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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Academica + +Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero + +Release Date: February 8, 2005 [EBook #14970] + +Language: Latin with English and Greek (ancient) + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA *** + + + + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<h3>THE</h3> + +<h1>ACADEMICA OF CICERO.</h1> + +<h3><i>THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED</i></h3> + +<p class="center">BY</p> + +<h2>JAMES S. REID,</h2> + +<p class="center">M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)<br /> +ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;<br /> +ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.</p> + +<h2>LONDON:<br /> +MACMILLAN AND CO.<br /> +1874</h2> + +<h3>[<i>All Rights reserved</i>.]</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h3>TO</h3> +<h3>THOSE OF HIS PUPILS</h3> +<h3>WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM</h3> +<h3><i>THE ACADEMICA</i>,</h3> +<h3>THIS EDITION</h3> +<h3>IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED</h3> +<h3>BY</h3> +<h3>THE EDITOR.</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>PREFACE.</h2> + + <p>Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has + edited the <i>Academica</i>. In Germany the last edition with explanatory + notes is that of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and + untrustworthiness of Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong + evidence; while the work of Davies, though in every way far superior to + that of Goerenz, is very deficient when judged by the criticism of the + present time.</p> + + <p>This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures + given by me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work + in its present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the + Universities, and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where + the philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those + where an attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient + Philosophy as will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now + required in the final Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford + and Cambridge. My notes have been written throughout with a practical + reference to the needs of junior students. During the last three or four + years I have read the <i>Academica</i> with a large number of intelligent + pupils, and there is scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested + by some difficulty or want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody + in an Introduction such information concerning Cicero's philosophical + views and the literary history of the <i>Academica</i> as could not be + readily got from existing books; next, to provide a good text; then to + aid the student in obtaining a higher knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, + and lastly, to put it in his power to learn thoroughly the philosophy + with which Cicero deals.</p> + + <p>My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in + the edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the + editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second + edition of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that + editor. I have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass + without carefully weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also + studied all original criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain + access. The result is a text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than + that of Halm. My obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently + acknowledged in my notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled + <i>Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos</i>, published in 1825 + at Copenhagen, but never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in + the edition of Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few + passages I have introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the + conjecttires of other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the + MSS. If any apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the + notes, questions of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from + a conviction that the very excellence of the texts now in use is + depriving a Classical training of a great deal of its old educational + value. The judgment was better cultivated when the student had to fight + his way through bad texts to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the + Latin tongue. The acceptance of results without a knowledge of the + processes by which they are obtained is worthless for the purposes of + education, which is thus made to rest on memory alone. I have therefore + done my best to place before the reader the arguments for and against + different readings in the most important places where the text is + doubtful.</p> + + <p>My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the + students for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller + acquaintance than they ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties + of language which the best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide + them to the best teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding + editor of Cicero must build. His edition of the <i>De Finibus</i> + contains more valuable material for illustrating, not merely the + language, but also the subject-matter of the <i>Academica</i>, than all + the professed editions of the latter work in existence. Yet, even after + Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be done in pointing out what + is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have therefore added very many + references from my own reading, and from other sources. Wherever a + quotation would not have been given but for its appearance in some other + work, I have pointed out the authority from whom it was taken. I need + hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to look out all the + references given. It was necessary to provide material by means of which + the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if it were new to + him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that occurred. Want of + space has compelled me often to substitute a mere reference for an actual + quotation.</p> + + <p>As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not + touched upon somewhere in the <i>Academica</i>, it is evidently + impossible for an editor to give information which would be complete for + a reader who is studying that subject for the first time. I have + therefore tried to enable readers to find easily for themselves the + information they require, and have only dwelt in my own language upon + such philosophical difficulties as were in some special way bound up with + the <i>Academica</i>. The two books chiefly referred to in my notes are + the English translation of Zeller's <i>Stoics, Epicureans and + Sceptics</i> (whenever Zeller is quoted without any further description + this book is meant), and the <i>Historia Philosophiae</i> of Ritter and + Preller. The <i>pages</i>, not the <i>sections</i>, of the fourth edition + of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's <i>De Finibus</i>, + all teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a + philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have + constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all + of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.</p> + + <p>Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is + hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as + bringing together much scattered information illustrative of the + <i>Academica</i>, which was before difficult of access. The present work + will, I hope, prepare the way for an exhaustive edition either from my + own or some more competent hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, + for no English scholar of recent times has treated any portion of + Cicero's philosophical works with quite the purpose which I have kept in + view and have explained above. Should this attempt meet with favour, I + propose to edit after the same plan some others of the less known and + less edited portions of Cicero's writings.</p> + + <p>In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited + I cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to + repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than + to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a + great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that + intellectual disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this + University, and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of + English scholarship as compared with that of Germany,</p> + + <p>I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and + omissions from any who are interested in the subject.</p> + + <p>JAMES S. REID.</p> + + <p>CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, <i>December, 1873.</i></p> + +<hr /> + +<h3>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.</h3> + + <p>Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica + Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De + Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. = + Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus; + Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = + De Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. + = Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; + Ad Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., + Verr. = In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; + In Cat. = In Catilinam.</p> + + <p>Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia + Socratis; Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.</p> + + <p>Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna + Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De + Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. = + Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.</p> + + <p>Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. + Rep. = De Stoicis Repugnantiis.</p> + + <p>Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. = + Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = + Pyrrhoneôn Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata.</p> + + <p>Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.</p> + + <p>Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.</p> + + <p>Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et + Platonis.</p> + + <p>Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.</p> + + <p>Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; + De Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.</p> + + <p>Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.</p> + + <p>Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad + Helvidium.</p> + + <p>Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.</p> + + <p>Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. = + Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. + = Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.</p> + + <p>Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. + = Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or + Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.</p> + + <p>Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.</p> + + <p>Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie.</p> + + <p>Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.</p> + + <p>Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.</p> + + <p>Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. = + conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. = + emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. = + especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. + = Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, + or omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. = + subjunctive.</p> + + <p>R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium + locis contexta.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.</h2> + +<!-- Page i --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i"></a>[i]</span> + +<h3>INTRODUCTION.</h3> + +<p class="center">I. <i>Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of +Letters:</i> 90—45 B.C.</p> + + <p>It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his + father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and + spent the greater part of his time in study.<a name="NtA_1"></a><a + href="#Nt_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> From him was probably derived that strong + love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son throughout + his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young Cicero to + feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a corrective for + the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.<a + name="NtA_2"></a><a href="#Nt_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a></p> + + <p>Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the + Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of + Athens, whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he + had assumed the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at + once to the tenets of the <!-- Page ii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_ii"></a>[ii]</span> master.<a name="NtA_3"></a><a + href="#Nt_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> Phaedrus remained to the end of his life + a friend of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable + disposition and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, + the exception of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any + literary power.<a name="NtA_4"></a><a href="#Nt_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> + Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius + Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus. + It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend + became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the + Epicurean school.<a name="NtA_5"></a><a + href="#Nt_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a></p> + + <p>At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of + Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively, + the art of dialectic.<a name="NtA_6"></a><a + href="#Nt_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> This art, which Cicero deems so important + to the orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the + monopoly of the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days + with Diodotus in the severest study, but he seems never to have been much + attracted by the general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between + the two lasted till the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion + set by the Roman Stoic circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became + an inmate of Cicero's house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil + heir to a not inconsiderable property.<a name="NtA_7"></a><a + href="#Nt_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> He seems to have been one of the most + accomplished <!-- Page iii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_iii"></a>[iii]</span> men of his time, and Cicero's feelings + towards him were those of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.<a + name="NtA_8"></a><a href="#Nt_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a></p> + + <p>In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the + Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled + from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. + Philo, like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic + philosopher, he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice + of oratory. Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for + Epicureanism was swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, + as he tells us, to the brilliant Academic.<a name="NtA_9"></a><a + href="#Nt_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he + abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the + conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever, + and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.<a + name="NtA_10"></a><a href="#Nt_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a></p> + + <p>We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been + brought into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent + philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and + important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become + thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of + each. His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his + egotism has been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. + In his later works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to + philosophy.<a name="NtA_11"></a><a href="#Nt_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> It + would be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection <!-- + Page iv --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv"></a>[iv]</span> which + subsisted between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; + but there can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then + Rhodian ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning + the ethical part of Greek philosophy.</p> + + <p>During the years 88—81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly + with the study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many + ambitious works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him + at this period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the + Marian party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular + course, and Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one + philosophic orator of Rome, as he not unjustly boasts<a + name="NtA_12"></a><a href="#Nt_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a>. For two years he + was busily engaged, and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern + Hellas. It is usually supposed that he came into collision with Sulla + through the freedman Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of + Roscius. The silence of Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which + rests on no better evidence than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even + when mentioning his speech in defence of Roscius, never assigns any other + cause for his departure than his health, which was being undermined by + his passionate style of oratory<a name="NtA_13"></a><a + href="#Nt_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>The whole two years 79—77 B.C. were spent in the society of + Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at + Athens, and were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the + exception <!-- Page v --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_v"></a>[v]</span> of Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent + rhetorical teachers at that time resident in the city<a + name="NtA_14"></a><a href="#Nt_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a>. By the advice of + Philo himself<a name="NtA_15"></a><a href="#Nt_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a>, + Cicero attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as + Diogenes calls him<a name="NtA_16"></a><a + href="#Nt_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a>, Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the + Epicurean school. In Cicero's later works there are several references to + his teaching. He was biting and sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in + spirit, hence in striking contrast to Patro and Phaedrus<a + name="NtA_17"></a><a href="#Nt_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a>. It is curious to + find that Zeno is numbered by Cicero among those pupils and admirers of + Carneades whom he had known<a name="NtA_18"></a><a + href="#Nt_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a>. Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along + with Atticus who loved him beyond all other philosophers<a + name="NtA_19"></a><a href="#Nt_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a>, Cicero spent much + time in listening to his instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the + two pupils<a name="NtA_20"></a><a href="#Nt_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a>. + Patro was probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere + explicitly stated. Cicero must at this time have attained an almost + complete familiarity with the Epicurean doctrines.</p> + + <p>There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school + then at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose + lectures Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed + Peripatetic, was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens<a + name="NtA_21"></a><a href="#Nt_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a>. Only three + notable Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of + Naples, who lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens<a + name="NtA_22"></a><a href="#Nt_22"><sup>[22]</sup></a>; it is probable, + however, from a mention of <!-- Page vi --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span> him in the De Oratore, that Cicero knew + himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently named + by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time + unknown to him.</p> + + <p>The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at + this period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a + Stoicised Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to + treat later, when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised + over our author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point + which was in controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still + continued to think with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, + make it evident that he set a high value on the abilities and the + learning of Antiochus, especially in dialectic, which was taught after + Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him as eminent among the philosophers + of the time, both for talent and acquirement <a name="NtA_23"></a><a + href="#Nt_23"><sup>[23]</sup></a>; as a man of acute intellect<a + name="NtA_24"></a><a href="#Nt_24"><sup>[24]</sup></a>; as possessed of a + pointed style<a name="NtA_25"></a><a href="#Nt_25"><sup>[25]</sup></a>; + in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the philosophers of the + age<a name="NtA_26"></a><a href="#Nt_26"><sup>[26]</sup></a>. A + considerable friendship sprang up between Antiochus and Cicero<a + name="NtA_27"></a><a href="#Nt_27"><sup>[27]</sup></a>, which was + strengthened by the fact that many friends of the latter, such as Piso, + Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or less adhered to the views of + Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at this time became acquainted + with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in the Academica<a + name="NtA_28"></a><a href="#Nt_28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> he is mentioned in + such a way as to show that he was unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.</p> + +<!-- Page vii --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span> +The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had +been to learn philosophy; in Asia and at Rhodes he +devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the guidance +of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was +his old friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian +school<a name="NtA_29"></a><a href="#Nt_29"><sup>[29]</sup></a>. Cicero, however, formed while at Rhodes one +friendship which largely influenced his views of philosophy, +that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, +the most famous Stoic of the age. To him Cicero +makes reference in his works oftener than to any other +instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the +Stoics<a name="NtA_30"></a><a href="#Nt_30"><sup>[30]</sup></a>; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom +Pompey, in the midst of his eastern campaigns, put +himself to much trouble<a name="NtA_31"></a><a href="#Nt_31"><sup>[31]</sup></a>; as a minute inquirer<a name="NtA_32"></a><a href="#Nt_32"><sup>[32]</sup></a>. He +is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression of +affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works +more than those of any other author<a name="NtA_33"></a><a href="#Nt_33"><sup>[33]</sup></a>. Posidonius +was at a later time resident at Rome, and stayed in +Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of +Panaetius, may have been at Rhodes at this time. +Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers of Panaetius, +belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was +well acquainted with the works of the former, he does +not seem to have known either personally. + + <p>From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters + begins, Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political + affairs to spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed + much to philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; <!-- Page viii + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span> and we + know from his letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style + by much study of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. + During the period then, about which we have little or no information, we + may believe that he kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many + Roman friends who had a bent towards philosophy, as well as with the + Greeks who from time to time came to Rome and frequented the houses of + the Optimates; to this he added such reading as his leisure would allow. + The letters contained in the first book of those addressed to Atticus, + which range over the years 68—62 B.C., afford many proofs of the + abiding strength of his passion for literary employment. In the earlier + part of this time we find him entreating Atticus to let him have a + library which was then for sale; expressing at the same time in the + strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his love for + books, to which he looks as the support of his old age<a + name="NtA_34"></a><a href="#Nt_34"><sup>[34]</sup></a>. In the midst of + his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest for + the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan + villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be + taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all + things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory + held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed + his intellect, but never his heart.</p> + + <p>The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to + indulge his literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his + speeches, which were <!-- Page ix --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span> crowded, he says, with the maxims of + philosophy<a name="NtA_35"></a><a href="#Nt_35"><sup>[35]</sup></a>; the + history of his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he + sent to Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the + poem on his consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two + later we find him reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and + keeping up his acquaintance with living Greek philosophers<a + name="NtA_36"></a><a href="#Nt_36"><sup>[36]</sup></a>. His long lack of + leisure seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at + this time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he + presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes + to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the + endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even + slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find + greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit<a + name="NtA_37"></a><a href="#Nt_37"><sup>[37]</sup></a>." At this period + of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates near Tusculum, + Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater emphasis on these + facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero was a mere + dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore paraphrases of + Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for every kind of + literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each department + considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his age, with + the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus<a + name="NtA_38"></a><a href="#Nt_38"><sup>[38]</sup></a> will give a fair + picture of his life at this time. He especially studied the political + writings of <!-- Page x --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_x"></a>[x]</span> the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and + Dicaearchus<a name="NtA_39"></a><a href="#Nt_39"><sup>[39]</sup></a>. He + also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of Theopompus<a + name="NtA_40"></a><a href="#Nt_40"><sup>[40]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>The years from 59—57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private + cares overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return + from exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring + literature" with a marvellous man named Dionysius<a name="NtA_41"></a><a + href="#Nt_41"><sup>[41]</sup></a>, and laughingly pronouncing that + nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the + year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, + the son of the Dictator<a name="NtA_42"></a><a + href="#Nt_42"><sup>[42]</sup></a>. Literature formed then, he tells us, + his solace and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which + Atticus had, beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of + office. Towards the end of the year, he was busily engaged on the <i>De + Oratore</i>, a work which clearly proves his continued familiarity with + Greek philosophy<a name="NtA_43"></a><a + href="#Nt_43"><sup>[43]</sup></a>. In the following year (54) he writes + that politics must cease for him, and that he therefore returns + unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature, that of the + student<a name="NtA_44"></a><a href="#Nt_44"><sup>[44]</sup></a>. During + this year he was again for the most part at those of his country villas + where his best collections of books were. At this time was written the + <i>De Republica</i>, a work to which I may appeal for evidence that his + old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to drop<a + name="NtA_45"></a><a href="#Nt_45"><sup>[45]</sup></a>. Aristotle is + especially mentioned as one of the authors <!-- Page xi --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span> read at this time<a + name="NtA_46"></a><a href="#Nt_46"><sup>[46]</sup></a>. In the year 52 + B.C. came the <i>De Legibus</i>, written amid many distracting + occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older + philosophers of the Socratic schools.</p> + + <p>In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, + much to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the + house of Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His + acquaintance with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the + affectionate mention in the <i>Brutus</i><a name="NtA_47"></a><a + href="#Nt_47"><sup>[47]</sup></a>. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of + Xeno, an Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. + It was at this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil + of the great Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in + which Epicurus had lived<a name="NtA_48"></a><a + href="#Nt_48"><sup>[48]</sup></a>. Cicero seems to have been somewhat + disappointed with the state of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the + only man of merit then resident there<a name="NtA_49"></a><a + href="#Nt_49"><sup>[49]</sup></a>. On the journey from Athens to his + province, he made the acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at + Athens as head of the Peripatetic school<a name="NtA_50"></a><a + href="#Nt_50"><sup>[50]</sup></a>. At this time he was resident at + Mitylene, where Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society<a + name="NtA_51"></a><a href="#Nt_51"><sup>[51]</sup></a>. He was by far the + greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and + indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school<a + name="NtA_52"></a><a href="#Nt_52"><sup>[52]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's + thoughts till the end of 50. <!-- Page xii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xii"></a>[xii]</span> Yet he yearned for Athens and + philosophy. He wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful + city, and anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build + a <span lang="el" title="propylon" + >προπυλον</span> at the + Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis<a + name="NtA_53"></a><a href="#Nt_53"><sup>[53]</sup></a>. It seems the + Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient statues + to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome + inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter + of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in + the books <i>De Republica</i><a name="NtA_54"></a><a + href="#Nt_54"><sup>[54]</sup></a>. His wishes with regard to Athens still + kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke + of conferring on the city some signal favour<a name="NtA_55"></a><a + href="#Nt_55"><sup>[55]</sup></a>. Cicero was anxious to show Rhodes, + with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus, who + accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days<a + name="NtA_56"></a><a href="#Nt_56"><sup>[56]</sup></a>. From thence they + went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with Aristus<a + name="NtA_57"></a><a href="#Nt_57"><sup>[57]</sup></a>, and renewed his + friendship with other philosophers, among them Xeno the friend of + Atticus<a name="NtA_58"></a><a href="#Nt_58"><sup>[58]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical + condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The + letters which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times + contrasts the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn + in the <i>De Republica</i><a name="NtA_59"></a><a + href="#Nt_59"><sup>[59]</sup></a>; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's + description of the tyrant is present to <!-- Page xiii --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii"></a>[xiii]</span> his mind<a + name="NtA_60"></a><a href="#Nt_60"><sup>[60]</sup></a>; when, he + deliberates about the course he is himself to take, he naturally recals + the example of Socrates, who refused to leave Athens amid the misrule of + the thirty tyrants<a name="NtA_61"></a><a + href="#Nt_61"><sup>[61]</sup></a>. It is curious to find Cicero, in the + very midst of civil war, poring over the book of Demetrius the Magnesian + concerning concord<a name="NtA_62"></a><a + href="#Nt_62"><sup>[62]</sup></a>; or employing his days in arguing with + himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about tyranny<a + name="NtA_63"></a><a href="#Nt_63"><sup>[63]</sup></a>. Nothing could + more clearly show that he was really a man of books; by nothing but + accident a politician. In these evil days, however, nothing was long to + his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn became unpleasant<a + name="NtA_64"></a><a href="#Nt_64"><sup>[64]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 + he returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a + letter written to Varro in that year<a name="NtA_65"></a><a + href="#Nt_65"><sup>[65]</sup></a>, he says "I assure you I had no sooner + returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my + books." These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear + richer fruit than in his days of prosperity<a name="NtA_66"></a><a + href="#Nt_66"><sup>[66]</sup></a>. The tenor of all his letters at this + time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also + to Sulpicius<a name="NtA_67"></a><a href="#Nt_67"><sup>[67]</sup></a>. + The <i>Partitiones Oratoriae</i>, the <i>Paradoxa</i>, the <i>Orator</i>, + and the <i>Laudatio Catonis</i>, to which Caesar replied by his + <i>Anticato</i>, were all finished within the year. Before the end of the + year the <i>Hortensius</i> and the <i>De Finibus</i> had probably both + been planned and commenced. <!-- Page xiv --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xiv"></a>[xiv]</span> Early in the following year the + <i>Academica</i>, the history of which I shall trace elsewhere, was + written.</p> + + <p>I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero + as the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion + of his life which preceded the writing of the <i>Academica</i>. Even the + evidence I have produced, which does not include such indirect + indications of philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual + philosophical works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at + no time had he been divorced from philosophy<a name="NtA_68"></a><a + href="#Nt_68"><sup>[68]</sup></a>. He was entitled to repel the charge + made by some people on the publication of his first book of the later + period—the <i>Hortensius</i>—that he was a mere tiro in + philosophy, by the assertion that on the contrary nothing had more + occupied his thoughts throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic + life<a name="NtA_69"></a><a href="#Nt_69"><sup>[69]</sup></a>. Did the + scope of this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in + showing from a minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with + ancient authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as + accurate as it was extensive. So far as the <i>Academica</i> is + concerned, I have had in my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's + substantial accuracy; of the success of the defence I must leave the + reader to judge. During the progress of this work I shall have to expose + the groundlessness of many feelings and judgments now current which have + contributed to produce a low estimate of Cicero's philosophical + attainments, but there is one piece of unfairness which I shall have no + better opportunity of mentioning <!-- Page xv --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xv"></a>[xv]</span> than the present. It is this. Cicero, the + philosopher, is made to suffer for the shortcomings of Cicero the + politician. Scholars who have learned to despise his political weakness, + vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate his achievements in + philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too closely into + their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance the + illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the <i>De Legibus</i> as "an oasis in + the desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political + partizanship, and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in + hand, I beg all students to free themselves in reading the + <i>Academica</i>.</p> + +<p class="center">II. <i>The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero</i>.</p> + + <p>In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student + of philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed + historical examination of the later Greek schools—the Stoic, + Peripatetic, Epicurean and new Academic. These it would be necessary to + know, not merely as they came from the hands of their founders, but as + they existed in Cicero's age; Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as + Posidonius and the other pupils of Panaetius propounded it; not merely + the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and + Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum by Cratippus; the new + Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and Carneades; the + medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put forward by + Antiochus in the name of the Old <!-- Page xvi --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi"></a>[xvi]</span> Academy. A systematic + attempt to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine + held by these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements + concerning any particular school are generally tested by comparing them + with the assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier + representatives of the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at + once concluded that Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all + probability, he is uttering opinions which would have been recognised as + genuine by those who were at the head of the school in his day. The + criticism of Madvig even is not free from this error, as will be seen + from my notes on several passages of the <i>Academica</i><a + name="NtA_70"></a><a href="#Nt_70"><sup>[70]</sup></a>. As my space + forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I have indicated as desirable, + I can but describe in rough outline the relation in which Cicero stands + to the chief schools.</p> + + <p>The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often + insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to + distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical + standard<a name="NtA_71"></a><a href="#Nt_71"><sup>[71]</sup></a>. We + have in the <i>Academica</i> Cicero's view of the first problem: that the + attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To go more into + detail here would be to anticipate the text of the <i>Lucullus</i> as + well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in + this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, + and in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine + that absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against + which all the other schools <!-- Page xvii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xvii"></a>[xvii]</span> were combined<a name="NtA_72"></a><a + href="#Nt_72"><sup>[72]</sup></a>. In that which was most distinctively + New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.</p> + + <p>It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. + Nothing was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he + was accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on + both sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition + with a conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. + One requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this + arrogance<a name="NtA_73"></a><a href="#Nt_73"><sup>[73]</sup></a>. + Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most opposite + opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from all + doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most + probable, was the only prudent course<a name="NtA_74"></a><a + href="#Nt_74"><sup>[74]</sup></a>. Cicero's temperament also, apart from + his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration, and + repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the + diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to + lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness<a + name="NtA_75"></a><a href="#Nt_75"><sup>[75]</sup></a>. In positiveness + of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and disgraceful, + unworthy of a self-controlled character<a name="NtA_76"></a><a + href="#Nt_76"><sup>[76]</sup></a>. Here we have a touch of feeling + thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar to some put + forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to Mill, to show + that the free conflict of opinion is necessary <!-- Page xviii --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii"></a>[xviii]</span> to the progress + of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to maturity + in Greece<a name="NtA_77"></a><a href="#Nt_77"><sup>[77]</sup></a>. + Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice, says Cicero, there + philosophy has pined. Pythagoras<a name="NtA_78"></a><a + href="#Nt_78"><sup>[78]</sup></a> is quoted as a warning example, and the + baneful effects of authority are often depicted<a name="NtA_79"></a><a + href="#Nt_79"><sup>[79]</sup></a>. The true philosophic spirit requires + us to find out what can be said for every view. It is a positive duty to + discuss all aspects of every question, after the example of the Old + Academy and Aristotle<a name="NtA_80"></a><a + href="#Nt_80"><sup>[80]</sup></a>. Those who demand a dogmatic statement + of belief are mere busybodies<a name="NtA_81"></a><a + href="#Nt_81"><sup>[81]</sup></a>. The Academics glory in their freedom + of judgment. They are not compelled to defend an opinion whether they + will or no, merely because one of their predecessors has laid it down<a + name="NtA_82"></a><a href="#Nt_82"><sup>[82]</sup></a>. So far does + Cicero carry this freedom, that in the fifth book of the <i>Tusculan + Disputations</i>, he maintains a view entirely at variance with the whole + of the fourth book of the <i>De Finibus</i>, and when the discrepancy is + pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former statements, on the score + that he is an Academic and a freeman<a name="NtA_83"></a><a + href="#Nt_83"><sup>[83]</sup></a>. "Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius + videtur<a name="NtA_84"></a><a href="#Nt_84"><sup>[84]</sup></a>." The + Academic sips the best of every school<a name="NtA_85"></a><a + href="#Nt_85"><sup>[85]</sup></a>. He roams in the wide field of + philosophy, while the Stoic dares not stir a foot's breadth away from + Chrysippus<a name="NtA_86"></a><a href="#Nt_86"><sup>[86]</sup></a>. The + Academic is only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he + makes it his sole <!-- Page xix --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xix"></a>[xix]</span> aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and + others of the mists of error<a name="NtA_87"></a><a + href="#Nt_87"><sup>[87]</sup></a>. This spirit is even found in Lucullus + the Antiochean<a name="NtA_88"></a><a href="#Nt_88"><sup>[88]</sup></a>. + While professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero + indignantly repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek + for the truth, has no truth to follow<a name="NtA_89"></a><a + href="#Nt_89"><sup>[89]</sup></a>. The probable is for it the true.</p> + + <p>Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their + evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that + eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy<a + name="NtA_90"></a><a href="#Nt_90"><sup>[90]</sup></a>. Orators, + politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the + teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters<a name="NtA_91"></a><a + href="#Nt_91"><sup>[91]</sup></a>. The Stoics and Epicureans cared + nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic tenets were those + with which the common sense of the world could have most sympathy<a + name="NtA_92"></a><a href="#Nt_92"><sup>[92]</sup></a>. The Academy also + was the school which had the most respectable pedigree. Compared with its + system, all other philosophies were plebeian<a name="NtA_93"></a><a + href="#Nt_93"><sup>[93]</sup></a>. The philosopher who best preserved the + Socratic tradition was most estimable, <i>ceteris paribus</i>, and that + man was Carneades<a name="NtA_94"></a><a + href="#Nt_94"><sup>[94]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, + we must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later + philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first. + Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of <!-- Page xx --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx"></a>[xx]</span> conduct (<i>ars + vivendi</i>). All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely + estimable as supplying a basis on which this practical art could be + reared. This is equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the + dogmatism of Zeno and Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were + mere outworks or ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school + was carried on. These were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; + in time of peace ethics held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a + key to unlock many difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may + instance one passage in the beginning of the <i>Academica + Posteriora</i><a name="NtA_95"></a><a href="#Nt_95"><sup>[95]</sup></a>, + which has given much trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro + with having deserted the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. + How is this to be reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he + never recanted the doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. + Arcesilas, Carneades, and Philo had been too busy with their polemic + against Zeno and his followers, maintained on logical grounds, to deal + much with ethics. On the other hand, in the works which Cicero had + written and published before the <i>Academica</i>, wherever he had + touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The works + themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and + Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics + mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase + "Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical + resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical <!-- Page xxi + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi"></a>[xxi]</span> difference, + would naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus + Academia," so long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought + dialectic to the front, and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would + naturally regard him as a deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This + view is confirmed by the fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, + the Academic dialectic had found no eminent expositor. So much was this + the case, that when Cicero wrote the <i>Academica</i> he was charged with + constituting himself the champion of an exploded and discredited school<a + name="NtA_96"></a><a href="#Nt_96"><sup>[96]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the + sphere of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in + the <i>De Legibus</i> when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he + begs the New Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, + to be silent<a name="NtA_97"></a><a href="#Nt_97"><sup>[97]</sup></a>. + Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected, is in the + <i>De Legibus</i> spoken of with considerable favour<a + name="NtA_98"></a><a href="#Nt_98"><sup>[98]</sup></a>. All ethical + systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an + attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the + power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he + calls them "great and famous philosophers<a name="NtA_99"></a><a + href="#Nt_99"><sup>[99]</sup></a>," and he frequently speaks with + something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands of + Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they + should be the only true philosophers <!-- Page xxii --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii"></a>[xxii]</span> after all<a + name="NtA_100"></a><a href="#Nt_100"><sup>[100]</sup></a>. There was a + kind of magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited + to a superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the + barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him<a name="NtA_101"></a><a + href="#Nt_101"><sup>[101]</sup></a>. On moral questions, therefore, we + often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism than even his + teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the philosophers of + the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The Stoics + maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero agrees + with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a life + enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be happy, + but could not be the happiest possible<a name="NtA_102"></a><a + href="#Nt_102"><sup>[102]</sup></a>. He begs the Academic and Peripatetic + schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire) and to allow + that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired even if he + were thrust into the bull of Phalaris<a name="NtA_103"></a><a + href="#Nt_103"><sup>[103]</sup></a>. In another place he admits the + purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible<a + name="NtA_104"></a><a href="#Nt_104"><sup>[104]</sup></a>. These + opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but + appeals to Socrates as his authority for them<a name="NtA_105"></a><a + href="#Nt_105"><sup>[105]</sup></a>. Zeno, who is merely an ignoble + craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is Cicero's + general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt that he + caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno, ever + stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however, + regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so + <!-- Page xxiii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xxiii"></a>[xxiii]</span> regarded chiefly the dialectic. It + is just in this that the difference between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To + the former Zeno's dialectic was true and Socratic, while the latter + treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon Socrates as the apostle of + doubt<a name="NtA_106"></a><a href="#Nt_106"><sup>[106]</sup></a>. On the + whole Cicero was more in accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in + all points, however: for while Antiochus accepted without reserve the + Stoic paradoxes, Cicero hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded + that they were Socratic<a name="NtA_107"></a><a + href="#Nt_107"><sup>[107]</sup></a>. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the + Stoic theory that all emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in + his joys and sorrows, refused it with horror<a name="NtA_108"></a><a + href="#Nt_108"><sup>[108]</sup></a>. It must be admitted that on some + points Cicero was inconsistent. In the <i>De Finibus</i> he argued that + the difference between the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of + terms; in the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i> he held it to be real. The + most Stoic in tone of all his works are the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i> + and the <i>De Officiis</i>.</p> + + <p>With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a + comparatively small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this + branch of philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient + theology was, as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical + science. The religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very + strongly to sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal + operation of divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were + impossible in any form, he thought, if the divine <!-- Page xxiv --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv"></a>[xxiv]</span> government of the + universe were denied<a name="NtA_109"></a><a + href="#Nt_109"><sup>[109]</sup></a>. It went to Cicero's heart that + Carneades should have found it necessary to oppose the beautiful Stoic + theology, and he defends the great sceptic by the plea that his one aim + was to arouse men to the investigation of the truth<a + name="NtA_110"></a><a href="#Nt_110"><sup>[110]</sup></a>. At the same + time, while really following the Stoics in physics, Cicero often believed + himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose from the actual + adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines, which they + gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious and the + genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange + oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen<a + name="NtA_111"></a><a href="#Nt_111"><sup>[111]</sup></a>. Still, Cicero + contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic physics by a + study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of his notions + about physics, the <i>Timaeus</i> of Plato, which he knew well and + translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that + the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well + aware of the fact.</p> + + <p>Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's + estimate of the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not + very powerfully represented during his lifetime. The philosophical + descendants of the author of the <i>Organon</i> were notorious for their + ignorance of logic<a name="NtA_112"></a><a + href="#Nt_112"><sup>[112]</sup></a>, and in ethics had approximated + considerably to the Stoic teaching. While not much influenced by the + school, Cicero generally <!-- Page xxv --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xxv"></a>[xxv]</span> treats it tenderly for the sake of its + great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic family. With + the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood absolutely + alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they discarded + mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing but + loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors + by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely + indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.</p> + +<p class="center">III. <i>The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works</i>.</p> + + <p>It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a + philosopher, and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is + true, but still absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of + Cicero's purpose in writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek + speculation. The conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite + unwarranted. If the later philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, + Cicero's works are of equal value, for it is only from them that we get + any full or clear view of it. Any one who attempts to reconcile the + contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch + and other authorities, will perhaps feel little inclination to cry out + against the confusion of Ciceros ideas. Such outcry, now so common, is + due largely to the want, which I have already noticed, of any clear + exposition of the <!-- Page xxvi --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xxvi"></a>[xxvi]</span> variations in doctrine which the late + Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before the + Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This + is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works + (if we except the third book of the <i>De Officiis</i>), which he does + not freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the + time when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault + rather than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no + one had propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had + been simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing + tenets. It would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two + centuries are therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not + the substance of the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which + ultimately exercised no unimportant influence on society and on the + Christian religion itself.</p> + + <p>When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have + been destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed + study to those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the + best Greek speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the + education of his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at + the same time to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism + throughout Italy. The doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin + in a shape suited to catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a + very large Epicurean literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty + traces is now lost. C. Amafinius, mentioned in <!-- Page xxvii --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxvii"></a>[xxvii]</span> the + <i>Academica</i><a name="NtA_113"></a><a + href="#Nt_113"><sup>[113]</sup></a>, was the first to write, and his + books seem to have had an enormous circulation<a name="NtA_114"></a><a + href="#Nt_114"><sup>[114]</sup></a>. He had a large number of imitators, + who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in Cicero's strong + language, they took possession of the whole of Italy<a + name="NtA_115"></a><a href="#Nt_115"><sup>[115]</sup></a>. Rabirius and + Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of Horace, were two + of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various reasons for + their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean physics, the + fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and the + voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in + one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It + is exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean + literature dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics + than with the ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the + fact that the Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for + morality in the legal and social constitution of the family, and did not + much feel the need of any speculative system; while the general decay + among the educated classes of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied + as it was by an increase of superstition among the masses, prepared the + way for the acceptance of a purely mechanical explanation of the + universe. But of this subject, interesting and important as it is in + itself, and neglected though it has been, I can treat no farther.</p> + + <p>These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached <!-- Page xxviii + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxviii"></a>[xxviii]</span> by + Cicero for their uncouth style of writing<a name="NtA_116"></a><a + href="#Nt_116"><sup>[116]</sup></a>. He indeed confesses that he had not + read them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious + question arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero + had for omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman + Epicureans. The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible + to include the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being + unwilling to allow that anything good could come from the school of + Epicurus, preferred to keep silence, which nothing compelled him to + break, since Lucretius was an obscure man and only slowly won his way to + favour with the public.</p> + + <p>In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero + had a patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the + reproach that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He + often tries by the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had + left its mark on the early Italian peoples<a name="NtA_117"></a><a + href="#Nt_117"><sup>[117]</sup></a>. To those who objected that + philosophy was best left to the Greek language, he replies with + indignation, accusing them of being untrue to their country<a + name="NtA_118"></a><a href="#Nt_118"><sup>[118]</sup></a>. It would be a + glorious thing, he thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled + to resort to Greeks<a name="NtA_119"></a><a + href="#Nt_119"><sup>[119]</sup></a>. He will not even concede that the + Greek is a richer tongue than the Latin<a name="NtA_120"></a><a + href="#Nt_120"><sup>[120]</sup></a>. As for the alleged incapacity of the + Roman intellect to deal with philosophical <!-- Page xxix --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxix"></a>[xxix]</span> enquiries, he will + not hear of it. It is only, he says, because the energy of the nation has + been diverted into other channels that so little progress has been made. + The history of Roman oratory is referred to in support of this opinion<a + name="NtA_121"></a><a href="#Nt_121"><sup>[121]</sup></a>. If only an + impulse were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the + wane in Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of + oratory, which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war<a + name="NtA_122"></a><a href="#Nt_122"><sup>[122]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he + could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political + inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one + service he could render<a name="NtA_123"></a><a + href="#Nt_123"><sup>[123]</sup></a>. He is within his right when he + claims praise for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so + many of the most prominent men of the time<a name="NtA_124"></a><a + href="#Nt_124"><sup>[124]</sup></a>. For Cicero idleness was misery, and + in those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow<a + name="NtA_125"></a><a href="#Nt_125"><sup>[125]</sup></a>. Philosophy + took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and politics<a + name="NtA_126"></a><a href="#Nt_126"><sup>[126]</sup></a>. It is strange + to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies as he does for devoting + himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might set them down to + egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such studies were + merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a life to them + seemed well enough for Greeks, <!-- Page xxx --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xxx"></a>[xxx]</span> but for Romans unmanly, unpractical and + unstatesmanlike<a name="NtA_127"></a><a + href="#Nt_127"><sup>[127]</sup></a>. There were plenty of Romans who were + ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh + importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were + received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, + like the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy + was good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing<a name="NtA_128"></a><a + href="#Nt_128"><sup>[128]</sup></a>. Some few preferred that Cicero + should write on other subjects<a name="NtA_129"></a><a + href="#Nt_129"><sup>[129]</sup></a>. To these he replies by urging the + pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.</p> + + <p>Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were + roused by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. + The elder generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the + books, and many were incited both to read and to write philosophy<a + name="NtA_130"></a><a href="#Nt_130"><sup>[130]</sup></a>. Cicero now + extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as + to bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were + accustomed to treat<a name="NtA_131"></a><a + href="#Nt_131"><sup>[131]</sup></a>. Individual questions in philosophy + could not be thoroughly understood till the whole subject had been + mastered<a name="NtA_132"></a><a href="#Nt_132"><sup>[132]</sup></a>. + This design then, which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest + works which we possess, the <i>Academica</i> and the <i>De Finibus</i>, + required the composition of a sort of philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero + never claimed to be more than an interpreter of Greek philosophy <!-- + Page xxxi --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxi"></a>[xxxi]</span> + to the Romans. He never pretended to present new views of philosophy, or + even original criticisms on its history. The only thing he proclaims to + be his own is his style. Looked at in this, the true light, his work + cannot be judged a failure. Those who contrive to pronounce this judgment + must either insist upon trying the work by a standard to which it does + not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek philosophy it copies, or + perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed worthlessness of the + philosophy of his age.</p> + + <p>In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his + oratorical and political writings, all or nearly all published before the + <i>Hortensius</i>, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia<a + name="NtA_133"></a><a href="#Nt_133"><sup>[133]</sup></a>. The only two + works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded + the <i>Academica</i>, were the <i>De Consolatione</i>, founded on + Crantor's book, <span lang="el" title="peri penthous" + >περι + πενθους</span>, and the + <i>Hortensius</i>, which was introductory to philosophy, or, as it was + then called, protreptic.</p> + + <p>For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of + their composition, the student must be referred to the <i>Dict. of + Biography</i>, Art. Cicero.</p> + +<p class="center">IV. <i>History of the Academica</i>.</p> + + <p>On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 + B.C., Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which + was pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and <!-- Page + xxxii --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxii"></a>[xxxii]</span> + Circeii<a name="NtA_134"></a><a href="#Nt_134"><sup>[134]</sup></a>. Here + he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book + <i>De Consolatione</i> was written. He found the mechanic exercise of + composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days + together<a name="NtA_135"></a><a href="#Nt_135"><sup>[135]</sup></a>. At + other times he would plunge at early morning into the dense woods near + his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till nightfall<a + name="NtA_136"></a><a href="#Nt_136"><sup>[136]</sup></a>. Often exertion + failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the entreaties of Atticus that he + would return to the forum and the senate. A grief, which books and + solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would crush him, he felt, + in the busy city<a name="NtA_137"></a><a + href="#Nt_137"><sup>[137]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>It was amid such surroundings that the <i>Academica</i> was written. + The first trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a + letter of Cicero to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks + of his bereavement<a name="NtA_138"></a><a + href="#Nt_138"><sup>[138]</sup></a>. It was his wont to depend on Atticus + very much for historical and biographical details, and in the letter in + question he asks for just the kind of information which would be needed + in writing the <i>Academica</i>. The words with which he introduces his + request imply that he had determined on some new work to which our + <i>Academica</i> would correspond<a name="NtA_139"></a><a + href="#Nt_139"><sup>[139]</sup></a>. He asks what reason brought to Rome + the embassy which Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader + of the Epicurean school; who were then the most noted <span lang="el" + title="politikoi" + >πολιτικοι</span> + at Athens. The meaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in + the <i>De Oratore</i><a name="NtA_140"></a><a + href="#Nt_140"><sup>[140]</sup></a>, <!-- Page xxxiii --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxiii"></a>[xxxiii]</span> where Cicero + speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under that name. + It may be with reference to the progress of the <i>Academica</i> that in + a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has + made in his literary undertakings<a name="NtA_141"></a><a + href="#Nt_141"><sup>[141]</sup></a>. During the whole of the remainder of + his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although + he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention + in his letters to Atticus of the <i>Academica</i><a name="NtA_142"></a><a + href="#Nt_142"><sup>[142]</sup></a>. He declares that however much his + detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not read + the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the same + space of time that he has taken to write them<a name="NtA_143"></a><a + href="#Nt_143"><sup>[143]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near + Antium<a name="NtA_144"></a><a href="#Nt_144"><sup>[144]</sup></a>, where + he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he afterwards suppressed<a + name="NtA_145"></a><a href="#Nt_145"><sup>[145]</sup></a>. From the same + place he wrote to Atticus of his intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome + by way of Lanuvium about the middle of June<a name="NtA_146"></a><a + href="#Nt_146"><sup>[146]</sup></a>. He had in the time immediately + following Tullia's death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she + died. This he felt now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either + abandon Tusculum altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even + ten years would make the effort no less painful<a name="NtA_147"></a><a + href="#Nt_147"><sup>[147]</sup></a>. Before setting out for Antium Cicero + <!-- Page xxxiv --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xxxiv"></a>[xxxiv]</span> wrote to Atticus that he had + finished while at Astura <i>duo magna</i> <span lang="el" + title="syntagmata" + >συνταγματα</span>, + words which have given rise to much controversy<a name="NtA_148"></a><a + href="#Nt_148"><sup>[148]</sup></a>. Many scholars, including Madvig, + have understood that the first edition of the <i>Academica</i>, along + with the <i>De Finibus</i>, is intended. Against this view the reasons + adduced by Krische are convincing<a name="NtA_149"></a><a + href="#Nt_149"><sup>[149]</sup></a>. It is clear from the letters to + Atticus that the <i>De Finibus</i> was being worked out book by book long + after the first edition of the <i>Academica</i> had been placed in the + hands of Atticus. The <i>De Finibus</i> was indeed begun at Astura<a + name="NtA_150"></a><a href="#Nt_150"><sup>[150]</sup></a>, but it was + still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the + <i>Academica</i><a name="NtA_151"></a><a + href="#Nt_151"><sup>[151]</sup></a>. The final arrangement of the + characters in the <i>De Finibus</i> is announced later still<a + name="NtA_152"></a><a href="#Nt_152"><sup>[152]</sup></a>; and even at a + later date Cicero complains that Balbus had managed to obtain + surreptitiously a copy of the fifth book before it was properly + corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia having copied the whole five books + while in that state<a name="NtA_153"></a><a + href="#Nt_153"><sup>[153]</sup></a>. A passage in the <i>De + Divinatione</i><a name="NtA_154"></a><a + href="#Nt_154"><sup>[154]</sup></a> affords almost direct evidence that + the <i>Academica</i> was published before the <i>De Finibus</i>. On all + these grounds I hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero + describes as having been finished simultaneously at Astura.</p> + + <p>Another view of the <span lang="el" title="syntagmata" + >συνταγματα</span> + in question is that they are simply the two books, entitled + <i>Catulus</i> and <i>Lucullus</i>, of the <i>Priora Academica</i>. In my + opinion <!-- Page xxxv --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xxxv"></a>[xxxv]</span> the word <span lang="el" + title="syntagma" + >συνταγμα</span>, the use + of which to denote a portion of a work Madvig suspects<a + name="NtA_155"></a><a href="#Nt_155"><sup>[155]</sup></a>, thus obtains + its natural meaning. Cicero uses the word <span lang="el" + title="syntaxis" + >συνταξις</span> of the + whole work<a name="NtA_156"></a><a href="#Nt_156"><sup>[156]</sup></a>, + while <span lang="el" title="syntagma" + >συνταγμα</span><a + name="NtA_157"></a><a href="#Nt_157"><sup>[157]</sup></a>, and <span + lang="el" title="syngramma" + >συγγραμμα</span><a + name="NtA_158"></a><a href="#Nt_158"><sup>[158]</sup></a>, designate + definite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content, + then, to refer the words of Cicero to the <i>Catulus</i> and + <i>Lucullus</i>. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides that + this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the + <i>Hortensius</i> (or <i>de Philosophia</i>) and the <i>Priora + Academica</i> are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is + correct, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the + <i>Hortensius</i> which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are + quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and published before + the <i>Academica</i>. This would be clear from the mention in the + <i>Academica Posteriora</i> alone<a name="NtA_159"></a><a + href="#Nt_159"><sup>[159]</sup></a>, but the words of Cicero in the <i>De + Finibus</i><a name="NtA_160"></a><a href="#Nt_160"><sup>[160]</sup></a> + place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the <i>Hortensius</i> + had been published a sufficiently long time before the <i>De Finibus</i>, + to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in + the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i> and the <i>De Divinatione</i><a + name="NtA_161"></a><a href="#Nt_161"><sup>[161]</sup></a> the + <i>Hortensius</i> and the <i>Academica</i> are mentioned together in such + a way as to show that the former was finished and given to the world + before the latter. Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's + conjecture, except the doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word + <span lang="el" title="syntagma" + >συνταγμα</span>, which + equally affects the old view maintained by Madvig.</p> + +<!-- Page xxxvi --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxvi"></a>[xxxvi]</span> + + <p>Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the + <i>Hortensius</i> and the <i>Academica</i> must have been more closely + connected, in style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting + perhaps the <i>Academica</i> and the <i>De Finibus</i>. The interlocutors + in the <i>Hortensius</i> were exactly the same as in the <i>Academica + Priora</i>, for the introduction of Balbus into some editions of the + fragments of the <i>Hortensius</i> is an error<a name="NtA_162"></a><a + href="#Nt_162"><sup>[162]</sup></a>. The discussion in the <i>Academica + Priora</i> is carried on at Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the + <i>Hortensius</i> at the villa of Lucullus near Cumae. It is rather + surprising that under these circumstances there should be but one direct + reference to the <i>Hortensius</i> in the <i>Lucullus</i><a + name="NtA_163"></a><a href="#Nt_163"><sup>[163]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, + Cicero sent Atticus the <i>Torquatus</i>, as he calls the first book of + the <i>De Finibus</i><a name="NtA_164"></a><a + href="#Nt_164"><sup>[164]</sup></a>. He had already sent the first + edition of the <i>Academica</i> to Rome<a name="NtA_165"></a><a + href="#Nt_165"><sup>[165]</sup></a>. We have a mention that new prooemia + had been added to the <i>Catulus</i> and <i>Lucullus</i>, in which the + public characters from whom the books took their names were extolled. In + all probability the extant prooemium of the <i>Lucullus</i> is the one + which was then affixed. Atticus, who visited Cicero at Tusculum, had + doubtless pointed out the incongruity between the known attainments of + Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they were made to take in difficult + philosophical discussions. It is not uncharacteristic of Cicero that his + first plan for healing the incongruity should be a <!-- Page xxxvii + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxvii"></a>[xxxvii]</span> + deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of statements + concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans which he + knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I may + note, as of some interest in connection with the <i>Academica</i>, the + fact that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was + one from Varro<a name="NtA_166"></a><a + href="#Nt_166"><sup>[166]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, + to arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing + attentions of Brutus<a name="NtA_167"></a><a + href="#Nt_167"><sup>[167]</sup></a>. Before leaving Astura, however, it + had been his intention to go on to Arpinum<a name="NtA_168"></a><a + href="#Nt_168"><sup>[168]</sup></a>. He seems to have been still + unsatisfied with his choice of interlocutors for the <i>Academica</i>, + for the first thing he did on his arrival was to transfer the parts of + Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and Brutus<a name="NtA_169"></a><a + href="#Nt_169"><sup>[169]</sup></a>. This plan was speedily cast aside on + the receipt of a letter from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work + should be dedicated to Varro, or if not the <i>Academica</i>, the <i>De + Finibus</i><a name="NtA_170"></a><a href="#Nt_170"><sup>[170]</sup></a>. + Cicero had never been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems + to have been chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times + anxious to draw them more closely together. Nine years before he had + pressed Cicero to find room in his works for some mention of Varro<a + name="NtA_171"></a><a href="#Nt_171"><sup>[171]</sup></a>. The nature of + the works on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to + comply with the request<a name="NtA_172"></a><a + href="#Nt_172"><sup>[172]</sup></a>. Varro had promised on his side, full + two years before the <i>Academica</i> was <!-- Page xxxviii --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxviii"></a>[xxxviii]</span> written, to + dedicate to Cicero his great work <i>De Lingua Latino</i>. In answer to + the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared himself very much + dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise. From this it is + evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude of that work. + His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years without making + any progress<a name="NtA_173"></a><a href="#Nt_173"><sup>[173]</sup></a>, + shows that there could have been little of anything like friendship + between the two. Apart from these causes for grumbling, Cicero thought + the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend<a name="NtA_174"></a><a + href="#Nt_174"><sup>[174]</sup></a>." Since the <i>De Finibus</i> was + already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer to Varro the + <i>Academica</i>, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of noble + birth, had no claim to learning<a name="NtA_175"></a><a + href="#Nt_175"><sup>[175]</sup></a>. So little of it did they possess + that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had been + made in the first edition of the <i>Academica</i> to maintain<a + name="NtA_176"></a><a href="#Nt_176"><sup>[176]</sup></a>. For them + another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the + <i>Academica</i> would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, + and the fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher<a + name="NtA_177"></a><a href="#Nt_177"><sup>[177]</sup></a>. It happened + that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's stay at + Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his + <i>Academica</i>, which he now divided into four books instead of two, + making the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus<a + name="NtA_178"></a><a href="#Nt_178"><sup>[178]</sup></a>. The position + occupied by Atticus in the dialogue was quite an <!-- Page xxxix --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxxix"></a>[xxxix]</span> inferior one, but + he was so pleased with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often + in the future such minor parts<a name="NtA_179"></a><a + href="#Nt_179"><sup>[179]</sup></a>. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta + should also be introduced was found impracticable<a name="NtA_180"></a><a + href="#Nt_180"><sup>[180]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had + constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He + frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus, + but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his + plans. Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the + work contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over + again before he finally decided<a name="NtA_181"></a><a + href="#Nt_181"><sup>[181]</sup></a>. As no reasons had been given for + these solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was + obliged to assure him that there were reasons, which he could not + disclose in a letter<a name="NtA_182"></a><a + href="#Nt_182"><sup>[182]</sup></a>. The true reasons, however, did + appear in some later letters. In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of + Varro, and the more so because he wishes it, but you know he is</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><span lang="el" title="deinos anêr, tacha ken kai anaition aitioôito." >δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.</span></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, + it may be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than + his; a charge which you will perceive to be untrue<a + name="NtA_183"></a><a href="#Nt_183"><sup>[183]</sup></a>." Cicero, then, + feared Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical + fastidiousness. Before these explanations Atticus <!-- Page xl --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xl"></a>[xl]</span> had concluded that + Cicero was afraid of the effect the work might produce on the public. + This notion Cicero assured him to be wrong; the only cause for his + vacillation was his doubt as to how Varro would receive the dedication<a + name="NtA_184"></a><a href="#Nt_184"><sup>[184]</sup></a>. Atticus would + seem to have repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured + Cicero that there was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a + general assurance, and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the + reasons from which it proceeded<a name="NtA_185"></a><a + href="#Nt_185"><sup>[185]</sup></a>. In order to stimulate his friend, + Atticus affirmed that Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown + more favour<a name="NtA_186"></a><a href="#Nt_186"><sup>[186]</sup></a>. + We find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it + Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not + have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to + have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed + ignorant of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of + being actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently + while at Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the <i>De + Finibus</i>, but employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the + dedication<a name="NtA_187"></a><a + href="#Nt_187"><sup>[187]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the + <i>Academica</i> is often given in the letters. He tells us that it + extended, on the whole, to greater length than the first, though much had + been omitted; <!-- Page xli --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xli"></a>[xli]</span> he adds, "Unless human self love + deceives me, the books have been so finished that the Greeks themselves + have nothing in the same department of literature to approach them.... + This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and altogether better + than the last<a name="NtA_188"></a><a + href="#Nt_188"><sup>[188]</sup></a>." Again: "The Antiochean portion has + all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may + possess<a name="NtA_189"></a><a href="#Nt_189"><sup>[189]</sup></a>." + Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what success, but with a + care which nothing could surpass<a name="NtA_190"></a><a + href="#Nt_190"><sup>[190]</sup></a>." The binding and adornment of the + presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and the letter + accompanying it was carefully elaborated<a name="NtA_191"></a><a + href="#Nt_191"><sup>[191]</sup></a>. Yet after everything had been done + and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome, Cicero was still uneasy as + to the reception it would meet with from Varro. He wrote thus to Atticus: + "I tell you again and again that the presentation will be at your own + risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to Brutus, who is also a + follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou wert ever wont, + flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part "shuddered" at the + idea of taking the responsibility<a name="NtA_192"></a><a + href="#Nt_192"><sup>[192]</sup></a>. After the work had passed into his + hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to prevent it from + getting into circulation until they could meet one another in Rome<a + name="NtA_193"></a><a href="#Nt_193"><sup>[193]</sup></a>. This warning + was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had just managed to get + access to the <i>De Finibus</i><a name="NtA_194"></a><a + href="#Nt_194"><sup>[194]</sup></a>. In a letter, dated apparently a day + or two later, Cicero declared his intention <!-- Page xlii --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xlii"></a>[xlii]</span> to meet Atticus at + Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable to do so, + after a consultation<a name="NtA_195"></a><a + href="#Nt_195"><sup>[195]</sup></a>. The meeting ultimately did not take + place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to + approve any course that might be taken<a name="NtA_196"></a><a + href="#Nt_196"><sup>[196]</sup></a>. Atticus wrote to say that as soon as + Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time, then," + says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal step; oh + dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my letter + stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to hear + how the matter stands<a name="NtA_197"></a><a + href="#Nt_197"><sup>[197]</sup></a>." Again, a little later: "You have + been bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment + upon them, but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books + in the first fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work + on the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i><a name="NtA_198"></a><a + href="#Nt_198"><sup>[198]</sup></a>. A copy of the first edition had + already got into Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which + Cicero begs Atticus to ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of + the <i>Academica</i>, at a time when the fate of the second edition was + still undecided<a name="NtA_199"></a><a + href="#Nt_199"><sup>[199]</sup></a>. From this fact we may conclude that + Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing the first edition. If he + consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies of the first edition, + it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of course assumes that + Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people, wishes to have the + "Splendidiora, breviora, <!-- Page xliii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xliii"></a>[xliii]</span> meliora." Still, on every occasion + which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised edition + the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately after + the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> was completed<a name="NtA_200"></a><a + href="#Nt_200"><sup>[200]</sup></a>, and often subsequently, when he most + markedly mentioned the number of the books as four<a + name="NtA_201"></a><a href="#Nt_201"><sup>[201]</sup></a>. That he wished + the work to bear the title <i>Academica</i> is clear<a + name="NtA_202"></a><a href="#Nt_202"><sup>[202]</sup></a>. The + expressions <i>Academica quaestio</i>, <span lang="el" title="Akadêmikê syntaxis" + >Ακαδημικη + συνταξις</span>, and + <i>Academia</i>, are merely descriptive<a name="NtA_203"></a><a + href="#Nt_203"><sup>[203]</sup></a>; so also is the frequent appellation + <i>Academici libri</i><a name="NtA_204"></a><a + href="#Nt_204"><sup>[204]</sup></a>. The title <i>Academicae + Quaestiones</i>, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the + <i>Tusculanae Quaestiones</i>, which was supported by the false notion, + found as early as Pliny<a name="NtA_205"></a><a + href="#Nt_205"><sup>[205]</sup></a>, that Cicero had a villa called + Academia, at which the book was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his + Tusculan villa, which he called his Academia, but we are certain from the + letters to Atticus that the work was written entirely at Astura, Antium, + and Arpinum.</p> + + <p>Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well<a + name="NtA_206"></a><a href="#Nt_206"><sup>[206]</sup></a>, but the second + edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books are + expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the + title <i>Academica</i>. Augustine speaks of them only as <i>Academici + libri</i>, and his references show that he knew the second edition only. + Lactantius also uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks + of <!-- Page xliv --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xliv"></a>[xliv]</span> the <i>Academica</i>. Plutarch shows + only a knowledge of the first edition<a name="NtA_207"></a><a + href="#Nt_207"><sup>[207]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of + the genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. + That it was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding + theories which old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the + two editions. A fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of + Goerenz. I now proceed to examine into the constitution and arrangement + of the two editions.</p> + +<p class="center">a. <i>The lost dialogue "Catulus."</i></p> + + <p>The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the <i>Lucullus</i> + are among those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party + whom Cicero so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue + was named was son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the + political career of father and son we shall have little to do. I merely + inquire what was their position with respect to the philosophy of the + time, and the nature of their connection with Cicero.</p> + + <p>Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the + <i>Lucullus</i><a name="NtA_208"></a><a + href="#Nt_208"><sup>[208]</sup></a> that he did little more than put + forward opinions he had received from his father. Cicero would, + doubtless, have preferred to introduce the elder man as speaking for + himself, but in that case, as in the <i>De Oratore</i>, the author would + have been <!-- Page xlv --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xlv"></a>[xlv]</span> compelled to exclude himself from the + conversation<a name="NtA_209"></a><a href="#Nt_209"><sup>[209]</sup></a>. + The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of the father, just as + Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does nothing but render + literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to have heard<a + name="NtA_210"></a><a href="#Nt_210"><sup>[210]</sup></a>. For the + arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be found in their <span + lang="el" title="atripsia" + >ατριψια</span> with respect to + philosophy<a name="NtA_211"></a><a href="#Nt_211"><sup>[211]</sup></a>. + This <span lang="el" title="atripsia" + >ατριψια</span> did not amount + to <span lang="el" title="apaideusia" + >απαιδευσια</span>, + or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of + philosophy in the <i>Hortensius</i><a name="NtA_212"></a><a + href="#Nt_212"><sup>[212]</sup></a>. Though Cicero sometimes classes the + father and son together as men of literary culture and perfect masters of + Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of all the passages where + the two are mentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning + of the son<a name="NtA_213"></a><a href="#Nt_213"><sup>[213]</sup></a>. + But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be + considered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties. + During all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of + the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence + are often depicted in even extravagant language by the orator<a + name="NtA_214"></a><a href="#Nt_214"><sup>[214]</sup></a>. He is one of + the pillars of the state<a name="NtA_215"></a><a + href="#Nt_215"><sup>[215]</sup></a>, Cicero cries, and deserves to be + classed with the ancient worthies of Rome<a name="NtA_216"></a><a + href="#Nt_216"><sup>[216]</sup></a>. When he opposes the Manilian law, + and asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic + power concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one + <!-- Page xlvi --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xlvi"></a>[xlvi]</span> voice "On you<a name="NtA_217"></a><a + href="#Nt_217"><sup>[217]</sup></a>." He alone was bold enough to rebuke + the follies, on the one hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate<a + name="NtA_218"></a><a href="#Nt_218"><sup>[218]</sup></a>. In him no + storm of danger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire + either fear or hope, or cause to swerve from his own course<a + name="NtA_219"></a><a href="#Nt_219"><sup>[219]</sup></a>. His influence, + though he be dead, will ever live among his countrymen<a + name="NtA_220"></a><a href="#Nt_220"><sup>[220]</sup></a>. He was not + only glorious in his life, but fortunate in his death<a + name="NtA_221"></a><a href="#Nt_221"><sup>[221]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there + were special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the <i>viri + consulares</i> who had given their unreserved approval to the measures + taken for the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the + first to confer on Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title + "Father of his country<a name="NtA_222"></a><a + href="#Nt_222"><sup>[222]</sup></a>." So closely did Cicero suppose + himself to be allied to Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for + the death of Tullia, by bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden + times<a name="NtA_223"></a><a href="#Nt_223"><sup>[223]</sup></a>." The + statement of Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never + been so unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except + when Cinna held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast + between the zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague + Antonius<a name="NtA_224"></a><a href="#Nt_224"><sup>[224]</sup></a>. + Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house + of the two Catuli<a name="NtA_225"></a><a + href="#Nt_225"><sup>[225]</sup></a>.</p> + +<!-- Page xlvii --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xlvii"></a>[xlvii]</span> + + <p>We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first + edition of the <i>Academica</i> from circulation, he affixed a prooemium + to each book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. + From the passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit + in such matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a + portion of the contents of the lost prooemium to the <i>Catulus</i>. The + achievements of the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as + those of his son. The philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made + to cast its lustre on the younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once + more lauded, and great stress was laid upon the patronage it received + from so famous a man as the younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in + the fervid language which Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. + Some allusion most likely was made to the connection of Archias with the + Catuli, and to the poem he had written in Cicero's honour. Then the + occasion of the dialogue, its supposed date, and the place where it was + held, were indicated. The place was the Cuman villa of Catulus<a + name="NtA_226"></a><a href="#Nt_226"><sup>[226]</sup></a>. The feigned + date must fall between the year 60 B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, + the year of Cicero's consulship, which is alluded to in the + <i>Lucullus</i><a name="NtA_227"></a><a + href="#Nt_227"><sup>[227]</sup></a>. It is well known that in the + arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against + anachronisms.</p> + + <p>The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly + made to the <i>Hortensius</i>, in which the same speakers had been + engaged; and after more compliments had been bandied about, most of <!-- + Page xlviii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_xlviii"></a>[xlviii]</span> which would fall to Cicero's + share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between the + dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's views, + at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy. Before + we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from indications + offered by the <i>Lucullus</i>, it is necessary to speak of the character + and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.</p> + + <p>In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to + mention his <i>sapientia</i>, which implies a certain knowledge of + philosophy. He was, says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the + wisest, the holiest of men<a name="NtA_228"></a><a + href="#Nt_228"><sup>[228]</sup></a>. He was a man of universal merit, of + surpassing worth, a second Laelius<a name="NtA_229"></a><a + href="#Nt_229"><sup>[229]</sup></a>. It is easy to gather from the <i>De + Oratore</i>, in which he appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view + of his accomplishments. Throughout the second and third books he is + treated as the lettered man, par excellence, of the company<a + name="NtA_230"></a><a href="#Nt_230"><sup>[230]</sup></a>. Appeal is made + to him when any question is started which touches on Greek literature and + philosophy. We are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance + with Greek, and his style of speaking it, won admiration<a + name="NtA_231"></a><a href="#Nt_231"><sup>[231]</sup></a>. He defends the + Greeks from the attacks of Crassus<a name="NtA_232"></a><a + href="#Nt_232"><sup>[232]</sup></a>. He contemptuously contrasts the + Latin historians with the Greek<a name="NtA_233"></a><a + href="#Nt_233"><sup>[233]</sup></a>. He depreciates the later Greek + rhetorical teaching, while he bestows <!-- Page xlix --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xlix"></a>[xlix]</span> high commendation + on the early sophists<a name="NtA_234"></a><a + href="#Nt_234"><sup>[234]</sup></a>. The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle + and Theophrastus is most to his mind<a name="NtA_235"></a><a + href="#Nt_235"><sup>[235]</sup></a>. An account is given by him of the + history of Greek speculation in Italy<a name="NtA_236"></a><a + href="#Nt_236"><sup>[236]</sup></a>. The undefiled purity of his Latin + style made him seem to many the only speaker of the language<a + name="NtA_237"></a><a href="#Nt_237"><sup>[237]</sup></a>. He had written + a history of his own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had + imitated<a name="NtA_238"></a><a href="#Nt_238"><sup>[238]</sup></a>, and + was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams<a name="NtA_239"></a><a + href="#Nt_239"><sup>[239]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the + <i>Academica</i> that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In + the <i>De Oratore</i>, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome<a + name="NtA_240"></a><a href="#Nt_240"><sup>[240]</sup></a>, he does not + declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in his + long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular + teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the + poet Antipater of Sidon<a name="NtA_241"></a><a + href="#Nt_241"><sup>[241]</sup></a>. Still it might have been concluded + that he was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. + Cicero repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator + spring, and the whole tone of the <i>De Oratore</i> shows that Catulus + could have had no leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans<a + name="NtA_242"></a><a href="#Nt_242"><sup>[242]</sup></a>. The + probability is that he had never placed himself under the instruction of + Greek teachers for any length of time, but had rather gained his + information <!