneades_: see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 την τε πιθανην +φαντασιαν και την πιθανην ‛αμα και απερισπαστον και διεξωδευμενην (R. and +P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable +undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation. +The merely πιθανη is that sensation which at first sight, without any +further inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no +sensation is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other +synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (περισπαν, +περιελκειν) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. +This last is only called απερισπαστος when examination has shown all the +concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.) +The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The +διεξωδευμενη ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent +agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one. +Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined; +the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition +of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between +the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the +person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext. +181--189). + +§34. _Communitas_: απαραλλαξια or επιμιξια των φαντασιων; Sext. _A.M._ VII. +403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so Sext. often uses ιδιομα, e.g. _A. M._ +IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_ for _nota_, merely from love of variety. +The _in_ before _communi_, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is +perfectly sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after +_notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186. _Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected +the corrupt MSS. readings, comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W. +Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13 rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, +"_Non unum maledictum appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi +vociferatio_." He is wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word +_once_ in the plural (_Ad Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20, +and elsewhere. _Perspicua_: εναργη, a term used with varying signification +by all the later Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what +_they_ call 'true'." _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_: +Halm retains the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is +quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both +trans. of καταλαμβανεσθαι; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus +described in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum +vocabulis idem declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of +ακριβως or κατ' ακριβειαν (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123). +_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._ +IV. 76. _Inaniter_ = κενως = ψευδως. Cf. n. on I. 35, also II. 47, _D.F._ +V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II. 120, 126, 140 (_per +se moveri_), Greek κενοπαθειν (Sext. _P.H._ II. 49), κενοπαθεια (= _inanis +motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184), κενοπαθηματα και αναπλασματα της διανοιας +(_ib._ VIII. 354), διακενος ‛ελκυσμος (_ib._ VII. 241), διακενος φαντασια +(_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase κινημα της διανοιας. For the +meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. απολειπειν is constantly +used as the opposite of αναιρειν (_tollere_). + +§35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any +mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ πιθανη φαντασια is +here meant; see 33. + +§36. _Ex circumspectione_, etc.: the διεξωδευμενη; see n. on 33. _Primum +quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II. p. 796. +_Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting a number +of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each _appearance_ to +the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no faith in any +_appearance_ even if you have gone through the process required by +Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf. 47, and +also 7. _Insigne_: σημειον, the same as _nota_ and _signum_ above. _Quo +obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm keeps. Cf. _quam +obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33. _Argumentum_: Cic. seems +to be thinking of the word τεκμηριον, which, however, the Stoics hardly +use. _Id quod significatur_: το σημειωντον in Sext. + + §§37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must + either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to + phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a + firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away + with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39). + +§37. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_). +_Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23. +_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless, +cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the +assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 το μεν γαρ +φαντασιωθηναι αβουλητον ην). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9, _N.D._ I. +69 + +§38. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the +sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_: +cf. εικειν, ειξις in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51, των δε +αισθητικων μετα ειξεως και συγκαταθεσεως γινονται [‛αι φαντασια]; also 66 +of this book. Οικειον: cf. 34. _Adsentitur statim_: this really contradicts +a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20. _Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra +potestate_: this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the _Ac. Post._, which +see. + +§39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral +action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri +aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on +25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the +change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._ +V. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29. + + §§40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give + a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different + classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong + arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have + been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly + capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must + be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to + distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly + true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_, + while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now + sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly + perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also + a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) + false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are + indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. + The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are + partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a + reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an + unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions + into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from + sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either + class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known + sensation."] + +§40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of θεμελιος or the like; cf. +‛ωσπερ θεμελιος in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method, like τεχνη, cf. +_M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_: the general character which +attaches to all φαντασιαι; _genera_ the different classes of φαντασιαι. +_Totidem verbis_: of course with a view to showing that nothing really +corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the _reductio ad +absurdum_ method. _Contineant ... quaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65 +_una res videtur causam continere_. _Quae ita_: it is essential throughout +this passage to distinguish clearly the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the +_thing_ which causes it. Here the _things_ are meant; two _things_ are +supposed to cause two _sensations_ so similar that the person who has one +of the _sensations_ cannot tell from which of the two _things_ it comes. +Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide +_things_ into those which can be perceived (known with certainty) and those +which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the sceptic is not concerned to +prove the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two +dissimilar things, it is enough if he can show that human faculties are not +perfect enough to discern whatever difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera +sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that +truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of +_things_, though not of _sensations_. If we could only pierce _through_ a +sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to +believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume +that _sensation_ and _thing_ correspond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 περι μεν +του φαισθαι τοιον η τοιον το ‛υποκειμενον (i.e. the thing from which the +appearance proceeds) ουδεις ισως αμφισβητει, περι δε του ει τοιουτον εστιν +‛οποιον φαινεται ζητειται. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as +some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause +sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the +things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them. +_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very +remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from +_recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101. + +§41. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf. +Munio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. +n. on I. 29. + +§42. _Proposita_: cf. προτασεις _passim_ in Sext. _In sensus_: = _in ea, +quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: "general +experience" εμπειρια, cf. _N.D._ I. 83. _Quam obscurari volunt_: cf. I. 33. +_quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is against Cic.'s +usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton without being +ingenious. _De reliquis_: i.e. _iis quae a sensibus ducuntur_. _In +singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_, not _things_, to +which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly apply. _Adiuncta_: +Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) πασηι τη δοκουσηι αληθει καθεσταναι +ευρισκεται τις απαραλλακτος ψευδης, also VII. 438, etc. + + §§43--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a + definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition + is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being + thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes + of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only + proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false + sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge + therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is + none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of + _visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45). + +§43. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv. +_Gram._ 214 b. _Luminibus_: cf. 101. _Nihilo magis_: = ουδεν μαλλον, which +was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. _P.H._ I. 14. _Num +illa definitio ... transferri_: I need hardly point out that the ‛ορος of +the Academics was merely founded on probability, just as their "truth" was +(cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to the question, "probably +it cannot, but I will not affirm it." _Vel illa vera_: these words seem to +me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. _Vel_ = "even" i.e. if +_even_ the definition is firmly known, the thing, which is more important, +must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have a pointed mocking repetition +like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In falsum_: note that _falsum_ = +_aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 209 μοχθηρους ‛ορους +ειναι τους περιεχοντας τι των μη προσοντων τοις ‛οριστοις, and the +schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet latior esse definito suo_. _Minime +volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_ +hardly ever stands for _omn. rebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter +rebus_ for _partibus_. A little closer attention to the subject matter +would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_, +_T.D._ III. 24, where _genus_ = division, _pars_ = subdivision. + +§44. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at +the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of εναντιουσθαι as Goer. says, but +of απανταν, which occurs very frequently in Sext. _Sumpta_: the two +premisses are in Gk. called together λημματα, separately λημμα and +προσληψις (_sumptio et adsumptio_ _De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber +points out, Cic. does sometimes use this word like _ratio_ (συλλογισμος), +cf. _De Leg._ I. 48 _conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26. +_Profiteatur_: so ‛υπισχνεισθαι is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII. +283. _Patefacturum_: n. on 26, εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος, δηλωτικος (the +last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ... +nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_, +_in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties +were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real +things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which +either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly +represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference. +_Non iungitur_: a supposed case of διαρτησις, which is opposed to +συναρτησις and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430. + +§45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the +strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in +remissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight +anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui +videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus' +view of sensation see n. on 79, 80. + + §§46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate + clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due to two causes, (1) they + do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these + phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic + paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom + sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is + easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be + mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom + sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The + dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command + assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so + closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48) + +§46. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that +the clause _quanta sint_ is inserted παρενθετικως! Orelli actually follows +him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_. _Interrogationibus_: cf. +I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_ and _conclusio_ are +convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms are very frequently +called ερωτησεις, and that he often introduces a new argument by ερωταται +και τουτο, when there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all. +_Dissolvere_: απολυεσθαι in Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44. + +§47. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus +in _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic. +cf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very +common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the +Letters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be +false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by +the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it +may be a mere φαντασμα or αναπλασμα της διανοιας, a phantom behind which +there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis videantur_: for the support +given by Stoics to all forms of divination see Zeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7, +etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from _dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo +... nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage can only be properly +explained in connection with 50 and with the general plan of the Academics +expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate it as follows. The +whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in 41 and 42 viz. +_omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism in 50 shows that +the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known to be Stoic, +_omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_) sensations +which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why +can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable as to closely +resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty distinguishable from the +true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable from the true (this +meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by 40, where see n.)? +_Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as have only a slight +degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding stages the +resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_ is a sort of tertiary +predicate after _efficere_ ("to manufacture so as to be probable"). It +_must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or the whole sense will +be inverted and this section placed out of harmony with 50. _Plane +proxime_: = _quam proxime_ of 36. + +§48. _Ipsa per sese_: simply = _inaniter_ as in 34, 47, i.e. without the +approach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as +διανοια is in Greek, to express our "imagination." _Non numquam_: so Madv. +for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_ with an +interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III. 58 for +_sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz +to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as +those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here is merely +"as," "for instance," cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_ here is a +repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of the +sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before +_esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ +VII. 241 ητοι των εκτος η των εν ‛ημιν παθων, and the two classes of _falsa +visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there _are_ false +sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not +be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable +from the true? The rest exactly as in 47. + + §§49--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and + therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity + between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the + impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We + contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we + require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we + make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our + opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our + waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say they, "you allow that the + wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he + will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about + dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53). + +§49. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and +similar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: αυτα τα κεφαλαια. _Interrogationis_: the +_sorites_ was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. _De Div._ +II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his +proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary), _Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n. +on 92. _Hoc vocant_: i.e. _hoc genus_, cf. _D.F._ III. 70 _ex eo genere, +quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50 _ille sorites, quo nihil +putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read _hos_, which indeed in 136 is +a necessary em. for MSS. _hoc_. _Tale visum_: i.e. _falsum_. _Dormienti_: +sc. τινι. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.: cf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_: +not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf. _M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._ +II. 112, and an instance of _proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75. +_Vitium_: cf. _vitiosum_ above. + +§50. _Omnia deum posse_: this was a principle generally admitted among +Stoics at least, see _De Div._ II. 86. For the line of argument here cf. +_De Div._ II. 106 _fac dare deos, quod absurdum est_. _Eadem_: this does +not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when +one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. +on 40. _Similes_: after this _sunt_ was added by Madv. _In suo genere +essent_: substitute _esse viderentur_ for _essent_, and you get the real +view of the Academic, who would allow that _things in their essence_ are +divisible into sharply-defined _genera_, but would deny that the +_sensations_ which proceed from or are caused by the _things_, are so +divisible. + +§51. _Una depulsio_: cf. 128 (_omnium rerum una est definitio +comprehendendi_), _De Div._ II. 136 (_omnium somniorum una ratio est_). _In +quiete_: = _in somno_, a rather poetical usage. _Narravit_: Goer., Orelli, +Klotz alter into _narrat_, most wantonly. _Visus Homerus_, etc.: this +famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his _Annals_, is referred to by Lucr. +I. 124, Cic. _De Rep._ VI. 10 (_Somn. Scip._ c. 1), Hor. _Epist._ II. 1, +50. _Simul ut_: rare in Cic., see Madv. _D.F._ II. 33, who, however, unduly +restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it +to stand, the _ut_ precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid +writing _ac_ before a vowel, so that in _D.F._ II. 33 _ut_ should probably +be written (with Manut. and others) for _et_ which Madv. ejects. + +§52. _Eorumque_: MSS. om. _que_. Dav. wrote _ac_ before _eorum_, this +however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n. +on 34. For the argument see n. on 80 _quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non +quid videatur_. _Primum interest_: for om. of _deinde_ cf. 45, 46. +_Imbecillius_: cf. I. 41. _Edormiverunt_: "have slept _off_ the effects," +cf. αποβριζειν in Homer. _Relaxentur_: cf. ανιεναι της οργης Aristoph. +_Ran._ 700, _relaxare_ is used in the neut. sense in _D.F._ II. 94. +_Alcmaeonis_: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by Cic., e.g. _D.F._ +IV. 62. + +§53. _Sustinet_: επεχει; see on 94. _Aliquando sustinere_: the point of the +Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the εποχη of +the _sapiens_ becomes _habitual_; he gives up the attempt to distinguish +between true and false _visa_. Lucullus answers that, did no distinction +exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even in the sane condition. +_Confundere_: so 58, 110, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 56 (συγχεουσι τα πραγματα), +_ib._ VIII. 157 (συγχεομεν τον βιον), VIII. 372 (‛ολην συγχεει την +φιλοσοφον ζητησιν), Plut. _De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos_ p. 1077 (‛ως +παντα πραγματα συγχεουσι). _Utimur_: "we have to put up with," so χρησθαι +is used in Gk. _Ebriosorum_: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than +_vinolenti_ above. _Illud attendimus_: Goer., and Orelli write _num illud_, +but the emphatic _ille_ is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a +good ex. occurs in 136. _Proferremus_: this must apparently be added to the +exx. qu. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "_non id +quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit_." As such passages are +often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as +elliptic constructions in which a _condition_ is expressed without its +_consequence_. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "_tu dictis +Albane maneres_" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy +word, Alban!" Here the condition "_if_ thou hadst kept, etc." stands +without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the +kind. Such a condition may be expressed without _si_, just as in Eng. +without "_if_," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek +optative to express a wish (with ει γαρ, etc., and even without ει) is +susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points +of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the functions +of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 seems to imply that he +prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in his _Gram._ 351 +_b_, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.] + + §§54--63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do + away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is + childish (54). They press into their service the old physical + philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them + (55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every + particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists, + who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The + Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and + Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which + hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are + able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that + they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between + individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). + Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they + profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are + indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified εποχη of Arcesilas + (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and + about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the + panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? + (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of + your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended + Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then + Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus + were to induce me to change my view (63). + +§54. _Ne hoc quidem_: the common trans. "not even" for "_ne quidem_" is +often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this _either_," cf. n. on +I. 5. _Habeant_: the slight alteration _habeat_ introduced by Goer. and +Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. _Quod nolunt_: cf. 44. _An +sano_: Lamb. _an ut sano_, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads. +_Similitudines_: cf. 84--86. The impossibility of distinguishing between +twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the +sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely +alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically +refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one +deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money +back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus _A.M._ VII. 408--410. +_Negat esse_: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places _esse_ second, +especially at the end of a clause. _Cur eo non estis contenti_: Lucullus +here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the _amount_ of +similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two +phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard +against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could. +_Quod rerum natura non patitur_: again Lucullus confounds _essential_ with +_phenomenal_ difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on 50. _Nulla re +differens_: cf. the _nihil differens_ of 99, the substitution of which here +would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the +common Gk. term απαραλλακτος (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 252, etc.). _Ulla +communitas_: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of +Lamb. _nulla_ after the fine note of Madv. (_Em._ 154), approved by Halm +and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated +thus _suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut +pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas_ (ουδε ‛υπαρχει επιμιγη +απαραλλακτος). This opinion is negatived by _non patitur ut_ and it will be +evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs +(_est_) into the subjunctive. The change of _ulla_ into _nulla_ is in no +way needed. _Ut_ [_sibi_] _sint_: _sibi_ is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a +note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of +Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read _nulla re +differens communitas visi? Sint et ova_ etc. omitting _ulla_ and _ut_ and +changing _visi_ into _sibi_ (cf. Faber's em. _novas_ for _bonas_ in 72). +This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in +the second vol. of his _Adversaria_. Lamb. reads _at tibi sint_, Dav. _at +si vis, sint_, Christ _ut tibi sint_, Bait. _ut si sint_ after C.F.W. +Muller, I should prefer _sui_ for _sibi_ (SVI for SIBI). B is very +frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in. _Eosdem_: +once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional misconception +of the sceptic position; see n. on 50. Before leaving this section, I may +point out that the επιμιγη or επιμιξια των φαντασιων supplies Sext. with +one of the sceptic τροποι, see _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 124. + +§55. _Irridentur_: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the +constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. _A.M._ IX. 1. _Absolute ita +paris_: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets _ita_; if any change +be needed, it would be better to place it before _undique_. For this +opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. _Et eo quidem innumerabilis_: this is +the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has +yet been proposed, cf. 125. _Nihil differat, nihil intersit_: these two +verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g._D.F._ III. 25. + +§56. _Potiusque_: this adversative use of _que_ is common with _potius_, +e.g._D.F._ I. 51. Cf. _T.D._ II. 55 _ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum +est, idque raro_, also _ac potius_, _Ad Att._ I. 10, etc. _Proprietates_: +the ιδιοτητες or ιδιωματα of Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the +whole question at issue between dogmatism and scepticism. _Cognoscebantur_: +Dav. _dignoscebantur_, Walker _internoscebantur_. The MSS. reading is +right, cf. 86. _Consuetudine_: cf. 42, "experience". _Minimum_: an adverb +like _summum_. + +§57. _Dinotatas_: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not +recognise the word. Most edd. change it into _denotatas_. _Artem_: τεχνην, +a set of rules. _In proverbio_: so _venire in proverbium_, _in proverbii +usum venire_, _proverbii locum obtinere_, _proverbii loco dici_ are all +used. _Salvis rebus_: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. _Ad Fam._ IV. 1. +_Gallinas_: cf. fragm. 19 of the _Acad. Post._ The similarity of eggs was +discussed _ad nauseam_ by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic +actually wrote a book entitled, ωι σκοπια (egg investigation) η περι +σοφιστειας προς Ακαδημαικους, mentioned by Suidas. + +§58. _Contra nos_: the sense requires _nos_, but all Halm's MSS. except one +read _vos_. _Non internoscere_: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is +correct, though Orelli omits _non_. The sense is, "we are quite content not +to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be +led into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive +assertion about the eggs." _Adsentiri_: for the passive use of this verb +cf. 39. _Par est_: so Dav. for _per_, which most MSS. have. The older edd. +and Orelli have _potest_, with one MS. _Quasi_: the em. of Madv. for the +_quam si_ of the MSS. _Transversum digitum_: cf. 116. _Ne confundam omnia_: +cf. 53, 110. _Natura tolletur_: this of course the sceptics would deny. +They refused to discuss the nature of _things in themselves_, and kept to +_phenomena_. _Intersit_: i.e. _inter visa_. _In animos_: Orelli with one +MS. reads _animis_; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and +Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) "_imprimere_ wird klas sisch verbunden _in +aliqua re_, nicht _in aliquam rem_," will require modification. _Species et +quasdam formas_: ειδη και γενη, _quasdam_ marks the fact that _formas_ is a +trans. I have met with no other passage where any such doctrine is assigned +to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is absurd, for surely +it must always be easier to distinguish between two _genera_ than between +two individuals. If the _non_ before _vos_ were removed a better sense +would be given. It has often been inserted by copyists when _sed_, _tamen_, +or some such word, comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage +of Cic _Ad Quintum Fratrem_, II. 11, discussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed. +3. + +§59. _Illud vero perabsurdum_: note the omission of _est_, which often +takes place after the emphatic pronoun. _Impediamini_: cf. n. on 33. _A +veris_: if _visis_ be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the +Academic belief, if _rebus_ be meant, it is wide of the mark. _Id est ... +retentio_: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. 6, +8. _Constitit_: from _consto_, not from _consisto_ cf. 63 _qui tibi +constares_. _Si vera sunt_: cf. 67, 78, 112, 148. The _nonnulli_ are Philo +and Metrodorus, see 78. _Tollendus est adsensus_: i.e. even that qualified +assent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. _Adprobare_: this +word is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n. +on 104. _Id est peccaturum_: "which is equivalent to sinning," cf. I. 42. +_Iam nimium etiam_: note _iam_ and _etiam_ in the same clause. + +§60. _Pro omnibus_: note _omnibus_ for _omnibus rebus_. _Ista mysteria_: +Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were +_servata et pro mysteriis custodita_ by the New Academics. The notion that +the Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while +they had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the +reactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and +may perhaps from a passage of Augustine, _C. Ac._ III. 41 (whose authority +must have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller +534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p. +279), and all succeeding inquirers. _Auctoritate_: cf. 8, 9. _Utroque_: +this neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv. +_Gram._ 214 c. + +§61. _Amicissimum_: "_because_ you are my dear friend". _Commoveris_: a +military term, cf. _De Div._ II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. 53. +_Sequere_: either this is future, as in 109, or _sequeris_, the constant +form in Cic. of the pres., must be read. _Approbatione omni_: the word +_omni_ is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf. +59. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 74, and _D.F._ I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in +reproving Torquatus for using the phrase _sensus tolli_, on the ground that +the Academics swept away not _sensus_ but _iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis_. +Goer. qu. Plin. _N.H._ III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v. +_Cimmerii_, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to +Bauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. _Deus +aliquis_: so the best edd. without comment, although they write _deus +aliqui_ in 19. It is difficult to distinguish between _aliquis_ and +_aliqui_, _nescio quis_ and _nescio qui_, _si quis_ and _si qui_ (for the +latter see n. on 81). As _aliquis_ is substantival, _aliqui_ adjectival, +_aliquis_ must not be written with impersonal nouns like _terror_ (_T.D._ +IV. 35, V. 62), _dolor_ (_T.D._ I. 82, _Ad Fam._ VII. 1, 1), _casus_ (_De +Off._ III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g. +_deus aliqui_ (_T.D._ I. 23, IV. 35), _deus aliquis_ (_Lael._ 87, _Ad Fam._ +XIV. 7, 1), _anularius aliqui_ (86 of this book), _magistratus aliquis_ +(_In Verr._ IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person +_aliquis_ ought to be written (_Myrmecides_ in 120, see my n.). +_Dispiciendum_: not _despiciendum_, cf. _M.D.F._ II. 97, IV. 64, also _De +Div._ II. 81, _verum dispicere_. _Iis vinculis_, etc. this may throw light +on fragm. 15 of the _Acad. Post._, which see. + +§62. _Motum animorum_: n. on 34. _Actio rerum_: here _actio_ is a pure +verbal noun like πραξις, cf. _De Off._ I. 83, and expressions like _actio +vitae_ (_N.D._ I. 2), _actio ullius rei_ (108 of this book), and the +similar use of _actus_ in Quintilian (_Inst. Or._ X. 1, 31, with Mayor's +n.) _Iuratusque_: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads _iratus_. +_Comperisse_: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to +Catiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic. +was often taunted. See _Ad Fam._ V. 5, 2, _Ad Att._ I. 14, 5. _Licebat_: +this is the reading of the best MSS., not _liquebat_, which Goer., Kl., Or. +have. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy +see 3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. 46 with respect to Catulus, in +most of which Lucullus is also mentioned. + +§63. _Quod ... fecerat, ut_: different from the constr. treated by Madv. +_Gram._ 481 b. _Quod_ refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration, +which the clause introduced by _ut_ defines, "which admiration he had shown +... to such an extent that, etc." _Iocansne an_: this use of _ne ... an_ +implies, Madv. says (on _D.F._ V. 87), more doubt than the use of _ne_ +alone as in _vero falsone_. _Memoriter_: nearly all edd. before Madv. make +this mean _e memoria_ as opposed to _de scripto_; he says, "_laudem habet +bonae et copiosae memoriae_" (on _D.F._ I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in +the _Antibarbarus_, ed. 4. _Censuerim_: more modest than _censeo_, see +Madv. _Gram._ 380. _Tantum enim non te modo monuit_: edd. before Madv., +seeing no way of taking _modo_ exc. with _non_, ejected it. Madv. (_Em._ +160) retains it, making it mean _paulo ante_. On the other hand, Halm after +Christ asserts that _tantum non_ = μονον ου occurs nowhere else in Cic. +Bait. therefore ejects _non_, taking _tantum_ as _hoc tantum, nihil +praeterea_. Livy certainly has the suspected use of _tantum non_. +_Tribunus_: a retort comes in 97, 144. _Antiochum_: cf. I. 13. +_Destitisse_: on the difference between _memini_ followed by the pres. and +by the perf. inf. consult Madv. _Gram._ 408 _b_, obs. 2. + + §§64--71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of + Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be + answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my + character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and + would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate + inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to + assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must + deal with the _sapiens_, whose characteristic it is never to err in + giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the _sapiens_ ever + gives his assent he will be obliged to _opine_, but he never will + _opine_ therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and + Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is + possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so + the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument + must tend to show that _perception_ in the Stoic sense is impossible + (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted, + what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some + think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more + probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other + schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for + an _argumentum ad hominem_ (71). + +§64. _Quadam oratione_: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not +_quandam orationem_ as Lamb., Orelli. _De ipsa re_: cf. _de causa ipsa_ +above. _Respondere posse_: for the om. of _me_ before the infin, which has +wrongly caused many edd. either to read _respondere_ (as Dav., Bait.) or to +insert _me_ (as Lamb.), see n. on I. 7. + +§65. _Studio certandi_: = φιλονεικια. _Pertinacia ... calumnia_: n. on 14. +_Iurarem_: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of his +consulship. + +§66. _Turpissimum_: cf. I. 45, _N.D._ I. 1. _Opiner_: _opinio_ or δοξα is +judgment based on insufficient grounds. _Sed quaerimus de sapiente_: cf. +115, _T.D._ IV. 55, 59 also _De Or._ III. 75 _non quid ego sed quid +orator_. _Magnus ... opinator_: Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 31 qu. this +passage wrongly as from the _Hortensius_. He imitates it, _ibid._ I. 15 +_magnus definitor_. _Qua fidunt_, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s +_Aratea_, and are quoted in _N.D._ II. 105, 106. _Phoenices_: the same fact +is mentioned by Ovid, _Fasti_ III. 107, _Tristia_ IV. 3, 1. _Sed Helicen_: +the best MSS. om. _ad_, which Orelli places before _Helicen_. _Elimatas_: +the MSS. are divided between this and _limatas_. _Elimare_, though a very +rare word occurs _Ad Att._ XVI. 7, 3. _Visis cedo_: cf. n. on 38. _Vim +maximam_: so _summum munus_ is applied to the same course of action in +_D.F._ III. 31. _Cogitatione_: "idea". _Temeritate_: cf. I. 42, _De Div._ +I. 7, and the charge of προπετεια constantly brought against the dogmatists +by Sext. _Praepostere_: in a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing +first. + +§67. _Aliquando ... opinabitur_: this of course is only true if you grant +the Academic doctrine, _nihil posse percipi_. _Secundum illud ... etiam +opinari_: it seems at first sight as though _adsentiri_ and _opinari_ ought +to change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies +in the words _secundum illud_, which, it has been supposed, must refer back +to the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be +translated thus, "Carneades sometimes granted _as a second premiss_ the +following statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine" the difficulty +vanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) _Si ulli rei_, +etc. as above, (2) _adsentietur autem aliquando_, (3) _opinabitur igitur_. + +§68. _Adsentiri quicquam_: only with neuter pronouns like this could +_adsentiri_ be followed by an accusative case. _Sustinenda est_: εφεκτεον. +_Iis quae possunt_: these words MSS. om. _Tam in praecipiti_: for the +position of _in_ cf. n. on I. 25. The best MSS. have here _tamen in_. Madv. +altered _tamen_ to _tam_ in n. on _D.F._ V. 26. The two words are often +confused, as in _T.D._ IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. 16. _Sin autem_, etc.: cf. +the passage of Lactantius _De Falsa Sapientia_ III. 3, qu. by P. Valentia +(p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) _si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates +docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est_. +_Nitamur ... percipi_: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The +construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect _hoc_, or some +such word, to have fallen out between _igitur_ and _nihil_. + +§69. _Non acrius_: one of the early editions omits _non_ while Goer. reads +_acutius_ and puts a note of interrogation at _defensitaverat_. M. _Em._ +161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of +Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments +against it. _Quis enim_: so Lamb. for MSS. _quisquam enim_. _Excogitavit_: +on interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv. +_Gram._ 450. _Eadem dicit_: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken +without this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on +132. _Sensisse_: = _iudicasse_, n. on I. 22. _Mnesarchi ... Dardani_: see +_Dict. Biogr._ + +§70. _Revocata est_: Manut. here wished to read _renovata_, cf. n. on I. +14. _Nominis dignitatem_, etc.: hence Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 41 calls him +_foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus_ (that _tulchan_ Platonist). _Gloriae +causa_: cf. Aug. _ibid._ II. 15 _Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam +veritatis_. _Facere dicerent_: so Camerarius for the MSS. _facerent_. +_Sustinere_: cf. 115 _sustinuero Epicureos_. _Sub Novis_: Faber's brilliant +em. for the MSS. _sub nubes_. The _Novae Tabernae_ were in the forum, and +are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In _De Or._ II. 266 a story is told +of Caesar, who, while speaking _sub Veteribus_, points to a "_tabula_" +which hangs _sub Novis_. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by +comparing that of Manut. _sub nube_, and that of Lamb. _nisi sub nube_. I +have before remarked that _b_ is frequently written in MSS. for _v_. +_Maenianorum_: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were +probably named from their inventor like _Vitelliana_, _Vatinia_ etc. + +§71. _Quoque ... argumento_: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread +is picked up by _quod argumentum_ near the end. _Utrum_: the neuter +pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by +_ne_ and _an_. The same usage is found in _D.F._ II. 60, _T.D._ IV. 9, and +must be carefully distinguished from the use of _utrum ... ne ... an_, +which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g _De Invent._ II. 115 _utrum +copiane sit agri an penuria consideratur_. On this point cf. M. _Em._ 163, +_Gram._ 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. _Verr._ IV. 73. _Honesti inane nomen +esse_: a modern would be inclined to write _honestum_, in apposition to +_nomen_, cf. _D.F._ V. 18 _voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum_. +_Voluptatem_ etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called ‛ο μεταθεμενος) +from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. _T.D._ II. 60, Diog. Laert. VII. 166--7. +_A vero_: "coming from a reality," cf. 41, n. _Is curavit_: Goer. reads +_his_, "_solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire_," says Madv. The scribes +often prefix _h_ to parts of the pronoun _is_, and Goer. generally +patronises their vulgar error. + + §§72--78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a + revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers + of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge, + and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether (72, 73). Empedocles, + Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You + said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why? + Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato + pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do + not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus + stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience. + You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he + admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75). + The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to + themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held + strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from _opinion_. + Arcesilas agreed but this without _knowledge_ was impossible. + _Knowledge_ consists of _perceptions_. Arcesilas therefore demanded a + definition of _perception_. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is + the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with _opinion_ + and _perception_, and the εποχη of Arcesilas follows at once (77, 78). + +§72. _De antiquis philosophis_: on account of the somewhat awkward constr. +Lamb. read _antiquos philosophos_. _Popularis_: cf. 13. _Res non bonas_: +MSS. om. _non_, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber +ingeniously supposed the true reading to be _novas_, which would be written +_nobas_, and then pass into _bonas_. _Nivem nigram_: this deliverance of +Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In _P.H._ I. 33 he quotes +it as an instance of the refutation of φαινομενα by means of νοουμενα, +"Αναξαγορας τωι λευκην ειναι την χιονα, ανετιθει ‛οτι χιων εστιν ‛υδορ +πεπηγος το δε ‛υδορ εστι μελαν και ‛η χιων αρα μελαινα." There is an +obscure joke on this in _Ad Qu. Fratrem_ II. 13, 1 _risi nivem atram ... +teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat_. +_Sophistes_: here treated as the demagogue of philosophy. _Ostentationis_: += επιδειξεος. + +§73. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always +exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans, +cf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42. +_Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse +aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse +videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non +obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a +reference here to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., by which he meant that +knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as shown by +sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a γνησιη +γνωσις, dealing with the realities of material existence, the atoms and the +void, which exist ετεηι and not merely νομωι as appearances do. See R. and +P. 51. + +§74. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of +Empedocles about the possibility of επιστημη see the remarks of Sextus +_A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "_patet errare eos qui +scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_." _Sonum fundere_: similar +expressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides, +Xenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with +scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but +held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_ +I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_: +Dav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, μεμψαιτο δ' αν τις Παρμενιδου την +στιχοποιιαν. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where +the verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_: +for the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41. +_Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_: +cf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words +referred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 εοικα γουν τουτου σμικρωι τινι αυτωι +τουτωι σοφωτερος ειναι, ‛οτι α μη οιδα ουδε οιομαι ειδεναι, a very +different statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets +it (cf. R. and P. 148). That επιστημη in the strict sense is impossible, is +a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists. _De Platone_: +the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon Plato. The +dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham knowledge, all +assume that the real επιστημη is attainable. _Ironiam_: the word was given +in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio persequi_: n. on 17. + +§75. _Videorne_: = _nonne videor_, as _videsne_ = _nonne vides_. _Imitari +numquam nisi_: a strange expression for which Manut. conj. _imitari? num +quem_, etc., Halm _nullum unquam_ in place of _numquam_. Bait. prints the +reading of Man., which I think harsher than that of the MSS. _Minutos_: for +the word cf. _Orat._ 94, also _De Div._ I. 62 _minuti philosophi_, _Brut._ +256 _minuti imperatores_. _Stilponem_, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P. +177--182. σοφισματα: Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here +the translation _cavillationes_, to which Seneca _Ep._ 116 refers, cf. +Krische, p. 65. _Fulcire porticum_: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch". +Cf. the anonymous line ει μη γαρ ην Χρυσιππος, ουκ αν ην Στοα. _Quae in +consuetudine probantur_: n. on 87. _Nisi videret_: for the tense of the +verb, see Madv. _Gram._ 347 _b_, obs. 2. + +§76. _Quid ... philosophi_: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv. +and followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this +reading, which only requires the alteration of _Cyrenaei_ into _Cyrenaici_ +(now made by all edd. on the ground that _Cyrenaeus_ is a citizen of +Cyreno, _Cyrenaicus_ a follower of Aristippus) and the insertion of _tibi_. +I see no difficulty in the _qui_ before _negant_, at which so many edd. +take offence. _Tactu intimo_: the word ‛αφη I believe does not occur in +ancient authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was +παθος. From 143 (_permotiones intimas_) it might appear that Cic. is +translating either παθος or κινησις. For a clear account of the school see +Zeller's _Socrates_, for the illustration of the present passage pp +293--300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. and P. 162 sq. _Quo quid colore_: +cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 191 (qu. Zeller _Socrates_ 297, R. and P. 165). +_Adfici se_: = πασχειν. _Quaesieras_: note the plup. where Eng. idiom +requires the perfect or aorist. _Tot saeculis_: cf. the same words in 15. +_Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis_: cf. _summis ingeniis, maximis studiis_ in +15. _Obtrectandi_: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in 16; cf. +also I. 44. + +§77. _Expresserat_: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. 7 and I. 19. +_Exprimere_ and _dicere_ are always sharply distinguished by Cic., the +latter merely implying the mechanic exercise of utterance, the former the +moulding and shaping of the utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. _Orat._ +3, 69, and _Ad Att._ VIII. 11, 1; also _De Or._ I. 32, _De Div._ I. 79, qu. +by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. _exposuerat_ is therefore +needless. _Fortasse_: "we may suppose". _Nec percipere_, etc.: cf. 68, n. +_Tum illum_: a change from _ille, credo_ (sc. _respondit_), the _credo_ +being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after _ita +definisse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 13 (who quotes exx.); also the construction +with _ita iudico_ in 113. _Ex eo, quod esset_: cf. 18, n. _Effictum_: so +Manut. for MSS. _effectum_, cf. 18. _Ab eo, quod non est_: the words _non +est_ include the two meanings "is non existent," and "is different from +what it seems to be"--the two meanings of _falsum_ indeed, see n. on 47. +_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 40, 84. MSS. have _eius modi_, altered by Dav. _Recte +... additum_: the semicolon at _Arcesilas_ was added by Manutius, who is +followed by all edd. This involves taking _additum_ = _additum est_, an +ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. _Opusc._ I. 448, _D.F._ I. +43, _Gram._ 479 a. I think it quite possible that _recte consensit additum_ +should be construed together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly +made." For the omission of _esse_ in that case cf. Madv. _Gram._ 406, and +such expressions as _dicere solebat perturbatum_ in 111, also _ita +scribenti exanclatum_ in 108. _Recte_, which with the ordinary stopping +expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain in +point. Qy, should _concessit_ be read, as in 118 _concessisse_ is now read +for MSS. _consensisse_? _A vero_: cf. 41. + +§78. _Quae adhuc permanserit_: note the subj., "which is of such a nature +as to have lasted". _Nam illud ... pertinebat_: by _illud_ is meant the +argument in defence of εποχη given in 67; by _nihil ... pertinebat_ nothing +more is intended than that there was no _immediate_ or _close_ connection. +Cf. the use of _pertinere_ in _D.F._ III. 55. _Clitomacho_: cf. n. on 59. + + §§79--90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in + spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting + like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation + can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of whom + you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound + senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our + vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you, + _we_ desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not + the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god + because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you + want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the + sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a + little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed, + too, he appears to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies in a + nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is + disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a + false one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has mistaken P. for + Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say + that no such indistinguishable resemblances _exist_. Never mind, they + _seem_ to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw + all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its + own _genus_ this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that + two sensations _are_ absolutely similar, it is enough that human + faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of + signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to rival your chicken + rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or + hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of + the art with which nature has constructed the senses! (86) But about + physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the + senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the + sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of + the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his + Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides + disprove your point (88, 89). In their case at least 'mind and eyes + agreed. It is no good to talk about the saner moments of such people; + the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time + they were affected? (90) + +§79. _Communi loco_: τοπω, that of blinking facts which cannot be +disproved, see 19. _Quod ne_ [_id_]: I have bracketed _id_ with most edd. +since Manut. If, however, _quod_ be taken as the conjunction, and not as +the pronoun, _id_ is not altogether insupportable. _Heri_: cf. Introd. 55. +_Infracto remo_: n. on 19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher +Pantheism"--"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool". +_Manent illa omnia, iacet_: this is my correction of the reading of most +MSS. _maneant ... lacerat_. Madv. _Em._ 176 in combating the conj. of Goer. +_si maneant ... laceratis istam causam_, approves _maneant ... iaceat_, a +reading with some MSS. support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole +confusion of the passage arises from the mania of the copyists for turning +indicatives into subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx. +occur every few pages. If _iacet_ were by error turned into _iaceret_ the +reading _lacerat_ would arise at once. The nom. to _dicit_ is, I may +observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. "all my +arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his senses are +true quotha!" (For this use of _dicit_ cf. _inquit_ in 101, 109, 115). +Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed. Cratandriana of 1528 _latrat_. +Dav. conjectured comically _blaterat iste tamen et_, Halm _lacera est ista +causa_. _Habes_: as two good MSS. have _habes et eum_, Madv. _Em._ 176 +conj. _habet_. The change of person, however, (from _dicit_ to _habes_) +occurs also in 101. _Epicurus_: n. on 19. + +§80. _Hoc est verum esse_: Madv. _Em._ 177 took _verum_ as meaning fair, +candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical +epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed _virum esse_, a very +strange em. Halm's conj. _certum esse_ is weak and improbable. _Importune_: +this is in one good MS. but the rest have _importata_, a good em. is +needed, as _importune_ does not suit the sense of the passage. _Negat ... +torsisset_: for the tenses cf. 104 _exposuisset, adiungit_. _Cum oculum +torsisset_: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing upwards +or sideways. Cf. Aristot. _Eth. Eud._ VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.) οφθαλμους +διαστρεψαντα ‛ωστε δυο το ‛εν φανηναι. Faber qu. Arist. _Problemata_ XVII. +31 δια τι εις το πλαγιον κινουσι τον οφθαλμον ου (?) φαινεται δυο το ‛εν. +Also _ib._ XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why drunkards see double he says +ταυτο τουτο γιγνεται και εαν τις κατωθεν πιεση τον οφθαλμον. Sextus refers +to the same thing _P.H._ I. 47, _A.M._ VII. 192 (‛ο παραπιεσας τον +οφθαλμον) so Cic. _De Div._ II. 120. Lucretius gives the same answer as +Timagoras, _propter opinatus animi_ (IV. 465), as does Sext. _A.M._ VII. +210 on behalf of Epicurus. _Sed hic_: Bait. _sit hic_. _Maiorum_: cf. 143. +_Quasi quaeratur_: Carneades refused to discuss about things in themselves +but merely dealt with the appearances they present, το γαρ αληθες και το +ψευδες εν τοις πραγμασι συνεχωρει (Numen in Euseb. _Pr. Eu._ XIV. 8). Cf. +also Sext. _P.H._ I. 78, 87, 144, II. 75. _Domi nascuntur_: a proverb used +like γλαυκ' εσ' Αθηνας and "coals to Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut. +_Miles_ II. 2, 38, and cf. _Ad Att._ X. 14, 2, _Ad Fam._ IX. 3. _Deus_: cf. +19. _Audiret ... ageret_: MSS. have _audies ... agerent_. As the insertion +of _n_ in the imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read _ageret_ and alter +_audies_ to suit it. Halm has _audiret ... ageretur_ with Dav., Bait. +_audiet, egerit_. _Ex hoc loco video ... cerno_: MSS. have _loco cerno +regionem video Pompeianum non cerno_ whence Lipsius conj. _ex hoc loco e +regione video_. Halm ejects the words _regionem video_, I prefer to eject +_cerno regionem_. We are thus left with the slight change from _video_ to +_cerno_, which is very often found in Cic., e.g. _Orat._ 18. Cic. sometimes +however joins the two verbs as in _De Or._ III. 161. _O praeclarum +prospectum_: the view was a favourite one with Cic., see _Ad Att._ I. 13, +5. + +§81. _Nescio qui_: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that _nescio quis_ +implies contempt, while _nescio qui_ does not, cf. _Div. in qu. Caec._ 47, +where _nescio qui_ would contradict his rule. It is as difficult to define +the uses of the two expressions as to define those of _aliquis_ and +_aliqui_, on which see 61 n. In _Paradoxa_ 12 the best MSS. have _si qui_ +and _si quis_ almost in the same line with identically the same meaning +Dav. quotes Solinus and Plin. _N.H._ VII. 21, to show that the man +mentioned here was called Strabo--a misnomer surely. _Octingenta_: so the +best MSS., not _octoginta_, which however agrees better with Pliny. _Quod +abesset_: "_whatever_ might be 1800 stadia distant," _aberat_ would have +implied that Cic. had some _particular_ thing in mind, cf. Madv. _Gram._ +364, obs. 1. _Acrius_: οξυτερον, Lamb. without need read _acutius_ as Goer. +did in 69. _Illos pisces_: so some MSS., but the best have _ullos_, whence +Klotz conj. _multos_, Orelli _multos illos_, omitting _pisces_. For the +allusion to the fish, cf. _Acad. Post._ fragm. 