-- Page l --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_l"></a>[l]</span> from books and especially from the writings + of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual communication with any of + the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have failed to tell us, as he + does in the case of Antonius<a name="NtA_243"></a><a + href="#Nt_243"><sup>[243]</sup></a>, and Crassus<a name="NtA_244"></a><a + href="#Nt_244"><sup>[244]</sup></a>. It is scarcely possible that any + direct intercourse between Philo and Catulus can have taken place, + although one passage in the <i>Lucullus</i> seems to imply it<a + name="NtA_245"></a><a href="#Nt_245"><sup>[245]</sup></a>. Still Philo + had a brilliant reputation during the later years of Catulus, and no one + at all conversant with Greek literature or society could fail to be well + acquainted with his opinions<a name="NtA_246"></a><a + href="#Nt_246"><sup>[246]</sup></a>. No follower of Carneades and + Clitomachus, such as Catulus undoubtedly was<a name="NtA_247"></a><a + href="#Nt_247"><sup>[247]</sup></a>, could view with indifference the + latest development of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were + probably not known to Catulus<a name="NtA_248"></a><a + href="#Nt_248"><sup>[248]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>I now proceed to draw out from the references in the <i>Lucullus</i> + the chief features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably + introduced by a mention of Philo's books<a name="NtA_249"></a><a + href="#Nt_249"><sup>[249]</sup></a>. Some considerable portion of the + speech must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon + the genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated + with great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of + the older Academics<a name="NtA_250"></a><a + href="#Nt_250"><sup>[250]</sup></a>. The most important part of the + speech, however, must have consisted of a defence of Carneades and + Arcesilas against <!-- Page li --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_li"></a>[li]</span> the dogmatic schools<a + name="NtA_251"></a><a href="#Nt_251"><sup>[251]</sup></a>. Catulus + evidently concerned himself more with the system of the later than with + that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly probable that he + touched only very lightly on the negative Academic arguments, while he + developed fully that positive teaching about the <span lang="el" + title="pithanon" + >πιθανον</span> which was so + distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of Lucullus which + concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to be distinctly + aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the discourse of the day + before<a name="NtA_252"></a><a href="#Nt_252"><sup>[252]</sup></a>. On + the other hand, those parts of Lucullus' speech which deal with the + constructive part of Academicism<a name="NtA_253"></a><a + href="#Nt_253"><sup>[253]</sup></a> seem to be intended for Catulus, to + whom the maintenance of the genuine Carneadean distinction between <span + lang="el" title="adêla" >αδηλα</span> and + <span lang="el" title="akatalêpta" + >ακαταληπτα</span> + would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by + Lucullus on the way in which the <i>probabile</i> had been handled + appertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would + naturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the + party—Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of + establishing an intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of + Catulus, and the succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the + innovations of Philo were mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only + object aimed at by them, a satisfactory basis for <span lang="el" + title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span>, was + already attained by the Carneadean theory of the <span lang="el" + title="pithanon" + >πιθανον</span>; whereupon + Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus, that <!-- Page lii + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lii"></a>[lii]</span> such a basis + was provided by the older philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had + wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the + discussion. With this arrangement none of the indications in the + <i>Lucullus</i> clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius upon Catulus<a + name="NtA_254"></a><a href="#Nt_254"><sup>[254]</sup></a> need only imply + such a bare statement on the part of the latter of the negative + Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for the Carneadean <span + lang="el" title="pithanon" + >πιθανον</span>. One important + opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man would + opine<a name="NtA_255"></a><a href="#Nt_255"><sup>[255]</sup></a> (<span + lang="el" title="ton sophon doxasein" >τον + σοφον + δοξασειν</span>), seems + another indication of the generally constructive character of his + exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the + dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.</p> + + <p>Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of + Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain<a + name="NtA_256"></a><a href="#Nt_256"><sup>[256]</sup></a>. I think it + extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy, + corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the <i>Academica + Posteriora</i>. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty + of understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the + speech could have been assigned in the first edition. In the <i>Academica + Posteriora</i> it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second + as Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second + edition of the polemical argument of Hortensius<a name="NtA_257"></a><a + href="#Nt_257"><sup>[257]</sup></a>, which would be appropriate only in + the mouth of one <!-- Page liii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_liii"></a>[liii]</span> who was answering a speech already + made. On the view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the + fact that Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the + lost dialogue which bore his name he had argued against philosophy + altogether<a name="NtA_258"></a><a href="#Nt_258"><sup>[258]</sup></a>, + and denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing<a + name="NtA_259"></a><a href="#Nt_259"><sup>[259]</sup></a>. Such a + historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within + the reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put + forward to show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old + Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant + for stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial<a + name="NtA_260"></a><a href="#Nt_260"><sup>[260]</sup></a>. We are thus + relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word + <i>commoveris</i><a name="NtA_261"></a><a + href="#Nt_261"><sup>[261]</sup></a>, from which Krische infers that the + dialogue, entitled <i>Hortensius</i>, had ended in a conversion to + philosophy of the orator from whom it was named. To any such conversion + we have nowhere else any allusion.</p> + + <p>The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character + and attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to + have been as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it + was possible for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech + of Hortensius were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral + teaching of Antiochus.</p> + + <p>The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of + the preceding speech is correct, <!-- Page liv --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_liv"></a>[liv]</span> it follows that + Cicero in his reply pursued the same course which he takes in his answer + to Varro, part of which is preserved in the <i>Academica Posteriora</i><a + name="NtA_262"></a><a href="#Nt_262"><sup>[262]</sup></a>. He justified + the New Academy by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, + and also with those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, + therefore, reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great + and ancient names like a seditious tribune<a name="NtA_263"></a><a + href="#Nt_263"><sup>[263]</sup></a>. Unfair use had been made, according + to Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, + Xenophanes, Plato, and Socrates<a name="NtA_264"></a><a + href="#Nt_264"><sup>[264]</sup></a>. But Cicero did not merely give a + historical summary. He must have dealt with the theory of <span lang="el" + title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span> and <span + lang="el" title="ennoiai" + >εννοιαι</span> (which though + really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he found it necessary + to "manufacture" (<i>fabricari</i>) Latin terms to represent the Greek<a + name="NtA_265"></a><a href="#Nt_265"><sup>[265]</sup></a>. He probably + also commented on the headlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave + their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a retort is made by + Lucullus<a name="NtA_266"></a><a href="#Nt_266"><sup>[266]</sup></a>. + That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be + seen by the fact that he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms <span + lang="el" title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span> + (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual <span lang="el" + title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span>), <span + lang="el" title="enargeia, hormê, apodeixis, dogma, oikeion, adêla, epochê" + >εναργεια, + ‛ορμη, + αποδειξις, + δογμα, + οικειον, + αδηλα, + εποχη</span>, nearly all important terms in + the Stoic, and to some extent in the Antiochean system, all of which + Lucullus is obliged to translate for himself<a name="NtA_267"></a><a + href="#Nt_267"><sup>[267]</sup></a>. The more the matter is examined the + more clearly does it appear that the main purpose <!-- Page lv --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lv"></a>[lv]</span> of Cicero in this + speech was to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the + New Academy, and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, + which were reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he + expressly tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him + in the first day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely + introduced in order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next<a + name="NtA_268"></a><a href="#Nt_268"><sup>[268]</sup></a>. Yet these + arguments must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, + although foreign to its main intention<a name="NtA_269"></a><a + href="#Nt_269"><sup>[269]</sup></a>. He probably gave a summary + classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent + to the truth of each class<a name="NtA_270"></a><a + href="#Nt_270"><sup>[270]</sup></a>. The whole constitution and tenor of + the elaborate speech of Cicero in the <i>Lucullus</i> proves that no + general or minute demonstration of the impossibility of <span lang="el" + title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span> in the + dogmatic sense had been attempted in his statement of the day before. + Cicero's argument in the <i>Catulus</i> was allowed by Lucullus to have + considerably damaged the cause of Antiochus<a name="NtA_271"></a><a + href="#Nt_271"><sup>[271]</sup></a>. The three speeches of Catulus, + Hortensius, and Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out + for the discussion<a name="NtA_272"></a><a + href="#Nt_272"><sup>[272]</sup></a>, but only cursorily, so that there + was plenty of room for a more minute examination in the + <i>Lucullus</i>.</p> + + <p>One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the + attack of Catulus? Krische believes <!-- Page lvi --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lvi"></a>[lvi]</span> that the argument of + Catulus was answered point by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. + Cicero never appears elsewhere as the defender of Philo's reactionary + doctrines<a name="NtA_273"></a><a href="#Nt_273"><sup>[273]</sup></a>. + The expressions of Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching + had been dismissed by all the disputants<a name="NtA_274"></a><a + href="#Nt_274"><sup>[274]</sup></a>. It follows that when Cicero, in his + letter of dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo + (<i>partes mihi sumpsi Philonis</i><a name="NtA_275"></a><a + href="#Nt_275"><sup>[275]</sup></a>), he merely attaches Philo's name to + those general New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly + supported by the pupil of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief + sources for Cicero's speech in the <i>Catulus</i> were, doubtless, Philo + himself and Clitomachus.</p> + + <p>In that intermediate form of the <i>Academica</i>, where Cato and + Brutus appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no + doubt that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. + Consequently Cato must have taken the comparatively inferior part of + Hortensius, while Brutus took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem + strange that a Stoic of the Stoics like Cato should be chosen to + represent Antiochus, however much that philosopher may have borrowed from + Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius, however, was in my view such as any + cultivated man might sustain who had not definitely committed himself to + sceptical principles. So eminent an Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been + reduced to the comparatively secondary position assigned to Hortensius in + the <i>Academica Priora</i>. He would naturally occupy the <!-- Page lvii + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lvii"></a>[lvii]</span> place + given to Varro in the second edition<a name="NtA_276"></a><a + href="#Nt_276"><sup>[276]</sup></a>. If this be true, Brutus would not + speak at length in the first half of the work. Cato is not closely enough + connected with the <i>Academica</i> to render it necessary to treat of + him farther.</p> + +<p class="center">b. <i>The "Lucullus."</i></p> + + <p>The day after the discussion narrated in the <i>Catulus</i>, during + which Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the + Cuman villa of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of + Hortensius at Bauli<a name="NtA_277"></a><a + href="#Nt_277"><sup>[277]</sup></a>. In the evening, if the wind + favoured, Lucullus was to leave for his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his + at Pompeii<a name="NtA_278"></a><a href="#Nt_278"><sup>[278]</sup></a>. + Bauli was a little place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round + which so many legends lingered<a name="NtA_279"></a><a + href="#Nt_279"><sup>[279]</sup></a>. The scenery in view was + magnificent<a name="NtA_280"></a><a href="#Nt_280"><sup>[280]</sup></a>. + As the party were seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines + of statues, the waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the + horizon glistened and quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour + under the freshening breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and + Puteoli, thirty stadia distant<a name="NtA_281"></a><a + href="#Nt_281"><sup>[281]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and <!-- Page lviii + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_lviii"></a>[lviii]</span> to keep + it perfectly free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still + living, although when the words were written he had been dead for many + years<a name="NtA_282"></a><a href="#Nt_282"><sup>[282]</sup></a>. The + surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom + of Lucullus, is very dramatic<a name="NtA_283"></a><a + href="#Nt_283"><sup>[283]</sup></a>. The many political and private + troubles which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept + carefully out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of + thoughts and plans which were actively employing the author's mind at + Astura. His intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last + section of the book, while in the last but one the <i>De Finibus</i>, the + <i>De Natura Deorum</i> and other works are shadowed forth<a + name="NtA_284"></a><a href="#Nt_284"><sup>[284]</sup></a>. In another + passage the design of the <i>Tusculan Disputations</i>, which was carried + out immediately after the publication of the <i>Academica</i> and <i>De + Finibus</i>, is clearly to be seen<a name="NtA_285"></a><a + href="#Nt_285"><sup>[285]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the + conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially + acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus<a + name="NtA_286"></a><a href="#Nt_286"><sup>[286]</sup></a>. Nearly all + that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue, + and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to + have dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private + citizen, was directed to the care of his fish-ponds<a + name="NtA_287"></a><a href="#Nt_287"><sup>[287]</sup></a>. In his train + when he went to Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his + residence in <!-- Page lix --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_lix"></a>[lix]</span> the East he sought to attach learned men + to his person. At Alexandria he was found in the company of Antiochus, + Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius Rogus and the Selii, all men of + philosophic tastes<a name="NtA_288"></a><a + href="#Nt_288"><sup>[288]</sup></a>. He is several times mentioned by + Pliny in the <i>Natural History</i> as the patron of Greek artists. Yet, + as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters to Atticus + that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like Catulus, + by the authority of another person. All his arguments are explicitly + stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard Antiochus + engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a reply to + that of Cicero in the <i>Catulus</i>. Any closer examination of its + contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The + same may be said of Cicero's answer.</p> + + <p>In the intermediate form of the <i>Academica</i>, the speech of + Lucullus was no doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a + slight connection with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much + more than call attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close + relationship in which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have + had to deal. He was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife + of Lucullus<a name="NtA_289"></a><a href="#Nt_289"><sup>[289]</sup></a>. + Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while + Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the + Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero, + during the war between Pompey <!-- Page lx --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_lx"></a>[lx]</span> and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both + friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was<a + name="NtA_290"></a><a href="#Nt_290"><sup>[290]</sup></a>.</p> + +<p class="center">c. <i>The Second Edition.</i></p> + + <p>When Cicero dedicated the <i>Academica</i> to Varro, very slight + alterations were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the + piece. Cicero had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost + within sight of Hortensius' villa at Bauli<a name="NtA_291"></a><a + href="#Nt_291"><sup>[291]</sup></a>. Varro's villa, at which the scene + was now laid, was close to the Lucrine lake<a name="NtA_292"></a><a + href="#Nt_292"><sup>[292]</sup></a>. With regard to the feigned date of + the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is + shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition<a + name="NtA_293"></a><a href="#Nt_293"><sup>[293]</sup></a>. Many allusions + are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the Pompeian + party, the death of Tullia<a name="NtA_294"></a><a + href="#Nt_294"><sup>[294]</sup></a>, and the publication of the + <i>Hortensius</i><a name="NtA_295"></a><a + href="#Nt_295"><sup>[295]</sup></a>. Between the date of Tullia's death + and the writing of the <i>Academica</i>, it can be shown that Varro, + Cicero and Atticus could not have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore + for once admits into his works an impossibility in fact. This + impossibility would at once occur to Varro, and Cicero anticipates his + wonder in the letter of dedication<a name="NtA_296"></a><a + href="#Nt_296"><sup>[296]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the + ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact + between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his + philosophical <!-- Page lxi --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_lxi"></a>[lxi]</span> opinions, are alone needed here. The + first mention we have of Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself + sufficient to show his character and the impossibility of anything like + friendship between the two. Varro had done the orator some service in the + trying time which came before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had + eulogised Varro; and in the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to + send Varro the eulogy to read, adding "<i>Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut + nosti,</i> <span lang="el" title="elikta kai ouden" + >ελικτα και + ουδεν</span><a name="NtA_297"></a><a + href="#Nt_297"><sup>[297]</sup></a>." All the references to Varro in the + letters to Atticus are in the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to + write Varro a letter of thanks for supposed exertions in his behalf, + during his exile<a name="NtA_298"></a><a + href="#Nt_298"><sup>[298]</sup></a>. Several passages show that Cicero + refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported by Atticus<a + name="NtA_299"></a><a href="#Nt_299"><sup>[299]</sup></a>. On Cicero's + return from exile, he and Varro remained in the same semi-friendly state. + About the year 54 B.C., as we have already seen, Atticus in vain urged + his friend to dedicate some work to the great polymath. After the fall of + the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to have been drawn a little + closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in the year before the + <i>Academica</i> was published, testify to this approximation<a + name="NtA_300"></a><a href="#Nt_300"><sup>[300]</sup></a>. Still they are + all cold, forced and artificial; very different from the letters Cicero + addressed to his real intimates, such for instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, + Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all show a fear of giving offence to + the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility in presence of his vast + learning which is by <!-- Page lxii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_lxii"></a>[lxii]</span> no means natural to Cicero. The + negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication of + the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this + slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship<a + name="NtA_301"></a><a href="#Nt_301"><sup>[301]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable + accuracy from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro + <i>De Philosophia</i><a name="NtA_302"></a><a + href="#Nt_302"><sup>[302]</sup></a>. Beyond doubt he was a follower of + Antiochus and the so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school + from, among the 288 philosophies which he considered possible, by an + elaborate and pedantic process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious + in Augustine. My notes on the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> will show that + there is no reason for accusing Cicero of having mistaken Varro's + philosophical views. This supposition owes its currency to Müller, who, + from Stoic phrases in the <i>De Lingua Latina</i>, concluded that Varro + had passed over to the Stoics before that work was written. All that was + Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus<a name="NtA_303"></a><a + href="#Nt_303"><sup>[303]</sup></a>.</p> + + <p>The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the + subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more + conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition + preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the + contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical + exposition of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by + Varro; then the historical justification of the Philonian position, <!-- + Page lxiii --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="Page_lxiii"></a>[lxiii]</span> which Cicero had given in the first + edition as an answer to Hortensius<a name="NtA_304"></a><a + href="#Nt_304"><sup>[304]</sup></a>. Book II.: an exposition by Cicero of + Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same as that given by + Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that foretaste of the + negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had formed part of + the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech of Varro in + reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in ed. 1. Book + IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1. Atticus must + have been almost a <span lang="el" title="kôphon prosôpon" + >κωφον + προσωπον</span>.</p> + + <p>I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old + editions the <i>Lucullus</i> is marked throughout as <i>Academicorum + liber IV</i>. This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of + Nonius' quotations, which are always from the <i>second</i> edition, and + can tell us nothing about the constitution of the <i>first</i>. One other + thing is worth remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the + <i>Academica Priora</i> before the <i>Posteriora</i>. This seems to me an + unnatural arrangement; the subject-matter of the <i>Varro</i> is + certainly prior, logically, to that of the <i>Lucullus</i>.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>M. TULLII CICERONIS</h2> + +<h2>ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM</h2> + +<h3>LIBER PRIMUS.</h3> + +<hr /> + + <p>I. <a name="BkI_1"></a><a href="#BkIN_1">1</a>. In Cumano nuper cum + mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a M. Varrone, venisse eum + Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset, continuo ad nos + venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram interponendam + putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et vetustate + amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus, paulumque + cum <i>ab</i> eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus: atque + ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad suam + villam reduximus. <a name="BkI_2"></a><a href="#BkIN_2">2</a>. Hic pauca + primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis, ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: + Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec audire sine molestia possumus, + quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse novi. Silent enim diutius + Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum cessare, sed celare quae + scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille: intemperantis enim arbitror + esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo opus magnum in manibus, + idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum—me autem dicebat—quaedam + institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me politius. <a + name="BkI_3"></a><a href="#BkIN_3">3</a>. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, + Varro, iam diu exspectans, non audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e + Libone nostro, cuius nosti studium—nihil enim eius modi celare + possumus—non te ea intermittere, sed accuratius tractare nec de + manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante hoc tempus numquam in + mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam sum ingressus res eas, + quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis philosophiamque veterem illam + a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare, quaero quid sit cur, cum + multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim cum et ipse in eo + excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et studiis et artibus + antecedat.</p> + + <p>II. <a name="BkI_4"></a><a href="#BkIN_4">4</a>. Tum ille: Rem a me + saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris. Itaque non haesitans + respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu, quod ista ipsa de re + multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam viderem + diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de nostris + eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca + potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis + abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca + intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti + intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. <a name="BkI_5"></a><a + href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. Vides autem—eadem enim ipse + didicisti—non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui + nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone + disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione + concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. + Nos autem praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque + vim virtutem esse nostri putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque + novis cogimur uti, quae docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti + ne a nobis quidem accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur <i>labor</i>. + <a name="BkI_6"></a><a href="#BkIN_6">6</a>. Iam vero physica, si + Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut + Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium + sustuleris, de corpusculorum—ita enim appellat + atomos—concursione fortuita loqui? Nostra tu physica nosti, quae + cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea, quam fingit et format + effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam quibusnam quisquam + enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit adducere? <i>Quid</i>, + haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis fugiendisque rebus? Illi + enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum esse censent: apud nostros + autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas. <a name="BkI_7"></a><a + href="#BkIN_7">7</a>. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut + quis intelligat quid sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab + honestate seiungi: quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine + voluptatibus sensum moventibus ne suspicari <i>quidem</i>. Si vero + Academiam veterem persequamur, quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit + illa acute explicanda nobis! quam argute, quam obscure etiam contra + Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem + ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem + animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a dis + datum munus homini. <a name="BkI_8"></a><a href="#BkIN_8">8</a>. Sed meos + amicos, in quibus est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire + iubeo, ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae + autem nemo adhuc docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, + quantum potui—nihil enim magno opere meorum miror—feci ut + essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii + nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et tamen in illis veteribus nostris, + quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati, quadam hilaritate conspersimus, + multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa dicta dialectice †quae + quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate quadam ad legendum + invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum prooemiis + †philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.</p> + + <p>III. <a name="BkI_9"></a><a href="#BkIN_9">9</a>. Tum, ego. Sunt, + inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe peregrinantis errantisque + tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando + qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem patriae, tu descriptiones + temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu domesticam, tu bellicam + disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque + rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti, plurimumque poetis + nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis attulisti, atque + ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti philosophiamque + multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum. <a + name="BkI_10"></a><a href="#BkIN_10">10</a>. Causam autem probabilem tu + quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne + haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi nunc: satisne probas? Immo + vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent + sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi + legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat Ennius, Pacuvius, + Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum expresserunt + poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi Aeschylum, + Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem, + Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem + sint aut Demosthenem imitati. <a name="BkI_11"></a><a + href="#BkIN_11">11</a>. Ego autem—dicam enim, ut res est—dum + me ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed + quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum + tenebat, haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum + licebat, legendo. Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et + administratione rei publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia + peto et otii oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic + aetati hoc maxime aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, + hoc in primis consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil + utilius aut, si haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. + <a name="BkI_12"></a><a href="#BkIN_12">12</a>. Brutus quidem noster, + excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris + persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem + sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, + cuius tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi + litterarum.</p> + + <p>IV. <a name="BkI_13"></a><a href="#BkIN_13">13</a>. Tum, ille. Istuc + quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te ipso quid est, inquit, + quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te veterem illam, inquit, + tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho id magis licuerit, + nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam nobis in novam e + vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime. + Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu existimas ipse, negat + in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse + erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit, ut dicis: sed + ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra <i>ea</i> Philonis Antiochus + scripserit. <a name="BkI_14"></a><a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>. Immo vero et + ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum iam diu, renovari a te, nisi + molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus, inquam, si videtur. Sane istud + quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus. Sed videamus idemne Attico + placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi vero, ille: quid est enim + quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita recordari? et simul videre + satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum essent dicta, in + conspectu consedimus [omnes].</p> + + <p><a name="BkI_15"></a><a href="#BkIN_15">15</a>. Tum Varro ita exorsus + est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnis, primus a rebus + occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi + occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, + ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret, + caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si + maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum <i>valere</i>. <a + name="BkI_16"></a><a href="#BkIN_16">16</a>. Hic in omnibus fere + sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum audierunt perscripti varie <i>et</i> + copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil + se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae + nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque + rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec + esset una omnis sapientia non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum + diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen + in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis + consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi + potest. <a name="BkI_17"></a><a href="#BkIN_17">17</a>. Platonis autem + auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens + duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et + Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum + Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset, + duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium + et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti + sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis + instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et + sermones habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique + Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam + composuerunt et eam quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam + dubitationem de omnibus rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita + consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt. Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates + probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio + disciplinae. <a name="BkI_18"></a><a href="#BkIN_18">18</a>. Quae quidem + erat primo duobus, ut dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos + et illam veterem Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni + praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat + utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.</p> + + <p>V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi + non sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum + Atticus: Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque + nostros, meque ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid + me, inquam, putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro + exhibiturum? Pergamus igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. <a + name="BkI_19"></a><a href="#BkIN_19">19</a>. Fuit ergo iam accepta a + Platone philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de + natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid + falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid + repugnans iudicando. Ac primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura + petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in + natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur, + constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum + adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita. Corporis autem + alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in partibus: valetudinem, viris + pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam + aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, + claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem: <a + name="BkI_20"></a><a href="#BkIN_20">20</a>. animi autem, quae essent ad + comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et + mores dividebantur. Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: + quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant + studia esse et quasi consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis + adsiduitate, partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. + In qua quod incohatum est neque absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem + appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae + omniumque rerum, quas in animis ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec + animorum. <a name="BkI_21"></a><a href="#BkIN_21">21</a>. Vitae + autem—id enim erat tertium—adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad + virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et + <i>in</i> quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. + Hominem esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis + humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac + de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad + id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum, ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, + ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis inducitur ratio bonorum.</p> + + <p>VI. <a name="BkI_22"></a><a href="#BkIN_22">22</a>. Atque haec illa + sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem + non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum: illud imprudenter, si alios + esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios Peripateticos arbitrantur. + Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci + quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda, aut omnia aut + maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute + versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute + esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam, nisi adiungerentur et + corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad virtutis usum idonea. <a + name="BkI_23"></a><a href="#BkIN_23">23</a>. Ex hac descriptione agendi + quoque aliquid in vita et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat + in conservatione earum rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur + fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque + susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, + quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia + exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis + vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio + et eius partis, quam primam posui, forma atque descriptio.</p> + + <p><a name="BkI_24"></a><a href="#BkIN_24">24</a>. De natura + autem—id enim sequebatur—ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in + res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, + ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, + in eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen + utrumque: neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi + contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non + alicubi esse cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi + qualitatem quandam nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus + inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, + utamur verbis interdum inauditis.</p> + + <p>VII. <a name="BkI_25"></a><a href="#BkIN_25">25</a>. Nos vero, inquit + Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum voles, si te Latina forte + deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine loquar, nisi in huiusce + modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut physicam aut dialecticam + appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam utitur pro Latinis. + Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas <span lang="el" title="poiotêtas" + >ποιοτητας</span> + Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed + philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt + publica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut + enim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. + Quod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, + quanto id magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare + conamur? <a name="BkI_26"></a><a href="#BkIN_26">26</a>. Tu vero, inquam, + Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos non modo + copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus ergo, + inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur + qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius + modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes. + Itaque aër—utimur enim pro Latino—et ignis et aqua et terra + prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae + gignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa + dicuntur: e quibus aër et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, + reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. + Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, + quae supra dixi, dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. <a + name="BkI_27"></a><a href="#BkIN_27">27</a>. Sed subiectam putant omnibus + sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate—faciamus enim + tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius—materiam quandam, ex qua + omnia expressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit + omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in + nihilum, sed in suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum + sit nihil omnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem + moveantur, omnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi + possint. <a name="BkI_28"></a><a href="#BkIN_28">28</a>. Et cum ita + moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro + citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa + effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et + continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem + nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, + quae insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta + insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo + intereat: <a name="BkI_29"></a><a href="#BkIN_29">29</a>. quam vim animum + esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem + deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae, quasi prudentiam + quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea, quae + pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia + nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem et + immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem + fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter + obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.</p> + + <p>VIII. <a name="BkI_30"></a><a href="#BkIN_30">30</a>. Tertia deinde + philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur + ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium + veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem: solam + censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper + esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi <span + lang="el" title="idean" >ιδεαν</span> + appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus + dicere. <a name="BkI_31"></a><a href="#BkIN_31">31</a>. Sensus autem + omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res + eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut + sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil + umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur + et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant. + <a name="BkI_32"></a><a href="#BkIN_32">32</a>. Scientiam autem nusquam + esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa + definitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, + adhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa + quaeque essent ita nominata, quam <span lang="el" title="etymologian" + >ετυμολογιαν</span> + appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad + probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque + tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione + conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, + explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. <a + name="BkI_33"></a><a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>. Haec erat illis disciplina a + Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos + vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.</p> + + <p>IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur + Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus + species, quas paulo ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat + amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, + vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et + ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem + veteris disciplinae: spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque + reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. <a + name="BkI_34"></a><a href="#BkIN_34">34</a>. Nam Strato, eius auditor, + quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: + qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in + virtute et moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae + contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et + Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et + post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, + diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem + audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. <a name="BkI_35"></a><a + href="#BkIN_35">35</a>. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque + subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est + disciplinam. Eam quoque, si videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut + solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero, inquam, videtur, quod vides idem + significare Pomponium.</p> + + <p>X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos + virtutis inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam + pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, + idque appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum + bonum. <a name="BkI_36"></a><a href="#BkIN_36">36</a>. Cetera autem etsi + nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia + naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. + Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione + dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis + relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. <a + name="BkI_37"></a><a href="#BkIN_37">37</a>. Sed quae essent sumenda, ex + iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea praeposita + appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam + vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum, officium + et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in bonis + actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem servata + praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. <a name="BkI_38"></a><a + href="#BkIN_38">38</a>. Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione + esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic omnis + in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera virtutum, quae supra dixi, + seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat + nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse + praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur. + Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et + condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, + sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi + morbis voluit carere sapientem. <a name="BkI_39"></a><a + href="#BkIN_39">39</a>. Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse + dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia + rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes + voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium + perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quamdam + intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.</p> + + <p>XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum + illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici + rebantur, non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae + quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod + nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset + corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse + dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse + esse non corpus. <a name="BkI_40"></a><a href="#BkIN_40">40</a>. Plurima + autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de + sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam + quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille <span lang="el" + title="phantasian" + >φαντασιαν</span>, + nos visum appellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim + utendum in reliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi + accepta sensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis + positam et voluntariam. <a name="BkI_41"></a><a href="#BkIN_41">41</a>. + Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam + haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum + ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis hoc? Nos vero, + inquit. Quonam enim modo <span lang="el" title="katalêpton" + >καταληπτον</span> + diceres?—Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem + appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam + nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, + plurimisque idem novis verbis—nova enim dicebat—usus est. + Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita + erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam: sin aliter, + inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam opinio, quae esset + imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. <a name="BkI_42"></a><a + href="#BkIN_42">42</a>. Sed inter scientiam et inscientiam + comprehensionem illam, quam dixi, collocabat, eamque neque in rectis + neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo + sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut supra dixi, comprehensio facta + sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia, quae + essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset + relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui + dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur, e quibus + non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae + reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem + et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et + constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his + fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.</p> + + <p>XII. <a name="BkI_43"></a><a href="#BkIN_43">43</a>. Quae cum + dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est, inquam, a te, + Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse [autem] + arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem veteris + Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc Varro: + Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis et ea, + quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa + discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. <a + name="BkI_44"></a><a href="#BkIN_44">44</a>. Tum ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, + ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut + studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, + quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et iam ante + Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis paene veteres: qui + nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt: angustos + sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut Democritus, in + profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, + nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse + dixerunt. <a name="BkI_45"></a><a href="#BkIN_45">45</a>. Itaque + Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, + quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere censebat in occulto: + neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi posset: quibus de causis + nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione + approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu continere temeritatem, + quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita res approbaretur, + neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni + adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod erat + consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam + plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus + momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio + sustineretur. <a name="BkI_46"></a><a href="#BkIN_46">46</a>. Hanc + Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex + illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque + partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur: sed + tamen illa, quam exposui<i>sti</i>, vetus, haec nova nominetur: quae + usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eadem + Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae partis + ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex Epicureo + Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter ceteros + mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....</p> + +<hr /> + +<h3>ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.</h3> + +<p class="center">EX LIBRO I.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_1"></a><a href="#FrN_1">1</a>. Nonius p. 65 Merc. + <i>Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere, dictum a gladiis. + Cicero Academicorum lib. I.</i>: quid autem stomachatur Menesarchus? quid + Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_2"></a><a href="#FrN_2">2</a>. Nonius s.v. + <i>concinnare</i> p. 43. <i>Idem in Academicis lib. I.</i>: qui cum + similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.</p> + +<p class="center">EX LIBRO II.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_3"></a><a href="#FrN_3">3</a>. Nonius p. 65. <i>Aequor ab + aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II. vocabulum accepisse + confirmat</i>: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor + illud poetae vocant.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_4"></a><a href="#FrN_4">4</a>. Nonius p. 69. <i>Adamare + Cicero Academicorum lib. II.</i>: qui enim serius honores adamaverunt vix + admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini possunt esse.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_5"></a><a href="#FrN_5">5</a>. Nonius p. 104. <i>Exponere + pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis lib. II.</i>: frangere + avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad imitandum + iuventuti.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_6"></a><a href="#FrN_6">6</a>. Nonius p. 121. <i>Hebes + positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:</i> quid? + lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere? cuius et nascentis et + senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur cornua.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_7"></a><a href="#FrN_7">7</a>. Nonius p. 162. + <i>Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:</i> quid? mare nonne + caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem + aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_8"></a><a href="#FrN_8">8</a>. Nonius p. 162. + <i>Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:</i> atqui si id + crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non regulis.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_9"></a><a href="#FrN_9">9</a>. Nonius p. 394. <i>Siccum + dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur et sobrium, non madidum + ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:</i> alius (<i>color</i>) adultis, alius + adulescentibus, alius aegris, <i>alius sanis</i>, alius siccis, alius + vinulentis ...</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_10"></a><a href="#FrN_10">10</a>. Nonius p. 474. + <i>Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:</i> si quando enim nos + demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum + cernimus.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_11"></a><a href="#FrN_11">11</a>. Nonius p. 545. + <i>Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:</i> quibus etiam alabaster + plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.</p> + +<p class="center">EX LIBRO III.</p> + + <p>Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. <i>De gloria librum ad te misi: at in + eo</i> prooemium <i>id est, quod in Academico tertio.</i></p> + + <p><a name="Fr_12"></a><a href="#FrN_12">12</a>. Nonius p. 65. + <i>Digladiari ... idem tertio:</i> digladiari autem semper, depugnare cum + facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam stultissimum + dixerit?</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_13"></a><a href="#FrN_13">13</a>. Nonius p. 65. + <i>Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.</i>: et ut + nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus ...</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_14"></a><a href="#FrN_14">14</a>. Nonius p. 123. + <i>Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.</i>: in + tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas ingeneraretur + cognitionis et scientiae.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_15"></a><a href="#FrN_15">15</a>. Nonius p. 419. + <i>Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum lib. III.</i>: + aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_16"></a><a href="#FrN_16">16</a>. Lactantius Inst. div. + VI. 24. <i>Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico tertio verba sunt:</i> quod + si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent, sic vitam deviam secutis + corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_17"></a><a href="#FrN_17">17</a>. Diomedes p. 373, ed. + Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. <i>Varro ad Ciceronem tertio</i> fixum <i>et + Cicero Academicorum tertio</i> (= <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_27">§27</a>): †malcho in opera adfixa.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_18"></a><a href="#FrN_18">18</a>. Nonius p. 139. + <i>Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic. Academicorum + lib. III.</i>: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse + dicemus. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_51">§51</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_19"></a><a href="#FrN_19">19</a>. Nonius p. 117. + <i>Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III.</i>: qui gallinas alere + permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae gallina + peperisset dicere solebant. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_57">§57</a>.</p> + +<p class="center">EX LIBRO IIII.</p> + + <p>20. Nonius p. 69, <i>Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in + Academicis lib. IIII.</i>: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = <i>Lucullus</i> + <a href="#BkII_67">§67</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_21"></a><a href="#FrN_21">21</a>. Nonius p. 65. + <i>Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et columna Maenia. + Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: item ille cum aestuaret, veterum ut + Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_70">§70</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_22"></a>22. Nonius p. 99. <i>Dolitum, quod dolatum usu + dicitur, quod est percaesum vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum + Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore + dolatus. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_100">§100</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_23"></a><a href="#FrN_23">23</a>. Nonius p. 164. <i>Ravum + fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: quia nobismet ipsis tum + caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole conlucet.... = + <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_105">§105</a>.</p> + + <p>24. Nonius p. 107. <i>Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. + Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi + quendam laborem exanclatum. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_108">§108</a>.</p> + + <p>25. Nonius p. 163. <i>Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic. + Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = <i>Lucullus</i> + <a href="#BkII_109">§109</a>.</p> + + <p>26. Nonius p. 122. <i>Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: + at hoc Anaximandro infinitatem. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_118">§118</a>.</p> + + <p>27. Nonius p. 65. <i>Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. + Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = + <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_120">§120</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_28"></a><a href="#FrN_28">28</a>. Nonius p. 189. + <i>Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: nec ut ille qui + asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse dicat. = + <i>Lucullus</i> <a href="#BkII_121">§121</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_29"></a><a href="#FrN_29">29</a>. Martianus Capella V. + §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. <i>Cicero ... in Academicis</i>: latent ista + omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa tenebris. = <i>Lucullus</i> + <a href="#BkII_122">§122</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_30"></a><a href="#FrN_30">30</a>. Nonius p. 102. <i>E + regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: nec ego + non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in contraria parte terrae + qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_123">§123</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_31"></a><a href="#FrN_31">31</a>. Nonius p. 80. + <i>Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et confusione + trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII.</i>: plane, ut supra dictus, + Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_135">§135</a>.</p> + +<p class="center">Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_32"></a><a href="#FrN_32">32</a>. Lactantius Inst. div. + III. 14. <i>Haec tua verba sunt</i> (<i>sc. Cicero!</i>): mihi autem non + modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte + cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_33"></a><a href="#FrN_33">33</a>. August. contra + Academicos II. <a href="#BkII_26">§26</a>.: <i>id probabile vel veri + simile Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent + invitare</i>. ... Talia, <i>inquit Academicus</i>, mihi videntur omnia + quae probabilia vel veri similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine + vis vocare, nihil repugno. Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid + dicam, id est, quibus rebus haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum + opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem decet esse sapientem. [<i>Proximis post + hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat Augustinus haec ipsius esse + Ciceronis verba</i>.]</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_34"></a><a href="#FrN_34">34</a>. Augustin. c. Acad. III. + <a href="#BkII_15">§15</a>. <i>Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius + causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... </i> + Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes + videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse + sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo, + qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_35"></a><a href="#FrN_35">35</a>. Augustin. c. Acad. III. + <a href="#BkII_43">§43</a>. <i>Ait enim Cicero</i> illis (<i>i.e. + Academicis</i>) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, + nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.</p> + + <p><a name="Fr_36"></a><a href="#FrN_36">36</a>. Augustin. De Civit. Dei + VI. 2. <i>Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T. Varroni) tale + testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi versatur + disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone</i>, homine, <i>inquit</i>, + omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM</h2> + +<h3>LIBER II.</h3> + + <p>I. <a name="BkII_1"></a><a href="#BkIIN_1">1</a>. Magnum ingenium Luci + Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum omnis liberalis et digna + homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus temporibus florere in foro + maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut enim admodum adolescens + cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas inimicitias magna + cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor profectus, ibi permultos + annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit; deinde absens factus + aedilis, continuo praetor—licebat enim celerius legis + praemio—, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut + diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad + Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, + quae de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. <a + name="BkII_2"></a><a href="#BkIIN_2">2</a>. Idque eo fuit mirabilius, + quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui adolescentiam + in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto + gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni + magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum + iter et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, + partim in rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum + esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam + memoriam rerum, verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis + gerendis res quam verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam + fuisse in Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem + ferunt: qui quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum + primum proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle + discere, credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. + Tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles + spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis + mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. <a + name="BkII_3"></a><a href="#BkIIN_3">3</a>. Tantus ergo imperator in omni + genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus pugnis totiusque + belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum maximus hunc a + se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos legisset, fateretur. + In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis temperandisque + civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis + servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum utilitate + rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque ingeni + peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum victor a + Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio tardius quam + debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in urbem + currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum in + maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod + hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito + testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem.</p> + + <p>II. <a name="BkII_4"></a><a href="#BkIIN_4">4</a>. Sed quae populari + gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt et Graecis litteris + celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum multis, haec interiora + cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim studio Lucullus cum omni + litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit quam qui illum ignorabant + arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed et pro quaestore + aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei militaris esse + occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus otii + relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur + Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et + post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea + saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse + potuisset. Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus + audiebat.</p> + + <p><a name="BkII_5"></a><a href="#BkIIN_5">5</a>. Ac vereor interdum ne + talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam etiam gloriam. Sunt enim + multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam, + reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum rerum disputationem + principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego autem, cum Graecas + litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani + historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit, + Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nec + philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. <a name="BkII_6"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_6">6</a>. Restat ut iis respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi + nolint personas tam gravis illigari. Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut + tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut ludicros sermones aut rerum + colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro vere est a nobis + philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque amplissimo + quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos + populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de + opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo + operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem + ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo + non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut + plurimis prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam + augeri arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has + etiam minus notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. <a + name="BkII_7"></a><a href="#BkIIN_7">7</a>. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, + qui in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus + disputatur, scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam + mortuis invidere.</p> + + <p>III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non + probatur. Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam + philosophiae probaret praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, + quoniam contra omnis dicere quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii + a nobis dissentiant recusare: quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, + qui verum invenire sine ulla contentione volumus, idque summa cura + studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa + difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis + nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire + se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos + studium exquirendi defetigati relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes + quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo eliciant et + tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime + accedat. <a name="BkII_8"></a><a href="#BkIIN_8">8</a>. Neque inter nos + et eos, qui se scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non + dubitant quin ea vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, + quae sequi facile, adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et + solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut + omnia, quae praescripta et quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate + ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset + optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut + obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius, quem primum audierunt, oratione + capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam + quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad saxum adhaerescunt. <a + name="BkII_9"></a><a href="#BkIIN_9">9</a>. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se + credere ei, quem iudicent fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes + et indocti iudicare potuissent—statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel + maxime videtur esse sapientis—, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus + rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem + re semel audita atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio + quo modo plerique errare malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, + pugnacissime defendere quam sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur + exquirere. Quibus de rebus et alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata + sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa, quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et + Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. + Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus, quod erat constitutum, si ventus + esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur + pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in spatio consedimus.</p> + + <p>IV. <a name="BkII_10"></a><a href="#BkIIN_10">10</a>. Hic Catulus: + Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene explicatum est, ut tota + fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea, quae te pollicitus + es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem, inquit Hortensius, + feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit. + Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in promptu erant, dicta + sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille: Non sane, inquit, + Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est iis, qui placere + volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde ea, quae dico, + probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec ea, in quibus, + si non fuerint, <i>non</i> vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed mehercule, ut + quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata est, mihi + tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus agebat: nota + enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio, + eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei faciam + quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum animos + ereximus. <a name="BkII_11"></a><a href="#BkIIN_11">11</a>. At ille: Cum + Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat + iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et + Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista + philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis: cum + quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem + isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant + adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant: et homo + natura lenissimus—nihil enim poterat fieri illo + mitius—stomachari tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante + videram. At ille, Heracliti memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo + viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico + audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id + quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei familiares, docti homines, P. et + C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa audivisse Romae de Philone et ab + eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent descripsisse. <a name="BkII_12"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_12">12</a>. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus + commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin + contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum + igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et + item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut + causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito + doctisque compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea + Aristone et Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, + multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae + contra Philonem erat, praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est + adversarius is, qui ista, quae sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino + dicere. Etsi enim mentitur, tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam + Carneademque veniamus.</p> + + <p>V. <a name="BkII_13"></a><a href="#BkIIN_13">13</a>. Quae cum + dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini—me autem + nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod + seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt, + quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur. + Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit, + commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, + cum consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem + agrariam aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis + tulerit invito senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. + Pompeium: illi quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum + solent. Duos vero sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. + Scaevolam, aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut + videmus, palam, alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. + Marium. Et de hoc quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum + atque tantorum expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. <a + name="BkII_14"></a><a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>. Similiter vos, cum + perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam + constitutam velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, + Xenophanem, Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, + ut nostrum inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum + illorum nec Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. + Et tamen isti physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant + quasi mente incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere + videatur, abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil + omnino quale sit posse reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes + isti videntur nimis etiam quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire + quam sciant. <a name="BkII_15"></a><a href="#BkIIN_15">15</a>. Quod si + illi tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot + saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum + iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est + ut in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas + qui constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate + delitisceret, qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e + numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit + perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus + differentis, re congruentis, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam + sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in + disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita, cum aliud + agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, + quam Graeci <span lang="el" title="eirôneian" + >ειρωνειαν</span> + vocant: quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea + vitiosum in illo non putandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.</p> + + <p>VI. <a name="BkII_16"></a><a href="#BkIIN_16">16</a>. Sed fuerint illa + veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est igitur actum, quod + investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut putatur, obtrectans + nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores immutatione verborum, dum + huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est clarissimis rebus + tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio, quamquam + floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi, proxime + a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est + quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, + Lacydi discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu + tenuit: nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum + floruerunt: e quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho + fuit—declarat multitudo librorum—ingeni non minus in + [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene + autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus Metrodorus putabatur. <a + name="BkII_17"></a><a href="#BkIIN_17">17</a>. Iam Clitomacho Philo + vester operam multos annos dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium + Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra + Academicos disseramus, id quidam e philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres + faciendum omnino non putabant: nec vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum + iis, qui nihil probarent, Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo + fuisset, reprehendebant, nec definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset + cognitio aut perceptio aut, si verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam + <span lang="el" title="katalêpsin" + >καταληψιν</span> + illi vocant, eosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod + comprehendi et percipi posset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod + nihil esset clarius <span lang="el" title="enargeiai" + >εναργειαι</span>, + ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus + fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi—me appellabat + iocans—hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant + illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, + definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam + priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere + putabant, ne qui fallerentur. <a name="BkII_18"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam + evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et + homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova + quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum + pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre + Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum + enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset—id enim + volumus esse <span lang="el" title="akatalêpton" + >ακαταληπτον</span>—, + si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum—iam enim hoc pro + <span lang="el" title="phantasiai" + >φαντασιαι</span> + verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus—visum igitur impressum + effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non + esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest + quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, + quod est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque + Philo, iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse + comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis + oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam + definitionem, quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi + nihil posse concedimus.</p> + + <p>VII. <a name="BkII_19"></a><a href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>. Ordiamur igitur + a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa sunt, ut, si optio naturae + nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat contentane sit suis integris + incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius aliquid, non videam quid + quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est, dum de remo inflexo + aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum, qui quidquid videtur + tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit et alia multa. Meo + autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac + valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt. Itaque et lumen + mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur, et intervalla + aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum adspectus + ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in + sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium + requirat acrius. <a name="BkII_20"></a><a href="#BkIIN_20">20</a>. + Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures + cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa + vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus! quam + multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati! qui + primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, quum id nos + ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu et odoratu loqui, in + quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen. Quid de tactu, et + eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis? + in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia + sentiatur:—potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, + et inter eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet + non apertissime insaniat? <a name="BkII_21"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_21">21</a>. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi + dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed + quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum + illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, + non sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series + deinde sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum + comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis + particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus + nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. <a + name="BkII_22"></a><a href="#BkIIN_22">22</a>. Quod si essent falsae + notitiae—<span lang="el" title="ennoias" + >εννοιας</span> enim notitias + appellare tu videbare—, si igitur essent hae falsae aut eius modi + visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non possent, quo tandem + his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset, + quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo + philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime continet, + nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum? + aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? Ars vero + quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi + perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab + inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus, + sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item. + Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, + aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea + potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is, + qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in + similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo + atque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem + tractabit, multa perceperit?</p> + + <p>VIII. <a name="BkII_23"></a><a href="#BkIIN_23">23</a>. Maxime vero + virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi multa posse. In quibus + solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non comprehensionem modo + rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse censemus, itemque + sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat constantiam. Ea autem + constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti, quaero unde nata sit aut + quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui statuit omnem cruciatum + perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam aut officium prodat + aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges imposuerit, cum quam ob + rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi, percepti, cogniti, + constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam tanti aestimet + aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum supplicium + recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non possint. <a + name="BkII_24"></a><a href="#BkIIN_24">24</a>. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se + ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo modo primum obtinebit nomen + sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam rem aut agere fidenter + audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum vero dubitabit quid sit + extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit + esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse + initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur, idque initium + esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter appetitio—eam enim volumus + esse <span lang="el" title="hormên" + >‛ορμην</span>—, qua ad + agendum impellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. + <a name="BkII_25"></a><a href="#BkIIN_25">25</a>. Illud autem, quod + movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id, + quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri + animus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur + accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit + non occurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam + impelletur, numquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, + necesse est id ei verum, quod occurrit, videri. <a name="BkII_26"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis + tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate + perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem, + cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio + cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea, + quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi + involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium + quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet<i>ur</i>. Itaque + argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece <span lang="el" title="apodeixis" + >αποδειξις</span>, + ita definitur: 'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non + percipiebatur, adducit.'</p> + + <p>IX. <a name="BkII_27"></a><a href="#BkIIN_27">27</a>. Quod si omnia + visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel falsa esse possent, + neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo quemquam aut conclusisse + aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset conclusi argumenti fides? + Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit + exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de se ipsa dubitare + debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant <span lang="el" + title="dogmata" + >δογματα</span>, quorum nullum + sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum proditur, lex veri rectique + proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum proditiones et rerum publicarum + nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum + possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile, + fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla ratio queat. Talia autem + neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui illa visa, e quibus + omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis interesse. <a + name="BkII_28"></a><a href="#BkIIN_28">28</a>. Ex hoc illud est natum, + quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente + diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum + diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi, consentaneum esse unum + tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia non possent, Carneades acutius + resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id consentaneum esset, ut + maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod + perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum quidem, + quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse. <a + name="BkII_29"></a><a href="#BkIIN_29">29</a>. Antiochus ad istum locum + pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id haberent Academici + decretum,—sentitis enim iam hoc me <span lang="el" title="dogma" + >δογμα</span> dicere—, nihil posse + percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus, + fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam + totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam + rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis<i>a</i> accipi + oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique + iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in + philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, + qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut + unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere + dubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a + sapientia plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut + hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de + inconstantia totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse + potest nihil approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.</p> + + <p>X. <a name="BkII_30"></a><a href="#BkIIN_30">30</a>. Sequitur + disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior—habet enim + aliquantum a physicis—, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra + dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de + abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari + poterat subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum + animal omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad + modum primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa + sequeretur, tum ut sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim + ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim + habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, + ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. + Cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae + rerum, quas Graeci tum <span lang="el" title="ennoias" + >εννοιας</span>, tum <span + lang="el" title="prolêpseis" + >προληψεις</span> + vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque + innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem + ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. <a + name="BkII_31"></a><a href="#BkIIN_31">31</a>. Ad rerum igitur scientiam + vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime + cognitionem, et istam <span lang="el" title="katalêpsin" + >καταληψιν</span>, + quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum + ipsam per se amat—nihil est enim ei veritatis luce + dulcius—tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et + artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam + corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo + ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel + instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt + funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate + eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.</p> + + <p><a name="BkII_32"></a><a href="#BkIIN_32">32</a>. Nec vero satis + constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid velint. Interdum + enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea, quae disputentur, + vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid ergo istud ad nos? + num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait + Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam + queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque intersit + inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur eaque + distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui + omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi + desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim—et hoc quidem vel + maxime vos animadvertebam moveri—probabile aliquid esse et quasi + veri simile, eaque se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac + disserendo.</p> + + <p>XI. <a name="BkII_33"></a><a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. Quae ista regula + est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi, propterea quod ea non + possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus, interesse oportet ut + inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si nihil interest, + nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique communis, + ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum dicunt + hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem modo + falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt pueriliter. + Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut si quis + quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non ademisse. + Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed propria + veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu probabilem + visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades volebat, + sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo agimus, + tibi erit revertendum. <a name="BkII_34"></a><a href="#BkIIN_34">34</a>. + In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia + proprium in communi signo notari non potest. Sin autem commune nihil + erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod ita mihi videatur verum, ut + non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore versantur, cum convicio + veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt distinguere et conantur + ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo + atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque comprehendi posse. Quo enim + modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum possit accidere ut id, + quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo ista aut perspicua + dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere inaniterne + moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec argumentum nec + sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. <a name="BkII_35"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_35">35</a>. Ex hoc illud iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid + dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur: 'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed + qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur. Non enim urguent, ut coarguant + neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque adseverare sine aliqua eius + rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et propria nota. Quod est + igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique occurrit et primo + quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo levius? <a + name="BkII_36"></a><a href="#BkIIN_36">36</a>. Sin ex circumspectione + aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod visum sit, id se dicent sequi, + tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis visis, inter quae nihil + interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides: deinde, cum dicant posse + accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit, + exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile videatur et absit longissime a vero, + ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam + proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt. Ut enim confidant, notum iis + esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et oppresso quod tandem verum + sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum + ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum et ea re + id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod significatur, aut falsum sit aut + nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae + dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam absentibus nobis veritas se + ipsa defendet.</p> + + <p>XII. <a name="BkII_37"></a><a href="#BkIIN_37">37</a>. His satis + cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione atque approbatione, + quam Graeci <span lang="el" title="synkatathesin" + >συγκαταθεσιν</span> + vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta + sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul + illud aperiebatur, comprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine + adsensione non potest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime + intersit, quod animal agit aliquid—nihil enim agens ne cogitari + quidem potest quale sit—, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae + est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda adsensio. <a name="BkII_38"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_38">38</a>. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos + neque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra + ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo + non potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam + appareat—Graeci id <span lang="el" title="oikeion" + >οικειον</span> + appellant—, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non approbare. + Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil attinet de + adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur statim. Sed + haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse constare nec + notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit aliquid in + nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit. <a + name="BkII_39"></a><a href="#BkIIN_39">39</a>. Ubi igitur virtus, si + nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem absurdum vitia in ipsorum + esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi adsensione: hoc idem in + virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et firmitas ex iis rebus + constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit, omninoque ante videri + aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum sit, adsentiatur. Qua + re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem actionem tollit e + vita.</p> + + <p>XIII. <a name="BkII_40"></a><a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>. Nunc ea + videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius potestis totius + eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt igitur primum artem + quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et genera definiunt, + in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit, totidem verbis + quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant omnem hanc + quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri possint + nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia non + percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi + sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti + conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic + est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum + est, id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, + ut eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius + modi, ut in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi + possint, alia non possint. <a name="BkII_41"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_41">41</a>. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' + Quae autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant + concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa + sint, ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, + ex iis non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non + possint:' reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item + duo, unum: 'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: + 'omne visum, quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit + esse.' <a name="BkII_42"></a><a href="#BkIIN_42">42</a>. Haec duo + proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam + adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas: + primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni + consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne + ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa + concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis, + item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima + dispertiunt, volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta + esse falsa, quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse + comprehendi.