13. _Videntur_: n. on 25. +_Amplius_: cf. 19 _non video cur quaerat amplius_. _Desideramus_: Halm, +failing to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading _desiderant_ +(i.e. _pisces_). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my opponents, the +Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we have." Well you +are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light because it does not +know what light is. Of course all the ancients thought the mole blind. A +glance will show the insipidity of the sense given by Halm's reading. +_Quererer cum deo_: would enter into an altercation with the god. The +phrase, like λοιδορεσθαι τινι as opposed to λοιδορειν τινα implies mutual +recrimination, cf. _Pro Deiotaro_ 9 _querellae cum Deiotaro_. The reading +_tam quererer_ for the _tamen quaereretur_ of the MSS. is due to Manut. +_Navem_: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in _P.H._ I. 107, +_A.M._ VII. 414. _Non tu verum testem_, etc.: cf. 105. For the om. of _te_ +before _habere_, which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to +alter the text, see n. on I. 6. + +§82. _Quid ego_: Bait. has _sed quid_ after Ernesti. _Nave_: so the best +MSS., not _navi_, cf. Madv. _Gram._ 42. _Duodeviginti_: so in 128. Goer. +and Roeper qu. by Halm wished to read _duodetriginta_. The reff. of Goer. +at least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the +sun at 28 times the size of the earth. _Quasi pedalis_: cf. _D.F._ I. 20 +_pedalis fortasse_. For _quasi_ = _circiter_ cf. note on 74. Madv. on +_D.F._ I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert. X. 91, who preserves the very words of +Epicurus, in which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. V. 590, +who copies Epicurus, and Seneca _Quaest. Nat._ I. 3, 10 (_solem sapientes +viri pedalem esse contenderunt_). Madv. points out from Plut. _De Plac. +Phil._ II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus asserted the sun to be a foot +wide, he does not however quote Stob. _Phys._ I. 24, 1 ‛ηλιον μεγεθος εχειν +ευρος ποδος ανθρωπειου, which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus +and Hecataeus. _Ne maiorem quidem_: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read +_nec_ for _ne_, incurring the reprehension of Madv. _D.F._ p. 814, ed 2. +_Nihil aut non multum_: so in _D.F._ V. 59, the correction of Orelli, +therefore, _aut non multum mentiantur aut nihil_, is rash. _Semel_: see 79. +_Qui ne nunc quidem_: sc. _mentiri sensus putat_. Halm prints _quin_, and +is followed by Baiter, neither has observed that _quin ne ... quidem_ is +bad Latin (see _M.D.F._ V. 56). Nor can _quin ne_ go together even without +_quidem_, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, _Antibarbarus_ ed. 4 on _quin_. + +§83. _In parvo lis sit_: Durand's em. for the _in parvulis sitis_ of the +MSS., which Goer. alone defends. _Quattuor capita_: these were given in 40 +by Lucullus, cf. also 77. _Epicurus_: as above in 19, 79 etc. + +§84. _Geminum_: cf. 56. _Nota_: cf. 58 and the speech of Lucullus _passim_. +_Ne sit ... potest_: cf. 80 _quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. +Si ipse erit_ for _ipse_ apparently = _is ipse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 93. + +§85. _Quod non est_: = _qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur_. _Sui generis_: cf. +50, 54, 56. _Nullum esse pilum_, etc.: a strong expression of this belief +is found in Seneca _Ep._. 113, 13, qu. R. and P. 380. Note the word +_Stoicum_; Lucullus is of course not Stoic, but Antiochean. _Nihil +interest_: the same opinion is expressed in 40, where see my note. _Visa +res_: Halm writes _res a re_, it is not necessary, however, either in Gk. +or Lat. to express _both_ of two related things when a word is inserted +like _differat_ here, which shows that they _are_ related. Cf. the elliptic +constructions in Gk. with ‛ομοιον, μεταξυ, μεσος, and such words. _Eodem +caelo atque_: a difficult passage. MSS. have _aqua_, an error easy, as Halm +notes, to a scribe who understood _caelum_ to be the heaven, and not +γλυφειον, a graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading, +adducing passages to show that sky and water were important in the making +of statues. For _aqua_ Orelli conj. _acu_ = _schraffirnadel_, C.F. Hermann +_caelatura_, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian word. Halm's _aeque_ +introduces a construction with _ceteris omnibus_ which is not only not +Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I read _atque_, taking _ceteris omnibus_ +to be the abl. neut. "all the other implements." Formerly I conj. _ascra_, +or _atque in_, which last leading would make _omnibus_ = _om. statuis_. +_Alexandros_: Lysippus alone was privileged to make statues of Alexander, +as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the conqueror, cf. _Ad Fam._ V. 12, +7. + +§86. _Anulo_: cf. 54. _Aliqui_: n. on 61. _Gallinarium_: cf. 57. _Adhibes +artem_: cf. 20 _adhibita arte_. _Pictor ... tibicen_: so in 20. _Simul +inflavit_: note _simul_ for _simul atque_, cf. _T.D._ IV. 12. _Nostri +quidem_: i.e. _Romani_. _Admodum_: i.e. _adm. pauci_ cf. _De Leg._ III. 32 +_pauci enim atque admodum pauci_. _Praeclara_: evidently a fem. adj. +agreeing with _natura_. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and +understanding _sunt_ interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge are +grand, viz. _quanto art_. etc." + +§87. _Scilicet_: Germ. "natürlich." _Fabricata sit_: cf. 30, 119, 121 and +N.D. I. 19. _Ne modo_: for _modo ne_, a noticeable use. _Physicis_: +probably neut. _Contra sensus_: he wrote both for and against συνηθεια; cf. +R. and P. 360 and 368. _Carneadem_: Plut. _Sto. Rep_. 1036 B relates that +Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the senses, quoted +the address of Andromache to Hector: δαιμονιε φθισει σε το σον μενος. From +Diog. IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied the line qu. in n. on 75, ει μη +γαρ ην Χρυσιππος ουκ αν ην εγω. + +§88. _Diligentissime_: in 48--53. _Dicebas_: in 52 _imbecillius +adsentiuntur_. _Siccorum_: cf. Cic. _Contra Rullum_ I. 1 _consilia +siccorum_. _Madere_ is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut. +_Mostellaria_ I. 4, 6. _Non diceret_: Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit +the verb, with one MS., cf. 15 and I. 13. The omission of a verb in the +subjunctive is, Madv. says on _D.F._ I. 9, impossible; for other ellipses +of the verb see _M.D.F._ V. 63. _Alcmaeo autem_: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon; +cf. 52. _Somnia reri_: the best MSS. have _somniare_. Goer. reads _somnia_, +supplying _non fuisse vera_. I have already remarked on his extraordinary +power of _supplying_. Halm conj. _somnia reprobare_, forgetting that the +verb _reprobare_ belongs to third century Latinity, also _sua visa putare_, +which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from the MSS., I +read _reri_, which verb occurred in I. 26, 39. Possibly _putare_, a little +farther on, has got misplaced. _Non id agitur_: these difficulties supply +Sextus with one of his τροποι, i.e. ‛ο περι τας περιστασεις; cf. _P.H._ I. +100, also for the treatment of dreams, _ib._ I. 104. _Si modo_, etc.: "if +only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it." _Aeque ac +vigilanti_: = _aeque ac si vigilaret_. Dav. missing the sense, and pointing +out that _when awake_ Ennius did not assent to his sensations at all, conj. +_vigilantis_. Two participles used in very different ways not unfrequently +occur together, see Madv. _Em. Liv._ p. 442. _Ita credit_: MSS. have +_illa_, which Dav. altered. Halm would prefer _credidit_. _Itera dum_, +etc.: from the _Iliona_ of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see +_Ad Att._ XIV. 14, and _T.D._ II. 44. + +§89. _Quisquam_: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences cf. +Virg. _Aen._ I. 48 with the Notes of Wagner and Conington. _Tam +certa putat_: so Sextus _A.M._ VII. 61 points out that Protagoras must in +accordance with his doctrine παντων μετρον ανθρωπος hold that the μεμηνως +is the κριτηριον των εν μανιαι φαινομενων. _Video, video te_: evidently +from a tragedy whose subject was Αιας μαινομενος, see Ribbeck _Trag. Lat. +rel._ p. 205. Cic. in _De Or._ III. 162 thus continues the quotation, +"_oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape_." So in Soph. _Aiax_ 100 the hero, +after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in +order to torture him. _Hercules_: cf. Eur. _Herc. Fur._ 921--1015. The mad +visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are often referred to for a +similar purpose by Sext., e.g. _A.M._ VII. 405 ‛ο γουν ‛Ερακλης μανεις και +λαβων φαντασιαν απο των ιδιων παιδων ‛ως Ευρυσθεος, την ακολουθον πραξιν +ταυτηι τη φαντασιαι συνηψεν. ακολουθον δε ην το τους του εχθρου παιδας +ανελειν, ‛οπερ και εποιησεν. Cf. also _A.M._ VII. 249. _Moveretur_: imperf. +for plup. as in 90. _Alcmaeo tuus_: cf. 52. _Incitato furore_: Dav. reads +_incitatus_. Halm qu. from Wesenberg _Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. Sestio_ p. 51 +this explanation, "_cum furor eius initio remissior paulatim incitatior et +vehementior factus esset_," he also refers to Wopkens _Lect. Tull._ p. 55 +ed. Hand. _Incedunt_ etc.: the MSS. have _incede_, which Lamb. corrected. +The subject of the verb is evidently _Furiae_. _Adsunt_: is only given once +by MSS., while Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have +written it twice. _Caerulea ... angui_: _anguis_ fem is not uncommon in the +old poetry. MSS. here have _igni_. _Crinitus_: ακερσεκομης, "never shorn," +as Milton translates it. _Luna innixus_: the separate mention in the next +line of _Diana_, usually identified with the moon, has led edd. to emend +this line. Some old edd. have _lunat_, while Lamb. reads _genu_ for _luna_, +cf. Ov. _Am._ I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) _lunavitque genu sinuosum fortiter +arcum_. Wakefield on Lucr. III. 1013 puts a stop at _auratum_, and goes on +with _Luna innixans_. Taber strangely explains _luna_ as = _arcu ipso +lunato_, Dav. says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it +is the utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should +not regard _luna_ and _Diana_ as distinct. + +§90. _Illa falsa_: sc. _visa_, which governs the two genitives. Goer. +perversely insists on taking _somniantium recordatione ipsorum_ closely +together. _Non enim id quaeritur_: cf. 80 n. Sext. very often uses very +similar language, as in _P.H._ I. 22, qu. in n. on 40. _Tum cum +movebantur_: so Halm for MSS. _tum commovebantur_, the em. is supported by +88. + + §§91--98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge, its + processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical + questions (91). You value the art, but remember that it gave rise to + fallacies like the _sorites_, which you say is faulty (92). If it is + so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will + avail you nothing (93). If you refrain because you _cannot_ answer, + your knowledge fails you, if you _can_ answer and yet refrain, you are + unfair (94). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did + her web, witness the _Mentiens_, (95). You assent to arguments which + are identical in form with the _Mentiens_, and yet refuse to assent to + it Why so? (96) You demand that these sophisms should be made + exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that + exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very + first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned + Dialectic from Antiochus, the _Mentiens_ and the arguments identical + with it in form must stand or fall together (98). + +§91. _Inventam esse_: cf. 26, 27. _In geometriane_: with this inquiry into +the special function of Dialectic cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato +_Gorg._ 453 D, 454 C. _Sol quantus sit_: this of course is a problem for +φυσικη, not for διαλεκτικη. _Quod sit summum bonum_: not διαλεκτικη but +ηθικη must decide this. _Quae coniunctio_: etc. so Sext. often opposes +συμπλοκη or συνημμενον to διεζευγμενον, cf. esp _P.H._ II. 201, and Zeller +109 sq. with footnotes. An instance of a _coniunctio_ (hypothetical +judgment) is "_si lucet, lucet_" below, of a _disiunctio_ (disjunctive +judgment) "_aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet_". _Ambigue dictum_: +αμφιβολον, on which see _P.H._ II. 256, Diog VII. 62. _Quid sequatur_: το +ακολουθον, cf. I. 19 n. _Quid repugnet_: cf. I. 19, n. _De se ipsa_: the +_ipsa_, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p. +301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an art is not to be condemned as +useless merely because it is unable to solve every problem presented to it. +He quotes Plato's remarks (in _Rep._ II.) that the Expert is the man who +knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar +arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. _P.H._ II. 175 and the +words εαυτου εσται εκκαλυπτικον. For the mode in which Carneades dealt with +Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. The true ground of attack is that Logic +always _assumes_ the truth of phenomena, and cannot _prove_ it. This was +clearly seen by Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the +Origin of Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol II. of his _Aristotle_. + +§92. _Nata sit_: cf. 28, 59. _Loquendi_: the Stoic λογικη, it must be +remembered, included ‛ρητορικη. _Concludendi_: του συμπεραινειν or +συλλογιζεσθαι. _Locum_: τοπον in the philosophical sense. _Vitiosum_: 49, +n. _Num nostra culpa est_: cf. 32. _Finium_: absolute limits; the fallacy +of the _sorites_ and other such sophisms lies entirely in the treatment of +purely _relative_ terms as though they were _absolute_. _Quatenus_: the +same ellipse occurs in _Orator_ 73. _In acervo tritici_: this is the false +_sorites_, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one grain +makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three, four, +etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins to +answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and no +heap. One grain therefore _does_ make a heap. The true _sorites_ or chain +inference is still treated in books on logic, cf. Thomson's _Laws of +Thought_, pp 201--203, ed 8. _Minutatim_: cf. Heindorf's note on κατα +σμικρον in _Sophistes_ 217 D. _Interrogati_: cf. 104. In 94 we have +_interroganti_, which some edd. read here. _Dives pauper_, etc.: it will be +easily seen that the process of questioning above described can be applied +to any relative term such as these are. For the omission of any connecting +particle between the members of each pair, cf. 29, 125, _T.D._ I. 64, V. +73, 114, Zumpt _Gram._ 782. _Quanto addito aut dempto_: after this there is +a strange ellipse of some such words as _id efficiatur, quod interrogatur_. +[_Non_] _habemus_: I bracket _non_ in deference to Halm, Madv. however +(_Opusc._ I. 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation arising from a +sort of anacoluthon, comparing _In Vatin._ 3, _Ad Fam._ XII. 24. The +scribes insert and omit negatives very recklessly, so that the point may +remain doubtful. + +§93. _Frangite_: in later Gk. generally απολυειν. _Erunt ... cavetis_: this +form of the conditional sentence is illustrated in Madv. _D.F._ III. 70, +_Em. Liv._ p. 422, _Gram._ 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence _Heaut._ V. 1, 59 +_quot incommoda tibi in hac re capies nisi caves_, cf. also 127, 140 of +this book. The present is of course required by the instantaneous nature of +the action. _Chrysippo_: he spent so much time in trying to solve the +sophism that it is called peculiarly his by Persius VI. 80. _inventus, +Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi_. The titles of numerous distinct works of +his on the _Sorites_ and _Mentiens_ are given by Diog. _Tria pauca sint_: +cf. the instances in Sext. _A.M._ VII. 418 τα πεντηκοντα ολιγα εστιν, τα +μυρια ολιγα εστιν, also Diog. VII. 82 ‛ησυχαζειν the advice is quoted in +Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 (δειν ‛ιστασθαι και επεχειν), _A.M._ VII. 416 (‛ο +σοφος στησεται και ‛ησυχασει). The same terms seem to have been used by the +Cynics, see Sext. _P.H._ II. 244, III. 66. _Stertas_: imitated by Aug. +_Contra Ac._ III. 25 _ter terna novem esse ... vel genere humano stertente +verum sit_, also _ib._ III. 22. _Proficit_: Dav. _proficis_, but Madv. +rightly understands το ‛ησυχαζειν (_Em._ 184), cf. _N.D._ II. 58. _Ultimum +... respondere_: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of _defendere_ with +an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests _paucorum quid sit_. + +§94. _Ut agitator_: see the amusing letter to Atticus XIII. 21, in which +Cic. discusses different translations for the word επεχειν, and quotes a +line of Lucilius _sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator equosque_, +adding _semperque Carneades_ προβολην _pugilis et retentionem aurigae +similem facit_ εποχη. Aug. _Contra Ac._ trans. εποχη by _refrenatio_ cf. +also _Lael._ 63. _Superbus es_: I have thus corrected the MSS. _responde +superbe_; Halm writes _facis superbe_, Orelli _superbis_, which verb is +hardly found in prose. The phrase _superbe resistere_ in Aug. _Contra Ac._ +III. 14 may be a reminiscence. _Illustribus_: Bait. with some probability +adds _in_, comparing _in decimo_ below, and 107, cf. however Munro on Lucr. +I. 420. _Irretiat_: parallel expressions occur in _T.D._ V. 76, _De Or._ I. +43, _De Fato_ 7. _Facere non sinis_: Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 points the moral +in the same way. _Augentis nec minuentis_: so Halm for MSS. _augendi nec +minuendi_, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase _primum +augendi_ to be Latin. + +§95. _Tollit ... superiora_: cf. _Hortensius_ fragm. 19 (Orelli) _sed ad +extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit +dialecticorum ratio_. _Vestra an nostra_: Bait. after Christ needlessly +writes _nostra an vestra_. αξιωμα: "a judgment expressed in language"; cf. +Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this subject. _Effatum_: +Halm gives the spelling _ecfatum_. It is probable that this spelling was +antique in Cic.'s time and only used in connection with religious and legal +formulae as in _De Div._ I. 81, _De Leg._ II. 20, see Corss. _Ausspr._ I. +155 For the word cf. Sen. _Ep._ 117 _enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod +alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum_, in _T.D._ I. 14 +_pronuntiatum_ is found, in _De Fato_ 26 _pronuntiatio_, in Gellius XVI. 8 +(from Varro) _prologium_. _Aut verum esse aut falsum_: the constant Stoic +definition of αξιωμα, see Diog. VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107. +_Mentiris an verum dicis_: the _an_ was added by Schutz on a comparison of +Gellius XVIII. 10 _cum mentior et mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico?_ +The sophism is given in a more formally complete shape in _De Div._ II. 11 +where the following words are added, _dicis autem te mentiri verumque +dicis, mentiris igitur_. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. +301, ed Orelli), _quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum +pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?_ _Inexplicabilia_: απορα in the Greek +writers. _Odiosius_: this adj. has not the strong meaning of the Eng. +"hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying." _Non comprehensa_: as +in 99, the opposite of _comprehendibilia_ III. 1, 41. The past partic. in +Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in _-bilis_. Faber points out +that in the _Timaeus_ Cic. translates αλυτος by _indissolutus_ and +_indissolubilis_ indifferently. _Imperceptus_, which one would expect, is +found in Ovid. + +§96. _Si dicis_: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by +Manut. with the exception of _nunc_ which was added by Dav. The idea of +Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the +comic writers is untenable. _In docendo_: _docere_ is not to _expound_ but +to _prove_, cf. n. on 121. _Primum ... modum_: the word _modus_ is +technical in this sense cf. _Top._ 57. The προτος λογος αναποδεικτος of the +Stoic logic ran thus ει ‛ημερα εστι, φως εστιν ... αλλα μην ‛ημερα εστιν +φως αρα εστιν (Sext. _P.H._ II. 157, and other passages qu. Zeller 114). +This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly tautological as +Cic.'s translation, which merges φως and ‛ημερα into one word, or that of +Zeller (114, note). These arguments are called μονολημματοι (involving only +one premise) in Sext. _P.H._ I. 152, 159, II. 167. _Si dicis te mentiri_, +etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, that when a man _truly_ +states that he _has_ told a lie, he establishes against himself not merely +that he _has_ told a lie, but also that he _is_ telling a lie at the moment +when he makes the _true_ statement. The root of the sophism lies in the +confusion of past and present time in the one infinitive _mentiri_. +_Eiusdem generis_: the phrase _te mentiri_ had been substituted for _nunc +lucere_. _Chrysippea_: n. on 93. _Conclusioni_: on _facere_ with the dat. +see n. on 27. _Cederet_: some edd. _crederet_, but the word is a trans. of +Gk. εικειν; n. on 66. _Conexi_: = συνημμενον, cf. Zeller 109. This was the +proper term for the hypothetical judgment. _Superius_: the συνημμενον +consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the affirmative--called in +Greek ‛ηγουμενον and ληγον; if one is admitted the other follows of course. + +§97. _Excipiantur_: the legal _formula_ of the Romans generally directed +the _iudex_ to condemn the defendant if certain facts were proved, unless +certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went by the name of +_exceptio_. See _Dict. Ant_. _Tribunum ... adeant_: a retort upon Lucullus; +cf. 13. The MSS. have _videant_ or _adeant_; Halm conj. _adhibeant_, +comparing 86 and _Pro Rabirio_ 20. _Contemnit_: the usual trans. "to +despise" for _contemnere_ is too strong; it means, like ολιγωρειν, merely +to neglect or pass by. _Effabimur_; cf. _effatum_ above. _Hermarchus_: not +_Hermachus_, as most edd.; see _M.D.F._ II. 96. _Diiunctum_: διεζευγμενον, +for which see Zeller 112. _Necessarium_: the reason why Epicurus refused to +admit this is given in _De Fato_ 21 _Epicurus veretur ne si hoc +concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant_. The context of +that passage should be carefully read, along with _N.D._ I. 69, 70. Aug. +_Contra Ac._ III. 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth of +disjunctive propositions. _Catus_: so Lamb. for MSS. _cautus_. _Tardum_: +_De Div._ II. 103 _Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici_; +cf. also _ib._ II. 116, and the frequent use of βραδυς in Sext., e.g. +_A.M._ VII. 325. _Cum hoc igitur_: the word _igitur_, as usual, picks up +the broken thread of the sentence. _Id est_: n. on I. 8. _Evertit_: for the +Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343. Zeller 399 sq., _M.D.F._ I. +22. _E contrariis diiunctio_: = διεζευγμενον εξ εναντιων. + +§98. _Sequor_: as in 95, 96, where the _Dialectici_ refused to allow the +consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. _Ludere_: this +reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for which +see Cope in the old _Journal of Philology_. No. 7. _Iudicem ... non +iudicem_: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by μεν and δε, +has been a great crux of edd.; Dav. here wished to insert _cum_ before +_iudicem_, but is conclusively refuted by Madv. _Em._ 31. The same +construction occurs in 103. _Esse conexum_: with great probability Christ +supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the copyists. + + §§98--105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the case of + Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of + Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two divisions of _visa_, + one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the + other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses + concern the first division only; the sapiens will follow probability, + as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly does (99, 100). Our + sapiens is not made of stone; many things _seem_ to him true; yet he + always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The + Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this + admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes + impossible (101). It is strange that our _Probables_ do not seem + sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He + condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy; + nothing is swept away but its _necessary_ certainty (103). There are + two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and + withholding it merely so far as to deny the _certainty_ of phenomena. + The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104). + +§98. _Tortuosum_: similar expressions are in _T.D._ II. 42, III. 22, _D.F._ +IV. 7. _Ut Poenus_: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf. _D.F._ +IV. 56, _tuus ille Poenulus, homo acutus_. A different meaning is given by +the _ut_ in passages like _De Div._ II. 30 _Democritus non inscite nugatur, +ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius_; "for a physical philosopher." + +§99. _Genera_: here = classifications of, modes of dividing _visa_. This +way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong censure of +Madv. (Pref. to _D.F._ p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted of ignorance, for +representing Carneades as dividing _visa_ into those which can be perceived +and those which cannot. Is it possible that any one should read the +_Academica_ up to this point, and still believe that Cic. is capable of +supposing, even for a moment, that Carneades in any way upheld καταληψις? +_Dicantur_: i.e. _ab Academicis_. _Si probabile_: the _si_ is not in MSS. +Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading _est, probabile nihil esse_. +_Commemorabas_: in 53, 58. _Eversio_: cf. _D.F._ III. 50 (the same words), +Plat. _Gorg_. 481 C ‛ημων ‛ο βιος ανατετραμμενος αν ειη, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. +157 συγχεομεν τον βιον. _Et sensibus_: no second _et_ corresponds to this; +_sic_ below replaces it. See Madv. _D.F._ p. 790, ed. 2. _Quicquam tale_ +etc.: cf. 40, 41. _Nihil ab eo differens_: n. on 54. _Non comprehensa_: n. +on 96. + +§100. _Si iam_: "if, for example;" so _iam_ is often used in Lucretius. +_Probo ... bono_: it would have seemed more natural to transpose these +epithets. _Facilior ... ut probet_: the usual construction is with _ad_ and +the gerund; cf. _De Div._ II. 107, _Brut_. 180. _Anaxagoras_: he made no +‛ομοιομερειαι of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is +dark in colour. _Concreta_: so Manut. for MSS. _congregata_. In 121 the +MSS. give _concreta_ without variation, as in _N.D._ II. 101, _De Div._ I. +130, _T.D._ I. 66, 71. + +§101. _Impeditum_: cf. 33, n. _Movebitur_: cf. _moveri_ in 24. _Non enim +est_: Cic. in the vast majority of cases writes _est enim_, the two words +falling under one accent like _sed enim, et enim_ (cf. Corss. _Ausspr._ II. +851); Beier on _De Off._ I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read +_est enim_, but the MSS. both of the _Lucullus_ and of Nonius agree in the +other form, which Madv. allows to stand in _D.F._ I. 43, and many other +places (see his note). Cf. fragm. 22 of the _Acad. Post_. _E robore_: so +Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here _ebore_. _Dolatus_: an evident +imitation of Hom. _Od._ T 163 ου γαρ απο δριος εσσι παλαιφατου ουδ' απο +πετρης. _Neque tamen habere_: i.e. _se putat_. For the sudden change from +_oratio recta_ to _obliqua_ cf. 40 with n. _Percipiendi notam_: = χαρακτηρα +της συγκταθεσεως in Sext. _P.H._ I. 191. For the use of the gerund cf. n. +on 26, with Madv. _Gram._ 418, Munro on Lucr. I. 313; for _propriam_ 34. +_Exsistere_. cf. 36. _Qui neget_: see 79. _Caput_: a legal term. _Conclusio +loquitur_: cf. _historiae loquantur_ (5), _consuetudo loquitur_ (_D.F._ II. +48), _hominis institutio si loqueretur_ (_ib._ IV. 41), _vites si loqui +possint_ (_ib._ V. 39), _patria loquitur_ (_In Cat._ I. 18, 27); the last +use Cic. condemns himself in _Orat._ 85. _Inquit_: "quotha," indefinitely, +as in 109, 115; cf. also _dicit_ in 79. + +§102. _Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis_: Bait. follows Madv. in +placing a comma after _est_, and a full stop at _probabilia_. _Tamen_ ought +in that case to follow _dicimus_, and it is noteworthy that in his +communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn's ed. of the +philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word _tamen_ altogether, nor +does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. _Ista diceret_: +"stated the opinions you asked for." _Poetam_: this both Halm and Bait. +treat as a gloss. + +§103. For this section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. _P.H._ I. +227 sq. _Academia ... quibus_: a number of exx. of this change from sing. +to plural are given by Madv. on _D.F._ V. 16. _Nullum_: on the favourite +Ciceronian use of _nullus_ for _non_ see 47, 141, and Madv. _Gram._ 455, +obs. 5. _Illud sit disputatum_: for the construction cf. 98; _autem_ is +omitted with the same constr. in _D.F._ V. 79, 80. _Nusquam alibi_: cf. 50. + +§104. _Exposuisset adiungit_: Madv. on _D.F._ III. 67 notices a certain +looseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the +opinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. _Ut aut +approbet quid aut improbet_: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent +editors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced +by _ut_. Halm brackets a similar clause in 20, and is followed in both +instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive _bracketer_ of +modern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical +works. In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that +_approbare_ and _improbare_ may mean either to render an _absolute_ +approval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely +based on _probability_. For example, in 29 the words have the first +meaning, in 66 the second. The same is the case with _nego_ and _aio_. I +trace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to +express distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent. The +general sense will be as follows. "There are two kinds of εποχη, one which +prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the +two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving +an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute +approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will +neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely +give a qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of +the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the +_Philologus_ (vol. VII.), which I had not read when this note was first +written. _Alterum placere ... alterum tenere_: "the one is his formal +dogma, the other is his actual practice." For the force of this see my note +on _non probans_ in 148, which passage is very similar to this. _Neget ... +aiat_: cf. 97. _Nec ut placeat_: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the +wrong sense, for Clitomachus _did_ allow such _visa_ to stand as were +sufficient to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's _neu cui_ labours +under the same defect. Various emendations are _nam cum_ (Lamb., accepted +by Zeller 522), _hic ut_ (Manut.), _et cum_ (Dav. followed by Bait.), _sed +cum_ (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me that of Manut. I should +prefer _sic ut_, taking _ut_ in the sense of "although." _Respondere_: "to +put in as an answer," as in 93 and often. _Approbari_: sc. _putavit_. Such +changes of construction are common in Cic., and I cannot follow Halm in +altering the reading to _approbavit_. + +§105. _Lucem eripimus_: cf. 30. + + §§105--111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your + defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was + possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of + Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true, + then these will be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient basis + for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to + _assent_. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you + yourself refuse assent to the _sorites_, why then should not the + Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your other strong point is + that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions + of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the + use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where probability is, + there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument + of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and + false _visa_ and then contradict themselves by denying that there is + any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that + the difference _exists_; we do deny that human faculties are capable of + perceiving the difference (111). + +§105. _Inducto ... prob._: so Aug. _Cont Ac._ II. 12 _Soluto, libero_: cf. +n. on 8. _Implicato_: = _impedito_ cf. 101. _Iacere_: cf. 79. _Isdem +oculis_: an answer to the question _nihil cernis?_ in 102. _Purpureum_: cf. +fragm. 7 of the _Acad. Post_. _Modo caeruleum ... sole_: Nonius (cf. fragm. +23) quotes _tum caeruleum tum lavum_ (the MSS. in our passage have +_flavum_) _videtur, quodque nunc a sole_. C.F. Hermann would place _mane +ravum_ after _quodque_ and take _quod_ as a proper relative pronoun, not as += "because." This transposition certainly gives increased clearness. +Hermann further wishes to remove _a_, quoting exx. of _collucere_ without +the prep., which are not at all parallel, i.e. _Verr._ I. 58, IV. 71. +_Vibrat_: with the ανηριθμον γελασμα of Aeschylus. _Dissimileque_: Halm, +followed by Bait., om. _que_. _Proximo et_: MSS. have _ei_, rightly altered +by Lamb., cf. e.g. _De Fato_ 44. _Non possis ... defendere_: a similar line +is taken in 81. + +§106. _Memoria_: cf. 22. _Polyaenus_: named _D.F._ I. 20, Diog. X. 18, as +one of the chief friends of Epicurus. _Falsum quod est_: Greek and Latin do +not distinguish accurately between the _true_ and the _existent_, the +_false_ and the _non existent_, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the +confusion is frequent, notably in the _Sophistes_ and _Theaetetus_. _Si +igitur_: "if then recollection is recollection only of things perceived and +known." The dogmatist theory of μνημη and νοησις is dealt with in exactly +the same way by Sext. _P.H._ II. 5, 10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat +_Theaet._ 191 sq. _Siron_: thus Madv. on _D.F._ II. 119 writes the name, +not _Sciron_, as Halm. _Fateare_: the em. of Dav. for _facile_, _facere_, +_facias_ of MSS. Christ defends _facere_, thinking that the constr. is +varied from the subj. to the inf. after _oportet_, as after _necesse est_ +in 39. For _facere_ followed by an inf. cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 8. _Nulla_: for +_non_, cf. 47, 103. + +§107. _Fiet artibus_: n. on 27 for the constr., for the matter see 22. +_Lumina_: "strong points." Bentl. boldly read _columina_, while Dav. +proposed _vimina_ or _vincula_. That an em. is not needed may be seen from +_D.F._ II. 70. _negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est)_ _N.D._ I. 79, +and 43 of this book. _Responsa_: added by Ernesti. Faber supplies +_haruspicia_, Orelli after Ern. _haruspicinam_, but, as Halm says, some +noun in the plur. is needed. _Quod is non potest_: this is the MSS. +reading, but most edd. read _si is_, to cure a wrong punctuation, by which +a colon is placed at _perspicuum est_ above, and a full stop at +_sustineat_. Halm restored the passage. _Habuerint_: the subj. seems due to +the attraction exercised by _sustineat_. Bait. after Kayser has +_habuerunt_. _Positum_: "when laid down" or "assumed." + +§108. _Alterum est quod_: this is substituted for _deinde_, which ought to +correspond to _primum_ above. _Actio ullius rei_: n. on _actio rerum_ in +62, cf. also 148. _Adsensu comprobet_: almost the same phrase often occurs +in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. _Sit etiam_: the _etiam_ is a little +strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. It seems to have the force of +Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent consists." _Sensus ipsos adsensus_: +so in I. 41 _sensus_ is defined to be _id quod est sensu comprehensum_, +i.e. καταληψις, cf. also Stobaeus I. 41, 25 αισθητικη γαρ φαντασια +συγκαταθεσις εστι. _Appetitio_: for all this cf. 30. _Et dicta ... multa_: +Manut. ejected these words as a gloss, after _multa_ the MSS. curiously add +_vide superiora_. _Lubricos sustinere_: cf. 68 and 94. _Ita scribenti ... +exanclatum_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. 77, 113 with notes. _Herculi_: for +this form of the gen. cf. Madv. on _D.F._ I. 14, who doubts whether Cic. +ever wrote _-is_ in the gen. of the Greek names in _-es_. When we consider +how difficult it was for copyists _not_ to change the rarer form into the +commoner, also that even Priscian (see _M.D.F._ V. 12) made gross blunders +about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost irresistible. +_Temeritatem_: προπετειαν, εικαιοτητα. + +§109. _In navigando_: cf. 100. _In conserendo_: Guretus interprets "εν τω +φυτυεσθαι τον αγρον," and is followed by most commentators, though it seems +at least possible that _manum_ is to be understood. For the suppressed +accus. _agrum_ cf. n. on _tollendum_ in 148. _Sequere_: the fut. not the +pres. ind., cf. 61. _Pressius_: cf. 28. _Reprehensum_: sc. _narrasti_. _Id +ipsum_: = _nihil posse comprehendi_. _Saltem_: so in 29. _Pingue_: cf. _Pro +Archia_ 10. _Sibi ipsum_: note that Cic. does not generally make _ipse_ +agree in case with the reflexive, but writes _se ipse_, etc. +_Convenienter_: "consistently". _Esse possit_: Bait. _posset_ on the +suggestion of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not +throwing it back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant. +_Ut hoc ipsum_: the _ut_ follows on _illo modo urguendum_ above. _Decretum +quod_: Halm followed by Bait. gives _quo_, referring to _altero quo neget_ +in 111, which however does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have +_qui_. _Et sine decretis_: Lamb. gave _nec_ for _et_, but Dav. correctly +explains, "_multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed tantum +probabilia._" + +§110. _Ut illa_: i.e. the _decreta_ implied in the last sentence. Some MSS. +have _ille_, while Dav. without necessity gives _alia_. _Sic hoc ipsum_: +Sext. then is wrong is saying (_P.H._ I. 226) that the Academics +διαβεβαιουνται τα πραγματα ειναι ακαταληπτα, i.e. state the doctrine +dogmatically, while the sceptics do not. _Cognitionis notam_: like _nota +percipiendi_, _veri et falsi_, etc. which we have already had. _Ne +confundere omnia_: a mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. 58. +_Incerta reddere_: cf. 54. _Stellarum numerus_: another echo of Lucullus; +see 32. _Quem ad modum ... item_: see Madv. on _D.F._ III. 48, who quotes +an exact parallel from _Topica_ 46, and _sicut ... item_ from _N.D._ I. 3, +noting at the same time that in such exx. neither _ita_ nor _idem_, which +MSS. sometimes give for _item_, is correct. + +§111. _Dicere ... perturbatum_: for om. of _esse_ cf. 108, etc. +_Antiochus_: this Bait. brackets. _Unum ... alterum_: cf. 44. _Esse quaedam +in visis_: it was not the _esse_ but the _videri_, not the actual existence +of a difference, but the possibility of that difference being infallibly +perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. _Cernimus_: i.e. the +_probably_ true and false. _Probandi species_: a phenomenal appearance +which belongs to, or properly leads to qualified approval. + + §§112--115. Summary. If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose + definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should + not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes + _opines_ (112). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more + reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does, + can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate + your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic + system like yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to join your + school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks + so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but + the _sapiens_ is to adopt (115). + +§112. _Campis ... exsultare ... oratio_: expressions like this are common +in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 54, _De Off._ I. 61, _Orat._ 26; cf. also Aug. +_Cont. Ac._ III. 5 _ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret oratio_. _Cum +Peripatetico_: nothing that Cic. states here is at discord with what is +known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. esp. Sext. _A.M._ VII. +216--226. All that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic +formula, putting upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic +would have wondered how a sceptic _could_ accept his formulae; but the +spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the +same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at +Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on 18) that we have here +a trace of Philo's teaching, as distinct from that of Carneades. I see +absolutely no reason for the very severe remarks of Madvig on _D.F._ V. 76, +a passage which very closely resembles ours. _Dumeta_: same use in _N.D._ +I. 68, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 6; the _spinae_ of the Stoics are often +mentioned, e.g. _D.F._ IV. 6. _E vero ... a falso_: note the change of +prep. _Adhiberet_: the MSS. are confused here, and go Halm reads _adderet_, +and Bait. follows, while Kayser proposes _adhaereret_, which is indeed +nearer the MSS.; cf. however I. 39 _adhiberet_. _Accessionem_: for this cf. +18 and 77. _Simpliciter_: the opposite of _subtiliter_; cf. +_simpliciter--subtilitas_ in I. 6. _Ne Carneade quidem_: cf. 59, 67, 78, +148. + +§113. _Sed qui his minor est_: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for +MSS. _sed mihi minores_. Guietus gave _sed his minores_, Durand _sed +minutior_, while Halm suggests _sed minutiores_. I conj. _nimio minares_, +which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. I. 734 _inferiores partibus +egregie multis multoque minores_. _Tale verum_: _visum_ omitted as in +_D.F._ V. 76. _Incognito_: cf. 133. _Amavi hominem_: cf. Introd. p. 6. _Ita +iudico, politissimum_; it is a mistake to suppose this sentence incomplete, +like Halm, who wishes to add _eum esse_, or like Bait., who with Kayser +prints _esse_ after _politissimum_. Cf. 108 _ita scribenti, exanclatum_, +and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 13. _Horum +neutrum_: cf. 77 _nemo_. _Utrumque verum_: Cic. of course only accepts the +propositions as Arcesilas did; see 77. + +§114. _Illud ferre_: cf. 136. _Constituas_: this verb is often used in +connection with the ethical _finis_; cf. 129 and I. 19. _Idemque etiam_: +Krebs and Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) deny that the expression _idem +etiam_ is Latin. One good MS. here has _atque etiam_, which Dav. reads; cf. +however _Orat._ 117. _Artificium_: = _ars_, as in 30. _Nusquam labar_: cf. +138 _ne labar_. _Subadroganter_: cf. 126. + +§115. _Qui sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse_: so Cic. vary often speaks of +the Peripatetics, as in _D.F._ IV. 5, V. 7. _Sustinuero_: cf. 70. _Tam +bonos_: Cic. often speaks of them and of Epicurus in this patronising way; +see e.g. _T.D._ II. 44, III. 50, _D.F._ I. 25, II. 81. For the Epicurean +friendships cf. esp. _D.F._ I. 65. _Diodoto_: cf. Introd. p. 2. _Nolumus_: +Halm and Bait., give _nolimus_; so fine a line divides the subjunctive from +the indicative in clauses like these that the choice often depends on mere +individual taste. _De sapiente loquamur_: n. on 66. + + §§116--128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics + first. Would your _sapiens_ swear to the truth of any geometrical + result whatever? (116) Let us see which one of actual physical systems + the _sapiens_ we are seeking will select (117). He must choose _one_ + teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander, + Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, + Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers, + great men though they be, he must reject (118). Whatever system he + selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as + strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds + this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must + defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not + allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to be free, as I am and + not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe! + (120) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato, + however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His + mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some + good in Strato, yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system + or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know + nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the + advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the + earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122). + Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the + heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who + hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature + of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato + and Xenocrates. Our _sapiens_ will be unable to decide (124). If you + say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose + Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous + falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical + subjects, why will they not allow me to differ from them? (126) Not + that I deprecate the study of Physics, for moral good results from it + (127). Our _sapiens_ will be delighted if he attains to anything which + seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your + weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be + prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times + as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you + admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than + the size of the sun, I am almost content (128). + +§116. _Tres partes_: cf. I. 19. _Et a vobismet_: "and especially by you". +The threefold division was peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools, +cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 13 (on the same subject) ‛οι Στωικοι και αλλοι τινες. +For other modes of dividing philosophy see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 2. _At illud +ante_: this is my em. for the MSS. _velut illud ante_, which probably arose +from a marginal variant "_vel ut_" taking the place of _at_; cf. a similar +break in 40 _sed prius_, also in 128 _at paulum ante_. Such breaks often +occur in Cic., as in _Orator_ 87 _sed nunc aliud_, also _T.D._ IV. 47 +_repenam fortasse, sed illud ante._ For _velut_ Halm writes _vel_ (which +Bait. takes), Dav. _verum_. _Inflatus tumore_: cf. _De Off._ I. 91 _inflati +opinionibus._ Bentl. read _errore_. _Cogere_: this word like αναγκαζειν and +βιαζεσθαι often means simply to argue irresistibly. _Initia_: as in 118, +bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable of proof, so αρχαι in Gk. +_Digitum_: cf. 58, 143. _Punctum esse_ etc.: σημειον εστιν ου μερος ουθεν +(Sext. _P.H._ III. 39), στιγμη = το αμερες (_A.M._ IX. 283, 377). +_Extremitatem_: = επιφανειαν. _Libramentum_: so this word is used by Pliny +(see Forc.) for the slope of a hill. _Nulla crassitudo_: in Sext. the +επιφανεια is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as +μηκος μετα πλατους (_P.H._ III. 39), περας (_extremitas_) σοματος δυο εχον +διαστασεις, μηκος και πλατος (_A.M._ III. 77). _Liniamentum ... carentem_: +a difficult passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as μηκος +απλατες. (Sext. as above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the +point and surface negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against +the introduction of _longitudinem_ which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and +others propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would +rather add _et crassitudine_ before _carentem_, comparing I. 27 _sine ulla +specie et carentem omni illa qualitate_. I have merely bracketed +_carentem_, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in this +clause as in the other two, he suggests _quod sit sine_. Hermann takes +_esse_ after _punctum_ as strongly predicative ("there _is_ a point," +etc.), then adds _similiter_ after _liniamentum_ and ejects _sine ulla_. +Observe the awkwardness of having the _line_ treated of after the +_superficies_, which has induced some edd. to transpose. For _liniamentum_ += _lineam_ cf. _De Or._ I. 187. _Si adigam_: the fine em. of Manut. for _si +adiiciamus_ of MSS. The construction _adigere aliquem ius iurandum_ will be +found in Caes. _Bell. Civ._ I. 76, II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg. +_Aen._ III. 56 _quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra fames?_ +_Sapientem nec prius_: this is the "_egregia lectio_" of three of Halm's +MSS. Before Halm _sapientemne_ was read, thus was destroyed the whole point +of the sentence, which is _not_ that the _sapiens_ will swear to the size +of the sun after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations, _but_ +that the _sapiens_, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which +Archimedes uses, will _not_ swear to the truth of the elaborate conclusions +which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in 128 against +the absurdity of attaching one and the same degree of certainty to the +simplest and the most complex truths, and tries to condemn the Stoic +_sapiens_ out of his own mouth, cf. esp. _nec ille iurare posset_ in 123. +_Multis partibus_: for this expression see Munro on Lucr. I. 734, for the +sense cf. 82, 123, 126, 128. _Deum_: see 126. + +§117. _Vim_: = αναγκην, cf. _cogere_ in 116. _Ne ille_: this asseverative +_ne_ is thus always closely joined with pronouns in Cic. _Sententiam eliget +et_: MSS. have (by _dittographia_ of _m_, _eli_) added _melius_ after +_sententiam_, and have also dropped _et_. Dav. wished to read _elegerit_, +comparing the beginning of 119. _Insipiens eliget_: cf. 115 _quale est a +non sapiente explicari sapientiam?_ and 9 _statuere qui sit sapiens vel +maxime videtur esse sapientis_. _Infinitae quaestiones_: θεσεις, general +propositions, opposed to _finitae quaestiones_, limited propositions, Gk. +‛υποθεσεις. Quintal III. 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former _An uxor +ducenda_, of the latter _An Catoni ducenda_. These _quaestiones_ are very +often alluded to by Cic. as in _D.F._ I. 12, IV. 6, _De Or._ I. 138, II. +65--67, _Topica_ 79, _Orat._ 46, cf. also Quint. X. 5, II. _E quibus omnia +constant_: this sounds like Lucretius, _omnia_ = το παν. + +§118. For these _physici_ the student must in general be referred to R. and +P., Schwegler, and Grote's _Plato_ Vol. I. A more complete enumeration of +schools will be found in Sext. _P.H._ III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated +by Aug _De Civ. Dei_ XVIII. 37. _Concessisse primas_: Cic. always considers +Thales to be _sapientissimus e septem_ (_De Leg._ II. 26). Hence Markland +on Cic. _Ad Brutum_ II. 15, 3 argued that that letter cannot be genuine, +since in it the supremacy among the seven is assigned to Solon. +_Infinitatem naturae_: το απειρον, _naturae_ here = ουσιας. _Definita_: +this is opposed to _infinita_ in _Topica_ 79, so _definire_ is used for +_finire_ in _Orat._ 65, where Jahn qu. _Verr._ IV. 115. _Similis inter se_: +an attempt to translate ‛ομοιομερειας. _Eas primum_, etc.: cf. the exordium +of Anaxagoras given from Diog. II. 6 in R. and P. 29 παντα χρηματα ην ‛ομου +ειτα νους ελθων αυτα διεκοσμησε. _Xenophanes ... deum_: Eleaticism was in +the hands of Xenoph. mainly theological. _Neque natum unquam_: cf. _neque +ortum unquam_ in 119. _Parmenides ignem_: cf. Arist. _Met. A._ 5 qu. R. and +P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence of the phenomenal +world, after which he made two αρχαι, θερμον και ψυχρον τουτων δε το μεν +κατα μεν το ‛ον θερμον ταττει, θατερον δε κατα το μη ον. _Heraclitus_: n. +on I. 39. _Melissus_: see Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. το εον +αιει αρα ην τε και εσται. _Plato_: n. on I. 27. _Discedent_: a word often +used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 7, 17. + +§119. _Sic animo ... sensibus_: knowledge according to the Stoics was +homogeneous throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than +another. _Nunc lucere_: cf. 98, also 128 _non enim magis adsentiuntur_, +etc. _Mundum sapientem_: for this Stoic doctrine see _N.D._ I. 84, II. 32, +etc. _Fabricata sit_: see 87 n. _Solem_: 126. _Animalis intellegentia_: +reason is the essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138--9, +also 28, 29 of Book I. _Permanet_: the deity is to the Stoic πνευμα +ενδιηκον δι ‛ολου του κοσμου (Plut. _De Plac. Phil._ I. 7 qu. R. and P. +375), _spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus._ +(Seneca, _Consol. ad Helvid._ 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). _Deflagret_: the Stoics +considered the κοσμος φθαρτος, cf. Diog. VII. 141, Zeller 156--7. _Fateri_: +cf. _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_ in 111. _Flumen aureum_: Plut. _Vita +Cic._ 24 alludes to this (‛οτι χρυσιου ποταμος ειη ρεοντος). This is the +constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote, _Aristot._ Vol I. +p. 43, quotes _Topica_ 3, _De Or._ I. 49, _Brut._ 121, _N.D._ II. 93, _De +Inv._ II. 6, _D.F._ I. 14, _Ad Att._ II. 1, and discusses the difficulty of +applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we possess. _Nulla +vis_: cf. I. 28. _Exsistere_: Walker conj. _efficere_, "_recte ut videtur_" +says Halm. Bait. adopts it. _Ornatus_: = κοσμος. + +§120. _Libertas ... non esse_: a remarkable construction. For the Academic +liberty see Introd. p. 18. _Quod tibi est_: after these words Halm puts +merely a comma, and inserting _respondere_ makes _cur deus_, etc. part of +the same sentence. Bait. follows. _Nostra causa_: Cic. always writes _mea, +tua, vestra, nostra causa_, not _mei, tui, nostri, vestri_, just as he +writes _sua sponte_, but not _sponte alicuius_. For the Stoic opinion that +men are the chief care of Providence, see _N.D._ I. 23, II. 37, _D.F._ III. +67, _Ac._ I. 29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding the opinion +are treated of in Zeller 175, _N.D._ II. 91--127. They supply in Sext. +_P.H._ I. 32, III. 9--12 an example of the refutation of νοουμενα by means +of νοουμενα. _Tam multa ac_: MSS. om. _ac_, which I insert. Lactantius qu. +the passage without _perniciosa_. _Myrmecides_: an actual Athenian artist, +famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot which a fly +covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee concealed. See +Plin. _Nat. Hist._ VII. 21, XXXVI. 5. + +§121. _Posse_: n. on I. 29. _Strato_: R. and P. 331. _Sed cum_: _sed_ often +marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read _et_, as Halm. +_Asperis ... corporibus_: cf. fragm. 28 of the _Ac. Post._, also _N.D._ I. +66. _Somnia_: so _N.D._ I. 18 _miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed +somniantium_, _ib._ I. 42 _non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium +somnia_, also _ib._ I. 66 _flagitia Democriti_. _Docentis_: giving _proof_. +_Optantis_: Guietus humorously conj. _potantis,_ Durand _oscitantis_ (cf. +_N.D._ I. 72), others _opinantis_. That the text is sound however may be +seen from _T.D._ II. 30 _optare hoc quidem est non docere_, _De Fato_ 46, +_N.D._ I. 19 _optata magis quam inventa_, _ib._ III. 12 _doceas oportet nec +proferas_; cf. also _Orat._ 59 _vocis bonitas optanda est, non est enim in +nobis_, i.e. a good voice is a thing to be prayed for, and not to be got by +exertion. There is a similar Greek proverb, ευχη μαλλον η αληθεια, in Sext. +_P.H._ VIII. 353. _Magno opere_: Hermann wishes to read _onere_. The phrase +_magnum onus_ is indeed common (cf. _De Or._ I. 116), but _magnum opus_, in +the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf. _T.D._ III. 79, 84, _Orat._ +75. _Modo hoc modo illud_: 134. + +§122. _Latent ista_: see n. on fragm. 29 of the _Ac. Post._; for _latent_ +cf. I. 45. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12, III. 1 imitates this passage. +_Circumfusa_: cf. I. 44, and 46 of this book. _Medici_: cf. _T.D._ I. 46 +_Viderentur_: a genuine passive, cf. 25, 39, 81. _Empirici_: a school of +physicians so called. _Ut ... mutentur_: exactly the same answer was made +recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he was said to have +assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same properties as the +dead. _Media pendeat_: cf. _N.D._ II. 98, _De Or._ III. 178. + +§123. _Habitari ait_: for this edd. qu. Lactant. _Inst._ III. 23, 12. +_Portenta_: "monstrosities these," cf. _D.F._ IV. 70. _Iurare_: cf. 116. +_Neque ego_, etc.: see fragm. 30 of _Ac. Post._ Αντιποδας: this doctrine +appears in Philolaus (see Plut. _Plac. Phil._ III. 11 qu. R. and P. 75), +who give the name of αντιχθων to the opposite side of the world. Diog. +VIII. 26 (with which passage cf. Stob. _Phys._ XV. 7) mentions the theory +as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says that Plato first +invented the name. The word αντιπους seems to occur first in Plat. _Tim._ +63 A. The existence of αντιποδες; was of course bound up with the doctrine +that the universe or the world is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the +_Tim._ and by the Stoics, see Stob. _Phys._ XV. 6, Diog. VII. 140), hence +the early Christian writers attack the two ideas together as unscriptural. +Cf. esp Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XVI. 9. _Hicetas_: he was followed by Heraclides +Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext. _A.M._ X. 174 speaks of the followers +of Aristarchus the mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems +also to be found in Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. _Theophrastus_: who wrote +much on the history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. _Platonem_: the words +of Plato (_Tim._ 40 B) are γην δε τροφον μεν ‛ημετεραν, ειλλομενην δε περι +τον δια παντος πολον τεταμενον. _Quid tu, Epicure_: the connection is that +Cic., having given the crotchets of other philosophers about φυσικη, +proceeds to give the peculiar crotchet of Epic. _Putas solem ... tantum_: a +hard passage. _Egone? ne bis_ is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. _egone vobis_, +and is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (_Em._ 185) "_cum +interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82) solem esse putaret, +Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat quantus videretur vel +paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius circumscribit, ne bis quidem +tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem et bipedalem_". (_D.F._ I. 20) +This explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given. +Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the +outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's +size, i.e. twice the apparent size. _Ne ... quidem_ may possibly appear +strange, cf. however _ne maiorem quidem_ in 82. _Aristo Chius_: for this +doctrine of his see R. and P. 358. + +§124. _Quid sit animus_: an enumeration of the different ancient theories +is given in _T.D._ I. 18--22, and by Sext. _A.M._ VII. 113, who also speaks +in _P.H._ II. 31 of the πολλη και ανηνυτος μαχη concerning the soul. In +_P.H._ II. 57 he says Γοργιας ουδε διανοιαν ειναι φησι. _Dicaearcho_: +_T.D._ I. 21. _Tres partis_: in Plato's _Republic_. _Ignis_: Zeno's +opinion, _T.D._ I. 19. _Animam_: _ib._ I. 19. _Sanguis_: Empodocles, as in +_T.D._ I. 19 where his famous line ‛αιμα γαρ ανθρωποις περικαρδιον εστι +νοημα is translated, see R. and P. 124. _Ut Xenocrates_: some edd. read +_Xenocrati_, but cf. I. 44, _D.F._ II. 18, _T.D._ III. 76. _Numerus_: so +Bentl. for _mens_ of MSS., cf. I. 39, _T.D._ I. 20, 41. An explanation of +this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and P. 244. _Quod +intellegi_ etc.: so in _T.D._ I. 41 _quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide +dicitur_. _Momenta_ n. on I. 45. + +§125. _Verecundius_: cf. 114 _subadroganter_. _Vincam animum_: a common +phrase in Cic., cf. _Philipp._ XII. 21. _Queru potissimum? quem?_: In +repeated questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of +_quisnam_, not _quis_, in the second question, as in _Verr._ IV. 5. The +mutation of Augustine _Contra Ac._ III. 33 makes it probable that _quemnam_ +was the original reading here. Zumpt on _Verr._ qu. Quint. IX. 2, 61, Plin. +_Epist._ I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud it for its +likeness to impromptu. _Nobilitatis_: this is to be explained by referring +to 73--75 (_imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem_), where Cic. +protests against being compared to a demagogue, and claims to follow the +aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the commentators to show that +Democr. was literally an aristocrat have failed. _Convicio_: cf. 34. +_Completa et conferta_: n. on I. 27. _Quod movebitur ... cedat_: this is +the theory of motion disproved by Lucr. I. 370 sq., cf. also _N.D._ II. 83. +Halm writes _quo quid_ for _quod_ (with Christ), and inserts _corpus_ +before _cedat_, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever +body is pushed, gives way." _Tam sit mirabilis_: n. on I. 25. +_Innumerabilis_: 55. _Supra infra_: n. on 92. _Ut nos nunc simus_, etc.: n. +on fragm. 