</p> + + <p>XIV. <a name="BkII_43"></a><a href="#BkIIN_43">43</a>. Hanc ego + subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed ab eorum causa, + qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et partitiones et + horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines dissimilitudinesque et + earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est hominum illa vera et firma + et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui clament nihilo magis vera illa + esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum aliquid definierint, roget eos + quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam rem transferri quamlubet? Si + posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa vera definitio sit? + si<i>n</i> negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera definitio + transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur, id + percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus + partibus. <a name="BkII_44"></a><a href="#BkIIN_44">44</a>. Si enim + dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide perspicere nec ulla + communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se fatebuntur. Sin autem + negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui poterunt longius + progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam concludi argumentum + non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt, ita probatis, ut + falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus comprehensis et + perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse comprehendi, + quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque ipsa natura + accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam quod non + appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et ea, + quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse + quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro + congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam + falsa visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, + inter falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam + interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.</p> + + <p><a name="BkII_45"></a><a href="#BkIIN_45">45</a>. Sed progrediamur + longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse videamur, quaeque ab + iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis relinquamus. + Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim, ut + ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed tamen, ut + maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus est vel + arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese, quasi + praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit subvenire + erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, + dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil + profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.</p> + + <p>XV. <a name="BkII_46"></a><a href="#BkIIN_46">46</a>. Quam ob rem cum + duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus adversentur, auxilia totidem + sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim primum, quod parum defigunt + animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt, ut quanta luce ea + circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod fallacibus et + captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti quidam, cum eas + dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet igitur et ea, quae + pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere, de quibus iam + diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus interrogationibus eorum + captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere constitui. <a + name="BkII_47"></a><a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>. Exponam igitur generatim + argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum + conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum + animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, + quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, + quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis, auspiciis, extis + declarentur—haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra + disputant—, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus + efficere possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, + efficere non possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae + perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae + nihil sit omnino? <a name="BkII_48"></a><a href="#BkIIN_48">48</a>. + Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea declarant, quae + cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel furiosis + videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut non + modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis nihil + intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se + motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset, + qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset + inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae + falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile + internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi + dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in + visis distinctio appareat.</p> + + <p>XVI. <a name="BkII_49"></a><a href="#BkIIN_49">49</a>. Ad has omnis + visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat et erat de hac una + re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum puto, sed ipsa + capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod captiosissimo + genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in philosophia probari + solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc + vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano. Vitiosum sane et + captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum obiectum est a deo + dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri simile? cur + deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne + internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc + si perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin + ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum. <a name="BkII_50"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_50">50</a>. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut + ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid cui + simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit? + deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi + canibus similes <i>sunt</i>, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis + similia sunt quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime + artificiosa: quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? + Ne repugnantia quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud + genus transferri possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium + generum nihil interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in + alieno. <a name="BkII_51"></a><a href="#BkIIN_51">51</a>. Quod fieri qui + potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa + cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete + sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis + perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim, + cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse + commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et + inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum + Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba + ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Idemque in Epicharmo:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita + habemus, ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.</p> + + <p>XVII. <a name="BkII_52"></a><a href="#BkIIN_52">52</a>. At enim dum + videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum<i>que</i>, quae vigilantes + videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim dicimus, non + eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium nec mente + nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione faciunt + qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae + videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam + levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes + furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum + relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum</p> + <p>adspectu' ...</p> + </div> + </div> + <p><a name="BkII_53"></a><a href="#BkIIN_53">53</a>. At enim ipse sapiens + sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro veris. Et alias quidem + saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte gravitas aut tarditas + aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo temporis brevitate + excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando sustinere + adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset, aut + semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest + levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus + gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis + somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere + quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos + aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter + vigilantium visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter + adfecti, tum nihil interesse. <a name="BkII_54"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_54">54</a>. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, + quod nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae <span lang="el" title="adêla" + >αδηλα</span> Graeci. Si enim res se ita + habeant, ut nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, + cui possit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non + mediocris insaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum + anulis impressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum + similitudines negat esse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si + satis est ad tollendam cognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo + non estis contenti, praesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius + contenditis, quod rerum natura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit + tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla + communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid + pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis + esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non + similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest. <a name="BkII_55"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_55">55</a>. Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in + Academia irridentur, a quibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais + Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter + sese non solum similis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut + inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque + homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo, ut + inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque + nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil differat, nihil + intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus + gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus + innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in + hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?</p> + + <p>XVIII. <a name="BkII_56"></a><a href="#BkIIN_56">56</a>. Primum quidem + me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior potiusque refello propter id, + quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis singularum rerum singulas + proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, + tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam eosdem fuisse? Non + cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a suis. An non videmus + hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis internosci posse, eos + consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti ne minimum quidem + similes viderentur? <a name="BkII_57"></a><a href="#BkIIN_57">57</a>. + Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo: quin etiam concedam illum ipsum + sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum ei res similes occurrant, quas + non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum nec umquam ulli viso + adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse non possit. Sed et + ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis possit distinguere, + et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater geminos + internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si adsueveris. + Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen hoc + accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere + permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id + gallina peperisset dicere solebant. <a name="BkII_58"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_58">58</a>. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis est ova + illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc illud + esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam, ut + talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non + licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri + enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit + quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere, + cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas + impressiones nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. + Quasi vero non specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata + veri et falsi nota. <a name="BkII_59"></a><a href="#BkIIN_59">59</a>. + Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re nulla + impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non + distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his + illa necessario nata est <span lang="el" title="epochê" + >εποχη</span>, id est adsensionis retentio, + in qua melius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non + nulli existimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, + tollendus adsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare + non cognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse + <i>eo</i> delabi interdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse + sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi + possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil + opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae. <a + name="BkII_60"></a><a href="#BkIIN_60">60</a>. Restat illud, quod dicunt, + veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo + igitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt + tandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam + vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate + ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant, + nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi + quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et + perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam + maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?</p> + + <p>XIX. <a name="BkII_61"></a><a href="#BkIIN_61">61</a>. Haec Antiochus + fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo etiam adseverantius, + in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus. Sed iam confirmata + causa te, hominem amicissimum—me autem appellabat—et aliquot + annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus + philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, + eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos + iudicio, privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis + quidem, quibus adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat + sive eius loci, quem incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis + uti lumine licebat, isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris + ne scintillam quidem ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si + sequamur, iis vinculis simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. <a + name="BkII_62"></a><a href="#BkIIN_62">62</a>. Sublata enim adsensione + omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo + recte fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam + sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas + aperueris in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, + quod mihi quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem + ullam quae cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam + atque etiam ne illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur + auctoritas. Quae cum dixisset ille, finem fecit. <a name="BkII_63"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_63">63</a>. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod + quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret, + nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, + me quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens—non enim satis + intellegebam—, coepit hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi + Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, + accurate, copiose, taceo neque te quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, + sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud vero non censuerim, ut eius + auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo monuit, inquit adridens, ut + caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, quorum vides quanta copia + semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione quaereret qui tibi + constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse reperiri, idem te + comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De causa autem ipsa + malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno opere mirabor. + Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia sensisset, simul ac + visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset Catulus, me omnes + intueri.</p> + + <p>XX. <a name="BkII_64"></a><a href="#BkIIN_64">64</a>. Tum ego non + minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius modi quadam oratione + sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita movit, ut docti + hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum, quae pro illa + causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse diffiderem. + Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses non minorem + tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero. <a + name="BkII_65"></a><a href="#BkIIN_65">65</a>. Ego enim si aut + ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad hanc potissimum + philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed etiam mores et + naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus pertinacia + reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu consilioque + totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum alios tum + etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione + id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum solet, + iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri reperiendi et + ea sentire, quae dicerem. <a name="BkII_66"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>. Qui enim possum non cupere verum invenire, cum + gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse + iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. Nec + tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui numquam adsentiar, + qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero ipse et magnus + quidem sum opinator—non enim sum sapiens—et meas cogitationes + sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore + specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non + de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter + mentem sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec + percipio tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; + itaque visis cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet + Arcesilas vim esse maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne + fallatur videre. Nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de + gravitate sapientis, errore, levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur + loquar de firmitate sapientis? quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, + Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te probatur—ut praepostere tecum + agam, mox referam me ad ordinem—haec primum conclusio quam habeat + vim considera.</p> + + <p>XXI. <a name="BkII_67"></a><a href="#BkIIN_67">67</a>. Si ulli rei + sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur: numquam autem + opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc conclusionem Arcesilas + probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non numquam + secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita sequebatur etiam opinari, + quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed illud primum, sapientem, + si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et + eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a veris et quae non + possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. <a + name="BkII_68"></a><a href="#BkIIN_68">68</a>. Nobis autem primum, etiam + si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo adsentiendi periculosa esse + videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam vitiosum esse constet adsentiri + quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum, sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, + ne praecipitet, si temere processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa + veris, eaque, quae percipi non possunt, <i>iis quae possunt</i>—si + modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus—, ut tam in praecipitem + locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem omnino nihil esse quod + percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das, accepero, sapientem + nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus omnes cohibiturum, + ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum esse sapientem. + Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse percipi: etenim de + eo omnis est controversia.</p> + + <p>XXII. <a name="BkII_69"></a><a href="#BkIIN_69">69</a>. Sed prius + pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me defenduntur, et didicit apud + Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de + his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non acrius accusavit in senectute quam + antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen + inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim iste dies illuxerit quaero, + qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse negitavisset, veri et + falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae Stoici. Poenituit illa + sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime ad Stoicos? eorum enim + erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi poenitebat? quid? + Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. Numquam a Philone + discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent habere. <a + name="BkII_70"></a><a href="#BkIIN_70">70</a>. Unde autem subito vetus + Academia revocata est? Nominis dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa + descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod erant qui illum gloriae causa facere + dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii, qui se sequerentur, Antiochii + vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non potuisse sustinere concursum + omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt inter illos non nulla + communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam reliquorum + philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub Novis solem + non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum, sic + Academicorum umbram secutus est. <a name="BkII_71"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_71">71</a>. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum, cum ei + placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille Heracleotes + utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis oportere, + illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro credidisset, + honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea defensitavisset, + honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum: qui ex illius + commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis nostris a + vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit <i>ut</i> quod + argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum + hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.</p> + + <p>XXIII. <a name="BkII_72"></a><a href="#BkIIN_72">72</a>. Et primum + quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a nobis de antiquis + philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros viros, sed tamen + popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res <i>non</i> bonas tractent, + similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri, quae + vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras + nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si + dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?—sic enim + appellabantur ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa + philosophabantur—: maxima fuit et gravitatis et ingeni gloria. <a + name="BkII_73"></a><a href="#BkIIN_73">73</a>. Quid loquar de Democrito? + Quem cum eo conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam + animi? qui ita sit ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil + excipit de quo non profiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? + quis hunc philosophum non anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis + inferioris aetatis? qui mihi cum illo collati quintae classis videntur. + Atque is non hoc dicit, quod nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, + percipi posse negamus; ille verum plane negat esse: sensus quidem non + obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic enim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc + maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus initio libri, qui est de natura: + 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne aliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id + ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos, nec omnino sitne aliquid an + nihil sit.' <a name="BkII_74"></a><a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. Furere tibi + Empedocles videtur: at mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, + sonum fundere. Num ergo is excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum + magnam vim censet in iis esse ad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, + iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus bonis quamquam versibus, sed + tamen illi versibus increpant eorum adrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum + sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire dicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum + Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis certius possum dicere? Vixisse cum + iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones perscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari + non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, + 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius. Quid dicam de Platone? qui + certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset, nisi probavisset. + Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio + persequi.</p> + + <p>XXIV. <a name="BkII_75"></a><a href="#BkIIN_75">75</a>. Videorne tibi, + non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris homines, sed imitari numquam + nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam molestos vobis, sed minutos, + Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt contorta et aculeata quaedam + <span lang="el" title="sophismata" + >σοφισματα</span>; + sic enim appellantur fallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum + habeam Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa + ille contra sensus, quam multa contra omnia, quae in consuetudine + probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi quidem non videtur: sed dissolverit + sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset, quae nos fallerent probabilitate + magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile posse. <a + name="BkII_76"></a><a href="#BkIIN_76">76</a>. Quid Cyrenaici <i>tibi</i> + videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui negant esse quicquam quod + percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere, quae tactu intimo + sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid colore aut quo + sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.</p> + + <p>Satis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem + post illos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis + tantisque studiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te + ipso quidem iudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone + pugnavisse, sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. <a + name="BkII_77"></a><a href="#BkIIN_77">77</a>. Nemo, inquam, superiorum + non modo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, + nec solum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum + vera sententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone + fortasse quid futurum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec + opinari sapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, + quod percipi posset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur + visum? tum illum ita definisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum + et signatum et effictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset + visum verum, quale vel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse + visum quod percipi posset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem + modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad + definitionem additum: neque enim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si + esset tale, quale vel falsum. Incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut + doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso + possit esse. <a name="BkII_78"></a><a href="#BkIIN_78">78</a>. Haec est + una contentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum + esse sapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim + nihil percipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: + equidem Clitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab + eo disputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe + opinatione et perceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, + ut, si ostendero nihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum + esse.</p> + + <p>XXV. <a name="BkII_79"></a><a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>. Quid ergo est + quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera nuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, + communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere posses, idcirco heri non + necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram. Tu autem te negas + infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur? Nam et in remo + sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris videri colores + nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?—Manent illa + omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.—Igitur + semper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim + rem demittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli + umquam esse credendum. <a name="BkII_80"></a><a href="#BkIIN_80">80</a>. + Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et importune insistere! + Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum oculum torsisset, duas + ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse mendacium, non + oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed hic quidem + maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas esse, alia + falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi nobis + ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et integris + sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?—Utinam + quidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus, + quam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non + cerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies + longius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at + familiarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, + non videmus. <a name="BkII_81"></a><a href="#BkIIN_81">81</a>. At ille + nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et octingenta stadia + quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius. Responderem igitur + audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse contentum. Dicet me + acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque videntur a nobis et + nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere possunt. Ergo ut + illis aqua, sic nobis aër crassus offunditur. At amplius non desideramus. + Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam quererer cum deo, quod + parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem illam? Stare nobis + videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa. Quaere rationem cur + ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio an non possis, non + tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum testimonium dicere + ostenderis.</p> + + <p>XXVI. <a name="BkII_82"></a><a href="#BkIIN_82">82</a>. Quid ego de + nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse quaeris. Quid potest + esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti partibus + confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi quidem + quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum quam + videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum + esse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi + igitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri + putat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta + incitatione fertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem + possit, tamen nobis stare videatur. <a name="BkII_83"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_83">83</a>. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, + quam in parvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse + quod nosci, percipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E + quibus primum est esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id + percipi, tertium, inter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut + eorum alia percipi possint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum + verum a sensu profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo + nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum + secundum et tertium omnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, + quibuscum res est, id quoque conceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. <a + name="BkII_84"></a><a href="#BkIIN_84">84</a>. Qui igitur P. Servilium + Geminum videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi + visum, quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a + falso: qua distinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum + Gemino consul fuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non + posset? Negas tantam similitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, + sed cum adversario facili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet + igitur sensum, et si una fefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. + Sublato enim iudicio illo, quo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem + videris, qui tibi videbitur, tamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis + oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa. <a name="BkII_85"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_85">85</a>. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus + videri, quid habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non + sit, quoniam aliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis + esse, nihil esse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum + credibile 'nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, + nullum granum.' Haec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod + agitur, nihil interest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an + internosci non possit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo + tanta esse non potest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, + eadem temperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros + eiusdem modi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? <a + name="BkII_86"></a><a href="#BkIIN_86">86</a>. Quid? si in eius<i>dem</i> + modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in + agnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui, + quoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?</p> + + <p>XXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae + nos non videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. + Quid? hoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad + quae pauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire + possimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros + mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! <a + name="BkII_87"></a><a href="#BkIIN_87">87</a>. Cur non extimescam + opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse aliquam + vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo verbo + utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi adhibita? + quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur etiam + eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de physicis + mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo ante + dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam, res + iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris + solum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:—de quo queri solent Stoici, dum + studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque + omnem consuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem + inferiorem fuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.—<a + name="BkII_88"></a><a href="#BkIIN_88">88</a>. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a + te diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et + furiosorum visa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, + sanorum. Quo modo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se + vidisse Homerum, sed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Similia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, + eum somnia re<i>ri</i> et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea + vera, quae essent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum + videbantur, quo modo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non + putamus ita totum illud audivisse,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'O pietas animi ...',</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>si modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit + illa visa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti + probabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Mater, te appello ...'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>nonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde + enim illa:</p> + + <p>'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur + minorem habere visis quam vigilantes fidem?</p> + + <p>XXVIII. <a name="BkII_89"></a><a href="#BkIIN_89">89</a>. Quid loquar + de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus, Catule, Tuditanus? quisquam + sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is putabat quae videbantur? + Quid ille, qui:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>nonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? + apud Euripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat + sagittis, cum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde + movebatur falsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat + 'cor sibi cum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'unde haec flamma oritur?'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>et illa deinceps:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, <i>adsunt</i>, me expetunt:'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Quid? cum virginis fidem implorat:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam</p> + <p class="i4">hanc vim, quae me excruciat!</p> + <p>Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant</p> + <p class="i4">cum ardentibus taedis.'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Num dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>'Intendit crinitus Apollo</p> + <p>arcum auratum, luna innixus:</p> + <p>Diana facem iacit a laeva.'</p> + </div> + </div> + <p><a name="BkII_90"></a><a href="#BkIIN_90">90</a>. Qui magis haec + crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur? Apparet enim iam + 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur, ut illud + efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et falsa ad + animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa falsa + vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non enim + id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti sint, + aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut furentium + aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.</p> + + <p><a name="BkII_91"></a><a href="#BkIIN_91">91</a>. Quid est quod + ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse dicitis, veri et falsi + quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et falsi? et in qua re? In + geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus iudicabit an in + litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia igitur. Sol + quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut queat + iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera + sit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? + Si haec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem + pollicebatur. Nam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in + philosophia multae atque magnae, non est satis. <a name="BkII_92"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis, videte ne + contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit elementa + loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum paucis + additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod tu + modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.</p> + + <p>XXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura + nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus + quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla + omnino in re minutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, + multa pauca, magna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito + aut dempto certum respondeamus [non] habemus.—<a + name="BkII_93"></a><a href="#BkIIN_93">93</a>. At vitiosi sunt + soritae.—Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt + enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum est, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum + gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto + prius quam ad multa perveniat quiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, + <span lang="el" title="hêsychazein" + >‛ησυχαζειν</span>. + Per me vel stertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid + proficit? Sequitur enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo + interroget. Quo in numero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, + multane erunt? Progrediere rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim + fateris, neque ultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere + posse. Cuius generis error ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit + accedere. <a name="BkII_94"></a><a href="#BkIIN_94">94</a>. Nihil me + laedit, inquit: ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem + veniam, equos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, + praeceps erit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose + interroganti respondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus + es: si non habes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed + negas te usque ad obscura progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si + id tantum modo, ut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te + captare volt, utrum tacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad + novem, verbi gratia, sine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo + insistis: etiam a certis et illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me + in obscuris facere non sinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista + adiuvat, quae nec augentis nec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut + postremum docet. <a name="BkII_95"></a><a href="#BkIIN_95">95</a>. Quid? + quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum + superiora. Utrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum + dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur—id autem appellant <span + lang="el" title="axiôma" + >αξιωμα</span>, quod est quasi + effatum—, aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an + falsa sunt? Si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris <i>an</i> + verum dicis? Haec scilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius + quam illa, quae nos non comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.</p> + + <p>XXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec + eorum ullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa + sint, ubi est illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum + sit'? Rebus sumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias + improbandas, quae sint in genere contrario. <a name="BkII_96"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_96">96</a>. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si + dicis <i>nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem</i> nunc lucere + et verum dicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime + conclusum dicitis. Itaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum + traditis. Aut quidquid igitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars + ista nulla est. Vide ergo hanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis + te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque + dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui potes hanc non probare, cum probaveris + eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec Chrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem + dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic conclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet + autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet scilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum + concesseris superius, cogit inferius concedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa + conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris, mentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris + igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec approbare nec improbare. <a + name="BkII_97"></a><a href="#BkIIN_97">97</a>. Qui igitur magis illud? Si + ars, si ratio, si via, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in + utroque. Sed hoc extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec + inexplicabilia. Tribunum aliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem + numquam impetrabunt. Etenim cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et + contemnit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita + effabimur, 'aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic + statuant, omne, quod ita diiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non + modo verum esse, sed etiam necessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti + tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, + necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est + in natura rerum talis necessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id + est, Antiochus et Stoici: totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e + contrariis diiunctio—contraria autem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, + alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est. <a + name="BkII_98"></a><a href="#BkIIN_98">98</a>. Mecum vero quid habent + litium, qui ipsorum disciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, + sic ludere Carneades solebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, + minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab eo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec + autem merces erat dialecticorum. Sequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab + Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo iudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob + eam causam, quod ita didici, omne, quod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum + esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris, mentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut + igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi hoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.</p> + + <p>XXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi + relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis + sententia Antiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, + ut quisquam id fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad + senectutem cum Carneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde + studiosus ac diligens. Et quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis + adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae iam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. <a + name="BkII_99"></a><a href="#BkIIN_99">99</a>. Duo placet esse Carneadi + genera visorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi + possint, alia quae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse + probabilia; alia non probabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque + perspicuitatem dicantur, ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra + posteriorem nihil dici oportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum + esse, ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra + naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam + tu, Luculle, commemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa + sunt, teneatur modo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non + etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit + specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi + contrarium, utetur eo sapiens ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. + Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis sapiens inducitur, multa sequitur + probabilia, non comprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa, sed similia + veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita tollatur. <a name="BkII_100"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_100">100</a>. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num + comprehensum animo habet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui + potest? Sed si iam ex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, + probo navigio, bono gubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur + se illuc venturum esse salvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et + agendi et non agendi, faciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam + erat Anaxagoras, qui id non modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret + aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri + quidem. <a name="BkII_101"></a><a href="#BkIIN_101">101</a>. Et + quaecumque res eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla + re impeditum, movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore + dolatus, habet corpus, habet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut + ei multa vera videantur, neque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam + percipiendi notam: eoque sapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem + modi exsistere falsum aliquod, cuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra + sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque + aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.</p> + + <p>XXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, + praesto est qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis + tacentibus ex uno Epicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio + tollitur. Quod est caput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, + nihil percipi potest.' Quod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid + sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio ipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non + concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa igitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus + est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem certe, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, + tibi adsentior. <a name="BkII_102"></a><a href="#BkIIN_102">102</a>. + Quamquam nihil mihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem + maxime, cui erant ea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec + quivis arbitratu suo reprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, + certe levior reprehensio est: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, + non videtur hoc satis esse vobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, + quae a te vel maxime agitata sunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? + nihil tibi est perspicuum?' Explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo + modo ista Carneades diceret. Accipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a + Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C. Lucilium scripsit poëtam, cum + scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum, eum, qui consul cum M. + Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis—sunt enim mihi nota, + propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima institutio et + quasi disciplina illo libro continetur—, sed scriptum est ita: <a + name="BkII_103"></a><a href="#BkIIN_103">103</a>. 'Academicis placere + esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut aliae probabiles videantur, + aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia + non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi + perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait vehementer errare eos, qui + dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus numquam dictum sit aut colorem + aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit disputatum, non inesse in + his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam. <a + name="BkII_104"></a><a href="#BkIIN_104">104</a>. Quae cum exposuisset, + adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc + intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri: altero, cum se a + respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet, sustineat, ut neque neget + aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum placere, ut numquam + adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem, ubicumque haec + aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere possit. + †Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab + adsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, + quibus ad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque + partem respondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, + dum sine adsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, + quae nulla re impedirentur. <a name="BkII_105"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_105">105</a>. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, + invidiosa certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos + percipi comprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri + dicimus.</p> + + <p>XXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem + expedito, soluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, + iacere iam illud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, + de quo loquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, + isdem sensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare + illud, quod nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro + videbitur, nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum + videbatur, mane ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et + vibrat dissimileque est proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis + rationem reddere cur id eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod + videbatur oculis, defendere. <a name="BkII_106"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_106">106</a>. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim + quaerebas. Quid? meminisse visa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? + Polyaenus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro + adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae + sciebat, oblitus est? Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut + vobismet ipsis placet. Si igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque + rerum est, omnia, quae quisque meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque + percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil potest, et omnia meminit Siron + Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed + tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime vis, aut memoriam mihi + remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si comprehensio + perceptioque nulla sit. <a name="BkII_107"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_107">107</a>. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne, quae ipsae + fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae tantum id, + quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera et falsa + diiudicent?</p> + + <p>Sed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum + enim negatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem + perspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio + Stoicorum, ea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici + certissimam putant, vera esse haruspicum [<i>responsa</i>], auspicia, + oracula, somnia, vaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is + potest facere vel de iis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas + habuerint, cur id sapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est + aliquid, quod positum vel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non + possit? an tu in soritis poteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus + non poterit eodem modo insistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione + ipsam veri similitudinem non impeditam sequi? <a name="BkII_108"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_108">108</a>. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei + posse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim + videri oportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos + adsensus esse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli + autem omnia, si visa tollantur.</p> + + <p>XXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, + sed brevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto + repugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere, + credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a + Carneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris + adsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea + pars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia + sequitur, nulla re impediente? <a name="BkII_109"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_109">109</a>. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod statuet, ne + id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque impediet in + navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis procreandis + plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter probabile.</p> + + <p>Et tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, + sed, ut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret + consentaneum esse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum + saltem dicere posse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et + sibi ipsum contrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil + comprehendi posse, si quicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo + potius putat urguendum fuisse Carneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum + esse possit nisi comprehensum, perceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum + decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse + perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud decretum habeat et sine + decretis vitam agere possit! <a name="BkII_110"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_110">110</a>. Sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic + hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, + eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus. + Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur et incerta reddere. Non + enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit, stellarum numerus par an + impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de rebus, in quibus + versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis enim nihil + probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti nec quid + faciat nec quid respondeat. <a name="BkII_111"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_111">111</a>. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti, Luculle, + reprehensionem Antiochi—nec mirum: in primis enim est + nobilis—, qua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. + Cum enim sumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea + differre a veris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse + concessum, quod videretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli + altero, quo neget visa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id + ita esset, si nos verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam + falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum + habemus.</p> + + <p>XXXV. <a name="BkII_112"></a><a href="#BkIIN_112">112</a>. Ac mihi + videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim campus in quo + exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum + dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui id + percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet + illam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum + simplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque + etiam, si, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille + sapientem interdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem + huic loco valde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? <a + name="BkII_113"></a><a href="#BkIIN_113">113</a>. Quaero enim quid sit + quod comprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, + ne Xenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale + falsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito + nimirum adsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus + Academia concedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, + vel quod amavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum + et acutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero + quo tandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam + alia, haec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae + aut Peripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, + quale falsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. + Horum neutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque + verum puto, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.</p> + + <p>XXXVI. <a name="BkII_114"></a><a href="#BkIIN_114">114</a>. Illud + ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes idque turpissimum + esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi adroges, ut exponas + disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, finis + bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam vitam ingrediar + definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium dicas te et + artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia complectens + nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad quam me + deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si + dixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. <a name="BkII_115"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_115">115</a>. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad suam quisque + rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus cognationem + esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam saepe rexisse, + sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam inter se + amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi? qui mecum + vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo? qui ista + Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola, si + vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos + impudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint + scire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire. + Optime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale + est, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet + ipsis, de sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec + quaestio est.</p> + + <p><a name="BkII_116"></a><a href="#BkIIN_116">116</a>. In tres igitur + partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa sapientia est. + Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita, videamus: at + illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire + persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura pendent, quae + disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent persuadendi + necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non persuadere, + sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non quaero ex + his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum progredi non + possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat: extremitatem et + quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit: liniamentum sine + ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero, si adigam ius + iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante rationes + omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem maiorem + esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem deum + censet esse, contempserit. <a name="BkII_117"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_117">117</a>. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est + crediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille + longe aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus, + quorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est: + quaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum + esse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget <i>et</i> disciplinam? Etsi + quamcumque eliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e + physicis potissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor + quaestiones infinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia + constant, videamus quem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa + dissensio.</p> + + <p>XXXVII. <a name="BkII_118"></a><a href="#BkIIN_118">118</a>. Princeps + Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse primas ferunt, ex + aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari et sodali suo, + non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua omnia + gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum aëra, sed ea, quae ex + eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his + omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis inter + se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente + divina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse + mutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata + figura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur: + Leucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in + ceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem: + Melissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et + fore. Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a + deo sempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis + proficisci volunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, + credo, quem sequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo + condemnatique discedent. <a name="BkII_119"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_119">119</a>. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic + animo comprehensam habebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit + nunc lucere, quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, + habere mentem, quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, + moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum etiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, + terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam animalis intellegentia per omnia ea + permanet et transeat, fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore + deflagret.</p> + + <p>XXXVIII. Sint ista vera—vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse + veri—, comprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste + Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis + aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum + esse umquam mundum, quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari + operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat + motus mutationemque moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum + exsistere, ut hic ornatus umquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, + illud autem superius sicut caput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, + cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem relinquatur. <a name="BkII_120"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_120">120</a>. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, + quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? + Cur deus, omnia nostra causa cum faceret—sic enim voltis—, + tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa + <i>ac</i> perniciosa terra marique disperserit? Negatis haec tam polite + tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine divina aliqua sollertia. Cuius + quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque + perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum + opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. <a name="BkII_121"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_121">121</a>. Negas sine deo posse quicquam. Ecce tibi e + transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem + muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius + habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum. + Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec, ut ille, qui + asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse + dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non docentis, + sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens, quidquid aut + sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et + motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore. Quis enim + potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum + numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit—quod cui non + accidit?—extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen + adsentior, nec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.</p> + + <p>XXXIX. <a name="BkII_122"></a><a href="#BkIIN_122">122</a>. Latent + ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla + acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum, terram intrare + possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium, quam vim + quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum intererat ea + nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici notiora + esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed ecquid + nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus, ut + videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an + media pendeat? <a name="BkII_123"></a><a href="#BkIIN_123">123</a>. + Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram multarum urbium et + montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui dixit, iurare + posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam dicitis esse e + regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis vestigiis stent + contra nostra vestigia, quos <span lang="el" title="antipodas" + >αντιποδας</span> + vocatis: cur mihi magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, + qui, cum audiunt, desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait + Theophrastus, caelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare + censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum + axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, + si stante terra caelum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo + dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? + loquere. Putas solem esse tantulum? Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos + ab illo irridemini et ipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali + irrisione Socrates, liber Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat + posse. <a name="BkII_124"></a><a href="#BkIIN_124">124</a>. Sed redeo ad + animum et corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura + sit, quae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, + ut Dicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis + habeat, ut Platoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex + unusque sit? si simplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut + Xenocrates, numerus nullo corpore—quod intellegi quale sit vix + potest—et, quidquid est, mortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in + partem multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, + nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in + plerisque contrariarum rationum paria momenta.</p> + + <p>XL. <a name="BkII_125"></a><a href="#BkIIN_125">125</a>. Sin agis + verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non adsentiar, sed + quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem potissimum? + quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis fui. + Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes esse, + cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur corporum + cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos ullas, + e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine aliqua + mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus hic + tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante post, + alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc simus + ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis isdem + esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus, + isdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid + animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus + irrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus + adsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. <a + name="BkII_126"></a><a href="#BkIIN_126">126</a>. Non ergo id agitur, ut + aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam + postules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne + probabilia quidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam + esse arbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne + exaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud + scio an ita sit.</p> + + <p>XLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? + an Stoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et + reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua + omnia regantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis + auditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione + sapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri + serviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem—ipse enim hic radiatus me + intueri videtur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui—vos ergo + huius magnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis + architectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum + sit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? <a name="BkII_127"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_127">127</a>. Neque tamen istas quaestiones physicorum + exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam + quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur, elatiores + fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque caelestia + haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum cum + maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero aliquid + occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus + voluptate. <a name="BkII_128"></a><a href="#BkIIN_128">128</a>. Quaeret + igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester, ut adsentiatur, + credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi + secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit. + Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum ante dicendum + est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde adfirmant, + earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur, amittere. + Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam, cum cornix + cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis adfirmabunt + signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem metiri non + possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam terram. Ex quo + illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non potest, qui + ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas res non + percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id + approbat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse + percipi quantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera + percipi comprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis + minusve comprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio + comprehendendi.</p> + + <p>XLII. <a name="BkII_129"></a><a href="#BkIIN_129">129</a>. Sed quod + coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati? nempe fines + constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur: qua de + re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio? Omitto illa, quae + relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum + bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo + dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis + disciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo + nominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici + philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a + quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod + esset unum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A + Menedemo autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne + bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli + similia, sed, opinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. <a + name="BkII_130"></a><a href="#BkIIN_130">130</a>. Hos si contemnimus et + iam abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui + cum Zenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse + bonum nisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in + mediis ea momenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum + bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae <span lang="el" + title="adiaphoria" + >αδιαφορια</span> + ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae <span + lang="el" title="apatheia" + >απαθεια</span> nominatur. Has + igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae diu + multumque defensa sunt. <a name="BkII_131"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_131">131</a>. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt: quorum + princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post + Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de + ipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse + Callipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate + Diodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis, + quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut + indicant scripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles + eiusque amici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam + Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse + frui rebus iis, quas primas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, + quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, + qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit.</p> + + <p>XLIII. <a name="BkII_132"></a><a href="#BkIIN_132">132</a>. Iam illud + perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos exposui, malorum finis + esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar: modo ne quis illud tam + ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo aliquem.' Nihil + potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos. Licetne—omitto + per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope singularem—per + ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca + mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in discrimine. Nam + aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae. Utrumque non + potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione + contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni continetur, de + qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non potest igitur + uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed alter. Si + Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens—nam vos quidem + nihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum—: sin vera sunt Zenonis, + eadem in veteres Academicos <i>et</i> Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur + neutri adsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? <a + name="BkII_133"></a><a href="#BkIIN_133">133</a>. Quid? cum ipse + Antiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne + indicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia + peccata esse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat + tandem mihi considerare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue + aliquando quidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in + utramque partem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim + dicebas esse, Luculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito + assentiar: quod mihi tecum est dogma commune. <a name="BkII_134"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_134">134</a>. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno in una + virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit, + beatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti, + homuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse, + partim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam + natura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente. + Et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis + et fortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, + si sapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, + et tamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his + discrepant.</p> + + <p>XLIV. <a name="BkII_135"></a><a href="#BkIIN_135">135</a>. Quid? illa, + in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare possumus? Sapientis animum + numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia efferri. Age, haec probabilia + sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere, numquam dolere? Sapiensne non + timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si deleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni + necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est in bonis, tibi vero, + Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona, praeter turpitudinem + multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens necesse est et + venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint <i>ab</i> Academia vetere + decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent? + Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant + esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. + Est enim non magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, + ad verbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura + dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, + misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis + quasi cotem esse dicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. <a + name="BkII_136"></a><a href="#BkIIN_136">136</a>. Atrocitas quidem ista + tua quo modo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non + possum, non quo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia + Stoicorum, quae <span lang="el" title="paradoxa" + >παραδοξα</span> + nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? hos enim + quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos reges, + solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse? + neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum + quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum? + insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta + Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis + quidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? <a + name="BkII_137"></a><a href="#BkIIN_137">137</a>. Haec tibi, Luculle, si + es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia: + mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.</p> + + <p>XLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad + senatum in Capitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. + Marcello coss. praetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, + doctum sane hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem + dixisse Carneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia + sapiens non sum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico + non videris.' Aristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, + non dubitavisset quin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas + incoleret. Sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca + balbutiens. <a name="BkII_138"></a><a href="#BkIIN_138">138</a>. Vos + autem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et + comprobem incognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur + saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de + finibus bonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem + esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id + esse, si vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, + sed in vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum + honestate coniungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima + naturae commoda adiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat + probabiliter posse defendi. <a name="BkII_139"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_139">139</a>. Sit sane ita—quamquam a Polemonis et + Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam + habeo adhuc probabilius—, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas + sensibus nostris blandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut + Aristippo. Revocat virtus vel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos + motus esse dicit, hominem iungit deo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam + Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, + quasi corporis simus expertes, animum solum complectitur, ut Calliphontem + sequar, cuius quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut + eam probare etiam videretur. Quamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se + intellegere potuisse quid Carneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim + sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, + cum honestas in voluptate contemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate + tamquam hominem cum belua copulabis?</p> + + <p>XLVI. <a name="BkII_140"></a><a href="#BkIIN_140">140</a>. Unum igitur + par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum honestate. De quo Chrysippo + fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio. Alteram si sequare, multa + ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere, caritas, amicitia, + iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest, nisi erit + gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium impellitur, + ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis. Audi contra + illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant, nisi forte, + quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere: fontem omnium + bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc praescriptionem + esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur + habiturum. <a name="BkII_141"></a><a href="#BkIIN_141">141</a>. Nihil + igitur me putatis, haec et alia innumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam + moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me minus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum + interest, quod tu, cum es commotus, adquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, + verum illud certum, comprehensum, perceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse + vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque pelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil + eius modi esse arbitror, cui si adsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, + quoniam vera a falsis nullo discrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia + ista dialecticae nulla sint.</p> + + <p><a name="BkII_142"></a><a href="#BkIIN_142">142</a>. Venio enim iam ad + tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium Protagorae est, qui putet id + cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui praeter + permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii: aliud Epicuri, qui omne + iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in voluptate constituit. + Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab + opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit. <a + name="BkII_143"></a><a href="#BkIIN_143">143</a>. Num quid horum probat + noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne maiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut + Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt de ratione loquendi multi et multum + probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo profecto nihil est acutius, nihil + politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.</p> + + <p>XLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut + cur cogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in + elementis dialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne + sit, si quid ita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta + contentio est! Aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. + Quid? cum Cleanthe doctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! + quid? duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, + opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis in rebus dissentiunt? <a + name="BkII_144"></a><a href="#BkIIN_144">144</a>. Quid me igitur, + Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem vocas? et quidem, ut + seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, + cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui + si undique omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam + primum illa invidiosa, quod eos omnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, + servos, insanos esse dicatis: deinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad + multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos, qui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos + Zeno, negat Antiochus scire quicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim + defendimus etiam insipientem multa comprehendere. <a + name="BkII_145"></a><a href="#BkIIN_145">145</a>. At scire negatis + quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. + Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, + 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius + modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem + illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non + fuerat, <span lang="el" title="katalêpsin" + >καταληψιν</span> + imposuit. Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte + vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem + nisi sapientem esse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi + quidem solent dicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, + Hortensi, in tua villa nos esse. <a name="BkII_146"></a><a + href="#BkIIN_146">146</a>. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen + nimis eleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi + posset, artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile + esset, satis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem + sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut + Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos + docuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: + ne nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod + nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem + maiorum etiam comprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi + sententia' quemque voluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,' + quod inscientia multa versaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret, + ut 'arbitrari' se diceret etiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati + iudices cognovissent, ea non ut esse facta, sed ut 'videri' + pronuntiarentur.</p> + + <p>XLVIII. <a name="BkII_147"></a><a href="#BkIIN_147">147</a>. Verum, + quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius ipse insusurrat + navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis multa dixi, est + mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius de + dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae + deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto + opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere necesse + sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum + mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici + texuerunt. <a name="BkII_148"></a><a href="#BkIIN_148">148</a>. Tum + Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec contulisse. Saepius enim + congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis nostris, si quae videbuntur, + requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus sentit? quid Hortensius? Tum + Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor sententiam, quam quidem ille + Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil putem posse, adsensurum autem + non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem existimem, sed ita, ut + intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi + possit: qua re <span lang="el" title="epochên" + >εποχην</span> illam omnium rerum non + probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit, + vehementer adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum + aspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens: + Tollendum. Teneo te, inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. + Ita sermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras + descendimus.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>NOTES.</h2> + +<h3>BOOK I.</h3> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_1">§§1</a>—<a + href="#BkI_14">14</a></b>. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae + (<a href="#BkI_1">1</a>). Cic., after adroitly reminding Varro that the + promised dedication of the <i>De Lingua Latina</i> is too long delayed, + turns the conversation towards philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves + this subject untouched (<a href="#BkI_2">2</a>, <a href="#BkI_3">3</a>). + Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful purpose, and + points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (<a + href="#BkI_4">4</a>—<a href="#BkI_6">6</a>). He greatly believes in + philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to Greece for it, while he + devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks have not treated (<a + href="#BkI_7">7</a>, <a href="#BkI_8">8</a>). Cic. lauds this devotion, + but demurs to the theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. + Latins may surely imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and + orators. He gives reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and + instancing the success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy + (<a href="#BkI_9">9</a>—<a href="#BkI_12">12</a>). Varro putting + the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the Old Academy for + the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for the statement + that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro refers to + Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a proposal on + the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference between Antiochus + and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition of the principles of + Antiochus (<a href="#BkI_13">13</a>, <a + href="#BkI_14">14</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_1"></a><a href="#BkI_1">§1</a></b>. <i>Noster</i>: + our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus than of + Cic., see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxxvii">37</a>. <i>Nuntiatum</i>: the + spelling <i>nunciatum</i> is a mistake, cf. Corssen, <i>Ausspr.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> p. 51. <i>A M. Varrone</i>: <i>from M. Varro's + house</i> news came. <i>Audissemus</i>: Cic. uses the contracted forms of + such subjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms + like <i>audiissemus</i>. <i>Confestim</i>: note how artfully Cic. uses + the dramatic form of the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for + Varro. <i>Ab eius villa</i>: the prep is absent from the MSS., but + Wesenberg (<i>Em. M.T. Cic. Epistolarum</i>, p. 62) shows that it must be + inserted. Cic. writes <i>abesse Roma</i> (<i>Ad Fam.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 15, 4), <i>patria</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 106) etc., but not <i>abesse officio</i> (<i>De + Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 43, where Wes. alters it) or the + like. <i>Satis eum longo intervallo</i>: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after + Davies, reads <i>se visentum</i> for <i>satis eum</i>, quoting <i>Ad + Att.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, Madv. <i>tum</i> for <i>eum</i> + (Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the + repetition of pronouns (<i>illum</i>, <i>eum</i>) is quite Ciceronian. + The emphatic <i>ille</i> is often repeated by the unemphatic <i>is</i>, + cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 71, and <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 22. I may note that the separation of <i>satis</i> + from <i>longo</i> by the word <i>eum</i> is quite in Cicero's style (see + my note on <a href="#BkIN_25">25</a> <i>quanta id magis</i>). Some + editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking <i>intervallo</i> of + distance in space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly + press <i>satis</i>, which only means "tolerably," to mean "sufficiently." + The words <i>satis longo intervallo</i> simply = "after a tolerably long + halt." For the clause <i>ut mos</i>, etc., cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 13.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_2"></a><a href="#BkI_2">§2</a></b>. <i>Hic pauca + primo</i>: for the omission of <i>locuti</i>, cf. the very similar + passages in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 14, <span + class="vol">III.</span> 8, also my note on <a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>. + <i>Atque ea</i>: Halm brackets <i>ea</i>, quite needlessly, for its + insertion is like Cic. <i>Ecquid forte Roma novi</i>: <i>Roma</i> is the + ablative, and some verb like <i>attulisset</i> is omitted. (So Turnebus.) + To take it as nom., understanding <i>faciat</i>, is clearly wrong. + <i>Percontari</i>: the spelling <i>percunctari</i> rests on false + derivation (Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 36). <i>Ecquid ipse + novi</i>: cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 13. The MSS. + have <i>et si quid</i>, bad Latin altered by Manutius. <i>Istum</i>: some + edd. <i>ipsum</i>, but Cic. often makes a speaker use <i>iste</i> of a + person who is present. Goer. qu. <i>Brut.</i> 125, <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 228. <i>Velit</i>: Walker reads <i>velis</i> with + St Jerome. For <i>quod velit</i> = <i>quod quis velit</i>, cf. <i>De + Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 30. <i>In manibus</i>: so often, cf. + <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 38. <i>Idque</i>: MSS. have in the place of this + <i>quod</i> with variants <i>que</i>, <i>quae</i>, <i>qui</i>, + <i>quo</i>. Dav. gave <i>quia</i>, which was the vulgate reading down to + Halm, who reads <i>idque</i>, after Christ. <i>Ad hunc enim ipsum</i>: + MSS. have <i>eum</i> for <i>enim</i> (exc. Halm's G). Such a combination + of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for expressions like <i>me illum + ipsum</i> (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, 11) are not in + point. Of course if <i>quia</i> be read above, <i>eum</i> must be ejected + altogether. <i>Quaedam institui</i>: the <i>De Lingua Latina</i>; see + <i>Ad. Att</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 12.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_3"></a><a href="#BkI_3">§3</a></b>. <i>E Libone</i>: + the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see Cæsar <i>B. Civ.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 5, 16, 24. <i>Nihil enim eius modi</i> again all + MSS. except Halm's G. have <i>eum</i> for <i>enim</i>. Christ conj. + <i>enim eum</i>; so Baiter. <i>Illud ... requirere</i>: i.e. the question + which follows; cf. <i>requiris</i> in <a href="#BkI_4">4</a>. <i>Tecum + simul</i>: Halm's G om. <i>tecum</i>; but cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 330. <i>Mandare monumentis—letteris + illustrare</i>: common phrases in Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 1, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 1, <i>De + Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 4. <i>Monumentis</i>: this, and not + <i>monimentis</i> (Halm) or <i>monementis</i>, is probably the right + spelling; cf. Corss. <span class="vol">II.</span> 314. <i>Ortam a</i>: + Cic. <i>always</i> writes the prep. after <i>ortus</i>; cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">V.</span> 69. <i>Genus</i>: regularly used by Cic. as + <i>opus</i> by Quintilian to mean "department of literature." <i>Ea + res</i>: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter has <i>ars</i>; on the + other hand Bentley (if the <i>amicus</i> so often quoted in Davies' notes + be really he) reads <i>artibus</i> for <i>rebus</i> below. The slight + variation, however, from <i>res</i> to <i>artibus</i> is such as Cic. + loves. <i>Ceteris</i>: the spelling <i>caeteris</i> (Klotz) is absolutely + wrong, cf. Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 325. <i>Antecedat</i>: some + MSS. give <i>antecellat</i>. a frequent variant, cf. <i>De Off.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 105</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_4"></a><a href="#BkI_4">§4</a>.</b> + <i>Deliberatam—agitatam</i>: Cic. as usual exaggerates the + knowledge possessed by the <i>personae</i> of the dialogue; cf. Introd. + p. <a href="#Page_xxxviii">38</a>, <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 1. <i>In promptu</i>: so <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_10">10</a>. <i>Quod ista ipsa ... + cogitavi</i>: Goer., who half a page back had made merry over the gloss + hunters, here himself scented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo + expels the words. Yet they are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. <i>De Div.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 38), and moreover + nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and clauses in + slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense desire to + flatter Varro. <i>Si qui ... si essent</i>: the first <i>si</i> has + really no conditional force, <i>si qui</i> like <span lang="el" + title="eitines" >ειτινες</span> + merely means "all who," for a strong instance see <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 9, 13, ed Nobbe, <i>si accusandi sunt, si qui + pertimuerunt</i>. <i>Ea nolui scribere</i>, etc.: very similar + expressions occur in the prologue to <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span>, which should be compared with this prologue + throughout.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_5"></a><a href="#BkI_5">§5</a>.</b> <i>Vides ... + didicisti</i>: MSS. have <i>vides autem eadem ipse didicisti enim</i>. My + reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ, has + <i>vides autem ipse—didicisti enim eadem—non posse</i>, etc. + <i>Similis</i>: Halm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write <i>i</i> and + <i>e</i> indiscriminately in the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write + <i>i</i> everywhere, we shall thus, I believe, be far nearer Cicero's + real writing. Though I do not presume to say that his usage did not vary, + he must in the vast majority of instances have written <i>i</i>, see + Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 738—744. <i>Amafinii aut + Rabirii</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxvi">26</a>. <i>Definiunt ... + partiuntur</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIN_32">32</a>. <i>Interrogatione</i>: + Faber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g. + Bentl. <i>argumentatione</i>, Ernesti <i>ratione</i>. But the word as it + stands has exactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure. + <i>Interrogatio</i> is merely the <i>conclusio</i> or syllogism put as a + series of questions. Cf. <i>Paradoxa</i> 2, with <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 42 which will show that <i>interrogatiuncula</i> + and <i>conclusiuncula</i> are almost convertible terms. See also + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 39. <i>Nec dicendi nec + disserendi</i>: Cic.'s constant mode of denoting the Greek <span + lang="el" title="rhêtorikê" + >‛ρητορικη</span> + and <span lang="el" title="dialektikê" + >διαλεκτικη</span>; + note on <a href="#BkIN_32">32</a>. <i>Et oratorum etiam</i>: Man., Lamb. + om. <i>etiam</i>, needlessly. In <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span + class="vol">IX.</span> 25, 3, the two words even occur without any other + word to separate them. For <i>oratorum</i> Pearce conj. <i>rhetorum</i>. + <i>Rhetor</i>, however is not thus used in Cic.'s phil. works. + <i>Utramque vim virtutem</i>: strange that Baiter (esp. after Halm's + note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. <i>unam</i> for + <i>virtutem</i>. Any power or faculty (vis, <span lang="el" + title="dynamis" + >δυναμις</span>) may be called + in Gk. <span lang="el" title="aretê" + >αρετη</span>, in Lat <i>virtus</i>. Two + passages, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 72, <i>De Or.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 65, will remove all suspicion from the + text. <i>Verbis quoque novis</i>: MSS. have <i>quanquam</i> which however + is impossible in such a place in Cic. (cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 68). <i>Ne a nobis quidem</i>: so all the MSS., but + Orelli (after Ernesti) thinking the phrase "<i>arrogantius dictum</i>" + places <i>quidem</i> after <i>accipient</i>. The text is quite right, + <i>ne quidem</i>, as Halm remarks, implies no more than the Germ. <i>auch + nicht</i>, cf. also Gk. <span lang="el" title="oude" + >ουδε</span>. <i>Suscipiatur labor</i>: MSS. om. + the noun, but it is added by a later hand in G.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_6"></a><a href="#BkI_6">§6</a>.</b> <i>Epicurum, id + est si Democritum</i>: for the charge see <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 17, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 13, <i>N.D.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 73. <i>Id est</i> often introduces in Cic. a + clause which intensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, + exx. in <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 33. <i>Cum causas rerum + efficientium sustuleris</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 18, the same charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, + <i>Met.</i> A, 2. Many editors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read + <i>efficientis</i>, which would then govern <i>rerum</i> (cf. <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">V.</span> 81, <i>De Fato</i>, 33, also Gk. <span + lang="el" title="poiêtikos" + >ποιητικος</span>). + But the genitive is merely one of definition, the <i>causae</i> are the + <i>res efficientes</i>, for which cf. <a href="#BkI_24">24</a> and + <i>Topica</i>, 58, <i>proximus locus est rerum efficientium, quae causae + appellantur</i>. So Faber, though less fully. <i>Appellat</i>: i.e. + Amafinius, who first so translated <span lang="el" title="atomos" + >ατομος</span>. <i>Quae cum + contineantur</i>: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it must + be kept, and <i>adhibenda etiam</i> begins the <i>apodosis</i>. Madvig + (<i>Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos</i>, Hauniae, 1825, p. + 108) tacitly reads <i>continentur</i> without <i>cum</i>, so Orelli and + Klotz. Goer. absurdly tries to prop up the subj. without <i>cum</i>. + <i>Quam quibusnam</i>: Durand's em. for <i>quoniam quibusnam</i> of the + MSS., given by Halm and also Baiter. Madv. (<i>Em.</i> p. 108) made a + forced defence of <i>quoniam</i>, as marking a rapid transition from one + subject to another (here from physics to ethics) like the Gk. <span + lang="el" title="epei" >επει</span>, only one + parallel instance, however, was adduced (<i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 14) and the usage probably is not Latin. + <i>Adducere?</i>: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole + sentence, so far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true + system of physics. If <i>quoniam</i> is read and no break made at + <i>adducere</i>, all after <i>quoniam</i> will refer to ethics, in that + case there will be a strange change of subject in passing from + <i>quisquam</i> to <i>haec ipsa</i>, both which expressions will be + nominatives to <i>poterit</i>, further, there will be the almost + impossible ellipse of <i>ars</i>, <i>scientia</i>, or something of the + kind after <i>haec ipsa</i>. On every ground the reading of Madv. is + insupportable. <i>Quid, haec ipsa</i>: I have added <i>quid</i> to fill + up the lacuna left by Halm, who supposes much more to have fallen out. + [The technical philosophical terms contained in this section will be + elucidated later. For the Epicurean ignorance of geometry see note on + <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_123">123</a>] <i>Illi enim + simpliciter</i>: "frankly," cf. <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span + class="vol">VIII.</span> 6, 1 <i>Pecudis et hominis</i>: note on <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_139">139</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_7"></a><a href="#BkI_7">§7</a>.</b> <i>Sive sequare + ... magnum est</i>: for the constr. cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_140">140</a>. <i>Magnum est</i>: cf. <i>quid est magnum</i>, + <a href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>Verum et simplex bonum</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkI_35">35</a>. <i>Quod bonum ... ne suspicari quidem</i> an + opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with + the Greek preserved by Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">X.</span> 6 (qu. + Zeller, 451), and less accurately by Athenaeus, <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). <i>Ne suspicari + quidem</i>: for this MSS. give <i>nec suspicari</i>, but Madv. + (<i>D.F.</i>, Excursus <span class="vol">III.</span>) has conclusively + shown that <i>nec</i> for <i>ne ... quidem</i> is post Augustan Latin. + Christ supposes some thing like <i>sentire</i> to have fallen out before + <i>nec suspicari</i>; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20, 30, <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 46, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 111, + where the same opinion of Epicurus is dealt with, we have either <i>ne + suspicari quidem</i> or <i>ne intellegere quidem</i> (cf. also <i>In + Pisonem</i> 69). Further, <i>ne ... quidem</i> is esp frequent with + <i>suspicari</i> (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20), and verbs + of the kind (<i>cogitari</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_82">82</a>), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end + of sentences eg <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, 155. Notice + <i>negat ... ne suspicari quidem</i> without <i>se</i>, which however + Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous passages produced from Cic. by + Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 111), in which not only <i>se</i>, but <i>me</i>, + <i>nos</i>, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the + infinitive, after verbs like <i>negat</i>. Cf. also the omission of + <i>sibi</i> in <i>Paradoxa</i> 40. <i>Si vero</i>: this, following + <i>sive enim</i> above, is a departure from Cic.'s rule which is to write + <i>sive—sive</i> or <i>si—sin</i>, but not + <i>si—sive</i> or <i>sive—si</i>. This and two or three other + similar passages in Cic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most + important and exhaustive excursus to his <i>D.F.</i> (p. 785, ed. 2), and + are connected with other instances of broken sequence. There is no need + therefore to read <i>sive</i> here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. + <i>Quam nos ... probamus</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_lxii">62</a>. + <i>Erit explicanda</i>: for the separation of these words by other words + interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see <a + href="#BkI_11">11</a>, <a href="#BkI_17">17</a>. I am surprised that Halm + and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical objection to the + phrase <i>explicare Academiam</i>, and read <i>erunt</i> against the + MSS., making <i>illa</i> plural. If <i>erunt</i> is read, <i>erit</i> + must be supplied from it to go with <i>disserendum</i>, which is harsh. + <i>Quam argute, quam obscure</i>: at first sight an oxymoron, but + <i>argute</i> need not only imply <i>clearness</i>, it means merely + "acutely". <i>Quantum possum</i>: some MSS. have <i>quantam</i>, which is + scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only follows <i>nequeo</i>, + <i>volo</i>, <i>malo</i>, <i>possum</i>, and such verbs when an + infinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For <i>velle</i> see a + good instance in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 68, where + consult Madv. <i>Constantiam</i>: the notions of firmness, consistency, + and clearness of mind are bound up in this word, cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_53">53</a>. <i>Apud Platonem</i>: + <i>Timaeus</i>, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by Cic., cf. <i>De + Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 58, <i>Laelius</i> 20, 47, + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 64.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_8"></a><a href="#BkI_8">§8</a>.</b> <i>Id est ... + jubeo</i>: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss. But Cicero + is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight variations + in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of slightly varied + phrases connected by <i>id est</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 72, <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 90. I therefore + hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. <i>Ea a</i>: + Lamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read + <i>e</i> for <i>a</i>, which Halm would also prefer. <i>De</i>, + <i>ab</i>, and <i>ex</i> follow <i>haurire</i> indifferently in Cic. + <i>Rivulos consectentur</i>: so Wordsworth, "to hunt the waterfalls". The + metaphor involved in <i>fontibus—rivulos</i> is often applied by + Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus in + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 120. <i>Nihil enim magno + opere</i>: <i>magno opere</i> should be written in two words, not as + <i>magnopere</i>, cf. the phrases <i>maximo opere</i>, <i>nimio + opere</i>, the same holds good of <i>tanto opere</i>, <i>quanto + opere</i>. <i>L. Aelii</i>: MSS. <i>Laelii</i>. The person meant is L. + Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the master of Varro, and the earliest + systematic grammarian of Rome. See Quintil. <i>Inst. Or.</i> <span + class="vol">X.</span> 1, 99, Gellius <span class="vol">X.</span> 21, + Sueton. <i>Gramm.</i> 3. <i>Occasum</i>: an unusual metaphor. + <i>Menippum</i>: a Cynic satirist, see <i>Dict. Biogr.</i> Considerable + fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and have often been + edited—most recently by Riese (published by Teubner). <i>Imitati + non interpretati</i>: Cic. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, + gives his opinion as to the right use to be made of Greek models. + <i>†Quae quo</i>: these words are evidently wrong. Halm after + Faber ejects <i>quae</i>, and is followed by Baiter. Varro is thus made + to say that he stated many things dialectically, <i>in order that</i> the + populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault lies in the word + <i>quo</i>, for which I should prefer to read <i>cum</i> (=<i>quom</i>, + which would be written <i>quō</i> in the MSS.) The general sense + would then be "Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature + which the unlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the + learned read." <i>Laudationibus</i>: <span lang="el" title="logois epitaphiois" + >λογοις + επιταφιοις</span>, + cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 48 where Varro's are + mentioned. <i>†Philosophe scribere</i>: the MSS. all give + <i>philosophie</i>. Klotz has <i>philosophiam</i>, which is demonstrably + wrong, <i>physica</i>, <i>musica</i> etc. <i>scribere</i> may be said, + but not <i>physicam</i>, <i>musicam</i> etc. <i>scribere</i>. The one + passage formerly quoted to justify the phrase <i>philosophiam + scribere</i> is now altered in the best texts (<i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads + <i>philosophiae scribere</i>; his explanation is, as Orelli gently says, + "vix Latina." I can scarcely think Halm's <i>philosophe</i> to be right, + the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic. almost condemns it by his use of + the Greek <span lang="el" title="philosophôs" + >φιλοσοφως</span> + (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 20). In older Greek the + adverb does not appear, nor is <span lang="el" title="philosophos" + >φιλοσοφος</span> + used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses <i>philosophus</i> adjectivally + in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 121, <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 22, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 23, just as he uses + <i>tyrannus</i> (<i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 45), and + <i>anapaestus</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 57) Might we + not read <i>philosophis</i>, in the dative, which only requires the + alteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would + then be "to write <i>for</i> philosophers," which would agree with my + emendation <i>cum</i> for <i>quo</i> above. <i>Philosophice</i> would be + a tempting alteration, but that the word <span lang="el" + title="philosophikos" + >φιλοσοφικος</span> + is not Greek, nor do <i>philosophicus</i>, <i>philosophice</i> occur till + very late Latin times. <i>Si modo id consecuti sumus</i>: cf. + <i>Brut.</i> 316.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_9"></a><a href="#BkI_9">§9</a>.</b> <i>Sunt ista</i>: + = <span lang="el" title="esti tauta" >εστι + ταυτα</span>, so often, e.g. <i>Lael.</i> + 6. Some edd. have <i>sint</i>, which is unlikely to be right. <i>Nos in + nostra</i>: Augustine (<i>De Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> 2) + quotes this with the reading <i>reduxerunt</i> for <i>deduxerunt</i>, + which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with approval Durand's + remark, "<i>deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus + humanitatis</i>." The words, however, are almost convertible; see <i>Cat. + Mai.</i> 63. In <i>Lael.</i> 12, <i>Brut.</i> 86, we have + <i>reducere</i>, where Durand's rule requires <i>deducere</i>, on the + other hand cf. <i>Ad Herennium</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 64, + <i>hospites domum deducere. Aetatem patriae</i> etc., August. (<i>De Civ. + Dei</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> 3) describes Varro's "<i>Libri + Antiquitatum</i>" (referred to in <a href="#BkI_8">8</a>), in which most + of the subjects here mentioned were treated of. <i>Descriptiones + temporum</i>: lists of dates, so <span lang="el" title="chronoi" + >χρονοι</span> is technically used + for dates, Thuc. <span class="vol">V.</span> 20, etc. <i>Tu + sacerdotum</i>: after this Lamb. inserts <i>munera</i> to keep the + balance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of + formal accuracy. <i>Domesticam—bellicam</i>: opposed like <i>domi + bellique</i>, cf. <i>Brut.</i> 49, <i>De Off.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 74. Augustine's reading <i>publicam</i> shows him + to have been quoting from memory. <i>Sedem</i>: so the best MSS. of Aug., + some edd. here give <i>sedium</i>. The argument for <i>sedem</i> is the + awkwardness of making the three genitives, <i>sedium</i>, + <i>regionum</i>, <i>locorum</i>, dependent on the accusatives, + <i>nomina</i>, <i>genera</i>, <i>officia</i>, <i>causas</i>. Cic. is fond + of using <i>sedes</i>, <i>locus</i>, <i>regio</i> together, see <i>Pro + Murena</i>, 85, <i>Pro Cluentio</i>, 171, quoted by Goer. <i>Omnium + divinarum humanarumque rerum</i>: from the frequent references of Aug. it + appears that the "<i>Libri Antiquitatum</i>" were divided into two parts, + one treating of <i>res humanae</i>, the other of <i>res divinae</i> + (<i>De Civ. Dei</i>, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 1, 27, <span + class="vol">VI.</span> 3). <i>Et litteris luminis</i>: for + <i>luminis</i>, cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5. <i>Et + verbis</i>: Manut. reads <i>rebus</i> from <a href="#BkI_26">26</a>. + Varro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant. <i>Multis locis + incohasti</i>: Varro's book "<i>De Philosophia</i>" had apparently not + yet been written.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_10"></a><a href="#BkI_10">§10</a>.</b> <i>Causa</i>: + = <span lang="el" title="prophasis" + >προφασις</span>. + <i>Probabilem</i>: = specious. <i>Nesciunt</i>: Halm with his one MS. G, + which is the work of a clever emendator, gives <i>nescient</i> to suit + <i>malent</i> above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not necessary to + force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which Halm + himself allows to be broken in two similar passages, <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>, <a + href="#BkII_105">105</a>. <i>Sed da mihi nunc, satisne probas?</i>: So + all MSS. except G, which has the evident conj. <i>sed ea (eam) mihi non + sane probas</i>. This last Baiter gives, while Halm after Durand reads + <i>sed eam mihi non satis probas</i>, which is too far from the MSS. to + please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable, though <i>da + mihi</i> for <i>dic mihi</i> is certainly poetic. <i>Da te mihi</i> + (Manut., Goer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be + supported by <a href="#BkI_12">12</a>, <i>Brut.</i> 306, <i>Ad Fam.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 8, or such like passages. <i>Attius</i>: the + old spelling <i>Accius</i> is wrong. <i>Si qui ... imitati</i>: note the + collocation, and cf. <a href="#BkI_17">17</a>. Halm needlessly writes + <i>sint</i> for MSS. <i>sunt</i>. For this section throughout cf. the + prologues to <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span>, <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> and <span class="vol">II.</span></p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_11"></a><a href="#BkI_11">§11</a>.</b> + <i>Procuratio</i>: for the proper meaning of <i>procurator</i> and + <i>procuratio</i> see Jordan on <i>Pro Caecina</i> 55. <i>Implacatum et + constrictum</i>: the conjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; + cf. <a href="#BkI_17">17</a> <i>plenam ac refertam</i>, <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_127">127</a> <i>exigua et + minima</i>, so <span lang="el" title="kai" >και</span> + in Greek. <i>Inclusa habebam</i>: cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 1. <i>Obsolescerent</i>, used of <i>individual</i> + memory, is noteworthy. <i>Percussus volnere</i>: many edd. give the + frequent variant <i>perculsus</i>. The <i>volnus</i>, which Goer. finds + so mysterious, is the death of Tullia, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 9, <i>De Consolatione</i>, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, + and Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxxii">32</a>. <i>Aut ... aut ... aut ... + aut</i>: This casting about for an excuse shows how low philosophy stood + in public estimation at Rome. See Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxix">29</a>. + The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the exordium of + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span></p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_12"></a><a href="#BkI_12">§12</a>.</b> <i>Brutus</i>: + the same praise often recurs in <i>D.F.</i> and the <i>Brutus Graecia + desideret</i> so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has <i>Graeca</i>. Halm + (and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, <i>Graeca + desideres</i>. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's <i>Philologus</i> + <span class="vol">XXIV.</span> 483, approves the reading on the curious + ground that Brutus was not anxious to satisfy Greek requirements, but + rather to render it unnecessary for Romans to have recourse to Greece for + philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for Greece with Cicero is the + supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if she is satisfied the + philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 20, 6, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 8, + <i>Ad Qu. Fr.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 16, 5. I just note the em. + of Turnebus, <i>a Graecia desideres</i>, and that of Dav. <i>Graecia + desideretur</i>. <i>Eandem sententiam</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_lvi">56</a>. <i>Aristum</i>: cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> + <a href="#BkII_11">11</a>, and <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 8.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_13"></a><a href="#BkI_13">§13</a>.</b> <i>Sine + te</i>: = <span lang="el" title="sou dicha" >σου + διχα</span>. <i>Relictam</i>: Cic. very rarely + omits <i>esse</i>, see note on <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkIIN_77">77</a>, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p. + <a href="#Page_xx">20</a>. <i>Veterem illam</i>: MSS. have <i>iam</i> for + <i>illam</i>. The position of <i>iam</i> would be strange, in the passage + which used to be compared, <i>Pro Cluentio</i> 16, Classen and Baiter now + om. the word. Further, <i>vetus</i> and <i>nova</i> can scarcely be so + barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The reading + <i>illam</i> is from Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 115), and is supported by <i>illam + veterem</i> (<a href="#BkI_18">18</a>), <i>illa antiqua</i> (<a + href="#BkI_22">22</a>), <i>istius veteris</i> (<i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 8), and similar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and + Bait.) thinks <i>iam</i> comprises the last two syllables of + <i>Academiam</i>, which he reads. <i>Correcta et emendata</i>: a fine + sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words often occur + together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of expression, + cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 30, <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 21, also Tac. <i>Hist.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 37. <i>Negat</i>: MSS. have <i>negaret</i>, but + Cic. never writes the subj. after <i>quamquam</i> in <i>oratio recta</i>, + as Tac. does, unless there is some conditional or potential force in the + sentence; see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70. Nothing is + commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for the + pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and <i>vice versa</i>. <i>In + libris</i>: see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_11">11</a>. + <i>Duas Academias</i>: for the various modes of dividing the Academy + refer to R. and P. 404. <i>Contra ea Philonis</i>: MSS. have <i>contra + Philonis</i> merely, exc. Halm's <span class="vol">V.</span>, which gives + <i>Philonem</i>, as does the ed. Rom. (1471). I have added <i>ea</i>. + Orelli quotes <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XII.</span> 23, 2, <i>ex + Apollodori</i>. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and <i>libros</i> may be + supplied from <i>libris</i> above, so in <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">XIII.</span> 32, 2, <i>Dicaearchi</i> <span lang="el" + title="peri psychês" >περι + ψυχης</span> <i>utrosque</i>, the word + <i>libros</i> has to be supplied from the preceding letter, cf. a similar + ellipse of <i>bona</i> in <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>, <a + href="#BkI_22">22</a>. Madvig's <i>Philonia</i> is improbable from its + non-appearance elsewhere, while the companion adjective <i>Antiochius</i> + is frequent. Halm inserts <i>sententiam</i>, a heroic remedy. To make + <i>contra</i> an adv. and construe <i>Philonis Antiochus</i> together, + supplying <i>auditor</i>, as is done by some unknown commentators who + probably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified + by <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 13.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_14"></a><a href="#BkI_14">§14</a>.</b> <i>A qua absum + iam diu</i>: MSS. have strangely <i>aqua absumtam diu</i>, changed by + Manut. <i>Renovari</i>: the vulg. <i>revocari</i> is a curious instance + of oversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note + he gave <i>renovari</i>. Orelli—who speaks of Goerenz's + "<i>praestantissima recensio</i>," and founds his own text upon it two + years after Madvig's crushing exposure in his <i>Em.</i> often quoted by + me—not only reads <i>revocari</i>, but quotes <i>renovari</i> as an + em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536. From Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no + independent value, took it. <i>Renovare</i> in Cic. often means "to + refresh the memory," e.g. <a href="#BkI_11">11</a>, <i>Brut.</i> 315. + <i>Nisi molestum est</i>: like <i>nisi alienum putas</i>, a variation on + the common <i>si placet, si videtur</i>. <i>Adsidamus</i>: some MSS. have + <i>adsideamus</i>, which would be wrong here. <i>Sane istud</i>: Halm + <i>istuc</i> from G. <i>Inquit</i>: for the late position of this word, + which is often caused by its affinity for <i>quoniam</i>, <i>quidem</i>, + etc., cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 20 <i>Quae cum + essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus (omnes)</i>: most edd. since + Gulielmus print this without <i>essent</i> as a hexameter, and suppose it + a quotation. But firstly, a verse so commonplace, if familiar, would + occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if not familiar, would not be given + without the name of its author. Secondly, most MSS. have <i>sint</i> or + <i>essent</i> before <i>dicta</i>. It is more probable therefore that + <i>omnes</i> was added from an involuntary desire to make up the + hexameter rhythm. Phrases like <i>quae cum essent dicta consedimus</i> + often occur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. <i>De Div.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 150, and Augustine, the imitator of Cic., + <i>Contra Academicos</i>, <span class="vol">I.</span> 25, also + <i>consedimus</i> at the end of a clause in <i>Brut.</i> 24, and + <i>considitur</i> in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 18. + <i>Mihi vero</i>: the omission of <i>inquit</i>, which is strange to + Goer., is well illustrated in <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 9. There is an odd ellipse of <i>laudasti</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 81.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_15">§§15</a>—<a + href="#BkI_42">42</a>.</b> Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. + First part of Varro's Exposition, <a href="#BkI_15">15</a>—<a + href="#BkI_18">18</a>. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made ethics + supreme in philosophy (<a href="#BkI_15">15</a>). He had no fixed tenets, + his one doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of + ignorance. Moral exhortation was his task (<a href="#BkI_16">16</a>). + Plato added to and enriched the teaching of his master, from him sprang + two schools which abandoned the negative position of Socrates and adopted + definite tenets, yet remained in essential agreement with one + another—the Peripatetic and the Academic (<a href="#BkI_17">17</a>, + <a href="#BkI_18">18</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_15"></a><a href="#BkI_15">§15</a>.</b> <i>A rebus ... + involutis</i>: physical phenomena are often spoken of in these words by + Cic., cf. <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>, <i>Timaeus</i> c. 1, <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 64, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 18, <span + class="vol">V.</span> 10, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 49. + Ursinus rejected <i>ab</i> here, but the insertion or omission of + <i>ab</i> after the passive verb depends on the degree to which + <i>natura</i> is personified, if <a href="#BkI_28">28</a> be compared + with <i>Tim.</i> c. 1, this will be clear. <i>Involutis</i> = veiled; cf. + <i>involucrum</i>. Cic. shows his feeling of the metaphor by adding + <i>quasi</i> in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_26">26</a>, + and often. <i>Avocavisse philosophiam</i>: this, the Xenophontic view of + Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's time, cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_123">123</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 10, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 87, 88, + also Varro in Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i>, <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 3. + Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were curiously answered + in <i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. + <i>De Civ. Dei</i>, <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 4). The same view is + supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the passages quoted by R. and P. + 141. To form an opinion on this difficult question the student should + read Schleiermacher's <i>Essay on the Worth of Socrates as a + Philosopher</i> (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's <i>Socrates and the + Socratic Schools</i>, Eng. Trans., pp. 112—116 [I dissent from his + view of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's <i>Handbook</i>, so far + as it relates to Socrates and Plato. <i>Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum + valere</i>: <i>valere</i> is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, + its use in <a href="#BkI_21">21</a> makes it more probable than + <i>conferre</i>, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius vainly tries to + justify the MSS. reading by such passages as <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 39, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 70. The + strangest ellipse with <i>nihil ad</i> elsewhere in Cic. is in <i>De + Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 6.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_16"></a><a href="#BkI_16">§16</a>.</b> <i>Hic ... + illum</i>: for this repetition of pronouns see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 43. <i>Varie et copiose</i>: MSS. omit <i>et</i>, + but it may be doubted whether Cic. would let two <i>adverbs</i> stand + together without <i>et</i>, though three may (cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> 63), and though with pairs of <i>nouns</i> and + <i>adjectives, et</i> often is left out, as in the passages quoted here + by Manut. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 3, 3, <i>Ad + Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 24, <span + class="vol">XIII.</span> 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, + reprinted in Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works + (1861), on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 6. <i>Varie et + copiose</i> is also in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 240. + Cf. the omission of <i>que</i> in <a href="#BkI_23">23</a>, also <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_63">63</a>. <i>Perscripti</i>: Cic. + like Aristotle often speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were + authentic reports of Socratic conversations, cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>. <i>Nihil adfirmet</i>: + so <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 99. "<i>Eoque praestare + ceteris</i>" this is evidently from Plato <i>Apol.</i> p. 21, as to the + proper understanding of which see note on <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. <i>Ab Apolline</i>, Plato <i>Apol.</i> 21 A, + <i>Omnium</i>: Dav. conj. <i>hominum</i> needlessly. <i>Dictum</i>: + Lamb., followed by Schutz, reads <i>iudicatum</i>, it is remarkable that + in four passages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (<i>Cato Mai.</i> + 78, <i>Lael.</i> 7, 9, 13) he uses the verb <i>iudicare</i>. <i>Una + omnis</i>: Lamb. <i>hominis</i>, Baiter also. <i>Omnis eius oratio + tamen</i>: <i>notwithstanding</i> his negative dialectic he gave positive + teaching in morals. <i>Tamen</i>: for MSS. <i>tam</i> or <i>tum</i> is + due to Gruter, Halm has <i>tantum</i>. <i>Tam</i>, <i>tum</i> and + <i>tamen</i> are often confused in MSS., e.g. <i>In Veri</i> (<i>Act</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span>) <span class="vol">I.</span> 3, 65, <span + class="vol">II.</span> 55, 112, <span class="vol">V.</span> 78, where see + Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that <i>tum ... et</i>, <i>tum + ... que</i>, <i>et ... tum</i>, correspond in Cic. like <i>tum ... + cum</i>, <i>tum ... tum</i>. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled + by <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_1">1</a>, <a + href="#BkII_43">43</a>. <i>Ad virtutis studium cohortandis</i>: this + broad assertion is distinctly untrue; see Zeller's <i>Socrates</i> 88, + with footnote.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_17"></a><a href="#BkI_17">§17</a>.</b> <i>Varius et + multiplex, et copiosus</i>: these characteristics are named to account + for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For + <i>multiplex</i> "many sided," cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 11. <i>Una et consentiens</i>: this is an opinion + of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5 <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 38, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 67. Five ancient + philosophers are generally included in this supposed harmonious + Academico-Peripatetic school, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, + Xenocrates, Polemo (cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 2), + sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have been first + broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in Aug. <i>De + Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1, cf. also <a + href="#BkI_34">34</a>. Antiochus doubtless rested his theory almost + entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">V.</span> 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, + this appears, as also in Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as + though ethics were the whole of philosophy (cf. also <i>De Off.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 20). Antiochus probably made light of such + dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about <span + lang="el" title="ideai" >ιδεαι</span>, + which had long ceased. Krische <i>Uber Cicero's Akademika</i> p. 51, has + some good remarks. <i>Nominibus</i>: the same as <i>vocabulis</i> above. + Cic. does not observe Varro's distinction (<i>De L. L.</i> <span + class="vol">IX.</span> 1) which confines <i>nomen</i> to proper nouns, + <i>vocabulum</i> to common nouns, though he would not use + <i>vocabulum</i> as Tac. does, for the name of a person (<i>Annals</i> + <span class="vol">XII.</span> 66, etc.). <i>Quasi heredem ... duos + autem</i>: the conj. of Ciaconus "<i>ex asse heredem, secundos autem</i>" + is as acute as it is absurd. <i>Duos</i>: it is difficult to decide + whether this or <i>duo</i> is right in Cic., he can scarcely have been so + inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and Halm's ed., + <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_11">11</a>, <a + href="#BkII_13">13</a> with <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 6). The older inscr. in the <i>Corpus</i> vol. <span + class="vol">I.</span> have <i>duo</i>, but only in <i>duoviros</i>, two + near the time of Cic. (<i>C.I.</i> vol. <span class="vol">I.</span> nos. + 571 and 1007) give <i>duos</i>, which Cic. probably wrote. <i>Duo</i> is + in old Latin poets and Virgil. <i>Chalcedonium</i>: not + <i>Calchedonium</i> as Klotz, cf. Gk. <span lang="el" + title="Chalkêdonion" + >Χαλκηδονιον</span>. + <i>Praestantissimos</i>: Halm wrongly, cf. <i>Brut.</i> 125. + <i>Stagiritem</i>: not <i>Stagiritam</i> as Lamb., for Cic., exc. in a + few nouns like <i>Persa</i>, <i>pirata</i>, etc., which came down from + antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in <span lang="el" title="-ês" + >-ης</span> into Latin nouns in <i>-a</i>. See <i>M.D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 94. <i>Coetus ... soliti</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkI_10">10</a>. <i>Platonis ubertate</i>: cf. Quintilian's + "<i>illa Livii lactea ubertas</i>." <i>Plenum ac refertam</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIN_11">11</a>. <i>Dubitationem</i>: Halm with one MS., G, gives + <i>dubitantem</i>, Baiter <i>dubitanter</i>, Why alter? <i>Ars quaedam + philosophiae</i>: before these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert + <i>disserendi</i>, probably from the line above, Lipsius keeps it and + ejects <i>philosophiae</i>, while Lamb., Day read <i>philosophia</i> in + the nom. Varro, however, would never say that philosophy became entirely + dialectical in the hands of the old Academics and Peripatetics. + <i>Ars</i> = <span lang="el" title="technê" + >τεχνη</span>, a set of definite rules, so + Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the <i>certa dogmata</i> of this old + school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy. + <i>Descriptio</i>: so Halm here, but often <i>discriptio</i>. The + <i>Corp. Inscr.</i>, vol. <span class="vol">I.</span> nos. 198 and 200, + has thrice <i>discriptos</i> or <i>discriptum</i>, the other spelling + never.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_18"></a><a href="#BkI_18">§18</a>.</b> <i>Ut mihi + quidem videtur</i>: MSS. transpose <i>quidem</i> and <i>videtur</i>, as + in <a href="#BkI_44">44</a>. <i>Quidem</i>, however nearly always comes + closely after the pronoun, see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> + 43, cf. also <span class="vol">I.</span> 71, <span + class="vol">III.</span> 28, <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 406. <i>Expetendarum fugiendarumque</i>: <span lang="el" title="hairetôn kai pheuktôn" + >‛αιρετων + και + φευκτων</span>, about which + more in n. on <a href="#BkIN_36">36</a>. The Platonic and Aristotelian + ethics have indeed an external resemblance, but the ultimate bases of the + two are quite different. In rejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did + away with what Plato would have considered most valuable in his system. + The ideal theory, however, was practically defunct in the time of + Antiochus, so that the similarity between the two schools seemed much + greater than it was. <i>Non sus Minervam</i>: a Greek proverb, cf. + Theocr. <i>Id.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 23, <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 233, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">IX.</span> + 18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the <i>Academica</i>, also + quotes Plutarch <i>Præc. Polit.</i> 7. <i>Inepte ... docet</i>: elliptic + for <i>inepte docet, quisquis docet</i>. <i>Nostra atque nostros</i>: few + of the editors have understood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian, + and speaks as though he were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the + words "<i>tui cives</i>," meaning the Athenians, often occur. <i>Quid me + putas</i>: i.e. <i>velle</i>. <i>Exhibiturum</i>: Halm inserts <i>me</i> + before this from his one MS. G, evidently emended here by its copyist. + For the omission of <i>me</i>, cf. note on <a href="#BkIN_7">7</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_19">§§19</a>—<a + href="#BkI_23">23</a>.</b> Part <span class="vol">II.</span> of Varro's + Exposition: Antiochus' <i>Ethics</i>. Summary. The threefold division of + philosophy into <span lang="el" title="êthikê, physikê, dialektikê" + >ηθικη, + φυσικη, + διαλεκτικη</span>. + Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the acquisition of natural + advantages. These are of three kinds, mental, bodily, and external. The + bodily are described (<a href="#BkI_19">19</a>); then the mental, which + fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the chief of + the acquired (<a href="#BkI_20">20</a>), then the external, which form + with the bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (<a + href="#BkI_21">21</a>). The ethical standard is then succinctly stated, + in which virtue has chief part, and is capable in itself of producing + happiness, though not the greatest happiness possible, which requires the + possession of all three classes of advantages (<a href="#BkI_22">22</a>). + With this ethical standard, it is possible to give an intelligent account + of action and duty (<a href="#BkI_23">23</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_19"></a><a href="#BkI_19">§19</a>.</b> <i>Ratio + triplex</i>: Plato has not this division, either consciously or + unconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's + time, so by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i> + <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 4, and by Diog. Laert. <span + class="vol">III.</span> 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself + cannot be traced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian + Peripatetics, to whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i> + <span class="vol">VII.</span> 16. It was probably first brought into + strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more sharply and + decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf. esp. + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 3. <i>Quid verum ... repugnans + iudicando</i>: MSS. exc. G have <i>et</i> before <i>quid falsum</i>, + whence Klotz conj. <i>sit</i> in order to obviate the awkwardness of + <i>repugnet</i> which MSS. have for <i>repugnans</i>. Krische wishes to + read <i>consequens</i> for <i>consentiens</i>, comparing <i>Orator</i> + 115, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 68, <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 150, to which add <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 21 On the other hand cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>, <a + href="#BkII_91">91</a>. Notice the double translations of the Greek + terms, <i>de vita et moribus</i> for <span lang="el" title="êthikê" + >ηθικη</span>, etc. This is very + characteristic of Cic., as we shall see later. <i>Ac primum</i>: many + MSS. and edd. <i>primam</i>, cf. <a href="#BkI_23">23</a>, <a + href="#BkI_30">30</a>. <i>A natura petebant</i>: how Antiochus could have + found this in Plato and Aristotle is difficult to see; that he did so, + however, is indubitable; see <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 24—27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and Varro + in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3. The root of Plato's system is + the <span lang="el" title="idea" >ιδεα</span> of + the Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the + abstract <span lang="el" title="physis" + >φυσις</span>, that he scarcely appeals + even incidentally to <span lang="el" title="physis" + >φυσις</span> in his ethical works. The + abstract conception of nature in relation to ethics is first strongly + apparent in Polemo, from whom it passed into Stoic hands and then into + those of Antiochus. <i>Adeptum esse omnia</i>: put rather differently in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 24, 26, cf. also <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 33, 34, <i>Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>. <i>Et animo et + corpore et vita</i>: this is the <span lang="el" title="trias" + >τριας</span> or <span lang="el" + title="trilogia tôn agathôn" + >τριλογια + των αγαθων</span>, + which belongs in this form to late Peripateticism (cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 43), the third division is a development + from the <span lang="el" title="bios teleios" + >βιος + τελειος</span> of Aristotle. + The <span lang="el" title="trias" + >τριας</span> in this distinct shape is + foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus, <i>Ethica</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro + seems to merge the two last divisions into one in Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i> + XIX 3. This agrees better with <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 34—36, cf. also Aug. <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 8. On the + Antiochean <i>finis</i> see more in note on <a href="#BkIN_22">22</a>. + <i>Corporis alia</i>: for ellipse of <i>bona</i>, see n. on <a + href="#BkIN_13">13</a>. <i>Ponebant esse</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIN_36">36</a>. <i>In toto in partibus</i>: the same distinction + is in Stob. <i>Eth.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7; cf. also + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 35. <i>Pulchritudinem</i>: Cic. + <i>Orator</i> 160, puts the spelling <i>pulcher</i> beyond a doubt; it + often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only + <i>pulcrai</i>, <i>pulcrum</i>, etc., occur in inscr., exc. + <i>pulchre</i>, which is found once (<i>Corp. Inscr.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> no 1019). <i>Sepulchrum</i>, however, is frequent + at an early time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see + Boscher in Curtius' <i>Studien</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, p. + 145. In the case of <i>pulcher</i> the false derivation from <span + lang="el" title="polychroos" + >πολυχροος</span> + may have aided the corruption. Similarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger + derived it from <span lang="el" title="poly cheir" + >πολυ χειρ</span> + (Curtius' <i>Grundz</i> ed. 3, p. 8) For <i>valetudinem viris + pulchritudinem</i>, cf. the <span lang="el" title="hygieia ischys kallos" + >‛υγιεια + ισχυς + καλλος</span> of Stob. <i>Eth</i>. + <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7, and <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 22. <i>Sensus integros</i> <span lang="el" + title="euaisthêsia" + >ευαισθησια</span> + in Stob., cf. also <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 36 (<i>in + sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus</i>). <i>Celeritatem</i>: so <span + lang="el" title="podôkeia" + >ποδωκεια</span> in + Stob., <i>bene currere</i> in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3. + <i>Claritatem in voce</i>: cf. <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 133. <i>Impressionem</i>: al. <i>expressionem</i>. For the former cf. + <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 185, which will show the + meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter <i>De + Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 41, which will disprove Klotz's + remark "<i>imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit</i>." See also <i>De + Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 133. One old ed. has + <i>pressionem</i>, which, though not itself Ciceronian, recalls <i>presse + loqui</i>, and <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 149. Pliny, + <i>Panegyric</i>, c. 64, has <i>expressit explanavitque verba</i>; he and + Quintilian often so use <i>exprimere</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_20"></a><a href="#BkI_20">§20</a>.</b> + <i>Ingeniis</i>: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 2, and <i>animis</i> below and in <i>N.D.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 58. <i>In naturam et mores</i>: for <i>in ea + quae natura et moribus fiunt</i>. A similar inaccuracy of expression is + found in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_42">42</a>. The + division is practically Aristotle's, who severs <span lang="el" + title="aretai" >αρεται</span> into + <span lang="el" title="dianoêtikai" + >διανοητικαι</span> + and <span lang="el" title="êthikai" + >ηθικαι</span> (<i>Nic. Eth.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> c. 13, <i>Magna Mor.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> c. 5). In <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 38 the <span lang="el" title="dianoêtikai" + >διανοητικαι</span> + are called <i>non voluntariae</i>, the <span lang="el" title="êthikai" + >ηθικαι</span> <i>voluntariae</i>. + <i>Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam</i>: cf. the <span lang="el" + title="eumatheia, mnêmê" + >ευμαθεια, + μνημη</span> of Arist. (who adds <span + lang="el" title="anchinoia sophia phronêsis" + >αγχινοια + σοφια + φρονησις</span>), and the + <i>docilitas, memoria</i> of <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 36. + <i>Quasi consuetudinem</i>: the <i>quasi</i> marks a translation from the + Greek, as frequently, here probably of <span lang="el" title="ethismos" + >εθισμος</span> (<i>Nic. + Eth.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> c. 1). <i>Partim ratione + formabant</i>: the relation which reason bears to virtue is set forth in + <i>Nic. Eth.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> c. 2. <i>In quibus</i>: + i.e. <i>in moribus</i>. All the late schools held that ethics formed the + sole ultimate aim of philosophy. <i>Erat</i>: note the change from + <i>oratio obliqua</i> to <i>recta</i>, and cf. the opposite change in + <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>. + <i>Progressio</i>: this, like the whole of the sentence in which it + stands, is intensely Stoic. For the Stoic <span lang="el" title="prokorê, prokoptein eis aretên" + >προκορη, + προκοπτειν + εις αρετην</span>, + cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 64, 66, R. and P. 392, + sq., Zeller, <i>Stoics</i> 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said to be + Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised + Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. <i>Perfectio + naturae</i>: cf. esp. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 25. More + Stoic still is the definition of virtue as the perfection of the + <i>reason</i>, cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_26">26</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 35, + <span class="vol">V.</span> 38, and Madvig's note on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 88. Faber quotes Galen <i>De Decr. Hipp. et + Plat.</i> c. 5, <span lang="el" title="hê aretê teleiotês esti tês hekastou physeos" + >‛η αρετη + τελειοτης + εστι της + ‛εκαστου + φυσεος</span>. <i>Una res optima</i>: + the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. <span + class="vol">XIX.</span> 3, cf. also <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 36, 38.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_21"></a><a href="#BkI_21">§21</a>.</b> <i>Virtutis + usum</i>: so the Stoics speak of their <span lang="el" title="adiaphora" + >αδιαφορα</span> as the + practising ground for virtue (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 50), cf. <i>virtutis usum</i> in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1. + <i>Nam virtus</i>: most MSS. have <i>iam</i>, which is out of place here. + <i>Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam</i>: MSS. omit + <i>et</i> between <i>cernitur</i> and <i>in</i>, exc. Halm's G which has + <i>in</i> before <i>animi</i> and also before <i>corporis</i>. These last + insertions are not necessary, as may be seen from <i>Topica</i> 80, + <i>causa certis personis locis temporibus actionibus negotiis cernitur + aut</i> in <i>omnibus aut</i> in <i>plerisque</i>, also <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 22. In Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 8, the + <span lang="el" title="telos" >τελος</span> + of the Peripatetics is stated to be <span lang="el" title="to kat' aretên zên en tois peri sôma kai tois exôthen agathois" + >το κατ' + αρετην ζην + εν τοις περι + σωμα και + τοις εξωθεν + αγαθοις</span>, here + <i>quibusdam quae</i> etc., denote the <span lang="el" title="exôthen" + >εξωθεν</span> or <span lang="el" + title="ektos agatha" >εκτος + αγαθα</span>, the third class in <a + href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Hominem ... societate</i>: all this is strongly + Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob. <span + class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7 (<span lang="el" title="koinê philanthrôpia" + >κοινη + φιλανθρωπια</span>), + etc., doubtless the humanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the + <span lang="el" title="physei anthrôpos politikon zôon" + >φυσει + ανθρωπος + πολιτικον + ζωον</span> theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 66, <i>De Leg.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293—296. The + repetitions <i>hominem</i>, <i>humani</i>, <i>hominibus</i>, + <i>humana</i> are striking. For the last, Bentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous + friend) proposed <i>mundana</i> from <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 108, Varro, however, has <i>humana societas</i> in + Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3. <i>Cetera autem</i>: what are these + <i>cetera?</i> They form portion of the <span lang="el" title="ektos agatha" + >εκτος + αγαθα</span>, and although not strictly + contained within the <i>summum bonum</i> are necessary to enrich it and + preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. <span + class="vol">II.</span> 6, 8, 13, <span lang="el" title="philia, philoi" + >φιλια, + φιλοι</span> would belong to the + <i>quaedam</i> of Cicero, while <span lang="el" title="ploutos archê eutychia eugeneia dynasteia" + >πλουτος + αρχη + ευτυχια + ευγενεια + δυναστεια</span> + would be included in <i>cetera</i>. The same distinction is drawn in Aug. + <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 8. <i>Tuendum</i>: most MSS. + <i>tenendum</i>, but <i>tuendum</i> corresponds best with the division of + <span lang="el" title="agatha" + >αγαθα</span> into <span lang="el" + title="poiêtika" + >ποιητικα</span> and + <span lang="el" title="phylaktika" + >φυλακτικα</span>, + Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 13. For the word <i>pertinere</i> + see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 54.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_22"></a><a href="#BkI_22">§22</a>.</b> + <i>Plerique</i>: Antiochus believes it also Academic. <i>Qui tum + appellarentur</i>: MSS. <i>dum</i>, the subj. is strange, and was felt to + be so by the writer of Halm's G, which has <i>appellantur</i>. + <i>Videbatur</i>: Goer. and Orelli stumble over this, not perceiving that + it has the strong meaning of the Gr. <span lang="el" title="edokei" + >εδοκει</span>, "it was their dogma," + so often. <i>Adipisci</i>: cf. <i>adeptum esse</i>, <a + href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Quae essent prima natura</i>: MSS. have <i>in + natura</i>. For the various modes of denoting the <span lang="el" + title="prôta kata physin" >πρωτα + κατα φυσιν</span> + in Latin see Madvig's <i>Fourth Excursus to the D.F.</i>, which the + student of Cic.'s philosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase <i>prima + natura</i> (abl.) could not stand alone, for <span lang="el" title="ta prôta tê physei" + >τα πρωτα τη + φυσει</span> is one of Goerenz's numerous + forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv. A + comparison of this statement of the ethical <i>finis</i> with that in <a + href="#BkI_19">19</a> and the passages quoted in my note there, will show + that Cic. drew little distinction between the Stoic <span lang="el" + title="ta prôta kata physin" >τα + πρωτα κατα + φυσιν</span> and the Peripatetic <span + lang="el" title="trilogia" + >τριλογια</span>. That + this is historically absurd Madvig shows in his <i>Excursus</i>, but he + does not sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly + correctly reported Antiochus. At all events, Varro's report (Aug. <i>De + Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3) coincides with Cic.'s in + every particular. Even the <i>inexplicabilis perversitas</i> of which + Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen + from Augustine <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1, 3, included even + <i>virtus</i> among the <i>prima naturae</i>. A little reflection will + show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained the practical + identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the <i>finis</i>. I regret + that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject farther. + For the Stoic <span lang="el" title="prôta kata physin" + >πρωτα κατα + φυσιν</span> see Zeller, chap <span + class="vol">XI.</span> <i>Ipsa per sese expetenda</i>: Gk. <span + lang="el" title="haireta" + >‛αιρετα</span>, which is + applied to all things contained within the <i>summum bonum</i>. As the + Stoic <i>finis</i> was <span lang="el" title="aretê" + >αρετη</span> only, that alone to them was + <span lang="el" title="haireton" + >‛αιρετον</span>, their + <span lang="el" title="prôta kata physin" + >πρωτα κατα + φυσιν</span> were not <span lang="el" + title="haireta" + >‛αιρετα</span>, (cf. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 21). Antiochus' <i>prima + naturae</i> were <span lang="el" title="haireta" + >‛αιρετα</span> to him, cf. + Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 3, <i>prima illa naturae propter se + ipsa existimat expetenda</i> so Stob., <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7, + demonstrates each branch of the <span lang="el" title="trilogia" + >τριλογια</span> to be + <span lang="el" title="kath' hauto haireton" >καθ' + ‛αυτο + ‛αιρετον</span>. <i>Aut + omnia aut maxima</i>: so frequently in Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 27, so Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 8, + <span lang="el" title="ta pleista kai kyriôtata" >τα + πλειστα και + κυριωτατα</span>. + <i>Ea sunt maxima</i>: so Stob., Varro in Aug. <i>passim</i>. + <i>Sensit</i>: much misunderstood by edd., here = <i>iudicavit</i> not + <i>animadvertit</i> cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 6. + <i>Reperiebatur</i>: for change of constr. cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 26 <i>Nec tamen beatissimam</i>: the question + whether <span lang="el" title="aretê" + >αρετη</span> was <span lang="el" + title="autarkes pros eudaimonian" + >αυταρκες + προς + ευδαιμονιαν</span> + was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As to + Antiochus, consult <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 67.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_23"></a><a href="#BkI_23">§23</a>.</b> <i>Agendi + aliquid</i>: Gk. <span lang="el" title="praxeôs" + >πραξεως</span>, the usual + translation, cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>, + <a href="#BkII_37">37</a>. <i>Officii ipsius initium</i>: <span lang="el" + title="tou kathêkontos archên" >του + καθηκοντος + αρχην</span>, Stob. <span + class="vol">II.</span> 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New + Academics, whose scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the + ground from action and duty, see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Recti honestique</i>: these words are redolent + of the Stoa. <i>Earum rerum</i>: Halm thinks something like + <i>appetitio</i> has fallen out, <i>susceptio</i> however, above, is + quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is found in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 32. <i>Descriptione + naturae</i>: Halm with one MS. (G) gives <i>praescriptione</i>, which is + in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_140">140</a>, cf. also + <i>praescriberet</i> above. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. <i>prima + constitutio naturae</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 15. + <i>Aequitas</i>: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of + <span lang="el" title="epieikeia" + >επιεικεια</span>. + <i>Eaeque</i>: so Halm for MSS. <i>haeque</i>, <i>haecque</i>. Of course + <i>haecque</i>, like <i>hicque</i>, <i>sicque</i>, would be + un-Ciceronian. <i>Voluptatibus</i>: a side blow at the Epicureans. + <i>Forma</i> see n. on <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_24">§§24</a>—<a + href="#BkI_29">29</a>.</b> Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' + <i>Physics</i>. Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which + are never actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. + When force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed + entity (<span lang="el" title="poion ti" + >ποιον τι</span> or + <i>quale</i>)—(<a href="#BkI_24">24</a>). These formed entities are + either <i>primary</i> or <i>secondary</i>. Air, fire, water, earth are + primary, the two first having an active, the two last a passive function. + Aristotle added a fifth (<a href="#BkI_26">26</a>). Underlying all formed + entities is the formless matter, matter and space are infinitely + subdivisible (<a href="#BkI_27">27</a>). Force or form acts on the + formless matter and so produces the ordered universe, outside which no + matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes it eternal. This + Reason has various names—Soul of the Universe, Mind, Wisdom, + Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the same thing + (<a href="#BkI_28">28</a>, <a href="#BkI_29">29</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_24"></a><a href="#BkI_24">§24</a>.</b> <i>Natura</i>: + this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a translation both + of <span lang="el" title="physis" + >φυσις</span> and <span lang="el" + title="ousia" >ουσια</span>. Here it is + <span lang="el" title="ousia" >ουσια</span> + in the broadest sense, all that exists. <i>In res duas</i>: the + distinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in + the universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however + probably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this + read carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of + Aristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler, <i>Handbook</i>, pp + 99—105. R. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important + coincidence of Force with logical <i>genus</i> (<span lang="el" + title="eidos" >ειδος</span>), and of Matter + (<span lang="el" title="hylê" >‛υλη</span>) with + logical <i>differentia</i> (<span lang="el" title="diaphora" + >διαφορα</span>). For the + <i>duae res</i>, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 18. + <i>Efficiens ... huic se praebens</i>: an attempt to translate <span + lang="el" title="to poioun" >το + ποιουν</span> and <span lang="el" + title="to paschon" >το + πασχον</span> of the + <i>Theaetetus</i>, <span lang="el" title="to othen" >το + οθεν</span> and <span lang="el" title="to dechomenon" + >το + δεχομενον</span> of + the <i>Timaeus</i> (50 D). Cic. in <i>Tim.</i> has <i>efficere</i> and + <i>pati</i>, Lucretius <span class="vol">I.</span> 440 <i>facere</i> and + <i>fungi</i>. <i>Ea quae</i>: so Gruter, Halm for MSS. <i>eaque.</i> The + meaning is this; passive matter when worked upon by an active generative + form results in an <i>aliquid</i>, a <span lang="el" title="tode ti" + >τοδε τι</span> as Aristotle calls + it. Passive matter <span lang="el" title="hylê" + >‛υλη</span> is only potentially <span lang="el" + title="tode ti" >τοδε τι</span>, + passing into actual <span lang="el" title="tode ti" + >τοδε τι</span>, when affected by the + form. (Cf. <span lang="el" title="tode, touto" + >τοδε, + τουτο</span>, Plato <i>Tim.</i> 49 E, 50 A, + also Arist. <i>Metaph</i> H, 1, R. and P. 270—274). A figurative + description of the process is given in <i>Timaeus</i>, 50 D. <i>In eo + quod efficeret ... materiam quandam</i>: Cic. is hampered by the + <i>patrii sermonis egestas</i>, which compels him to render simple Greek + terms by laboured periphrases. <i>Id quod efficit</i> is not distinct + from, but <i>equivalent</i> to <i>vis</i>, <i>id quod efficitur</i> to + <i>materia</i>. <i>Materiam quandam</i>: it is extraordinary how edd. + (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled over <i>quandam</i> and <i>quasi</i> + used in this fashion. Both words (which are joined below) simply mark the + unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its philosophical use, in the Greek + <span lang="el" title="hylê" >‛υλη</span> the + strangeness had had time to wear off. <i>In utroque</i>: for <i>in eo + quod ex utroque</i> (sc. <i>vi et materia</i>) <i>fit</i>, the meaning is + clearly given by the next clause, viz. that Force and Matter cannot + actually exist apart, but only in the compound of the two, the formed + entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the reff. given above. + <i>Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur</i>: the meaning of this + is clear, that nothing can <i>exist</i> except in space <i>(alicubi)</i>, + it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here. Unless + <i>est</i> be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence + the Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent + the belief of Aristotle and Plato. The <span lang="el" title="ideai" + >ιδεαι</span> for instance, though to Plato + in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle + explicitly says this, <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 4). + Aristotle also recognised much as existent which did not exist in space, + as in <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5 (qu. R. and P. 289). + Cic. perhaps translates here from <i>Tim.</i> 52 B, <span lang="el" + title="phamen anankaion einai pou to hon hapan en tini topô" + >φαμεν + αναγκαιον + ειναι που το + ‛ον ‛απαν + εν τινι + τοπω</span>. For ancient theories about space the + student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair summary + is given by Stob. <i>Phys.</i> <span lang="el" title="peri kenou kai topou kai chôras" + >περι κενου + και τοπου + και χωρας</span>, ch. + <span class="vol">XVIII.</span> 1. <i>Corpus et quasi qualitatem</i>: + note that <i>corpus</i> is <i>formed</i>, as contrasted with + <i>materia</i>, <i>unformed</i> matter. <i>Qualitas</i> is here wrongly + used for <i>quale</i>; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the + product of Force and Matter, cf. <a href="#BkI_28">28</a>. The Greeks + themselves sometimes confuse <span lang="el" title="poiotês" + >ποιοτης</span> and <span + lang="el" title="poion" >ποιον</span>, the + confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the phrase <span lang="el" + title="to poion" >το + ποιον</span> in Greek, which may either + denote the <span lang="el" title="tode ti" >τοδε + τι</span> as <span lang="el" title="poion" + >ποιον</span>, or the Force which makes it + <span lang="el" title="poion" + >ποιον</span>, hence Arist. calls one of + his categories <span lang="el" title="to poion" >το + ποιον</span> and <span lang="el" + title="poiotês" >ποιοτης</span> + indifferently For the Stoic view of <span lang="el" title="poiotês" + >ποιοτης</span>, see Zeller, + 96—103, with footnotes.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_25"></a><a href="#BkI_25">§25</a>.</b> <i>Bene + facis</i>: <i>passim</i> in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly + like this. <i>Rhetoricam</i>: Hülsemann conj. <i>ethicam</i>, which + however is <i>not</i> Latin. The words have no philosophical significance + here, but are simply specimens of words once foreign, now naturalised. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words + make it clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first + declension nouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in + <i>en</i>. <i>Non est vulgi verbum</i>: it first appears in + <i>Theaet.</i> 182 A, where it is called <span lang="el" title="allokoton onoma" + >αλλοκοτον + ονομα</span>. <i>Nova ... facienda</i>: = + <i>imponenda</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 5. <i>Suis + utuntur</i>: so <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 4. + <i>Transferenda</i>: <i>transferre</i> = <span lang="el" + title="metapherein" + >μεταφερειν</span>, + which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on metaphor, + <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 153 sq., where + <i>necessitas</i> is assigned as one cause of it (159) just as here; cf. + also <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 149. <i>Saecula</i>: the + spelling <i>secula</i> is wrong; Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 325, + 377. The diphthong bars the old derivations from <i>secare</i>, and + <i>sequi</i>. <i>Quanto id magis</i>: Cic. is exceedingly fond of + separating <i>tam quam ita tantus quantus</i>, etc., from the words with + which they are syntactically connected, by just one small word, e.g. + <i>Lael.</i> 53 <i>quam id recte</i>, <i>Acad.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 125 <i>tam sit mirabilis</i>, <span + class="vol">II.</span> 68 <i>tam in praecipitem</i>; also <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 5 <i>quanto id nobis magis est concedendum + qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_26"></a><a href="#BkI_26">§26</a>.</b> <i>Non modo + rerum sed verborum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkI_9">9</a>. <i>Igitur</i> picks + up the broken thread of the exposition; so <a href="#BkI_35">35</a>, and + frequently. <i>Principes ... ex his ortae</i>: the Greek terms are <span + lang="el" title="hapla" >‛απλα</span> and + <span lang="el" title="syntheta" + >συνθετα</span>, see Arist. + <i>De Coelo</i>, <span class="vol">I.</span> 2 (R. and P. 294). The + distinction puzzled Plutarch (quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both + Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics (Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly + Heraclitus, and cast aside many refinements of Aristotle which will be + found in R. and P. 297. <i>Quasi multiformes</i>: evidently a trans. of + <span lang="el" title="polyeideis" + >πολυειδεις</span>, + which is opposed to <span lang="el" title="haplous" + >‛απλους</span> in Plat. + <i>Phaedr.</i> 238 A, and often. Plato uses also <span lang="el" + title="monoeidês" + >μονοειδης</span> + for <i>unius modi</i>; cf. Cic. <i>Tim.</i> ch. <span + class="vol">VII.</span>, a transl. of Plat. <i>Tim.</i> 35 A. <i>Prima + sunt</i>: <i>primae</i> (sc. <i>qualitates</i>) is the needless em. of + Walker, followed by Halm. <i>Formae</i> = <i>genera</i>, <span lang="el" + title="eidê" >ειδη</span>. The word is applied to + the four elements themselves, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19; + cf. also <i>quintum genus</i> below, and <i>Topica</i>, 11—13. A + good view of the history of the doctrine of the four elements may be + gained from the section of Stob. <i>Phys.</i>, entitled <span lang="el" + title="peri archôn kai stoicheiôn kai tou pantos" + >περι αρχων + και + στοιχειων + και του + παντος</span>. It will be there seen + that Cic. is wrong in making <i>initia</i> and <i>elementa</i> here and + in <a href="#BkI_39">39</a> (<span lang="el" title="archai" + >αρχαι</span> and <span lang="el" + title="stoicheia" + >στοιχεια</span>) + convertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements <span + lang="el" title="stoicheia" + >στοιχεια</span> but + <i>not</i> <span lang="el" title="archai" + >αρχαι</span>, which term would be reserved + for the primary Matter and Force. <i>Aër et ignis</i>: this is Stoic but + <i>not</i> Aristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary + properties of matter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two + former as active, the two latter as passive. He then assigns <i>two</i> + of these properties, <i>one</i> active and <i>one</i> passive, to each of + the four elements; each therefore is to him <i>both</i> active and + passive. The Stoics assign only <i>one</i> property to each element; heat + to fire, cold to air (cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 26), + moisture to water, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at + once. Cf. Zeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq. + <i>Accipiendi ... patiendi</i>: <span lang="el" title="dechesthai" + >δεχεσθαι</span> often + comes in Plat. <i>Tim.</i> <i>Quintum genus</i>: the note on this, + referred to in Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xvi">16</a>, is postponed to <a + href="#BkIN_39">39</a>. <i>Dissimile ... quoddam</i>: so MSS.; one would + expect <i>quiddam</i>, which Orelli gives. <i>Rebatur</i>: an old + poetical word revived by Cic. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 153; cf. Quintil. <i>Inst. Or.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 3, + 26.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_27"></a><a href="#BkI_27">§27</a>.</b> <i>Subiectam + ... materiam</i>: the <span lang="el" title="hypokeimenê hylê" + >‛υποκειμενη + ‛υλη</span> of Aristotle, from which our word + subject-matter is descended. <i>Sine ulla specie</i>: <i>species</i> here + = <i>forma</i> above, the <span lang="el" title="eidos" + >ειδος</span> or <span lang="el" + title="morphê" >μορφη</span> of Arist. + <i>Omnibus</i> without <i>rebus</i> is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes + avoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in + <a href="#BkI_21">21</a> in <i>quibusdam</i>, <i>quae</i>. + <i>Expressa</i>: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf. <i>expressa effigies</i> + <i>De Off</i>. <span class="vol">III.</span> 69); <i>efficta</i>, moulded + as by a potter (see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_77">77</a>); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS. + <i>effecta</i>. So Matter is called an <span lang="el" title="ekmageion" + >εκμαγειον</span> + in Plat. <i>Tim.</i> <i>Quae tota omnia</i>: these words have given rise + to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them. <i>Tota</i> is + feminine sing.; cf. <i>materiam totam ipsam</i> in <a + href="#BkI_28">28</a>; "which matter throughout its whole extent can + suffer all changes." For the word <i>omnia</i> cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_118">118</a>, and Plat. <i>Tim.</i> + 50 B (<span lang="el" title="dechetai gar êi ta panta" + >δεχεται γαρ + ηι τα + παντα</span>), 51 A (<span lang="el" + title="eidos pandeches" >ειδος + πανδεχες</span>). The + word <span lang="el" title="pandeches" + >πανδεχες</span> is also + quoted from Okellus in Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, 3. Binder is + certainly wrong in taking <i>tota</i> and <i>omnia</i> both as + neut.—"<i>alles und jedes</i>." Cic. knew the <i>Tim.</i> well and + imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the + passages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between + Plato's <span lang="el" title="hylê" + >‛υλη</span> and that of Aristotle. <i>Eoque + interire</i>: so MSS.; Halm after Dav. <i>eaque</i>. Faber was right in + supposing that Cic. has said loosely of the <i>materia</i> what he ought + to have said of the <i>qualia</i>. Of course the <span lang="el" + title="prote hylê" >προτε + ‛υλη</span>, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, + is imperishable (cf. <i>Tim.</i> 52 A. <span lang="el" title="phthoran ou prosdechomenon" + >φθοραν ου + προσδεχομενον</span>). + <i>Non in nihilum</i>: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that + infinite subdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing + and their reparation out of nothing again. See Lucr. <span + class="vol">I.</span> 215—264, and elsewhere. <i>Infinite + secari</i>: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the + infinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox + one that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 20 <i>ne illud quidem physici credere esse + minimum</i>, Arist. <i>Physica</i>, <span class="vol">I.</span> 1 <span + lang="el" title="ouk estin elachiston megethos" >ουκ + εστιν + ελαχιστον + μεγεθος</span>. The history of + ancient opinion on this subject is important, but does not lie close + enough to our author for comment. The student should at least learn + Plato's opinions from <i>Tim.</i> 35 A sq. It is notable that Xenocrates, + tripping over the old <span lang="el" title="antiphasis" + >αντιφασις</span> + of the One and the Many, denied <span lang="el" title="pan megethos diaireton einai kai meros echein" + >παν μεγεθος + διαιρετον + ειναι και + μερος + εχειν</span> (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus + followed Aristotle very closely (R. and P. 377, 378). <i>Intervallis + moveri</i>: this is the theory of motion without void which Lucr. <span + class="vol">I.</span> 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf. also Sext. + Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 214. Aristotle + denied the existence of void either within or without the universe, + Strato allowed its possibility within, while denying its existence + without (Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 18, 1), the Stoics did the + exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it within the + universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). <i>Quae intervalla ... + possint</i>: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter + atom. As regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed + Aristotle, whose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and + especially from M. Saint Hilaire's explanation of the <i>Physica</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_28"></a><a href="#BkI_28">§28</a>.</b> <i>Ultro + citroque</i>: this is the common reading, but I doubt its correctness. + MSS. have <i>ultro introque</i>, whence <i>ed. Rom.</i> (1471) has + <i>ultro in utroque</i>. I think that <i>in utroque</i>, simply, was the + reading, and that <i>ultro</i> is a dittographia from <i>utro</i>. The + meaning would be "since force plays this part in the compound," + <i>utroque</i> being as in <a href="#BkI_24">24</a> for <i>eo quod ex + utroque fit</i>. If the vulg. is kept, translate "since force has this + motion and is ever thus on the move." <i>Ultro citroque</i> is an odd + expression to apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with + a <i>quasi</i>. Indeed if it is kept I suggest <i>quasi</i> for <i>cum + sic</i>. The use of <i>versetur</i> is also strange. <i>E quibus in omni + natura</i>: most edd. since Dav. (Halm included) eject <i>in</i>. It is + perfectly sound if <i>natura</i> be taken as <span lang="el" + title="ousia" >ουσια</span> = existence + substance. The meaning is "out of which <i>qualia</i>, themselves + existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf. <i>totam + commutari</i> above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was + formed." For the <i>in</i> cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 35, <i>in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid</i>, also a similar use + <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 80, and <i>Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_42">42</a>. If <i>in utroque</i> be + read above, <i>in omni natura</i> will form an exact contrast, substance + as a whole being opposed to the individual <i>quale</i>. <i>Cohaerente et + continuata</i>: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than + any other school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19, 84, 119, <i>De Div.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 33, <i>De Leg.</i> fragm. 1. (at the end of + Bait. and Halm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if + they be got at second hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. <span + class="vol">I.</span> 22, 3. The <i>partes mundi</i> are spoken of in + most of the passages just quoted, also in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic + sources. <i>Effectum esse mundum</i>: Halm adds <i>unum</i> from his + favourite MS. (G). <i>Natura sentiente</i>: a clumsy trans. of <span + lang="el" title="aisthêtê ousia" + >αισθητη + ουσια</span> = substance which can affect + the senses. The same expression is in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 75. It should not be forgotten, however, that to + the Stoics the universe was itself sentient, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 22, 47, 87. <i>Teneantur</i>: for + <i>contineantur</i>; cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 29 with + <span class="vol">II.</span> 31 <i>In qua ratio perfecta insit</i>: this + is thorough going Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are + interchangeable terms with the Stoics. See Zeller 145—150 By an + inevitable inconsistency, while believing that Reason <i>is</i> the + Universe, they sometimes speak of it as being <i>in</i> the Universe, as + here (cf. Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 138, <i>N.D.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 34) In a curious passage (<i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same + inconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope "lives through all life, + extends through all extent". <i>Sempiterna</i>: Aristotle held this: see + <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_119">119</a> and <i>N.D.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 118, Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 21, + 6. The Stoics while believing that our world would be destroyed by fire + (Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 141, R. and P. 378, Stob. + <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an + absorption into the Universal World God, who will recreate the world out + of himself, since he is beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert. <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller 159) Some Stoics + however denied the <span lang="el" title="ekpyrôsis" + >εκπυρωσις</span>. + <i>Nihil enim valentius</i>: this is an argument often urged, as in + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 31 (<i>quid potest esse mundo + valentius?</i>), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. <i>A quo intereat</i>: + <i>interire</i> here replaces the passive of <i>perdere</i> cf. <span + lang="el" title="anastênai, ekpiptein hypo tinos" + >αναστηναι, + εκπιπτειν + ‛υπο + τινος</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_29"></a><a href="#BkI_29">§29</a>.</b> <i>Quam vim + animum</i>: there is no need to read <i>animam</i>, as some edd. do. The + Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the + names God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance, + Fire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. <span + class="vol">VI.</span> <i>passim</i>. Nearly all these names occur in + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> The whole of this section is + undilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it + all in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics. + <i>Sapientiam</i>: cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 36 with + <span class="vol">III.</span> 23, in which latter passage the Stoic + opinion is severely criticised. <i>Deum</i>: Cic. in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 30 remarks that Plato in his <i>Timaeus</i> had + already made the <i>mundus</i> a God. <i>Quasi prudentium quandam</i>: + the Greek <span lang="el" title="pronoia" + >προνοια</span> is translated + both by <i>prudentia</i> and <i>providentia</i> in the same passage, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 58, also in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 77—80. <i>Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad + homines</i>: the World God is perfectly beneficent, see <i>Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_120">120</a>, <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 23, <span class="vol">II.</span> 160 (where there + is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq. <i>Necessitatem</i>: + <span lang="el" title="anankên" + >αναγκην</span>, which is <span + lang="el" title="eirmos aitiôn" + >ειρμος + αιτιων</span>, <i>causarum series + sempiterna</i> (<i>De Fato</i> 20, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 55, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 125, + 127, Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 149, and Zeller as before). This + is merely the World God apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of + cause upon cause. When the World God is called Fortune, all that is + expressed is human inability to see this orderly sequence. <span + lang="el" title="Tuchê" >Τυχη</span> therefore is + defined as <span lang="el" title="aitia adêlos anthrôpinôi logismôi" + >αιτια + αδηλος + ανθρωπινωι + λογισμωι</span> (Stob. + <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, 9, where the same definition is ascribed + to Anaxagoras—see also <i>Topica</i>, 58—66). This + identification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and + excites his wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward + by Heraclitus, if we may trust Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 5, 15. + <i>Nihil aliter possit</i>: on <i>posse</i> for <i>posse fieri</i> see + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 48, also <i>Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_121">121</a>. For the sense of + Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), <span lang="el" + title="oude ti gignetai ergon epi chthoni sou dicha daimon" + >ουδε τι + γιγνεται + εργον επι + χθονι σου + διχα + δαιμον</span>. <i>Inter quasi + fatalem</i>: a trans. of the Gk. <span lang="el" title="katênankasmenon" + >κατηναγκασμενον</span>. + I see no reason for suspecting <i>inter</i>, as Halm does. + <i>Ignorationemque causarum</i>: the same words in <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 49; cf. also August. <i>Contra Academicos</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 1. In addition to studying the reff. given + above, the student might with advantage read Aristotle's <i>Physica</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> ch. 4—6, with M. Saint Hilaire's + explanation, for the views of Aristotle about <span lang="el" + title="tychê" >τυχη</span> and <span lang="el" + title="to automaton" >το + αυτοματον</span>, + also ch. 8—9 for <span lang="el" title="anankê" + >αναγκη</span>. Plato's doctrine of + <span lang="el" title="anankê" + >αναγκη</span>, which is + diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in + <i>Timaeus</i> p. 47, 48, Grote's <i>Plato</i>, <span + class="vol">III.</span> 249—59.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_30">§§30</a>—<a + href="#BkI_32">32</a>.</b> Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' + <i>Ethics</i>. Summary. Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based + knowledge on the senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of + truth, but the mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true + (<a href="#BkI_30">30</a>). The senses they thought heavy and clogged and + unable to gain knowledge of such things as were either too small to come + into the domain of sense, or so changing and fleeting that no part of + their being remained constant or even the same, seeing that all parts + were in a continuous flux. Knowledge based <i>only</i> on sense was + therefore mere opinion (<a href="#BkI_31">31</a>). Real knowledge only + came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they <i>defined</i> + everything about which they argued, and also used verbal explanations, + from which they drew proofs. In these two processes consisted their + dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric (<a + href="#BkI_32">32</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_30"></a><a href="#BkI_30">§30</a>.</b> <i>Quae + erat</i>: the Platonic <span lang="el" title="ên" >ην</span>, + = was, as we said. <i>In ratione et disserendo</i>: an instance of + Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 22 <i>quaerendi ac disserendi</i>. <i>Quamquam + oriretur</i>: the sentence is inexact, it is <i>knowledge</i> which takes + its rise in the senses, not the criterion of truth, which is the mind + itself; cf. however <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkIIN_30">30</a> and n. <i>Iudicium</i>: the constant translation + of <span lang="el" title="kritêrion" + >κριτηριον</span>, + a word foreign to the older philosophy. <i>Mentem volebant rerum esse + iudicem</i>: Halm with his pet MS. writes <i>esse rerum</i>, thus giving + an almost perfect iambic, strongly stopped off before and after, so that + there is no possibility of avoiding it in reading. I venture to say that + no real parallel can be found to this in Cic., it stands in glaring + contradiction to his own rules about admitting metre in prose, + <i>Orator</i> 194 sq., <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 182 + sq. <i>Solam censebant ... tale quale esset</i>: probably from Plato's + <i>Tim.</i> 35 A thus translated by Cic., <i>Tim.</i> c. 7 <i>ex ea + materia quae individua est et unius modi</i> (<span lang="el" title="aei kata tauta echousês" + >αει κατα + ταυτα + εχουσης</span> cf. 28 A. <span + lang="el" title="to kata tauta echon" >το + κατα ταυτα + εχον</span>) <i>et sui simile</i>, cf. also + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 58 <i>id solum esse quod semper + tale sit quale sit, quam</i> <span lang="el" title="idean" + >ιδεαν</span> <i>appellat ille, nos + speciem</i>, and <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_129">129</a>. <i>Illi</i> <span lang="el" title="idean" + >ιδεαν</span>, etc.: there is more than one + difficulty here. The words <i>iam a Platone ita nom</i> seem to exclude + Plato from the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an + oversight, but to say first that the school (<i>illi</i>, cf. <i>sic + tractabatur ab utrisque</i>) which included Aristotle held the doctrine + of <span lang="el" title="ideai" + >ιδεαι</span>, and next, in <a + href="#BkI_33">33</a>, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears + very absurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's + <span lang="el" title="ideai" >ιδεαι</span> + and Aristotle's <span lang="el" title="ta kathalou" >τα + καθαλου</span> would naturally + seem microscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in + his time as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid + at Cicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with + Plato's must have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very + knowledge of Plato has, however, probably led him to intensify what + inconsistency there was in Antiochus, who would have glided over Plato's + opinions with a much more cautious step.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_31"></a><a href="#BkI_31">§31</a>.</b> <i>Sensus + omnis hebetes</i>: this stands in contradiction to the whole Antiochean + view as given in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>—<a href="#BkII_64">64</a>, cf. esp. <a + href="#BkII_19">19</a> <i>sensibus quorum ita clara et certa iudicia + sunt</i>, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his agreement with Plato + by asserting that though sense is naturally dull, reason may sift out the + certain from the uncertain. <i>Res eas ... quae essent aut ita</i>: Halm + by following his pet MS. without regard to the meaning of Cic. has + greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He reads <i>res ullas + ... quod aut ita essent</i>; thus making Antiochus assert that <i>no</i> + true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall see in + the <i>Lucullus</i>, he really divided sensations into true and false. I + believe that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's + reminiscences of the <i>Theaetetus</i> and of Xenocrates; see below. + <i>Nec percipere</i>: for this see <i>Lucullus</i> passim. Christ's conj. + <i>percipi, quod perceptio sit mentis non sensuum</i>, which Halm seems + to approve, is a wanton corruption of the text, cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_101">101</a> <i>neget rem ullam + percipi posse sensibus</i>, so <a href="#BkII_21">21</a>, <a + href="#BkII_119">119</a> (just like <i>ratione percipi</i> <a + href="#BkII_91">91</a>), also <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_41">41</a> <i>sensu comprehensum</i>. <i>Subiectae + sensibus</i>: cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_74">74</a> + and Sext. Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 9, <span + lang="el" title="ta hypopiptonta tê aisthêsei" >τα + ‛υποπιπτοντα + τη + αισθησει</span>. <i>Aut + ita mobiles</i>, etc.: this strongly reminds one of the + <i>Theaetetus</i>, esp. 160 D sq. For <i>constans</i> cf. <span lang="el" + title="estêkos" + >εστηκος</span>, which so often + occurs there and in the <i>Sophistes</i>. <i>Ne idem</i>: Manut. for MSS. + <i>eidem</i>. In the <i>Theaetetus</i>, Heraclitus' theory of flux is + carried to such an extent as to destroy the self-identity of things; even + the word <span lang="el" title="eme" >εμε</span> is + stated to be an absurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas + the subject is changing from moment to moment; the expression therefore + ought to be <span lang="el" title="tous eme" + >τους εμε</span>. + <i>Continenter</i>: <span lang="el" title="ounechôs" + >ουνεχως</span>; cf. Simplicius + quoted in Grote's Plato, <span class="vol">I.</span> p. 37, about + Heraclitus, <span lang="el" title="en metabolê gar synechei ta onta" + >εν μεταβολη + γαρ συνεχει + τα οντα</span>. <i>Laberentur et + fluerent</i>: cf. the phrases <span lang="el" title="rhoê, panta rhei, hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta" + >‛ροη, παντα + ‛ρει, ‛οιον + ‛ρευματα + κινεισθαι + τα παντα</span>, etc., which + are scattered thickly over the <i>Theaet.</i> and the ancient texts about + Heraclitus; also a very similar passage in <i>Orator</i> 10. + <i>Opinabilem</i>: <span lang="el" title="doxastên" + >δοξαστην</span>, so + <i>opinabile</i> = <span lang="el" title="doxaston" + >δοξαστον</span> in Cic. + <i>Tim</i> ch. <span class="vol">II.</span> The term was largely used by + Xenocrates (R. and P. 243—247), Arist. too distinguishes between + the <span lang="el" title="doxaston" + >δοξαστον</span> and the + <span lang="el" title="epistêton" + >επιστητον</span>, + e.g <i>Analyt. Post.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 33 (qu. R. and P. + 264).</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_32"></a><a href="#BkI_32">§32</a>.</b> For this cf. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 8—10. <i>Notionibus</i>: + so one MS. for <i>motionibus</i> which the rest have. <i>Notio</i> is + Cicero's regular translation for <span lang="el" title="ennoia" + >εννοια</span>, which is Stoic. This + statement might have been made both by Aristotle and Plato, though each + would put a separate meaning on the word <i>notio</i>. <span lang="el" + title="Epistêmê" + >Επιστημη</span> in Plato + is of the <span lang="el" title="ideai" + >ιδεαι</span> only, while in Aristotle it + is <span lang="el" title="ton katholou" >τον + καθολου</span>; cf. <i>Anal. + Post.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 33 (R. and P. 264), <span lang="el" + title="legô noun archên epistêmês" >λεγω + νουν αρχην + επιστημης</span>. + <i>Definitiones rerum</i>: these must be carefully distinguished fiom + <i>definitiones nominum</i>, see the distinction drawn after Aristotle in + R. and P. 265, note b. The <i>definitio rei</i> really involves the whole + of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one might almost add, with + moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen from the + <i>Politicus</i> and <i>Sophistes</i>, to Aristotle from the passages + quoted in R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as + clear as it can be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole + of Aristotle's philosophy. <i>Verborum explicatio</i>: this is quite a + different thing from those <i>definitiones nominum</i> just referred to; + it is <i>derivation</i>, which does not necessitate definition. <span + lang="el" title="etymologian" + >ετυμολογιαν</span>: + this is almost entirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek + Prose, as are <span lang="el" title="etymos" + >ετυμος</span> and all its + derivatives. (<span lang="el" title="Etymôs" + >Ετυμως</span> means "etymologically" + in the <i>De Mundo</i>, which however is not Aristotle's). The word <span + lang="el" title="etymologia" + >ετυμολογια</span> + is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who use rather <span + lang="el" title="onomatôn orthotês" + >ονοματων + ορθοτης</span> (Diog. Laert. + <span class="vol">VII.</span> 83), the title of their books on the + subject preserved by Diog. is generally "<span lang="el" title="peri tôn etymologikôn" + >περι των + ετυμολογικων</span>" + The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than Chrysippus, when + it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and Cleanthes had + given the first impulse (<i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 63). + Specimens of Stoic etymology are given in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> and ridiculed in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> (cf. esp. 62 <i>in enodandis nominibus quod + miserandum sit laboratis</i>). <i>Post argumentis et quasi rerum notis + ducibus</i>: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to prove something + about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in <i>Topica</i> + 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation + <i>veriloquium</i> of <span lang="el" title="etymologia" + >ετυμολογια</span> + and adopts <i>notatio</i>, the <i>rerum nota</i> (Greek <span lang="el" + title="symbolon" + >συμβολον</span>) being + the name so explained (<i>Top.</i> 35). Varro translated <span lang="el" + title="etymologia" + >ετυμολογια</span> + by <i>originatio</i> (Quintil. <span class="vol">I.</span> 6, 28). + Aristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of + etymology, and Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be + said to belong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer + examination of authorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em. + <i>notationibus</i> for <i>notas ducibus</i>, the word <i>notatio</i> is + used for the whole science of etymology, and not for particular + derivations, while Cic. in numerous passages (e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 74) describes <i>verba</i> or <i>nomina</i> as + <i>rerum notae</i>. Berkley's <i>nodis</i> for <i>notis</i> has no + support, (<i>enodatio nominum</i> in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I + conclude this wearisome note. The <i>quasi</i> marks <i>rerum nota</i> as + an unfamiliar trans. of <span lang="el" title="symbolon" + >συμβολον</span>. Davies + therefore ought not to have placed it before <i>ducibus</i>, which word, + strong as the metaphor is, requires no qualification, see a good instance + in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 27. <i>Itaque tradebatur</i>: + so Halm improves on Madvig's <i>ita</i> for <i>in qua</i> of the MSS., + which cannot be defended. Orelli's reference to <a href="#BkI_30">30</a> + <i>pars</i> for an antecedent to <i>qua</i> (<i>in ea parte in qua</i>) + is violent, while Goerenz's resort to <i>partem rerum opinabilem</i> is + simply silly. Manut. conj. <i>in quo</i>, Cic. does often use the neut. + pronoun, as in <i>Orator</i> 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes + thought that Cic. wrote <i>haec, inquam</i> (cf. <i>huic</i> below). + <i>Dialecticae</i>: as <span lang="el" title="logikê" + >λογικη</span> had not been + Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word to denote <span lang="el" + title="logikê" >λογικη</span>, of + which <span lang="el" title="dialektikê" + >διαλεκτικη</span> + is really one subdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, <span lang="el" + title="rhêtorikê" + >‛ρητορικη</span> + which is mentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, + 70. <i>Orationis ratione conclusae</i>: speech drawn up in a syllogistic + form which becomes <i>oratio perpetua</i> under the influence of <span + lang="el" title="rhêtorikê" + >‛ρητορικη</span>. + <i>Quasi ex altera parte</i>: a trans. of Aristotle's <span lang="el" + title="antistrophos" + >αντιστροφος</span> + in the beginning of the <i>Rhetoric</i>. <i>Oratoria</i>: Halm brackets + this word; cf. however a close parallel in <i>Brut.</i> 261 <i>oratorio + ornamenta dicendi</i>. The construction is simply a variation of Cic.'s + favourite double genitive (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 39), + <i>oratoria</i> being put for <i>oratoris</i>. <i>Ad persuadendum</i>: + <span lang="el" title="to pithanon" >το + πιθανον</span> is with Arist. + and all ancient authorities the one aim of <span lang="el" + title="rhêtorikê" + >‛ρητορικη</span>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_33">§§33</a>—<a + href="#BkI_42">42</a>.</b> Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures + from the old Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the + <span lang="el" title="ideai" >ιδεαι</span> + of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (<a + href="#BkI_33">33</a>). Strato abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus, + Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to + which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (<a + href="#BkI_34">34</a>). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could + influence happiness, and would allow the name <i>good</i> to nothing else + (<a href="#BkI_35">35</a>). All other things he divided into three + classes, some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with + nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive + value, and called them <i>preferred</i> to the second a negative value + and called them <i>rejected</i>, to the third no value + whatever—mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (<a + href="#BkI_36">36</a>, <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>). Though the terms + <i>right action</i> and <i>sin</i> belong only to virtue and vice, he + thought there was an appropriate action (<i>officium</i>) and an + inappropriate, which concerned things <i>preferred</i> and things + <i>rejected</i> (<a href="#BkI_37">37</a>). He made <i>all</i> virtue + reside in the reason, and considered not the <i>practice</i> but the mere + <i>possession</i> of virtue to be the important thing, although the + possession could not but lead to the practice (<a href="#BkI_38">38</a>). + All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (<a + href="#BkI_38">38</a>, <a href="#BkI_39">39</a>). In physics he discarded + the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while + he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (<a + href="#BkI_39">39</a>). In dialectic he analysed sensation into two + parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in + passing which the will was entirely free (<a href="#BkI_40">40</a>). + Sensations (<i>visa</i>) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the + examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a + sensation he called it <i>Knowledge</i>, if otherwise, <i>Ignorance</i> + (<a href="#BkI_41">41</a>). <i>Perception</i>, thus defined, he regarded + as morally neither right nor wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of + truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in + the application to them of the reason he thought could not coexist with + virtue and perfect wisdom (<a href="#BkI_42">42</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_33"></a><a href="#BkI_33">§33</a>.</b> <i>Haec erat + illis forma</i>: so Madv. <i>Em.</i> 118 for MSS. <i>prima</i>, comparing + <i>formulam</i> in 17, also <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 19, + <span class="vol">V.</span> 9, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 38, to which add <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_23">23</a>. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the + MSS. reading and supply <i>pars</i>, as usual. His power of + <i>supplying</i> is unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the + difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in <a href="#BkI_6">6</a>, <a + href="#BkI_15">15</a>, <a href="#BkI_32">32</a> and here. + <i>Immutationes</i>: so Dav. for <i>disputationes</i>, approved by Madv. + <i>Em.</i> 119 who remarks that the phrase <i>disputationes + philosophiae</i> would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain + by <i>mutavit</i> in <a href="#BkI_40">40</a>, <i>commutatio</i> in <a + href="#BkI_42">42</a>, and <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 38. + Halm's odd em. <i>dissupationes</i>, so much admired by his reviewer in + Schneidewin's <i>Philologus</i>, needs support, which it certainly does + not receive from the one passage Halm quotes, <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 207. <i>Et recte</i>: for the <i>et</i> cf. <i>et + merito</i>, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. <i>Auctoritas</i>: + "system". <i>Inquit</i>: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the + omission of <i>igitur</i> after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to + begin here. To the objection that Varro (who in <a href="#BkI_8">8</a> + says <i>nihil enim meorum magno opere miror</i>) would not eulogise + himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is + meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying. <i>Aristoteles</i>: after + this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture, + inserts <i>igitur</i>, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his + exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter <span + class="vol">IX.</span> ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader + would not be much incommoded. <i>Labefactavit</i>, that Antiochus still + continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic + school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical + resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro + in Aug. <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1 <i>nulla est causa philosophandi + nisi finis boni</i>. <i>Divinum</i>: see R. and P. 210 for a full + examination of the relation in which Plato's <span lang="el" + title="ideai" >ιδεαι</span> stand to his + notion of the deity. <i>Suavis</i>: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. + R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from + his style (cf. <i>loquendi nitor ille divinus</i>, Quint. <span + class="vol">X.</span> 1, 83). For <i>suavis</i> of style cf. <i>Orat.</i> + 161, <i>Brut.</i> 120. <i>Negavit</i>: for his various offences see + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 12 sq., <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he + departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic + view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_134">134</a> Cic. speaks very + differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that + of Antiochus in <a href="#BkI_22">22</a> the difference is merely verbal. + <i>Beate vivere</i>: the only translation of <span lang="el" + title="eudaimonian" + >ευδαιμονιαν</span>. + Cic. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 95 suggests <i>beatitas</i> + and <i>beatitudo</i> but does not elsewhere employ them.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_34"></a><a href="#BkI_34">§34</a>.</b> <i>Strato</i>: + see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_121">121</a>. The + statement in the text is not quite true for Diog. <span + class="vol">V.</span> 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven + ethical works, while Stob. <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 4 quotes his + definition of the <span lang="el" title="agathon" + >αγαθον</span>. <i>Diligenter ... + tuebantur</i>: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, + cf. Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 18, <i>Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 34, and R. and P. <i>Congregati</i>: "<i>all</i> + in the Academic fold," cf. <i>Lael.</i> 69, <i>in nostro, ut ita dicam, + grege</i>. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. <i>Polemonem ... Zeno + et Arcesilas</i>: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many + teachers (Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 2, 3), while he is not + mentioned by Diog. at all among the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is + that we have a mere theory, which accounts for the split of Stoicism from + Academicism by the rivalry of two fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. + <i>Praep. Ev.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 5, <span lang="el" + title="symphoitôntes para Polemôni ephilo timêthêsan" + >συμφοιτωντες + παρα + Πολεμωνι + εφιλο + τιμηθησαν</span>. + Dates are against the theory, see Zeller 500.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_35"></a><a href="#BkI_35">§35</a>.</b> <i>Anteiret + aetate</i>: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, though the + dates are uncertain. <i>Dissereret</i>: was a deep reasoner. Bentl. + missing the meaning conj. <i>definiret</i>. <i>Peracute moveretur</i>: + Bentl. <i>partiretur</i>; this with <i>definiret</i> above well + illustrates his licence in emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted + the soundness of the text, the words refer not to the emotional, but to + the intellectual side of Zeno's nature. The very expression occurs <i>Ad + Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 21, 4, see other close parallels in + n. on <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_37">37</a>. <i>Nervos + ... inciderit</i>: same metaphor in <i>Philipp.</i> <span + class="vol">XII.</span> 8, cf. also <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 27 <i>nervos virtutis elidere</i>, <span + class="vol">III.</span> 83 <i>stirpis aegritudinis elidere</i>. (In both + these passages Madv. <i>Em. Liv.</i> 135 reads <i>elegere</i> for + <i>elidere</i>, I cannot believe that he is right). Plato uses <span + lang="el" title="neura ektemnein" >νευρα + εκτεμνειν</span> + metaphorically. Notice <i>inciderit</i> but <i>poneret</i>. There is no + need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the sequence is not uncommon + in Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 33. <i>Omnia, + quae</i>: MSS. <i>quaeque</i>, which edd. used to take for + <i>quaecunque</i>. Cf. Goerenz's statement "<i>negari omnino nequit hac + vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri</i>" with Madvig's utter refutation in + the sixth Excursus to his <i>D.F.</i> <i>Solum et unum bonum</i>: for the + Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. and P. and Zeller for + himself. I can only treat such points as are involved in the special + difficulties of the <i>Academica</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_36"></a><a href="#BkI_36">§36</a>.</b> <i>Cetera</i>: + Stoic <span lang="el" title="adiaphora" + >αδιαφορα</span>, the + presence or absence of which cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly + protested against their being called either <i>bona</i> or <i>mala</i>, + and this question was one of the great battle grounds of the later Greek + philosophy. <i>Secundum naturam ... contraria</i>: Gr. <span lang="el" + title="kata physin, para physin" >κατα + φυσιν, παρα + φυσιν</span>. <i>His ipsis ... + numerabat</i>: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words + <i>quae minoris</i> below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness + (with Halm). The word <i>media</i> is the Gk. <span lang="el" + title="mesa" >μεσα</span>, which word however is + not usually applied to <i>things</i>, but to <i>actions</i>. + <i>Sumenda</i>: Gk. <span lang="el" title="lêpta" + >ληπτα</span>. <i>Aestimatione</i>: <span + lang="el" title="axia" >αξια</span>, positive + value. <i>Contraque contraria</i>: Cic. here as in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 50 feels the need of a word to express <span + lang="el" title="apaxia" + >απαξια</span> (negative value). + (Madv. in his note on that passage coins the word <i>inaestimatio.</i>) + <i>Ponebat esse</i>: cf. <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>, <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 73.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_37"></a><a href="#BkI_37">§37</a>.</b> To cope + thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the + student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and + Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it + would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general + acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic. + appears at first sight to have made the <span lang="el" + title="apoproêgmena" + >αποπροηγμενα</span> + a subdivision of the <span lang="el" title="lêpta" + >ληπτα</span> (<i>sumenda</i>), the two + being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (<i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the + text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads + <i>media</i> in the place of <i>sumenda</i>, must be rejected. Nor can + anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in + order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe + that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best + known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the <span + lang="el" title="apoproêgmena" + >αποπροηγμενα</span> + formed a branch of the <span lang="el" title="lêpta" + >ληπτα</span>. This view of Madvig's is + strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in <a href="#BkI_36">36</a> had + explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the <span + lang="el" title="adiaphora" + >αδιαφορα</span>, nor is + there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory + any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the + intention to speak of the <i>sumenda</i> only and then rapidly extended + his thought so as to embrace the whole class of <span lang="el" + title="adiaphora" + >αδιαφορα</span>, which + he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in + the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I + defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance + of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 52, <i>quae secundum locum + obtinent</i>, <span lang="el" title="proêgmena" + >προηγμενα</span> + <i>id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et + remota</i>. If this language be closely pressed, the <span lang="el" + title="apoproêgmena" + >αποπροηγμενα</span> + are made of a subdivision of the <span lang="el" title="proêgmena" + >προηγμενα</span>, + though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. + So if his words in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 90 be pressed, + the <i>sumenda</i> are made to include both <i>producta</i> and + <i>reducta</i>, in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 16 + <i>appeterent</i> includes <i>fugerent</i>, <i>ibid.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 86 the opposite of <i>beata vita</i> is abruptly + introduced. So <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 88 <i>frui + dolore</i> must be construed together, and <i>ibid.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 73 <i>pudor modestia pudicitia</i> are said + <i>coerceri</i>, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the + vices which are opposite to these virtues.</p> + + <p>I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by + <i>ex iis</i> Cic. means <i>mediis</i>, and not <i>sumendis</i>, about + which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that + <i>pluris aestimanda</i> and <i>minoris aestimanda</i> simply indicate + the <span lang="el" title="axia" >αξια</span> and + <span lang="el" title="apaxia" + >απαξια</span> of the Greek, + <i>not</i> different degrees of <span lang="el" title="axia" + >αξια</span> (positive value). That <i>minor + aestimatio</i> should mean <span lang="el" title="apaxia" + >απαξια</span> need not surprise us + when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing + this <span lang="el" title="apaxia" + >απαξια</span> or negative value in + Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on <a href="#BkIN_36">36</a>; + (2) on the strong negative meaning which <i>minor</i> bears in Latin, + e.g. <i>sin minus</i> in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall + victims to the task of expressing <span lang="el" title="apaxia" + >απαξια</span>. Stobaeus, in a + passage closely resembling ours makes <span lang="el" title="elattôn axia" + >ελαττων + αξια</span> equivalent to <span lang="el" + title="pollê apaxia" >πολλη + απαξια</span> (II. 6, 6), while Sext. + Emp. after rightly defining <span lang="el" title="apoproêgmena" + >αποπροηγμενα</span> + as <span lang="el" title="ta hikanên apaxian echonta" >τα + ‛ικανην + απαξιαν + εχοντα</span> (<i>Adv. Math.</i> + <span class="vol">XI.</span> 62—64) again speaks of them as <span + lang="el" title="ta mê hikanên echonta axian" >τα + μη ‛ικανην + εχοντα + αξιαν</span> (<i>Pyrrhon. Hypot.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 191) words which usually have an opposite + meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words <i>minoris aestimanda</i> bear + quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, <span + lang="el" title="ta mê hikanên axian echonta" >τα + μη ‛ικανην + αξιαν + εχοντα</span>. I therefore conclude + that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express + the Stoic doctrine that, of the <span lang="el" title="adiaphora" + >αδιαφορα</span>, some + have <span lang="el" title="axia" >αξια</span> + while others have <span lang="el" title="apaxia" + >απαξια</span>. He may fairly claim + to have applied to his words the rule "<i>re intellecta in verborum usu + faciles esse debemus</i>" (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 52). + There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of + misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are + difficulties connected with the terms <span lang="el" title="hikanê axia" + >‛ικανη + αξια</span> and <span lang="el" title="hikanê apaxia" + >‛ικανη + απαξια</span> which are not + satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret + that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student + will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the + <i>D.F.</i> quoted in this note. <i>Non tam rebus quam vocabulis</i>: + Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen + the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never + properly belonged to the Stoics at all. <i>Inter recte factum atque + peccatum</i>: Stob. speaks <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 6 of <span + lang="el" title="ta metaxy aretês kai kakias" >τα + μεταξυ + αρετης και + κακιας</span>. (This does not + contradict his words a little earlier, <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 5, + <span lang="el" title="aretês de kai kakias ouden metaxy" + >αρετης δε + και κακιας + ουδεν + μεταξυ</span>, which have regard to + divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see + R. and P. 393.) <i>Recte factum</i> = <span lang="el" title="katorthôma" + >κατορθωμα</span>, + <i>peccatum</i> = <span lang="el" title="hamartêma" + >‛αμαρτημα</span>, + <i>officium</i> = <span lang="el" title="kathêkon" + >καθηκον</span> (cf. R. and P. + 388—394, Zeller 238—248, 268—272). <i>Servata + praetermissaque</i>: MSS. have <i>et</i> before <i>servata</i>, which all + edd. since Lamb. eject. Where <i>et</i> and <i>que</i> correspond in + Cic., the <i>que</i> is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the + <i>et</i>. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this + oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate + <i>clauses</i> it is possible. Cf. <a href="#BkI_43">43</a> and + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 64.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_38"></a><a href="#BkI_38">§38</a>.</b> <i>Sed quasdam + virtutes</i>: see <a href="#BkI_20">20</a>. This passage requires careful + construing: after <i>quasdam virtutes</i> not the whole phrase <i>in + ratione esse dicerent</i> must be repeated but <i>dicerent</i> merely, + since only the <i>virtutes natura perfectae</i>, the <span lang="el" + title="dianoêtikai aretai" + >διανοητικαι + αρεται</span> of Arist., could be + said to belong to the reason, while the <i>virtutes more perfectae</i> + are Aristotle's <span lang="el" title="êthikai aretai" + >ηθικαι + αρεται</span>. Trans. "but spoke of + certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) + by habit." <i>Ea genera virtutum</i>: both Plato and Arist. roughly + divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the + emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 47, and Arist. <span lang="el" + title="to men hôs logon echon, to de epipeithes logôi" >το + μεν ‛ως + λογον εχον, + το δε + επιπειθες + λογωι</span>); Zeno however asserted the + nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, + to which he gave the name <span lang="el" title="hêgemonikon" + >‛ηγεμονικον</span> + (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller + 248, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> <i>passim</i>). When the + <span lang="el" title="hêgemonikon" + >‛ηγεμονικον</span> + was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there + was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not + resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, + but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. <i>Virtutis + usum</i>: cf. the description of Aristotle's <i>finis</i> in <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 19. <i>Ipsum habitum</i>: the mere + possession. So Plato, <i>Theaetet.</i> 197 B, uses the word <span + lang="el" title="hexis" >‛εξις</span>, a + use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the + <i>Ethics</i> of Arist. In this sense virtue is <i>not</i> a <span + lang="el" title="hexis" >‛εξις</span>, + according to the Stoics, but a <span lang="el" title="diathesis" + >διαθεσις</span> (Stob. + <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 5, Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> + 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a <span lang="el" + title="hexis" >‛εξις</span>, <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). <i>Nec + virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur</i>: cf. Stob. <span + class="vol">II.</span> 6, 6 <span lang="el" title="duo genê tôn anthrôpôn einai to men tôn spoudaiôn, to de tôn phaulôn, kai to men tôn spoudaiôn dia pantos tou biou chrêsthai tais aretais, to de tôn phaulôn tais kakiais" + >δυο γενη των + ανθρωπων + ειναι το μεν + των + σπουδαιων, + το δε των + φαυλων, και + το μεν των + σπουδαιων + δια παντος + του βιου + χρησθαι + ταις + αρεταις, το + δε των + φαυλων ταις + κακιαις</span>. + <i>Perturbationem</i>: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of + Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of + the <i>Acad.</i> appears, should read the plural <i>perturbationes</i>, a + conj. of Walker. <i>Perturbationem</i> means emotion in the abstract; + <i>perturbationes</i> below, particular emotions. There is exactly the + same transition in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 23, 24, + <span class="vol">IV.</span> 59, 65, <span class="vol">V.</span> 43, + while <i>perturbatio</i> is used, in the same sense as here, in at least + five other passages of the <i>T.D.</i>, i.e. <span class="vol">IV.</span> + 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. <i>Quasi mortis</i>: a trans. of Stoic <span lang="el" + title="pathesi" >παθεσι</span>, which + Cic. rejects in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 35. <i>Voluit + carere sapientem</i>: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the + reason, and perfect reason being virtue (<a href="#BkI_20">20</a>), it + follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All + emotions are reasonless; <span lang="el" title="hêdonê" + >‛ηδονη</span> or <i>laetitia</i> + for instance is <span lang="el" title="alogos eparsis" + >αλογος + επαρσις</span>. (<i>T.D.</i> + Books <span class="vol">III.</span> and <span class="vol">IV.</span> + treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, <i>Em.</i> to + the <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> p. 8, says Cic. always uses + <i>efferri laetitia</i> but <i>ferri libidine</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_39"></a><a href="#BkI_39">§39</a>.</b> <i>Aliaque in + parte</i>: so Plato, <i>Tim.</i> 69 C, <i>Rep.</i> 436, 441, Arist. <i>De + Anima</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 3, etc.; cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 20. <i>Voluntarias</i>: the whole aim of the Stoic + theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the + will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general + Stoic fatalism we are not told. <i>Opinionisque iudicio suscipi</i>: all + emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external + object; cf. Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 111. <span lang="el" + title="ta pathê kriseis einai" >τα + παθη + κρισεις + ειναι</span>. Instances of each in Zeller + 233. For <i>iudicio</i> cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 35, + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 61, <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 14, 15, 18. <i>Intemperantiam</i>: the same in + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 22, Gk. <span lang="el" + title="akolasia" + >ακολασια</span>, see + Zeller 232. <i>Quintam naturam</i>: the <span lang="el" title="pemptê ousia" + >πεμπτη + ουσια</span> or <span lang="el" + title="pempton sôma" >πεμπτον + σωμα</span> of Aristotle, who proves its + existence in <i>De Coelo</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 2, in a curious + and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. + derived <i>mind</i> from this fifth element, though the finest and + highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a + material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 22, 41, 65, <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important + note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from + Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the + time were in the habit of deriving the mind from <span lang="el" + title="aithêr" >αιθηρ</span>, which is the + very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (<span lang="el" + title="sôma aitherion" >σωμα + αιθεριον</span> in the + <i>De Coelo</i>), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The + error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred + influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen + into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of + these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time + succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed <span + lang="el" title="nous en aitheri" >νους + εν αιθερι</span> (see + Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial + existence The notion that <span lang="el" title="nous" + >νους</span> or <span lang="el" title="psychê" + >ψυχη</span> came from <span lang="el" + title="aithêr" >αιθηρ</span> was also + fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as <span + lang="el" title="aeikinêtos" + >αεικινητος</span> + in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his + mind One from the <i>Phaedrus</i> 245 C is translated twice, in + <i>Somnium Scipionis</i> (<i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span>), + and <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 53 sq. Now the only thing + with Aristotle which is <span lang="el" title="aeikinêtos" + >αεικινητος</span> + in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion + is alone perfect and eternal), is the <span lang="el" title="aithêr" + >αιθηρ</span> or <span lang="el" + title="pempton sôma" >πεμπτον + σωμα</span>, that fiery external rim of the + universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve. + How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that + the <span lang="el" title="aeikinêtos psychê" + >αεικινητος + ψυχη</span> of Plato came from the <span + lang="el" title="aeikinêtos aithêr" + >αεικινητος + αιθηρ</span> of Aristotle! Arist. had + guarded himself by saying that the soul as an <span lang="el" + title="archê kinêseôs" >αρχη + κινησεως</span> must be + <span lang="el" title="akinêtos" + >ακινητος</span>, but + Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> + 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to + the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just + where Arist. placed his <span lang="el" title="pempton sôma" + >πεμπτον + σωμα</span> Any one who will compare <i>T.D.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 43 with the <i>Somn. Scipionis</i> will see + what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the + mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on + as divine (cf. <i>Somn. Scip.</i> 15) These considerations will be enough + to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible + for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by + the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too + late. <i>Sensus</i>: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction + drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being + <span lang="el" title="analogon tô tôn astrôn stoicheiô" + >αναλογον τω + των αστρων + στοιχειω</span> (<i>De + Gen. An.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 3, qu. R. and P. 299). + <i>Ignem</i>: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree, + between <span lang="el" title="aithêr" + >αιθηρ</span> and <span lang="el" + title="pyr" >πυρ</span>, see Zeller 189, 190. <i>Ipsam + naturam</i>: <span lang="el" title="pyr" >πυρ</span> is + <span lang="el" title="kat' exochên stoicheion" >κατ' + εξοχην + στοιχειον</span> + (Stob. <span class="vol">I.</span> 10, 16), and is the first thing + generated from the <span lang="el" title="apoios hylê" + >αποιος + ‛υλη</span>; from it comes air, from air water, + from water earth (Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 136, 137) + The fire is <span lang="el" title="logikon" + >λογικον</span>, from it comes + the <span lang="el" title="hêgemonikon" + >‛ηγεμονικον</span> + of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. + These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics + (Zeller ch. <span class="vol">VIII.</span> with notes) For his view of + sensation and thought see Sextus <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 127—129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics + probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's + <i>Plato</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 34 sq. <i>Expers corporis</i>: + for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a + connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed + from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (<span lang="el" + title="ou gar enchôrein ta hetera kai diapheronta paschein hyp' allêlôn" + >ου γαρ + εγχωρειν τα + ‛ετερα και + διαφεροντα + πασχειν ‛υπ' + αλληλων</span>, qu. from Arist. + <i>De Gen. et Corr.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, by R. and P. 43), + the same is affirmed loosely of all the old <span lang="el" + title="physikoi" + >φυσικοι</span>, (Sextus + <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 116), and by Empedocles + in his lines <span lang="el" title="gaiai men gaian opôpamen" + >γαιαι μεν + γαιαν + οπωπαμεν</span>, etc. + Plato in the <i>Timaeus</i> fosters the same notion, though in a + different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of + thought. <i>Xenocrates</i>: see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkIIN_124">124</a>, n. <i>Superiores</i>: merely the supposed old + Academico-Peripatetic school. <i>Posse esse non corpus</i>: there is no + ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see + Zeller, pp. 134, 135.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_40"></a><a href="#BkI_40">§40</a>.</b> + <i>Iunctos</i>: how can anything be a <i>compound</i> of one thing? The + notion that <i>iunctos</i> could mean <i>aptos</i> (R. and P. 366) is + untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his + <i>D.F.</i>) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say + <i>iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum</i>, but having to + explain <span lang="el" title="phantasia" + >φαντασια</span> was + obliged to break off and resume at <i>sed ad haec</i>. The explanation of + a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in <i>De Off.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 153. Schuppe, <i>De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis</i> p. + 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 44 <i>e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus</i> + Ernesti em. <i>cunctos</i>, Dav. <i>punctos</i>, <i>ingeniose ille + quidem</i> says Halm, <i>pessime</i> I should say. <span lang="el" + title="Phantasian" + >Φαντασιαν</span>: + a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by + Zeller, ch. <span class="vol">V.</span>, R. and P. 365 sq. <i>Nos + appellemus licet</i>: the same turn of expression occurs <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 21, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 74. <i>Hoc + verbum quidem hoc quidem</i> probably ought to be read, see <a + href="#BkI_18">18</a>. <i>Adsensionem</i> = <span lang="el" + title="synkatathesin" + >συγκαταθεσιν</span>. + <i>In nobis positam</i>: the usual expression for freedom of the will, + cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_37">37</a>, <i>De + Fato</i>, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is + involuntary (<span lang="el" title="akousion" + >ακουσιον</span> Sext. + Emp. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 397). <i>Tironum + causa</i> I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the + mind as <i>involuntary,</i> while the <span lang="el" title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span> + <i>compels</i> assent (see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_38">38</a>). This is, however, only true of the healthy + reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_41"></a><a href="#BkI_41">§41</a>.</b> <i>Visis non + omnibus</i>: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno + abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner + citadel of the <span lang="el" title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span>. + <i>Declarationem</i>: <span lang="el" title="enargeian" + >εναργειαν</span>, + a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_17">17</a>. <i>Earum rerum</i>: + only this class of sensations gives correct information of the + <i>things</i> lying behind. <i>Ipsum per se</i>: i.e. its whole truth + lies in its own <span lang="el" title="enargeia" + >εναργεια</span>, which + requires no corroboration from without. <i>Comprehendibile</i>: this form + has better MSS. authority than the vulg <i>comprehensibile</i>. Goerenz's + note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity <i>Nos + vero, inquit</i>: Halm with Manut. writes <i>inquam</i>. Why change? + Atticus answers as in <a href="#BkI_14">14</a>, <a href="#BkI_25">25</a>, + <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <span lang="el" title="Katalêpton" + >Καταληπτον</span>: + strictly the <i>thing</i> which emits the <i>visum</i> is said to be + <span lang="el" title="katalêpton" + >καταληπτον</span>, + but, as we shall see in the <i>Lucullus</i>, the sensation and the thing + from which it proceeds are often confused. <i>Comprehensionem</i>: this + word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the + individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use <span + lang="el" title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span> + for <span lang="el" title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span> very + often. <i>Quae manu prehenderentur</i>: see <span class="vol">II.</span> + <a href="#BkII_145">145</a>. <i>Nova enim dicebat</i>: an admission not + often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno + merely renamed old doctrines (cf. <a href="#BkI_43">43</a>). + <i>Sensum</i>: so Stob., <span class="vol">I.</span> 41, 25 applies the + term <span lang="el" title="aisthêsis" + >αισθησις</span> to the + <span lang="el" title="phantasia" + >φαντασια</span>. + <i>Scientiam</i>: the word <span lang="el" title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span> is used + in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or + systematised perceptions (<span lang="el" title="katalêpseis" + >καταληψεις</span> + or <span lang="el" title="katalêptikai phantasiai" + >καταληπτικαι + φαντασιαι</span>) + sometimes also called <span lang="el" title="technê" + >τεχνη</span> (cf. Sext. <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 188 <span lang="el" title="technên de einai systêma ek katalêpseôn syngegymnasmenôn" + >τεχνην δε + ειναι + συστημα εκ + καταληψεων + συγγεγυμνασμενων</span>); + (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be + seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. <i>Ut convelli ratione non + posset</i>: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all <span + lang="el" title="katalêptikai phantasiai" + >καταληπτικαι + φαντασιαι</span> + were <span lang="el" title="asphaleis, ametaptôtoi hypo logou" + >ασφαλεις, + αμεταπτωτοι + ‛υπο λογου</span>. + Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to + logical tests; see Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> + 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every <span lang="el" title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span>, instead + of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of + sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller + remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic + theory. <i>Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret</i>: I know nothing like this + in the Stoic texts; <span lang="el" title="amathia" + >αμαθια</span> is very seldom talked + of there. <i>Opinio</i>: <span lang="el" title="doxa" + >δοξα</span>, see Zeller and cf. <i>Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_52">52</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 52, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 15, 26.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_42"></a><a href="#BkI_42">§42</a>.</b> <i>Inter + scientiam</i>: so Sextus <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> + 151 speaks of <span lang="el" title="epistêmên kai doxan kai tên en methopiai toutôn katalêpsin" + >επιστημην + και δοξαν + και την εν + μεθοπιαι + τουτων + καταληψιν</span>. + <i>Soli</i>: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives + <i>solum ei</i>. <i>Non quod omnia</i>: the meaning is that the reason + must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can + know thoroughly any one <i>thing</i>. This will appear if the whole + sentence be read <i>uno haustu</i>; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same + view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek. + <i>Quasi</i>: this points out <i>normam</i> as a trans. of some Gk. word, + <span lang="el" title="kritêrion" + >κριτηριον</span> + perhaps, or <span lang="el" title="gnômôn" + >γνωμων</span> or <span lang="el" + title="kanôn" >κανων</span>. <i>Notiones + rerum</i>: Stoic <span lang="el" title="ennoiai" + >εννοιαι</span>; Zeller + 81—84, R. and P. 367, 368. <i>Quodque natura</i>: the omission of + <i>eam</i> is strange; Faber supplies it. <i>Imprimerentur</i>: the terms + <span lang="el" title="enapesphragismenê, enapomemagmenê, entetypômenê" + >εναπεσφραγισμενη, + εναπομεμαγμενη, + εντετυπωμενη</span> + occur constantly, but generally in relation to <span lang="el" + title="phantasiai" + >φαντασιαι</span>, + not to <span lang="el" title="ennoiai" + >εννοιαι</span>. <i>Non + principia solum</i>: there seems to be a ref. to those <span lang="el" + title="archai tês apodeixeôs" >αρχαι + της + αποδειξεως</span> + of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the + bases of all proof. (See Grote's <i>Essay on the Origin of Knowledge</i>, + first printed in Bain's <i>Mental and Moral Science</i>, now re-published + in Grote's <i>Aristotle.</i>) Zeno's <span lang="el" title="ennoiai" + >εννοιαι</span> were all this + and more. <i>Reperiuntur</i>: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from + <i>oratio obliqua</i> to <i>recta</i>, which however has repeatedly taken + place during Varro's exposition, and for which see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 30, <span class="vol">III.</span> 49; (2) the + phrase <i>reperire viam</i>, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm + give <i>aperirentur</i>. There is no MSS. variant. <i>Aliena</i>: cf. + <i>alienatos</i> <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 18. <i>A + virtute sapientiaque removebat</i>: cf. <i>sapiens numquam fallitur in + iudicando</i> <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 59. The <i>firma + adsensia</i> is opposed to <i>imbecilla</i> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>. For + the <i>adsensio</i> of the <i>sapiens</i> see Zeller 87. More information + on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the + first part of the <i>Lucullus</i>. <i>In his constitit</i>: cf. <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_134">134</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkI_43">§§43</a>—end.</b> Cicero's + historical justification of the New Academy. Summary. Arcesilas' + philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the + obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of + knowledge (<a href="#BkI_44">44</a>). He even abandoned the one tenet + held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of + equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of + phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (<a + href="#BkI_45">45</a>). His views were really in harmony with those of + Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (<a + href="#BkI_46">46</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_43"></a><a href="#BkI_43">§43</a>.</b> + <i>Breviter</i>: MSS. <i>et breviter;</i> see <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>. + <i>Tunc</i>: rare before a consonant; see Munro on <i>Lucr.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 130. <i>Verum esse [autem] arbitror</i>: in + deference to Halm I bracket <i>autem</i>, but I still think the MSS. + reading defensible, if <i>verum</i> be taken as the neut. adj. and not as + meaning <i>but</i>. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it + is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that <i>esse</i> + was needed to go with <i>putandam</i>. This is a total mistake; cf. + <i>ait ... putandam</i>, without <i>esse</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + <a href="#BkII_15">15</a>, <i>aiebas removendum</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>; a hundred other + passages might be quoted from Cic.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_44"></a><a href="#BkI_44">§44</a>.</b> <i>Non + pertinacia aut studio vincendi</i>: for these words see n. on <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>. The sincerity of + Arcesilas is defended also in <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_76">76</a>. <i>Obscuritate</i>: a side-blow at + <i>declaratio</i> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>. <i>Confessionem + ignorationis</i>: see <a href="#BkI_16">16</a>. Socrates was far from + being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. <i>Et iam ante + Socratem</i>: MSS. <i>veluti amantes Socratem;</i> Democritus + (460—357 B.C.) was really very little older than Socrates + (468—399) who died nearly sixty years before him. <i>Omnis paene + veteres</i>: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised + <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_14">14</a>. None of these + were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on <span class="vol">II.</span> + <a href="#BkIIN_73">73</a>, for Empedocles on <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>, for Anaxagoras on + <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkIIN_72">72</a>. <i>Nihil + cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri</i>: the verbs are all equivalent; + cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 15 <i>equidem soleo etiam + quod uno Graeci ... idem pluribus verbis exponere</i>. <i>Angustos + sensus</i>: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles <span + lang="el" title="steinopoi men gar palamai k.t.l." + >στεινοποι + μεν γαρ + παλαμαι + κ.τ.λ.</span> R. and P. 107. <i>Brevia curricula + vitae</i>: cf. Empedocles' <span lang="el" title="pauron de zôês abiou meros" + >παυρον δε + ζωης αβιου + μερος</span>. Is there an allusion in + <i>curricula</i> to Lucretius' <i>lampada vitai tradunt</i>, etc.? <i>In + profundo</i>: Dem. <span lang="el" title="en bythô" >εν + βυθω</span>, cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_32">32</a>. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would + suit better. <i>Institutis</i>: <span lang="el" title="nomô" + >νομω</span> of Democritus, see R. and P. 50. + Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance. <i>Deinceps + omnia</i>: <span lang="el" title="panta ephexês" + >παντα + εφεξης</span> there is no need to + read <i>denique</i> for <i>deinceps</i> as Bentl., Halm. <i>Circumfusa + tenebris</i>: an allusion to the <span lang="el" title="skotiê gnôsis" + >σκοτιη + γνωσις</span> of Democr., see <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_73">73</a>. <i>Dixerunt</i>: Halm + brackets this because of <i>dixerunt</i> above, parts of the verb + <i>dicere</i> are however often thus repeated by Cic.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_45"></a><a href="#BkI_45">§45</a>.</b> <i>Ne illud + quidem</i>: cf. <a href="#BkI_16">16</a>. <i>Latere censebat</i> Goer. + omitted <i>censebat</i> though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as + usual. For the sense <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_122">122</a>. <i>Cohibereque</i>: Gk. <span lang="el" + title="epechein" + >επεχειν</span>, which we shall + have to explain in the <i>Lucullus</i>. <i>Temeritatem ... turpius</i>: + for these expressions, see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>, note. <i>Praecurrere</i>: as was the case with + the dogmatists. <i>Paria momenta</i>: this is undiluted scepticism, and + excludes even the possibility of the <i>probabile</i> which Carneades put + forward. For the doctrine cf. <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_124">124</a>, for the expression Euseb. <i>Praep. Evan.</i> + <span class="vol">XIV.</span> c. 4 (from Numenius) of Arcesilas, <span + lang="el" title="einai gar panta akatalêpta kai tous eis ekatera logous isokrateis allêlois" + >ειναι γαρ + παντα + ακαταληπτα + και τους εις + εκατερα + λογους + ισοκρατεις + αλληλοις</span>, Sextus + <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">IX.</span> 207 <span lang="el" + title="isostheneis logoi" + >ισοσθενεις + λογοι</span>; in the latter writer the word + <span lang="el" title="isostheneia" + >ισοσθενεια</span> + very frequently occurs in the same sense, e g <i>Pyrrhon. Hyp.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 8 (add <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 10, + <i>rationis momenta</i>)</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIN_46"></a><a href="#BkI_46">§46</a>.</b> + <i>Platonem</i>: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, + Sextus <i>Pyrrhon. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 221 <span + lang="el" title="ton Platôna oin hoi men dogmatikon ephasan einai, hoi de apo êtikon, hoi de kata men ti aporêtikon, kata de ti dogmatikon" + >τον Πλατωνα + οιν ‛οι μεν + δογματικον + εφασαν + ειναι, ‛οι + δε απο + ητικον, ‛οι + δε κατα μεν + τι + απορητικον, + κατα δε τι + δογματικον</span>. + Stobaeus <span class="vol">II.</span> 6, 4 neatly slips out of the + difficulty; <span lang="el" title="Platôn polyphônos ôn, ouch hôs tines oiontai polydoxos" + >Πλατων + πολυφωνος + ων, ουχ ‛ως + τινες + οιονται + πολυδοξος</span>. + <i>Exposuisti</i>: Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm, + etc. for MSS. <i>exposui</i>. <i>Zenone</i>: see Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_v">5</a>.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h3>NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.</h3> + +<p class="center">BOOK I.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_1"></a><a href="#Fr_1">1</a>.</b> <i>Mnesarchus</i>: + see <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_69">69</a>, <i>De Or.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 45, and <i>Dict. Biogr.</i> 'Antipater'; cf. + <span class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_143">143</a>, <i>De Off.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 50. Evidently this fragment belongs to that + historical justification of the New Academy with which I suppose Cicero + to have concluded the first book.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_2"></a><a href="#Fr_2">2</a>.</b> The word + <i>concinere</i> occurs <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 60, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 16, in both which places it is + used of the Stoics, who are said <i>re concinere, verbis discrepare</i> + with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had already + mentioned <a href="#BkI_43">43</a>, and probably repeated in this + fragment. Krische remarks that Augustine, <i>Cont. Acad.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 14, 15, seems to have imitated that part of + Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic. must have + condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order to excuse + the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).</p> + +<p class="center">BOOK II.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_3"></a><a href="#Fr_3">3</a>.</b> This fragm. clearly + forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments which Cic. in the + first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius, see Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_lv">55</a>. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so + level as the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not + level.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_4"></a><a href="#Fr_4">4</a>.</b> On this I have + nothing to remark.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_5"></a><a href="#Fr_5">5</a>.</b> There is nothing + distinctive about this which might enable us to determine its connection + with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who <i>serius adamavit + honores</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_6"></a><a href="#Fr_6">6</a>.</b> The changing aspects + of the same thing are pointed to here as invalidating the evidence of the + senses.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_7"></a><a href="#Fr_7">7</a>.</b> This passage has the + same aim as the last and closely resembles <i>Lucullus</i> <a + href="#BkII_105">105</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_8"></a><a href="#Fr_8">8</a>.</b> The fact that the + eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy the senses are. A + similar argument occurs in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_86">86</a>. + <i>Perpendiculum</i> is a plumb line, <i>norma</i> a mason's square, the + word being probably a corruption of the Greek <span lang="el" + title="gnômôn" >γνωμων</span> (Curt. + <i>Grundz</i> p. 169, ed. 3), <i>regula</i>, a rule.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_9"></a><a href="#Fr_9">9</a>.</b> The different + colours which the same persons show in different conditions, when young + and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober and when drunken, + are brought forward to prove how little of permanence there is even in + the least fleeting of the objects of sense.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_10"></a><a href="#Fr_10">10</a>.</b> <i>Urinari</i> is + to dive; for the derivation see Curt. <i>Grundz</i> p. 326. A diver would + be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in <i>Luc.</i> <a + href="#BkII_81">81</a>, which are unable to see that which lies + immediately above them and so illustrate the narrow limits of the power + of vision.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_11"></a><a href="#Fr_11">11</a>.</b> Evidently an + attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy. Different people pass + different judgments on one and the same odour. The student will observe + that the above extracts formed part of an argument intended to show the + deceptive character of the senses. To these should probably be added + fragm. <a href="#Fr_32">32</a>. Fr. <a href="#Fr_19">19</a> shows that + the impossibility of distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been + brought forward in the <i>Catulus</i>, was allowed to stand in the second + edition, other difficulties of the kind, such as those connected with the + bent oar, the pigeon's neck, the twins, the impressions of seals + (<i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>, <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>), would + also appear in both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses + must have been summed up in the phrase <i>cuncta dubitanda esse</i> which + Augustine quotes from the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> (see fragm. <a + href="#Fr_36">36</a>).</p> + +<p class="center">BOOK III.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_12"></a><a href="#Fr_12">12</a>.</b> This forms part + of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in substance to Lucullus' + speech in the <i>Academica Priora</i> The drift of this extract was most + likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the battle against + criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we must cease to + fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own way. See + another view in Krische, p. 62.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_13"></a><a href="#Fr_13">13</a>.</b> Krische believes + that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show that the senses were + trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with which the fishes + were seen leaping from the water was brought up as evidence. (In + <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>, on the other hand, Cic. drew an + argument hostile to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The + explanation seems to me very improbable. The words bear such a striking + resemblance to those in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_125">125</a> (<i>ut + nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic innumerabilis paribus + in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis</i>) that I am inclined to think + that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book <span + class="vol">IV.</span> and not Book <span class="vol">III.</span>, and + that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the Lucrine lake, also + changed <i>Puteolosque</i> into <i>pisciculosque exultantes</i> for the + sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa on the + Lucrine.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_14"></a><a href="#Fr_14">14</a>.</b> The passion for + knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by Varro as an argument + in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be attainable. The same line + is taken in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_31">31</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 17, and elsewhere.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_15"></a><a href="#Fr_15">15</a>.</b> It is so much + easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than in that of + Lucullus in the <i>Academica Priora</i> that I think the reference in + Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than + a dogmatist (see <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_105">105</a>, <a + href="#BkII_120">120</a>, and Cic.'s words in <a href="#BkII_8">8</a> of + the same). If my conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book <span + class="vol">IV.</span> Krische gives a different opinion, but very + hesitatingly, p. 63.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_16"></a><a href="#Fr_16">16</a>.</b> This may well + have formed part of Varro's explanation of the <span lang="el" + title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span>, + <i>temeritas</i> being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics + as by the Academics cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_42">42</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_17"></a><a href="#Fr_17">17</a>.</b> I conjecture + <i>malleo</i> (a hammer) for the corrupt <i>malcho</i>, and think that in + the second ed. some comparison from building operations to illustrate the + fixity of knowledge gained through the <span lang="el" + title="katalêpseis" + >καταληψεις</span> + was added to a passage which would correspond in substance with <a + href="#BkII_27">27</a> of the <i>Lucullus</i>. I note in Vitruvius, + quoted by Forc. s.v. <i>malleolus</i>, a similar expression (<i>naves + malleolis confixae</i>) and in Pliny <i>Nat. Hist.</i> <span + class="vol">XXXIV.</span> 14 <i>navis fixa malleo</i>. <i>Adfixa</i> + therefore in this passage must have agreed with some lost noun either in + the neut. plur. or fem. sing.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_18"></a><a href="#Fr_18">18</a>.</b> This and fragm. + <a href="#Fr_19">19</a> evidently hang very closely together. As Krische + notes, the Stoic <span lang="el" title="enargeia" + >εναργεια</span> had + evidently been translated earlier in the book by <i>perspicuitas</i> as + in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_17">17</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_19"></a><a href="#Fr_19">19</a>.</b> See on + <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkIIN_57">57</a>.</p> + +<p class="center">BOOK IV.</p> + + <p>Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on + the parallel passages of the <i>Lucullus</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_21"></a><a href="#Fr_21">21</a>.</b> <i>Viam</i> + evidently a mistake for the <i>umbram</i> of <i>Luc.</i> <a + href="#BkII_70">70</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_23"></a><a href="#Fr_23">23</a>.</b> The best MS. of + Nonius points to <i>flavum</i> for <i>ravum</i> (<i>Luc.</i> <a + href="#BkII_105">105</a>). Most likely an alteration was made in the + second edition, as Krische supposes, p. 64.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_28"></a><a href="#Fr_28">28</a>.</b> + <i>Corpusculis</i>: <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_121">121</a> has + <i>corporibus</i>. Krische's opinion that this latter word was in the + second edition changed into the former may be supported from <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_6">6</a>, which he does not notice. + The conj. is confirmed by Aug. <i>Contr. Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 23.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_29"></a><a href="#Fr_29">29</a>.</b> <i>Magnis + obscurata</i>: in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_122">122</a> it is + <i>crassis occultata</i>, so that we have another alteration, see + Krische, p. 64.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_30"></a><a href="#Fr_30">30</a>.</b> Only slight + differences appear in the MSS. of the <i>Luc.</i> <a + href="#BkII_123">123</a>, viz. <i>contraria</i>, for <i>in c.</i>, <i>ad + vestigia</i> for <i>contra v.</i></p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_31"></a><a href="#Fr_31">31</a>.</b> <i>Luc.</i> <a + href="#BkII_137">137</a> has <i>dixi</i> for <i>dictus</i>. As Cic. does + not often leave out <i>est</i> with the passive verb, Nonius has probably + quoted wrongly. It will be noted that the fragments of Book <span + class="vol">III.</span> correspond to the first half of the <i>Luc.</i>, + those of Book <span class="vol">IV.</span> to the second half. Cic. + therefore divided the <i>Luc.</i> into two portions at or about <a + href="#BkII_63">63</a>.</p> + +<p class="center">UNCERTAIN BOOKS.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_32"></a><a href="#Fr_32">32</a>.</b> I have already + said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary assault on the + senses made by Cic. in the second book.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_33"></a><a href="#Fr_33">33</a>.</b> In the Introd. p. + <a href="#Page_lv">55</a> I have given my opinion that the substance of + Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the <i>probabile</i> was + incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To + that part this fragment must probably be referred.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_34"></a><a href="#Fr_34">34</a>.</b> This important + fragment clearly belongs to Book <span class="vol">II.</span>, and is a + jocular application of the Carneadean <i>probabile</i>, as may be seen + from the words <i>probabiliter posse confici</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_35"></a><a href="#Fr_35">35</a>.</b> Krische assigns + this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book. With this opinion I + find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the <i>Lucullus</i> (<a + href="#BkII_60">60</a>) proves to demonstration that in the first edition + this allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have + occurred either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no + reason whatever appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer + to regard it as belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of + Academic doctrine in the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the + Academic school must not be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see + <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>, also <a href="#BkII_66">66</a> + and <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 12. Also Aug. <i>Contra. + Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 29.</p> + + <p><b><a name="FrN_36"></a><a href="#Fr_36">36</a>.</b> It is difficult + to see where this passage could have been included if not in that + prooemium to the third book which is mentioned <i>Ad. Att.</i> <span + class="vol">XVI.</span> 6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me + wrong in holding that the whole four books formed one discussion, + finished within the limits of a single day. Why interrupt the discussion + by the insertion of a prologue of so general a nature as to be taken from + a stock which Cic. kept on hand ready made? (Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> as + above.)</p> + +<hr /> + + <p>Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications + of its contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled <i>Contra + Academicos</i>, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions, + imitated throughout the second edition of the <i>Academica</i> of Cic. No + writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture + and opinions of Augustine as the <i>Academica</i> and the lost + <i>Hortensius</i>. I give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications + of the contents of the former which are to be gathered from the bishop's + works. In Aug. <i>Contr. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 14, 15, we + have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of Book <span + class="vol">I.</span> to the following effect. The New Academy must not + be regarded as having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to + discuss that new doctrine of <span lang="el" title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span> + advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of <span lang="el" title="akatalêpsia" + >ακαταληψια</span> + though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct + shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather + enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under + the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife + between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic. + must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his + opinion (<i>Contra. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1) that New + Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in which it + appeared. Indications of Book <span class="vol">II.</span> in Aug. are + scarce, but to it I refer <i>Contra. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 7 <i>placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad + eius inventionem non valeat pervenire</i>, also <i>ibid.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 10 <i>illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse + hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse</i>. + These I refer to Cicero's development of the <i>probabile</i> in Book + <span class="vol">II.</span>, although I ought to say that Krische, p. + 65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the <i>Ac. + Priora</i> transferred to Book <span class="vol">IV.</span> of the <i>Ac. + Posteriora</i>. As this would leave very meagre material for Book <span + class="vol">II.</span>, nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of + the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement; + mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from the first + edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in Book + <span class="vol">II.</span> are difficult to fix, as they apply equally + well to the later attack in Book <span class="vol">IV.</span> As to Books + <span class="vol">III.</span> and <span class="vol">IV.</span>, I do not + think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement + between them and the <i>Lucullus</i>, which will find a better place in + my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear from + other sources. These are the translation of <span lang="el" + title="sophismata" + >σοφισματα</span> + by <i>cavillationes</i> in <i>Luc.</i> <a href="#BkII_75">75</a> (Seneca + <i>Ep.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span>), and the insertion in <a + href="#BkII_118">118</a> of <i>essentia</i> as a translation of <span + lang="el" title="ousia" >ουσια</span>.</p> + +<h3>BOOK II.</h3> + +<p class="center">ENTITLED <i>LUCULLUS</i>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_1">§§1</a>—<a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>.</b> Summary. Lucullus, though an able and + cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during + his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum (<a + href="#BkII_1">1</a>). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was + due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory (<a + href="#BkII_2">2</a>). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits + as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till + just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I + cannot now tell (<a href="#BkII_3">3</a>). He was not merely a general; + he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read + much for himself (<a href="#BkII_4">4</a>). Those enemies of Greek + culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be + referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (<a href="#BkII_5">5</a>). + Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of + the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about + trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public + duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but + enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (<a + href="#BkII_6">6</a>). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these + dialogues had no such knowledge show that they can make their envy reach + beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy + which I follow—the Academic. This is natural, but they must know + that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry (<a href="#BkII_7">7</a>). My + school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to + authority (<a href="#BkII_8">8</a>). The dogmatists say they bow to the + authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without + hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus, + Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the + <i>Catulus</i> (<a href="#BkII_9">9</a>). Catulus called on Lucullus to + defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to + do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day + before (<a href="#BkII_10">10</a>). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard + discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, + and Antiochus. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday + came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book + against his old teacher (<a href="#BkII_11">11</a> and <a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>). I will now give the substance of the disputes + between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter + against Philo (<a href="#BkII_12">12</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_1"></a><a href="#BkII_1">§1</a>.</b> <i>Luculli</i>: + see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_lviii">58</a>, and <i>Dict. Biog.</i> + <i>Digna homini nobili</i>: a good deal of learning would have been + considered <i>unworthy</i> of a man like Lucullus, see Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_xxx">30</a>. <i>Percepta</i>: "gained," "won;" cf. + <i>percipere fruges</i>, "to reap," <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 24. <i>Caruit</i>: + "was cut off from;" <i>carere</i> comes from a root <i>skar</i> meaning + to divide, see Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 403. For the three + nouns with a singular verb see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 213 A, who confines the + usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common + reading <i>dissensit</i> in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 68 is right, the restriction does not hold. <i>Admodum</i>: "to a + degree." <i>Fratre</i>: this brother was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro, + and was a man of distinction also; see <i>Dict. Biog.</i> <i>Magna cum + gloria</i>: a ref. to <i>Dict. Biog.</i> will show that the whole affair + was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have + gained greater glory by letting it drop. <i>Quaestor</i>: to Sulla, who + employed him chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. + <i>Continuo</i>: without any interval. <i>Legis praemio</i>: this seems + to mean "by the favour of a special law," passed of course by Sulla, who + had restored the old <i>lex annalis</i> in all its rigour, and yet + excepted his own officers from its operation. <i>Prooemio</i>, which has + been proposed, would not be Latin, see <i>De Leg.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 16. <i>Consulatum</i>: he seems to have been + absent during the years 84—74, in the East. <i>Superiorum</i>: + scarcely that of Sulla.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_2"></a><a href="#BkII_2">§2</a>.</b> <i>Laus</i>: + "merit," as often, so <i>praemium</i>, Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span + class="vol">XII.</span> 437, means a deed worthy of reward. <i>Non + admodum exspectabatur</i>: Cic. forgets that Luc. had served with + distinction in the Social War and the first Mithridatic war. <i>In Asia + pace</i>: three good MSS. have <i>Asiae</i>; Baiter ejects <i>Asia</i>; + Guilelmus read <i>in Asia in pace</i> (which Davies conjectures, though + he prints <i>Asiae</i>). <i>Consumere</i> followed by an ablative without + <i>in</i> is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 53 denies the use altogether. In addition, however, + to our passage, I note <i>hoc loco consumitur</i> in <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give + no variants. <i>Pace</i> here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like + <i>tranqullo</i>. <i>Indocilem</i>: this is simply passive, = "untaught," + as in Prop. <span class="vol">I.</span> 2, 12, Ov. <i>Fast.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong + in making it active. <i>Factus</i>: = <i>perfectus</i>; cf. Hor. + <i>Sat.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5, 33 <i>homo factus ad + unguem</i>, Cic. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 184, <i>In + Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 126. So <i>effectus</i> in silver + Latin. <i>Rebus gestis</i>: military history, so often. <i>Divinam + quandam memoriam</i>: the same phrase in <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 360. <i>Rerum, verborum</i>: same distinction in + <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 359. <i>Oblivisci se + malle</i>: the same story is told <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 104, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 299. The ancient art of memory was begun by Simonides (who is the person + denoted here by <i>cuidam</i>) and completed by Metrodorus of Scepsis, + for whom see <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 360. + <i>Consignamus</i>: cf. <i>consignatae in animis notiones</i> in + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 57. <i>litteris</i> must be an + ablative of the instrument. <i>Mandare monum.</i>: cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_3">3</a>. <i>Insculptas</i>: rare in + the metaphorical use, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 45.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_3"></a><a href="#BkII_3">§3</a>.</b> <i>Genere</i>: + "department" cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_3">3</a>. + <i>Navalibus pugnis</i>: <span lang="el" title="naumachiais" + >ναυμαχιαις</span>. + <i>Instrumento et adparatu</i>: <span lang="el" title="kataskeuê kai paraskeuê" + >κατασκευη + και + παρασκευη</span>. + <i>Rex</i>: Mithridates. <i>Quos legisset</i>: = <i>de quibus l.</i>; cf. + the use of the passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. <i>Trist.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 4, 14. I take of course <i>rex</i> to be nom. to + <i>legisset</i>, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and + that <i>quos legisset</i> = <i>quorum commentarios legisset</i> I think + improbable. <i>Hodie</i>: Drakenborch on Livy <span class="vol">V.</span> + 27 wants to read <i>hodieque</i>, which however, is not Ciceronian. In + passages like <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 103 and + <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 64, the <i>que</i> connects + clauses and does not modify <i>hodie</i>. On this subject see Madv. + <i>Opuscula</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 390. <i>Etsi</i>: + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 68, shows that in Cic. a + parenthetic clause with <i>etsi</i> always has a common verb with its + principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same + holds of <i>quamquam</i>, see n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. <i>Calumnia</i>: properly a fraudulent use of + litigation, <span lang="el" title="sykophantia" + >συκοφαντια</span>. + The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who prosecuted him. <i>In + urbem</i>: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the city. + <i>Profuisset</i>: this ought properly to be <i>profuerit</i>, but the + conditional <i>dicerem</i> changes it. <i>Potius ... quam ... + communicem</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_23">23</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_4"></a><a href="#BkII_4">§4</a>.</b> <i>Sunt ... + celebrata</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_11">11</a>, + <a href="#BkI_17">17</a> for the collocation of the words. <i>Externa ... + interiora</i>: cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 124 <i>sed + haec quoque in promptu, nunc interiora videamus</i>. <i>Pro + quaestore</i>: for this Faber wrote <i>quaestor</i>, arguing that as Luc. + was Sulla's <i>quaestor</i> and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he could not be + <i>pro quaestor</i>. But surely after the first year he would be <i>pro + quaestor</i>. Dav. reads <i>quaestor</i> here and <a + href="#BkII_11">11</a>, saying "<i>veterem lectionem iugulavit + Faber</i>". <i>Ea memoria ... quam</i>: Bentl., Halm, Baiter give + <i>qua</i>, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. <i>Sat.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 6, 15. A passage like ours is <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 29, <i>ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis</i>, where + one MS. has <i>qua</i>. Read Madvig's lucid note there. <i>De quibus + audiebat</i>: Madv. <i>Em.</i> 121 makes this equivalent to <i>de eis + rebus de quibus</i>, the necessity of which explanation, though approved + by Halm, I fail to see. The form of expression is very common in Cic., + and the relative always refers to an actually expressed antecedent, cf. + e.g. <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 83. I take <i>quibus</i> as simply = + <i>libris</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_5"></a><a href="#BkII_5">§5</a>.</b> <i>Ac</i>: + strong, as often, = <span lang="el" title="kai mên" + >και μην</span>. <i>Personarum</i>: + public characters, <span lang="el" title="prosôpôn poleôs" + >προσωπων + πολεως</span> (<i>Ad. Fam.</i> <span + class="vol">XV.</span> 17, 2), so <i>personas</i> <a + href="#BkII_6">6</a>. <i>Multi ... plures</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_xxx">30</a>. <i>Reliqui</i>: many MSS. insert <i>qui</i> by + <i>dittographia</i>, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains + it. On the retention or omission of this <i>qui</i> will depend the + choice of <i>putant</i> or <i>putent</i> below. <i>Earum rerum + disputationem</i>: for <i>disp.</i> followed by genitive see n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>. <i>Non ita decoram</i>: + for this feeling see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxx">30</a>. For <i>non + ita</i> cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae". <i>Historiae + loquantur</i>: <i>hist.</i> means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than + "history," which is better expressed by <i>res gestae</i>. Note that the + verb <i>loqui</i> not <i>dicere</i> is used, and cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_101">101</a>. <i>Legatione</i>: to the kings in Egypt and + the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the + embassy see <i>Dict. Biogr.</i> art. 'Panactius'. <i>Auctorem</i>: one + would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read + <i>fautorem</i>, Dav. <i>auditorem</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_6"></a><a href="#BkII_6">§6</a>.</b> + <i>Illigari</i>: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use + Forc. qu. Liv. <span class="vol">XXXIII.</span> 21, Tac. <i>Ann.</i> + <span class="vol">XIII.</span> 40. <i>Aut ludicros sermones</i>: = <i>aut + clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat</i>. <i>Rerum leviorum</i>: a + similar argument in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 12. <i>Quodam + in libro</i>: the <i>Hortensius</i>. <i>Gradu</i>: so the word "degree" + was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the ballad. <i>De opera + publica detrahamus</i>: the dative often follows this verb, as in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 7 <i>nihil operae reipublicae + detrahens</i>, a passage often wrongly taken. <i>Operae</i> is the dat. + after the verb, not the gen. after <i>nihil</i>, <i>reip.</i> the gen. + after <i>operae</i>, like <i>opera publica</i> here, not the dat. after + <i>detrahens</i>. <i>Nisi forensem</i>: the early oratorical works may + fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the <i>De + Republica</i> or the <i>De Leg.</i> both of which fall within the period + spoken of. <i>Ut plurimis prosimus</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_xxix">29</a>. <i>Non modo non minui, sed</i>: notice <i>non + modo ... sed</i> thrice over in two sentences.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_7"></a><a href="#BkII_7">§7</a>.</b> <i>Sunt ... qui + negent</i>: and truly, see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxxviii">38</a>. In + <i>Cat. Mai.</i> §3 Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned + than he really was. <i>Mortuis</i>: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about + 57, Hortensius 50. <i>Contra omnis dicere quae videntur</i>: MSS. mostly + insert <i>qui</i> between <i>dicere</i> and <i>quae</i>, one of the best + however has <i>dicere quae aliis</i> as a correction, while another has + the marginal reading <i>qui scire sibi videntur</i>. The omission of + <i>qui</i>, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal. 2) + referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. <i>Verum invenire</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_60">60</a>. <i>Contentione</i>: = <span lang="el" + title="philoneikia" + >φιλονεικια</span> + as usual. <i>In ... rebus obscuritas</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> + <a href="#BkI_44">44</a> <i>rerum obscuritate</i>. <i>Infirmitas</i>: cf. + <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_44">44</a> <i>imbecillos + animos</i>. <i>Antiquissimi et doctissimi</i>: on the other hand + <i>recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_13">13</a>. <i>Diffisi</i>: one of + the best MSS. has <i>diffissi</i>, which reminds one of the spelling + <i>divisssiones</i>, asserted to be Ciceronian in Quint. <i>Inst. Or</i>. + <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, 20. <i>In utramque partem</i>: <span + lang="el" title="ep' amphotera" >επ' + αμφοτερα</span>, cf. + <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_45">45</a>. <i>Exprimant</i>: + "embody," cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_19">19</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_8"></a><a href="#BkII_8">§8</a>.</b> + <i>Probabilia</i>: <span lang="el" title="pithana" + >πιθανα</span>, for which see <a + href="#BkII_33">33</a>. <i>Sequi</i>: "act upon," cf. <a + href="#BkII_99">99</a>-<a href="#BkII_101">101</a>. <i>Liberiores et + solutiores</i>: these two words frequently occur together in Cic. and + illustrate his love for petty variations; see <a + href="#BkII_105">105</a>, also <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 43, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, <i>De Rep.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 4, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 56, + <i>Orat.</i> 64. <i>Integra</i>: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "<i>non + mihi integrum est</i>"—"I have committed my self." <i>Et quasi</i>: + MSS. have <i>et quibus et quasi</i>. <i>Cogimur</i>: for this Academic + freedom see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xviii">18</a>. <i>Amico cuidam</i>: + Orelli after Lamb. <i>cuipiam;</i> for the difference see Madv. + <i>Gram.</i> 493 <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_9"></a><a href="#BkII_9">§9</a>.</b> <i>Ut + potuerint, potuerunt</i>: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which was + simply <i>ut potuerunt</i>, "granting that they had the ability, they + gained it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they <i>did</i> + decide on a single hearing," etc. <i>Iudicaverunt autem</i>: so Lamb. for + MSS. <i>aut</i>. Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "<i>arguta + hariolatio</i>," read <i>an</i> for <i>aut</i> and put a note of + interrogation at <i>contulerunt</i>. C.F. Hermann (Schneidewin's + <i>Philologus</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 466) introduces by conj. + a sad confusion into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's + remarks in <i>Em.</i> 125 has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, + followed by the faithful Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion + of <i>aut</i> between <i>sed</i> and <i>ut</i> at the beginning; of this + Madv. says "<i>non solum Latina non est, sed sanae menti repugnat</i>." + For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 10, <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 36. + <i>Quam adamaverunt</i>: "which they have learned to love;" the <i>ad</i> + has the same force as <span lang="el" title="pro" + >προ</span> in <span lang="el" title="promanthanein" + >προμανθανειν</span>, + which means "to learn <i>on and on</i>, to learn by degrees" (cf. <span + lang="el" title="proumathon stergein kakois" + >προυμαθον + στεργειν + κακοις</span>), not, as the lexica + absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly." + <i>Constantissime</i>: "most consistently". <i>Quae est ad Baulos</i>: + cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_lvii">57</a>. <i>In spatio</i>: this + <i>xystus</i> was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called <span + lang="el" title="xystos" + >ξυστος</span> from its polished + floor and pillars. <i>Consedimus</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> + <a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_10"></a><a href="#BkII_10">§10</a>.</b> <i>Servatam + oportuit</i>: a construction very characteristic of Terence, found, but + rarely, in Cic. and Livy. <i>In promptu ... reconditiora</i>: cf. <i>in + promptu ... interiora</i> in <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 124, also <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_4">4</a>. + <i>Quae dico</i>: Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and + wishes to read <i>dixero</i>. But the substitution of the pres. for the + future is common enough in all languages cf. Iuv. <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 130 with Mayor's copious note. <i>Si non + fuerint</i>: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have <i>si + vera</i> etc. In support of the text, see <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_9">9</a> (<i>sunt ista</i>) and note. <i>Labefactata</i>: this + is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in <i>Ed. Rom.</i> + (1471); the others have <i>labefacta</i>. Orelli's statement (note to his + separate text of the <i>Academica</i> 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the + perfect <i>labefeci</i> and the part, <i>labefactus</i> is quite wrong. + The former is indeed the vulg. reading in <i>Pro Sestio</i> 101, the + latter in <i>De Haruspicum Responsis</i> 60, but the last of these two + passages is doubtful. Cic. as a rule prefers long forms like + <i>sustentatus</i>, which occurs with <i>labefactatus</i> in <i>Cat. + Mai.</i> 20. For the perfect <i>labefactavit</i> cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <i>Agam igitur</i>: Cic. + rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a belief in the + learning of Lucullus.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_11"></a><a href="#BkII_11">§11</a>.</b> <i>Pro + quaestore</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_4">4</a>. <i>Essem</i>: MSS. + <i>issem</i>, whence Goer. conj. <i>Alexandriam issem</i>. <i>Heraclitus + Tyrius</i>: scarcely known except from this passage. <i>Clitomachum</i>: + for this philosopher see Zeller 532. <i>Quae nunc prope dimissa + revocatur</i>: sc. <i>a Cicerone</i>. Philo's only notable pupils had + combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the + <i>Academica</i> the New Academic dialectic had been without a + representative for many years. Cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xxi">21</a>. + <i>Libri duo</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_13">13</a>. <i>Heri</i> for this indication of the contents of + the lost <i>Catulus</i>, see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_l">50</a>. + <i>Implorans</i>: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to + with tears," see Corss. <span class="vol">I.</span> 361. <i>Philonis</i>: + sc. <i>esse</i>. <i>Scriptum agnoscebat</i>: i.e. it was an actual work + of Ph. <i>Tetrilius</i>: some MSS. are said to have Tetrinius, and the + name <i>Tertinius</i> is found on Inscr. One good MS. has + <i>Tretilius</i>, which may be a mistake for <i>Tertilius</i>, a name + formed like <i>Pompilius</i>, <i>Quintilius</i>, <i>Sextilius</i>. Qy, + should <i>Petrilius</i>, a derivative from the word for four, be read? + <i>Petrilius</i> and <i>Pompilius</i> would then agree like + <i>Petronius</i> and <i>Pomponius</i>, <i>Petreius</i> and + <i>Pompeius</i>. For the formation of these names see Corss. <span + class="vol">I.</span> 116. <i>Rogus</i>: an ill omened and unknown name. + <i>Rocus</i>, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on <i>denarii</i> of the + <i>gens Creperia</i>. <i>De Philone ... ab eo ipso</i>: note the change + of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." <i>De</i> and <i>ex</i> + are common in Cic. after <i>audire</i>, while <i>ab</i> is rather rarer. + See <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 39, and for <i>describere + ab aliquo</i> cf. <i>a te</i> in <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">XIII.</span> 22, 3.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_12"></a><a href="#BkII_12">§12</a>.</b> <i>Dicta + Philoni</i>: for this see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_l">50</a>. It cannot + mean what Goer. makes it mean, "<i>coram Philone</i>." I think it + probable that <i>Philoni</i> is a marginal explanation foisted on the + text. As to the statements of Catulus the elder, they are made clear by + <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>. <i>Academicos</i>: i.e. <i>novos</i>, who are + here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the + title. <i>Aristo</i>: see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xi">11</a>. + <i>Aristone</i>: Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 mentions an + Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems + unknown. <i>Negat</i>: see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>. + <i>Lenior</i>: some MSS. <i>levior</i>, as is usual with these two words. + In <a href="#BkII_11">11</a> one of the earliest editions has + <i>leviter</i> for <i>leniter</i>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_13">§§13</a>—<a + href="#BkII_18">18</a>.</b> Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted + like a seditious tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as + supporters of scepticism (<a href="#BkII_13">13</a>), Those very + philosophers, with the exception of Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, + too dogmatic (<a href="#BkII_14">14</a>). Even if they were often in + doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made during so many + centuries by the investigations of so many men of ability? Arcesilas was + a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. Gracchus was a rebel + against a good government (<a href="#BkII_15">15</a>). Has nothing really + been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty, + though brilliant support (<a href="#BkII_16">16</a>). Now many dogmatists + think that no argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument + can add nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (<a + href="#BkII_17">17</a>). Most however do allow of discussion with + sceptics. Philo in his innovations was induced to state falsehoods, and + incurred all the evils he wished to avoid, his rejection of Zeno's + definition of the <span lang="el" title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span> really + led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. We then + must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the sceptics (<a + href="#BkII_18">18</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_13"></a><a href="#BkII_13">§13</a>.</b> <i>Rursus + exorsus est</i>: cf. <i>exorsus</i> in <a href="#BkII_10">10</a>. + <i>Popularis</i>: <span lang="el" title="dêmotikous" + >δημοτικους</span>. + <i>Ii a</i>: so Dav. for MSS. <i>iam</i>. <i>Tum ad hos</i>: so MSS., + Dav. <i>aut hos</i>. The omission of the verb <i>venire</i> is very + common in Cic.'s letters. <i>C. Flaminium</i>: the general at lake + Trasimene. <i>Aliquot annis</i>: one good MS. has <i>annos</i>, cf. + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, where all the best MSS. have + <i>annos</i>. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and + indeed it may be doubted whether the best writers <i>ever</i> use any + accusative in that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to + express duration (cf. Prop. <span class="vol">I.</span> 6, 7 and Madv. + <i>Gram.</i> 235, 2). <i>L. Cassium</i>: this is L. Cassius Longinus + Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (<i>De Leg.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 35), he was the author of the <i>cui + bono</i> principle and so severe a judge as to be called <i>scopulus + reorum</i>. Pompeium: apparently the man who made the disgraceful treaty + with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C. <i>P. Africanum</i>: i.e. + the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius, but seems to have + done nothing else for the democrats. <i>Fratres</i>: Lamb. <i>viros</i>, + but cf. <i>Brut.</i> 98. <i>P. Scaevolam</i>: the pontifex, consul in the + year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against + the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of + Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about + the legal effect the bills would have. <i>Ut videmus ... ut + suspicantur</i>: Halm with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that + the statement about Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but + him. Those words need not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be + allowed the inconsistency.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_14"></a><a href="#BkII_14">§14</a>.</b> + <i>Similiter</i>: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have + <i>simile</i>. <i>Xenophanem</i>: so Victorius for the MSS. + <i>Xenoplatonem</i>. <i>Ed. Rom.</i> (1471) has <i>Cenonem</i>, which + would point to <i>Zenonem</i>, but Cic. does not often name Zeno of Elea. + <i>Saturninus</i>: of the question why he was an enemy of Lucullus, Goer. + says <i>frustra quaeritur</i>. Saturninus was the persistent enemy of + Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage. + <i>Arcesilae calumnia</i>: this was a common charge, cf. <i>Academicorum + calumnia</i> in <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20 and + <i>calumnia</i> in <a href="#BkII_18">18</a> and <a + href="#BkII_65">65</a> of this book. So August. <i>Contra Acad.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 1 speaks of <i>Academicorum vel calumnia vel + pertinacia vel pericacia</i>. <i>Democriti verecundia</i>: Cic. always + has a kind of tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 20 remarks, cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the + general <i>arrogantia</i> of the <i>physici</i>. <i>Empedocles quidem ... + videatur</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>. The exordium of his poem is + meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of the text, + see R. and P. 108. <i>Quale sit</i>: the emphasis is on <i>sit</i>, the + sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. <i>Quasi modo + nascentes</i>: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however <i>T.D.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 5 <i>ut oratorum laus ... senescat ... , + philosophia nascatur</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_15"></a><a href="#BkII_15">§15</a>.</b> + <i>haesitaverunt</i>: Goer. cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 40. <i>Constitutam</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_14">14</a>. + <i>Delitisceret</i>: this is the right spelling, not <i>delitesceret</i>, + which one good MS. has here, see Corssen <span class="vol">II.</span> + 285. <i>Negavissent</i>: "had denied, as they said." <i>Tollendus + est</i>: a statement which is criticised in <a href="#BkII_74">74</a>. + <i>Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt</i>: genuine Antiochean + opinions, see the <i>Academica Posteriora</i> <a href="#BkI_17">17</a>, + <a href="#BkI_43">43</a>. <i>De se ipse</i>: very frequent in Cic. (cf. + Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 487 <i>b</i>). <i>Diceret</i>: this is omitted by the + MSS., but one has <i>agnosceret</i> on the margin; see n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_88">88</a>. <i>Fannius</i>: in his "Annals." The same + statement is quoted in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 270, + <i>Brutus</i> 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius + (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XII.</span> 5, 3).</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_16"></a><a href="#BkII_16">§16</a>.</b> + <i>Veteribus</i>: Bentley's em. of MSS. <i>vetera</i>: C.F. Hermann + (Schneid <i>Philol.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 457), thinking the + departure from the MSS. too great, keeps <i>vetera</i> and changes + <i>incognita</i> into <i>incondita</i>, comparing <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 197, <span class="vol">III.</span> 173. A glance, + however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely + "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between + order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that + <i>incognita</i> is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS. + reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us + suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were + not <i>knowledge</i>, but mere <i>opinion</i>." The conj. of Kayser + <i>veri nota</i> for <i>vetera</i> (cf. <a href="#BkII_76">76</a>) and + <i>investigatum</i> below, is fanciful and improbable. <i>Quod + investigata sunt</i>: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again + disturbs the text which since Madv. <i>Em.</i> 127 supported it (quoting + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 15, Liv. <span + class="vol">XXXV.</span> 16) had been settled. Holding that <i>illa</i> + in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects + <i>nihilne est igitur actum</i> as a dittographia (!) from <a + href="#BkII_15">15</a> <i>nihilne explicatum</i>, and reads <i>quot</i> + for <i>quod</i> with Bentl. For the meaning cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as + there quoted. <i>Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans</i>: see n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_34">34</a>. These charges were + brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch <i>Adv. Colotem</i> + p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge + is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was + often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug. <i>Contra Acad.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 14, 15 and notes on fragm. <a + href="#FrN_2">2</a> and <a href="#FrN_35">35</a> of the <i>Academica + Posteriora</i>. <i>Immutatione verborum</i>: n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>. This phrase has also + technical meanings; it translates the Greek <span lang="el" + title="tropoi" >τροποι</span> + (<i>Brut.</i> 69) and <span lang="el" title="allêgoria" + >αλληγορια</span> + in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 261, where an ex. is given. + <i>Definitiones</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>. <i>Tenebras + obducere</i>: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is + mentioned, cf. <a href="#BkII_30">30</a> (<i>lucem eripere</i>), + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 6 (<i>noctem obfundere</i>) Aug. + <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 14 (<i>quasdam nebulas + obfundere</i>), also the joke of Aug. <span class="vol">II.</span> 29 + <i>tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse</i>. <i>Non admodum + probata</i>: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. + <i>Lacyde</i>: the most important passages in ancient authorities + concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that + Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of + information about his teacher's doctrines. <i>Tenuit</i>: cf. the use of + <i>obtinere</i> in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 45. <i>In + Aeschine</i>: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher + see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have <i>hac nonne</i> Christ conj. + <i>Hagnone</i> which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to + adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon + just mentioned in Quint. <span class="vol">II.</span> 17, 15. There is + not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known + at all, from these two passages only.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_17"></a><a href="#BkII_17">§17</a>.</b> + <i>Patrocinium</i>: for the word cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 6. <i>Non defuit</i>: such patronage <i>was</i> + wanting in the time of Arcesilas (<a href="#BkII_16">16</a>). + <i>Faciendum omnino non putabant</i>: "Epictetus (Arrian, <i>Diss.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by + saying <span lang="el" title="ouk agô scholên pros tauta" + >ουκ αγω + σχολην προς + ταυτα</span>" (Zeller 85, n.). In another + passage (Arrian, <span class="vol">I.</span> 5) Epict. says it is no more + use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse. <i>Ullam rationem + disputare</i>: the same constr. occurs in <a href="#BkII_74">74</a> and + <i>Pro Caecina</i> 15, <i>Verr. Act.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 24. + <i>Antipatrum</i>: cf. fragm. <a href="#Fr_1">1</a> of Book <span + class="vol">I.</span> <i>Verbum e verbo</i>: so <a + href="#BkII_31">31</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 15, + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 7, not <i>verbum de verbo</i>, + which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. <i>Comprehensio</i>: cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>. <i>Ut Graeci</i>: for the + ellipse of the verb cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_44">44</a> <i>ut Democritus</i>. <i>Evidentiam</i>: other + translations proposed by Cic. were <i>illustratio</i> (Quint. <span + class="vol">VI.</span> 2, 32) and <i>perspicientia</i> (<i>De Off.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 15). <i>Fabricemur</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_87">87</a>, <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>, <a + href="#BkII_121">121</a>. <i>Me appellabat</i>: Cic. was the great + advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (<i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 15). <i>Sed tamen</i>: this often resumes the + interrupted narrative, see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 480. <i>Ipsa evidentia</i>: + note that the verb <i>evidere</i> is not Latin.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_18"></a><a href="#BkII_18">§18</a>.</b> + <i>Sustinere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_70">70</a>. <i>Pertinaciam</i>: the + exact meaning of this may be seen from <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 107, <span class="vol">III.</span> 1. It denotes + the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to + see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term + to the Academics, cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>, <a + href="#BkII_66">66</a>, also <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_44">44</a> and <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 94, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 13, in the last of which passages + the Academy is called <i>procax</i>. <i>Mentitur</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>. <i>Ita negaret</i>: this <i>ita</i> corresponds + to <i>si</i> below,—a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf. <a + href="#BkII_19">19</a>. <span lang="el" title="Akatalêpton" + >Ακαταληπτον</span>: + the conj. of Turnebus <span lang="el" title="katalêpton" + >καταληπτον</span> + is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in <i>negaret</i>. + <i>Visum</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_40">40</a>. + <i>Trivimus</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_27">27</a>. <i>Visum igitur</i>: the Greek of this definition + will be found in Zeller 86. The words <i>impressum effictumque</i> are + equivalent to <span lang="el" title="enapesphragismenê kai enapomemagmenê" + >εναπεσφραγισμενη + και + εναπομεμαγμενη</span> + in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to + be a real alteration (<span lang="el" title="heteroiôsis" + >‛ετεροιωσις</span>) + of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external + thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. + Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. <i>Ex eo unde esset ... unde non + esset</i>: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given + by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in + <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 86 <i>Pyrrh. + Hypotyp.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 242, the definition is clipt), + and in Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 50 (in 46 he gives a + clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It + is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of + his <i>Academica</i>) that Cic. omits to represent the words <span + lang="el" title="kat' auto to hyparchon" >κατ' + αυτο το + ‛υπαρχον</span>. Sextus + <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 249 considers them + essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra, + mistook her for an Erinys. The <span lang="el" title="phantasia" + >φαντασια</span> + therefore which he had although <span lang="el" title="apo hyparchontos" + >απο + ‛υπαρχοντος</span> + (proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not <span lang="el" + title="kata to hyparchon" >κατα το + ‛υπαρχον</span>, i.e. + did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug. <i>Cont. Acad.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses + it thus; <i>his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest + habere quod falsum est</i>. <i>Iudicium</i>: <span lang="el" + title="kritêrion" + >κριτηριον</span>, + a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. <i>Eo, quo + minime volt</i>: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a + reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of + knowledge on a ground quite different from the <span lang="el" + title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span>, which he + pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to + suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. <a + href="#BkII_11">11</a>, Sextus <i>Pyrr. Hyp.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans + believed all things to be <span lang="el" title="akatalêpta" + >ακαταληπτα</span>, + Philo held them to be <span lang="el" title="katalêpta" + >καταληπτα</span>, + and Numenius in Euseb. <i>Praep. Ev.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 8, + p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is + evident from the <i>Academica</i> and from Sextus as quoted above. The + foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to + comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be <i>in their + own nature</i> <span lang="el" title="katalêpta (hoson de epi tê physei tôn pragmatôn autôn katal.)" + >καταληπτα + (‛οσον δε + επι τη φυσει + των + πραγματων + αυτων + καταλ.)</span>. But Arcesilas and Carneades + would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that + things <i>in themselves</i> were incognisable, <i>but</i> that human + faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore + Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such + a doctrine. The Stoics by their <span lang="el" title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span> professed + to be able to get at <i>the thing in itself</i>, in its real being, if + then Philo did away with the <span lang="el" title="katal. phant." + >καταλ. + φαντ.</span> and substituted no other mode of + curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, + he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius + treats his polemic against the <span lang="el" title="katal. phant." + >καταλ. + φαντ.</span> as a mere feint intended to cover + his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in + <a href="#BkII_112">112</a> of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be + expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually + does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to + be "<i>quod impressum esset e vero</i>" (<span lang="el" title="phantasia apo hyparchontos enapomemagmenê" + >φαντασια + απο + ‛υπαρχοντος + εναπομεμαγμενη</span>), + refusing to add "<i>quo modo imprimi non posset a falso</i> (<span + lang="el" title="hoia ouk an genoito apo mê hyparchontos" + >‛οια ουκ αν + γενοιτο απο + μη + ‛υπαρχοντος</span>), + cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that + the cognisable was equivalent to the <span lang="el" title="dêlon" + >δηλον</span> or <span lang="el" + title="pithanon" + >πιθανον</span> of Carneades, + hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the + wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on + phenomena. (See <a href="#BkII_78">78</a> of this book.) The scarcity of + references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact + view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or + nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book + entitled <i>Academica</i> (pp. 313—316 of the reprint by Orelli). + With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" + consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that + they were apostles of doubt, to be correct (<a href="#BkII_12">12</a>). I + may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of + Stobaeus' <i>Ethica</i>, he would appear to have afterwards left + dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is, + that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new + Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as + genuinely Academic. <i>Revolvitur</i>: cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 13, also <a href="#BkII_148">148</a> of this book. + <i>Eam definitionem</i>: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the + sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single + sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these + sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that + <i>all</i> knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility + depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_19">§§19</a>—<a + href="#BkII_29">29</a>.</b> Summary. If the senses are healthy and + unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things. + Not that I maintain the truth of <i>every</i> sensation, Epicurus must + see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses must always be + removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can (<a + href="#BkII_19">19</a>). What power the cultivated senses of painters and + musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! (<a + href="#BkII_20">20</a>). After the perceptions of sense come the equally + clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of + sense, since they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we + arrive at definitions and ideas (<a href="#BkII_21">21</a>). If these + ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at + once rendered impossible (<a href="#BkII_22">22</a>). That true + perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the + things on which he takes action might prove to be false? (<a + href="#BkII_23">23</a>) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing + certain to guide her? There must he some ground on which action can + proceed (<a href="#BkII_24">24</a>). Credence must be given to the thing + which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible (<a + href="#BkII_25">25</a>). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an + end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never + be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, + should be brought to light (<a href="#BkII_26">26</a>). Syllogisms are + rendered useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a + sure basis (<a href="#BkII_27">27</a>). Hence the Academics have been + urged to allow their <i>dogma</i> that perception is impossible, to be a + certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be + inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there + can be <i>any</i> true perception (<a href="#BkII_28">28</a>). Antiochus + declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they + had not even confidence in their one dogma (<a + href="#BkII_29">29</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_19"></a><a href="#BkII_19">§19</a>.</b> + <i>Sensibus</i>: it is important to observe that the word <i>sensus</i> + like <span lang="el" title="aisthêsis" + >αισθησις</span> means + two things, (1) one of the <i>five</i> senses, (2) an individual act of + sensation. <i>Deus</i>: for the supposed god cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 67. <i>Non videam</i>: this strong statement is + ridiculed in <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>. <i>De remo inflexo et de collo + columbae</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkII_82">82</a>. + The <span lang="el" title="kôpê enalos keklasmenê" + >κωπη εναλος + κεκλασμενη</span> + and <span lang="el" title="peristeras trachêlos" + >περιστερας + τραχηλος</span> are + frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the + deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. <i>Pyrrhon. Hypot.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 119-121, <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day + before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 27. <i>Epicurus hoc viderit</i>: see <a + href="#BkII_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>. Epic. held all + sensation, <i>per se</i>, to be infallible. The chief authorities for + this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. <i>Lumen + mutari</i>: cf. <i>Brut.</i> 261. <i>Intervalla ... diducimus</i>: for + this cf. Sext. <i>Pyrrh</i>. <span class="vol">I.</span> 118 <span + lang="el" title="pemptos esti logos" + >πεμπτος + εστι λογος</span> + (i.e. the 5th sceptic <span lang="el" title="tropos" + >τροπος</span> for showing sense to + be untrustworthy) <span lang="el" title="ho para tas theseis" + >‛ο παρα τας + θεσεις</span> (<i>situs</i>) <span + lang="el" title="kai ta diastêmata" >και τα + διαστηματα</span> + (<i>intervalla</i>) <span lang="el" title="kai tous topous" + >και τους + τοπους</span>. <i>Multaque facimus + usque eo</i>: Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 258 + <span lang="el" title="panta poiei mechris an tranên kai plêktikên spasê phantasian" + >παντα ποιει + μεχρις αν + τρανην και + πληκτικην + σπαση + φαντασιαν</span>. + <i>Sui iudicii</i>: see for the gen. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. + <i>Persa</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 2, 8, quoted by Goer. <i>Sui + cuiusque</i>: for this use of <i>suus quisque</i> as a single word see + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 46.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_20"></a><a href="#BkII_20">§20</a>.</b> <i>Ut oculi + ... cantibus</i>: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other + hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. <i>Quis est quin + cernat</i>: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here + (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 27). <i>Umbris ... + eminentia</i>: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses <i>umbra</i> and + <i>lumen</i>, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. <span + lang="el" title="skia" >σκια</span> and <span + lang="el" title="skiasma" + >σκιασμα</span> are opposed to + <span lang="el" title="lampra" + >λαμπρα</span>; cf. also <span + lang="el" title="skiagraphein" + >σκιαγραφειν</span>, + <i>adumbrare</i>, and Aesch. <i>Agam</i>. 1328. Cic. often applies + metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. <i>De Or.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. <span + class="vol">II.</span> 17, 21. <i>Inflatu</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_86">86</a> (where an answer is given) and <span lang="el" + title="anabolê" + >αναβολη</span>. + <i>Antiopam</i>: of Pacuvius. <i>Andromacham</i>: of Ennius, often quoted + by Cic., as <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 23. + <i>Interiorem</i>: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's <i>Socrates and the + Socratic Schools</i>, 296. <i>Quia sentiatur</i>: <span lang="el" + title="aisthêsis" + >αισθησις</span> being + their only <span lang="el" title="kritêrion" + >κριτηριον</span>. + Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R. + and P. and Zeller will show) conj. <i>cui adsentiatur</i>, comparing <a + href="#BkII_39">39</a>, <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>; cf. also <a + href="#BkII_76">76</a>. <i>Inter eum ... et inter</i>: for the repetition + of <i>inter</i> cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 32 and Madv. + <i>Gram.</i> 470. <i>Nihil interesse</i>: if the doctrine of the + Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied + himself in pleasure, and <i>vice versa</i>; thus the distinction between + pleasure and pain would be obscured. <i>Sentiet ... insaniat</i>: For the + sequence cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 62 and Wesenberg's + fine note on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 102.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_21"></a><a href="#BkII_21">§21</a>.</b> <i>Illud est + album</i>: these are <span lang="el" title="axiômata" + >αξιωματα</span>, + judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see + Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too + long to quote entire: <span lang="el" title="aisthêsesi men oun monais labein talêthes" + >αισθησεσι + μεν ουν + μοναις + λαβειν + ταληθες</span> (which resides + only in the <span lang="el" title="axiôma" + >αξιωμα</span>) <span lang="el" + title="ou dynatai anthrôpos. ... physei gar eisin alogoi ... dei de eis phantasian achthênai tou toioutou pragmatos 'touto leukon esti kai touto glyky estin.' tôi de toioutôi pragmati ouketi tês aisthêseôs ergon estin epiballein ... syneseôs te dei kai mnêmês" + >ου δυναται + ανθρωπος. ... + φυσει γαρ + εισιν + αλογοι ... δει + δε εις + φαντασιαν + αχθηναι του + τοιουτου + πραγματος + "τουτο + λευκον εστι + και τουτο + γλυκυ εστιν." + τωι δε + τοιουτωι + πραγματι + ουκετι της + αισθησεως + εργον εστιν + επιβαλλειν + ... συνεσεως + τε δει και + μνημης</span>. <i>Ille deinceps</i>: + <i>deinceps</i> is really out of place; cf. <a href="#BkII_24">24</a> + <i>quomodo primum</i> for <i>pr. quom.</i> <i>Ille equus est</i>: Cic. + seems to consider that the <span lang="el" title="axiôma" + >αξιωμα</span>, which affirms the + existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the + existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from + the Greek texts. <i>Expletam comprehensionem</i>: full knowledge. Here we + rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. <i>Adv. + Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> <span lang="el" title="anthrôpos esti zôon logikon thnêton, nou kai epistêmês dektikon" + >ανθρωπος + εστι ζωον + λογικον + θνητον, νου + και + επιστημης + δεκτικον</span>. The + Stoic <span lang="el" title="horoi" + >‛οροι</span>, and this among them, are + amusingly ridiculed, <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 208—211. <i>Notitiae</i>: this Cic. uses as a translation both of + <span lang="el" title="prolêpsis" + >προληψις</span> and + <span lang="el" title="ennoia" + >εννοια</span>, for which see Zeller + 79, 89. In <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_40">40</a> + <i>notiones rerum</i> is given. <i>Sine quibus</i>: <span lang="el" + title="dia gar tôn ennoiôn ta pragmata lambanetai" >δια + γαρ των + εννοιων τα + πραγματα + λαμβανεται</span> + Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 42.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_22"></a><a href="#BkII_22">§22</a>.</b> + <i>Igitur</i>: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 480. + <i>Consentaneum</i>: so Sextus constantly uses <span lang="el" + title="akolouthon" + >ακολουθον</span>. + <i>Repugnaret</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_19">19</a> and n. <i>Memoriae certe</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_106">106</a>. <i>Continet</i>: cf. <i>contineant</i> in <a + href="#BkII_40">40</a>. <i>Quae potest esse</i>: Cic. nearly always + writes <i>putat esse</i>, <i>potest esse</i> and the like, not <i>esse + putat</i> etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause. + <i>Memoria falsorum</i>: this difficulty is discussed in Plato + <i>Sophist.</i> 238—239. <i>Ex multis animi perceptionibus</i>: the + same definition of an art occurs in <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 148, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 18 + (see Madv.), Quint, <span class="vol">II.</span> 17, 41, Sext. <i>Pyrrh. + Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 188 <span lang="el" title="technên einai systêma ek katalêpseon syngegymnasmenôn" + >τεχνην + ειναι + συστημα εκ + καταληψεον + συγγεγυμνασμενων</span> + <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 250. <i>Quam</i>: for the change + from plural to singular (<i>perceptio in universum</i>) cf. n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_38">38</a>, Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 61, <i>Em.</i> 139. <i>Qui distingues</i>: Sext. + <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 280 <span lang="el" + title="ou dioisei tês atechnias hê technê" >ου + διοισει της + ατεχνιας ‛η + τεχνη</span>. Sextus often comments on + similar complaints of the Stoics. <i>Aliud eiusmodi genus sit</i>: this + distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence + in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span + class="vol">XI.</span> 197 who adds a third class of <span lang="el" + title="technai" >τεχναι</span> called + <span lang="el" title="apotelesmatikai" + >αποτελεσματικαι</span> + to the usual <span lang="el" title="theôrêtikai" + >θεωρητικαι</span> + and <span lang="el" title="praktikai" + >πρακτικαι</span>, + also Quint. <span class="vol">II.</span> 18, 1 and 2, where <span + lang="el" title="poiêtikê" + >ποιητικη</span> + corresponds to the <span lang="el" title="apot." + >αποτ.</span> of Sext. <i>Continget</i>: "will be + the natural consequence." The notion that the verb <i>contingit</i> + denotes necessarily <i>good</i> fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer + on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 4. <i>Tractabit</i>: <span + lang="el" title="mellei metacheirizesthai" + >μελλει + μεταχειριζεσθαι</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_23"></a><a href="#BkII_23">§23</a>.</b> + <i>Cognitio</i>: like Germ. <i>lehre</i>, the branch of learning which + concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of + <span lang="el" title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span> + here. <i>In quibus</i>: the antecedent is not <i>virtutum</i>, as Petrus + Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, + but <i>multa</i>. This is shown by <i>etiam</i>; not <i>merely</i> the + virtues but <i>also</i> all <span lang="el" title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span> depends + on <span lang="el" title="katalêpseis" + >καταληψεις</span>; + cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_40">40</a>, <a + href="#BkI_41">41</a>, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. + <i>Stabilem</i>: <span lang="el" title="bebaion kai ametaptôtou" + >βεβαιον και + αμεταπτωτου</span>. + <i>Artem vivendi</i>: "<i>tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos</i>" + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 42. Sextus constantly talks + about <span lang="el" title="hê oneiropoloumenê peri ton bion technê" + >‛η + ονειροπολουμενη + περι τον + βιον τεχνη</span> + (<i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 250) the existence of + which he disproves to his own satisfaction (<i>Adv. Math.</i> <span + class="vol">XI.</span> 168 sq). <i>Ille vir bonus</i>: in all ancient + systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the <i>sapiens</i> must be + proof against the rack; cf. esp. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 29, 75, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the <span lang="el" + title="sophos" >σοφος</span> in Plato's + <i>Gorgias</i>. <i>Potius quam aut</i>: Lamb. <i>ut</i>; but I think C.F. + Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. <i>never</i> + inserts <i>ut</i> after <i>potius quam</i> with the subj. Tischer on + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 52 affirms that <i>ut</i> is + frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. <i>De Off.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 86, Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 12 who says the <i>sapiens</i> of the Academy must + be <i>desertor officiorum omnium</i>. <i>Comprehensi ... constituti</i>: + cf. the famous <i>abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit</i>. <i>Iis rebus</i>: + note the assumption that the <i>sensation</i> corresponds to the + <i>thing</i> which causes it. <i>Adsensus sit ... possint</i>: nearly all + edd. before Halm read <i>possunt</i>, but the subj. expresses the + possibility as present to the mind of the supposed <i>vir bonus</i>. Cf. + Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 368.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_24"></a><a href="#BkII_24">§24</a>.</b> + <i>Primum</i>: out of place, see on <a href="#BkIIN_21">21</a>. + <i>Agere</i>: the dogmatist always held that the sceptic must, if + consistent, be <span lang="el" title="anenergêtos en biôi" + >ανενεργητος + εν βιωι</span> (Sext. <i>Pyrrh. + Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 23). <i>Extremum</i>: similar + attempts to translate <span lang="el" title="telos" + >τελος</span> are made in D.F. <span + class="vol">I.</span> 11, 29, <span class="vol">V.</span> 17. <i>Cum quid + agere</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_23">23</a> for + the phrase <i>Naturae accommodatum</i>. a purely Stoic expression, <span + lang="el" title="hômoiômenon tê physei" + >‛ωμοιωμενον + τη φυσει</span>; cf. <a + href="#BkII_38">38</a> and <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 17, + also <span class="vol">III.</span> 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. + 390. <i>Impellimur</i>: <span lang="el" title="kinoumetha" + >κινουμεθα</span>, + Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 391, as often.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_25"></a><a href="#BkII_25">§25</a>.</b> <i>Oportet + videri</i>: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. <a + href="#BkII_39">39</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a> and <a + href="#BkII_122">122</a> of this book. <i>Videri</i> at the end of this + section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly + from the one use to the other; cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> 262 with + <span class="vol">I.</span> 270, and Munro's n., also <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 52, <i>Em. Liv.</i> p. 42. <i>Non poterit</i>: as + the Academics allege. <i>Naturae ... alienum</i>: Cic. uses this + adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by <i>ab</i>; + I doubt whether the phrase <i>maiestate alienum</i> (without the + preposition) can be right in <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 102, where the best texts still keep it. <i>Non occurrit ... aget</i>: + occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_127">127</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_26"></a><a href="#BkII_26">§26</a>.</b> <i>Quid quod + si</i>: Goer., outrageously reads <i>quid quod si, si</i>. + <i>Tollitur</i>: the verb <i>tollere</i> occurs as frequently in this + sense as <span lang="el" title="anairein" + >αναιρειν</span> does in + Sextus. <i>Lux lumenque</i>: Bentl. <i>dux</i> The expression <i>dux + vitae</i> is of course frequent (cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 40, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 5 and + Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. <i>Lux</i> is properly natural + light, <i>lumen</i> artificial, cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">XVI.</span> 13, 1. <i>lumina dimiseramus, nec satis + lucebat</i>, D.F. <span class="vol">III.</span> 45 <i>solis luce ... + lumen lucernae</i>. There is the same difference between <span lang="el" + title="phôs" >φως</span> and <span lang="el" + title="phengos" >φεγγος</span>, the + latter is used for the former (<span lang="el" title="phengos hêliou" + >φεγγος + ‛ηλιου</span>) just as <i>lumen</i> + is for <i>lux</i> (<i>si te secundo lumine his offendere</i>—<i>Ad + Att.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 26, 1) but not often <i>vice + versa</i>. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext. + <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 269 where the <span + lang="el" title="phantasia" + >φαντασια</span> is + called <span lang="el" title="phengos" + >φεγγος</span>. <i>Finis</i>: so in + the beginning of the <i>Nicom. Eth.</i> Aristot. assumes that the actual + existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a <span + lang="el" title="telos" >τελος</span>. + <i>Aperta</i>: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms + <span lang="el" title="ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos" + >εκκαλυπτειν, + εκκαλυπτικος</span> + etc., cf. Sextus <i>passim</i>, and <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 30. <i>Initium ... exitus</i> = <span lang="el" + title="archê ... telos" >αρχη ... + τελος</span>. <i>Tenetur</i>: MSS. + <i>tenet</i>, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be <i>ratio</i> above. + <span lang="el" title="Apodeixis" + >Αποδειξις</span>: + cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 143 <span lang="el" title="logos di' homologoumenôn lêmmatôn" + >λογος δι' + ‛ομολογουμενων + λημματων</span> + (premisses) <span lang="el" title="kata synagôgên epiphoran" + >κατα + συναγωγην + επιφοραν</span> + (conclusion) <span lang="el" title="ekkalyptôn adêlon" + >εκκαλυπτων + αδηλον</span>, also Diog. <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 45, <span lang="el" title="logon dia tôn mallon katalambanomenôn to hêtton katalambanomenon perainonta" + >λογον δια + των μαλλον + καταλαμβανομενων + το ‛ηττον + καταλαμβανομενον + περαινοντα</span> + (if the reading be right).</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_27"></a><a href="#BkII_27">§27</a>.</b> + <i>Notio</i>: another trans. of <span lang="el" title="ennoia" + >εννοια</span>. <i>Conclusisse</i>: + although the Greeks used <span lang="el" title="symperasma" + >συμπερασμα</span> + instead of <span lang="el" title="epiphora" + >επιφορα</span> sometimes for + the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb <span + lang="el" title="symperainein" + >συμπεραινειν</span> + which has been supposed to correspond to <i>concludere</i>. It is more + likely to be a trans. of <span lang="el" title="synagein" + >συναγειν</span>, and + <i>conclusum argumentum</i> of <span lang="el" title="synaktikos logos" + >συνακτικος + λογος</span>, which terms are of frequent + occurrence. <i>Rationibus progredi</i>: to a similar question Sextus + answers, <span lang="el" title="ouk estin anankaion tas ekeinon" + >ουκ εστιν + αναγκαιον + τας + εκεινον</span> (the dogmatists) + <span lang="el" title="dogmatologias probainein, plasmatôdeis hyparchousas" + >δογματολογιας + προβαινειν, + πλασματωδεις + ‛υπαρχουσας</span> + (<i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 367). <i>Sapientiae ... + futurum est</i>: for the dat. with <i>facio</i> and <i>fio</i> see Madv. + <i>Gram.</i> 241, obs. 5, <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 370, + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 79, and cf. <a + href="#BkII_96">96</a> of this book. <i>Lex veri rectique</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_29">29</a>; the <i>constitutio veri</i> and the determination + of what is <i>rectum</i> in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy. + <i>Sapientique satis non sit</i>: so Manut. for the <i>sapientisque + sit</i> of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads <i>sapientis, neque satis + sit</i>, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the + construction will run <i>neque dubitari potest quin satis sit</i>, which + gives the exact opposite of the sense required. <i>Ratum</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_141">141</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_28"></a><a href="#BkII_28">§28</a>.</b> + <i>Perceptum</i>: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are + very frequent in Sextus, e.g. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span + class="vol">VIII.</span> 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be + impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it + impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be <i>provable</i>. Cf. <a + href="#BkII_109">109</a> of this book. <i>Postulanti</i>: making it a + necessity for the discussion; cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 21. <i>Consentaneum esse</i>: <span lang="el" + title="akolouthon einai" + >ακολουθον + ειναι</span>. <i>Ut alia</i>: + <i>although</i> others. <i>Tantum abest ut—ut</i>: cf. Madv. + <i>Gram.</i> 440 a.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_29"></a><a href="#BkII_29">§29</a>.</b> + <i>Pressius</i>: cf. <i>De Fato</i> 31, 33, <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 20, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 14, + <i>Hortensius</i> fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in <a + href="#BkII_109">109</a>. <i>Decretum</i>: of course the Academics would + say they did not hold this <span lang="el" title="dogma" + >δογμα</span> as <i>stabile fixum ratum</i> + but only as <i>probabile</i>. Sextus however <i>Pyrrh. Hyp.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in + reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. + <i>Sentitis enim</i>: cf. <i>sentis</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 26. <i>Fluctuare</i>: "to be at sea," Halm + <i>fluctuari</i>, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. + <i>Summa</i>: cf. <i>summa philosophiae</i> <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 86. <i>Veri falsi</i>: cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. <i>Quae visa</i>: so Halm for MSS. + <i>quaevis</i>, which edd. had changed to <i>quae a quovis</i>. + <i>Repudiari</i>: the selection depended on the <i>probabile</i> of + course, with the Academics. <i>Veri falsique</i>: these words were used + in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by + them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements + in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. + says, <span lang="el" title="psilê phasei ison pheretai psilê phasis" + >ψιλη φασει + ισον + φερεται + ψιλη φασις</span> + (<i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 315), <span lang="el" + title="phasei men phasis epischethêsetai" + >φασει μεν + φασις + επισχεθησεται</span> + (<i>ib.</i> 337). <i>Cognoscendi initium</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_26">26</a>, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my + <i>probabile</i>." <i>Extremum expetendi</i>: a rather unusual phrase for + the ethical <i>finis</i>. <i>Ut moveri non possint</i>: so <span + lang="el" title="kineisthai" + >κινεισθαι</span> + is perpetually used in Sext. <i>Est ut opinor</i>: so Halm after Ernesti + for <i>sit</i> of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading + is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek + <span lang="el" title="hikanos eioêsthô" + >‛ικανος + ειοησθω</span> and the like. + The subj. is supported by <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 20, + <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 8, <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">XIII.</span> 14, 3, where <i>ut opinor</i> is thrown in as + here, and by <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> <a + href="#BkII_17">17</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 21, 24, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 109, where <i>si placet</i> is + appended in a similar way.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_30">§§30</a>—<a + href="#BkII_36">36</a>.</b> Summary. With respect to physical science, we + might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is + naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (<a + href="#BkII_30">30</a>). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and + so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason. + Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the + senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (<a + href="#BkII_31">31</a>). Some sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others + distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of + its absolute presence. Let us deal with these rather than with the former + (<a href="#BkII_32">32</a>). Now they on the one hand profess to + distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no + absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is + possible (<a href="#BkII_33">33</a>). This is absurd, a thing cannot be + known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. How + can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility remains + that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be "evident" at all + if it may be after all a mere phantom (<a href="#BkII_34">34</a>)? There + is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known. + Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (<a + href="#BkII_35">35</a>). Even if they only profess to decide after + careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is + still possibly false is useless (<a href="#BkII_36">36</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_30"></a><a href="#BkII_30">§30</a>.</b> + <i>Physicis</i>: neuter not masc.; cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>Libertatem et licentiam</i>: <i>et</i> = "and + even." <i>Libertas</i> = <span lang="el" title="parrêsia" + >παρρησια</span> as often + in Tacitus. <i>Abditis rebus et obscuris</i>: cf. n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_15">15</a>, and the word <span + lang="el" title="syneskiasmenos" + >συνεσκιασμενος</span> + Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 26. <i>Lucem + eripere</i>: like <i>tollere</i> (n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>), cf. + <a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, <a href="#BkII_103">103</a> and <i>N.D.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 6. For the sense see n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_16">16</a>, also <a href="#BkII_61">61</a>. + <i>Artificio</i>: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to <i>ars</i> + in all its senses, cf. <a href="#BkII_114">114</a> and <i>De Or.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 83. <i>Fabricata esset</i>: the expression + is sneered at in <a href="#BkII_87">87</a>. <i>Quem ad modum primum</i>: + so Halm rightly for MSS. <i>prima</i> or <i>primo</i>, which latter is + not often followed by <i>deinde</i> in Cicero. <i>Primum</i> is out of + position, as in <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Appetitio pulsa</i>: = + <i>mota</i>, set in motion. For <span lang="el" title="hormê" + >‛ορμη</span> see <a + href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Intenderemus</i>: as in the exx. given in <a + href="#BkII_20">20</a>. <i>Fons</i>: "reservoir," rather than "source" + here. It will be noted that <span lang="el" title="synkatathesis" + >συγκαταθεσις</span> + must take place before the <span lang="el" title="hormê" + >‛ορμη</span> is roused. <i>Ipse sensus + est</i>: an approach to this theory is made in Plat. <i>Theaet.</i> 185, + 191. Cf. especially Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> + 350 <span lang="el" title="kai hoi men diapherein autên tôn aisthêseôn, hôs hoi pleious, hoi de autên einai tas aisthêseis ... hês staseôs êrxe Straton" + >και ‛οι μεν + διαφερειν + αυτην των + αισθησεων, + ‛ως ‛οι + πλειους, ‛οι + δε αυτην + ειναι τας + αισθησεις ... + ‛ης στασεως + ηρξε + Στρατον</span>. All powers of + sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included + in the <span lang="el" title="hêgemonikon" + >‛ηγεμονικον</span>, + cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_38">38</a>. <i>Alia + quasi</i>: so Faber for <i>aliqua</i>. "<i>In vera et aperta partitione + nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis—alius dixit, multo minus + alius—aliquis</i>," <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 63. + Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he + forbears however, to produce them. <i>Recondit</i>: so the <span + lang="el" title="ennoiai" + >εννοιαι</span> are called + <span lang="el" title="apokeimenai noêseis" + >αποκειμεναι + νοησεις</span> (Plut. <i>De + Sto. Repug.</i> p. 1057 a). In Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 373 <span lang="el" title="mnêmê" + >μνημη</span> is called <span lang="el" + title="thêsaurismos phantasiôn" + >θησαυρισμος + φαντασιων</span>. + <i>Similitudinibus</i>: <span lang="el" title="kath' homoiôsin" + >καθ' + ‛ομοιωσιν</span> + Sext. <i>Pyrr. Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 75. Cic. uses this + word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not + immediately perceived by sense. In <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see + Madv. there, and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best + translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in <i>N.D.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 22 38. <i>Construit</i>: so MSS. Orelli gave + <i>constituit</i>. <i>Notitiae</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. Cic. + fails to distinguish between the <span lang="el" title="physikai ennoiai" + >φυσικαι + εννοιαι</span> or <span + lang="el" title="koinai" + >κοιναι</span> which are the <span + lang="el" title="prolêpseis" + >προληψεις</span>, + and those <span lang="el" title="ennoiai" + >εννοιαι</span> which are the + conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 21, <span class="vol">V.</span> 60, for + this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also + Zeller 79. <i>Rerumque</i>: "facts". <i>Perfecta</i>: <i>sapientia</i>, + <i>virtus</i>, <i>perfecta ratio</i>, are almost convertible terms in the + expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_20">20</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_31"></a><a href="#BkII_31">§31</a>.</b> <i>Vitaeque + constantiam</i>: which philosophy brings, see <a href="#BkII_23">23</a>. + <i>Cognitionem</i>: <span lang="el" title="epistêmên" + >επιστημην</span>. + <i>Cognitio</i> is used to translate <span lang="el" title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span> + in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 16, <span + class="vol">III.</span> 17, cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_41">41</a>. <i>Ut dixi ... dicemus</i>: For the repetition + cf. <a href="#BkII_135">135</a>, <a href="#BkII_146">146</a>, and + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 41. The future tense is odd and + unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote <i>dicimus</i>, I would rather read + <i>dicamus</i>; cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_29">29</a>. <i>Per se</i>: + <span lang="el" title="kath' autên" >καθ' + αυτην</span>, there is no need to read + <i>propter</i>, as Lamb. <i>Ut virtutem efficiat</i>: note that virtue is + throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the + <i>reason</i>. <i>Evertunt</i>: cf. <i>eversio</i> in <a + href="#BkII_99">99</a>. <i>Animal ... animo</i>: Cic. allows + <i>animus</i> to all animals, not merely <i>anima</i>; see Madv. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. + <i>animans</i> is therefore wrong. <i>Temeritate</i>: <span lang="el" + title="propeteia" + >προπετεια</span>, + which occurs <i>passim</i> in Sext. The word, which is constantly hurled + at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in + Sext. <i>Adv. Math.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 260, the sceptic is + called <span lang="el" title="embrontêtos" + >εμβροντητος</span> + for rejecting the <span lang="el" title="katalêptikê phantasia" + >καταληπτικη + φαντασια</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_32"></a><a href="#BkII_32">§32</a>.</b> + <i>Incerta</i>: <span lang="el" title="adêla" + >αδηλα</span>. <i>Democritus</i>: cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_44">44</a>. <i>Quae ... + abstruserit</i>: "<i>because</i> she has hidden." <i>Alii autem</i>: note + the ellipse of the verb, and cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_2">2</a>. <i>Etiam queruntur</i>: "actually complain;" "go so + far as to complain." <i>Inter incertum</i>: cf. Numenius in Euseb. <i>Pr. + Ev.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 7, 12, <span lang="el" + title="diaphoran einai adêlou kai akatalêptou, kai panta men einai akatalêpta ou panta de adêla" + >διαφοραν + ειναι + αδηλου και + ακαταληπτου, + και παντα + μεν ειναι + ακαταληπτα + ου παντα δε + αδηλα</span> (quoted as from Carneades), + also <a href="#BkII_54">54</a> of this book. <i>Docere</i>: "to prove," + cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_121">121</a>. <i>Qui haec distinguunt</i>: the + followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_45">45</a>. <i>Stellarum + numerus</i>: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext. + e.g. <i>P.H</i>. <span class="vol">II.</span> 90, 98, <i>A.M</i>. <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 243, <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 147, 317; + where it is reckoned among things <span lang="el" title="aiônion echonta agnôsian" + >αιωνιον + εχοντα + αγνωσιαν</span>. So in + the Psalms, God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. <a + href="#BkII_110">110</a>. <i>Aliquos</i>: contemptuous; <span lang="el" + title="aponenoêmenous tinas" + >απονενοημενους + τινας</span>. Cf. <i>Parad.</i> 33 + <i>agrestis aliquos</i>. <i>Moveri</i>: this probably refers to the + speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_li">51</a>. Aug. + <i>Cont. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 15 refers to this passage, + which must have been preserved in the second edition.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_33"></a><a href="#BkII_33">§33</a>.</b> <i>Veri et + falsi</i>: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and + Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and appropriate. + "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false + while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether." The + discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use + the term "true" to denote the <i>probably true</i>, the Academics are not + open to the criticism here attempted; cf. <a href="#BkII_111">111</a> + <i>tam vera quam falsa cernimus</i>. <i>Ut inter rectum et pravum</i>: + the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this + distinction than of the other. <i>Communis</i>: the <span lang="el" + title="aparallaktos" + >απαραλλακτος</span> + of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf. <span + lang="el" title="koinê phantasia alêthous kai pseudous" + >κοινη + φαντασια + αληθους και + ψευδους</span> Sext. + <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175. + <i>Notam</i>: the <span lang="el" title="sêmeion" + >σημειον</span> of Sextus; cf. + esp. <i>P.H</i>. <span class="vol">II.</span> 97 sq. <i>Eodem modo + falsum</i>: Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 (R. and + P. 410) <span lang="el" title="oudemia estin alêthês phantasia hoia ouk an genoito pseudês" + >ουδεμια + εστιν + αληθης + φαντασια + ‛οια ουκ αν + γενοιτο + ψευδης</span>. <i>Ut si quis</i>: + Madv. in an important n. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 30 + explains this thus; <i>ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit + dicere</i>. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he + quotes, and still prefer to construe <i>quem</i> as a strong relative, + making a pause between <i>quis</i> and <i>quem</i>. <i>Visionem</i>: + Simply another trans. of <span lang="el" title="phantasia" + >φαντασια</span>. <i>Ut + Carneades</i>: see Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 166 + <span lang="el" title="tên te pithanên phantasian kai tên pithanên hama kai aperispaston kai diexôdeumenên" + >την τε + πιθανην + φαντασιαν + και την + πιθανην + ‛αμα και + απερισπαστον + και + διεξωδευμενην</span> + (R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 + "probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own + explanation. The merely <span lang="el" title="pithanê" + >πιθανη</span> is that sensation + which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true + (Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 167—175). Now no + sensation is perceived <i>alone</i>; the percipient subject has always + other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (<span + lang="el" title="perispan, perielkein" + >περισπαν, + περιελκειν</span>) + from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is + only called <span lang="el" title="aperispastos" + >απερισπαστος</span> + when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in + harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175—181.) The word "undisputed," + therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The <span lang="el" + title="diexôdeumenê" + >διεξωδευμενη</span> + ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of + the concomitant sensations with the principal one. Circumstances quite + external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which + they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space + within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person + and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's + mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext. + 181—189).</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_34"></a><a href="#BkII_34">§34</a>.</b> + <i>Communitas</i>: <span lang="el" title="aparallaxia" + >απαραλλαξια</span> + or <span lang="el" title="epimixia tôn phantasiôn" + >επιμιξια + των + φαντασιων</span>; + Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 403, <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 127. <i>Proprium</i>: so Sext. often uses <span + lang="el" title="idioma" + >ιδιομα</span>, e.g. <i>A. M.</i> + <span class="vol">IX.</span> 410. <i>Signo notari</i>: <i>signo</i> for + <i>nota</i>, merely from love of variety. The <i>in</i> before + <i>communi</i>, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly + sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after + <i>notare</i> in <i>De Or.</i>, <span class="vol">III.</span> 186. + <i>Convicio</i>: so Madv. <i>Em.</i> 143 corrected the corrupt MSS. + readings, comparing <i>Orator</i> 160, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span + class="vol">XV.</span> 18. A.W. Zumpt on <i>Pro Murena</i> 13 rightly + defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "<i>Non unum maledictum + appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio</i>." He is + wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word <i>once</i> in the + plural (<i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18, 1), for it occurs + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20, and elsewhere. + <i>Perspicua</i>: <span lang="el" title="enargê" + >εναργη</span>, a term used with + varying signification by all the later Greek schools. <i>Verum illud + quidem</i>: "which is indeed what <i>they</i> call 'true'." + <i>Impressum</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>. <i>Percipi atque + comprehendi</i>: Halm retains the barbarous <i>ac</i> of the MSS. before + the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The + two verbs are both trans. of <span lang="el" title="katalambanesthai" + >καταλαμβανεσθαι</span>; + Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 14 <i>erit notius quale sit, pluribus + notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus</i>. <i>Subtiliter</i>: Cic.'s + constant trans. of <span lang="el" title="akribôs" + >ακριβως</span> or <span + lang="el" title="kat' akribeian" >κατ' + ακριβειαν</span> + (<i>passim</i> in Sext. e.g. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 123). <i>Inaniterne moveatur</i>: MSS. agree in <i>ve</i> for <i>ne</i>, + on which see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 76. + <i>Inaniter</i> = <span lang="el" title="kenôs" + >κενως</span> = <span lang="el" + title="pseudôs" >ψευδως</span>. Cf. + n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_35">35</a>, also <span + class="vol">II.</span> <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 3 (<i>inaniter moveri</i>), <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 13, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 120, 126, 140 (<i>per se moveri</i>), Greek <span lang="el" + title="kenopathein" + >κενοπαθειν</span> + (Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 49), <span lang="el" + title="kenopatheia" + >κενοπαθεια</span> + (= <i>inanis motus</i>, Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> + 184), <span lang="el" title="kenopathêmata kai anaplasmata tês dianoias" + >κενοπαθηματα + και + αναπλασματα + της + διανοιας</span> + (<i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 354), <span lang="el" + title="diakenos helkysmos" + >διακενος + ‛ελκυσμος</span> + (<i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 241), <span lang="el" + title="diakenos phantasia" + >διακενος + φαντασια</span> + (<i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 67), and the frequent phrase + <span lang="el" title="kinêma tês dianoias" + >κινημα της + διανοιας</span>. For the + meaning see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>. <i>Relinquitur</i>: so in + Sext. <span lang="el" title="apoleipein" + >απολειπειν</span> + is constantly used as the opposite of <span lang="el" title="anairein" + >αναιρειν</span> + (<i>tollere</i>).</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_35"></a><a href="#BkII_35">§35</a>.</b> + <i>Neminem</i> etc.: they are content to make strong statements without + any mark of certainty. <i>Primo quasi adspectu</i>: the <i>merely</i> + <span lang="el" title="pithanê phantasia" + >πιθανη + φαντασια</span> is here + meant; see <a href="#BkII_33">33</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_36"></a><a href="#BkII_36">§36</a>.</b> <i>Ex + circumspectione</i>, etc.: the <span lang="el" title="diexôdeumenê" + >διεξωδευμενη</span>; + see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. <i>Primum quia ... deinde</i>: for + the slight anacoluthia, cf. <i>M.D.F</i> ed. <span class="vol">II.</span> + p. 796. <i>Iis visis</i>, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of + <i>things</i>, emitting a number of <i>appearances</i>, and you cannot be + sure of uniting each <i>appearance</i> to the <i>thing</i> from which it + proceeds, then you can have no faith in any <i>appearance</i> even if you + have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules. <i>Ad verum + ipsum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>. <i>Quam proxime</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_47">47</a>, and also <a href="#BkII_7">7</a>. <i>Insigne</i>: + <span lang="el" title="sêmeion" + >σημειον</span>, the same as + <i>nota</i> and <i>signum</i> above. <i>Quo obscurato</i>: so Lamb. for + MSS. <i>obscuro</i> which Halm keeps. Cf. <i>quam obscurari volunt</i> in + <a href="#BkII_42">42</a> and <i>quo sublato</i> in <a + href="#BkII_33">33</a>. <i>Argumentum</i>: Cic. seems to be thinking of + the word <span lang="el" title="tekmêrion" + >τεκμηριον</span>, + which, however, the Stoics hardly use. <i>Id quod significatur</i>: <span + lang="el" title="to sêmeiônton" >το + σημειωντον</span> + in Sext.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_37">§§37</a>—<a + href="#BkII_40">40</a>.</b> Summary The distinction of an animal is to + act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to + assent to phenomena (<a href="#BkII_37">37</a>). Mind, memory, the arts + and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena, + he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life + (<a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, <a href="#BkII_39">39</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_37"></a><a href="#BkII_37">§37</a>.</b> + <i>Explicabamus</i>: <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>—<a + href="#BkII_21">21</a> and <a href="#BkII_30">30</a> (<i>quae vis esset + in sensibus</i>). <i>Inanimum</i>: not <i>inanimatum</i>, cf. + <i>M.D.F</i>. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 36. <i>Agit aliquid</i>: <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_23">23</a>. <i>Quae est in + nostra</i>: Walker's insertion of <i>non</i> before <i>est</i> is + needless, cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_40">40</a>. It is the impact of the sensation from without, + not the assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VIII.</span> 397 <span lang="el" title="to men gar phantasiôthênai aboulêton ên" + >το μεν γαρ + φαντασιωθηναι + αβουλητον + ην</span>). For <i>in potestate</i> cf. <i>De Fato</i> 9, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 69</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_38"></a><a href="#BkII_38">§38</a>.</b> + <i>Eripitur</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_30">30</a>. <i>Neque sentire</i>: + Christ om. <i>neque</i>; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob + people of their senses. <i>Cedere</i>: cf. <span lang="el" title="eikein, eixis" + >εικειν, + ειξις</span> in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 193, 230, Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 51, + <span lang="el" title="tôn de aisthêtikôn meta eixeôs kai synkatatheseôs ginontai [hai phantasia\]" + >των δε + αισθητικων + μετα ειξεως + και + συγκαταθεσεως + γινονται + [‛αι + φαντασια]</span>; also <a + href="#BkII_66">66</a> of this book. <span lang="el" title="Oikeion" + >Οικειον</span>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_34">34</a>. <i>Adsentitur statim</i>: this really contradicts + a good deal that has gone before, esp. <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>. + <i>Memoriam</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>In nostra + potestate</i>: this may throw light on fragm. <a href="#Fr_15">15</a> of + the <i>Ac. Post.</i>, which see.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_39"></a><a href="#BkII_39">§39</a>.</b> + <i>Virtus</i>: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral + action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_40">40</a>. <i>Ante videri + aliquid</i> for the doctrine cf. <a href="#BkII_25">25</a>, for the + passive use of <i>videri</i>, n. on <a href="#BkIIN_25">25</a>. + <i>Adsentiatur</i>: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. <i>Em.</i> + 131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after <i>necesse + est</i> on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 25. <i>Tollit e + vita</i>: so <i>De Fato</i> 29.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_40">§§40</a>—<a + href="#BkII_42">42</a>.</b> Summary. The Academics have a regular method. + They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the + different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong + arguments, (1) <i>things</i> which produce <i>sensations</i> such as + might have been produced in the same form by other <i>things</i>, cannot + be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) + <i>sensations</i> must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties + do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed. + Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be + real <i>perceptions</i>, while the true are always of a form which the + false <i>may</i> assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from + false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no + sensation which is also a perception (<a href="#BkII_40">40</a>). Two + admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot + be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, + cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. The following two assertions + they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2) + every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might + have if it proceeded from an unreality (<a href="#BkII_41">41</a>). To + prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are + sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they + show that credit cannot be given to either class (<a + href="#BkII_42">42</a>). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a + certainly known sensation."]</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_40"></a><a href="#BkII_40">§40</a>.</b> <i>Quasi + fundamenta</i>: a trans. probably of <span lang="el" title="themelios" + >θεμελιος</span> or the + like; cf. <span lang="el" title="hôsper themelios" + >‛ωσπερ + θεμελιος</span> in Sext. + <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 50. <i>Artem</i>: method, like + <span lang="el" title="technê" + >τεχνη</span>, cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 4, Mayor on Iuv. <span class="vol">VII.</span> + 177. <i>Vim</i>: the general character which attaches to all <span + lang="el" title="phantasiai" + >φαντασιαι</span>; + <i>genera</i> the different classes of <span lang="el" title="phantasiai" + >φαντασιαι</span>. + <i>Totidem verbis</i>: of course with a view to showing that nothing + really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the + <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> method. <i>Contineant ... quaestionem</i>: + cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a> and <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 65 <i>una res videtur causam continere</i>. + <i>Quae ita</i>: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish + clearly the <i>sensation</i> (<i>visum</i>) from the <i>thing</i> which + causes it. Here the <i>things</i> are meant; two <i>things</i> are + supposed to cause two <i>sensations</i> so similar that the person who + has one of the <i>sensations</i> cannot tell from which of the two + <i>things</i> it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that + it is absurd to divide <i>things</i> into those which can be perceived + (known with certainty) and those which cannot. <i>Nihil interesse + autem</i>: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity + of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is + enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to + discern whatever difference may exist, cf. <a href="#BkII_85">85</a>. + <i>Alia vera sunt</i>: Numenius in Euseb. <i>Pr. Ev.</i> <span + class="vol">XIV.</span> 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and + falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of <i>things</i>, + though not of <i>sensations</i>. If we could only pierce <i>through</i> a + sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to + believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume + that <i>sensation</i> and <i>thing</i> correspond. Cf. Sext. <i>P.H.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 22 <span lang="el" title="peri men tou phaisthai toion ê toion to hypokeimenon" + >περι μεν του + φαισθαι + τοιον η + τοιον το + ‛υποκειμενον</span> + (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds) <span lang="el" + title="oudeis isôs amphisbêtei, peri de tou ei toiouton estin hopoion phainetai zêteitai" + >ουδεις ισως + αμφισβητει, + περι δε του + ει τοιουτον + εστιν + ‛οποιον + φαινεται + ζητειται</span>. Neither + Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done, + the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply + maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do + not give us correct information about them. <i>Eiusdem modi</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_33">33</a> <i>eodem modo</i>. <i>Non posse accidere</i>: this + is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (<i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 30) thinks, impossible, change from <i>recta oratio + to obliqua</i>. Halm with Manut. reads <i>potest</i>. Cf. <a + href="#BkII_101">101</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_41"></a><a href="#BkII_41">§41</a>.</b> <i>Neque + enim</i>: a remark of Lucullus' merely. <i>Quod sit a vero</i>: cf. Munio + on Lucr. <span class="vol">II.</span> 51 <i>fulgor ab auro</i>. + <i>Possit</i>: for the om. of <i>esse</i> cf. n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_29">29</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_42"></a><a href="#BkII_42">§42</a>.</b> + <i>Proposita</i>: cf. <span lang="el" title="protaseis" + >προτασεις</span> + <i>passim</i> in Sext. <i>In sensus</i>: = <i>in ea, quae ad sensus + pertinent</i> cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_20">20</a>. + <i>Omni consuetudine</i>: "general experience" <span lang="el" + title="empeiria" + >εμπειρια</span>, cf. + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 83. <i>Quam obscurari volunt</i>: + cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <i>quod + explanari volebant</i>; the em. of Dav. <i>obscurare</i> is against + Cic.'s usage, that of Christ <i>quam observari nolunt</i> is wanton + without being ingenious. <i>De reliquis</i>: i.e. <i>iis quae a sensibus + ducuntur</i>. <i>In singulisque rebus</i>: the word <i>rebus</i> must + mean <i>subjects</i>, not <i>things</i>, to which the words <i>in minima + dispertiunt</i> would hardly apply. <i>Adiuncta</i>: Sext. <i>A.M.</i> + <span class="vol">VII.</span> 164 (R. and P. 410) <span lang="el" + title="pasêi tê dokousêi alêthei kathestanai eurisketai tis aparallaktos pseudês" + >πασηι τη + δοκουσηι + αληθει + καθεσταναι + ευρισκεται + τις + απαραλλακτος + ψευδης</span>, also <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 438, etc.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_43">§§43</a>—<a + href="#BkII_45">45</a>.</b> Summary. The sceptics ought not to + <i>define</i>, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things, + (2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be + capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others (<a + href="#BkII_43">43</a>). For the purposes of reasoning their + <i>probabile</i> is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon + <i>certain</i> premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is + to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference, + then you contradict yourselves and say there is none (<a + href="#BkII_44">44</a>). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate + clearness of <i>visa</i>, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (<a + href="#BkII_45">45</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_43"></a><a href="#BkII_43">§43</a>.</b> + <i>Horum</i>: Lamb. <i>harum</i>; the text however is quite right, cf. + Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 214 <i>b</i>. <i>Luminibus</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_101">101</a>. <i>Nihilo magis</i>: = <span lang="el" + title="ouden mallon" >ουδεν + μαλλον</span>, which was constantly + in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 14. <i>Num illa definitio ... transferri</i>: I + need hardly point out that the <span lang="el" title="horos" + >‛ορος</span> of the Academics was merely + founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_29">29</a>). An Academic would say in reply to the question, + "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." <i>Vel illa vera</i>: + these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. + <i>Vel</i> = "even" i.e. if <i>even</i> the definition is firmly known, + the thing, which is more important, must also be known. In <i>illa + vera</i> we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of <i>veri et + falsi</i> in <a href="#BkII_33">33</a>. <i>In falsum</i>: note that + <i>falsum</i> = <i>aliam rem</i> above. For the sense cf. Sext. + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 209 <span lang="el" + title="mochthêrous horous einai tous periechontas ti tôn mê prosontôn tois horistois" + >μοχθηρους + ‛ορους + ειναι τους + περιεχοντας + τι των μη + προσοντων + τοις + ‛οριστοις</span>, + and the schoolmen's maxim <i>definitio non debet latior esse definito + suo</i>. <i>Minime volunt</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>. + <i>Partibus</i>: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but <i>omnibus</i> + hardly ever stands for <i>omn. rebus</i>, therefore C.F. Hermann reads + <i>pariter rebus</i> for <i>partibus</i>. A little closer attention to + the subject matter would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. <a + href="#BkII_42">42</a> <i>dividunt in partis</i>, <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 24, where <i>genus</i> = division, <i>pars</i> = + subdivision.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_44"></a><a href="#BkII_44">§44</a>.</b> <i>Impediri + ... fatebuntur</i>: essentially the same argument as in <a + href="#BkII_33">33</a> at the end. <i>Occurretur</i>: not an imitation of + <span lang="el" title="enantiousthai" + >εναντιουσθαι</span> + as Goer. says, but of <span lang="el" title="apantan" + >απανταν</span>, which occurs + very frequently in Sext. <i>Sumpta</i>: the two premisses are in Gk. + called together <span lang="el" title="lêmmata" + >λημματα</span>, separately + <span lang="el" title="lêmma" >λημμα</span> + and <span lang="el" title="proslêpsis" + >προσληψις</span> + (<i>sumptio et adsumptio</i> <i>De Div</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 108). <i>Orationis</i>: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use this + word like <i>ratio</i> (<span lang="el" title="syllogismos" + >συλλογισμος</span>), + cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 48 <i>conclusa oratio</i>. + Fab. refers to Gell. <span class="vol">XV.</span> 26. <i>Profiteatur</i>: + so <span lang="el" title="hypischneisthai" + >‛υπισχνεισθαι</span> + is often used by Sext. e.g. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> + 283. <i>Patefacturum</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>, <span + lang="el" title="ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos, dêlôtikos" + >εκκαλυπτειν, + εκκαλυπτικος, + δηλωτικος</span> + (the last in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 277) often + recur in Greek. <i>Primum esse ... nihil interesse</i>: there is no + inconsistency. Carneades allowed that <i>visa</i>, <i>in themselves</i>, + might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable + of distinguishing those <i>visa</i> which proceed from real things and + give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are + mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it. + Lucullus confuses <i>essential</i> with <i>apparent</i> difference. + <i>Non iungitur</i>: a supposed case of <span lang="el" title="diartêsis" + >διαρτησις</span>, + which is opposed to <span lang="el" title="synartêsis" + >συναρτησις</span> + and explained in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> + 430.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_45"></a><a href="#BkII_45">§45</a>.</b> + <i>Assentati</i>: here simply = <i>assensi</i>. <i>Praeteritis</i>: here + used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed + over," cf. <i>in remissis</i> <i>Orat.</i> 59. <i>Primum igitur ... sed + tamen</i>: for the slight anacoluthia cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 480. <i>Iis + qui videntur</i>: Goer. <i>is qui videtur</i>, which is severely + criticised by Madv. <i>Em.</i> 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see + n. on <a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkIIN_80">80</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_46">§§46</a>—<a + href="#BkII_48">48</a></b>. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to + the innate clearness of some phenomena (<span lang="el" title="enargeia" + >εναργεια</span>) is due + to two causes, (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light + by which these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by + sceptic paradoxes (<a href="#BkII_46">46</a>). The sceptics argue thus: + you allow that mere phantom sensations are often seen in dreams, why then + do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really + existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (<a + href="#BkII_47">47</a>). Further, they urge that a phantom sensation + produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say + they admit that mere phantom sensations <i>do</i> command assent. Why + should they not admit that they command assent when they so closely + resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (<a + href="#BkII_48">48</a>)</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_46"></a><a href="#BkII_46">§46</a></b>. + <i>Circumfusa sint</i>: Goer. retains the MSS. <i>sunt</i> on the ground + that the clause <i>quanta sint</i> is inserted <span lang="el" + title="parenthetikôs" + >παρενθετικως</span>! + Orelli actually follows him. For the phrase cf. <a + href="#BkII_122">122</a> <i>circumfusa tenebris</i>. + <i>Interrogationibus</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_5">5</a> where I showed that the words <i>interrogatio</i> and + <i>conclusio</i> are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure + syllogisms are very frequently called <span lang="el" title="erôtêseis" + >ερωτησεις</span>, + and that he often introduces a new argument by <span lang="el" + title="erôtatai kai touto" + >ερωταται + και τουτο</span>, when + there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all. + <i>Dissolvere</i>: <span lang="el" title="apolyesthai" + >απολυεσθαι</span> + in Sext. <i>Occurrere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_44">44</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_47"></a><a href="#BkII_47">§47</a></b>. <i>Confuse + loqui</i>: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 27. <i>Nulla sunt</i>: on the + use of <i>nullus</i> for <i>non</i> in Cic. cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 455 + obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very common in Plaut. and + Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the Letters. <i>Inaniter</i>: + cf. <a href="#BkII_34">34</a>. There are two ways in which a sensation + may be false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be + supposed by the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different + thing, (2) it may be a mere <span lang="el" title="phantasma" + >φαντασμα</span> or <span + lang="el" title="anaplasma tês dianoias" + >αναπλασμα + της + διανοιας</span>, a + phantom behind which there is no reality at all. <i>Quae in somnis + videantur</i>: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination + see Zeller 166, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, etc. + <i>Quaerunt</i>: a slight anacoluthon from <i>dicatis</i> above. + <i>Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino</i>: this difficult passage can only + be properly explained in connection with <a href="#BkII_50">50</a> and + with the general plan of the Academics expounded in <a + href="#BkII_41">41</a>. After long consideration I elucidate it as + follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in <a + href="#BkII_41">41</a> and <a href="#BkII_42">42</a> viz. <i>omnibus + veris visis adiuncta esse falsa</i>. The criticism in <a + href="#BkII_50">50</a> shows that the argument is meant to be based on + the assumption known to be Stoic, <i>omnia deum posse</i>. If the god can + manufacture (<i>efficere</i>) sensations which are false, but probable + (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why can he not manufacture false + sensations which are so probable as to closely resemble true ones, or to + be only with difficulty distinguishable from the true, or finally to be + utterly indistinguishable from the true (this meaning of <i>inter quae + nihil sit omnino</i> is fixed by <a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>, where see + n.)? <i>Probabilia</i>, then, denotes false sensations such as have only + a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding + stages the resemblance is made complete. The word <i>probabilia</i> is a + sort of tertiary predicate after <i>efficere</i> ("to manufacture so as + to be probable"). It <i>must not be repeated</i> after the second + <i>efficere</i>, or the whole sense will be inverted and this section + placed out of harmony with <a href="#BkII_50">50</a>. <i>Plane + proxime</i>: = <i>quam proxime</i> of <a href="#BkII_36">36</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_48"></a><a href="#BkII_48">§48</a>.</b> <i>Ipsa per + sese</i>: simply = <i>inaniter</i> as in <a href="#BkII_34">34</a>, <a + href="#BkII_47">47</a>, i.e. without the approach of any external object. + <i>Cogitatione</i>: the only word in Latin, as <span lang="el" + title="dianoia" >διανοια</span> + is in Greek, to express our "imagination." <i>Non numquam</i>: so Madv. + for MSS. <i>non inquam</i>. Goer. after Manut. wrote <i>non inquiunt</i> + with an interrogation at <i>omnino</i>. <i>Veri simile est</i>: so Madv. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 58 for <i>sit</i>. The argument + has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz to show that + phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as those which + proceed from realities. <i>Ut si qui</i>: the <i>ut</i> here is merely + "as," "for instance," cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. <i>Nihil ut + esset</i>: the <i>ut</i> here is a repetition of the <i>ut</i> used + several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend + on <i>sic</i>. Lamb. expunged <i>ut</i> before <i>esset</i> and before + <i>quicquam</i>. <i>Intestinum et oblatum</i>: cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> + <span class="vol">VII.</span> 241 <span lang="el" title="êtoi tôn ektos ê tôn en hêmin pathôn" + >ητοι των + εκτος η των + εν ‛ημιν + παθων</span>, and the two classes of + <i>falsa visa</i> mentioned in n. on <a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>. <i>Sin + autem sunt</i>, etc.: if there <i>are</i> false sensations which are + probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations + so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true? The + rest exactly as in <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_49">§§49</a>—<a + href="#BkII_53">53</a>.</b> Antiochus attacked these arguments as + <i>soritae</i>, and therefore faulty (<a href="#BkII_49">49</a>). The + admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false + sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing + between the true and the false (<a href="#BkII_50">50</a>). We contend + that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require + before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light + of the sensations we had while in it (<a href="#BkII_51">51</a>). But, + say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid + as our waking ones. This we deny (<a href="#BkII_52">52</a>). "But," say + they, "you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent." This + proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life. + All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our + attention (<a href="#BkII_53">53</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_49"></a><a href="#BkII_49">§49</a>.</b> + <i>Antiochus</i>: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and + similar subjects. <i>Ipsa capita</i>: <span lang="el" title="auta ta kephalaia" + >αυτα τα + κεφαλαια</span>. + <i>Interrogationis</i>: the <i>sorites</i> was always in the form of a + series of questions, cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 11 + (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his + proposed trans. <i>acervalis</i> is unnecessary), <i>Hortens.</i> fragm. + 47, and n. on <a href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. <i>Hoc vocant</i>: i.e. <i>hoc + genus</i>, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70 <i>ex eo + genere, quae prosunt</i>. <i>Vitiosum</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 50 <i>ille sorites, quo nihil putatis</i> (Stoici) + <i>vitiosius</i>. Most edd. read <i>hos</i>, which indeed in <a + href="#BkII_136">136</a> is a necessary em. for MSS. <i>hoc</i>. <i>Tale + visum</i>: i.e. <i>falsum</i>. <i>Dormienti</i>: sc. <span lang="el" + title="tini" >τινι</span>. <i>Ut probabile + sit</i>, etc.: cf. <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <a href="#BkII_48">48</a> + and notes. <i>Primum quidque</i>: not <i>quodque</i> as Klotz; cf. + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 105, to whose exx. add <i>De + Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 112, and an instance of <i>proximus + quisque</i> in <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 75. + <i>Vitium</i>: cf. <i>vitiosum</i> above.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_50"></a><a href="#BkII_50">§50</a>.</b> <i>Omnia + deum posse</i>: this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at + least, see <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 86. For the line + of argument here cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 106 + <i>fac dare deos, quod absurdum est</i>. <i>Eadem</i>: this does not mean + that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of + them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>. <i>Similes</i>: after this <i>sunt</i> was added + by Madv. <i>In suo genere essent</i>: substitute <i>esse viderentur</i> + for <i>essent</i>, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would + allow that <i>things in their essence</i> are divisible into + sharply-defined <i>genera</i>, but would deny that the <i>sensations</i> + which proceed from or are caused by the <i>things</i>, are so + divisible.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_51"></a><a href="#BkII_51">§51</a>.</b> <i>Una + depulsio</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> (<i>omnium rerum una est + definitio comprehendendi</i>), <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 136 (<i>omnium somniorum una ratio est</i>). <i>In + quiete</i>: = <i>in somno</i>, a rather poetical usage. <i>Narravit</i>: + Goer., Orelli, Klotz alter into <i>narrat</i>, most wantonly. <i>Visus + Homerus</i>, etc.: this famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his + <i>Annals</i>, is referred to by Lucr. <span class="vol">I.</span> 124, + Cic. <i>De Rep.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> 10 (<i>Somn. Scip.</i> + c. 1), Hor. <i>Epist.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, 50. <i>Simul + ut</i>: rare in Cic., see Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 33, who, however, unduly restricts the usage. In three out of the five + passages where he allows it to stand, the <i>ut</i> precedes a vowel; + Cic. therefore used it to avoid writing <i>ac</i> before a vowel, so that + in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 33 <i>ut</i> should probably + be written (with Manut. and others) for <i>et</i> which Madv. ejects.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_52"></a><a href="#BkII_52">§52</a>.</b> + <i>Eorumque</i>: MSS. om. <i>que</i>. Dav. wrote <i>ac</i> before + <i>eorum</i>, this however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a + guttural condemned in n. on <a href="#BkIIN_34">34</a>. For the argument + see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_80">80</a> <i>quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non + quid videatur</i>. <i>Primum interest</i>: for om. of <i>deinde</i> cf. + <a href="#BkII_45">45</a>, <a href="#BkII_46">46</a>. <i>Imbecillius</i>: + cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a>. + <i>Edormiverunt</i>: "have slept <i>off</i> the effects," cf. <span + lang="el" title="apobrizein" + >αποβριζειν</span> + in Homer. <i>Relaxentur</i>: cf. <span lang="el" title="anienai tês orgês" + >ανιεναι της + οργης</span> Aristoph. <i>Ran.</i> 700, + <i>relaxare</i> is used in the neut. sense in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 94. <i>Alcmaeonis</i>: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is + often quoted by Cic., e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> + 62.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_53"></a><a href="#BkII_53">§53</a>.</b> + <i>Sustinet</i>: <span lang="el" title="epechei" + >επεχει</span>; see on <a + href="#BkIIN_94">94</a>. <i>Aliquando sustinere</i>: the point of the + Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the <span + lang="el" title="epochê" >εποχη</span> of + the <i>sapiens</i> becomes <i>habitual</i>; he gives up the attempt to + distinguish between true and false <i>visa</i>. Lucullus answers that, + did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even + in the sane condition. <i>Confundere</i>: so <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>, + <a href="#BkII_110">110</a>, Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VIII.</span> 56 (<span lang="el" title="syncheousi ta pragmata" + >συγχεουσι + τα + πραγματα</span>), + <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 157 (<span lang="el" + title="syncheomen ton bion" + >συγχεομεν + τον βιον</span>), <span + class="vol">VIII.</span> 372 (<span lang="el" title="holên syncheei tên philosophon zêtêsin" + >‛ολην + συγχεει την + φιλοσοφον + ζητησιν</span>), Plut. <i>De + Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos</i> p. 1077 (<span lang="el" title="hôs panta pragmata syncheousi" + >‛ως παντα + πραγματα + συγχεουσι</span>). + <i>Utimur</i>: "we have to put up with," so <span lang="el" + title="chrêsthai" + >χρησθαι</span> is used in Gk. + <i>Ebriosorum</i>: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than + <i>vinolenti</i> above. <i>Illud attendimus</i>: Goer., and Orelli write + <i>num illud</i>, but the emphatic <i>ille</i> is often thus introduced + by itself in questions, a good ex. occurs in <a href="#BkII_136">136</a>. + <i>Proferremus</i>: this must apparently be added to the exx. qu. by + Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 35 of the subj. used to + denote "<i>non id quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri + debuerit</i>." As such passages are often misunderstood, I note that they + can be most rationally explained as elliptic constructions in which a + <i>condition</i> is expressed without its <i>consequence</i>. We have an + exact parallel in English, e.g. "<i>tu dictis Albane maneres</i>" may + fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy word, Alban!" Here the + condition "<i>if</i> thou hadst kept, etc." stands without the + consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the kind. Such + a condition may be expressed without <i>si</i>, just as in Eng. without + "<i>if</i>," cf. Iuv. <span class="vol">III.</span> 78 and Mayor's n. The + use of the Greek optative to express a wish (with <span lang="el" + title="ei gar" >ει γαρ</span>, etc., and + even without <span lang="el" title="ei" >ει</span>) is + susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points + of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the + functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 35 seems to imply that he prefers the hypothesis + of a suppressed protasis, but as in his <i>Gram.</i> 351 <i>b</i>, obs. 4 + he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_54">§§54</a>—<a + href="#BkII_63">63</a>.</b> Summary. The Academics fail to see that such + doctrines do away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and + seals is childish (<a href="#BkII_54">54</a>). They press into their + service the old physical philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much + ridiculed by them (<a href="#BkII_55">55</a>). Democritus may say that + innumerable worlds exist in every particular similar to ours, but I + appeal to more cultivated physicists, who maintain that each thing has + its own peculiar marks (<a href="#BkII_55">55</a>, <a + href="#BkII_56">56</a>). The Servilii were distinguished from one another + by their friends, and Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the + appearance of an egg which hen had laid it (<a href="#BkII_56">56</a>, <a + href="#BkII_57">57</a>). We however, do not much care whether we are able + to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that they say + is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between individual + sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). Equally absurd + are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they profess to follow. + The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable + logically leads to the unqualified <span lang="el" title="epochê" + >εποχη</span> of Arcesilas (59). What + nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and about the bad + influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the panegyrist of + philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? (61) By holding + that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of your famous oath + that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended Lucullus, amid the + continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then Catulus said that he should + not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus were to induce me to change my + view (63).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_54"></a><a href="#BkII_54">§54</a>.</b> <i>Ne hoc + quidem</i>: the common trans. "not even" for "<i>ne quidem</i>" is often + inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this <i>either</i>," cf. n. + on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. <i>Habeant</i>: + the slight alteration <i>habeat</i> introduced by Goer. and Orelli quite + destroys the point of the sentence. <i>Quod nolunt</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_44">44</a>. <i>An sano</i>: Lamb. <i>an ut sano</i>, which + Halm approves, and Baiter reads. <i>Similitudines</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_84">84</a>—<a href="#BkII_86">86</a>. The impossibility + of distinguishing between twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was + a favourite theme with the sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no + two things were absolutely alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the + Stoic view, was practically refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who + took two twins, and made one deposit money with Aristo, while the other + after a time asked for the money back and received it. On this subject + cf. Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 408—410. + <i>Negat esse</i>: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places + <i>esse</i> second, especially at the end of a clause. <i>Cur eo non + estis contenti</i>: Lucullus here ignores the question at issue, which + concerned the <i>amount</i> of similarity. The dogmatists maintained that + the similarity between two phenomena could never be great enough to + render it impossible to guard against mistaking the one for the other, + the sceptics argued that it could. <i>Quod rerum natura non patitur</i>: + again Lucullus confounds <i>essential</i> with <i>phenomenal</i> + difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_50">50</a>. + <i>Nulla re differens</i>: cf. the <i>nihil differens</i> of <a + href="#BkII_99">99</a>, the substitution of which here would perhaps make + the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the common Gk. term <span + lang="el" title="aparallaktos" + >απαραλλακτος</span> + (Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 252, etc.). <i>Ulla + communitas</i>: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of + Lamb. <i>nulla</i> after the fine note of Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 154), + approved by Halm and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the + Stoics may be stated thus <i>suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec + est in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas</i> (<span + lang="el" title="oude hyparchei epimigê aparallaktos" + >ουδε + ‛υπαρχει + επιμιγη + απαραλλακτος</span>). + This opinion is negatived by <i>non patitur ut</i> and it will be evident + at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs + (<i>est</i>) into the subjunctive. The change of <i>ulla</i> into + <i>nulla</i> is in no way needed. <i>Ut</i> [<i>sibi</i>] <i>sint</i>: + <i>sibi</i> is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a note communicated + privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's + ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read <i>nulla re differens + communitas visi? Sint et ova</i> etc. omitting <i>ulla</i> and <i>ut</i> + and changing <i>visi</i> into <i>sibi</i> (cf. Faber's em. <i>novas</i> + for <i>bonas</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_72">72</a>). This ingenious but, as I + think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in the second vol. of his + <i>Adversaria</i>. Lamb. reads <i>at tibi sint</i>, Dav. <i>at si vis, + sint</i>, Christ <i>ut tibi sint</i>, Bait. <i>ut si sint</i> after + C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer <i>sui</i> for <i>sibi</i> (SVI for SIBI). + B is very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip + in. <i>Eosdem</i>: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps + intentional misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_50">50</a>. Before leaving this section, I may point out + that the <span lang="el" title="epimigê" + >επιμιγη</span> or <span + lang="el" title="epimixia tôn phantasiôn" + >επιμιξια + των + φαντασιων</span> + supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic <span lang="el" title="tropoi" + >τροποι</span>, see <i>Pyrrh. + Hyp.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 124.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_55"></a><a href="#BkII_55">§55</a>.</b> + <i>Irridentur</i>: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the + constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">IX.</span> 1. <i>Absolute ita paris</i>: Halm as well as + Bait. after Christ, brackets <i>ita</i>; if any change be needed, it + would be better to place it before <i>undique</i>. For this opinion of + Democr. see R. and P. 45. <i>Et eo quidem innumerabilis</i>: this is the + quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has + yet been proposed, cf. <a href="#BkII_125">125</a>. <i>Nihil differat, + nihil intersit</i>: these two verbs often appear together in Cic., + e.g.<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 25.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_56"></a><a href="#BkII_56">§56</a>.</b> + <i>Potiusque</i>: this adversative use of <i>que</i> is common with + <i>potius</i>, e.g.<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 51. Cf. + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 55 <i>ingemescere nonnum quam + viro concessum est, idque raro</i>, also <i>ac potius</i>, <i>Ad Att.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 10, etc. <i>Proprietates</i>: the <span + lang="el" title="idiotêtes" + >ιδιοτητες</span> + or <span lang="el" title="idiômata" + >ιδιωματα</span> of + Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the whole question at issue + between dogmatism and scepticism. <i>Cognoscebantur</i>: Dav. + <i>dignoscebantur</i>, Walker <i>internoscebantur</i>. The MSS. reading + is right, cf. <a href="#BkII_86">86</a>. <i>Consuetudine</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_42">42</a>, "experience". <i>Minimum</i>: an adverb like + <i>summum</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_57"></a><a href="#BkII_57">§57</a>.</b> + <i>Dinotatas</i>: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not + recognise the word. Most edd. change it into <i>denotatas</i>. + <i>Artem</i>: <span lang="el" title="technên" + >τεχνην</span>, a set of rules. <i>In + proverbio</i>: so <i>venire in proverbium</i>, <i>in proverbii usum + venire</i>, <i>proverbii locum obtinere</i>, <i>proverbii loco dici</i> + are all used. <i>Salvis rebus</i>: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. <i>Ad + Fam.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 1. <i>Gallinas</i>: cf. fragm. <a + href="#Fr_19">19</a> of the <i>Acad. Post.</i> The similarity of eggs was + discussed <i>ad nauseam</i> by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras + the Stoic actually wrote a book entitled, <span lang="el" title="ôi skopia" + >ωι σκοπια</span> (egg + investigation) <span lang="el" title="ê peri sophisteias pros Akadêmaikous" + >η περι + σοφιστειας + προς + Ακαδημαικους</span>, + mentioned by Suidas.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_58"></a><a href="#BkII_58">§58</a>.</b> <i>Contra + nos</i>: the sense requires <i>nos</i>, but all Halm's MSS. except one + read <i>vos</i>. <i>Non internoscere</i>: this is the reading of all the + MSS., and is correct, though Orelli omits <i>non</i>. The sense is, "we + are quite content not to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we + shall not on that account be led into a mistake for our rule will prevent + us from making any positive assertion about the eggs." <i>Adsentiri</i>: + for the passive use of this verb cf. <a href="#BkII_39">39</a>. <i>Par + est</i>: so Dav. for <i>per</i>, which most MSS. have. The older edd. and + Orelli have <i>potest</i>, with one MS. <i>Quasi</i>: the em. of Madv. + for the <i>quam si</i> of the MSS. <i>Transversum digitum</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Ne confundam omnia</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_53">53</a>, <a href="#BkII_110">110</a>. <i>Natura + tolletur</i>: this of course the sceptics would deny. They refused to + discuss the nature of <i>things in themselves</i>, and kept to + <i>phenomena</i>. <i>Intersit</i>: i.e. <i>inter visa</i>. <i>In + animos</i>: Orelli with one MS. reads <i>animis</i>; if the MSS. are + correct the assertion of Krebs and Allgayer (<i>Antibarbarus</i>, ed. 4) + "<i>imprimere</i> wird klas sisch verbunden <i>in aliqua re</i>, nicht + <i>in aliquam rem</i>," will require modification. <i>Species et quasdam + formas</i>: <span lang="el" title="eidê kai genê" + >ειδη και + γενη</span>, <i>quasdam</i> marks the fact that + <i>formas</i> is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such + doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine + is absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two + <i>genera</i> than between two individuals. If the <i>non</i> before + <i>vos</i> were removed a better sense would be given. It has often been + inserted by copyists when <i>sed</i>, <i>tamen</i>, or some such word, + comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage of Cic <i>Ad + Quintum Fratrem</i>, <span class="vol">II.</span> 11, discussed by Munro, + Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_59"></a><a href="#BkII_59">§59</a>.</b> <i>Illud + vero perabsurdum</i>: note the omission of <i>est</i>, which often takes + place after the emphatic pronoun. <i>Impediamini</i>: cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>. <i>A veris</i>: if <i>visis</i> be supplied the + statement corresponds tolerably with the Academic belief, if <i>rebus</i> + be meant, it is wide of the mark. <i>Id est ... retentio</i>: supposed to + be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on <span class="vol">I.</span> + <a href="#BkIN_6">6</a>, <a href="#BkIN_8">8</a>. <i>Constitit</i>: from + <i>consto</i>, not from <i>consisto</i> cf. <a href="#BkII_63">63</a> + <i>qui tibi constares</i>. <i>Si vera sunt</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a + href="#BkII_112">112</a>, <a href="#BkII_148">148</a>. The + <i>nonnulli</i> are Philo and Metrodorus, see <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>. + <i>Tollendus est adsensus</i>: i.e. even that qualified assent which the + Academics gave to probable phenomena. <i>Adprobare</i>: this word is + ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_104">104</a>. <i>Id est peccaturum</i>: "which is equivalent + to sinning," cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_42">42</a>. + <i>Iam nimium etiam</i>: note <i>iam</i> and <i>etiam</i> in the same + clause.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_60"></a><a href="#BkII_60">§60</a>.</b> <i>Pro + omnibus</i>: note <i>omnibus</i> for <i>omnibus rebus</i>. <i>Ista + mysteria</i>: Aug. <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 37, 38 + speaks of various doctrines, which were <i>servata et pro mysteriis + custodita</i> by the New Academics. The notion that the Academic + scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while they had an + esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the reactionary + period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and may + perhaps from a passage of Augustine, <i>C. Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 41 (whose authority must have been Cicero), be + attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller 534, n.). The idea is + ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p. 279), and all + succeeding inquirers. <i>Auctoritate</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_8">8</a>, <a + href="#BkII_9">9</a>. <i>Utroque</i>: this neuter, referring to two fem. + nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 214 <i>c</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_61"></a><a href="#BkII_61">§61</a>.</b> + <i>Amicissimum</i>: "<i>because</i> you are my dear friend". + <i>Commoveris</i>: a military term, cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_liii">53</a>. <i>Sequere</i>: either this is future, as in <a + href="#BkII_109">109</a>, or <i>sequeris</i>, the constant form in Cic. + of the pres., must be read. <i>Approbatione omni</i>: the word + <i>omni</i> is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified + assent, cf. <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>. <i>Orbat sensibus</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_74">74</a>, and <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 64, + where Madv. is wrong in reproving Torquatus for using the phrase + <i>sensus tolli</i>, on the ground that the Academics swept away not + <i>sensus</i> but <i>iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis</i>. Goer. qu. Plin. + <i>N.H.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 5, Sil. Ital. <span + class="vol">XII.</span> 131, Festus, s.v. <i>Cimmerii</i>, to show that + the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to Bauli, and probably induced + this mention of the legendary people. <i>Deus aliquis</i>: so the best + edd. without comment, although they write <i>deus aliqui</i> in <a + href="#BkII_19">19</a>. It is difficult to distinguish between + <i>aliquis</i> and <i>aliqui</i>, <i>nescio quis</i> and <i>nescio + qui</i>, <i>si quis</i> and <i>si qui</i> (for the latter see n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_81">81</a>). As <i>aliquis</i> is substantival, + <i>aliqui</i> adjectival, <i>aliquis</i> must not be written with + impersonal nouns like <i>terror</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 35, <span class="vol">V.</span> 62), <i>dolor</i> + (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 82, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 1, 1), <i>casus</i> (<i>De Off.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. + vary, e.g. <i>deus aliqui</i> (<i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 23, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 35), <i>deus aliquis</i> (<i>Lael.</i> + 87, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 7, 1), <i>anularius + aliqui</i> (<a href="#BkII_86">86</a> of this book), <i>magistratus + aliquis</i> (<i>In Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 146). With a + proper name belonging to a real person <i>aliquis</i> ought to be written + (<i>Myrmecides</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_120">120</a>, see my n.). + <i>Dispiciendum</i>: not <i>despiciendum</i>, cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 97, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 64, also <i>De + Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 81, <i>verum dispicere</i>. <i>Iis + vinculis</i>, etc. this may throw light on fragm. <a href="#Fr_15">15</a> + of the <i>Acad. Post.</i>, which see.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_62"></a><a href="#BkII_62">§62</a>.</b> <i>Motum + animorum</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_34">34</a>. <i>Actio rerum</i>: here + <i>actio</i> is a pure verbal noun like <span lang="el" title="praxis" + >πραξις</span>, cf. <i>De Off.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 83, and expressions like <i>actio vitae</i> + (<i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 2), <i>actio ullius rei</i> (<a + href="#BkII_108">108</a> of this book), and the similar use of + <i>actus</i> in Quintilian (<i>Inst. Or.</i> <span class="vol">X.</span> + 1, 31, with Mayor's n.) <i>Iuratusque</i>: Bait. possibly by a mere + misprint reads <i>iratus</i>. <i>Comperisse</i>: this expression of Cic., + used in the senate in reference to Catiline's conspiracy, had become a + cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic. was often taunted. See <i>Ad + Fam.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 5, 2, <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 14, 5. <i>Licebat</i>: this is the reading of the + best MSS., not <i>liquebat</i>, which Goer., Kl., Or. have. For the + support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy see <a + href="#BkII_3">3</a>, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_xlvi">46</a> with respect to Catulus, in most of which + Lucullus is also mentioned.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_63"></a><a href="#BkII_63">§63</a>.</b> <i>Quod ... + fecerat, ut</i>: different from the constr. treated by Madv. <i>Gram.</i> + 481 <i>b</i>. <i>Quod</i> refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' + admiration, which the clause introduced by <i>ut</i> defines, "which + admiration he had shown ... to such an extent that, etc." <i>Iocansne + an</i>: this use of <i>ne ... an</i> implies, Madv. says (on <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">V.</span> 87), more doubt than the use of <i>ne</i> + alone as in <i>vero falsone</i>. <i>Memoriter</i>: nearly all edd. before + Madv. make this mean <i>e memoria</i> as opposed to <i>de scripto</i>; he + says, "<i>laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae</i>" (on <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in the + <i>Antibarbarus</i>, ed. 4. <i>Censuerim</i>: more modest than + <i>censeo</i>, see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 380. <i>Tantum enim non te modo + monuit</i>: edd. before Madv., seeing no way of taking <i>modo</i> exc. + with <i>non</i>, ejected it. Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 160) retains it, making it + mean <i>paulo ante</i>. On the other hand, Halm after Christ asserts that + <i>tantum non</i> = <span lang="el" title="monon ou" + >μονον ου</span> occurs nowhere + else in Cic. Bait. therefore ejects <i>non</i>, taking <i>tantum</i> as + <i>hoc tantum, nihil praeterea</i>. Livy certainly has the suspected use + of <i>tantum non</i>. <i>Tribunus</i>: a retort comes in <a + href="#BkII_97">97</a>, <a href="#BkII_144">144</a>. <i>Antiochum</i>: + cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_13">13</a>. + <i>Destitisse</i>: on the difference between <i>memini</i> followed by + the pres. and by the perf. inf. consult Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 408 <i>b</i>, + obs. 2.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_64">§§64</a>—<a + href="#BkII_71">71</a>.</b> Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The + strength of Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it + can be answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my + character (<a href="#BkII_64">64</a>). I protest my entire sincerity in + all that I say, and would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (<a + href="#BkII_65">65</a>). I am a passionate inquirer after truth, and on + that very account hold it disgraceful to assent to what is false. I do + not deny that I make slips, but we must deal with the <i>sapiens</i>, + whose characteristic it is never to err in giving his assent (<a + href="#BkII_66">66</a>). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the <i>sapiens</i> + ever gives his assent he will be obliged to <i>opine</i>, but he never + will <i>opine</i> therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and + Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is + possible to distinguish between true and false (<a + href="#BkII_67">67</a>). Even if it be so the mere habit of assenting is + full of peril. Still, our whole argument must tend to show that + <i>perception</i> in the Stoic sense is impossible (<a + href="#BkII_68">68</a>). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When + he was converted, what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long + denied? (<a href="#BkII_69">69</a>) Some think he wished to found a + school called by his own name. It is more probable that he could no + longer bear the opposition of all other schools to the Academy (<a + href="#BkII_70">70</a>). His conversion gave a splendid opening for an + <i>argumentum ad hominem</i> (<a href="#BkII_71">71</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_64"></a><a href="#BkII_64">§64</a>.</b> <i>Quadam + oratione</i>: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not <i>quandam + orationem</i> as Lamb., Orelli. <i>De ipsa re</i>: cf. <i>de causa + ipsa</i> above. <i>Respondere posse</i>: for the om. of <i>me</i> before + the infin, which has wrongly caused many edd. either to read + <i>respondere</i> (as Dav., Bait.) or to insert <i>me</i> (as Lamb.), see + n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_7">7</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_65"></a><a href="#BkII_65">§65</a>.</b> <i>Studio + certandi</i>: = <span lang="el" title="philoneikia" + >φιλονεικια</span>. + <i>Pertinacia ... calumnia</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_14">14</a>. + <i>Iurarem</i>: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of + his consulship.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_66"></a><a href="#BkII_66">§66</a>.</b> + <i>Turpissimum</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_45">45</a>, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 1. + <i>Opiner</i>: <i>opinio</i> or <span lang="el" title="doxa" + >δοξα</span> is judgment based on insufficient + grounds. <i>Sed quaerimus de sapiente</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_115">115</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 55, 59 + also <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 75 <i>non quid ego sed + quid orator</i>. <i>Magnus ... opinator</i>: Aug. <i>Contra Acad.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 31 qu. this passage wrongly as from the + <i>Hortensius</i>. He imitates it, <i>ibid.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 15 <i>magnus definitor</i>. <i>Qua fidunt</i>, + etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s <i>Aratea</i>, and are quoted in + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 105, 106. <i>Phoenices</i>: the + same fact is mentioned by Ovid, <i>Fasti</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 107, <i>Tristia</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> + 3, 1. <i>Sed Helicen</i>: the best MSS. om. <i>ad</i>, which Orelli + places before <i>Helicen</i>. <i>Elimatas</i>: the MSS. are divided + between this and <i>limatas</i>. <i>Elimare</i>, though a very rare word + occurs <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">XVI.</span> 7, 3. <i>Visis + cedo</i>: cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_38">38</a>. <i>Vim maximam</i>: so + <i>summum munus</i> is applied to the same course of action in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 31. <i>Cogitatione</i>: "idea". + <i>Temeritate</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_42">42</a>, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, and + the charge of <span lang="el" title="propeteia" + >προπετεια</span> + constantly brought against the dogmatists by Sext. <i>Praepostere</i>: in + a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing first.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_67"></a><a href="#BkII_67">§67</a>.</b> <i>Aliquando + ... opinabitur</i>: this of course is only true if you grant the Academic + doctrine, <i>nihil posse percipi</i>. <i>Secundum illud ... etiam + opinari</i>: it seems at first sight as though <i>adsentiri</i> and + <i>opinari</i> ought to change places in this passage, as Manut. + proposes. The difficulty lies in the words <i>secundum illud</i>, which, + it has been supposed, must refer back to the second premiss of Arcesilas' + argument. But if the passage be translated thus, "Carneades sometimes + granted <i>as a second premiss</i> the following statement, that the wise + man sometimes does opine" the difficulty vanishes. The argument of + Carneades would then run thus, (1) <i>Si ulli rei</i>, etc. as above, (2) + <i>adsentietur autem aliquando</i>, (3) <i>opinabitur igitur</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_68"></a><a href="#BkII_68">§68</a>.</b> <i>Adsentiri + quicquam</i>: only with neuter pronouns like this could <i>adsentiri</i> + be followed by an accusative case. <i>Sustinenda est</i>: <span lang="el" + title="ephekteon" + >εφεκτεον</span>. <i>Iis + quae possunt</i>: these words MSS. om. <i>Tam in praecipiti</i>: for the + position of <i>in</i> cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_25">25</a>. The best MSS. have here <i>tamen in</i>. Madv. + altered <i>tamen</i> to <i>tam</i> in n. on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 26. The two words are often confused, as in + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 7, cf. also n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_16">16</a>. <i>Sin autem</i>, etc.: + cf. the passage of Lactantius <i>De Falsa Sapientia</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 3, qu. by P. Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's + reprint) <i>si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque + opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est</i>. <i>Nitamur + ... percipi</i>: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The + construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect <i>hoc</i>, or + some such word, to have fallen out between <i>igitur</i> and + <i>nihil</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_69"></a><a href="#BkII_69">§69</a>.</b> <i>Non + acrius</i>: one of the early editions omits <i>non</i> while Goer. reads + <i>acutius</i> and puts a note of interrogation at <i>defensitaverat</i>. + M. <i>Em.</i> 161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the + old arguments of Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his + new arguments against it. <i>Quis enim</i>: so Lamb. for MSS. <i>quisquam + enim</i>. <i>Excogitavit</i>: on interrogations not introduced by a + particle of any kind see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 450. <i>Eadem dicit</i>: on + the subject in hand, of course. Taken without this limitation the + proposition is not strictly true, see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_132">132</a>. + <i>Sensisse</i>: = <i>iudicasse</i>, n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_22">22</a>. <i>Mnesarchi ... Dardani</i>: see <i>Dict. + Biogr.</i></p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_70"></a><a href="#BkII_70">§70</a>.</b> <i>Revocata + est</i>: Manut. here wished to read <i>renovata</i>, cf. n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_14">14</a>. <i>Nominis + dignitatem</i>, etc.: hence Aug. <i>Contra Acad.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 41 calls him <i>foeneus ille Platonicus + Antiochus</i> (that <i>tulchan</i> Platonist). <i>Gloriae causa</i>: cf. + Aug. <i>ibid.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 15 <i>Antiochus gloriae + cupidior quam veritatis</i>. <i>Facere dicerent</i>: so Camerarius for + the MSS. <i>facerent</i>. <i>Sustinere</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_115">115</a> <i>sustinuero Epicureos</i>. <i>Sub Novis</i>: + Faber's brilliant em. for the MSS. <i>sub nubes</i>. The <i>Novae + Tabernae</i> were in the forum, and are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. + In <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 266 a story is told of + Caesar, who, while speaking <i>sub Veteribus</i>, points to a + "<i>tabula</i>" which hangs <i>sub Novis</i>. The excellence of Faber's + em. may be felt by comparing that of Manut. <i>sub nube</i>, and that of + Lamb. <i>nisi sub nube</i>. I have before remarked that <i>b</i> is + frequently written in MSS. for <i>v</i>. <i>Maenianorum</i>: projecting + eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were probably named from their + inventor like <i>Vitelliana</i>, <i>Vatinia</i> etc.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_71"></a><a href="#BkII_71">§71</a>.</b> <i>Quoque + ... argumento</i>: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread is + picked up by <i>quod argumentum</i> near the end. <i>Utrum</i>: the + neuter pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are + marked by <i>ne</i> and <i>an</i>. The same usage is found in <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 60, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> + 9, and must be carefully distinguished from the use of <i>utrum ... ne + ... an</i>, which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g <i>De Invent.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 115 <i>utrum copiane sit agri an penuria + consideratur</i>. On this point cf. M. <i>Em.</i> 163, <i>Gram.</i> 452, + obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 73. + <i>Honesti inane nomen esse</i>: a modern would be inclined to write + <i>honestum</i>, in apposition to <i>nomen</i>, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 18 <i>voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum<i>. + </i>Voluptatem</i> etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called <span + lang="el" title="ho metathemenos" >‛ο + μεταθεμενος</span>) + from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 60, Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">VII.</span> + 166—7. <i>A vero</i>: "coming from a reality," cf. <a + href="#BkIIN_41">41</a>, n. <i>Is curavit</i>: Goer. reads <i>his</i>, + "<i>solet <span class="vol">V.</span> D. in hoc pronomen saevire</i>," + says Madv. The scribes often prefix <i>h</i> to parts of the pronoun + <i>is</i>, and Goer. generally patronises their vulgar error.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_72">§§72</a>—<a + href="#BkII_78">78</a>.</b> Summary. You accuse me of appealing to + ancient names like a revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and + Metrodorus, philosophers of the highest position, protest against the + truth of sense knowledge, and deny the possibility of knowledge + altogether (<a href="#BkII_72">72</a>, <a href="#BkII_73">73</a>). + Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense + knowledge. You said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with + these. Why? Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while + Plato pursued the same theme in all his works (<a + href="#BkII_74">74</a>). Now do you see that I do not merely name, but + take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus stated many difficulties + concerning the senses and general experience. You say he solved them, + even if he did, which I do not believe, he admitted that it was not easy + to escape being ensnared by them (<a href="#BkII_75">75</a>). The + Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to + themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (<a + href="#BkII_76">76</a>). Zeno held strongly that the wise man ought to + keep clear from <i>opinion</i>. Arcesilas agreed but this without + <i>knowledge</i> was impossible. <i>Knowledge</i> consists of + <i>perceptions</i>. Arcesilas therefore demanded a definition of + <i>perception</i>. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is the + controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with <i>opinion</i> and + <i>perception</i>, and the <span lang="el" title="epochê" + >εποχη</span> of Arcesilas follows at once + (<a href="#BkII_77">77</a>, <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_72"></a><a href="#BkII_72">§72</a>.</b> <i>De + antiquis philosophis</i>: on account of the somewhat awkward constr. + Lamb. read <i>antiquos philosophos</i>. <i>Popularis</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_13">13</a>. <i>Res non bonas</i>: MSS. om. <i>non</i>, which + Or. added with two very early editions. Faber ingeniously supposed the + true reading to be <i>novas</i>, which would be written <i>nobas</i>, and + then pass into <i>bonas</i>. <i>Nivem nigram</i>: this deliverance of + Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 33 he quotes it as an instance of the refutation of + <span lang="el" title="phainomena" + >φαινομενα</span> + by means of <span lang="el" title="nooumena" + >νοουμενα</span>, "<span + lang="el" title="Anaxagoras tôi leukên einai tên chiona, anetithei hoti chiôn estin hydor pepêgos to de hydor esti melan kai hê chiôn ara melaina" + >Αναξαγορας + τωι λευκην + ειναι την + χιονα, + ανετιθει + ‛οτι χιων + εστιν ‛υδορ + πεπηγος το + δε ‛υδορ + εστι μελαν + και ‛η χιων + αρα + μελαινα</span>." There is an + obscure joke on this in <i>Ad Qu. Fratrem</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 13, 1 <i>risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo + esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat</i>. <i>Sophistes</i>: here + treated as the demagogue of philosophy. <i>Ostentationis</i>: = <span + lang="el" title="epideixeos" + >επιδειξεος</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_73"></a><a href="#BkII_73">§73</a>.</b> + <i>Democrito</i>: Cic., as Madv. remarks on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 20, always exaggerates the merits of Democr. in + order to depreciate the Epicureans, cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 22, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5, + <span class="vol">II.</span> 139, <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 120, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 42. <i>Quintae + classis</i>: a metaphor from the Roman military order. <i>Qui veri esse + aliquid</i>, etc.: cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 12 <i>non + enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris + falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus</i>. <i>Non obscuros sed tenebricosos</i>: + "not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the <span + lang="el" title="skotiê gnôsis" + >σκοτιη + γνωσις</span> of Democr., by which he + meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things + as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also + held a <span lang="el" title="gnêsiê gnôsis" + >γνησιη + γνωσις</span>, dealing with the + realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist + <span lang="el" title="eteêi" >ετεηι</span> + and not merely <span lang="el" title="nomôi" + >νομωι</span> as appearances do. See R. and + P. 51.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_74"></a><a href="#BkII_74">§74</a>.</b> + <i>Furere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_14">14</a>. <i>Orbat sensibus</i>: cf. + <a href="#BkII_61">61</a>, and for the belief of Empedocles about the + possibility of <span lang="el" title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span> see the + remarks of Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 123—4 + qu. R. and P. 107, who say "<i>patet errare eos qui scepticis + adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant</i>." <i>Sonum fundere</i>: similar + expressions occur in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 42, <span + class="vol">V.</span> 73, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 48. + <i>Parmenides, Xenophanes</i>: these are the last men who ought to be + charged with scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against + sense-knowledge, but held that real knowledge was attainable by the + reason. Cf. Grote, <i>Plato</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 54, Zeller + 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. <i>Minus bonis</i>: Dav. qu. + Plut. <i>De Audit.</i> 45 A, <span lang="el" title="mempsaito d' an tis Parmenidou tên stichopoiian" + >μεμψαιτο δ' + αν τις + Παρμενιδου + την + στιχοποιιαν</span>. + <i>Quamquam</i>: on the proper use of <i>quamquam</i> in clauses where + the verb is not expressed see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 68 and cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_5">5</a>. <i>Quasi + irati</i>: for the use of <i>quasi</i> = almost cf. <i>In Verr. Act.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 22, <i>Orat.</i> 41. <i>Aiebas + removendum</i>: for om. of <i>esse</i> see n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_43">43</a>. <i>Perscripti sunt</i>: + cf. n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_16">16</a>. <i>Scire + se nihil se scire</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_16">16</a>, <a href="#BkI_44">44</a>. The words referred to + are in Plat. <i>Apol.</i> 21 <span lang="el" title="eoika goun toutou smikrôi tini autôi toutôi sophôteros einai, hoti a mê oida oude oiomai eidenai" + >εοικα γουν + τουτου + σμικρωι + τινι αυτωι + τουτωι + σοφωτερος + ειναι, ‛οτι + α μη οιδα + ουδε οιομαι + ειδεναι</span>, a very + different statement from the <i>nihil sciri posse</i> by which Cic. + interprets it (cf. R. and P. 148). That <span lang="el" title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span> in the + strict sense is impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left + to the Sophists. <i>De Platone</i>: the doctrine above mentioned is an + absurd one to foist upon Plato. The dialogues of search as they are + called, while exposing sham knowledge, all assume that the real <span + lang="el" title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span> is + attainable. <i>Ironiam</i>: the word was given in its Greek form in <a + href="#BkII_15">15</a>. <i>Nulla fuit ratio persequi</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_17">17</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_75"></a><a href="#BkII_75">§75</a>.</b> + <i>Videorne</i>: = <i>nonne videor</i>, as <i>videsne</i> = <i>nonne + vides</i>. <i>Imitari numquam nisi</i>: a strange expression for which + Manut. conj. <i>imitari? num quem</i>, etc., Halm <i>nullum unquam</i> in + place of <i>numquam</i>. Bait. prints the reading of Man., which I think + harsher than that of the MSS. <i>Minutos</i>: for the word cf. + <i>Orat.</i> 94, also <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 62 + <i>minuti philosophi</i>, <i>Brut.</i> 256 <i>minuti imperatores</i>. + <i>Stilponem</i>, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P. 177—182. <span + lang="el" title="sophismata" + >σοφισματα</span>: + Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here the translation + <i>cavillationes</i>, to which Seneca <i>Ep.</i> 116 refers, cf. Krische, + p. 65. <i>Fulcire porticum</i>: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch". + Cf. the anonymous line <span lang="el" title="ei mê gar ên Chrysippos, ouk an ên Stoa" + >ει μη γαρ ην + Χρυσιππος, + ουκ αν ην + Στοα</span>. <i>Quae in consuetudine + probantur</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_87">87</a>. <i>Nisi videret</i>: for + the tense of the verb, see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 347 <i>b</i>, obs. 2.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_76"></a><a href="#BkII_76">§76</a>.</b> <i>Quid ... + philosophi</i>: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv. and + followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this reading, + which only requires the alteration of <i>Cyrenaei</i> into + <i>Cyrenaici</i> (now made by all edd. on the ground that + <i>Cyrenaeus</i> is a citizen of Cyreno, <i>Cyrenaicus</i> a follower of + Aristippus) and the insertion of <i>tibi</i>. I see no difficulty in the + <i>qui</i> before <i>negant</i>, at which so many edd. take offence. + <i>Tactu intimo</i>: the word <span lang="el" title="haphê" + >‛αφη</span> I believe does not occur in ancient + authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was <span + lang="el" title="pathos" >παθος</span>. + From <a href="#BkII_143">143</a> (<i>permotiones intimas</i>) it might + appear that Cic. is translating either <span lang="el" title="pathos" + >παθος</span> or <span lang="el" + title="kinêsis" + >κινησις</span>. For a clear + account of the school see Zeller's <i>Socrates</i>, for the illustration + of the present passage pp 293—300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. + and P. 162 sq. <i>Quo quid colore</i>: cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 191 (qu. Zeller <i>Socrates</i> 297, R. and P. + 165). <i>Adfici se</i>: = <span lang="el" title="paschein" + >πασχειν</span>. + <i>Quaesieras</i>: note the plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect + or aorist. <i>Tot saeculis</i>: cf. the same words in <a + href="#BkII_15">15</a>. <i>Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis</i>: cf. + <i>summis ingeniis, maximis studiis</i> in <a href="#BkII_15">15</a>. + <i>Obtrectandi</i>: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in <a + href="#BkII_16">16</a>; cf. also <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_44">44</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_77"></a><a href="#BkII_77">§77</a>.</b> + <i>Expresserat</i>: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. <a + href="#BkII_7">7</a> and <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Exprimere</i> and <i>dicere</i> are always + sharply distinguished by Cic., the latter merely implying the mechanic + exercise of utterance, the former the moulding and shaping of the + utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. <i>Orat.</i> 3, 69, and <i>Ad + Att.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 11, 1; also <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 32, <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 79, + qu. by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. <i>exposuerat</i> is + therefore needless. <i>Fortasse</i>: "we may suppose". <i>Nec + percipere</i>, etc.: cf. <a href="#BkIIN_68">68</a>, n. <i>Tum illum</i>: + a change from <i>ille, credo</i> (sc. <i>respondit</i>), the <i>credo</i> + being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after <i>ita + definisse</i> cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 13 (who + quotes exx.); also the construction with <i>ita iudico</i> in <a + href="#BkII_113">113</a>. <i>Ex eo, quod esset</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>, n. <i>Effictum</i>: so Manut. for MSS. + <i>effectum</i>, cf. <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>. <i>Ab eo, quod non + est</i>: the words <i>non est</i> include the two meanings "is non + existent," and "is different from what it seems to be"—the two + meanings of <i>falsum</i> indeed, see n. on <a href="#BkIIN_47">47</a>. + <i>Eiusdem modi</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>, <a + href="#BkII_84">84</a>. MSS. have <i>eius modi</i>, altered by Dav. + <i>Recte ... additum</i>: the semicolon at <i>Arcesilas</i> was added by + Manutius, who is followed by all edd. This involves taking <i>additum</i> + = <i>additum est</i>, an ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. + <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 448, <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 43, <i>Gram.</i> 479 <i>a</i>. I think it quite + possible that <i>recte consensit additum</i> should be construed + together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly made." For the + omission of <i>esse</i> in that case cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 406, and such + expressions as <i>dicere solebat perturbatum</i> in <a + href="#BkII_111">111</a>, also <i>ita scribenti exanclatum</i> in <a + href="#BkII_108">108</a>. <i>Recte</i>, which with the ordinary stopping + expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain + in point. Qy, should <i>concessit</i> be read, as in <a + href="#BkII_118">118</a> <i>concessisse</i> is now read for MSS. + <i>consensisse</i>? <i>A vero</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_41">41</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_78"></a><a href="#BkII_78">§78</a>.</b> <i>Quae + adhuc permanserit</i>: note the subj., "which is of such a nature as to + have lasted". <i>Nam illud ... pertinebat</i>: by <i>illud</i> is meant + the argument in defence of <span lang="el" title="epochê" + >εποχη</span> given in <a + href="#BkII_67">67</a>; by <i>nihil ... pertinebat</i> nothing more is + intended than that there was no <i>immediate</i> or <i>close</i> + connection. Cf. the use of <i>pertinere</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 55. <i>Clitomacho</i>: cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_59">59</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_79">§§79</a>—<a + href="#BkII_90">90</a>.</b> Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding + your cause in spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are + thus acting like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the + sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (<a + href="#BkII_79">79</a>, <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>). I wish the god of + whom you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound + senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our + vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you, + <i>we</i> desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires + not the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the + god because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (<a + href="#BkII_80">80</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>). If you want something + greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the sun? Still he + seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a little broader + or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed, too, he appears + to us to stand still (<a href="#BkII_82">82</a>). The whole question lies + in a nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is + disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a false + one indistinguishable from it (<a href="#BkII_83">83</a>). A man who has + mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising + Cotta. You say that no such indistinguishable resemblances <i>exist</i>. + Never mind, they <i>seem</i> to exist and that is enough. One mistaken + sensation will throw all the others into uncertainty (<a + href="#BkII_84">84</a>). You say everything belongs to its own + <i>genus</i> this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that two + sensations <i>are</i> absolutely similar, it is enough that human + faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of + signet rings? (<a href="#BkII_85">85</a>) Can you find a ring merchant to + rival your chicken rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So + we cannot see or hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea + this gives us of the art with which nature has constructed the senses! + (<a href="#BkII_86">86</a>) But about physics I will speak afterwards. I + am going now to advance against the senses arguments drawn from + Chrysippus himself (<a href="#BkII_87">87</a>). You said that the + sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of + the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his Alcmaeon, + of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides disprove + your point (<a href="#BkII_88">88</a>, <a href="#BkII_89">89</a>). In + their case at least 'mind and eyes agreed. It is no good to talk about + the saner moments of such people; the question is, what was the nature of + their sensations at the time they were affected? (<a + href="#BkII_90">90</a>)</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_79"></a><a href="#BkII_79">§79</a>.</b> <i>Communi + loco</i>: <span lang="el" title="topô" + >τοπω</span>, that of blinking facts which cannot + be disproved, see <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>. <i>Quod ne</i> [<i>id</i>]: + I have bracketed <i>id</i> with most edd. since Manut. If, however, + <i>quod</i> be taken as the conjunction, and not as the pronoun, + <i>id</i> is not altogether insupportable. <i>Heri</i>: cf. Introd. <a + href="#Page_lv">55</a>. <i>Infracto remo</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher + Pantheism"—"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a + pool". <i>Manent illa omnia, iacet</i>: this is my correction of the + reading of most MSS. <i>maneant ... lacerat</i>. Madv. <i>Em.</i> 176 in + combating the conj. of Goer. <i>si maneant ... laceratis istam + causam</i>, approves <i>maneant ... iaceat</i>, a reading with some MSS. + support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole confusion of the passage + arises from the mania of the copyists for turning indicatives into + subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx. occur every few + pages. If <i>iacet</i> were by error turned into <i>iaceret</i> the + reading <i>lacerat</i> would arise at once. The nom. to <i>dicit</i> is, + I may observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. + "all my arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his + senses are true quotha!" (For this use of <i>dicit</i> cf. <i>inquit</i> + in <a href="#BkII_101">101</a>, <a href="#BkII_109">109</a>, <a + href="#BkII_115">115</a>). Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed. + Cratandriana of 1528 <i>latrat</i>. Dav. conjectured comically + <i>blaterat iste tamen et</i>, Halm <i>lacera est ista causa</i>. + <i>Habes</i>: as two good MSS. have <i>habes et eum</i>, Madv. <i>Em.</i> + 176 conj. <i>habet</i>. The change of person, however, (from <i>dicit</i> + to <i>habes</i>) occurs also in <a href="#BkII_101">101</a>. + <i>Epicurus</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_80"></a><a href="#BkII_80">§80</a>.</b> <i>Hoc est + verum esse</i>: Madv. <i>Em.</i> 177 took <i>verum</i> as meaning fair, + candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical + epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed <i>virum esse</i>, a + very strange em. Halm's conj. <i>certum esse</i> is weak and improbable. + <i>Importune</i>: this is in one good MS. but the rest have + <i>importata</i>, a good em. is needed, as <i>importune</i> does not suit + the sense of the passage. <i>Negat ... torsisset</i>: for the tenses cf. + <a href="#BkII_104">104</a> <i>exposuisset, adiungit</i>. <i>Cum oculum + torsisset</i>: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing + upwards or sideways. Cf. Aristot. <i>Eth. Eud.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 13 (qu. by Dav.) <span lang="el" + title="ophthalmous diastrepsanta hôste duo to hen phanênai" + >οφθαλμους + διαστρεψαντα + ‛ωστε δυο το + ‛εν + φανηναι</span>. Faber qu. + Arist. <i>Problemata</i> <span class="vol">XVII.</span> 31 <span + lang="el" title="dia ti eis to plagion kinousi ton ophthalmon ou (?) phainetai duo to hen" + >δια τι εις + το πλαγιον + κινουσι τον + οφθαλμον ου + (?) φαινεται + δυο το ‛εν</span>. Also + <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">XXXI.</span> 3 inquiring the reason why + drunkards see double he says <span lang="el" title="tauto touto gignetai kai ean tis katôthen piesê ton ophthalmon" + >ταυτο τουτο + γιγνεται + και εαν τις + κατωθεν + πιεση τον + οφθαλμον</span>. Sextus + refers to the same thing <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 47, + <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 192 (<span lang="el" title="ho parapiesas ton ophthalmon" + >‛ο + παραπιεσας + τον + οφθαλμον</span>) so Cic. + <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 120. Lucretius gives the same + answer as Timagoras, <i>propter opinatus animi</i> (IV. 465), as does + Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 210 on behalf of + Epicurus. <i>Sed hic</i>: Bait. <i>sit hic</i>. <i>Maiorum</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_143">143</a>. <i>Quasi quaeratur</i>: Carneades refused to + discuss about things in themselves but merely dealt with the appearances + they present, <span lang="el" title="to gar alêthes kai to pseudes en tois pragmasi synechôrei" + >το γαρ + αληθες και + το ψευδες εν + τοις + πραγμασι + συνεχωρει</span> + (Numen in Euseb. <i>Pr. Eu.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 8). Cf. + also Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 78, 87, 144, <span + class="vol">II.</span> 75. <i>Domi nascuntur</i>: a proverb used like + <span lang="el" title="glauk' es' Athênas" + >γλαυκ' εσ' + Αθηνας</span> and "coals to + Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut. <i>Miles</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 2, 38, and cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">X.</span> 14, 2, <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">IX.</span> + 3. <i>Deus</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>. <i>Audiret ... ageret</i>: + MSS. have <i>audies ... agerent</i>. As the insertion of <i>n</i> in the + imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read <i>ageret</i> and alter + <i>audies</i> to suit it. Halm has <i>audiret ... ageretur</i> with Dav., + Bait. <i>audiet, egerit</i>. <i>Ex hoc loco video ... cerno</i>: MSS. + have <i>loco cerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno</i> whence Lipsius + conj. <i>ex hoc loco e regione video</i>. Halm ejects the words + <i>regionem video</i>, I prefer to eject <i>cerno regionem</i>. We are + thus left with the slight change from <i>video</i> to <i>cerno</i>, which + is very often found in Cic., e.g. <i>Orat.</i> 18. Cic. sometimes however + joins the two verbs as in <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 161. <i>O praeclarum prospectum</i>: the view was a favourite one with + Cic., see <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 13, 5.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_81"></a><a href="#BkII_81">§81</a>.</b> <i>Nescio + qui</i>: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that <i>nescio quis</i> implies + contempt, while <i>nescio qui</i> does not, cf. <i>Div. in qu. Caec.</i> + 47, where <i>nescio qui</i> would contradict his rule. It is as difficult + to define the uses of the two expressions as to define those of + <i>aliquis</i> and <i>aliqui</i>, on which see <a href="#BkIIN_61">61</a> + n. In <i>Paradoxa</i> 12 the best MSS. have <i>si qui</i> and <i>si + quis</i> almost in the same line with identically the same meaning Dav. + quotes Solinus and Plin. <i>N.H.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 21, to + show that the man mentioned here was called Strabo—a misnomer + surely. <i>Octingenta</i>: so the best MSS., not <i>octoginta</i>, which + however agrees better with Pliny. <i>Quod abesset</i>: "<i>whatever</i> + might be 1800 stadia distant," <i>aberat</i> would have implied that Cic. + had some <i>particular</i> thing in mind, cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 364, + obs. 1. <i>Acrius</i>: <span lang="el" title="oxyteron" + >οξυτερον</span>, Lamb. + without need read <i>acutius</i> as Goer. did in <a + href="#BkII_69">69</a>. <i>Illos pisces</i>: so some MSS., but the best + have <i>ullos</i>, whence Klotz conj. <i>multos</i>, Orelli <i>multos + illos</i>, omitting <i>pisces</i>. For the allusion to the fish, cf. + <i>Acad. Post.</i> fragm. <a href="#Fr_13">13</a>. <i>Videntur</i>: n. on + <a href="#BkIIN_25">25</a>. <i>Amplius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_19">19</a> + <i>non video cur quaerat amplius</i>. <i>Desideramus</i>: Halm, failing + to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading <i>desiderant</i> + (i.e. <i>pisces</i>). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my + opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we + have." Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light + because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients + thought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense + given by Halm's reading. <i>Quererer cum deo</i>: would enter into an + altercation with the god. The phrase, like <span lang="el" + title="loidoresthai tini" + >λοιδορεσθαι + τινι</span> as opposed to <span lang="el" + title="loidorein tina" + >λοιδορειν + τινα</span> implies mutual recrimination, cf. + <i>Pro Deiotaro</i> 9 <i>querellae cum Deiotaro</i>. The reading <i>tam + quererer</i> for the <i>tamen quaereretur</i> of the MSS. is due to + Manut. <i>Navem</i>: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 107, <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 414. <i>Non tu verum testem</i>, etc.: cf. <a + href="#BkII_105">105</a>. For the om. of <i>te</i> before <i>habere</i>, + which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see + n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_6">6</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_82"></a><a href="#BkII_82">§82</a>.</b> <i>Quid + ego</i>: Bait. has <i>sed quid</i> after Ernesti. <i>Nave</i>: so the + best MSS., not <i>navi</i>, cf. Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 42. + <i>Duodeviginti</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_128">128</a>. Goer. and Roeper + qu. by Halm wished to read <i>duodetriginta</i>. The reff. of Goer. at + least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the sun + at 28 times the size of the earth. <i>Quasi pedalis</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 20 <i>pedalis fortasse</i>. For <i>quasi</i> + = <i>circiter</i> cf. note on <a href="#BkIIN_74">74</a>. Madv. on + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20 quotes Diog. Laert. <span + class="vol">X.</span> 91, who preserves the very words of Epicurus, in + which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. <span + class="vol">V.</span> 590, who copies Epicurus, and Seneca <i>Quaest. + Nat.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 3, 10 (<i>solem sapientes viri + pedalem esse contenderunt</i>). Madv. points out from Plut. <i>De Plac. + Phil.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus + asserted the sun to be a foot wide, he does not however quote Stob. + <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 24, 1 <span lang="el" + title="hêlion megethos echein euros podos anthrôpeiou" + >‛ηλιον + μεγεθος + εχειν ευρος + ποδος + ανθρωπειου</span>, + which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus. <i>Ne + maiorem quidem</i>: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read <i>nec</i> for + <i>ne</i>, incurring the reprehension of Madv. <i>D.F.</i> p. 814, ed 2. + <i>Nihil aut non multum</i>: so in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 59, the correction of Orelli, therefore, <i>aut non + multum mentiantur aut nihil</i>, is rash. <i>Semel</i>: see <a + href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Qui ne nunc quidem</i>: sc. <i>mentiri sensus + putat</i>. Halm prints <i>quin</i>, and is followed by Baiter, neither + has observed that <i>quin ne ... quidem</i> is bad Latin (see + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 56). Nor can <i>quin ne</i> go + together even without <i>quidem</i>, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, + <i>Antibarbarus</i> ed. 4 on <i>quin</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_83"></a><a href="#BkII_83">§83</a>.</b> <i>In parvo + lis sit</i>: Durand's em. for the <i>in parvulis sitis</i> of the MSS., + which Goer. alone defends. <i>Quattuor capita</i>: these were given in <a + href="#BkII_40">40</a> by Lucullus, cf. also <a href="#BkII_77">77</a>. + <i>Epicurus</i>: as above in <a href="#BkII_19">19</a>, <a + href="#BkII_79">79</a> etc.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_84"></a><a href="#BkII_84">§84</a>.</b> + <i>Geminum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_56">56</a>. <i>Nota</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_58">58</a> and the speech of Lucullus <i>passim</i>. <i>Ne + sit ... potest</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_80">80</a> <i>quasi quaeratur quid + sit, non quid videatur. Si ipse erit</i> for <i>ipse</i> apparently = + <i>is ipse</i> cf. <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 93.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_85"></a><a href="#BkII_85">§85</a>.</b> <i>Quod non + est</i>: = <i>qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur</i>. <i>Sui generis</i>: cf. + <a href="#BkII_50">50</a>, <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>, <a + href="#BkII_56">56</a>. <i>Nullum esse pilum</i>, etc.: a strong + expression of this belief is found in Seneca <i>Ep.</i>. 113, 13, qu. R. + and P. 380. Note the word <i>Stoicum</i>; Lucullus is of course not + Stoic, but Antiochean. <i>Nihil interest</i>: the same opinion is + expressed in <a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>, where see my note. <i>Visa + res</i>: Halm writes <i>res a re</i>, it is not necessary, however, + either in Gk. or Lat. to express <i>both</i> of two related things when a + word is inserted like <i>differat</i> here, which shows that they + <i>are</i> related. Cf. the elliptic constructions in Gk. with <span + lang="el" title="homoion, metaxy, mesos" + >‛ομοιον, + μεταξυ, + μεσος</span>, and such words. <i>Eodem + caelo atque</i>: a difficult passage. MSS. have <i>aqua</i>, an error + easy, as Halm notes, to a scribe who understood <i>caelum</i> to be the + heaven, and not <span lang="el" title="glypheion" + >γλυφειον</span>, a + graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading, adducing + passages to show that sky and water were important in the making of + statues. For <i>aqua</i> Orelli conj. <i>acu</i> = <i>schraffirnadel</i>, + C.F. Hermann <i>caelatura</i>, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian + word. Halm's <i>aeque</i> introduces a construction with <i>ceteris + omnibus</i> which is not only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I + read <i>atque</i>, taking <i>ceteris omnibus</i> to be the abl. neut. + "all the other implements." Formerly I conj. <i>ascra</i>, or <i>atque + in</i>, which last leading would make <i>omnibus</i> = <i>om. + statuis</i>. <i>Alexandros</i>: Lysippus alone was privileged to make + statues of Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the + conqueror, cf. <i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 12, 7.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_86"></a><a href="#BkII_86">§86</a>.</b> + <i>Anulo</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>. <i>Aliqui</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_61">61</a>. <i>Gallinarium</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_57">57</a>. <i>Adhibes artem</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_20">20</a> <i>adhibita arte</i>. <i>Pictor ... tibicen</i>: + so in <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>. <i>Simul inflavit</i>: note <i>simul</i> + for <i>simul atque</i>, cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 12. + <i>Nostri quidem</i>: i.e. <i>Romani</i>. <i>Admodum</i>: i.e. <i>adm. + pauci</i> cf. <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 32 <i>pauci + enim atque admodum pauci</i>. <i>Praeclara</i>: evidently a fem. adj. + agreeing with <i>natura</i>. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and + understanding <i>sunt</i> interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge + are grand, viz. <i>quanto art</i>. etc."</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_87"></a><a href="#BkII_87">§87</a>.</b> + <i>Scilicet</i>: Germ. "natürlich." <i>Fabricata sit</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_30">30</a>, <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>, <a + href="#BkII_121">121</a> and N.D. <span class="vol">I.</span> 19. <i>Ne + modo</i>: for <i>modo ne</i>, a noticeable use. <i>Physicis</i>: probably + neut. <i>Contra sensus</i>: he wrote both for and against <span lang="el" + title="synêtheia" + >συνηθεια</span>; cf. R. + and P. 360 and 368. <i>Carneadem</i>: Plut. <i>Sto. Rep</i>. 1036 B + relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the + senses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector: <span lang="el" + title="daimonie phthisei se to son menos" + >δαιμονιε + φθισει σε το + σον μενος</span>. From + Diog. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 62 we learn that he thus parodied the + line qu. in n. on <a href="#BkIIN_75">75</a>, <span lang="el" title="ei mê gar ên Chrysippos ouk an ên egô" + >ει μη γαρ ην + Χρυσιππος + ουκ αν ην + εγω</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_88"></a><a href="#BkII_88">§88</a>.</b> + <i>Diligentissime</i>: in <a href="#BkII_48">48</a>—<a + href="#BkII_53">53</a>. <i>Dicebas</i>: in <a href="#BkII_52">52</a> + <i>imbecillius adsentiuntur</i>. <i>Siccorum</i>: cf. Cic. <i>Contra + Rullum</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 1 <i>consilia siccorum</i>. + <i>Madere</i> is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut. + <i>Mostellaria</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, 6. <i>Non diceret</i>: + Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit the verb, with one MS., cf. <a + href="#BkII_15">15</a> and <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_13">13</a>. The omission of a verb in the subjunctive is, + Madv. says on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 9, impossible; for + other ellipses of the verb see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 63. <i>Alcmaeo autem</i>: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon; cf. <a + href="#BkII_52">52</a>. <i>Somnia reri</i>: the best MSS. have + <i>somniare</i>. Goer. reads <i>somnia</i>, supplying <i>non fuisse + vera</i>. I have already remarked on his extraordinary power of + <i>supplying</i>. Halm conj. <i>somnia reprobare</i>, forgetting that the + verb <i>reprobare</i> belongs to third century Latinity, also <i>sua visa + putare</i>, which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from + the MSS., I read <i>reri</i>, which verb occurred in <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkI_39">39</a>. + Possibly <i>putare</i>, a little farther on, has got misplaced. <i>Non id + agitur</i>: these difficulties supply Sextus with one of his <span + lang="el" title="tropoi" + >τροποι</span>, i.e. <span lang="el" + title="ho peri tas peristaseis" >‛ο + περι τας + περιστασεις</span>; + cf. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 100, also for the treatment + of dreams, <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 104. <i>Si modo</i>, + etc.: "if only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it." + <i>Aeque ac vigilanti</i>: = <i>aeque ac si vigilaret</i>. Dav. missing + the sense, and pointing out that <i>when awake</i> Ennius did not assent + to his sensations at all, conj. <i>vigilantis</i>. Two participles used + in very different ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv. <i>Em. + Liv.</i> p. 442. <i>Ita credit</i>: MSS. have <i>illa</i>, which Dav. + altered. Halm would prefer <i>credidit</i>. <i>Itera dum</i>, etc.: from + the <i>Iliona</i> of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see <i>Ad + Att.</i> <span class="vol">XIV.</span> 14, and <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 44.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_89"></a><a href="#BkII_89">§89</a>.</b> + <i>Quisquam</i>: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences + cf. Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 48 with the + Notes of Wagner and Conington. <i>Tam certa putat</i>: so + Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 61 points out that + Protagoras must in accordance with his doctrine <span lang="el" + title="pantôn metron anthrôpos" + >παντων + μετρον + ανθρωπος</span> hold that + the <span lang="el" title="memênôs" + >μεμηνως</span> is the <span + lang="el" title="kritêrion tôn en maniai phainomenôn" + >κριτηριον + των εν + μανιαι + φαινομενων</span>. + <i>Video, video te</i>: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was <span + lang="el" title="Aias mainomenos" >Αιας + μαινομενος</span>, + see Ribbeck <i>Trag. Lat. rel.</i> p. 205. Cic. in <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 162 thus continues the quotation, "<i>oculis + postremum lumen radiatum rape</i>." So in Soph. <i>Aiax</i> 100 the hero, + after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in + order to torture him. <i>Hercules</i>: cf. Eur. <i>Herc. Fur.</i> + 921—1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are + often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 405 <span lang="el" title="ho goun Heraklês maneis kai labôn phantasian apo tôn idiôn paidôn hôs Eurystheos, tên akolouthon praxin tautêi tê phantasiai synêpsen. akolouthon de ên to tous tou echthrou paidas anelein, hoper kai epoiêsen." + >‛ο γουν + ‛Ερακλης + μανεις και + λαβων + φαντασιαν + απο των + ιδιων + παιδων ‛ως + Ευρυσθεος, + την + ακολουθον + πραξιν + ταυτηι τη + φαντασιαι + συνηψεν. + ακολουθον + δε ην το τους + του εχθρου + παιδας + ανελειν, + ‛οπερ και + εποιησεν.</span> Cf. also + <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 249. <i>Moveretur</i>: imperf. + for plup. as in <a href="#BkII_90">90</a>. <i>Alcmaeo tuus</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_52">52</a>. <i>Incitato furore</i>: Dav. reads + <i>incitatus</i>. Halm qu. from Wesenberg <i>Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. + Sestio</i> p. 51 this explanation, "<i>cum furor eius initio remissior + paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus esset</i>," he also refers to + Wopkens <i>Lect. Tull.</i> p. 55 ed. Hand. <i>Incedunt</i> etc.: the MSS. + have <i>incede</i>, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the verb is + evidently <i>Furiae</i>. <i>Adsunt</i>: is only given once by MSS., while + Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice. + <i>Caerulea ... angui</i>: <i>anguis</i> fem is not uncommon in the old + poetry. MSS. here have <i>igni</i>. <i>Crinitus</i>: <span lang="el" + title="akersekomês" + >ακερσεκομης</span>, + "never shorn," as Milton translates it. <i>Luna innixus</i>: the separate + mention in the next line of <i>Diana</i>, usually identified with the + moon, has led edd. to emend this line. Some old edd. have <i>lunat</i>, + while Lamb. reads <i>genu</i> for <i>luna</i>, cf. Ov. <i>Am.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) <i>lunavitque genu sinuosum + fortiter arcum</i>. Wakefield on Lucr. <span class="vol">III.</span> 1013 + puts a stop at <i>auratum</i>, and goes on with <i>Luna innixans</i>. + Taber strangely explains <i>luna</i> as = <i>arcu ipso lunato</i>, Dav. + says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it is the + utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should not + regard <i>luna</i> and <i>Diana</i> as distinct.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_90"></a><a href="#BkII_90">§90</a>.</b> <i>Illa + falsa</i>: sc. <i>visa</i>, which governs the two genitives. Goer. + perversely insists on taking <i>somniantium recordatione ipsorum</i> + closely together. <i>Non enim id quaeritur</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkIIN_80">80</a> n. Sext. very often uses very similar language, + as in <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 22, qu. in n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>. <i>Tum cum movebantur</i>: so Halm for MSS. + <i>tum commovebantur</i>, the em. is supported by <a + href="#BkII_88">88</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_91">§§91</a>—<a + href="#BkII_98">98</a>.</b> Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable + knowledge, its processes are not applicable to a large number of + philosophical questions (<a href="#BkII_91">91</a>). You value the art, + but remember that it gave rise to fallacies like the <i>sorites</i>, + which you say is faulty (<a href="#BkII_92">92</a>). If it is so, refute + it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will avail you + nothing (<a href="#BkII_93">93</a>). If you refrain because you + <i>cannot</i> answer, your knowledge fails you, if you <i>can</i> answer + and yet refrain, you are unfair (<a href="#BkII_94">94</a>). The art you + admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did her web, witness the + <i>Mentiens</i>, (<a href="#BkII_95">95</a>). You assent to arguments + which are identical in form with the <i>Mentiens</i>, and yet refuse to + assent to it Why so? (<a href="#BkII_96">96</a>) You demand that these + sophisms should be made exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go + to a tribune for that exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would + not allow the very first postulate of your Dialectic (<a + href="#BkII_97">97</a>). In my opinion, and I learned Dialectic from + Antiochus, the <i>Mentiens</i> and the arguments identical with it in + form must stand or fall together (<a + href="#BkII_98">98</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_91"></a><a href="#BkII_91">§91</a>.</b> <i>Inventam + esse</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkII_27">27</a>. <i>In + geometriane</i>: with this inquiry into the special function of Dialectic + cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato <i>Gorg.</i> 453 D, 454 C. <i>Sol + quantus sit</i>: this of course is a problem for <span lang="el" + title="physikê" >φυσικη</span>, not + for <span lang="el" title="dialektikê" + >διαλεκτικη</span>. + <i>Quod sit summum bonum</i>: not <span lang="el" title="dialektikê" + >διαλεκτικη</span> + but <span lang="el" title="êthikê" + >ηθικη</span> must decide this. <i>Quae + coniunctio</i>: etc. so Sext. often opposes <span lang="el" + title="symplokê" + >συμπλοκη</span> or <span + lang="el" title="synêmmenon" + >συνημμενον</span> + to <span lang="el" title="diezeugmenon" + >διεζευγμενον</span>, + cf. esp <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 201, and Zeller 109 sq. + with footnotes. An instance of a <i>coniunctio</i> (hypothetical + judgment) is "<i>si lucet, lucet</i>" below, of a <i>disiunctio</i> + (disjunctive judgment) "<i>aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet</i>". + <i>Ambigue dictum</i>: <span lang="el" title="amphibolon" + >αμφιβολον</span>, + on which see <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 256, Diog <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 62. <i>Quid sequatur</i>: <span lang="el" + title="to akolouthon" >το + ακολουθον</span>, + cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_19">19</a> n. <i>Quid + repugnet</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_19">19</a>, + n. <i>De se ipsa</i>: the <i>ipsa</i>, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. + and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an + art is not to be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to + solve every problem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in + <i>Rep.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span>) that the Expert is the man who + knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar + arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 175 and the words <span lang="el" title="eautou estai ekkalyptikon" + >εαυτου + εσται + εκκαλυπτικον</span>. + For the mode in which Carneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. + The true ground of attack is that Logic always <i>assumes</i> the truth + of phenomena, and cannot <i>prove</i> it. This was clearly seen by + Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the Origin of + Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol <span class="vol">II.</span> of his + <i>Aristotle</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_92"></a><a href="#BkII_92">§92</a>.</b> <i>Nata + sit</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_28">28</a>, <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>. + <i>Loquendi</i>: the Stoic <span lang="el" title="logikê" + >λογικη</span>, it must be + remembered, included <span lang="el" title="rhêtorikê" + >‛ρητορικη</span>. + <i>Concludendi</i>: <span lang="el" title="tou symperainein" + >του + συμπεραινειν</span> + or <span lang="el" title="syllogizesthai" + >συλλογιζεσθαι</span>. + <i>Locum</i>: <span lang="el" title="topon" + >τοπον</span> in the philosophical sense. + <i>Vitiosum</i>: <a href="#BkIIN_49">49</a>, n. <i>Num nostra culpa + est</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_32">32</a>. <i>Finium</i>: absolute limits; + the fallacy of the <i>sorites</i> and other such sophisms lies entirely + in the treatment of purely <i>relative</i> terms as though they were + <i>absolute</i>. <i>Quatenus</i>: the same ellipse occurs in + <i>Orator</i> 73. <i>In acervo tritici</i>: this is the false + <i>sorites</i>, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one + grain makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three, + four, etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins + to answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and + no heap. One grain therefore <i>does</i> make a heap. The true + <i>sorites</i> or chain inference is still treated in books on logic, cf. + Thomson's <i>Laws of Thought</i>, pp 201—203, ed 8. + <i>Minutatim</i>: cf. Heindorf's note on <span lang="el" title="kata smikron" + >κατα + σμικρον</span> in + <i>Sophistes</i> 217 D. <i>Interrogati</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_104">104</a>. In <a href="#BkII_94">94</a> we have + <i>interroganti</i>, which some edd. read here. <i>Dives pauper</i>, + etc.: it will be easily seen that the process of questioning above + described can be applied to any relative term such as these are. For the + omission of any connecting particle between the members of each pair, cf. + <a href="#BkII_29">29</a>, <a href="#BkII_125">125</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 64, <span class="vol">V.</span> 73, 114, Zumpt + <i>Gram.</i> 782. <i>Quanto addito aut dempto</i>: after this there is a + strange ellipse of some such words as <i>id efficiatur, quod + interrogatur</i>. [<i>Non</i>] <i>habemus</i>: I bracket <i>non</i> in + deference to Halm, Madv. however (<i>Opusc.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation + arising from a sort of anacoluthon, comparing <i>In Vatin.</i> 3, <i>Ad + Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XII.</span> 24. The scribes insert and omit + negatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_93"></a><a href="#BkII_93">§93</a>.</b> + <i>Frangite</i>: in later Gk. generally <span lang="el" title="apolyein" + >απολυειν</span>. + <i>Erunt ... cavetis</i>: this form of the conditional sentence is + illustrated in Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70, <i>Em. + Liv.</i> p. 422, <i>Gram.</i> 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence + <i>Heaut.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 1, 59 <i>quot incommoda tibi in + hac re capies nisi caves</i>, cf. also <a href="#BkII_127">127</a>, <a + href="#BkII_140">140</a> of this book. The present is of course required + by the instantaneous nature of the action. <i>Chrysippo</i>: he spent so + much time in trying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his + by Persius <span class="vol">VI.</span> 80. <i>inventus, Chrysippe, tui + finitor acervi</i>. The titles of numerous distinct works of his on the + <i>Sorites</i> and <i>Mentiens</i> are given by Diog. <i>Tria pauca + sint</i>: cf. the instances in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 418 <span lang="el" title="ta pentêkonta oliga estin, ta myria oliga estin" + >τα + πεντηκοντα + ολιγα εστιν, + τα μυρια + ολιγα + εστιν</span>, also Diog. <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 82 <span lang="el" title="hêsychazein" + >‛ησυχαζειν</span> + the advice is quoted in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 253 (<span lang="el" title="dein histasthai kai epechein" + >δειν + ‛ιστασθαι + και + επεχειν</span>), <i>A.M.</i> + <span class="vol">VII.</span> 416 (<span lang="el" title="ho sophos stêsetai kai hêsychasei" + >‛ο σοφος + στησεται + και + ‛ησυχασει</span>). + The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see Sext. + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 244, <span + class="vol">III.</span> 66. <i>Stertas</i>: imitated by Aug. <i>Contra + Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 25 <i>ter terna novem esse ... vel + genere humano stertente verum sit</i>, also <i>ib.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 22. <i>Proficit</i>: Dav. <i>proficis</i>, but + Madv. rightly understands <span lang="el" title="to hêsychazein" + >το + ‛ησυχαζειν</span> + (<i>Em.</i> 184), cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 58. + <i>Ultimum ... respondere</i>: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of + <i>defendere</i> with an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests + <i>paucorum quid sit</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_94"></a><a href="#BkII_94">§94</a>.</b> <i>Ut + agitator</i>: see the amusing letter to Atticus <span + class="vol">XIII.</span> 21, in which Cic. discusses different + translations for the word <span lang="el" title="epechein" + >επεχειν</span>, and quotes a + line of Lucilius <i>sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator + equosque</i>, adding <i>semperque Carneades</i> <span lang="el" + title="probolên" + >προβολην</span> + <i>pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit</i> <span lang="el" + title="epochê" >εποχη</span>. Aug. + <i>Contra Ac.</i> trans. <span lang="el" title="epochê" + >εποχη</span> by <i>refrenatio</i> cf. also + <i>Lael.</i> 63. <i>Superbus es</i>: I have thus corrected the MSS. + <i>responde superbe</i>; Halm writes <i>facis superbe</i>, Orelli + <i>superbis</i>, which verb is hardly found in prose. The phrase + <i>superbe resistere</i> in Aug. <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 14 may be a reminiscence. <i>Illustribus</i>: + Bait. with some probability adds <i>in</i>, comparing <i>in decimo</i> + below, and <a href="#BkII_107">107</a>, cf. however Munro on Lucr. <span + class="vol">I.</span> 420. <i>Irretiat</i>: parallel expressions occur in + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 76, <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 43, <i>De Fato</i> 7. <i>Facere non sinis</i>: + Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 253 points the moral in + the same way. <i>Augentis nec minuentis</i>: so Halm for MSS. <i>augendi + nec minuendi</i>, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase + <i>primum augendi</i> to be Latin.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_95"></a><a href="#BkII_95">§95</a>.</b> <i>Tollit + ... superiora</i>: cf. <i>Hortensius</i> fragm. 19 (Orelli) <i>sed ad + extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit + dialecticorum ratio</i>. <i>Vestra an nostra</i>: Bait. after Christ + needlessly writes <i>nostra an vestra</i>. <span lang="el" title="axiôma" + >αξιωμα</span>: "a judgment expressed + in language"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this + subject. <i>Effatum</i>: Halm gives the spelling <i>ecfatum</i>. It is + probable that this spelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in + connection with religious and legal formulae as in <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 81, <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 20, + see Corss. <i>Ausspr.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 155 For the word + cf. Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 117 <i>enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod alii + effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum</i>, in <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 14 <i>pronuntiatum</i> is found, in <i>De Fato</i> + 26 <i>pronuntiatio</i>, in Gellius <span class="vol">XVI.</span> 8 (from + Varro) <i>prologium</i>. <i>Aut verum esse aut falsum</i>: the constant + Stoic definition of <span lang="el" title="axiôma" + >αξιωμα</span>, see Diog. <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 65 and other passages in Zeller 107. <i>Mentiris + an verum dicis</i>: the <i>an</i> was added by Schutz on a comparison of + Gellius <span class="vol">XVIII.</span> 10 <i>cum mentior et mentiri me + dico, mentior an verum dico?</i> The sophism is given in a more formally + complete shape in <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 11 where + the following words are added, <i>dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, + mentiris igitur</i>. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301, + ed Orelli), <i>quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum + pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?</i> <i>Inexplicabilia</i>: <span + lang="el" title="apora" >απορα</span> in + the Greek writers. <i>Odiosius</i>: this adj. has not the strong meaning + of the Eng. "hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying." <i>Non + comprehensa</i>: as in <a href="#BkII_99">99</a>, the opposite of + <i>comprehendibilia</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 1, 41. The past + partic. in Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in <i>-bilis</i>. + Faber points out that in the <i>Timaeus</i> Cic. translates <span + lang="el" title="alytos" + >αλυτος</span> by <i>indissolutus</i> + and <i>indissolubilis</i> indifferently. <i>Imperceptus</i>, which one + would expect, is found in Ovid.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_96"></a><a href="#BkII_96">§96</a>.</b> <i>Si + dicis</i>: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by Manut. + with the exception of <i>nunc</i> which was added by Dav. The idea of + Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the + comic writers is untenable. <i>In docendo</i>: <i>docere</i> is not to + <i>expound</i> but to <i>prove</i>, cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_121">121</a>. <i>Primum ... modum</i>: the word <i>modus</i> + is technical in this sense cf. <i>Top.</i> 57. The <span lang="el" + title="protos logos anapodeiktos" + >προτος + λογος + αναποδεικτος</span> + of the Stoic logic ran thus <span lang="el" title="ei hêmera esti, phôs estin ... alla mên hêmera estin phôs ara estin" + >ει ‛ημερα + εστι, φως + εστιν ... αλλα + μην ‛ημερα + εστιν φως + αρα εστιν</span> (Sext. + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 157, and other passages qu. + Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly + tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges <span lang="el" + title="phôs" >φως</span> and <span lang="el" + title="hêmera" >‛ημερα</span> into + one word, or that of Zeller (<a href="#BkIIN_114">114</a>, note). These + arguments are called <span lang="el" title="monolêmmatoi" + >μονολημματοι</span> + (involving only one premise) in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 152, 159, <span class="vol">II.</span> 167. <i>Si + dicis te mentiri</i>, etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, + that when a man <i>truly</i> states that he <i>has</i> told a lie, he + establishes against himself not merely that he <i>has</i> told a lie, but + also that he <i>is</i> telling a lie at the moment when he makes the + <i>true</i> statement. The root of the sophism lies in the confusion of + past and present time in the one infinitive <i>mentiri</i>. <i>Eiusdem + generis</i>: the phrase <i>te mentiri</i> had been substituted for + <i>nunc lucere</i>. <i>Chrysippea</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_93">93</a>. + <i>Conclusioni</i>: on <i>facere</i> with the dat. see n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_27">27</a>. <i>Cederet</i>: some edd. <i>crederet</i>, but + the word is a trans. of Gk. <span lang="el" title="eikein" + >εικειν</span>; n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>. <i>Conexi</i>: = <span lang="el" + title="synêmmenon" + >συνημμενον</span>, + cf. Zeller 109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment. + <i>Superius</i>: the <span lang="el" title="synêmmenon" + >συνημμενον</span> + consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the + affirmative—called in Greek <span lang="el" title="hêgoumenon" + >‛ηγουμενον</span> + and <span lang="el" title="lêgon" + >ληγον</span>; if one is admitted the other + follows of course.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_97"></a><a href="#BkII_97">§97</a>.</b> + <i>Excipiantur</i>: the legal <i>formula</i> of the Romans generally + directed the <i>iudex</i> to condemn the defendant if certain facts were + proved, unless certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went + by the name of <i>exceptio</i>. See <i>Dict. Ant</i>. <i>Tribunum ... + adeant</i>: a retort upon Lucullus; cf. <a href="#BkII_13">13</a>. The + MSS. have <i>videant</i> or <i>adeant</i>; Halm conj. <i>adhibeant</i>, + comparing <a href="#BkII_86">86</a> and <i>Pro Rabirio</i> 20. + <i>Contemnit</i>: the usual trans. "to despise" for <i>contemnere</i> is + too strong; it means, like <span lang="el" title="oligôrein" + >ολιγωρειν</span>, + merely to neglect or pass by. <i>Effabimur</i>; cf. <i>effatum</i> above. + <i>Hermarchus</i>: not <i>Hermachus</i>, as most edd.; see <i>M.D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 96. <i>Diiunctum</i>: <span lang="el" + title="diezeugmenon" + >διεζευγμενον</span>, + for which see Zeller 112. <i>Necessarium</i>: the reason why Epicurus + refused to admit this is given in <i>De Fato</i> 21 <i>Epicurus veretur + ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant</i>. + The context of that passage should be carefully read, along with + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 69, 70. Aug. <i>Contra Ac.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth + of disjunctive propositions. <i>Catus</i>: so Lamb. for MSS. + <i>cautus</i>. <i>Tardum</i>: <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 103 <i>Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici</i>; cf. also + <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 116, and the frequent use of + <span lang="el" title="bradys" + >βραδυς</span> in Sext., e.g. + <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 325. <i>Cum hoc igitur</i>: the + word <i>igitur</i>, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence. + <i>Id est</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_8">8</a>. + <i>Evertit</i>: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343. + Zeller 399 sq., <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 22. <i>E + contrariis diiunctio</i>: = <span lang="el" title="diezeugmenon ex enantiôn" + >διεζευγμενον + εξ + εναντιων</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_98"></a><a href="#BkII_98">§98</a>.</b> + <i>Sequor</i>: as in <a href="#BkII_95">95</a>, <a + href="#BkII_96">96</a>, where the <i>Dialectici</i> refused to allow the + consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. <i>Ludere</i>: + this reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for + which see Cope in the old <i>Journal of Philology</i>. No. 7. <i>Iudicem + ... non iudicem</i>: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by + <span lang="el" title="men" >μεν</span> and <span + lang="el" title="de" >δε</span>, has been a great crux of + edd.; Dav. here wished to insert <i>cum</i> before <i>iudicem</i>, but is + conclusively refuted by Madv. <i>Em.</i> 31. The same construction occurs + in <a href="#BkII_103">103</a>. <i>Esse conexum</i>: with great + probability Christ supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the + copyists.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_98">§§98</a>—<a + href="#BkII_105">105</a>.</b> Summary. In order to overthrow at once the + case of Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of + Carneades' system (<a href="#BkII_98">98</a>). Carneades laid down two + divisions of <i>visa</i>, one into those capable of being perceived and + those not so capable, the other into probable and improbable. Arguments + aimed at the senses concern the first division only; the sapiens will + follow probability, as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly + does (<a href="#BkII_99">99</a>, <a href="#BkII_100">100</a>). Our + sapiens is not made of stone; many things <i>seem</i> to him true; yet he + always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The Stoics + themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this admission + together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes impossible + (<a href="#BkII_101">101</a>). It is strange that our <i>Probables</i> do + not seem sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (<a + href="#BkII_102">102</a>). He condemns those who say that sensation is + swept away by the Academy; nothing is swept away but its <i>necessary</i> + certainty (<a href="#BkII_103">103</a>). There are two modes of + withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and withholding it merely + so far as to deny the <i>certainty</i> of phenomena. The latter mode + leaves all that is required for ordinary life (<a + href="#BkII_104">104</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a href="#BkII_98">98</a>.</b> <i>Tortuosum</i>: similar + expressions are in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 42, <span + class="vol">III.</span> 22, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 7. + <i>Ut Poenus</i>: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 56, <i>tuus ille Poenulus, homo + acutus</i>. A different meaning is given by the <i>ut</i> in passages + like <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 30 <i>Democritus non + inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius</i>; "for a + physical philosopher."</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_99"></a><a href="#BkII_99">§99</a>.</b> + <i>Genera</i>: here = classifications of, modes of dividing <i>visa</i>. + This way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong + censure of Madv. (Pref. to <i>D.F.</i> p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted + of ignorance, for representing Carneades as dividing <i>visa</i> into + those which can be perceived and those which cannot. Is it possible that + any one should read the <i>Academica</i> up to this point, and still + believe that Cic. is capable of supposing, even for a moment, that + Carneades in any way upheld <span lang="el" title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span>? + <i>Dicantur</i>: i.e. <i>ab Academicis</i>. <i>Si probabile</i>: the + <i>si</i> is not in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading + <i>est, probabile nihil esse</i>. <i>Commemorabas</i>: in <a + href="#BkII_53">53</a>, <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>. <i>Eversio</i>: cf. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 50 (the same words), Plat. + <i>Gorg</i>. 481 C <span lang="el" title="hêmôn ho bios anatetrammenos an eiê" + >‛ημων ‛ο + βιος + ανατετραμμενος + αν ειη</span>, Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VIII.</span> 157 <span lang="el" title="syncheomen ton bion" + >συγχεομεν + τον βιον</span>. <i>Et + sensibus</i>: no second <i>et</i> corresponds to this; <i>sic</i> below + replaces it. See Madv. <i>D.F.</i> p. 790, ed. 2. <i>Quicquam tale</i> + etc.: cf. <a href="#BkII_40">40</a>, <a href="#BkII_41">41</a>. <i>Nihil + ab eo differens</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_54">54</a>. <i>Non + comprehensa</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_96">96</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_100"></a><a href="#BkII_100">§100</a>.</b> <i>Si + iam</i>: "if, for example;" so <i>iam</i> is often used in Lucretius. + <i>Probo ... bono</i>: it would have seemed more natural to transpose + these epithets. <i>Facilior ... ut probet</i>: the usual construction is + with <i>ad</i> and the gerund; cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 107, <i>Brut</i>. 180. <i>Anaxagoras</i>: he made + no <span lang="el" title="homoiomereiai" + >‛ομοιομερειαι</span> + of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is dark in colour. + <i>Concreta</i>: so Manut. for MSS. <i>congregata</i>. In <a + href="#BkII_121">121</a> the MSS. give <i>concreta</i> without variation, + as in <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 101, <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 130, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 66, + 71.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_101"></a><a href="#BkII_101">§101</a>.</b> + <i>Impeditum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkIIN_33">33</a>, n. <i>Movebitur</i>: + cf. <i>moveri</i> in <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>. <i>Non enim est</i>: Cic. + in the vast majority of cases writes <i>est enim</i>, the two words + falling under one accent like <i>sed enim, et enim</i> (cf. Corss. + <i>Ausspr.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 851); Beier on <i>De Off.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read + <i>est enim</i>, but the MSS. both of the <i>Lucullus</i> and of Nonius + agree in the other form, which Madv. allows to stand in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 43, and many other places (see his note). Cf. + fragm. <a href="#Fr_22">22</a> of the <i>Acad. Post</i>. <i>E robore</i>: + so Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here <i>ebore</i>. <i>Dolatus</i>: + an evident imitation of Hom. <i>Od.</i> T 163 <span lang="el" title="ou gar apo drios essi palaiphatou oud' apo petrês" + >ου γαρ απο + δριος εσσι + παλαιφατου + ουδ' απο + πετρης</span>. <i>Neque tamen + habere</i>: i.e. <i>se putat</i>. For the sudden change from <i>oratio + recta</i> to <i>obliqua</i> cf. <a href="#BkIIN_40">40</a> with n. + <i>Percipiendi notam</i>: = <span lang="el" title="charaktêra tês synktatheseôs" + >χαρακτηρα + της + συγκταθεσεως</span> + in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 191. For the use of the + gerund cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>, with Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 418, + Munro on Lucr. <span class="vol">I.</span> 313; for <i>propriam</i> 34. + <i>Exsistere</i>. cf. <a href="#BkII_36">36</a>. <i>Qui neget</i>: see <a + href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Caput</i>: a legal term. <i>Conclusio + loquitur</i>: cf. <i>historiae loquantur</i> (<a href="#BkII_5">5</a>), + <i>consuetudo loquitur</i> (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 48), + <i>hominis institutio si loqueretur</i> (<i>ib.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 41), <i>vites si loqui possint</i> (<i>ib.</i> + <span class="vol">V.</span> 39), <i>patria loquitur</i> (<i>In Cat.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself + in <i>Orat.</i> 85. <i>Inquit</i>: "quotha," indefinitely, as in <a + href="#BkII_109">109</a>, <a href="#BkII_115">115</a>; cf. also + <i>dicit</i> in <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_102"></a><a href="#BkII_102">§102</a>.</b> + <i>Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis</i>: Bait. follows Madv. in + placing a comma after <i>est</i>, and a full stop at <i>probabilia</i>. + <i>Tamen</i> ought in that case to follow <i>dicimus</i>, and it is + noteworthy that in his communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., + and Hahn's ed. of the philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word + <i>tamen</i> altogether, nor does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice + the omission. <i>Ista diceret</i>: "stated the opinions you asked for." + <i>Poetam</i>: this both Halm and Bait. treat as a gloss.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_103"></a><a href="#BkII_103">§103</a>.</b> For this + section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 227 sq. <i>Academia ... quibus</i>: a number of + exx. of this change from sing. to plural are given by Madv. on + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 16. <i>Nullum</i>: on the + favourite Ciceronian use of <i>nullus</i> for <i>non</i> see <a + href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <a href="#BkII_141">141</a>, and Madv. + <i>Gram.</i> 455, obs. 5. <i>Illud sit disputatum</i>: for the + construction cf. <a href="#BkII_98">98</a>; <i>autem</i> is omitted with + the same constr. in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 79, 80. + <i>Nusquam alibi</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_50">50</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_104"></a><a href="#BkII_104">§104</a>.</b> + <i>Exposuisset adiungit</i>: Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 67 notices a certain looseness in the use of + tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the opinions of philosophers, + but no ex. so strong as this is produced. <i>Ut aut approbet quid aut + improbet</i>: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent editors of + Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced by + <i>ut</i>. Halm brackets a similar clause in <a href="#BkII_20">20</a>, + and is followed in both instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the + most extensive <i>bracketer</i> of modern times, rejects very many + clauses of the kind in the Oratorical works. In our passage, the + difficulty vanishes when we reflect that <i>approbare</i> and + <i>improbare</i> may mean either to render an <i>absolute</i> approval or + disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely based on + <i>probability</i>. For example, in <a href="#BkII_29">29</a> the words + have the first meaning, in <a href="#BkII_66">66</a> the second. The same + is the case with <i>nego</i> and <i>aio</i>. I trace the whole difficulty + of the passage to the absence of terms to express distinctly the + difference between the two kinds of assent. The general sense will be as + follows. "There are two kinds of <span lang="el" title="epochê" + >εποχη</span>, one which prevents a man + from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the two senses + above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving an answer + to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute approval + or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will neither + absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely give a + qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of the + clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the + <i>Philologus</i> (vol. <span class="vol">VII.</span>), which I had not + read when this note was first written. <i>Alterum placere ... alterum + tenere</i>: "the one is his formal dogma, the other is his actual + practice." For the force of this see my note on <i>non probans</i> in <a + href="#BkIIN_148">148</a>, which passage is very similar to this. + <i>Neget ... aiat</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_97">97</a>. <i>Nec ut + placeat</i>: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the wrong sense, for + Clitomachus <i>did</i> allow such <i>visa</i> to stand as were sufficient + to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's <i>neu cui</i> labours under + the same defect. Various emendations are <i>nam cum</i> (Lamb., accepted + by Zeller 522), <i>hic ut</i> (Manut.), <i>et cum</i> (Dav. followed by + Bait.), <i>sed cum</i> (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me + that of Manut. I should prefer <i>sic ut</i>, taking <i>ut</i> in the + sense of "although." <i>Respondere</i>: "to put in as an answer," as in + <a href="#BkII_93">93</a> and often. <i>Approbari</i>: sc. + <i>putavit</i>. Such changes of construction are common in Cic., and I + cannot follow Halm in altering the reading to <i>approbavit</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_105"></a><a href="#BkII_105">§105</a>.</b> <i>Lucem + eripimus</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_30">30</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_105">§§105</a>—<a + href="#BkII_111">111</a>.</b> Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this + time, that your defence of dogmatism is overthrown (<a + href="#BkII_105">105</a>). You asked how memory was possible on my + principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of Epicurus? If + nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true, then these will + be true (<a href="#BkII_106">106</a>). Probability is quite sufficient + basis for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us + to <i>assent</i>. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, + and you yourself refuse assent to the <i>sorites</i>, why then should not + the Academic doubt about other things? (<a href="#BkII_107">107</a>) Your + other strong point is that without assent action is impossible (<a + href="#BkII_108">108</a>). But surely many actions of the dogmatist + proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the use of the + hackneyed argument of Antiochus (<a href="#BkII_109">109</a>). Where + probability is, there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (<a + href="#BkII_110">110</a>). The argument of Antiochus that the Academics + first admit that there are true and false <i>visa</i> and then contradict + themselves by denying that there is any difference between true and + false, is absurd. We do not deny that the difference <i>exists</i>; we do + deny that human faculties are capable of perceiving the difference (<a + href="#BkII_111">111</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a href="#BkII_105">105</a>.</b> <i>Inducto ... prob.</i>: so Aug. + <i>Cont Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 12 <i>Soluto, libero</i>: + cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_8">8</a>. <i>Implicato</i>: = <i>impedito</i> + cf. <a href="#BkII_101">101</a>. <i>Iacere</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Isdem oculis</i>: an answer to the question + <i>nihil cernis?</i> in <a href="#BkII_102">102</a>. <i>Purpureum</i>: + cf. fragm. <a href="#Fr_7">7</a> of the <i>Acad. Post</i>. <i>Modo + caeruleum ... sole</i>: Nonius (cf. fragm. <a href="#Fr_23">23</a>) + quotes <i>tum caeruleum tum lavum</i> (the MSS. in our passage have + <i>flavum</i>) <i>videtur, quodque nunc a sole</i>. C.F. Hermann would + place <i>mane ravum</i> after <i>quodque</i> and take <i>quod</i> as a + proper relative pronoun, not as = "because." This transposition certainly + gives increased clearness. Hermann further wishes to remove <i>a</i>, + quoting exx. of <i>collucere</i> without the prep., which are not at all + parallel, i.e. <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 58, <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 71. <i>Vibrat</i>: with the <span lang="el" + title="anêrithmon gelasma" + >ανηριθμον + γελασμα</span> of Aeschylus. + <i>Dissimileque</i>: Halm, followed by Bait., om. <i>que</i>. <i>Proximo + et</i>: MSS. have <i>ei</i>, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g. <i>De + Fato</i> 44. <i>Non possis ... defendere</i>: a similar line is taken in + <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_106"></a><a href="#BkII_106">§106</a>.</b> + <i>Memoria</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>Polyaenus</i>: named + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, Diog. <span + class="vol">X.</span> 18, as one of the chief friends of Epicurus. + <i>Falsum quod est</i>: Greek and Latin do not distinguish accurately + between the <i>true</i> and the <i>existent</i>, the <i>false</i> and the + <i>non existent</i>, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the confusion + is frequent, notably in the <i>Sophistes</i> and <i>Theaetetus</i>. <i>Si + igitur</i>: "if then recollection is recollection only of things + perceived and known." The dogmatist theory of <span lang="el" + title="mnêmê" >μνημη</span> and <span + lang="el" title="noêsis" + >νοησις</span> is dealt with in + exactly the same way by Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 5, + 10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat <i>Theaet.</i> 191 sq. <i>Siron</i>: thus + Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 119 writes the name, + not <i>Sciron</i>, as Halm. <i>Fateare</i>: the em. of Dav. for + <i>facile</i>, <i>facere</i>, <i>facias</i> of MSS. Christ defends + <i>facere</i>, thinking that the constr. is varied from the subj. to the + inf. after <i>oportet</i>, as after <i>necesse est</i> in <a + href="#BkII_39">39</a>. For <i>facere</i> followed by an inf. cf. + <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 8. <i>Nulla</i>: for + <i>non</i>, cf. <a href="#BkII_47">47</a>, <a + href="#BkII_103">103</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_107"></a><a href="#BkII_107">§107</a>.</b> <i>Fiet + artibus</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_27">27</a> for the constr., for the + matter see <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>Lumina</i>: "strong points." + Bentl. boldly read <i>columina</i>, while Dav. proposed <i>vimina</i> or + <i>vincula</i>. That an em. is not needed may be seen from <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 70. <i>negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum + lumen est)</i> <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 79, and <a + href="#BkII_43">43</a> of this book. <i>Responsa</i>: added by Ernesti. + Faber supplies <i>haruspicia</i>, Orelli after Ern. <i>haruspicinam</i>, + but, as Halm says, some noun in the plur. is needed. <i>Quod is non + potest</i>: this is the MSS. reading, but most edd. read <i>si is</i>, to + cure a wrong punctuation, by which a colon is placed at <i>perspicuum + est</i> above, and a full stop at <i>sustineat</i>. Halm restored the + passage. <i>Habuerint</i>: the subj. seems due to the attraction + exercised by <i>sustineat</i>. Bait. after Kayser has <i>habuerunt</i>. + <i>Positum</i>: "when laid down" or "assumed."</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_108"></a><a href="#BkII_108">§108</a>.</b> + <i>Alterum est quod</i>: this is substituted for <i>deinde</i>, which + ought to correspond to <i>primum</i> above. <i>Actio ullius rei</i>: n. + on <i>actio rerum</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_62">62</a>, cf. also <a + href="#BkII_148">148</a>. <i>Adsensu comprobet</i>: almost the same + phrase often occurs in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. <i>Sit etiam</i>: + the <i>etiam</i> is a little strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. + It seems to have the force of Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent + consists." <i>Sensus ipsos adsensus</i>: so in <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_41">41</a> <i>sensus</i> is defined + to be <i>id quod est sensu comprehensum</i>, i.e. <span lang="el" + title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span>, + cf. also Stobaeus <span class="vol">I.</span> 41, 25 <span lang="el" + title="aisthêtikê gar phantasia synkatathesis esti" + >αισθητικη + γαρ + φαντασια + συγκαταθεσις + εστι</span>. <i>Appetitio</i>: for all this cf. + <a href="#BkII_30">30</a>. <i>Et dicta ... multa</i>: Manut. ejected + these words as a gloss, after <i>multa</i> the MSS. curiously add <i>vide + superiora</i>. <i>Lubricos sustinere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_68">68</a> + and <a href="#BkII_94">94</a>. <i>Ita scribenti ... exanclatum</i>: for + the om. of <i>esse</i> cf. <a href="#BkII_77">77</a>, <a + href="#BkIIN_113">113</a> with notes. <i>Herculi</i>: for this form of + the gen. cf. Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 14, who + doubts whether Cic. ever wrote <i>-is</i> in the gen. of the Greek names + in <i>-es</i>. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists + <i>not</i> to change the rarer form into the commoner, also that even + Priscian (see <i>M.D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 12) made gross + blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost + irresistible. <i>Temeritatem</i>: <span lang="el" title="propeteian, eikaiotêta" + >προπετειαν, + εικαιοτητα</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_109"></a><a href="#BkII_109">§109</a>.</b> <i>In + navigando</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_100">100</a>. <i>In conserendo</i>: + Guretus interprets "<span lang="el" title="en tô phytyesthai ton agron" + >εν τω + φυτυεσθαι + τον αγρον</span>," and is + followed by most commentators, though it seems at least possible that + <i>manum</i> is to be understood. For the suppressed accus. <i>agrum</i> + cf. n. on <i>tollendum</i> in <a href="#BkIIN_148">148</a>. + <i>Sequere</i>: the fut. not the pres. ind., cf. <a + href="#BkII_61">61</a>. <i>Pressius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_28">28</a>. + <i>Reprehensum</i>: sc. <i>narrasti</i>. <i>Id ipsum</i>: = <i>nihil + posse comprehendi</i>. <i>Saltem</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_29">29</a>. + <i>Pingue</i>: cf. <i>Pro Archia</i> 10. <i>Sibi ipsum</i>: note that + Cic. does not generally make <i>ipse</i> agree in case with the + reflexive, but writes <i>se ipse</i>, etc. <i>Convenienter</i>: + "consistently". <i>Esse possit</i>: Bait. <i>posset</i> on the suggestion + of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not throwing it + back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant. <i>Ut hoc + ipsum</i>: the <i>ut</i> follows on <i>illo modo urguendum</i> above. + <i>Decretum quod</i>: Halm followed by Bait. gives <i>quo</i>, referring + to <i>altero quo neget</i> in <a href="#BkII_111">111</a>, which however + does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have <i>qui</i>. <i>Et sine + decretis</i>: Lamb. gave <i>nec</i> for <i>et</i>, but Dav. correctly + explains, "<i>multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed + tantum probabilia.</i>"</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_110"></a><a href="#BkII_110">§110</a>.</b> <i>Ut + illa</i>: i.e. the <i>decreta</i> implied in the last sentence. Some MSS. + have <i>ille</i>, while Dav. without necessity gives <i>alia</i>. <i>Sic + hoc ipsum</i>: Sext. then is wrong is saying (<i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 226) that the Academics <span lang="el" + title="diabebaiountai ta pragmata einai akatalêpta" + >διαβεβαιουνται + τα πραγματα + ειναι + ακαταληπτα</span>, + i.e. state the doctrine dogmatically, while the sceptics do not. + <i>Cognitionis notam</i>: like <i>nota percipiendi</i>, <i>veri et + falsi</i>, etc. which we have already had. <i>Ne confundere omnia</i>: a + mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>. + <i>Incerta reddere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_54">54</a>. <i>Stellarum + numerus</i>: another echo of Lucullus; see <a href="#BkII_32">32</a>. + <i>Quem ad modum ... item</i>: see Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 48, who quotes an exact parallel from + <i>Topica</i> 46, and <i>sicut ... item</i> from <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 3, noting at the same time that in such exx. + neither <i>ita</i> nor <i>idem</i>, which MSS. sometimes give for + <i>item</i>, is correct.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_111"></a><a href="#BkII_111">§111</a>.</b> <i>Dicere + ... perturbatum</i>: for om. of <i>esse</i> cf. <a + href="#BkII_108">108</a>, etc. <i>Antiochus</i>: this Bait. brackets. + <i>Unum ... alterum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_44">44</a>. <i>Esse quaedam + in visis</i>: it was not the <i>esse</i> but the <i>videri</i>, not the + actual existence of a difference, but the possibility of that difference + being infallibly perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. + <i>Cernimus</i>: i.e. the <i>probably</i> true and false. <i>Probandi + species</i>: a phenomenal appearance which belongs to, or properly leads + to qualified approval.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_112">§§112</a>—<a + href="#BkII_115">115</a>.</b> Summary. If I had to deal with a + Peripatetic, whose definitions are not so exacting, my course would be + easier; I should not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise + man sometimes <i>opines</i> (<a href="#BkII_112">112</a>). The + definitions of the real Old Academy are more reasonable than those of + Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does, can he profess to belong to + the Old Academy? (<a href="#BkII_113">113</a>) I cannot tolerate your + assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic system like + yours free from mistakes (<a href="#BkII_114">114</a>). You wish me to + join your school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who + thinks so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, + but the <i>sapiens</i> is to adopt (<a + href="#BkII_115">115</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_112"></a><a href="#BkII_112">§112</a>.</b> <i>Campis + ... exsultare ... oratio</i>: expressions like this are common in Cic., + e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 54, <i>De Off.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 61, <i>Orat.</i> 26; cf. also Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 5 <i>ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret + oratio</i>. <i>Cum Peripatetico</i>: nothing that Cic. states here is at + discord with what is known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. + esp. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 216—226. All + that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic formula, putting + upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic would have + wondered how a sceptic <i>could</i> accept his formulae; but the + spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the + same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at + Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_18">18</a>) that we have here a trace of Philo's teaching, + as distinct from that of Carneades. I see absolutely no reason for the + very severe remarks of Madvig on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 76, a passage which very closely resembles ours. <i>Dumeta</i>: same use + in <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 68, Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 6; the <i>spinae</i> of the Stoics are often + mentioned, e.g. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 6. <i>E vero ... + a falso</i>: note the change of prep. <i>Adhiberet</i>: the MSS. are + confused here, and go Halm reads <i>adderet</i>, and Bait. follows, while + Kayser proposes <i>adhaereret</i>, which is indeed nearer the MSS.; cf. + however <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_39">39</a> + <i>adhiberet</i>. <i>Accessionem</i>: for this cf. <a + href="#BkII_18">18</a> and <a href="#BkII_77">77</a>. <i>Simpliciter</i>: + the opposite of <i>subtiliter</i>; cf. + <i>simpliciter—subtilitas</i> in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>Ne Carneade quidem</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_59">59</a>, <a href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a + href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_113"></a><a href="#BkII_113">§113</a>.</b> <i>Sed + qui his minor est</i>: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for MSS. + <i>sed mihi minores</i>. Guietus gave <i>sed his minores</i>, Durand + <i>sed minutior</i>, while Halm suggests <i>sed minutiores</i>. I conj. + <i>nimio minares</i>, which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. + <span class="vol">I.</span> 734 <i>inferiores partibus egregie multis + multoque minores</i>. <i>Tale verum</i>: <i>visum</i> omitted as in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 76. <i>Incognito</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_133">133</a>. <i>Amavi hominem</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a + href="#Page_vi">6</a>. <i>Ita iudico, politissimum</i>; it is a mistake + to suppose this sentence incomplete, like Halm, who wishes to add <i>eum + esse</i>, or like Bait., who with Kayser prints <i>esse</i> after + <i>politissimum</i>. Cf. <a href="#BkII_108">108</a> <i>ita scribenti, + exanclatum</i>, and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 13. <i>Horum neutrum</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_77">77</a> <i>nemo</i>. <i>Utrumque verum</i>: Cic. of course + only accepts the propositions as Arcesilas did; see <a + href="#BkII_77">77</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_114"></a><a href="#BkII_114">§114</a>.</b> <i>Illud + ferre</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_136">136</a>. <i>Constituas</i>: this verb + is often used in connection with the ethical <i>finis</i>; cf. <a + href="#BkII_129">129</a> and <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_19">19</a>. <i>Idemque etiam</i>: Krebs and Allgayer + (<i>Antibarbarus</i>, ed. 4) deny that the expression <i>idem etiam</i> + is Latin. One good MS. here has <i>atque etiam</i>, which Dav. reads; cf. + however <i>Orat.</i> 117. <i>Artificium</i>: = <i>ars</i>, as in <a + href="#BkII_30">30</a>. <i>Nusquam labar</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_138">138</a> <i>ne labar</i>. <i>Subadroganter</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_126">126</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_115"></a><a href="#BkII_115">§115</a>.</b> <i>Qui + sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse</i>: so Cic. vary often speaks of the + Peripatetics, as in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5, <span + class="vol">V.</span> 7. <i>Sustinuero</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_70">70</a>. <i>Tam bonos</i>: Cic. often speaks of them and + of Epicurus in this patronising way; see e.g. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 44, <span class="vol">III.</span> 50, <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 25, <span class="vol">II.</span> 81. For the + Epicurean friendships cf. esp. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 65. <i>Diodoto</i>: cf. Introd. p. <a href="#Page_ii">2</a>. + <i>Nolumus</i>: Halm and Bait., give <i>nolimus</i>; so fine a line + divides the subjunctive from the indicative in clauses like these that + the choice often depends on mere individual taste. <i>De sapiente + loquamur</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_66">66</a>.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_116">§§116</a>—<a + href="#BkII_128">128</a>.</b> Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy + take Physics first. Would your <i>sapiens</i> swear to the truth of any + geometrical result whatever? (<a href="#BkII_116">116</a>) Let us see + which one of actual physical systems the <i>sapiens</i> we are seeking + will select (<a href="#BkII_117">117</a>). He must choose <i>one</i> + teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander, + Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, + Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers, great + men though they be, he must reject (<a href="#BkII_118">118</a>). + Whatever system he selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must + believe as strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If + he holds this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, + must defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not + allow me even to doubt (<a href="#BkII_119">119</a>). How much better to + be free, as I am and not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles + of the universe! (<a href="#BkII_120">120</a>) Nothing can exist, say + you, apart from the deity. Strato, however, says he does not need the + deity to construct the universe. His mode of construction again differs + from that of Democritus. I see some good in Strato, yet I will not assent + absolutely either to his system or to yours (<a + href="#BkII_121">121</a>). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We + know nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the + advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the + earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (<a + href="#BkII_122">122</a>). Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell + strange things of the heavenly bodies. How much better to side with + Socrates and Aristo, who hold that nothing can be known about them! (<a + href="#BkII_123">123</a>) Who knows the nature of mind? Numberless + opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato and Xenocrates. Our + <i>sapiens</i> will be unable to decide (<a href="#BkII_124">124</a>). If + you say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose + Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous + falsehoods (<a href="#BkII_125">125</a>). The Stoics differ among + themselves about physical subjects, why will they not allow me to differ + from them? (<a href="#BkII_126">126</a>) Not that I deprecate the study + of Physics, for moral good results from it (<a href="#BkII_127">127</a>). + Our <i>sapiens</i> will be delighted if he attains to anything which + seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your weakness + in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be prepared to + asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times as large as + the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you admit that all + things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than the size of the + sun, I am almost content (<a href="#BkII_128">128</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_116"></a><a href="#BkII_116">§116</a>.</b> <i>Tres + partes</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>. + <i>Et a vobismet</i>: "and especially by you". The threefold division was + peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools, cf. Sext. <i>P.H.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 13 (on the same subject) <span lang="el" + title="hoi Stôikoi kai alloi tines" >‛οι + Στωικοι και + αλλοι + τινες</span>. For other modes of dividing + philosophy see Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 2. <i>At + illud ante</i>: this is my em. for the MSS. <i>velut illud ante</i>, + which probably arose from a marginal variant "<i>vel ut</i>" taking the + place of <i>at</i>; cf. a similar break in <a href="#BkII_40">40</a> + <i>sed prius</i>, also in <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> <i>at paulum + ante</i>. Such breaks often occur in Cic., as in <i>Orator</i> 87 <i>sed + nunc aliud</i>, also <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 47 + <i>repenam fortasse, sed illud ante.</i> For <i>velut</i> Halm writes + <i>vel</i> (which Bait. takes), Dav. <i>verum</i>. <i>Inflatus + tumore</i>: cf. <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 91 <i>inflati + opinionibus.</i> Bentl. read <i>errore</i>. <i>Cogere</i>: this word like + <span lang="el" title="anankazein" + >αναγκαζειν</span> + and <span lang="el" title="biazesthai" + >βιαζεσθαι</span> + often means simply to argue irresistibly. <i>Initia</i>: as in <a + href="#BkII_118">118</a>, bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable + of proof, so <span lang="el" title="archai" + >αρχαι</span> in Gk. <i>Digitum</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_58">58</a>, <a href="#BkII_143">143</a>. <i>Punctum esse</i> + etc.: <span lang="el" title="sêmeion estin ou meros outhen" + >σημειον + εστιν ου + μερος + ουθεν</span> (Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 39), <span lang="el" title="stigmê" + >στιγμη</span> = <span lang="el" + title="to ameres" >το + αμερες</span> (<i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">IX.</span> 283, 377). <i>Extremitatem</i>: = <span lang="el" + title="epiphaneian" + >επιφανειαν</span>. + <i>Libramentum</i>: so this word is used by Pliny (see Forc.) for the + slope of a hill. <i>Nulla crassitudo</i>: in Sext. the <span lang="el" + title="epiphaneia" + >επιφανεια</span> + is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as <span + lang="el" title="mêkos meta platous" >μηκος + μετα + πλατους</span> (<i>P.H.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 39), <span lang="el" title="peras" + >περας</span> (<i>extremitas</i>) <span + lang="el" title="somatos duo echon diastaseis, mêkos kai platos" + >σοματος δυο + εχον + διαστασεις, + μηκος και + πλατος</span> (<i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 77). <i>Liniamentum ... carentem</i>: a difficult + passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as <span lang="el" + title="mêkos aplates" >μηκος + απλατες</span>. (Sext. as + above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface + negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction + of <i>longitudinem</i> which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others + propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather + add <i>et crassitudine</i> before <i>carentem</i>, comparing <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_27">27</a> <i>sine ulla specie et + carentem omni illa qualitate</i>. I have merely bracketed + <i>carentem</i>, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in + this clause as in the other two, he suggests <i>quod sit sine</i>. + Hermann takes <i>esse</i> after <i>punctum</i> as strongly predicative + ("there <i>is</i> a point," etc.), then adds <i>similiter</i> after + <i>liniamentum</i> and ejects <i>sine ulla</i>. Observe the awkwardness + of having the <i>line</i> treated of after the <i>superficies</i>, which + has induced some edd. to transpose. For <i>liniamentum</i> = + <i>lineam</i> cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 187. <i>Si + adigam</i>: the fine em. of Manut. for <i>si adiiciamus</i> of MSS. The + construction <i>adigere aliquem ius iurandum</i> will be found in Caes. + <i>Bell. Civ.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 76, <span + class="vol">II.</span> 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 56 <i>quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra + fames?</i> <i>Sapientem nec prius</i>: this is the "<i>egregia + lectio</i>" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm <i>sapientemne</i> was + read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is + <i>not</i> that the <i>sapiens</i> will swear to the size of the sun + after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations, <i>but</i> that + the <i>sapiens</i>, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which + Archimedes uses, will <i>not</i> swear to the truth of the elaborate + conclusions which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in + <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> against the absurdity of attaching one and + the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most complex truths, + and tries to condemn the Stoic <i>sapiens</i> out of his own mouth, cf. + esp. <i>nec ille iurare posset</i> in <a href="#BkII_123">123</a>. + <i>Multis partibus</i>: for this expression see Munro on Lucr. <span + class="vol">I.</span> 734, for the sense cf. <a href="#BkII_82">82</a>, + <a href="#BkII_123">123</a>, <a href="#BkII_126">126</a>, <a + href="#BkII_128">128</a>. <i>Deum</i>: see <a + href="#BkII_126">126</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_117"></a><a href="#BkII_117">§117</a>.</b> + <i>Vim</i>: = <span lang="el" title="anankên" + >αναγκην</span>, cf. + <i>cogere</i> in <a href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Ne ille</i>: this + asseverative <i>ne</i> is thus always closely joined with pronouns in + Cic. <i>Sententiam eliget et</i>: MSS. have (by <i>dittographia</i> of + <i>m</i>, <i>eli</i>) added <i>melius</i> after <i>sententiam</i>, and + have also dropped <i>et</i>. Dav. wished to read <i>elegerit</i>, + comparing the beginning of <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>. <i>Insipiens + eliget</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_115">115</a> <i>quale est a non sapiente + explicari sapientiam?</i> and <a href="#BkII_9">9</a> <i>statuere qui sit + sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis</i>. <i>Infinitae + quaestiones</i>: <span lang="el" title="theseis" + >θεσεις</span>, general propositions, + opposed to <i>finitae quaestiones</i>, limited propositions, Gk. <span + lang="el" title="hypotheseis" + >‛υποθεσεις</span>. + Quintal <span class="vol">III.</span> 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former + <i>An uxor ducenda</i>, of the latter <i>An Catoni ducenda</i>. These + <i>quaestiones</i> are very often alluded to by Cic. as in <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 12, <span class="vol">IV.</span> 6, <i>De + Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 138, <span class="vol">II.</span> + 65—67, <i>Topica</i> 79, <i>Orat.</i> 46, cf. also Quint. <span + class="vol">X.</span> 5, <span class="vol">II.</span> <i>E quibus omnia + constant</i>: this sounds like Lucretius, <i>omnia</i> = <span lang="el" + title="to pan" >το παν</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_118"></a><a href="#BkII_118">§118</a>.</b> For these + <i>physici</i> the student must in general be referred to R. and P., + Schwegler, and Grote's <i>Plato</i> Vol. <span class="vol">I.</span> A + more complete enumeration of schools will be found in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 30 sq. Our passage is imitated by Aug <i>De + Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XVIII.</span> 37. <i>Concessisse + primas</i>: Cic. always considers Thales to be <i>sapientissimus e + septem</i> (<i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 26). Hence + Markland on Cic. <i>Ad Brutum</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 15, 3 + argued that that letter cannot be genuine, since in it the supremacy + among the seven is assigned to Solon. <i>Infinitatem naturae</i>: <span + lang="el" title="to apeiron" >το + απειρον</span>, <i>naturae</i> + here = <span lang="el" title="ousias" + >ουσιας</span>. <i>Definita</i>: this + is opposed to <i>infinita</i> in <i>Topica</i> 79, so <i>definire</i> is + used for <i>finire</i> in <i>Orat.</i> 65, where Jahn qu. <i>Verr.</i> + <span class="vol">IV.</span> 115. <i>Similis inter se</i>: an attempt to + translate <span lang="el" title="homoiomereias" + >‛ομοιομερειας</span>. + <i>Eas primum</i>, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog. + <span class="vol">II.</span> 6 in R. and P. 29 <span lang="el" + title="panta chrêmata ên homou eita nous elthôn auta diekosmêse" + >παντα + χρηματα ην + ‛ομου ειτα + νους ελθων + αυτα + διεκοσμησε</span>. + <i>Xenophanes ... deum</i>: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph. mainly + theological. <i>Neque natum unquam</i>: cf. <i>neque ortum unquam</i> in + <a href="#BkII_119">119</a>. <i>Parmenides ignem</i>: cf. Arist. <i>Met. + A.</i> 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence + of the phenomenal world, after which he made two <span lang="el" + title="archai, thermon kai psychron toutôn de to men kata men to hon thermon tattei, thateron de kata to mê on" + >αρχαι, + θερμον και + ψυχρον + τουτων δε το + μεν κατα μεν + το ‛ον + θερμον + ταττει, + θατερον δε + κατα το μη + ον</span>. <i>Heraclitus</i>: n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_39">39</a>. <i>Melissus</i>: see + Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. <span lang="el" title="to eon aiei ara ên te kai estai" + >το εον αιει + αρα ην τε και + εσται</span>. <i>Plato</i>: n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_27">27</a>. <i>Discedent</i>: a word + often used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. <i>Sat.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 7, 17.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_119"></a><a href="#BkII_119">§119</a>.</b> <i>Sic + animo ... sensibus</i>: knowledge according to the Stoics was homogeneous + throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than another. + <i>Nunc lucere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_98">98</a>, also <a + href="#BkII_128">128</a> <i>non enim magis adsentiuntur</i>, etc. + <i>Mundum sapientem</i>: for this Stoic doctrine see <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 84, <span class="vol">II.</span> 32, etc. + <i>Fabricata sit</i>: see <a href="#BkIIN_87">87</a> n. <i>Solem</i>: <a + href="#BkII_126">126</a>. <i>Animalis intellegentia</i>: reason is the + essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138—9, also <a + href="#BkI_28">28</a>, <a href="#BkI_29">29</a> of Book <span + class="vol">I.</span> <i>Permanet</i>: the deity is to the Stoic <span + lang="el" title="pneuma endiêkon di holou tou kosmou" + >πνευμα + ενδιηκον δι + ‛ολου του + κοσμου</span> (Plut. <i>De Plac. + Phil.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7 qu. R. and P. 375), <i>spiritus + per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus.</i> (Seneca, + <i>Consol. ad Helvid.</i> 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). <i>Deflagret</i>: the + Stoics considered the <span lang="el" title="kosmos phthartos" + >κοσμος + φθαρτος</span>, cf. Diog. <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 141, Zeller 156—7. <i>Fateri</i>: cf. + <i>tam vera quam falsa cernimus</i> in <a href="#BkII_111">111</a>. + <i>Flumen aureum</i>: Plut. <i>Vita Cic.</i> 24 alludes to this (<span + lang="el" title="hoti chrysiou potamos eiê reontos" + >‛οτι + χρυσιου + ποταμος ειη + ρεοντος</span>). This is the + constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote, <i>Aristot.</i> + Vol <span class="vol">I.</span> p. 43, quotes <i>Topica</i> 3, <i>De + Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 49, <i>Brut.</i> 121, <i>N.D.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 93, <i>De Inv.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 6, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 14, + <i>Ad Att.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 1, and discusses the + difficulty of applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we + possess. <i>Nulla vis</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_28">28</a>. <i>Exsistere</i>: Walker conj. <i>efficere</i>, + "<i>recte ut videtur</i>" says Halm. Bait. adopts it. <i>Ornatus</i>: = + <span lang="el" title="kosmos" + >κοσμος</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_120"></a><a href="#BkII_120">§120</a>.</b> + <i>Libertas ... non esse</i>: a remarkable construction. For the Academic + liberty see Introd. p. <a href="#Page_xviii">18</a>. <i>Quod tibi + est</i>: after these words Halm puts merely a comma, and inserting + <i>respondere</i> makes <i>cur deus</i>, etc. part of the same sentence. + Bait. follows. <i>Nostra causa</i>: Cic. always writes <i>mea, tua, + vestra, nostra causa</i>, not <i>mei, tui, nostri, vestri</i>, just as he + writes <i>sua sponte</i>, but not <i>sponte alicuius</i>. For the Stoic + opinion that men are the chief care of Providence, see <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 23, <span class="vol">II.</span> 37, <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> 67, <i>Ac.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + <a href="#BkI_29">29</a> etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding + the opinion are treated of in Zeller 175, <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 91—127. They supply in Sext. <i>P.H.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 32, <span class="vol">III.</span> 9—12 + an example of the refutation of <span lang="el" title="nooumena" + >νοουμενα</span> by means + of <span lang="el" title="nooumena" + >νοουμενα</span>. <i>Tam + multa ac</i>: MSS. om. <i>ac</i>, which I insert. Lactantius qu. the + passage without <i>perniciosa</i>. <i>Myrmecides</i>: an actual Athenian + artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot + which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee + concealed. See Plin. <i>Nat. Hist.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 21, + <span class="vol">XXXVI.</span> 5.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_121"></a><a href="#BkII_121">§121</a>.</b> + <i>Posse</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_29">29</a>. <i>Strato</i>: R. and P. 331. <i>Sed cum</i>: + <i>sed</i> often marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read + <i>et</i>, as Halm. <i>Asperis ... corporibus</i>: cf. fragm. <a + href="#Fr_28">28</a> of the <i>Ac. Post.</i>, also <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 66. <i>Somnia</i>: so <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 18 <i>miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed + somniantium</i>, <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 42 <i>non + philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia</i>, also <i>ib.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 66 <i>flagitia Democriti</i>. <i>Docentis</i>: + giving <i>proof</i>. <i>Optantis</i>: Guietus humorously conj. + <i>potantis,</i> Durand <i>oscitantis</i> (cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 72), others <i>opinantis</i>. That the text is + sound however may be seen from <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 30 <i>optare hoc quidem est non docere</i>, <i>De Fato</i> 46, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19 <i>optata magis quam + inventa</i>, <i>ib.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 12 <i>doceas + oportet nec proferas</i>; cf. also <i>Orat.</i> 59 <i>vocis bonitas + optanda est, non est enim in nobis</i>, i.e. a good voice is a thing to + be prayed for, and not to be got by exertion. There is a similar Greek + proverb, <span lang="el" title="euchê mallon ê alêtheia" + >ευχη μαλλον + η αληθεια</span>, in + Sext. <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 353. <i>Magno opere</i>: + Hermann wishes to read <i>onere</i>. The phrase <i>magnum onus</i> is + indeed common (cf. <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 116), but + <i>magnum opus</i>, in the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf. + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 79, 84, <i>Orat.</i> 75. + <i>Modo hoc modo illud</i>: <a href="#BkII_134">134</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_122"></a><a href="#BkII_122">§122</a>.</b> <i>Latent + ista</i>: see n. on fragm. <a href="#FrN_29">29</a> of the <i>Ac. + Post.</i>; for <i>latent</i> cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_45">45</a>. Aug. <i>Cont. Ac.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> + 12, <span class="vol">III.</span> 1 imitates this passage. + <i>Circumfusa</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_44">44</a>, and <a href="#BkII_46">46</a> of this book. + <i>Medici</i>: cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 46 + <i>Viderentur</i>: a genuine passive, cf. <a href="#BkII_25">25</a>, <a + href="#BkII_39">39</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>. <i>Empirici</i>: a + school of physicians so called. <i>Ut ... mutentur</i>: exactly the same + answer was made recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he + was said to have assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same + properties as the dead. <i>Media pendeat</i>: cf. <i>N.D.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 98, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 178.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_123"></a><a href="#BkII_123">§123</a>.</b> + <i>Habitari ait</i>: for this edd. qu. Lactant. <i>Inst.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 23, 12. <i>Portenta</i>: "monstrosities these," + cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 70. <i>Iurare</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Neque ego</i>, etc.: see fragm. <a + href="#Fr_30">30</a> of <i>Ac. Post.</i> <span lang="el" + title="Antipodas" + >Αντιποδας</span>: + this doctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut. <i>Plac. Phil.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 11 qu. R. and P. 75), who give the name of <span + lang="el" title="antichthôn" + >αντιχθων</span> to the + opposite side of the world. Diog. <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 26 (with + which passage cf. Stob. <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 7) + mentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says + that Plato first invented the name. The word <span lang="el" + title="antipous" + >αντιπους</span> seems to + occur first in Plat. <i>Tim.</i> 63 A. The existence of <span lang="el" + title="antipodes" + >αντιποδες</span>; + was of course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world + is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the <i>Tim.</i> and by the Stoics, + see Stob. <i>Phys.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 6, Diog. <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 140), hence the early Christian writers attack + the two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i> + <span class="vol">XVI.</span> 9. <i>Hicetas</i>: he was followed by + Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">X.</span> 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the + mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in + Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. <i>Theophrastus</i>: who wrote much on the + history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. <i>Platonem</i>: the words of + Plato (<i>Tim.</i> 40 B) are <span lang="el" title="gên de trophon men hêmeteran, eillomenên de peri ton dia pantos polon tetamenon" + >γην δε + τροφον μεν + ‛ημετεραν, + ειλλομενην + δε περι τον + δια παντος + πολον + τεταμενον</span>. + <i>Quid tu, Epicure</i>: the connection is that Cic., having given the + crotchets of other philosophers about <span lang="el" title="physikê" + >φυσικη</span>, proceeds to give the + peculiar crotchet of Epic. <i>Putas solem ... tantum</i>: a hard passage. + <i>Egone? ne bis</i> is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. <i>egone vobis</i>, and + is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (<i>Em.</i> 185) "<i>cum + interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem <a href="#BkII_82">82</a>) + solem esse putaret, Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat + quantus videretur vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius + circumscribit, ne bis quidem tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem + et bipedalem</i>". (<i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20) This + explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given. + Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the + outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's + size, i.e. twice the apparent size. <i>Ne ... quidem</i> may possibly + appear strange, cf. however <i>ne maiorem quidem</i> in <a + href="#BkII_82">82</a>. <i>Aristo Chius</i>: for this doctrine of his see + R. and P. 358.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_124"></a><a href="#BkII_124">§124</a>.</b> <i>Quid + sit animus</i>: an enumeration of the different ancient theories is given + in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 18—22, and by Sext. + <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 113, who also speaks in + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 31 of the <span lang="el" + title="pollê kai anênytos machê" >πολλη + και + ανηνυτος + μαχη</span> concerning the soul. In <i>P.H.</i> + <span class="vol">II.</span> 57 he says <span lang="el" title="Gorgias oude dianoian einai phêsi" + >Γοργιας + ουδε + διανοιαν + ειναι φησι</span>. + <i>Dicaearcho</i>: <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 21. <i>Tres + partis</i>: in Plato's <i>Republic</i>. <i>Ignis</i>: Zeno's opinion, + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19. <i>Animam</i>: <i>ib.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 19. <i>Sanguis</i>: Empodocles, as in + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 19 where his famous line <span + lang="el" title="haima gar anthrôpois perikardion esti noêma" + >‛αιμα γαρ + ανθρωποις + περικαρδιον + εστι νοημα</span> + is translated, see R. and P. 124. <i>Ut Xenocrates</i>: some edd. read + <i>Xenocrati</i>, but cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_44">44</a>, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18, + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 76. <i>Numerus</i>: so Bentl. + for <i>mens</i> of MSS., cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_39">39</a>, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 20, 41. An + explanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and + P. 244. <i>Quod intellegi</i> etc.: so in <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 41 <i>quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide + dicitur</i>. <i>Momenta</i> n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_45">45</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_125"></a><a href="#BkII_125">§125</a>.</b> + <i>Verecundius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_114">114</a> <i>subadroganter</i>. + <i>Vincam animum</i>: a common phrase in Cic., cf. <i>Philipp.</i> <span + class="vol">XII.</span> 21. <i>Queru potissimum? quem?</i>: In repeated + questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of + <i>quisnam</i>, not <i>quis</i>, in the second question, as in + <i>Verr.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 5. The mutation of Augustine + <i>Contra Ac.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 33 makes it probable that + <i>quemnam</i> was the original reading here. Zumpt on <i>Verr.</i> qu. + Quint. <span class="vol">IX.</span> 2, 61, Plin. <i>Epist.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud + it for its likeness to impromptu. <i>Nobilitatis</i>: this is to be + explained by referring to <a href="#BkII_73">73</a>—<a + href="#BkII_75">75</a> (<i>imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi + nobilem</i>), where Cic. protests against being compared to a demagogue, + and claims to follow the aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the + commentators to show that Democr. was literally an aristocrat have + failed. <i>Convicio</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_34">34</a>. <i>Completa et + conferta</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_27">27</a>. <i>Quod movebitur ... cedat</i>: this is the + theory of motion disproved by Lucr. <span class="vol">I.</span> 370 sq., + cf. also <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 83. Halm writes <i>quo + quid</i> for <i>quod</i> (with Christ), and inserts <i>corpus</i> before + <i>cedat</i>, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever + body is pushed, gives way." <i>Tam sit mirabilis</i>: n. on <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_25">25</a>. <i>Innumerabilis</i>: <a + href="#BkII_55">55</a>. <i>Supra infra</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_92">92</a>. <i>Ut nos nunc simus</i>, etc.: n. on fragm. <a + href="#FrN_13">13</a> of <i>Ac. Post.</i> <i>Disputantis</i>: <a + href="#BkII_55">55</a>. <i>Animo videre</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_22">22</a>. <i>Imagines</i>: <span lang="el" title="eidôla" + >ειδωλα</span>, which Catius + translated (<i>Ad Fam.</i> <span class="vol">XV.</span> 16) by + <i>spectra</i>, Zeller 432. <i>Tu vero</i>: etc. this is all part of the + personal <i>convicium</i> supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by + the Antiocheans, and beginning at <i>Tune aut inane</i> above. + <i>Commenticiis</i>: a favourite word of Cic., cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 113.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_126"></a><a href="#BkII_126">§126</a>.</b> <i>Quae + tu</i>: elliptic for <i>ut comprobem quae tu comprobas</i> cf. <a + href="#BkII_125">125</a>. <i>Impudenter</i>: <a href="#BkII_115">115</a>. + <i>Atque haud scio</i>: <i>atque</i> here = <span lang="el" + title="kaitoi" >καιτοι</span>, "and + yet," n. on <a href="#BkIIN_5">5</a> <i>ac vereor</i>. <i>Invidiam</i>: + cf. <a href="#BkII_144">144</a>. <i>Cum his</i>: i.e. <i>aliis cum + his</i>. <i>Summus deus</i>: "the highest form of the deity" who was of + course one in the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and <span + lang="el" title="pyr technikon" >πυρ + τεχνικον</span> is one of + the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_29">29</a>, Zeller 161 sq. <i>Solem</i>: as of course being + the chief seat of fire. <i>Solis autem ... nego credere</i>: Faber first + gave <i>ac monet</i> for MSS. <i>admonens</i>, which Halm retains, Manut. + then restored to its place <i>permensi refertis</i>, which MSS. have + after <i>nego</i>. <i>Hic</i>, which MSS. have after <i>decempeda</i>, + Madv. turns into <i>hunc</i>, while <i>hoc</i>, which stands immediately + after <i>nego</i>, he ejects (<i>Em.</i> 187). <i>Ergo</i> after + <i>vos</i> is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this + arrangement. <i>Leniter</i>: Halm and Hermann <i>leviter</i>; the former + reads <i>inverecundior</i> after Morgenstern, for what reason it is + difficult to see.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_127"></a><a href="#BkII_127">§127</a>.</b> + <i>Pabulum</i>: similar language in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 46. <i>Consideratio contemplatioque</i>: Cic. is + fond of this combination, as <i>De Off.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> + 153; cf. Wesenberg on <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 9, who qu. + similar combinations from <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 11, 58. + <i>Elatiores</i>: MSS. mostly have <i>latiores</i>. Halm with Lamb. reads + <i>altiores</i>, in support of which reading Dav. qu. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 51, Val. Flaccus <i>Argon.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 547, add Virg. <i>Aen.</i> <span + class="vol">VI.</span> 49, Cic. <i>Orat.</i> 119. <i>Exigua et + minima</i>: <span lang="el" title="smikra kai elachista" + >σμικρα και + ελαχιστα</span>. Madv. on + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 78 notes that except here Cic. + always writes <i>exigua et paene minima</i> or something of the kind. + <i>Occultissimarum</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_15">15</a>. <i>Occurit ... completur</i>: MSS. have + <i>occuret</i> mostly, if that is retained <i>complebitur</i> must be + read. Madv. <i>Opusc.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 282 takes + <i>occurit</i>, explaining it as a perfect, and giving numerous exx. of + this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 35.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_128"></a><a href="#BkII_128">§128</a>.</b> <i>Agi + secum</i>: cf. <i>nobiscum ageret</i> in <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>. + <i>Simile veri</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_66">66</a>. <i>Notionem</i>: = + <i>cognitionem</i>, <span lang="el" title="epistêmên" + >επιστημην</span>. + <i>At paulum</i>: MSS. <i>et</i> Halm <i>sed.</i>; cf. <i>at illud + ante</i> in <a href="#BkII_116">116</a>. <i>Si quae</i>: Halm and many + edd. have <i>se, quae</i>. But the <i>se</i> comes in very awkwardly, and + is not needed before the infinitive. Madv. indeed (<i>Em.</i> 114), after + producing many exx. of the reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts + about this passage because <i>considero</i> does not belong to the class + of verbs with which this usage is found, but he produces many instances + with <i>puto</i>, which surely stands on the same level. <i>Non + magis</i>: so in <a href="#BkII_119">119</a> <i>nec magis approbabit nunc + lucere</i>, etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely + cognisable phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to + absolute knowledge by refusing <span lang="el" title="ton hêlion homologein einai katalêpton" + >τον ‛ηλιον + ‛ομολογειν + ειναι + καταληπτον</span> + (Galen <i>De Opt. Gen. Dicendi</i> 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). + <i>Cornix</i>: for the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller + 349—358. <i>Signum illud</i>: the <i>xystus</i> (<a + href="#BkII_9">9</a>) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. <i>Nat. + Hist.</i> <span class="vol">XXXIV.</span> 8. <i>Duodeviginti</i>: <a + href="#BkII_82">82</a>, I just note that <i>octodecim</i> is not used by + Cic. <i>Sol quantus sit</i>: <a href="#BkII_91">91</a>. <i>Omnium rerum + ... comprehendendi</i>: not a case of a plural noun with a singular + gerund like <i>spe rerum potiendi</i>, etc., but of two genitives + depending in different ways on the same word (<i>definitio</i>). M. + <i>Em.</i> 197 qu. Plat. <i>Leg.</i> 648 E <span lang="el" title="tên pantôn hêttan phoboumenos anthrôpon toi pômatos" + >την παντων + ‛ητταν + φοβουμενος + ανθρωπον + τοι + πωματος</span>, <i>Brut.</i> + 163 <i>Scaevolae dicendi elegantia</i>, <i>De Or.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 156. Other exx. in <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 14. For the turn of expression cf. <i>T.D.</i> + <span class="vol">IV.</span> 62 <i>omnium philosophorum una est ratio + medendi</i>, <i>Lael.</i> 78 <i>omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est</i>, + also <a href="#BkII_51">51</a> of this book.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_129">§§129</a>—<a + href="#BkII_141">141</a>.</b> Summary. What contention is there among + philosophers about the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems + like that of Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, + Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, + Aristippus, Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, + Carneades (<a href="#BkII_129">129</a>-<a href="#BkII_131">131</a>). If I + desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow me, while if I + follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (<a href="#BkII_132">132</a>). I must + be careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both + you, Lucullus, and myself (<a href="#BkII_133">133</a>). Zeno thinks + virtue gives happiness. "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest + possible." How am I to choose among such conflicting theories? (<a + href="#BkII_134">134</a>) Nor can I accept those points in which + Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard emotion as harmful, + which the ancients thought natural and useful (<a + href="#BkII_135">135</a>). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (<a + href="#BkII_136">136</a>) Albinus joking said to Carneades "You do not + think me a praetor because I am not a <i>sapiens</i>." "That," said + Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" (<a href="#BkII_137">137</a>). + Chrysippus thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be + defended (<a href="#BkII_138">138</a>). I gravitate then towards one of + them, that of pleasure. Virtue calls me back, nor will she even allow me + to join pleasure to herself (<a href="#BkII_139">139</a>). When I hear + the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I cannot avoid being moved + by both, and so I find it impossible to choose (<a + href="#BkII_141">141</a>, <a href="#BkII_142">142</a>).</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_129"></a><a href="#BkII_129">§129</a>.</b> <i>Quod + coeperam</i>: in <a href="#BkII_128">128</a> at <i>veniamus nunc ad boni + maique notionem</i>. <i>Constituendi</i>: n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_114">114</a>. <i>Bonorum summa</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 21 and Madv. <i>Est igitur</i>: so in <i>De + Div.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 8, <i>igitur</i> comes fourth word + in the clause; this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. + <i>Omitto</i>: MSS. <i>et omitto</i>, but cf. Madv. <i>Em.</i> 201 + <i>certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro simplici 'omitto,' in + initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae exempla subiciuntur + per figuram omissionis</i>. <i>Relicta</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_130">130</a> <i>abiectos</i>. Cic. generally classes Herillus + (or Erillus as Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 35 + spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded + systems, cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 43, <i>De Off.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 6, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> + 85. <i>Ut Herillum</i>. MSS. have either <i>Erillum</i> or <i>et + illum</i>, one would expect <i>ut Herilli</i>. <i>Cognitione et + scientia</i>: double translation of <span lang="el" title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span>. For the + <i>finis</i> of Herillus see Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 43. <i>Megaricorum</i>: <i>Xenophanes</i>. Cic + considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to + have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history. + The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic + doctrine. Zeller, <i>Socrates</i> 211. <i>Unum et simile</i>: for this + see Zell. <i>Socr.</i> 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. + <i>Simile</i> ought perhaps to be <i>sui simile</i> as in <i>Tim.</i> c. + 7, already quoted on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_30">30</a>, see my note there and cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_35">35</a>. <i>Menedemo</i>: see + Zeller <i>Socr.</i> 238, R. and P. 182. The <i>Erctrian</i> school was + closely connected with the Megarian. <i>Fuit</i>: = <i>natus est</i>, as + often. <i>Herilli</i>: so Madv. for <i>ulli</i> of MSS.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_130"></a><a href="#BkII_130">§130</a>.</b> + <i>Aristonem</i>: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a + Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines + of Aristo the Chian <i>ib.</i> 358, Zeller 58 sq. <i>In mediis</i>: cf. + <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_36">36</a>, <a + href="#BkI_37">37</a>. <i>Momenta</i> = <i>aestimationes</i>, <span + lang="el" title="axiai" >αξιαι</span> in <a + href="#BkII_36">36</a>, where <i>momenti</i> is used in a different way. + <i>Pyrrho autem</i>: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but in <a + href="#BkII_124">124</a> there is just the same change from + <i>Pyrrhoni</i> to <i>Xenocrates</i>. <span lang="el" title="Apatheia" + >Απαθεια</span>: Diog. <span + class="vol">IX.</span> 108 affirms this as well as <span lang="el" + title="praiotês" + >πραιοτης</span> to be a + name for the sceptic <span lang="el" title="telos" + >τελος</span>, but the name scarcely occurs + if at all in Sext. who generally uses <span lang="el" title="ataraxia" + >αταραξια</span>, but + occasionally <span lang="el" title="metriopatheia" + >μετριοπαθεια</span>; + cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338. <span lang="el" title="Apatheia" + >Απαθεια</span> was also a + Stoic term. <i>Diu multumque</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_4">4</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_131"></a><a href="#BkII_131">§131</a>.</b> <i>Nec + tamen consentiens</i>: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences between + the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448. + <i>Callipho</i>: as the genitive is <i>Calliphontis</i>, Cic. ought + according to rule to write <i>Calliphon</i> in the nom; for this see + Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19, who also gives the + chief authorities concerning this philosopher. <i>Hieronymus</i>: + mentioned <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19, 35, 41, <span + class="vol">V.</span> 14, in which last place Cic. says of him <i>quem + iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio</i>. <i>Diodorus</i>: see Madv. on + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 19. <i>Honeste vivere</i>, etc.: + in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 14 the <i>finis</i> of Polemo + is stated to be <i>secundum naturam vivere</i>, and three Stoic + interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present + passage—<i>omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint + fruentem vivere</i>. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him + it is attributed to the <i>vetus Academia</i> in <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_22">22</a>, where the words <i>aut + omnia aut maxima</i>, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. + Clemens Alex. qu. by Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> + 15. See n. below on Carneades. <i>Antiochus probat</i>: the germs of many + Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in Polemo; see <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_34">34</a>, n. <i>Eiusque amici</i>: + Bentl. <i>aemuli</i>, but Halm refers to <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree + Stoicised. <i>Nunc</i>: Halm <i>huc</i> after Jo. Scala. + <i>Carneades</i>: this <i>finis</i> is given in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 35 (<i>frui principiis naturalibus</i>), <span + class="vol">II.</span> 42 (<i>Carneadeum illud quod is non tam ut + probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum gerebat + opponeret</i>), <span class="vol">V.</span> 20 (<i>fruendi rebus iis, + quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem + auctor sed defensor disserendi causa fuit</i>), <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 84 (<i>naturae primus aut omnibus aut maximis frui, + ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat</i>). The <i>finis</i> therefore, + thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is clear that + Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include + <i>virtus</i> in it (see <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 38, 42, + <span class="vol">V.</span> 22) while Polemo did (I. <a + href="#BkI_22">22</a>). See more on <a href="#BkII_139">139</a>. + <i>Zeno</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 15 <i>Inventor + et princeps</i>: same expression in <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 48, <i>De Or.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 91, + <i>De Inv.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 6; <i>inv.</i> = <span + lang="el" title="oikistês" + >οικιστης</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_132"></a><a href="#BkII_132">§132</a>.</b> + <i>Quemlibet</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_125">125</a>, <a + href="#BkII_126">126</a>. <i>Prope singularem</i>: cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 22 <i>Aristoteles longe omnibus—Platonem + semper excipio—praestans</i>; also <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 7, <i>De Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 15. + <i>Per ipsum Antiochum</i>: a similar line of argument is taken in Sext. + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 88, <span class="vol">II.</span> + 32, etc. <i>Terminis ... possessione</i>: there is a similar play on the + legal words <i>finis terminus possessio</i> in <i>De Leg.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. <i>Omnis ratio</i> + etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. + Aug. <i>De Civ. Dei</i> <span class="vol">XIX.</span> 1 <i>neque enim + existimat</i> (Varro) <i>ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam, quae + non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et + malorum</i>, etc. <i>Si Polemoneus</i>: i.e. <i>sapiens fuerit</i>. + <i>Peccat</i>: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>. <i>Academicos et</i>: + MSS. om. <i>et</i> as in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_16">16</a>, and <i>que</i> in <a href="#BkII_52">52</a> of + this book. <i>Dicenda</i>: for the omission of the verb with the + gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic clauses) cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_7">7</a>, and Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 43, who how ever unduly limits the usage. + <i>Hic igitur ... prudentior</i>: MSS. generally have <i>assentiens</i>, + but one good one (Halm's E) has <i>assentientes</i>. I venture to read + <i>adsentietur</i>, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, + as in <a href="#BkII_26">26</a> (<i>tenetur</i>) and that then + <i>adsentiet</i>, under the attraction of the <i>s</i> following, passed + into <i>adsentiens</i>, as in <a href="#BkII_147">147</a> <i>intellegat + se</i> passed into <i>intelligentes</i>. <i>N</i>, I may remark, is + frequently inserted in MSS. (as in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_7">7</a> <i>appellant</i>, <a href="#BkI_16">16</a> + <i>disputant</i>, <a href="#BkI_24">24</a> <i>efficerentur</i>), and all + the changes involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read + <i>sin, inquam</i> (<i>sc. adsentietur</i>) for <i>si numquam</i> of MSS. + The question <i>uter est prudentior</i> is intended to press home the + dilemma in which Cicero has placed the supposed <i>sapiens</i>. All the + other emendations I have seen are too unsatisfactory to be + enumerated.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_133"></a><a href="#BkII_133">§133</a>.</b> <i>Non + posse ... esse</i>: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads <i>non + esse illa probanda sap.</i> after Lamb., who also conj. <i>non posse illa + probata esse</i>. <i>Paria</i>: <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 48, <i>Paradoxa</i> 20 sq., Zeller 250. <i>Praecide</i>: <span lang="el" + title="syntomos" + >συντομος</span> or <span + lang="el" title="synelôn eipe" + >συνελων + ειπε</span>, cf. <i>Cat. Mai.</i> 57, <i>Ad + Att.</i> <span class="vol">VIII.</span> 4, <span class="vol">X.</span> + 16. <i>Inquit</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>. <i>Quid quod + quae</i>: so Guietus with the approval of Madv. (<i>Em.</i> 203) reads + for MSS. <i>quid quae</i> or <i>quid quaeque</i>, Halm and Bait., follow + Moser in writing <i>Quid? si quae</i> removing the stop at <i>paria</i>, + and make <i>in utramque partem</i> follow <i>dicantur</i>, on Orelli's + suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often + omit one. <i>Dicebas</i>: in <a href="#BkII_27">27</a>. <i>Incognito</i>: + <a href="#BkII_133">133</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_134"></a><a href="#BkII_134">§134</a>.</b> + <i>Etiam</i>: = "yes," Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 454. <i>Non beatissimam</i>: + <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_22">22</a>, n. <i>Deus + ille</i>: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's <span lang="el" title="ê theos ê thêrion" + >η θεος η + θηριον</span>), if he can do without + other advantages. For the omission of <i>est</i> after the emphatic + <i>ille</i> cf. <a href="#BkIIN_59">59</a>, n. <i>Theophrasto</i>, etc.: + n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_33">33</a>, <a + href="#BkI_35">35</a>. <i>Dicente</i>: before this Halm after Lamb., + followed by Bait., inserts <i>contra</i>, the need for which I fail to + see. <i>Et hic</i>: i.e. Antiochus. <i>Ne sibi constet</i>: Cic. argues + in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> that there cannot be degrees + in happiness. <i>Tum hoc ... tum illud</i>: cf. <a + href="#BkII_121">121</a>. <i>Iacere</i>: <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>In + his discrepant</i>: <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_42">42</a> + <i>in his constitit</i>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_135"></a><a href="#BkII_135">§135</a>.</b> + <i>Moveri</i>: <span lang="el" title="kineisthai" + >κινεισθαι</span>, + <a href="#BkII_29">29</a>. <i>Laetitia efferri</i>: <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_38">38</a>. <i>Probabilia</i>: the + removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain. + <i>Sapiensne ... deleta sit</i>: see Madv. <i>D.F.</i> p. 806, ed. 2, who + is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), <i>non + timeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?</i> which + involves the use of <i>nec</i> for <i>ne ... quidem</i>. I have followed + the reading of Madv. in his <i>Em.</i>, not the one he gives (after + Davies) in <i>D.F.</i> <i>ne patria deleatur</i>, which Halm takes, as + does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS. <i>Decreta</i>: some MSS. + <i>durata</i>; Halm conj. <i>dictata</i>. <i>Mediocritates</i>: <span + lang="el" title="mesopetes" + >μεσοπετες</span>, + as in Aristotle; cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 11, 22, + 74. <i>Permotione</i>: <span lang="el" title="kinesei" + >κινεσει</span>. <i>Naturalem + ... modum</i>: so <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 74. + <i>Crantoris</i>: sc. <i>librum</i>, for the omission of which see n. on + <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_13">13</a>; add Quint. <span + class="vol">IX.</span> 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read <i>in + Herodoti</i>, supplying <i>libro</i>. <i>Aureolus ... libellus</i>: it is + not often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is + rather colloquial; cf. <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 2, + <i>N.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 43, also for <i>aureolus</i> <a + href="#BkII_119">119</a> <i>flumen aureum</i>. <i>Panaetius</i>: he had + addressed to Tubero a work <i>de dolore</i>; see <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 23. <i>Cotem</i>: <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 43, 48, Seneca <i>De Ira</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle + (<i>iram calcar esse virtutis</i>). <i>Dicebant</i>: for the repetition + of this word cf. <a href="#BkII_146">146</a>, <span class="vol">I.</span> + <a href="#BkI_33">33</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_136"></a><a href="#BkII_136">§136</a>.</b> <i>Sunt + enim Socratica</i>: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is + affirmed in <i>Parad.</i> 4, <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> + 10. <i>Mirabilia</i>: Cic. generally translates <span lang="el" + title="paradoxa" + >παραδοξα</span> by + <i>admirabilia</i> as in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 74, or + <i>admiranda</i>, under which title he seems to have published a work + different from the <i>Paradoxa</i>, which we possess: see Bait., and + Halm's ed. of the Phil. works (1861), p. 994. <i>Quasi</i>: = almost, + <span lang="el" title="hôs epos eipein" >‛ως + επος + ειπειν</span>. <i>Voltis</i>: cf. the + Antiochean opinion in <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_18">18</a>, <a href="#BkI_22">22</a>. <i>Solos reges</i>: for + all this see Zeller 253 sq. <i>Solos divites</i>: <span lang="el" + title="hoti monos ho sophos plousios" >‛οτι + μονος ‛ο + σοφος + πλουσιος</span>, + <i>Parad.</i> <span class="vol">VI.</span> <i>Liberum</i>: <i>Parad.</i> + <span class="vol">V.</span> <span lang="el" title="hoti monos ho sophos eleutheros kai pas aphron doulos" + >‛οτι μονος + ‛ο σοφος + ελευθερος + και πας + αφρον + δουλος</span>. <i>Furiosus</i>: + <i>Parad.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> <span lang="el" title="hoti pas aphron mainetai" + >‛οτι πας + αφρον + μαινεται</span>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_137"></a><a href="#BkII_137">§137</a>.</b> <i>Tam + sunt defendenda</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_8">8</a>, <a + href="#BkII_120">120</a>. <i>Bono modo</i>: a colloquial and Plautine + expression; see Forc. <i>Ad senatum starent</i>: "were in waiting on the + senate;" cf. such phrases as <i>stare ad cyathum</i>, etc. + <i>Carneade</i>: the vocative is <i>Carneades</i> in <i>De Div.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 23. <i>Huic Stoico</i>: i.e. <i>Diogeni</i>; cf. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 24. Halm brackets <i>Stoico</i>, + and after him Bait. <i>Sequi volebat</i>: "professed to follow;" cf. + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 13 <i>Strato physicum se + voluit</i> "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 102. <i>Ille noster</i>: Dav. + <i>vester</i>, as in <a href="#BkII_143">143</a> <i>noster Antiochus</i>. + But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. <a + href="#BkII_113">113</a>. <i>Balbutiens</i>: "giving an uncertain sound;" + cf. <i>De Div.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 5, <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 75.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_138"></a><a href="#BkII_138">§138</a>.</b> <i>Mihi + veremini</i>: cf. Caes. <i>Bell. Gall</i>. <span class="vol">V.</span> 9 + <i>veritus navibus</i>. Halm and Bait. follow Christ's conj. + <i>verenti</i>, removing the stop at <i>voltis</i>. <i>Opinationem</i>: + the <span lang="el" title="oiêsin" + >οιησιν</span> of Sext., e.g. + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 280. <i>Quod minime voltis</i>: + cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_18">18</a>. <i>De + finibus</i>: not "concerning," but "from among" the different + <i>fines</i>; otherwise <i>fine</i> would have been written. Cf. <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_4">4</a> <i>si qui de nostris.</i> + <i>Circumcidit et amputat</i>: these two verbs often come together, as in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 44; cf. also <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">III.</span> 31. <i>Si vacemus omni molestia</i>: which + Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. <i>Cum honestate</i>: Callipho + in <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>. <i>Prima naturae commoda</i>: Cic. here + as in <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 59, <span + class="vol">V.</span> 58 confuses the Stoic <span lang="el" title="prôta kata physin" + >πρωτα κατα + φυσιν</span> with <span lang="el" title="ta tou sômatos agatha kai ta ektos" + >τα του + σωματος + αγαθα και τα + εκτος</span> of the Peripatetics, for which + see <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_19">19</a>. More on the + subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the <i>D.F.</i> <i>Relinquit</i>: + Orelli <i>relinqui</i> against the MSS.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_139"></a><a href="#BkII_139">§139</a>.</b> + <i>Polemonis ... finibus</i>: all these were composite <i>fines</i>. + <i>Adhuc</i>: I need scarcely point out that this goes with <i>habeo</i> + and not with <i>probabilius</i>; <i>adhuc</i> for <i>etiam</i> with the + comparative does not occur till the silver writers. <i>Labor eo</i>: cf. + Horace's <i>nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor</i>, also + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 6 <i>rapior illuc: revocat autem + Antiochus</i>. <i>Reprehendit manu</i>: <i>M.D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">II.</span> 3. <i>Pecudum</i>: <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_6">6</a>, <i>Parad.</i> 14 <i>voluptatem esse summum bonum, + quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non hominum</i>; similar expressions + occur with a reference to Epicurus in <i>De Off.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 105, <i>Lael.</i> 20, 32. <i>T.D.</i> <span + class="vol">V.</span> 73, <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18; + cf. also Aristoph. <i>Plut.</i> 922 <span lang="el" title="probatiou bion legeis" + >προβατιου + βιον + λεγεις</span> and <span lang="el" + title="boskêmatôn bios" + >βοσκηματων + βιος</span> in Aristotle. The meaning of + <i>pecus</i> is well shown in <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 69. + <i>Iungit deo</i>: Zeller 176 sq. <i>Animum solum</i>: the same criticism + is applied to Zeno's <i>finis</i> in <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 17, 25. <i>Ut ... sequar</i>: for the repeated + <i>ut</i> see <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 10, Madv. + <i>Gram.</i> 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second <i>ut</i> with Lamb. + <i>Carneades ... defensitabat</i>: this is quite a different view from + that in <a href="#BkII_131">131</a>; yet another of Carneades is given in + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 83. <i>Istum finem</i>: MSS. + <i>ipsum</i>; the two words are often confused, as in <span + class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_2">2</a>. <i>Ipsa veritas</i>: MSS. + <i>severitas</i>, a frequent error; cf. <i>In Verr. Act.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 3, <span class="vol">III.</span> 162, <i>De + Leg.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 4, also Madv. on <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">IV.</span> 55. <i>Obversetur</i>: Halm takes the conj. of + Lamb., <i>adversetur</i>. The MSS. reading gives excellent sense; cf. + <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 52 <i>obversentur honestae + species viro</i>. Bait. follows Halm. <i>Tu ... copulabis</i>: this is + the feigned expostulation of <i>veritas</i> (cf. <a + href="#BkII_34">34</a> <i>convicio veritatis</i>), for which style see <a + href="#BkII_125">125</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_140"></a><a href="#BkII_140">§140</a>.</b> + <i>Voluptas cum honestate</i>: this whole expression is in apposition to + <i>par</i>, so that <i>cum</i> must not be taken closely with + <i>depugnet</i>; cf. Hor. <i>Sat.</i> <span class="vol">I.</span> 7, 19 + <i>Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius</i> (sc. + <i>par</i>) <i>cum Bitho Bacchius</i>. <i>Si sequare, ruunt</i>: for + constr. cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkI_7">7</a>. + <i>Communitas</i>: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. <i>Nulla potest + nisi erit</i>: Madv. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 70 "<i>in + hac coniunctione—hoc fieri non potest nisi—fere semper + coniunctivus subicitur praesentis—futuri et perfecti indicativus + ponitur</i>." <i>Gratuita</i>: "disinterested." <i>Ne intellegi + quidem</i>: n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_7">7</a>, + cf. also <i>T.D.</i> <span class="vol">V.</span> 73, 119. <i>Gloriosum in + vulgus</i>: cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 44 <i>populus + cum illis facit</i> (i.e. <i>Epicureis</i>). <i>Normam ... regulam</i>: + n. on <i>Ac. Post.</i> fragm. <a href="#FrN_8">8</a>. + <i>Praescriptionem</i>: <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_23">23</a>, n.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_141"></a><a href="#BkII_141">§141</a>.</b> + <i>Adquiescis</i>: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads <i>adsciscis</i>, + comparing <a href="#BkII_138">138</a>. Add <i>D.F.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 23 (<i>sciscat et probet</i>), <span + class="vol">III.</span> 17 (<i>adsciscendas esse</i>), <span + class="vol">III.</span> 70 (<i>adscisci et probari</i>) Bait. follows + Halm. <i>Ratum ... fixum</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_27">27</a> and n. on + <i>Ac. Post.</i> fragm. <a href="#FrN_17">17</a>. <i>Falso</i>: like + <i>incognito</i> in <a href="#BkII_133">133</a>. <i>Nullo discrimine</i>: + for this see the explanation of <i>nihil interesse</i> in <a + href="#BkIIN_40">40</a>, n. <i>Iudicia</i>: <span lang="el" + title="kritêria" + >κριτηρια</span> as + usual.</p> + + <blockquote><b><a href="#BkII_142">§§142</a>—<a + href="#BkII_146">146</a>.</b> Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how + Protagoras, the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (<a + href="#BkII_142">142</a>). Does Antiochus follow any of these? Why, he + never even follows the <i>vetus Academia</i>, and never stirs a step from + Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot agree about the very elements + of their art (<a href="#BkII_143">143</a>). Why then, Lucullus, do you + rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling them I do + away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd together, I + will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them are slaves, + exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being <i>sapiens</i>, + know nothing whatever (<a href="#BkII_144">144</a>). This last point Zeno + used to illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any + actual <i>sapiens</i> (<a href="#BkII_145">145</a>). Now as there is no + knowledge there can be no art. How would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this + conclusion? They would prefer mine, to which our ancestors bear + testimony.</blockquote> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_142"></a><a href="#BkII_142">§142</a>.</b> <i>Venio + iam</i>: Dialectic had been already dealt with in <a + href="#BkII_91">91</a>—<a href="#BkII_98">98</a> here it is merely + considered with a view to the choice of the supposed <i>sapiens</i>, as + was Ethical Science in <a href="#BkII_129">129</a>—<a + href="#BkII_141">141</a> and Physics in <a + href="#BkII_116">116</a>—<a href="#BkII_128">128</a>. With the + enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus + gives in <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 48 sq. + <i>Protagorae</i>: R. and P. 132 sq. <i>Qui putet</i>: so MSS., Halm and + Bait. <i>putat</i> after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks". + <i>Permotiones intimas</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_20">20</a> <i>tactus + interior</i>, also <a href="#BkII_76">76</a>. <i>Epicuri</i>: nn. on <a + href="#BkIIN_19">19</a>, <a href="#BkIIN_79">79</a>, <a + href="#BkIIN_80">80</a>. <i>Iudicium</i>: <span lang="el" + title="kritêrion" + >κριτηριον</span> + as usual. <i>Rerum notitiis</i>: <span lang="el" title="prolêpsesi" + >προληψεσι</span>, + Zeller 403 sq. <i>Constituit</i>: note the constr. with <i>in</i>, like + <i>ponere in</i>. <i>Cogitationis</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_30">30</a>. Several MSS. have <i>cognitionis</i>, the two + words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg <i>Fm.</i> to <i>T.D.</i> + <span class="vol">III.</span> p. 17, who says, <i>multo tamen saepius + "cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam contra</i>, also + <i>M.D.F</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 21.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_143"></a><a href="#BkII_143">§143</a>.</b> <i>Ne + maiorum quidem suorum</i>: sc. <i>aliquid probat</i>. For <i>maiorum</i> + cf. <a href="#BkII_80">80</a>. Here Plato is almost excluded from the + so-called <i>vetus Academia</i>, cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_33">33</a>. <i>Libri</i>: titles of some are preserved in + Diog. Laert. <span class="vol">IV.</span> 11—14. <i>Nihil + politius</i>: cf. <a href="#BkIIN_119">119</a>, n. <i>Pedem nusquam</i>: + for the ellipse cf. <a href="#BkII_58">58</a>, <a + href="#BkII_116">116</a>, <i>Pro Deiot.</i> 42 and <i>pedem latum</i> in + Plaut. <i>Abutimur</i>: this verb in the rhetorical writers means to use + words in metaphorical or unnatural senses, see Quint. <span + class="vol">X.</span> 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we + use the name Academic in a non natural fashion?" <i>Si dies est + lucet</i>: a better trans of <span lang="el" title="ei phôs estin, hêmera estin" + >ει φως + εστιν, + ‛ημερα + εστιν</span> than was given in <a + href="#BkIIN_96">96</a>, where see n. <i>Aliter Philoni</i>: not Philo of + Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus the Megarian, + mentioned also in <a href="#BkII_75">75</a>. The dispute between Diodorus + and Philo is mentioned in Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span + class="vol">VIII.</span> 115—117 with the same purpose as here, see + also Zeller 39. <i>Antipater</i>: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded + Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. <i>Archidemus</i>: + several times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as <span + class="vol">VII.</span> 68, 84. <i>Opiniosissimi</i>: so the MSS. I + cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn it. Halm is + certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as + <i>ingeniosissimi</i> is necessary. I believe that the word + <i>opiniosissimi</i> (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was + manufactured on the spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two + philosophers, who are playfully described as men full of <i>opinio</i> or + <span lang="el" title="doxa" + >δοξα</span>—just the imputation which, as + Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's <i>spinosissimi</i> is + ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable + as Halm thinks.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_144"></a><a href="#BkII_144">§144</a>.</b> <i>In + contionem vocas</i>: a retort, having reference to <a + href="#BkII_14">14</a>, cf. also <a href="#BkII_63">63</a>, <a + href="#BkII_72">72</a>. For these <i>contiones</i> see Lange, <i>Romische + Alterthumer</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 663, ed 2. They were called + by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of whom had the + right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under fewer + restrictions than the right of the others. <i>Occludi tabernas</i> in + order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this + see Liv. <span class="vol">III.</span> 27, <span class="vol">IV.</span> + 31, <span class="vol">IX.</span> 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O + Israel" in the Bible. <i>Artificia</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_30">30</a>. + <i>Tolli</i>: n. on <a href="#BkIIN_26">26</a>. <i>Ut opifices + concitentur</i>: cf. <i>Pro Flacc.</i> 18 <i>opifices et tabernarios quid + neqoti est concitare?</i> <i>Expromam</i>: Cic. was probably thinking of + the use to which he himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in <i>Pro + Murena</i> 61, a use of which he half confesses himself ashamed in + <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 74. <i>Exsules</i> etc.: <a + href="#BkII_136">136</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_145"></a><a href="#BkII_145">§145</a>.</b> <i>Scire + negatis</i>: cf. Sext. <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">VII.</span> 153, who + says that even <span lang="el" title="katalêpsis" + >καταληψις</span> + when it arises in the mind of a <span lang="el" title="phaulos" + >φαυλος</span> is mere <span + lang="el" title="doxa" >δοξα</span> and not <span + lang="el" title="epistêmê" + >επιστημη</span>; also + <i>P.H.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 83, where it is said that the + <span lang="el" title="phaulos" + >φαυλος</span> is capable of <span + lang="el" title="to alêthes" >το + αληθες</span> but not of <span + lang="el" title="alêtheia" + >αληθεια</span>, which the + <span lang="el" title="sophos" + >σοφος</span> alone has. <i>Visum ... + adsensus</i>: the Stoics as we saw (II. <a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, etc.) + analysed sensations into two parts; with the Academic and other schools + each sensation was an ultimate unanalysable unit, a <span lang="el" + title="psilon pathos" >ψιλον + παθος</span>. For this symbolic action of + Zeno cf. <i>D.F.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 18, <i>Orat.</i> 113, + Sextus <i>A.M.</i> <span class="vol">II.</span> 7, Quint. <span + class="vol">II.</span> 20, 7, Zeller 84. <i>Contraxerat</i>: so Halm who + qu. Plin. <i>Nat. Hist.</i> <span class="vol">XI.</span> 26, 94 + <i>digitum contrahens aut remittens</i>; Orelli <i>construxerat</i>; MSS. + mostly <i>contexerat</i>. <i>Quod ante non fuerat</i>: <span lang="el" + title="katalambanein" + >καταλαμβανειν</span> + however is frequent in Plato in the sense "to seize firmly with the + mind." <i>Adverterat</i>: the best MSS. give merely <i>adverat</i>, but + on the margin <i>admoverat</i> which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one + good MS. has <i>adverterat</i>. <i>Ne ipsi quidem</i>: even Socrates, + Antisthenes and Diogenes were not <span lang="el" title="sophoi" + >σοφοι</span> according to the Stoics, but + merely were <span lang="el" title="en prokopêi" >εν + προκοπηι</span>; see + Diog. <span class="vol">VII.</span> 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. <i>Sto. + Rep.</i> 1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) <span lang="el" + title="esti de outos" >εστι δε + ουτος</span> (i.e. <span lang="el" + title="ho sophos" >‛ο + σοφος</span>) <span lang="el" + title="oudamou gês oude gegone" + >ουδαμου γης + ουδε + γεγονε</span>. <i>Nec tu</i>: sc. + <i>scis</i>; Goer. has a strange note here.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_146"></a><a href="#BkII_146">§146</a>.</b> + <i>Illa</i>: cf. <i>illa invidiosa</i> above (<a + href="#BkII_144">144</a>). <i>Dicebas</i>: in <a href="#BkII_22">22</a>. + <i>Refero</i>: "retort," as in Ovid. <i>Metam.</i> <span + class="vol">I.</span> 758 <i>pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici potuisse + et non potuisse referri</i>; cf. also <i>par pari referre dicto</i>. + <i>Ne nobis quidem</i>: "<i>nor</i> would they be angry;" cf. n. on. + <span class="vol">I.</span> <a href="#BkIN_5">5</a>. <i>Arbitrari</i>: + the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an + eye-witness," see Corssen <span class="vol">I.</span> 238. <i>Ea non + ut</i>: MSS. have <i>ut ea non aut</i>. Halm reads <i>ut ea non</i> + merely, but I prefer the reading I have given because of Cicero's + fondness for making the <i>ut</i> follow closely on the negative: for + this see Madv. <i>Gram.</i> 465 <i>b</i>, obs.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_147"></a><a href="#BkII_147">§147</a>.</b> + <i>Obscuritate</i>: cf. <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkI_44">44</a>, n. on <span class="vol">I.</span> <a + href="#BkIN_15">15</a>. <i>Plus uno</i>: <a href="#BkII_115">115</a>. + <i>Iacere</i>: cf. <a href="#BkII_79">79</a>. <i>Plagas</i>: cf. n. on <a + href="#BkIIN_112">112</a>.</p> + + <p><b><a name="BkIIN_148"></a><a href="#BkII_148">§148</a>.</b> <i>Ad + patris revolvor sententiam</i>: for this see Introd. <a + href="#Page_l">50</a>, and for the expression <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>. + <i>Opinaturum</i>: see <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>, <a + href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a + href="#BkII_112">112</a>. <i>Intellegat se</i>: MSS. + <i>intellegentes</i>, cf. n. on <a href="#BkIIN_132">132</a>. <i>Qua + re</i>: so Manut. for <i>per</i> of MSS. <span lang="el" title="Epochên" + >Εποχην</span> <i>illam omnium + rerum</i>: an odd expression; cf. <i>actio rerum</i> in <a + href="#BkII_62">62</a>. <i>Non probans</i>: so Madv. <i>Em.</i> 204 for + MSS. <i>comprobans</i>. Dav. conj. <i>improbans</i> and is followed by + Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is wrong. The difficulty is + essentially the same as that involved in <a href="#BkII_104">104</a>, + which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a + theoretical dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that <i>assent</i> + (meaning absolute assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma + Catulus might well describe himself as formally approving + (<i>comprobans</i>). The <i>practice</i> is to give assent (meaning + modified assent). There is the same contrast in <a + href="#BkII_104">104</a> between <i>placere</i> and <i>tenere</i>. I may + note that the word <i>alteri</i> (cf. <i>altero</i> in <a + href="#BkII_104">104</a>) need not imply that the dogma and the practice + are irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably + confirmed edd. in their introduction of the negative. <i>Nec eam + admodum</i>: cf. <i>non repugnarem</i> in <a href="#BkII_112">112</a>. + <i>Tollendum</i>: many edd. have gone far astray in interpreting this + passage. The word is used with a double reference to <i>adsensus</i> and + <i>ancora</i>; in the first way we have had <i>tollere</i> used a score + of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes. + <i>Bell. Gall.</i> <span class="vol">IV.</span> 23, <i>Bell. Civ.</i> + <span class="vol">I.</span> 31, where <i>tollere</i> is used of weighing + anchor, and Varro <i>De Re Rust.</i> <span class="vol">III.</span> 17, 1, + where it occurs in the sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any + reference to the sea. (The exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe + and this alone is referred to in <i>Ad Att.</i> <span + class="vol">XIII.</span> 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried + at first to manage a joke by using the word <i>inhibendum</i>, which had + also a nautical signification, but finding that he had mistaken the + meaning of the word, substituted <i>tollendum</i>.</p> + +<div class="note"> + <p><a name="Nt_1"></a><a href="#NtA_1">[1]</a> <i>De Leg.</i> II. §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_2"></a><a href="#NtA_2">[2]</a> Cf. <i>De Or.</i> II. §1 + with II. §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_3"></a><a href="#NtA_3">[3]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 1, + Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut philosophus + probabatur.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_4"></a><a href="#NtA_4">[4]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §93, + Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_5"></a><a href="#NtA_5">[5]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. + 1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_6"></a><a href="#NtA_6">[6]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, §309.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_7"></a><a href="#NtA_7">[7]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II. 20, + §6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_8"></a><a href="#NtA_8">[8]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 16. + <i>T.D.</i> V. §113. <i>Acad.</i> II. §<a href="#BkII_115">115</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_9"></a><a href="#NtA_9">[9]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, §306.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_10"></a><a href="#NtA_10">[10]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p> + + <p><a name="Nt_11"></a><a href="#NtA_11">[11]</a> <i>Rep.</i> I. §7. + <i>T.D.</i> V. §5. <i>De Off.</i> II. §§3,4. <i>De Fato</i>, §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_12"></a><a href="#NtA_12">[12]</a> Cf. <i>Brutus</i>, + §§312, 322.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_13"></a><a href="#NtA_13">[13]</a> Cf. <i>Brutus</i>, + §§312, 314, 316.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_14"></a><a href="#NtA_14">[14]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, + §315.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_15"></a><a href="#NtA_15">[15]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §59.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_16"></a><a href="#NtA_16">[16]</a> VII. I. §35.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_17"></a><a href="#NtA_17">[17]</a> Cf. <i>N.D.</i> I. §93 + with <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 1, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_18"></a><a href="#NtA_18">[18]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. §<a + href="#BkI_46">46</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_19"></a><a href="#NtA_19">[19]</a> <i>D.F.</i> V. §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_20"></a><a href="#NtA_20">[20]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. §16.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_21"></a><a href="#NtA_21">[21]</a> <i>D.F.</i> V. §6, + etc.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_22"></a><a href="#NtA_22">[22]</a> <i>D.F.</i> V. §8.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_23"></a><a href="#NtA_23">[23]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_4">4</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_24"></a><a href="#NtA_24">[24]</a> <i>Ib.</i> §<a + href="#BkII_69">69</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_25"></a><a href="#NtA_25">[25]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 19, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_26"></a><a href="#NtA_26">[26]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_113">113</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_27"></a><a href="#NtA_27">[27]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_113">113</a>. <i>De Leg.</i> I. §54.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_28"></a><a href="#NtA_28">[28]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_29"></a><a href="#NtA_29">[29]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, + §316.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_30"></a><a href="#NtA_30">[30]</a> <i>Hortensius</i>, + fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_31"></a><a href="#NtA_31">[31]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. + §61.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_32"></a><a href="#NtA_32">[32]</a> <i>De Div.</i> I. + §130.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_33"></a><a href="#NtA_33">[33]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. §6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_34"></a><a href="#NtA_34">[34]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> I. 10 + and 11.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_35"></a><a href="#NtA_35">[35]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. 1, §3. + <i>N.D.</i> I. §6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_36"></a><a href="#NtA_36">[36]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II. + 2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_37"></a><a href="#NtA_37">[37]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. 20. Cf. + II. 1, §12.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_38"></a><a href="#NtA_38">[38]</a> II. 6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_39"></a><a href="#NtA_39">[39]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II. 7 + and 16.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_40"></a><a href="#NtA_40">[40]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. 6, + §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_41"></a><a href="#NtA_41">[41]</a> Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> IV. + 11 with IV. 8 a.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_42"></a><a href="#NtA_42">[42]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. + 10.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_43"></a><a href="#NtA_43">[43]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. 16, + §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_44"></a><a href="#NtA_44">[44]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. 16 c, + §10, ed. Nobbe.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_45"></a><a href="#NtA_45">[45]</a> <i>Ad Qu. Fr.</i> II. + 14.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_46"></a><a href="#NtA_46">[46]</a> <i>Ad Qu. Fr.</i> III. + 5 and 6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_47"></a><a href="#NtA_47">[47]</a> §332.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_48"></a><a href="#NtA_48">[48]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> XIII. 1. + <i>Ad Att.</i> V. 11, §6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_49"></a><a href="#NtA_49">[49]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> V. 10, + §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_50"></a><a href="#NtA_50">[50]</a> <i>De Off.</i> I. + §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_51"></a><a href="#NtA_51">[51]</a> <i>Tim.</i> c. 1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_52"></a><a href="#NtA_52">[52]</a> Cf. <i>Tim.</i> c. 1 + with <i>De Div.</i> I. §5. <i>Brutus</i>, §250.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_53"></a><a href="#NtA_53">[53]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> VI. 1, + §26.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_54"></a><a href="#NtA_54">[54]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VI. 2, + §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_55"></a><a href="#NtA_55">[55]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VI. 6, + §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_56"></a><a href="#NtA_56">[56]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VI. 7, §2. + <i>Ad Fam.</i> II. 17, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_57"></a><a href="#NtA_57">[57]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. §22.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_58"></a><a href="#NtA_58">[58]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> VII. 1, + §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_59"></a><a href="#NtA_59">[59]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VII. 3, + VIII. 11.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_60"></a><a href="#NtA_60">[60]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> X. 8, + §6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_61"></a><a href="#NtA_61">[61]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> VIII. 2, + §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_62"></a><a href="#NtA_62">[62]</a> <span lang="el" + title="peri homonoias" >περι + ‛ομονοιας</span>, + <i>Ad Att.</i> IX. 9, §2, etc.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_63"></a><a href="#NtA_63">[63]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IX. 4, §2; + 9, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_64"></a><a href="#NtA_64">[64]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IX. 10, + §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_65"></a><a href="#NtA_65">[65]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX. + 1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_66"></a><a href="#NtA_66">[66]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IX. 3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_67"></a><a href="#NtA_67">[67]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. 3 and + 4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_68"></a><a href="#NtA_68">[68]</a> <i>De Rep.</i> I. §7. + <i>T.D.</i> V. §5, etc.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_69"></a><a href="#NtA_69">[69]</a> Cf. <i>N.D.</i> I. + §6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_70"></a><a href="#NtA_70">[70]</a> Esp. I. §§<a + href="#BkI_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkI_37">37</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_71"></a><a href="#NtA_71">[71]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_29">29</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_72"></a><a href="#NtA_72">[72]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_70">70</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_73"></a><a href="#NtA_73">[73]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. §1. + <i>Ac.</i> I. §<a href="#BkI_45">45</a>, etc.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_74"></a><a href="#NtA_74">[74]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_75"></a><a href="#NtA_75">[75]</a> Cf. esp. <i>N.D.</i> I. + §5. <i>T.D.</i> II. §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_76"></a><a href="#NtA_76">[76]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. §1. + <i>N.D.</i> I. §7, etc.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_77"></a><a href="#NtA_77">[77]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_78"></a><a href="#NtA_78">[78]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §10.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_79"></a><a href="#NtA_79">[79]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_8">8</a>. <i>N.D.</i> I. §§10, 66.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_80"></a><a href="#NtA_80">[80]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. §9.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_81"></a><a href="#NtA_81">[81]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §10.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_82"></a><a href="#NtA_82">[82]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. §17. + <i>Ac.</i> II. §§<a href="#BkII_120">120</a>, <a + href="#BkII_137">137</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_83"></a><a href="#NtA_83">[83]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. §33.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_84"></a><a href="#NtA_84">[84]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_121">121</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_85"></a><a href="#NtA_85">[85]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. §82, + <i>libas ex omnibus</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_86"></a><a href="#NtA_86">[86]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_143">143</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_87"></a><a href="#NtA_87">[87]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. §11.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_88"></a><a href="#NtA_88">[88]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_89"></a><a href="#NtA_89">[89]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §12.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_90"></a><a href="#NtA_90">[90]</a> <i>Parad.</i> §2. <i>De + Fato</i>, §3. <i>T.D.</i> I. §7. <i>De Off.</i> I. §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_91"></a><a href="#NtA_91">[91]</a> <i>D.F.</i> IV. §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_92"></a><a href="#NtA_92">[92]</a> <i>Paradoxa</i>, + §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_93"></a><a href="#NtA_93">[93]</a> <i>T.D.</i> I. §55. + <i>De Div.</i> II. §62.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_94"></a><a href="#NtA_94">[94]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. §11. + <i>D.F.</i> II. §§1 and 2, etc.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_95"></a><a href="#NtA_95">[95]</a> §<a + href="#BkI_13">13</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_96"></a><a href="#NtA_96">[96]</a> Cf. esp. <i>N.D.</i> i. + §6. <i>Ac.</i> ii. §§<a href="#BkII_11">11</a> and <a + href="#BkII_17">17</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_97"></a><a href="#NtA_97">[97]</a> <i>De Leg.</i> I. + §39.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_98"></a><a href="#NtA_98">[98]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. §§55, + 56.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_99"></a><a href="#NtA_99">[99]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_100"></a><a href="#NtA_100">[100]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV. + §53.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_101"></a><a href="#NtA_101">[101]</a> Cf. <i>De Off.</i> + III. §20.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_102"></a><a href="#NtA_102">[102]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. + §§21-31, esp. §23.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_103"></a><a href="#NtA_103">[103]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> V. + §75.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_104"></a><a href="#NtA_104">[104]</a> <i>De Off.</i> II. + §35.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_105"></a><a href="#NtA_105">[105]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. + §34.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_106"></a><a href="#NtA_106">[106]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. §<a + href="#BkI_16">16</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_107"></a><a href="#NtA_107">[107]</a> <i>Paradoxa</i>, §4. + <i>Ac.</i> II. §§<a href="#BkII_136">136</a>, <a + href="#BkII_137">137</a>. <i>T.D.</i> III. §10.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_108"></a><a href="#NtA_108">[108]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_135">135</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_109"></a><a href="#NtA_109">[109]</a> See esp. <i>N.D.</i> + I. §§3, 4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_110"></a><a href="#NtA_110">[110]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, also + <i>T.D.</i> V. §83.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_111"></a><a href="#NtA_111">[111]</a> Grote's + <i>Aristotle</i>, vol. I. ch. 11.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_112"></a><a href="#NtA_112">[112]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV. §9. + <i>D.F.</i> III. §41.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_113"></a><a href="#NtA_113">[113]</a> I. §<a + href="#BkI_6">6</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_114"></a><a href="#NtA_114">[114]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV. + §7.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_115"></a><a href="#NtA_115">[115]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> IV. §7. + Cf. <i>D.F.</i> II. §44, <i>populus cum illis facit</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_116"></a><a href="#NtA_116">[116]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. §<a + href="#BkI_6">6</a>. <i>T.D.</i> IV. 6, 7; II. §7; III. §33. <i>D.F.</i> + III. §40.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_117"></a><a href="#NtA_117">[117]</a> <i>T.D.</i> IV. + §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_118"></a><a href="#NtA_118">[118]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. + §§4-6. <i>Ac.</i> I. §<a href="#BkI_10">10</a>. <i>D.F.</i> III. §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_119"></a><a href="#NtA_119">[119]</a> <i>De Div.</i> I. + §§4, 5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_120"></a><a href="#NtA_120">[120]</a> <i>D.F.</i> III. §5. + <i>N.D.</i> I. §8. <i>T.D.</i> III. §§10, 16.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_121"></a><a href="#NtA_121">[121]</a> <i>T.D.</i> I. + §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_122"></a><a href="#NtA_122">[122]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. + §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_123"></a><a href="#NtA_123">[123]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. + §1. <i>De Off.</i> II. §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_124"></a><a href="#NtA_124">[124]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. + §6. <i>De Off.</i> II. §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_125"></a><a href="#NtA_125">[125]</a> See esp. <i>De + Consolatione</i>, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. <i>T.D.</i> V. §5. <i>Ac.</i> I. + §<a href="#BkI_11">11</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_126"></a><a href="#NtA_126">[126]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. + §6.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_127"></a><a href="#NtA_127">[127]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. §§1, + 4. <i>De Off.</i> II. §3. <i>D.F.</i> I. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_128"></a><a href="#NtA_128">[128]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. §1. + <i>D.F.</i> I. §§1, 3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_129"></a><a href="#NtA_129">[129]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. §§1, + 11.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_130"></a><a href="#NtA_130">[130]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. + §5. <i>De Off.</i> II. §2. <i>T.D.</i> IV. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_131"></a><a href="#NtA_131">[131]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. + §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_132"></a><a href="#NtA_132">[132]</a> <i>N.D.</i> I. §9. + <i>T.D.</i> II. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_133"></a><a href="#NtA_133">[133]</a> <i>De Div.</i> II. + §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_134"></a><a href="#NtA_134">[134]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XII. + 19, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_135"></a><a href="#NtA_135">[135]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 14, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_136"></a><a href="#NtA_136">[136]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 15, 16.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_137"></a><a href="#NtA_137">[137]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 21, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_138"></a><a href="#NtA_138">[138]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 23, §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_139"></a><a href="#NtA_139">[139]</a> <i>Ut scias me ita + dolere ut non iaceam.</i></p> + + <p><a name="Nt_140"></a><a href="#NtA_140">[140]</a> <i>De Or.</i> III. + §109.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_141"></a><a href="#NtA_141">[141]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XII. + 28, §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_142"></a><a href="#NtA_142">[142]</a> Cf. esp. <i>Ad + Att.</i> XII. 40, §2 with 38, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_143"></a><a href="#NtA_143">[143]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 40, §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_144"></a><a href="#NtA_144">[144]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 40, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_145"></a><a href="#NtA_145">[145]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 26.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_146"></a><a href="#NtA_146">[146]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 41, §1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_147"></a><a href="#NtA_147">[147]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XII. + 46.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_148"></a><a href="#NtA_148">[148]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XII. + 45, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_149"></a><a href="#NtA_149">[149]</a> <i>Über Cicero's + Akademika</i>, p. 4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_150"></a><a href="#NtA_150">[150]</a> Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> + XII. 12, §2, where there is a distinct mention of the first two + books.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_151"></a><a href="#NtA_151">[151]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 12, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_152"></a><a href="#NtA_152">[152]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 19, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_153"></a><a href="#NtA_153">[153]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 21, §§4, 5; 22, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_154"></a><a href="#NtA_154">[154]</a> II. §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_155"></a><a href="#NtA_155">[155]</a> <i>De Fin.</i> + Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_156"></a><a href="#NtA_156">[156]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 12, §3; 16, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_157"></a><a href="#NtA_157">[157]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XVI. 3, + §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_158"></a><a href="#NtA_158">[158]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XVI. 6, + §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_159"></a><a href="#NtA_159">[159]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_61">61</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_160"></a><a href="#NtA_160">[160]</a> <i>D.F.</i> I. + §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_161"></a><a href="#NtA_161">[161]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. §4. + <i>De Div.</i> II. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_162"></a><a href="#NtA_162">[162]</a> Cf. Krische, p. + 5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_163"></a><a href="#NtA_163">[163]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_61">61</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_164"></a><a href="#NtA_164">[164]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 5, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_165"></a><a href="#NtA_165">[165]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 32, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_166"></a><a href="#NtA_166">[166]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 33, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_167"></a><a href="#NtA_167">[167]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + II. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_168"></a><a href="#NtA_168">[168]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XII. + 42.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_169"></a><a href="#NtA_169">[169]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 16, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_170"></a><a href="#NtA_170">[170]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 12, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_171"></a><a href="#NtA_171">[171]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. IV. + 16a, §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_172"></a><a href="#NtA_172">[172]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 12, §3; also IV. 16a, §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_173"></a><a href="#NtA_173">[173]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 12, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_174"></a><a href="#NtA_174">[174]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 19, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_175"></a><a href="#NtA_175">[175]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 12, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_176"></a><a href="#NtA_176">[176]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 19, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_177"></a><a href="#NtA_177">[177]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 12, §3; 19, §4; 16, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_178"></a><a href="#NtA_178">[178]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. XIII. + 19, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_179"></a><a href="#NtA_179">[179]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 22, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_180"></a><a href="#NtA_180">[180]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 19, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_181"></a><a href="#NtA_181">[181]</a> Cf. <i>Ibid.</i> + XIII. 14, §3; 16, §2; 18; 19, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_182"></a><a href="#NtA_182">[182]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 19, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_183"></a><a href="#NtA_183">[183]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 25, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_184"></a><a href="#NtA_184">[184]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 24.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_185"></a><a href="#NtA_185">[185]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 13, §1; 18.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_186"></a><a href="#NtA_186">[186]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 13, §1; 18; 19, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_187"></a><a href="#NtA_187">[187]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 12, §3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates Schütz assigns to + these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition of the + <i>Academica</i> in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_188"></a><a href="#NtA_188">[188]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 13, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_189"></a><a href="#NtA_189">[189]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 19, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_190"></a><a href="#NtA_190">[190]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 19, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_191"></a><a href="#NtA_191">[191]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 25, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_192"></a><a href="#NtA_192">[192]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 25, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_193"></a><a href="#NtA_193">[193]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 21, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_194"></a><a href="#NtA_194">[194]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 21, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_195"></a><a href="#NtA_195">[195]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 22, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_196"></a><a href="#NtA_196">[196]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 24.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_197"></a><a href="#NtA_197">[197]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 35, 36, §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_198"></a><a href="#NtA_198">[198]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 38, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_199"></a><a href="#NtA_199">[199]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XIII. + 21, §§3, 4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_200"></a><a href="#NtA_200">[200]</a> <i>T.D.</i> II. §4. + Cf. Quintil. <i>Inst. Or.</i> III. 6, §64.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_201"></a><a href="#NtA_201">[201]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XVI. + 6, §4. <i>N.D.</i> I. §11. <i>De Div.</i> II. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_202"></a><a href="#NtA_202">[202]</a> <i>De Off.</i> II. + §8, <i>Timæus</i>, c. 1. <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. 13, §1; 19, §5.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_203"></a><a href="#NtA_203">[203]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 12; 16; 13; 19.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_204"></a><a href="#NtA_204">[204]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> XVI. 6, + §4. <i>T.D.</i> II. §4. <i>N.D.</i> I. §11. <i>De Div.</i> II. §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_205"></a><a href="#NtA_205">[205]</a> <i>Nat. Hist.</i> + XXXI. c. 2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_206"></a><a href="#NtA_206">[206]</a> <i>Inst. Or.</i> + III. 6, §64.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_207"></a><a href="#NtA_207">[207]</a> Plut. + <i>Lucullus</i>, c. 42.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_208"></a><a href="#NtA_208">[208]</a> §§<a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>, <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>, <a + href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_209"></a><a href="#NtA_209">[209]</a> Cf. <i>Att.</i> + XIII. 19, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_210"></a><a href="#NtA_210">[210]</a> <i>Lucullus</i>, + §12.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_211"></a><a href="#NtA_211">[211]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. + 16, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_212"></a><a href="#NtA_212">[212]</a> Lactant. + <i>Inst.</i> VI 2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_213"></a><a href="#NtA_213">[213]</a> Cf. esp. <i>De + Off.</i> I. §133 with <i>Brutus</i>, §§133, 134.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_214"></a><a href="#NtA_214">[214]</a> Esp. <i>Pro Lege + Manilia</i>, §51.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_215"></a><a href="#NtA_215">[215]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, + §222.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_216"></a><a href="#NtA_216">[216]</a> <i>In Verrem</i>, + II. 3, §210.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_217"></a><a href="#NtA_217">[217]</a> <i>Pro Lege + Manilia</i>, §59.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_218"></a><a href="#NtA_218">[218]</a> <i>Pro Sestio</i>, + §122.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_219"></a><a href="#NtA_219">[219]</a> <i>Pro Sestio</i>, + §101.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_220"></a><a href="#NtA_220">[220]</a> <i>Philipp.</i> II. + §12.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_221"></a><a href="#NtA_221">[221]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II. + 24, §4.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_222"></a><a href="#NtA_222">[222]</a> <i>Pis.</i> §6. + <i>Pro Sestio</i>, §121. <i>Pro Domo</i>, §113. <i>Post Reditum in + Senatu</i>, §9. <i>Philipp.</i> II. §12.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_223"></a><a href="#NtA_223">[223]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX. + 15, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_224"></a><a href="#NtA_224">[224]</a> Cf. <i>Post Reditum + in Senatu</i>, §9. <i>Pro Domo</i>, §113.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_225"></a><a href="#NtA_225">[225]</a> <i>Pro Archia</i>, + §§6, 28.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_226"></a><a href="#NtA_226">[226]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. + §<a href="#BkII_9">9</a> with §<a href="#BkII_80">80</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_227"></a><a href="#NtA_227">[227]</a> §<a + href="#BkII_62">62</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_228"></a><a href="#NtA_228">[228]</a> <i>Pro Plancio</i>, + §12. <i>Pro Murena</i>, §36. <i>Pro Rabirio</i>, §26. <i>Pro Cornelia</i> + II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_229"></a><a href="#NtA_229">[229]</a> <i>T.D.</i> V. §56. + Cf. <i>De Or.</i> III. §9. <i>N.D.</i> III. §80.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_230"></a><a href="#NtA_230">[230]</a> Cf. esp. III. + §173.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_231"></a><a href="#NtA_231">[231]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. + §28.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_232"></a><a href="#NtA_232">[232]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. + §§13, 20, 21.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_233"></a><a href="#NtA_233">[233]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. + §51.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_234"></a><a href="#NtA_234">[234]</a> Cf. <i>ibid.</i> II. + §74 with III. §127.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_235"></a><a href="#NtA_235">[235]</a> Cf. II. §152 with + III. §187.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_236"></a><a href="#NtA_236">[236]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. + §154.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_237"></a><a href="#NtA_237">[237]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, + §§132, 133, 134, 259. <i>De Or.</i> III. §29.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_238"></a><a href="#NtA_238">[238]</a> <i>Brutus</i>, + §132.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_239"></a><a href="#NtA_239">[239]</a> <i>De Or.</i> II. + §244. <i>N.D.</i> I. §79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_240"></a><a href="#NtA_240">[240]</a> <i>De Or.</i> II. + §155.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_241"></a><a href="#NtA_241">[241]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> III. + §194.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_242"></a><a href="#NtA_242">[242]</a> Cf. <i>De Or.</i> + II. §68 with III. §§182, 187.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_243"></a><a href="#NtA_243">[243]</a> <i>De Or.</i> I. §82 + sq.; II. §360.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_244"></a><a href="#NtA_244">[244]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> I. §45; + II. §365; III. §§68, 75.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_245"></a><a href="#NtA_245">[245]</a> §<a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>, <i>commemoravit a patre suo dicta + Philoni</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_246"></a><a href="#NtA_246">[246]</a> Cf. <i>De Or.</i> + III. §110.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_247"></a><a href="#NtA_247">[247]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_248"></a><a href="#NtA_248">[248]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. + §<a href="#BkII_11">11</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_249"></a><a href="#NtA_249">[249]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p> + + <p><a name="Nt_250"></a><a href="#NtA_250">[250]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> §§<a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>, <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>, with my notes.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_251"></a><a href="#NtA_251">[251]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>: <i>ista quae heri defensa sunt</i> compared with + the words <i>ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_252"></a><a href="#NtA_252">[252]</a> See below.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_253"></a><a href="#NtA_253">[253]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §§<a + href="#BkII_33">33</a>—<a href="#BkII_36">36</a> inclusive; §<a + href="#BkII_54">54</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_254"></a><a href="#NtA_254">[254]</a> <i>Ac.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_28">28</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_255"></a><a href="#NtA_255">[255]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. + §§<a href="#BkII_59">59</a>, <a href="#BkII_67">67</a>, <a + href="#BkII_78">78</a>, <a href="#BkII_112">112</a>, <a + href="#BkII_148">148</a>, with my notes.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_256"></a><a href="#NtA_256">[256]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_257"></a><a href="#NtA_257">[257]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_28">28</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_258"></a><a href="#NtA_258">[258]</a> Cf. II. §<a + href="#BkII_61">61</a> with the fragments of the <i>Hortensius</i>; also + <i>T.D.</i> II. §4; III. §6; <i>D.F.</i> I. §2.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_259"></a><a href="#NtA_259">[259]</a> Lactant. III. + 16.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_260"></a><a href="#NtA_260">[260]</a> Cf. <i>Ac.</i> II. + §<a href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_261"></a><a href="#NtA_261">[261]</a> <i>Ib.</i> II. §<a + href="#BkII_61">61</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_262"></a><a href="#NtA_262">[262]</a> §§<a + href="#BkI_44">44</a>—<a href="#BkI_46">46</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_263"></a><a href="#NtA_263">[263]</a> §<a + href="#BkII_13">13</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_264"></a><a href="#NtA_264">[264]</a> Cf. II. §<a + href="#BkII_14">14</a> with I. §<a href="#BkI_44">44</a>, and II. §§<a + href="#BkII_55">55</a>, <a href="#BkII_56">56</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_265"></a><a href="#NtA_265">[265]</a> II. §§<a + href="#BkII_17">17</a>, <a href="#BkII_18">18</a>, <a + href="#BkII_22">22</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_266"></a><a href="#NtA_266">[266]</a> Cf. II. §<a + href="#BkII_31">31</a> with I. §<a href="#BkI_45">45</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_267"></a><a href="#NtA_267">[267]</a> II. §§<a + href="#BkII_17">17</a>, <a href="#BkII_24">24</a>, <a + href="#BkII_26">26</a>, <a href="#BkII_27">27</a>, <a + href="#BkII_29">29</a>, <a href="#BkII_38">38</a>, <a + href="#BkII_54">54</a>, <a href="#BkII_59">59</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_268"></a><a href="#NtA_268">[268]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_79">79</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_269"></a><a href="#NtA_269">[269]</a> Cf. the words <i>tam + multa</i> in II. §<a href="#BkII_79">79</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_270"></a><a href="#NtA_270">[270]</a> See II. §<a + href="#BkII_42">42</a>, where there is a reference to the "<i>hesternus + sermo</i>."</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_271"></a><a href="#NtA_271">[271]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_10">10</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_272"></a><a href="#NtA_272">[272]</a> Cf. II. §<a + href="#BkII_10">10</a>: <i>id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut + tota fere quaestio tractata videatur</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_273"></a><a href="#NtA_273">[273]</a> What these were will + appear from my notes on the <i>Lucullus</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_274"></a><a href="#NtA_274">[274]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_12">12</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_275"></a><a href="#NtA_275">[275]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX. + 8.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_276"></a><a href="#NtA_276">[276]</a> Cf. <i>Ad Att.</i> + XIII. 25, §3: <i>Ad Brutum transeamus</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_277"></a><a href="#NtA_277">[277]</a> This is not, as + Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy after Hortensius' death. + That lay at Puteoli: see <i>Ad Att.</i> VII. 3, §9.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_278"></a><a href="#NtA_278">[278]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_9">9</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_279"></a><a href="#NtA_279">[279]</a> Cf. II. §6<a + href="#BkII_1">1</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_280"></a><a href="#NtA_280">[280]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_80">80</a>: <i>O praeclarum prospectum</i>!</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_281"></a><a href="#NtA_281">[281]</a> Cf. II. §<a + href="#BkII_9">9</a> with §<a href="#BkII_128">128</a> (<i>signum + illud</i>), also §§<a href="#BkII_80">80</a>, <a href="#BkII_81">81</a>, + <a href="#BkII_100">100</a>, <a href="#BkII_105">105</a>, <a + href="#BkII_125">125</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_282"></a><a href="#NtA_282">[282]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_115">115</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_283"></a><a href="#NtA_283">[283]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_63">63</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_284"></a><a href="#NtA_284">[284]</a> II. §§<a + href="#BkII_147">147</a>, <a href="#BkII_148">148</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_285"></a><a href="#NtA_285">[285]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_135">135</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_286"></a><a href="#NtA_286">[286]</a> Cf. II. §§<a + href="#BkII_11">11</a>, 12 with the words <i>quae erant contra</i> <span + lang="el" title="akatalêpsian" + >ακαταληψιαν</span> + <i>praeclare collecta ab Antiocho</i>: <i>Ad Att.</i> XIII. 19, §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_287"></a><a href="#NtA_287">[287]</a> Varro, <i>De Re + Rust.</i> III. 17.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_288"></a><a href="#NtA_288">[288]</a> II. §<a + href="#BkII_11">11</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_289"></a><a href="#NtA_289">[289]</a> <i>Paradoxa</i>, §1. + <i>D.F.</i> III. §8. <i>Brutus</i>, §119.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_290"></a><a href="#NtA_290">[290]</a> <i>Ac.</i> I. §<a + href="#BkI_12">12</a>. <i>D.F.</i> V. §8.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_291"></a><a href="#NtA_291">[291]</a> Cf. II. §<a + href="#BkII_80">80</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_292"></a><a href="#NtA_292">[292]</a> Cf. Aug. <i>Adv. + Acad.</i> III. §35. Nonius, sub v. <i>exultare</i>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_293"></a><a href="#NtA_293">[293]</a> Cf. the word + <i>nuper</i> in §<a href="#BkI_1">1</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_294"></a><a href="#NtA_294">[294]</a> §<a + href="#BkI_11">11</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_295"></a><a href="#NtA_295">[295]</a> §§<a + href="#BkI_3">3</a>, <a href="#BkI_18">18</a>.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_296"></a><a href="#NtA_296">[296]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX. + 8, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_297"></a><a href="#NtA_297">[297]</a> <i>Ad Att.</i> II. + 25, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_298"></a><a href="#NtA_298">[298]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. III. 8, + §3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_299"></a><a href="#NtA_299">[299]</a> <i>Ibid</i>. III. + 15, §3; 18, §1.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_300"></a><a href="#NtA_300">[300]</a> <i>Ad Fam.</i> IX. + 1—8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro preserved in + our collections.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_301"></a><a href="#NtA_301">[301]</a> Above, pp. + xxxvii—xlii.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_302"></a><a href="#NtA_302">[302]</a> <i>De Civ. Dei</i>, + XIX. cc. 1—3.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_303"></a><a href="#NtA_303">[303]</a> See Madvig, <i>De + Fin.</i> ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50. Brückner, <i>Leben des + Cicero</i>, I. p. 655, follows Müller.</p> + + <p><a name="Nt_304"></a><a href="#NtA_304">[304]</a> Cf. Krische, p. + 58.</p> + +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Academica, by Marcus Tullius Cicero + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA *** + +***** This file should be named 14970-h.htm or 14970-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/4/9/7/14970/ + +Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed +Proofreading Team + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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