13 of _Ac. Post._ _Disputantis_: 55. _Animo videre_: cf. 22. +_Imagines_: ειδωλα, which Catius translated (_Ad Fam._ XV. 16) by +_spectra_, Zeller 432. _Tu vero_: etc. this is all part of the personal +_convicium_ supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by the Antiocheans, +and beginning at _Tune aut inane_ above. _Commenticiis_: a favourite word +of Cic., cf. _De Div._ II. 113. + +§126. _Quae tu_: elliptic for _ut comprobem quae tu comprobas_ cf. 125. +_Impudenter_: 115. _Atque haud scio_: _atque_ here = καιτοι, "and yet," n. +on 5 _ac vereor_. _Invidiam_: cf. 144. _Cum his_: i.e. _aliis cum his_. +_Summus deus_: "the highest form of the deity" who was of course one in the +Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and πυρ τεχνικον is one of the +definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. I. 29, Zeller 161 sq. _Solem_: as of +course being the chief seat of fire. _Solis autem ... nego credere_: Faber +first gave _ac monet_ for MSS. _admonens_, which Halm retains, Manut. then +restored to its place _permensi refertis_, which MSS. have after _nego_. +_Hic_, which MSS. have after _decempeda_, Madv. turns into _hunc_, while +_hoc_, which stands immediately after _nego_, he ejects (_Em._ 187). _Ergo_ +after _vos_ is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this +arrangement. _Leniter_: Halm and Hermann _leviter_; the former reads +_inverecundior_ after Morgenstern, for what reason it is difficult to see. + +§127. _Pabulum_: similar language in _D.F._ II. 46. _Consideratio +contemplatioque_: Cic. is fond of this combination, as _De Off._ I. 153; +cf. Wesenberg on _T.D._ V. 9, who qu. similar combinations from _D.F._ V. +11, 58. _Elatiores_: MSS. mostly have _latiores_. Halm with Lamb. reads +_altiores_, in support of which reading Dav. qu. _D.F._ II. 51, Val. +Flaccus _Argon._ II. 547, add Virg. _Aen._ VI. 49, Cic. _Orat._ 119. +_Exigua et minima_: σμικρα και ελαχιστα. Madv. on _D.F._ V. 78 notes that +except here Cic. always writes _exigua et paene minima_ or something of the +kind. _Occultissimarum_: n. on I. 15. _Occurit ... completur_: MSS. have +_occuret_ mostly, if that is retained _complebitur_ must be read. Madv. +_Opusc._ II. 282 takes _occurit_, explaining it as a perfect, and giving +numerous exx. of this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on _T.D._ IV. +35. + +§128. _Agi secum_: cf. _nobiscum ageret_ in 80. _Simile veri_: cf. 66. +_Notionem_: = _cognitionem_, επιστημην. _At paulum_: MSS. _et_ Halm _sed._; +cf. _at illud ante_ in 116. _Si quae_: Halm and many edd. have _se, quae_. +But the _se_ comes in very awkwardly, and is not needed before the +infinitive. Madv. indeed (_Em._ 114), after producing many exx. of the +reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts about this passage because +_considero_ does not belong to the class of verbs with which this usage is +found, but he produces many instances with _puto_, which surely stands on +the same level. _Non magis_: so in 119 _nec magis approbabit nunc lucere_, +etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely cognisable +phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to absolute +knowledge by refusing τον ‛ηλιον ‛ομολογειν ειναι καταληπτον (Galen _De +Opt. Gen. Dicendi_ 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). _Cornix_: for the +Stoic belief in divination see Zeller 349--358. _Signum illud_: the +_xystus_ (9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV. +8. _Duodeviginti_: 82, I just note that _octodecim_ is not used by Cic. +_Sol quantus sit_: 91. _Omnium rerum ... comprehendendi_: not a case of a +plural noun with a singular gerund like _spe rerum potiendi_, etc., but of +two genitives depending in different ways on the same word (_definitio_). +M. _Em._ 197 qu. Plat. _Leg._ 648 E την παντων ‛ητταν φοβουμενος ανθρωπον +τοι πωματος, _Brut._ 163 _Scaevolae dicendi elegantia_, _De Or._ III. 156. +Other exx. in _M.D.F._ I. 14. For the turn of expression cf. _T.D._ IV. 62 +_omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi_, _Lael._ 78 _omnium horum +vitiorum una cautio est_, also 51 of this book. + + §§129--141. Summary. What contention is there among philosophers about + the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of + Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides, + Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus, + Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades + (129-131). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow + me, while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must be + careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both + you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness. + "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest possible." How am I to + choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those + points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard + emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful + (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to + Carneades "You do not think me a praetor because I am not a _sapiens_." + "That," said Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (137). Chrysippus + thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended + (138). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue + calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself + (139). When I hear the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I + cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose + (141, 142). + +§129. _Quod coeperam_: in 128 at _veniamus nunc ad boni maique notionem_. +_Constituendi_: n. on 114. _Bonorum summa_: cf. _D.F._ V. 21 and Madv. _Est +igitur_: so in _De Div._ II. 8, _igitur_ comes fourth word in the clause; +this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. _Omitto_: MSS. _et omitto_, +but cf. Madv. _Em._ 201 _certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro +simplici 'omitto,' in initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae +exempla subiciuntur per figuram omissionis_. _Relicta_: cf. 130 _abiectos_. +Cic. generally classes Herillus (or Erillus as Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 +spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded +systems, cf. _D.F._ II. 43, _De Off._ I. 6, _T.D._ V. 85. _Ut Herillum_. +MSS. have either _Erillum_ or _et illum_, one would expect _ut Herilli_. +_Cognitione et scientia_: double translation of επιστημη. For the _finis_ +of Herillus see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 43. _Megaricorum_: _Xenophanes_. Cic +considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to +have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history. +The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic doctrine. +Zeller, _Socrates_ 211. _Unum et simile_: for this see Zell. _Socr._ 222 +sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. _Simile_ ought perhaps to be _sui +simile_ as in _Tim._ c. 7, already quoted on I. 30, see my note there and +cf. I. 35. _Menedemo_: see Zeller _Socr._ 238, R. and P. 182. The +_Erctrian_ school was closely connected with the Megarian. _Fuit_: = _natus +est_, as often. _Herilli_: so Madv. for _ulli_ of MSS. + +§130. _Aristonem_: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a +Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines of +Aristo the Chian _ib._ 358, Zeller 58 sq. _In mediis_: cf. I. 36, 37. +_Momenta_ = _aestimationes_, αξιαι in 36, where _momenti_ is used in a +different way. _Pyrrho autem_: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but +in 124 there is just the same change from _Pyrrhoni_ to _Xenocrates_. +Απαθεια: Diog. IX. 108 affirms this as well as πραιοτης to be a name for +the sceptic τελος, but the name scarcely occurs if at all in Sext. who +generally uses αταραξια, but occasionally μετριοπαθεια; cf. Zeller 496, R. +and P. 338. Απαθεια was also a Stoic term. _Diu multumque_: n. on I. 4. + +§131. _Nec tamen consentiens_: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences +between the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448. +_Callipho_: as the genitive is _Calliphontis_, Cic. ought according to rule +to write _Calliphon_ in the nom; for this see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 19, who +also gives the chief authorities concerning this philosopher. _Hieronymus_: +mentioned _D.F._ II. 19, 35, 41, V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of +him _quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio_. _Diodorus_: see Madv. on +_D.F._ II. 19. _Honeste vivere_, etc.: in _D.F._ IV. 14 the _finis_ of +Polemo is stated to be _secundum naturam vivere_, and three Stoic +interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present +passage--_omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem +vivere_. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him it is +attributed to the _vetus Academia_ in I. 22, where the words _aut omnia aut +maxima_, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. Clemens Alex. qu. +by Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 15. See n. below on Carneades. _Antiochus probat_: +the germs of many Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in +Polemo; see I. 34, n. _Eiusque amici_: Bentl. _aemuli_, but Halm refers to +_D.F._ II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree Stoicised. +_Nunc_: Halm _huc_ after Jo. Scala. _Carneades_: this _finis_ is given in +_D.F._ II. 35 (_frui principiis naturalibus_), II. 42 (_Carneadeum illud +quod is non tam ut probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum +gerebat opponeret_), V. 20 (_fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum +naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor +disserendi causa fuit_), _T.D._ V. 84 (_naturae primus aut omnibus aut +maximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat_). The _finis_ +therefore, thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is +clear that Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include +_virtus_ in it (see _D.F._ II. 38, 42, V. 22) while Polemo did (I. 22). See +more on 139. _Zeno_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 15 _Inventor et princeps_: same +expression in _T.D._ I. 48, _De Or._ I. 91, _De Inv._ II. 6; _inv._ = +οικιστης. + +§132. _Quemlibet_: cf. 125, 126. _Prope singularem_: cf. _T.D._ I. 22 +_Aristoteles longe omnibus--Platonem semper excipio--praestans_; also +_D.F._ V. 7, _De Leg._ I. 15. _Per ipsum Antiochum_: a similar line of +argument is taken in Sext. _P.H._ I. 88, II. 32, etc. _Terminis ... +possessione_: there is a similar play on the legal words _finis terminus +possessio_ in _De Leg._ I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. _Omnis ratio_ +etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. Aug. +_De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1 _neque enim existimat_ (Varro) _ullam philosophiae +sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat +fines bonorum et malorum_, etc. _Si Polemoneus_: i.e. _sapiens fuerit_. +_Peccat_: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see I. 37. _Academicos et_: +MSS. om. _et_ as in I. 16, and _que_ in 52 of this book. _Dicenda_: for the +omission of the verb with the gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic +clauses) cf. I. 7, and Madv. on _D.F._ I. 43, who how ever unduly limits +the usage. _Hic igitur ... prudentior_: MSS. generally have _assentiens_, +but one good one (Halm's E) has _assentientes_. I venture to read +_adsentietur_, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, as in +26 (_tenetur_) and that then _adsentiet_, under the attraction of the _s_ +following, passed into _adsentiens_, as in 147 _intellegat se_ passed into +_intelligentes_. _N_, I may remark, is frequently inserted in MSS. (as in +I. 7 _appellant_, 16 _disputant_, 24 _efficerentur_), and all the changes +involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read _sin, inquam_ +(_sc. adsentietur_) for _si numquam_ of MSS. The question _uter est +prudentior_ is intended to press home the dilemma in which Cicero has +placed the supposed _sapiens_. All the other emendations I have seen are +too unsatisfactory to be enumerated. + +§133. _Non posse ... esse_: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads +_non esse illa probanda sap._ after Lamb., who also conj. _non posse illa +probata esse_. _Paria_: _D.F._ III. 48, _Paradoxa_ 20 sq., Zeller 250. +_Praecide_: συντομος or συνελων ειπε, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 57, _Ad Att._ VIII. +4, X. 16. _Inquit_: n. on 79. _Quid quod quae_: so Guietus with the +approval of Madv. (_Em._ 203) reads for MSS. _quid quae_ or _quid quaeque_, +Halm and Bait., follow Moser in writing _Quid? si quae_ removing the stop +at _paria_, and make _in utramque partem_ follow _dicantur_, on Orelli's +suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often +omit one. _Dicebas_: in 27. _Incognito_: 133. + +§134. _Etiam_: = "yes," Madv. _Gram._ 454. _Non beatissimam_: I. 22, n. +_Deus ille_: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's η θεος η θηριον), if he can +do without other advantages. For the omission of _est_ after the emphatic +_ille_ cf. 59, n. _Theophrasto_, etc.: n. on I. 33, 35. _Dicente_: before +this Halm after Lamb., followed by Bait., inserts _contra_, the need for +which I fail to see. _Et hic_: i.e. Antiochus. _Ne sibi constet_: Cic. +argues in _T.D._ V. that there cannot be degrees in happiness. _Tum hoc ... +tum illud_: cf. 121. _Iacere_: 79. _In his discrepant_: I. 42 _in his +constitit_. + +§135. _Moveri_: κινεισθαι, 29. _Laetitia efferri_: I. 38. _Probabilia_: the +removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain. +_Sapiensne ... deleta sit_: see Madv. _D.F._ p. 806, ed. 2, who is severe +upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), _non timeat? nec si +patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?_ which involves the use of +_nec_ for _ne ... quidem_. I have followed the reading of Madv. in his +_Em._, not the one he gives (after Davies) in _D.F._ _ne patria deleatur_, +which Halm takes, as does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS. _Decreta_: +some MSS. _durata_; Halm conj. _dictata_. _Mediocritates_: μεσοπετες, as in +Aristotle; cf. _T.D._ III. 11, 22, 74. _Permotione_: κινεσει. _Naturalem +... modum_: so _T.D._ III. 74. _Crantoris_: sc. _librum_, for the omission +of which see n. on I. 13; add Quint. IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to +read _in Herodoti_, supplying _libro_. _Aureolus ... libellus_: it is not +often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is rather +colloquial; cf. _T.D._ III. 2, _N.D._ III. 43, also for _aureolus_ 119 +_flumen aureum_. _Panaetius_: he had addressed to Tubero a work _de +dolore_; see _D.F._ IV. 23. _Cotem_: _T.D._ IV. 43, 48, Seneca _De Ira_ +III. 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle (_iram calcar esse +virtutis_). _Dicebant_: for the repetition of this word cf. 146, I. 33. + +§136. _Sunt enim Socratica_: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is +affirmed in _Parad._ 4, _T.D._ III. 10. _Mirabilia_: Cic. generally +translates παραδοξα by _admirabilia_ as in _D.F._ IV. 74, or _admiranda_, +under which title he seems to have published a work different from the +_Paradoxa_, which we possess: see Bait., and Halm's ed. of the Phil. works +(1861), p. 994. _Quasi_: = almost, ‛ως επος ειπειν. _Voltis_: cf. the +Antiochean opinion in I. 18, 22. _Solos reges_: for all this see Zeller 253 +sq. _Solos divites_: ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος πλουσιος, _Parad._ VI. _Liberum_: +_Parad._ V. ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος ελευθερος και πας αφρον δουλος. _Furiosus_: +_Parad._ IV. ‛οτι πας αφρον μαινεται. + +§137. _Tam sunt defendenda_: cf. 8, 120. _Bono modo_: a colloquial and +Plautine expression; see Forc. _Ad senatum starent_: "were in waiting on +the senate;" cf. such phrases as _stare ad cyathum_, etc. _Carneade_: the +vocative is _Carneades_ in _De Div._ I. 23. _Huic Stoico_: i.e. _Diogeni_; +cf. _D.F._ II. 24. Halm brackets _Stoico_, and after him Bait. _Sequi +volebat_: "professed to follow;" cf. _D.F._ V. 13 _Strato physicum se +voluit_ "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on +_D.F._ II. 102. _Ille noster_: Dav. _vester_, as in 143 _noster Antiochus_. +But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. 113. +_Balbutiens_: "giving an uncertain sound;" cf. _De Div._ I. 5, _T.D._ V. +75. + +§138. _Mihi veremini_: cf. Caes. _Bell. Gall_. V. 9 _veritus navibus_. Halm +and Bait. follow Christ's conj. _verenti_, removing the stop at _voltis_. +_Opinationem_: the οιησιν of Sext., e.g. _P.H._ III. 280. _Quod minime +voltis_: cf. I. 18. _De finibus_: not "concerning," but "from among" the +different _fines_; otherwise _fine_ would have been written. Cf. I. 4 _si +qui de nostris._ _Circumcidit et amputat_: these two verbs often come +together, as in _D.F._ I. 44; cf. also _D.F._ III. 31. _Si vacemus omni +molestia_: which Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. _Cum honestate_: +Callipho in 131. _Prima naturae commoda_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ IV. 59, V. +58 confuses the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν with τα του σωματος αγαθα και τα +εκτος of the Peripatetics, for which see I. 19. More on the subject in +Madvig's fourth Excursus to the _D.F._ _Relinquit_: Orelli _relinqui_ +against the MSS. + +§139. _Polemonis ... finibus_: all these were composite _fines_. _Adhuc_: I +need scarcely point out that this goes with _habeo_ and not with +_probabilius_; _adhuc_ for _etiam_ with the comparative does not occur till +the silver writers. _Labor eo_: cf. Horace's _nunc in Aristippi furtim +praecepta relabor_, also _D.F._ V. 6 _rapior illuc: revocat autem +Antiochus_. _Reprehendit manu_: _M.D.F._ II. 3. _Pecudum_: I. 6, _Parad._ +14 _voluptatem esse summum bonum, quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non +hominum_; similar expressions occur with a reference to Epicurus in _De +Off._ I. 105, _Lael._ 20, 32. _T.D._ V. 73, _D.F._ II. 18; cf. also +Aristoph. _Plut._ 922 προβατιου βιον λεγεις and βοσκηματων βιος in +Aristotle. The meaning of _pecus_ is well shown in _T.D._ I. 69. _Iungit +deo_: Zeller 176 sq. _Animum solum_: the same criticism is applied to +Zeno's _finis_ in _D.F._ IV. 17, 25. _Ut ... sequar_: for the repeated _ut_ +see _D.F._ V. 10, Madv. _Gram._ 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second _ut_ +with Lamb. _Carneades ... defensitabat_: this is quite a different view +from that in 131; yet another of Carneades is given in _T.D._ V. 83. _Istum +finem_: MSS. _ipsum_; the two words are often confused, as in I. 2. _Ipsa +veritas_: MSS. _severitas_, a frequent error; cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 3, +III. 162, _De Leg._ I. 4, also Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 55. _Obversetur_: Halm +takes the conj. of Lamb., _adversetur_. The MSS. reading gives excellent +sense; cf. _T.D._ II. 52 _obversentur honestae species viro_. Bait. follows +Halm. _Tu ... copulabis_: this is the feigned expostulation of _veritas_ +(cf. 34 _convicio veritatis_), for which style see 125. + +§140. _Voluptas cum honestate_: this whole expression is in apposition to +_par_, so that _cum_ must not be taken closely with _depugnet_; cf. Hor. +_Sat._ I. 7, 19 _Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius_ (sc. +_par_) _cum Bitho Bacchius_. _Si sequare, ruunt_: for constr. cf. I. 7. +_Communitas_: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. _Nulla potest nisi +erit_: Madv. _D.F._ III. 70 "_in hac coniunctione--hoc fieri non potest +nisi--fere semper coniunctivus subicitur praesentis--futuri et perfecti +indicativus ponitur_." _Gratuita_: "disinterested." _Ne intellegi quidem_: +n. on I. 7, cf. also _T.D._ V. 73, 119. _Gloriosum in vulgus_: cf. _D.F._ +II. 44 _populus cum illis facit_ (i.e. _Epicureis_). _Normam ... regulam_: +n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 8. _Praescriptionem_: I. 23, n. + +§141. _Adquiescis_: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads _adsciscis_, +comparing 138. Add _D.F._ I. 23 (_sciscat et probet_), III. 17 +(_adsciscendas esse_), III. 70 (_adscisci et probari_) Bait. follows Halm. +_Ratum ... fixum_: cf. 27 and n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 17. _Falso_: like +_incognito_ in 133. _Nullo discrimine_: for this see the explanation of +_nihil interesse_ in 40, n. _Iudicia_: κριτηρια as usual. + + §§142--146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the + Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow + any of these? Why, he never even follows the _vetus Academia_, and + never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot + agree about the very elements of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus, + do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling + them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd + together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them + are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being + _sapiens_, know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno used to + illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual + _sapiens_ (145). Now as there is no knowledge there can be no art. How + would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer + mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony. + +§142. _Venio iam_: Dialectic had been already dealt with in 91--98 here it +is merely considered with a view to the choice of the supposed _sapiens_, +as was Ethical Science in 129--141 and Physics in 116--128. With the +enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus gives +in _A.M._ VII. 48 sq. _Protagorae_: R. and P. 132 sq. _Qui putet_: so MSS., +Halm and Bait. _putat_ after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks". +_Permotiones intimas_: cf. 20 _tactus interior_, also 76. _Epicuri_: nn. on +19, 79, 80. _Iudicium_: κριτηριον as usual. _Rerum notitiis_: προληψεσι, +Zeller 403 sq. _Constituit_: note the constr. with _in_, like _ponere in_. +_Cogitationis_: cf. I. 30. Several MSS. have _cognitionis_, the two words +are frequently confused. See Wesenberg _Fm._ to _T.D._ III. p. 17, who +says, _multo tamen saepius "cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam +contra_, also _M.D.F_ III. 21. + +§143. _Ne maiorum quidem suorum_: sc. _aliquid probat_. For _maiorum_ cf. +80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the so-called _vetus Academia_, cf. +I. 33. _Libri_: titles of some are preserved in Diog. Laert. IV. 11--14. +_Nihil politius_: cf. 119, n. _Pedem nusquam_: for the ellipse cf. 58, 116, +_Pro Deiot._ 42 and _pedem latum_ in Plaut. _Abutimur_: this verb in the +rhetorical writers means to use words in metaphorical or unnatural senses, +see Quint. X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we use the name +Academic in a non natural fashion?" _Si dies est lucet_: a better trans of +ει φως εστιν, ‛ημερα εστιν than was given in 96, where see n. _Aliter +Philoni_: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus +the Megarian, mentioned also in 75. The dispute between Diodorus and Philo +is mentioned in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 115--117 with the same purpose as here, +see also Zeller 39. _Antipater_: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded +Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. _Archidemus_: several +times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as VII. 68, 84. _Opiniosissimi_: +so the MSS. I cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn +it. Halm is certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as +_ingeniosissimi_ is necessary. I believe that the word _opiniosissimi_ (an +adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was manufactured on the spur of the +moment, in order to ridicule these two philosophers, who are playfully +described as men full of _opinio_ or δοξα--just the imputation which, as +Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's _spinosissimi_ is ingenious, and +if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable as Halm thinks. + +§144. _In contionem vocas_: a retort, having reference to 14, cf. also 63, +72. For these _contiones_ see Lange, _Romische Alterthumer_ II. 663, ed 2. +They were called by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of +whom had the right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under +fewer restrictions than the right of the others. _Occludi tabernas_ in +order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this see +Liv. III. 27, IV. 31, IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O Israel" +in the Bible. _Artificia_: n. on 30. _Tolli_: n. on 26. _Ut opifices +concitentur_: cf. _Pro Flacc._ 18 _opifices et tabernarios quid neqoti est +concitare?_ _Expromam_: Cic. was probably thinking of the use to which he +himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in _Pro Murena_ 61, a use of which he +half confesses himself ashamed in _D.F._ IV. 74. _Exsules_ etc.: 136. + +§145. _Scire negatis_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 153, who says that even +καταληψις when it arises in the mind of a φαυλος is mere δοξα and not +επιστημη; also _P.H._ II. 83, where it is said that the φαυλος is capable +of το αληθες but not of αληθεια, which the σοφος alone has. _Visum ... +adsensus_: the Stoics as we saw (II. 38, etc.) analysed sensations into two +parts; with the Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate +unanalysable unit, a ψιλον παθος. For this symbolic action of Zeno cf. +_D.F._ II. 18, _Orat._ 113, Sextus _A.M._ II. 7, Quint. II. 20, 7, Zeller +84. _Contraxerat_: so Halm who qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XI. 26, 94 _digitum +contrahens aut remittens_; Orelli _construxerat_; MSS. mostly _contexerat_. +_Quod ante non fuerat_: καταλαμβανειν however is frequent in Plato in the +sense "to seize firmly with the mind." _Adverterat_: the best MSS. give +merely _adverat_, but on the margin _admoverat_ which Halm takes, and after +him Bait.; one good MS. has _adverterat_. _Ne ipsi quidem_: even Socrates, +Antisthenes and Diogenes were not σοφοι according to the Stoics, but merely +were εν προκοπηι; see Diog. VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. _Sto. Rep._ +1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) εστι δε ουτος (i.e. ‛ο σοφος) +ουδαμου γης ουδε γεγονε. _Nec tu_: sc. _scis_; Goer. has a strange note +here. + +§146. _Illa_: cf. _illa invidiosa_ above (144). _Dicebas_: in 22. _Refero_: +"retort," as in Ovid. _Metam._ I. 758 _pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici +potuisse et non potuisse referri_; cf. also _par pari referre dicto_. _Ne +nobis quidem_: "_nor_ would they be angry;" cf. n. on. I. 5. _Arbitrari_: +the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an +eye-witness," see Corssen I. 238. _Ea non ut_: MSS. have _ut ea non aut_. +Halm reads _ut ea non_ merely, but I prefer the reading I have given +because of Cicero's fondness for making the _ut_ follow closely on the +negative: for this see Madv. _Gram._ 465 _b_, obs. + +§147. _Obscuritate_: cf. I. 44, n. on I. 15. _Plus uno_: 115. _Iacere_: cf. +79. _Plagas_: cf. n. on 112. + +§148. _Ad patris revolvor sententiam_: for this see Introd. 50, and for the +expression 18. _Opinaturum_: see 59, 67, 78, 112. _Intellegat se_: MSS. +_intellegentes_, cf. n. on 132. _Qua re_: so Manut. for _per_ of MSS. +Εποχην _illam omnium rerum_: an odd expression; cf. _actio rerum_ in 62. +_Non probans_: so Madv. _Em._ 204 for MSS. _comprobans_. Dav. conj. +_improbans_ and is followed by Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is +wrong. The difficulty is essentially the same as that involved in 104, +which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a theoretical +dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that _assent_ (meaning absolute +assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma Catulus might well +describe himself as formally approving (_comprobans_). The _practice_ is to +give assent (meaning modified assent). There is the same contrast in 104 +between _placere_ and _tenere_. I may note that the word _alteri_ (cf. +_altero_ in 104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice are +irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably confirmed +edd. in their introduction of the negative. _Nec eam admodum_: cf. _non +repugnarem_ in 112. _Tollendum_: many edd. have gone far astray in +interpreting this passage. The word is used with a double reference to +_adsensus_ and _ancora_; in the first way we have had _tollere_ used a +score of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes. +_Bell. Gall._ IV. 23, _Bell. Civ._ I. 31, where _tollere_ is used of +weighing anchor, and Varro _De Re Rust._ III. 17, 1, where it occurs in the +sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any reference to the sea. (The +exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe and this alone is referred to +in _Ad Att._ XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried at first +to manage a joke by using the word _inhibendum_, which had also a nautical +signification, but finding that he had mistaken the meaning of the word, +substituted _tollendum_. + +[1] _De Leg._ II. §3. + +[2] Cf. _De Or._ II. §1 with II. §5. + +[3] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut +philosophus probabatur. + +[4] _N.D._ I. §93, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius. + +[5] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1. + +[6] _Brutus_, §309. + +[7] _Ad Att._ II. 20, §6. + +[8] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 16. _T.D._ V. §113. _Acad._ II. §115. + +[9] _Brutus_, §306. + +[10] _Ibid._ + +[11] _Rep._ I. §7. _T.D._ V. §5. _De Off._ II. §§3,4. _De Fato_, §2. + +[12] Cf. _Brutus_, §§312, 322. + +[13] Cf. _Brutus_, §§312, 314, 316. + +[14] _Brutus_, §315. + +[15] _N.D._ I. §59. + +[16] VII. I. §35. + +[17] Cf. _N.D._ I. §93 with _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, §1. + +[18] _Ac._ I. §46. + +[19] _D.F._ V. §3. + +[20] _D.F._ I. §16. + +[21] _D.F._ V. §6, etc. + +[22] _D.F._ V. §8. + +[23] _Ac._ II. §4. + +[24] _Ib._ §69. + +[25] _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, §5. + +[26] _Ac._ II. §113. + +[27] _Ac._ II. §113. _De Leg._ I. §54. + +[28] II. §12. + +[29] _Brutus_, §316. + +[30] _Hortensius_, fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe. + +[31] _T.D._ II. §61. + +[32] _De Div._ I. §130. + +[33] _D.F._ I. §6. + +[34] _Ad Att._ I. 10 and 11. + +[35] _Ibid._ II. 1, §3. _N.D._ I. §6. + +[36] _Ad Att._ II. 2. + +[37] _Ibid._ I. 20. Cf. II. 1, §12. + +[38] II. 6. + +[39] _Ad Att._ II. 7 and 16. + +[40] _Ibid._ II. 6, §2. + +[41] Cf. _Ad Att._ IV. 11 with IV. 8 a. + +[42] _Ibid._ IV. 10. + +[43] _Ibid._ IV. 16, §2. + +[44] _Ibid._ IV. 16 c, §10, ed. Nobbe. + +[45] _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 14. + +[46] _Ad Qu. Fr._ III. 5 and 6. + +[47] §332. + +[48] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1. _Ad Att._ V. 11, §6. + +[49] _Ad Att._ V. 10, §5. + +[50] _De Off._ I. §1. + +[51] _Tim._ c. 1. + +[52] Cf. _Tim._ c. 1 with _De Div._ I. §5. _Brutus_, §250. + +[53] _Ad Att._ VI. 1, §26. + +[54] _Ibid._ VI. 2, §3. + +[55] _Ibid._ VI. 6, §2. + +[56] _Ibid._ VI. 7, §2. _Ad Fam._ II. 17, §1. + +[57] _T.D._ V. §22. + +[58] _Ad Att._ VII. 1, §1. + +[59] _Ibid._ VII. 3, VIII. 11. + +[60] _Ad Att._ X. 8, §6. + +[61] _Ibid._ VIII. 2, §4. + +[62] περι ‛ομονοιας, _Ad Att._ IX. 9, §2, etc. + +[63] _Ibid._ IX. 4, §2; 9, §1. + +[64] _Ibid._ IX. 10, §2. + +[65] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1. + +[66] _Ibid._ IX. 3. + +[67] _Ibid._ IV. 3 and 4. + +[68] _De Rep._ I. §7. _T.D._ V. §5, etc. + +[69] Cf. _N.D._ I. §6. + +[70] Esp. I. §§26, 37. + +[71] Cf. _Ac._ II. §29. + +[72] _Ac._ II. §70. + +[73] _De Div._ II. §1. _Ac._ I. §45, etc. + +[74] _N.D._ I. §1. + +[75] Cf. esp. _N.D._ I. §5. _T.D._ II. §5. + +[76] _De Div._ II. §1. _N.D._ I. §7, etc. + +[77] _T.D._ II. §4. + +[78] _N.D._ I. §10. + +[79] Cf. _Ac._ II. §8. _N.D._ I. §§10, 66. + +[80] _T.D._ II. §9. + +[81] _N.D._ I. §10. + +[82] _Ibid._ I. §17. _Ac._ II. §§120, 137. + +[83] _T.D._ V. §33. + +[84] _Ac._ II. §121. + +[85] _T.D._ V. §82, _libas ex omnibus_. + +[86] _Ac._ II. §143. + +[87] _T.D._ V. §11. + +[88] _Ac._ II. §10. + +[89] _N.D._ I. §12. + +[90] _Parad._ §2. _De Fato_, §3. _T.D._ I. §7. _De Off._ I. §3. + +[91] _D.F._ IV. §5. + +[92] _Paradoxa_, §2. + +[93] _T.D._ I. §55. _De Div._ II. §62. + +[94] _T.D._ V. §11. _D.F._ II. §§1 and 2, etc. + +[95] §13. + +[96] Cf. esp. _N.D._ i. §6. _Ac._ ii. §§11 and 17. + +[97] _De Leg._ I. §39. + +[98] _Ibid._ I. §§55, 56. + +[99] _N.D._ I. §4. + +[100] _T.D._ IV. §53. + +[101] Cf. _De Off._ III. §20. + +[102] _T.D._ V. §§21-31, esp. §23. + +[103] _Ibid._ V. §75. + +[104] _De Off._ II. §35. + +[105] _T.D._ V. §34. + +[106] _Ac._ I. §16. + +[107] _Paradoxa_, §4. _Ac._ II. §§136, 137. _T.D._ III. §10. + +[108] _Ac._ II. §135. + +[109] See esp. _N.D._ I. §§3, 4. + +[110] _Ibid._, also _T.D._ V. §83. + +[111] Grote's _Aristotle_, vol. I. ch. 11. + +[112] _T.D._ IV. §9. _D.F._ III. §41. + +[113] I. §6. + +[114] _T.D._ IV. §7. + +[115] _Ibid._ IV. §7. Cf. _D.F._ II. §44, _populus cum illis facit_. + +[116] _Ac._ I. §6. _T.D._ IV. 6, 7; II. §7; III. §33. _D.F._ III. §40. + +[117] _T.D._ IV. §3. + +[118] _D.F._ I. §§4-6. _Ac._ I. §10. _D.F._ III. §5. + +[119] _De Div._ I. §§4, 5. + +[120] _D.F._ III. §5. _N.D._ I. §8. _T.D._ III. §§10, 16. + +[121] _T.D._ I. §5. + +[122] _T.D._ II. §5. + +[123] _De Div._ II. §1. _De Off._ II. §4. + +[124] _De Div._ II. §6. _De Off._ II. §2. + +[125] See esp. _De Consolatione_, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. _T.D._ V. §5. _Ac._ +I. §11. + +[126] _N.D._ I. §6. + +[127] _T.D._ II. §§1, 4. _De Off._ II. §3. _D.F._ I. §1. + +[128] _T.D._ II. §1. _D.F._ I. §§1, 3. + +[129] _D.F._ I. §§1, 11. + +[130] _De Div._ II. §5. _De Off._ II. §2. _T.D._ IV. §1. + +[131] _De Div._ II. §4. + +[132] _N.D._ I. §9. _T.D._ II. §1. + +[133] _De Div._ II. §4. + +[134] _Ad Att._ XII. 19, §1. + +[135] _Ibid._ XII. 14, §3. + +[136] _Ibid._ XII. 15, 16. + +[137] _Ibid._ XII. 21, §5. + +[138] _Ibid._ XII. 23, §2. + +[139] _Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam._ + +[140] _De Or._ III. §109. + +[141] _Ad Att._ XII. 28, §2. + +[142] Cf. esp. _Ad Att._ XII. 40, §2 with 38, §3. + +[143] _Ibid._ XII. 40, §2. + +[144] _Ibid._ XII. 40, §5. + +[145] _Ibid._ XIII. 26. + +[146] _Ibid._ XII. 41, §1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26. + +[147] _Ibid._ XII. 46. + +[148] _Ad Att._ XII. 45, §1. + +[149] _Über Cicero's Akademika_, p. 4. + +[150] Cf. _Ad Att._ XII. 12, §2, where there is a distinct mention of the +first two books. + +[151] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, §3. + +[152] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §4. + +[153] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §§4, 5; 22, §3. + +[154] II. §2. + +[155] _De Fin._ Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2. + +[156] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, §3; 16, §1. + +[157] _Ibid._ XVI. 3, §1. + +[158] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, §4. + +[159] _Ac._ II. §61. + +[160] _D.F._ I. §2. + +[161] _T.D._ II. §4. _De Div._ II. §1. + +[162] Cf. Krische, p. 5. + +[163] _Ac._ II. §61. + +[164] _Ad Att._ XIII. 5, §1. + +[165] _Ibid._ XIII. 32, §3. + +[166] _Ad Att._ XIII. 33, §4. + +[167] _Ibid_. XIII. II. §1. + +[168] _Ibid_. XII. 42. + +[169] _Ibid_. XIII. 16, §1. + +[170] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3. + +[171] _Ibid_. IV. 16a, §2. + +[172] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3; also IV. 16a, §2. + +[173] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, §3. + +[174] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §4. + +[175] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3. + +[176] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §4. + +[177] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, §3; 19, §4; 16, §1. + +[178] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, §3. + +[179] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, §1. + +[180] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5. + +[181] Cf. _Ibid._ XIII. 14, §3; 16, §2; 18; 19, §5. + +[182] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5. + +[183] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3. + +[184] _Ad Att._ XIII. 24. + +[185] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, §1; 18. + +[186] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, §1; 18; 19, §4. + +[187] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, §3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates +Schütz assigns to these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition +of the _Academica_ in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13. + +[188] _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, §1. + +[189] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §5. + +[190] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, §3. + +[191] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3. + +[192] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, §3. + +[193] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §4. + +[194] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §5. + +[195] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, §3. + +[196] _Ibid._ XIII. 24. + +[197] _Ibid._ XIII. 35, 36, §2. + +[198] _Ibid._ XIII. 38, §1. + +[199] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, §§3, 4. + +[200] _T.D._ II. §4. Cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ III. 6, §64. + +[201] _Ad Att._ XVI. 6, §4. _N.D._ I. §11. _De Div._ II. §1. + +[202] _De Off._ II. §8, _Timæus_, c. 1. _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, §1; 19, §5. + +[203] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12; 16; 13; 19. + +[204] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, §4. _T.D._ II. §4. _N.D._ I. §11. _De Div._ II. §1. + +[205] _Nat. Hist._ XXXI. c. 2. + +[206] _Inst. Or._ III. 6, §64. + +[207] Plut. _Lucullus_, c. 42. + +[208] §§12, 18, 148. + +[209] Cf. _Att._ XIII. 19, §4. + +[210] _Lucullus_, §12. + +[211] _Ad Att._ XIII. 16, §1. + +[212] Lactant. _Inst._ VI 2. + +[213] Cf. esp. _De Off._ I. §133 with _Brutus_, §§133, 134. + +[214] Esp. _Pro Lege Manilia_, §51. + +[215] _Brutus_, §222. + +[216] _In Verrem_, II. 3, §210. + +[217] _Pro Lege Manilia_, §59. + +[218] _Pro Sestio_, §122. + +[219] _Pro Sestio_, §101. + +[220] _Philipp._ II. §12. + +[221] _Ad Att._ II. 24, §4. + +[222] _Pis._ §6. _Pro Sestio_, §121. _Pro Domo_, §113. _Post Reditum in +Senatu_, §9. _Philipp._ II. §12. + +[223] _Ad Fam._ IX. 15, §3. + +[224] Cf. _Post Reditum in Senatu_, §9. _Pro Domo_, §113. + +[225] _Pro Archia_, §§6, 28. + +[226] Cf. _Ac._ II. §9 with §80. + +[227] §62. + +[228] _Pro Plancio_, §12. _Pro Murena_, §36. _Pro Rabirio_, §26. _Pro +Cornelia_ II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe. + +[229] _T.D._ V. §56. Cf. _De Or._ III. §9. _N.D._ III. §80. + +[230] Cf. esp. III. §173. + +[231] _Ibid._ II. §28. + +[232] _Ibid._ II. §§13, 20, 21. + +[233] _Ibid._ II. §51. + +[234] Cf. _ibid._ II. §74 with III. §127. + +[235] Cf. II. §152 with III. §187. + +[236] _Ibid._ II. §154. + +[237] _Brutus_, §§132, 133, 134, 259. _De Or._ III. §29. + +[238] _Brutus_, §132. + +[239] _De Or._ II. §244. _N.D._ I. §79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9. + +[240] _De Or._ II. §155. + +[241] _Ibid._ III. §194. + +[242] Cf. _De Or._ II. §68 with III. §§182, 187. + +[243] _De Or._ I. §82 sq.; II. §360. + +[244] _Ibid._ I. §45; II. §365; III. §§68, 75. + +[245] §12, _commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni_. + +[246] Cf. _De Or._ III. §110. + +[247] _Ac._ II. §148. + +[248] Cf. _Ac._ II. §11. + +[249] _Ibid._ + +[250] _Ibid._ §§12, 18, with my notes. + +[251] _Ac._ II. §12: _ista quae heri defensa sunt_ compared with the words +_ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus_. + +[252] See below. + +[253] _Ac._ II. §§33--36 inclusive; §54. + +[254] _Ac._ II. §28. + +[255] Cf. _Ac._ II. §§59, 67, 78, 112, 148, with my notes. + +[256] _Ibid._ II. §10. + +[257] _Ibid._ II. §28. + +[258] Cf. II. §61 with the fragments of the _Hortensius_; also _T.D._ II. +§4; III. §6; _D.F._ I. §2. + +[259] Lactant. III. 16. + +[260] Cf. _Ac._ II. §10. + +[261] _Ib._ II. §61. + +[262] §§44--46. + +[263] §13. + +[264] Cf. II. §14 with I. §44, and II. §§55, 56. + +[265] II. §§17, 18, 22. + +[266] Cf. II. §31 with I. §45. + +[267] II. §§17, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54, 59. + +[268] II. §79. + +[269] Cf. the words _tam multa_ in II. §79. + +[270] See II. §42, where there is a reference to the "_hesternus sermo_." + +[271] II. §10. + +[272] Cf. II. §10: _id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere +quaestio tractata videatur_. + +[273] What these were will appear from my notes on the _Lucullus_. + +[274] II. §12. + +[275] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8. + +[276] Cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 25, §3: _Ad Brutum transeamus_. + +[277] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy +after Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see _Ad Att._ VII. 3, §9. + +[278] II. §9. + +[279] Cf. II. §61. + +[280] II. §80: _O praeclarum prospectum_! + +[281] Cf. II. §9 with §128 (_signum illud_), also §§80, 81, 100, 105, 125. + +[282] II. §115. + +[283] II. §63. + +[284] II. §§147, 148. + +[285] II. §135. + +[286] Cf. II. §§11, 12 with the words _quae erant contra_ ακαταληψιαν +_praeclare collecta ab Antiocho_: _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, §3. + +[287] Varro, _De Re Rust._ III. 17. + +[288] II. §11. + +[289] _Paradoxa_, §1. _D.F._ III. §8. _Brutus_, §119. + +[290] _Ac._ I. §12. _D.F._ V. §8. + +[291] Cf. II. §80. + +[292] Cf. Aug. _Adv. Acad._ III. §35. Nonius, sub v. _exultare_. + +[293] Cf. the word _nuper_ in §1. + +[294] §11. + +[295] §§3, 18. + +[296] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8, §1. + +[297] _Ad Att._ II. 25, §1. + +[298] _Ibid_. III. 8, §3. + +[299] _Ibid_. III. 15, §3; 18, §1. + +[300] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1--8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro +preserved in our collections. + +[301] Above, pp. xxxvii--xlii. + +[302] _De Civ. Dei_, XIX. cc. 1--3. + +[303] See Madvig, _De Fin._ ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50. +Brückner, _Leben des Cicero_, I. p. 655, follows Müller. + +[304] Cf. Krische, p. 58. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA *** + +***** This file should be named 14970-0.txt or 14970-0.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/7/14970/ + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +https://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +https://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at https://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit https://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including including checks, online payments and credit card +donations. To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + https://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |